THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA

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Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of The Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Approved by:

June 1, 1929.
PREFACE

The writer desires herewith to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor W. W. Davis, who has given unstintedly of his time in the revision and correction of the manuscript.
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CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

Jutting out from the Asiatic mainland lies the peninsula of Korea. It is nearly as large as the main island of Japan proper. In the north the peninsula is separated from Siberia by the Tumen River. In the south the peninsula faces Kyushu across the Strait 1. of Korea. Separated from China proper by mountains and the Manchurian plain, the Korean kingdoms were able to maintain practical autonomy, although subject to occasional invasions. Culturally, Korea was soon subject to the superior civilization of China.

Korea, though unknown even by name in Europe until the sixteenth century, was the subject of description by Arab geographers of the middle ages. Before the peninsula was known as a political unit, the envoys of Shinra, one of the three Korean states, and those from Persia met face to face before the throne of China. The Arab merchants trading to Chinese ports crossed

1. Japan Year Book, 1921-22, p. 572; The Strait between Korea and Japan is only about 120 miles wide.
the Yellow Sea, visited the peninsula and even settled there. The youths of Shinra, sent by their sovereign to study the arts of war and peace at Nanking, might have seen and talked with the merchants of Bagdad and Damascus. The Korean term for Mussulman is hoi-hoi, 1.
"round and round" man.

When in the nineteenth century the Russians established themselves on the northern frontier of Korea the political difficulties of the little kingdom were greatly increased and she became but a pawn in the game played by China, Japan and Russia.

1. Griffis, W. E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 1.
Korea and China.

Students of the Chinese classics claim that long before the reign of Yao (2357-2258 B.C.) southern Manchuria and northern Korea had formed a part of two of the nine provinces into which China was then divided.

By the middle part of the Chou dynasty (1122-255 B.C.) there was in existence a Chinese colony in northern Korea which was ruled by the Chis, who claimed that both the colony and the ruling house were found by Chi-tzu. Chi-tzu was a refugee from China at the time of the fall of the Shang dynasty in 1122 B.C. He secured permission to emigrate to Korea with 5,000 followers. Whether he came by sea or by land is not known; but upon his arrival he settled at Pyeng-yang. Chi-tzu, if he was really an historical character, was one of the greatest colonisers that the world has ever seen. He brought with him artisans of every kind, and all the other necessities of a self-supporting colony. Arriving here, he began a peaceful reign, making special

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 2.
laws for the civilizing of the half-wild people. It is believed that it was by him that the land was first called Chosen, or "Land of Morning Freshness." No remnants of literature have come down to us from his time; and while the Koreans passionately resent the supposition that he was a merely legendary character, and show his tomb and many other relics of his kingdom, it can never be definitely said that he was an historical character.

The Tsin dynasty (255-206 B.C.) acquired the allegiance of Chosen. In 193 B.C. Wyman, a fugitive from Chinese justice, found asylum in Chosen. This Wiman descended upon Kijun, the last King of the Chi dynasty, and compelled him to take boat with a few followers and flee southward along the coast. The Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 214 A.D.) soon directed its attention to Chosen. The Han forces invaded Chosen by land and sea and organized the country into two prefectures, Lo-lang and Yuan-tu.

Kijun landed on the shore of southern Korea, and there found a peculiar race of people, differ-

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 5.
4. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 5-6.
ing in almost every respect from those of the north. There were three groups of tribes scattered along the southern coast of the peninsula. They were the Mahan, Pyonhan and Chinhan. Kijun, with the superior civilization which he brought with him, found no difficulty in establishing control over the people of Mahan, and for many decades the Chi dynasty continued in its second home. Meanwhile important things were happening among the peoples of Chinhan. At the time of the building of the Great Wall in China, about 225 B.C., a great number of Chinese had fled across the Yellow Sea to Korea, and after wandering about awhile, had been given a place to live by the people of Chinhan. The superior arts which they brought with them exerted a great influence upon their neighbors, and as they gradually became absorbed with the population of Chinhan, a new and stronger civilization had its birth there. It was in 57 B.C., that several of the most powerful chiefs met and agreed to consolidate their interests and establish a kingdom such as which they had heard about from their Chinese guests. This was done, and a kingdom was established. It was called

1. Griffis, W. E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 20.
2. Ibid, p. 27.
Suyabul at first, but is generally known by the name Shinra.

The prefectures of Lo-lang and Yuan-tu formed part of one of the thirteen provinces into which the China of the Han, later Han and Wei dynasties (206 B.C. - 264 A.D.) was divided. During the Tsin dynasty (264 - 322) the northern part of Lo-lang was organized as a prefecture known as Tai-fang.

At the opening of the Barbarian Rebellion (317-439) northern Korea fell into the hands of the Mujungs, a branch of the Hsien-pie nomads. The Mujungs were replaced by a Manchurian tribe known as the Kaoku-li, who occupied the three prefectures of Lo-lang, Yuan-tu and Tai-fang, and there founded a barbarian kingdom known as Kaoku-li or Kaoli.

A fugitive from Kaoli came into the northern borders of Mahan, and by treachery succeeded in wresting the kingdom away from the Chis, on whose fallen throne he erected the new kingdom of Pakche. Thus it came to pass that there were three powers in Korea, -- Shinra in the southeast, Pakche in the southwest and Kaoli in the north.

1. Hulbert, H.B., Passing of Korea, p. 72.
2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 8-9.
5. cf. Dautremer, J., The Japanese Empire, pp. 301-302; also, Mr. Foote's report on Korea, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883, p. 245.
After the rise of the kingdoms in Korea, their rulers one after another applied to the Chinese dynasties for authorization to hold their kingly offices. These rulers were appointed as governors and at the same time invested as kings.

On the occasion Shinra appealed to the Tang dynasty (618-907) for protection against attacks from Kaoli and Pakche, the dynasty readily dispatched forces to her aid. Pakche was conquered in 660 and Kaoli in 668. True to its original purpose -- the enforcement of suzerain claims -- the Tang dynasty refrained from annexing the kingdoms which were subsequently restored to their respective princes.

After the death of Kao-tsung (650-683) Pakche and southern Kaoli were absorbed by Shinra. Northern Kaoli was absorbed by a Manchurian kingdom known as Po-hai, after the title "Prince of Po-hai" conferred upon its King by the Tang dynasty. This was an event of great importance. Now for the first time in Korean history the whole territory was united under a single government. It was the language, the laws, the civilization of Shinra that welded the Korean people into a homogeneous population and laid the found-

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 17-19.
1. At about the same time there began that wonderful influx of Chinese ideas which have done so much to mould Korea to the Chinese type.

By 924 the Chitans, descendants of the Hsien-pie nomads, had conquered the kingdom of Po-hai. The Chitans were displaced by the Nuchens, a Manchurian tribe, in the twelfth century. The Mongols finally conquered the Muchens. This meant that northern Kaoli was absorbed by the Mongols. But in the south there lay the kingdom of Shinra for the Mongols to conquer.

About the time the Chitans conquered Po-hai, Shinra fell into its constituent parts; namely, Kaoli and Pakche. Kaoli, under the leadership of Wang Kien, succeeded in unifying the peninsula by conquering Pakche in 936. Kaoli took upon herself the duty of Shinra in paying homage to the Chinese court. But in 995 Kaoli was compelled to transfer her allegiance to the Chitans. When Kublai Khan became a Chinese monarch the Mongols laid suzerain claims upon Kaoli. A Resident was placed at the Korean capital. Under the Mongols

1. Griffis, W.E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 32.
2. Hulbert, H.B., Passing of Korea, p. 75.
3. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 22-27.
4. Griffis, W.E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 34. See also Hillier, W.C., Korea, its History and Prospects, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 81, p. 946.
5. Hulbert, H.B., Passing of Korea, p. 84.
Kaoli differed from the provinces only in the respect that she still had a king.

When Hung-wu-ti (1368-1398), the first Ming emperor, came to power, he merely announced to Kaoli his ascension to the Chinese throne. On receiving the announcement, the King of Kaoli applied to the Ming dynasty for investiture which was accordingly granted.

In Kaoli the house of the Wangs was destined to vacate its place for the Lis. In 1392 the new ruler, Li Cheng-kuei, applied to the Ming dynasty for recognition as well as a new designation for his kingdom. The latter readily accorded him recognition and conferred upon his kingdom the name of Chao-hsien. Throughout the Ming dynasty Chao-hsien never failed in her duty towards the suzerain. When Chao-hsien was overrun by the Japanese at the end of the sixteenth century the Ming dynasty readily came to her rescue. When the Ming dynasty fought against the Manchus at the beginning of the seventeenth century Chao-hsien hastened to send aid.

The Tsing dynasty (1644-1911) made no departure from the policy of the Ming dynasty towards

Chao-hsien and the happy relation established between China and that vassal kingdom by the founder of the Ming dynasty was continued until it was terminated by the Japanese War of 1894–95. Thus we see that, for all practical intents and purposes, Korea had been for ages the vassal state of China. Mr. Foote, United States Minister at Seoul, reported in 1883: "Each year an embassy goes to Peking with certain gifts and brings back the Chinese calendar. To receive this calendar is an evidence of dependence, and if it is not used it is regarded as an act of treason. It is necessary to report to the Chinese Emperor the accession of a new King to the throne, and to obtain his sanction to the same. Envoys going from Korea to China are treated as Chinese subjects, and all official documents from the Korean King to the Emperor of China bear the subscription of 1.

1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883, p.246.
Japan and Korea

The titles conferred upon the King of Wo (Japan) by the Chinese dynasties (the Southern Dynasties 420-589) were "Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of Wo, Pakche, etc." This indicates that the interests of Wo at that time were not confined to the Japanese islands. When the kingdoms of Kaoli, Pakche and Wo made their appearance, the eastern coast of southern Korea was still in an unorganized state. Wo, accordingly, took upon herself the task of dominating that southern section of the Korean peninsula. This aggression, however, ended dismally; a native kingdom known as Shinra made its appearance there and drove out the Wos.

In 1592 Hideyoshi, who ruled Japan at that time, overran Korea. His main intention was the conquest of China. Korea was to be but an incident along the way. It was necessary to make Korea the road by which he should invade China, and therefore he sent an envoy suggesting that, as he was about to conquer the four corners of the earth, Korea should give him free passage through her territory. To this the

1. Hulbert, H.B., Passing of Korea, p. 94; also, Griffis, W.E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, pp. 40-50.
King replied that, as Korea had always been friendly with China, she could not think of taking such a wicked course. After a considerable interchange of envoys, Hideyoshi became convinced that there was nothing to do but crush Korea, as a preliminary to the greater work.

Korea had long expected the invasion, and had kept China well informed of the plans of Hideyoshi and his demands, but when the blow was struck it found Korea unprepared. She had enjoyed the blessings of peace so long that her army had dwindled to a mere posse of police. At the first blow it became apparent that Korea could do nothing against the invaders. Fusan, Tong-na, Kim-ha, and the other towns along the route to Seoul fell in quick succession. Then came the rescuing forces of China, the suzerain power. The Japanese fleet was swept from the sea by the Koreans. Hideyoshi sued for peace which was granted.

In 1596 Hideyoshi again invaded Korea, but was held in check both on land and at sea. He died in 1598, and on his death-bed ordered the recall of the Japanese troops from Korea. They returned, having obtained for their countrymen somewhat greater privileges

1. Hulbert, H.B., Passing of Korea, p. 95.
2. Griffith, W.E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 52. See also, Ireland, W.W., Japanese Invasion of Korea, Living Age, Vol. 203, p. 611.
than before in the Port of Fusan, and for their country
a heavy tribute from Korea.

The Hideyoshi invasion won for the Japanese the abiding hatred of the Koreans. Even as late as 1894 Lord Curzon wrote:--

"The race hatred between Koreans and Japanese is the most striking phenomenon in contemporary Chosen. The Japanese develop in Korea a faculty for bullying and bluster that is the result partly of national vanity, partly of memories of the past. The lower orders ill-treat the Koreans on every opportunity, and are cordially detested by them in return."

Another writer wrote as follows:--

"Chief of the points to which attention must be directed is one which bulks much bigger than all the other things put together: and this is merely that the Koreans hate the Japanese.

"The Korean hatred is really hereditary. Hatred for the Japanese has been as natural an instinct in Korea as sleeping or eating."

2. Lawrence, T.J., War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 6.
CHAPTER II.

Sino-Japanese Rivalries In Korea.

Korea for ages has been the pupil of China. Manners, customs, culture and nearly everything that makes up civilization have been borrowed from or enforced by China. The very face of the map is Chinese, and the names of the kingdom, capital and provinces bear witness to the desire for "the sunshine of China". The people have been taught to believe that their country is the "little house" of "the Great Country", while those who subsist upon the public treasury look to Peking very much as a plant turns to the sun for its very existence.

On the other hand, from the end of the sixteenth century until 1834 it was the practice of the Korean Court to send envoys to Japan upon the installation of each new Shogun. But Korea in no sense acknowledged political connection with Japan, while she did look to China as her suzerain. After 1834 the

1. Griffis, W.E., Corea, the Hermit Nation, p. 1.
practice of sending envoys to Japan was discontinued. When the Manchu power was at its height, the political boundaries of China extended to Korea, the Liuchiu Islands, Burma and Indo-China. All these territories were bound to China by a tie of suzerainty. With the decline of the Manchu dynasty in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Chinese claim of suzerainty over these outlying states had not been vigorously asserted. It was left for the foreign powers who coveted these regions to take full advantage of China's passivity. As early as 1874, Japan had been encroaching upon the Liuchiu Islands. The case of the Liuchiu Islands was similar to that of Korea.

A number of Liuchiu sailors had been murdered by the aborigines of Formosa. Japan intervened in the name of the Liuchiu sailors. "One member of the Yamen, Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, replied that the Formosan aborigines had hitherto been left much to themselves on account of their peculiar mode of life".

This reply was tantamount to China's recognition of

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 89-91.
Japan's right to protect the Liuchiuans sailors. It also meant that Chinese suzerainty over the Liuchiu Islands was ended. Accordingly, in 1874 Japan sent an expedition to Formosa. While she announced that she would champion the cause of the Liuchiuans sailors, she also made the Liuchiu King a feudal lord of Japan. In 1879 Japan deposed the King and annexed Liuchiu outright, with China protesting.
Chinese Suzerainty Over Korea

Over Korea the Chinese claim of an ill-defined suzerainty was always kept up. After the massacre of French missionaries in 1866, when the French charge' d' affaires pressed the matter at Peking, the Tsung-li Yamen declared that Korea was an independent state for which China had no responsibility. When in 1871, Admiral Rodgers of the American Navy, claimed satisfaction for the looting of the schooner "General Sherman" in 1866, the Chinese Government took the same position. "It was a costly mistake, for when China wished to reassert her claims, it was easy for objectors to quote her own admissions that Korea was independent."

1. "When any foreign power approached China either to demand redress for an outrage committed in Corea or to make a treaty with that country, China repudiated all responsibility for Corean affairs and declined to interfere as her suzerain. Thus Corea came to be treated as an independent state by other countries." (Annual Register, 1885, p. 339.)
2. Lawrence, T.J., War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 6.
The Japanese Treaty of 1876

"Japan may be said to have embarked on the course of empire building at about the time when the German Empire and the Kingdom of Italy were first beginning to adjust themselves to their newly-won positions among the states of Europe."  

As early as 1868 Japan had begun her activities with Korea. An envoy was sent to Korea to announce the resumption by the Mikado of the imperial sovereignty, but due to Korean opposition the envoy returned without any satisfaction.

After the settlement of the Formosan question Japan deemed it a good time to take decisive steps to resume her activities with Korea. In September 1875, a Japanese gunboat, while surveying the mouth of the Han River, was fired on by a Korean fort. The Japanese made a landing in force and practically annihilated the garrison. The statesmen who were making Japan already had among their policies an intention to open Korea.

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 103-104.
Before taking action, the Japanese Government found out that China would stand aside and let Japan redress her own grievance. With this assurance she proceeded to send in January 1876, a naval expedition to Korea. "It was a grave mistake for China to allow Japan to undertake to secure for herself redress for the wrong done by firing on her vessel. The same mistake had been made repeatedly in other places in order to save the Imperial Government from temporary embarrassment, and always with unfortunate consequences from the standpoint of preserving China's authority as suzerain. Her passivity led to equally disastrous results for her in Korea. In spite of repeated attempts to repair the initial blunder by a reassertion of her authority. China gradually found Korea slipping from her grasp as had Burma and Indo-China. The mistake had been made by China. It was left for Japan to take full advantage of it”. This she did by insisting that Korea virtually repudiate the bond by entering into a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan.

Article I of the Treaty of 1876 (February 26) reads:--

"Chosen, being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan."

This treaty put an end to Korea's isolation and was destined to mark the beginning of her subjugation to Japan.

In March 1882, through the good offices of Li Hung-chang, negotiations for a treaty were begun at Tientsin between Korea and the United States. The draft of the treaty was drawn up by Li in consultation with Korean commissioners. The treaty as agreed upon was then brought to Korea and on May 22, 1882, on Korean soil it was signed by Korean and American plenipotentiaries. Article I of the Treaty reads:--

"If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement."

Prior to this on May 15, 1882, the King of Korea had declared to the President of the

3. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 107-112.
United States that Korea has been from ancient times
a tributary state to China. On this matter the
Annual Register made the following remarks:--

"Conspicuous in this Treaty was the
recognition by the United States Government of China's
suzerainty over Korea; China herself, though evidently
inspiring the text of the Treaty, not being one of
the contracting parties. Some think Commodore Schufeldt,
the United States envoy, was a catspaw of Li Hung-chang,
the Treaty having been drawn up by the Chinese, and the
ceremony of negotiating and signing it having been pre-
vously arranged between the Chinese and Korean officials."

On the other hand, the United States
had fully recognized the treaty independence of Korea
ever since 1882. This attitude of the United States
Government had been confirmed by Mr. Adee, Acting Sec-
retary of the Department of State, when he wrote to
Mr. Sill, American Minister at Seoul, (July 9, 1895) as
follows:--

"Your action in refusing to recognize
that Korean independence dates from the sixth of June,
1895, is approved. The position assumed by this Govern-

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 107-112.
2. Annual Register, 1882, p. 344.
ment toward Korea since contracting a treaty with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events. Korea's treaty independence since then has been for us an established and accepted fact."

Following the American treaty were also concluded a number of treaties, with Great Britain and Germany on November 26, 1883; with Italy in June, 1884; with Russia on July 7, 1884; and with Austria in June, 1892. All these treaties recognized the independence of Korea.

2. The British Treaty took good care to observe the reign of the Chinese Emperor, Kuang Hsu. It contained the following clause: "Done at Hanyang, this 26th day of November, being the 9th year of the Chinese reign Kuang Hsu." (British and foreign state papers, Vol. 74, p. 93.)
3. In 1888 Russia and Korea agreed to regulate the frontier trade on the river Tumen. See British and foreign state papers, Vol. 79, p. 634.
4. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 107-112.
The First Anti-Japanese Riot

There were two factions at the Korean Court, one progressive and the other conservative. The Progressives looked to Japan for example and aid; the Conservatives relied upon China. Japanese influence led to the employing of numerous Japanese advisers and instructors by the Korean Court. The Regent, on the other hand, was thoroughly conservative.

Just about two months after the signing of the American treaty (1882) the Regent (or Tayuan-chun) incited a palace revolution. The anti-Japanese feeling which had been generated in Korea found in the revolution an occasion to manifest itself. The Japanese legation was burned by a mob. Japan promptly sent a large military force to Korea -- ostensibly to protect her legation -- and the Japanese troops entered Seoul.

Upon hearing of the disturbance China dispatched Ma Kien-tsung with troops to Korea. Chinese troops were at the truee and had been traditionally in garrison in Seoul. No treaty gave China this right of garrison. The right might be considered the privilege

2. Annual Register, 1882, p. 344.

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assumed by a suzerain. Ma quelled the disturbance and arrested the instigator, the Tayuanchun. The cause of complaint being removed, Japan had to content herself with a convention from the Korean Government for an indemnity and the right to maintain a legation guard in Korea.

"The fact that China had seized and retained without hindrance the rebel chief, counselled the Koreans what to do in their negotiations with Japan, and helped them to provide the compensation money, is sufficient evidence of her hold over Korea, while Japan's acquiescence is an acknowledgement of diplomatic defeat."

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 113-115. The treaty provided for "a suitable apology, the punishment of the murderers, increased liberty of movement in the interior, the opening of another port of trade, and the payment of a war indemnity of $500,000 in addition to $50,000 for the families of those killed." (Annual Register, 1882, p. 345.)
2. Annual Register, 1882, p. 345.
The Second Anti-Japanese Riot

In 1884 there occurred another collision between the Conservatives and the Progressives of Korean officialdom. On the night of December 4, 1884, the King and Queen were seized by Korean conspirators assisted by Takezoya, Japanese charge d'affaires at Seoul, and his guards. The rescue of the King was effected by the Chinese troops in Korea. The Japanese legation was attacked and burned. The Japanese people clamored for war--with both Korea and China. Japan promptly sent a large military force to Korea and on January 9, 1885, succeeded in obtaining a convention by which Korea engaged to pay $30,000 as indemnity.

With China a treaty was concluded at Tientsin with reference to the outbreak in the Korean capital at the close of 1884. Count Ito demanded neither an apology nor an indemnity from China but

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 115-117.
3. Mr. Foote to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1885, p. 332. See also Annual Register, 1884, p. 378.
5. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 117.
asked only that China should disavow the acts of her soldiers, punish the officers who had been in fault at Seoul, and withdraw her troops from Korea, on condition of Japan doing the same. "It was not until the last day of the conference that Li Hung-chang assented to the third condition, but his doing so was important and significant, for China thereby and for the first time recognized Japan as upon the same footing with herself in relation to Korea". The Convention of Tientsin was signed by Ito and Li Hung-chang on April 18, 1885:

"China shall withdraw her troops now stationed in Korea, and Japan shall withdraw her's stationed therein for the protection of her legation.

"The respective Powers mutually agree to invite the King of Korea to instruct and drill a sufficient armed force and to invite him to engage into his service an officer or officers from among those of a third Power.

"In case any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea which necessitates the re-

1. Annual Register, 1885, p. 337.
spective countries to send troops to Korea, it is
hereby understood that they shall give, each to the
other, previous notice in writing of their intentions
so to do."

Takezoje's disastrous venture inflicted
a heavy blow on Japanese prestige. The Japanese dead
lay unburied in the streets. China was momentarily
supreme. "The whole mass of the people are violently
pro-Chinese in their sentiments, the American representa-
"tive stated in a private dispatch to his Government,
'and so violently anti-Japanese that it is impossible
to obtain other than a volume of execrations and vitu-
erations against them when questioned.' "

1. British and foreign state papers, vol. 76, pp.297-298;
Also, Chung, H., Korea: Treaties and Agreements, p.7.
2. Mckenzie, F.A., Korea's Fight for Freedom, p.43; also
Mr. Foote to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1885, p. 332.

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Reassertion of Chinese Suzerainty Over Korea

While Korea paid an annual tribute to China and a Chinese Resident was installed in her capital, the tie had of late been considerably relaxed, for the Korean Government was allowed to conclude treaties 1. in its own name with Western Powers.

As early as 1883, Mr. Foote of the United States Legation at Seoul wrote:--

"The question of sending an embassy to the United States has been under consideration since my arrival here. In an audience with the King on the 5th instant, I took occasion to say that my Government would be pleased to receive an envoy from His Majesty. On the following day it was determined to send two plenipotentiaries with full powers to the United States." 2.

In 1887, on the advice of Mr. Denny, American adviser at the Korean foreign office, the King decided to establish legations in the United States and 3. Europe. The Korean representative was received at Washington. China complained that the Korean representa-

1. Annual Register, 1888, p. 378.
2. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1883, p. 245.
3. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 133, pp. 137-139.
tive had presented letters of credit to the
President of the United States without the inter-
vention of the Chinese Minister. The result was that
the Korean representative was disavowed by his own
Government as having exceeded his instructions. The
other envoy, who was to have proceeded to Europe,
never succeeded in getting beyond Hongkong.

1. Annual Register, 1888, p. 378.
The Ascendancy of Japan

Despite China's claim of suzerainty, Japanese influence was on the increase in Korea. When Korea was opened to foreign trade by treaties made since 1882, China felt it necessary to place some experienced European in the Korean foreign ministry. Von Mollendorff, a German, was selected by Li Hung-chang as adviser. Mollendorff left Korea in 1885, and Mr. Denny, an American, was invited by Li Hung-chang to accept the post of Foreign Adviser to the King of Korea.

But the appointment of General C. W. Legendre in April as Foreign Adviser to the King indicated that the influence of Japan in Korea was increasing, since it was made on the recommendation of Japan. Heretofore this post had been filled by China. Another indication of Japanese influence in the affairs of Korea appeared in that vacancies in the customs service were being filled from Japan and not from China.

In 1892, just two years before the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese activities in Korea were summed up by the Annual Register as follows:

1. Annual Register, 1888, p. 379.
2. Ibid, 1890, p. 409.
"The working of the mint for the new currency is wholly under Japanese management and the Japanese take 95 per cent of the export trade. Their steamers frequent every port. They have established schools in Seoul for teaching the Japanese language to the Koreans and there are more than 10,000 Japanese residents in Korea."

1. Annual Register, 1892, p. 327.
The crisis in Sino-Japanese relations was precipitated much sooner than anyone had anticipated. Early in 1893 alarm was created among the foreign residents of Korea by the activities of the Tong Hak Society. The Tong Haks manifested their discontent with the government and their hatred of the Japanese and other foreigners. They issued a manifesto in 1893. The tone of their manifesto was extremely anti-Japanese:

"Japanese and foreign rebels are now introduced into the very bounds of our land. Think of the oath of the year Yen Chen (1592, the date of the Japanese invasion) and the disgrace of the year Ping-tzu (1876, the date of the Treaty of Kanghua with Japan). Can you bear to forget it?

"Let it, moreover, be remembered that most of the Japanese rebels cherish feelings of hatred toward us.

"We, who number several millions, have sworn to the death that we will unite in our common effort to sweep out the Japanese and foreigners. This is the earnest prayer of millions of people."

On the other hand, according to Mr. McKenzie, the Tong Hak movement was inspired by Japan. "Few of the Tong Haks," wrote Mr. McKenzie, "had any idea that their movement was organized under Japanese influences. When the movement was ripe, Japan set her puppets to work. The Tong Haks were suddenly found to be possessed of arms, and some of their units were trained. Their avowed purpose was to drive all foreigners out of the country; but this was mere camouflage. The real purpose was to provoke China to send troops to Korea and so give Japan an excuse for war. When the Tong Haks, thirty thousand in number, came within a hundred miles of Seoul, Japan saw an excuse for intervention."

(a) The Occasion.

In the spring of 1894 the Tong Haks revolted in the south of Korea. "The Korean Government, discouraged by the success of the rebellion in the south, and upon the urgent requests of the Chinese Representative here, asked Chinese aid, and 2,000 Chinese troops were at once dispatched to Asan, a port

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 150-153, 158-159.

- 33 -
in the south. Before they could arrive, however, the Korean troops succeeded in capturing the chief rebels. The Chinese troops have not as yet actively helped in the suppression of the rebellion. Meanwhile the Japanese were also sending troops to Korea, and the Korean Government, fearing trouble, asked the Chinese to leave. This they promised to do, but as 500 Japanese marines landed at Chemulpo and came to Seoul on June 10, the Chinese held their troops where they were."

The rebellion being over, China accordingly requested Japan to withdraw her troops simultaneously with the Chinese forces as provided in the Li-Ito Convention of 1885. On June 16, Japan replied by proposing that China and Japan should jointly reform the financial, civil and military administration in Korea. China pointed out the absurdity of such a proposal. She indicated further that reform was a question for Korea herself, that even China would not interfere with the internal administration of Korea and that Japan had no right to interfere.

1. Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 20-21.
2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 150-153, pp. 158-159.
"On the 16th instant, 3,000 Japanese troops landed at Chemulpo and now they are encamped with batteries upon the general foreign settlement of Chemulpo, without the consent of the other Powers, thus wholly ignoring the treaty rights of each nation represented here." The King has begged the Chinese to leave, but they refuse to do so as long as the Japanese remain, and the latter positively refuse to leave till the Chinese go.

On June 24, the Korean Minister of foreign affairs wrote Mr. Sill, American Minister at Seoul, as follows:

"At this moment the troops of two nations, namely, China and Japan, are in occupation of Korean soil. The first, by invitation, to aid in quelling a rebellion; the other, without invitation and against the protest of the Korean Government, but on account of solicitude for the safety of her own subjects resident here.

"The Chinese authorities are now willing to remove their troops from Korean soil, provided Japan will remove hers. But Japan refuses to remove her troops until the Chinese have been removed, and ne-

1. Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 20-21.
glects to entertain any proposition for the simultaneous removal of both."

In a telegram, dated June 24, from Mr. Sill, American Minister at Seoul, to Mr. Uhl of the Department of State, conditions in Korea were described as follows:---

"Thousands Chinese and Japanese troops occupying Korea. Neither of them will withdraw first. Chinese are in favor of simultaneous departure. Japanese stubborn. Ulterior purpose suspected. She seems to desire war."

"The Japanese Government, on the other hand, does not propose to withdraw its forces until definite guarantees are given by China that she will not again interfere in Korean affairs. It is asserted that, in the present instance, the action of China was only communicated to Japan after it was an accomplished fact. The Chinese troops left Taku the 3rd and arrived at Chemulpo the 5th instant, and it was not until this latter date that notice of their departure was given at Tokyo."

2. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, p. 22.
3. Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 24-25.
In China "the ministers of the Yamen talk of this affair as if it were entirely in the hands of Li Hung-chang. An imperial edict stated that war would be exceedingly to be regretted in this year of rejoicing over the Empress' sixtieth birthday". Li Hung-chang himself was not in a mood to fight. On July 8, Mr. Denby, American charge at Peking, received from the American consul at Tientsin the following telegram:--

"Viceroy Li requests the United States to take the initiative urging Powers to unite in request to Japan to withdraw troops Korea."

In Japan public opinion favored a war with China. "The Korean question engrosses public attention. Journalistic comments on this subject have been reproduced from time to time. It is apparent that the restless energies of the people year for employment in a foreign war. The real difficulty that the Japanese cabinet has now to grapple with, is not China's aggressive designs upon the peninsual kingdom, but the control of the warlike spirit roused among its own countrymen.

1. Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, pp. 24-25.
"The Mainichi Shimbun is perhaps the most pacific in its attitude. It advises both the government and the people to behave in such a manner as to convince the Koreans that Japan has no aggressive design upon their country. The recollection of several disastrous invasions of Korea by Japanese troops in the past still suggests to the minds of the Korean people very erroneous notions about Japan's attitude toward them. The Mainichi demonstrates at some length how unwise Japan would be to aim at becoming a continental power.

"The Tiji Shimpo is one of the papers persuaded that great alarm and consternation have been caused to the Chinese Government by the news of Japan's having promptly dispatched a large force to Korea. 'Of late years', says the paper, 'the Chinese have come to regard Japan with indifference if not contempt. As the result of their consternation and fear of the Chinese statesmen', says the Jiji, 'may be desirous of quietly withdrawing their troops before any serious collision arises between the latter and the Japanese forces.'

"The Kokumin Shimbun thinks it not improbable that the Chinese Government, being unwilling
to bring about a rupture with Japan, may not object
to withdraw its troops in compliance with the request
of the Seoul Government. In that case a similar re-
quest will doubtless be referred to Japan. But the
Kokumin is of opinion that Japan ought not to recall
her troops until all danger to the life and property
of her subjects resident in Korea and all danger to
Korean independence have been removed. The presence
of Chinese troops is not the only, or even the principal,
menace to Korea's independence. The real danger lies
in China's interference in the internal affairs of the
peninsula kingdom. The Kokumin urges the Japanese
Government to take advantage of the present opportunity
to terminate once for all that source of danger."

(b) The Course Of The War.

The war began on July 25. But before
fighting actually began, "the Japanese forces broke
into and took possession of the royal palace at 4 A.M.

1.
on July 23." The King was compelled to yield. This
was followed in August by a treaty of alliance, the
main object of which was to "maintain the independence

I. Japan Weekly Mail, June 16, 1894.
2. Mr. Sill to Mr. Cresham, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1894, Appendix 1, p. 40; McKenzie, F. A.,
Korea's Fight for Freedom, p. 46.
of Korea:—"

"The independence of Korea was declared, and in keeping with it the Chinese troops were to be driven out of the country.

"While war against China was being carried on by Japan, Korea was to facilitate the movements and to help in the food supplies of the Japanese troops.

"This treaty should only last until the conclusion of peace with China."

On July 26, Mr. Sill, American Minister at Seoul, reported as follows:--

"The King is acceding to the demands of Japan. His father is said to now virtually regent of Korea, and a number of pro-Japanese officials have been appointed to positions of great importance."

In justification of a war with China a Japanese writer had the following to say:--

"It is not at all surprising that Japan adopted a positive policy for the maintenance of Korean independence. To carry out this policy two measures

1. Lawrence, T.J., War and Neutrality in the Far East, p.9.
3. Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Appendix I, p. 41.
must be taken: in the first place, internal affairs in Korea must be thoroughly reformed so that she can develop her resources for self-protection; and in the second place, her independence must be guaranteed by the Powers interested.

"Why, then, is not a joint control of Korean affairs feasible? Is not China ready to act harmoniously with Japan? Or, if cooperation is impossible, cannot China alone be trusted to supervise Korean affairs in the joint interest of China and Japan? The answer is that China cannot be trusted."

The Nichi Nichi Shimbun wrote as follows:--

"Japan does not love war, but she is forced to fight. In despatching troops to Korea and advising that country to effect administrative reforms, Japan was not actuated by any sinister motives. It was her original object, in concert with China, to place Korea's independence and peaceful progress on a secure footing. Japan's disinterested motive has met with the sympathy of the Powers of the world. But China not only rejected Japan's offer of cooperation but she has attempted to thwart the latter's plans in

The Kokumin Shimbun was more outspoken. "It gives an elaborate argument to show that now is the best time for Japan to begin hostilities with China. The surplus revenue in the keeping of the treasury amounts to 8,795,739 yen to which must be added another sum of 5,023,355 yen accruing from the surplus for various expenditures. This would be enough to defray the army expenses for a short time. When the war actually begins, the note-issuing power of the Bank of Japan may be increased."

On July 25, a small Chinese squadron convoying a British vessel which, acting as a transport, had 1,200 Chinese soldiers aboard, was met and sunk, as it approached Korea, by a Japanese squadron, and hostilities ensued. War was formally declared on August 1. In the subsequent engagements China was ignominiously beaten. The Japanese had actually invaded North China, had taken Wei-hai-wei, and were ready to advance upon Peking.

2. Ibid.
3. Great Britain declared her neutrality on August 7. See British and foreign state papers, Vol. 86,p.147.
"To say that the course of the war surprised all but the informed few, is to put it mildly. China did have an inexhaustible supply of men, but she had no modern army worthy of the name." The army showed itself to be a mere herd of helpless coolies, and "its officers proved themselves more worthless even than the rank and file. The military mandarins were never with their men, and least of all when any fighting had to be done." She had been satisfied with inferior instruction and equipment, "the difference in cost between old and discarded weapons and the newer types of armament going to line the pockets of officials and their friends, from Li Hung-chang down."

"Japan, on the other hand, is a nation of hero worshippers. The enthusiasm of the army for the first time called out for active service was equalled only by the enthusiasm of the people for the army." She had thoroughly reorganized and modernized her fighting services from the standpoint of both training and equipment.

"The Chinese navy, on paper greatly superior to that of Japan, proved entirely unable to cope with the Japanese navy." After the solution of the Formosan question the Tsungli Yamen memorialized the throne, urging the immediate carrying out of the measures of maritime defence. One of the measures was the creation of a navy of three squadrons. The Government, however, was not yet prepared to spend such a large sum of money as was required for the project, and as late as 1879 only eight gunboats were purchased from Great Britain. The Manchu Government was inefficient and corrupt. In addition to this serious handicap, the country had just passed through the Tai Puig Rebellion which crippled its man-power and credit.

The annexation of Liuchiu by Japan reminded China of her navy program. An annual appropriation of 4,000,000 taels was made from national revenues and orders were placed with British and German firms. By the time the vessels ordered from Europe were about to be sent to China, a board of the navy was created. Prince Chun made himself the president of the new board and, to please his imperial mistress, diverted the greater part

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, pp. 140-144.
of the navy fund for the repairing of the Winter Palace and the construction of the Summer Palace.

Shortly before the war of 1894-95 Li Hung-chang wrote to the Board of the Navy asking for funds to replace the boilers of the vessels. His request was refused on the ground that the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the birth of Tzu-hsi was about to take place.

"China was further handicapped by the feeling south of the Yangtze River that the war was the private affair of Li Hung-chang. The southern Chinese navy refused to participate in the struggle, and the governors whose territories were unaffected failed to support the Imperial cause. The consequence was that the war was carried on largely between Japan and the followers of Li Hung-chang."

On the significance of the Sino-Japanese War Mr. Chirol made the following comments:--

"While in China the war has laid bare the immeasurable rottenness hitherto half concealed under the venerable cloak of an ancient civilization,

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 444.
in Japan it has triumphantly vindicated the reality of a new civilization against the scepticism with which a social evolution of unprecedented rapidity had been generally regarded. Until last year (1895) the attitude of the western world towards Japan was mainly one either of thinly-veiled derision or of good-natured condescension."

(c) The Treaty of Shimonoseki.

China was compelled to sue for peace. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) that ended the war, China "recognizes definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea." But the Japanese Government "became so enamoured with the idea of creating a buffer territory between Korea and China, which would render it impossible for the Peking Government ever to interfere again in the vassal state, that in addition to the cession of Formosa the entire Liaotung peninsula was demanded.

3. Weale, B. L. Putnam., Re-shaping of the Far East, Vol. I, p. 440. As early as 1894 Japan even threatened to break up China: "The Japanese threat of breaking up China as the enemy of civilization," wrote one writer, "is ridiculous. Yet it seems to have imposed on some persons, and a mad scheme has even been put forward for dividing China between England, Russia, and Japan." (Boulger, D.C., The Corean Crux, Nineteenth Century, Vol. 36, p. 781.)
CHAPTER III.

Russo-Japanese Rivalries In Korea

The history of Korea since the Sino-Japanese War is full of intrigues. For ten years since the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), Russia and Japan had been engaged in a deadly struggle for concessions and territories. From 1894 to 1895, as we shall see, Japan was in complete ascendancy; from 1896 to 1897 the Russian power predominated. The period from 1897 to 1903 is one of the most intense rivalries, during which so many concessions and "pledges" had been secured by both Japan and Russia that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 was precipitated.

1. "As a result of economic necessities Japan had developed political interests in Korea." (Hershey, A.S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 2.)
Japanese Ascendancy (1894-1895)

The Sino-Japanese War, as we have seen, resulted in the complete elimination of Chinese influences in Korea. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) China "recognizes definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea." Japan regarded the recognition of the independence of Korea "as merely the severing of Chinese ties, and not as a satisfactory solution of the Korean question. While the Korean King was practically a prisoner in his own palace, the Japanese demanded a franchise for all the railroads in Korea for fifty years, all the telegraphs for twenty-five years, and all the posts for five years. They sought to eliminate the foreign advisers to the Korean Government and they urged Korea to dispose of the Korean legation in Washington (U.S.A.) and to place Korean affairs in the United States in the hands of the Japanese legation."

The proposed franchises, however, were opposed by Great Britain as well as other Powers, including the United States.

At this time Japan was represented at Seoul by Viscount Miura, a military man who was representative of the extreme expansionist party in Japan.

Viscount Miura met with resistance not only from the Powers, but also from the Korean Queen, who "planned a coup d'etat early in October 1895, with a view to disbanding the soldiers trained by Japanese offices." Thus enraged, Viscount Miura "became a party to, if not the instigator of, a plot to eliminate the Queen and her party and to demolish all opposition to Japan." This plot was accomplished on October 8, 1895, in an attack on the palace and the murder of the Queen.

Four months after the assassination of the Queen, the King managed to seek refuge in the Russian legation. "On February 10, 1896, a force of Russian Marines with a field gun landed at Chemulpo and advanced to Seoul. The King by a preconcerted ar-

2. Dennett, T., Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 503.
3. In a telegram dated October 9, 1895, Mr. Dun, United States representative at Seoul, reported: "Yesterday morning King's father, with the assistance of Japanese, forcibly entered into royal palace. Two officials killed in attempting to save Her Majesty. Queen and three ladies murdered. Murderers were Japanese in civilian dress. Royal palace in charge of Japanese troops." (House Documents, Vol. 2, No. 1, Pt. 2, Message and Foreign Relations, Part 2, 1895-96, p. 971).
rangement left his palace on February 11, for the
Russian legation.” The Russian Minister received
the fugitive with open arms. "The seat of government 
was practically transferred to the Russian legation.”
A pro-Russian ministry was at once formed, in place
of the pro-Japanese ministry that had been in office
since the Japanese coup d’etat of October 1895.

1. Annual Register, 1896, p. 351.
Russian Ascendency (1896-1897)

The Korean King being virtually in the custody of the Russians, their ascendancy resulted as a matter of course. First of all, they "lent 7,000,000 roubles to the Korean Government guaranteed by Russia's holding the two northern provinces." In addition to the foregoing, on April 22, 1896, "the Muscovites concluded an agreement with the Seoul Government whereby they were granted the privilege of mining gold and other minerals for fifteen years and coal for twenty years, in two districts near Kiong-hung, as well as the right to construct a railway from the mines to the shore. The Korean forces trained by Japanese officers stationed at the ports and Seoul were reduced in number. Finally on April 28, 1896, a concession was granted, giving a Russian Company the monopoly for

1. "Russia had attempted a policy of expansion at the expense of China. In 1860 she had acquired the Maritime province and she thought it possible to move on from this region to Manchuria and Korea." (Seymour, C., The Background of the War, p. 126; Rambaud, A., The Case of Russia, p. 79.)
twenty years of the lumber region in the Musan
1.
district on the Tumen," and also on the Uinung
Island in the Japan Sea. It was further provided
that when work in these two regions should have been
under way the Company might start a similar exploit-
ation along the Yales River.

Thus far Russia's adventure in Korea
had been successful. But this condition could not
long continue. Already on May 14, 1896, due to Jap-
anese pressure, the Russian Minister, M. Waebier, had
agreed to advise the Korean King to return from the
Russian legation to his palace as soon as there was
no more apprehension for his safety; Japan, in turn,
pledging to keep the Japanese political bravoes(soshi)
in Seoul under a strict surveillance.

One month later (June 9, 1896) the
following arrangements were made between Japan and
Russia concerning Korea:—

"If it should become necessary to
have recourse to foreign debts, the two Governments
should of a common accord render their support to Korea.

"The two Governments should try to abandon to Korea the creation and maintenance of an armed force and of a police organized of natives without foreign aid."

By a subsequent Russo-Japanese Convention, published in February 1897, it was provided that "Russia and Japan would support the Korean King in maintaining order by the organization of a force of native troops and police." Japan was to be allowed 200 men for protection of telegraph lines and three military detachments for the protection of Japanese settlements at Seoul, Fusan, and Gensan; and Russia, a military force of equal strength for the protection of the Russian legation.

On the 19th of February, 1897, the Korean King left the Russian legation. A force of 80 men with one gun was landed from the three Russian war vessels at Chemulpo to quiet any agitation. Henceforth Korea was exposed to the most intense Russo-Japanese rivalries for a period of six years.

2. Annual Register, 1897, p. 361.
The Battle for Concessions (1897-1903)

The Korean King having left the Russian legation, an Agreement between Russia and Japan was signed on April 25, 1898. The real purpose of the Agreement was to expose Korea to the free competition of both Japan and Russia. The "independence" of Korea was recognized. Japan was allowed to undertake commercial and industrial activities in Korea, with Russia and Japan mutually engaging "to abstain from all direct interference in the affairs of that country."

The diplomatic battle which ensued since the return of the Korean King was a protracted one. To do Russia justice, it must be acknowledged that her diplomatic manoeuvres in Korea, though not always successful, were indeed ingenious. Toward five objects she directed her diplomacy: army, banking, customs, Masampo, and Yongampo. In all these attempts she was destined to fail. Let us turn first to the Korean army.

It was Russia's desire that the Korean troops "should be instructed under the Russian system of military education. In July 1897, three Russian officers and ten soldiers entered Seoul, whose service for three years was finally, on September 6, imposed upon the Korean Government by the new Russian Minister, M. Speyer. Thus the royal guard and five battalions of the Korean infantry, numbering about 3,000, came under Russian instruction."

One month later M. Speyer requested that the control of all the receipts from the taxes and customs be placed in the hands of M. Alexieff, a Russian subject. At that time, however, Mr. McLeavy Brown, a British subject had not served his term as Financial Adviser and General Director of Customs. The British Consul protested, but in vain, for on October 26, the Korean Emperor issued an edict releasing Mr. Brown from his duties. A Russo-Korean Bank was soon organized to transact the financial affairs of Korea.

   See also Hulbert, H.B., Korea, Independent, Vol.51, p.1220
2. The sovereign of Korea, formerly King, had assumed the title Emperor on October 12, 1894.
On December 27, 1897, seven British men-of-war visited Chemulpo. Russia and Great Britain thereupon effected a compromise. Mr. Brown was restored to his office, while M. Alexieff remained as Financial Adviser. Finally "on March 15, 1898, the Korean Emperor dismissed M. Alexieff and also the Russian drill instructors in the Korean army." Also the Russo-Korean Bank was dissolved.

In 1901 "Russia repeated the old policy of replacing Mr. Brown with M. Alexieff. In March Mr. Brown was suddenly ordered by the Korean Government, which acted obviously at the instance of the Russian Representative, to surrender his post. From this predicament Mr. Brown was narrowly rescued by an earnest representation made on May 5, by Count Hayashi to the Korean Emperor."

Despite repeated diplomatic reverses, Russia was as ambitious as ever. In South Korea nothing better could be desired by Russia than a

1. Annual Register, 1898, p. 336.
lease of Masampo, a harbor unsurpassed for its naval facilities and most admirably situated as a connecting-point between Vladivostok and Port Arthur. An opportunity came in May, 1899, when Masampo was opened for foreign trade, for the foreigner was at liberty to purchase land within the three-mile radius of an open port. In the same month M. Pavloff, the Russian Minister, visited Masampo and selected the most strategic site on the foreshore. This large lot, he notified the local authorities, would presently be purchased by a Russian Steamship Company as the site for a dock and coaling sheds. It was not till July that the interpreter at the Russian legation went to Masampo with a view to effecting the purchase of the selected lot, which, to his chagrin, had already been bought by certain Japanese subjects. In vain the Russian charge demanded the Seoul Government to cancel the contract and resell the land to the Russian Company.

On March 18, 1900, M. Pavloff signed a lease
agreement with the Korean Foreign Minister. The lease, however, was of little practical use so long as the most important tract had been bought by the Japanese. On the same day M. Pavloff secured from the Korean Government a pledge not to alienate any part of the Kojedo Island and its surrounding territories.

In May, 1900, M. Pavloff "wished to lease Tja-pok on the inner shore of Masampo, but, finding again that a Japanese subject had already leased it, finally acquired the lease of Pankumi on the outer shore. Count Hayashi, the Japanese Minister, met the Russian concession by acquiring, between May and October 29, 1901, about forty acres of land within the treaty limits of Masampo."

Enough has now been said to explain why Russia had suffered repeated reverses at the hands of Japan. Despite the greatest exertions, Russia had failed to secure the lease of Masampo.

Her financial adviser and military instructors in Korea had been dismissed. The Russo-Korean Bank had been dissolved. Not a whit dismayed, Russia now directed her activities to Yongampo.

The Yongampo affair was one of the events which caused the Japanese Government to open negotiations with Russia in the middle of 1903. It will be remembered that on August 28, 1896, when the Korean King was a guest at the Russian legation, a concession had been granted, giving a Russian Company the monopoly for twenty years of the lumber region in the Musan district on the Tumen and also on the Ulung Island in the Japan Sea. It was provided that when work in these two regions should have been under way the Company might start a similar exploitation along the Yalu River. Accordingly, the Russian Company undertook to fell trees at Musan in 1896, and again in 1898, though never on a large scale. On the Ulung Island, however, the Russians had at no time made a serious attempt to exploit it.

On April 13, 1903, M. Stein, Russian charge' at
Seoul, suddenly notified the Korean Government that Baron Gunzburg would henceforth represent at Seoul the interests of the Russian Company, which would now commence its work on the Yalu. Early in May, forty-seven Russian soldiers in civilian dress were reported to have come to Yongampo, a point near the mouth of the river. "The Russians began to construct military roads throughout the Yalu territory. An American who visited Yongampo in December wrote that everything indicated a semi-political and semi-military permanent occupation." When the Korean Government demanded of M. Stein to order the evacuation of the Russians, M. Pavloff requested, on the contrary, that the Korean Government should protect the Russian subjects at Yongampo.

"Late in July, 1903, the Commissioner of Forestry of Korea and Baron Gunzburg visited Yongampo, and drafted an Agreement leasing the port to the Timber Company, represented by the Baron.

The Company was granted judiciary rights over the residents within the leased area. Under circumstances "so irritating to the peace of the Far East, the Japanese Government now felt justified in opening direct negotiations with Russia in order to arrive at a definite understanding of the relative position of the Powers in Korea".

2. Ibid., p. 291.
Relative Position of Russia and Japan

On the Eve of The Russo-Japanese War

Before plunging into the Russo-Japanese negotiations, let us review the positions of the two rivals. We have already noted the failure of Russia to gain control of Korean army, banking and customs. The lease of Masampo had not been realized. Her adventure at Yongamplo had alarmed Japan. Nevertheless, some substantial gains had been obtained. (1) "In March, 1898, Zeto Yeito (Deer Island), opposite Fusan, was leased to Russia by Korea." (2) "On March 29, 1899, M. Pavloff succeeded in leasing for twelve years, for the use of Count Keyserling, a Russian subject, who represented the East Russian Fishery Company, three whaling stations on the northeastern coast of Korea. This concession was offset by one secured by a Japanese citizen on February 14, 1900, which conferred upon him the right of whaling for three years along the Korean coast." (3) "On April 20, 1900, Russia obtained a concession for whale-

1. Annual Register, 1898, p. 337.
fishing off the southern coast of Korea." (4) "On April 3, 1901, the Korean Emperor was induced to promise that he would not grant any further mining concessions to foreigners, but that if the right to operate the mines were given to any foreigner, it should be to a Russian, and that if any foreign capital were borrowed for the construction of the railway from Seoul to Wiju, it should be from Russia." (5) "A telegraphic connection with Wiju from Port Arthur and from Harbin was granted to M. Pavloff in April, 1903."

Meanwhile the Japanese were not inactive. They had already completed a telegraph line from Fusan to Seoul (July, 1898). On September 8, 1898, they obtained a concession to build a railway between Fusan and Seoul, and the line was opened for traffic on December 1, 1904." Another concession, the railway from Seoul to Chemil-po, was obtained on December 31, 1898, and the line

2. Ibid., 144.
was opened for traffic on July 8, 1900. On August 23, 1900, the Japanese secured a mining concession; on October 3, a fishing concession."

At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese were controlling 78 per cent of the tonnage engaged in shipping on the coast of Korea. The import and export trades were in Japanese hands. Their 40,000 fishermen dominated the fisheries and their business men owned many of the banks and commercial houses. "There are now 25,000 Japanese residents in Korea. Japan now largely controls the railways, mines, posts and telegraphs."

Of inestimable value to Japan was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. "It was dread of Russia that caused England to conclude an Alliance with Japan." Japan had first sought alliance with Russia and had sent Prince Ito on a visit to St. Petersburg for that purpose. But

2. Annual Register, 1902, p. 393.
3. "It was out of a fear of Russia that the idea of conquering Korea was born. This fact marks a well-defined Russo-Japanese policy in China and Korea and the beginning of that rivalry which had grown so intensively by the time the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was made." (Hayashi (Count), Memoirs, p.80.)
Russia was too proud and self-confident to contemplate any such step. So Japan turned to England, and obtained a readier hearing. The terms of the Agreement (signed on January 30, 1902) are briefly as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties, having in view their special interests, recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea. The interests of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea.

"If either Great Britain or Japan should become involved in war with another Power, the other contracting party will maintain a strict neutrality.

"If any other Power should join in hostilities against that ally, the other contracting party will conduct the war in common."

1. British and foreign state papers, Vol. 95, p.83.
The Alliance of 1902 gave preservation of the independence of Korea as one of its objects. "That was inserted because Japan intended to make the 'independence of Korea' her ostensible reason for going to war against Russia. The primary cause of Japan making the Alliance was her determination to possess Korea. To do this Japan knew that she must fight and defeat Russia. The Alliance with England enabled her to finance a war and assured Japan that no other Powers would interfere."
Russo-Japanese Negotiations (1903-1904)

In the eyes of Japan, the Yongampo affair was so disturbing to the peace of the Far East that the Japanese Government decided to settle with Russia the Korean question once and for all by diplomacy. On August 12, 1903, the first Japanese note was handed to Count Lamsdorff, Russian foreign minister, by Mr. Kurino, Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg. In this note Japan made the following proposals:—

"1. A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

"2. A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests.

"3. An engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the
Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria.

"4. A reciprocal engagement that, in case it should be found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, the troops so sent are to be recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

"5. The recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interests of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance."

"On October 5, Baron Rosen, Russian Minister at Tokyo, submitted Russia's counter proposals which revealed the utter irreconcilability of the wishes of the two Powers:--

"1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

"2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire.

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 269.
"3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea.

"4. Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia.

"5. Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.

"6. Mutual engagement to consider that part of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops."

It is to be noted that in the counter note Russia seriously reduced Japan's demands concerning Korea by excluding her right of rendering advice and assistance to Korea in the latter's military affairs. Moreover, Russia imposed upon Japan the following new conditions: (1) not

to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes; (2) nor to fortify the southern coast; (3) and to consider the territory north of the 39th parallel as neutral between the two Powers.

The Russian counter note having been received, the Japanese Government communicated to the Russian Minister on the 30th the irreducible minimum in the form of the following note:

"1. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give to Korea advice and assistance including military assistance, tending to improve the administration of the Korean Empire.

"2. Engagement on the part of Japan not to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits.

"3. Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Korean-Manchurian frontier extending 50 kilometres on each side into which zone neither of the contracting parties shall in-
 introduce troops.

"4. Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interest, and recognition by Russia that Korea is outside her sphere of special interest."

To the Japanese note of October 30, Russia replied on December 11. The reply was not satisfactory to Japan. "On December 21, Japan suggested the suppression of the Russian proposal concerning the neutral zone and the elimination of the clause "not to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes." Russia replied on January 6, 1904, accepting the Japanese suggestion concerning the elimination of the clause "not to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes", but maintaining her position with regard to the neutral zone."

On January 15, 1904, for the fourth time, the Japanese Government reminded Russia of

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 271.
the serious position in which the two Powers found themselves, and begged her to reconsider the situation. "An early reply was urged by Mr. Kurino, but even as late as February 1, Count Lansdorff declined even to name the date on which his reply would be given."

"On February 5, Japan instructed her minister at St. Petersburg to inform Russia officially of her decision to terminate the negotiations and to take such independent action as she may deem necessary." On February 10, war was formally declared by the Emperors of both Powers.

2. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 272.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)

As soon as relations were severed
1. Japanese troops were on their way to Korea. On
February 7, 1904, Japan seized Masampo as a base
of operation. On February 8, a Japanese squadron
appeared off Chemulpo and on the next day destroyed
the whole Russian fleet. Japan now commanded the
sea and her troops were poured into Chemulpo and
other Korean ports without danger of interruption.
Seoul was at once occupied.

Three months were to elapse, how-
ever, before the first Japanese landed at Liaotung.
On January 2, 1905, General Stoessel surrendered at
Port Arthur to the Japanese General, Nogi. General
Kuropatkin retreated to Tiehling, seventy miles north
of Mukden. The Russian Baltic fleet were sunk, cap-
tured, or interned by the Japanese. Meanwhile in
Russia the revolutionary movements threatened the
dynasty, while Japan had strained her resources to
the breaking-point.

On May 31, Komura, Japanese minister of foreign affairs, suggested to President Roosevelt that he invite the two belligerents to consider terms of peace. The president approached the tsar, and with his approval sent out formal invitations, which were promptly accepted.

The resulting negotiations were held at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and were concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905):

"Russia, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economic interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea."

Japan's imperialists had every reason to be satisfied with the Treaty. She had blocked Russian advance and had established herself firmly in Korea. She had risen to the position of a world power; she was the one non-European nation since the Wave of Turkish invasion had begun to subside that

had faced successfully on the field of battle a
first-class Occidental power.

1. Iatourette, K.S., The Development of Japan,
p. 178. See also Fassett, J.S., Korea as the
CHAPTER IV.

The Consummation of Annexation

With the elimination of Russian influence in Korea, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan set herself arduously to make her influence felt in Korea. She succeeded in doing this by (1) securing from Great Britain the recognition of her peculiar position in Korea, and (2) inducing the Korean Government to sign a series of treaties, which gave her control of Korean foreign affairs, internal administration and other things.

The course of events which resulted in the annexation of Korea was, in outline, as follows:

Great Britain endorsed Japan's Korean policy on August 12, 1905; Korea became a protectorate of Japan (November 17, 1905) by surrendering the control of her foreign relations to the latter; Japan took over the legislative power of the Korean Government on July 24, 1907;
and, finally, to crown the success of her policy, Japan proclaimed to the world that she had annexed Korea on August 22, 1910.
Japanese Activities Prior to August 12, 1905.

As early as February 23, 1904, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan had succeeded in securing a Protocol from Korea. Korea was to adopt the advice of Japan in regard to improvement in administration. Japan, in turn, guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea was endangered by aggression of a third Power, Japan should take such necessary measures as circumstances required, and in such case might occupy such places as might be necessary from strategic points of view."

After the signature of the Protocol, "Marquis Ito was dispatched in March on a mission to Seoul to visit the Emperor of Korea." Apart from a feverish building of railways in Korea and the landing of an unending stream of Japanese troops on the peninsula pushing their way up north towards the Yalu, nothing important happened. "To the Korean eye, Japanese activity was merely a means to an end--

2. Annual Register, 1904, p. 397.
which was the beating of Russia and the consequent control of a disputed country."

But a wide step forward was made on August 19, 1905, when Japan induced the Korean Government to sign an Agreement. This Agreement bestowed upon Japan the right of recommending to Korea "a Japanese subject as financial adviser and a foreigner as diplomatic adviser. It was also agreed that, "when concluding any treaty with a foreign Power, Korea would consult Japan."

Accordingly Mr. Megata was appointed financial adviser to the Korean treasury, while "Mr. Stevens, an American citizen, acted as diplomatic adviser to the Korean Government." Furthermore, at the end of the year, "the Korean police in the capital (Seoul) were replaced by Japanese gendarmes."

Japan was henceforth to have a free hand in the capital of Korea by virtue of the presence of her gendarmes. The last move made by Japan, prior to the date of the British endorsement of Japan's

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Korean policy, was to "obtain control of the Korean post, telegraph and telephone services."  
(May 30, 1905).

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p. 280.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance

(August 12, 1905)

The conclusion of the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance marks the beginning of a period of reinforced Japanese activities in Korea. To be sure, an earlier agreement between Great Britain and Japan had been concluded (January 30, 1902), but this later one is of greater significance, so far as the status of Korea is concerned.

In the Agreement of August 12, 1905, it is definitely stated that, "Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests." The difference between the Agreement of 1905 and that of 1902 lies in that, in the later Agreement (1905) Japan is said to possess paramount military interests.

in Korea. What is worse, "the guarantee of Korea's independence which the first alliance (1902) contained was dropped, and a clause substituted by which Japan's right to do as she pleased there was recognized by Great Britain. After the publication of the second alliance (1905), none had any doubt that Japan would annex Korea."

In less than one month's time the Alliance was followed by the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905), in which "Russia, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, MILITARY, and economic interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea." Henceforth Japan was left entirely free to do whatever she wished in Korea.

Japanese Activities Since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Just fifteen days after the signature of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan had secured an agreement from the Korean Government (August 29, 1905) placing "the Korean maritime customs under the ministry of finance which was controlled by the Japanese financial adviser."

After the holding of a Council of State in Tokyo, Marquis Ito, furnished with full powers, proceeded in November (1905) to Korea. He exchanged visits with a number of Korean officials. On the 17th of November, thanks to Ito's efforts, an Agreement was signed in the presence of the Korean cabinet, which practically changed the status of Korea from a nominally independent state to that of a protectorate. The terms of the Agreement are as follows:

"Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, will hereafter have control and direction of the external affairs of Korea.

1. Hsu, S., China and Her Political Entity, p.280.
"Japan shall be represented by a
Resident-General at Seoul, primarily for the
purpose of taking charge of diplomatic affairs."

As the year 1905 drew to a close
it became more and more clear that Japan, despite
her many promises to Korea, intended to destroy
the independence of that country. The Korean
Emperor, on the other hand, had thought "that, be-
cause Korean independence was provided for in
various treaties with the Powers, therefore, he was
safe."

It is indeed pathetic to note that
the Emperor of Korea did make a direct appeal to
President Roosevelt of the United States to exert
his good offices in the matter of the Agreement
of November 17. It will be remembered that the
treaty between the United States and Korea signed
on May 22, 1882, contains an article which reads:—

"If other Powers deal unjustly or
oppressively with either Government, the other will
exert their good offices to bring about an amicable


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The Korean-American treaty of 1882 is, therefore, the basis of the action of the Korean Emperor. Thereupon President Roosevelt referred the matter to the American Minister at Seoul. The American Minister proceeded to the Korean Foreign Office, and was informed by the American diplomatic adviser, who had been installed at the instance of the Japanese Government, that "everything was in order." Therefore nothing was done.

Marquis Ito soon returned to Tokyo, and almost immediately an Imperial Ordinance was published on December 20, 1905 establishing the office of Resident-General in Korea. The Ordinance reads:

"The Resident-General shall represent the Japanese Government in Korea, and shall exercise general control over all matters relative to the foreign consulates and foreigners in Korea.

"The Resident-General shall have control of all political affairs which are to be admin-

istered by the Imperial Government of Japan in Korea.

"The Resident-General may order the commander of the Imperial garrison in Korea to use military force.

"In case of urgency the Resident-General may communicate directly with the local authorities of Korea and cause them to act, informing the Korean Government afterwards of the steps thus taken."

The first Resident-General was Prince Ito (1906 to 1908). He was followed by Viscount Sone who carried on his policies until 1910. "For some time the military party in Japan had been clamoring for a more severe policy. After the assassination of Ito by a Korean at Harbin in October 1909, General Terauchi, leader of the military party, was appointed Resident-General. General Terauchi came to Seoul in the summer of 1910 and started to adopt a firm policy in Korea."


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It will be recalled that the powers of the Resident-General though extensive, relate primarily to the foreign affairs of Korea. The internal administration of Korea as yet remained intact. But in July 1907, by an Agreement with Korea, the Residency-General greatly extended its powers over Korea. To all intents and purposes, Korea was hence-forth a part of the Japanese Empire, though annexation was not formally declared until 1910.

The course of events which led to the great extension of the powers of the Resident-General was, in outline, as follows:—

In the early summer of 1907, the Korean Emperor thought that he might strike a blow for freedom through the Hague Conference. Amid great secrecy, three Korean delegates were dispatched to the Hague under the guardianship of Hulbert, an American. They reached the Hague only to be refused a hearing. This action on the part of the Korean Emperor gave the Japanese an excuse "Since the Korean Cabinet Ministers were nominated not by the Emperor but by the Resident-General, they did as they were
instructed. They went to the Emperor and demanded that he should abandon the throne. On July 19, 1907, the Emperor abdicated in favor of his son."

In less than a week the Japanese had obtained an Agreement from the Korean Government. Under the terms of the Agreement of July 24, 1907, the Resident-General became virtually the supreme administrator of Korea. "Korea shall act under the guidance of the Resident-General in respect to reforms in administration. Korea engages not to enact any laws without the previous assent of the Resident-General. Appointment of all high officials in Korea shall be made upon the concurrence of the Resident-General. Lastly, Korea shall appoint as Korean officials Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General."

A few days later a rescript was issued in the name of the new Emperor ordering the disbandment of the Korean army. "The departments of agriculture, commerce, and industry were

were given Japanese directors and advisers. The police forces were placed under Japanese inspectors." Over the provinces were appointed Residents and Vice-Residents of Japanese nationality acting practically as governors.

There was one thing on which Japan, thus far, had not laid her hands: It was the administration of justice. Even this function of the Korean Government was later usurped by Japan. The memorandum drawn up by Japan and Korea on July 12, 1909, contains the following two significant articles:--

"Korea delegates to Japan the administration of justice and prison.

"Japan shall appoint officers of the Japanese courts and prisons in Korea from among Japanese and Korean subjects having the necessary qualifications for the posts."

About one month afterwards the Bank of Korea was established under the provisions of an Agreement signed between Japan and Korea on Aug-

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2. British and foreign state papers, Vol. 102, p. 930.
ust 17, 1909. "The Bank of Korea shall manage
the business of the National Treasury of Japan,
and the directors of the Bank shall be Japanese."

We have seen how Japan had assumed
dcontrol of the various functions of the Korean
Government. By July 24, 1907, Japan's control over
Korea had been nearly complete, and thenceforth
Korea, as we have noted, was in all but name a
part of the Japanese Empire.

The Treaty of Annexation (August
22, 1910) is, therefore, in no sense, a surprise.
Nevertheless, it marks the culmination of Japanese
activities in Korea since the Russo-Japanese war.
It signifies the consummation of the annexation of
Korea.

Article I of the Treaty reads;--

2. "It may suffice to say that the Korean Emperor
and Court did not willingly make these concessions.
They were practically held as prisoners, were sur-
rounded with military guards, and, when pleadings
and arguments did not suffice, threats and show of
violence were employed." (Jenks, J.W., Japan and
Her Neighbor, North American Review, Vol. 210,
pp. 212-221, August, 1919.)
"The Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea."

Article VI reads:--

"The Government of Japan assumes the entire government and administration of Korea."

After the annexation all Korean foreign treaties brought under Japanese law.

"Foreign ships were allowed to engage in Korean tariff was maintained for ten years both for goods coming in from Japan and abroad -- this was a concession to foreign importers."

CHAPTER V.

The Japanese Administration

The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 reflected the determination of Japan to forestall any attempt which might be contemplated by China to reassert her former suzerainty over Korea, or on the part of Russia to secure in the Korean peninsula a position of such dominance as would create the temptation to take the control of the country out of the hands of its weak, incompetent, and corrupt rulers.

Looking forward from 1910, one thing was clear, namely that Japan, having decided to make Korea part of her empire, would deem the permanence of her occupation to be a major element of her national policy, to be held intact, at whatever cost, against internal revolt or foreign intrigue.

In the following pages an attempt is made to describe the Japanese colonial administration in Korea.

1. Ireland, A., The New Korea, p. 15.
I. Government.

On October 30, 1910, the Organic
Regulations of the Government-General of Chosen
were promulgated by a Japanese Imperial Ordinance. The Regulations established a Secretariat, and
five Departments, to which were assigned, respective-
ly, (1) General Affairs, (2) Home Affairs, (3) Fin-
ance, (4) Justice, and (5) Agriculture, Commerce
and Industry. For the purpose of carrying on the
government a large staff of Japanese officials was
installed. An annual budget was prescribed as the
basis of the financial system. A central Council
was created for the purpose of providing the Japan-
ese Governor-General with a Korean advisory com-
mittee, which he could consult in regard to adminis-
trative measures. The Vice-President and all mem-
bers of the Council were chosen from the ranks of the
Korean nobility, gentry and officialdom. But the

1. In 1910 the name of the country was changed back
from Tai Han, which had been adopted in 1897, to
president of the Council, the chief secretary, and the secretaries were chosen from the higher ranks of the Japanese officials attached to the Government General. The actual number of Koreans in the Council at the end of 1911 was 71; and the Japanese staff of the Council consisted of one president, one chief secretary, one assistant secretary and one interpreter-secretary.

For local administration the country was divided into thirteen provinces. The Organic Regulations for Provincial Government established a central authority in each province, headed by a Provincial Governor; and equipped with the administrative staff necessary to conduct the provincial business connected with Finance, Police, Education, Harbors, Public Works, and so on.

Each province was subdivided into districts of three types — municipal prefectures, rural counties, and insular districts. The last-named group comprised two of the larger islands lying off the coast of Korea. To sum up, the govern-

ment of Korea presented the following administrative pattern:

1 Government-General,
13 Provincial Governments,
12 Municipal Prefectures,
218 Rural Counties, and
2 Insular Districts.

II. Railways.

The first railway construction undertaken in Korea was a line of about 25 miles between Seoul and Chemulpo. A concession for this undertaking was secured from the Korean Government by an American, Mr. James R. Morse, in 1898. It was subsequently bought by a Japanese Company which carried the undertaking through and opened the line to traffic in 1902. The next line to be constructed was that from Seoul to Fusan. The concession for the construction and operation of this line was granted in 1898 to a Japanese syndicate which began work in 1901. The line was completed in 1904 and was opened to traffic on January 1, 1905, its length being 268 miles.
In 1906 the Japanese Government purchased the lines from Seoul to Fusan, and from Seoul to Chemulpo. At the time of the annexation (1910) the management of the railways was assigned to the Railroad Department of the Government-General.

From this time onward a steady increase has occurred in railroad mileage, and a great deal has been spent on improving the existing lines. Among the more important undertakings are to be noted the construction of an iron bridge, about 3,000 feet long, across the Yalu River, connecting the Korean railroad system with that of the South Manchurian Railway Company; and the building of branch lines connecting the ports of Geusen, Chinampo and Mokpo.

The management of all the state-owned railways in Korea was, in 1917, entrusted to the South Manchurian Railway Company. The terms of the arrangement are, in brief, that the Government makes the plans for new construction and improvements, and provides the capital for these pur-

2. Ireland, A., The New Korea, p. 27.
poses, while the Company is responsible for carrying out these plans, for the proper maintenance of the railways, and for their operation.

At the end of March, 1925, the mileage had increased to 1,300, and the receipts from traffic to 29,027,866 yen.

III. Maritime Transportation.

In order to insure regular maritime communication, both coastwise and foreign, the old Korean government found it necessary to subsidise local steamship lines. This policy was adopted by the Government-General, and has been continues down to the present time. At the beginning of 1923 the Government-General was granting a subsidy of 1,144,371 yen, distributed among 126 vessels of a total tonnage of about 20,000.

IV. Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone Communications.

Prior to 1876 there was nothing in Korea which could be dignified by the name of "postal

service. In that year, however, the Japanese Government opened a post office at Fusan. At first only ordinary mail business was done; but as early as 1880 money orders were made available and a postal savings system started. To these services a parcel post was added in 1900. When Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910 a Communications Bureau was created in the Government-General, and to it were assigned the control and management of all postal, telegraph, and telephone business.

In 1927 there were 670 post offices, 21,503 miles of telegraph and 3,279 miles of telephone lines.

V. Finance.

To know the financial condition of Chosen in its true aspect, it is necessary to have a general idea of what it was previous to the annexation. Under the Korean Government both the taxation and currency systems were in confusion.

On the conclusion of the Agreement between Japan

and Chosen in August, 1904, resulting in the appointment of a financial adviser recommended by the Japanese Government, strenuous efforts were put forth to improve this corrupt condition of the finances. The gold standard was adopted in order to secure a uniform currency, a central bank was established to act as the national treasurer, while agricultural and industrial banks were founded in important places for the purpose of facilitating the development of industry.

When the Government-General of Chosen was first established, the revenue obtained in Chosen was not sufficient to meet the expenditure necessary for the preservation of public peace and order. The Japanese Government, therefore, decided to make good the deficiency by granting a subsidy to Chosen, and in the fiscal year 1911 the amount for this purpose was fixed at 12,350,000 yen yearly. With this assistance, Chosen was able to meet all expenses necessary for the improvement and development of her various institutions, and to make firmer

the foundations of her finances year by year.
The outbreak of the Great War involved her in some economic depression from which, however, she soon recovered, and the plan of financial independence was realized at last in 1919, in which year no subsidy was called for.

Though in 1919 the Government-General ceased to receive a subsidy from the Japanese Government, the aftermath of the Great War demanded quickened development of the peninsula and made some change necessary in the financial policy of the Government-General. The aim of financial independence was therefore abandoned in favor of doing and spending as much as possible for the material development of Chosen. In consequence of this change of policy, a subsidy of 10,000,000 yen was received from the Japanese Government in 1920. In the following fiscal year the subsidy was increased to 15,600,000 yen. Thus the estimated revenue for the fiscal year 1921 was over 162,000,000 yen, which includes the subsidy.

1. Annual Report on Reforms and Progress, 1921-22, p. 34.
With regard to taxation, reform was made in the fiscal year 1920 in the method of levying the taxes on liquor, tobacco, and corporation incomes, while making some increase in certain other taxes. The following pages give a brief account of how each tax was adjusted.

(a) Land Tax.

The compilation of the land register, completed in 1911, made possible a more exact collection of the land tax by definitely fixing their ownership. In 1913 the practice of collecting the tax from tenant-farmers was discontinued, and the land-owners were made directly responsible for its payment. In 1914 the regulations for the land tax and urban land tax were made public, thus opening the way for the levying of the latter tax on those urban lands hitherto too exempt. Both taxes were increased in 1921, the new rates being 1.7 per cent of the land value for the former and 0.95 per cent for the latter. The result of this reform was seen in the income from the land taxes for the fiscal year 1922 amount—

ing to over 14,770,000 yen, that is 50 per cent of the domestic taxes, and taking the first place in revenue items.

(b) Tobacco Tax and Liquor Tax.

The new tobacco tax law and the new liquor tax law were introduced in March, 1914, and in July, 1916, respectively. In 1921 the monopoly in tobacco was established. The tobacco tax law consequently became null and void.

As to the liquor tax the receipts from it have gradually increased from 200,000 yen to 6,600,000 yen in recent years.

(c) Other Taxes.

Besides the taxes above mentioned the following taxes were levied since the annexation in 1910: war-profits tax, registration fee, corporation income tax, exchange tax, sugar consumption tax and stamp duty. The income from these various sources amounted to 25,000,000 yen in 1920.

(d) Customs.

At the time of the annexation, the Japanese Government announced that the existing customs tariff in Chosen would be left unchanged for ten years. On August 28, 1920, the grace of ten years promised to foreign countries having expired, the Japanese Government promptly enforced the new tariff in conformity with that of Japan proper.

Receipts from customs duties have always been on the increase except in 1914 and 1915. In 1921 the receipts reached over 13,320,000 yen, that is three to four times the receipts at the time of annexation. Of course these increasing receipts are in part due to the rise in prices, but the industrial and commercial development of the country is the factor really responsible for the marked increase.

VI. Government Undertakings

(a) Tobacco Monopoly.

Smoking is widespread among Koreans, nearly everybody contracting the habit long before adult age is reached. The former Korean Government attempted to make the tobacco tax one of its most important sources of revenue, and issued a tobacco cultivation law which, however, failed to bring in the returns expected by the Government. In 1914 the Government-General imposed the tobacco consumption tax, but in 1921 the Government, seeing that the general situation had developed favorably for the establishment of a monopoly in tobacco, issued the tobacco monopoly law in April and enforced it from July 1 following. The receipts from tobacco monopoly in 1921 amounted to over 12,000,000 yen.

(b) Ginseng Monopoly.

The chief market for ginseng is China where it sells at a very good profit. The

2. Ginseng is a perennial herb, highly valued by Chinese and Koreans.
former Korean Government enacted a ginseng monopoly law in July, 1908. After the annexation the Government-General took the matter in hand and encouraged its cultivation by introducing modern scientific methods. Associations were organized and money loaned to them at a low rate of interest. In October, 1920, a new ginseng monopoly law was issued, superseding the one promulgated in 1908. The receipts from this monopoly in 1921 reached over 2,000,000 yen.

VII. Banking

In the days of the former Korean Government the financial system was so primitive that a banking organ worthy of the name was nowhere to be found. Banking business on a modern system was first started by the establishment of a branch of the Dai Ichi Ginko of Japan at Fusan in 1878. Later on the Juhachi Ginko opened branches at Jinsen (Chemulpo) and Gensan, chiefly to transact business in exchanges for the benefit of the

Japanese making their home in Korea.

In 1902 the Dai Ichi Ginko was granted permission to issue bank-notes for circulation in Korea. In 1909 the Bank of Korea was founded as the central bank of Korea, and to it was entrusted the national treasury business hitherto conducted by the Dai Ichi Ginko. After annexation the Bank of Korea was renamed the Bank of Chosen. Along with financial development its sphere of activity was extended to Manchuria, where many branches were opened, and recognition was given to the free circulation of its notes in Kwantung Province (Port Arthur and Dai-ren) and the South Manchurian Railway Zone. The Bank also made loans to China in accordance with the Government policy, and opened an agency in New York with the object of facilitating exchange operations and of utilizing the New York market for the development of Chosen and Manchuria. Urged by the expansion of its business sphere, the Bank increased its capital from 20,000,000

yen to 40,000,000 yen in 1918, and to 80,000,000 yen in 1920.

VIII. Laws

Prior to 1895 the laws in force in Korea were those of the native system which had been developed after the Chinese model. The first judicial reforms were undertaken shortly after the Sino-Japanese War, at the instance of the Japanese advisers to the Korean Government. The Korean Government promulgated an order on March 25, 1895, for the constitution of law courts. The order was, however, more honored in the breach than in the observance, as only two of the courts were effectively established -- the court of appeals and the local court at Seoul.

Acting upon an agreement signed on July 24, 1907, law courts were opened in August, 1908, competent Japanese being appointed judges, public prosecutors, and clerks, in association with selected Korean judicial officers.

An agreement was concluded on July 12, 1909, under which the whole of the judicial and

prison administration of Korea was transferred to the Japanese, who undertook to defray all the expenses of reforming and of administering these services. According, in October following, all Korean law courts were converted into Residency-General Courts, and in addition twenty-six new district courts were established. At the end of 1909 there were in Korea one Supreme Court, three Courts of Appeal, eight Local Courts, nine Branch Local Courts, and eighty District Courts.

The transfer of the Korean Law Courts to Japanese administration did not make Japanese laws applicable to Koreans, for the Residency-General Courts were required to administer justice in conformity with Korean laws. Japanese residents in Korea continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of their own consular courts. Since 1910 the general judicial principle adopted was that Japanese laws should be held applicable to Korea, but the courts were authorized to apply Korean laws, when both parties to a civil suit are Koreans. In civil suits between Koreans and non-Koreans it
was provided that Japanese laws should be applied.


IX. Police

Prior to 1894 police administration in Korea was under the full control of the Korean Government. Police work was regarded as a branch of military affairs; and throughout the various provinces the local garrisons acted as the local police forces. Under the terms of an agreement concluded between Japan and Korea in 1894, the Korean Government engaged the services of a number of Japanese officials for the purpose of removing the gross abuses which had long existed in the police

2. Ireland, A., The New Korea, p. 150.
administration of the country. Acting in conformity with Japanese advice the Korean Government separated police affairs from the military administration, and created a Bureau of Police affairs in the Home Office.

The extent to which the Japanese interested themselves in the reform of the Korean police system may be measured roughly by the fact that the expenditure on the police force was increased from $196,453, in 1906 to $1,349,599 in 1909. In the latter year the ordinary police force was made up of 36 Japanese and 11 Korean inspectors, 156 Japanese and 102 Korean sergeants, 1,924 Japanese and 57 Korean interpreters, and 63 Japanese physicians.

In addition to the ordinary police force the Japanese maintained for a number of years in Korea a force of gendarmes. This gendarmerie was originally established after the Sino-Japanese War, for the purpose of guarding telegraph lines. Later, its functions were extended to include protection of the railroads and the performance

of ordinary police work.

The personnel of the Korean Police Force in October, 1922, was as follows: 1,161 Japanese officers, 422 Korean officers, 11,028 Japanese policemen, and 8,180 Korean policemen -- a total of 20,771.

X. Education

The principles in conformity with which the present educational system of Korea is operated are derived from certain general precepts set forth in an Imperial Prescript promulgated on October 30, 1890, by the late Emperor Meiji of Japan. In a notification issued by the Government-General to the teachers of Korea on January 14, 1916, the three controlling motives of educational policy were declared:

(1). The fostering of loyalty and filial piety is to be made the radical principle of education.

(2). Practical utility shall always be held in view when imparting instruction.

(3) Robust physical development is to be striven for.

2. Ibid, p. 188.
An enlarging upon these principles, the notification explains that by adhering to the first principle men will be made good subjects of their Emperor, and good sons to their parents, and will acquire those habits of diligence and thrift which lead to social and business success, and to the enhancement of the prosperity of the nation.

On March 1, 1925, there were for the education of Japanese 449 elementary schools with 54,137 pupils, 10 middle schools, 1 medical school, 21 girls' high schools, 1 commercial high school, 1 special school for law, and various kindergarten and private schools. For the education of Koreans there were 1,244 common schools, 78 private common schools, 23 higher common schools, and a technical college at Seoul. To sum up, there were 1,931 schools of all kinds with 474,203 pupils and a University at Seoul with 321 students (89 Koreans and 323 Japanese).

XI. Comments

An evaluation of the Japanese administration in Korea was made by Mr. Powell as follows:

"The Japanese have made amazing progress in Korea. The old, corrupt administration was swept away. A cabinet was formed on the model of that in Japan. An elaborate system of local government was adopted. The judiciary was reformed. A sound monetary system was established and maintained. Prisons were cleansed and modernized. The mileage of the railways was doubled. The inadequate Korean harbors were transformed into spacious ports, equipped with all modern appliances. Remarkable improvements in the public health were effected by government hospitals, and system of sanitation. New waterworks were built in fourteen cities and towns. The 500 miles of road which existed in 1910 were increased to 8,000, it being proposed eventually to cover the peninsula with a network of highways. New industries were introduced, nearly 800 factories, something hitherto unknown in Korea, being established. Handsome public buildings were erected. Streets were extended and paved. Primary, secondary, technical, agricultural,
and other schools were opened.

"Agriculture -- the mainstay of the peninsula -- was enormously developed, the Korean farmer being taught new and profitable side lines: fruit, cotton, hemp, tobacco, and sheep-breeding. Afforestation was pushed forward on an astonishing scale, no less than half a billion young trees being planted by the Japanese Forestry Service on the bare hillsides. The area of cultivated land was doubled. The output of the Korean coal mines was trebled. Cotton acreage increased by more than 4500 per cent. There were increases of several hundred per cent in the acreages of wheat, beans, 1. and barley. The foreign trade of Korea went up from 59,000,000 yen to 131,000,000 yen in seven years. In less than a decade after the annexation, there were a million depositors in the postal-savings banks. In short, more public improvements were made, civic reforms instituted, and economic progress effected in these ten years than the Koreans had so much as thought of since their history began." 2.

1. See also Japan Year-Book, 1921-22, p. 580.
On the other hand the Literary Digest criticized the Japanese administration as being too militaristic. "Japan's failure in Korea," the Digest says, "is attributed by not a few Japanese observers to the fact that the weight of authority in Korea has been lodged with the military administration. Domestic observers in Japan are severe in their criticism of the militarist party, while even those of anti-Korean inclination are bound to admit the necessity of a radical change in the administration of the peninsula. Even such conservative journals as the Tokyo Jiji-shimpo and the Tokyo Asahi are publishing articles in which the failure of the Japanese authorities in Korea is rated in harsh terms. A writer in the Jiji-shimpo, who is considered an authority on the Korean question, pictures the civil administration in Korea as little more than a puppet in the hands of the Governor-General and the Director of the Police. He informs us that --

"If the gendarmerie and the police confined their activities to the maintenance of order in the narrow sense of the term, no harm would follow. But their authority goes much further than their proper function. Directly or indirectly, the exercise great in-
fluence upon the judiciary, and educational sections of the civil administration. It seems no exaggeration to say that Korea under Japanese rule is really administered by the gendarmerie, with its usual accompanying spy system.

"The militarists who have gained a controlling influence in Korea act as though they were conquerors who have taken the peninsula by the might of arms. They look upon the natives as a vanquished people, and think that the country should be governed by force. That is the fundamental mistake from which many administrative blunders must inevitably result." 1

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