

POLITICS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC REBELLION:  
THE ESCALATION OF ETHNIC TENSIONS FROM 1946 TO 2005

BY

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ROBERT P HUGHES

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Chairperson Elif Andac

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ChangHwan Kim

---

Robert Antonio

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Mehrangiz Najafizadeh

---

Paul Johnson

Date Defended: April 18, 2014

The Dissertation Committee for Robert P Hughes  
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

**POLITICS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC REBELLION:  
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Chairperson Elif Andac

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## ABSTRACT

Qualitative theories of ethnic violence and rebellion have traditionally argued the importance of broad long-term processes that escalate ethnic tensions. Alternatively, quantitative scholarship has focused more narrowly on the question of onset. In this dissertation, I break with this tradition and quantitatively examine the structural factors associated with the escalation of ethnic tensions, including, but not limited to, the onset of ethnic rebellion. I build upon and refine elements of a power and legitimacy school of scholarship to shed light on three critical points of escalation in ethno-political power relations. First, the politicization of ethnic boundaries is more likely in states with limited resources and lower levels of ethnic diversity or abundant resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity. Second, in those states where ethnic boundaries have already been politicized, state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is more likely when resources are scarce and ethnic diversity is higher or resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is lower. Third, in those states where state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is practiced, ethnic rebellion is more likely when the size of the excluded population increases but the ethnic diversity of the excluded population remains lower. Importantly, even when the excluded population is very large, ethnic rebellions become less likely as the ethnic diversity of the excluded population increases. I test these hypotheses using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset, which includes the world's independent states from 1946 through 2005. Aside from the substantive contributions regarding the escalation of ethnic tensions, as a whole, the dissertation argues for, and demonstrates, the importance of quantitatively engaging with the entirety of qualitative theoretical perspectives, rather than just limiting quantitative inquiry to the onset of ethnic violence.

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## **Acronyms**

AEC	Armed Ethnic Conflict Dataset
DBC	Diversity Breeds Conflict School
EPR	Ethnic Power Relations Dataset
GAO	Greed and Opportunity School
MM	Minority Mobilization School
PAL	Power and Legitimacy School

## **Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Overview**

Throughout modern history, the idea of popular sovereignty and the right of national self-determination linked the “nation” to the state and defined the *demos* in terms of the nation itself. The modern political era, forged in the trenches of World War I, and tempered in the fires of World War II, ended the age of empire and institutionalized the nation-state system on a global scale. Within the United Nations, safeguards were established to limit large scale conventional warfare and emphasize the central importance of human rights, the dignity of the individual person, and equal rights of all “nations” large and small. Consequently, since 1945, popular sovereignty and the right of self-determination for “we, the people,” has been the singularly largest source of political legitimacy for the modern state. Moreover, the wide acceptance of popular sovereignty and self-determination within the world polity has made wars motivated by territorial expansionism all but a relic of an increasingly distant past. The nation-state form is global. There are no more territorial empires which can disintegrate on a globe full of internationally recognized states.

Notwithstanding the reduction in the scale of interstate violence, ethnic rebellion and civil war have become the primary forms of organized violence in the modern political era. Over the past century ethno-nationalist wars have been an increasing portion of the world’s violent conflicts. Where ethno-nationalist violence accounted for only 20 percent of the wars fought between the Congress of Vienna (1814) and the Treaty of Versailles (1919), between 1919 and 2001, ethnonationalist wars made up 45 percent of total wars fought. Between the end of the Cold War and 2005 that figure increased

still, to 75 percent (Wimmer et al. 2009). As events in Syria and Sudan remind us (to name but two recent examples), the toll of human suffering is both tragic and alarming.

The trend in ethno-nationalist violence has not gone unnoticed by the social scientific community. The last three decades have witnessed a surge in research on ethnic conflict and violence. While our collective understanding has improved substantially, the sheer scope, complexity, and weight of the subject matter has left the field substantially fragmented (See Wimmer 2013b for an excellent book length review). Moreover, there is hardly consensus among social scientists on the underlying dynamics and determinants of ethnic violence. For example, one leading school of thought--the “greed-and-opportunity school”--largely rejects the ‘ethnic’ facet of the term ‘ethnic violence’ altogether, viewing the concept as a mere descriptor by rebels and academics without real explanatory power (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Laitin 2007). Growing research from a power and legitimacy school, on the other hand, convincingly argues that (1) a prerequisite of ethnic conflict is the politicization of ethnicity; and (2) ethnic exclusion from state power is directly related to ethnic rebellion (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2004; Wimmer 2013b). In brief, despite the wide variety of studies on ethnic conflict and violence, there remains basic disagreement over the role that ethnicity plays in the onset of ethnic violence itself. While social scientific debate often resolves around competing explanations for a given phenomenon, it is perhaps rare for so much ink to be spilled on the very *existence* of the phenomenon in question. Hence, even as the importance of understanding the dynamics of ethnic conflict has grown, the body of research on ethnic violence and civil war has also grown increasingly fragmented.

How can we better understand the processes that lead to ethnic rebellions? How might we incorporate the insights from such diverse and fragmented perspectives to grasp the foundations of ethnic rebellion and civil war? Building upon and expanding Wimmer's power and legitimacy approach, I diverge from a narrow focus on the *onset* of ethnic rebellions that typifies the quantitative conflict literature, to pursue an empirical analysis of the institutional thresholds that solidify political boundaries along ethnic lines. The recent wave of quantitative research on ethnic violence and civil war relies on a host of theoretical assumptions drawn from a body of case-based qualitative research. For example, it is readily acknowledged that ridged ethno-political cleavages do not simply materialize but rather result from processes and actions that escalate tensions between ethnic groups and the state. But many quantitative studies treat these processes as a mere backdrop to conditions focusing solely the onset of ethnic violence. If real progress is going to be made in understanding (if not averting) ethnic conflict and civil war, it will be by better understanding the institutional factors that escalate ethnic tensions. In this way, de-escalation might occur prior to a point where categories of peoples find it necessary to pick up arms. To be sure, the scope of most case based and comparative work regarding ethnic rebellion at least implicitly addresses these foundational elements. Yet if the quantitative wing of social science is to make its fullest contribution, it should work in concert with qualitative research to examine such factors as the politicization of ethnicity and ethnically based exclusion as important outcomes to be explained. Simply put, examining the onset of ethnic violence and civil war should be considered the beginning of inquiry, not the end.

Expanding the scope of inquiry has a fundamental influence on case selection, which is important for two reasons. First, it leads to misleading parameter estimates. Wimmer et al. (2009) demonstrate this clearly by noting that only in states where ethnicity has been politicized is ethnic violence possible. In turn, ethnic rebellions, nearly by definition, are instigated by those outside of power and thus only possible where some form of ethnic exclusion exists. This insight motivates the first two of three questions addressed in this dissertation: (1) Which institutional factors promote the politicization of ethnicity? and (2) Which institutional factors promote the escalation of ethnic politics into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in states where ethnicity is politicized? While Wimmer et al. (2009) note that improper case selection biases parameter estimates and results, the issue is actually more problematic than they acknowledge. Indeed, a second way improper case selection distorts research is by obscuring the actual substantive meaning of model results.

Let me illustrate by briefly anticipating a single result. The greed-and-opportunity school (GAO) argues that rebellions are most probable where states are weak and insurgents have ample terrain within which to avoid capture by the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As evidence, Fearon and Laitin note that percentage of mountainous terrain is a significant predictor in their model of civil war, while their measure of ethnic diversity is not. Their dataset, however, combines both ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars, which is troubling. As the authors do not account for the processes that are theoretically linked to ethnic exclusion, their interpretation of the actual coefficient is problematic. Their theory only links mountainous terrain to the onset of civil war through the enabling mechanism, so it should *not* be a significant predictor of

ethnic exclusion. Yet, as shown in the results I present in chapter 3, mountainous terrain is a structural factor positively linked to the probability of ethnic exclusion but shows no relationship to the onset of ethnic rebellion in results provided in chapter 4. Since the Fearon and Laitin study does not account for ethnic exclusion, the mountainous terrain measure may actually be indicating an exclusion effect. In this regard, my result is more consistent with the difficulty states with large amounts of rough terrain have in providing equal access to public services than it is evidence supporting Fearon and Laitin's opportunity theory. The example illustrates the necessity of expanding beyond a narrow focus on the onset of ethnic rebellion and civil war and placing such research, both methodologically and theoretically, within the broader processes and mechanisms of escalation.

Within this dissertation I analyze configurations of institutional and structural factors connected to the escalation of ethnic tensions, including ethnic rebellion. Firmly situated within the power and legitimacy approach, I take the perspective that ethnic violence is the culmination of broader long term processes which involve culturally marked ethnic categories, increase their salience through politicization, and institutionalize these now politicized boundaries of social closure through state sanctioned exclusion. As will be seen, these processes emerge as fundamental dynamics of state building and solidification (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b). From this standpoint, ethnic rebellion is seen as a result of a series of institutional escalations that have locked embattled states into turning the deadly machines of modern warfare on their own populations.

In chapter 2, I use data from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009) to test a set of theoretical expectations regarding the politicization of ethnicity. In chapter 3, I take those states where ethnicity has been politicized, and examine a set of hypotheses regarding the institutional and structural conditions conducive to state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. In chapter 4, I further restrict the sample to those states that have excluded at least one ethnic category of people from state access, and test a series of hypotheses concerning the onset of ethnic rebellion. Over the course of chapters 2, 3 and 4 I systematically expand upon and refine Wimmer's (2002) theory of national exclusion and ethnic violence, which provides the foundation for the power and legitimacy approach. Finally, in chapter 5, I discuss the substantive implications of my findings as well as a vision of social research that embraces a dialogue across the methodological divide.

Although the forgoing series of analyses are fundamentally aligned with Wimmer's power and legitimacy school, I also examine explanatory factors from two other relatively distinct schools to empirically assess a number of alternative explanatory factors for the politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion, and ethnic rebellion. First, the actual onset of violence has been linked to availability of resources and terrain that enable rebel movements to operate and survive. This GAO School holds that the onset of any form of anti-state violence is fundamentally related to opportunity structures and incentives, such as weak governments (Fearon and Laitin 2004), insurgent friendly terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007), and lootable resources, such as oil (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Alternatively, a second, "diversity-breeds-conflict" school (DBC) argues that ethnic tension and violence result from the

intersection of ethnic diversity and the functional necessities of modernization (Gellner 2006), unequal modernization (Horowitz 1985), or decreased organizational costs achieved by utilizing ethnic ties (Sambanis 2001). While the GAO School downplays the role of ethnicity, within the DBC School the role of ethnicity varies substantially. In addition to the power and legitimacy school, the analysis I present here applies insights and empirically tests hypotheses derived from each of these competing schools. My aim is to clarify where in the processes of ethnic tension escalation mechanisms suggested by each of these schools plays a role, and where the empirical evidence does or does not substantiate their predictions. My dissertation thus presents one of the most systematic and comprehensive quantitative analyses of ethnic rebellion to date.

Let me take a moment to provide an introductory summary of my results. Contrary to the direct link to ethnic violence proposed by the DBC School, my findings show that ethnic diversity plays its biggest role in the escalation of ethnic tensions through its interaction with the resources available to elites. The central finding of chapter 2 is that the influence of ethnic diversity on the probability that ethnicity will be politicized is not constant. Rather, I find evidence that when elites have an abundance of resources to distribute, increased ethnic diversity increases the probability of ethnicity's politicization. However, when resources are limited, higher levels of ethnic diversity actually lower the probability of ethnicity's politicization. These findings represent an important contribution to our understanding of ethnic rebellion in three ways. First, contrary to assumptions made by Wimmer's resource availability theory and the DBC school, increased ethnic diversity does not necessarily result in higher potential for ethnicity's politicization. Wimmer (2002) has argued that where resources are scarce

elites tend to restrict access to the state along ethnic lines because they lack sufficient resources to distribute to the entire population. Yet, as Tilly (1999) and Wimmer (2013a) both argue, political cleavages mobilize populations on both sides of the divide. Thus when resources are scarce but ethnic diversity is high, states tend to pursue the politicization of ethnicity only as a last resort due to concerns of state fragmentation and increased repression costs. Second, these results expand and refine Wimmer's (2002) theory in a manner consistent with expectations from his micro work on ethno-political boundary formation (Wimmer 2013a). Finally, economic hardship has been one of the few common explanatory factors supported in the literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Yet my findings show that its contribution to the onset of ethnic civil war is far more profound as it is an important element in the processes that politicize ethnicity and thus lay the foundation for ethnic exclusion and rebellion.

The analysis of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion shown in chapter 3 demonstrates a similar pattern. Once again the relationship between ethnic diversity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is shown to be contingent upon levels of resources available to elites. Contrary to the totally inclusive nationalism proposed in Wimmer's (2002) theory of ethnic exclusion, states with abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity are found almost universally to exclude some portion of their population along ethnic lines. However, states with abundant resources and high ethnic diversity are shown to be substantially less likely to exclude along ethnic lines, as ruling elites have resources and incentives to create a multiethnic state. For states where resources are limited an alternative pattern holds which supports my further revision of Wimmer's (2002) theory. States with high ethnic diversity and limited resources tend to pursue divide and rule

strategies since the ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population lowers the repression costs associated with exclusion. On the other hand, the benefits to elites of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in states with limited resources and limited ethnic diversity is substantially reduced as exclusion may create a relatively homogenous population which could compete for the state. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that mountainous terrain is the result of geopolitical and uneven-development factors suggested by Horowitz (1985), rather than the opportunity mechanisms argued for by Fearon and Laitin (2003). My extension and refinement of Wimmer's power-and-legitimacy based theory is thus empirically supported while also raising questions about the interpretation of previous results from the GAO School. Additionally, where a refinement of Wimmer's theoretical approach is empirically supported, no such revisions to the DBC expectations are supported. The ethnic diversity of the state is clearly central in explaining state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, but not in the manner expected by proponents of the DBC approach. In this regard the emphasis on ethnic power relations proposed by Wimmer's power and legitimacy school is far more compelling and empirically supported.

In chapter 4, I further examine support for and the efficacy of divide and rule strategies. Once again, although the spirit of the power and legitimacy school receives empirical support, the mechanisms regarding ethnic rebellions outlined in Wimmer et al. (2009) require some refinements. The Wimmer et al. (2009) argument holds that as the proportion of the population that is excluded increases, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion increases as well. My analysis shows that this relationship only holds in states where the number of excluded ethnic groups is low. When the proportion of the excluded

population is high but the excluded population is also divided between large numbers of excluded ethnic groups, the risks of ethnic rebellion actually decrease substantially. Increased ethno-political fragmentation amongst a large excluded population actually lessens the probability of an onset of ethnic rebellion. These findings lend further evidence to the efficacy of divide and rule strategies by ruling elites. In a world where modern states have penetrated their societies deeper than at any point in history, the human cost of ethno-nationalist exclusion and violence results in limitations on careers, marriage, and state sponsored discrimination. Yet rebellion may still not occur. Wimmer (2002) refers to the ethnicization of the bureaucracy as the “race for the state.” These findings suggest that once the public goods of the state have been appropriated for one ethnic group, when there are multiple excluded ethnic categories and the excluded population is large, the organization of politics along ethnic lines tends to inhibit multi-ethnic alliances due to tensions and mistrust among excluded peoples themselves.

Collectively, my results suggest that the politicization of ethnicity, exclusion along ethnic lines, and ethnic rebellion should be considered as critical institutional points of ethnic-tension escalation, upon which the factors commonly linked solely to the onset of ethnic rebellion suggest a variety of theoretically interesting relationships. By identifying which factors relate to which points of escalation, this dissertation demonstrates the value of heeding Brubaker’s (1996; 2004; 2006) call for an examination of how ethnicity becomes an actual practical category. Moreover, it provides further insight into how macro-institutional forces escalate those practical categories into the institutionalized categorical points of ethnic exclusion that lead to civil war. As such, this study expands upon insights developed by Tilly (1996; 1999; 2005; 2007) regarding the

nature of what he describes as durable and categorical inequality. Reconceptualizing the politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion as points of institutional escalation and boundary hardening at a mid-range theoretical level expands the explanatory power of the power and legitimacy school in a manner directly useful from a policy perspective. Furthermore, expanding the quantitative empirical analysis of ethnic rebellion to include the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion also helps explain the fragmentation in the academic literature on this issue. Simply put, the literature often fails to account either theoretically or methodologically for the broader processes that create the proverbial “powder keg” at the center of most ethnic rebellion metaphors. Overall this project helps to clarify our understanding of ethnic rebellions through a sustained focus on the structural factors that are conducive not only to the onset of ethnic violence but to the emergence and solidification of their underlying ethnic tensions.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter I provide an overview of the ethnic conflict literature, and then present the central theoretical framework that treats the politicization of ethnicity, ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion as points of institutional escalation on the spectrum of ethnic tensions. I then briefly explicate the specific factors and hypotheses examined in greater detail in chapters 2, 3, and 4.

### ***The State of the Field in Ethnic Violence, Rebellion, and Civil War***

In an effort to understand the surge in ethnic conflict that has marked world political affairs since 1919, three competing schools of thought have emerged within the academic literature. Somewhat ironically, the most prominent perspective on ethnic conflict and civil war within the quantitative literature maintains that ethnicity holds little explanatory power. Aptly described as the greed and opportunity school, they argue

ethnic conflict is relatively rare. Primarily in response to arguments emerging from the DBC School, they argue that since ethnic grievances are nearly ubiquitous across the globe, they cannot possibly explain the relatively rare occurrences of civil war across the world (Laitin 2007). Instead, they argue that ethnic actors on both sides of a potential divide usually work to avoid the potential risks of an escalating cycle of violence through in-group policing (Fearon and Laitin 1996). In those moments where these mechanisms fail, Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasize a specific set of opportunity structures that make the escalation of tensions more feasible. Specifically, they highlight the role of weak governments, mountainous terrain, limited economic development, and lootable resources as the *primary* motors of civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007). As Table 1 indicates, they highlight the opportunity structures that allow economic grievances to become militant and violent, but see their ethnicization as an unfortunate rhetorical descriptor used by both scholars and activists themselves.

Although, consistent with Brubaker's (2006) findings concerning the politicisation of ethnicity at the local level, scholarship emerging from the GAO School does not actively address the role that the state plays in either fomenting or mitigating ethnic violence. Moreover, the narrow focus on the immediate predictors of conflict itself results in a failure to account for the structural conditions of a state that make conflict and violence a moral and cognitively acceptable possibility. Lootable resources and terrain that benefits rebels only promotes conflict when there are grievances of some kind inciting a need to rebel. Thus, while the GAO School does an admirable job highlighting structural factors that lower the threshold of tensions necessary for an outbreak of violence, the perspective does a rather poor job explaining why violence

should occur in the first place. Although these twin elements of onset can be separated analytically, they are nevertheless intimately connected in both practice and theory. Their models should convey this.

**Table 1.1**  
**Schools of Thought on the Causes of Ethnic Conflict**

School of Thought	Central Focus	Role of Ethnicity and Ethno-Nationalism	Mechanism of Effect	Historically Situates Ethnicity
Greed and Opportunity	Weak Governments, Mountainous Terrain, Low Economic Development, Lootable Resources	Descriptive	---	No
Diversity Breeds Conflict	Uneven Economic Development, Ethnic Diversity	Causal	Resource Competition, Relative Deprivation, and Reduced Mobilization Costs	No
Legitimacy and Power	Low Economic Development, Lack of Civil Society	Causal	Power Relations between Ethnic Groups and the State	Yes

Standing apart from the GAO School is the diversity breeds conflict school, which offers multiple lines of argument focusing on the central role that ethnicity plays in ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, each line of argument tends to treat the institutions of the modern state in a quite limited fashion. Perhaps the most well known functionalist line of argument has been offered by Ernest Gellner (2006), who maintains that economic modernity requires a certain level of cultural homogenization, which the nation-state framework has excelled at providing. This version of the DBC perspective maintains that conflict develops as a result of ethnic groups grating against the imposition of nationalistic ideologies aimed at creating a common pool of labor for industrialization. A

second perspective, championed by Horowitz (1985), sees ethnic conflict as the result of the unequal distribution of modernity's economic goods (See Esser 1988, cited in Wimmer 2002, as the original article is in German). Gurr and Harff (1994) continue in this vein and emphasize the interplay of communal economic grievances that result in relative deprivation and the various opportunity structures provided by different regime types. Finally, Sambanis (2001) argues that states which are more ethnically divided are at a higher risk of ethnic conflict specifically because ethnicity reduces the cost of organizing a rebellion. Within this vein of research, Elkins and Sides (2007) have also found that ethnic minorities have less attachment to the state than majorities, implying that not only does ethnic diversity decrease organizational costs but also lowers constraints preventing the state from being considered an acceptable target. Yet in all three versions of the DBC perspective modernization is seen as forcing the integration of peoples and breaking down smaller forms of self-segregation. During this process, states are argued to work hard to create a national consciousness that overcomes these divisions through institutions such as mass public education and other social services (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Whether it is the nationalist threat to minority culture, the unequal spread of the fruits of modernity, or these threats in conjunction with reduced mobilization costs, the DBC School places much more emphasis on the motivations of ethnic violence than on its plausibility in terms of opportunity—thus standing in stark opposition to the GAO School of thought.

There are, however, at least three weaknesses with the DBC School relevant to this project. First, the perspective fails to explain why ethnic divisions are triggered by modernization processes and not others. In response to this criticism, DBC scholars have

argued that the rise of the nation-state system has occurred, at least in part, because of the innate importance of ethnic ties in their primordial fight for self determination (Smith 1987; Smith 1995; Smith 2003). However, such an argument cannot be reconciled with research showing that ethnicity has not historically been the primary trigger of violence in human history. Rather, it has been the multiethnic empire that has been the dominant form of social organization for most of recorded human history (Hobsbawm 1992; Motyl 2001). Second, the perspective ultimately reduces ethnic conflict to a byproduct of “the” economic modernization process. Gellner’s argument paints modernization as a much more homogeneous process than the extant evidence suggests, while Horowitz’s position essentially maintains that only when the fruits of modernity spread to the whole of a state’s population can ethnic, as well as other divisions, be overcome. Economic concerns are certainly a factor but these approaches do not elaborate fully on the role of state sanctioned exclusion and other state driven factors. Where one can face everything from limitations on careers and marriage choices, to state sponsored discrimination and extermination, access to the state is everything. The DBC school correctly highlights that conflict is not the product of everyday interactions between individuals but rather the result of organized ethnic groups challenging the state (Cederman and Girardin 2007) (see also, Brubaker 2006). Unfortunately, focusing on those institutions, such as universal education and other inclusive institutions of the state, the perspective overlooks the fact that states often implement the very exclusionary practices that lead to ethnic rebellion. Scholarship from the DBC school thus tends to take the role of ethnic economic grievances in fomenting conflict as a given, *a priori*, just as the GAO School overwhelmingly treats the state as an ethnically neutral actor.

### ***The Power and Legitimacy School: The State, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict***

In opposition to both the GAO and DBC schools, the power and legitimacy school draws upon a broader theoretical tradition regarding the rise and spread of the nation-state. It builds on Breuilly's (1993) account linking nationalism and nation-state formation to the rise of political modernity, as well as insights highlighted by a number of macro comparative-historical realists (specifically, Mann 1993; Moore 1993 [1963]; Tilly 1992). Wimmer's (2002) historical institutionalist approach holds that the nation-state is itself a form of *social closure* based on ethno-national principles that define the “national we” and the “alien other.” In brief, the initial rise of the nation-state is seen as the result of two parallel processes. The first is suggested by Tilly's (1992) capital and coercion argument that gave the nation-state a competitive advantage in the international arena. The second is the simultaneous development of a new foundation for the legitimacy of rule, or what Wimmer (2002) refers to as the *nationalist cultural compromise*. Drawing on a line of scholarship stretching back to Bendix (1978), Wimmer situates his central concept of *nationalist cultural compromise* within an international nation-state system originally based on ethno-nationalist principles. The ideal typical example of a *successful nationalist cultural compromise* is the Western European state. In these cases, the ruling elite have exchanged all the rights associated with political modernity (equality before the law, democracy, and citizenship) for the power to tax, raise armies, and otherwise substantially regulate the everyday lives of their citizens. When successful, the benefits of political modernity have been extended to nearly (if not) all of the state’s permanent population, thereby distinguishing a territory’s permanent residents from its

“aliens” that permanently reside outside of the state territory. The national “we, the people” are largely coterminous with a state’s permanent residents and are thus in keeping with the principles of self-determination and its corollary, state sovereignty. Wimmer thus supplements Tilly’s (1992) argument about why the nation-state form was superior to other state models with an analysis that outlines why the domestic populations in the initial wave of nation states supported their development.

For Wimmer, the success of the *nationalist cultural compromise* is central to explaining ethnic violence because when successful it removes the threat of ethnic exclusion from the state and therefore the prospects of ethnic rebellion. But the *nationalist cultural compromise* is not always successful. As the major empires fell, they were broken up into states within a world increasingly populated by the nation-state form (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). The deceptively neat lines on the global map followed old imperial legacies and interests of the major world powers (Hobsbawm 1992) and still serve to reify national distinctions that are hardly realities on the ground (Calhoun 1997). In many cases, statehood was bequeathed to the colonies of imperial powers, with little thought to the ethnic makeup of these regions. Whereas in the early Western nation-states nationalism and the modern state had grown up together (Greenfeld 1992), newly formed states in the post-WWII era have rarely had readymade nations to transform into a titular nationality (a major exception was the breakup of the Soviet Union). Thus, in many cases, these new political entities were states without “nations,” within a community of nation states. When the *nationalist cultural compromise* fails, the field has documented two alternative paths: the politicization of ethnicity, also known as the

ethnicization of the bureaucracy, and populist nationalism (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).

When the nationalist cultural compromise fails, efforts at state formation, building and solidification do not cease but are argued to take an alternative trajectory which Wimmer (2002) describes as the “ethnicization of the bureaucracy.” In his view, the ethnicization of the bureaucracy occurs for two principle reasons. First, when states lack enough resources to distribute public goods to the whole of its population, those in control of the state tend to favor one ethnic group over another. Second, even when the state has enough resources, if civil society is weak and interest group politics have not developed, ruling elites can use ethnic solidarity as a framework for amassing political support through the development of clientlist networks of patronage. In both cases ruling elites tend draw on ethnic divisions reinforced by the international system or colonial past. When the state bureaucracy is ethnicized the benefits of the state (i.e., public goods) are not made available to the entire permanent population. Instead, public goods are distributed along ethnic lines. In such cases, a reduced variant of the nationalist cultural compromise is carried out with only an ethnic portion of the state’s permanent population. The process of social closure continues but draws points of distinction between elements of the state’s permanent population, thus excluding a portion of the population from the protections and public goods provided by the state along ethnic lines. When distinctions of social closure slice through the territorial population excluding those of the “wrong” ethnicity from state access, ethnic rebellions can often ensue (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Wimmer (2002) thus links both economic and civil society development to processes of nation-

state building by tying these factors to distinct configurations of shifting power and legitimacy structures. From these configurations emerge the politicization of ethnicity and the exclusion of ethnic groups, thus generating the foundations of ethnic conflict.

By linking the rise of the nation-state system to political modernity, the power and legitimacy school avoids an ahistorical explanation with mechanisms that are firmly situated within clearly delimited time frames that coincide with the shaping of the international world system and its waves of state formation (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). Unlike the first historical cases of nationalism (Greenfeld 1992), the formation of internationally recognized nation-states within the world polity during the post WWII political era commonly proceeded prior to the development of organic and comprehensive national identities (Wimmer 2002). Anti-colonial movements certainly marshaled nationalist rhetoric in their bids for independence. Yet once independence had been achieved, most splintered along factional and ethnic lines as anti-colonial nationalisms proved far less cohesive than their earlier imperial ancestors (Mayall 1990). The ethno-nationalist bend in the right of national self-determination justified these forms of anti-colonial nationalism, but also raised the question of who, exactly, constituted the “national we.” Minahan (1996), for example, finds that there are an estimated 9000 stateless nations, with over 200 of them making organized claims of independence. Within the modern political era, ethnicity has been increasingly politicized as disparate ethnic groups vie for control of the state, with often violent consequences (Moynihan 1993; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer 2002). By linking the rise of political and economic modernity, Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion gives a historically contingent account of how ethnicity became the primary

fault line of organized conflict within the modern political era. In doing so it avoids the error of assuming ethnicity is politically relevant *a priori*. In turn, the rising importance of state membership within the modern political era explains why exclusion from access to the state would plausibly escalate into violent civil war.

As modern states have become increasingly powerful, the human cost of ethno-nationalist exclusion is more extreme than ever (consider, for example, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Rohingya people in Myanmar, or the expulsion of the Armenians from Turkey). Simply put, exclusion from the public goods provided by the state influences every sector of life. The power and legitimacy perspective does not necessarily run counter to the expectations of the other three schools, but rather gives them context. For example, opportunity structures such as mountainous terrain may make the escalation of political tensions to violent rebellion more feasible, but only the power and legitimacy school articulates why such an escalation would be accepted in the first place. The consequences of exclusion from the state are simply too high. On the other hand, the Wimmer perspective forces substantial reinterpretation of other findings. For example, the Sambanis (2001) argument that ethnicity reduces the organizational costs of rebellion may indeed hold, but to examine the validity of that specific interpretation requires that it be separated from the effect of ethnically based exclusion. However, at the time of this writing quantitative analyses of ethnic rebellion and violence have not branched out beyond the narrow question of violent onset.

The present moment is ripe for just such an expansion. Through one of the most impressive data collection efforts in the discipline, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2009) have recently engaged in a massive effort to assess the quantitative empirical support of

what had largely been a qualitative endeavor based on case study and limited comparative research. To date, the Wimmer School has garnered substantial empirical support. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) stress compellingly that ethnic rebellions *are more likely when greater proportions of the population are excluded along ethnic lines*. These findings are supplemented at the group level by research suggesting that ethnic groups that are *increasingly excluded, better organized and have recently experienced violent conflict* are more likely to engage in conflict with the state (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Collectively, these findings have implications for both the greed and opportunity school and the diversity breeds conflict school. First, contrary to the GAO School, the power and legitimacy school finds that, when politicized, ethnicity presents an organizational framework through which individuals attempt to gain access to state power. Here the politicization of ethnicity is not merely descriptive but ultimately related to ethnically based exclusion. Second, quantitative findings from the power and legitimacy school suggests that it is unequal power relations between ethnic groups that breeds conflict, not simply the existence of diverse populations grating against the homogenizing forces of economic modernity (as argued by the Gellner wing of the diversity breeds conflict school). Quantitative research findings simultaneously expand Horowitz's hypothesis concerning the equal spread of modernity's economic goods to the realm of political modernity as well. On the other hand, findings from the power and legitimacy school contradict DBC School results, showing that ethnic rebellions tend to be initiated by excluded ethnic majorities rather than by ethnic minorities as they struggle to gain control of the very means of organized violence with which they are confronted. In short, the recent quantitative scholarship

from the Wimmer School has clearly demonstrated that ethnic power relations play a decisive role in fomenting ethnic violence.

Unfortunately, the recent spate of quantitative analysis within the power and legitimacy school on the subject of ethnic violence and state formation has not subjected the entirety of Wimmer's theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict to empirical scrutiny. The majority of Wimmer's theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence focuses on how ethnicity is politicized and why states commit to a course of ethnic exclusion, but only the link between exclusion and ethnic rebellion has been seriously treated in the quantitative research. Thus there are several elements of Wimmer's (2002) theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict that further require empirical assessment. First, as it stands, the formation of ethnic power relations requires analysis in its own right because the finding that excluded majorities, for example, are more likely to rebel, raises the question of why ethnic majorities would be excluded in the first place. Such an act not only runs counter to the idea of national self-determination, but also more rational actor based approaches which would predict efforts at developing a broad base of support (See Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012 for a game theoretic elite-masses alliance based analysis).

Second, and more importantly, however, beyond the influence of ethnic exclusion, the same factors that are theorized to contribute to the onset of ethnic rebellion are also theorized to influence the politicization of ethnicity and the act of ethnic exclusion itself. These effects need to be disaggregated to be accurately understood. Finally, although the power and legitimacy school focuses on the boundaries between groups and the state, the perspective conflates the politicization of ethnicity with ethnic

exclusion. Ethnicity is certainly a practical category when membership means exclusion from the state, but ethnicity can be politically relevant without the presence of ethnically based exclusion. For the power and legitimacy school the politicization of ethnicity is primarily addressed in the context of nation-building and state-formation, while the onset of ethnic conflict is seen to result primarily from ethnically based exclusion. But this distinction is analytical. The roots of rebellion lay in exclusion and the roots of exclusion lay in the politicization of ethnicity, for they are part and parcel of the same overarching process. What is necessary is (1) a better conceptualization and empirical assessment of the politicization of ethnicity; (2) a reexamination of the factors thought to contribute to the onset of ethnic exclusion; and, in light of such an analysis, (3) an examination of the implications of these findings in regards to the onset of ethnic rebellion.

***Theorizing the Institutionalization of Ethnic Tensions: The Politicization of Ethnicity, Ethnic Exclusion, and Ethnic Rebellion***

Wimmer's theory of ethnic conflict and nationalist exclusion is ultimately a two level theory. On the one hand it emphasizes the importance of analyzing configurations of power relations between ethnic groups and the state (Wimmer 2013b), which is the locus of the current project. On the other hand, Wimmer's theory is also fundamentally about the negotiation of group boundaries, and cultural compromises that legitimate the rule of some set of elites (Wimmer 2013a). However, within the modern political era, rule in the name of "we the people," has largely become the principle foundation for the legitimacy of rule around the globe. The values of state sovereignty and national self-determination are enshrined in the United Nations Charter, but both states, and aspiring ethno-nationalist movements, draw upon these values to defend their aspirations (Mayall

1990). As this analysis is concerned with explaining ethnic rebellions within the modern political era (i.e., post WWII), the historically specific circumstances of state formation within this period are directly relevant. In the midst of post-independence fragmentation, elites attempted nation-building within relatively fixed territorial boundaries, often containing peoples from an array of ethnic categories, many with organizations aspiring to transform themselves into recognized nations (Mayall 1990; Meyer 1999; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Moynihan 1993).

Yet, even if the nation-state form is all but ubiquitous, the politicization of ethnicity is not. That is, ethnic cleavages do not necessarily represent boundaries along which public goods are distributed and state membership defined. Nor are all the world's states characterized by attempts to gain political support along ethnic lines. Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) argue that the elites and masses negotiate an exchange alliance--trading political participation for military support and taxation for public goods, ultimately producing one of three states of equilibrium: a successful inclusion of a state's population through a nationalist cultural compromise; the incorporation of all but the counter elites through populist nationalism; or the politicization of ethnicity through the formation of alliances along ethnic lines. When the alliances fall along ethnic lines they are characterized by three features that serve to reproduce them. As Wimmer (2013a:110) states, “Highly salient, socially closed, and culturally marked ethnic groups will produce high degrees of identifications among its members and thus stabilize a boundary through path dependent effects.” Following Wimmer’s institutional work, I conceive of the negotiated legitimacy and boundary work as micro-level processes and treat them as the backdrop in my analysis. Similarly, I place Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007)

cycles of repression and reprisal that characterize contentious politics in the same category. Placing them backstage, as exogenous micro-mechanisms, it becomes clear that the quote from Wimmer can be reformulated in solely institutional terms. Thus stated, the institutionalization of highly salient, socially closed, and culturally marked ethnic categories *solidify* the boundaries that foment ethnic rebellion.

To provide some context on why the institutionalization of highly salient, socially closed, and culturally marked ethnic categories create the foundation for ethnic rebellions, consider the following. Minahan (1996) finds that there are an estimated 9000 stateless nations, with over 200 of them making organized claims of independence, within a limited number of recognized sovereign territories (Mayall 1990; Wimmer 2002). In states where ethnic categories are culturally marked, highly salient, and socially closed, organized members of ethnic categories and aspiring nations are hemmed in a world of presumptive nation-states. There they play a deadly version of musical chairs for a limited number of seats at the United Nations table. If one acknowledges the truism that any ideological framework, once institutionalized, tends to gain a certain advantage and momentum, three points of institutional escalation become fundamental to understanding ethnic rebellion. The first such point concerns the macro-structural conditions under which ruling elites endorse, reify, and create the highly salient, and culturally marked ethnic categories that characterize the politicization of ethnicity. The second are the macro-structural conditions under which these politicized ethnic categories become the criteria for state-based exclusion. And the third are the macro-structural conditions that light the proverbial powder keg of ethnically based exclusion, ushering in the onset of ethnic rebellion. Before presenting the specific hypotheses regarding each

threshold, I briefly develop the mid-level theoretical framework within which each is situated.

The research on the politicization of ethnicity, and why exclusion from the state often follows ethnic cleavages, is actually quite limited relative to the vast literature on ethnicity. In part this can be explained by the foundational Herderian remnants of the concept itself. The Herderian roots of ethnicity, as a concept, made such questions difficult to pose since it was assumed that all peoples of the world naturally belonged to ethnic groups with unique cultural traits. Initially the idea that peoples could be sorted according to the Herderian trinity of ethnic community, culture, and identity, was largely taken as a given (Wimmer 2013a: Chapter 2). The literature has of course moved on from Herder, but until the last decade the question of ethnicity's politicization, let alone its relationship to ethnic exclusion, remained largely unaddressed because it seems self evident. Brubaker's (2004; 2006) call to the academy to stop treating ethnic groups as firmly bounded and integrated peoples that possess individual agency *a priori*, is more than a call to reformulate the way we think about ethnicity. More concretely, it endorses the search for, and analysis of, what he calls *practical categories*. If groups are conceptualized as bounded collectivities with a sense of solidarity, corporate identity, and capacity for concerted action, then ethnic categories are at best, as Brubaker (2004:12) states, only "a potential basis for group formation." Nearly all but the poorest states in the world today have some center for national statistics with an ethnic classification system for their population. The world's populations are indeed ethnically categorized, but the crux of Brubaker's argument is that just because they can be classified, does not mean that those classifications have practical consequences. The task is thus to discover

the structural circumstances under which ethnicity might act in various ways: as a relatively meaningless category in the eyes of the state; a practical category in political life; the practical criteria for state sanctioned exclusion; or the organizing principle for ethnic rebellion.

The politicization of ethnicity is addressed in two sub-literatures within the power and legitimacy school. Most of the work addressing the politicization of ethnicity as an outcome has emerged as a byproduct of work on nation-building and nation-state formation. Wimmer (2002) claims that when ruling elites do not have enough resources or when civil society is weak, they tend to favor co-ethnics in their distribution of public goods. Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) follow up on this analysis by providing evidence that ethnically based social closure results when civil society is weak and/or states are less centralized (For a complete review, see Wimmer 2013b). On the other hand, the conflict wing of the power and legitimacy school has placed more weight on its consequences. For example, Wimmer et al, (2009) make the case that the politicization of ethnicity is a *necessary* condition for the ruling elite to commit ethnic exclusion, thus possibly fomenting ethnic rebellion. Given the substantial role institutionalized power explanations play in the power and legitimacy school, the lack of analysis focusing explicitly on the institutional factors that increase the salience of marked ethno-cultural diacritics is somewhat surprising. However, such an omission is understandable insofar as Wimmer (2002) subsumes both the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion as elements of what he terms *ethnicized bureaucracies*. That is to say, ethnicized bureaucracies emerge where the politicization of ethnicity has been institutionalized and the fault lines of exclusion fall along these politicized ethnic cleavages and categories.

Within the power and legitimacy school, the mechanism of institutionalization is important because it locks a state into a particular equilibrium that narrows the set of potential trajectories and plausible outcomes. Wimmer's ethnicized bureaucracy is just such an outcome. Nevertheless, this institutional approach can be expanded to usefully understand the series of institutional points of escalation that place some states at a much higher risk of ethnic rebellion than others by separating the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion. The methodological critique Wimmer et al. (2009) levels against the field, regarding the improper inclusion of cases without politicized ethnicity in the study of ethnic violence, rests upon his conceptualization of *ethnicized bureaucracies*. But it also points toward a series of institutional escalations that characterize what could be described as partial and fully *ethnicized bureaucracies*. Both Wimmer et al. (2009) and Cederman et al. (2010) imply and assume that a salience threshold must be met prior to the possibility of ethnic exclusion by the state. In short, ethnic exclusion from the public goods of the state is an inherently political act that can occur only if a state's politics are framed around ethnic categories with political organizations mobilizing political support along ethnic lines.

By extending the logic of this argument, three specific institutional thresholds become clear preconditions for the onset of ethnic rebellion. First, ethnic categories must become so salient that they are politicized and ultimately become institutionalized as the principle organizing framework of political support. At this point, power sharing mechanisms between ethnic political organizations may be able to stop the escalation but this condition can be best described as *partial ethnicization of the bureaucracy*. If not, however, a second threshold is reached when one of the competing ethnic organizations

successfully gains control of the state and formally excludes some or all of its competitors along ethnic lines. In other words, once this second threshold is met, such states could be described as having *fully ethnicized bureaucracies*. Fully ethnicized bureaucracies are essentially proverbial powder kegs of ethnic rebellion. The final institutional threshold of organized violence is reached when organizations representing excluded categories of peoples violently or non-violently contest their exclusion from the public goods of the state and ruling elites turn the military on the “rebelling” population. To borrow Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) term, cycles of repression and reprisal dominate fully ethnicized bureaucracies, but once the state turns its military on an ethnic category of its population, the final institutional threshold of escalation has been reached. Limited ethnic rebellion turns into ethnic civil war, as the state turns the means of organized violence against an ethnic category of people now considered foreign (Consider, for example the current civil war in Syria).

It is important to note that these trajectories of institutional escalation are long term processes that move between thresholds of equilibrium. As these points of institutional escalation are also points of equilibrium, they do not tend to vary greatly over time in terms of years, but rather decades and centuries from the moment of state formation. Thus, the conceptualization of institutional escalation should not be interpreted in simple linear fashion. All states do not enter at the lower end of the continuum and then proceed through each successive point. Rather, for the newest states, which have been formed in the modern political era, the state of ethnic tensions at the moment of formation is crucial. Over the course of their emerging history they may slowly move up or down the ethnic tension spectrum, but the extent to which ethnicity is

institutionalized in the state's political processes places the state that much closer or further away from potential ethnic rebellion and civil war.


The newest state of South Sudan is a case in point. South Sudan is a new state formed out of civil war and threatened by yet more internal divisions. Rebels in support of deposed deputy Machar have been targeting President Kiir's ethnic category, the Dinka, while government forces have been targeting those who share Machar's Nuer background. Ethnicity has been politicized in South Sudan from the very beginning of its existence, with Machar receiving the second highest governmental post as a compromise intended to get members of the Nuer ethnic community to buy into the new government. Although the conflict has ethnic overtones, both Machar and Kiir have some support outside of their respective ethnic groups, and thus Southern Sudan may yet step back from the precipice. Regardless, ethnicity will, at best, remain politicized for some time. It will take some deft political maneuvering to avoid a potentially catastrophic race for the state that could emerge if political leaders from the Dinka and Nuer fully pursue the building of ethnically homogenous constituencies. In such a case, the fear of exclusion from state access would no doubt escalate tensions. The fallout is a reality that South Sudan, the rest of Africa, and the world will have to deal with well into the future. Clearly, the formation of South Sudan as a state renders the probability that ethnicity remains politically dormant in the near future all but impossible.

On the other hand, state building projects have resulted in a wide range of ethnic tensions, including several political frameworks where ethnicity is politically irrelevant. The best operational definition of politically relevant ethnicity in the field is provided in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR). The EPR codes an ethnic category as

politically relevant if, “at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics” (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2008:1). Using these criteria, Tunisia, Libya, Venezuela, Denmark, Tanzania and Oman are just a few of the world’s states with long histories of politically irrelevant ethnicity. To provide several illustrations: ethnicity is not politically relevant in Denmark; yet it is politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion in the Netherlands. In Sweden and Norway ethnicity is irrelevant, while ethnicity is politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion in Finland. As of 2005, ethnicity was politically relevant with no ethnic exclusion in Burundi, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic, while in the respective bordering states of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Sudan at least one ethnic category was excluded from state access. Even in well developed Western Europe such a divide occurs. As of 2005, ethnicity was politically relevant with ethnically based exclusion in France, while ethnicity was politically irrelevant in Germany. Looking further up the spectrum of ethnic tensions, as of 2005 the states of Sudan, Chad and Iran were locked in violent struggles against organized ethnic rebel forces, while the DRC, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria were systematically excluding ethnic groups but not facing such rebellions. The wide array of economic development which this brief selection entails presents a puzzle with regard to the available resources element of Wimmer’s theory of the politicization of ethnicity.

Figure 1.1 provides a list of the world’s states with populations of 1 million or more—or a total square area of 500,000 kilometers—placed along an ethnic tensions

spectrum from 1946-2005. Four specific categories are highlighted. For states in the lowest category ethnicity is not politically relevant, while states in the top category experienced at least one ethnic rebellion between 1946 and 2005. In the second from the bottom category you find states where ethnicity has been politicized but people are not excluded from the state along ethnic lines. In the third from the bottom category are those states where the politicization of ethnicity has escalated into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. Although levels of ethnic tension vary substantially for the states within each of these categories, membership in a category indicates a certain institutionalization of politicized ethnicity that draws attention to quantitative scholarship's focus on the ethnic rebellion category. As Wimmer et al. (2009) illustrate, an ethnic rebellion versus no ethnic rebellion variable is inadequate because it includes the category of states where ethnicity is not politicized. Hence they focus on the remainder of the world's states in an analysis of multiple types of ethnic violence. In this project I have purposefully restricted my focus to ethnic rebellions to highlight the importance of the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in placing ethnic rebellion in context. I will now briefly outline the forgoing dissertation.



**Figure 1.1: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Tensions in the World's States from 1946 to 2005**

Chapter 2 pursues an examination of the structural and institutional factors associated to with the politicization of ethnicity. From examining Figure 1.1, it is clear that all states in the second box from the bottom and higher have some version of politicized ethnicity. The literature on the politicization of ethnicity has primarily emerged from the power and legitimacy school. Wimmer's (2002) theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence houses within it a theory of ethnicity's politicization. In his eyes, ethnicized bureaucracies tend to emerge where ruling elites have limited resources and where civil societies are weak. However, his approach requires refinement in two ways. First, it does not treat ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity as analytically distinct. Although ethnicity is often politicized by elites with the aim of excluding certain segments of the population from the state, this is not always the case. One need only look at the politicization of ethnicity in Canada. Ethnicity is certainly relevant, as the narrowly failed Quebec secession referendum of 1995 illustrates, yet it would be hard to argue that the French-Canadian population was excluded from the state. Secessionist movements that wish greater autonomy often force the politicization of ethnicity on states where it may otherwise not emerge. Here the term ethnic exclusion does not really hold in the conventional sense and ideas of national self determination that motivate the politicization of ethnicity still emerge. Second, the role actual ethnic diversity of the state plays in ethnicity's politicization is left undeveloped in Wimmer's approach. His lack of treatment may suggest that ethnic diversity has a relatively constant effect on the politicization of ethnicity or that it is simply not a factor. After all, by analytically combining politicized ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, diversity only matters

when an ethnic category is excluded. Chapter 2 is explicitly devoted to disentangling and empirically examining these countervailing theoretical possibilities.

Continuing to move up Figure 1.1, in chapter 3 I shift to examining state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. State based ethnic exclusion is the second characteristic of Wimmer's theory of politicized ethnicity. As such, the role of ethnic diversity in promoting exclusion is also glossed over. To paraphrase the opening of Karl Marx's 18<sup>th</sup> Brumaire, men may make history, but they seldom do so in the setting of their choosing. So too proceeds the process of state building, state formation and solidification. Ruling elites operate within the confines of the existing system. If ethnicity is already politicized, the status quo may be continued, or escalated to ethnic exclusion, or attempts can be made to depoliticize the boundary. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, just as ethnic rebellions cannot occur where ethnicity has not been politicized so too does state sanctioned ethnic exclusion require the requisite politicization of ethnicity. The structural elements of available resources and ethnic diversity once again are the major players, but in chapter 3 I analytically separate the processes of ethnic exclusion from the politicization of ethnicity in an effort to develop their separate and opposing logics. As such, I reduce the pool of cases to only those cases where ethnicity is politically relevant focus on the distinction between the presence or absence of ethnic exclusion.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of ethnic rebellion proper to examine the role ethnic diversity plays within the excluded population in fomenting rebellion in states with state sanctioned ethnic exclusion already in place. Where the DBC School focuses on a wide variety of grievances when attempting to explain ethnic rebellion, the power and legitimacy school remains transfixed on state sanctioned exclusion. In terms of ethnic

rebellion specifically, Wimmer et al. (2009) find that as the proportion of the population excluded from the state increases, so too does the probability of ethnic rebellion.

Conversely, Laitin (2007) argues that ethnic grievances and exclusion are so ubiquitous that they cannot possibly explain ethnic rebellion. In chapter 4, I develop an explanation that accounts for why the Wimmer et al. (2009) finding should hold, while the rarity of ethnic rebellion would initially seem to support the Laitin perspective. As previously noted, it would be naïve to assume that ruling elites would not expect at least some opposition to state sanctioned exclusion. Through an extension of findings from chapter 3 and Wimmer et al. (2009) findings regarding ethnic infighting, chapter 4 presents a “power and legitimacy” explanation for the rarity of ethnic rebellion and civil war.

## **Chapter 2: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Politics**

In spite of the shift in emphasis from group rights to individual rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter, during the modern political era (roughly 1946-present) ethnic and ethno-national divisions continue to provide principal cleavages around which politics are organized. From 1946 through 2005, between 80 to 85 percent of the world's states were characterized by some form of ethnic politics.<sup>1</sup> The ethnic organization of state level politics is undeniably widespread. Given the widely accepted nature of ethnic politics, many scholars have opted to simply acknowledge this dominance, and move to explaining ethnic exclusion and conflict, which necessarily take the politicization of ethnicity as given. Yet, within any framework, public politics are characterized by what the late Charles Tilly (2005: 173-174) described as the “creation, activation, and transformation of visible us-them boundaries, as well as reversal of those processes: destruction, deactivation, or restoration of us-them boundaries.” Contentious politics, to borrow Tilly and Tarrow’s (2007) term, are thus not restricted to states where ethnicity has been politicized. Realizing this insight, a major vein of civil war literature argues that ethnicity is just a descriptive element. Other scholars have responded, arguing that only where ethnicity has been politicized to a point where it becomes the primary organizational framework for political action can contentious politics escalate into ethnic exclusion and ethnic civil war. Unfortunately, many studies of ethnic rebellion and exclusion have assumed the political relevance, or irrelevance, of ethnicity, choosing to steer clear of the empirical question. Although this dissertation seeks to address the

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<sup>1</sup> Data for this claim are drawn from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, in which an ethnic category was coded as politically relevant if “at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics.” Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic Power Relations Dataset." Dataverse Network, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796>

questions of exclusion and ethnic rebellion as well, in this chapter I purposely bracket these questions in an effort to focus explicitly on the politicization of ethnicity.

Why has the politicization of ethnicity not received more direct academic attention? Why are the majority of the world's states characterized by some form of ethnic politics? Which structural factors tend to motivate the politicization of ethnicity? Answers to these questions that *directly* address the politicization of ethnicity remain surprisingly incomplete. Quantitative work on the issue is especially sparse. Indeed, literature on the politicization of ethnicity has largely developed as theoretical backdrop to the broader questions of ethnic discrimination, exclusion and conflict within three veins of inquiry. Neo-romanticist approaches take the existence of ethnically framed grievances as a given *a priori*. They therefore simply assume that ethnicity is nearly always politically relevant or that ethnic divisions are simmering just below the surface. As a result neo-romanticists' explanations of ethnic conflict rest on the assumption that higher amounts of ethnic diversity tend to result in its politicization. Alternatively, rational actor approaches seek to understand how and why ethnicity lowers the costs of mobilization and the maintenance of political support. The rational actor approach largely side steps the question of politicization by arguing that the ethnicization of politics operates like any other tool which legitimates struggle and garners support. Such strategies and tactics are argued to follow a common logic and research focuses on the conditions which allow the politicization of ethnicity to solve efficiency and utilitarian problems. Perhaps the most prominent argument in this vein is Michael Hechter's (2000) position which links a history of indirect rule to the politicization of ethnicity. Hence the neo-romanticist approach has a specific theoretical locus that narrowly limits the scope of

analysis—a problem it shares with the rational actor school (despite the latter’s greater contribution to the dynamics of ethnic politicization in the modern era). In fact, rational actor studies pay special attention to specific historical conditions, which are then argued to make the politicization of ethnicity more attractive in terms of efficiency or utility, thus resolving the perennial free rider problem. Once again, however, the role of ethnic diversity is largely overlooked.

In contrast to these perspectives, the power and legitimacy school (PAL) has been diligent in its engagement with the politicization of ethnicity, pursuing the topic along two paths. First, drawing on insights from Barth and Bourdieu, power and legitimacy scholars offer an ethnic group formation perspective that highlights the micro-level social processes and mechanisms that individuals employ to reinforce, dismantle, redefine, manage and ultimately navigate the boundaries between ethnic categories of peoples. In many ways, this approach is an ethnically focused version of Tilly’s work on boundary formation and categorical inequality. A second macro-strand of research argues that the widespread politicization of ethnicity has resulted from the same historical forces that ostensibly engendered the rise of political modernity and the nation-state form over the *longue duree*. Taking radically distinct points of departure, yet relying on the other as backdrop, these dual approaches both focus on the power relations and resources available to elites in constructing a nationalist cultural compromise. The structural and institutional argument holds that where resources are scarce an inclusive nationalizing project cannot succeed because ruling elites lack the means to distribute the public goods of the state to the entire population. In these cases ethnicity is more likely to be politicized as ruling elites struggle to develop and maintain the foundations of political

support along narrower ethnic lines. I argue that each of these three perspectives either misconceives the role that levels of ethnic diversity play in facilitating or limiting the politicization of ethnic boundaries, or simply leaves the issue unaddressed.

To better understand the structural and institutional conditions that promote ethnic exclusion and foment ethnic rebellion, a deeper understanding of how these same conditions influence the politicization of ethnicity is required. Why is this the case? The most recent studies of ethnic rebellion from the PAL school openly acknowledge that the politicization of ethnicity is a necessary condition for ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion. In fact, one of its central findings is that ethnic diversity is not a predictor of ethnic rebellion once ethnic power relations are accounted for (Wimmer et al. 2009). Yet, in bypassing the structural and institutional conditions that lead to the politicization of ethnicity, the power and legitimacy approach underemphasizes the role ethnic diversity plays in both limiting and promoting ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion. Rather than assume away or simply bypass the importance of ethnic diversity, I argue that it is one of the central structural conditions faced by states that has played a crucial role in the formation and politicization of ethnic boundaries.

The *longue duree* studies of the power and legitimacy school set the analytical backdrop, if you will, for the forgoing analysis, explaining the rise of the broader nation-state system of political modernity. Building on Wimmer's resource availability argument, I propose a structural-configural model that emphasizes the long term interplay between a state's ethnic diversity and its available resources. Within the processes of state formation, state-stabilization and state-building, ruling elites are conceived to be constantly balancing the limitations of available resources and the constraints of the

territory's ethnic diversity in their quest to create a widely accepted national identity. The constant balancing of these two structural factors, I argue, has channeled states into four ideal-typical outcomes—two where ethnicity is less likely to be politicized and two where ethnicity is quite likely to be politicized. The politicization of ethnicity is *less* likely where ruling elites have limited resources coupled with high levels of ethnic diversity that prohibitively raise fears of widespread ethnic fractionalization, intolerable repression costs, and potential power sharing arrangements (For example, Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Swaziland). Second, politicized ethnicity is also *less* likely in states where abundant resources and low levels of ethnic diversity have made a broadly inclusive national cultural compromise, to borrow Wimmer's (2002) terminology, relatively easy to achieve (For example, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark). I call these two structural conditions the populist and national closure scenarios, respectively. Alternatively, the politicization of ethnicity is *more* likely in what I call the ethno-bureaucratic and multi-culturalist scenarios. Ethnicized bureaucracies tend to emerge in states with limited resources and low levels of ethnic diversity. The reason for this is that the ethnic bases of political support are small enough that they can be included with the limited resources available, but large enough to provide a stable and manageable basis of political support (For example, Mauritania, Haiti, or Vietnam). The politicization of ethnicity is also *high* in the multi-culturalist scenario, where abundant resources have resulted in a successful nationalist cultural compromise. In such cases, high levels of ethnic diversity result in an increased probability of organized ethnic groups fearing the loss of their unique cultural heritage within the broader national whole (For example, Canada, France, and the United States).

I test the empirical support for these hypothesized scenarios through a quantitative analysis of the world's states from 1946-2005 using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009). This dataset records whether ethnicity was politically relevant within a state based on the extent of access to executive level state power possessed by various ethnic groups within a state's population, as well as the presence of systematic discrimination along ethnic lines. Unlike the Minorities at Risk dataset, which only records information on disadvantaged minorities, the EPR codes for ethnicity's political relevance and irrelevance, making it the best available dataset to quantitatively probe the formation of ethnic politics within states. Following Tilly (1999; 2005) I assume that once a balance is struck between available resources and the ethnic diversity of a state, the resulting politicization (or non-politicization) of ethnicity is reproduced by actors on both sides of the relevant political divide. Although shifts from politicized to non-politicized ethnicity do happen, they are relative rare, and are seen as the outcome of long-term processes. Politicized and non-politicized ethnicity are thus conceptualized as points of relative equilibrium that, if empirically supported, should be characterized by distinct configurations of available resources and levels of ethnic diversity. As such, evidence of the long-term structural and institutional channeling mechanisms should be observable within the configurations of resources and ethnic diversity *between* states within the modern political era. Using binomial logit models, I test the extent to which the relationship between these two variables aligns with theoretical expectations in the modern political era.

The results largely support my inclusion of ethnic diversity within the original power and legitimacy school perspective. Politicized and non-politicized ethnicity, my

findings suggest, emerge from the structural interplay of resources available to the ruling elite *and* ethnic diversity of the state. That is, my findings show that the effect of available resources on the politicization of ethnicity is contingent on the levels of ethnic diversity. First, my results show that less developed states are more likely to be characterized by politicized ethnicity if they are also less ethnically diverse. Second, well developed states with higher levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to contain ethnic politics than well developed states that have less ethnic diversity. The effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity therefore varies depending on the availability of resources. Thus, contrary to expectations commonly assumed by neo-romanticist positions, my findings suggest that the politicization of ethnicity is not necessarily more common in states characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity. Finally, my analysis shows no evidence that colonial legacy or the history of indirect rule—a prominent argument from the rational actor approach—play a role in the development of ethnic politics. Taken together, these findings suggest that states are structurally channeled into situations of politicized or non-politicized ethnicity depending on the configural relationship of ethnic diversity and available resources at moments of emergence, solidification, and reproduction within national state level politics.

In linking the strategic balance of limited resources and the general ethnic diversity of the state territory to politicized ethnicity, this chapter further broadens the empirical support for a slightly expanded version of the power and legitimacy school's comprehensive explanation of ethnic exclusion and ethnic rebellion. Consciously built on the case-based theoretical work of prior research, the forgoing analysis follows in the footsteps of scholars who embrace a dialog between quantitative and qualitative research

(Amenta 2003). Moreover, it supports the recent trend of closely examining the constellation of structural factors that tend to promote the politicization of ethnicity within states (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012).

### ***Moving Beyond the Assumption that Ethnicity is Politically Relevant***

Within the social sciences, the topic of ethnicity has been a robust field of inquiry and yet, when it comes to the question of ethnicity's politicization, it suffers from two interrelated problems. First, why and how ethnic boundaries become the primary cleavages around which politics are organized have received remarkably little attention in comparison to the topic of ethnicity as a whole. Second, where the politicization of ethnicity is treated, it tends to be as backdrop for analytically separate but connected topics, such as the rise of nationalism or ethnic violence. I first discuss why the politicization of ethnicity has received comparatively scant direct attention, linking the trend back to ethnicity's Herderian conceptual roots. I then turn to the assumptions about ethnicity's politicization that provide the foundations for the neo-romanticist, rational actor, modernist and finally, the power and legitimacy schools of thought on ethnic violence and civil war.

As a concept within the social sciences, the scope and importance of ethnicity is only rivaled by other foundational concepts such as gender and class. Indeed, each of these concepts has its own legacy within academia. It is perhaps not surprising that our knowledge concerning the processes through which ethnic cleavages develop as the organizing principle of state level politics has been hindered by the initial conceptualization of ethnicity itself. As a concept, ethnicity's Herderian legacy has left a pervasive axiomatic lens that tends to treat the triad of ethnic culture, community, and

identity as all but accepted truths. Within ethnic and folklore studies, seminal works from assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and an emancipatory left-Herderian paradigm, all assume the near universal existence of bounded ethnic communities whose interrelationships are fraught with opposition and oppression (Wimmer 2013a, Chapter 2; see also Loveman 1997).

Fortunately, over the last decade a small but distinguished literature has begun to challenge these assumptions. Calls admonishing “commonsense groupism” (Brubaker 2004), “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer 2002), and the unquestioned acceptance of ethnic motives as a cause of civil war (Laitin 2007) have created a toehold in the literature. Such work warns against the perils of seeing ethnicity as causally active everywhere. Although the pervasiveness of this axiom has spurred wide-ranging research, the literature is dominated by analyses where ethnic categories are explanatory variables. In this regard, research concerning immigration, discrimination and assimilation has far outpaced studies examining why ethnicity has dominated the social organization of peoples in the modern political era. For example, the move to distinguish ethnic civil wars from non-ethnic civil wars has largely occurred over the last decade (Buhaug 2006; Kalyvas 2007; Sambanis 2001). Wimmer’s (2013a) call to “de-ethnicize research designs” and look for the ways in which ethnic boundaries are created, dissolved and otherwise navigated signal a fundamental shift in how we treat ethnic boundaries within the social sciences. Nevertheless, the amount of empirical work that addresses why and how groups develop ethnic descriptors as an outcome of interest is relatively small compared to the general body of ethnic scholarship.

The work that has been done on the politicization of ethnicity is a case and point. The majority of work on ethnicity's politicization has primarily emerged within literatures attempting to explain the rise of nationalism, nationalist violence, and the rise of the nation-state system itself. In dealing with these concerns four general explanations of how ethnicity is politicized have emerged.<sup>2</sup> A rational actor approach maintains that ethno-national group identities are seen as politically relevant only when they can be mobilized for political support. Within this vein the emphasis is on determining the interest groups that make ethnically based political alliances strategically preferable. For example, Olzak and Nagel (1986) have focused on class fractionalization, while Hechter (2000) links the rise of nationalism and ethno-nationalist zeal to the colonial legacy of indirect rule. For the purposes of this analysis, the important feature of the rational actor perspective is that while it seems to speak to why ethnicity is politicized, at its core, ethnicity is seen as just an interchangeable tool lowering the transaction costs of mobilizing political support. The family resemblance between the hard rational actor explanation and David Laitin's (2007) argument holding that the ethnic components of ethnic violence and civil war are merely descriptive is striking.

Alternatively, Anthony Smith (1991; 1995; 2003) has been the most prolific advocate of what can best be described as a neo-romantic perspective. Here ethnic communities are seen as having historically asserted their political autonomy for millennia, with the rise of ethno-nationalisms but the most recent example. Armstrong's (1982) *Nations before Nationalism*, for example, seeks to explain the emergence of the nation-state in the historical origins of national awareness, stretching back into the

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<sup>2</sup> These four explanations ultimately provide the theoretical foundations for the three primary schools of thought addressing ethnic conflict and violence (discussed at length in Chapter 1).

Middle Ages. To be fair, some versions of work from a neo-romanticist approach are softer, emphasizing *both* the (re)constructed nature and the historical origins of various myths of national dignity and predestination. Gellner (2006) is a great example of this balancing act. Although Gellner argues against the neo-romanticist perspective, when he maintains that the trans-historical nature of ethnicity cannot explain the rise of nationalism, he ultimately depends on a soft version of this trans-historical existence. He argues that the functionalist requirements of modernity create homogenizing forces which are at odds with immemorial ethnic loyalties, and thus create the foundations for ethnic conflict and violence. Hence his explanation fuses neo-romanticist elements with the important role of industrialization. Regarding the harder version of the neo-romanticist framework, Wimmer (2002:47) insightfully notes, “the concept of the *ethnie* is elevated, next to that of society, to the status of a fundamental analytical category endowed with trans-historical and universal validity.” The neo-romanticist explanation of why ethnicity becomes politicized is, in a phrase, because it is primordial. As such, the neo-romanticist approach has spent more time stressing the near ubiquity of politicized ethnicity than analytically breaking down the processes that actually create political boundaries out of various marked ethno-cultural diacritics.

Two further approaches tie the rise of nationalism and the politicization of ethnicity directly to the rise of modernity. The distinction between them is the differing weight each gives to political and economic modernity. Although Gellner’s (2006) argument relies on a weak version of trans-historical ethnic ties, his main argument links the functional needs of industrialization of a relatively homogeneous labor force to nationalist conflict. For Gellner, the cause of ethno-nationalist conflict is to be found in

the threat of the nationalist project to the ethnic ties of pre-modern societies. On the other hand, Donald Horowitz (1985) has argued that the origins of ethnic violence and tension are related to unequal development. Horowitz sees the politicization of ethnicity as resulting from an unequal distribution of the benefits of economic modernity along ethnic lines. Gurr and Harff (1994), place greater emphasis political modernity and draw from a mixture of rational actor and economic modernity approaches to support their ethnic grievance perspective on ethnic violence. Here, regime type is argued to promote compromise or violent escalation in the face of ethnic grievances, though the empirical record for the exact relationship is woefully contradictory. Breuilly (1994) emphasizes the development of political modernity to an even stronger degree, and cites it as the primary cause of ethnicity's politicization. This 'statist' approach emphasizes two historical developments. First, the transition from the legitimacy of divine right to rule to the belief that 'like should rule over like,' or popular sovereignty, fundamentally shifted the political foundations of support (See also, Bendix 1978). Second, the emergence of the nationalist ideal, which holds that the territorial boundaries of the state should be congruent with the 'state's nation' directly challenged the fundamental aim of imperial expansion. While not directly contradictory to the Horowitz hypothesis, Breuilly brings a statist approach to the question, arguing that ethnicity has become politicized as a result of shifts in the legitimacy of rule and the foundations of political authority that characterize political modernity.

Wimmer (2002) extends the statist perspective by fusing the shift from divine right to rule to the idea that like should rule over like, with the emergence of the welfare state as having a responsibility to provide for those rightfully included in the national

community (See also, Haggard and Kaufman 2008). For Wimmer, political modernity is a process of social closure, through which social boundaries are formed between sets of peoples who are increasingly defined by their membership within a state. In what he terms the ‘nationalist cultural compromise,’ people ostensibly trade loyalty, taxes, and military service for equality before the law, political participation, and citizenship (i.e., rights to draw upon the public goods provided by the state). The nationalist cultural compromise is part of a larger transition where legal, political, and military forms of integration and exclusion increasingly become centralized under a singular criterion of state membership. As Wimmer (2002:65) states,

Under the modern nation-state, these participatory rights are tied to nationally defined citizenship, thus establishing a difference between those who are privileged and those who are not. In the eyes of the population, the nation-state provides access to a space free of discrimination and arbitrary state action.

In Wimmer’s view, where the nationalist cultural compromise is successful the politicization of ethnicity is a far less prominent feature of political modernity. But where elites are unsuccessful in achieving some version of the ideal-typical nationalist cultural compromise outlined above, a condition which Wimmer describes as the ‘ethnicisation of the bureaucracy’ is often the result.

An ethnicized bureaucracy emerges when one ethnic group claims sole rights to the state and its goods and services, to the exclusion of other ethnic groups within the state’s territory. The aims of the nationalizing project are thus fundamentally different in the national closure and ethno-bureaucratic scenarios. The calculus is strategically

changed from an effort to bring disparate ethnic groups under a single national umbrella, to a more exclusionary approach based on a narrower ethnic definition of the national “we.” Despite conflating ethnic political relevance and ethnic exclusion, Wimmer’s (2002) emphasis on the process of nation-state building highlights the need to directly examine the conditions under which the nationalist cultural compromise tends to proceed (or not) along ethnic lines. The politicization of ethnicity tends to occur under two structural conditions. First, when ruling elites do not have sufficient political, legal and economic resources to ensure the non-discriminatory inclusion of a state’s whole population, nationalist social solidarity cannot take hold. States across the developing world often lack enough resources to generate the public goods necessary for the achievement of a successful nationalist cultural compromise. Second, the world community has often granted statehood to states that have not developed robust civil societies. In the absence of strong civil societies, ruling elites must harness whatever institutions and structures are in place. Clans, tribal affiliations, and ethnic ties become the frameworks for clientelistic political relationships that bring new importance to pre-existing but malleable social boundaries.

Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) extend the argument further in their study of France and the Ottoman Empire. Their results show that successful nation building tends to result from strongly centralized states and developed civil societies, while forms of ethnic closure emanate from weak state capacity and weak civil societies. Resonant of each the four approaches discussed, Wimmer’s extension of the statist approach to the politicization of ethnicity remains a stepping stone in a much broader theoretical framework to explain ethno-nationalist violence. As a result, the theorized relationship


between available state resources and the politicization of ethnicity requires elaboration and empirical scrutiny. Nevertheless, as I argue below, of the four approaches only Wimmer's provides an explanation that is well supported empirically, does not treat ethnicity as politicized *a priori*, and provides a strong foundation for future inquiry.

### ***Bringing Ethnic Diversity into the Power and Legitimacy Explanation of Politicized Ethnicity***

The actual ethnic diversity of a state's territory is notably absent from the major approaches to explaining the politicization of ethnicity. The principle variables which Wimmer's power and legitimacy school have tasked with explaining the politicization of ethnicity are the abundance of state resources and civil society development. Gellner's theory of nationalist conflict also emphasizes the importance of resources through his treatment of economic modernity. Both, however, leave the variability of ethnic diversity relatively unexamined. Gellner treats ethnic boundaries as relatively constant, but at high levels, only becoming sources of contention when pressured by the demands of modernity. Wimmer, in turn takes a similar approach, arguing that the marked cultural diacritics that form the basic material for ethnic boundaries are ubiquitous. For Wimmer, the conditions under which these marked cultural diacritics become more salient and politicized are related to the resources available to ruling elites. Although they emphasize slightly different mechanisms, rational actor approaches depend on similar assumptions. Yet in all three, the actual level of ethnic diversity is treated as relatively constant and unaddressed. In contrast, the neo-romanticist perspective essentially sees the existence of ethnic diversity as widely variable, but almost always politically relevant because of the primordial quest for ethnic self-determination. The task is thus (1) to

demonstrate that ethnic diversity varies considerably across states, (2) theoretically incorporate ethnic diversity into the Wimmer's extension of the statist approach in a manner that avoids the teleological elements of neo-romanticist and rational actor arguments and (3) assess the empirical support of this incorporation.

Contrary to the assumptions of three of the four primary explanations, levels of ethnic diversity across states are actually quite diverse and it seems unlikely that this diversity has no influence on the politicization of ethnicity. To elaborate and illustrate this point I cite ethno-linguistic diversity. With the possible exception of religion, language is perhaps the most commonly cited of all marked cultural diacritics (Brubaker 2004; Calhoun 2007; Enloe 1980; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Landau 1986). In fact, the most commonly used measure of ethnic diversity in the quantitative ethnic conflict literature is Fearon and Laitin's (2003) ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. The ELF index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. Linguistic differences are, thus, a common and well accepted indicator of ethnic diversity within the field. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the ELF index in 2005.



**Figure 2.1: The Distribution of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization in 2005**

As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, aside from the high and low points, the distribution is relatively uniform. Just over 20 percent of the world's states had between zero and a .10 ELF score, with just under 2 percent of the world's states between .9 and 1. The remaining 78 percent of the world's states range between .1 and .9 with each bin ranging between just over 7 percent to around 14 percent. If measured by ethno-linguistic fractionalization, in 2005 the world's states varied substantially in terms of their ethnic diversity.<sup>3</sup>

Within the modern political era, ethno-nationalist claims for self determination have been the primary manner in which political movements legitimize their claims of independence and the foundation for the nationstate system itself (Laitin 2007; Minahan 1996; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b). Therefore, from the world polity perspective,

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<sup>3</sup> As one would expect the ELF distribution is relatively stable over time, with changes resulting primarily from de-colonialization and the breakup of the Soviet Union. I simply present the 2005 data, as it is the most recent in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset.

the ethno-nationalist foundations of the nationstate creates an affinity toward the politicization of ethnicity that forms a macro-level backdrop for this analysis (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). On a grand historical scale this helps explain why states with politicized ethnicity would be so prevalent. But domestic balance of power concerns between ruling elites, counter elites, and the masses are essential to unpacking the structural and institutional sorting mechanisms at work underneath such broad historical claims. Process is key. The variety of ethnic diversity between the world's states is important to consider when attempting to explain the politicization of ethnicity because it should fundamentally affect the calculus ruling elites must make. Wimmer (2002; 2013b) argues that when elites have insufficient resources to include the entirety of a state's population within the nationalist cultural compromise, they tend to turn to the politicization of ethnicity. They do so by extending a smaller version of the nationalist cultural compromise to an ethnically defined subsection of the state's population, which becomes their primary basis of political support. Additionally, Wimmer (2002) argues that this compromise can be negotiated in such a way that it includes multiple ethnic groups while excluding others. Here the calculus of ruling elites has already been theoretically emphasized through case based research on both Mexico and Iraq. Yet, while his analysis highlights a central motivation for why elites would pursue the politicization of ethnicity he only acknowledges that multiple ethnic categories can be involved without fully exploring the theoretical ramifications. Inclusion of ethnic diversity within the ruling elite calculus is thus a logical extension.

Wimmer's version of the statist approach is primarily aimed at explaining nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict, for which the politicization of ethnicity is a

necessary condition. However, in focusing on this explanation, two fundamental oversights emerge in his treatment of ethnic diversity. First, his resource exchange perspective fails to take into account the extent to which the risks of ethnic violence and unrest must change the decision calculus for ruling elites. And second, ethnicity can be politicized without creating systematic exclusion. Politicized ethnicity is shift that raises the practical importance a social boundary marked by ethnic elements. Research clearly shows that social boundaries define and organize both included and excluded groups (Tilly 1996; Tilly 1999; Tilly 2005; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Wimmer 2008; Wimmer 2013a). The emphasis on boundary formation and management shared between the work of Tilly and Wimmer suggest that an ethnic organizational frame is no different.

Where ethnicity is politicized two theoretical outcomes present themselves: non-exclusionary politicized ethnicity and exclusionary politicized ethnicity. The separation is an important analytical distinction but the consequences for political factions on either side of the divide are raised. If ethnicity becomes the dominate mobilizational framework, the state can quickly become the principal prize political factions are looking to monopolize. Wimmer (2002) describes this outcome as an ethnic race for the state. Wimmer Cederman and Min (2009) show that where ethnic exclusion occurs ethnic conflict is much more likely. However, the fear of systematic state based exclusion if a rival group gains control over the state apparatus can be enough to motivate unrest. If the ruling elite use an ethnic framework to legitimize and define the boundaries of state inclusion, it simultaneously provides a legitimized mobilization framework for opposition groups. If one ethnic group can monopolize the state in the name of their right to self determination, competitors must attempt the same lest they risk becoming discriminated


second class populations or even stateless persons. Where multiple ethnic groups become mobilized, a coalitional structure may yet allow a regime to maintain sufficient support to stay in power, but usually at a steep price. The potentially explosive dynamics of including multiple ethnic groups through powersharing arrangements are well documented (Elkins and Sides 2007; Elkins and Sides 2011; Hechter 2000; Laitin 2007).

Where limited resources are a concern for the ruling elite, the decision to pursue a less inclusive version of the nationalist cultural compromise is thus far less straightforward than Wimmer's resource exchange theory would suggest. What is required is a calculus by ruling elites that balances their ability to distribute public goods against ethnic fragmentation, the potential costs of repressing opposition groups and a loss of total state control due to potential powersharing arrangements with ethnic counter elites. Fragmentation of the state and a hold on power are precisely what ruling elites are seeking to avoid. From this perspective, the actual ethnic diversity within a state should, therefore, play a decisive role in the politicization of ethnicity because it is practical indicator of the possible ethnic fragmentation that could result. Where ethnic diversity is high and resources scarce, ruling elites may opt for some form of what Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) describe as a populist middle ground, to avoid the potential of ethnic fragmentation, the high cost of repression, and potential loss of the state through power sharing arrangements. In this case, the joint structural imperatives of limited resources and high ethnic diversity should tend to divert states into the non-politicized ethnicity category (The Populist Hypothesis). Papua New Guinea, Swaziland, and Tanzania are examples of states with long histories where ethnicity was not politicized but also have relatively limited resources. Conversely, states where ethnic diversity is low and resources

scarce, politicized ethnicity should be far more common due to the intersection of two factors. In such cases, the politicization of ethnicity should allow elites to draw political support from a subsection of the population which is, (1) small enough to allow the provision of public goods given the limited available resources, but (2) large enough to provide a stable and manageable political base (The Ethnicized Bureaucracy Hypothesis). Here, notable examples include Haiti, Vietnam, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

The inclusion of ethnic diversity within the ruling elite calculus also helps explain the existence of politicized ethnicity in states with an abundance of resources, where Wimmer's (2002) formulation falls short. Where the nationalist cultural compromise has been inclusively extended, ethnicity can still become politicized by groups fearing the disappearance of their 'unique' cultural heritage within the larger national whole. Analytically this is a similar phenomenon to the risk of ethnic fragmentation but the existence abundant state resources changes the potential outcomes. Ethnic cooptation of the state is no longer necessary. This is also similar to the mechanism posed by Gellner (2006) emphasizing the homogenizing forces of modernity, the national project can create fear of cultural loss. Wimmer (2002) cites the Swiss case, arguing that in instances of a successful nationalist cultural compromise the ethno-national roots of the nationstate manifest as racism and xenophobia. Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National Party is a clear example, in which a small, but organized, group of French citizens have joined together to make sure that France stays 'French'. To cite a somewhat more extreme ideal typical example, consider the powerful movement in Quebec which, at one point, made secession from Canada a remote, but seemingly, plausible possibility when a vote on secession was narrowly defeated in 1995. These examples suggest that the ethnic

diversity of a state remains involved in the calculus that the ruling elite must consider in how they mobilize and maintain support. But when abundant resources exist, rival claimants can be sufficiently appeased through language and cultural privilege laws. Clearly, the ethno-nationalist roots of the nation-state system legitimate ethno-nationalist claims even in the most economically developed of states. Its manifestation is different because ruling elites have the resources to maintain the nationalist cultural compromise through a combination of public good provision and some form of multi-culturalist accommodation (The Multi-Culturalist Hypothesis). Conversely, where resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is low, there is little structural imperative to politicized ethnicity, thus resulting in a structural diversion of these states into the non-politicized ethnicity category (The National Closure Hypothesis). Notable examples here include Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Figure 2.2, summarizes the expected hypothesized relationships.



**Figure 2.2: Theorized Contingent Effects of Ethnic Diversity and Resources Available to Ruling Elites on the Politicization of Ethnicity**

Figure 2.2 illustrates the combination of available resources and ethnic diversity that are hypothesized to result in higher or lower probabilities of ethnicity's politicization. As can be seen, the expected relationships proposed by Wimmer's resource exchange perspective are altered considerably when levels of ethnic diversity included into the theoretical model. These alterations also run counter to the theoretical expectations of the neo-romanticist approach. The neo-romanticist position suggests that more ethnically diverse states should also be more likely to be characterized by the politicization of ethnicity because ethnic groups are seen as primordially struggling for self-determination (Counter Hypothesis 1). Wimmer's extension of the statist position maintains that the politicization of ethnicity is more likely in states with lower levels of economic development but he also posits mechanisms which politicize ethnicity when resources are more readily available. My modification to Wimmer's perspective shifts the emphasis to how the ethnic diversity of a state influences the politicization of ethnicity, and examines the role that available resources has in modifying this influence. In other words, the structural sorting effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity should be seen *contingent* upon the abundance of resources available to ruling elites.

### **Data, Measures, and Methods**

To empirically test these hypotheses I employ the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (2009) (EPR). The EPR contains data from 1946 through 2005 on the entire population of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at least 1 million or a territorial area of at least 500,000 square kilometers. The resulting dataset includes 7,155 country-year observations for 155 post-independence sovereign states with both a measure of

ethnic diversity (as found in the Fearon and Laitin dataset) and a measure of whether ethnicity was politically relevant in a given country year. The political relevance of ethnicity is closely connected to its politicization and is thus the dependent variable of interest. An ethnic category was coded as relevant if at least one significant political actor claimed to speak on behalf of that particular group, or if those from that particular group were systematically discriminated against by the state.<sup>4</sup> Emerging from the power and legitimacy school, it is important to understand the theoretical origin of this measure and the view of ethnicity that motivates it. I follow the Wimmer et al. (2009:325) working definition, which holds that ethnicity is, “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture.” Wimmer et al. (2009) includes in this definition ethno-linguistic, ethno-somatic and ethno-religious groups, while excluding tribes and clans which focus on genealogy or region, and do not link shared ancestry with commonality. Within this definitional framework the political relevance of ethnicity measure is well constructed. It does, however, have a few imperfections that must be acknowledged. First, it does not take into account degrees of political relevance. Second, it also does not capture the extent to which members of an ethnic category acknowledge the relevance of those claiming to speak on their behalf. Finally, it does not measure the breadth or range of positions held by those speaking on behalf of an ethnic category or group. Nevertheless, given its temporal range, analytic clarity, and sample coverage, the EPR political relevance of ethnicity measure remains the best available quantitative indicator of politicized ethnicity.

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<sup>4</sup> The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset may be found at (<http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html>) or <http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf>.

In an effort to keep my study as comparable to recent work from the power and legitimacy school as possible, I have efforted, where possible to use the same data. In line with this goal, I utilize the version of the ELF index, as provided by Fearon and Laitin, as my measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index measures the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who speak languages from different ethno-linguistic categories. The overlap between ethno-somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties can be substantial but this is not always the case. As such, my use of the ELF index will make my results less generalizable to those areas where linguistic cultural diacritics are not the primary markers of ethnic boundaries. Still, given the central importance of language to ethnicity in general and the absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index offers a solid analytical tool to measure the ethnic diversity of a state. To measure the resources available to ruling elites I draw upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. (2009), and use gross domestic product per capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars. Since economic development and the resources from which states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have a strong thoeretical connection with overall GDP per capita, GDP per capita is an obvious choice of measure for resource abundance. Using the GDP data used in the Wimmer et al. (2009) grants an overall coverage of 99.6 percent of sample.<sup>5</sup> Operationally, my four principle hypotheses hold that the effect of ELF index is contingent on GDP, and thus I include an interaction term in the model for the ELF and GDP measures.

I also include two substantive control variables. The first of these deals with previous imperial history. The measure is the proportion of a territory's existance spent

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<sup>5</sup> Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates taken from Fearon and Laitin's dataset, with values extended back to 1946.

in colonial dependency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and their independence (Wimmer and Min 2006). This variable is included to control for the possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter's (2000) argument linking indirect rule to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially actually active in the politicization of ethnicity, rather than simply in the escalation of tensions and violence. The second substantive control variable is population size. A key theoretical mechanism are the resource limitations on elites to provide sufficient public goods. The more people the more goods required. If my theoretical model holds, omission of a population size measure would artificially inflate the estimates of my explanatory variables and should thus be included.

To carry out the actual analysis, I have repurposed the standard modeling approach in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress my explanatory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for in years where ethnicity was politically relevant and 0 when it was not. Although the temporal variation is limited in this analysis, I control for this limited temporal variation by following Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). As recommended I include a cubic spline on a non-politicized ethnicity year count variable of the number of years since ethnicity was last politically relevant. I also include a previous politicized ethnicity year count total variable to further control for inertia effects. In addition to these temporal variables I finally include a calendar year variable to control for possible changes in international political climate. Like most other statistical models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many datasets routinely violate. For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of the country-year format violate the independence of observations assumption. To

account for many of these possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster them by sovereign state to specifically address the non-independence of cases within states. The inclusion of the calendar year dummy variables creates a substantial number of nuisance parameters, which I suppress in the presentation of results. The full model results, a set of models fit to demonstrate the robustness of my results, and full descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A.

I present three models which move the analysis along in three steps. I first test the original neo-romantic expectation that as ethnic diversity increases, the probability of ethnicity's politicization should also increase (Counter Hypothesis 1). I then examine the evidence for my four principle hypotheses (the National Closure, Multi-culturalist, Ethno-Bureaucratic, and Populist Hypotheses). These hypotheses all hinge on the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita and the ELF index. Due to the dynamics of the binary logit model the meaning of this interaction coefficient must be developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which the data actually support each hypothesis. I now present the results.

### ***Results: Explaining the Politicization of Ethnicity***

Table 2.1 presents results from two models. Model 1 examines the relationship posited by neo-romanticist approaches. The initial evidence shown in model 1 suggests initial support for the argument that ethnicity is more likely to be politicized when ethnic diversity is higher (Counter Hypothesis 1). However, the results from model 1 do not tell the whole story. The neo-romanticist mechanism suggests a constant positive linear relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity while the theoretical mechanisms for my four principle hypotheses expect a contingent non-linear

effect. The significance of the interaction term in model 2 indicates that the effect of ethnic diversity coefficient varies according to GDP per capita.

**Table 2.1.**  
**Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 1	Model 2
	Logit Coefficient (S.E.)	Logit Coefficient (S.E.)
<b>Politicization Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>		
GDP per Capita	0.207 (0.162)	-0.388 (0.245)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	2.894** (1.087)	2.566* (1.021)
GDP-ELF Interaction		3.279*** (0.771)
<b>Other Control Variables</b>		
Imperial Past	0.363 (0.552)	0.289 (0.565)
Population	0.334* (0.170)	0.408* (0.161)
Time Control Variables	Suppressed	Suppressed
Constant	0.127 (21.906)	-0.792 (1.346)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-86.9915	-84.2645
Wald $\chi^2$	2035.97*** (18)	1156.53*** (19)
N (Number of States)	6935 (153)	6935 (153)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis.

<sup>\*\*</sup>The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to collinearity which suggests only two knots between the beginning and end points of the data. The pre and post knot slopes of splines 1 and 2 are not significantly different from one another.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$


The positive ethnic diversity estimate in model 1 is thus more likely due to the mechanisms motivating the four primary hypotheses of this chapter, explicitly tested in model 2. In all models the measure of indirect rule also not significant. In models testing expectations from the power and legitimacy, neo-romanticist, and rational actor approaches, the results either provide no supporting evidence or directly contradict their theoretical expectation. From the structural-configural perspective argued for in this

chapter, however, the results from models 1 are not surprising. They actually suggest the need for further investigation.

The central argument of this chapter, is that the effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity is *conditional* on the resources available to the state. This conditional aspect is captured in the GDP-ELF interaction term, which is added in model 2. As the results for model 2 show, the significantly positive interaction coefficient provides evidence that the structural sorting effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity is indeed *contingent* on the amount resources the state can access. To examine the extent to which the nature of this contingent relationship follows theoretical expectations, it is necessary to probe the model deeper and examine the predicted probabilities of politicized ethnicity for the ELF index across a range of GDP per capita values. These predicted probability plots are shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4.

The ethno-bureaucratic and populist hypothesis holds that for the poorest of states, as levels of ethnic diversity increase the probability of politicized ethnicity should decrease. Thus, when resources are scarce and ethnic diversity is very low the probability of ethnicity's politicization should be quite high (the Ethno-Bureaucratic Scenario), but when ethnic diversity is higher, and resources remain scarce, ruling elites tend to pursue more populist themes in an effort to avoid unnecessary ethnic fragmentation (the Populist Scenario). Although model results are consistent with this hypothesized pattern of relationships, Figure 2.3 demonstrates their substantive limitations. The logic behind the ethno-bureaucratic and populist scenarios only seems to hold in the poorest of poor states. While the hypothesized negative slope of the ELF

index in clearly visible when GDP per capita is at its minimum, Figure 2.3 shows that it is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the 2.5 percentile of GDP per capita.




**Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity by Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization and Lower Levels of GDP per Capita**

Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score. Some cases appear in different locations between plots due to economic growth.

The slope of the ELF index is clearly positive when GDP per capita is set to the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile, which indicates that the operational logic motivating the Nationalist Closure and Multi-Cultural Scenario hypotheses is active at far lower levels of state resources than I had expected. Nevertheless, as Figure 2.3 illustrates, the number of states that have been in lower 2.5<sup>th</sup> percentile of lnGDP at some point in their histories is remarkable. Actual complete dataset coverage of the logit plane is provided in Figure 2.5.

Although neo-romanticist arguments suggest a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity, my extension of the power and legitimacy perspective holds that at higher levels of resources, the effect of ethnic diversity on ethnicity's politicization should become larger as GDP per capita increases. Figure 2.3 indicates that states with GDP per capita as low as the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile are characterized by a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity. The evidence thus suggests that the structural mechanisms at work in the National Closure and Multi-Cultural Scenarios are at work within roughly 97.5 percent of the world's states. However, the evidence that this relationship is not due to the mechanisms argued for by neo-romanticist scholars is found in the fact that the positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity is not constant at all levels of GDP per Capita. Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probabilities when GDP per capita is set to the 25<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles. As levels of GDP per Capita increase, the effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity also increases. The slope of each line depicting the relationship between ethnic diversity and the politicization of ethnicity gets steeper as the resources that the state commands increases.




**Figure 2.4: Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity by Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization and Higher Levels of GDP per Capita**

Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score. Some cases appear in multiple locations between plots due to economic growth.

Simply put, the evidence shows that the importance of the state grows as the resources which it can command increase. States with low levels of ethnic diversity and relatively abundant resources are shown to be less likely to be characterized by politicized ethnicity (the National Closure Scenario) than states with relatively abundant resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity (the Multi-Culturalist Scenario). However, these results indicate that as the resources available to the state increase, higher levels of ethnic diversity tend to make the politicization of ethnicity increasingly difficult to avoid.

## Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity Scatter Plot by Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization & Ln GDP per Capita



**Figure 2.5: Predicted Probability of Politicized Ethnicity Scatter Plot by Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization and LnGDP per Capita**

Figure 2.5 provides a better illustration of the data coverage over the logit plane.

Although coverage is far from full, it is sufficient to show that body of the data are driving the results. Support for ethno-bureaucratic scenario is found in the right most quadrant, where both resources and ethnic diversity result in higher predicted probabilities for politicized ethnicity. Where ethnic diversity is limited and resources are more abundant (top-center quadrant), the nationalist closure scenario plays out, but quickly give way to the multi-culturalist scenario as ethnic diversity increases. The left most quadrant is dominated by states with relatively abundant resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity. The predicted probabilities in this area are consistent with theoretical expectations from the multi-cultural scenario. It is in the lower-center quadrant, where we would expect to see states defined as more similar to the populist scenario and

it is here where the data are the sparsest. This thinly populated area of the three dimensional scatter plot is understandable, given the difficulty of making populist appeals in the face of limited resources. More importantly, the limited data points that do exist in this lower-center region do indeed strongly conform to the theoretical expectations of the populist scenario with low to very low predicted probabilities of politicized ethnicity.

### ***Conclusion and Discussion***

This chapter identifies four structural configurations of available resources and levels of ethnic diversity that give states a structural affinity towards politicized ethnicity or non-politicized ethnicity. States with the highest probability of politicized ethnicity tend to have higher levels of GDP per Capita and higher levels of ethnic diversity, consistent with the Multi-Cultural Scenario of state formation, solidification and reproduction. The evidence also suggests that for a small subset of states which are extremely poor and have very low levels of ethnic diversity also have a higher probability of politicized ethnicity (Ethno-Bureaucratic Scenario). However, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the guiding logic of the multi-cultural scenario best explains the majority of cases where ethnicity is politicized. When the state has more resources at its command, it becomes an increasingly lucrative target. While a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnicity's politicization is expected by the rational actor and neo-romanticist approaches, neither can explain the curvilinear relationship demonstrated in this analysis. Increased ethnic diversity may indeed lower the organizing costs associated with political mobilization, and the present analysis is not equipped to rule out this explanation. It may be included in the overall positive effect of ethnic diversity on ethnicity's politicization. However, the increasing size of the ethnic

diversity effect that results from higher levels of resource availability provides compelling evidence that as the state becomes a richer target, the various ethnic groups are within a state are increasingly motivated to politically organize along ethnic lines.

Similarly the majority of states where ethnicity is not politically relevant tend to track along a National Closure Scenario. States with at least a modicum of resources and low levels of ethnic diversity have a lower probability of politicized ethnicity. Although a very small subset of states that are very poor and highly diverse have a much lower likelihood of politicized ethnicity (the Populist Scenario), the absolute size of this subsection is objectively small. The vast majority of states where ethnicity is not politicized have followed a path most similar to the ideal-typical national closure outcome. Contrary to the logic of the Multi-Cultural Scenario, the limited ethnic diversity of the state tends to depoliticize ethnicity for two reasons. First, for the ruling elite it is easier to extend provision of public goods to the entirety of the population. Second, for the potential counter ethnic elites, the limited size of their potential constituency makes it more beneficial to assimilate within the super-nationalist whole. Neither, traditional rational actor approaches, nor neo-romanticist explanations provide explanations for the factors that lead states away from the politicization of ethnicity. In this regard my extension of the power and legitimacy school approach presents a far more theoretically robust explanation that also receives strong empirical support.

The results of this chapter provide empirical support for a substantial refinement to the power and legitimacy school, which has emphasized the role of available resources without including the role of ethnic diversity. Overall the Wimmer's (2002) resource exchange approach implies a small negative relationship between available resources and

ethnicity's politicization. However, this relationship is empirically unsupported and my results demonstrate the importance of including ethnic diversity within the theoretical calculus. Although the arguments and findings I have presented here suggests some substantial revisions to the original power and legitimacy framework, as a whole the foundational logic of the approach remains fundamentally untouched. Consistent with other scholarship from the power and legitimacy school, my structural-configural approach identifies the incentive and disincentive structures that must be included within the calculus of both ruling and counter elites. The major results from this chapter extend the power and legitimacy school insight that the state has increasingly become the prize of political contests and an instrument of power within the modern political era. Far from an historical observation, my results suggest that as the resources available to the state increase, the opportunity structures for increased ethnic mobilization created by high levels of ethnic diversity also increase as well. Ethnic diversity may not be directly related to the onset of ethnic rebellion, but these results suggest that it is an important structural sorting effect that is contingent upon the resources a state can command. In this capacity, the ethnic makeup of the state has historically driven some states to politicize ethnicity and some to pursue alternative organizing principles of state level politics.

To be sure, these results do not present the foundation for a linear argument where states first politicize ethnicity, commit to ethnic exclusion, and then experience an ethnic rebellion. Rather, states from the moment of formation find themselves with politicized ethnicity, non-politicized ethnicity, ethnic exclusion, or even ethnic rebellions. But the politicization of ethnicity is undeniably a necessary condition for ethnic exclusion and

ethnic rebellion. For a lucky few ethnicity is not politicized while the majority of states exist in a position where the politicization of ethnicity has been institutionalized. This much larger set of states has a structural disadvantage that places them substantially more at risk for ethnically based exclusion and ethnic rebellion. The vicissitudes of history have given some states an advantage in avoiding ethnic rebellion and violence. But an important implication of this chapter's findings is that the vicissitudes of history are patterned. For all the unique qualities of each state's situation and narrative, there nevertheless exist theoretically meaningful and identifiable general patterns. It is this reality that allows for a rich and fruitful dialogue between quantitative and qualitative scholars in this area. Wimmer's (2002) original theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence was founded on strong qualitative case based research. Over the last decade scholars have subjected the elements of this theory regarding state formation and the rise of the nation-state (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010) and ethnic violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009) to quantitative scrutiny. This dissertation follows in this vein. By systematically harnessing the strengths of quantitative techniques within a larger project, the ambitious scope of qualitative research can be maintained and empirically strengthened. Understanding the structural factors that both push states into or away from politicization of ethnicity is fundamental to the broader project of explaining ethnic rebellion. In this regard, my results suggest that the patterns of ethnicity's politicization around the world are best explained through the empirically supported extensions and refinements I have proposed the broader power and legitimacy framework.

### **Chapter 3: The Institutionalization of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion**

States characterized by politicized ethnicity are an institutional stepping stone closer to potential ethnic rebellion than states where political cleavages fall along alternative lines. Given the widespread politicization of ethnicity globally, a substantial majority of the world's states have crossed the threshold rendering ethnic rebellions more likely. Nevertheless, contrary to most theories regarding the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, the concepts are not interchangeable. Not all states where ethnicity has been politicized exclude portions of their populations from state access along ethnic lines. In fact, between 1946 and 2005, the percentage of states where ethnicity was politicized but state sanctioned ethnic exclusion did not occur has fluctuated between 13 and 20 percent. Hence a sizeable minority of states has managed to largely avoid systematic ethnic group exclusion, even as ethnic boundaries remain powerful political concerns. As states with state sanctioned ethnic exclusion are substantially more likely to suffer the onset of ethnic rebellion, our understanding of the structural forces that promote and propagate the systematic ethnic exclusion of peoples is critical. When does politicized ethnicity transform into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion? Which structural and institutional mechanisms channel states toward categorical ethnic exclusion versus more conciliatory ethnic power-sharing solutions? For example, why have states such as Burundi, Haiti, and Switzerland witnessed the politicization of ethnicity without excluding an ethnic category? Yet Uganda, the Dominican Republic, and France all exclude at least one ethnic category of their population from access to the state?

The lack of answers to these questions within both the quantitative and qualitative literatures stems from the failure of social scientific theories of ethnic exclusion, ethnic

violence, and (more broadly) nationalism, to distinguish between the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. The most recent work from the PAL school merges the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion under a unified concept of ethnicized bureaucracy. Here ruling elites are argued to politicize ethnicity and exclude a portion of the population along ethnic lines in two basic circumstances: they either have insufficient resources to provide public goods to the whole of a state's population; or civil society organization remains inadequate for ruling elites to move away from clientelistic ties of state patronage. Alternative and less direct explanations vary. A DBC approach takes the nationalist exclusion of ethnic minorities as a given and seeks to explain the escalation of their complaints into rebellion. Rational actor approaches, in contrast, tend to examine the formation of the nation through both inclusive and exclusive practices linked to indirect rule. Here state formation is linked to a titular nation within the modern political era by theoretical fiat. The definition of the nation is then expanded or contracted depending on the type of state building strategies being pursued in a given case. As a result, within the ethnic rebellion literature, the question of ethnic exclusion is either obliquely addressed by treating it as one of many different nationalist state-building strategies, or simply bracketed from the discussion as a grievance, the existence of which is assumed *a priori*. When it *has* been addressed directly, ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity have been conceptually conflated. In contrast to these approaches, I argue that the relationship between state sanctioned ethnic exclusion and the politicization of ethnicity requires an analysis that allows each a unique logic of escalation. I will unpack this argument below.

Two issues arise from treating the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion as two facets of the ethnicization of state bureaucracies. First, such a move depends on the unrealistic assumption that both follow the same escalatory logic. Second, doing so obscures the role ethnic diversity plays in altering the fundamental calculus faced by ruling elites. Why are these assumptions problematic? Simply put, they assume that members of the ruling elite who enter a governing role do so in a situation where ethnicity is not politicized. Such a premise is clearly not tenable within the modern political era.

Chapter 2 addresses the fact that state formation and changes in regime occur within traditions of both non-politicized and politicized ethnicity. Here I narrow the investigation to those states where ethnicity has been politicized and examine the conditions that promote its escalation from non-exclusionary politicized ethnicity to politicized ethnicity with ethnic exclusion. For new states, the power players at the moment of state formation have already constructed the foundations of political support to varying degrees, either ethnic or otherwise. Similarly, for well established states, the rise to power of a new regime occurs with a comparable foundation of political support. For those presented with situations where ethnicity is not politicized, the risks and gains of ethnicity's politicization must be assessed. A similar dilemma for leaders exists where ethnicity is already politicized in the weighing of continued non-exclusory politicized ethnicity or escalation into state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.

The entrenchment of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion presents ruling elites with a somewhat graver calculus, as their decisions could directly result in ethnic rebellion. (I address this escalation in chapter 4.) However, conflating the politicization of ethnicity

and ethnic exclusion into a single process, the PAL school assumes that neither ethnicity's politicization nor the ethnic diversity confronted by the state alter the basic escalatory logic utilized by elites. Since ethnic exclusion cannot occur unless ethnicity has been politicized, but not all states where ethnicity is politicized commit to state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, the extent to which the same escalatory logic and structural factors pattern both developments should be an empirical question, not a theoretical presumption. Forcing their theoretical conflation leaves no room for consideration of how a state's ethnic diversity alters the strategic logic of the decision facing ruling elites and thus fails to explain the sizable minority of states where ethnicity is politicized but state sanctioned ethnic exclusion has been avoided.

Continuing the line of inquiry presented in chapter 2, I propose an extended and modified version of PAL's foundation theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict that makes explicit the analytical distinction between the politicization of ethnicity and the emergence of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. Building on the insight that state sanctioned exclusion is not possible without politicized ethnicity, I identify two scenarios in which the probability of ethnic exclusion is increased and two in which it is decreased. In states where ethnicity has already been politicized, state sanctioned exclusion is more likely when resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is low. This occurs as state elites attempt to limit the extension of citizenship and national privileges to the established members of the nation. I label this outcome *xenophobic nationalist exclusion*.

State sanctioned ethnic exclusion is also more likely when resources are limited and ethnic diversity is high. In this scenario elites hope that overwhelming support of a single ethnic minority will provide a sufficient base of political power if (1) untrusting

opposition groups that can be played against one another can be created; and (2) drawing support from this ethnic minority can free up sufficient resources to oppress this fragmented opposition. I labeled this scenario *divisive exclusion* because of the emphasis on divide and rule.

State sanctioned ethnic exclusion is less likely where resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is high. In this scenario it is difficult for one ethnicity to gain a monopoly on the state. The abundance of resources in these cases makes, what I term, *multi-cultural nationalist inclusion* both plausible and more appealing to all involved. On the other hand, state sanctioned exclusion is also less likely when ethnic diversity is low and resources are limited. In this setting the exclusion of a tiny minority does little to solidify the regime. Such a move tends to create higher repression costs than the resources it creates and does not notably increase the public goods provided to the national majority. I term this outcome *formal inclusion* since inclusion within these states has little more than token importance for most citizens since the state is relatively weak and the limitation of resources substantially reduces the benefits of state membership.

The hypotheses supporting these four different outcomes receive empirical support from an analysis using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009). These results continue the trend of empirical support for my extensions and refinements to Wimmer's (2002) theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict begun in chapter 2. I also continue the trend of using quantitative techniques to disaggregate and distinguish between various structural elements linked to the escalation of ethnic tensions (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer,

Cederman, and Min 2009). Additionally, by drawing heavily on previous case based and comparative research to highlight hypothesized mechanisms, I heed Amenta's (2003) call for a closer dialogue between qualitative and quantitative research.

### ***Ethnic Diversity and State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion***

The three major schools of thought on ethnic violence have three pronounced weaknesses when comes to their explanations of ethnic exclusion. First, the GAO school sees the motivation for rebellion, including ethnic exclusion, as negligible to explaining the onset of ethnic violence. Second, DBC scholars tend to overlook ethnic exclusion for two reasons. It either premises that ethnic groups have an all but primordial urge toward self determination, making ethnic diversity (regardless of exclusion) a motivation for rebellion (formerly the predominant view in the school); or it emphasizes the reduced collective action costs provided by ethnic ties. Finally, PAL, while being the only school to directly address the role of ethnic exclusion, conflates it with the politicization of ethnicity, thus assuming that identical mechanisms drive both outcomes.

For their part, the GAO approach treats ethnic exclusion as non-essential to the goal of explaining rebellions in general. Instead, to the extent that they acknowledge ethnic exclusion, it is simply treated as one of the many types of potential grievances motivating rebellion and insurgency (Laitin 2007). Ironically, GAO scholars take grievances deemed worthy of rebellion, ethnic or not, as nearly ubiquitous across the globe. For them the central explanatory component in the onset of rebellion is feasibility. Thus, Fearon and Laitin (2003; 2004) emphasize the role of opportunity structures such as mountainous terrain and weak states, while others stress the role of lootable resources such as oil (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; see also, Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007). This

emphasis on opportunity structures requires at least two critical theoretical assumptions. First, potential grievances that could inspire armed revolt and insurgency are treated as existing in nearly every state across the globe. Second, the intensity of the grievance is assumed to be equal in every state in which a grievance exists. Under these two assumptions, the world is treated as a veritable cluster of grenades; the pin of each, to continue the metaphor, keeps the grenade from exploding only so long as the opportunity structures that allow it to be pulled do not arise. As can be seen, the emphasis on opportunity structures—in conjunction with their lack of emphasis on grievances—does not allow for the possibility that stronger grievances may lower the feasibility threshold. Similarly, if oppressive grievances are not as widespread as assumed, then the sweeping inclusion of nearly all cases becomes increasingly problematic. As the number of cases with sufficient grievances and opportunity structures to warrant revolt increases, the effect size of any solid measure of the requisite opportunity structures would be artificially reduced. In short, non-findings regarding ethnicity are more prominent because the scope conditions have been incorrectly specified.

The disregard for grievances, including ethnic exclusion, also raises issues about the interpretation of variables meant to measure opportunity structures. This is most obvious in regard to mountainous terrain. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that while mountainous terrain is a predictor of violent onset, ethnic diversity is not. If mountainous terrain is only measuring an opportunity structure, their interpretation is straightforward and unobjectionable. However, it is possible that mountainous terrain is not measuring the intended opportunity structure. Rather (to give one possible alternative) there may be structural proclivity toward the ethnic exclusion of mountain dwelling peoples from the

ruling majority. That is, the mechanism of exclusion may be due to both cultural or political differences between regional mountain peoples and the national majority, the difficulty of distributing the public goods of the state to remote areas, or a combination of the two (consider, for example, the Hmong of Vietnam). However, the failure to treat grievance with its due importance omits this simple consideration. Once the assumption that ethnic rebellions are no different than other types of rebellions is dropped, it becomes clear that ethnic exclusion is a clear cause of ethnic rebellions but not other types of rebellions (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).

I argue that the Fearon and Laitin interpretation of the mountainous terrain measure requires two tests to receive support. The mountainous terrain coefficient should be statistically significant in the ethnic rebellion onset models results presented in chapter 4 (since opportunity structures should be important for both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions). However, if mountainous terrain is measuring an opportunity structure that allows insurgents to better avoid government forces, it should not be statistically significant in the exclusion models presented in the present analysis. As this is a secondary result, only speaking to the limitations of the GAO approach, allow me to anticipate this particular result. Mountainous terrain is a statistically significant predictor of ethnic exclusion ( $p \leq .05$ ), but not ethnic rebellion, once ethnic exclusion has been accounted for. The mountainous terrain result thus provides far more plausible evidence of the ethno-political/cultural exclusion argument than the opportunity structure interpretation.

Regardless of the damaging nature of these results to the GAO perspective, a broader point is clear. Fundamental understandings of both ethnic exclusion and the

politicization of ethnicity are essential to a comprehensive explanation of ethnic rebellion onset. The basic assumptions of GAO undercut its capacity to take the role grievances seriously in the onset of rebellions, thus precluding the possibility of explaining state sanctioned exclusion, ethnic or otherwise.

Alternatively, DBC scholars see ethnic diversity as a fundamental impetus for ethnic rebellion and civil war. From this point of view, ethnic exclusion is also seen as a widespread and in some ways a natural result of ethno-nationalist drives for self-determination. Exclusion is seen as only exacerbating already raised ethnic tensions due to the very existence of multiple ethnic groups existing in close proximity. This harder version of the DBC argument maintains that ethnic diversity is central to understanding ethnic violence because ethnic ties are a central feature in the primordial fight for self-determination (Smith 1987; Smith 1995; Smith 2003). The work of Ernest Gellner (2006) offers a softer version in which ethnic diversity is seen as incompatible with processes of industrialization, and thus a source of tension as nation-building projects seek to assimilate their various ethnic categories into the national whole. Ethnic diversity is seen as a critical issue as some groups offered inclusion resist incorporation, while those who experience exclusion tend to organize and rebel as a result. A major contribution of GAO is its cogent emphasis on diverse mechanisms for lowering ethnic tensions in situations of high ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin 1996). In this vein, recent work by Roger's Brubaker (2006) has shown that local politics can be ethnically divisive even as national level politics strive to create inclusion.

There are two weaker versions of DBC scholarship that merit comment. First, Sambanis (2001) argues that ethnic ties reduce the organizational costs of collective

action that can lead to both secessionist rebellions as well as revolts aimed at establishing broader inclusion. The logic of Sambanis' argument shares a rational actor foundation similar to Hechter's (2000) work on the rise and spread of nationalism. Ethnic diversity is important for Sambanis, however, since he explains conflict with or without an exclusionary grievance. Second, Donald Horowitz (1985; 2001) maintains that economic grievances are fundamental to explaining ethnic violence. In his view, only when the benefits of modernity are shared by the entirety of a state's population can ethnic violence be overcome. Though resonant with PAL conclusions, Horowitz's stress on unequal development offers a major refinement to Gellner's argument. It is uneven development that produces ethnic tensions, rather than blind ethnic resistance to the state nationalizing project.

As a whole, the DBC school fails to even attempt an explanation of ethnic exclusion since its origins are treated as largely self evident byproducts of ethnically diverse states. Even Horowitz's approach falls short of explaining exclusion, as it focuses narrowly on how unequal economic access along ethnic lines is a central factor in unrest. Exclusion or economic inequality along ethnic lines are taken *a priori*, which offers the analytical advantage of hypotheses that are clean and clear at the expense of a comprehensive explanation concerning the mechanisms and escalation (Wimmer 2002).

### ***The Power and Legitimacy School and Ethnic Exclusion***

Unlike the other two major schools discussed thus far, the PAL approach situates the processes leading to ethnic rebellion within the broader historical rise of the nation-state system. Building on notable scholars, such as John Breuilly (1994), Reinhart Bendix (1978), Charles Tilly (1992; 2003), and Barrington Moore (1993 [1963]), the

perspective emphasizes the power relations between categories of ethnic peoples and the state, as well as the shift from divine right to rule in the name of a sovereign people. As the dominant state form shifted from agrarian empire to the nation state, the shift in the legitimacy of rule from divine right to rule in the name of a sovereign population resulted in a need to define who exactly composed the body politic. Within the fully developed nation-state, the argument goes, ruling elites both submitted to and worked to develop a *nationalist cultural compromise* where they traded political participation for the right to collect taxes; extended the benefits of the welfare state to raise armies; and accepted the rule of law for political loyalty (Wimmer 2002). Wimmer's foundational theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence posits two criteria for achieving a successful nationalist cultural compromise. First, ruling elites have to command the means to provide and distribute public goods to the whole of a state's population. And second, civil society has to be developed enough to make interest group politics a viable alternative to ethnic clientelist approaches to garnering political support. Where these elements are missing, the ethnicization of the bureaucracy ensues as ruling elites turn to their particular ethnic group for political support and instead limit the 'national we' to this specific group (Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013b).

Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) extend the dichotomous outcome of successful nation-state formation and ethnicized bureaucracy with a third category they call "populism." In this category, the ruling elite focus on excluding counter elites, attempting to draw on broad popular support of the masses in the process. States where ethnicity has been politicized and ethnic exclusion has become a reality are argued to be far more prone to ethnic rebellion because multiple ethnically organized political groups

race for control of the state. This process can often prove violent as ethnic groups may already suffer from state sanctioned exclusion, or the prospect thereof, should they fail (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).

The body of scholarship which has emerged from the PAL school provides the single most comprehensive explanation of ethnic violence in the field. Nevertheless, it is not without its weaknesses. The concepts of politicized ethnicity, national closure along ethnic lines (i.e., ethnic exclusion), and ethnicized bureaucracy do a tremendous amount of theoretical heavy lifting in explaining ethnic rebellion. However, the fuzzy conceptual relationship between ethnicity's politicization and ethnic exclusion demands further refinement for two interrelated reasons. First, the role the ethnic makeup of a state plays in the rise of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is not included in the framework. Second, by treating the politicization of ethnicity and the rise of ethnic exclusion as simultaneous processes that tend to promote the ethnicization of the bureaucracy, Wimmer relies on the assumption that the escalatory logics of each are identical. From this standpoint, ruling elites politicize ethnicity because of the need to reduce the size of the population which can make "legitimate" claims on public goods. This ethnic exclusion provides a source of political support for counter elites along ethnic lines, which further entrenches the politicization of ethnicity. Thus, for Wimmer, when resources are limited, it is the practical need to exclude a portion of the population that operates as the primary driving force of ethnicity's politicization.

The inability to deliver public goods to the entire population is rarely the only concern facing elites, even if it is central. As Karl Marx (2005:1) famously wrote, "Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make

it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand.” The ruling elite must confront their economic situation, as well as the ethnic diversity of their state, in determining their course of action. Moreover, they must confront the extent to which ethnicity is already politicized within the political system. In treating the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion as parts of the same phenomenon, Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence overlooks how the state of ethnic tensions and ethnic diversity alter the calculus facing ruling elites depending on the abundance or paucity of resources. Thus, while Wimmer is right to emphasize the role of resources available to elites, the omission of ethnic diversity and the extent to which ethnicity has already been politicized obscures the structural mechanisms that contribute to the formation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.

### ***The Disparate Escalatory Logics of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion and Politicized Ethnicity When Resources are Limited***

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the central relationships expected by Wimmer’s theoretical perspective, the revisions presented in chapter 2, and the further extensions I propose in the current chapter. As the tables indicate, the same configurations of resources and diversity that promote the politicization of ethnicity by elites should also promote ethnic *inclusion* when the politicization of ethnicity is already well established. Conversely, conditions associated with lower levels of politicization should actually promote ethnic exclusion by elites if the politicization of ethnicity has already been institutionalized. To demonstrate why this is the case for states with limited resources, I briefly review the escalatory logics presented in chapter 2, and discusses the expectations

in regard to state sanctioned exclusion. I will then highlight the importance of such distinctions in the circumstances currently facing Syria and Southern Sudan.

As Table 3.1 shows, the ethno-bureaucratic scenario for politicizing ethnicity and Wimmer's ethnicized bureaucracy configuration are the most similar. Wimmer argues that states with limited resources politicize ethnicity with the aim of excluding an ethnic element of the population. However, the results presented in chapter 2 suggest that only very poor states with low diversity actually have a structural affinity toward politicizing ethnicity. Ruling elites attempt to avoid the loss of power that could result from politicizing ethnicity due to potential ethnic fragmentation. The inclusion of ethnic diversity within the decision calculus suggests that very poor states with high diversity are incentivized to pursue more populist approaches to building political support, since politicizing ethnicity could unleash a torrent of competing ethnic claims to the state. Multiple competing claims are precisely what elites would rather avoid. Plainly, the essential question is, Do they have the choice? Where the institutionalization of ethnic politics is not complete it is more likely that ruling elites will indeed be able to steer the state down a populist path. But where ethnicity is firmly politicized, the options available to elites are far more limited.

**Table 3.1**  
**Theoretical Expectations from the Power and Legitimacy School:**  
**Both Original and Refined When Resources are Limited**

	Relevant Structural Conditions			Expected Outcomes	
	State of Ethnicity's Politicization	Resources	Ethnic Diversity	Likelihood of Politicized Ethnicity	Likelihood of Ethnic Exclusion
<b>Wimmer's Original Theoretical Expectations</b>					
Ethnicized Bureaucracy	Uncertain	Limited	---	Higher	Higher
<b>Chapter 2: Empirically Supported Revisions</b>					
Ethno-Bureaucratic Scenario	Uncertain	Limited	Low	Higher	---
Populist Scenario	Uncertain	Limited	High	Lower	---
<b>Chapter 3: Hypothesized Revisions Regarding Exclusion</b>					
Formal Inclusion	Politicized	Limited	Low	---	Lower
Divisive Exclusion	Politicized	Limited	High	---	Higher

As Table 3.1 reveals, elites in states where the politicization of ethnicity is firmly entrenched face a fundamentally different decision calculus than elites in states where the institutionalization of politicized ethnicity is uncertain. Here Wimmer's original framework best describes what I call divisive exclusion. Divisive exclusion occurs when a regime gives preferential treatment and state access to their ethnic kin and excludes multiple ethnic groups from state access in an effort to play them off each other. Elites that have gained power within the context of politicized ethnicity owe some allegiance to the ethnic group from which they garner political support. This limits the options they can viably pursue to the extent that they lack the resources to provide equal access to the rest of the state's population without reducing those reserved for their ethnic kin. Where

regimes have had the choice of politicizing ethnicity or not, the analysis presented in chapter 2 suggests that when diversity is high and resources are very limited the populist outcome tends to be preferred. However, when ethnicity becomes politicized in states with limited resources and high diversity, elites face a critical but difficult decision with limited options—one that often traps them into the further escalation of ethnic tensions. These ruling elites do not have the resources to distribute public goods to the whole population. Neither can they simply abandon their political base in favor of broader populist appeal, since internal competitors would take political advantage. In the absence of immense political skill and highly fortuitous circumstances, ruling elites are often left with little choice but to essentially double down and escalate the politicization of ethnicity into full state sanctioned ethnic exclusion.

Two examples from current world events offer useful illustrations of these two divergent escalatory logics. For divisive exclusion, we turn to Syria; and for a teetering populist scenario, let's consider Southern Sudan. In Syria, a minority Alawite sect, composing less than 10 percent of the population, has held power for four decades. The transition that brought the Assad regime to power institutionalized the politicization of ethnicity along ethno-religious lines. A small Numailatiyya clan of the Matawira tribe has overwhelmingly given preferential state access to the Alawite minority, systematically playing rival ethno-religious factions off one another in an effort to maintain power. Over the last forty years the regime has continually ‘doubled down’ on its Alawite foundation of political support, brutally oppressing any form of dissent. Yet the regime has always done so while legitimating its rule with the populist overtones of a pan-Arab Syrian Nationalism (Batatu 1981).

The strategy of divisive exclusion gives a veneer of stability until it can no longer be maintained. The present Syrian civil war is thus indicative of the tenuous nature of divisive exclusion. Within the context of the Arab Spring, the Assad regime proved unable to keep the opposition sufficiently fragmented so as to avoid a violent rebellion. Nevertheless, the legacy of divisive exclusion remains does not disappear. The fruits of the Syrian regime's seeds of distrust among the opposition remain visible in its complex amalgam of competing religious sects and peoples. The legacy of fragmentation has made it difficult for the opposition to maintain a unified resistance against an Assad regime empowered by assistance from Hezbollah, Russia and Iran. With the politicization of ethnicity institutionalized, the limited resources and high ethnic diversity facing the Alawite dominated Syrian regime channeled the Syrian state into a pattern of divisive exclusion, the consequences of which are playing out in a bloody and devastating civil war.

Southern Sudan, in contrast, illustrates a case where ethnic diversity is high, resources are extremely limited, but politicization of ethnicity is not completely institutionalized. As such, state sanctioned ethnic exclusion by the government remains a potential course of action, but one that has not yet been totally embraced. The most recent turmoil developed when President Kiir removed from office Dr. Machar, his primary deputy and political rival (as well as 15 others), amid accusations that Machar was planning a coup. Although political pundits have played up the fact that Machar is from the Nuer ethnic group, while Kiir is from the Dinkha, President Kiir has been publically downplaying the ethnic argument in an attempt to build a populist Southern Sudanese Nationalism around his regime. It is too early to tell if President Kiir's

exclusion of rival counter elites on the back of calls for multi-ethnic populist support will ultimately win the day.

There is no doubt that ethnicity is highly politicized and charged in Southern Sudan. The appointment of Dr. Machar, who hails from Southern Sudan's second largest Nuer ethnic group, as the primary deputy in the government was a critical compromise that allowed the formation of the Southern Sudanese government. The move expanded an already broad base of multi-ethnic support for President Kiir. Dr. Machar, a well known political figure in his own right, has a political following that responded violently to his removal, but unlike the Syrian case, the conflict in Southern Sudan is more akin to political infighting. President Kiir and Dr. Machar have each taken different paths to political prominence that have exacerbated differences in their leadership styles as well as their political perspectives. In line with results presented in chapter 2, Southern Sudan's limited resources and high ethnic diversity seem to be motivating President Kiir to pursue a version of the populist scenario. As Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012) point out, excluded counter elites have an incentive to further politicize ethnicity in order to build political support for an opposition. In the Sudanese case, should Dr. Machar or others succeed, President Kiir would no doubt attempt to gain political support almost solely from the Dinkha ethnic group. Such a move would necessitate a formal governmental power sharing situation or an expansion of the current hostilities into outright civil war.

The human toll in each of these example cases is alarming. But the brief comparison serves to highlight the importance of distinguishing between the politicization of ethnicity and the onset of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. When resources are limited, ethnic diversity is high, and politicized ethnicity has been

institutionalized, regimes are often trapped into a cycle of divide and rule through divisive exclusion. As the previous discussion of the Syrian case highlights, when ethnic distinctions are already institutionalized as the principal bases of political mobilization, the configuration of limited resources and high ethnic diversity should result in higher levels of state sanctioned exclusion (i.e., the divisive exclusion hypothesis). Yet this pattern should only hold when the politicization of ethnicity is firmly institutionalized. As the Southern Sudanese case suggests, the distinction between the institutionalization of ethnicity as the principal source of political mobilization and alternative modes of political mobilization is of critical importance to understanding the onset of ethnic exclusion. Chapter 2 showed that when resources are limited and ethnic diversity is high, a populist outcome where counter elites are excluded and the government aims to build a multi-ethnic base of support is common. Southern Sudan thus stands at a crossroads. Even as President Kiir aims to build a broad populist base, the strong support his counter-elite (Dr. Machar) enjoys from the Nuer ethnic group could politicize ethnicity to such an extent that Kiir would have to rely more upon Dinka support. If Southern Sudan can achieve a populist outcome, it may be able to limit the current conflict to a rebellion, preventing expansion into a full blown civil war. Although, such a result would require a move preventing the already politicized ethnic boundaries from becoming institutionalized. This may simply be too difficult task in the current political climate.

Contrary to the expectations of Wimmer's theory, not all states with limited resources and politicized ethnicity are beset by ethnic exclusion. While extremely limited resources and low ethnic diversity are linked to ethnicity's politicization (as shown in chapter 2), states where ethnicity is already politicized, resources are limited,

and ethnic diversity is low, should be far less likely to exclude populations along ethnic lines (i.e., the formal inclusion hypothesis). In such cases the excluded minority would be quite small and the costs of the additional unrest would tend to be outweighed by the benefits. The amount of resources freed up by excluding a small minority is often insufficient to create a noticeable increase in political support from the national majority when redistributed across the nation. Here, small minorities are encouraged to assimilate into the primary national culture. Although racism and discrimination are still all too common in these states, they are not a formally institutionalized part of the state itself (for example Haiti or Madagascar from 1973-1992). The extremely limited resources available to these states further requires the label of ‘formal inclusion’ since the extreme scarcity makes it difficult for ruling elites to develop any real loyalty to the centralized state. Thus, although states in this situation attempt to build a foundation upon a formally inclusive nationalism, their limited resources severely limit the overall capacity of these states. The result, plainly, can be a failed state, such as in Somalia, where ruling elites were unable to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force were overrun by competing warlords. The failed state’s former territory is then regionally fragmented in a small example of what Theda Skocpol (1979) coined ‘a balance of weakness.’

***The Disparate Escalatory Logics of State Sanctioned Ethnic Exclusion and Politicized Ethnicity When Resources are Relatively Abundant***

Wimmer’s theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic rebellion does not fully address the ethnic exclusion that remains quite common in both economically advanced and moderately developed states. The oversight occurs for two reasons. First, exclusion and discrimination is often more subtle and less draconian in more economically

developed states. Although not ethnic in character, consider the following example. The conservative legislature in Arizona recently sent a bill to the governor of Arizona's desk that would allow businesses to refuse service to the gay and lesbian community on religious grounds. In Uganda, by comparison, a law was recently enacted that makes homosexuality a crime punishable by life in prison. Although both of these pieces of legislation represent fundamental encroachments on individual human rights, the Uganda law is by far more extreme. As Wimmer (2002) points out, within well developed nation-states ethno-nationalist ideologies find their voice in racist and xenophobic attitudes that gain more salience in times of economic difficulty. However, where protest and demonstrations emerge ruling elites are often able to incorporate the upper elements of these movements by extending inclusion in the social system rather than facing fundamental reform. His emphasis on ethnic conflict and violence thus steers the project away from a deeper treatment of ethnic exclusion in well developed societies. Thus, as Table 3.2 illustrates, Wimmer argues that ethnicity largely remains politicized in most developed states, but that state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is much less likely. The second reason this conclusion is reached, can be found in the fact that his paradigmatic case, upon which the broad theoretical hypothesis is constructed is, Switzerland. Here ethnicity is certainly politicized, but exclusion is, indeed, notably absent. However, as a result of fusing the politicization of ethnicity with state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, Wimmer overlooks the role that high levels of ethnic diversity can play in pushing well developed states away from ethnic exclusion. In fact, Switzerland is quite ethnically diverse, and fits well within the revised theoretical framework I propose.

**Table 3.2**  
**Theoretical Expectations from the Power and Legitimacy School:**  
**Original and Refined When Resources are Abundant**

	Relevant Structural Conditions			Expected Outcomes	
	State of Ethnicity's Politicization	Resources	Ethnic Diversity	Likelihood of Politicized Ethnicity	Likelihood of Ethnic Exclusion
<b>Wimmer's Original Theoretical Expectations</b>					
Nationalist Cultural Compromise	Uncertain	Abundant	---	Higher	Lower
<b>Chapter 2: Empirically Supported Revisions</b>					
National Closure Scenario	Uncertain	Abundant	Low	Lower	---
Multi-Culturalist Scenario	Uncertain	Abundant	High	Higher	---
<b>Chapter 3: Hypothesized Revisions Regarding Exclusion</b>					
Xenophobic Exclusion	Politicized	Abundant	Low	---	Higher
Multi-Ethnic Nationalist Inclusion	Politicized	Abundant	High	---	Lower

The Swiss case is actually an excellent example of what I call multi-ethnic inclusion. States characterized by multi-ethnic inclusion are also characterized by the institutionalization of politicized ethnicity. Their high ethnic diversity, to a large extent, makes the avoidance of politicized ethnicity quite difficult. On the other hand, the state can still strike a grand multi-ethnic nationalist bargain because the state has sufficient resources to include the whole of a state's population. Each included ethnic group makes exclusion in this context much more difficult. If a group were excluded along ethnic lines, the grounds for their exclusion would challenge the very foundation upon which the state exists. In this regard, post-Apartheid South Africa and Switzerland are quite

similar. Both have a GDP per capita above the international mean, and both states contain well above average ethnic diversity, as measured by the Ethno-Fractionalization Index (ELF).<sup>6</sup> If empirically supported on a broader level, states with higher levels of ethnic diversity and relatively abundant resources should prove less likely to carryout state sanctioned ethnic exclusion (the Multi-Ethnic Inclusion Hypothesis).

A close reading of Wimmer's (2002) theoretical framework illustrates that the multi-ethnic inclusive outcome is quite close to the scenario he outlines. The multi-ethnic inclusion hypothesis is thus a straightforward extension of his theoretical logic, once the ethnic diversity of the state is allowed to contribute in a meaningful manner. States with abundant resources and high levels of ethnic diversity are expected to be characterized by politicized ethnicity but low levels of exclusion in both the Wimmer's original framework and my own extension of his theoretical framework. The logic of the historical-comparative tradition suggests that any theoretical revision must explain what the previous version addressed, while adding insight to new cases. In this regard, the larger contribution of my revision to his framework is that it also allows for an explanation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in well-developed states. As Table 3.2 indicates, the original Wimmer theoretical framework does not explain the existence of states with relatively abundant resources that systematically exclude a portion of their population along ethnic lines. In this regard, Wimmer's version of a successful nationalist cultural compromise is somewhat optimistic regarding the extent to which economically developed states have achieved a full nationalist cultural compromise. For Wimmer, the fully realized nation-state includes the *whole* of their territory's permanent

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<sup>6</sup> The data supporting this claim are drawn from Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic Power Relations Dataset." Dataverse Network, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796>

population while excluding those who are citizens of another state on the grounds that that they have rights and representation elsewhere. The fully realized nation-state thus provides a setting of formal equality for those included in the national “we.” In Switzerland this has come to fruition. In other cases, such as France and the United States, this is less the case.

The multi-ethnic inclusion scenario is by no means assured. The French and United States cases are illustrative in demonstrating the merits of extending Wimmer’s perspective. France is a nation-state that is economically well developed, where ethnicity is politicized and certain ethnic segments of society are excluded from full state access. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National Party is a clear example, where racist and xenophobic viewpoints have coalesced into a political movement to make sure that France stays ‘French.’ In the United States, the Civil Rights movement struggled against similar conservative, racist, and xenophobic political movements (Blee 1991; Santa Ana 2002) and the current opposition in Congress to immigration reform is rife with xenophobic undertones. Ruling elites do indeed wish to dispense the public goods associated with political modernity, but these dispensations do not occur due to simple benevolence. A vast and rich literature has repeatedly shown that these are concessions from ruling elites, achieved via struggle in a host of various socio-political arenas of society. Consider, for example, the seminal work of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) regarding the role of working class movements in the rise of capitalist democracy, or Kurzman’s (2008) work showing the shortcomings democratic movements headed by emerging middle class intelligentsias. Haggard and Kaufman’s (2008) work on nation-building and democratization through extension of the welfare state in South America is yet

another example. These few examples come from a literature that clearly demonstrate a utilitarian bend in the offering of political participation for the right to collect taxes, extension of the welfare state to raise armies, and acceptance of the rule of law for political loyalty. The logic of the argument is not that ruling elites are overtly greedy, but rather, like all social actors, if I may draw from Bourdieu, deeply immersed in their particular *habitus*, with all the requisite resistances to change.

Wimmer (2002:69) incisively demonstrates that racism and xenophobia are, as he states, “*enfants naturels* of the world order of nation-states, an extreme form of nationalism revealing in its exaggeration the very principles of communal solidarity on which modern societies are based.” Wimmer then links this reality to states, such as Switzerland, where politicized ethnicity is seen as a byproduct of the nation-state system, in which modern states exist. However, by largely conflating the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, as well omitting consideration of ethnic diversity, Wimmer simply does not extend this position far enough. Thus, while his approach does offer an account for the existence of states, such as Switzerland, where ethnicity is politicized but state sanctioned ethnic exclusion has been avoided, it does not offer an equally compelling explanation for cases, such as France, and the United States, which are economically developed and quite ethnically diverse but also have a history of exclusion. Yes, high levels of ethnic diversity and abundant resources should press states toward the multi-cultural inclusive scenario, but empirically there remains variation. To understand this variation it is necessary to consider the xenophobic exclusion scenario which tends to emerge within states with abundant resources but far less ethnic diversity.

The inclusion of ethnic diversity within the theoretical framework allows for just these types of cases. Chapter 2 showed that states with abundant resources and low levels of ethnic diversity are more likely to not politicize ethnicity than states where resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is high. However, for those states that, thanks to the vicissitudes of history, have firmly politicized ethnicity in spite of this structural affinity, the probability of ethnically based exclusion is expected to be quite high. The national, “we the people,” is firmly established, and yet the nationalist cultural compromise does not extend to the complete permanent territorial population of the state. To use Wimmer’s terminology, ruling elites do not extend the rights and freedoms of political modernity simply because they can. They do so within the context of historically situated and contested struggles. As such, it is expected that when ethnicity has already been politicized, ethnic diversity is relatively low and resources relatively abundant, *ceteris paribus* ruling elites will still continue to exclude at least as much of the population as is permitted by the socially normative status quo (the Xenophobic Exclusion Hypothesis). The march for full formal civil equality may ultimately be achieved in any given state, but from a structural and institutional perspective, within the boundaries of any given state, where ethnicity is politicized, ethnic diversity is low, and resources abundant, the nation-state form tends to mean formal inclusion for *most*, not all.

Here the Netherlands and Poland are the paradigmatic cases. France, the United Kingdom and the United States have less ethnic diversity than Switzerland, but far more than either the Netherlands or Poland. As such, they occupy a kind of theoretical transitional space between the multi-cultural inclusivity scenario and the xenophobic exclusivity scenario. If Wimmer’s original framework were sufficient, ethnic exclusion

in Poland and the Netherlands would not exist. Nor would it exist in the United States, France and the United Kingdom. If, empirically supported, my refinements to Wimmer's original framework, through the inclusion of ethnic diversity, would allow the basic framework to explain these important anomalous cases

### ***Data, Measures, and Methods***

To empirically test these hypotheses I employ the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009) (EPR). The EPR contains data from 1946 through 2005 on the entire population of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at least 1 million people or a territorial area of at least 500,000 square kilometers. The resulting dataset includes 7,155 country-year observations for 155 post-independence sovereign states. The present analysis is concerned with the onset of ethnic exclusion within states where ethnicity has already been politicized. In this regard, the EPR provides two critical measures. First, it provides a measure of state sanctioned ethnic group exclusion. Ethnic group exclusion was coded as 1 if at least one ethnic group was categorically excluded from the executive branch of the state along ethnic lines.

Although this measure is only one type of state based exclusion it remains the best available measure in the field. Second, I also use dataset's measure of the political relevance of ethnicity to restrict the cases analysed to those which have politicized ethnicity. Extending the insight, highlighted by Wimmer et al. (2009), that ethnic rebellions cannot occur in states where ethnicity has not become politicized, my perspective regarding the institutional escalation of ethnic tensions holds that ethnic exclusion cannot occur without the prior politicization of ethnicity. Restricting the sample of cases to those where ethnicity has been coded politically relevant leaves an

eligible 5,861 country years for 129 post-independence states. An ethnic category was coded as relevant if at least one significant political actor claimed to speak on behalf of that particular group, or if those from that particular group were systematically discriminated against by the state.<sup>7</sup>

As with chapter 2, the present analysis draws heavily from the power and legitimacy school, I follow the Wimmer et al. (2009:325) working definition, which holds that ethnicity is, “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture.” Wimmer et al. (2009) includes in this definition ethno-linguistic, ethno-somatic and ethno-religious groups, while excluding tribes and clans which focus on genealogy or region, and do not link shared ancestry with commonality. Within this definitional framework the political relevance of ethnicity, as well as the measure of state exclusion, are theoretically sound. They do, however, have at least a few imperfections that must be acknowledged. First, the measure of ethnicity’s political relevance does not take into account degrees of ethnicity’s politicization. Second, the relevance measure also does not capture the extent to which members of an ethnic category actually support those claiming to speak on their behalf. For its part, limiting the measure of exclusion to a coding of access to the executive branch of government, including the cabinet, potentially misses forms of discrimination and exclusion that exist even after access to the executive branch has been gained. For example, it is unrealistic to think that when Nelson Mandela became president in South Africa, the legacies of state sponsored exclusion simply dissapeared. Nevertheless, given its temporal range, analytic clarity, and sample coverage, the EPR’s measures of

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<sup>7</sup> The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset may be found at (<http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html>) or <http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf>.

ethnicity's political relevance and ethnic group exclusion it the best available source of data for quantitative analysis on the subject.

### ***Explanatory Variables of Interest***

The two concepts of interest in this chapter are the resources available to ruling elites and the ethnic diversity of the state. In an effort to keep my study as comparable to recent work from the power and legitimacy school as possible, I have efforited, where possible to use the same data. In line with this goal, I utilize the version of the ELF index, as provided by Fearon and Laitin, as my measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index measures the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who speak languages from different ethno-linguistic categories. The overlap between ethno-somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties is often substantial but this is not always the case. As such, my use of the ELF index will make my results less generalizable to those areas where linguistic cultural diacritics are not the primary markers of ethnic boundaries. Still, given the central importance of language to ethnicity in general and the absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index offers a solid analytical tool to measure the ethnic diversity of a state. To measure the resources available to ruling elites I draw upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. (2009), and use gross domestic product per capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars. Since economic development and the resources from which states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have a strong thoeretical connection with overall GDP per capita, the measure is an obvious choice for the relative abundance or scarcity of resources available to elites. Using the GDP data used in the Wimmer et al. (2009)

study grants an overall coverage of 99.6 percent of sample.<sup>8</sup> Operationally, my four principle hypotheses hold that the effect of the ELF index is contingent on the GDP per capita, and thus I include an interaction term in the model for the ELF and GDP measures. I discuss the role of the interaction term in testing my hypotheses in more detail in the modeling section. Full descriptive statistics are provided for all variables in Appendix B.

### ***Control Variables***

I also include a number of substantive control variables. The first of these deals with previous imperial history. The measure is the proportion of a territory's existence spent in colonial dependency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and their independence (Wimmer and Min 2006). This variable is included to control for the possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter's (2000) argument linking indirect rule to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially active in the formation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. The second substantive control variable is population size. A key theoretical mechanism stems from the resource limitations elites face in their efforts to provide sufficient public goods. It logically follows that the more people the more goods required by the state. If my theoretical model holds, omission of a population size measure would artificially inflate the estimates of my explanatory variables and should thus be included. Wimmer (2002) also argues that the breakdown of new democracies can provide the impetus for ethnic exclusion if a party, once voted into power, realizes they can maintain power along narrower ethnic lines. Harff and Gurr (2004) also argue

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<sup>8</sup> Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates taken from Fearon and Laitin's dataset, with values extended back to 1946.

that government form can exacerbate ethnic tensions or play a role in alleviating them. Although there are conflicting results in the literature regarding regime form, as part of the process of unpacking the relationships between common explanatory variables of ethnic rebellion and their effect on ethnic exclusion, I include a dummy variable for democracy and another for anocracy derived from the Polity IV dataset. Following Wimmer et al. (2009), I also use the +6 and -6 cut points to distinguish between democracies, anocracies, and autocracies.

The final two control variables I include are proportion mountainous terrain and barrels of oil per capita. As discussed early in the paper, Fearon and Laitin's (2003) insurgency model posits that opportunity structures are the triggers of civil war, as opposed to grievances, and that ethnicity is simply a descriptive quality regarding a subset of these conflicts. Since, studies in this area have not taken ethnic power relations into account in their models, it is possible that their measure of mountainous terrain was capturing some element of the ethnic variance. Although Fearon and Laitin do not expect that ethnicity plays a role in the onset of such conflicts, it is a central part of their theoretical perspective that both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions are brought about through similar opportunity structures. If their hypothesis is supported, there is thus no reason that mountainous terrain should not demonstrate the expected positive relationship. However, if proportion of mountainous terrain does not receive empirical support as a predictor of ethnic rebellion and is a statistically significant predictor of ethnic group exclusion, then the finding and theoretical interpretation of the proportion of mountainous terrain measure requires substantial reconsideration. Following a similar line of argument, Collier and Hoeffer (2004) posit a second type of opportunity structure in the

form of lootable resources. Buhaug (2006) has also argued that oil production is a critical resource because it is commonly controlled by the state. In these situations the control of the state becomes an even larger prize and is thus worth greater risk to monopolize. It is more than plausible that competition over such resources could also raise ethnic tensions and provide grounds for ethnic exclusion (for a possible example see pre-2011 Sudan, as well as the current conflict in Southern Sudan). To control for this possibility I use the EPR's oil production per capita variable, which is computed from data analyzed by Wimmer and Min (2006).

### ***Modeling Approach***

To carry out the actual analysis, I have repurposed the standard modeling approach in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress my explanatory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for country-years in which a state excluded at least one ethnic group from executive power along ethnic lines. I control for the limited temporal variation by following Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). As recommended, I include a cubic spline on a non-exclusionary year count variable indicating the number of years since an ethnic group was last excluded from state access. I also include a previous exclusion-year count total variable to further control for inertia effects. In addition to these temporal variables I also include a calendar year variable to control for possible changes in international political climate. Like most other statistical models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many datasets routinely violate. For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of the country-year format violate the independence of observations assumption. To account for many of these

possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster them by sovereign state to specifically address the non-independence of cases within states.

The statistical tests of my hypotheses require the inclusion of an interaction term between the ELF index and GDP per capita. The inclusion of this term in the model has the effect of making the influence of ELF on ethnic group exclusion contingent on the value of GDP per capita. Within this methodological framework I present three models which move the analysis along in three steps. I first test the original power and legitimacy expectation that as GDP per capita increases, the probability of ethnic exclusion decreases (Counter Hypothesis 1). I then test the neo-romantic expectation that as ethnic diversity increases, the probability of ethnic exclusion should also increase (Counter Hypothesis 2). Finally, I examine the evidence for my four principle hypotheses (the Formal Inclusion, Divisive Exclusion, Xenophobic Nationalist Exclusion, and Multi-Ethnic Nationalist Inclusion Hypotheses). These hypotheses all hinge on the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP per capita and the ELF index. Due to the dynamics of the binary logit model the meaning of this interaction coefficient must be developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which the data actually support each hypothesis. In Appendix B, I also present results from two alternative model specifications that confirm the findings presented in the main results section, but have been conducted and provided as a robustness check of the principal results.

### ***Results: Explaining Ethnic Exclusion***

As the results reported in Table 3.3, for model 1, indicate, counter hypothesis 1, which expected ethnic group exclusion to become less likely as GDP per capita increased

is not supported. In fact, the logit coefficient for GDP per capita is positive and significant which is opposite of the expectation suggested by Wimmer (2002). The initial result for counter hypothesis 2, suggested by the neo-romanticist wing of the diversity-breeds-conflict school, does not fair much better. Inclusion of the ELF index in model 2 shows that the ethnic diversity measure is not statistically significant. However, these models do not tell the whole story. The four principal hypotheses offered in this analysis suggest that the effect of ethnic diversity is contingent on available resources. Operationally this means that the effect of the ELF index should vary depending on the value of GDP per capita. To test this expectation I thus include an interaction term to the model, as shown in model 3. The negative statistically significant GDP-ELF interaction coefficient provides initial evidence that my four principal hypotheses are empirically supported. The extent of this support must be ascertained by probing the results presented in model 3 through predicted probability plots.

**Table 3.3.**  
**Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Logit Coefficient (S.E.)	Logit Coefficient (S.E.)	Logit Coefficient (S.E.)
<b>Politicization Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>			
GDP per Capita	0.488** (0.183)	0.488* (0.195)	1.467*** (0.436)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		-0.113 (0.657)	1.172 (0.670)
GDP-ELF Interaction			-2.052** (0.750)
<b>Other Control Variables</b>			
Imperial Past	0.303 (0.505)	0.291 (0.521)	0.846 (0.539)
Oil Production per Capita	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.016)
<b>Form of Government Reference: Autocracy</b>			
Anocracy	-0.292 (0.308)	-0.296 (0.305)	-0.312 (0.322)
Democracy	-0.584 (0.343)	-0.591 (0.342)	-0.767* (0.347)
Population	0.189 (0.128)	0.188 (0.128)	0.165 (0.117)
Percentage of Mountainous Terrain	0.318** (0.112)	0.315** (0.112)	0.405** (0.119)
<b>Time Control Variables</b>			
Constant	Suppressed -0.221 (1.169)	Suppressed 0.116 (1.154)	Suppressed -0.561 (1.012)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-377.3892	--377.3527	-367.7335
Wald $\chi^2$ (d.f.)	104360.02*** (68)	113783.40*** (69)	121978.93*** (70)
N (Number of States)	5632 (128)	5632 (128)	5632 (128)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountainous Terrain were used in the analysis.


<sup>§</sup>The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to collinearity which suggests only two knots between the beginning and end points of the data.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

### ***The Practical Inclusion and Divisive Exclusion Hypotheses***

In categorical terms, the practical inclusion and divisive exclusion hypothesis can be stated as follows. When resources are low and ethnic diversity is low, the probability

of ethnic exclusion should also be low. Conversely, when resources are limited and ethnic diversity is high the probability of ethnic exclusion should also be high. However, since both resources and ethnic diversity are both continuous attributes the hypotheses can be combined into one. When resources are limited the effect of ethnic diversity on the probability of ethnic exclusion should be positive. The two categorical hypotheses are fused because practical inclusive outcomes are expected to dominate the lower levels of ethnic diversity and divisive exclusionary outcome in the cases with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities of ethnic exclusion for lower levels of GDP per capita across the range of values for ethnic diversity. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, the effect of the ELF index on ethnic exclusion is most positive at the lowest levels of GDP per capita and becomes less so as GDP per capita increases to mean levels. The overall pattern clearly supports both the formal inclusion and divisive exclusion hypotheses. In the poorest of states, with low levels of ethnic diversity, the probability of ethnic exclusion is lower than in states with higher levels of ethnic diversity.



**Figure 3.1, Predicted Probability of Ethnic Exclusion by Lower Levels of GDP per Capita across the Range of Values for Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization**

Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score. Some cases appear in different locations between plots due to economic growth.

Those poorest states with higher levels of ethnic diversity have a much higher probability of ethnic exclusion. These results suggest that the original Wimmer hypothesis regarding the effect of available resources is only empirically supported when ethnic diversity is high and the mechanism of divide and rule can drive the divisive exclusion outcome. But in cases of limited resources and little ethnic diversity, ethnic exclusion is a much less certain prospect. Moreover, the effect of resource abundance simply does not play the simple role expected by Wimmer’s (2002) theory. For each level of increased GDP per capita the baseline probability of ethnic exclusion substantially increases. As noted earlier, this is contrary to the expectations of the Wimmer theoretical perspective.

Substantively, these results suggest strong empirical evidence for the mechanisms argued to channel resource starved states into either the formal inclusion or divisive exclusion outcome. These results also indicate that cases of formal inclusion are quite rare. This should not be surprising for two reasons. First, states with politicized ethnicity but not ethnic group exclusion are a minority of the world's states. The formal inclusion scenario is one of two structural tracks that tend to result in this outcome. Second, states with extremely limited resources have limited capacities and often enjoy a perilous and uncertain existence. One need only think about the unfortunate events that led to the failed state in Somalia. On the other hand, these results foreshadow the finding that xenophobic nationalist exclusion is the predominant outcome around the globe. The slightly negative slope for the line set at the mean level of GDP per capita indicates that ethnic diversity has little to no effect on the probability of ethnic exclusion for states with that level of resource availability. The relativistic nature of terms, such as high and low resource abundance must be kept in mind. Although the slope is still positive for the line set at -1 standard deviation from mean GDP per capita, at its lowest level of ethnic diversity it is still above .75. At -2 standard deviations from mean GDP per capita at the lowest levels of ethnic diversity, the probability of ethnic exclusion is a fifty-fifty proposition. As an outcome, formal inclusion should thus be reserved for only the poorest of states with lower levels of ethnic diversity. Divisive exclusion, on the other hand, is largely at play for states roughly 1 standard deviation below mean GDP per capita, and lower, but with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Descriptively these criteria include a much larger proportion of the world states relative to those poorest of states that also have low levels of ethnic diversity. The vast majority of states that exclude along at

least one population along ethnic lines do in a manner that is more in line with xenophobic nationalist exclusion, followed by a divisive exclusion approach.


### ***The Xenophobic Nationalist Exclusion and Multi-Ethnic Nationalist Inclusion***

#### ***Hypotheses***

Both the xenophobic nationalist exclusion and multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion hypotheses concern the probability of ethnic exclusion when resources are relatively abundant. In categorical form the xenophobic nationalist exclusion hypothesis holds that when resources are relatively abundant and ethnic diversity is low, the probability of ethnic exclusion should be high. Conversely, when resources are relatively abundant and ethnic diversity is high the probability of ethnic exclusion should be lower. When these two expectations are described in terms that allow resources and diversity to vary along their continuous range of values they can be combined by stating that the effect of diversity on the probability of ethnic exclusion should be negative when resources are relatively abundant. The extent which the data support this hypothesis is shown in Figure 3.2. When GDP per capita is at the mean value, the line over the range of ELF index values is slightly negative with the predicted probability ranging between .975 and .925. This extremely high probability of exclusion is indicative of both the xenophobic nationalist and divisive exclusionary outcomes. States with mean levels of GDP per capita and higher, as well as levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization around .7 and lower are almost exclusively characterized by ethnic exclusion consistent with the structural conditions argued to result in xenophobic nationalist exclusion. At mean levels of GDP per capita the mechanism of divisive exclusion is still in effect, as

evidenced by the location of South Africa on the plot which has only emerged from the divisive exclusion of Apartheid over the last two decades.

The empirical support for the multi-culturalist scenario is far less compelling and actually quite weak.




**Figure 3.2, Predicted Probability of Ethnic Exclusion by Higher Levels of GDP per Capita across the Range of Values for Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization**

Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their

Although the predicted probability plots show a certain drift in the direction of the multi-culturalist scenario, the evidence actually suggests that states achieving a multi-culturally inclusive result are in the extreme minority. For example, my theoretical framework fits the case of Switzerland well, but the predicted probability plots indicate that the data drive the model to clearly expect Switzerland to be an ethnic exclusionary state.

Although results for an ELF index value of one are provided for a certain aesthetic

appeal, the maximum score of the ELF index is .923. While the evidence shows that while lower levels of GDP per Capita modify the effect of ethnic diversity, this moderation effect almost ceases once GDP per Capita has climbed to mean levels.



**Figure 3.3, Predicted Probability Scatter Plot of Ethnic Exclusion by Ln GDP per Capita and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization**

The three dimensional scatter plot provided in Figure 3.3 illustrates where and how the distribution of the data is driving the results. Nearly all the observed cases at the low end of the Ln GDP per capita spectrum also have low levels of ethnic diversity. At higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization the curvature witnessed at lower levels almost completely ceases. Although there is some minor curvature within the left most quadrant, which is in the direction expected by the multi-culturalist inclusion scenario, it is nevertheless negligible. From Figure 3.3 it is clear that the data clearly support the formal inclusion, xenophobic exclusion, and divisive exclusion scenarios but provide

little to no evidence supporting the multi-cultural inclusion outcome. The case of Switzerland is truly a rare case which does fit the proposed theoretical revisions to Wimmer's foundational framework. Yet, the evidence for generalizing the multi-cultural inclusion argument refinement is weak at best.

Taken together, the results presented in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 demonstrate that both GDP and ethnic diversity must be taken into account when attempting to explain ethnic exclusion. States where ethnicity was politicized and ethnic exclusion did not emerge represented only 15.45 percent, or 19 states, of the total 123 states in the 2005 eligible population. The evidence I present here strongly suggests that this minority of states have managed to avoid ethnic exclusion due to single structural channeling mechanisms. For the most part, the population of states where ethnicity is politicized and ethnic exclusion has been avoided tend to fall into the formal inclusion category. They tend to have very low levels of resources per capita and are quite ethnically homogenous. The results also demonstrate the true rarity of cases such as Switzerland. Contrary to expectations from the power and legitimacy school higher levels of resources availability do not substantially reduce the risk of ethnic exclusion. Rather, my results suggest that as resources increase the probability of ethnic exclusion increases dramatically. Clearly, there has been, and continues to be, an overwhelming trend of ethnic group exclusion across the globe (Harff and Gurr 2004; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b). But contrary to commonly held assumptions, ethnic exclusion is not the domain of the world's poorest states. It is, rather, the domain of those in economic middle and higher end of the spectrum that drive exclusion.

Ethnic group exclusion comes in two forms. When ethnic diversity is low or at moderate levels and GDP is just below the mean or higher, xenophobic nationalist exclusion is the order of the day. However, when ethnic diversity is high and resources are very scarce to moderately available divisive exclusion is the dominant outcome. Contrary to the expectations of the neo-romanticist wing of the diversity-breeds-conflict school, increased ethnic diversity is not always associated with ethnic exclusion. When resources are extremely limited to moderately available, high levels of ethnic diversity do indeed seem to push states into ethnic exclusion. However, when resources very abundant and ethnic diversity is very high the evidence indicates a structural pull toward multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion. My modification of the original power and legitimacy perspective, through the inclusion of ethnic diversity, thus out performs the original power and legitimacy approach, as well as the diversity-breeds-conflict school. Finally, the fact that percentage of mountainous terrain is significant in the presented models of ethnic exclusion suggests the need for deeper scrutiny regarding the interpretation of this measure as an indicator of opportunity structure.

### ***Conclusion and Discussion***

In the population of states where ethnicity is politicized the vast majority of them are also characterized by ethnic exclusion. The structural mechanisms that have channeled states in this direction do not conform to present theoretical expectations. Contrary to the expectation of the power and legitimacy school, which expects that richer states should be less likely to exclude along ethnic lines than poorer states, richer states are more likely to commit ethnic exclusion. The diversity-breeds-conflict school fairs no better. Neo-romanticist scholars have long claimed that increased ethnic diversity was

associated with higher levels of ethnic exclusion as the world's ethnic categories of peoples fought for their right to self-determination. Although there are a larger number of cases where increased ethnic diversity is indeed linked to ethnic exclusion, the relationship is far more contingent than previous scholars have emphasized. My structural explanation of both ethnic exclusion and inclusion highlights a set of theoretically grounded expectations regarding systematic patterns in the wide variety of economic conditions and ranges of ethnic diversity confronted by the world's states. The configurations of these patterns are theoretically argued to create structural pressures that push some states toward ethnic exclusion, while other patterns push states toward ethnic inclusion.

My results suggest that three of my four ideal-typical outcomes receive generalized empirical support. States where ethnicity is politicized and escalated into ethnic group exclusion tend to (1) develop along a path or xenophobic nationalist exclusion or (2) along a separate trajectory best described as divisive exclusion. Xenophobic nationalist states tend to have moderately to relatively abundant levels of economic development with lower levels of ethnic diversity. In this scenario ruling elites are able to establish a nationalist cultural compromise without the need to draw support from the state's ethnic minorities. Ruling elites believe that the state is sufficiently strong and has the requisite resources to repress any potential unrest from the excluded population and there is thus little incentive to completely include the entirety of the state's population within a full nationalist cultural compromise. Alternatively, a strategy of divisive exclusion is often pursued in poor to moderately poor states where ethnic diversity is moderate to very high. In this divisive exclusionary scenario ruling

elites draw support from an ethnic minority of the population while they use the non-distributed resources to harshly repress dissent, play multiple excluded ethnic categories of peoples against one another, and broadly pursue a strategy of divide and rule.

Conversely, my results demonstrate that states where ethnicity is politicized but not escalated to ethnic exclusion tend to be characterized by low levels of both ethnic diversity and access to economic resources. Contrary to expectations, a second scenario defined by an abundance of economic resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity show little to no trend toward non-exclusionary politicized ethnicity. I have labeled the inclusive scenario receiving empirical support formal inclusion because the material constraints faced by state largely preclude the exclusion of an ethnic minority. Simply put, the resource drain required for the requisite repression in these states is not actually viable. I also deem such inclusion as “formal,” since the extreme deprivation faced by the state precludes the possibility of distributing enough public goods to ensure real loyalty. These states are precariously perched on the edge of state failure should the vicissitudes of history be unkind.

As previously noted, a multi-ethnic nationalist scenario did not receive generalized empirical support. Although cases do exist where the high ethnic diversity of the state nearly ensures that ethnicity will be politically relevant, while at the same time lowering the probability of ethnic group exclusion, these cases are shown to be empirically rare. States, such as Switzerland have indeed defied the odds, and achieved a balance of power between included ethnic groups that limits the drive for ethnic exclusion, since doing so would delegitimize the very ideological foundation of the state itself. In these few successful cases, there is no ethnic majority large enough to claim

sole possession of the title *staatsvolk* and so each ethnic category of people is mutually dependent upon the multi-ethnic nationalist framework to legitimate their membership. Nevertheless, the lack of generalizable findings regarding this trend only speaks to the difficulty in arriving at such equilibriums.

Overall, my results largely support my extension of the power and legitimacy school and its proposed contingent relationship of resources and ethnic diversity. Should the results presented in this chapter withstand further empirical scrutiny the findings have strong implications from a policy perspective. The decision where to send foreign aid to stabilize regions is a constant and evolving concern. Although policy goals may be clear, the means to reach them all too often remain shrouded. In this regard, these finding suggest two important considerations. First, although those states where ethnicity is politicized, resources limited and quite ethnically homogenous would seem at little risk for ethnic violence, added care should be taken to help promote even development. Here, my findings dovetail nicely with Horowitz's (1985; 2001; 2005) research. A tertiary finding of my results suggests that for those states where ethnicity has been politicized, development may increase the probability of ethnic exclusion. As states become more developed, they also tend to become more powerful and increasingly more attractive prizes for those who are disenfranchised. Thus, care should be given to provide development assistance to those poorest of states which does not have the effect of creating ethnic inequality. Unfortunately, on this point, the Western powers have a woefully horrendous track record.

Second, much has been made about the imperfections and instability of power sharing, as well as consociational democracy (Elkins and Sides 2007; 2011; Hechter

2000; Laitin 2007). My findings suggest that within the current nation-state system, substantial economic resources and very high ethnic diversity are required to make such multi-ethnic nationalist cultural compromises viable. This finding emerges indirectly, since states that have multiple power sharing partners and very limited resources are all but non-existent. As Wimmer et al. (2009) demonstrates, when these power sharing arrangements hit difficulties, ethnic infighting is often the result. The logic underpinning my results helps explain why. The un-solidified multi-ethnic state with only moderate resources at its disposal is but one successful attempt at monopolizing state power by one of the minority partners, from becoming an entrenched case of divisive exclusion. Moreover, the fear that another minority partner may make such a move, leaving one's own ethnic group on the wrong side of the exclusionary divide only serves to make the multi-ethnic nationalist inclusion scenario that much more difficult to achieve when truly abundant resources are lacking. The lack of support for my multi-cultural inclusion scenario suggests that these types of power sharing states are difficult to achieve when resources are plentiful.

As a field of study, the origins of ethno-nationalist exclusion and, just as importantly, inclusion are in their infancy and require a great deal more work. The present analysis is but one small contribution to a discussion which requires both more voices and more data. Many more questions remain. Together, chapters 2 and 3 have shown empirical evidence that the logics of escalation regarding the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic group exclusion follow opposite paths. The very structural conditions that make the politicization of ethnicity less likely are the same as those that encourage ethnic group exclusion and vice versa. As such, the foundational assumptions

justifying the treatment of ethnicity's politicization and ethnic exclusion as a singular phenomenon within the power and legitimacy school do not hold. The present analysis has also shown that the assumed negative relationship between development and ethnic exclusion is not empirically supported. The present analysis is but one corrective. The field requires more data gathering projects like the one embodied in the EPR. Specifically it requires data on civil society development, which I have had to necessarily exclude from this analysis. Given the profusion of ethno-religious exclusion, the politicization of ethno-religious boundaries through political Islam, and the significant *prima facie* evidence that ethno-religious conflicts and political boundaries follow similar logics to their strictly ethnic cousins, the need for a better understanding regarding the origins of categorical exclusion is obvious. In chapters 2 and 3 I have highlighted the contingent and contradictory logics concerning how resource availability and ethnic diversity promote and discourage the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. I now turn to extending the divide and rule logic motivating divisive exclusion to the onset of ethnic rebellion.

## **Chapter 4: The Institutionalization of Ethnic Conflict as a Bulwark against Ethnic Rebellion**

Within the modern political era ethno-nationalist violence has become the most common form of interstate and intrastate organized violence. Where ethno-nationalist violence accounted for only 20 percent of the wars fought between the Congress of Vienna (1814) and the Treaty of Versailles (1919), between 1919 and 2001, ethno-nationalist wars made up 45 percent of total wars fought. Between the end of the Cold War and 2005 that figure increased still, to 75 percent (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

The most common forms of ethno-nationalist violence are ethnic rebellions and civil wars. Given that 68 percent of the world's states were characterized by some form of xenophobic or divisive ethnic exclusion from 1946 and 2005, the recent increase in ethnonationalist violence seems understandable. Several recent studies by PAL have compellingly linked ethnic group exclusion from the state to the onset ethnic rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). In fact, the proportion of the population excluded from state access along ethnic lines has been shown to be the predominant predictor of ethnic rebellion.

While these recent findings help explain why ethnic rebellions have made up an increasing proportion of organized intrastate violence around the globe, they fail to account for why ethnic rebellions are so rare despite the prevalence of ethnic exclusion. Through the modern era more than half of the world's states excluded at least one ethnic group from full access to the state. Yet only about 2.5 percent of this population experienced the onset of a new ethnic rebellion. As a result of ever-deepening encroachment by the modern state, ethno-nationalist exclusion places increasingly severe

limitations on the life chances of those barred from access to its presumptively public goods. Plainly, the puzzle remains: Why are ethnic rebellions so rare? Which institutional factors press so many ethnic populations around the world to accept, even if begrudgingly, the detrimental effects of state sanctioned exclusion?

The rarity of ethnic rebellions remains an open question within the quantitative literature on ethno-nationalist violence. Initial attempts at explaining the onset of ethnic rebellions focused on the presence of ethnic diversity. Drawing on a fundamentally Herderian concept of ethnicity, DBC held that the housing of multiple ethnic groups under one state increased the threat of ethnic tensions due to the primordial drive for ethnic self-determination.

A minority-mobilization school developed in response, arguing that it was not ethnic diversity per se that led to increased ethnic tensions, but rather a mix of political, cultural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged ethnic minorities. GAO then emerged to challenge the underlying claim that ethnic conflicts were distinct from non-ethnic forms of organized anti-state violence. GAO scholars argue that ethnic grievances are far too widespread to explain the relatively rare incidence of ethnic rebellion. Instead, as their name aptly describes, they argue that opportunity structures are the decisive factors—that is, social structures that either welcome or inhibit rebellion depending on institutional context and feasibility. From this standpoint, neither grievances nor even the category of ethnic identity are particularly helpful as explanatory factors in ethnic violence.

PAL, of course, developed most recently in opposition to each of these approaches. PAL scholars hold that the state is not an ethnically neutral actor and that

the primary cause of ethnic rebellions is unequal access to public goods. In pursuing this line of argument, PAL made at least three critical contributions to the field. First, it challenged the field's use of demographic indices that only indirectly measure actual power relations between ethnic categories of peoples and the state. Second, it historically situated ethnic power relations within the rise of the nation-state system (while culling insights from both the DBC and MM schools). And third, it collected new data on ethnic power relations to test its theoretical expectations, convincingly demonstrating that ethnic group-state power relations represent the 'master grievance' at the root of virtually all ethnic rebellions. While acknowledging the importance of opportunity structures, PAL fundamentally shifted intellectual debate regarding ethnic violence to issues of power--demonstrating why ethnic violence, insurgency, and rebellion merit academic attention in their own right.

For all of its strengths, however, PAL falls short of addressing the rarity of ethnic rebellions. Although GAO has addressed the question most directly, I argue that all four traditions largely overlook the importance of power relationships and competition between excluded ethnic groups themselves. What is required is an explanation of ethnic rebellion's rarity that is fundamentally grounded in the structural conditions that explain its existence.

To understand the rarity of ethnic rebellion two points emphasized in chapter 3 are critical and must be extended. First, it is essential to recognize that ruling elites are historically situated actors, who tend to limit the provision of public goods to those deemed socially "legitimate" members of the state, national or otherwise. And second, state sanctioned categorical exclusion is neither total nor equal. Why is this the case?

Let's return to my explanation of the rarity of ethnic rebellion discussed above.

Contrary to states with an abundance of resources and ethnic exclusion, states with limited resources and ethnic exclusion do not have the resources to expand the social boundaries of inclusion. The ability of ruling elites to stay in power, therefore, shifts from providing governance for the majority of the population to maintaining the committed support of a narrow base, while regularly attempting to thwart potential opposition. In their efforts to maintain power, ruling elites, in states with limited resources and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, thus tend to (1) quash any sign of dissent, and (2) make it as difficult as their limited resources allow for a unified opposition to develop. In such situations, the ethnic diversity of the state's excluded population is a powerful aid to ruling elites insofar as it fundamentally eases the regime's efforts to cultivate mistrust among the ethnically excluded population and keep potential opposition fragmented. Thus, the same logic of divide and rule, which motivated the divisive exclusion scenario in chapter 3, serves to reduce the absolute probability of rebellion even while continuing to exacerbate ethnic tensions.

The model I propose suggests a substantial, yet simple, revision to the configural-structural model proposed by PAL. The recent finding that ethnic rebellions become increasingly likely as the relative size of a state's ethnically excluded population increases requires re-examination. By including the ethnic diversity of the excluded population within the theoretical framework, three ideal typical outcomes emerge, only one of which is consistent with the original framework: Ethnic rebellions should be most common in states where a large proportion of the population is excluded along ethnic lines and the excluded are highly homogenous. Ethnic rebellions should be less likely if

(1) the proportion of the excluded population is very small, regardless of its ethnic diversity; or (2) the proportion of the excluded population is large but highly diverse.

From this standpoint, the rarity of ethnic rebellions is due to the fact that conditions conducive to their onset are largely limited to one of the three empirically observable scenarios. And the configuration most likely to result in ethnic rebellion is the rarest due to its inherent instability. To test the empirical support for these scenarios I once again employ the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Ethnic Armed Conflict (EAC) Datasets.<sup>9</sup> These datasets are the best available to test these hypotheses. To my knowledge, they are the most comprehensive attempt to code ethnic exclusion from state power, the political relevance of ethnicity, and the world's civil wars, whether ethnic or not. This ambitious undertaking represents a substantial improvement over the well known Correlates of War (COW) and Minorities at Risk (MAR) datasets, which do not distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts or limit their scope to those states with disenfranchised ethnic minorities, respectively. Most importantly, the EPR allows the present analysis to move beyond simple demographic characteristics and actually examine the effect that varying levels of ethnic diversity within an excluded population has on the probability of ethnic rebellion.

My findings suggest that ethnic fragmentation and unequal exclusion substantially aid in explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellion in a manner inspired by but contrary to GAO. Conversely, although the logic of the original PAL argument holds, by allowing

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<sup>9</sup> The version of the EPR I utilize is actually a combination of the EPR and Ethnic Armed Conflict Datasets provided by the Wimmer et al. (2009). The original datasets that make up this combined file can also be obtained via, Cederman, L. E., B. Min, and A. Wimmer. 2009. "Ethnic Power Relations Dataset." Dataverse Network, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11796> and Cederman, Lars-Erik., Brian Min, and Andreas Wimmer. 2008. "Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset." Dataverse Network, <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11797> V1 [Version]. respectively.

for the ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population, the escalation of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion into ethnic rebellion is found to be less viable than previously thought. My results support the conclusion that the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population is an important structural resource that ruling elites marshal in their efforts to prevent the formation of a unified multi-ethnic opposition. I thus explicitly follow in the footsteps of those arguing for ethnic-power relations approaches to ethnic rebellions (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009). In the process I respond to the critique leveled by GAO that ethnic rebellion is far more rare than grievance oriented explanations would suggest (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Laitin 2007).

### ***The Surprising Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion***

Similar to questions of ethnicity's politicization and the development of ethnic exclusion, much of the ethnic violence and civil war literature has sidestepped addressing the limited frequency of ethnic rebellions in relation to the abundance of ethnic grievances found around the globe. It is perhaps not surprising that the devastating human toll of ethnic violence has spurred attention to its roots rather than its rarity. Yet Laitlin (2007) is correct in stressing that an adequate theory of ethnic violence must address its rarity.

Below I will chart and contextualize the GAO school. I will show that the critique leveled by PAL provides a compelling rebuttal to GAO's claim that ethnicity has no influence on the onset of anti-state violence. Yet as currently constructed, PAL too falls short of adequately explaining the rarity of ethno-nationalist violence in the face of widespread ethnic exclusion. I then present my revision to the PAL approach and argue for

the inclusion of ethnic segmentation amongst the ethnically excluded population within the theoretical perspective.

From its very beginning in the mid 1990s, GAO has stressed that anti-state violence is far more rare than the explanations debated have implied. In fact, it was two empirically grounded observations, both of which directly challenged the theoretical expectations of the DBC and minority mobilization schools that motivated GAO's early research. First, if grievances play a central role fomenting ethnic violence as theorized by scholars (e.g Horowitz (1985), then the prevalence of such grievances worldwide should spur much more violence (for more on the fundamental logic of the minority-mobilization school see, Gurr and Harff 1994; Harff and Gurr 2004). Similarly, if ethnic diversity were the central explanatory factor as premised by DBC (Smith 1987; Smith 1991; Smith 1995; Smith 2003), then high levels of such diversity around the globe should spur more observable instances of violence (see also, Calhoun 1997). Thus, while the field as a whole witnessed the previously dominant primordialist position whither before social-constructivist criticisms, Fearon and Laitin charted a somewhat rogue approach attempting to explain the relative rarity of civil war and anti-state violence.

GAO's initial efforts to explain the rarity of ethnic violence focused on intra-ethnic group dynamics. Instead of focusing on the ethnic components of conflict, they attempted to demonstrate that the internal power-relations of ethnic groups tended to promote interethnic cooperation through such mechanisms as 'in-group policing' (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Still grappling with the potential implications of "socially constructed" ethnic identities for the onset of ethnic violence, Fearon and Laitin's (2000) meta-

analysis of the field found little evidence that the social construction of ethnic identities actually contributed to ethnic violence. In fact, their analysis showed that the only consistent link between the social construction of ethnicity and the onset of ethnic violence was through the efforts of political demagogues, in the Weberian sense of the term, to construct everyday primordialist ethnic narratives.

Within the quantitative literature, the relevance of ethnicity in explaining civil war and violent insurgency had been fundamentally questioned. Studies by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003; 2004) found that ethnic fractionalization, as measured by a state's ethnic diversity, showed no evidence that ethnicity was linked to civil war and insurgent violence. Bolstered by these findings, Laitin (2007) made the following claims: (1) ethnicity was only a descriptive quality of some instances of anti-state violence with no explanatory power; (2) grievances were far too common across the world to explain the relatively rarity of anti-state violence; and (3) opportunity structures that make anti-state violence feasible explain the onset of civil war and insurgent violence.

Quantitative support for GAO, however, was not as uniform as Laitin's (2007) classic book argued. Other scholars indeed found evidence illustrating the link between ethnic fractionalization and insurgent violence. Ethnic fractionalization was found to be a powerful predictor of ethnic civil war (Sambanis 2001), low intensity conflicts (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), and secessionist conflicts (Buhaug 2006). Nevertheless, amid the morass of contradictory findings, by the mid-2000s GAO became the predominant explanation in the discipline. Scholars on both sides argued, somewhat accurately, that opposing findings were the result of methodological inadequacies and the setting of poor

scope conditions. Yet, as with so many academic debates, what the field really needed was better data.

### ***The Power and Legitimacy School: Bringing Ethnic Power Relations Back In***

In response to the fragmented debate, and a need for the necessary data to test elements of Wimmer's (2002) theory, Cederman, Min, and Wimmer (2009; 2008) put together the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Armed Ethnic Conflict (AEC) Datasets. Although Wimmer's (2002) theory was not widely known in quantitative circles at the time, the results of their analyses, based on this new data, created a sea change in the quantitative debate. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) addressed two critical issues plaguing quantitative analyses of ethno-nationalist violence. First, where earlier quantitative studies had only poorly specified ahistorical mechanisms, such as primordial ethnic hatreds or organizational opportunity structures, their approach firmly situated the onset of ethnic violence within an historicized account of the nation-state system itself. For PAL, political modernity shifted the legitimacy of rule from divine right to 'like over like', the importance of popular political support continued to grow. Where resources were limited and civil society was only weakly developed, the interrelated efforts of state and constituency building had a profound effect on the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion (Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 2013a; Wimmer 2013b).

To be sure, I have suggested substantial revisions to the specific structural constellations of resource abundance and state ethnic diversity that are empirically linked with the politicization of ethnicity and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in chapters 2 and 3. Yet the basic escalatory logic of Wimmer's theory of nationalist exclusion still holds. PAL stresses that the primary motor of ethnic violence is to be found in the

constellations of ethno-political power relations between ethnic groups and the state. Its primary contribution to the debate is a substantively robust and historically situated theoretical framework developed from qualitative case-study and comparative historical research.

PAL's second major contribution is its relentless focus on measuring mechanisms and correctly indentifying scope conditions. Rather than continuing to rely on demographic proxies (such as a state's ethno-linguistic fractionalization) to gauge the importance of ethnicity on ethnic violence, its creation of the EPR allowed for the first direct quantitative measure of ethnic power relations not directly related to case selection. Although the widely used Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset improved our understanding of ethnic violence, it has remained focused solely on excluded ethnic minorities. As a result, the dataset omitted those cases where an ethnic minority actually achieved a monopoly on power, or cases where several large ethnic groups exist in complex power-sharing arrangements. Wimmer et al. (2009) point out that the MAR criteria excludes roughly fifty percent of cases included in the EPR. Regrettably, this leads to research where the conditions linking ethnicity to insurgent violence are over specified and suffer from the effect of sampling on the dependent variable.

As a whole, previous quantitative work largely utilized ethnic diversity arguments unrelated to ethnic politics, depended on rough measures of ethnic diversity to measure such mechanisms, or relied on data that developed from scope conditions inconsistent with the identified research question. In contrast, PAL's response drew upon the EPR, which contained measures of ethnicity's political relevance and directly measured ethnic group exclusion. PAL combined the EPR and EAC, which coded the ethnic and non-

ethnic characteristics, ethnic groups involved, and the secessionist/non-secessionist aims of the world's conflicts from 1946 through 2005. The result was data far stronger than that hitherto seen in the field.

Given the time and effort committed to theoretical development and the quality of the data marshaled by PAL, the resulting sea change in the field is not surprising. Contrary to GAO expectations, Wimmer et al. (2009) found that (1) ethnic rebellions increase in probability as the size of the excluded population increased; (2) ethnic infighting increases when the number of ethnic groups sharing power increases; and (3) incohesive states with shorter histories of indirect rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. Cederman et al. (2010) employed the group level version of the EPR and found that ethnic counter-elites are more likely to engage in ethnic rebellion (1) as exclusion increases; (2) their mobilization capacity increases; and (3) the more recently they had experienced previous conflict. Rooted in excellent data, these findings demonstrate decisive evidence that constellations of ethnic power relations are fundamental in explaining the onset of ethnic violence. By correctly specifying scope conditions, not over-aggregating types of ethnic conflict, and making a distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, PAL demonstrates the variety of ways in which ethnic power relations contribute to different types of ethnic conflicts. As such, PAL presents a fundamental challenge to GAO's view that ethnicity is merely a descriptive quality in many cases of anti-state violence.

PAL's results thus address two of the three critiques leveled by GAO. First, the evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the claim that ethnicity and ethnic power relations are not fundamentally relevant to explaining the onset of ethnic violence. Second, the

evidence does suggest that ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts may share similar opportunity structures, such as recent violence. However, on the third count, PAL falls short of explaining why ethnic violence and civil war are rare.

### ***Extending the Logic of Ethnic Infighting to Explain the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellions***

Although a formal explanation of the rarity of ethnic exclusion has not been posed by PAL, a simple extension of the logic explaining ethnic infighting provides an answer. Wimmer et al. (2009) hold that as the number of ethnically defined power sharing groups increases, the likelihood that one will choose to mobilize its ethnic base and violently attempt to gain inroads into state power also increases. The theoretical reasoning behind this empirically supported expectation is twofold. First, as the number of power-sharing partners increases, the possibility of shifting political alliances also increases. Second, the larger the number of competing power-sharing groups, the greater the fear each of those groups have of losing their share of state power.

This segmented center position is well supported by other research, which shows that power-sharing arrangements tend to be fundamentally unstable (Elkins and Sides 2007; Elkins and Sides 2011). Of course, resources also play an important role. When resources are abundant, all ethnic groups have a strategic reason to “buy in” to a super ethno-nationalist identity. A prime example of this type of case is Switzerland. In this case, multiple ethnic groups share power in a state of democratized struggle. There exists an abundance of public goods to appease all ethnic constituencies that results in a stable and strong multi-ethnic state. However, the struggle over the balance of power between groups continues even in the presence of abundant resources. It simply takes a different form.

When resources are scarce the divide between winners and losers in the power-sharing game becomes much more drastic. As Wimmer (2002:93) so eloquently states,

Where only one freeway can be built on the entire territory, where tribunals cannot handle the mountains of cases they are responsible for, where there are resources only for one reasonably good university, where police cannot possibly establish a well-staffed post in every neighborhood of the capital, favoritism solves the problem.

Every decision regarding the allocation of even minor state projects holds the seeds of profound political struggles because the outcome of each allotment has its corresponding winners and losers. These struggles play their way out regardless of the resources at hand, but the presence of resources affords the possibility for compromise and a de-escalation of tensions. When resources are limited and absolute losers under the existing power-sharing system are predictable, each “partner” has little reason to completely buy in. Instead, if the opportunity presents itself, ruling elites are often left in a situation where they feel no other choice but to mobilize their ethnic constituency and violently lay-claim to the state.

The central point of importance in revisiting ethnic infighting is that a stable and unified state, in the presence of multiple ethnic groups, is extremely hard to achieve. In such a situation, limited resources may make the formation of a stable unified state all but impossible. This logic is, of course, well developed by Wimmer et al. (2009), but it is only applied to the onset of ethnic infighting. However, there is no reason why it should not be extended to the formation of a unified excluded opposition. The same structural difficulties faced in creating a unified stable state, in the face of multiple power-sharing

partners, are faced by those excluded groups attempting to develop a unified opposition to the regime in control of the state.

Wimmer et al. (2009) are right to argue that as the size of the excluded population increases, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion also increases because the regime in control of the state is seen as less legitimate. However, when the excluded population is ethnically fragmented, the lives of the various peoples often depend on the existence of unequal exclusion. That is, members of excluded groups compete for the limited crumbs they can eke out of the current regime without inducing violent reprisal. The expectation that ethnic rebellions are more common as the proportion of the population that is excluded from state power increases assumes that the mechanisms of opposition are independent of the ethnic segmentation that makes up the ethnically excluded population. Theoretically, this seems to be an untenable assumption to be resolved empirically in the end.

We can see that the logic explaining the onset of ethnic infighting should also explain why ethnic rebellions are so rare. Should such a unified opposition overcome the obstacles and form, the leaders of its constituent members would be thrust into the same configuration of ethno-political power relations most likely to experience ethnic infighting. The present Syrian civil war is a case in point. The Bashir al-Assad regime has historically repressed any sign of dissent, while excluding multiple ethno-religious categories of peoples from access to the state. An Alawite minority has held a monopoly on state power since the early 1970s. For decades the strategy of divide and rule (or divisive exclusion) has held sway, as I posit in chapter 3. However, the initial successes of the Arab Spring weakened the Assad regimes ability to prevent a semi-unified

opposition from coalescing. Confronted with this systemic “world opening,” to borrow a term by John Foran (2005), the Syrian state found itself facing the most unified opposition it had seen since the regime’s rise to power. Although the opposition to the Bashir al-Assad regime took to the streets in an initially peaceful protest, it soon clashed with harsh reality. As the late civil rights activist Stokely Carmichael put it: ‘In order for nonviolence to work, your opponent must have a conscience.’ Resistance to oppression in the Syrian case has escalated into a violent civil war between the Assad regime and an opposition, which remains woefully fragmented along ethno-religious lines. Thus, while a world historical moment opened to allow the excluded population of Syria to at least temporarily unite, the Assad regime’s legacy of divisive exclusion continues to haunt rebel forces. Such forces continue to struggle against the Syrian state, while aspiring to hold their fragile alliance together.

Given the high level of ethno-religious exclusion, the Syrian government’s capacity (with its dominant Alawite minority) to avoid ethnic rebellion as long as it did highlights the importance of including the ethnic segmentation of the excluded within an explanatory framework. Individuals can see a government as illegitimate while fearing a potential alternative. As chapter 3 stresses, the majority of the world’s states that exclude part of their populations along ethnic lines pursue either xenophobic exclusion or divisive exclusion. Of these two scenarios, only the path of divisive exclusion entails a significant risk of ethnic rebellions, as it is characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity and limited resources. The logic of ethnic infighting, which makes the formation of stable power-sharing regimes more difficult as the number of included ethnic partners increases,

also applies to the difficulties excluded counter-elites face in forming unified opposition movements. The theoretical implications of this extension are provided in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1**  
**Extensions of the Power and Legitimacy School:**  
**Explaining the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion**

Explanation of Ethnic Rebellion	Resources	Size of Excluded Population	Diversity of Excluded Population	Probability of Ethnic Rebellion
Power and Legitimacy School Expectation	Limited	High	---	High
Revised Expectations				
Institutionalized Repression	Limited	High	High	Low
State Initiated Ethnic Civil War	Limited	High	Low	High

A number of structural combinations have been omitted from Table 4.1 because they logically or empirically do not exist. For example, while states in the modern political era with abundant national resources do tend to exclude small portions of their populations (i.e., xenophobic exclusion from chapter 3), they simply do not tend to exclude large sections of their populations. Ethnic rebellions do not occur in these states because the excluded population is too small to mount a full scale rebellion and because the abundance of resources usually allows the ruling elite to extend the boundaries of state inclusion when necessary. On the other hand, states with limited resources often do exclude vast swaths of their population and it is in these states that ethnic rebellions are most likely. However, ethnic rebellions are not as likely as the original PAL explanation would expect. States with large excluded populations that are also highly ethnically diverse should tend to avoid ethnic rebellions, as ruling ethnic elites endeavor to keep the various ethnic groups in near perpetual competition with one another through institutionalized repression. *Thus, as the number of ethnic groups that makes up a sizable*

*excluded population increases, the impact of excluding such groups on the likelihood of ethnic rebellion should actually decrease (Core Hypothesis).* As a result, states with large excluded and ethnically diverse populations should have a low likelihood of ethnic rebellion; while states with large excluded populations that are relatively homogenous should have a much higher likelihood.

Empirical support of this chapter’s core hypothesis would explain the rarity of ethnic rebellions in a manner consistent with the PAL framework. States with large ethnically homogenous populations excluded along ethnic lines tend to be the result of failed power-sharing arrangements. The group in power may have won the conflict that ensued from ethnic infighting, but the resulting state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is intrinsically unstable. These types of conflicts tend to burn themselves out in violent fashion with consequent “peace” built on the rubble.

The Rwanda genocide offers an example of just such a case of “stability through blood.” Conversely, states with large ethnically excluded and diverse populations have a much lower likelihood of ethnic rebellion, even though they perpetually sit on the edge of the abyss. These states, locked in vicious cycles of institutionalized repression, depend on maintaining delicate balances of power between excluded ethnic groups. Similar to the ‘systemic world opening’ discussed by Foran (2005), states usually require an exogenous shock that fundamentally alters the calculus of excluded ethnic elites regarding the risks and benefits of committing to an anti-state alliance. These types of openings can also occur as a result of leadership transitions and other rare domestic shifts. The critical point for the core hypothesis of this chapter is that increased ethnic exclusion does not always create fertile ground for ethnic rebellion. Rather, the relationship between the

sizeable excluded populations and ethnic rebellion is contingent upon the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population.

### ***Data Measures and Methods***

To empirically test the core hypothesis of this chapter, I employ the Ethnic Power Relations (Cederman et al. 2009) (EPR) and Ethnic Armed Conflict (Cederman et al. 2008) (EAC) Datasets. The EPR and EAC contain data from 1946 through 2005 on the entire population of sovereign states that had an estimated population of at least 1 million people or a territorial area of at least 500,000 square kilometers. This includes 7,155 country-year observations for 155 post-independence sovereign states. The present analysis is concerned with the onset of ethnic rebellion within states where ethnicity has already been politicized and at least one ethnic group is excluded from state access.

In this regard, the EPR provides two critical measures. First, it provides a measure of state sanctioned ethnic group exclusion. Ethnic group exclusion is coded as 1 if at least one ethnic group was categorically excluded from the executive state power along ethnic lines. Although this measure is only one type of state based exclusion, it remains the best available measure in the field, and covaries with many other forms of formal state sponsored discrimination. Wimmer et al. (2009) correctly argue that ethnic rebellions cannot occur where ethnicity has not been politicized. However, a review of the types of conflict indicated in their typology suggests that ethnic rebellions cannot occur unless at least one ethnic group is excluded from state access along ethnic lines. I thus restrict the sample of cases to those logically eligible to experience an ethnic rebellion, defined as states that have excluded at least one ethnic group from power. Setting the scope conditions in this manner leaves 4372 country-years for 116 post-

independence states. Similarly, the outcome variable is a measure of ethnic rebellions. To capture only ethnic rebellions, the outcome variable excludes all non-ethnic conflicts, and includes only ethnic conflicts that involved at least one excluded group in anti-state violence. Ethnic ingroup conflicts are excluded from the present analysis but the category of ethnic rebellions contains both secessionist and non-secessionist conflicts.<sup>10</sup> Full descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix C.

### ***Explanatory Variables of Interest***

The two concepts of interest in this chapter are the relative size of the excluded population and the extent to which this population is ethnically segmented. Consistent with PAL, I use the same measure of ethnically excluded population size as used by Wimmer et al. (2009). The EPR measure consists of the proportion of the population that is excluded from executive power. Due to the distribution of this variable, a natural log transformation was used. To measure the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population, I employ a count of the total number of ethnically excluded groups. This measure is similar conceptually to the number of ethnic-ingroups sharing power (used by Wimmer et al. to measure center segmentation in their analysis of ethnic infighting). The core hypothesis being tested suggests an interaction effect between these two measures. Supporting evidence relies on an interaction term between the size of the excluded population and the number of ethnic groups contained therein. The core hypothesis suggests that the effect of excluded population size on ethnic rebellion is contingent on the number of competing excluded ethnic groups. Specifically, I expect that as the number of ethnic groups within the excluded population increases, the effect of ethnic

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<sup>10</sup> The complete documentation on the coding procedures used in the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset and Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset may be found at <http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2009/toc068.html> or <http://www.princeton.edu/~awimmer/AppendixEthnicPolitics.pdf>.

exclusion on ethnic rebellion will become smaller. Operationally, this means the interaction term should be negative and significantly different from zero. Due to the dynamics of the binary logit model, the meaning of this interaction coefficient must be developed through predicted probability plots to determine the extent to which the data actually support the central hypothesis.

### ***Control Variables***

The first two control variables are the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index and GDP per capita. DBC suggests that higher levels of ethnic diversity make ethnic rebellion more likely. Although their mechanisms are not explicit, I include the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index as my measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index measures the probability of randomly selecting two individuals who speak languages from different ethno-linguistic categories. The overlap between ethno-somatic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties is often substantial, but this is not always the case. Still, given the central importance of language to ethnicity in general and the absence of multiple indicators, the ELF index offers a solid analytical tool to measure the general ethnic diversity of a state. The inclusion of this measure provides a more specific test regarding the unique effects of ethnic exclusion relative to simple ethnic diversity. GDP per capita has been routinely shown to be associated with ethnic rebellion onset (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), and the abundance of resources available to elites plays a central role in the power and legitimacy school. To measure the resources available to ruling elites I draw upon the same data utilized by Wimmer et al. (2009), and use gross domestic product per capita in 2000 U.S. Dollars. Since economic development and the resources from which states can draw revenues, such as taxes, have

a strong theoretical connection with overall GDP per capita, the measure is an obvious choice for the relative abundance or scarcity of resources available to ruling elites. The GDP data used in the Wimmer et al. (2009) study grants an overall coverage of 99.6 percent of sample.<sup>11</sup> Excluded ethnic group competition exists regardless of the resources available to ruling elites, but only states with abundance resources can afford to expand state access and avoid the onset of ethnic rebellion. GDP per capita is thus an essential control variable in this analysis.

I also include a number of other substantive control variables, to account for other possible hypothesized effects from the broader literature. The first of these deals with previous imperial history. The measure is the proportion of a territory's existence spent in colonial dependency or subject to some form of indirect rule between 1816 and their independence (Wimmer and Min 2006). This variable is included to control for the possibility that the central mechanism in Hechter's (2000) argument linking indirect rule to the onset of nationalist violence is at least partially active in the onset of ethnic rebellion. The second substantive control variable is population size. A key theoretical mechanism stems from the resource limitations elites face in their efforts to provide sufficient public goods, but it also follows from the difficulty of distributing these public goods. It logically follows that the larger the excluded population, the more goods required by the state and the harder it is to adequately distribute them. Wimmer (2002) also argues that the breakdown of new democracies can provide the impetus for ethnic exclusion if a party, once voted into power, realizes they can maintain power along

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<sup>11</sup> Data for the GDP per capita measure was drawn primarily from the Penn World Table 6.2 (79 percent), World Bank World Development Indicators (3 percent), and the remainder calculated from growth rates taken from Fearon and Laitin's dataset, with values extended back to 1946.

narrower ethnic lines. Harff and Gurr (2004) also argue that government form can exacerbate ethnic tensions or play a role in alleviating them. Although there are conflicting results in the literature regarding regime form, I include regime type to provide the most complete test of my central hypothesis. The regime type measure I include are a set of dummy variables for democracy and anocracy derived from the Polity IV dataset. Following Wimmer et al. (2009), I also use the +6 and -6 cut points to distinguish between democracies, anocracies, and autocracies.

The final three control variables I include are proportion of mountainous terrain, barrels of oil per capita and recent instability. As discussed early in the paper, Fearon and Laitin's (2003) insurgency model posits that opportunity structures are the triggers of civil war, as opposed to grievances. Since, studies in this area have not taken ethnic power relations into account in their models, it is possible that their measure of mountainous terrain was capturing some element of the ethnic exclusion variance. Although Fearon and Laitin do not expect that ethnicity plays a role in the onset of such conflicts, it is a central part of their theoretical perspective that both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions are brought about through similar opportunity structures. If their hypothesis is supported, there is thus no reason that mountainous terrain should not demonstrate the expected positive relationship with increased ethnic rebellion. However, if proportion of mountainous terrain does not receive empirical support as a predictor of ethnic rebellion, its significance in predicting ethnic exclusion in the previous chapter suggest that the Fearon and Laitin finding and theoretical interpretation of the proportion of mountainous terrain measure requires some substantial reconsideration.

Following a similar line of argument, Collier and Hoeffer (2004) posit a second type of opportunity structure in the form of lootable resources. Buhaug (2006) has also argued that oil production is a critical resource because it is commonly controlled by the state. In these situations the control of the state becomes an even larger prize and is thus worth greater risk to monopolize. It is more than plausible that competition over such resources could also raise ethnic tensions and provide grounds for ethnic rebellion (examples include pre-2011 Sudan, as well as the current conflict in Southern Sudan). To control for this possibility I use the EPR's oil production per capita variable, which is computed from data compiled and analyzed by Wimmer and Min (2006). Weak states have also been shown to be linked to ethnic rebellion and non-ethnic rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2004). Here the logic is that weak states are less able to keep opposition groups from organizing and the very perception of weakness makes the chances of a rebellion's success seem more likely. To account for this possibility, I follow Wimmer et al. (2009) and utilize a measure of recent regime change as a proxy for state stability. The stability measures was coded 1 if a state had experienced a change in their Polity IV rating of 3 or more points in the prior 3 years. Otherwise the stability measure was coded zero.

### ***Modeling Approach***

To carry out the actual analysis, I have followed the standard modeling approach in the literature for civil war onset and employ a binary logit model to regress my explanatory variables on a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for country-years in which a state was experiencing an ethnic rebellion. Unlike the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, the temporal variation of ethnic rebellion is much higher. I account

for this increased variability by following the guidance offered by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). As recommended, I include a cubic spline peace-year spline and count variable indicating the number of years since a state last experienced an ethnic rebellion. I also include a previous rebellion-year count total variable to further control for inertia effects. In addition to these temporal variables I also include a calander year variable to control for possible changes in the international political climate. Like most other statistical models, binary logit has a number of assumptions which many datasets routinely violate. For example, it is well known that the repeated observations of the country-year format violate the independence of observations assumption. To account for many of these possible violations I employ robust standard errors, and cluster them by sovereign state to specifically address the non-independence of cases within states. Finally there has been some debate in the field about how to handle ongoing ethnic rebellions within the model, since they should not be counted a new onsets. I present results from models which both include and exclude these ongoing conflicts, to demonstrate the robust quality of my results.

### ***Results: Explaining the Rarity of Ethnic Rebellion***

The results for both model specifications, including and excluding ongoing rebellion-years respectively, are presented in Table 4.2. As expected, the excluded group-population size interaction term is statistically significant ( $p \leq .01$ ) and negative in Model 1.

**Table 4.2**  
**Binary Logit of Ethnically Excluded Population Size, Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups, Excluded Population-Group Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Rebellion<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 1	Model 2
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
<b>Exclusion Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>		
Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups	-0.056* (0.023)	-0.073* (0.036)
Excluded Population Size	0.357** (0.131)	0.268 (0.151)
Excluded Population-Group Interaction	-0.043** (0.015)	-0.055* (0.023)
GDP per Capita	-0.385* (0.152)	-0.750*** (0.224)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.613 (0.360)	1.503* (0.617)
Imperial Past	0.827* (0.365)	1.069* (0.524)
Oil Production per Capita	0.001 (0.016)	0.012 (0.008)
Anocracy	0.695* (0.320)	0.851* (0.353)
Democracy	0.879** (0.337)	0.492 (0.412)
Population	0.143 (0.093)	0.163 (0.123)
Percentage of Mountainous Terrain	0.046 (0.092)	0.141 (0.114)
Recent Regime Change	0.060 (0.272)	0.008 (0.291)
Ongoing War	3.670*** (0.266)	2.027*** (0.361)
<b>Time Control Variables<sup>  </sup></b>		
Constant	Suppressed -5.311*** (0.973)	Suppressed -8.761*** (1.155)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-439.93306	-283.2758
Wald $\chi^2$ (d.f.)	43804.40*** (74)	3400.36*** (61)
N (Number of States)	4372 (116)	3718 (115)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.


<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, Percent of Mountainous Terrain and Excluded Population Size were used in the analysis.

<sup>||</sup>For the sake of presentation, all time control variables, including the 59 calander year dummy variables, were suppressed from this table. Please see Appendix C for full result tables.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

Moreover, the coefficient is significant ( $p \leq .05$  for model 2) and negative in both models indicating that results are robust to both common model specifications in the field.

Substantively, these results suggest initial support for my core hypothesis that the relationship of excluded population size and ethnic rebellion onset is contingent upon the amount of ethnic segmentation contained within the excluded population itself. To better demonstrate the overall effect and implications of this result, I provide Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which provide the predicted probabilities of ethnic rebellion for the commonly observed number of excluded ethnic groups, by size of the ethnically excluded population. Although both graphs largely convey the same substantive story, there remain a few important differences between them that warrant some discussion.



**Figure 4.1, Model 1 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion by Size of Excluded population & Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups**


Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities for the model 1, which includes all continuing rebellion years. When the logged excluded population proportion is at its highest, the probability of ethnic rebellion decreases as the number of excluded ethnic groups increase. At the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, there is a slight negative slope, which indicates that highest quartile states with the largest excluded populations is where ruling elites actually lower the probability of ethnic rebellion by keeping the opposition fragmented. Between the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile and the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile, the relationship between the number of excluded groups and ethnic rebellion shifts from negative to positive. These results suggest that ethnic fragmentation of the excluded population only reduces the onset of rebellion when the ethnically excluded population is large. The minimum and 25<sup>th</sup>

percentile lines have been omitted because states with those levels of excluded populations only excluded between 1 and 5 ethnic groups. Within this more limited range they follow the same positive pattern as the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile line, but with lower starting positions commensurate with a smaller excluded population. Results from chapter 3 suggested that states with high ethnic diversity and limited resources were very likely to commit to state sanctioned ethnic exclusion. These results suggest that these same states decrease their risk of ethnic rebellion by maintaining large ethnically segmented excluded populations. This pattern helps explain why the likelihood of ethnic rebellions is so low, above and beyond the pressures of other organizational opportunity structures. These finding suggest that the population of states Wimmer et al. (2009) specifically target for being the most fertile soil for ethnic rebellions, are just those states that reduce their risk of ethnic rebellion the most by maintaining ethnically segmented excluded populations. While it may be difficult for an ethnic minority to actually gain a strangle hold on the state, the fact that they are usually able to hold onto power while excluding broad swaths of their population along ethnic lines is not by simple coincidence. Rather the evidence suggests that these most ethnically exclusive of states avoid rebellion through institutionalized repression meant to keep the ethnically excluded population in competition with one another. The stability of these regimes is fundamentally rooted in their ability to prevent the formation of a unified opposition to the state. The politicized ethnic boundaries between the groups making up the excluded population serves as a structural resource that allow ruling elites to achieve this goal. Results from model 1, thus, provide supporting evidence that the simple relationship between the size of the excluded population and the onset of rebellion is not always

positive. Rather, the evidence powerfully indicates that the effect of excluded population size on the probability of ethnic rebellion is contingent upon the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population itself.

Although models 1 and 2 largely suggest the same story, there are some differences that should be noted. Where model one includes all rebellion-years, years of continued rebellion are omitted from examination in model 2. Similar to model 1, the ongoing war variable is included to indicate that there was a previous conflict underway, when a truly new ethnic rebellion began. States that have been dropped due to continued conflict reenter the model once all conflicts have ended. They can thus experience a second failure. The inclusion of the previous rebellion-years variable and clustering of standard errors allows the model to avoid seeing more ‘new’ ethnic rebellions than have actually occurred. These changes produce two key differences in the predicted probability plots presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Where model 1 produced predicted probabilities over .04, as Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the model 2 results all remain below .01.



**Figure 4.2, Model 2 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion by Size of Excluded population & Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups**


Note: States provided on the predicted probability plot are for general reference only. Although care was taken to place each state name as accurately as possible, a balance was struck between readability and precision. In general, the portion of state name closest to the prediction line is its actual location, and “floater” states tend to be centered on their ethno-linguistic score.

The fulcrum point of the graph also shifts from eight excluded ethnic groups in model 1, to five in model 2. However, as the similar patterns shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, the results of model 2 suggest the same substantive conclusions as model 1. The effect of excluded population size is at its highest when the number of excluded groups is lowest, and decreases as the number of excluded ethnic groups increases. As shown in model 1, it is states in the upper quartile of excluded population size that gain the most resistance to ethnic rebellion by maintaining high levels of ethnic segmentation within their excluded population. The results are thus robust to model specification. These findings indicate that the effect of excluded population size on ethnic rebellion is contingent upon the number of excluded ethnic groups comprising excluded population.

The empirical results I present allow the power and legitimacy school to address the question of why ethnic rebellions are so rare. Many of those states originally thought to be at the highest risk of ethnic rebellion under the original power and legitimacy theory actually have a much lower risk of rebellion. Indeed the ethnic fragmentation that characterizes states with large excluded populations arguably played a decisive role in an ethnic minority achieving a monopoly over state power. In these cases the ruling elite strive to cultivate the same conditions of ethnic mistrust that both allowed, and allow for, their continued domination. Although the exclusion of a relatively large and ethnically homogenous group is the most likely way to foment an ethnic rebellion, empirical examples of these types of states are quite rare. Much more common are states with relatively large excluded populations that are comprised of a moderate to large number of ethnic groups. These states marshal the same structural factors that make high numbers of ethnic power sharing groups more likely to fall into ethnic infighting (Wimmer et al. 2009), to their advantage. By cultivating ethnic mistrust and politicizing ethnic differences between groups ruling elites prevent the mobilizations multi-ethnic opposition movements. In doing so, they drive down the likelihood of ethnic rebellion in that set of states, commonly deemed most likely to experience a revolt.

The predicted probability plots shown above utilize specific values. However, the interaction between the percent of the population excluded and the number of excluded groups can be clearly seen through a three dimensional predicted probability scatter plot. This plot is useful for determining where the data are driving the findings and where further interpretation would be unwarranted extrapolation. Figure 4.3 thus provides the predicted probabilities from model 1 by excluded groups, and excluded population size.

## Model 1 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion Scatter Plot by Size of Excluded Population & Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups



**Figure 4.3: Model 1 Predicted Probability of Ethnic Rebellion by Size of Excluded Population and from 1 to 20 Excluded Ethnic**

Consistent with results of the model, the probability of ethnic rebellion increases as the size of the excluded population increases. As the bend, similar to lifting the corner of a piece of paper, demonstrates, however, the probability of ethnic rebellion drops as the number of excluded ethnic categories increases. The number of excluded categories shown in the plot above has been capped at 20, which excludes three extreme cases. Although the data is sparse in some areas, the general shape of the plane driving the results rests upon the body of the data and not simply a few outliers or renegade cases. Where the data is “thickest” the expected relationship is well demonstrated. The results thus strongly support my extension of Wimmer’s ethnic infighting mechanism to explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellions. Where the ruling elite can take advantage of ethnic group competition between excluded groups and foment ethnic fractionalization, it

easier for them to avoid the kind of organized resistance that can lead to ethnic rebellion and civil war.

### ***Conclusion and Discussion***

This chapter extends the mechanism of center segmentation, developed by the power and legitimacy school to explain ethnic infighting, to also explain the relative rarity of ethnic rebellions. The same factors that tend to make ethnically based power-sharing systems of government more unstable as the number of partners increases, plays a similar role in preventing ethnically segmented excluded populations from mobilizing wide-spread multi-ethnic resistances to ethnically exclusionary regimes. Difficulties in maintaining multi-ethnic alliances in the face of state efforts to cultivate ethnic mistrust, while subject to violent repression of even the smallest dissent, serve to make large scale ethnic rebellion less probable in precisely those states where such revolts are commonly theorized to be most likely. Contrary to current views proffered by the power and legitimacy school of thought, larger ethnically excluded populations are not necessarily more likely to commit to a course of ethnic rebellion. The relationship is actually contingent upon the ethnic segmentation of the excluded population. Large ethnically excluded populations with limited ethnic segmentation are more likely to organize and violently rebel, than large ethnically excluded populations with high levels of ethnic segmentation.

These results refine and extend previous insights offered by the power and legitimacy school of thought on ethnic rebellion in two ways. First, these results offer an explanation of the relative rarity of ethnic rebellion that does not prematurely dispense with the theoretical role ethnic factors play in the onset of ethnic rebellion itself. Second,

this extension makes the power and legitimacy and greed-and-opportunity schools the only approaches to address the structural factors that make ethnic rebellions so rare in the face of large scale exclusion. To be sure, elements emphasized by the greed-and-opportunity approach, such as weak states, conditions conducive to the successful evasion of government forces, and the presence of lootable resources may receive broader empirical support if measured with better data. And these factors should theoretically be relevant for the onset of specifically ethnic rebellions. However, the results presented here find greater empirical support for the position that the rarity of ethnic rebellion can be explained in the very logic of ethnic exclusion. This argument rests on a combination of established observations within the discipline and the findings of this chapter. First, ethnic rebellions are not logically possible in states where ethnicity has not been politicized, or ethnic exclusion has not occurred. Within the modern political era only about 68 percent of the world's states are therefore logically eligible. Second, states with relatively abundant resources can often extend inclusion and thus avoid ethnic rebellion. Within the subsection of states with limited resources, states with (1) relatively small ethnically excluded populations are *less* likely to experience an ethnic rebellion, (2) large ethnically excluded populations, with high ethnic segmentation, are *less* likely to experience an ethnic rebellion, and (3) states with large ethnically excluded populations, with low levels of ethnic segmentation, are most likely to result in ethnic rebellion. However, this third configuration is empirically rare, precisely because it is so prone to ethnic anti-state violence. Contrary to the greed-and-opportunity claim that ethnicity is purely a descriptive element of some violent insurgencies and civil wars, my findings, in conjunction with other results from the power and legitimacy school,

compellingly suggest that the overall rarity of ethnic rebellions is to be found in the logic of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion itself. My inclusion of excluded group ethnic segmentation thus allows the power and legitimacy framework to explain the overall rarity of ethnic rebellion onset, without resorting to the greed-and-opportunity solution of jettisoning the theoretical importance of ethnic power relations.

## **Chapter 5: Substantive Theoretical Extensions and Concluding Remarks**

### ***Substantive Theoretical Extensions***

This dissertation identifies configurations of ethnic diversity that are structurally associated with three critical locations along the spectrum of ethnic tensions. The institutionalization of ethnic politics, the emergence of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, and the onset of ethnic rebellion have been the three focal points of examination. The evidence presented in chapter two suggests that the structural channeling effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity is contingent upon the resources available to state. The results of chapter 3 show a similar contingent relationship between ethnic diversity, state resources and ethnic exclusion. Chapter 4 rounds out the set of analyses by demonstrating the relationship between excluded population size and ethnic rebellion expected by the power and legitimacy school as actually contingent upon the ethnic fractionalization of the excluded population. By also examining possible explanations from the diversity-breeds-conflict and greed-and-opportunity schools the dissertation further speaks to the limitations of these approaches while highlighting a few points where they continue to make important contributions. Together, this set of results and findings, thus, both refines and extends previous insights articulated by the power and legitimacy school, and strengthens its place as the most comprehensive explanation of ethnic violence in the field.

The politicization of ethnicity is the first element of the ethnic tensions spectrum examined. A central mechanism in Wimmer's (2002; 2013b) theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict holds that as the modern state has become more powerful and pertinent to the daily lives of individuals it has increasingly become the principal

prize in multi-ethnic ‘races for the state.’ The findings of chapter two add nuance and generalized evidence to this argument. When the state is impoverished and on the brink of failure, higher levels of ethnic diversity tend to have little effect on the politicization of ethnicity. However, politicized ethnic boundaries are more likely in states with higher levels of resources that represent more lucrative sources of public goods. Strong states with abundant resources may be able to avoid ethnic rebellion, but the abundance of resources at the state’s command is directly related to the politicization of ethnicity. A state’s various ethnic groups increasingly organize, my findings suggest, to ensure they are distributed their “fair share” of the public goods provided by the state, as the state increasingly has more public goods to distribute. To my knowledge, the contingent effect of ethnic diversity on the politicization of ethnicity found in chapter two provides the first evidence supporting a generalization of this mechanism. The contributions of chapter two are thus, two fold. First, the results extend the power and legitimacy approach to include the importance of ethnic diversity as a structural factor in the politicization of ethnic boundaries. And two, the results provide evidence that his theory regarding the state as the major prize of a multi-ethnic competition is generalizable beyond the cases of Iraq and Mexico, upon which it was founded.

On the other hand, a number of mechanisms for the politicization of ethnicity did not receive empirical support. Results showed no evidence that length of imperial or colonial domination generally played a role. On the other hand, population size was found to be associated with the politicization of ethnicity. This population size finding could be capturing ethnic diversity variance inherent in large states not captured by the linguistic foundation of the ethno-fractionalization measure. Although included primarily

as a control, this population size finding requires further scrutiny. Nevertheless, the findings of chapter two suggest that it is the resources and ethnic diversity of state, above and beyond population size pressures that play a fundamental role in motivating the politicization of ethnicity early on, thus laying the foundations for ethnic exclusion and ethnic violence. If further research confirms these findings they also imply yet another difficulty that complicates the task faced by ruling elites attempting to maintain stability while pursuing strategies of development. As the state becomes more powerful counter ethnic elites find it increasingly easier to mobilize their ethnic kin under the auspices of ensuring that they get their fair share of state spoils. The importance of ethnically even development in those less developed states where ethnicity is not politicized would seem critically important.

Similar to chapter two, chapter three extends and refines elements of Wimmer's (2002) foundational framework in regard to ethnic exclusion, as well as providing empirical evidence in support of the generalization of mechanisms hitherto relying upon case based research on Iraq, Mexico, and Switzerland. Chapter three completes the analytical separation between ethnicity's politicization and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, which have been largely conflated within the PAL school. Once again my results point to the importance of including ethnic diversity amongst the structural concerns considered by ruling elites in the decision to commit to a course of ethnic exclusion. In states where ethnicity is already politicized, ethnic exclusion, my findings show, is least likely in states that are very poor and have little ethnic diversity. I label these types of states *formally inclusive* states since the public goods the state can distribute are extremely limited.

Contrary to theoretical expectations, high levels of ethnic diversity were not necessarily linked with decreases in the probability of ethnic exclusion when the resources available to the state were very high. In these cases of *multi-cultural inclusion* I argued that very existence of the state is dependent upon such inclusion, since the legitimacy of every ethnic group's claim to the public goods of the state simultaneously legitimates the claims of every other group. Equally essential is that resources are abundant enough for reasonable compromise to prevail. However, results only demonstrated limited empirical support for this outcome. In some ways this was not completely surprising. There is a rich literature lamenting the instability of states with power sharing arrangements. Although findings were directionally consistent with the multi-culturally inclusive scenario, the effect size was substantively small. The theory explaining the existence of states, such as Switzerland, may yet hold, but due to their extremely limited number simply elude traditional large N quantitative techniques. Indeed the further examination states with abundant state resources and high ethnic diversity that have eluded ethnic exclusion remains an important lacuna for future research.

The results provided in chapter three also suggest that those states most likely to engage in state sanctioned ethnic exclusion tend to follow patterns of *xenophobic* or *divisive exclusion*. Xenophobic exclusion occurs in states with abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity, whereas divisive exclusion is characterized by limited resources and high levels of ethnic diversity. The overwhelming presence of xenophobic exclusion around the globe provides compelling evidence of how ruling elites, as all social actors, are historically and culturally situated. Simply put, the ability to provide public goods to

the entirety of a state's population does not mean that they will necessarily do so. Ethnic minorities often have to mobilize in protest before they are granted full inclusion within these states. The abundance of resources available to the state in these cases is usually sufficient to allow for the inclusion of these excluded ethnic minorities and prevents the escalation of protests into full ethnic rebellions. Additionally, such protests rarely organize in an effort to monopolize the state, but rather press for greater equality in access and the rights of full citizenship within the state apparatus. This is an important distinction, since it leaves open the possibility of compromise.

As already referenced, chapter 3 also provides evidence for a second, and far more dangerous, ideal typical structural configuration, which tends to promote state sanctioned ethnic exclusion in what I label a *divisive exclusion* scenario. These cases generally occur in states with high ethnic diversity and limited resources. In such circumstances power sharing arrangements have been found to be fundamentally unstable (Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton, and Chernykh 2010; Elkins and Sides 2007). When an ethnic minority in these situations is able to achieve a monopoly over the state they tend to, (1) actively oppress any form of dissent and (2) intentionally sow seeds of distrust amongst excluded ethnic groups, in an effort to prevent the formation of a unified multi-ethnic opposition to the regime. The stability of these states depends on maintaining the status quo. Any quasi-exogenous shock, either foreign or domestic, can have a devastating outcome. When such shocks either weaken the regime's ability to repress dissent, or motivate fragmented opposition groups to overcome their differences, the outcome is often violent and bloody. Those supporting the regime fear reprisal from the opposition if the regime falls and thus tend to encourage the regime to bitterly resist. On the other

hand, the legacy of ethnic fragmentation cultivated by the ruling elite is not often truly overcome, but rather temporarily smoothed over. Those with control of the state apparatus and the modern machines of war, thus tend to up the cost of dissent even further by turning their military forces against the organized resistance. Once this line has been crossed, the state is all but thrown into the abyss. Rebel forces are often inclined to fight to the bitter end, since surrender likely means death, and the regime is equally fearful of the outcome should they lose. *Divisive exclusion* is thus the most dangerous form of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion because these states do not have the resources to include the entirety of their population, and their very stability is predicated on the ethnic divisiveness and fragmentation that simultaneously hold them perpetually on the precipice of disaster.

Although Wimmer's (2002) theoretical framework argues that ethnic exclusion occurs most often in states with limited resources, my findings suggest that xenophobic exclusion is the dominant type of state sanctioned exclusion around the globe. However, Wimmer's theoretical rendering of state sanctioned ethnic exclusion most similarly resembles the *divisive exclusion* scenario without the emphasis on the structural influence of ethnic diversity. Chapter three thus makes two substantive contributions to field. First, the results of chapter three further refine Wimmer's theoretical approach by incorporating the ethnic diversity as a structural factor considered by ruling elites regarding the decision to commit to ethnic exclusion. Second, while the chapter suggests some revisions to the power and legitimacy framework, it nevertheless remains thoroughly situated within the school. The findings of chapter three therefore provide evidence generalizing a modified version of Wimmer's (2002) theoretical approach

concerning the emergence of ethnic exclusion. To date, the nation-state formation and ethnic violence portions of his theoretical framework have evidence for their generalizability beyond the cases upon which they were initially based (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010), and the findings of chapter three are, to my knowledge, the first evidence supporting the generalization of power and legitimacy arguments regarding the formation of state sanctioned exclusion. Chapters two and three thus continue in the footsteps of these scholars and continue the systematic empirical evaluation of Wimmer's (2002) foundational theoretical perspective.

Although the dissertation has been focused on extending the power and legitimacy approach, potentially important variables from both the GAO and DBC schools were included in the chapter 3 analysis of ethnic exclusion. Democracies were indeed found to be less likely to commit ethnic exclusion than were autocracies, which is in line with original expectations of the DBC approach. Imperial history and oil production showed no relationship to the onset of ethnic exclusion. Interestingly, however, the mountainous terrain measure, argued to provide additional opportunities for anti-state insurgents to organize by the GAO school, was found to be positively related to ethnic exclusion. This finding raises questions about what exactly the percentage of mountainous terrain is exactly a proxy measure of. It may be the case the this mountainous terrain measure was actually capturing cultural differences between mountain and non-mountain dwelling peoples within states, or possibly the difficulty of providing equal access to the states public goods over rough terrain. Either way, the role

of mountainous terrain in the formation of ethnic exclusion requires further theoretical and empirical examination moving forward.

Having addressed the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion in chapters two and three, chapter four turns to question of why ethnic rebellions are so rare. An original observation within the greed-and-opportunity school, the rarity of ethnic rebellion in the face of widespread grievances around the globe motivated its examination by the GAO. In fact, the rarity of ethnic rebellion has only been seriously addressed by GAO scholars. The lack of explanation of ethnic rebellion's rarity from the PAL represents a significant blind spot in the approach. Although, I disagree strongly with Laitin's (2007) conclusion that the widespread nature of ethnic grievances cannot explain a relatively rare event like ethnic rebellion, the foundational puzzle of why there are not more rebellions when grievances are so abundant remains an important academic question. Any solid explanation of ethnic rebellion must explain this part of the ethnic violence puzzle.

In chapter four, I extend the Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) argument regarding the emergence of ethnic infighting, to explain the structural difficulty of forming a unified multi-ethnic opposition within states characterized by *divisive exclusion*. Wimmer et al. (2009) find that as the number of ethnic groups sharing power increases, the likelihood of violent ethnic infighting also increases because it is easier for political alliances to shift. They call this 'center segmentation.' Wimmer et al, (2009) also find that the larger the ethnically excluded population, the higher the probability of an ethnic rebellion. I extend the logic of center segmentation to explain the rarity of ethnic rebellion. Under the auspices of a regime committing ethnic group exclusion, my

findings show, the likelihood of ethnic rebellion increases substantially as the size of the excluded population increases, *unless* the excluded population is ethnically fragmented as well. Once again, I find evidence of a contingent relationship between the ethnic diversity and the outcome of interest. The results of chapter four clearly indicate that when the excluded population is large and the ethnic diversity of the excluded population is low, the probability of ethnic rebellion is at its highest. This effect diminishes as the number of excluded ethnic groups increases. Alternatively, when the size of the population is smaller increases in the number of excluded ethnic groups actually increase the likelihood of ethnic rebellion. Chapter four thus suggests that the same structural logic at play in the instability of power sharing regimes, also explains why ethnic rebellions are so rare. States can forestall large scale unrest from a large excluded population to the extent that they are able to maintain and cultivate a culture of ethnic mistrust amongst a number of competing ethnic groups.

Contrary to the assumptions of the GAO school, ethnic fractionalization is thus essential to explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellions. Although Wimmer et al. (2009) rightly point out that the state is not an ethnically neutral actor in their explanation of ethnic rebellion, they do not sufficiently develop the extent to which an ethnically unneutral state can usefully escalate the ethnic tensions between excluded ethnic groups to their benefit. The findings of chapter four thus suggest empirical evidence for a revision of the Wimmer et al. (2009) configural institutional model of ethnic violence that allows it to also explain the rarity of ethnic rebellions in states where a large proportion of the population is excluded along ethnic lines. As Wimmer et al. (2009:335) maintain, the state “is both the prize over which contending political actors struggle and a power

instrument for those who have control it.” The principal substantive contribution of chapter four is that it demonstrates that when ethnic boundaries are politicized and ethnic groups excluded from state access, it is not just the ethnic excluded-included divide that matters for explaining ethnic rebellions but also the multiple excluded-excluded politicized ethnic boundaries that result in the ethnic fragmentation of the oppositional body politic.

Although the results expected by the GAO and DBC approaches are mixed at best, there are nevertheless a few findings worth noting. Consistent with the minority-mobilization element of the DBC, government form is shown to have a relationship with rebellion onset. Both rebellion models indicate that anaocracies are more likely than autocracies to experience anti-state insurgents. However, consistent with other findings in the field, the relationship between democracy and anti-state violence continues to experience mixed support as the relationship expected by the DBC school was not robust to both model specifications. Additionally, where imperial history was not found to influence the politicization of ethnicity or ethnic exclusion, it was found to be positively related to ethnic rebellion onset in both model specifications, which is consistent with the findings of Wimmer et al. (2009). Finally, the GAO expectation that mountainous terrain increased opportunities for insurgents to organize thus increasing the likelihood of violent insurgency was not empirically supported. This lack of support, combined with the significant relationship found in chapter 3 between mountainous terrain and ethnic exclusion suggests that this particular opportunity structure is most likely operating as theorized by GAO scholars. Further research is required in regards to government form,

imperial history, and mountainous terrain to better understand the mechanisms at work behind these relationships.

### ***Concluding Remarks on an Emerging Practical Qualitative-Quantitative Dialogue***

#### ***Within the Field***

As a whole, this dissertation also contributes to an emerging brand of scholarship that takes the potential fruits of a multi-method dialogue concerning the origins of ethnic rebellions and civil war seriously. Although multi-method dialogues are almost common-place in many research fields, this has not been the case within area of conflict studies, debates over the rise of nationalism or nation-state formation. The intrinsically historical quality of these questions placed such scholarship squarely in the crossfire of a qualitative/quantitative methodological debate focused on firm theoretical and ontological differences (for a solid review of both sides see Abbott (2001), and Goldthorpe (2000)). In a rare move across the methodological aisle, Andreas Wimmer, has taken steps to systematically test the generalizability his 2002 theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict within a quantitative framework. Between 2006 and 2010, he and colleagues quantitatively examined segments of his theory addressing the rise of the nation state and the rise of nationalism (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010), as well as the link between ethnic exclusion and ethnic violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009). In doing so, what I have come to describe as the power and legitimacy school has organically arrived at a sensible and pragmatic solution to the polemical methods debate that dominated the 1990s. To be sure, there is less resistance to this move from quantitative circles than qualitative circles, given historical sociology's rich tradition of ideographic research and its sometimes substantial

aversion to the aim of generalization. Nevertheless, the organic emergence of this methodological third way over the last eight years within this area of research represents an approach to scholarship committed to the collaborative accumulation of knowledge that I hope can provide a working example for others in the discipline. Indeed, given the profound influence this vein of research has had on my professional development and the extent to which it has motivated this dissertation, I would feel remiss if I did not take this opportunity to properly highlight the importance of continuing this multi-method collaboration.

The heated methods debate of the 1990s essentially burned itself out without ever really arriving at any solid consensus. Although this is not the place for an extensive review of these debates, one central element of them is particularly relevant here. As Steinmets (2004) has clearly shown, the qualitative v. quantitative debates were actually between, four camps of scholars: quantitative scholars arguing against the usefulness of historical projects within the social sciences (for a review see, Goldthorpe 2000), a historical narrative approach to explanation rather than causation (for a review see, Abbott 2001), the classic comparative historical school (for a review see, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) and those ultimately arguing that every historical case is so unique that the broad comparisons found in the scholarship profoundly suffer from a fatal ‘incommensurability’ of case problem (the position taken by the classic historian). As can be seen from the well known reviews of each approach, the debate did little to change the minds of their opposing colleagues but did much to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Thus, while many fields outside those traditionally deemed historical and comparative in content have developed a strong and productive

engagement between quantitative and qualitative scholars (Amenta 2003), the widespread emergence of such productive dialogues within the fields which originated the methods debate have largely failed to materialize.

The conflict literature sits at a relative unique intersection within the context of these methodological divides. The seminal works of Ernest Gellner (2006) and Donald Horowitz (1985) and Hechter (2000) on one side, with scholars, such as James Fearon and David Laitin (1996), and Nicholas Sambanis (2001) building upon the legacy of early quantitative scholarship made possible by the vision of Robert Gurr's Minorities at Risk project (begun in 1985) on the other. For the most part, as one might expect given the sometimes polemical methodological battles that raged during the decade of the 1990s, these literatures have largely existed in parallel and barely interacted. A quick glance at the reference sections of either and it is clear they were not really speaking to one another. Even as a debate regarding whether ethnicity was actually a causal factor in the onset of ethnic rebellions and violent insurgency within the quantitative literature, qualitative scholars simply continued to probe the links between ethnicity and conflict (Budryte 2005) or, for example, democracy and genocide (Mann 2005).

The power and legitimacy response to the increasingly popular GAO approach to explaining ethnic rebellions represented a second push from Andreas Wimmer and colleagues to cross the methodological divide and champion a broad qualitatively developed theoretical perspective within the quantitative debate. Rather than attempt to bring multiple methods into a single study, the collaboration between scholars within the power and legitimacy school has sought to systematically apply the strengths of quantitative techniques in assessing the level of empirical evidence for portions of

Wimmer's (2002) foundational theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence. Rather than pursue a line of inquiry that solely adds additional case based and comparative research in the, truly impressive, style of John Foran (2005), this ambitious research agenda has resulted in the consultation of regional and country specific experts in the coding of new datasets (Cederman et al. 2009; Cederman et al. 2008) aimed at explicitly measuring specific theoretically important mechanisms.<sup>12</sup> Within such a framework, the strengths of a multitude of scholars can be harnessed toward the goal of expanding our knowledge of ethnic violence and civil war.

Kroneberg and Wimmer (2012), for example, use game theoretic techniques drawing on historical data from the French and Ottoman empires to demonstrate the importance of civil society development in the emergence of the nation-state, while Wimmer and Feinstein's (2010) quantitative analysis found that nation-state formation was associated with the break-up of empires in manners consistent with theory. Of course, not all findings support theoretical expectations. Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) also found no evidence for their expected world-polity isomorphic borrowing effects, raising questions about that portion of the Wimmer theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic violence. In proceeding in this fashion, power and legitimacy scholars have harnessed the strengths of quantitative research techniques in assessing the existence and strength of empirical evidence supporting specific and well specified theoretical expectations. In short, rather than attempt some grand definitive multi-method project, they have opted to pursue a steady and pragmatic middle course and develop an

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<sup>12</sup> The citation of John Foran's (2005) analysis of social revolutions is not meant to slight his impressive and comprehensive work, as the absolute frequency of social revolutions is far smaller than ethnic rebellions and quantitative techniques are truly not applicable. A rich comparative analysis of ethnic rebellions within a Boolean framework would no doubt yield substantial insight.

overwhelming body of evidence supporting the explanatory endeavor from both qualitative and quantitative analyses.

In regards to this emerging trend within the power and legitimacy school, this dissertation, in many ways simply continues along this emergent course. Yet, on the whole, this dissertation makes one other small but significant contribution. By extending my analysis of ethnic rebellion to include examinations of ethnicity's politicization and state sanctioned ethnic exclusion, my results also provide an example of the benefits to be gained from engagement between quantitative and qualitative scholarship. The primary finding from this dissertation speaking directly to this point concerns the influence of mountainous terrain on any rebellion type expected by the GAO school of scholars. The quantitative questions that emerge from the power and legitimacy school carry a similar tone and timbre to those of the greed-and-opportunity school, with the exception that the latter emerges from within a broader qualitatively derived theoretical framework while the latter has been satisfied to largely limit their debate with other quantitative scholarship. The broader contribution of this dissertation therefore lays in clearly demonstrating the dangers of failing to adequately take advantage of this wealth of qualitative scholarship.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) specifically argue that grievances are ubiquitous and that it is the opportunity structures that make violent insurgency viable that lead to the outbreak of rebellion. In many respects this position may be true. Indeed, the goal of explaining the rarity of ethnic rebellion, and rebellions in general is a truly important question since, as they rightfully argue, existing theories of ethnic violence expect far more ethnic violence than empirically occurs. However, they continue on and make the

claim that ethnicity is not actually relevant in the emergence of anti-state conflicts commonly deemed ethnic in nature (for a review of the position see Laitin 2007). Their 2003 argument and 2007 rebuttal demonstrate a firm disengagement if not disregard, for the qualitative scholarship on the issue, which, when referenced, is argued to see ethnicity as causal everywhere.

As I show in chapter 4, however, when one takes the broader processes linked to the escalation of ethnic tensions seriously, the dynamics of ethnic power relations themselves explain the overall rarity of ethnic violence. Yet, more importantly, the mountainous terrain measure, argued to measure an opportunity structure easing the organization of anti-state insurgencies by the GAO approach, was not shown to be related to the onset of ethnic violence while it was shown to be related to ethnic exclusion. The basic claim that opportunity structures which favor anti-state insurgents should increase both ethnic and non-ethnic rebellions alike seems abundantly plausible. Thus, if the mountainous terrain measure was indeed tapping the mechanism argued for by Fearon and Laitin (2003), then it should remain active in an analysis of ethnic rebellion onset. My results simply do not support this conclusion. Rather, they actually tie mountainous terrain to the onset of ethnic exclusion, suggesting that the measure is actually tapping some kind of ethnic tension or public goods distribution variance, inconsistent with the GAO school's broader claims about the role of ethnicity. The ability of the present analysis to demonstrate this weakness of the mountainous terrain finding within the GAO approach rests firmly in theoretically situating ethnic rebellion within the broader spectrum of ethnic tensions; a practice which qualitative scholars seem to excel. To be sure, my argument is not against the basic position of the GAO school regarding the role

of opportunity structures. Indeed, I am sympathetic to the argument that opportunity structures which ease the organization of insurgencies are an important explanatory part of the anti-state violence puzzle. As my results concerning the role of mountainous terrain demonstrate, when the body of qualitative scholarship is ignored or dismissed the resulting claims can easily be overdrawn. Quantitative scholarship on ethnic violence or, more broadly, any type of anti-state violence that fails to draw from the extensive qualitative work on the subject does so at its peril. In the case of the GAO school, a general lack of engagement with the qualitative scholarship on the issue has resulted in a narrow focus on the immediate causes of violent onset, which obscured the relationship between mountainous terrain and ethnic exclusion. These types of oversights within the quantitative scholarship on anti-state violence are much more likely to be avoided through consistent and sustained engagement with the relevant qualitative scholarship.

Wimmer's foundational theory of nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict represents the most robust, theoretically deep, and historically situated theory of ethnic violence and civil war in the field. Over the last decade scholars have subjected the elements of this theory regarding state formation and the rise of the nation-state (Wimmer and Min 2006; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010) and ethnic violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009) to quantitative scrutiny. As a byproduct of their efforts, power and legitimacy scholars are starting to accumulate a sizeable body of scholarship demonstrating the rich benefits to be had by engagement across the methodological aisle. By addressing the politicization of ethnicity and ethnic exclusion, the results of this dissertation, as a whole, thus contribute to a small but growing body of quantitative scholarship committed to the production of historically situated and bounded research.

The inter-method dialogue promoted within the power and legitimacy school nevertheless remains in its infancy. Nevertheless, it is my hope that it may yet continue to thrive and bloom. The quantitative element of scholarship on conflict and civil war can only be bettered through a full engagement with its qualitative sibling. The dialogue between quantitative and qualitative scholarship that has come to define the power and legitimacy school approach to scholarship is beginning to bare productive fruits that could, and I hope will, be usefully extended and embraced by those hailing from alternative theoretical perspectives within the field.

## Appendix A

Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 2 are provided in Table 2.2.

**Table 2.2**  
**Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 2**

Variable Name	Mean/ Proportion	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Ethnicity Politically Relevant	.821	---	0	1	7138
Lagged LnGDP per Capita	1.178	1.145	-3.580	4.703	6955
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	.381	.285	.001	.925	6997
Lagged GDP-ELF Interaction	.335	.475	-1.468	2.526	6952
Lagged Imperial Past	.475	.315	0	1	7000
Lagged LnPopulation Size	9.188	1.390	5.581	14.076	7060
Year	1979	16.508	1946	2005	7155
Previous Politicized Ethnicity Year Count	21.009	17.798	0	59	7155
Prior Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Span	4.283	11.358	0	59	7138
Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Spline 1	-5923.626	23606.72	-205379	0	7138

Full chapter two model results with time control parameter estimates provided in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3.**  
**Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity<sup>†</sup>**

	Full Model 1	Full Model 2
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
<b>Politicization Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>		
GDP per Capita	0.207 (0.162)	-0.388 (0.245)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	2.894** (1.087)	2.566* (1.021)
GDP-ELF Interaction		3.279*** (0.771)
<b>Other Control Variables</b>		
Imperial Past	0.363 (0.552)	0.289 (0.565)
Population	0.334* (0.170)	0.408* (0.161)
<b>Time Control Variables</b>		
5-Year period: 1950		
1955	1.448* (0.624)	1.380* (0.559)
1960	0.224 (0.591)	0.260 (0.587)
1965	-0.165 (0.589)	-0.064 (0.550)
1970	0.315 (0.705)	0.181 (0.668)
1975	0.314 (0.791)	0.115 (0.762)
1980	1.479 (2.463)	0.727 (1.937)
1985	7.189 (5.199)	6.127 (4.610)
1990	13.079 (18.646)	12.364 (8.792)
1995	-1.380 (0.730)	-1.692* (0.785)
2000	0.173 (0.972)	-0.040 (1.091)
2005	1.338 (0.858)	1.047 (0.894)
Previous Politicized Ethnicity Year Count	0.096* (0.048)	0.101* (0.043)
Prior Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Span	-3.192 (1.904)	-3.026 (1.744)

Non-Politicized	-0.001	-0.001
Ethnicity Year Spline 1	(0.001)	(0.000)
Non-Politicized		
Ethnicity Year Spline 2 <sup>‡‡</sup>		
Non-Politicized		
Ethnicity Year Spline 3 <sup>‡‡</sup>		
Constant	0.127 (21.906)	-0.792 (1.346)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-86.9915	-84.2645
Wald $\chi^2$	2035.97*** (18)	1156.53*** (19)
N (Number of States)	6935 (153)	6935 (153)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis.

<sup>‡‡</sup>The Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Spline 2 and 3 were dropped due to collinearity which suggests only one knot between the beginning and end points of the data.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

An argument has been made that a single interaction coefficient is not sufficient to test the four core hypotheses in chapter two. As a robustness check I present three alternative model specifications which explicitly test the hypothesized non-linear effect of ethnic diversity on politicized ethnicity for both abundant and limited resources. Two interaction terms are included which consist of the original interaction term multiplied by a dummy variable indicating abundant resources and a dummy variable indicating limited resources. For this model specification the GDP and ELF index variables have been standardized. The results of this type of model specification are sensitive to what is defined as abundant and limited resources. For example, states at mean levels of GDP per capita may have fewer resources than the richest states but they may yet have enough to avoid the problems faced by states with extremely limited resources. I thus define the cut point between abundant and limited resources at -1 standard deviation, the mean, and 1.5 standard deviations GDP per capita. Due the specification of the four core hypotheses would be empirically supported if both interaction terms are significant and positive.

As Table 2.4 illustrates, the interaction terms of interest are both significant and positive in the -1 standard deviation centered and the 1.5 standard deviation model as expected. The non-significant result for the interaction-high variable in the mean centered model occurs because the effect of limited resources is empirically restricted to the very poor states. All these models tell the same substantive story as those presented in the body of chapter 2.

**Table 2.4.  
Binary Logit of Standardized GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization,  
GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on the Political Relevance of Ethnicity<sup>†</sup>**

	-1 Std Centered Model	Mean Centered Model	1.5 Std Centered Model
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
<b>Politicization Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>			
GDP per Capita	0.915*** (0.244)	0.897** (0.217)	0.976** (0.214)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	1.840*** (0.324)	2.052** (0.409)	1.836** (0.336)
GDP-ELF	1.140*** (0.289)	1.282** (0.368)	1.078** (0.263)
Interaction-Low			
GDP-ELF	0.856* (0.351)	0.500 (0.528)	0.938* (0.383)
Interaction-High			
<b>Other Control Variables</b>			
Imperial Past	0.237 (0.591)	0.189 (0.576)	0.283 (0.564)
Population	0.403* (0.157)	0.397* (0.159)	0.406* (0.160)
<b>Time Control Variables</b>			
5-Year period: 1950			
1955	1.417* (0.570)	1.417** (0.546)	1.379* (0.557)
1960	0.259 (0.588)	0.279 (0.588)	0.264 (0.584)
1965	-0.048 (0.548)	-0.061 (0.554)	-0.069 (0.551)
1970	0.145 (0.668)	0.129 (0.676)	0.175 (0.668)
1975	0.078 (0.758)	0.012 (0.770)	0.115 (0.761)
1980	0.735 (1.948)	0.683 (1.966)	0.724 (1.940)
1985	6.135	6.087	6.125

	(4.585)	(4.552)	(4.601)
1990	12.404 (8.483)	12.322 (8.431)	12.381 (8.915)
1995	-1.715* (0.756)	-1.766* (0.785)	-1.698* (0.787)
2000	-0.060 (1.120)	-0.114 (1.071)	-0.034 (1.094)
2005	1.031 (0.889)	0.935 (0.877)	0.998 (0.888)
Previous Politicized	0.101*	0.102*	0.101*
Ethnicity Year Count	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Prior Non-Politicized	-3.025	-3.026	-3.026
Ethnicity Year Span	(1.733)	(1.729)	(1.742)
Non-Politicized	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
Ethnicity Year Spline 1	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Non-Politicized			
Ethnicity Year Spline 2 <sup>‡‡</sup>			
Non-Politicized			
Ethnicity Year Spline 3 <sup>‡‡</sup>			
Constant	1.244 (1.432)	1.330 (1.473)	1.213 (1.456)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-.84.1554	-83.7758	-84.2226
Wald $\chi^2$	1506.63*** (20)	1457.20*** (20)	1443.36*** (20)
N	6935	6935	6935
(Number of States)	(153)	(153)	(153)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>\*</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, was used in the analysis and all politicization variables have been standardized except for the high and low resources dummies.

<sup>‡‡</sup>The Non-Politicized Ethnicity Year Spline 2 and 3 were dropped due to colinearity which indicates only one knot between the beginning and end points of the data.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

## Appendix B

Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 3 are provided in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4**  
**Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 3<sup>†</sup>**

Variable Name	Mean/ Proportion	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Ethnic Group Exclusion	.832	---	0	1	5861
Lagged LnGDP per Capita	1.093	1.117	-3.580	4.703	5699
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	.427	.274	.004	.901	5733
Lagged GDP-ELF Interaction	.379	.450	-1.392	2.526	5699
Lagged Imperial Past	.475	.320	0	1	5733
Lagged Barrels of Oil per Capita	1.522	11.982	0	272.403	5784
Lagged Anocracy	.245	---	0	1	5713
Lagged Democracy	.332	---	0	1	5713
Lagged LnPopulation Size	9.266	1.416	5.755	14.076	5784
Year	1979	16.627	1946	2005	5861
Previous Ethnic Exclusion Year Count	21.233	17.796	0	59	5861
Prior Non-Ethnic Exclusion Year Span	3.133	9.241	0	59	5861
Non-Ethnic Exclusion Year Spline 1	-3548.856	17469.49	-205379	0	5861
Non-Ethnic Exclusion Year Spline 3	-1170.246	4619.292	-40404	0	5861

<sup>†</sup>Only states where ethnicity was politically relevant were used in the analysis for chapter 3

Table 3.5 presents the chapter 3 models, including the previously suppressed time control variables.

**Table 3.5.  
Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
<b>Politicization Variables<sup>‡</sup></b>			
GDP per Capita	0.488** (0.183)	0.488* (0.195)	1.467*** (0.436)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization		-0.113 (0.657)	1.172 (0.670)
GDP-ELF Interaction			-2.052** (0.750)
<b>Other Control Variables</b>			
Imperial Past	0.303 (0.505)	0.291 (0.521)	0.846 (0.539)
Oil Production per Capita	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.016)
Form of Government Reference: Autocracy			
Anocracy	-0.292 (0.308)	-0.296 (0.305)	-0.312 (0.322)
Democracy	-0.584 (0.343)	-0.591 (0.342)	-0.767* (0.347)
Population	0.189 (0.128)	0.188 (0.128)	0.165 (0.117)
Percentage of Mountainous Terrain	0.318** (0.112)	0.315** (0.112)	0.405** (0.119)
<b>Time Control Variables</b>			
Year:1946-1948			
1949	0.669 (0.536)	0.675 (0.542)	0.556 (0.536)
1950	1.160 (0.699)	1.165 (0.705)	1.034 (0.678)
1951	1.779** (0.634)	1.783** (0.638)	1.696** (0.633)
1952	2.397** (0.654)	2.398** (0.655)	2.302** (0.674)
1953	1.079 (0.931)	1.085 (0.938)	0.851 (0.964)
1954	1.404 (0.781)	1.404 (0.783)	1.169 (0.822)
1955	2.068** (0.714)	2.063** (0.711)	1.812* (0.763)
1956	2.798** (0.733)	2.793** (0.726)	2.486** (0.793)

1957	7.950 (5.785)	7.942 (5.863)	7.485 (6.174)
1958	8.891 (3.735)*	8.887* (3.778)	8.405* (4.097)
1959	1.056 (0.958)	1.074 (0.966)	0.810 (0.960)
1960	1.420 (0.772)	1.446 (0.802)	1.187 (0.809)
1961	0.389 (0.483)	0.415 (0.509)	0.128 (0.529)
1962	0.726 (0.508)	0.753 (0.555)	0.458 (0.580)
1963	0.284 (0.514)	0.308 (0.574)	0.042 (0.573)
1964	1.366 (0.884)	1.389 (0.932)	1.131 (0.956)
1965	0.743 (0.530)	0.770 (0.578)	0.408 (0.614)
1966	1.056 (1.174)	1.087 (1.189)	0.680 (1.161)
1967	1.188 (1.187)	1.215 (1.236)	0.895 (1.160)
1968	0.515 (0.614)	0.537 (0.650)	0.326 (0.656)
1969	0.905 (0.653)	0.927 (0.679)	0.829 (0.658)
1970	4.045 (3.530)	4.061 (3.552)	3.930 (2.745)
1971	1.213 (0.688)	1.241 (0.732)	1.056 (0.801)
1972	1.757 (1.739)	1.783 (1.749)	1.540 (1.795)
1973	0.442 (0.808)	0.466 (0.867)	0.209 (0.865)
1974	0.751 (0.801)	0.773 (0.863)	0.513 (0.831)
1975	1.184 (0.722)	1.202 (0.774)	0.935 (0.740)
1976	1.509* (0.688)	1.523* (0.729)	1.250 (0.703)
1977	2.616 (1.368)	2.627 (1.368)	2.338 (1.307)
1978	2.419* (1.050)	2.429* (1.066)	2.071* (0.982)
1979	1.563** (0.542)	1.584** (0.601)	1.298 (0.581)*
1980	1.558 (1.565)	1.580 (1.572)	1.283 (1.650)
1981	0.205 (0.671)	0.233 (0.713)	-0.058 (0.755)
1982	1.325 (0.833)	1.356 (0.891)	1.021 (0.978)
1983	0.533 (0.835)	0.562 (0.925)	0.234 (0.831)
1984	0.704 (0.907)	0.730 (0.988)	0.394 (0.942)

		1.016	1.034	0.552
1985		(0.809)	(0.873)	(0.870)
1986		1.584	1.599	0.934
1987		(2.399)	(2.398)	(1.916)
1988		0.702	0.731	0.452
1989		(0.993)	(1.043)	(0.961)
1990		1.123	1.155	0.967
1991		(0.910)	(0.985)	(0.939)
1992		0.445	0.474	0.261
1993		(1.120)	(1.216)	(1.163)
1994		2.112	2.148	1.997
1995		(3.897)	(4.006)	(4.018)
1996		-0.601	-0.580	-0.773
1997		(0.834)	(0.875)	(0.862)
1998		0.304	0.328	0.143
1999		(0.731)	(0.776)	(0.775)
2000		0.628	0.655	0.450
2001		(0.754)	(0.798)	(0.797)
2002		1.123	1.152	0.929
2003		(1.464)	(1.422)	(1.551)
2004		0.382	0.412	0.187
2005		(0.576)	(0.594)	(0.682)
2006		0.718	0.753	0.579
2007		(0.930)	(0.951)	(0.986)
2008		0.712	0.750	0.611
2009		(0.614)	(0.693)	(0.713)
2010		1.270*	1.311	1.159
2011		(0.647)	(0.751)	(0.732)
2012		1.869**	1.911*	1.780*
2013		(0.679)	(0.796)	(0.752)
2014		4.848**	4.904**	4.900**
2015		(1.640)	(1.741)	(1.638)
2016		4.442**	4.496**	4.542**
2017		(1.323)	(1.470)	(1.514)
2018		3.194	3.234	2.993
2019		(6.777)	(6.926)	(6.763)
2020		0.234	0.266	0.018
2021		(0.863)	(0.907)	(0.909)
2022		0.316	0.350	0.126
2023		(0.788)	(0.846)	(0.838)
2024		0.755	0.794	0.559
2025		(0.710)	(0.803)	(0.775)
Previous Politicized		0.030	0.030	0.031*
Ethnicity Year Count		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Prior Non-Politicized		-1.971**	-1.972**	-1.930**
Ethnicity Year Span		(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.213)
Non-Politicized		0.001*	0.001*	0.001*
Ethnicity Year Spline 1		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Non-Politicized				
Ethnicity Year Spline 2 <sup>‡‡</sup>				
Non-Politicized		-0.008**		-0.007**
Ethnicity Year Spline 3 <sup>‡‡</sup>		(0.002)		(0.002)
Constant		-0.221	0.116	-0.561
		(1.169)	(1.154)	(1.012)

Log Pseudolikelihood	-377.3892	--377.3527	-367.7335
Wald $\chi^2$	104360.02***	113783.40***	121978.93***
(d.f.)	(68)	(69)	(70)
N	5632	5632	5632
(Number of States)	(128)	(128)	(128)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountainous Terrain were used in the analysis.

<sup>§§</sup>The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to collinearity which suggests only two knots between the beginning and end points of the data.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

Two alternative specifications of model 3 were conducted as robustness checks and the sake of completeness. In these models each category the measures of GDP per capita, the ELF index, and their interaction were broken up into a set of dummy variables. To balance the strain on the data due to the increased number parameter estimates and the continuous nature of the GDP per capita and ELF measures, I split the two variables into quartiles, creating 16 dummy variables. I specifically hypothesize that states with limited resources and little ethnic diversity are *less* likely to exclude ethnic groups than states with limited resources and high levels of ethnic diversity. Within this dummy code model, the “GDP .25-ELF.25” measure should be statistically significant and negative when the reference category is “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” This expectation is tested in model 3a. In model 3b I change the reference category to “GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00” and test the hypothesis that states with abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity are *more* likely to commit to ethnic exclusion than states with abundant resources high ethnic diversity. Empirical evidence for this hypothesis would be shown by a statistically significant and positive coefficient for the “GDP 1.00-ETH .25” dummy variable when the “GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00” dummy is the reference group. Results for models 3a and 3b are provided in Table 3.6. Given the number of dummy codes for the time controls and the dummy codes for the GDP-ELF interaction I once again suppress the time controls. I note,

however, to further reduce the strain on the data introduced by utilizing 59 year dummies to control for time, I instead and used a set of dummy variables, set in 5 year, increments.

**Table 3.6.**  
**Binary Logit of GDP per Capita, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization, GDP-ELF Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Group Exclusion<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 3a	Model 3b
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
<b>Predictors of Interest</b>		
GDP per Capita-ELF Index Quartile Categories <sup>‡</sup>	Omitted Reference Category GDP .25-ELF 1.00 <sup>‡</sup>	Omitted Reference Category GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00 <sup>‡</sup>
GDP .25-ELF .25	-1.489** (0.562)	-2.779 (1.438)
GDP .25-ELF .50	-0.630 (0.614)	-2.497** (0.958)
GDP .25-ELF .75	0.182 (0.523)	-0.480 (0.868)
GDP 25-ELF 1.00	---- ----	0.662 (0.691)
GDP .50- ELF .25	1.575 (0.821)	-1.205 (1.491)
GDP .50-ELF .50	2.552** (0.973)	0.055 (0.782)
GDP .50-ELF .75	0.607 (0.799)	0.127 (0.997)
GDP .50-ELF 1.00	0.118 (0.424)	1.867* (0.755)
GDP .75-ELF .25	4.292** (1.518)	1.512 (1.377)
GDP .75- ELF .50	5.877** (1.467)	3.380* (1.599)
GDP .75-ELF .75	3.702** (1.174)	3.222* (1.263)
GDP .75-ELF 1.00	-1.513* (0.740)	-1.566 (0.972)
GDP 1.00-ELF .25	2.779 (1.438)	1.291 (1.273)
GDP 1.00-ELF .50	2.497** (0.958)	1.867* (0.755)
GDP 1.00- ELF .75	0.480 (0.868)	0.662 (0.691)
GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00	0.053 (0.668)	---- ----
<b>Other Control Variables</b>		
Imperial Past	0.339 (0.480)	0.339 (0.480)
Oil Production per Capita	0.049 (0.041)	0.049 (0.041)
Form of Government Reference: Autocracy		

Anocracy	-0.234 (0.344)	-0.234 (0.344)
Democracy	-0.582 (0.371)	-0.582 (0.371)
Population	0.260* (0.132)	0.260 (0.132)*
Percentage of Mountainous Terrain	0.350** (0.108)	0.350 (0.108)**
Time Control Variables	Suppressed	Suppressed
Constant	-0.552 (1.250)	-0.499 (1.279)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-387.4449	-387.4449
Wald $\chi^2$ (d.f.)	794.43*** (36)	794.43*** (36)
N (Number of States)	5633 (129)	5633 (128)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, and Percent of Mountainous Terrain were used in the analysis.

<sup>§</sup>The Ethnic Inclusion Year Spline 2 was dropped due to colinearity which suggests only two knots between the beginning and end points of the data.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

As Table 3.6 demonstrates, the results are substantively similar to the conclusions drawn in chapter 3. As expected the “GDP .25-ELF .25” category estimate is negative and statistically significant ( $p \leq .01$ ). This indicates evidence for the expectation that states with limited resources and low ethnic diversity are structurally incentivized to pursue a strategy of *formal inclusion*, while states with limited resources and high levels of ethnic diversity conversely incentivized to pursue strategies of *divisive exclusion*. Although not specifically hypothesized, the positive significance of “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” compared to “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” is consistent with the basic logic motivating the hypotheses. These findings have three implications. First, they suggest that states in the bottom of both quartiles are the least likely to exclude segments of their population along ethnic lines. Second, they indicate that ethnic exclusion is more likely for states where resources are limited and ethnic diversity high relative to states in the lower quartile on both measures. And third, they indicate that exclusion is more likely in states with

abundant resources and limited ethnic diversity than it is in states with limited resources and high diversity. Together, these create a general ranking for the influence of the hypothesized structural factors on likelihood of exclusion in each ideal typical scenario.

The factors associated with the *formal inclusion scenario* push states into the lowest probability of ethnic exclusion. The second most common type of ethnic exclusion follows the pattern of *divisive exclusion*, with states following a pattern of *xenophobic exclusion* the most frequent type of ethnic exclusionary outcome.

The evidence for the *multi-culturalist scenario* is less consistent. As Table 3.5, model 3b shows, the “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” measure, although positive, is not registering a statistically significant difference with “GDP 1.00-ELF 1.00.” The “GDP 1.00-ELF .50” coefficient is positive and statistically significant, which indicates some support for the hypothesis that states that have abundant resources and high ethnic diversity have a lower probability of ethnic exclusion than states that have an abundance of resources and a high diversity. The lack of significance of the “GDP 1.00-ELF .25” dummy but the significance of the “GDP 1.00-ELF .50” dummy suggests some support for the hypothesized relationship. However, it also indicates that the relationship is not as clean as theoretically expected. The “GDP 1.00-ELF1.00” category has a higher probability of ethnic exclusion than the “GDP .25-ELF .25” category but is not indicated to be lower than the “GDP .25-ELF 1.00” category. The “GDP .50-ELF 1.00” category is significantly positive, relative to the “GDP 1.00-ELF1.00” category, as is the “GDP 1.00-ELF .50”. These relationships provide some evidence that state’s with abundant resources and mid-levels of ethnic diversity, as well as states with mid-level resource availability and high ethnic diversity are more likely to experience ethnic exclusion than

states with an abundance of both resources and ethnic diversity. In light of the strength of the evidence from model 3a, it seems clear that while states with an abundance of resources and high ethnic diversity have some incentive to avoid ethnic exclusion, this incentive is not as high as theoretically expected. As a whole however, they paint a very similar picture to model 3, presented in Table 3.3 (see Table 3.5 above for the table showing the time controls).

## Appendix C

Descriptive statistics for the data used in chapter 4 are provided in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3**  
**Descriptive Statistics for Substantive Variables Used in Chapter 4<sup>†</sup>**

Variable Name	Mean/ Proportion	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Ethnic Rebellion	0.167	---	0	1	4557
Ethnic Rebellion Onset	0.026	---	0	1	3899
Lagged LnGDP per Capita	1.137	1.053	-2.008	4.703	4738
Lagged Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups	4.184	7.183	0	55	4768
Lagged LnProportion of Population Excluded	-2.132	1.303	-5.298	-0.020	4742
Excluded Group-Population Interaction	-7.514	10.649	-80.461	-0.020	4742
Lagged Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.424	0.269	0.005	0.902	4772
Lagged Imperial Past	0.468	0.327	0.000	1	4772
Lagged Barrels of Oil per Capita	1.718	13.079	0.000	272.403	4815
Lagged Anocracy	0.257	---	0	1	4764
Lagged Democracy	0.321	---	0	1	4764
Lagged LnPopulation Size	9.411	1.430	5.755	14.076	4815
LnPercent of Mountainous Terrain	2.436	1.323	0.000	4.407	4879
Change in Regime in Last Three Years	0.133	---	0	1	4879
Lagged Ongoing War Year	0.222	---	0	1	4772
Model 1 Previous Ethnic War Year Count	3.048	7.751	0	57	4879
Model 1 Prior Peace Year Span	17.776	16.889	0	59	4557
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 1	-5714.940	7962.200	-30510	0	4557
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 2	-11510.110	17736.320	-70176	0	4557
Model 1 Peace Year Spline 3	-10268.710	17563.640	-74304	0	4557
Model 2 Previous Ethnic War Year Count	0.195	0.561	0	7	4879
Model 2 Prior Peace Year Span	20.776	16.464	0	59	3899
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 1	-9466.147	12045.510	-44880	0	3899
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 2	-13935.350	19630.740	-75240	0	3899
Model 2 Peace Year Spline 3	-11319.640	17556.800	-71400	0	3899

<sup>†</sup>Only states where ethnicity was politically relevant and at least one ethnic group was excluded were used in the analysis for chapter 4

**Table 4.4**  
**Binary Logit of Ethnically Excluded Population Size, Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups, Excluded Population-Group Interaction and Controls on Ethnic Rebellion<sup>†</sup>**

	Model 1	Model 2
	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)	Logit Coeficient (S.E.)
Exclusion Variables <sup>‡</sup>		
Number of Excluded Ethnic Groups	-0.056*	-0.073*
Excluded Population Size	0.357** (0.131)	0.268 (0.151)
Excluded Population-Group Interaction	-0.043** (0.015)	-0.055* (0.023)
GDP per Capita	-0.385* (0.152)	-0.750*** (0.224)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization	0.613 (0.360)	1.503* (0.617)
Imperial Past	0.827* (0.365)	1.069* (0.524)
Oil Production per Capita	0.001 (0.016)	0.012 (0.008)
Anocracy	0.695* (0.320)	0.851* (0.353)
Democracy	0.879** (0.337)	0.492 (0.412)
Population	0.143 (0.093)	0.163 (0.123)
Percentage of Mountainous Terrain	0.046 (0.092)	0.141 (0.114)
Recent Regime Change	0.060 (0.272)	0.008 (0.291)
Ongoing War	3.670*** (0.266)	2.027*** (0.361)
1948	-0.448 (0.754)	---
1949	-1.476 (1.145)	1.322 (0.910)
1950	0.849 (0.834)	2.214** (0.814)
1951	-0.126 (1.276)	---
1952	0.740 (1.396)	1.140 (1.370)
1953	0.179 (0.852)	---
1954	0.839 (0.626)	---
1955	-0.010 (1.016)	---
1956	2.048 (1.077)	1.860 (1.183)
1957	0.930	1.382

	(0.629)	(0.833)
1958	2.380** (0.870)	2.436* (0.983)
1959	0.330 (0.950)	---
1960	-0.190 (1.080)	1.266 (0.852)
1961	0.975 (0.833)	2.059* (1.005)
1962	0.079 (1.015)	---
1963	0.704 (1.198)	1.504 (1.259)
1964	0.896 (0.601)	---
1965	2.772*** (0.656)	3.135*** (0.769)
1966	2.404* (1.036)	2.999*** (0.812)
1967	1.389** (0.511)	1.792 (1.063)
1968	1.421** (0.543)	---
1969	0.979 (0.813)	---
1970	2.179*** (0.612)	2.296* (1.130)
1971	2.591* (1.034)	2.947** (1.027)
1972	1.703 (1.004)	2.714** (0.942)
1973	1.973** (0.731)	---
1974	2.591** (0.804)	2.685* (1.055)
1975	1.520*** (0.440)	3.038** (1.005)
1976	1.962* (0.772)	1.692 (1.084)
1977	1.888* (0.943)	1.992 (1.399)
1978	2.693*** (0.765)	1.737 (1.291)
1979	2.698*** (0.768)	2.945*** (0.795)
1980	2.681** (0.935)	2.974** (1.026)
1981	1.958*** (0.494)	2.960** (1.012)
1982	2.213* (0.943)	2.254* (0.979)
1983	2.568*** (0.653)	2.640** (0.950)
1984	1.708* (0.734)	2.274 (1.227)
1985	2.761***	---

	(0.655)	---
1986	2.132** (0.785)	2.537** (0.977)
1987	2.010*** (0.493)	1.974* (0.969)
1988	2.608* (1.019)	---
1989	2.664** (0.937)	2.927** (0.919)
1990	2.376* (1.060)	3.525*** (0.848)
1991	1.981* (0.818)	3.045*** (0.899)
1992	0.736 (0.754)	3.357*** (0.773)
1993	1.422* (0.608)	1.902* (0.891)
1994	0.537 (0.603)	2.088* (0.959)
1995	0.738 (0.854)	---
1996	0.566 (0.867)	2.494** (0.763)
1997	0.999 (0.786)	1.562 (1.147)
1998	0.498 (0.674)	1.511 (1.265)
1999	0.975 (0.829)	0.671 (0.705)
2001	1.508* (0.741)	2.003* (0.921)
2002	-0.026 (0.927)	1.640 (1.258)
2003	-0.462 (1.066)	0.645 (1.475)
2004	0.992 (1.282)	1.156 (1.349)
Previous Ethnic War Year	0.071***	0.452
Count	(0.018)	(0.235)
Prior Peace Year Span	-0.492*** (0.107)	0.036 (0.082)
Peace Year Spline 1	-0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Peace Year Spline 2	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Peace Year Spline 3	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)
Constant	-5.311*** (0.973)	-8.761*** (1.155)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-439.93306	-283.2758
Wald $\chi^2$ (d.f.)	43804.40*** (74)	3400.36*** (61)
N (Number of States)	4372 (116)	3718 (115)

<sup>†</sup>All variables, where appropriate, were lagged by one year. Robust standard errors, clustered by sovereign state are reported in parentheses.

<sup>‡</sup>The natural log of the GDP per Capita, Population Size, Percent of Mountianous Terrain and Excluded Population Size were used in the analysis.

\*  $p \leq .05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

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