THE PHILOSOPHY OF REWARDS

by

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Nota Bene

As to Editions of Works Cited

The editions in which works are cited in this study are fully indicated in the Bibliography which constitutes Appendix II. In the case, however, of every work which is cited in more than one edition the footnotes, also, indicate them.
This writing occupies itself with two main questions concerning the philosophy of Johnathan Edwards: 1. What is it? 2. Is its idealism original? Thus, the discussion has the following parts and order:— Part I - The Philosophy of Edwards: Its content and Character; Part II - The Philosophy of Edwards: The Originality of Its Idealism. An appendix containing representative passages of Edwards’ works affords ready means of testing the justice with which, in this treatise, all claims of Edwards’ authority are made. This appendix has, also, the merit of presenting the philosophical thought of Edwards as it appears in his successive works, that is, as it grew.

The purpose of what is here done lies upon the surface of it. It is, of course, to put in easily accessible and manageable form what is salient in the thinking of the most noteworthy American philosopher, and, especially, to challenge the negativadogmatism and the indolent following of tradition which unite to strip that philosopher of his originality in respect of his idealism. Does the space given to the question of originality seem disproportionately large? It is justified in the view of the writer by such considerations as these. First, the most obtrusive problem relating to the philosophy of Edwards is precisely this of originality. Again, to look into the problem of originality is to discover afresh the mysticism which is a spring, perhaps the spring, of what Edwards thought upon all the greatest matters to which he addressed himself. Lastly, patriotism demands
that we should not continue lightly to surrender to Europe a chief splendor of American history — the more that such surrender adds little if any thing to Europe, since what we are wont to yield up in respect of Edwards, the Old World already largely has in Berkeley.

I bring to a conclusion this study of the thinking of Jonathan Edwards with special gratitude to Doctor Edmund H. Hollands for the flawless courtesy and kindness with which he has put at my service, in relation to it, his vast and accurate learning and deep-going insight. I wish also now heartily to thank Mr. Earl N. Manchester for his unfailing goodness to me during a number of years about books needed in preparation to write the following pages.
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Part I

The Philosophy of Edwards; Its Content and Character.
Sure, He that made us with such large discourse
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and Godlike reason
To fast in us unused.  ————Shakespeare

The beginning of philosophy ••••• is a
consciousness of your own weakness and inability
in necessary things.  ————Epictetus

How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.  ————Milton

A little philosophy inclineth man's mind
to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth
man's minds about to religion.  ————Bacon
Chapter I

How To Understand Edwards

Sage
Saint

Whoever would understand the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards, in all of its reaches and phases, must, as he reads after him, keep fast hold of the fact that he is one of the great saints of the world. The phrase of Riley, "the saint of New England," suffices to designate but not to describe him. He is a fellow of Pascal, Thomas a Kempis, Francis of Assisi, and the Beloved Disciple. His sainthood is of a majestic kind, and it is a spiritual property of no mere corner of a more or less barbarous land, but a royal part of the soul-wealth of all lands.

Terrific
Preaching

What is said and can be said against this estimate of Edwards as a saint is plain to all who in any fair sort know him. The sum of it is in his thought of the divine sovereignty linked with his thoughts of original sin and hell. How is it possible, one asks, to say, or to think, or so much as to dream, some of the things which are to be found in what he has written on these subjects? Can any man who says such things be good and gracious? For example, in his world-famous sermon on Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God, he uses these expressions

and many more like them. He declares that God is angry with the
wicked, as angry with the living wicked as "with many of those
miserable creatures that he is now tormenting in hell. 1

"The furnace, he says, "is now hot, ready to receive them; the
flames do now rage and glow. ... The old serpent is gaping for
them. ... Scripture represents them as his goods. 2 The
flames gather and flash about them." "That world of misery, that
lake of brimming brimstone," he warns, "is extended abroad under
you. There is the dreadful pit of the glowing flames of the
wrath of God. ... 4 And then the preacher changes his figure.
He says, "... The bow, of God's wrath is bent, and the arrow
made ready on the string, and justice bends the arrow at your
heart, and strains the bow, and it is nothing but the mere pleasure
of God, and that of an angry God, without any promise or obliga-
tion at all, that keeps the arrow one moment from being made drunk
with your blood." 5 Now he returns to the figure of the flaming
pit. "The God" he says, "that holds you over the pit of hell,
much as one holds a spider or some loathsome insect over the fire,
abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his wrath towards you
burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but
to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to behold you

1. Gardiner, Selected Sermons, p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Ibid., p. 85.
4. Ibid., p. 86.
5. Ibid., p. 87.
in his sight; you are ten thousand times so abominable in his
eyes, as the most venomous serpent is in ours."¹ When at length
they are let drop into hell, so the preacher tells his unregener-
ate hearers, they will remain there forever, suffering "the
fierceness and wrath of Almighty God" -- "there will be no
end to this exquisite, horrible misery." And they are to know
this. "You will know certainly," he says, "that you must wear
out long ages, millions of millions of ages, in wrestling and con-
flicting with this almighty, merciless vengeance; and then when
you have so done, when so many ages have actually been spent by
you in this manner, you will know that all is but a point to
what remains. So that your punishment will indeed be infinite."²
And then the preacher addresses himself to several groups of his
hearers in succession. He comes to speak to the children. "And
you children that are unconverted, don't you know," he questions,
"that you are going down to hell, to bear the dreadful wrath of
that God that is now angry with you every day and every night?"³
The sermon comes to an end in these words. "The wrath of Al-
mighty God is now undoubtedly hanging over a great part of this
congregation. Let every one fly out of Sodom. 'Haste and escape
for your lives, look not behind you, escape to the mountain, lest
ye be consumed.'"
In his work, *On Original Sin*, Edwards, in discussing the nature of infants, says that "it is no wonder that they be not guilty of positive wicked action, before they are capable of any moral action at all. A young viper has a malignant nature, though incapable of doing a malignant action, and at present appearing a harmless creature."¹ This is of a piece with a passage which Doctor Holmes found in the work of Edwards on revivals as it appeared in a New York edition of 1832. "As innocent as children seem to be to us," so runs Doctor Holmes' quotation, "yet, if they are cut of Christ, they are not so in God's sight, but are young vipers, and are infinitely more hateful than vipers, and are in a most miserable condition, as well as grown persons; and they are naturally very senseless and stupid, being born as a wild ass's colt, and need much to awaken them."² If it is possible that anything in human speech should more shock the sensibilities of ordinary men and women than the things just cited, it is doubtless this. "The view," says Edwards, "of the doleful condition of the damned will make them" — the saints in heaven — "more prize their own blessedness." They will have a most joyful sense of the grace of God in putting such a difference between them and others of the same species, "who are no worse by nature than they, and have deserved no worse of God.

¹ Works of Edwards, Rogers and Hickman, p.229 - Original Sin, p. IV, Chap. 4.
² Holmes, Pages From An Old Volume of Life, p.393.
than they." And "when they shall look upon the damned and see their misery, how will heaven ring with the praises of God's justice towards the wicked, and his grace towards the saints! And with how much greater enlargement of heart will they praise Jesus Christ their Redeemer, that ever he was pleased to set his love upon them, his dying love." 1 "Was the man who could utter such blasphemous sentiments -- for so they undoubtedly appear to us -- a being of ordinary flesh and blood? That he should have been a gentle, meditative creature, around whose knees had clung eleven 'young vipers' of his own begetting, is certainly an astonishing reflection." 2 Thus Leslie Stephen expresses the abhorrence and perplexity which this kind of words is calculated to produce. And no less does Stephen speak for many besides himself when he later exclaims: "How could any man hold such doctrines without going mad? Or, as experience has reconciled us to that phenomenon, how could a man with so many elevated conceptions of the truth reconcile these ghastly conclusions to the nobler part of his creed?" And then Stephen joins with another in suggesting that Edwards is something less than candid in the argument with which he often defends the justice of God. He says, "though it is not peculiar to him, it sounds very much like a poor quibble in his mouth." 3 It is such utterances as we now think of which led Holmes to say:

"Edwards' system seems, in the light of to-day, to the last degree barbaric, mechanical, materialistic, pessimistic."¹

Some Explanations of the Terrific

This, then, is what is against the estimate of Edwards as a saint a while ago expressed: his teachings as to original sin and his alleged lack of candor in enforcing them. The former seem to show him to be heartless and cruel, the latter to indicate that he was not honest; and callous cruelty and quibbling defense of it make, together, a pretty emphatic contradiction of sainthood. How is such contradiction to be cleared away? It is only fair to both Edwards and the adverse critics of his fiery and fateful eschatology to remark, first of all, that not one of these critics of any standing in letters or philosophy, so far as they are known to the writer of this, disparages his moral character. That is, whether they tell us or not, how to reconcile the rigors of his Calvinism with the spirit of Christ, they hail him as a high and beautiful soul.² And then it should be remarked, that it is by no means an exceptional thing to find stern views of the nature and end of moral evil in the same soul with lofty purity of motive, and warmest devotion to persons, and all holy interests. They were found together in Jeremy Taylor, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine and Paul. And they have been found thus

1. Holmes, Pages from an Old Volume, p. 395.
together in former times and in our own time in lesser men without number. And it should not be forgotten that there is a temptation which is constant and to which Edwards opposed a sturdy and heroic resistance in the disposition of us all to be too complaisant toward human nature. There is an easy optimism, an uncritical sentimentalism, which does not face the facts of the life of man as they are; and which can be quite as silly as the most vitriolic of the words of Edwards are horrible. And this too we should now note well. The mighty thinker nowhere more proclaims his kinship with some of the chief minds of our race than in his clear and arresting call to men to know what evil is in them and to what limitless evil it may grow. Isaiah, Plato, Dante, and Milton are amongst those spiritual fathers of his who think they see and try to tell each in his own way of the terrible nature of moral wrong and of the terrifying goal to which, if unchecked, it runs. As to the crass forms in which Edwards speaks and writes of such things it is only just to him to remember that they were more or less ready to hand — in the main, he did not make them. Moreover it is likely that Edwards was scarcely aware of the repellent result of using the bold imagery of the Bible and of the Puritan pulpit of his time as terms in as close-knit arguments as are to be read in the records of man. Nor is it to be lost sight of that Edwards was a polemic who

1. Holmes, Pages from an Old Volume, pp.384 ff.
felt that his party was in peril and that the peril of his party
was that of his country and the world. It were strange if in such
a case he should not now and then despite his utmost efforts to be
fair fail of perfect candor. But this is merely to recognize
that he was human. What is much worthier to be noted is the
persistent and pervasive courtesy of his disputation whether in-
volving his person or his party; and in respect of his candor with
which for the moment we are especially concerned there is a view
very opposite to that held by Stephen; for Rogers affirms that
candor "is inscribed on every page of his controversial works;"
that "he never attempts to evade the force of an argument, or to
attack only its most vulnerable points;" that "he never misrepren-
tsents the sentiments he controverts, but uniformly gives them the
fullest and strongest expression of which they were capable;" that
"he never resorts to the mean subterfuge of putting forward an argu-
ment manifestly weak and inconclusive, nor condescends to main-
tain an opinion once proved to be untenable;" that "the part he
took in the controversy on the subject of "Communion" is perhaps
one of the most astonishing triumphs over every kind and degree of
prejudice which any man ever gained;" and that "this perfect can-
dor was partly the effect of the purely logical character of his

mind, inspiring him with an habitual and absorbing love of truth, and rendering him too magnanimous to descend to the employment of any sophistry;" but that it was "still more conspicuously owing to the stern dominion of religious principle." What remains to be thought of is only the inconsistency between the polemic and the gentle mystic -- between the horrible conceptions of extreme Calvinism and the beautiful serenity and bewitching charity of this American Fenelon. But if inconsistency be deadly sin then all philosophers are moral renegades. Revolting, then, as many of Edwards' expressions are, and hopelessly perplexing as some of his views may be, they do not, upon a rational consideration of them, constitute an effective impeachment of his saintly character.

Amongst Spiritual Elite

The considerations of a positive sort which warrant us in setting Edwards on high amongst the religious elite of all times, are easily and quickly set out. It should be remarked that no distinction is here made of the moral from the religious; for, as Edwards himself insisted, real morality is the exclusive fruit and the one trustworthy mark of religion; and this is, also, the well-known teaching of the New Testament. That is, true morality is so dependent upon, and intertwined with, true religion, that no adequate account of the one is at all possible, without some account of the other.

2. St. Cyres: Fenelon, Britannica, Col.3.
A feature of the character of Jonathan Edwards which
of
Duty
was one who attends to it is his sense of duty. "When
his mind was once made up to the course he should pursue, he was
distinguished by a stern fixedness of purpose, an indomitable
resolve, which no consideration of interest, no strength of
prejudices, no allurements of ease, no impulse of passion, could
penetrate or soften. All these fell around him, light as snow
flakes on granite; .... His whole life affords a comment on
this." Indeed his whole career was in the key of that moral
music which beats through such words of his as these.

"Resolved, never to do, be, or suffer, anything, in soul
or body, less or more, but what tends to the glory of God.
Resolved, never to lose one moment of time; but improve it
in the most profitable way I possibly can.
Resolved, to live with all my might, while I do live.
Resolved, never to do anything which I should be afraid
to do, if it were the last hour of my life.
Resolved, to endeavor to my utmost to act as I can
think I should do, if I had already seen the happiness of heaven,
and the hell torments."*

The moral sense of Edwards was so delicately acute as it
was relentlessly stern. This, also, others of the same early

p. xvii.
2. Dwight, Life of Edwards, p. 68.
resolutions exemplified in the matter just quoted, prophesy. Some of these other resolutions are as follows.

"Resolved, in narrations, never to speak anything but the pure and simple verity.

Resolved, to enquire every night, as I am going to bed, wherein I have been negligent, -- what sin I have committed, -- and wherein I have denied myself; -- also, at the end of every week, month and year.

Resolved, never to do anything, of which I so much question the lawfulness, as that I intend, at the same time, to consider and examine afterwards, whether it be lawful or not; unless I as much question the lawfulness of the omission.

Resolved, to endeavor, to my utmost, to deny whatever is not most agreeable to a good and universally sweet and benevolent, quiet, peaceable, contented and easy, compassionate and generous, humble and meek, submissive and obliging, diligent and industrious, charitable and even, patient, moderate, forgiving and sincere, temper; and to do at all times, what such a temper would lead one to; and to examine strictly, at the end of every week, whether I have done so."

One of the most significant and engaging facts of the moral life of Edwards is seen in his foresight of the tendency of age to restrict and destroy the spirit of

1. Dwight, Life of Edwards, pp. 70f.
discovery in the world of truth, and to provide himself against it. He begins a war for a permanently open mind in his twenty-first year. Thus in his diary for that year he writes as follows.

"I observe that old men seldom have any advantage of new discoveries, because they are beside the way of thinking, to which they have been so long used. Resolved, if ever I live to years, that I will be impartial to hear the reasons of all pretended discoveries, and receive them if rational, how long so ever I have been used to another way of thinking." This resolution, in so far as it is possible to a man, Edwards fulfilled to the end of his life. That his open-mindedness did not bring him to views of science and theology prevalent in our own time is no more against this than the fact that Aristotle's passion for truth did not bring him to the natural science of Galileo or the Metaphysics of Kant proves that he had no such passion.

Sway

The sway of Edwards over his passions looks almost absolute. "He never moved till the severest reason had audited the matter, and pronounced the occasion just and reasonable." His control of all grosser appetites is so perfect as to seem to an onlooker to be effortless. This despite some occasional words in his diary as to his imperfect mastery of himself at table. "Those

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1. Dwight, Life, p.94
3. Ibid., vol.I, p.viii
other and more dangerous, because more subtle and more spiritual enemies, such as pride, vanity, wrath, and envy, which lurk in the
inmost recesses of our nature, and some of which have peculiar
affinity for a genius like Edwards, yield not to such exorcisms" as reason knows. "Such more powerful kind of demons go not forth
but 'by prayer and fasting;' to their complete mortification, there-
fore, Edwards brought incessant watchfulness and devotion." 1 This
is nowhere more strikingly obvious than in his controversial writ-
ings. "The spirit of the advocate scarcely ever appears.... He
derived the most exquisite pleasure from the discovery and perception
of truth; and for the loss of truth, no success, however signal,
over an inferior disputant would ever have consoled him. ..... 2 He
argues like a being without affections, a pure intelligence. ....It
may perhaps be affirmed, that the chief defect of Edwards' moral
nature was, that this control of the emotions and passions was car-
rried somewhat too far. ...... But we have the most abundant proof,
that Jonathan Edwards possessed, substantially, the virtues of
benevolence, charity, and kindness, in a degree seldom equalled, per-
haps never surpassed." 3

Edwards     But it is when Edwards comes face to face with the great
As He Is     basic things of religion that we see him as he is. "If in

any man, in him the love of God was an all-absorbing, all-controlling

2. Ibid., vol. I, p.xix
3. Ibid., vol. I, p.xix
affection. ... If ever there was a man who prostrated himself in
abject self-abbasement before the throne of God; who resigned himself
implicitly to the Divine will; who was habitually ready to obey it,
whatever it might enjoin, or submit to whatever it might inflict;
that man was Jonathan Edwards.  

And this deep and utter submission
to God bore the natural fruits of general humility and modesty. He
"contemplated a glory, an Absolute Excellence, which at once checked
the swellings of pride, and sickened him of the praise which his
powers might have won from the world." He speaks and acts as
selflessly as George Washington is said to have done. Moreover
there is in him the simplicity of a child in respect of his vast
abilities. "He appears not to dream, that as a philosopher he would
ever command the homage of the world, or that his writings would be
regarded in relation to philosophy at all." His interest was first
of all in religion. What he did in philosophy was the fruit of that.

"In a word, rarely have such genius and worth, such greatness and
modesty, been united: and the reader of his pages might say, with
at least as much truth as Atterbury said of Berkeley, 'So much
understanding, .... , so much innocence, and such humility, I did
not think had been the portion of any but angels.'"

Jonathan Edwards, then, is one of the great saints of the
world. He worked as hard and as constantly as Wesley. He

dared in a way that despite the vast differences in all merely external things between himself and them suggests Athanasius and Chrysostom: for like them he put in pawn for God all of worldly advantage and prospect he had. In the perfect devotion with which he used his powers of disputation for the true doctrine as he understood it to be he resembled Augustine. He was as humble as St. Francis. He was serious and even solemn, but neither sombre nor uncheerful. His modesty, as we have seen, was flawless. Men in distant and populous places turned for council to the Colonial village of Northampton and the Indian village of Stockbridge as in long past ages they had turned to Hippo and Clairvaux; and the great labors of the counsellor were performed as thoroughly and as scrupulously by the preacher to pioneers and savages as they had been by the immortal Bishop and the hardly less illustrious Abbot. And the pastor of the wilderness was not less than either the Bishop or the Abbot in his sense of God as a personal yet all-pervading presence. What did they, what could they, or any other saint, of whatever time, say, or think, or feel about personal relations to God more than he? He said this, and much else of the same kind, and meant it all. Holiness, he wrote, makes "the soul like a field of garden of God, with all manner of pleasant flowers; engaging a sweet calm, and the greatly vivifying beams of the sun. The soul of a true Christian, ...... appeared like such a little white flower as we see in the spring of
the year; low and humble on the ground, opening its bosom, to receive the pleasant beams of the sun's glory. ..... My heart panted after this — to lie low before God, as in the dust; that I might be nothing, and that God might be All, that I might become as a little child."

Thus it is certain that Jonathan Edwards was first of all a great Christian; and that his philosophy is the daughter of his religion; and that, therefore, one who would explain to himself, or others, the former, must know the fair face of the latter.

Chapter II
Psychology

The early writings of Edwards, from which, as we have seen, must be got the most of our knowledge of his philosophy, as such, are strongly Lockian in their psychology. But Edwards makes use of emphases of his own which suggest an independence that might easily, under conditions favorable to his continuance in the direct study of psychology, have developed into important difference from his master. For example, he agrees that there are no innate ideas, in a sense; that is, there are no images or concepts present in the mind at birth; but it is quite conceivable, 1

he thinks, that there should be thoughts and judgments in some respects innate.

With Locke Edwards holds to the beginning of all ideas from sensation. "There never can be any idea, thought or act of the mind unless the mind first received some ideas from sensation or some other way equivalent, ...." With Locke, he holds to the entire passivity of the mind in perception, "which," he says, "is the mere presence of an idea in the mind." Yet he also writes: "We know our own existence, and the existence of everything that we are conscious of in our own minds, intuitively; but all our reasoning, with respect to Real Existence, depends upon that natural, unavoidable and invariable, disposition of the mind, when it sees a thing begin to be, to conclude certainly, that there is a cause of it; or if it sees a thing to be in a very orderly, regular and exact, manner, to conclude that some Design regulated and disposed it. .... Where we, therefore, see anything begin to be, we intuitively know there is a cause of it, and not by ratiocination, or any kind of argument. This is an innate principle in that sense, that the soul is born with it — a necessary, fatal propensity, so to conclude, on every occasion." These expressions indicate an interesting and significant balance of conceptions. On the one hand is utter passivity of the mind in perception; on the other is

1. Notes on Mind, Series I, no.52.
2. Ibid., Series I, No. 29.
3. Ibid., Series I, No. 28.
4. Ibid., Series II, No. 54.
imperious dictation by the mind of a form of thought. There is
then, for Edwards, at least one innate principle."

Ideas

complex

Modes

Edward follows Locke in respect of complex ideas and
modes of ideas, "without comment or criticism." Of
abstract ideas Edwards says that the formation of them "is not
merely a tying them under the same name;" for the deaf and dumb, as
he believed, "abstract and distribute things into kinds; but it is
so putting them together that the mind resolves hereafter to think
of them together, under a common notion, as if they were a collective
substance; the mind being as sure, in this proceeding, of reasoning
well as if it were a particular substance, for it has abstracted
that which belongs alike to all and has a perfect idea, whose
relations and properties it can behold, as well as those of the
idea of one individual." Again in the same sense he writes that
"many of our universal ideas are not arbitrary; the tying of ideas
together in genera and species is not merely the calling of them
by the same name, but such an union of them that the consideration
of one shall naturally excite the idea of others." He adds that
such excitation of ideas is sometimes quite against our wills. He
illustrates in this way. We are to suppose a stranger to the Earth
talking with a man and a long time afterward talking with another
man. The stranger would inevitably think of the former as he

1. Jones, Early American Philosophers, p.50.
2. Ibid., p.50.
talked with the latter, being compelled to this by the agreement between the two men. "So if he should see a third, and afterwards should find multitudes, there would be a genus, or universal idea, formed in his mind, naturally, without his counsel or design." Or, suppose one born blind suddenly given sight. Let him see blue, red, green and yellow in order. "They would immediately get into one general idea — they would be united in his mind without his deliberation."  

Word Idea Ambiguous  
"Edwards, like Johnson, had seen the confusion arising from the use of the term idea to cover all the immediate objects of the mind or all subjective thoughts, but he does not suggest any limitation of its meaning and continues to use the term without qualification."  

Consciousness  
Edwards describes consciousness as "the mind's perceiving what is in itself, ideas, actions, passions, and everything that is there perceptible; it is a sort of feeling within itself." He comes to nothing definitive in his course of thought on this subject. On the involved questions of identity of person and identity of substance he evinces an interestingly mixed attitude in relation to Locke. Thus in one place he says: "Well might Mr. Locke say, that identity of person consisted in identity of consciousness; for he might have said that identity of spirit, too,"

1. Notes on Mind, Series II, No.43.  
2. Ibid., Series I, No. 41; Jones, Early American Philosophers,p.50.  
consisted in the same consciousness; for a mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is included in it. The same consciousness is, to all intents and purposes, individually the very same spirit, or substance; as much as the same particle of matter can be the same with itself, at different times.¹. In another place he says: "Identity of person is what seems never to have been explained. It is a mistake that it consists in sameness, or identity, of consciousness -- if by sameness of consciousness be meant having the same ideas hereafter that I have now, with a notion or apprehension that I had them before; just in the same manner as I now have the same ideas that I had in time past, by memory." For, he affirms, it lies within the power of God to annihilate a man and then to create two beings having his "ideas communicated to them, with a notion of their having had them before, after the manner of memory" and still to leave the two ignorant of each other. "In such a case," it is asked, "will anyone say that both of these are one and the same person, as they must be if they are both one and the same person" with the man who was annihilated. Or equally it lies within the power of the Most High, he says, to "cause there to be another being, who should begin to exist, in some distant part of the universe with the same ideas I now have, after the manner of memory; and should henceforth coexist with me; we both retaining a consciousness of what was before the moment of his first existence, in like manner; but thenceforward should have a different train of

¹. Notes on Mind, Series II, No. 11.
ideas. Will any one say," he asks, "that he, in such a case, is the same person with me, when I know nothing of his sufferings, and am never the better for his joys?" In one of the passages just quoted consciousness person spirit and substance are made synonymous of one another. In the other and later passage there is a clearly marked purpose to distinguish between mind and consciousness, i.e., between a thinking substance and the process of thinking and to identify personal identity with identity of the former and by no means with that of the latter. How this latter view diverges from that of Locke is obvious; for he holds that a person may suffer change of his substance and keep his identity as a person; or, suffer change of his person and keep his identity as a thinking substance. These reflections as to personal identity, it is remarked in passing, suggest the doctrine of the identity of all other human beings with the first held by Edwards, which doubtless is best understood in the light of the theological interest represented by the correlative doctrine of imputation.

"Assent to a thing as true or dissent from it as false," judgment differs from "mere perception," and so is "not the perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas." What such assent, that is, judgment, is and how it differs from perception the

1. Notes on Mind, Series II, No. 72
writer does not tell us. 1 Judgment is involved in memory, the judgment, namely, that the remembered idea or ideas, were in the mind before. Such a judgment is "not properly from proof but from natural necessity, arising from a law of nature which God hath fixed." 2 One often judges wrongly in perception and in consequence probably says that his "senses deceive him." The fact is rather that inexperience leads him to misread a most reliable report on the part of the senses.

Edwards' account of reasoning is very interesting.

Reasoning, according to him, "is the act of the will in bringing its ideas into contemplation and ranging and composing of them in reflection and abstraction." 4 Now the act of the will called reasoning is thought of in its relation to perception and self-evident truth may be seen in the following language: "Reasoning does not absolutely differ from perception, any further than there is the act of the will about it. It appears to be so in demonstrative reasoning. Because the knowledge of a self-evident truth, it is evident, does not differ from perception. But all demonstrative knowledge consists in, and may be resolved into, the knowledge of self-evident truths. It is also evident that the act of the mind, in other reasoning, is not of a different nature from demonstrative reasoning." 5 As to knowledge it "is not the percep-

1. Jones, Early American Philosophers, p.50.
4. Ibid., Series II, No.59.
5. Ibid., Series II, No.58.
tion of the agreement and disagreement of ideas, but rather the perception of the union or disunion of ideas or the perceiving whether two or more ideas belong to one another. .... We may see that they are united and know that they belong to one another, though we do not know how they are tied together. ¹ And "memory is the identity in some degree of ideas we formerly had in our minds with a consciousness that we formerly had them and the supposition that their former being in the mind is the cause of their being in us at present." ²

Will is "that by which the mind chooses anything." It is the inclination of the mind "with respect to its own immediate action." The love of happiness and the capacity of enjoying and suffering are identified with it." ³

Association "But the most striking development in Edwards' psychology is the formulation of the doctrine of the association of ideas. Here again Locke's Essay was the point of departure. It was before the time of Hume, and Edwards did not know the earlier writings on the subject. Hence he lacked the opportunities that Hume had to derive suggestions from other sources than Locke. In the Essay on the Human Understanding, the association of ideas was invoked to account for the unusual connections of ideas. A natural connection of ideas was taken for-

2. Ibid., Series II, No. 69.
3. Ibid., Series II, No. 60; Series I, No. 44.
granted and not analyzed. Edwards uses the term "connection of ideas" to express the general law and reserves "association of ideas" for a special use. His statement is this: "Concerning the laws by which ideas follow each other or call up one another, in which one thing comes into the mind after another in the course of our thinking. How far this is owing to the association of ideas, and how far to any relation of cause and effect, or any other relation, and whether the whole may not be reduced to these following: (1) Association of Ideas; (2) Resemblance of some kind; (3) and the natural disposition in us when we see anything begin to be, to suppose it to be owing to a cause." His use of the laws of resemblance and cause and effect corresponds to that of Hume. Those connections not covered by these two laws are put by Hume under the law of contiguity in time and space. By Edwards they are put under the special law of 'association.'

Hume used the latter term to designate the general law. The difference between them is a matter of terminology. It is true that Edwards' presentation of the doctrine is tentative and was never completely developed but so far as it is developed it is equal to Hume's doctrine. He fully realized the value of these principles. 'If it were not for this mutual attraction of ideas, how rarely our minds would serve us; how the mind would be without ideas except as suggested by the senses. Reasoning and contemplation depend upon it; it serves further in the explanation of
the appetites which, be says, 'consist in some present pain attendant
ed with the idea of ease habitually connected with a certain
object. ... A longing for a particular thing comes from an idea
of pleasure or of the removal of pain associated with that object.
Words come by custom to have certain associations and thus influ-
ence our thoughts and actions. Many prejudices arise in this
way. The training of animals is possible only by virtue of the
association of ideas.’ This is Edwards’ contribution to the
doctrine of association and although it had no influence in the
development of the doctrine it does indicate the independence
and originality of his thinking.”

On the moot question of the mutual relations of
mind and body Edwards holds that they are so united
"that an alteration is caused in the body by every action of
the mind." Yet "mind cannot be said to be in the place where
the body is, except in the sense that all created spirits have
clearer and more strongly impressed ideas of things, and can pro-
duce effects in place where the body is. In the same sense mind
may be said to be in the brain.”

Such are the more salient and representative teachings
of Edwards on matters of psychology.

1. Jonas, Early American Philosophers, pp.52,53; Notes on Mind,
Series I, Nos.43, & 27; Ibid., Series II, No.18; Ibid., Ser.I,
No.57; Ibid., Ser.I, No.59; Freedom of Will, Ch.1,S.3.
2. Notes on Mind, Series II, No.4. 3. Ibid., Series II, No.2.
Chapter III
Epistemology

Much of what we have seen under the head of psychology together with much else in the writings of Edwards may profitably be viewed under the modern term epistemology. True, our thinker did not know the latter discipline under that name, but he was interested in psychical states, not merely as facts to be observed and arranged, but also in their relation to the real. Unfortunately, as it must seem to every thoughtful reader of his pages, he has left us seminal thoughts rather than a treatise on this relation. Other interests than those of an immediately philosophical kind early crowded out of him the purpose to put all his thoughts of the universe in order. This purpose which burned, for a time, in his Yale days, as a mighty passion, had it been executed, would, of necessity, have enriched, if not altered, the history of modern philosophy, not least of all by its bearing upon the questions about knowledge.

The remark just made, as it has to do with the theory of knowledge, is easily and quickly justified. Locke is for Edwards, as for Berkeley, the point of departure in all his thinking on this subject, that is, in so far as his speculations are to be historically explained. And Locke is regarded as the
father of modern epistemology. Edwards reacts from Locke as promptly and decisively as Berkeley and, at first, it appears, even more thoroughly than he. The former went almost immediately to the position that *Essa Est Conципи, whereas the latter reached it probably only after decades. How Edwards at once went beyond Locke, and anticipated Hume, in the formulation of the doctrine of the association of ideas, we saw a while ago in our notice of Edwards' psychology. What might not justly have been expected of a man who thus in his boyhood and early youth convinced the insight and independence of extraordinary genius had he kept to his cherished design of erecting his ideas into a system?

It gives one pause to think of naming and describing Edwards in respect of his theory of knowledge. One remembers that "any label may turn out to be a libel" -- any definition, a defamation -- especially in the case of so versatile and massive a man. But one must somehow designate and somehow think of even a fellow of Descartes, Locke and Kant.

Philosophy of a Mystic
What is doubtless most indisputable about Edwards' philosophy is that it is that of a mystic. How one of the marks of the mystic is passivity. Accordingly, many

1. Riley, American Philosophy, p. 149.
2. Above, pp. 130f.
passages already examined in this study represent perception as a passive experience. I quote again one which is typical. "Our perceptions or ideas that we passively receive through our bodies are communicated to us immediately by God. There never can be any idea, thought or action of the mind unless the mind first received some ideas from sensation, or some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly passive in receiving them." What shall we call this? It has a Lockian sound, in part — in part only. It is probably not at its heart, Lockian at all. The single point of agreement with Locke is in the notion of passivity. Locke's material substance is gone: "ideas" are "communicated to us immediately by God." Locke's sole dependence upon the senses for the stuff of knowledge is likewise gone, for ideas may be brought to us "by some other way equivalent." But what of passivity in such a case? It is changed from passivity in relation to a supposed inert and unknown substance to passivity in relation to the living and self-revealing God. Did this notion of passivity have its root in Locke, or was Locke only a timely rain that made it sprout and grow?

Empiricist or Rationalist

In respect, then, of the origin of knowledge as conceived by Edwards, which of our labels, empiricist

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1. Above p.124.
and rationalist, shall we put upon him? Passivity in perception is, of course, a note of empiricism. The clear rejection expressed by Edwards of all thoughts or mental action not founded upon ideas passively received is certainly empiricistic. His associationism is a familiar concomitant of empiricism. His repudiation of innatism in general is that of the empiricist. But there is no leaning upon matter as a substance supporting phenomena — no exclusive dependence upon sense-experience.

I have just said that Edwards discards innatism in general; albeit, I now remark, he holds to at least one innate principle, namely, that of causation. This also appears in the next preceding section of this study. Is he then in part, a rationalist? Certainly not, if rationalism be the mode of thinking illustrated by those who would come to a knowledge of nature through a priori reasonings from innate truths. Yet Riley calls him a rationalist. Of what kind is the rationalism of Edwards, if, indeed, it exists? It is the rationalism which is to be contradistinguished from mysticism, as Riley proceeds to make clear by quoting from the sermon entitled "A Divine and Supernatural Light" — not at all the dogmatic philosophical rationalism which constructs the cosmos apart from experience of

1. Above p.124f.
2. Riley, American Philosophy, p. 159.
its events. What Riley would have us understand is that, mystic though Edwards is, and that of a rather classical type, reason is so far from being drugged in him, that it seems instead to be quickened and nerved for its tasks. This, in fact, Edwards declares in the part of his sermon reproduced by his commentator. He says the sense of the holiness and loveliness of God "not only removes the hindrances of reason, but positively helps reason. It makes even the speculative notions more lively. .... The beauty of the objects draws on the faculties, and draws forth their exercises; so that reason itself is under far greater advantages for its proper and free exercises, and to attain its proper end, free of darkness and delusion." That one of the most acutely logical minds of our race should reason much, and find a great place in his scheme of things for the reason, is perhaps quite inevitable, certainly most natural; and that, in this quite generic and untechnical sense, he should be called a rationalist is most just. But Edwards was not a rationalist in relation to the origin of knowledge as it is considered in criteriology.

Perhaps Edwards' total thought of the significance of reason in relation to knowledge will be somewhat fairly represented if we add a notice of some expressions found farther on in the sermon quoted by Riley. The expressions are these. "It is not

a thing which belongs to reason to see the loveliness and beauty of spiritual things; it is not a speculative thing, but depends on the sense of the heart. Reason indeed is necessary in order to it, as it is by reason only that we are become the subjects of the means of it; but if we take reason strictly — not for the faculty of mental perception in general, but for ratiocination, or a power of inferring by arguments — the perceiving of spiritual beauty and excellency no more belongs to reason, than it belongs to the sense of feeling to perceive colours, or to the power of seeing to perceive the sweetness of food. It is out of reason's province to perceive the beauty or loveliness of anything; such a perception does not belong to that faculty. Reason's work is to perceive truth and not excellency. It is not ratiocination that gives men the perception of the beauty and amiableness of a countenance, though it may be many ways indirectly an advantage to it; yet it is no more reason that immediately perceives it, than it is reason which perceives the sweetness of honey; it depends on the sense of the heart.¹

¹ American Philosophy, p. 162f.
must still be applied to Edwards with much caution. Is he a real-
ist or an idealist? One remembers his alignment by commentators
with Berkeley and answers, "An idealist, of course;" and one is
justified in his answer including its "of course." It accords
well with this from the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics:
"Idealism implies that the relation of subject and object is one of
the essential starting-points of philosophy, and in its view of
that relation, it lays down the decisive principle that objects
can exist only for a subject, and that the subject which carries
the objects within itself is the higher category, and, as such,
must determine the process of philosophical thought."

Certainly Edwards finds one of his starting-points
in speculative thinking in the relation of subject and object.
He proposes as a title for the first part of his *summa philosophiae,
"The Natural History of the Mental World, or the Internal World:
being a Particular Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Mind, with
respect to both its Faculties -- the Understanding and the Will --
and its various instincts and Active and Passive Powers." 2 The
proposed introduction to his *magnum opus* is to treat of "the two
worlds -- the External and the Internal: the external, the subject
of Natural Philosophy; the Internal, our own Minds. How the Know-
ledge of the latter, is, in many respects, the most important." 3

1. Ency. of Religion and Ethics, Art. Idealism by Troeltsch.
2. Notes on Mind, Series I, Title.
3. Ibid., Series I, Introduction.
The work itself is to show "how far all acts of the mind are from sensation;" "in what respects Ideas, or thoughts and judgments may be said to be innate, and in what respects not;" "whether there could have ever been any such thing as thought, without external Ideas, immediately impressed by God, either according to some law or otherwise;" and what is meant by *External Ideas*."¹

Equally certain is it that Edwards holds that objects can exist only for a subject or subjects. It is "impossible," he says, "that the world should exist from Eternity, without a Mind;"² There is the necessity of the Eternal Existence of an All-comprehending Mind;" and "it is the complication of all contradictions to deny such a mind; all ideas are wholly in the mind;" and "there can be nothing like those things we call by the name of Bodies, out of mind."³

As to the superior character of the subject Edwards is explicit. "Those beings," he writes, "which have knowledge and consciousness, are the only proper, and real, and substantial beings: inasmuch as the being of other things is only by these."⁴

Thus it appears that Edwards is quite completely and truly an idealist. But there is another way of characterizing idealism. For example Paulsen tells us that "Idealism or Phenomen-
Eliaam asserts that ideas and things, thought and being, are absolutely different and not to be compared. Now, by this standard, our sage is no idealist—no gap yawns between the idea and the thing, for "all sorts of ideas of things are but the repetitions of those very things over again—as well the ideas of colors, figures, solidity, tastes, smells, as the ideas of thought and mental acts." True the Divine Idea and the human idea are what they respectively are—the one perfect the other imperfect; but the fact does not sunder the universe; it is still the universe. The Divine Idea is the substance of nature, the human idea is the Divine Idea in so far as human beings can receive it. The duality of idea and thing has been abolished. Henceforth the thing as known is the thing. If it be said that the thing as known is our idea of a Divine Idea the statement calls for correction, for, as we have before seen, "our perceptions or ideas that we passively receive by our bodies, are communicated to us immediately by God." The Divine Idea is not a cause of other ideas in us. It is, so to say, a sea which flows into such channels and basins as our natures afford it. What shall we call this first hand knowledge of things? Is it not realism raised to the nth power?

Here is no copying reality whether in the way of the photograph.

1. Introduction to Philosophy, p. 341.
3. Ibid., Series II, Nos. 15, 6, 10.
4. Ibid., Series II, Nos. 13, 6, 5.
5. Ibid., Series II, No. 3.
or the portrait: Here is reality's self in so far as it may be found in the world of things.

In conclusion then as to Edwards' view of the nature of knowledge it seems just to say this. First he is an idealist: knowledge for him is not a copy of something which cannot itself come into mind. Second he is an idealist of so thorough-going a sort that knowledge seems to him an immediate view of things and their relations — an idealist who in respect of the immediacy of the mind's relation to nature is yet more realistic than the realist.

It is quite obvious, it is believed, that in his theory of knowledge, as in his psychology, our author is pretty consistently a Christian Mystic.

Chapter IV

Metaphysics

The chief features of the Edwardian thought of being and its ultimate form are not hard to be made out, however some minor features may seem to hide themselves. In fact, the former have largely appeared, as it was inevitable that they should do, in our study of the Edwardian epistemology. This will facilitate relative brevity in this part of our work.
Nature of Reality

As to the nature of reality Edwards holds, as we have already seen, "that those beings which have knowledge and consciousness are the only proper and real and substantial beings; inasmuch as the being of other things is only by these." It is a "gross mistake," he tells us, to think of material things as "the most substantial beings," and of spirits as "more like a shadow." Thus there are in the universe "spirits" and "other things."

Spirits are God and created minds. Sometimes the latter are divided into "human souls" and "finite spirits." At other times the terms are still further varied; the sense of all the terms taken together in relation to kinds of spirits is not obscure and it is this: spirits, as first mentioned above, include God, other non-human spirits and the souls of men. Other things are ideas and acts of the mind about its ideas. Thus, being is a hierarchy. Its chief grades are God, spirits and the acts and states of spirits. "When we speak of Being in general," Edwards writes, "we may be understood of the Divine Being, for he is an Infinite Being; therefore all others must be considered as nothing. As to Bodies, we have shown in

1. Of Being, Corollary.
2. Notes on Mind, Series II, Nos. 34, 40.
3. Ibid., Series II, No. 32.
4. Ibid., Series II, No. 67.
another place, that they have no proper Being of their own. And as to Spirits, they are the communications of the Great Original Spirit; and doubtless, in metaphysical strictness and propriety, He is and there is none else." Again he says that "Bodies, the objects of our external senses, are but the shadows of beings."

The idealistic doctrine which here confronts us again, and which, by reason of its intrinsic interest and its relation to a noteworthy controversy, calls for special attention in this study, is, within the comparatively short span of the Notes on Mind treated in the way of proof some three times, and in the essay Of Being it is treated once more in the same way. Doubtless the earliest proof attempted is that of the essay. The argument of this piece runs thus. Being is necessary. We cannot think otherwise. We cannot think of nothing. When we fancy we succeed in doing so we deceive ourselves. Something must always be, and must everywhere be. "There must be a necessary eternal being, infinite and omnipresent." Now we can conceive that everything but space is removed. Space we cannot think away. We cannot think of its not being. "Space is God." And as we cannot think of nothing so we cannot think something which no mind knows. Try to conceive a universe in which is no

1. Notes on Mind, Series II, No. 45.
2. Jones, Early American Philosophers, pp. 56 ff.
mind. That is, being may not be thought of except in relation to created or uncreated consciousness. A universe known to God only would and could exist only in God's thought. Suppose no light, no motion. Colors, resistance, solidity are all gone.

"But you will say, though there is no actual resistance there is potential resistance, that is such and such parts of space would resist upon occasion." And you would be correct: there is no resistance, no solidity, now; but "God could cause there to be, on occasion." A universe without motion "can exist nowhere else but in the mind, either infinite or finite."

Another statement of Edwards' case in an argumentative way is made in this vein. If we had only the single sense of vision we should not so easily as we do conclude that things exist apart from being perceived. But feeling is no less relative to sense than is vision. It is as reasonable to suppose color existent out of mind as any other quality of body. Body is color and power of resisting. But it is agreed that color cannot exist out of mind. All that can possibly be left out of mind is resistance. But who can conceive of resistance without anything to be resisted? Now "Resistance is nothing else but the actual exertion of God's power, so the Power can be nothing else, but the constant Law or Method of that actual exertion. And how is there any Resistance except it be in some mind, in idea?" It is easy
however to think of resistance as a mode of an idea. "The world is therefore an ideal one: and the law of creating and the succession of these ideas is constant and regular."¹

A third presentation of his immaterialism is made by Edwards in the following course of thought. Take away solidity from body. Only empty space remains. This is intuitively certain. That is, the only notion we have of body apart from color is resistance which is only another name for solidity. But this resistance is action. To stop a motion requires agency no less than to start a motion. Shall we not ascribe this stoppage of motion as we do gravity to an agent? Or shall we be content to say it is due to "something" which is what we really mean by "Substance." Suppose we saw what we call a barrier and persons stopped at it. We should say a wall, or whatever we took the barrier to be, had stopped the persons. Yet we should not say that the colors which, in truth, we name a wall or other thing had stopped their way — that is, we ascribe what we saw to "Something" which we did not see. It is better to say that solidity, quite as much as gravity, is due to the divine agency — is a constant and regulated kind of God's action — not essentially an inert bearer of qualities.²

¹. Notes on Mind, Series II, No. 27.
². Ibid., Series II, No. 61.
The fourth of these statements of the argument for immaterialism is in substance this. The idea we have of space is only colored space. When color is gone, all is gone from the mind. The man born blind could by no means have the seeing man's notions of extension, motion and figure. But it is agreed that "color is only in the mind and nothing like it can be out of mind. Hence it is manifest, there can be nothing like those things we call by the name of Bodies, out of mind, unless it be in some other mind or minds."  

What then are other things made of — other things than spirits? "The secret," the philosopher declares, "lies here: that which truly is the substance of all bodies, is the infinitely exact, and precise, and perfectly stable Idea, in God's mind, together with his stable Will, that the same shall be gradually communicated to us, and to other minds, according to certain fixed and exact established Methods and Laws: or in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact and precise Divine Idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise and stable Will, with respect to correspondent communications to Created Minds, and effects on their Minds."  

Before we leave behind us these expressions it is only justice to their youthful writer to note and explain one

particular of his language. His statement that "space is God" doubtless calls loudly for comment. It is said that it was inspired by something in Newton; but Newton is explicit in disallowing the notion. It does not reappear in Edwards. To retract the expression, in any formal way, was not, of course, necessary, since it was written for his own eye alone. It did not, in fact, see the light of publicity until more than a century had passed. What the boy of fifteen or sixteen thus hazarded as to space very quickly gave place to other conceptions. The Notes on Mind contain not a few passages which teach such things as these. Space is "a necessary being if it may be called a being," for "all existence is mental." "It is a necessary being only as it is a necessary idea," that is, "it is in the same manner a necessary being, as anything external is a being." "The real and necessary existence of Space and its Infinity ... depend upon the impossibility of removing the idea out of the mind." "The very supposition of existence itself implies" time and place. Thus, space is no longer God, but an idea, very necessary indeed — but still an idea — having a quasi-infinity as being a container of all those ideas which we name material things. A student of Edwards has likened this conception of space to that of Kant. He says: "He did not call it an 'a

1. Newton, Principia, N. Y., 1848, p. 505.
4. Ibid., Series II, No. 61.
priori form under which ideas of the external world must be
received but it was as necessary to the perception of objects and
at the same time as ideal for him as for Kant.\(^1\)

Form

Little requires yet to be said here of the cosmology of Edwards. One is never in reading him out of
sight of his theism. The form of reality is that which it has from
an architectonic intelligence. He holds to a doctrine of atoms,
on account of which he is said to have been highly commended by men
of note in the world of science.\(^2\) But his atomism is proximate,
not ultimate: a theistic atomism. It belongs to the lowest level
of being, the level of the acts and states of spirit named bodies
and not to spirit itself or to its higher manifestations. Thus it
draws away from the spiritualistic atomism of Leibnitz, since the
latter's atoms are not ideas but beings having ideas. The atom
is not a spirit, not a being possessed of ideas whether awake or
asleep. Much less is it the term of a last analysis, such as it
belongs to philosophy to make, of experience. However, in its
order and likewise in relation to the whole, it is no shadow, no
negligible incident of creation. It is an act of God, as is its
motion, and as all its relations are acts of His. It cannot drop

1. Jones, Early Amer. Philosophers, p.59; Cf. Guisberg, Translatng's
    Intro. to Dialogues of Malebranche, London,1923, p.29; Malebranche,
    Dialogues, pp.207ff; Ibid. pp.80ff;212f; Berkeley, Works, Fraser,
out of being. To do so would alter the scheme of the world. It
depends upon no human apprehension of it. God supposes it; that is,
He causes all changes to arise, as if it had actually existed, along
with its fellows, in some created mind which comprehended all things
perfectly. The number, bulk, figure and motion of atoms give rise
to "all the natural changes in the universe, forever, in a continued
series;" and "were our thoughts comprehensive and perfect enough,
our view of the present state of the world, would excite in us a
perfect idea of all past changes."¹ In other words, God so designed
and ordered in relation to the atoms that "the changes" which they at
first constituted, "of themselves according to the established Laws
of Matter were brought into these various and excellent forms
adapted to every one of God's ends, excepting the more excellent
works of plants and animals, which it was proper and fit God should
have an immediate hand in."²

It remains to observe how Edwards fared through the
theological peril of all mysticism, perhaps, as Paulsen holds, of
all theism.³ I mean, of course, the peril of pantheism. In one
place he approaches the abyss, at least, in the form of his words.
"The substance of bodies at last," he declares, "becomes either
nothing, or nothing but the Deity, acting in that particular manner

². Notes on Natural Science, Series II, No. 88.
³. Intro. to Philosophy, p. 48.
in those parts of space where he thinks fit: So that speaking strictly, there is no proper substance but God himself. We speak at present with respect to Bodies only: how truly then is he said to be **ens entium**. 

In the paragraph next following that just quoted he proceeds thus. "Since .... Solidity, or Body is immediately from the exercise of Divine power causing there to be resistance in such a part of space, it follows that motion also, which is the communication of Body, Solidity, or this Resistance, from one part of space to another successively.... is by Divine Power communicating the resistance, according to certain conditions which we call 'the Laws of Motion.' How truly then is it, that, 'In Him we live, and move, and have our being:'" 

In many places, of course, may be found the kind of near-identification of the soul of the Christian with Christ as God which characterizes the writings of Paul. This is notably true in The Religious Affections.

Of such recurrent seeming pantheism what is to be said is almost too obvious to require the saying. And yet I set it down. First, the passages in question are somewhat isolated by such quotations as one makes of them. As they stand in the Notes, and other works, as a whole, they impress one otherwise than they do when thus taken from their original setting. That

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1. Notes on Natural Science, Prop.2, Cor.11.
2. Notes on Natural Science, Of Atoms etc. Prop.2, Cor.12.
setting in the notes we have before seen, sharply distinguishes spirits from their acts and states. Second, there is a no man's land between theism and pantheism which sometimes seems more to join than to separate the two spiritual regions. Third, it is, perhaps, a common-place of the history of religion and that of philosophy that thinkers upon the level of ultimate principles sometimes with difficulty stand clear of the positions they most reprobate. It would seem to follow that occasional inadvertent, and more or less rhetorical approaches, on the part of a philosopher or a theologian, to a position which he normally and strongly disallows should not be rated as characteristic.

In sum, Edwards is cosmologically a theist. His atomism is scientific rather than strictly philosophic: the atom is not the last form of the last stuff of all that is. His recurrent momentary near-pantheism is no more than the approach to the identification of God with His world made by all Christian philosophers from Paul to Eucken; indeed, it is probably much less than that made by many another mystic of good standing with the thinkers of the present in the Church. This is written without forgetfulness of what a high authority has said of Edwards' approximation to Spinoza's thought of the one substance.¹

¹ Allen, Jonathan Edwards, Boston, 1889, p.12.
Chapter V

Ethics

While Jonathan Edwards has the breadth of interest characteristic of the foremost thinkers of the world we have seen already many times in this study that his first concern is religion. It is most natural and quite inevitable therefore that amongst the three normative disciplines often included in philosophy he should most cultivate ethics. This is saying much, for what high use he made of logic is known to all who even casually look into his works; and the delicacy of his sense of beauty, while not so obvious, is demonstrably real and great. In truth, in no works of Edwards more than in those in which he treats the questions of ethics do both logic and aesthetics declare themselves. Of the naturalness and inevitableness of ethical interest as growing out of our sage's religious interest what further should be said will appear in the view now to be taken of the former.

Ethical Writings

The works of his which show immediately and, taken together, comprehensively the ethical theory of Edwards are these: some extended notes entitled Excellency and Excellence in the second series on Mind; the Freedom of the Will; The Nature of True Virtue; God's Last End in the Creation of the World. Two other works of no small ethical interest are The Religious Affections and Original Sin. The teachings of all these
we have noted in representative passages. It remains now to gather these teachings into as compact an expression as we can.

Hedonism? It has been said that "there are some implications of hedonism" in The Freedom of the Will, particularly in the doctrine that "the strongest motive is that which appears most pleasant or agreeable." However this may be, there is, I think, no reason for suspecting Edwards of hedonism, intentional or other, in his ethical writings as a whole. It is no doubt true also that there is a utilitarian look about some parts of his treatise on religious affections. But it must be apparent to the reader of that work that it is primarily a practical counsel of a pastor conceived and composed in response to an exigent situation of the people of his own and other parishes. Also it must be borne in upon the reader that here as in the case of the seeming near-pantheism a while ago considered the pastor is in accord with the New Testament. And it must not be overlooked that precisely as neither Jesus nor Paul, neither James nor John, while holding up the notion that Christians and Christian doctrine and all good doctrine may be known by the issue they have in practice, neither of these ever hints that such issue constitutes the goodness thus recognized, so Edwards, in his utmost urgency that

1. Above pp.6ff.,54ff.,64ff.,82ff.,90ff.,100ff.
3. Above pp.150ff.
religious affections be expressed in unmistakably Christian conduct, does not hint that such conduct constitutes those affections truly religious. Trees are known not made by their fruits: so Jesus taught and this was the teaching of Edwards. 1 To apply the principle of these remarks to the matter of truly moral living as conceived by Edwards, such living is not and cannot be made what it is by being advantageous to the individual or the community of which he chances to be a member: the longest reach of the fact of advantage is simply to show in part at least the true character of the living it arises from.

Virtue Defined

What then is virtue — true virtue? It is "the consent of being to being or being's consent to entity." 2 It is "Benevolence to Being in General." 3 Moral rightness is not, indeed, in every case, to love directly and immediately "the great system of universal existence," 4 but it is in every case of even a particular affection to have a generally benevolent temper. Now since God is the source of all being so great in Himself that all else is relatively nothing virtue is chiefly the love of God. 5 The love which one has to those spirits that love God, because they love God, is also virtuous, for, as is plain, such a love is, in truth, a love to being in

4. Ibid., vol.5, p.95.
general as represented in its constant source. Yet more is the
love one has to God, because He loves all being, truly virtuous. The notion that our fellow-men and not God should engage our love is mistaken. To rejoice in God's happiness and to increase amongst our fellows his glory are open to us. We are not necessarily useless to God. We can be benevolent in our relation even to Him. Besides to allow Him any place in our regard is unreasonable unless we allow Him as the Head of the whole system of the goods we know, the supreme place there. Let it be clear that the love one has for God takes nothing from one's love for one's fellows unless it be what is imperfect. God's love -- His infinite love of Himself -- is not exclusive of His creation, but inclusive of it. So, in his own measure, the man who loves God thereby loves all being besides. Efforts of philosophy and religion to invert this order of affection, that is, to give the first place to man and his supposed needs, are "fundamentally and essentially defective." 

Virtue Reflected There is a secondary kind of beauty concerning which we should be instructed and warned. It is the beauty of things -- of that which is not conscious and pos-

2. Ibid., vol.3, p.103.
sessed of will. Here is equality, proportion, harmony, the order of the inanimate world and of the animate world below man. It is a kind of minor of the true consent of being to entity, the love of spirits. God has made even the beautiful plant an "image of the consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent beings sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart." And then there is a plan of society, a political constitution. It too has beauty which is not the love of the whole of being. These and whatever other kinds of order there are, apart from the mutual love of spirits, serve good, often, even high, ends. But the love of such order whether in a flower, the solar system or the constitution of a state, is not true virtue. Only the love to being in general including, of course, the love of all being that loves being in general is true virtue.¹

Virtue  
not  
From  
Self-Love  

Another matter of which the seeker after true virtue should be warned is the doctrine that self-love is the root of virtue. It is certain, Edwards says, that we do many appropriate and helpful things which are popularly called virtuous out of self-love. But all such acts, except as they spring from love to being in general and not simply from motives of private interest, must be denied the name of virtue. Of course, if self-love be used in another sense than that of common speech,

namely, to mean the affection one has for oneself through the consent to being in general, self-love is virtue.¹

Natural Conscience Not Virtuous

Still another warning is given. Natural conscience is not an inclination to virtue. True, it approves much that a virtuous person approves and disapproves much that such a person disapproves, but it does these things out of no love to being in general. If it is properly enlightened, it even consents with the law of God, is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article. Natural conscience has two elements. One is the feeling that when I do that to another which I would not have him do to me, or the reverse, I am at variance with myself. The other is the notion of desert, of proportion between what one does to another and what, on his part, that other should or would do in response. Natural conscience seems thus to be a fruit of self-love, though it may be so enlightened as to accord in its approbation and disapprobation of modes of conduct with the divine rule.²

Certain Instincts Not Virtuous

And once more, we require to guard ourselves against the supposition that certain instincts are virtuous — such instincts as are called social, for example.

These kind affections resemble virtue, but are not truly virtuous.

No such affection would be virtuous if it took in its grasp all the universe except God. But is not pity virtuous? Not always. However, there is a truly virtuous pity, namely, that which is founded in the love to being in general, or the love of God, which latter, as we have seen, comes to the same thing as the former.¹

Virtue

Founded in

Being

Not

Sentiment

Lastly, the follower of true virtue must not be seduced from his course by sentiment. To resist sentiment in relation to moral good is by no means always easy. There is much which now and again tends to persuade one that virtue and vice are "arbitrary," being matters of variant views of men. But this is not true. Virtue is not founded on what men think, but on what the universe is. This is to say, amongst other things, that when God gives benevolence to being in general to a created mind he does not act arbitrarily. It is not to be supposed that he could have given the opposite attitude with equal advantage. Such a supposition would be absurd on the face of it, for it would be to say that disagreement with being in general agrees with being in general as well as agreement with it does! Besides, how can the loving God impart coldness or hatred to being in general? Further the system of the world is possible only on the basis of agreement amongst beings. Further still no man can truly agree with himself without agreeing with

¹ Works, Dwight, vol. 5, pp.135ff.
being in general. "If men loved hatred to being in general they would in effect love the hatred of themselves; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another. Further yet, the moral sense common to mankind is no mere sentiment, "arbitrarily given by the creator without any relation to the necessary nature of things: but rather this is established in agreement with the nature of things."  

Summary

Virtue then or moral good is the consent of being to being which is in effect the same as love to God. It is not the same as self-love as it is generally understood nor is it deducible from it. It is not a fruit of natural conscience or the moral sense of mankind. It is not any or all of the so-called social instincts. It is not founded in sentiment. But these negations are not the result of inability to say what is positive of it. Notably in The Religious Affections one is told in glowing words what love to being in general does.

Related Thoughts

Let us pause here in our condensation of the views of Edwards to vivify those just expressed by remarking along with them some related thoughts of some other modern men of like intellectual grasp. Let us turn to Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hegel, and Lotze.

Thoughts of Malebranche

The first makes God's will the same as His love to Himself and to created things in proportion to their participation in His being and perfections. God, he says, infinitely loves His own substance. By their very nature as proceeding from God and being supported by His finite minds must tend to the Good, that is must love God. Now the movement to the Good which God incessantly impresses upon us is properly speaking our will. But "in so far as we follow the tendency toward the Good it is not we ourselves who act, or, at any rate, our action cannot be distinguished from that of God. Nevertheless, Malebranche thinks that man is free, for man is master of his will in regard to particular goods." Towards the Good in general we are moved "invincibly;" but no particular good can exhaust all that is contained in the general Good, and, therefore, we are not moved to the particular good thus invincibly, but may choose as to it. These conceptions together with the whole doctrine of occasionalism with which they are bound up bring the thinking of the French savant to what some of his critics call pantheism.¹

Thoughts of Spinoza

Spinoza makes God the sum of all that is. The laws of God cannot be transgressed: they who may think to transgress them in spite of themselves fulfill them. And yet there is a true freedom for man, "a firm reality which our under-

¹. Coffey, Ontology, pp. 397ff; Malebranche, Dialogues, pp. 57ff, 323.
standing acquires through direct union with God, so that it can bring forth ideas in itself, and effects outside itself, in complete harmony with its nature; without, however, its effects being subjected to any external causes, so as to be capable of being changed or transformed by them. This freedom which is slavery to God consists in a word in being a good slave of His. Indeed failure in this is loss of well-being and even of being itself, for at last there is only one, namely, God; whereas to be in love with the unchangeable God and not with transient things is to be united with Him and to endure. This is the new birth: to begin to enjoy the effects of passing from the union with what perishes to union with what persists.

Thoughts of Leibnitz teaches us that "there is but one God and this God suffices," that is, He is the final reason of all that is, absolutely and infinitely perfect. The imperfection of creatures is grounded in their necessary finitude, their innumerable grades, for no two are alike, being due to the innumerable degrees in which they reflect other beings. For example simple monads are without memory and have no distinguishable perceptions; souls have livelier perceptions and desires; spirits are little divinities, living images of not only the world but also of God.

"The assembly of all spirits" constitutes "the City of God," that is, the most perfect state which is possible under the most perfect of monarchs." In this society God has His glory which consists precisely in the fact that His greatness and goodness are thus known and admired. It is in relation to this "divine city only that He possesses, properly, goodness." He is a most fatherly prince who has fore-established for all time a great harmony between "the realms of nature and of grace." Withal, being perfect, he is perfectly happy, that is to say, lovable. Now "truly pure love" is "the state that finds pleasure in the perfections and happiness of the loved object." Here then is the secret of our own highest happiness: to love God. "The love of God makes us enjoy a foretaste of future felicity." By it we have present content and satisfaction and a far-reaching hope — that of "a perpetual progress to new pleasures and to new perfections."  

Thoughts of Hegel

An accomplished interpreter of Hegel has summarized his teachings concerning love. This writer emphasizes amongst others these points. "Love is not only the highest reality but the sole reality." Knowledge as mere knowledge can never be satisfied. It will not cease to ask "why?" When all

1. Leibnitz, Philosophical Works, Duncan, pp. 230ff, 215ff.
such questioning as pertains to any part or parts of the universe has been answered, it will then though quite illegitimately inquire "why is the universe as a whole what it is and not something else?"
The completed order of our ideal equally excludes volition as volition since the action which it implies is an expression of lack or danger. Virtue has no place in the ideal, "even in the form of aspiration. Together with every other imperfection, it must be left outside the door of heaven. For virtue implies a choice, and choice implies either uncertainty or conflict. If it be urged against love that it is unreasonable and therefore wholly unsuited to be the term of the grand rational process of the Idea the answer is: "when reason is perfected, love will consent to be reasonable." Now unreasonable to love anything but the perfect! Yet we do love and that intensely and highly the imperfect. The reason within this unreason is no doubt that the imperfect is loved for what it will be, that is, for what it is in it to be — for what thus in a certain credible sense it is. It is in some such way we love ourselves; and thus it is that love overcomes the duality between self and not-self. But love cannot be perfect in any single case until it is universal in a perfect degree. Let such a harmony be explicit and it is capable of expressing the meaning of the whole universe. In order to such realization of the ideal of course "sense-presentation as a method of obtaining our
knowledge of the object, would have to cease. For sense presentation can only give us consciousness of reality under the form of matter, and in doing this, it clearly falls short of perfect harmony, since it presents reality in an imperfect and inadequate form. The love here intended cannot be love to God, "for love is of persons and God .... is a unity of persons, but not a personal unity. .... It is still more impossible to love mankind. For mankind is an abstraction too, and a far too superficial abstraction." This love does not and cannot exist now: it is to be grown up to. The nearest approach to it is the love which has no other account to give of itself than this: I am and those I bind together belong to one another. It is "the love of the Vita Nova and In Memoriam." Mysticism! Yes, but a mysticism which does not seek to abolish understanding but only to fulfill what understanding looks for beyond itself. Love, to conclude, is the "one all-embracing unity, which is only not true, only not good, because all truth and all goodness are but distorted shadows of its absolute perfection — 'das Unbegreifliche, weil es der Begriff selbst ist'".

Thoughts of Lotze

A fifth modern view of love as an element in an ethical system I set beside that of Edwards. I mean that of Lotze. Its essence is this. "The only thing that is really good is that Living Love which wills the blessedness of

others. And it is just this that is the Good-in-itself for which we are seeking.\(^1\) No kind of unsubstantial unrealized and yet eternally valid necessity, neither a realm of truth nor a realm of worth is prior as the initial reality.\(^2\) This Living Love is a person — is God — in comparison with whom all other persons are pale shadows.\(^3\) "The ethically meritorious" is effort "for the production of another's felicity,"\(^4\) that is, likeness to God. Finite spirits are not products of nature but children of God.\(^5\) Thus God is Living Love and love is the law of the spirit. The spirit is free. "The moving reason for contradicting" the doctrine of determinism which makes human life a play of fatalistic forces "lies entirely in an undemonstrable but strong and immediate conviction that it is not so, and the conception of 'an ought' and of an obligation which finds no place in such a view, has nevertheless, the most indubitable and incontrovertible significance."\(^6\)

Thoughts Compared

Now how are the thoughts about love of Edwards and these other masters of speculation related to one another in respect of likeness and difference? Malebranche, Leibnitz and Lotze are theists in the sense that they hold the according to McTaggart doctrine that God is a person. For Hegel, /God is a unity of persons properly called It and not He/. For Spinoza, God is the

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whole of being.\(^1\) All find the chief good capable of being reached through love and love only — the love the ultimate object of which is either God, or, in the case of Hegel the spirits which make up the totality which he calls by that name.\(^2\) And yet Hegel seems sometimes to agree with Lotze in substantializing love. Thus love is made the ultimate object of love for both. This as we have seen Edwards rejects. All are in their respective ways and degrees mystics,\(^3\) and the mysticism of all is religious. There seems to be scant place for that freedom of man which moral being calls for in either Malebranche, Spinoza or Hegel.\(^4\) Of Edwards in this respect we shall see something later. All these thinkers, except Leibnitz, concerning whom, in this respect, I do not know, have been charged with pantheism; Spinoza and Hegel, I suppose, with justice, the rest with varying degrees of injustice. As one thinks of the phases taken by the doctrine of spiritual love in these six men of surpassing intellect he marvels that they should have so agreed despite their differing personalities, times, places, and professional concerns; and then that, having so agreed in some basic attitudes, they should have so disagreed in other things.

No Natural Capacity for Virtue

Let us now return to the business of condensing the ethical teachings of Edwards. He has told us

1. Above pp.161f.
2. Above p.165.
3. Above pp.161-163,165,166
4. Above pp.161-165
what true virtue as he conceives of it is. How is it to be
achieved? Certainly not without special divine help. The super-
ior principle forfeited by the disobedience of Adam and proffered
to us by the obedience of Christ must be accepted in order that
we may truly please God. This acceptance must be by faith in
Christ. But the number of those chosen to exercise such faith is
fixed by the decree of the Eternal. This however does no violence
to the doctrine of Scripture that all who will may have the spirit
of holiness for those chosen for recovery to righteousness have their
wills determined to accept the Gospel, while those not chosen have
not their wills thus determined. The special grace requisite to
determine the will to the reception of the new life in Christ is
Grace and not something due, since in Adam all human beings sinned
and are bent by that fact to a career of sinning and it is simple
justice to deal with them as thus corrupted by sin. If it be in-
quired why the propensity to Christ on the part of the recovered is
not heritable as the opposite propensity is, this is the sufficient
answer: God has not so ordained. Is it inquired how the will is
determined whether in one direction or another the answer is, by the
strongest motive, namely, that which is strongest in respect of the
thing viewed, the nature and state of the viewing mind, and the
manner of its viewing. The will is that by which the mind chooses.
It is not a person or a substance of any sort but a property. It
cannot determine itself. It is not free but its human possessor
is free for freedom is and can be nothing else than the power or
opportunity to do as one pleases, that is, as one wills.

Ambiguities?
Logical Gaps?
Mysticism
Again

In these notions of the determinate character of
the will and those now massive and now subtle argu-
ments by which they are defended and enforced, one
beholds the maturest intellectual fruits of the mighty spirit
named Jonathan Edwards. It is believed that there are ambiguities
and perhaps some pretty obvious gaps in the reasonings in both
The Freedom of the Will and Original Sin. On the whole, however,
Lotze may be correct as to the logical cogency of determinism when
he writes that "he who is pleased with this complete transmutation
of human life into a play of fatalistic forces, void of merit and
blame, is not to be confuted on speculative grounds," and that "the
moving reason" for setting oneself against it is "an undemonstrable
but strong and immediate conviction that it is not so." 1 In other
words, to recall here a phrase of Edwards' own touching another
matter, "it puts the mind into mere convulsion and confusion ....
it contradicts the very nature of the soul," not, perhaps, as it
can be shown by reasoning with another, but as it is felt by oneself
to contemplate such a view. But to say this is not much, except

1. Supra p. 166.
2. Practical Philosophy, p. 57.
to the man who says it, and to such others as already sympathize with his side in the age-old war of ideas in relation to which we now think of it. It is eligible to reply to it that Spinoza, Hobbes, Calvin, and Edwards himself and many others suffered no such inveterate and incurable repugnance as their critics do to the deterministic view. What makes the determinism of Edwards especially painful, horrible and hateful is, in part, its union with the stern theology of his school as that school existed in his time, a theology which, we have already reflected, often took its terms from a parfervid sort of preaching which stuck at no terror that the human mind had yet thought of as a means of appeal. As to ambiguities and gaps just mentioned they might appear less numerous and less important if Edwards himself could answer his critics. In so far as they may really exist they tell us as do the like things in philosophies from Thales to Dewey that flawless reasoning about ultimate things is not characteristic of men. But it is no part of the province of this writing to criticize the Freedom of the Will or any other work of our author. What is here undertaken is merely to make known in brief what his philosophical teachings are. Such comment as is made use of has constant reference to this design. It is in a spirit of fidelity to this design that it is now suggested that a copious spring of such thoughts as fill the most deterministic of the works we have examined is to be found

in the Christian Mysticism of their writer. In the mystical disposition to make God the practically all, to abdicate every privilege in favor, so to speak, of Him, to "lie low before" Him, to be nothing and to think oneself nothing except in utter surrender and humblest submission to Him — in this disposition is a most probable source of much which these books contain. It may be said, indeed, it is said, that these works are the fruit of theological controversy and that as such they do not represent the philosopher which was in Edwards, but the ecclesiastical polemic in him in deference to whom the philosopher had long ago retired from all public view. But this is not tenable for Edwards tells us in his Personal Narrative how in early years after grappling of a painful sort with the notion of God's absolute sovereignty he had come to accept that notion and to find it "pleasant bright and sweet." Thus it appears that the doctrine of the divine sovereignty was early embraced, that is, in the years to which belong the essay named Of Being; the notes entitled The Mind and the Notes on Natural Science. And it is significant that both before and after the acceptance of this doctrine together with its chief implications Edwards had mystical experiences; and that this acceptance was epochal in relation to such experiences bringing in a deeper and ever increasing satisfaction in them.1 It should be added that to

account for a basic teaching of Edwards wholly by reference to a controversy is to do much less than justice to one in whom originality, candor and courage met as they seldom do in a human being.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Thus this summary comes back to the point from which it set out: the Christian mysticism of our thinker. It is said that Edwards might have been a great scientist, and his early writings seem to justify the statement. He was a great theologian. He was a philosopher who became known in both the New World and the Old. He was a preacher of exceptional power. Some passages of exquisite beauty in his writings indicate what attention to his style might have made of him in that respect. He was noted as a friend, as a father, as a husband. He was a champion of the rights of the Indians. He worked and achieved in the face of large and multiplied difficulties. But nothing is more obvious or more central in all we know of him than that he was an ardent saint of the Church and of the mystical order of John and Paul. This fact is a light to read by in all that considerable library into some more or less important corners of which we have but now looked. The truth of this we cannot question. The simplest explanation and, in some cases, perhaps, the only explanation of the views we have studied
is precisely here: they are the views of an ardent Christian Mystic with the intellect of a philosopher of the first order. The doctrine of the mind, the theories of knowledge and being and the ethical system are those of a mind of the noblest mold preoccupied with the sense of the greatness of God. The monstrous and terrifying shadows that appear, from time to time, through the glow and light of such a sense, arise from crude but somewhat prevalent modes of speech in highly evangelical circles of the time, and from that real tragedy of the life of man variously named wrong, moral evil, sin. Nothing more just to Edwards, or more helpful to the student of his philosophy, has been, or can be said in characterization of him than this from a chapel window at Yale University: Dei cultor mystice aruntissimus.
PART 2

The Philosophy of Edwards:
The Originality of Its Idealism
In the Church of the wilderness Edwards wrought,
Shaping his creed at the forge of thought;
And with Thor's own hammer welded and bent
The iron links of his argument,
Which strove to grasp in its mighty span
The purpose of God and the fate of man
Yet faithful still in his daily round
To the weak, and the poor, and sin-sick found,
The schoolmen's lore and the casuist's art
Drew warmth and life from his fervent heart.
Had he not seen in the solitudes
Of his deep and dark Northampton woods
A vision of love about him fell?
Not the blinding splendor which fell on Saul,
But the tenderer glory that rests on them
Who walk in the New Jerusalem,
Where never the sun nor moon is known,
But the Lord and His love are the light alone!

---Whittier

Faith

O World, thou choosest not the better part!
It is not wisdom to be only wise,
And on the inward vision close the eyes,
But it is wisdom to believe the heart.
Columbus found a world, and had no chart,
Save one that faith deciphered in the skies;
To trust the soul's invincible surmise
Was all his science and his only art.
Our knowledge is a torch of smoky pine
That lights the pathway but one step ahead
Across a void of mystery and dread.
Bid, then, the tender light of faith to shine
By which alone the mortal heart is led
Unto the thinking of the thought divine.

---Santayana
Chapter I

In Relation to Berkeley
Chapter I

IN RELATION TO BERKELEY

Originality Denied and Denial Examined

A Mystic in religion, Edwards was an idealist in philosophy. Was his idealism original with him? A casual glance at certain authorities, for example, George Lyon and George P. Fisher, discovers a negative answer. But the matter is of moment to the reputation of a great man, the credit of American intellect and the truth of history. No merely casual glance at it, therefore, can at all be justified.

The question of the originality of Edwards in his immaterialism most obviously relates to Bishop Berkeley. The likeness between the metaphysics of the two men is regarded, I suppose, by all who are conversant with the facts of it as remarkable, not to say startling. How is it to be explained? But first what, quite specifically, are the facts calling for explanation?

In the years 1709 to 1713 inclusive Berkeley published those revolutionary works which have fixed his name in the history of philosophy among those of the mighty makers of new highways of thought. Several years later, that is, in the year 1718 or 1719, out in half-savage Connecticut, a boy fifteen years
old is said to have written down in a commonplace book what is essential in the new metaphysics of Berkeley. The ready-made critical formula for such a case, I take it, is something like this: The authorship of a mature man, trained in the most approved way, and the priority of publication set aside at once and without further question the idea of the independent authorship of a boy who, when he is supposed to have written, was being schooled in the edge of a wilderness. The conclusion arrived at in this mode is, of course: The alleged writings of the boy are indebted, either directly or indirectly, to those of the man.

It is in the spirit of this style of criticism and in support of the position just stated that Lyon writes in the following sense. It is futile, he declares, to adduce the parallel of Pascal, since such a comparison is much too modest. The young Edwards united in himself many Passcals, and, by a double miracle, combined with them gifts by virtue of which he far surpassed a Galilee and a Newton. What we are asked to believe, he says, is not merely that as a boy in his teens he worked out independently a system of metaphysics closely similar to that of Berkeley, but that he anticipated most of the scientific discoveries which constitute the glory of the succeeding century.  

1. L'Idealisme En Angleterre, pp.429f.
Fisher, likewise, falls in with our ready-made formula. He writes:

"A less important, yet interesting, question relates to the particular source from which Edwards derived his acquaintance with Berkeley. Professor Fraser, in his very thorough and instructive biography of this philosopher, conjectures that it may have been through the influence of Doctor Samuel Johnson who was a personal friend of the philosopher and adopted his system. Johnson was a tutor at Yale from 1716 to 1719 when Edwards was a student. But, from 1717 to 1719 a portion of the students, of whom Edwards was one, were taught at Wethersfield, Johnson remaining in New Haven. The succeeding students who went to Wethersfield did not regard Tutor Johnson with favor. Nor is it certain that he had himself espoused the Berkeleian theory at that time. But the Theory of Vision was given to the world in 1709, and the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710; so that it is not improbably that copies of these works had come into the hands of Edwards independently of Johnson. They found in him an eager and congenial disciple."

What weight shall be allowed to these views of Lyon and Fisher? They offer no evidence that Edwards had read any work of Berkeley's before or during the composition of his own

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1. Discussions in History and Theology. The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards,
writings which he produced while he was a student at Yale. Lyon leans hard upon what seems to him the sheer incredibility of Edwards' independent authorship of the idealistic matter found in the memoranda of his college days; Fisher with equal confidence, apparently, upon this incredibility, together with the above conjecture of Fraser and a guess of his own. The mental procedure of Lyon seems to have been, in effect, this: Here is a bit of writing purporting to be from the hand of a school-boy in Yale College. It contains the essence of a new philosophy, namely, that of Bishop Berkeley. How did this essence of a revolutionary philosophical doctrine get into this writing purporting to be that of a school-boy? Did the school-boy produce it independently? Manifestly he could not. Therefore he did not! This way of arguing has the honor often to have been made use of by other more or less distinguished disputants when supporting facts failed them. Let it be noted that Lyon, in order to make more plausible his rejection of these writings of Edwards, has not a little exaggerated the relations of some of them. Brilliant and profound as are the observations under consideration, to say that by them their author "anticipated most of the scientific discoveries which constitute the glory of the succeeding century" is highly extravagant. Fisher, also, has evidently begun with his conclusion

2. Ibid., p.430
which he has justified to himself doubtless in the same way as Lyon has justified the same conclusion to himself. Edwards did not independently write his idealistic philosophy. The matter is so sure that what remains is, if practicable, merely to explain by what means Edwards received his doctrine from Berkeley. Such is the attitude of Fisher. But Fraser's suggestion that Johnson may have borne the new teaching to Edwards is beset with difficulty. First, during the most of the time of Johnson's official relation to Yale, Edwards was not with him at New Haven, but with a group of students who, in protest against the management of the institution at that place, had withdrawn to Wethersfield, where they prosecuted their studies. In the second place, Johnson was not, as Fisher remarks, in favor with the students; and hence he was not suited to introduce into the mind of their most independent representative a new and revolutionary way of thinking. Again, it would seem that Johnson was not himself a disciple of Berkeley until the year 1729, that is, almost a decade later than the period to which the metaphysical writings of Edwards with which we are now concerned are assigned. This will appear from the caption of a letter written by Johnson to Berkeley. The letter is a holograph letter now in the library of Columbia University. 1 The caption runs thus:

1. American Philosophy, Footnote p.61
"Letter to the Rev. Dr. Berkeley, Dean, of London, Derry, upon reading His Books of the Principles of Human Knowledge & Dialogues

Stratford Sept. 10, 1729"

After a complimentary opening paragraph occur the following words:

"These books (for which I stand humbly obliged to you) contain Speculations the most surprisingly ingenious I have ever met with; & I must confess that the Reading of them has almost convinced me that Matter as it has been commonly defined for an unknown Quiddity is but a mere Non-Entity."

And then the writer prophesies the prevalence of the Berkeleyan way of thinking. But he and others wish further instruction. So the letter goes on:

"And since you have condescended to give me leave to do so I will make bold to lay before you Sundry Things which yet remain in the Dark either to myself or to others & which I can't account for either to my own or at least to y^2 satisfaction."

After this eleven matters are asked of. The letter is thus addressed at its close:

"For the Rev. Dr. George Berkeley
Dean of London Derry
at Rhode Island."

A natural understanding of this letter must include, it seems to me, the following things: The writer has lately come into possession of, and contact with, for the first time, the views of Berkeley; he has done this by means of volumes supplied by Berkeley himself while the latter was resident in Rhode Island (1728-31); he is yet an inquirer of the way in respect of the new philosophy, and,
by no means, a practised teacher of it from a time ten years gone. To conclude, for the present, at least, concerning Johnson as a possible teacher of Edwards in the views of Berkeley, I remark that a manuscript of Johnson's entitled "A Catalogue of Books read by me from year to year since I left Yale College" contains no mention of anything of Berkeley's before 1727-28; and that "in that year and the year following the Principles are entered, and in 1729-30 the Dialogues and the Theory of Vision." One hardly need add that the unsupported statements of so recent a writer as Cushman touching Johnson's relation to Edwards philosophy is valueless as a reinforcement of Fraser.

But did Edwards read Berkeley for himself before or as he wrote the notes entitled Mind or the observations named Of Being? That he probably did so, Fisher, as we have seen, concedes to our formula and to Fraser, rather than affirms for himself. Not a scrap however of positive external evidence is offered in support of this. Two suggestions, however, in support of Fisher's guess that Edwards read Berkeley for himself before or during the writing of the notes now in question have been made something of. One relates to a statement of Johnson's biographer, Beardsley. He says that when Johnson was graduated from Yale in

1. American Philosophy, p.146.
1714 the students were warned against the "new philosophy," and that the philosophy thus black-listed was that of Berkeley. But Riley says that this statement of Boardsley has been demolished. The other suggestion relates to Edwards' occasional use of shorthand in the notes. It has been argued that this use of a character of his own in recording intimate thoughts and feelings implies a secretive disposition on the part of the young writer, and is an off-set to the remarkable openness which belongs to his writings as a whole. Concerning this, it is quite sufficient, I judge, to say these two things. First, something more than the bare fact that some shorthand appears in Edwards' notes would seem to be called for in order to establish that he was deficient in frankness. And, second, to establish that he was deficient in frankness is not the ghost of proof that he read Berkeley before or at the time of the composition of his notes entitled Mind and Of Being.

The scope and spirit of criticism adverse to the originality of Edwards in respect of the idealistic philosophy of his early years is sufficiently exemplified in the foregoing references to Lyon and Fisher. In fine, such criticism is without a jot of positive external support, and consists essentially in the question - begging assumption that those writings exceed the capacity of any conceivable boy or youth. I turn now to a statement

1. Historical Discourse, p.71; American Philosophy, p.146.
of what is to be said for the view that Edwards' formulation of the doctrine of immaterialism was made without dependence upon Berkeley.

Originality Affirmed by Dwight and Others

Doubtless, the first place in this statement belongs to the testimony concerning the matter at issue given by Doctor Sereno E. Dwight, in his Life of President Edwards, and by others. Doctor Dwight would seem to be a competent witness. He was a great-grandson of Edwards, having something of the tastes and dispositions of his immortal progenitor. Both his father and his grandfather were graduates of Yale. The former was born at Northampton, the scene for twenty-three years of the pastoral service of Edwards, and he was successively tutor and President at Yale. He was, also, a preacher and a poet, as well as more or less of a politician. S. E. Dwight himself was schooled at Yale, became a tutor there, practised law successfully in New Haven, and became, like his father, a Congregational minister and a college president. He was born in 1786 and was graduated at the age of seventeen years, the same at which Edwards had been graduated. Those facts, few though they are, establish the moral and intellectual character of Doctor Dwight, the interest on his part necessary
to a proper investigation of whatever concerned Edwards, and his extraordinary opportunity to know whatever is to be known of that massive and fascinating man. How different are the cases of Lyon and Fraser, from the latter of whom Fisher, as we have seen, got the notion that Johnson was the medium through which Berkeleian views were conveyed to Edwards, one need not stay to point out. Men of other stocks, other lands and later times, they have had both less interest and less opportunity to know the facts of Edwards' spiritual history. Doctor Dwight says: "In the series of articles under the heads Existence, Space, and Substance the reader will find a perfectly original and very ingenious examination of the question, whether material existence is actual or merely ideal. It appears to have been written at various times between 1717 and 1720 in as many distinct articles, yet each has a bearing on what precedes. This is the identical question investigated with so much ingenuity by Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knowledge. Both writers take the same side of the question and insist that matter is merely ideal; and each wrote independently of the other."¹ It remains to add that this judgment is given after years of constant editorial labor and care about the works of Edwards; that is, after precisely such labor and care as must have made its author familiar

¹. Life of Edwards, p.39f.
beyond any other man who has written of Edwards with pertinent extant sources.

Nash Porter holds the same opinion that Dwight holds. He coincides with Dwight also in the explanation which he gives of the great likeness between the youthful thinking of Edwards and the thinking of Berkeley. The explanation is that Edwards appears to have been led into immaterialism akin to Berkeley's by reading Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.¹ It is, of course, a commonplace of our knowledge of the Irish thinker that, to use the words of A. D. Lindsay, he is "Locke's direct successor, and his main philosophical doctrines are suggested by problems which Locke had left unsolved or had solved unsatisfactorily."² But Porter adds somewhat to the explanation of Dwight when he argues, as he does, "that being surrounded, as it were, by similar logical and spiritual impulses, Jonathan Edwards drew the same conclusions as Berkeley had done from the same data in Locke's Essay."³ The force of this is great. If Edwards and Berkeley dwelt, for the most part, each in his own land; and if the settled conditions and ways of the one land were in sharp contrast with the unsettled conditions and ways of the other land; and if, especially, there must have been marked differences between the intellectual training of the one thinker and that of the other; it is, nevertheless, true

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¹ Life of Edwards, p.40; Discourse p.71.
³ American Philosophy, p. 144.
that they were contemporaries; that they both lived under the flag of Britain; that they spoke and wrote and read the same tongue, and thus gathered profits from commerce in the same spiritual marts; that they were both of the church, deeply in earnest about its affairs and prospects, with a common repugnance to the merely material, and a common affinity for the highly spiritual. It is of the greatest interest to remark here the fact that while Berkeley is not so young as Edwards when he first works in the vein afterwards so thoroughly penetrated and drawn upon in his published expressions, he is still very young. "In 1705," writes Lindsey, "Berkeley had formed a society to discuss the New Philosophy, as it was called;" and again on the same page, "his one great philosophical principle — the impossibility of anything existing independently of perception — occurred to his mind during this early study of Locke." "We know," he goes on, "from his Commonplace Book that already in 1706 he was convinced that he had found here the key to the difficulties and inconsistencies which he found in the Essay." Is it not just to suggest that a youth of nineteen or twenty could by no possibility have thought so revolutionary a thing in a region where many mighty thinkers had already wrought? It is just if we allow the principle which underlies Lyon's denial of originality to Edwards merely because of lack of years.

Nosos Coit Tyler, in his History of American Literature, has this to say touching our matter: "It is certain that
Johnson derived his Idealism from Berkeley, and in consequence of Berkeley's visit to America; and the impression likely to be made by Professor Fraser's words is that the same was the case with Edwards. 1 This is by no means certain. The above sentences from Edwards avowing Idealism were written nine or ten years before Berkeley came to America. Moreover, Edwards was not the man to conceal his intellectual obligations; and the name of Berkeley nowhere occurs, so far as I can discover, in all the ten volumes of Edwards' printed writings. It seems more probable that the peculiar opinions which Edwards held in common with Berkeley were reached by him through an independent process of reasoning, and somewhat in the same way that they were reached by Berkeley, who, as Professor Fraser says, 2 proceeded in his intellectual work on the basis of postulates which he partly borrowed from Locke, and partly assumed in antagonism to him. 3 Thus, Tyler supports both Dwight and Porter as to the originality of Edwards.

Warfield, also, joins Dwight and these others. He says that Edwards worked out his Idealism, "certainly independently of Berkeley." 4 Gardiner supports all these. It is "practically certain," he holds, "that he" (Edwards) "had not then" (when the early documents were composed) "read Berkeley. However suggested, the doctrine" (immaterialism) "is worked out in a

2. Ibid, p. 35.
thoroughly independent fashion, and the expression of it is wholly original."¹

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### Originality Supported by Testimony

#### As to Edwards' Intellect

The second place in this statement seems to me to belong to some testimonies concerning the mental capacity of Edwards. These bear upon the presumption already noticed and especially represented by Lyon that no American boy or youth and, as I understand, no boy or youth at all, could have written independently the notes entitled Mind and Of Being and the other documents attributed to Edwards' early years. It is a somewhat startling fact that Lyon lends us at this point his talents as a writer and the prestige of his distinguished name. He says: "there are few names of the eighteenth century which have obtained such celebrity as that of Jonathan Edwards. Critics and historians, down to our own day, have praised in dithyrambic terms the logical vigor and the constructive powers of a writer whom they hold (as is done by MacKintosh, Dugald Stewart, Robert Hall, even Fichte) to be the greatest metaphysician America has yet produced. Who knows, they have asked themselves, to what heights this original genius might have risen, if, instead of being born in a half savage country, far

¹ Jonathan Edwards, Article in Americana.
from the traditions of philosophy and science, he had appeared, rather, in our world, and there received the direct impulse of the modern mind. Perhaps he would have taken a place between Leibnitz and Kant among the founders of immortal systems, instead of the work he has left reducing itself to a sublime and barbarous theology which astonishes our reason and outrages our heart, the object, at once, of our horror and admiration." Fraser also lends us here the authority of his name. In his Life of Berkeley, he calls Edwards "the most subtle reasoner that America has produced." F. J. E. Woodbridge, an American philosopher, indeed, but no more sympathetic with Edwards in his theological interest than Lyon himself, writes: "He" (Edwards) "was a distinctly great man. He did not merely express the thought of his time, or meet it simply in the spirit of his traditions. He stemmed it and moulded it. New England thought was already making towards that colorless theology which marked it later. That he checked. It was decidedly Arminian. He made it Calvinistic. His time does not explain him." Gardiner and Wood call Edwards "the most celebrated early American divine and metaphysician." Of the Freedom of the Will they say, "it is probably the most famous book in theology that America has produced, and one of the most famous philosophical works in the world."  

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2. Life of Berkeley, p.182.
field writes of Edwards as "the one figure of real greatness in
the intellectual life of colonial America." Again, he says: "Born,
bred, passing his whole life on the verge of civilization, he has
made his voice heard wherever men have busied themselves with
these two greatest topics which can engage human thought — God
and the soul." 1 Riley regards Edwards as "the most subtle of New
England idealists." 2 Tyler holds him "the most original and acutec
thinker yet produced in America." 3 Porter says that "Jonathan
Edwards is the first, and, perhaps, the greatest, name in Amer-
ican Philosophy." 4 Dugald Stewart writes of Edwards: "There is one
metaphysician of whom America has to boast, who, in logical acuten-
ness and subtlety, does not yield to any disputation bred in the
universities of Europe." 5 And A. V. G. Allen, in his life of
Edwards, remarks: "We are studying the life of a Protestant theol-
ogian, the peer of his predecessors in any age of the church in
intellectual power and acumen, as well as in a vast expanding in-
fluence." 6

The testimonies just given are drawn from a vast store-
house of similar matter. They in themselves and by their represen-
tative character assign Jonathan Edwards to a high place amongst
thinkers. In view of these, it is obvious that this son of New

1. Edwards and N.E. Theology, in Hastings.
5. Diss. pt. II, Sec. 7.
6. Jonathan Edwards, p. 43
England is a most massive human figure, one of the spiritual elite of all time, an immortal. The problem of Edwards' early idealistic writings ceases to be a problem. The man that Edwards undoubtedly was makes credible the precocity involved in the originality of the documents now in question. If it is said that the documents are marvellous, the answer is that their author was marvellous.

Originality Supported by Juvenile Writings of Edwards

The third item of this statement is the evidence supplied by writings of Edwards of the originality and proximate dates of which there is no question. What is here argued is, that these writings being what they are leave no question of the possibility that their author wrote the documents in dispute. To put the matter concretely, the author of the Freedom of the Will may have written practically anything at any age. But this work is only one of a score of works of the utmost worth and significance in the region of human interest to which they relate. We are not, however, under any necessity to infer from the mature works of our author to the possibility that he wrote remarkable juvenile papers; for, apart from the writings on idealism usually credited to his school days, he produced such things as were hardly, if at all, less astounding.
Amongst the undisputed juvenilia I cite first a letter of his eleventh to thirteenth year on the immateriality of the soul. "Some one in the vicinity," says Dwight, probably an older boy than himself, had advanced the opinion, either in writing or in conversation, that the soul was material and remained with the body until the resurrection; and had endeavored to convince him of its correctness. Struck with the absurdity of the notion, he sat down and wrote the following reply:

'I am informed that you have advanced a notion that the soul is material and attends the body till the resurrection; as I am a professed lover of novelty, you must imagine I am very much entertained by this discovery; (which however old in some parts of the world, is new to us;) but suffer my curiosity a little further. I would know the manner of the kingdom before I swear allegiance. Ist., I would know whether this material soul keeps with (the body) in the coffin; and if so whether it might not be convenient to build a repository for it; in order to which, I would know what shape it is of, whether round, triangular or four square; or whether it is a number of long fine strings reaching from the head to the foot, and whether it does not live a very discontented life. I am afraid when the coffin gives way, the earth will fall in and crush it; but if it should choose to live above ground and hover about the grave, how big it is; — whether it covers all the body, or is assigned to the head, or the breast, or how. If it covers all the body what it does when another body is laid upon it; whether the first gives way; and, if so, where is the place of retreat. But suppose that souls are not so big but that ten or a dozen of them may be about one body; whether they will not quarrel for the highest place; and, as I insist much upon my honor and property, I would know whether I must quit my dear head, if a superior soul comes in the way; but above all I am concerned to know what they do where a burying place has been filled twenty, thirty or an hundred

times. If they are atop of one another the uppermost will be so far off that it can take no care of the body. I strongly suspect they must march off every time there comes a new set. I hope there is some other place provided for them but dust. The undergoing so much hardship, and being deprived of the body at last will it make them ill tempered? I leave it with your physical genius to determine whether some medicinal applications might not be proper in such cases, and subscribe myself your proselyte when I can have solution of these matters?"

Amongst these juvenilia I cite next a letter concerning the flying spider written, Dwight says,\(^1\) not later than the age of twelve. My present purpose does not require that it be quoted at length, but only to that extent which will give some conception of the care and acumen with which its young author observed nature and the skill with which he reported his findings. His father, it appears, had, oversees, a correspondent of distinction who was curious about natural objects in this new land, so much so that he requested whatever new information of such objects Mr. Edwards might be able to add to some that he had already sent him. Not long before Jonathan had been observing, to what purpose we shall presently see, "the wonderful movements and singular skill of that species of spider which inhabits the forest." The results of this observation having become known to the boy's father, the latter bade him forward them to his foreign correspondent.\(^1\) The following are expressions contained in the letter which the boy then wrote:

\(^{1}\) Life of Edwards, p.22f.
"May it please your Honour,

In the postscript of your letter to my father, you manifest a willingness to receive anything else that he has observed worthy of remark, respecting the wonders of nature. What there is an account of in the following lines is by him thought to be such. He has laid it upon me to write the account, I having had advantage to make more full observations than himself. Forgive me that I do not conceal my name and communicate this to you through a mediator. I do not state it as an hypothesis, but as a plain fact, which my own eyes have witnessed, and which every one's senses may make him as certain of as of anything else. Although these things appear to me thus certain. Still I submit the whole to your better judgment and deeper insight. And I humbly beg to be pardoned for running the venture, though an utter stranger, of troubling you with so prolix an account of that, which I am altogether uncertain, whether you will esteem worthy of the time and pains of reading. If you think the observations childish and beside the rules of decorum, — with greatness and goodness overlook it in a child. Pardon me, if I thought it might at least give you occasion to make better observations, such as should be worthy of communicating to the learned world, respecting these wondrous animals, from whose glistening web so much of the wisdom of the Creator shines.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
Jonathan Edwards."

Here follows the report of the observations made by the young naturalist of the forest spider. It begins:

"May it please your Honour:

There are some things that I have happily seen of the wondrous ways of the working of the spider. Although everything belonging to this insect is admirable, there are some phenomena relating to them more particularly wonderful. Everybody that is used to the country, knows their marching in the air from one tree to another, sometimes at the distance of

1. Life of Edwards, p.23.
five or six rods. Nor can one go out in a dewy morning at the latter end of August or the beginning of September, but he shall see multitudes of webs made visible by the dew that hangs on them, reaching from one tree branch and shrub to another; which webs are commonly thought to be made in the night, because they appear only in the morning; whereas none of them are made in the night, for these spiders never come out in the night when it is dark, as the dew is then falling. But these webs may be seen well enough in the day time by an observing eye by their reflection in the sunbeams.\(^1\)

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"In the very calm and serene days in the forementioned time of year, standing at some distance behind the end of an house or some other opaque body, so as just to hide the disk of the sun and keep off his dazzling rays, and looking along closely the side of it, I have seen a vast multitude of little shining webs, and glistening strings, brightly reflecting the sunbeams, and some of them of great length, end of such a height that one would think they were tacked to the vault of the heavens, and would be burnt like tow in the sun, and make a very beautiful, pleasant as well as surprising appearance. It is wonderful at what a distance, these webs may be plainly seen."\(^2\) --- "But that which is most astonishing, is, that very often appears at the end of these webs, spiders sailing in the air with them; which I have often beheld with wonderment and pleasure, and showed to others, and since I have seen these things, I have been very conversant with spiders; resolving, if possible, to find out the mysteries of these their astonishing works."\(^3\) ---

Here follows a passage concerning the making and the use of the webs after which the writer continues thus:

"Now, Sir, it is certain that these webs when they first proceed from the spider, are so rare a substance, that they are lighter than the air, because they will ascend in it as they will immediately in a calm air, and never descend except driven by a wind; wherefore 'tis certain."\(^4\)

Here it is explained that a sufficient length of web will bear up its spinner "in equilibrio" or if desirable in ascent.

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3. Ibid., p.24. 4. Ibid., p.25.
"And in this way, Sir, I have multitudes oftentimes seen spiders mount away in the air, from a stick in my hands with a vast train of this silver web before them; for if the spider be disturbed upon the stick by shaking it, he will presently in this manner leave it. And their way of working may very distinctly be seen, if they are held up in the sun, or against a dark door, or anything that is black." 

"But how should they first let out of their tails the end of so fine and even a string; seeing that the web while it is in the spider, is a certain cloudy liquor, with which that great bottle tail of theirs is filled; which immediately upon its being exposed to the air turns to a dry substance, and exceedingly rarefies and extends itself." 

"Indeed, Sir," the boys writes of a certain action, "I never could distinctly see them do this; so small a piece of web being imperceptible among the spider's legs." 

He notes, "That it is not every sort of spider that is a flying spider, for those spiders that keep in houses are a quite different sort, as also those that keep in the ground, and those that keep in swamps, in hollow trees, and rotten logs." Flying spiders he remarks "delight most in walnut trees, and are that sort of spiders that make those curious network polygonal webs, that are so frequently to be seen in the latter end of the year. There are more of this sort of spiders by far than of any other. But yet, Sir, I am assured that the chief end of this faculty that is given the, is not their recreation but their destruction. For these spiders never fly, except the weather is fair and the atmosphere dry; but the atmosphere is never clear, neither in this nor any other continent, only when the wind blows from the midland parts, and consequently toward the sea as here in New England the fair weather is only when the wind is westerly, the land being on that side, and the ocean on the easterly. And I have never seen any of these spiders flying but when they have been hastening directly towards the sea. And the time of this flying being so long, even from about the middle of every sunny day until the end of October; (though their chief time as I observed before is the latter end of August and beginning of September;) and they never fly from the sea, but always towards it; must needs get there at last, for it is unreasonable to suppose that they have sense enough to stop themselves when they come

near the sea; for then they would have hundreds of times as many spiders upon the sea-shore, as anywhere else."

I sum up as to the evidence of these writings about which there is no dispute. First, the writer of the Freedom of the Will and the other mature works of Edwards is worthy to have grown from a boy who independently formulated the idealistic philosophy also generally, and justly, of course, thought of as Berkeley's. Second, the boy who, at twelve or thirteen years of age, wrote the letters just cited may most naturally, a year or two later, have begun to write the notes entitled Mind and Of Being.

Originality Supported by Edwards' Moral Character

The fourth reason which I offer for accepting as original with Edwards his idealistic philosophy is his moral character. That the man whose whole career besides is one full-toned utterance of conscience should, in the matter of his relation to Berkeley, have fallen into shameful silence is simply unthinkable. Such a view is not made more conceivable by certain suggestions of Allen. He writes: "Frank as these early writings of Edwards seem, they contain intimations of a reserved, and even secretive, temperament. He has recourse now and then to shorthand, in which he buried in

oblivion his most intimate thought or feeling. He charges himself not to allow it to appear as if he were familiar with books, or conversant with the learned world. He seems to feel that he has a secret teaching which will create opposition when revealed, and clash with the prejudices and fashion of the age. On one occasion, after writing in shorthand, he concludes with the remark, "Remember, to act according to Proverbs XII, 23, --"A prudent man concealēth knowledge." These words contain, indeed, the explanation in another sense than they intend of the use of shorthand by Edwards. They tell us that he seems to have anticipated opposition to some views of his, because he believed they would cut across the grain of existing prejudices and fashion, and that, in consequence, he here and there wrote something in a character of his own. Hence, Allen concludes, if his suggestion is of worth at all, that Edwards may not have acknowledged his debt to Berkeley. This seems to me as absurd a non-sequitur as one could easily find. Because one has the foresight to anticipate and the sensibility to draw back from popular displeasure with some things he is thinking; and because he would not confront such displeasure prematurely; and because, for these reasons, he uses shorthand to record certain intimate concerns of his intellectual life; he is, therefore, despite his half-century of resplendent devotion to duty, to be suspected of plagiarism, and that of a most aggravated sort. Notably trivial is
the use made by Allen of Edwards' quotation of Proverbs. The quotation is much more easily susceptible of a meritorious meaning than of the sinister one here implied. It may well have been a private witticism, for Edwards was a person of keen wit. More likely, however, it is an expression of modesty, for Edwards was remarkable for this virtue. More probably yet, it represents a fusion of wit and modesty. It is not difficult through it to see the earnest, intelligent, sensitive face of the most marvelous boy in all the history of our western world, as its owner remembers and sets down this bit of Holy Scripture — a face which wears a look which deprecates the probability of much publicity and stern opposition, and yet is alight with a restrained merriment at the opportune recall of so appropriate a fragment of the Great Book. But to argue for the moral uprightness of Edwards is gratuitous. His name, to whoever knows the colonial history of New England, is a kind of synonym for probity. The sense of mission to the soul of Athens is not more salient in the life of Socrates, nor the urge to preach the Gospel to the gentile more obvious in the life of Paul, than is the quiet but mighty and quenchless determination to do and to be what he ought in the life of Edwards. Nevertheless, I shall so far do what is superfluous as to point out an early resolution of our author, and to inquire where and when he failed to live up to it. The resolution is the first of a series of seventy formed in the years of his preparation for the ministry, the short period
of his preaching in New York, and his subsequent residence at his father's house. 1 It runs thus: "Resolved, that I will do whatsoever I think to be most to the glory of God and my own good, profit and pleasure, in the whole of my duration; without any consideration of the time, whether now, or never so many myriads of ages hence. Resolved to do whatever I think to be my duty, and most for the good and advantage of mankind in general. Resolved so to do, whatsoever difficulties I meet with, how many soever and how great soever." I have perhaps sufficiently said that the whole life of Edwards is a redemption of this obligation. But it is quite impossible to think of his fidelity to what he believed he ought to do without recalling to mind the fateful year 1750. Forty-seven years old, much worn with professional toils and cares of the weightiest and widest sort, the head of a large family mostly women, and having practically no other income than his not too large salary, and no prospect of other employment, rather than relax what he regarded as a vitally necessary regulation as to the observance of the Lord's Supper, he yielded up his pastoral staff. He is God's knight and Duty's — not the stuff that plagiarists are made of! In the language of Tyler already used under another head in this writing, "Edwards was not the man to conceal his intellectual obligations." 2

Originality Supported by Matter and Manner of Edwards

A fifth reason for accepting the early idealism of Edwards as original with him is more inward and, if possible, more impressive and convincing than those heretofore noted; I mean the sign manual of independence which is upon the documents in dispute. At this point, the facts confute Allen and support Riley. The former thinks Edwards moves in those documents as one who is "stepping into a heritage," and not as the creator of his intellectual estate; while the latter says that he has an "evident consciousness of independence." The following facts are some of the most pertinent. Nowhere in the decade of volumes which make up Dwight's edition of Edwards' works has mention been found of Berkeley. Let us contrast with this the free and enthusiastic recognition of indebtedness to Locke which our author makes. "In the second year of his collegiate course while at Wathersfield," says Dwight, "he read Locke on the Human Understanding with peculiar pleasure.----From his own account of the subject he was inexpressibly entertained and delighted with that profound work when he read it at the age of fourteen; enjoying a far higher pleasure in the perusal of its pages, than the most greedy miser finds, when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold, from some

newly discovered treasure." The only conclusion, as we have al-
ready seen, consistent with the known moral integrity of our thinker,
to be drawn from this contrast is that in respect of Berkeley he owed
nothing. Again, it should be noted that our young philosopher
designs to write a book in which the novel thoughts which have come
to him are to see the light of publication; and that he foresees
special difficulty about the doctrine that no bodies exist outside
minds.\(^1\) A conscious follower of another, I remark, could hardly
feel the sense and responsibility of ownership here implied. Again
the arrangement and style of the early idealistic writings of
Edwards are his own, not those of Berkeley. Lyon’s effort to show
the contrary cannot be called other than feeble. His examples
illustrate principally what is not in question; namely, that
Edwards had some ideas which were strikingly like some of Berkeleys.
As to style, he mentions a figure of a looking-glass, found in
Edwards’ writings, which is \textit{like} a figure of a looking-glass, found
in Berkeley’s. In both cases the figure is used to illustrate
"the merely mental existence of all the objects of vision," in
which relation it seems sufficiently obvious to occur to any one.\(^2\)
In the nature of the case, I cannot, in this writing, prove my
present contention, namely, that the works now under consideration
have a style and an arrangement of their own, and that, in these

\(^1\) American Philosophy, p.148; Retrospect pp.145–46; Life, Appendix

\(^2\) American Philosophy, p.145f.
respects, they do not at all reflect Berkeley; for, to do so, were to lay down beside one another page after page of their respective writers. It is open to me only to challenge the most careful and painstaking comparison of the writings of the one author with those of the other. Whoever will make such a comparison will find, I am bold to say, no cause in the manner of Edwards' writings to suppose a dependence of them upon the Irish philosopher.

Another fact which bears directly and heavily upon our present problem is that of Edwards' divergence in his idealism from Berkeley. This divergence is noteworthy and even startling. The matter now in mind is well put by Riley when he writes: "Not only is there no proof that Edwards derived his idealism from Berkeley, but it is already evident that his idealism has, to say the least, a different accent and character from that of the author of the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous. Berkeley's early doctrine is, as everyone knows, that the esse of material things is their percipi. Now it is no doubt true that in urging this doctrine his main object was to establish the reality of the divine being and action, and the substantiality and causality of spirit. That spirit is alone substantial and causal is indeed the real Berkeleyan idealism. But the relation of things sensible to spirits, and especially to the mind of God, is hardly considered by Berkeley in his early writings; he contents himself with the thought that God imprints the ideas of material
things on our senses in a fixed order. To the objection that material things when not actually perceived by us must be non-existent he can only reply that there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. The esse of things is thus their percipi. Later in life Berkeley went beyond this, and taught that the esse of things is not their percipi, but their concipi; that the world in its deepest truth is a divine order eternally existing in the mind of God. But it is this doctrine which, along with the phenomenalism which he shares with Berkeley is the characteristic doctrine of Jonathan Edwards. It is implied in his conception of the real, as distinguished from the nominal, essence, in his conception of truth as the agreement of our ideas with the ideas of God, and it is definitely expressed in various passages, best, perhaps, in the formulation of his idealism already quoted: 'That which truly is the substance of all bodies is the infinitely exact, and precise, and stable, Idea, in God's mind, together with His stable Will, that the same shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other minds, according to certain fixed and established Methods and Laws'. The phenomenalism in Edwards is relatively subordinate. But similar ideas are not at all prominent in Berkeley before the Siris which was not published until 1744.1

Another difference between Edwards and Berkeley is that concerning the notion that space is divine. This notion the former held, though for a time only, and the latter repudiated. It is supposed that it was suggested to Edwards by Newton, who conceived that "the omnipresent God perceives things themselves directly, and without needing the intervention of the senses;" and that "the world of things is in Him, and infinite space is as it were, the sensorium of the Deity." Whatever the source of his view, the New England thinker expressed it thus:

"And it is self-evident I believe to every man, that space is necessary, eternal, infinite and omnipresent. But I had as good speak plain; I have already said as much as that Space is God. And it is indeed clear to me that all the space there is, not proper to body, all the space there is without the bounds of Creation, all the space there was before the Creation, is God himself; and no body would in the least pick at it, if it were not because of the gross conception that we have of Space."

The following very explicit and emphatic utterance of the Irish author will sufficiently express his dissent from this. I remark that as Edwards is not mentioned here neither so far as I am aware is he elsewhere mentioned in relation to this matter or any other in the writings of Berkeley — a silence well nigh, if not quite as astonishing as that of Edwards as to Berkeley. "That is here laid down," writes Berkeley of his doctrine of immateriality, "seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties which have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of Pure

Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma to which several who have employed their thoughts on this subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, or thinking either that real space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to show, that the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it.¹

Yet another difference between Edwards and Berkeley which is of consequence to this inquiry concerns the freedom of the will; for Kelly² seems to me to be in error in assigning the view of this subject held by the American agent to the years next preceding the appearance of his immortal work in exposition of it. It is, of course, freely conceded that the notes on Mind, for example, do not contain matter of the same detailed and meticulous sort that appears in the Freedom of the Will, a work in which logic seems bent upon following to itsnatal place every idea which appears in opposition, and upon discovering and destroying every place where such

¹ Principals of Human Knowledge, CXVII.
² American Philosophy, p.149.
an idea, by any chance, may hide. The passages which seem to me to warrant my disallowance of Riley's criticism are these.

First, in the notes on Mind occur these words:

"It is not that, which appears the greatest good, or the greatest apparent good, that determines the Will. It is not the greatest good apprehended, or that which is apprehended to be the greatest good; but the Greatest apprehension of Good. It is not merely by judging that anything is a great good, that good is apprehended, or appears. There are other ways of apprehending good. The having a clear and sensible idea of any good, is one way of good's appearing, as well as judging that there is good. Therefore all those things are said to be considered -- the degree of the judgment, by which a thing is judged to be good, and the contrary evil; the degree of goodness under which it appears, and the evil of the contrary; and the clearness of the idea and strength of the conception of the goodness and of the evil. And that Good of which there is the greatest apprehension or sense, all those things being taken together is chosen by the Will. And if there be a greater apprehension of good to be obtained, or evil escaped, by doing a thing, than in letting it alone, the Will determines to the doing it. The mind will be for the present most uneasy in neglecting it, and the mind always avoids that in which it would be for the present most uneasy. The degree of apprehension of good which I suppose to determine the Will, is composed of the degree of good apprehended, and the degree of apprehension. The degree of apprehension, again is composed of the strength of the conception, and the judgment."1

In the same notes occur these words:

"The greatest mental existence of Good, the greatest degree of the mind's sense of Good, the greatest degree of apprehension, or perception, or idea of own Good, always determines the Will. .......... There is to be considered the proportion or degree of the mind's apprehension of the Propriety of the good, or of its own Concernment in it. Thus the soul has a clearer and stronger apprehension of a

pleasure, that it may enjoy the next hour, than of the same pleasure that it is sure it may enjoy ten years hence, though the latter doth really as much concern it as the former. There are usually other things concur, to make men choose present, before future, good. They are generally more certain of the good, and have a stronger sense of it. But if they were equally certain, and it were the very same good, and they were sure it would be the same, yet the soul would be most inclined to the nearest, because they have not so lively an apprehension of themselves, and of the good, and of the whole matter. And then there is the pain and uneasiness of enduring such an appetite so long a time, that generally comes in. But yet this matter wants to be made something more clear, why the soul is more strongly inclined to near, than distant good.

"It is utterly impossible but that it should be so, that the inclination and choice of the mind should always be determined by Good, as mentally or ideally existing. It would be a contradiction to suppose otherwise, for we mean nothing else by Good, but that which agrees with the inclination and disposition of the mind. And surely that, which agrees with it, must agree with it. And it also implies a contradiction, to suppose that that good whose mental or ideal being is greatest, does not always determine the Will; for ..........
The Will is no otherwise different from the Inclination, than that we commonly call that the Will, that is the Mind's Inclination with respect to its own Immediate Action."¹

In the notes on Mind is also, the following matter:

"That it is not uneasiness, in our present circumstances, that always determines the Will, as Mr. Locke supposes, is evident by this, that there may be an Act of the Will, in choosing and determining to forbear to act, or move, when some action is proposed to a man; as well as in choosing to act. Thus if a man be put upon rising from his seat, and going to a certain place; his voluntary refusal is an act of the Will, which does not arise from any uneasiness in his present circumstances certainly. An act of voluntary refusal is as truly an act of the Will, as an act of choice; and indeed there is an act of choice in the refusal. The Will chooses to neglect; it prefers the opposite of that which is refused."²

¹ Series II, no. 60. ² Series II, No. 70; above Chap. I, Will.
Here, before adducing some matter from Berkeley, let us pause to consider one or two things in respect of the citations just made. Dwight allows it to be possible, perhaps probable, that some years separate the earlier and the later notes on Mind. Since the first of the notes just quoted is numbered, as we have seen, (21) and the other two, as we have also seen, are numbered (60) and (70), the whole number of the notes on Mind being somewhat more than seventy, it immediately occurs to one that the first and the other two notes are not improbably thus separated. In the absence of other data it is sufficient to note that no interest of the present issue is involved in the question, and that, whenever written, the three passages consist as though they had been written within the same hour. I say no interest of the present issue is involved because nobody entertains any question of the early date of the notes on Mind; that is, that they were written before the opening of the Northampton ministry which began in the year 1726. Of the deterministic sense of the notes cited I judge there can be no doubt.

We turn now to Berkeley's view of the will. He says:

"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth only properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded on experience, but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words."

2. Principles of Knowledge, XXVIII.
"Thus," according to Berkeley, as represented by Alexander, "the activity of the soul is identified with will." He holds, also, that "certainty and necessity are not the same; in the former notion there is nothing that implies constraint; it may be foreseen that an event is about to happen, and yet be foreseen that it is about to happen through human choice and liberty." Again, in the language of Alexander, Berkeley teaches that "the abstractions of the determinist pervert the truth"; that "in ancient times, when philosophers denied the possibility of motion, they were met by those who walked before them"; that in the same way man is a free agent because he freely wills;" that "it is not judgment that determines the will, but I, being active, determine my own will"; that "thus, although one may not be able to defend the abstract idea of freedom, there is no doubt that the individual act is free"; that "a man is free in so far as he can do what he will"; that "human minds are far from being mere machines or footballs, acted upon and bandied about by corporeal objects, without any inward principle or action"; and that "the only true notions of liberty that we have, come from reflecting upon ourselves and the constitution of our minds".

It is probable that nothing in the thinking of Edwards more impressively diverges from Berkeley than his deep concern

1. Theories of the Will, p. 168.
2. Theories of the Will, p. 140.
3. Theories of the Will, p. 190 f.
about the relation of God to other spirits and, especially, to the
human soul. The merest glance at the sections of the *Principles
of Knowledge* and other early writings of its author reveals the
paramount character, in those works, of the problem as to how the
external world exists. On the other hand, and equally casual
glance at the notes on *Mind and Natural Science* and the *Journal*
of Edwards discovers a passionate pursuit of whatever may relate
to the being of the internal world. Berkeley would honor God by
destroying his age-old rival, gross matter. Edwards would honor
Him in the same way, but also, and more especially, by exhibiting
His sovereign and constantly creative contact with all other intel-
ligences. I do not justify further the statement that the problem
of the early writings of Berkeley is nature, since, as I have just
intimated, the fact is salient and unmistakable by whoever reads
those writings. Lest, however, my judgment as to the obviousness
of the interest of Edwards in the problem of spirit should seem to
someone to be at fault, I adduce certain typical utterances of his.

In his *Journal* under the date February 12, 1725, he
writes: "The very thing I now want, to give me a clearer and more
immediate view of the perfections and glory of God, is as clear a
knowledge of the manner of God's exerting Himself with respect to
spirit and mind as I have of his operations concerning matter and
bodies". In his first note in the second series on *Mind* he writes:

"This is an universal definition of excellency:

The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's Consent to Entity. The more the consent is, and the more extensive, the greater is the excellency. But God is proper entity itself, and these two, therefore, in Him, become the same; for, so far as a thing consents to Being in general, so far it consents to Him; and the more perfect "(it is)" in this regard. One alone, without any reference to any more, cannot be excellent; for in such case, there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore no such thing as Consent. Indeed what we call One, may be excellent because of a consent of parts, or some consent of those in that being, that are distinguished into a plurality some way or other. But in a being that is absolutely without any plurality, there cannot be excellency, for there can be no such thing as consent or agreement. One of the highest excellencies is Love. As nothing else has a proper being but Spirits, and as Bodies are but the shadow of being, therefore the consent of bodies one to another, and the harmony that is among them, is but the shadow of Excellence. The highest Excellence therefore must be the consent of Spirits to one another."

In his second note on Mind the place of minds is discussed; in his third note, perception of separate (disembodied) minds; in his sixth, tenth and fifteenth notes, truth; which, he says in general, is the consistency and agreement of our ideas, with the ideas of God and in the case of abstract ideas is the consistency of our ideas with themselves; in his fourteenth, forty-fifth, forty-ninth, sixty-second and sixty-fourth notes, excellency again.

Much else in the notes exemplifying the ardent concern of our author not merely to assess the perceived world, but, also, and much more, to apprehend the activity and constitution of the perceiving mind, and that especially by discovering, if at all possible, its relation

to God could be brought forward. But it is doubtless more profitable to our purpose to continue as we a while ago began; that is, to set down somewhat extendedly a few typical passages rather than to make a somewhat bare list of a much greater number of pertinent expressions. Accordingly, attention is asked to the pretty long note numbered forty-five which along with others is indicated above.

"When we spoke of Excellence in Bodies we were obliged", says Edwards, "to borrow the word Consent, from spiritual things; but excellence in and among spirits is in its prime and proper sense, Being's consent to Being. There is no other proper consent but that of Minds, even of their will; which when it is of Minds toward Minds, it is Love, and when of Minds towards other things, it is choice. Wherefore all the Primary and Original beauty or excellence, that is among Minds, is Love; and into this may all be resolved that is found among them. When we spoke of external excellency, we said, that Being's consent to Being, must needs be agreeable to Perceiving Being. But now we are speaking of Spiritual things, we may change the phrase, and say, that Mind's love to Mind; must needs be lovely to Beholding Mind, and Being's love to Being, in general, must needs be agreeable to Being that perceives it, because itself is a participation of Being, in general. As to the proportion of this Love; --to greater spirits, more, and to less, less;----it is beautiful, as it is a manifestation of love to Spirit or Being, in general.----Seeing God has so plainly revealed himself to us; and other minds are made in his image, and are emanations from him; we may judge what is the excellence of other minds by what is his, which we have shown is Love. His Infinite Beauty, is His Infinite mutual Love of Himself. Now God is the Prime and Original Being, the First and Last, and the Pattern of all, and has the sum of all perfection. We may therefore, doubtless conclude, that all that is the perfection of Spirits may be resolved into that which is God's perfection, which is Love. There are several degrees of deformity or disagreeableness of dissent from Being.----There are such contrarieties and jars in Being as must necessarily produce jarring and horror in perceiving Being."
Dissent from such Beings, if that be their fixed nature, is a manifestation of consent to Being in general; for consent to Being is dissent from that, which dissents from Being. Therefore all virtue, which is the excellency of minds, is resolved into Love to Being; and nothing is virtuous or beautiful in Spirits, any otherwise than as it is an exercise, or fruit, or manifestation, of this love; and nothing is sinful or deformed in Spirits, but as it is the defect of, or contrary to, these. When we speak of Being in general, we may be understood of the Divine Being, for he is an Infinite Being; therefore all others must necessarily be considered as nothing. As to Bodies, we have shown in another place, that they have no proper Being of their own. And as to Spirits, they are the communications of the Great Original Spirit; and doubtless in metaphysical strictness and propriety, He is, and there is none else. He is likewise Infinitely Excellent, and all Excellence and Beauty is derived from him in the same manner as all Being. And all other excellence, is, in strictness only, a shadow of his. We proceed therefore, to show how all Spiritual Excellency is resolved into Love.

"As to God's Excellency, it is evident it consists in the Love of himself; for he was as excellent before he created the Universe, as he is now. But if the excellency of spirits consists in their disposition and action, God could be excellent no other way at that time; for all the exertions of himself were toward himself. But he exerts himself towards himself, no other way, than in infinitely loving and delighting in himself, in the mutual love of the Father and the Son. This makes the Third, the Personal Holy Spirit, or the Holiness of God, which is his Infinite Beauty; and this is God's infinite consent to Being in general. And his love to the creature is his Excellency, or the communication of Himself, his complacency in them, according as they partake of more or less of excellence and beauty, that is of holiness, (which consists in love,) that is according as he communicates more or less of his Holy Spirit. As to that Excellency, that Created Spirits partake of; that it is all to be resolved into Love, none will doubt, that knows what is the Sum of the Ten Commandments; or believes what the Apostle says, That Love is the fulfilling of the Law; or what Christ says, that on these two, loving God and our neighbor, hang all
the Law and the Prophets. This doctrine is often repeated in the New Testament. We are told that the end of the commandment is Love; that to Love is to fulfil the Royal Law; and that all the Law is fulfilled in this one word, Love.----

"Tis peculiar to God, that he has beauty within himself, consisting in Being's consenting with his own Being, or the love of himself in his own Holy Spirit. Whereas the excellence of others is in loving others, in loving God, and in the communications of his Spirit. We shall be in danger, when we meditate on this love of God to himself, as being the thing wherein his infinite excellence and loveliness consists, of some alloy to the sweetness of our view, by its appearing with something of the aspect and cast of what we call self-love. But we are to consider that this love includes in it, or rather is the same as, a love to everything, as they are all communications of himself. So that we are to conceive of Divine Excellence as the Infinite General Love, that which reaches all, proportionally, with perfect purity and sweetness; yea, it includes the true Love of all creatures, for that is his Spirit, or which is the same thing, his Love. And if we take notice, when we are in the best frames meditating on Divine Excellence, our idea of that tranquility and peace, which seems to be overspread and cast abroad upon the whole earth, an Universe, naturally dissolves itself, into the idea of a General Love and Delight, everywhere diffused.

"Conscience is that sense the Mind has of this Consent; which sense consists in the Consent of the Perceiving Being, to such a General Consent; (that is of such perceiving Beings, as are capable of so general a perceptual, as to have any notion of Being in general;) and the Dissent of his mind to a Dissent from Being in general. We have said already, that it is naturally agreeable to perceiving Being that Being should consent to Being, and the contrary disagreeable. If by any means, therefore, a particular and restrained love overcomes this General Consent; —— the foundation of the consent yet remaining in the nature, exerts itself again, so that there is the contradiction of one consent to another. And as it is naturally agreeable to every Being, to have being consent to him; the mind, after it has thus exerted an act of dissent to Being in general, has a sense that Being in general dissents from it, which is most disagreeable to it. And as he is conscious of a dissent from Universal Being, and of that Being's
dissent from him, wherever he is, he sees what excites
horror. And by inclining or doing that, which is
against his natural inclination as a perceiving Be-
ing, he must necessarily cause uneasiness, inasmuch
as that natural inclination is contradicted. And
this is the Disquiet of Conscience. And though the
disposition be changed, the remembrance of his hav-
ing so done in time past, and the idea being still
tied to that of himself, he is uneasy. The notion
of such a dissent anywhere, as we have shown is odious;
but the notion of its being in himself, renders it un-
easy and disquieting. But when there is no sense of
any such dissent from Being in general, there is no
contradiction to the natural inclination of Perceiv-
ing Being. And when he reflects he has a sense that
Being in general doth not dissent from him; and then
there is Peace of Conscience; though he has a remem-
brance of past dissentions with nature. Yet if by any
means it be possible, when he has the idea of it, to
conceive of it as not belonging to him, he has the same
Peace. And if he has a sense not only of his not dis-
senting, but of his consenting to Being in general,
or Nature, and acting accordingly; he has a sense that
Nature in general, consents to him; he has not only
Peace but Joy of mind, wherever he is. These things
are obviously invigorated by the knowledge of God and
his Constitution about us, and by the light of the
Gospel. ¹

These passages seem to me to place beyond question
the Edwardian conception that somehow God is the substrate of the
life of spirit as he is that of the sensible world. They are a
part of the ample beginning made by the American philosopher to
gain "as clear a knowledge of the manner of God's exerting Himself
with respect to spirit and mind" as he had "of his operations con-
cerning matter and bodies". And these early views, I cannot for-
bear to add, reappear in a work published just before the death

¹. Notes on Mind, Series II, No. 45.
of our author, the treatise on *Original Sin*. And it is Allen who, perhaps, as much as any other critic emphasizes for us the divergence from Berkeley which is the subject of our present thinking. "We have here again", writes this authority, "the principle of Berkeley carried beyond the sphere of sense perception to which Berkeley confined it, and regarded as controlling the whole range of human consciousness or intellectual activity. God is not only the universal mind which constitutes the substance of the external world, but He is also the essence which lies behind the phenomena of consciousness or mind. There is no essential difference between the process by which we know the oak to be identical with the acorn, and the self-consciousness by which a man knows himself to be one and the same being from childhood to maturity. The hidden reality or substance in both cases is the immediate and continuous action of the stable will of God. Or, to follow Edwards' reasoning: 'There would be no necessity that the remembrance of what is past should continue to exist but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. It does not suffice to say that the nature of the soul will account for the existence of the consciousness of identity, for it is God who gives the soul this nature; identity of consciousness depends on a law of nature, and, therefore, on the sovereign will and agency of God. The oneness of all created substances is a dependent identity. It is God's immediate power which upholds every created substance in being. Preservation is but a continuous
creation. Present existence is no result of a past existence. But in each successive moment is witnessed the immediate divine agency. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them. And all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun."

We have by no means exhausted the matters in which Edwards proclaims his independence of Berkeley. But these suffice, it is believed, to justify the phrase used at the beginning of this section: the sign manual of independence which is upon the documents in dispute. Indeed it would be difficult to find any other works whatever which so amply declare their own originality. These writings of the boy and youth Jonathan Edwards have a single community of specific interest with those of the early years of George Berkeley: they are a reaction to Locke's Essay, a reaction which from time to time rises in revolt against it. As to the general interest which these youthful writings share with the first books of a metaphysical character written by the Irish philosopher, namely, the basic notion of idealism, even that is, as we have seen so stated and illustrated as to suggest not dependence, but utter independence on the part of its cis-Atlantic exponent.

Originality Supported by A Group of Circumstances

The sixth item of this statement is a collective one. It is a group of circumstances and considerations which, as a group and taken together with the items mentioned before, has, it seems to me, very great corroborative force. The circumstances and considerations which seem to me thus to make unshakably firm the foundations of our confidence in the independent authorship of Jonathan Edwards of his early idealistic writings are these.

First, the unformed handwriting in many parts of the documents in question is, of course, indicative of the immature age at which these parts were written. It is not forgotten that Allen regards lightly Dwight's inference in this sense. This biographer says: "The chief evidence on which Doctor Dwight relied to fix their date is the peculiarity of Edward's handwriting, which in youth was round and legible and at the age of twenty became angular and less distinct. But this is surely slender evidence on which to build an important conclusion." ¹ What Dwight says is this: "When a boy, his writing was round or circular, to an unusual degree, and very legible. At the age of twenty, it was more angular and less distinct, though much improved in appearance. From the time when he began to preach, in all his papers intended for his own inspection, his hand became more and more

¹ Allen, Jonathan Edwards, p.17.
careless, and less and less legible; though even to the close of life, his Letters were always neatly and legibly written. He appears to have had one hand for himself and another for his friends. Of the manuscripts of Edwards as a whole, Dwight, in explanation of his delay in bringing to an end his work of editor and biographer, says that they "were so illegible, and left in such a state, that it was impossible to decide on the publication of any of them, until they were copied." Later in the same paragraph Dwight tells us "that the whole work, including the examination and copying of the manuscripts, the preparation of the unpublished manuscripts, and of the Life, has occupied several years of constant labor, and has been pursued unremittingly, and at the sacrifice of health, by a regular devotion to it, of all the time, that could be spared from professional duties." How this author used his observations of Edwards' handwriting may be seen in this:

"The Series of remarks, entitled "The Mind," judging both from the handwriting and the subjects, I suppose, was commenced either during, or soon after, his perusal of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. It contains nine leaves of foolscap, folded separately, and a few more, obviously written at a later period. The arrange-ment of subjects in these papers, is less perfect, than that which he subsequently adopted in other writings." 

These expressions of Allen and Dwight present clearly a situation which freely yields the following remarks. First, Allen, uninten-

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2. Ibid., vol.I, p.3.
4. Ibid., vol.I, p.34.
tionally, doubtless, does Dwight an injustice in saying that "the chief evidence on which" he "relied to fix" the "date" of the writings about which we are now occupied was "the peculiarity of Edwards' handwriting." We have seen that Dwight judged of the time at which the notes on mind were written "both from the handwriting and the subjects." The "subjects" are largely, as we are well aware from earlier stages of our study of Edwards' originality, those suggested by the reading of Locke, which event occurred, beyond any question of which I have heard, when our thinker was about fourteen years old. That Dwight, in the absence of any slightest suggestion of the facts with which he was dealing to the contrary, should judge from the unformed hand and the "subjects" written of, that the notes on mind were composed during or soon after the reading of Locke on the Human Understanding, seems to me so utterly reasonable as to be inevitable. Second, the notion of Doctor Allen that it is not very practicable to assign writings to their several periods of composition on the basis of their chirography is not to be accepted carelessly. What could be done in the case of one man could not, perhaps, be done in that of another. But in the case of Edwards, Doctor Dwight is careful to say that, in his youth, his writing was "round or circular in an unusual degree," but that, at the age of twenty, it became "angular" and "less distinct;" and that what he wrote for his own convenience,
merely, became "more and more careless and less and less legible." Thus his handwriting has, as it were, strata, each of which belongs to a period of his life; so that a work found in one style of character may, with great probability, be assigned to a particular time of his authorship. Whatever may be true of handwritings in general, it is most certain that those of some men are, so to say, thus stratified. Third, if any man could use observations of handwriting as a basis of judgment as to the date of a work in manuscript, Dwight was qualified by his interest, his access to manuscripts and his years of labor over them, thus to use such observations in the case of Edwards. I conclude then that the unformed handwriting of Edwards in the notes in question is an evidence, though by no means the chief evidence, of their early dates.

Along with the juvenile handwriting of the manuscripts we are considering it is natural to remember the correspondingly immature spelling, punctuation and syntax found in some of them. For example, of the letter on the immateriality of the soul already quoted Dwight says: "from the hand, the spelling, and the want of separation into sentences, I cannot doubt that it was written at least one year and probably two earlier than the letter which follows."¹ "The letter which follows" is addressed "To Miss

Mary Edwards, at Hedley," and is dated "Windsor, May 10, 1716."

This, of course, is to say that, when Edwards wrote the letter on
the immateriality of the soul, he was about ten or eleven years
old. The syntactical irregularities of the letter concerning the
nature of the soul are quite as conspicuous as those mentioned in
Doctor Dwight's note, a fact which is readily verified by turning
to the letter itself. And the capitalization is precisely of the
uncertain sort which often marks the writings of some precocious
youths, not to say children, such as Jonathan Edwards was.

Of these largely mechanical aspects of Edwards' earli-
est writings Riley has something of moment to say. "While in his
entire system," he remarks, "there was a fourfold root, it was in
the undeveloped essays of Edwards' youth that the real ground of
his idealism is to be sought." Of this the earliest expression is
to be found in certain remarkable undergraduate papers, for Ed-
wards, entering Yale College when not quite thirteen, began to
arrange his reflections in a series of note books under the titles,
Mind, Natural Science, the Scriptures, and Miscellanies. This
entire series has been hitherto accepted as authoritative, and
has been pronounced as astonishingly precocious as the Thoughts
of Pascal. But nowadays, the contention that discussions as in-
dependent and original in conception, acute in distinction, sequa-

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2. Retrospect, p.116; American Philosophy, p.130.
ocuous and persistent in reasoning, and embracing so great a
variety of subjects, often complex and difficult, should emanate
from a youth from fourteen to sixteen years of age has been
questioned by the more critical spirit of the present day. Nevertheless, a renewed examination of some of the original manuscripts,
with their absence of punctuation, bad spelling, misuse of small
letters and capitals, has recently shown that the claims of Sereno
Dwight, Edwards’ great-grandson and careful biographer, are valid,
for even prior to the notes on Mind, and marked with the character-
ostiics of youthfulness and immaturity is this introductory essay:
"Of Being." At this point Riley quotes at large the essay of this
title. It should here be remembered that this juvenile essay,
which, it is now decided in the light of fresh study of original
manuscripts, was written even earlier than the earlier part of the
notes entitled Mind, contains the substance of that common core of
the writings of Edwards and those of Berkeley which is the occasion
of this investigation.

What then is the bearing upon our present study of
these boyish features of Edwardian manuscripts? It is this. They
redouble assurance of the correctness of Dwight’s view of the early
dates to which they must be assigned. They appear precisely in
the writing entitled Of Being, which perhaps more than any other

1. Smith,E.C., Jonathan Edwards’ Idealism, American Journal of
Theology, October, 1897, p.950.
p.706.
of its author's works suggests by likeness the philosophy of Berkeley. That is, whatever else may be true of this writing, it is that of a boy. As to the independence of its composition the case is quickly stated. There is no shred of external evidence that it was dependent; and the single internal support of the notion of dependence is the fact of the common core of thought just mentioned, which, as already observed, makes up our problem; while the approach to the subject and the plan and style of the treatment of it are so much the author's own as to make dependence incredible.

The unformed handwriting, the poor spelling, and lack of punctuation, the freakish use of capital letters and the bare and there rickety syntax of Edwards' early writings suggest a general reflection concerning the scholarship of Edwards which is not without present value to us. This reflection is happily put in a passage of Riley's. He is writing of the idealism of our philosopher. In respect of it, he holds that "one may say that his learning appears to have been less than his logical powers, and his intuition greater than either." And then he proceeds: "Such an evaluation has at least the merit of correlating the various opinions of the man and his works. First, there is the native opinions that, since he knew Plato but partially, Aristotle hardly at all, could not read French and was ignorant of the Schoolmen and the Catholic theologians since Augustine, and since the search
for his indebtedness to others has been vain, his early notes are all the greater warrant for ranking him among the great, original minds. Again there is the foreign opinion of Dugald Stewart that in logical acuteness and subtlety Edwards does not yield to any disputant bred in the universities of Europe. Finally, there is the opinion of Sir James Mackintosh that Edwards' power of subtle argument was joined as in some of the ancient mystics with a character which raised his piety to fervor. This sentiment is repeated in the most recent study of Edwards, which contends that it was not in the realm of the discursive but of the intuitive understanding that he has preeminence; for his mind in early years seems to have been dominated by the sense of the sublime and beautiful, proportion and symmetry.¹

We are thus led to another consideration which is most agreeable to the conviction that Edwards' early idealism was his own and not borrowed doctrine. I mean the auspicious character of the conditions under which he appeared, lived and worked. As one begins to think of this, he is vividly aware that he enters a region of debate. Indeed, he sees his matter against a background of age-old and world-wide contention as to the interaction of genius and its milieu. One therefore speaks here with diffidence. However, nothing dogmatic is now intended. It is rather the pur-

¹. American Philosophy, p. 151f.
pose to mitigate a negative dogmatism which has run too free a
course in the case of Edwards. We have seen the ease with which
Lyon assumes that our philosopher was checked and circumscribed by
his American birth and residence. The French critic is not alone
in the disposition manifest in this assumption to commiserate
Edwards on account of the adverse winds of fortune which buffeted
him. It is freely granted that it is conceivable that Edwards
might have loomed larger and more majestic athwart the story of
the past, if he had been born and bred in the old world, and even
in another age. What is meant to be said in answer is only this;
it is also conceivable that some things which have been rated as
hindrances were, in fact, helps to the New England savant; and that
some indubitable helps of a noble order in his circumstances have
not been made enough of.

Amongst the conditions of Edwards' which, with some
color of justice, may be called adverse to his achievement and
thus factors of incredulity as to his early writings, these some
immediately to mind: a new and undeveloped society fringed and
even somewhat penetrated with savagery; a consequent deficiency in
respect of the apparatus of scholarship; a theology very jealous of
other interests; his pastorate extending through twenty-three years
in a provincial, heady and unappreciative parish; his later service,
in a kind of exile, to a few Indians and fewer whites; and his
relative and, at times, pinching poverty. But let us think of these
one by one, and see whether or not they have each another possible sense than the unfavorable one. If the newness and immaturity of society in general are wont to incline thought and effort to practical rather than speculative matters, is it not, also, true that, in the case of a consummate theoretical genius like Edwards, the practical urge of his community is a wholesome counterpoise? Is not, indeed, an ever present peril of philosophy the temptation to go a too speculative way, to forget a part of the world it seeks to understand, and precisely that human and truly spiritual part which in any normal human view must seem to be of the greatest concern? And if the savagery with which society was confronted was very opposite to those high and spiritual things which belong to an idealistic philosophy, was it not, by this very opposition, calculated to awaken in such a mind as that we are now studying a fresh and more powerful sense of worth in all the processes and products of the truly cultured spirit? And if one may be stimulated to high endeavor of an intellectual kind by great libraries and other implements of education, is it not also true that a limited supply of such things may very effectively admonish one of the necessity of making the greater use of what one has? And if Edwards has, in half-savage Connecticut, few or no intellectual peers as daily companions, is it not also true that he has thereby a certain liberty and sturdy independence of spirit which he might not otherwise have
attained to? And may not even the vigorous and jealous theology in which he was trained, associated and, in the minds of many, practically identified, as it then was, with the religion of Jesus, have incited to a preternatural activity and skill in the philosophical matters which it involved? What, in fact, was the motive back of the Freedom of the Will? It was, of course, the acute interest of its author in the questions between Calvin and Arminius. And it was the bent to religion, the passionate preoccupation of his early years with it, that in the opinion of Riley led to his most characteristic metaphysical views. And if the pastoral service of Edwards took his mind from the prosecution of some of those studies which have left upon his youth and even his boyhood a fadeless light, it was in that service and to meet its exigent calls upon him that he carried out theologically and applied practically what was most central and basic in his philosophy. Even unpopularity, humiliation and poverty, which delivered their broadsides against him -- who knows? --- may have been more deeply related to the herculean deeds of the spirit which followed them than we have yet guessed; for it was after his tragic removal from Northampton that he wrote the Freedom of the Will, the Nature of Virtue, God's Chief End in Creation, and Original Sin.² Even Stockbridge

with its ugly graft, its paltry politics, its pertinacious and postiferous partisanship may have had so useful a part to play in the intellectual career of the most intellectual of all Americans. It is not insisted upon, but it may be so. This at least is so. Genius, like great virtue, very often seems quite inseparable from what ordinary men call hard, not to say impossible, circumstances. And this is highly true in the region of philosophy. Socrates has his cell; Epictetus, his servitude; Marcus Aurelius his cares of empire; Bruno, his papal persecution ending in fiery death; Roger Bacon, the like; Spinoza, his poverty, and, therefore, his lenses to grind; Hegel, his monetary perplexities, his withered look, his difficult utterance.

I have now set out some of the things which are to be said both for and against the view that Edwards wrote without dependence upon Berkeley those parts of his works which make mind and its states and acts the whole of the world. It is time to sum up what is thus before us.

Against this view are what seem to me the pure assumptions of Fraser and Lyon: the assumption of Fraser that, because Johnson was a tutor at Yale, in the time of Edwards' there, and, also, a disciple of Berkeley, a decade or so later, Edwards learned his immaterialism from Johnson; and the assumption of Lyon that Edwards could not have written the things in question.
Fisher is merely acquiescent in the assumption that Edwards must somehow have been dependent upon Berkeley; but as to Johnson, he notes, that he was not high in the esteem of young Edwards, and, also, that the latter was, during a large part of Johnson's residence in New Haven, with a group of seceders at Wethersfield. This is all that has been urged against the originality of the American thinker. There is no scrap of positive testimony, yet come to light, which even tends to suggest that he got his doctrine from Berkeley.

For this view we have found much. We have found Doctor Sereno Dwight favorable to it. Probably no man has had so good an opportunity and so great interest to know whatever belongs to the life of Edwards as Doctor Dwight. His skill and character were equal to his opportunity and interest. His industry was herculean. We have found Noah Porter, also a man of great learning and high character who lived in life-long contact with the scenes in which Edwards moved and with the literary sources and traditions of all sorts to which the careful student of Edwards inevitably turns in accord with Dwight. We have found Moses Coit Tyler, a noteworthy student of early American literature, opposing the assumption of Fraser and supporting the judgments of Dwight and Porter. We have found, that competent critics rate the mind of Edwards as one of the most massive and acute in the history of
our race; and that, thus, there is no longer any problem as to his precocity. We have found some writings of Edwards which are not in question as to either their genuineness or their proximate early dates which show a quality which makes it easy to believe that he, also, wrote the things in question. We have found that, while Edwards resembles Berkeley, he also differs from him, in respect of immaterialism. The tone, manner and emphasis of the American are in strong contrast to those of the Briton; and in one notable instance the former anticipates by many years the thinking of the latter. We have found the writings of Edwards most in question in the hand-writing of a school boy, which differs sharply from the hand-writing of the man he became; a fact which argues their early dates. We have found them in words often misspelled and freakishly capitalized and in sentences run together by a frequent almost total absence of punctuation; facts which do not comport with the notion of copying from a world-famous authority. And we have found that the easy assumption of some European critics of Edwards that his residence in America in the eighteenth century was a fact which must have been fatal to all chances of certain kinds and degrees of attainment is liable to be most reasonably questioned. I conclude, therefore, that the sum of what is now known of Jonathan Edwards gives us the soundest right to hold that he did not get his thought of the nothingness of unperceived matter from Berkeley.
Chapter II

In Relation to Descartes And Others
Chapter II

IN RELATION TO DESCARTES AND OTHERS

A further question which has been raised touching the immaterialism of Edwards is incidentally, in no small part at least, already answered. I mean the question as to whether or not Edwards borrowed it from another than Berkeley. To whatever part of this question may seem to any one to be left unanswered I now address myself.

Four philosophers besides Berkeley have been suggested one by one as probable sources of the thought of Edwards: Descartes, Malebranche, Norris and Collier. ¹ "Between these thinkers and Edwards there are affinities, yet as to actual connections they have been declared highly problematic and quite gratuitous, and for such reasons as these. Against Descartes the students of Yale had been warned as early as 1714 as one of those bringing in a corrupting new philosophy; in behalf of Malebranche there is no proof positive, for Edwards makes no reference to him; and the same is true of Norris, except for Edwards' chance use of the phrase 'ideal world;' while as for Collier's pamphlet, which, like Edwards' early note on 'Existence' compares the sensible world to a looking-glass, at this time that rare work was unknown even in England and Scotland."²

¹ American Philosophy, p.150. ² Ibid., p.150.
The suggestion of Descartes has in view what Riley very justly calls the "problematical idealism in the early part of the Meditations." Descartes proposes this idealism with the sole purpose of attacking it. The spirit and mode of his course in respect of it clearly shows itself in these typical passages. "I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that nevertheless (I possess the perceptions of all these things and that) they seem to me to exist just as I now see them? And besides as I sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this. . . . .

It is quite clear that, notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, the nature of man, inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body, cannot be otherwise than sometimes a source of deception. 1 But when I perceive things as to which I know distinctly both the place from which they proceed, and that in which they are, and the time at which they appeared to me; and when, without any interruption, I can connect the perceptions which I have of them with the whole course of my life, I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am waking and not during sleep. And I ought in no wise to doubt the truth of such matters, if, after having called up all my senses, my memory, and my understanding, to examine them, nothing is brought to evidence by any one of them which is repugnant to what is set forth by the others. For because God is in no wise a deceiver, it follows that I am not deceived in this. But because the exigencies of action often oblige us to make up our minds before having leisure to examine matters carefully, we must confess that the life of man is very frequently subject to error in respect to individual objects, and we must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature.2

Thus, in respect of Descartes, it appears (1) that Edwards in his years at Yale probably had no access to him; and (2) that if he had he was indebted to him in a way similar to that

in which Berkeley and he himself were indebted to Locke; that is, if Edwards learned his immaterialism from Descartes, he learned it from one who was not himself an immaterialist by adopting what Descartes explicitly and pains-takingly rejected.

Malebranche

The suggestion of dependence on the part of Edwards upon Malebranche is made by reason of the latter's supposition that "God is the only agent and does everything upon occasion of certain events in the mundane sphere." Some sentences which give us what is central in the notion of the divine agency held by the French sage are in the twelfth of his Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion. They run thus:

"You know, Aristotle, that man is composed of two substances, soul and body, the modifications of which are reciprocal as a result of the general laws, which are the causes of the conjunction of these two natures. .... Thence it happens that we are given warning of the presence of objects. .... The occasional causes of that which is to take place in the soul are to be found only in what takes place in the body, since it is the soul and body which God has willed to join together. Thus, God can be determined to act upon our soul in any particular manner only by the different changes which occur in the body. He must not act upon it as though he knew what is taking place outside us, but as though He knew all the things of our environment only through the knowledge which He has of what is taking place in our organs. .... Imagine that your soul knows exactly of everything new that is taking place in its body and that it gives itself all

1. American Philosophy, p. 150.
those feelings or sensations which are best adapted to further the preservation of life; that will be exactly what God does in it."¹

Beside these sentences I place one or two others taken from the first of the Dialogues.

"Since men attach no value to the ideas which they have of things, they give to the created world more reality than it has. They do not doubt the existence of objects, and they attribute to them many qualities which they have not. Yet they do not think of the reality of their ideas. This is so because they listen to their senses and do not consult inner truth. For, over again, it is much easier to prove the reality of ideas or ...the reality of this other world filled with the beauties of intelligence than to prove the existence of the material world. My reasons are as follows. Ideas have a necessary and eternal existence, but the corporeal world exists only because it has pleased God to create it. So, in order to see the intelligible world, it is sufficient to consult reason which contains the ideas, or the eternal and necessary intelligible essences, and this can be accomplished by all minds that are rational or are united to the infinite Reason. But in order to see the material world, or rather to judge that this world exists, since that world is invisible in itself, it is necessary that God should reveal it to us, for we cannot see His arbitrary volitions in the necessary Reason."²

The case of Malebranche is not very different from that of Descartes. First, there is no positive and specific evidence that Edwards was acquainted with his writings. The only testimony as to the point which I have been able to get is of a sort so general as to make it all but worthless for our present purpose. It is said, for example, that the Cambridge Platonists and Malebranche together with "his follower Morris" during a considerable period

¹ Malebranche, Nicolas, Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, Tr. by Morris Ginsberg, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. pp.299ff.
² Ibid., p.75.
before the Revolutionary War "were all influential in varying degrees" amongst the American colonists. In the second place, supposing for the moment that Edwards knew the works of Malebranche two things seem to me appropriate to be said. One is that the thinker of the New World must have found the utterly secondary place given by the thinker of the Old World to unperceived matter suggestive of what he himself actually did when he left it entirely out of his scheme of things. The other is that at the crucial point as to immaterialism we find the two thinkers in complete opposition to each other: the Frenchman holds to, the American repels, the notion of an inert somewhat which lies beyond the reach of our faculties. That is, whatever, upon our supposition, Edwards may have learned of Malebranche, he takes up his fundamental position in respect of matter in diametrical opposition to him.

Morris

The claim that Norris taught Edwards the immaterialism held by the latter rests upon a no more solid foundation than the like claims made for Descartes and Malebranche. Again there is a total absence of positive evidence for this claim; for the phrase, 'ideal world', because it chances to have been adopted into the

title of a book by Norris is not, I judge, to be denied to all other writers, on pain of their being convicted by any however slight use of it, of copying. And again if we suppose Edwards to have had knowledge of the works of Norris he could have got the immaterialistic belief only by deliberate rejection of a character-namely that matter is non-spiritual and inert.istic teaching of the British author. No passages in the works of Norris are cited because as has already been said what is salient in them is not different from what is salient in the works of Malebranche.

Collier

The case of Collier is most interesting, not to say engaging. It is of peculiar interest in this study for several reasons, but chiefly because he seems to have wrought out a completely idealistic theory of matter at about the same time that Berkeley was busy with his successive attacks upon the notion of an unperceived inert world. The latter began in his Common Place Book about the year 1705 to record his findings and reflections of a speculative sort; the former tells us that he had in mind the substance of his chief philosophical work, Clavis Universalis, ten years before its publication. Berkeley began to unfold for the

1. Fraser, Life and Letters of Berkeley, p.419N.
2. Clavis Universalis, p.5.
public his philosophy in *A New Theory of Vision*, which was published in 1709. The next year he extended the principles explicit and implicit in this work, by means of another, namely, *The Principles of the Human Knowledge*. The latter work expressed what is called his "universal immaterialism." Three years later Collier's book appeared. Thus priority of publication is with Berkeley. With Collier is his own statement that he had kept back for ten years the doctrine of *Clavis* and the wholly independent tone and style of his work. But of what is just as between Berkeley and Collier I have no present interest to judge. What I wish to remark is the relation of these facts as to Collier to the question about the originality of Edwards in respect of his idealism. Did Edwards borrow his notion of nonentity of unperceived matter from Collier? The nature of the latter's work and the time of its publication suggest this as possible. The doctrine of the book is a thorough-going immaterialism and it is presented with logical vigor. The book seems indeed, to have anticipated two celebrated arguments of Kant against an external world. But other facts make what is thus at first glance a possibility wholly impossible. These facts are too numerous so much as to be mentioned here. Two or three which more than suffice to justify the exclusion of Collier from the

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list of those who may be thought of as possible sources of the idealism of Edwards, I note. First, what is stated by Riley on the authority of another\(^1\) is amply supported. I mean the statement that *Glaucus Universalis* in the time of Edwards was unknown even in England and Scotland. Of this Bowman in her introduction to *Glaucus* writes thus: "The book seems to have attracted little attention even at the time of its publication. Had not Doctor Reid chanced upon it in the library at Glasgow, it might never have been known. Reid appreciated the value of the book, and in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, published in 1785, gives it brief notice. After a discussion of Norris's *Essay toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*, he says that he ought not to omit mention of 'an author of far inferior name, Arthur Collier. ..... His arguments are the same in substance with Berkeley's; and he appears,' Reid adds, 'to understand the whole strength of his cause. Though he is not deficient in metaphysical acuteness, his style is disagreeable, being full of conceits, of new-coined words, scholastic terms, and perplexed sentences.' Reid ends by saying, 'I have taken the liberty to give this short account of Collier's book because I believe it is rare and little known. I have only seen one copy of it, which is in the University library of Glasgow.'\(^2\) This notice attracted Dugald Stewart to the work, and

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1. American Philosophers, p. 150.
in his Dissertation, Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy, he compares Collier with Norris. 'Another very acute metaphysician,' he says, 'has met with still greater injustice. His name is not to be found in any of our Biographical Dictionaries. ..... Indeed, when compared with the writings of Berkeley himself, it (Clavis) yields to them less in force of argument, than in composition and variety of illustration.'

These notices attracted the English philosophers of this time to Collier's writings, and further traces of his life and works were sought. Sir James Mackintosh and Doctor Parr corresponded on the subject, but their efforts met with no important success. But interest in Collier had been aroused; and when some time before 1837, the History of Modern Wiltshire was published, the absence of his name from the history of the county, in which his family had held a living for four generations, called forth a remonstrance.

The awakened interest in Collier evidenced itself at the same time in a second edition of the Clavis. The copies numbered forty, and were 'exclusively bestowed as presents.' The third and last edition of the Clavis Universalis ... was brought out in 1837 in a small volume prepared by Doctor Parr entitled Metaphysical Treats.

of the Eighteenth Century." 1 I sum up the contribution to our discussion made in the words just quoted from Bowman. It comes to this. Nobody of consequence in the world of speculative thought took the slightest notice at the time of its publication of the one work of Collier with which we are concerned. Indeed, it was practically lost until discovered by Thomas Reid in 1785, that is, thirty-three years after the death of Edwards. A second consideration which forbids us to think that Edwards while composing the notes entitled Of Being and Mind was borrowing the idealism of those writings from Collier is that the latter was in his life time a man of only the most restricted local reputation. There is thus no conceivable reason why colleges or persons in far-away America, even if by some chance they had heard of the Clavis, should care to possess or to see it. A third fact to be reckoned with is the shortness of the time between the publication of Collier and the early notes of Edwards. As we have seen the Clavis appears in 1713, and Of Being was written about 1716. 2 The chance that a work of an unknown author or that any idea of his should in the early eighteenth century so quickly traverse the ocean and become known to a student in an American college is so remote as to be practically impossible.

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1. Clavis, Introduction by the Editor, pp.vii to xi.
2. Riley, American Philosophy, p.130.
In respect then, of Descartes, Malebranche, Norris and Collier, in relation to the immaterialism of Edwards, from what has just been set out, I conclude: (1) the last, it is practically impossible that Edwards ever so much as heard of, and he is the only immaterialist of the four. (2) Malebranche and Norris, Edwards does not mention. (3) Edwards probably had no access in his years in Yale to works of Descartes. (4) If Edwards had access to works of Descartes, or even of Malebranche and Norris, and if we suppose that his view of matter was affected by them his immaterialism which is the matter now in hand was a reaction from them.
Chapter III

In Relation to the Above Mentioned and
All Other Thinkers
Chapter III

IN RELATION TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED AND
ALL OTHER THINKERS

Originality Supported by Mysticism

It seems then that we need not hesitate to say with all confidence that the idealism of Edwards was not borrowed, but his own. And yet one of the solidest supports of the originality of Edwards, in this phase of his thinking, we have in this argument, until now, scarcely hinted at. I mean the fact of his mysticism. That our thinker was a mystic is beyond all question. The utterances of his, cited above, to show how, from his earliest years, he was concerned not only to make God the foundation of all things, and especially of human experience but to realize Him as such, are altogether in the vein of the mystic's sense that God is here and now; that "Nearer is He than breathing And closer than hands or feet." His mysticism is written large in the records of his religious life, and found notable expression in his preaching. At the age of seven or eight years he had great delight in prayer and other religious exercises. With other boys he built a booth in a retired spot in the woods for a place of prayer. Hither, both with his fellows and alone, he used to come to pray. From this precocious experience he suffered a reaction, in the course of which he lost even the disposition to pray in secret. As he looked back upon this
stage in his career, he thought of himself as a great sinner. This period was ended by an illness which was well-nigh fatal. Then it was that God "shook" him "over the pit of hell." But not long after his recovery from this illness he had fallen back into his "old ways of sin." God, however, so he tells us, would not let him be quiet in these ways. At length he "felt a spirit to part with all things in the world, for an interest in Christ." A question which had deeply troubled him was that as to the sovereignty of God. But he came at the end of these inward struggles to be convinced of the truth of the Calvinistic view of that matter. And later his conviction became a "delightful conviction ... exceedingly pleasant, bright and sweet." The beginning of his mature and lasting experience of "sweet delight in God and divine things" was in reading the words of Paul to Timothy: "Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen." "As I read the words," he says, "there came into my soul, and was, as it were, diffused through it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being; a new sense, quite different from anything I had experienced before. .... I thought with myself, how excellent a Being that was, and how happy I should be if I might enjoy that God, and be kept up to him in heaven, and be as it were swallowed up in him for ever! I kept

2. 1 Timothy, 1:17.
saying, and, as it were, singing, over these words of Scripture to myself; and went to pray to God that I might enjoy him, and prayed in a manner quite different from what I used to do with a new sort of affection." After this new awakening his mind dwelt on the greatness and beauty of Christ. No books so pleased him as those which treated of the loveliness of the person of Christ. The words, "I am the Rose of Sharon, and the Lily of the valley," haunted him with the sweetness of their suggestions; for they seemed to him to be about Christ. "The whole book of Canticles, he says, used to be pleasant to me, and I used to be much in reading it, about that time; and found, from time to time, an inward sweetness that would carry me away in my contemplations. This, I know not how to express otherwise, than by a calm sweet abstraction of soul from all concerns of this world; and sometimes a kind of vision, or fixed ideas and imaginations, or being alone in the mountains, or some solitary wilderness, far from all mankind, sweetly conversing with Christ, and wrapt and swallowed up in God. The sense I had of divine things, would often of a sudden kindle up, as it were, a sweet burning in my heart; an ardor of soul that I know not how to express. .... God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything; in the sun, noon and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees;  

1. Dwight, Life, p.60. 2. Cant. 2:1.
in the waters and all nature; which used greatly to fix my mind. And scarce anything in all the works of nature, was so sweet to me as thunder and lightning; formerly nothing had been so terrible to me. I felt God, if I may so speak, at the first appearance of a thunder storm; and used to take the opportunity at such times, to fix myself in order to view the clouds, and see the lightnings play and hear the majestic and awful voice of God's thunder, which oftentimes was exceedingly entertaining, leading me to sweet contemplations of my great and glorious God. While thus engaged, it always seemed natural for me to sing, or chant forth my meditations; or, to speak my thoughts in soliloquies with singing voice." From this time the mind of Edwards was "greatly fixed on divine things." He was "almost perpetually in the contemplation of them," and that "year after year." He compares what he now enjoys with his earlier pleasures in religion. "The delights which I now felt," he declares, "in the things of religion, were of an exceedingly different kind from those before-mentioned, that I had when a boy; and what then I had no more notion of, than one born blind has of pleasant and beautiful colors." Expressions of this sort abound in works of Edwards, both earlier and later. I do not now cite others because these are quite enough to exemplify the fact of his mysticism.

1. Dwight, Life, p.61.  
2. Ibid., p.62.
These are here preferred to others only because of their belonging to the first part of his life — to that period when his idealism took its rise.

Support of Originality by Mysticism Explained

But just how does the fact that Edwards was a mystic from his earliest years bear upon the question of his originality in respect of his idealism? In answering I largely follow Riley. Referring to a passage in the so-called Personal Narrative of Edwards, he writes: "In the concluding passage of this exquisite ecstacy, with its implication of union with the deity, of absorption into the inmost essence of the divine, there appear what have been called the unmistakable marks of the mystic in every age. But in Edwards' full narrative there are also to be found the marks of mysticism from the more modern point of view, and it is by combining the old and the new that there may be gathered some hints as to the idealistic bases of Edwards' philosophy." He proceeds to give what according to the most celebrated American psychologist were regarded as the distinctive psychological marks of mysticism. They are four and as follows: ineffability, noetic quality, transiency,

2. Dwight, Life, Chap's. V and VI.
passivity. The first is the incapacity of the experience to be put into words. The second is the sense of new knowledge which the experience imports. The third is the inability of the experience in its ecstatic phase, at least, to maintain itself for very considerable periods, or even to keep itself clearly defined for any long time. The last is the sense of utter receptivity, of something being absolutely and freely given, which the experience begets in its subject; this despite whatever voluntary practices may be used to induce high mystical states.

Riley says the mark of transiency may be neglected as being only an incident of the mystic state. However, he notes that Edwards is true to tradition in the matter of this mark, especially in his childhood and early youth; that is, his experiences of the more exalted sort are intermittent. "Leaving aside, then, the mark of transiency," Riley continues, "one comes to the more important mark of passivity. Here Edwards says in his early notes on Mind: 'Our perceptions or ideas that we passively receive through our bodies are communicated to us immediately by God. There never can be any idea, thought or action of the mind unless the mind first received some ideas from sensation, or some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly passive in receiving them.' Although

1. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, Boston, 1902, pp.380f.
these particular notes were probably written under the influence of the *Human Understanding*, yet the virtual contradiction of the Lockean sensationalism was not so easy a transition, unless the young thinker had some other and deeper basis upon which to rest. This basis appears to have been the mystic experience indirectly referred to in the alternative offered in the foregoing passage; for besides the reception of ideas 'from sensation' there was 'some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly passive in receiving them.'"

Riley goes on. "It is in this emphasis on the passive attitude in the reception of ideas that one fundamental source of Edwards' idealism is to be found. Being essentially subjective, the quietistic state readily lends itself to a sense of the unreality of the external world. In Edwards' language this takes the form of a belief that corporeal things could exist 'no otherwise than mentally,' and that other bodies have no existence of their own; in modern psychological terms the recognition of the unreal sense of things absence of may be laid to a temporary *honoesthesia*, a transient loss of the sense of the compact reality of the bodily organism. Furthermore, this indirect phenomenalism, this extreme subjectivism, being carried to its logical extreme, might well lead to the conclusion embodied in Edwards' first fragment, the corollary of the Essay on *Being*, which protested against the view that material things are the most
substantial, and affirmed that spirits only are properly substances.

"If these conjectures be true, if Edwards' mystic
ecstasies furnished a personal ground for the earliest of his
idealistie fragments, the question of originality receives a
new light, for that question is shifted from external to internal
sources, from a later period of general learning to an earlier
period of individual experience."

The conclusion of Riley as to the bearing of Edwards'
mysticism upon the problem of his idealism is that the religious
temper and the philosophical view go together practically through-
out his writings; and that such a heart as that of Edwards must
inevitably have suggested to such a mind as his that doctrine of
the origin of which in his writings we inquire. From this conclus-
ation I see no cause to dissent; On the contrary it seems to me wholly
reasonable -- in truth, almost factual. Edwards' mysticism is a
fact. The notions of the nearness of God, his present and persist-
ent activity in all things, his spiritual character, his awful and
yet gentle power, the removal of all intermediates between him
and the soul, and the passivity of the soul in his hands -- these
notions are facts of the mystic experience. The colossal reason
of Edwards, the reason that gives him a place in the estimates of
philosophical critics beside the foremost speculative thinkers of
all time, is a fact. That Edwards was a mystic as a child of seven
or eight years of age is a fact; and that he was thus a mystic be-
fore he was an idealist is so obvious and necessary a consequence
as to have the force of a fact. That the idealism of Edwards
however acquired is seen in writings of his which belong to a
period beginning in his first years at Yale, that is, when he was
thirteen or fourteen years old is a fact. That there is no external
evidence against his originality in his idealism is a fact. That
there are convincing reasons both external and internal, apart
from his mysticism, to believe that Edwards was original in his
idealistic thinking is, as we have seen, a fact. The very per-
fection of such demonstration as is possible in such a matter
has waited only for explanation of what seems in all views now
open to us to be a fact. Much of such explanation -- doubtless
quite enough to put beyond all question the position of this
study -- we have already had. But if any one should wish to see
assurance made doubly sure he has merely to note all other facts
of Edwards' early speculative thinking are further fused in the
fires of his mysticism. Let him conceive of a mind which belongs
to the spiritual lineage of Plato, Aquinas, and Kant. Let him
conceive of the passion for God which burned in the souls of
Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux. Let him put, from its earliest
beginnings in the field of philosophy, this mind under the fiery urge of this passion. The result is not less sure than the working of cause and effect in the laboratory of the physicist. The mystic will become an idealist.
Appendix
I

Representative Passages

of Successive Works
"The philosophical speculations of Edwards may be found in the following of his works: (1) Notes On the Mind and On Natural Science, in the Appendix to S. E. Dwight's "Life of Edwards,"¹ (2) Treatise on the Religious Affections,² (3) A careful and strict inquiry into the Modern Notion of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame, (4) The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended: Evidences of its Truth Produced, and Arguments to the contrary Answered, etc. etc., (5) Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue, also, Dissertation concerning the End for which God created the World, (6) Charity and Its Fruits." Thus, Ueberweg directs whoever would know how Edwards thought of what is ultimate in human experience.⁷ I now look into these works one by one and in the order of succession in which they were written, except the last, to which I have had no access.

The Notes On Mind and Natural Science

The earliest of the philosophical and scientific writings of Edwards which have thus far been published, if we except some letters,⁸

2. Boston, 1746.
4. Boston, 1758.
5. Boston, 1788.
6. New York, 1852, Edited by Tryon Edwards, D. D.
are the notes which antedate the beginning of his ministry at Northampton, and belong mainly if not exclusively to his years in Yale College. The general subjects of these notes as we know, are two: Mind and Natural Science. The first of the notes on Mind to be set down were inspired by Locke through his essay on the Human Understanding, which Edwards read when he was thirteen or fourteen years old. The notes on Natural Science seem to have been begun about the same time. Each series of the notes was to have been expanded into a great work. This is obvious in the case of the series on Mind from the sub-title of it, which reads thus: "The Natural History of the Mental World, or of the Internal World: being a particular inquiry into the Nature of the Human Mind, with respect to both its Faculties — the Understanding and the Will — and its various Instincts, and Active and Passive Powers." With the amplified title agrees the sketch of an introduction which immediately follows it, and reads thus: "Introduction. Concerning the two worlds — the External and the Internal: the External the subject of Natural Philosophy; the Internal: our own Minds. How the latter is, in many respects, the most important. Of what great use, the true knowledge of this is; and of what dangerous consequences errors here, are, more than in the other." And immediately after

2. Ibid. vol.1, Chap.3, Riley: American Philosophy, p.130.
3. Works of Edwards, Appendices II and I.
4. Ibid. vol.1, p.34, Riley: American Philosophy, p.130.
   Jones: Early American Philosophers, p.47.
5. Works, vol.1, p.36, Riley: American Philosophy, p.130
   Jones: Early American Philosophers, p.47.
these suggestions is this caption: "Subjects to be handled in
the Treatise on the Mind." That the notes on Natural Science were
to be made into a vast work may be seen at a glance by whoever will
turn to the first page of them; for he will find there directions
as to both matter and arrangement to be used in such work. A

a

glance at the second page will discover twenty other directions to
be observed in composing. A few of these directions will show the
scope and the spirit of them all. Here is one. "Let there be Defin-
itions and Postulates, not only at the beginning of the whole, but at
the beginning of particular Chapters and Sections, if there is oc-
casion, which postulates and definitions may be referred to from other
parts. If it suits best, these may be put before even the Sections,
in the midst of a chapter." Here is another. "That in prefatorial,
not to write in a distinct prose, or introduction, but in the body
of the work; then I shall be sure to have it read by every one."
And here one other. "Let such modesty be in the style." "Not to in-
sert any disputable thing, or that will be likely to be disputed by
learned men; for I may depend upon it, they will receive nothing but
what is undeniable from me; that is, in things exceedingly beside
the ordinary way of thinking." "In the course of reasoning, not to
pretend anything to be more certain than every one will plainly see
it is, by such expressions as, -- It is certain, It is undeniable, etc."

"Let there always be laid down as many Lemmata, or preparatory

propositions, as are necessary, to make the consequent proposition clear and perspicuous." "Oftentimes it suits the subject and reasoning best, to explain by way of objection and answer, after the manner of Dialogue." "Always, when I have occasion to make use of mathematical proofs." "If I publish these propositions ——."

Four of the twenty-five rules on the first two pages of these notes are in short-hand; and two other rules are completed in that character. These citations of notes in both series bring before us the boy that wrote them as he contemplated their extension into two huge writings which should treat the two parts into which human experience falls: they were to be a new Summa, with a new principle of unity in them; and he was at once bold with the sense of power and end with the sense of responsibility. It is not strange, therefore, that since this boy was himself, he should have given us in these fragments the contours of a system. What is perhaps somewhat less natural is that the system in these fragments is substantially that which appears in or underlies the noblest expressions of the man into which the boy grew. We are not, then in studying the juvenilia of Edwards, considering that in tentative and ephemeral, but the conceptions destined to dominate the whole intellectual life of the most intellectual man of the New World.

In "The Mind"

Doing In the series of reflections entitled The Mind, there are

Cause one hundred twenty-eight items numbered by their author

External World

2. Jones, Early American Philosophers, p.47.
from one upward in two series. The doctrines of these items include
the following fundamentals.

1. Doings is natural, i.e. thinkable: that there should be

nothing is not natural, i.e. not thinkable. 1 Cause is the regular

sequence of existents. 2 The visible world has no existence independ-

ent of perception; for "the ideas we have by the sense of feeling

are as much mere ideas, as those we have by the sense of seeing. 3"

Body is merely color and figure together or with some powers such as

resistance and motion - "If color exists not out of mind," and "Every

knowing philosopher" agrees to this ---, "then nothing exists out of

the mind but resistance, which is solidity, and the termination of

this resistance, which is figure and the communication of the resis-
tance, which is motion; though the latter are but modes of the former.
Therefore, there is nothing out of the mind but resistance. And

not that neither, when nothing is actually resisted. Then, there is

nothing but the Power of Resistance. And as Resistance is nothing

else but the actual exertion of God's power, so the Power can be

nothing else but the constant law or method of that actual exertion.
And how is there any resistance except it be in some mind, in idea?

What is it that is resisted? It is ridiculous to say that resistance

is resisted." Resistance is the mode of idea. "The idea may be

resisted, it may move, and stop and rebound; but how a mere power,

which is nothing real, can move and stop, is inconceivable, and it

2. Ibid. No. 26.
3. Ibid. No. 27.
is impossible to say a word about it without contradiction. The
world is therefore an ideal one; and the law of creating, and the
succession of these ideas is constant and regular."¹ There is an
"All-comprehending Mind;" and "it is the complication of all con-trad-
dictions to deny such a mind."²

But this is not to destroy the real physical world nor
to shut it up in a brain-pan; nor is it to "make void natural phi-
losophy, or the science of the causes or reasons of corporeal changes;
for to find out the reasons of things, in natural philosophy, is only
to find out the proportion of God's activity. And the case is the
same, as to such proportions, whether we suppose the world only men-
tal, in our sense, or no, though we suppose that the existence of the
whole material universe is absolutely dependent on an Idea, yet we
may speak in the old way, and as properly and truly as ever."³ Doubt-
less in the beginning God created such a number of atoms, of such
bulk figures, motions, directions, and velocities; "from chance arise
all the natural changes in the Universe, forever, in a continual
series. Yet, perhaps, all this does not exist anywhere perfectly, but
in the Divine Mind." But if "our thoughts were comprehensive and per-
fect enough, our view of the present state of the world would excite
in us a perfect idea of all past changes."⁴ It is not in strictness,
proper to say "that bodies do not exist without the mind. For place
itself is mental, and within and without, are more mental conceptions."⁵
Things exist in their relation to God from the first; that is, ideas

¹ Series II, No. 27. ² Ibid. No. 30.
³ Ibid. No. 34. ⁴ Ibid. No. 51.
are always the same and after the same mode." Thus, things exist "in the determination of God, that such and such ideas shall be raised in created minds, upon such conditions." Thus, also, things are not destroyed by being unperceived by finite minds or by being forgotten by them. They exist in the plan of God and are implied in all its outworkings; so much so that it had been a different world in which we dwell but for these things unperceived or unremembered by us. "Yes," says the writer, "the whole universe would be otherwise; such an influence have these things, by their attraction and otherwise. Yes, there must be an universal attraction, in the whole system of things, from the beginning of the world to the end; and, to speak more strictly and metaphysically, we must say, in the whole system and series of created minds; so that these things must necessarily be put in to make complete the system of the ideal world. That is, they must be supposed, if the train of ideas be in the order and course, settled by the Supreme Mind." And this is to say that God does suppose them as determined parts of a settled system of ideas. Not one of these can be finally neglected however overlooked for a time, since, being a part of an ordered whole, it implies the whole and is implied by it. That is, so close-knit is the system of our world that the most infinitesimal atom dropped out of it will soon or late declare its absence by altering the system itself. This system of ideas includes of course, our organs of sense and our bodies as a whole. They too are ideas. "The connection that our ideas have with such and such a mode of our organs, is no other than

1. Series II, No. 36.  
2. Ibid. No. 40.
God's constitution, that some of our ideas shall be connected with others, according to such a settled law and order, so that some ideas shall flow from others as their cause."¹

Space

Space is a necessary being; but only as it is a necessary idea. Time also is an idea. There was thus neither space nor time before or after or beyond the universe. Space is colored space. To remove color from the mind would be to take away space. "And so all that we call extension, motion, and figure, is gone if color is gone." To a man born blind they "would be nothing like that we call by these names. However it is manifest, there can be nothing like these things we call by the name of bodies, out of the mind, unless it be in some other mind or minds. And, indeed, the secret lies here: That, which truly is the substance of all bodies, is the infinitely exact and precise, and perfectly stable Idea, in God's Mind, together with his stable will, that the same shall be gradually communicated to us, and to other minds, according to certain fixed and exact established Methods and Laws; or in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact and precise Divine Idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise, and stable will, with respect to correspondent communications to created minds, and effects on their minds."²

Substance

The notion of substance as an unperceived inert essence of material things is really impossible. It is a contradiction "to suppose that body or matter exists without solidity, for all the

If the notion we have of empty space is space without solidity, and all the notion we have of free space is space resisting. And to suppose solidity or impenetrability to be inexpressible is absurd. It is quite as much action or the immediate result of action as gravity which concededly proceeds from an active influence. But it is no evident that action is required to stop a body as it is that action is required to set it in motion. Now the latter seems to us to presuppose an agent. No less does the former presuppose an agent. But this agent is no lifeless thing; it is a being which acts of itself, producing new effects, that are perfectly arbitrary, and that are no way necessary of themselves. It "must be intelligent and voluntary." But why is it "so exceedingly natural to man to suppose that there is some latent substance or something that is altogether hid, that upholds the properties of bodies?" It is because they feel the need of a cause not only to originate but to maintain. "All therefore agree, that there is something that is there, and upholds those properties. And it is most true, there undoubtedly is; but men are wont to content themselves in saying merely, that it is something; but that something is He, "by whom all things consist."

\[1\]

There can be no infinite body; for infinite body involves the possibility of infinite motion with infinite velocity. But such motion means that the body "would be in every part of the distances passed through exactly at once, and therefore it could not be said to move from one part of it to another." Infinite motion is

\[1\] Series II, Vol. 61.
therefore a contradiction. Supposing therefore a body were infinitely
great, it could doubtless be moved by Infinite Power, and turned round
some point or axis. But if that were possible, it is evident that some
part of that infinite body would move with infinite swiftness; which
we have seen is a contradiction. Body, therefore, cannot be infinite.  

1. Mind and Body

Matter cannot think; nor is it conceivable that God would
cause it to think in any other or further sense than that He
might arrange that thought should have a special relation to a particular place as, for example, He has done in respect of a human mind and a
human body. 2 The relation thus established is a law and we call it
"the union between soul and body." So the soul may be said to be in
the brain; because ideas, that come by the body, immediately ensue,
only on alterations that are made then; and the soul most immediately
produces effect nowhere else. No doubt that all finite spirits, united
to bodies or not, are thus in place; that is, that they perceive, or
passively receive, ideas, only of created things, that are in some
particular place at a given time. At least a finite spirit cannot
thus be in all places at a time equally. And doubtless the change of
the place where they perceive most thoroughly and produce effects
immediately, is regular and successive; which is the notion of spir-
its. 3 The mind by its every action probably influences the body, and
most of all perhaps when the body is weakened by disease. 4 When our
minds shall be separated from our bodies God will no doubt still have
and use some plan to communicate with us; but this plan or rule we do

2. Ibid. No. 2.
3. Ibid. No. 4.
4. Ibid. No. 21.
not yet know. For the present, "our perceptions, or ideas that we passively receive by our bodies, are communicated to us by God," in accordance with a rule which we know, but only "in some measure." 2

Consciousness

Consciousness is defined as the mind's perceiving that in Memory oneself. It is a sort of feeling within itself. 2 Memory is said to be "the identity, in some degree, of Ideas that we formerly had in our minds, with a consciousness that we formerly had them, and a supposition that their former being in the mind is the cause of their being in us at present. There is," the note
continues, "not only the presence of the same ideas, that were in our minds formerly, but also, an act of the judgment, that they were there formerly, and that judgment, not properly from proof, but from natural necessity, arising from a law of nature which God hath fixed." That we mean when we say we have such things laid up in memory is this: that "they would actually be repeated" in our minds, "upon certain occasions, according to the law of nature; though we cannot describe, particularly, the law of nature, about these mental acts so well as we can about other things." 3 Then comes an item on the closely relat-
ed and vexed question of personal identity. Dickis agrees with Locke that it is identity of consciousness. And this is the same as identity of spirit; "for a mind or spirit is nothing else but conscious,
ess, and what is included in it. The same consciousness is, to all intents and purposes, individually the very same spirit, or substance; as much as the same particle of matter can be the same with

1. Serios II, No. 3. 2. Ibid. No. 16.
3. Ibid. No. 69
itself at different times. But there is grave perplexity to be faced here. In fact identity of person "ceases never yet to have been explained." What is this identity of consciousness which we suppose to be one with personal identity? Is it merely the sameness of mental content? It must be more than this, for God could annihilate me and create another mind to have the content of mine. More than that, what is to forbid one to suppose that God could make two beings having the same ideas including memories which I have and so place them in the universe that they should be wholly ignorant of each other? If identity of mental content is identity of person, then the new created mind in the first case is I, and in the second, the two new-created minds are alike I, therefore identical with each other, which is absurd.

Will

Of the will a number of the items we are considering treat with care. These teach the following doctrines. Much human action is not properly voluntary though it is the fruit of judgment. But judgment in such cases is without reasoning. "Ideas are habitually associated together" and therefore "come into the mind together." Thus, "when a man is walking, there is not a new act of the will every time he takes up his foot and sets it down." It is, however, not necessary to attribute reason to beasts in many cases in which some do thus attribute it. "A horse," for example, "learns to perform such actions for his food, because he has accidentally had perceptions of such actions associated with the pleasant perceptions of taste; and so his appetite

1. Series II, No. 11. 2. Ibid. No. 72.
makes him perform the action, without any reason or judgment." Man and beasts differ from each other chiefly in this: man reflect, beasts do not, — they have only "direct consciousness." But reflection is an active, that is, a voluntary thing. Man are active about their ideas, beasts are passive. Albeit the association of ideas in beasts seems to be much quicker and stronger than in men.¹

The will is not determined by "the greatest good apprehended, nor by that which is apprehended to be the greatest good; but by the greatest apprehension of good."² This teaching is amplified in a later item where it stands thus: "The will is determined by (1) the degree of the good apprehended; (2) by the degree of the apprehension of the good which consists of the degree of judgment, and the degree of liveliness in conception of the good; and (3) the degree of apprehension of one's own interest in the good." It is utterly impossible but that it should be so, that the inclination and choice of the mind should always be determined by Good, as mentally or ideally existing. It would be a contradiction to suppose otherwise, for we mean nothing else by Good but that which agrees with the inclination and disposition of the mind. And surely that, which agrees with it must agree with it. And it also implies a contradiction, to suppose that that good whose mental or ideal being is greatest, does not always determine the will; for we mean nothing else, by Greatest Good, but that which agrees most with the inclination and disposition of the soul. It is ridiculous to say that the soul does not incline most to that which is most agreeable to the inclination of the soul. The will is

¹ Series II, No. 59. ² Ibid. No. 21.
no otherwise different from inclination, than that we commonly call
the will, that is the mind's inclination, with respect to its con im-
mediate notion." Mr. Locke is in error as to uneasiness in our
present circumstances being always the determinant of the will. Sup-
pone a man sitting decides to remain seated. His decision is no less
an act of the will than his rising and walking would have been; but
it did not arise from uneasiness in his circumstances at the moment
of decision.

Excellence and Love or Conscience

"Besides the two sorts of assents of the mind called will
and judgment, there is a third, arising from a sense of
the general beauty and harmony of things, which is conscience. There
are some things which move a kind of horror in the mind, which yet
the mind wills and chooses; and some which are agreeable in this
way to its make and constitution, which yet it chooses not. Those
assents of will and conscience have indeed a common object, which is
excellency. Still they differ." The one always has a general refe-
rence and is extensive, the other may refer to being either in gen-
eral or in particular but is always intensive.

Thus, the notes introduce that which was one of the earliest
considered of all those subjects which engaged our author, that of
excellency. Nothing, he says, has been more without definition; and
yet nothing would seem to be more worthy of it," for "we are really
concerned with nothing else" but excellency. But what is it? It is
equality, especially equality of ratios, that is, proportion. To lack
proportion is to be to that extent at variance with being — to offend

1. Series II, No. 60. 2. Ibid. No. 70. 3. Ibid. No. 39.
perception and perception is of the very essence of existence. "Cor-
respondency, symmetry, regularity and the like may be resolved into
equalities; though the equalities in beauty, in any degree complica-
ted, are so numerous, that it would be a most tedious piece of work
to enumerate them. There are millions of those equalities. Of these
consist the beautiful shape of flowers, the beauty of the body of man,
and of the bodies of other animals. That sort of beauty which is
called natural, as of vines, plants, trees, etc., consists of a very
complicated harmony; and all the natural motions, and tendencies, and
figures of bodies in the universe are done according to proportion,
and therein is their beauty." And there are harmonics of art and
science and of many other spiritual sorts. "This is an universal
definition of excellency: The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's
Consent to Entity. The more the consent is, and the more extension,
the greater is the excellency." Now "God in proper entity." Thus, to
consent to Being in general is to consent to Him; and he is pleased
by such consent. This is not akin to what is very improperly called
self-love which is really nothing but aversion to pain and inclination
to pleasure. Indeed, "one alone, without any reference to any more,
cannot be excellent; for in such case there can be no manner of rel-
lion no way, and therefore no such thing as consent." Of course,
there may be in what we call one, parts which consent to one another
and to the whole, and, in consequence, excellency. "But in a being
that is absolutely without plurality, there cannot be excellency, for
there can be no such thing as consent or agreement." One of the
loftiest kinds of excellency is love. The consent of spirits to one
another. The agreement of bodies is only a shadow of this high thing. Happiness is a perception of the consent to being. This consent is of three sorts: being's consent to one's own being, one's own consent to being, and being's consent to being. 

"Excellence, to put it in other words, is that which is beautiful and lovely. That which is beautiful, considered by itself separately, and deformed, considered as a part of something more extended; or beautiful, only with respect to itself and a few other things, and not as a part of that which contains all things — the Universe; is false beauty and a confined beauty. That which is beautiful, with respect to the university of things, has a generally extended excellence and a true beauty; and the more extended, or limited, its system is, the more confined or extended is its beauty."  

Excellence is, at last, being. God is the supreme excellence since He is the All-comprehending being. He "infinitely loves Himself because His being is infinite;" for it is being which pleases being. "All that is the perfection of spirits may be resolved into that which is God's perfection, which is love." But there is dissent from being, dissent even from being which consents with the dissentient's own being. Now, to dissent from such dissentient, if their opposite nature is fixed, "is to consent to being in general." And let us not forget that being in general is God. 

"Tis peculiar to God, that He has beauty within Himself, in His own Holy Spirit. Whereas the excellence of others is in loving others,

2. Ibid. No. 14.  
3. Ibid. No. 62.  
in loving God, and in the communications of His Spirit. We shall be
in danger, when we meditate on this love of God to Himself, as being
the thing wherein His infinite excellency and loveliness consists, of
some alloy to the sweetness of our view, by its appearing with some-
thing of the aspect and cast of what we call self-love. But we are
to consider that this love includes in it, or rather is the same as,
a love to everything, as they are all communications of Himself. So
that we are to conceive of the Divine excellency as the infinite
general love, that which reaches all, proportionally, with perfect
purity and sweetness; yes it includes the true love of all creatures,
for that is His Spirit, or which is the same thing, His Love.¹

And now we come again to the matter of conscience. It is
the sense which the mind has of the consent to bring in general. "If
by any means a particular and restrained love overcomes this general
consent; the foundation of that consent yet remaining in the nature,
exerts itself again, so that there is the contradiction of one con-
sent to another. And this is the Dismay of Conscience. But where
there is no sense of any such dissent from being in general, there
is no contradiction to the natural inclination of perceiving being.
And when he reflects, he has a sense that being in general doth not
dissent from him; and then there is Peace of Conscience; though he
has a remembrance of past dissentions with nature. Yet if by any
means it be possible when he has the idea of it, to conceive of it as
not belonging to him, he has the same Peace. And if he has a sense

¹. Series II, No. 45: 5, 6, 7, 12, 13.
not only of his not dissenting, but of his consenting to Being in
General, or Nature, and acting accordingly; he has a sense that
Nature, in General, Consents to him: he has not only Peace but
Joy of Mind, wherever he is. These things are obviously invigor-
ated by the knowledge of God and His Constitution about us, and by
the light of the Gospel.\(^1\)

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**In "NOTES ON NATURAL SCIENCE"**

The prejudices of the imagination are most opposite to
"Natural Philosophy." They affect both the vulgar and the learned.
Some perception is made the standard of possibility. For example,
no body, it is thought, larger than one can conceive of, or smaller
than the eye can see, can exist; no motion slower or swifter than
one can imagine is to be admitted to be actual. True, in respect
of some matters the learned have conquered their imaginations; e.g.,
in respect of the vast distances of heavenly bodies. And yet even
in respect of them, there is a disposition in learned circles to
draw back from what is well assured. On the other hand, it has
to be granted, it is possible to go to an extreme as to greatness
of size and number. "Thus ..... a very learned man and sagacious
astronomer, upon consideration of the vast multitude of the vis-
ible part of the universe, has in the ecstasy of his imagination,

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1. Series II, No. 45: 14
been hurried to pronounce the universe infinite; which, I may say, out of veneration was beneath such a man as he."

The author would cure men of such prejudices. "I will," he says, "as the best method I can think of, demonstrate two or three physical theorems; which, I believe, if they are clearly understood, will put every man clear out of conceit with his imagination in order whereunto, these two are prerequisite."

**Proposition 1.** There is no degree of motion whatever, but what is possible.

**Proposition 2.** There may be bodies of any infinite degree of smallness."

The former proposition is proved by supposing a revolving radius to be continually lengthened. This, it is said, can be done any assignable number of times. But every time it is done the peripheral end of the line has a new and more rapid motion. The second proposition is supported by supposing two perfect spheres in contact with each other and being continually enlarged and a globule between them near to their point of mutual incidence. This enlargement may take place any assignable number of times and the intervening globule be thus reduced in size an equal number of times. In sum, any assignable degree of motion or smallness is possible.

An especially striking notion of our young thinker is contained in a third proposition which is: "That it is possible for

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1. Learn to the whole.
a body, as small as a ray of light, to strike the surface of a
body as big as the earth, or any indefinite magnitude, supposing
it to be hard enough to hold the stroke, so as to impel it along
with any indefinite degree of swiftness."

There follow some related postulates and diagrams. After
them is the piece entitled Of Being, of which this is the substance.
One cannot think of nothing. To try to do so "puts the mind into
more convulsion and confusion. It contradicts the very nature of
the Soul," to think that nothingness can be. True something must
eternally be and everywhere be; "for absolute nothing and where
contradict each other." Nothing is more conceivable as being in
one place than as being in all places." So that we see that this
necessary, eternal being must be infinite and omnipresent." This
being cannot be solid; "for solidity is nothing but resistance to
other solidities." — Space is this being. "We find that we can
with ease conceive how all other things should not be." But not
so with space. Try to separate it into parts and push the parts
asunder leaving nothing between them and always space is there.
"It is self-evident ..... that space is necessary, eternal, infini-
to and omnipresent — space is God."

Absolute nothing is the aggregate of all the contra-
dictions in the world: a state wherein there is neither body nor
spirit, nor space, neither empty space nor full space, neither
little nor great, narrow nor broad, neither infinite space nor

1. Learn to the whole, preliminary propositions.
finite space, not even a mathematical point, neither up nor down, neither north nor south, (I do not mean as it is with respect to the body of the earth, or some other great body), but no contrary points, positions, or directions, no such thing as either here or there, this way or that way, or any way. Then we go about to form an idea of perfect Nothing we must shut out all these things: .... we must not allow ourselves to think of the least part of space, be it ever so small." .....We must expel emptiness itself and "think of the same the sleeping rocks do dream of; and not till then, shall we get a complete idea of Nothing. ...We do not know what we say if we say we think it possible in itself, that there should not be entity." And it is wholly impossible that the Universe should have existed and been subjected to mighty changes and yet nothing have known of it. That is, it is impossible to be without being known. And the reason is there is only one place and that is consciousness — the consciousness of God and the consciousness of his intelligent creation.

"Suppose that there were another universe, merely of bodies, created in excellent order, harmonious motions, and a beautiful variety; and there was no created intelligence in it, nothing but senseless bodies, and nothing but God knew anything of it. I demand where else that universe would have a being, but only in the Divine Consciousness? Certainly in no other respect. There would be figures, and magnitudes, and motions, and proportions; but where, where else, except in the Almighty's knowledge? ..... But then you
will say ..... in a room closely shut up, which nobody sees, there
is nothing, except in God's knowledge. — I answer: Created beings
are conscious of the effects of what is in the room; for, perhaps,
there is not one leaf of a tree, nor a spire of grass, but what
produces effects, all over the universe, and will produce them, to
the end of eternity. But any otherwise, there is nothing in a room
to shut up, but only in God's Consciousness. How can anything be
there any other way? This will appear to be truly so, to any one
who thinks of it, with the whole united strength of his mind. Let
us suppose, for illustration, this impossibility, that all the
spirits in the universe were for a time, deprived of their con-
sciousness, and that God's consciousness at the same time, were to be
intermitted. I say the universe, for that time, would cease to be,
of itself; and this not merely, as we speak, because the Almighty
could not attend to uphold it; but because God could know nothing of
it. It is our foolish imagination that will not suffer us to see it.
So fancy there may be figures and magnitudes, relations and propor-
tions without any one knowing of it. But it is our imagination
that hurts us. We do not know what figures and properties are.

".........But to help our imagination, .... let us suppose
the creation deprived of every ray of light. ......The universe
would really be immediately deprived of all its colors. No one
part .... is any more red, or blue, or green, or yellow, or black,
or white, or light, or dark, or transparent, or opaque. .... There
would be no difference in those respects, between the Universe and Nothing. At the same time, also, let us suppose the universe to be altogether deprived of motion, and all parts of it to be at perfect rest. Then, the universe would not differ from the void, in this respect: there would be no more motion in the one than in the other. Then, also, solidity would cease. All that we mean, or can be meant, by solidity, is resistance; resistance to touch, the resistance of some parts of space. This is all the knowledge we get of solidity, by our senses, and, I am sure, all that we can get any other way. But solidity shall be shown to be nothing else, more fully, hereafter. But there can be no resistance, if there is no motion. One body cannot resist another when there is perfect rest among them. But, you will say, though there is no actual resistance, yet there is potential resistance: that is such and such parts of space would resist upon occasion. But this is all that I would have, that there is no solidity now; not but that God could cease there to be, upon occasion. And if there is no solidity, there is no extension, for extension is the extendedness of solidity. Then, all figure, and magnitude, and proportion, immediately cease. But, then, both these suppositions together: that is, deprive the universe of light and motion, and the case would stand thus, with the universe: there would be neither white nor black, neither blue nor brown, neither bright nor shaded, pol lucid nor opaque, no noise nor sound, neither heat nor cold, neither fluid nor solid, neither wet nor dry, neither hard nor soft,
nor solidity, nor extension, nor figure, nor magnitude nor proportion, nor body nor spirit. What, then, is to become of the universe? Certainly, it exists no where but in the Divine Mind. This will be abundantly clear to one, after having read what I have further to say of solidity, etc.: so that we see that a universe, without notion, can exist no where else but in the mind either infinite or finite.

"Corollary. It follows from hence, that those beings, which have knowledge and consciousness, are the only proper, and real, and substantial beings; inasmuch as the being of other things is only by those. From hence, we may see the gross mistake of those who think material things the most substantial beings, and spirits more like a shadow; whereas, spirits only are properly substance." Here ends the part of the Notes which is called Of Being.

Atoms

Plenum

The next section of the Notes is named Of Atoms and of Perfectly Solid Bodies. It consists of two propositions, some corollaries of each, and the answer to a conceived objection to each. The first proposition is stated thus: "All bodies whatsoever, except atoms themselves, must of absolute necessity, be composed of atoms, or of bodies that are indiscripitable, that cannot be made less, or whose parts cannot by any finite power, be separated one from another." The somewhat elaborate argument in proof comes to this: the irreducible particle is the only alternative to

the possibility of annihilation for bodies, which latter is absurd. Or to this: An absolute plenum must be supposed or we must abandon the notion that the quantity of matter in the universe is constant. Or to this: Infinite divisibility of matter means the destructibility of it; whereas the indivisibility, that is, the solidity or impenetrability, of bodies is their perseverance to be. In fact solidity and body are the same thing. But says an objector: "What do you say to extension, figure, and mobility?" Our philosopher answers: "As to extension, I say, I am satisfied, that" body "has none any more than space without body, except what results from solidity. As for figure, it is nothing but a modification of solidity, or of the extension of solidity. And as to mobility, it is but the communicability of this solidity, from one part of space to another." But the minimum physicist is not of necessity very small; "for", says Edwards, "by our philosophy an atom may be as big as the universe; because any body of whatever figure, were an atom, if it were a perfect solid." At this point it is explained that a perfect solid or an absolute plenum is not necessarily without interstices. Its perfection may consist in the fact that interstices are surrounded by atoms which are truly conjoined; that is by atoms which touch one another in surfaces and not merely in points or lines. The second proposition is this: "No or more atoms, or perfect solids, touching each other by surfaces, (I mean so that every point, in any surface of the one, shall touch every point in some surface of the other; that is, not simply in some particular parts or lines of their surfaces, however many, for whatever does touch, in more than
points and lines, toucheth in every point of some surface,) thereby
become one and the same atom or perfect solid." The proof offered
is to this effect: Point for point contact by surfaces leaves no
more of separation between the two atoms than exists between the
parts of each atom; that is such contact makes the two atoms a
continuous solid. Whence it follows that: 1. Atoms which happen
to touch each other thus by surfaces can never by a finite power
be separated. 2. An infinite power must keep such atoms together:
Else some finite power could pull them apart. 3. God exerts His
power upon them, for infinite power is His. 4. Thus God must hold
the parts of atoms together or bodies would be annihilated; for we
have already seen that to divide the atom is to destroy all bodies.
5. The preservation of bodies is an incontestable argument for the
existence of God. 6. God must have created what only His power can
maintain. 7. God is wherever body is. He is omnipresent. 8. "All
body is nothing but what immediately results from the exercise of
Divine power" in the particular manner just noted. 9. Creation is
the exercise of that power by which there is indefinite resistance,
that is solidity. 10. The unknown substratum of solidity is solid-
ity itself; or, if something more ultimate is desired, it is God.
Philosophers would say so if they knew what they meant by substance.
"The substance of bodies at last becomes either nothing, or nothing
but the Deity, acting in that particular manner in those parts of
space where He thinks fit; so that, speaking most strictly, there
is no proper substance but God himself." 11. Motion which is only
the communication of resistance or body is also an exercise of the Divine power in accordance with his fixed plan which we call law of motion. "How truly then is it, that, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." 12. The notion of "Divine Concurrence had a great deal of truth lying at the bottom of it." 13. "The creation of the corporeal universe is nothing other than the first causing resistance in such parts of space as God saw fit, with a power of being communicated successively, from one part of space to another, according to such stated conditions, as his Infinite wisdom directed, and then the first beginning of this communication, so that ever after it might be continued, without deviating from those stated conditions." 14. "Laws of nature are stated methods of God's acting as to bodies. 15. "There is no such thing as mechanism": bodies do not act upon one another "purely and properly by themselves." 16. Bodies composed of atoms touching one another in many points and lines are more durable than those having atoms touching one another in a few points and lines. But the most durable body of this sort is feebleness itself composed with a body the atoms of which touch one another by surfaces.

Here Edwards conceives an objector to say: "My ... do we never find any bodies but what we can divide again?" He says: "I answer," 1. Perhaps God has made atoms of such figures that touching by surfaces is impossible to them. 2. Perhaps only a few atoms were so made as to be able thus to touch in which case the chance of their coming together might be negligible. 3. Perhaps
such as are suited to one another cannot come together by surfaces because of the figures of atoms about them. 4. Or, perhaps such atoms exist in great numbers and get together in great companies but owing to their smallness make a mass less than the microscope could discover. 5. Or it is possible that an atom here or there could be plucked as it were from the body in which it is by another atom having a surface conforming exactly to its own without damage to such a body without difference to it which is perceptible to a finite observer.

A last consequence of his basic doctrine of atoms is stated by our thinker in this way. He says: "Hence it follows, that two atoms or particles, however small, say by the force of their gravity, cleave together, with any finite degree of strength, and yet not with infinite strength," as they would do if they should touch each other by their surfaces. "And it is no strange thing, if two very small particles should cleave together, with such strength, as to exceed the force of the motion of a comet in its perihelion; so that, if all the force of that motion could be applied to these atoms, it shall not be able to rend them asunder, and yet, a greater force shall be sufficient for it."¹

The great body of the Natura, divided into two series, follow the treatment of atoms. Each series has this caption: Things to be Considered, or Written Fully About:

FIRST SERIES

The first comprises thirty-one items. The subjects of

¹ Works of Edwards, Knight, pp.708 ff.
these items include matters of optics, light and heat, meteorology, acoustics, physiology, geology, and psychology. The rest if not all of the questions broached here are of interest to all thoughtful persons. I mention a few of them as being more or less typical.

**Optics**

Thus in optics, and in relation to light and heat, it is proposed: to observe that incursion of a drop of water and hence refraction and reflection from its concave surfaces result from gravity;¹ to observe that the reason that an object though imaged in two eyes appears single is that the images exactly correspond and fall eventually point for point as one upon the aero spot in the brain;² to show that difference of refrangibility must arise from difference of velocity or difference of magnitude amongst rays;³ to show why, upon the principles of Newton in respect of light and colors, the sky is blue, the sun even at midday yellowish, and, at times, in rising and setting, red, and distant mountains blue;⁴ to inquire why all rays of one sort are obstructed by a given medium, while rays of other sorts are unimpeded by this medium, and why we have existing phenomena of reflection, and, by discovery concerning these and other such things, to "be let into a New World of Philosophy;"⁵ to show that the probable reason why no heat seems to accompany the light of the ignis fatuus, rotten wood, the glow-worm, etc., is the exquisite smallness of the rays.⁶

**Meteorology**

Concerning things of meteorology it is proposed: to show how clouds are turned to rain by the shrinking volume of

¹ No. 1 ² No. 5 ³ No. 9 ⁴ No. 11 ⁵ No. 13 ⁶ No. 9
cooling air in component bubbles which results in the water of the bubbles gathering at their under sides; 1 to explain the disparity between the temperature of the summer and that of the winter, by remarking, 1. that the reflex ray of summer is more opposite to the direct ray "and thereby raises a much hotter war, and more vehement agitation, of the particles of the air;" 2. that the slant rays of winter travel much farther through the air; 3. that the sun is a much less time above the horizon in winter; and 4. that more rays fall upon a given area from the sun when it is higher in the sky; 2 to consider that the particles of a morning fog are not single bubbles since when the fog is frozen it may be seen to to consist of six-pointed stars; 3 to note why more frigorific particles are toward the poles than are elsewhere, which is, that direct rays of the sun unfix them and the wind drives them hither and thither until on a matter of chance they come so near to the poles that they are no longer disturbed by the sun and so settle there. 4

In respect of sound, it is planned: to observe why thunder that is far away will soon dull, while that which is near seems very sharp, the reason being that the further the waves go the wider they become; 5 and to explain the long continuance of thunder which results from an instantaneous flash of lightning, by noting that some parts of the flash are farther away than other parts and that it is possible to hear the end of an explosion in the clouds before its beginning, because the end of the explosion

may be nearer to us than its beginning, and sound in such slower
than light. 1

In physiology the writer is notably concerned about
respiration and the circulation of the blood. He would
show "the grand use" of the former — "how it keeps nature in cir-
culation, and the blood in motion; and why the course of nature so
immediately ceases on the ceasing of respiration." 2 He would show
what a balance in respect of the latter is maintained; that is, how
the ascending blood is an exact counterpoise to the descending
blood. I note some of his own words. "Neither doth the blood as-
semble, he says, "with more difficulty than it descends, but with
equal facility, both in arteries and veins, above and below the
heart." He adds that he would "show the philosophy of this." 3 He
remarks the difference between the rate of flow in the larger blood
vessels and that in the smaller and explains that this is due to
the somewhat thick consistency of blood and the fact of much greater
friction in the smaller vessels. This discrepancy of rates of flow
is a beneficent arrangement, since the slower movement in the small-
er vessels, agrees with the fact that it is from then that the whole
body is principally if not entirely nourished. Otherwise "the
blood would have no time, orderly and regularly, to communicate
proper nourishment to each part, which requires different aliment,
as nothing to the brain but what is suitable, so that for the animal
spirits and other uses, one kind to the various bents, kinds of

1. No. 18. 2. No. 20. 3. No. 19.
flesh, nerves, humor, and the like." And then he observes that in case of disease this slowness of the blood in the smaller vessels is serviceable. "If," he writes, "the blood moved so very swiftly in these pipes, as in the greater veins, and one part of the body were diseased, the disease would be forthwith communicated to all others. We find when a person is hit by a serpent, if it be in a great vein, it is immediately communicated to all parts; but if not, perhaps the quantity of all the blood in the body may go through the heart many times, before the body in general feels much of the effect of the poison. If the blood were so swift in every small vein, the coldness of our extreme parts ... would kill the man, the shifting of the cold blood would be so quick."

Rocks

This small excursion is made into the geological field.

Erosion

The writer of the Notes tells us that "in the plain, flat rocks, that rivers run over, there are commonly holes, sometimes for a considerable depth into the rock, smooth on the sides, having a stone at the bottom something less than the diameter of the hole. That stone was doubtless the cause of the hole. But the difficulty is to know how the stone should first sink down so far into the firm rock. It must be thus: the stone, lying on the surface of the rock, and being a little moved by the water, greatly rubs the rock it lies on, and doubtless rubs off some particles of the rock; and so continuing to rub for a long time, perhaps hundreds of years, it wears down to such a depth in the rock."
In psychology our author expresses the following views.

The soul need not be supposed to be in all the body because the whole body is sensitive. The pleasure the mind has by the senses arises from an harmonious motion of the animal spirits: their appulse to the brain being in an harmonious order, consisting in a regular proportion of distance, time and celerity. We know that it is thus in one of the senses, to wit, hearing; which may lead us to think that it is so in all the rest, especially considering that we find nothing, that mind loves in things, but proportion. Pain is caused by a motion of the animal spirits that is contrary hereunto, or by a laceration and dislocation of the parts of the body, which are so far its destruction: which the mind abhors, by reason of the law of union between mind and body. Here follows a note relating to perception. The animal spirit in parts of the body touched "go to the brain before the soul perceives." At least this is probable. If one would have a mental picture of this notion he may think of water which fills a tube which moved however little at one end of the tube immediately gives motion at the other end of it.

**SECOND SERIES**

The second series of the Notes on Natural Science contains eighty-nine items. These items relate to things of Astronomy, physiography, tree-growth, etymology, mechanics, phytology, chronatics, acoustics, climatology, electriology, psychology, and other objects of scientific interest.

1. No. 25. 2. No. 30. 3. No. 31
Universe Spherical Finite

Our writer thinks of the universe as being "one vast spheroid." There is matter outside it, but this is so disposed that attraction on all sides is the same. But the universe is not as a drop of water in a vaster one, nor has it within it a tiny universe of like ratio to itself. The universe is of course finite. Its shell is perfectly solid, though perchance thin. It may be that some of the telescopic stars are only reflections of real stars from this shell. The fixed stars, it is "absolutely certain, are so many suns," for to change the position of the observer by the diameter of the earth's orbit makes no difference in the apparent positions of these stars. "And we know certainly that the light of the sun at such a distance will be no more than about so much as the light of a fixed star is here. (Let anybody calculate and see.)" This great brightness cannot be merely reflected. Our sun is a fixed star. Doubtless other such stars centers of systems. The sun, Edwards thinks, is probably liquid at least to a great depth from the surface inward. (1) First heat and light suggest mobility. (2) The telescope discovers conceptions in the sun which are much more agreeable to liquidity than to rigidity of material. (3) no substance known to us could fail to be liquified in such a degree of heat as must belong to the sun. Indeed it is "a strange sort of body" which endures at all "so many ages."

1. No. 1.  2. No. 2.  3. No. 3.  4. No. 5.
8. No. 37, Corollary 1.  9. No. 37, Corollary 2.
As to the brightness and whiteness of the light of the Sun, they are to be explained in this way. Its brightness is due to the intense hotness of its fires. Its whiteness is due to the proportion of blue and green rays in it; for the terrific agitation of all rays which results from the intense heat of their source tends to break up their particles, that is to convert the larger red and yellow rays into blue and green ones. Or it may be that the particles of the sun were made fire at first. Moreover it is reasonable to think that the inmeasurable pressure of part upon part in so great a mass as the sun must continually grind down toward their irreducible proportions all component particles. Indeed we find that the interior parts of the earth diffuse heat though not sufficient to set the globe afire. "It may be because the pressure is not sufficient, that the planets are not globes of fire as well as the fixed stars.\(^1\) Of matter enveloping the photosphere of the sun one of the notes has this to say. "The vast lenticular haze or mist, which appears about the body of the sun seems to me probably to arise thus. The effluvia that are carried off from the opaque bodies of the solar system, and especially the comets\(^2\) are caught by the attraction of the sun and revolve around it with a speed constantly lessened by the resistance of the ether and so gradually settle toward the photosphere. The planes of the orbits of the comets are inclined to that of the zodiac; but matter derived from the comets is seized upon by the ether-stream made by the motions of the

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\(^1\) No. 79
planets and hover about in the plane of the zodiac. What seems certain to Edwards concerning the "misty lens" is two-fold: 1. It is not a reflection or a refraction of an atmosphere; "because when it appears before the sun rises, or after it sets, it does not always appear perpendicular to the horizon, but always according to the zodiac; therefore, 2. it must be a reflection of the sun's light from some matter that really encompasses the body of the sun," 1

And this is the use of comets: "by their effluvia which go off in their tails continually, but especially in their perihelion, to feed the sun with matter suitable to be converted into rays of light, to repair the waste of such particles by the vast diffusion of light which it daily emits."

The last of the astronomical items relates to fixed stars and the rotation of the axis of the earth. "The motion of the fixed stars backwards in the ecliptic, if it be not real," the writer says, "must necessarily be caused by a motion of the poles of the earth round the poles of the ecliptic in a circle equal to the polar circle. ... Either the pole moves or the star moves." But the star, of course, is stationary. The pole is moving a degree in 70 years; whence it follows that it completes its circuit of the pole of the ecliptic in or at the end of every 25,200 years. Thus, "the earth has two rotations upon two different axes: one a diurnal upon the axis that runs from the north to south pole; another that is performed in 25,200 years, upon the

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1. No. 83. 2. No. 86.
axis that runs from one pole of the ecliptic to the other.

Now there would be exactly such a rotation upon the axis of the ecliptic, by a comet's coming near to the earth, if in the plane of the ecliptic, in its descent toward the sun: for the earth would be stretched somewhat in an oblong spheroid, in such a case; and as the comet went along, it is evident that the end of the spheroid that was next to it, would, in some measure, follow it or be drawn after it, which would begot just such a notion.\(^1\)

The following statements will sufficiently exemplify the physiographical notions of the writings we are studying. Our author proposes to write "about all the mountains being pitched over to the westward." Later he says, "it is somewhat difficult to know, how it comes to pass that there are, in all continents, however uneven and confused, hilly and jumbled, though they seem to have mountains and valleys, indifferently, and undesignedly, every where dispersed; yet, that there are such convenient channels, whereby water may be conveyed from the middle of the continents and from all parts, into the ocean. The reason is, when the world was first created, the water covering all the earth, the surface of the earth must needs be very soft, and loose, and easily worn or altered, by the motions of the water; and afterwards, the water, retiring in such a vast body, into one place, from off the continents, and some places of the (continents) being higher, and others lower, some were easily worn, and some more difficult;\(^1\)

\(^1\) No. 87.
in some places the water moving with more force, in others with less, some places would necessarily be worn deeper than others from the middle of the continent to the ocean; and as the water decreased as going off from the earth, all would retire into these channels; and after they (the waters) were gone they left channels everywhere into which, the waters afterwards gushing out in various parts of the continent, would naturally find their way. Thus also after the Deluge, when the surface of the earth was again loosened. But by this means," our author goes on, "it comes to pass, that, generally, our large rivers have champaign countries, without stones, on each side of them, before we come to the ridges of mountains, that commonly run parallel to them, at some distance on each side; and yet, near the river still, there are meadows on each side, lower than the plain; and last of all, the channel itself, as in the Connecticut River, because the water, when it first began to de-
flow from the level, it moved in vast quantities, enough to fill the whole space between the parallel mountains; so that the reason why the country is so plain, is, because it was all over the bottom of the river; but afterwards, the water decreasing, was confined to a narrower compass, and wore the meadows out. At last, still narrowing, it was confined to the space between the banks. But there being still a remainder, in the champaign, and country be-
tween the greater channels, this, flowing off by degrees, into then, wore the lesser channels for our little rivers."1

1. No. 45.
One of the most interesting and significant of all the items of the second series is that entitled Abyss. The writer thinks that there is within the shell of earth on which we live an abyss filled with water which is heavier than the shell; that "springs and fountains are much caused by the ascent of this water, in the chinks of the ground, streaming up by virtue of the central heat, and therefore, that there is a communication between the abyss and the sea; that the water in the abyss is compressed "by the weight of a body, of water, of four or five hundred miles thickness, incumbent upon it;" that if we can compress water only a little or not at all it is "merely for want of strength, for all compound bodies, that have not an absolute plenitude, are undoubtedly capable of compression, since their particles can be squeezed nearer together:" that "it is possible, that although the earth is much denser than the water, in its natural state, yet, that the water by its own weight, may so compress itself, as to bear the top of a column of earth, above its surface; that the water from the abyss will rise through chinks in the earth to the level of the surface of the sea, but no higher; that this water from the abyss is not salt water, — there is no need that the water of the abyss should be salt, because it has a communication with the sea, for the water of the sea, at a very great depth, is found not to be salt." Concerning the saltiness of the sea, Edwards says this further. "The saltiness of the ocean will not seem a matter difficult to us, if we consider, — 1. That

1. No. 71.
the earth has innumerable veins, beds, and parcels of fossil and mineral matter, that is capable of being dissolved by, and mixed with water: 2. That, as the sea covers, and washes, and soaks so great a part of the world, it is impossible, but that a very great number of these veins and beds should be soaked and washed by the sea: 3. that some of these fossils will, of themselves, dissolve in water, and mix with it, and especially salt, more perhaps than any other: 4. That some of these particles, if they be separated, and mixed with water, will again precipitate; and the water will, in time, cleanse itself from them; but salt will never precipitate itself, on the contrary, if it lies at the bottom of the water, it will of itself ascend, and diffuse itself all over the water, and will not afterwards precipitate, for if it should precipitate, its nature must be changed. 5. That salt will, of itself, dissolve, and mix with water to such a degree, that the water is, as it were, satisfied; and then, how much salt soever is thrown in, it precipitates and refuses to mix with the water: 6. That, if except the water of the sea be so full of salt, that it can hold no more, all the salt, that ever happens to mix with the water of the sea, will be there retained: 7. That if the water be not saturated with salt, or has not as many salt particles as it can retain, that the water of the sea could yet come at salt enough, to saturate it; 8. That besides the salt, which is diffused in the sea, from those beds which the sea washes, it holds all the saline particles, that are carried into it by all the rivers; and, though they should
be but for a little time, yet because the sea discharges itself of them no more, but the water when it returns by exhalation or otherwise, leaves them behind coming forth perfectly fresh, in whole ages, the rivers would carry in enough to make the sea salt. For there are a multitude of salt particles in the upper cloud of the earth, as appears, in that plants have no much salt in their constitution. And the rivers must needs bring a multitude of these: especially in times that they overflow their banks, great quantities must be carried into the rivers by rains, and the melting of snows; so that, it is impossible, but that the sea, in process of time, should be salt. ¹

¹ The reflections contained in the Metos which have to do with matters of atmosphere and climate show their character in the following ideas. "The planets may act on sublunary things, such as plants, animals, bodies of men, and indirectly upon their souls too, by that infinitely subtle matter diffused all around them; which is so subtle, as to permeate the air, and any bodies whatsoever, but more especially the moon, but most of all, the comets, because of the great quantity which is diffused from them; " In fact, our atmosphere is chiefly ether compressed by gravity. It contains of course "vapors and exhalations which ascend from the globe." Vapors are only masses of bubbles. And not only from the earth but from all heavenly bodies exhalations arise and spread through the universe acquiring rapidity of movement as they tend outward from their respective sources, since they be-

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¹ No. 72. ² No. 32.
come continually near from the force of gravity. Probably the
particles vary in character with their sources. Doubtless we are
most affected by effluvia from bodies nearest us — most fully as
noted before by emanations from the moon and from comets which pass
near us. The long lives of those who lived before the Flood enabled
them to observe much the influence of stars upon things of earth.
Thus, no doubt, "they could foretell nearly what effects such a
position or aspect of the stars would produce in the atmosphere."
The tradition of this from Noah and his sons "has been the cause of
the general opinion, which the nations of the world have had, that
the various phases and appearances of the planets had a considerable
effect upon the earth; and thus gave rise to judicial astrology, and,
in a great measure, to their worshipping the planets." Some particles
of the effluvia from the heavenly bodies are not so fine as those of
pure ether and are yet by reason of the density of the atmosphere
near the surface of the earth kept afloat; and these particles make
up a large part of the atmosphere and odors, our author believes,
are caused by such particles along with others rendered active by
rays of the sun, by other particles in motion, and by energy of
their own. ¹ Our author's account of the evaporation of water is
most interesting. He thinks the sun by the activity of its rays
drives particles of heated and therefore rarified air into the sur-
face of whatever water it shines on, and that these particles escape
from the water in bubbles, which being lighter than the air about

¹ No. 56.
then, rise and float. The greater heat caused by the sun at the surface of the earth he explains in this way. He says the case is illustrated by the falling of the sun's rays upon water. "The air," he tells us, "that is close to the surface of the water, is far more exposed to the force of the sun's rays, than any at a distance, because the other air has room to yield to the stroke of the rays, but this must bear all the brunt, and stand the stroke, and can go no further. A body that is whiten upon an evil, suffers much more by the stroke, than a thing that is floating in the free air." 2 Despite a temptation to think that only liquids give off exhalations he does not think this; but on the contrary he believes "that particles of every kind are caused, by the sun's rays, to diffuse themselves all over the atmosphere, after the same manner as odors are diffused, and those constituent parts of the atmosphere which we spoke of when treating of the atmosphere." 3 Then follows this as to heat from a secondary source. "And it is easy," he says, "to conceive, that many of these particles, when a sufficient number of them happen to get together, should be capable of creating heat after the same manner as the particles of the sun, and to any degree of intensity, and with any degree of suddenness." 4 The transition from the subject of evaporation and exhalation to that of clouds is natural. Why, it is asked, are clouds so distinctly outlined as they often are? Without observation one would expect them to have indistinct

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1. No. 57.
2. Nos. 57 and 58.
3. Nos. 56 and 73.
4. No. 73.
boundary. The explanation is the mutual attraction of the particles of vapor. Equally natural is it to go on to speak of rain.

The particular question about it is why landward breezes are likely to bring precipitation, while seaward breezes are more likely to bring fair weather. These facts are not explained merely by the other facts that the one kind of breezes come from the great source of the world's water, while the other kind come from regions relatively destitute of moisture. They are explained by the fact that landward currents of air move "up hill" and thus bear clouds too high to be supported by the upper medium of the upper atmosphere; and by the opposite fact that seaward winds bear their clouds to denser levels of the atmosphere, which are able to support them.

Winter

Winter, ice and cold next engage the writer of the

Ice

Note: He is not wholly satisfied with alginite as an explanation of these. First he says that it is not reasonable that the wedge-shaped nitrous particles of this supposed substance should thrust themselves between the freely moving globules quickly enough to stay their motion. Secondly he wishes to know how it happens that when all the interstices of the water are filled by frigid bodies it is lighter than it was. He proffers an explanation of his own. It is this. All particles of matter tend to one another. Suppose a flexible particle between particles of determinate shape. Particles touching thus at more points tend to become a solid. But solidity of any degree does not exclude porosity. Indeed by thus
binding together several particles, or many, as the case may be, into one, pores may be increased in size out of proportion to the space occupied by the binding particles. In this way water would become at once rigid and lighter. But how does cold contract some solids? The true effect, that is, the first effect of the particles is to draw other particles together. Expansion, as in the case of ice, is a secondary effect, resulting from changing the order of other particles. Nor whenever rigidity is such as to forbid the rearrangement of the particles of a body, cold contracts it for only the first effect of the frigorific particle is possible. And even in the case of water in rarefied forms the effect of frigorific particles is to condense it; for example, in changing vapor into clouds and rain. This is true because the particles of the vapor are so far a part already that the secondary effect of the action of the frigorific particles cannot equal the diffusion of particles by evaporation. Cold makes hard bodies brittle by rendering their particles immovable by the binding action of the frigorific corpuscles. In the case of water, it seems necessary to presuppose the binding particle. Not so in that of wax or tarlon: "For their particles seem to be of such a figure, that they tend of themselves to stick together, and that it is only the active particles of heat, that keeps them from adhering one to another, as in metals, and in stones, sand, and ashes, which are all capable of liquification. As to the pain of being cold, the young philosopher thinks it is due to the binding power of the cold particle which retards the
Fluids of the body and the animal spirits; which will contract, strain and pinch up the vessels, the veins and nerves, and most especially the capillary ones." Of the opposition between the frigid particles and the thermal particles he thinks thus. "It is also easy and natural to suppose," he says, "that these exceedingly active particles, which cause heat, should disengage these frigurile particles from others, to which they cleave, and thereby set them at liberty again."

**Light**

Light, color and electricity are of great interest to

**Color**

the author of the Notas as he appears in this second

**Electricity**

series of them. Of his more important ideas of matter belonging to these I note the following examples. The different refrangibility of rays is one of his problems. Rays he thinks have figure, magnitude, hardness, internal texture, and density. Refrangibility depends upon perhaps attractability and that he decides depends upon density and not upon the other properties of rays. "The densest rays will come from the sun with the most rapid motion" because their "repercussions in the sun" will be the most violent. How the rays that move swiftly by a body will be less attracted by that body than slower rays would be. Also, the swiftest rays will most push on, least be turned back, least reflected. This difference of density and swiftness in rays together with differences in the density and firmness of the bodies upon which they strike makes

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1. Nos. 76 and 77.
an infinite variety of colors. Of all colors red is strongest and harshest, and blue weakest and gentlest. When at sunset the air is denser than usual only red fights its way through to us; whence it is that the sun then looks as red as blood. Blue is reflected by the weakest bodies, "such as air, and their exhalations as in the blueness of the skin."

Lightning

Of lightning, Edwards writes that it is "not caused by any solid burning, or red hot mass of matter, exploded with such swiftness as to cause it to appear as if it were one continued stream of light: nor are the effects of lightning caused by the violent stroke of any such mass." A body thus projected would observe the laws of projectiles, which lightning does not, for example in its very crooked and angled" path. Nor is lightning caused by the taking fire of veins of combustible matter. "Lightning seems to be this: an almost infinitely fine, combustible matter, that floats in the air, that takes fire by a sudden and mighty fermentation, that is some way promoted by the cool and moisture, and perhaps attraction, of the clouds." The course of the burning matter is determined by such aerial conditions as cold and heat, density and rarity, moisture and dryness. Since these conditions are varied sharply from region to region of the atmosphere the course of the flash changes abruptly, from stage to stage. And it is remarked that "The rapid vibration of the air jars and jumbles, breaks and condenses, the bubbles of the clouds; whence it is, that, soon after

1. Nos. 45 and 89.
2. No. 67.
hard clays of thunder rain falls in greater plenty."

To matters about sound contained in the first series something is added in the second series. This will sufficiently represent the addition. Sound is said to be caused by the vibration of the air in "quick and sudden shocks, or leaps, reciprocated." Also, it is said, that sound that is made by the collision of solid bodies, is not made by the sudden start of the air from between the closing parts of those bodies; but the vibration of the air is begotten by a vibration of the parts of the bodies themselves; for if the body that is smitten be set upon another, the sound will be like that of the body it stands upon; which can be for no other reason, than that the vibration is communicated to the parts of that body, and from them to the air. So from the communication of sound in a long stick of timber; if we lay our ear at the further end, when it is struck, the sound will seem to be made there; which is doubtless, from the communication of the vibration, through the parts of the timber." As to loudness, the notes say that, in the case of many sounds, it arises from their continuance. For example, "if three sounds be made upon the ear, in so little time, that the mind has not the least sense of succession ....; then it will be all one to the mind, as if these three sounds had been made at once; and the sound will be as much louder than one of these sounds alone, as three joined together, would be louder than one of them." From the operation of this principle

1. No. 67.
arise in part the shrillness with which a bell sounds and the
loudness of thunder. 1

Perhaps the most interesting observation in mechanics

Lever
to be found in this part of the Notes is about the
principle of the lever. 2 As to tree growth what is best worth
noting is doubtless this, "And the trees, that grow now, are
nothing but the branches of those first trees", that is, the trees
first made by God: "which, although the communication with the
original branch has closed, yet still continues to grow and to be
diversified into more branches, in the same regular and uniform
method in infinitum and the seed, from wherever our trees proceed,
are no new plants, but branches of the old, a continuation of the
same plant, in its infinite regular progress — branches not yet
expanded. The trees, or seeds, or whatever they were, that God
first created, were only the beginning of this progress, enough
to set it a going". 3

Animal Spirits In the work of which these notes are the basis, the
Emission Influx author of them proposes in speaking of the body of man
to demonstrate that the same is distinct from matter. 4 Further,
concerning the same, he holds, that it can influence the body only
by invasion of animal spirits from the brain. The body, in turn,
influences the same by the action of those same animal spirits —
sometimes by influx, at other times by efflux, of them. Some
invasions of animal spirits are a natural result of the residence
of the same in the brain, while others are the result of volition.
It is to be observed that emission and retraction of spirits contin-
ally balance each other. 1

Much else of large interest is in the notes of the second series; but it is not within the proper scope of this writing to treat of it. There is, however, one note of such significance to the central interest of this study that it demands a place here; for it shows our author reaching up to his supreme thought — to God; and it is striking that this upward reaching is from the level of the atom. Between the two the atom and God — is the system of the world. These are the words of the note. The author is still thinking as, indeed, he always is, of the work into which the conceptions of the notes will grow. In it he is "To show how the motion, rest, and direction of the least atom has an influence on the motion, rest and direction of every body in the universe; and to show how, by that means, every thing which happens, with respect to notes, or straw and such little things, may be for some great uses in the whole course of things, throughout eternity; and to show how the least wrong step in a note, may, in eternity subvert the order of the universe; and to take notice of the great violation, that is necessary, in order time to dispose every atom at first, so that they should go for the best, throughout all eternity, and in the adjusting, by an exact computation, and a wise allowance to be made for miracles, which should be needful, and other ways whereby the course of bodica

1. No. 50.
should be directed. — And those to show how God, who does this, must be necessarily omniscient, and knows every least thing that must happen through eternity."

In "A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections"

The views and reasonings with which a student of the philosophy of Edwards is chiefly concerned in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections are not numerous in proportion to the volume of that work, but they are very important. What is essential in them to us now appears in the following quotations.

True Religion

"True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections. But what are the affections? They are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul. God has endued the soul with two principal faculties: the one, that which is capable of perceptions and speculation, or by which it discerns and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The other, that by which the soul is some way inclined with respect to things it views and considers; or it is the faculty by which the soul beholds things — not as an indifferent unaffected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names; it is

1. No. 14.
sometimes called the **inclinations**; and, as it respects the actions determined and governed by the will; and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart. The exercises of this last faculty are of two sorts; either those by which the soul is carried out towards the things in view in **approving** them, being pleased with and inclined to them; or, those in which the soul opposes the things in view **disapproving** them; and in being displeased with aversive from and rejecting them. —

And as the exercises of the inclination are various in their kinds, so they are much more various in their **degrees**. There are some exercises of pleasedness, or displeasedness, inclination or dis-inclination, wherein the soul is carried but a little beyond a state of perfect indifference. And there are other degrees wherein the approbation or dislike, pleasedness or aversion, are stronger; wherein we may rise higher and higher, till the soul comes to act vigorously and sensibly, and its doings are with that strength, that (through the laws of union which the creator has fixed between soul and body) the motion of the blood and the animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered; whence, oftentimes arises some bodily sensation especially about the **heart** and **vitals**, which are the fountain of the **fluids** of the body. Whence it comes to pass, that the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, perhaps in all nations and ages, is called the heart. And it is to be noted, that they are these more vigorous and sensible exercises of this faculty, which are called the **affections**.
"The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination, but only in the liveness and sensibility of exercise. It must be confessed, that language is here somewhat imperfect, the meaning of words in a considerable measure loose and unfixed, and not precisely limited by custom which governs the use of language. In some sense, the affection of the soul differs nothing at all from the will and inclination, and the will never is in any exercise further than it is affected; it is not moved out of a state of perfect indifference, any otherwise than it is affected one way or other. But yet there are many actings of the will and inclination that are not commonly called affections. In everything we do, wherein we act voluntarily, there is an exercise of the will and inclination. It is an inclination that governs us in our actions; but all the actings of the inclination and will, are not ordinarily called affections. Yet, what are commonly called affections are not essentially different from them, but only in the degree and manner of exercise. In every act of the will, whatsoever, the soul either likes or dislikes, is either inclined or disinclined to what is in view. These are not essentially different from love and hatred. A liking or inclination of the soul to a thing, if it be in a high degree vigorous and lively, is the very same thing with the affection of love; and a disliking and disinclining, if in a great degree, is the very same with hatred."
In every act of the will for or towards something not present, the soul is in some degree inclined to that thing; and that inclination if in a considerable degree, is the very same with the affection desire and in every degree of an act of the will, wherein the soul approves of something present, there is a degree of pleasen:e; and that pleasen:e, if it be in a considerable degree, is the very same with the affection of joy or delight. And if the will disapproves of what is present, the soul is in some degree displeased, and if that displeasen:e be great, it is the very same with the affection of grief or sorrow.

Mind and Body

“Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there never is in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the inclination, without some effect upon the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of the animal spirits. — And, on the other hand, from the same laws of union, over the constitution of the body, and the motion of its fluids, any promote the exercise of the affections. But yet it is not the body, but the mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of a man is capable of thinking and understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas so it is the soul only that has ideas so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its
I should. As it is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves, or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of. Nor are those notions of the animal spirits, and fluids of the body, anything properly belonging to the nature of the affections; though they always accompany them, in the present state; but are only effects or concomitants of the affections, which are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way essential to them; so that an unembodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear or other affections, as one that is united to a body.

Affections

"The affections and passions are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet, in the more common use of speech, there is, in some respect, a difference. Affection is a word, that, in its ordinary signification, seems to be something more extensive than passion, being used for all vigorous lively actions of the will or inclination; but passion is used for those that are sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, the mind being more overpower'd, and loses in its own command.

"As all the exercises of inclination and will, are concerned either in approving and liking, or disapproving or rejecting; so the affections are of two sorts; they are those by which the soul is carried out to what is in view, cleaving to it or seeking it; or those by which it is averse from it and opposes it. Of the former sort are love, desire, hope, joy, gratitude,
compliance. Of the latter kind are hatred, fear, anger, grief, and such like; which it is needless now to stand particularly to define.

"And there are some affections wherein there is a composition of each of the aforementioned kinds of actions of the will; as in the affection of pity, there is something of the former kind, towards the person suffering, and something of the latter towards what he suffers. And so in zeal, there is in it high approbation of some person or thing, together with vigorous opposition to what is conceived to be contrary to it." 1

To the preceding paragraphs which are distinctively related to the philosophy of our author should be added some passages which are more generally, though by no means less truly related to his ways of thinking. These belong to the religious purpose which prompted and vitalized the whole of the work which now engages our thought. I set down first this.

Religious

"All gracious persons have a solid, full, thorough, and effectual conviction of the truth of the great things of the Gospel. They no longer halt between two opinions. The great doctrines of the Gospel cease to be any longer doubtful things, or matters of opinion, which though probable, are yet disputable; but with them, they are points settled and determined as un doubted and indisputable; so that they are not afraid to

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venture their all upon their trust. Their conviction is an 
effectual conviction; so that the great, spiritual, mysterious, 
and invisible things of the Gospel, have the influence of real and 
certain things upon them; they have the weight and power of real 
things in their hearts; and accordingly rule in their affections, 
and govern them through the course of their lives. With respect to 
Christ’s being the Son of God, and Savior of the World, and the 
great things he has revealed concerning himself, and his Father, and 
another world, they have not only a predominating opinion that 
these things are true, and so yield their consent, as they do in 
many other matters of doubtful speculation; but they see that it is 
really so: their eyes are opened, so that they see that really 
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. And as to the 
things which Christ has revealed, of God’s eternal purposes and 
designs, concerning fallen man, and the glorious and everlasting 
things prepared for the saints in another world, they see that they 
are so indeed: and therefore these things are of great weight with 
them, and have a mighty power upon their hearts, and influence over 
their practice, in some measure answerable to their infinite im-
portance.”

A New 
Sense

I cite next these words, “Here is, as it were, a new 
spiritual sense, or a new principle of a new kind of 
perception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole nature 
different from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as

tasting is diverse from any of the other senses. And something is perceived by a true saint, in the exercise of this new sense of mind in spiritual and divine things, as entirely diverse from any thing that is perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is diverse from the idea men get of honey by only looking on and feeling it. So that the spiritual perceptions which a sanctified and spiritual person has, are not only diverse from all that natural men have as the perceptions of the same sense may differ from one another, but rather as the ideas and sensations of different senses may differ. Hence the work of the Spirit of God in regeneration is often in Scripture compared to the giving of a new sense, eyes to see, ears to hear, unstopping the ears of the deaf, opening the eyes of them that were born blind, and turning from darkness into light. And because this spiritual sense is immensely the most noble and excellent, and that without which all other principles of perception, and all our faculties, are useless and vain; therefore the giving of this new sense, with the blessed fruits and effects of it in the soul, is compared to the raising of the dead, and to a new creation.

Now Principles

"This new spiritual sense, and the new dispositions that attend it, are no new faculties, but new principles of nature: I use the word principles, for want of a word of a more determinate signification. By a principle of nature in this place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature; either
old or now, for any particular measure or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul; or a natural habit, or foundation for action, giving a person ability and disposition to exert the faculties in exercises of such a certain kind; so that to exert the faculties in that kind of exercises, may be said to be his nature. So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but in a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding. So that the new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of the will.\footnote{Works of Edwards, Rogers & Hickman, vol. I, p.267 - P. III, 5.1.}

I next note this language. From what has been said it follows, that all spiritual and gracious affections are attended with, and arise from, some apprehension, idea, or sensation of mind, which is in its whole nature different, from all that is or can be in the mind of a natural man. The natural man discerns nothing of it, any more than a man without the sense of tasting can conceive of the sweet taste of honey; or a man without the sense of hearing can conceive of the melody of a tune; or a man born blind can have a notion of the beauty of a rainbow.\footnote{Works of Edwards, Rogers & Hickman, vol. I, p.267 - P. III, 5.1.}
this holy relish discerns and distinguishes between good and evil, between holy and unholy, without being at the trouble of a train of reasoning. As he who has a true relish of external beauty, knows what is beautiful by looking upon it; he stands in no need of a train of reasoning about the proportion of the features, in order to determine whether that which he sees be a beautiful countenance or no; he needs nothing but only the glance of his eye. He who has a rectified musical ear, knows whether the sound he hears be true harmony; he does not need to be at the trouble of the reasonings of a mathematician, about the proportion of the notes. He that has a rectified palate, knows what is good food, as soon as he tastes it, without the reasoning of a physician about it. There is a holy beauty and sweetness in words and actions, as well as a natural beauty in countenances and sounds, and sweetness in food. .......When a holy and amiable action is suggested to the thought of a holy soul; that soul, if in the lively exercise of its spiritual taste, at once sees a beauty in it, and so inclines to it, and closes with it."

I add these short passages. "In the love of the true saint God is the lowest foundation. ....And as it is with the love of the saints, so it is with their joy, and spiritual delight; the first foundation of it is not any consideration of their interest in divine things; but it primarily consists in the sweet entertainment

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their minds have in the contemplation of the divine and holy beauty of those things, as they are in themselves. The first foundation of the delight, a true saint has in God, is his own perfection; and the first foundation of the delight he has in Christ, is his own beauty; he appears in himself the chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. A true saint, when in the enjoyment of true discoveries of the sweet glory of God and Christ, has his mind too much captivated and engaged by what he views without himself, to stand at that time to view himself, and his own attainments. It would be a loss which he could not bear, to have his eye taken off from the ravishing object of his contemplation, in order to survey his own experience, and to spend time thinking with himself, what a high attainment this is, and what a good story I now have to tell others! Nor does the pleasure and sweetness of his mind at that time, chiefly arise from the safety of his state, or anything he has in view of his own gratifications, experiences, or circumstances; but from the divine and supreme beauty of what is the object of his direct view, without himself; which exactly entertains and strongly holds his mind.

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In "The Freedom of the Will"

In A Careful And Strict Inquiring Into The Prevailing Notions Of The Freedom Of The Will Edwards proceeds in this way.

He presents his matter in four parts: "Part I. Wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belonging to the subject of the ensuing discourse; Part II. Wherein it is considered, whether there is or can be any such sort of freedom of the will, as that wherein Arminians place the essence of the liberty of all moral agents; and whether any such thing ever was or can be conceived of; Part III. Wherein is inquired, whether any such liberty of will as Arminians hold, be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and dispraise, etc.; Part IV. Wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of Arminians in support and defence of the formentioned notions of liberty, moral agency, etc., and against the opposite doctrines, are considered.

The definitions statements and other explanatory matter of the first part seek to make clear the following things: The nature of the will; the determination of the will; the meaning of the words necessity, impossibility, inability, and the like; and contingency; the distinction between natural necessity and moral necessity; the notions of liberty and moral agency.

FIRST PART

Definitions

The will is defined as "that by which the mind chooses anything." It is determined by "that motive, which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest." Necessity as thought of by persons in general differs from necessity.

as properly conceived of by philosophy. Philosophical Necessity is "the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and the predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true." This is only certainty. That is whatever is certain is necessary. Impossibility is merely negative necessity, i.e. "necessity that a thing should not be." In like manner contingency has got a special sense in philosophy: it stands "for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed or certain connection." How tenable or the reverse this notion of contingency is will appear later. The necessity just defined as the infallible connection of things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition is of two sorts: moral and natural. The former is the certainty of the connection of things "which arises from moral causes." The latter is the certainty of the connection of things which arises from "natural causes, as distinguished" from "habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements." The former may be as absolute as the latter. The difference between them does not lie in the connection itself but in the things connected. Thus there is a difference between moral inability and natural inability. Under the latter is inability to do even though we would;

the former is inability to do simply and solely because we will not. As to liberty, it belongs only to beings which have wills, and is the power of doing what they severally will. The will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. ... To be free is the property of an agent, ... not the property of a property. A moral agent is a being with a moral sense and the capacity of "being influenced in his actions by moral influences."^2

SECOND PART

Arminian The second part of the inquiry aims to show that no
Notion such freedom of the will as Arminians suppose to be the basis of moral agency is at all conceivable. Take their sup-
Unthinkable position that the will has a self-determining power — that the will itself determines all the free acts of will. How does the will act? By willing, by choosing. Thus according to this doc-
trine the will wills its acts of will, chooses its choices. But what of its first act, its first choice? Does it will this, choose this? Well then, this is not the first act of the will, not the first choice. What determines the first act of the will must be something else than the will. But this is to destroy the freedom which consists in the self-determination of the will;

(1) for this first act is not, according to the supposition with

which we are dealing, free; and, (2) since all the rest of the
train of acts of the will depend upon this one, they cannot be free.¹

Or is it supposed that acts of the will can be uncaused? Can "any
event whatsoever...come to pass without a cause of its existence," i.e., "without a reason why it is, rather than not?" Of course not.²

And "it is as repressive to reason, to suppose that an act of the
will should come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the
human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole
universe, should come into existence without a cause."³

But the Arminian says that the law of cause and effect
is operative amongst bodies, but not necessarily amongst spirits,
for they have the springs of action in themselves. It is true
that "the activity of the soul may enable it to be the cause of
effects; but it does not at all enable it to be the subject of
effects which have no cause."⁴ Further it is not a question of the
fact of activity in general in the mind, but of a particular
action. Why that action rather than another?⁵ Does the soul
excite it by its own power of willing? But when the soul acts
thus, its act, as we have seen, is an act of the will. That is,
as we have also seen, the soul determines its acts of the will by
other acts of the will. But this leads to the absurdity of a free
act of the will; or the determination of all acts of the will by

¹ Works of Edwards, Rogers & Dickman, vol. I, p. 15, = P.II, 54.1
² Ibid., vol. I, p. 15, P.II, 54.3
³ Ibid., vol. I, p. 17, = P.II, 54.2
⁴ Ibid., vol. I, p. 17, = P.II, 54.5
some first necessitated act in each train of acts. 'For still the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of the will which chose the consequent act. The answer must be that his liberty in this also lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeable to another act of choice preceding that. And so the question returns in infinitum, and the like answer must be made in infinitum. In order to support their opinion, there must be no beginning, but free acts of will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the soul of every man, without beginning.'

Take next the notion of the will as acting in a case in which the mind is absolutely indifferent. An Arminian author says, "The will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the will may determine itself to choose one or the other;" also, "Which I shall choose must be determined by the sole act of my will." But this is that same absurdity which we just dealt with — the absurdity of making choice free by making it the effect of antecedent choice. Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fitness in objects presented," this author has these words: "There it must act by its own choice, and determine itself as it pleases." Where it is supposed that the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable than another; and this preference and superior pleasure is

the ground of all it does in the case. ..... So that this wholly
destroye the thing supposed, viz. that the mind can by a sovereign
power choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the
mind are, in every respect perfectly equal, one of which does not
at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind
above another.1 Even in the case of one who is desired to teach
an undesignated spot on a chess-board and does so, there is no such
contingency as luminous imagine. One may be indifferent in respect
of the spots on the board but he is not and cannot be as to the
act desired of him. Also one may be indifferent as to the act in
a remote and general view of it. But the last step in willing does
not allow this. One teaches the spot which actually prevails in the
minds eye.2

Consider also the thought of some that the mind has
power to suspend volition. If the mind has this power and actually
uses it the act by which it does so is an act of choice, i.e., of
will. In other words liberty of will consists in the power of
willing not to will; which comes to this: liberty of will consists
in willing and not at all in a state of indifference. Thus the
notion of the suspended will destroys itself — it is only a phrase.3

In respect of the relation between the understanding
and the will, if the will determines its own acts then either no

such relation exists or the will determines the understanding, or the understanding and the will are the same; that is, the will acts without regard to dictates of perception and reflection or it acts with regard to these. The former is absurd. The latter makes perception and concepts factors in acts of the will and thus destroys its independence.  

But the supreme opposition involved in the Arminian notion of the liberty of the will is that between it and the Biblical teaching of God's foreknowledge. This opposition declares itself in this emphatic and conclusive way: That is foreknown cannot be otherwise than necessary, since to say that what God fore-knows can be otherwise than as he fore-knows it is nonsense. Or, to put the matter conversely, no contingent thing can conceivably be foreknown. That is not a part of an ordered whole cannot be the object of even imperfect intelligence. And that an absurdity it is to say that God knows as certain and fixed what is only contingent.  

All Arminians and all the sympathise with their lofty talk of the sovereignty of the will do not think rightly. They should rather ask, "what dignity or privilege" there is "in being given up to such a will contingency as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as such without the guidance of the understanding, as if we had none, or were as

Third Part

The third part of the work we are studying examines the doctrine of contingency in its bearing upon the matter of moral agency and moral responsibility.

Libertarians hold that goodness which is necessary cannot be praise-worthy, i.e., it is not moral good. But is it not a doctrine of Scripture that God is necessarily good? Is He not then praise-worthy? Thus it appears that necessity does not destroy the moral agency of God and the moral character of His acts. And was not Jesus necessarily holy? Was He the less to be honored for that? And are the utterly depraved blameless, merely because they are under necessity, i.e., are utterly unwilling to be other than they are? What of those whom God "gives up" to sin? Are they faultless? Not blame-worthy? Note that contingency is itself opposed to the whole scheme of moral government in this: it holds that liberty and therefore moral agency and accountability are in the determination by the will of its own acts. But we have seen how this self-determination must either be with a chain of acts of the will without end, or have something before the first act.

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of the will which determines it. But to determine that the first act of the will is to put all successive acts under the same necessity. Commands, assertions, motives are without purpose or effect; for whatever that first determining act of the soul which lies back of all acts of the will may be, it is, by hypothesis, not another act of the will, and is not, therefore, accessible to command or precept.

The liberty of indifference, likewise, so far is it from being necessary to moral agency, is at war with it. By the notion of this "vice and virtue are wholly excluded from the world;" since any previous bias to an act compromises its character in respect of virtue or vice. But now suppose what is impossible, namely, that one may act in utter indifference. In this case there is action without choice. What is done is thus, a contingency. The act happens to the man, arising from nothing in him; and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of his; and therefore cannot make him either the better or worse; any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it often happens to be lighted upon by a nightingale; or a rock more vicious than other rocks, because rattlesnake have happened oftener to crawl over it. So, that there is no virtue nor vice in good or bad dispositions, either fixed or transient; nor any virtue or vice in acting from any good or bad previous inclination; nor yet any vir-

tue or vice in acting wholly without any previous inclination.

Where then shall we find room for virtue or vice?"

FOURTH PART

The fourth part of the Inquiry proceeds and combats arguments offered in support of the notion of the liberty of will which consists in contingency of action. It attends first to the insistent view that virtue lies in the cause of an action rather than in its nature. But the view is opposed alike to philosophy and to common sense: to philosophy since it involves search for an ultimate cause of every action before it may be morally judged, which search is obviously an infinite regress, i.e., futile and ridiculous; to common sense, since, to it, ingratitude, for example, "is hateful and worthy of dispraise, not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the cause that produced it; but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deformity;" and the love of virtue, to use another example, "is amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place there—for instance, our own choice; we chose to love virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it—but because of the amibleness and condency of such a disposition and inclination of heart." Moreover, common sense

2. Ibid., vol.I, pp.57ff, P.IV, S.1e.
regards moral necessity as consistent with praise and blame. For example, it thinks of a man as worthy of blame who has a wrong heart and does wrong from his heart. Thus blame attaches in the view of common sense to the nature of the action without question as to its cause. ¹

And then the argument that necessity reduces men to machines is treated. The writer assumes for the moment its validity. Why then contingency reigns. The act of the will is only related to some precedent act of the same will. It has no dependence upon any foregoing event or existence. Hence the vice or virtue of any act of the will is without relation to foregoing means: endeavors, prayers or deeds human or divine.² Thus contingency reduces men below the machine. So far is it from giving them dignity and privilege above machines; for, "whereas, machines are guided by an intelligent cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner; the will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingency."³

It is said by libertarians that the doctrine of necessity is the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or that it is the same as the doctrine of Mr. Hobbes concerning the will. Edwards answers that the Stoics differed amongst themselves and he will not attempt to interpret them; but that "if any of them held such a Fate, as is

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² Ibid., pp. 677, p. 44, S. 5.
³ Ibid., p. 69, p. 44, S. 5.
repetition to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please," he "utterly" denies "such a fate;" that, as to Mr. Hobbes, he has not read him, but that agreement, if it exists between himself and Hobbes as to necessity in the action of the will, does not at all tend to disprove such necessity any more than the proclamation of the Sonship of Jesus by Satan made that great doctrine false. 1

It is urgently objected by libertarians that the doctrine of necessity takes away the proper sovereignty of God. And yet a chief exponent of libertarianism, Edwards says, "one thing that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose that appears most fit, where there is a superior Goodness and fitness in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed that in those things where there is any real preferable choice, it is no dishonor, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from necessity." Accordingly if it should be that there is always between possible things a difference of consequence to God, "there it would be no dishonor or anything unbecoming for God's will to be necessarily determined in every thing." If it be said that there are cases in which no preferable choice do in things as they are in the view of God, this has nothing to do with the question which we are thinking of. But supposing for the moment that it bore upon our

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question, it is easily answered. The answer is this: It is neither
proved nor can it be proved that there is amongst existences of
whatever sort any such indifference as is affirmed to be. Indeed
there is a practical and theoretical certainty that however the
case may stand for us, there is for God a difference between
different things.

But, says the libertarian, by the doctrine of necessity,
God is made the author of sin. But perplexity as to the problem
of evil must infect the thinking of libertarians who recognize that
God foreknows all that is or may be quite as much as that of
necessarians. Besides God is not the actor of sin: He only per-
nits it and controls it for His own vast and high ends. Now differ-
ent this is from his being the actor of sin will appear in this
analogy. The sun makes light and warmth and the brightness of
gold and diamonds "by its presence and positive influence;" it makes
darkness and frost by its absence and privative influence, i.e.,
by its motion. Thus God makes holiness in men by his positive
influence: they sin only when He leaves them to themselves. And
it belongs to God as supreme to order all things, most especially
what belongs to moral beings. He must not leave such things to
chance. To do so would be to abdicate his throne, to belittle his
nature. To manage moral affairs cannot then in him be immoral.
and such management infringes not the least any liberty which any

man has or can conceivably have. He may do as he chooses. To any who say that sin is so opposed to the nature of God that it is inconceivable that he should permit it and dispose its events and effects it is replied that "There is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences of the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world."

Now necessary it is to understand that God can permit and dispose sin and yet hate it will more clearly appear from the following axioms. First, "God is a perfectly happy Being." Second, He is thus free from all that is contrary to happiness. Third, if He were crossed and disappointed, he would have trouble. Hence it follows that He is not thus crossed and disappointed. His will is one; and this fact it is which effects his hatred of sin. But for this fact he must be "infinitely the most miserable of all beings."2

If it is urged against the necessarian view that in defending itself it makes use of the notion that one may do evil that good may result, the answer is "that for God to dispose and permit evil, in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all. - In order to a thing being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it, either it must be a thing unfit and un-
suitable in its own nature; or it must have a bad tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events, as the immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1) It is not unfit in its own nature, that he should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being who has infinite wisdom and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the world should take care of that matter. And, therefore there is no unfitness or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair; because they are not possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe. .... (2) It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point now in question.... (5) Nor is there any need of supposing, it proceeds from any evil disposition or sin; for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue in the final result of things.

In respect of the problem of the origin of evil the necessarian incurs no difficulty which does not equally exist for his opponent. The foreknowledge of God makes the same problem upon the view of either. To suppose a foreseen accident and the willing of the order which includes it — accident on the one hand and inclusive willed order and foresight on the other make a contradiction — is to make God responsible for the accident quite as much as to suppose a willed system which forbids any such thing as accident.¹

In the last place, the view that necessarian principles tend to atheism and licentiousness, and that, therefore, the opposite view should be espoused and cleaved to, is not warranted by either facts of history or the reasonings of philosophy. In the ancient pagan world it was the Stoics who were the greatest theists and the Epicureans who were the greatest atheists. In more recent times and in Christian countries virtue and religious practice have most prevailed where Calvinian "prevailed almost universally." As to the present, when Arminianism prevails greatly and increasingly, there is no corresponding moral improvement of men, but rather an increase of vice and all sin; so that there is a threat of the banishment of all religion and of the prevalence of "unbounded licentiousness of manners." The respective relations of these opposite doctrines to speculative

nations of God and his moral government have already been examined at length. As a result of our examination of them or even apart from such examination it is obvious that "the doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connection of all events, on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the existence of God; and the contrary doctrine of contingency... (which certainly implies, or infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence on anything foregoing, as their cause, ground or reason,) takes away all proof of the being of God."¹

The animus of the work into the four parts of which we have just looked has perhaps already sufficiently declared itself. In any case it appears quite unmistakably in the last paragraph of the whole. "The truth of the case is," so runs the passage, "that if Scripture plainly taught the opposite doctrines to those that are so much stumbled at, namely, the Arminian doctrine of free will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any, even the most mysterious, of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late free-thinkers have so superciliously exploded. Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures, that they teach

such doctrines, which in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the wise and great men of the world; which yet, when they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural dictates of reason. By such things it appears that the foolishness of God is wiser than men. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; I will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? And as it was in time past, so probably it will be in time to come, as it is written, 'But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty; and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; that no flesh should glory in his presence.' Amen.

In "The Great Christian Doctrine Of Original Sin Defended"

The teaching of the treatise on original sin is, like that on the freedom of the will, in four parts. The first part considers some evidences of native human depravity. These comprise

facts and events observed and experienced, testimonies of Scripture, and "the confession and assertion of opposers." Part II raises observations on particular passages of the Bible which are thought to support the doctrine in question. Part III notes and examines the redemption by Christ as an evidence of the original corruption of human nature. Part IV contains answers to objections.

**Argument Summarized**

The general course of the argument of this work may be seen in the following summary. All men without exception tend to sin and the ruin which is inseparable from it. Universal sin proves a universal sinful propensity. Hence it follows that men are by nature "in a corrupt, fallen and ruined state." Men begin to sin as soon as they are able and do so continually and progressively; and even the best of men have the remains of sin in them. Moreover in their natural state all have more sin than virtue. They tend, also, to extreme folly in religion. In a word, the most of mankind have been wicked persons. Not the least conclusive fact in support of the doctrine of original sin is the slight effect of the "manifold and great means used to promote virtue in the world." And the tragic fact of universal death, and "particularly the death of infants with its various circumstances," proves the moral badness, by nature, of every human person.

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9. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 173ff = P. I, Chap. II.
Sin came into the world through Adam, who was originally righteous, having not merely the natural faculties of men, but also, "a principle of holiness in his heart." In him the race sinned; for he and the race are as such a single being as are the root stock and branches of a tree. His sin was theirs, not by a theological fiction, but in sober fact. But how are Adam and his race one? Our thinking at this point may easily be at fault. We used to inquire what is sameness of being? Certainly not any such identity as that of God himself, "the same yesterday, today and forever." All other sameness is simply his ordinance. Whatever for any purpose or purposes he has joined together; for example: a tree with all its various parts, a man's body in all stages from infancy to age and even a man's body and his soul. Besides God maintains with constancy what he has ordained by the same power which he used in creation. Thus maintenance is only a succession of creations. The tree, the body, the person and all things else are each of them many, i.e., immovable creations which God chooses to treat as in some sense one. He chooses thus to think of Adam and his children.

Sin exists by reason of nothing imported into the heart of man, but only from the privation of the principle of holiness which resulted from the disobedience of Adam. Thus God does not cause it by any positive act of his. It is not

2. Ibid., vol. I, p. 221 and note - P. IV, Chap. III.
3. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 222ff - P. IV, Chap. III.
something, by some means or other, infused into the human nature; some quality or other, not from the choice of our minds, but like a taint, tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties and dispositions of our souls." It is not "implanted in the fœtus in the womb." That is man is not "conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart," if by this is meant "anything properly positive." His case is this. "When God made man at first, he implanted in his two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor and pleasure, were exercised: these when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call Flesh. Besides these, were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural, being (however concreted or connoted yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine Communications and influences of God's Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man's
nature forsaken of those principles, human nature would be human nature still: man's nature, as such, being entire without those divine principles which the Scripture sometimes calls Spirit in contradistinction to flesh. Those superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. Those divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man's nature. When man sinned and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, those superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which those principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principle wholly ceased; so light ceased in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woful corruption, and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being left alone, and
left to themselves, of course become reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites as supreme; and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles are like fire in a house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction." Self consideration is not intrinsically wrong, but when it displaces regard for God it is heinous; "and nothing but war ensues, in a constant course against God." Thus "Adam's nature became corrupt, without God's implanting or infusing of any evil thing into it;" and the nature of his race has become corrupt in the same way. From all which it comes that God is in no positive way the author of sin. ¹

In God Responsible?  But is he not the author of sin by his removal from man? This has been dealt with in the Freedom of the Will. ² It may be said here, however, that it is quite in the order of nature that children of Adam should be born without holiness; as much so as it is that Adam should have continued unholy and corrupt after he lost his holiness. If any ask why

2. Freedom of the Will, Part IV, Sec. 9.
according to the same established course of Nature the children of those having divine grace should not be born with holiness, it can only be answered that "the divine law and establishments of the author of nature are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom."

Argument Appraised

The things just set down are those which are most salient in the work concerning the doctrine of original sin. I cannot better conclude my statement of them than in a reproduction of Doctor Wright's compact and sympathetic notice of that work. The following are his words. "The views of Dr. Edwards, in this treatise, are these; that there is a tendency in human nature, prevailing and effectual, to that sin, which implies the utter ruin of all; that this tendency originates in the sin of Adam, of which the whole race are imputed the partakers; and that this tendency consists, in their being left of God, at their original, in the possession of merely human appetites and passions, in themselves 'innocent,' and without the influx of those superior principles, which come from divine influences. The only guilt, attributed by him to mankind, before they come to the exercise of moral agency themselves, is that of participating in the apostacy of Adam, in consequence of the original constitution of God, which made him and his race 'one.' He supposes this tendency to sin, pertaining to men, at their original, to constitute the subject of it

a sinner, only, because he regards him as a participant in that
sin, by which Adam apostatized, with his whole race. This tendency
he calls "sinful," "corrupt," "odious," etc., because it is a
tendency to that moral evil, by which, the subject of it becomes
odious in the sight of God. He supposes that infants, who have
it in tendency in their nature, are, as yet, "sinners, only by the
one act or offence of Adam; and, that they have not renewed the
act of sin themselves." He utterly denies any positive agency of
God, in producing sin; and resolves the tendency to sin, into
the "innocent principles" of human nature; (which God might create,
without sin;) and the withholding of that positive influence,
from which spring superior and divine principles: — which act of
withholding, is not infusing, or positively creating anything.
These "innocent principles" — such as hunger and thirst, love and
hatred, desire and fear, joy and sorrow, and self-love, as dis-
tinguished from selfishness, — which are necessary to the nature
of man, and belong to him, whether holy or sinful, are not, in
his view, sin. They barely constitute the ground of certainty,
that the being who has them, will sin, as soon as he is capable
of sinning, if that positive influence, from which spring superior
and divine principles, is withheld; and, in this relation, they
are spoken of, under the general designation, "a tendency," "a
propensity," etc., to sin. The views of imputation, contained in
this work, are such as had been long and extensively entertained;
yet some of them, certainly, are not generally received, at present. With this exception, the treatise on Original Sin is regarded as the standard work on the subject of which it treats; and is doubtless the ablest defense of the doctrine of human depravity, and of the doctrine that that depravity is the consequence of the sin of Adam, which has hitherto appeared. 1

In "A Dissertation Concerning The Nature

Of True Virtue."

Beauty of Heart    Virtue is the beauty of such qualities and acts as are attended by desert or worthiness of praise or blame. It belongs not merely to speculation but also very much to the disposition and the will. It is beauty of heart. True virtue is, of course, such virtue as is to be distinguished from what only seems to be virtue. The difference is that the former is beautiful in all its relations, the latter in some of its relations only. True virtue is beauty of heart in relation to all and every thing that it is in any way connected with. False virtue is an attitude of heart which seems to be beautiful only when viewed in some limited and private sphere; when viewed in relation to all that it touches immediately and remotely it is

seen to be unlovely. But the world is a system. Everything is
somehow connected with everything else. To be beautiful, then,
with reference to all a thing is connected with is to be beautiful
with reference to all that is. The nature of true virtue therefore
is this. It consists in benevolence to being in general. That
benevolence is of the essence of virtue is recognized in Scripture,
by Christian teachers and by the more representative deists. That
is to be virtuous involves love.\(^1\) But the love which is the essence
of true virtue must include amongst its objects only such particu-
lar persons or beings as are consistent with the love of all beings;
or, yet more precisely, no affection has the nature of true virtue
which does not spring from a love to being in general.\(^2\)

Virtue is
Love to
Doing

\(^1\) Works of Edwards, 2e and 3e, vol.1, p.122.
\(^2\) Ibid., vol.1, p.125 - Ch. 1.
it's beauty. Now whether love be of the one sort or the other, if it has beauty as its ultimate foundation, it has not the nature of true virtue, for true virtue is the love to being, and love to being is the beauty of intelligent beings. Thus to make moral beauty the ground of love is to ground virtue in virtue — to make virtue the love of virtue — "and so on in infinitum."

For there is no end in going back in a circle." And it is absurd to make virtue the cause of itself — or the consequence of itself. And this is done, also, when we say that virtue primarily consists in gratitude, which is to say, in one being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, which is the cause of gratitude." And surely "the first benevolence cannot be gratitude." We must then conclude that "the primary object of virtuous love is being in general."

This is not to say that there is no true virtue in any other love than absolute benevolence, but only that true virtue consists primarily in this love to being "simply considered." True virtue will seek the good of all being — the highest good of being in general. It will seek the good of every particular being in so far as this agrees with the highest good of being at large. When the good of one or some clashes with the highest good of the whole the former good must be given up — especially must the truly virtuous heart forsake and oppose whatever being is an irremovable enemy of being in general.\(^1\)

Virtue is Love to Benovolent Being

But true virtue has a secondary character as well as a primary character. Primarily, we have seen that true virtue consists in love to being simply considered.

Secondarily, true virtue consists in love to benovolent being. How this takes nothing from, but, in fact, adds to, what has been said of love to being in general; for to love another because he is a lover of being in general comes back to being in general as the ground of love. Thus once more it appears that true virtue is love to being as such "and the qualities and acts which arise from it." ¹ The love to being in general is not only the secondary ground of benevolence but equally it is the primary ground of benevolence when it is truly virtuous. The qualification, when it is truly virtuous, is important; for benevolence, which is delight in beauty, may limit beauty to agreeableness to itself, instead of taking it as agreeableness to all being. Thus, one may love a good man only for what he does for him, instead of loving him primarily for what he signifies to the world, and after that for what he means to him. The degree in which a benovolent being should be loved is compounded of the greatness of the benovolent being and the extent of his benevolence. How great is his benevolence? And how great is he? Answer to these questions determines the degree of his moral beauty. Let us say that he loves being in general. Who then or what is he? An ordinary man? An extraordinary

man? A philosopher, perhaps? A great saint? The greater he is, the more favorable to being in general is his love to it, that is, the more worthy is he to be loved. "As a large quantity of gold, with the same quality, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal." But no matter how lovable the spiritual beauty which is in another may be, none can, by any means, relish it who does not share it - who himself is not spiritually beautiful. For how should one come to care that another loves being in general, when he himself places no value upon it?  

Virtue
Chiefly
Love to God

"From what has been said it is evident that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God." He is the greatest being: greatest in the extent of his being; greatest also in his benevolence. In it said that God precisely by reason of his greatness can get no profit from us, and that, therefore, he is not a proper object of our benevolence? The answer is that though we cannot promote the happiness of God, we can rejoice in it; and to rejoice in the happiness of another is to exercise a benevolent spirit; and, further, that to deny that we owe God any love because we cannot profit him is of the same sort as to say that we owe God no gratitude because we cannot requite him. The disposition to move God from our affections as though his presence there were useless and absurd is wide-spread. This is often proposed as a reason of superior philanthropy. "Let us

3. Ibid., vol. I, p.125 - Chap.II.
serve our fellows. 'We can do them good.' Thus it is said. Well, whoever says this has not the nature of true virtue, even though he should think to serve a nation, a civilization, or the humanity of his age. These are the nearest fragments of being in general and in comparison with the being of God, the source and head of all other being than himself, utterly insignificant. The inevitable result of all private affection which is not grounded in a general benevolence includes (1) opposition to general benevolence; (2) opposition to being in general; (3) opposition to God. Such an affection is a consent which begets dissent, a union which begets disunion, a loyalty which begets disloyalty. Hence it ensues that the moral beauty of beings, including God himself, is chiefly love to God; and that all lesser loves of God himself and his virtuous creatures, are derived from and subordinate to love to God.

buildings and in constitutions and laws of states. But wherever it may be found it is not itself true virtue; and the love of it is not true virtue. Nor does the love of it spring from a virtuous disposition. Nor has this love any connection of any sort with virtue. "For otherwise their delight in the beauty of squares and cubes, and regular polygons, in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and low. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any being whatsoever, any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose." The case of justice in society seems to be exceptional for justice is agreeable to the truly virtuous mind. But this is not because of the proportion which is in it, but because of the benevolence which is also in it: for justice is proportion in the exercise of benevolence. By its proportion alone it is no more akin to virtue than a regular geometrical figure. Thus the doctrine is sure that the love of the beauty constituted by uniformity and proportion in themselves and alone is not akin to true virtue.

Whether or not self-love is the principle of all love
as has been asserted by many is already determined by
the course of our thinking. This further, however, may profitably
be said. While this love is not the source of all love it is
certain that not only love to others but its opposite also may
and do in many cases arise from it. But what is self-love? Inclina-
tion to what is pleasing to one? But this is to say nothing at
all, i.e., this: self-love is inclination to what one inclines to.
Or, is self-love regard for one's own private interest? Such is
the meaning of self-love in common speech. But, again, what is
one's private interest? It consists in those pleasures and pains
that are personal, i.e., which do not arise from a benevolent union
of heart with others. It includes perceptions of the love and the
hatred of others toward oneself; for one as naturally loves love
to himself, and hates hatred to himself, as he inclines to any
pleasure or pain of external sense. Accordingly, "that a man
should love those who are of his party, and who are warmly engaged
on his side, and promote his interest, is the natural consequence
of a private self-love." Not less purely natural is it that one
should hate those that hate him. Thus it is seen that self-love
may cause one equally to love his friends and to hate his enemies;
and those exercises are equally virtuous; i.e. they are without any
flavor of that love to being which is true virtue. It is also true
that as self-love causes one to love others who serve his private
interest, so also it leads one to love qualities and characters of a beneficial sort; and as in the same way, it causes hatred of others, so it impels to repugnance to qualities and characters that are generally hurtful. But neither is there any degree of true virtue in such approval of the helpful and such disapproval of the hurtful. Yet another disposition or principle of the mind which is often thought of as almost virtuous self which nevertheless springs from self-love, is natural conscience. Now for this disposition is from the love of virtue may be seen in the familiar fact that remorse is not the same as repentance. It may be seen, also, in the Scriptural representation of the last judgment, in respect of its effect upon the judged. If natural conscience were the same thing as a disposition to be pleased with true virtue, that effect would be to turn the last obdurate heart to holiness; for it is certain that the Great Judge will, in that great assize convince every conscience of the justice of what he then decides and appoints. But instead of any such happy effect, may "shall go away into everlasting torment." What then is natural conscience? It is the sense of consistency or the reverse with ourselves in our treatment of others and of our desert, whether good or ill, on account of such treatment. This does not involve "a virtuous and benevolent temper relishing and

delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposing and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holiness.\(^1\) The case of some natural instincts which take on the look of virtue is not essentially other than that of natural conscience. In themselves they are neither virtuous in the true sense nor the source of true virtue. Those instincts include parental affection, the mutual attraction of the sexes, pity. The first two quite obviously do not arise from an affection to being in general since they are the common heritage of all persons of all degrees of holiness in their inclinations. Besides, in their most apparent aspect they are affections for the most restricted of all social groups. And those private affections certainly do not tend to produce general benevolence. How could it be otherwise? Detached and subordinate, "their operation implies opposition to being in general, rather than general benevolence; as every one sees and con with respect to self-love." As to pity there is a pity founded in love to being as such; but not all pity thus originates. The pity that is common to mankind, pity as pity, does not thus arise. A single consideration makes this clear. If disquiet produced in us by

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the sight of misery were really benevolent, the perception of the
total want of happiness would make us very pitiful. But this is
not universally true. There are many who are not sensibly affected
by knowing that others are dead. And some of these are distressed
at sight of signs of pain in "a brute-creature." That is, one
may easily be moved by the sight of any creature in pain, who
would do nothing for that creature's positive good. But virtue is
love to being and works to promote well-being. True virtue
and pity as such are not the same.¹

Virtue
Rests on
Reason
And in the last place not sentiment, as it may, in
any degree, be contrary to reason and the nature of
things, but reason and the nature of things underlie
virtue. To this have tended all our reasonings concerning virtue.
Moreover the matter is an axiom, for by definition virtue is love
to being in general, to the comprehensive and ultimate — it is
consent to all that is including its source. How should it not
then rest upon reason and the nature of things?²

In "A Dissertation Concerning The End For Which
God Created The World"

God Wants
Nothing
Reason requires that we should not suppose that God
had any ultimate purpose in creation which would

² Ibid., vol.I, pp.140ff - Chap.VIII.
imply want of perfection in himself; such for example as receiving some service from his creatures. Besides as the source of creation, God has all that creation holds. It is, thus, not to be thought that it can give him anything. Reason, also, instructs us that whatever is most valuable in itself and attainable by means of creation is worthy to be God's last and highest end in bringing the world into being. God's existence and perfection are, of course, of infinite value in themselves; but, since they are before all his operations, they cannot be ends aimed at in his operations. But there is another possibility, namely, that the outflowing of his powers in God's last and highest end in his work as creator. 1

But God Should

Let us see if this be reasonable. First it seems  

known

"a thing in itself proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in sufficient to certain acts and effects should be exercised in such effects as might manifest his infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, etc. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had exercise." Thus, power, had done nothing, wisdom had contrived nothing, justice had weighed nothing, goodness had conferred no blessing, and truth had made no word sure. And then, equally, "it seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the

operations and expressions of them seen, by other beings besides himself. ..... It is a thing infinitely good in itself, that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings. ..... If existence is more worthy than defect, and non-entity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge is; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, namely that of God and his glory. This knowledge is one of the highest, most real, and substantial parts of all created existence, most remote from non-entity and defect." Not less is it desirable that God's glory should be delighted in. "If the perfection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent." And "it is a thing valuable and valuable in itself that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine Being must be looked upon as an excellent disposition. Such an exaltation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it. So far as the stream may be looked on as anything besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good." 1 It is reasonable then to think of the exaltation of the divine perfection as in itself the last and supreme end of creation.

Creation
Springs from God's Love of Himself

But the reasonableness of this view will yet more strongly lay hold of us if we reflect upon some clear implications of it. Consider for a moment why God's powers

should have exercise. Whatever else we may answer to this problem it is certain that beneath the disposition to this exercise is the esteem of the powers themselves, that is, God's love of himself. Consider why he should care to have his perfection known. Is not the reason his esteem of himself? Consider why he would care to be praised. Is the reason anything but the value he places upon himself? Consider why he should care to multiply manifestations of himself. Can there be any other reason than that he has regard to his own infinite worth? All of which comes just to this: the grand objective of God in creation is himself. But it is said, perhaps, that "self-love in a man is offensive and immoral; why not in God?" The question is as easily answered as it is natural. Every moral being is bound to love most the highest and best he knows. God is, of course, the highest and best of all beings, and since he is such, he knows himself to be such, and, accordingly, is under the moral necessity of loving himself most.  

Divine Love  This supreme regard for himself is no sort of contradiiction of God's care for others. For despite his self-sufficiency, independence, and immutability, he delights in the effects he produces in his creatures and in their qualifications, good dispositions and right actions. He gives and rejoices in

giving. He makes happy and holy and amils in what he does. And the disposition to diffuse himself as we have seen is at bottom a supreme regard to himself. That "inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communications of it." God cannot be judged in relation to his interest in self and his interest in others as man or any other creature must be judged. "In created beings a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; but this cannot be with respect to the Supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system; on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omniscient, should apprehend his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole."

If God Should Judge God

Teaching the whole matter of God himself being his last and chief and in creation "It may help us to judge with greater ease and satisfaction, to consider, what we can suppose would be determined by some third being, of perfect wisdom and rectitude, that should be perfectly indifferent and

disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct disinterested person, whose office it was to determine how things shall be most properly ordered in the whole kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and, upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should prevail in all proceedings. For such a judge, in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care, that a greater part of the whole should be more respected, than the lesser, in proportion (other things being equal) to the measure of existence. So that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion compounded of the proportion of existence and proportion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatness and goodness, considered conjunctly." Such an arbiter would more esteem the whole created world of intelligent beings than he would esteem only one such being. But contrariwise, he would esteem one, that is God, more than all beings else. In the former case there is more of being and excellence in the many than in the one. In the latter case there is more of being and excellence in the one than in the many: the whole created system "in comparison of the Creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance, or even as nothing and vanity." Thus the arbiter must esteem God more than all else and decide that he shall be the center of all interest and regard in the whole universe. But
this arbiter, is as we have supposed infinitely wise, justice.

Well, God has that, and it works in him as impartially as it is
imagined to work as a third person; for perfect vision and
justice are a part of the total perfection of God, and if they
worked otherwise than impartially, they would no longer be perfect,
and so, could no longer be a part of the perfection of God. 1

It is concluded, then, that God's last end in creation
is himself.

II

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II

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