Justifying Another’s Suppressed Prejudice: Racist Speech and Freedom of Expression

By

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Abstract

Anti-Black prejudice is generally socially unacceptable to express, and people meet harsh punishments for expressing it. A common theme in the news and on social media in response to these punishments is that they violate the expresser’s right to freedom of speech. Seven studies investigate my hypothesis that freedom of speech can be used as a justification for another’s suppressed prejudice. Study 1 examines the relationship between anti-Black prejudice and freedom of speech relevance in the context of a current event where students were punished for racist speech, while Study 2 experimentally demonstrates that this relationship only holds when the speech is anti-Black. Theories of prejudice suppression and justification have only addressed why people justify their own prejudice. Studies 3 – 7 test motivational, cognitive, and affective explanations for why people would justify another’s prejudice. I find evidence that subjective standards about what constitutes offensive speech (Study 6) and felt anger toward the suppressor (Study 7) explain this phenomenon, but no evidence that the justification is driven by a threat to the justifier’s self-integrity (Studies 3 – 5).
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Justifying Another’s Suppressed Prejudice: Racist Speech and Freedom of Expression

Contemporary norms in the United States proscribe the explicit expression of anti-Black prejudice (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009). These norms are institutionalized, and people that express this prejudice may face serious formal sanctioning from private or public schools and employers. Many stories about people being fired for expressing anti-Black prejudice have been in the news in recent months alone: an intern lost her position for posting a photo of her and a friend picking cotton with the caption “our inner n--- came out today” (Spata, 2015); when people started leaving a graduation ceremony early, a principal was fired for saying, “Look who’s leaving! All the Black people!” (Hanson, 2015); a firefighter was fired for saying that Dylan Roof, the man who shot and killed nine Black churchgoers, “needs to be praised for the good deed he has done” (Hensley, 2015); and a public school teacher was fired for tweeting statements like, “I am way too racist to be a teacher” (Bateman, 2015). A slew of police officers have been fired or otherwise disciplined for expressing anti-Black beliefs on social media: likening Black protesters to “Planet of the Apes,” (Workneh, 2015), or talking about Black suspects using phrases like, “typical hoodrat behavior” (Norman, 2015; also see Frolik & Gokavi, 2015; Plunkett, 2015; Shipps, 2015). A blog, named Racists Getting Fired, is dedicated to getting people fired from their jobs for making racist remarks on social media: visitors post screenshots of racist speech on social media as well as the poster’s employment information. Other visitors contact the employer, forward them the racist comments, and lobby for the employee to get fired. The blog includes a “Gotten” tab, where the moderators post examples of people they have successfully gotten fired (Haggerty, 2014).

Not all who read about these firings respond with such revelry as the visitors to Racists Getting Fired. Many respond to these firings by claiming that terminating an employee or
expelling a student for prejudice violates the right to freedom of speech (e.g., Hongo, 2015; Pearce, 2015; Randazza, 2015; Reynolds, 2015; Volokh, 2015).

Student activists at the University of Missouri and Yale University—among others—have recently challenged racist speech they encounter at these predominately White institutions. This led to an increase in the national conversation about the tensions between eradicating racism and ensuring freedom of speech in American society. Some say activists who want a “safe space” from racism are coddled, closed-minded, and prefer conformity and comfort at the cost of freedom of speech (e.g., LoBianco & Scott, 2015; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015; O’Neill, 2015; Rubin, 2015; Soave, 2015). Others say that these appeals to free speech are coded ways to perpetuate racist oppression and that freedom of speech does not imply freedom from the consequences of one’s speech (Case & Weddington, 2015; Cobb, 2015; Gay, 2015; Goldberg, 2015; Manne & Stanley, 2015). Millhiser (2015) recently referred to these events collectively as “speech wars.”

I examine the relationship between prejudice and support for freedom of speech. I hypothesize that freedom of speech can be employed as a justification for prejudice—these firings suppress the expression of prejudice, and prejudiced people will marshal freedom of speech to combat that suppression. I also investigate three explanations for this proposed relationship: the firings (a) threaten the self-integrity of prejudiced people, (b) are not seen as offensive or punishable to prejudiced people, and (c) elicit anger in prejudiced people.

The Suppression and Justification of Prejudice

Prejudice is a negative evaluation of any social group or of an individual due primarily to a group membership (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall, Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013). The prejudices social psychologists tend to study are the prejudices that are unacceptable to feel or
express (e.g., anti-Black prejudice; Crandall et al., 2013); however, many people still harbor these prejudices, whether they explicitly endorse them or not. How do people communicate a prejudice in a normative climate that sanctions the expression of the prejudice? Crandall and Eshleman (2003) propose a justification-suppression model of the expression of prejudice (JSM) to answer this question.

Suppressors of prejudice are external or internal forces that motivate people to reduce the expression of their own prejudice. For example, one may want to sound off about how they believe Black people are the real source of racial tension in America (a prejudiced statement; Henry & Sears, 2002), but they choose not to do so after reading a news story for someone getting fired for expressing this opinion on the Internet (Clark, 2015). The firing acts as a suppressor of prejudice because it is an external force that motivates this person to leave their prejudice unexpressed. Prejudices are so often suppressed that social psychologists have started to focus on the subtle, implicit ways of measuring prejudice and intergroup biases (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Payne & Lundberg, 2014; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). However, prejudice can still be verbally expressed—whether explicitly or in a coded form (Omi & Winant, 1994).

Suppressors diminish the expression of prejudice, but do not necessarily diminish the underlying negative affect that is prejudice. Prejudices are primarily affective and thus have a motivational force to be expressed (Brehm, 1999). According to the JSM, this motivational force leads people to justify their prejudices. Justifications of prejudice are “any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice without suffering external or internal sanction” (Crandall & Esleman, p. 425). For example, people express more prejudice when others demonstrate that it is normative to do so, which assures people that their
prejudice will not be met with negative sanctioning (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Perceiving one’s own group as unified and having collective goals leads participants to express more prejudice toward outgroups, because prejudice seems socially acceptable when expressed by cohesive ingroups (Effron & Knowles, 2015).

**Reacting to Suppressors**

The JSM proposes that justifications are releasers of prejudice—they free up its expression. A related strategy to justification is to take issue with the suppressors directly. Firing someone who expresses prejudice suppresses that prejudice; people who endorse that prejudice will question the legitimacy of this suppression by calling upon the value of free speech.

The value justification hypothesis (VJH; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994) is that “…people with opposing attitudes toward an issue will appeal to different general values to rationalize or justify their attitudes” (p. 49). People who had favorable attitudes toward producing nuclear weapons saw the value of “national security” as more relevant to the issue than those who did not support the production of nuclear weapons; moreover, people who approved of abortion saw the value of “freedom” as more relevant to the issue than those who did not support access to abortion (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988). Kristiansen and Zanna argue that values serve as effective justifications for political and intergroup attitudes because the values are “regarded as legitimate moral imperative by most people” (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994, p. 50; see also Maio & Olson, 1998). In the case of prejudice, values may also be effective justifications because they are ostensibly principled—one can claim that they strongly disagree with a prejudiced statement, but nevertheless find issue with firing someone for the statement because of their “principled” respect for freedom of expression.
Freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, which states, in part, that congress cannot create a law abridging the freedom of speech. While this language seems “unequivocal and absolute” (Van Alstyne, 1984, pp. 22-23), scholars and courts have interpreted the First Amendment in a multitude of ways (Bracken, 1994; Van Alstyne, 1984). The suppression of speech only violates the First Amendment when the suppressor is an agent of the state, but the illegitimacy of suppressing speech can be evoked by citizens even when the suppressor is an agent of a private business (e.g., Hentoff, 1992). People, including young children, believe in a broader definition of freedom of speech than what is explicitly written in the First Amendment (Helwig, 1995, 1997, 1998): People should be allowed to express their feelings, beliefs, and opinions. This conception of free speech is in line with the Article 19 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations, 1948). Americans see this freedom as a core American value (Cohn, 2012).

Being a core value makes freedom of speech an especially relevant justification for prejudice: individuals can shield themselves from negative external consequences for expressing prejudice by putting forth a moral imperative—one’s right to freedom of speech. While attitudes serve a value-expressive function (Azjen, 2001), I argue that values also have an attitude-justifying function: people strategically deploy these widely held beliefs to protect themselves and others from negative sanctioning for holding particular non-normative attitudes (e.g., prejudice). While values like freedom of speech might sometimes be a guiding principle people use to interpret speech suppression (Schwarz, 1992), I argue that appeals to freedom of speech
are not necessarily principled: anti-Black prejudice will only predict relevance of freedom of speech when someone is fired for anti-Black prejudice, but not another prejudice.

By deploying freedom of speech, people who are justifying prejudice and combating suppressors are manufacturing a “tragic tradeoff” (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2002), where individuals must choose one sacred value over another. Using the freedom of speech justification in the case of firing an employee for prejudiced speech pits freedom versus equality—two dominant values in American society.

**Experiencing Prejudice Suppression**

The mechanism that drives the JSM is Brehm’s (1999) contention that affect has a motivation to be expressed. This mechanism does not necessarily predict that people will confront suppressors of somebody else’s prejudice; however, this is precisely what occurs when people argue that firing someone for racism violates the right to freedom of speech. I argue that even the third-person witnessing of prejudice suppression triggers an internal experience of prejudice suppression. I hypothesize three different processes that may explain why people are motivated to justify another’s expressed prejudice.

**The Threat-To-Self Hypothesis**

The threat-to-self hypothesis states that suppression threatens the self-integrity of prejudiced people, which motivates them to justify prejudice and combat suppression to restore their self-integrity and self-esteem.

People do not want to appear prejudiced (Allport, 1954; Crandall et al., 2002; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993, 1996; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Dunton, 1971, 1976; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998), and the current norm in the United States is that it is inappropriate to be explicitly prejudiced.
People may harbor beliefs like, “The whole Black Lives Matter movement is misguided and out of hand” and believe that activists are simply “egotistical,” without necessarily seeing themselves as prejudiced. But reading a news story about a college studied being pilloried as racist on social media and fired from her job for posting this sentiment online (Klausner, 2015) communicates that these beliefs are indeed prejudiced, non-normative, and subject to harsh punishments. I hypothesize that this suppression makes those with similar beliefs to the fired employee feel prejudiced, which may threaten their self-integrity and self-esteem.

Many theories of the self argue that people’s sense of the self as good and moral rely on living up the relevant group norms in peoples’ lives. Leary and Baumeister (2000) argue self-esteem is how people can monitor how likely they are to be valued and accepted in relationships and groups. Similarly, proponents of self-affirmation theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) argue that self-integrity—seeing the self as “good and appropriate” (Sherman & Cohen, 2006, p. 186)—relies on knowing that one is living in accordance with cultural norms. Kristiansen and Zanna (1994) also suppose that values are more likely to be used as rhetorical devices to justify intergroup attitudes when the self is threatened; using values as justifications has an ego-defensive function.

The self plays a meaningful role in racial attitudes. Self-affirming White participants has led to greater perceptions of racism taking place in discriminatory actions (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006) and more acceptance that White privilege exists in society (Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta, 2014; Phillips & Lowery 2015); telling White men about affirmative action quotas protected their self-integrity from threatening information about their intelligence (Unzueta, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008); and threats to the self led participants to judge an ethnic minority job applicant more harshly, while affirming the self diminished the
tendecy to judge an ethnic outgroup applicant worse than an ingroup applicant (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Shapiro, Mistler, & Neuberg, 2010).

People losing their jobs over prejudicial remarks shows prejudiced people that their attitudes are non-normative and formally punishable; the more anti-Black prejudice one harbors, the more one’s sense of self is threatened by the job termination over anti-Black prejudice. In an effort to restore this self-integrity, prejudiced people could defend their egos by justifying free speech.

**The Self-As-Standard Hypothesis**

The threat-to-self hypothesis supposes that the situation—termination over anti-Black remarks— informs people about the integrity of their own selves; the *self-as-standard hypothesis*, however, suggests the opposite: People use information about their own attitudes to shape how they perceive the prejudice-suppressive situation. Prejudiced people are likely to have a higher threshold for what they label prejudiced, making them less likely to see a comment as prejudiced and thus more likely to perceive punishment as unwarranted or unjust. This higher standard for what is “truly prejudiced” means that high prejudice people will justify anothers’ prejudice and oppose suppression using freedom of speech without ever necessarily seeing the comments as prejudiced.

People use themselves as a referent for judging others (e.g., Biernat, 2005; Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Eiser, 1990). Dark-complexioned people rate a target as having a lighter skin tone than the light-complexioned people rate the target (Marks, 1943), and tall people rate a target as shorter than short people rate the target (Hinckley & Rethlingshafer, 1951). People are egocentric in their ratings of others: If a target is shorter *than me*, I call the target “short,” while if a target has a darker skin tone *than me*, I call the target “dark-complexioned.” The self is used
as a standard in judging others’ opinions about social issues, as well (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Manis, 1960; Segall, 1959, Upshaw, 1962).

Hovland and Sherif (1952) studied the perceived favorability of anti-Black statements. Contrary to the popular wisdom of the time (Hinckley, 1932), Hovland and Sherif argued that a participant’s own attitudes about Black people would influence how favorable of an attitude items on an anti-Black prejudice scale express toward Black people, because the participant’s own attitude is an “anchor” for his or her judgments, “whether or not his [sic] attitude is specifically called for in the instructions” (Hovland & Sherif, 1952, p. 824). Participants in this study were recruited based on their race and attitudes towards Black people, creating three groups: pro-Black Whites, anti-Black Whites, and Black participants. Each participant was presented with 114 statements about Black people and were asked how favorable these statements were in their attitudes toward Black people on an eleven-point scale from lowest favorability to highest favorability. Although participants were never asked how much they agree or disagree with the statements, there was an effect of one’s personal attitude on perceived favorability of the statements. Black participants rated about 50 of the statements as a 1, the lowest amount of perceived favorability; pro-Black White participants rated about 40 at the lowest point of the scale; and anti-Black White participants only rated about 20 of these statements to be of lowest favorability toward Black people. Prejudiced people had a higher threshold for what they labeled prejudiced speech.

People also generally believe that others are similar to themselves (Biernat, 2005; Krueger, 2007; Mullen et al. 1985; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). In the realm of prejudice, Watt and Larkin (2010) found that participants’ own prejudice against Indigenous Australians positively predicted the percentage of Australians participants perceived would agree with their
prejudiced beliefs: Highly prejudiced participants thought about 71% of Australians would share their prejudiced views, while lowly prejudiced participants estimated about 51% of Australians would have prejudiced views. Pedersen, Griffiths, & Watt (2008) demonstrated this same relationship: Higher prejudice toward Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers predicted greater belief that Australians in general were also prejudiced toward each group, respectively.

When someone loses their job over prejudicial remarks, prejudiced people use their own attitudes to judge if those remarks were truly inappropriate. These prejudiced remarks may be close enough to one’s own prejudiced attitude that they fall within their *latitude of acceptance*—the range of attitudes which people find to be acceptable (Sherif, 1963). One’s own attitude is the center of this range, and similar attitudes encompass the width of it. When an attitude strays too far from one’s own attitude, people find the attitude unacceptable and reject it. The more prejudiced people are, the more they believe others are prejudiced, and the less they believe prejudicial remarks are objectionable. In turn, they justify punished prejudice speech by claiming suppressing it violates the expresser’s right to freedom of speech.

**The Anger-Toward-Suppressor Hypothesis**

The *anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis* states that witnessing suppression of a prejudice one shares leads to anger, which is the affective fuel for justifying another’s prejudice and deploying values to counter the suppressor.

Crandall and Eshleman (2003) say that prejudice suppression “creates mildly negative mood” (p. 417), but do not cite specific evidence for this supposition. The affective consequences of *justification*—or freeing oneself from suppression—have been documented, however: people who expressed a suppressed prejudice (against overweight people) in a group session reported more positive mood and enjoyed the group discussion more than those
participants who chatted about an unsuppressed prejudice (e.g., child abusers) or a prejudice-unrelated, negatively-valenced topic (pollution; O’Brien & Crandall, 2000). I test the proposition that suppression has negative affective consequences, and I refine the JSM’s vague prediction of a “mildly negative mood” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 417) to a more specific prediction that prejudiced people feel anger when witnessing the suppression of prejudice.

When one hears about someone else being fired for expressing a prejudicial attitude that they share, one is not being punished, but people can nonetheless feel angry when someone else is treated unfairly or has her or his rights violated (Batson et al., 2007; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Spencer & Rupp, 2009). Additionally, reading about someone else being punished for or acquitted of a crime elicits anger when the outcome is inconsistent with one’s preexisting, strong, and morally convicted attitudes (Mullen & Nadler, 2008; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). For example, Mullen and Nadler (2008) told participants about a doctor who was on trial for performing a late-term abortion. Participants who were strongly pro-choice expressed more anger when the doctor was convicted of a crime than participants who held more neutral attitudes.

The anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis simply predicts that the more prejudiced one is, the angrier one feels toward a company who fired a similarly prejudiced employee, and this anger motivates one to call upon freedom of speech to combat the suppressor

**Justice**

I predict that there is nothing inherently special about freedom of speech as a justification. I believe that it is often employed in these “fired-for-racism” situations because freedom of speech is (a) valued and normatively acceptable, and (b) relevant to the specific situation, making it a plausible justification (a necessary characteristic of justifications for
prejudice: Bahns, 2015; Effron & Knowles, 2015). Therefore, I should also see the same effects on another justification that meets both of these qualities. The principle of justice is also a foundational aspect of American society, and it is certainly relevant in the case of someone facing institutional punishment (i.e., job termination). I make the same predictions for justice as a dependent variable as I do for freedom of speech, since these two justifications may be relatively interchangeable in the current situation. I examine both outcome justice (i.e., is the punishment fair?) and procedural justice (i.e., are the methods used to determine the punishment fair?).

The Present Studies

Prejudiced people will employ freedom of speech as a justification for someone else’s prejudice, arguing that the negative sanctioning the individual received is illegitimate due to one’s right to express themselves freely. I test this basic hypothesis in Studies 1 and 2: do prejudiced people think that harsh institutional punishments for prejudice violate the speaker’s rights to freedom of speech? I then examine why people might be motivated to justify another’s punished prejudice, testing the threat-to-self hypothesis in Studies 3, 4, and 5, the self-as-standard hypothesis in Study 6, and the anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis in Study 7.

Study 1: The Sigma Alpha Epsilon Controversy

In March of 2015, a video went viral on the Internet depicting fraternity brothers in Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) at the University of Oklahoma chanting a racist song on a bus. The school responded swiftly: The university president directly addressed the people in the video by saying, “You are disgraceful.” the Oklahoma chapter of SAE was shut down, all fraternity members were forced to move out of their fraternity house within days, and the Oklahoma University Board of Directors also expelled two students who were leading the chant on the bus.
I predicted that the higher their level of anti-Black prejudice, the more participants would agree that the punishments violated the students’ right to free speech.

**Method**

**Participants.** I recruited 176 participants with an Amazon Mechanical Turk\(^1\) (MTurk) listing for a “Survey about a recent news event.” Participants’ ages (M = 38.49, SD = 13.13) ranged from 19 to 77, the sample was 43.8% female, and 79.5% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.

**Procedure.** The survey took place 6 days after the Oklahoma video went viral, and 69.3% of participants had previously heard of the incident (this did not moderate any of the results). Participants were given a “description of the recent event” after agreeing to participate in the study. All participants read a brief description about the Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) controversy and subsequent punishment at the University of Oklahoma. The racist song was sung to the tune of, “If You’re Happy and You Know it, Clap Your Hands.” The lyrics were that there will “never be a n----- in S-A-E,” and also made reference to lynching of Black men by saying that one could “hang him by a tree, but he’ll never sign with me.” Participants then completed a brief questionnaire.

**Measures.**

**Free speech.** Three items measured perceived violations of free speech: “Kicking the fraternity off campus is a violation of their free speech,” “The students in the video have a right to free speech, so they should not have been expelled,” and “The university being so harsh on the students in the video is not respecting the students’ freedom of speech.” Participants were asked how much they agree or disagree with each of these statements on a seven-point scale (\(\alpha = .94\)).

\(^1\) No one participated in more than one study in this paper.
Anti-Black Prejudice.

Symbolic racism. Anti-Black beliefs were assessed with the symbolic racism scale (eight items; $\alpha = .92$; Henry & Sears, 2002). An example item reads: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.”

Specific prejudicial emotions. Participants were asked: “In general, how much do you feel the following emotions when you are around Black people?” (see Dijker, 1987). A list of twelve emotions followed, and participants were asked to respond on a seven-point scale anchored from 1, Not at all to 7, Very much so. A maximum likelihood, direct oblimin rotation exploratory factor analysis of these items yielded two factors: positive and negative emotions. The positive scale ($\alpha = .94$) included: happiness, admiration, affection, respect, warmth, and relaxed. The negative scale ($\alpha = .93$) included: annoyed, anger, fear, distrust, anxiety, and discomfort.

Feeling thermometer. Participants were asked to indicate their “overall feeling about the following groups based on a scale from 0 (Very cold and negative feelings) to 100 (Very warm and positive feelings).” One of the groups listed was “Black people.”

Overall prejudice. I standardized each of the four aforementioned measures, reverse-scored the positive emotions scale and feeling thermometer, and averaged them together to create an overall index of anti-Black prejudice ($\alpha = .76$). A second-order maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis of these four scores yielded one factor.

Ideological variables. I also assessed social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) using a 6-item measure. Political identification was measured by averaging two
Likert scales anchored with 1, Liberal to 7, Conservative and 1, Democrat to 7, Republican (r = .88).

Results

Anti-Black prejudice positively correlated with freedom of speech, $r = .47$, $p < .001$. Each of the individual prejudice measures correlated with freedom of speech; symbolic racism, $r = .56$; feeling thermometer, $r = -.37$; positive affect towards Black people, $r = -.35$; negative affect towards Black people, $r = .25$, all $p$’s $\leq .001$.

SDO, political identification, and gender (0 = female, 1 = male) were also significantly related to the free speech items, $r_s = .44$, .24, and .26, respectively. To see if any of these accounted for the relationship between prejudice and free speech relevance, I entered these three predictors and overall prejudice simultaneously into a linear regression model. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .28$, $F(4, 170) = 16.66$, $p < .001$. Prejudice remained significant after controlling for political ideology, SDO, and gender, $\beta = .26$, $t(170) = 3.08$, $p = .002$. The other significant predictors were SDO, $\beta = .27$, $t(170) = 3.00$, $p = .003$, and gender, $\beta = .17$, $t(170) = 2.53$, $p = .012$. Political identification was no longer significant after controlling for the effects of prejudice, SDO, and gender, $\beta = -.01$, $t(170) = -0.09$, $p = .926$.

Discussion

The more prejudiced someone was, the more likely they were to think that expelling the students and kicking the fraternity off campus violated their right to freedom of speech. This relationship held regardless of how prejudice was measured, and it held after statistically controlling for other relevant ideological and demographic variables. This is consistent with my hypothesis that freedom of speech can be used as a justification for prejudice.
Although I statistically controlled for a handful of other relevant variables, these data are also consistent with a competing prediction: that an unmeasured third variable correlates with both prejudice and principled support for freedom of speech, which explains the relationship. I address this potential confound experimentally in Study 2.

**Study 2: Justification or Principle?**

If the correlation found in Study 1 is explained by a principled belief in the sanctity of freedom of speech, then prejudiced people should endorse the relevance of freedom of speech *regardless* of context. If the deployment of freedom of speech defense is *not* principled—but rather a justification—it should only be called upon by prejudiced people when it can be used to justify the prejudicial attitudes they share. I experimentally manipulated the speech to be anti-Black prejudice or anti-police prejudice to test this free-speech-as-justification hypothesis. I predicted that anti-Black prejudice would *only* predict free speech when the punished speech is anti-Black, and *not* when the punished speech is anti-police.

**Method**

**Participants.** I recruited 231 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages (M = 33.63, SD = 10.93) ranged from 19 to 86, the sample was 44.2% female, and 80.1% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.

**Procedure.** Participants read a “description of a recent news event” after agreeing to participate in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: an *anti-Black* or an *anti-police* condition. The passages read:

Colin Slator, the director of content and advertising at a prominent phone company, was fired after management discovered comments he made about [Black people/police officers] on Facebook.
In recent months, there have been many demonstrations in the United States protesting the use of violence and deadly force by the police against African Americans. There was a protest like this in the town Colin lives in. He posted on Facebook how he felt about the issue:

"These [protesters/cops] are just a bunch of [looters and thugs/racists and pigs]. They're all bastards. [Blacks/police] are the ones causing all of this racial tension in America right now, and I'm sick of it. Fuck them."

Someone saw this post and forwarded the comments to management at Slator’s job. They decided to fire Slator, saying that he did not “represent the values that our company stands for.”

Participants were instructed to read this passage carefully and complete a questionnaire².

**Measures.**

**Free speech.** The relevance of freedom of speech to the firing was assessed with three items: “Firing Colin Slator is a violation of his rights to free speech,” “Colin Slator has a right to free speech, so he should not have been fired for his post,” and “The company being so hard on Colin Slator is not respecting his freedom of speech” ($\alpha = .96$).

**Anti-Black prejudice.** I again created a composite variable, this time including five indicators of anti-Black prejudice: symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002); specific positive and negative emotions felt toward Black people; social distance, e.g., “I would like to have Black people marry into my family” (Crandall, 1991); and an item that asked participants how they felt towards Black people on a scale from 1, *Very Negatively* to 7, *Very Positively*. Each measure of

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² Condition did not affect prejudice, $p = .275$. 
prejudice was standardized, reverse-scored when necessary, and averaged to form a composite measure of anti-Black prejudice ($\alpha = .82$).

**Results**

I hypothesized that anti-Black prejudice would only predict the relevance of freedom of speech for the firing in the condition where the ex-employee was fired for anti-Black remarks. I tested this hypothesis by entering prejudice, condition, and the interaction between the two in a linear regression model predicting freedom of speech. The overall model was significant, $R^2 = .05$, $F(3,227) = 3.99$, $p = .009$. There was no main effect of prejudice, $\beta = -.05$, $t(227) = -0.63$, $p = .533$, but there was a significant main effect of condition, $\beta = -.15$, $t(227) = -2.29$, $p = .023$.

The interaction that tested my hypothesis was also significant, $\beta = .19$, $t(227) = 2.27$, $p = .024$. I examined the simple slopes predicting free speech with prejudice at both levels of the independent variable (Figure 1). In the *anti-Black* condition (coded 1), prejudice predicted the relevance of free speech, $\beta = .24$, $t(94) = 2.36$, $p = .020$; prejudice was uncorrelated with the relevance of free speech in the *anti-police* condition (coded 0), $\beta = -.06$, $t(133) = -0.63$, $p = .528$.

Figure 1 shows that the effect of condition on freedom of speech is only significant for people who are low in prejudice. However, the intercepts in each condition are completely arbitrary: Where the significance falls on the dimension of prejudice is an artifact of the control condition I chose. If the control condition had a lower intercept (e.g., offensive speech about the boss’s children), high-prejudiced participants would be the ones driving the effect. I find a significant effect at both ends of the prejudice spectrum in Study 6.

**Discussion**

Anti-Black prejudice predicted greater agreement that firing someone for offensive speech violated First Amendment rights, but only when that offensive speech was anti-Black
prejudice. Prejudice had no relationship with freedom of speech when the speech was aimed at police. If free speech were a consistent moral principle that is higher among those with racial prejudice, then it should be endorsed as an objection to anti-police speech among this population. Because racial prejudice predicted free speech objections for race-relevant speech but did not predict free speech objections for police-relevant speech, it seems that free speech objections serve to justify prejudice.

I found support for my hypothesis that freedom of speech is strategically used as a justification for prejudice in the context of prejudice suppression (e.g., job termination for racist speech). Justifications are theorized as protecting one’s own prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), so why would people justify the prejudiced speech of someone else? I sought to answer this question in the remaining studies by testing if the suppression is motivated by a threat to self (Studies 3 – 5), stems from subjective standards of how prejudiced the speech is (Study 6), or is fueled by a feeling of anger toward the suppressor (Study 7).

**Studies 3 - 5: The Threat-To-Self Hypothesis**

One of the fundamental findings in social psychology is that North American people generally want to feel good about themselves (Cohen & Sherman, 2006; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 2000). My threat-to-self hypothesis suggests that prejudiced people feel a threat to their positive self-regard when they hear about someone getting fired for expressing their attitudes (i.e., when their prejudice is suppressed), because it reminds people that these attitudes are non-normative. In an attempt to affirm their self-integrity (Cohen & Sherman, 2006; Steele, 1988), prejudiced people call upon normative values—like freedom of speech—to justify the prejudiced speech. I test this hypothesis across three studies, employing three different experimental manipulations
related to self-regard. I chose to use these manipulations in lieu of measuring self-esteem as a mediating variable, as merely filling out self-esteem questions has shown to be self-affirming (Kimble, Kimble, & Croy, 1998; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), which would obviate the need for participants to use freedom of speech as a justification.

All participants in Studies 3 through 5 read about someone getting fired for prejudiced speech. In Study 3, I instructed participants to complete an affirming or control task. I predicted that affirming the self would decrease the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech, because affirming the self mitigates the threat brought about by reading about harsh suppression of prejudice. The manipulation in Study 3 is a general self-affirmation manipulation, so I employed a manipulation within the domain of prejudice in Study 4: I either threatened participants by making them feel prejudiced or affirmed them by making them feel non-prejudiced. I predicted that people would endorse the free speech justification more when they feel prejudiced. In Study 5, I manipulated how similar participants felt toward the employee who was punished for prejudiced speech, and I predicted that this increased self-relevance of the punishment would cause greater endorsement of the free speech justification. I present each of these studies in turn.

Study 3 Method

Participants. I recruited 206 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages (M = 34.45, SD = 12.16) ranged from 18 to 83, the sample was 49% female, and 80.1% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.

Procedure. All participants first read about someone who was fired for saying disparaging remarks about Black people on social media. The cover story was that this was a study on memory, and that participants should read the passage carefully because they will be
answering questions about it later in the study. The passage was similar to the passage in Study 2, but with different prejudiced speech:

He posted a link to a story covering a racial protest in his city and wrote, “I’m just going to go ahead and say it… the Blacks are the ones causing the problems and this ‘racial tension.’ I guess that’s what happens when you flunk out of school and have no education." He went on to say later in the post that, "This kind of trouble is why people don’t want to drive through the Black part of town."

The story concluded with the employee being fired for this post.

Participants were then randomly assigned to complete a self-affirmation manipulation or a control task. In the *self-affirmation* condition, I employed a widely-used self-affirmation manipulation by asking participants to select a “value, quality, or aspect” of life that is “most important to you in your life” from a list (e.g., sense of humor, creativity, romance, relations with friends and family; see McQueen & Klein, 2006). Participants were then prompted to write about why it is so important to them and to write about a time the value they selected made them feel good about themselves.

In the *control* condition, I asked participants to select a common household item from a list (e.g., pencil, shoelaces, ironing board; see Harvey & Oswald, 2000). Participants were then prompted to write down five uses for this household item and to describe where it would be located in a superstore. Participants then answered the same three free speech items ($\alpha = .93$) as in Study 2 and four prejudice scales ($\alpha = .81$) as in Study 1.

**Study 3 Results and Discussion**

I hypothesized that bolstering participants’ self-integrity would attenuate the relationship between prejudice and free speech, because a self-affirming experience assures participants that
they are good and moral people (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), which buffers the justification-motivating threat to self-integrity that may arise when a prejudice they share is suppressed. I tested this hypothesis by entering in condition, prejudice, and the prejudice by condition interaction simultaneously in a linear regression equation.

The overall model was significant, \( R^2 = .13, F(3,202) = 9.74, p < .001 \). There was a main effect of prejudice, \( \beta = .24, t(202) = 2.52, p = .012 \), but no main effect of condition, \( \beta = .03, t(202) = 0.50, p = .617 \). The interaction was not significant, \( \beta = .14, t(202) = 1.49, p = .139 \). In addition to this lack of significance, the pattern of coefficients was opposite than my prediction: Prejudice significantly predicted freedom of speech in both the control condition (coded 0), \( \beta = .23, t(106) = 2.45, p = .016 \), and self-affirmation condition (coded 1), \( \beta = .45, t(96) = 4.96, p < .001 \).

The threat-to-self hypothesis thus did not gain support in Study 3: Protecting participants from threat did not affect the relationship between prejudice and the freedom of speech justification. The self-affirmation manipulation was unrelated to prejudice, as nobody in the self-affirmation condition wrote about their non-prejudiced attitudes to affirm themselves. Perhaps the effect only emerges within the domain of prejudice and with a specific threat instead of a neutral comparison condition. I adapted the manipulation in Study 4 to address this limitation.

**Study 4 Method**

**Participants.** I recruited 134 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages (M = 32.16, SD = 10.24) ranged from 18 to 68, the sample was 40.3% female, and 79.9% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of two scales. Each condition presented a list of 14 social groups that Americans generally see as unacceptable to
express (e.g., prejudice toward Black people, Asians, immigrants, gays and lesbians; Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall et al., 2013). In a threat to non-prejudiced self-image condition, participants were asked to indicate if they have ever said anything negative about each group, marking “yes” or “no” for each. In an affirmation of non-prejudiced self-image condition, participants were asked to indicate if they frequently say negative things about this group (see Monin & Miller, 2001; Salancik & Conway, 1975). Participants were asked to tally up how many times they indicated “yes” and write it in a space below the scale. In an unrelated study, this manipulation significantly increased negative thoughts about the self (e.g., disappointed with myself; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), Cohen’s $d = .44, [.15, .72]^3$.

Participants then read a story about someone who was fired for making disparaging remarks about Black people on Facebook. The passage remained very similar to the passages in Studies 2 and 3, but with different prejudiced speech. It is difficult to tell whether or not null results come from lack of power or absence of effect, so I wrote this speech to be less extreme as in other studies to increase the probability that my participants would agree with the sentiment, which might produce a larger effect, increasing power. The prejudiced speech read:

He made a Facebook post about a recent conversation he had with a Black person, and he wrote that Black people "are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them." He said that Black people can "be combative" and "assume the worst from White people." He concluded by saying that this "makes me feel uncomfortable sometimes, which is why I don't really like to be around them."

Participants were again asked to write how many times they marked “yes” in the aforementioned scale, and then they completed a brief questionnaire.

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3 All confidence intervals reported are 95% confidence intervals.
Measures. I employed the same freedom of speech items as in Studies 2 and 3 ($\alpha = .92$). I measured prejudice by averaging together three scales ($\alpha = .84$): symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002), social distance (Crandall, 1991), and overall negative affect felt toward Black people (2 items: 1, Not At All Positively to 5 Extremely Positively, reverse-scored; and 1, Not At All Negatively to 5 Extremely Negatively).

Study 4 Results and Discussion

I hypothesized that threatening participants’ non-prejudiced self-image would cause them to justify someone else’s punished prejudice (using freedom of speech). Contrary to this prediction, the threat condition ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 1.96$) and affirmation condition ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 1.85$) did not differ from one another in the perceived relevance of free speech, $t(132) = 0.63$, $p = .532$, $d = .11 [-.23, .44]$. Prejudice and condition had no interactive effect on freedom of speech relevance, $\beta = -.01$, $p = .958$, but prejudice predicted the relevance of freedom of speech, $r = .43$, $p < .001$.

Again, the data do not support the threat-to-self hypothesis: Threatening participants’ selves within the domain of prejudice did not affect how much they chose to justify someone else’s suppressed prejudice: Participants’ who were led to feel non-prejudiced justified the prejudiced speech just as much as those who were induced to feel prejudiced. I chose to test the present hypothesis once more in Study 5 by manipulating how similar participants felt to the terminated employee, hypothesizing that similarity would increase justification.

Study 5 Method

Participants. I recruited 135 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages ($M = 32.03$, $SD = 9.90$) ranged from 19 to 64, 54.1% of the sample was female, and 77% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.
Procedure. Participants were asked to read a description of a man named Colin Slator carefully and were randomly assigned to either a *similar* or *different* condition. The passage contained simple information about Colin: where he is from, where he went to college, what type of music he likes, what his friends say about him, what pets he has, what food he likes, etc. In the *similar* condition, participants were asked to think about all the ways they were similar to Colin while reading the passage, and I prompted them to list five ways that they were similar to him below the passage. In the *different* condition, participants were asked to think about how different they were from Colin, and they listed five ways that they were different from Colin below the passage.

On the next screen, participants completed a manipulation check: “How similar do you feel to Colin Slator?” and “How different do you feel that you and Colin Slator are from one another?” \( r = -0.70, p < .001 \). Participants responded to these questions on five-point Likert scales, and I scored the items such that higher scores indicated feeling more similar to Colin. Participants in the *similar* condition (M = 3.71, SD = 0.84) reported more similarity to Colin than those in the *different* condition (M = 3.35, SD = 0.87), \( t(133) = 2.46, p = .015, d = .42 \ [0.08, .76] \). This effect is significant, but it should be noted that this effect size is smaller than the ideal for a manipulation check.

Participants then read about how Colin Slator was fired from his job for posting disparaging remarks about Black people on his personal Facebook page (the same remarks as in Study 4). Participants then answered a brief questionnaire: the same free speech items \( (\alpha = .94) \) and prejudice items \( (\alpha = .79) \) as in Study 4.

**Study 5 Results and Discussion**
I hypothesized that if participants felt similar to the ex-employee, then they would justify his prejudice. However, participants in the similar (M = 3.58, SD = 1.77) and different (M = 4.00, SD = 1.90) conditions did not significantly differ on how much they endorsed the freedom of speech items, \( t(133) = 1.31, p = .19, d = .23 [-.11, .56] \). Moreover, the manipulation check (how similar participants reported feeling to Colin Slator) did not correlate with endorsement of the freedom of speech items, \( r = -.07, p = .40 \). There was no interaction between condition and prejudice on free speech, \( \beta = .13, p = .259 \), but prejudice again predicted freedom of speech, \( r = .30, p = .001 \).

My third test of the threat-to-self hypothesis again failed to yield support for the relevance of self-threat to the present phenomenon: Participants who felt more similar to the terminated employee did not endorse the freedom of speech justification than those who felt dissimilar to him.

**Threat-To-Self Discussion**

An intuitive explanation for why prejudiced people choose to justify someone else’s suppressed prejudice is that the punishment simply makes them feel like bad people: An attitude they share is unequivocally pilloried and punished as socially unacceptable, which threatens their much-needed positive self-regard (Devine et al., 1991; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). To restore this bruised ego, prejudiced people endorse the relevance of freedom of speech, which reframes the issue from one of hate speech to one of freedom of speech (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994). However, I found no support for this hypothesis across three studies: Neither affirming participants general self-integrity, nor threatening self-integrity in the domain of prejudice, nor increasing the relevance of the self by making participants feel similar to the terminated employee affected the relationship between prejudice and the freedom of
speech justification. Despite self-regard being integral to many interracial attitudinal processes (e.g., Adams et al., 2006; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Knowles et al., 2014), I found no evidence that witnessing a harsh suppression of prejudice is the motivator that explains why prejudiced people combat the suppression by calling upon freedom of speech.

The unsupported threat-to-self hypothesis assumes that people use the prejudice-suppressive context to infer how they should feel about themselves (i.e., “Someone was fired for a prejudice I share, so I must not be a good person”); however, people may also be using their selves to inform how they should interpret the context (i.e., “I’m a good person, so attitudes close to mine must not be that bad”). Study 6 tests this latter possibility, the self-as-standard hypothesis.

**Study 6: The Self-As-Standard Hypothesis**

People use themselves as a standard to make judgments about people and situations they encounter in their life space (Biernat, 2005; Biernat & Eidelman, 2007). People see their own attitudes as normative and acceptable, and the further another’s attitudes stray from theirs, the more they hold the other’s attitude unacceptable. The more anti-Black prejudice one harbors, the closer an anti-Black remark that precipitated termination is to one’s attitude, and the more one is moved to justify that anti-Black remark. My self-as-standard hypothesis predicts that prejudiced people respond to the suppression of prejudiced speech with the freedom of speech justification because they they have a higher standard for what they think is prejudiced. These highly prejudiced people simply do not believe that the racist speech was “that bad.” Specifically, the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech in the context of someone being fired for prejudiced speech should be mediated by subjective standards about the appropriateness of the
remark: The more reported prejudice, the higher the latitude of rejection (Sherif, 1963), and the more endorsement of freedom of speech.

I also examined the relative interchangeability of justifications for prejudice in this study by including perceived procedural and outcome justice as dependent variables. I predict the same effects should emerge for perceived justice as for freedom of speech: Anti-Black prejudice should predict less perceived justice, but only in the anti-Black condition, and subjective standards should mediate this relationship.

**Method**

**Participants.** I recruited 251 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages (M= 34.88, SD = 11.43) ranged from 18 to 73, the sample was 47.4% female, and 78.1% of the participants identified as White/Caucasian.

**Procedure.** Participants read a “news story” about a man who was fired for making the same offensive remark as in Study 2—one that was either *anti-Black* or *anti-police*—on Facebook. I added information about the procedures management at the company used to decide on firing the employee:

An unscheduled emergency meeting occurred the next day. Seven of the company’s ten executives could attend the meeting, and three people from the human resources department also attended. They met in a 20-minute meeting, and management decided they would fire Connor Bell, saying he did not “represent the values that our company stands for.”

Participants then completed a brief questionnaire.\(^4\)

**Measures.**

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\(^4\) Condition did not affect prejudice, \(p = .913\).
Subjective standard. I created items that captured the moral and social acceptability of the prejudiced speech to measure if participants considered it to be outside of their personal latitude of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; \(\alpha = .83\)). Two items assessed the social projection aspect of using the self as a referent for others’ attitudes: “How many people do you think would agree with what Connor Bell said?” and “How many people do you think would privately agree with what Connor Bell posted?” Three items explicitly evoked comparing the prejudiced speech to a standard: “If you’re going to get fired for something, it should be more extreme than what Connor Bell wrote,” “Many people say worse things than what Connor Bell said,” and “Compared to all the terrible things that people say on social media, how terrible was Connor Bell’s post?” Lastly, one item assessed how acceptable participants found the post: “Overall, how bad was what Connor Bell said?”

Perceived justice. I adapted items from relevant literature (e.g., Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mullen, 2002) that measured perceived justice done in the firing of the ex-employee, including three distributive (e.g., “Do you think firing Connor Bell was a fair or unfair outcome?”) and three procedural (e.g., “Management used fair procedures in dealing with Connor Bell”) justice items. The procedural justice items had their own instructions, explicitly asking participants not to consider “what happened to Mr. Bell, but rather how his company went about making its decision.” Despite these instructions, the six items loaded onto one factor in a maximum likelihood exploratory factor analysis, which explained about 74% of the total variance, and the lowest loading was .54. All six items were averaged together to create a measure of general perceived justice (\(\alpha = .93\)).

Free speech. I updated the three freedom of speech items to be more distinct from the outcome itself: “Management’s actions went against Connor Bell’s freedom of expression,”
“Connor Bell’s bosses disrespected his right to free speech,” and “Firing Connor Bell is a violation of his rights to free speech” ($\alpha = .95$).

**Anti-Black prejudice.** I measured prejudice using Henry and Sears’s (2002) symbolic racism scale and a feeling thermometer. I reverse-scored the thermometer, standardized both measures, and averaged them together ($r = .45, p < .001$) to measure anti-Black prejudice.

**Results**

I hypothesized that anti-Black prejudice would (a) predict a higher subjective standard for deeming the speech offensive, (b) negatively predict perceived justice, and (c) positively predict the relevance of freedom of speech to the firing, but only in the *anti-Black* condition (coded 1) and not the *anti-police* condition (coded 0). I regressed subjective standards, perceived justice, and free speech on prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction in three separate regressions to test the three corresponding hypotheses. All coefficients are listed in Table 1.

The prejudice by condition interactions were the three critical tests of my hypotheses, and each was significant, $ps < .001$ (Table 1). I probed each of these interactions by examining the simple slopes of the dependent variables regressed on prejudice in each of the two conditions, and each pattern of slopes was consistent with my predictions.

**Subjective standard.** Prejudice predicted a higher subjective standard in the *anti-Black* condition, $\beta = .50$, $t(124) = 6.45$, $p < .001$. In the *anti-police* condition, prejudice predicted a lower subjective standard, $\beta = -.21$, $t(123) = -2.32$, $p = .022$.

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5 Results were identical in direction and statistical significance when doing analyses with each of the measures of prejudice separately.
**Perceived justice.** Prejudice predicted lower perceptions of justice in the anti-Black condition, $\beta = -.49$, $t(124) = -6.30$, $p < .001$. In the anti-police condition, prejudice predicted higher perceptions of justice, but with only $\beta = .16$, $t(123) = 1.76$, $p = .081$.

**Free speech.** Prejudice predicted greater freedom of speech relevance in the anti-Black condition, $\beta = .47$, $t(124) = 5.90$, $p < .001$. In the anti-police condition, prejudice did not predict free speech, $\beta = -.05$, $t(123) = -0.57$, $p = .573$ (Figure 2). Probing this interaction using the Johnson-Neyman technique (Hayes, 2013), I found that participants scoring $Z = 1.12$ and higher in prejudice thought free speech was violated more in the anti-Black condition than the anti-police condition; participants scoring $Z = 0.06$ and lower in prejudice thought free speech was violated less in the anti-Black condition than in the anti-police condition.

**Moderated mediation.** I then examined if having a higher subjective standard mediated the relationship between (a) prejudice and freedom of speech and (b) prejudice and perceived justice in the anti-Black condition, but in the opposite direction in the anti-police condition.

I accomplished this by regressing subjective standard on prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction; then in a separate model I regressed the dependent variable (either free speech or perceived justice) on subjective standard, prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction. I calculated these coefficients, the indirect effects, and the indeces of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015) using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8, Hayes 2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As reported in Table 1, the prejudice by condition interaction on subjective standard was significant, $b = .90$, $SE = .15$, $t(247) = 6.00$, $p < .001$.

I first examined the conditional indirect effect with freedom of speech as the dependent variable (Figure 3, Panel A). Regressing freedom of speech on subjective standard, prejudice,
condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction yielded two significant predictors: subjective standard, $b = .78, SE = .10, t(246) = 8.05, p < .001$; and the interaction, $b = .49, SE = .25, t(246) = 2.00, p = .047$. The index of moderated mediation indicates if the indirect effect in the *anti-Black* condition was significantly different from the indirect effect in the *anti-police* condition (Hayes, 2015). The index was significant, $.70 [.42, 1.06]. I then examined the indirect effects in both conditions, again using the PROCESS macro (Model 4, Hayes 2013), using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As can be seen in Panels B and C in Figure 3, respectively, subjective standard mediated the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech in the *anti-Black* condition, indirect effect = .38 [.17, .64], while the indirect effect was in the opposite direction in the *anti-police* condition, indirect effect = -.23 [-.53, -.01].

I then examined the conditional indirect effect with perceived justice as the dependent variable, using the same statistical analyses. Regressing perceived justice, prejudice, condition, and prejudice by condition interaction yielded one significant predictor: subjective standard, $b = -.90, t(246) = -14.57, p < .001$. The index of moderated mediation was significant, -.81 [-1.16, -.50], indicating that the indirect effects in the *anti-Black* and *anti-police* were significantly different from one another. I then examined the indirect effects in both conditions. The indirect effect was significant in the *anti-Black* condition, -.51 [-.75, -.33], and in the *anti-police* condition, it was significant in the opposite direction, .24 [.00, .53]. As shown in Panels B and C of Figure 3, prejudice predicted a higher subjective standard in the *anti-Black* condition and lower standards in the *anti-police* condition. Subjective standard predicted lower perceived justice in both conditions, $ts < -8.00, ps < .001$.

**Discussion**
Anti-Black prejudice predicted higher perceived relevance of freedom of speech for the firing of an employee over offensive speech, but only when the offensive speech was anti-Black, replicating the findings in Study 2. This relationship was because the more anti-Black prejudiced someone was, the less likely they were to consider anti-Black speech inappropriate or unacceptable, but the more likely they were to consider anti-police speech as offensive. In turn, the more appropriate people found the speech, the more they used freedom of speech to justify it.

People use themselves as a yardstick to judge the appropriateness of others’ attitudes. People high in anti-Black prejudice find anti-Black prejudiced speech acceptable, but people low in that prejudice find the same speech deplorable. Anti-Black speech is more likely to fall in the latitude of acceptance—the range of attitudes that people find acceptable (Sherif, 1963)—for participants harboring anti-Black prejudice, which makes them more likely to combat suppression by marshalling freedom of speech in the ex-employee’s defense. The anti-police speech was more likely to fall in the latitude of rejection (i.e., be acceptable) for participants with anti-Black prejudice, which makes them less likely to justify the anti-police statements using freedom of speech.

I also found evidence that the justifications are relatively interchangeable: Another value relevant to the situation—Justice—showed the exact same pattern of effects. The two justifications (free speech and justice) correlated strongly with one another, $r = -.65, p < .001$. There is nothing special about freedom of speech as a justification per se; prejudiced people will use any plausible, normative justification to protect the expression of prejudice. It is also noteworthy that my participants were not able to differentiate between outcome and procedural justice, even though they were explicitly instructed to do so, as previous research suggests that people can differentiate between the two (see Napier & Tyler, 2008; van den Bos, 2005) and they
can have differential effects (e.g., Törnblom & Kazemi, 2010). Such a high relationship between the two is generally found when people’s strong, morally convicted attitudes influence their judgments about justice (e.g., Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

I replicated the free-speech-as-justification effect, demonstrating once again that the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech in Study 1 is not due to a principled appreciation for the value of freedom of expression. I also found support for the self-as-standard hypothesis, as subjective standards for what is offensive mediated the relationship between anti-Black prejudice and freedom of speech when an employee is terminated for anti-Black speech.

A limitation of the current comparison condition—anti-police speech—is that the context essentially pits police and Black people against one another. A stronger test of the hypothesis would be employing a comparison condition that is a truly neutral group to the plight of Black Americans. I conduct such a test in Study 7, and I also test the anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis.

**Study 7: The Anger-Toward-Suppressor Hypothesis**

The JSM proposes that suppression of prejudice has negative affective consequences (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), and although expressing suppressed prejudices can have positive affective consequences (O’Brien & Crandall, 2000), the negative affective consequences of suppression have not been tested. I aim to provide evidence for and refine this supposition by testing my anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis: Using freedom of speech to justify someone else’s punished prejudice derives from the anger that is directed toward suppressors. Specifically, I predict a model whereby anger toward the management group who fired the employee will mediate the relationship between anti-Black prejudice and freedom of speech, but only in an anti-Black condition.
The control condition in the present study is *anti-cyclist* speech—a neutral group that is not perceived as oppositional to Black Americans (contrary to Studies 2 and 4, which use *anti-police* speech as the control condition). Moreover, I increase the offensiveness of the speech to see if the interactive effect of prejudice and condition on the free speech justification holds with more extreme language.

**Method**

**Participants.** I recruited 201 participants from MTurk to complete the study. Participants’ ages (M = 31.59, SD = 10.26) ranged from 19 to 71, the sample was 37.3% female, and 75.6% of participants identified as White/Caucasian.

**Procedure.** Participants read a “description of the recent event” after agreeing to participate in the study. The passage was similar to those in Studies 2 - 6, except with different prejudiced speech—*anti-Black* or *anti-cyclist*:

Bell frustratingly tweeted that he was stuck in traffic, driving behind a car occupied by African-Americans that was driving [group of road bicyclists who were pedaling] “too slow.” He continued to tweet that he was “sick of all the blacks [bike riders] here” and that they "should kill themselves."

They read this description and then completed a brief questionnaire.

**Measures.**

**Anger toward management.** Participants were asked how much they agree with the following statements on a seven-point scale (1, *Strongly Disagree* to 7, *Strongly Agree*): “The story makes me feel angry toward Lecil Consulting” (the name of the company) and “The story makes me feel angry toward Connor Bell.” I measured anger toward both the company and the

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6 Condition did not affect prejudice, \( p = .610. \)
ex-employee, because participants could have felt angry toward either or both parties. I calculated anger toward management by dividing the anger felt toward the company by the total anger felt toward both parties (i.e., the sum of the two items). This yielded a proportion of how much of the total anger participants felt was directed toward the group who fired the employee (i.e., the suppressors).

**Free speech and anti-Black prejudice.** Participants responded to the same free speech items as in Studies 2 and 3 ($\alpha = .96$). I measured prejudice using the same two measures as in Study 4 ($r = .40, p < .001$).

**Results**

I hypothesized that anti-Black prejudice would predict greater anger toward management and endorsement of freedom of speech in the anti-Black condition (coded 1), but not in the anti-cyclist condition (coded 0). I tested both of these hypotheses by regressing each of these dependent variables on prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction in two regression equations. All coefficients are listed in Table 2.

The prejudice by condition interactions that served as the tests of my hypotheses were both significant, $ps < .02$ (Table 2). I probed both of these interactions by examining the simple slopes of the dependent variables regressed on prejudice in each of the conditions.

**Anger toward management.** Prejudice predicted anger toward management in the anti-Black condition, $\beta = .50, t(99) = 5.73, p < .001$, but prejudice was not a significant predictor in the anti-cyclist condition, $\beta = .08, t(98) = 0.77, p = .441$.

**Free speech.** In the anti-Black condition, prejudice predicted greater relevance of free speech, $\beta = .43, t(99) = 4.78, p < .001$; however, prejudice did not predict the relevance of free speech in the anti-cyclist condition, $\beta = .13, t(98) = 1.29, p = .201$ (Figure 4).
Moderated mediation. I then examined if anger toward management mediated the relationship between prejudice and free speech in the anti-Black condition, but not the anti-cyclist condition (Figure 5). I first tested a model where prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction predicted anger toward management, and a second regression equation regressed freedom of speech on anger, prejudice, condition, and the prejudice by condition interaction (Figure 5, Panel A). I accomplished this employing the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8, Hayes, 2013) using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As explained above, the interaction between prejudice and condition on anger toward management was significant. In turn, anger toward management predicted freedom of speech, $b = 6.45$, $SE = 0.52$, $t(196) = 12.42$, $p < .001$. Adding anger toward management to the model predicting freedom of speech, the interaction between prejudice and condition on free speech became non-significant, $b = .02$, $SE = .12$, $t(196) = 0.17$, $p = .869$.

This index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015) was significant, $0.71 \left[ 0.29, 1.19 \right]$. I then examined the indirect effects in both conditions, again using the PROCESS macro (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples. As can be seen in Panels B and C in Figure 5, anger toward management mediated the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech in the anti-Black condition, indirect effect $= .82 \left[ .50, 1.20 \right]$, while this model was not significant in the anti-cyclist condition, indirect effect $= .11 \left[ -.18, .41 \right]$.

Discussion

Anti-Black prejudice predicted more anger toward the individuals who fired an employee for anti-Black speech, and this anger predicted more agreement that the punishment violated the ex-employee’s right to free speech; however, anti-Black prejudice did not predict anger toward management nor freedom of speech when the employee said offensive things about road cyclists.
Thus, the *anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis* was supported: using a value to justify someone else’s punished prejudice was mediated by anger toward the suppressor.

I showed that freedom of speech is predicted by anti-Black prejudice, but only when the suppressed prejudice is anti-Black. This replicates the findings of Studies 2 and 4, but with a more neutral comparison condition (i.e., anti-cyclist speech), providing stronger evidence that appeals to freedom of speech when people are fired for expressing racist attitudes is *not* a principled reaction, but a strategic one that aims to justify the expresser’s prejudice.

**Meta-Analytic Effect Size**

I calculated a fixed-effects meta-analytic effect size for the correlation between prejudice and freedom of speech in the anti-Black conditions. I chose fixed-effects due to all participants coming from population and the consistency in the way each of the constructs were measured (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). As can be seen in Table 3, I found an effect of $r = .39 \ [.33, .44]$.

**General Discussion**

Racist speech has been harshly punished in the form of job terminations and university expulsions in the recent months. Critics argue that these punishments violate First Amendment rights to freedom of expression (e.g., Reynolds, 2015) and that college kids would rather be comfortable than respect freedom of speech, lamenting that it seems as if “Free speech is so last century” (O’Neill, 2014).

In accordance with the justification-suppression model of prejudice (JSM), I found that these appeals to freedom of speech are justifications for prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) with data across seven studies and 1,334 participants. Study 1 was conducted days after a

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7 Calculating a random-effects meta-analytic effect size yielded nearly the same effect size and confidence interval: $r = .39 \ [.32, .45]$. 
widely-publicized controversy about university students being expelled from school for racist speech, and I found that anti-Black prejudice predicted more belief that the expulsion violated the students’ right to free speech. In Studies 2, 6, and 7, I demonstrated that this relationship was not due to prejudiced people having a principled respect for freedom of speech: Prejudice only predicted the relevance of freedom of speech in the context of an employee being fired for anti-Black speech—it did not have a relationship with freedom of speech when people were fired for other forms of offensive speech (i.e., anti-police in Studies 2 and 6, anti-cyclist in Study 7).

The JSM is primarily an intrapsychic model in how it attempts to explain how individuals come to express their own suppressed prejudices. The mechanism that affect has a motivational force to be expressed thus cannot explain the present data. I tested three hypotheses that could.

Studies 3, 4, and 5 provided no support for the threat-to-self hypothesis, which argues that witnessing another’s expression of prejudice be harshly suppressed threatens similarly prejudiced individuals’ sense of self-integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), or how much they perceive themselves as a good and moral person. No evidence supported the contention that people are motivated to justify someone else’s punished prejudice as a proxy for protecting their own self-integrity.

Study 6 found support for the self-as-standard hypothesis. People use their own attitudes as a standard for what is acceptable. The anti-Black statements that employees were fired for were closer to the beliefs of highly prejudiced people, so they saw them as more normative and appropriate than lowly prejudiced people. This higher threshold for being offensive mediated the relationship between prejudice and freedom of speech. The opposite effect emerged when one was punished for anti-police remarks: Highly prejudiced people found the suppressed statements more non-normative and inappropriate than lowly prejudiced people. Additionally, the same
effects emerged when perceived outcome and procedural justice was the dependent variable, suggesting that justifications can be relatively interchangeable.

In Study 7, I tested my anger-toward-suppressor hypothesis: Prejudiced people simply feel angry when they hear about others being punished for prejudice expression, and this anger fuels their need to justify someone else’s punished prejudice. The data supported this hypothesis: Prejudice predicted greater anger toward the management group that fired the employee, but only when the employee was fired for anti-Black prejudice (as compared to anti-cyclist prejudice). This anger, in turn, predicted greater endorsement that the termination harmed the ex-employee’s right to free speech.

**Prejudice-Justifying Function of Values**

Values are “favorable valences” associated with “abstract concepts” (Azjen, 2001, p. 42) that are “widely shared and rarely questioned”—they are *cultural truisms* (Maio & Olson, 1998, p. 294). Freedom of speech is a core American value that most people share (Cohn, 2012), and it is codified in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Functional theories of attitudes argue that values may have a value-expressive function (Azjen, 2001; DeBono, 1987; Katz, 1960; Maio & Olson, 1994, 1995), in that attitudes give people a concrete opportunity to express these abstract beliefs. My data are in line with the JSM (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and value-justification hypothesis (VJH; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994) in demonstrating that *values have an attitude-justifying function*: When an attitude (e.g., prejudice) comes under fire from others (e.g., suppressors), people can marshal these widely-shared beliefs to justify the attitude. Values are used to reframe the situation: Using the frame of “equality,” firing someone for racist speech is entirely acceptable; using the frame of “free speech,” the termination becomes controversial because it
violates a value. The present studies show that pre-existing prejudice shapes how relevant people think certain values are to situations that are relevant to those attitudes: If one shares the prejudice that is suppressed, one is more likely to endorse the relevance of the value that the suppressor violates. People strategically deploy values to combat suppressors and justify prejudices, and I see this effect emerge for the values of freedom and justice both. So while values may sometimes be guiding principles people use to live their lives (Schwarz, 1992), values may also serve the function of justifying controversial attitudes.

**Justifying Another’s Prejudice**

Brehm (1999) theorized that emotions are motivational states, and the JSM argues that prejudices—a largely affective attitude—also have a motivational force. One of these motivations is one of self-expression: People in Western, individualistic cultures are motivated to and derive positive psychological benefits from expressing their feelings and attitudes (Baldwin, Biernat, & Landau, 2014; Heppner et al., 2008; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Kim & Drolet, 2003; Kim & Sherman, 2007; Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schröder-Abé, 2015), especially attitudes that people cannot or do not express frequently (O’Brien & Crandall, 2000; Schlege, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009). The JSM argues that this motivational force to be expressed is the fuel that drives people to justify their own suppressed prejudices—so that they can derive the positive psychological benefits from communicating their prejudiced attitudes, and do so free from sanctioning. This motivational force to be expressed mechanism cannot explain the current data: My participants were justifying another’s expressed prejudice, not their own. The justification also came after the expression, not before it. Why do third-parties justify another’s similarly prejudiced statements being suppressed?
I found support for two of the three hypotheses I tested to answer this question. Across three studies, I found no support for the hypothesis that ego concerns motivate people to justify someone else’s suppressed prejudice. This null finding is noteworthy, as the VJH operated on the assumption that using values to justify their political and intergroup attitudes served an ego-defensive function. Self-integrity plays an important part in intergroup attitudes and perceptions of racism and discrimination in contemporary society (e.g., Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Lowery et al., 2014; Phillips & Lowery, 2015), yet my data did not follow this pattern of findings.

I found that people did not use the termination-for-racism story to inform how they should feel about themselves, but instead used themselves as a standard to inform how they should feel about the firing. Prejudice predicted a higher standard for what one considered non-normative and offensive, and this in turn predicted the relevance of freedom of speech and perceived justice done to the employee. Lastly, the termination provoked anger in more prejudiced individuals, which drove the justification process. I thus captured two explanations for why people would be motivated to justify another’s prejudice, in lieu of the JSM’s fundamental mechanism being absent.

**Interchangeability of Justifications**

Freedom of speech and perceptions of procedural and outcome justice showed virtually identical patterns of effects as dependent variables, suggesting that the content of the justification isn’t critical to the justification process; instead, people will gravitate toward justifications that are plausible (Bahns, 2015; Effron & Knowles, 2015) and normative. Freedom and justice are two values that are relevant to the situation and are normative (Maio & Olson, 1998), so their uses as justifications should be comparable, which my data show.
Limitations and Future Directions

I operationalized prejudice with self-report measures. Despite using a variety of measures and thus demonstrating conceptual replication (Crandall & Sherman, 2016), all of these measures were nonetheless self-reports, which differ from genuine prejudice (which is essentially unmeasurable, see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). While some researchers might suggest using indirect tests of prejudice, these measures have their own validity issues with regards to measuring personal attitudes (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton et al., 2009; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013; Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008; Uhlmann, Brescoll, & Paluck, 2006). Future research could address this limitation by manipulating prejudice, creating novel prejudices using evaluative conditioning (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Using this procedure, novel prejudices have been shown to create warmth-related stereotypes (Crandall, Bahns, Warner, & Schaller, 2011) and perceptions of threat (Bahns, 2015) toward the conditioned target groups. Participants that are conditioned to feel negatively toward a target group should justify punished prejudice against that group more than participants who are conditioned to feel neutrally or positively toward that same target group.

I assumed that freedom of speech and perceived justice were interchangeable justifications for prejudice because they were affected the same by my independent variables; however, being affected similarly does not necessarily imply that these effects derive from the same social psychological processes. Future studies should explicitly manipulate the plausibility/relevance of the justification to the situation at hand (see Bahns, 2015; Effron & Knowles, 2015) and how normative and widely shared are the values by people.

Conclusion
Dobby, a house-elf character from the *Harry Potter* book series, tells Harry Potter in the fifth book of the series about a very special room: “It is a room that a person can only enter when they have real need of it. Sometimes it is there, and sometimes it is not, but when it appears, it is always equipped for the seeker’s needs” (Rowling, 2003, pp. 386-387). I argue that values, when used as justifications, operate similarly to this special room: They appear for the anti-Black prejudiced person when it suits their needs (e.g., justifying anti-Black prejudice) but not when it does not suit their needs (e.g., justifying anti-cyclist prejudice). Freedom of speech is a justification because it only appears for prejudiced people when it is needed, and it may be rejected when it is animical to the prejudiced person’s needs.

For example, Univision chose not to air the Donald Trump-owned Miss USA and Miss Universe pageants after Trump said prejudiced remarks against Mexicans. He chose to sue Univision, citing freedom of speech (Perkins, 2015). Months later, Trump advocated shutting down certain “parts of the Internet” to prevent ISIS from recruiting members. In his words, “Somebody will say, ‘Oh freedom of speech, freedom of speech.’ These are foolish people. We have a lot of foolish people” (Frizell, 2015). Values may be used as guiding principles to live by, but my data show that they are also strategically deployed to justify prejudices.
References


Klausner, A. (2015, November 20). *College student apologizes for criticizing Black lives matter online after her post got her fired from her job and has activists calling for her expulsion.*


Table 1

Coefficients Tables for the Three Regression Models Tested in Study 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>49.06</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Condition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prejudice x Condition</td>
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<td>.44</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>&lt; .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>.14</td>
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<td>.058</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Condition</td>
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All overall models were significant, all $F$s > 12, $p$s < .001.
Table 2

*Coefficients Tables for the Three Regression Models Tested in Study 7*

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<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Predictor</th>
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<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
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<td>-.22</td>
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<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.16</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.019</td>
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</table>

All overall models were significant, both Fs > 11, ps <.001.
Table 3

*Meta-Analytic Relationship Between Prejudice and Freedom of Speech in Anti-Black Conditions*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Sample</th>
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<th>r</th>
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<td>.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 2, Anti-Black</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3, Self-Affirmation</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 3, Control</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study 4</td>
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<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 6, Anti-Black</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 7, Anti-Black</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meta-Analytic r and CI</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>.39 [..33, .44]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Anti-Black prejudice predicts freedom of speech in the anti-Black condition, but not in the anti-police condition (Study 2).
Figure 2. Anti-Black prejudice predicts freedom of speech in the anti-Black condition, but not in the anti-police condition (Study 6).
Figure 3. The moderated mediation model (Panel A), indirect effect in the anti-Black condition (Panel B), and the indirect effect in the anti-police condition (Panel C) in Study 6.
Figure 4. Anti-Black prejudice predicts freedom of speech in the anti-Black condition, but not in the anti-cyclist condition (Study 7).
Figure 5. The moderated mediation model (Panel A), indirect effect in the anti-Black condition (Panel B), and the indirect effect in the anti-cyclist condition (Panel C) in Study 7.
Appendix:

Materials and Measures Not Described in Full in the Primary Text

Study 1 Story

On Sunday, a video went viral on the Internet showing fraternity brothers in Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) at the University of Oklahoma chanting a racist song on a bus. They sang about how a there will “never be a n***** in SAE,” and also made reference to lynching of African Americans by saying that you could hang a Black person “from a tree,” but there would “never be a n***** in SAE.” The song was done to the tune of, “If You’re Happy and You Know It, Clap Your Hands.”

The school has responded swiftly: the university president directly addressed the people in the video by saying, “You are disgraceful.” The Oklahoma chapter of SAE was shut down, and all fraternity members have already been forced to move out. The OU Board of Directors has also expelled two students who were leading the chant on the bus.

Symbolic Racism (Henry & Sears, 2002)

1. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites

2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.

3. Some say that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast enough. What do you think?

4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are responsible for creating?
5. How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the United States today, limiting their chances to get ahead?

6. Generations of slavery have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

7. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

8. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.

Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)

1. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

2. Inferior groups should stay in their place.

3. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

4. It would be good if groups could be equal.

5. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

6. No group should dominate in society.

Social Distance (Crandall, 1991)

1. I would like a Black person to be a close personal friend.

2. I would like a Black person to move into my neighborhood.

3. I would like a Black person to come and work at the same place I do.

4. Black people are similar to me.

5. I would like to have Black people marry into my family.

6. I tend to avoid Black people.

Study 3 Experimental Manipulation
**Self-Affirmation.** Below is a list of personal characteristics, values, or aspects of life. Some of these may be important to you in your life, while some may be unimportant. Please read through the list and select the value, quality, or aspect that is most important to you in your life.

1. Artistic skills and aesthetic appreciation
2. Sense of humor
3. Relations with friends and family
4. Being spontaneous and living life in the moment
5. Sports and athletics
6. Music ability and appreciation
7. Creativity
8. Business and money
9. Romance
10. Science and the pursuit of knowledge

Now, think about the value, characteristic, or aspect that you selected above. We would like you to answer a few questions based on what you picked as the most important to you in your life:

1. Why is this value, characteristic, or aspect the most important to you? Please write 3 or 4 sentences about why it is important to you.
2. Describe a time when this value, characteristic, or aspect made you feel good about yourself (e.g., happy, content, proud). Please write 3 or 4 sentences describing a time when it made you feel good having this value, characteristic, or aspect about your life.

**Control.** Below is a list of common household items. Please read through the list and select one that you will be answering some questions about.
1. Pencil
2. Shoelaces
3. Lamp
4. Spatula
5. Scotch tape
6. Paper clip
7. Zip lock bag
8. Ironing board
9. Curtains
10. Coffee mug

Now, think about the household item that you selected. We would like you to answer a few questions based on the household items that you selected:

1. What are some uses for this household item? Please write down five uses for this household item.
2. Describe where this household item would be located in a superstore. Please provide as much detail as possible about where this item could be located in a superstore: what other things are in the aisle, where the aisle is, if its on the edge of the store or the center, and so on.

**Study 4 Experimental Manipulation**

There are fifteen social groups listed below. We would like to know if you have ever said [frequently say] something negative, stereotypical, or unfavorable about each of these groups. This could be on social networking sites, in a text message or e-mail, or face-to-face with
someone else. If you have ever said [frequently say] something negative about the group, please select "Yes." If you have never done so [rarely or never do], select "No."

Have you ever [Do you frequently say] negative things about this group?

1. African Americans
2. Overweight people
3. Asians
4. Intellectually disabled people
5. Gay people
6. Lesbian people
7. Transgender people
8. Immigrants
9. Muslims
10. Feminists
11. Elderly people
12. Ugly people
13. Latinos and Hispanic people
14. Poor people
15. Mentally ill people

How many times did you select "Yes" above? In the space below, please write how many times you picked "Yes." Remember this number, because we will want you to write it down again later.

**Study 5 Target Description**
Colin Slator is a director of content and advertising at a prominent phone company, where he manages teams of creative marketers that work on the phone company’s online advertisements.

He is from a suburban town in the Pacific Northwest, and he lived in the same town his entire childhood before moving across the country to study strategic communications at a major university in the Midwest.

Although his department manages the company’s Twitter account, the only social media account he has is one on Facebook. He lives in an apartment with two cats, and his favorite type of food is Thai food.

He enjoys music that many people don't appreciate, and he probably spends more time online than he should.

When it comes to friends, he believes in quality more than quantity: his friend group is small, but a group of tight-knit friends that all met in college. His friends describe him as outgoing and easy to get along with, but that he really likes his routine and doesn’t really like trying new things.

Colin has blonde hair, hazel eyes, and stands six feet tall.

**Procedural Justice**

1. Management used fair procedures in dealing with Connor Bell.
2. How biased or unbiased was management in making the decision to fire Connor Bell?
3. Do you think the way management went about deciding to fire Connor Bell was just or unjust?

**Outcome Justice**

1. Do you think firing Connor Bell was a fair or unfair outcome?
2. Firing Connor bell was the just and right outcome for his Facebook post.

3. Was firing Connor Bell the right or wrong outcome for his Facebook post?