Modernization and the Semi-Periphery:
Western Influence on Modern-Day LGBTQIA* Rights in Russia, Japan, and Iran

By

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to identify and investigate the reason for the change in sexual values experienced by Russia, Japan, and Iran from the middle of the nineteenth to the early twentieth century. I argue that semi-periphery nations exposed to Eurocentric globalization and associated “modernist” pressures around the turn of the nineteenth century, in attempting to conform to dominant Western European Victorian ideals, ultimately adopted the accompanying social conservatism and increased standards of heteronormative expectations. Modern-day policies and norms in these countries still reflect this conservatism and heteronormativity. My analysis of these case studies confirms this argument and shows that mechanisms of foucauldian notions of governmentality and world-systems theory factored into the transfer of norms from heteronormative homoeros to strictly heteronormative systems.
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Introduction

As of 1991, homosexual acts are punishable by death in Iran, while 2006 saw the first Russian provinces establish laws prohibiting "homosexual propaganda" (Carroll & Itaborahy 74-75, 18). In Japan, sexual and gender minorities are subject to pronounced discrimination and the expectation that they will enter into heteronormative relationships despite their inclinations otherwise (Crompton 443; Hawkins 36; DiStefano 1429). This occurs in spite of the recent legalization of same-sex marriage in Japan, implying a lingering sense of underlying reluctance to accept what is concealed from public view and deemed as socially “deviant.” Given a lack of government action, independent activists in the form of NGOs—Non-Governmental Organizations—have attempted to interfere in the marginalization of sexual and gender minorities in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Unfortunately, these well-intentioned efforts tend to not only be ineffective, but oftentimes do more harm than good (Baer 507).

This was not always the case. Prior to the twentieth century, Iran, Russia, and Japan were profoundly Hellenist in their conception of sexuality. What accounts for this change in values? This question occupies the core of this analysis. I argue that semi-periphery nations exposed to Eurocentric globalization and associated “modernist” pressures around the turn of the nineteenth century, in attempting to conform to dominant Western European Victorian ideals, ultimately adopted the accompanying social conservatism and increased standards of heteronormative expectations. Modern-day policies and norms in these countries still reflect this conservatism and heteronormativity. As such, the marginalization or acceptance of LGBTQIA* individuals—i.e. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning, Intersex, and Asexual, with the asterisk representing additional minority identities not already included1—allows for a greater

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1 It is for the sake of inclusion that I am using this term as opposed to any other acronyms frequently used to represent the community of sex and gender minorities, and because I am primarily interested in how we explain the
understanding of the consequences of western influence at the turn of the nineteenth century. In order to conduct my analysis, I will be utilizing both world-systems theory and Foucauldian discourse analysis to explain the ways in which these social changes took place.

This paper will proceed as follows: The first section will discuss other research pertinent to this work, relevant theories in greater detail, and the methodology used to conduct the analysis, including necessary definitions for clarification. The analysis will be broken down into three parts: Russia, Japan, and Iran prior to western pressures to modernize, during modernization, and after. Having chosen these countries as a result of their similarity prior to and after modernization, the analysis of these stages will involve all countries being compared simultaneously side-by-side, given their shared characteristics at these times. However, as each of these nations underwent the process of modernization differently, the stage set during modernization will see each country being analyzed separately, one after the other. Finally, the conclusion will account for complicating factors as well as possible avenues for future research.

**Literature Review**

In the process of conducting my research, I have found that, while a great number of people have looked at the individual “puzzle pieces” that contribute to my research question of how and why the transition into modernity occurred alongside a restructuring of sexual norms, no one has put these pieces together to arrive at any conclusions.

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variation in attitudes across societies toward these identities today. However, it should be noted here that this acronym is undeniably modern in its construction, and as modern conceptions of sexual minorities do not apply trans-historically, I will be using a variety of terms to signify the given sexual minorities and “deviant” acts being discussed at any given time.
The majority of works dealing specifically with the historical conception and construction of gendered sexuality by means of governmentality fixate either on the transition of a specific country or on the subject matter itself, with few focusing on the integration of the two. As a result, these works are scattered and showcase little evidence of relation amongst themselves, with the exception of the few authors that exhibit an overlap between one or more themes.

The most notable of these is Michel Foucault, who has written exhaustively on matters of governmentality, sexuality, sex and gender role construction, and the interplay between the social and the political in the construction of power hierarchies. Following in his footsteps came a number of other gender theorists. Judith Butler primarily focused on the hegemony of the heteronormative, power and hierarchy as part of sex, and performativity of gender, deeply challenging traditional notions of sex and gender. In this way, Butler jumpstarted a global movement of queer activism in the form of NGOs and think tanks, who were able to mobilize her novel conceptions for the so-perceived greater good. Eve Sedgwick reflected on male homosociality and homosexual desire, the construction of sexuality as a distinguishing element of character, and, much like Butler, performativity of gender. Gayle Rubin, who, with her 1984 essay "Thinking Sex" constructed the concept of the "Charmed Circle," articulated the notion that there exists a hierarchy of sex acts by constructing binaries to differentiate between

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acceptable vs. unacceptable sexuality. All of these authors contributed significantly to the modern conceptions of queer and critical theory and literature alike. In this way, she served to construct a notion of sexual citizenship, a concept later articulated more clearly by Margot Canaday and Brenda Cossman, wherein they discuss the concept-- both rooted in past and present-- of good vs. bad citizenship, problematizing this in order to discern how these constructions occur by means of social politics. This construction of sexual citizenship is further expounded upon by Marc Stein, writing on the American construction of heteronormativity rooted firmly within the Charmed Circle by means of landmark Supreme Court cases from 1965-73 traditionally hailed as revolutionary.

With a focus specifically on queer history, George Chauncey, alongside a number of other authors, has written extensively on those aspects that history seems to have forgotten, both writing comprehensively throughout history, but also on the gay male world that existed prior to

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4 Please see Marc Stein, Sexual Injustice: Supreme Court Decisions From Griswold to Roe (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
the Second World War in the United States, focusing in particular on New York. Other authors focus more on individual nations with respect to their gay histories.

**Theories**

I will primarily be utilizing world-systems theory and Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine the modernization process herein analyzed.

Within the realm of politics, Immanuel Wallerstein, as its primary progenitor, has written at length on world-systems theory, which was later expounded upon by a number of authors writing on the origins of globalization, and on its ties to modernization. World-systems theory is

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based in the idea that, as a result of capitalism, three tiers have formed as part of a global hierarchy. These tiers are comprised of the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The core is traditionally the most powerful and developed of these groups, originally made up of only Western Europe only to be later expanded to include North America (Robinson 129). The periphery is made up of those countries that are least developed, frequently comprised of those countries colonized by means of imperialism. Finally, the semi-periphery is the transient space in between, made up of those countries who have lost their place in the core or worked their way up from the periphery (129). As Robinson explains, “values flow from the periphery to the semi-periphery, and then to the core, as each region plays a functionally specific role within an international division of labour that reproduces this basic structure of exploitation and inequality” (129). In this way, though exploited themselves, the semi-periphery nevertheless has cause to propagate the model as they seek to attain a space in the core themselves.

The use of this system as theory requires a caveat. It’s possible for world-systems theory to lend itself to a somewhat polemic, anti-Western narrative, as it pits the dominant Western “core” in opposition to the rest of the world. Within this study, I will attempt to avoid this oversimplification, as this process is much more symbiotic than it is unidirectional. Though no one would discount the damage done as a result of Western imperialism, the resulting

consequences analyzed in this paper should not be viewed as intentional, as much as they may have been coincidental.

Foucauldian discourse analysis will contribute greatly to this analysis in its conception of governmentality, the theory of sexualities as socially constructed, and Hegelian power dynamics as embodied socially, politically, and by means of gender and gendered relationships. Foucault’s notion of governmentality plays a crucial role in understanding the method by which normative sexual mores and behaviors were socio-culturally established by means of top-down systems of bureaucracy. When writing on governmentality, Foucault established the notion that governments mobilize a wide variety of methods in order to govern their populace, a concept established first during his lectures at the Collège de France from 1970 to 1981. In a more negatively nuanced light, this can frequently translate to the strategic exercise of control by a government. In a similar fashion, Foucault is able to utilize Hegel's master-slave dialectic, which, in its conception of class struggles and the relationship between dominant and dominated, which can easily be applied to both postcolonial theory and the dynamics of sex and gender relations.

Finally, a note should be added with regard to the influence of post-colonial theory’s role in influencing these mechanisms. In the struggle for cultural and political autonomy and sovereignty in lieu of the inferior position held by colonized states, the semi-periphery inevitably hoped to distinguish themselves in order to cultivate a sense of national pride. Wishing to attain the success of the west without succumbing to mimicry, the lack of a competitive "edge" in an industrial sense meant that pride had to be located elsewhere. With a similar moral ground to build on, the West's growing permissiveness as seen in its cultural centers meant that it was no longer living up to its own Victorian ideals. Instances such as the 1889 Cleveland Street Scandal and the 1895 trial of Oscar Wilde showcased the West as a hypocritical, decadent entity opposite
which the semi-periphery could cultivate itself as more sexually appropriate. This sense of national pride was crucial to the success of the nation-building project rooted in the Western model of Modernity. As the established sexual norm was an inherently heteronormative one even in homoerotic relations, this morality was simple to mobilize for government purpose.

**Methodology**

I will be conducting a historical qualitative comparative case study with three cases, Russia, Japan, and Iran, employing Mill’s Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) in order to understand variance, as it allows me to compare unlike cases while simultaneously showcasing the strength of the link between variables in order to better support my research. Within the context of this study, the variables will be the cultural norms of society versus that society’s desire for international status. In this way, MDSD is able to expertly identify relevant correlation, thus allowing me to argue that the western influence, however differently it may have played out in each country's case, was responsible for the change in social and sexual mores in these nations.

As aforementioned, this analysis will be conducted in three stages: prior to western pressures to modernize, during modernization, and after. These stages are articulated, first, via the existence of commonly accepted homoerotic relations prior to western influence, second, via the existence of western influence upon these nation-states at the time of Victorian social and sexual mores, and, third, via the modern-day socially restrictive nature of the countries in question. As such, this case study will use secondary sources exclusively, hoping to utilize the works of those that have come before me in order to establish a “bigger” picture overview.
The argument can be put forth that Japan is part of the core of world-systems theory in the modern day. While this may be the case, as my focus is based on position relative to historical relation with the West, its previous status in the Western shadow makes it an ideal candidate for the purposes of this study, as, despite its status as part of the core in the modern day, its social conservatism until very recently stands in stark contrast to the policies of the core itself.

China, despite its obvious global presence, was not included for a number of reasons. While I could have included it as part of this analysis as a result of its exposure to western pressures in the nineteenth century, one actor taken from East Asia felt more than sufficient. In addition, I felt that its overly complex status as simultaneously developed (on the coast) and developing (in the heartland) would have complicated the subject matter of this study unnecessarily.

Japanese isolationism had been absolute up until Commodore Perry’s unceremonious 1853 entry into Edo harbor (now Tokyo) in order to force it out of its isolation on behalf of the United States government. With no option other than to engage in trade with the U.S., Japan was both rapidly and involuntarily thrust onto the international sphere. And while Iran’s emergence from isolation may not have been quite as traumatic, the influx of Western travelers fascinated by an “Orientalist” Middle East opened it up to the full extent of Western judgment and subsequent pressures.

Russia is a more complicated case. Close enough to the West to feel the perpetual possibility of membership, and yet far enough removed to never feel completely part of the West, Russia has had a tumultuous and torn history in relation to its engagement with its Western neighbors. This phenomenon was only exacerbated upon its rapidly dwindling relevance through
the nineteenth century (Fagin 26). Torn between the urge to remain independent and isolationist and retaining their previously proud place as part of the core, Russia simultaneously wished to be part of the West and distinctly separate from it. This dichotomy is easily expressed as a Russian “identity crisis,” wherein this is expressed “through the competition of two often mutually exclusive trends in the country’s […] development, Westernization and isolationism” (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 9). Ultimately amounting to a deeply felt social stigma, this drove Russia further into isolationism as a result of “a lack of ‘the self’s’ acceptance by the European ‘other’,” inevitably resulting in “dogmatism and isolationism, in particular, [becoming] essential features” of the Russian socio-political topography (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 6). In this way, the Western European pressures upon Russia to modernize are of particular relevance to my research.

Finally, there is a unifying thread uniting Iran and Japan in particular, and Russia to a certain extent. Both Japan and Iran were notably homonormative prior to the substantial exposure to Western pressures to modernize and conform to Victorian standards of sexuality. Russia, too, held a far more liberal stance with respect to homosexuality prior to its emergence on the international tribunal. And while this policy may have been less homonormative and more “don’t ask, don’t tell,” the cultural difference between the Russian attitude of casual sexual fluidity stands in stark contrast to Western notions of the Foucauldian homosexual “type.”

Definitions
The androcentric model of sexuality maintains a fairly heteronormative structure. Within this framework, heteronormativity is defined as an inherently hierarchical system that positions "heterosexuality as the cornerstone of the [...] sex/gender system and obligate the personal construction of sexuality and gender in terms of heterosexual norms. Heteronormativity assumes [...] two sexes and therefore two genders [and] requires that all discussions [...] be framed strictly in terms of this dichotomy, forcing gendered actors to be labelled as either ‘women’ or ‘men,’” while markedly Western institutions work together to provide the idea of heteronormativity with "its natural and normal facade" (Lovaas & Jenkins 98). This regulation occurs by means of "distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable sexual/gendered identities and practices and through an ordering of the social worth of individuals on the basis of their allegiance to such distinctions" (Lovaas & Jenkins 98).

Conversely, the idea of homonormativity is far more complex. While Duggan argued that homonormativity is "a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption," thereby firmly rooting the concept firmly within a strictly neoliberal framework, she considered the term to be a thoroughly modern one that didn't apply outside of the neoliberal emergence of the white gay male as a viable consumerist citizen (179). I don't consider the term to be nearly as limited. Instead, within the context of my research, I am using the concept of homonormativity to apply in contrast to heteronormativity, a state very similar to that of Hellenist-inspired approach to sexuality, wherein it was typical to have male lovers and friends while women were often used solely for the sake of procreation.
But even this configuration was one that existed within the confines of very strict norms and guidelines of propriety and acceptability. This pattern can be observed in Japan, Iran, and Russia alike, wherein the older, adult male is expected to be sexually dominant opposite a younger male adolescent who would be submissive up until a certain point in his life (Pflugfelder 964; Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 15; Healey 236). This adolescent in both Japan and Iran possessed a distinctly androgynous appearance, suggesting a certain fluidity of sexuality; the same fluidity can be found in the Russian conception, as well (Pflugfelder 966; Najmabadi 16; Healey 239). In Russia, meanwhile, it was considered perfectly acceptable to engage in homosexual liaisons provided that one played the role of the dominant, thus ensuring that one retained his masculinity (Baer 515).

In a lot of ways, this can be viewed as a form of heteronormativity in the guise of homonormativity, but this would be an incorrect construction. My sentiments on this matter echo that of Najmabadi’s, who states that "... the classical definition [of the adolescent male] is decidedly not in relation to women," and while she acknowledges that they are affiliated categories in that the adolescent male and women both "defined nonmanhood," she argues that "the ubiquitous designation [of the adolescent male] as effeminate in our time reveals the depth of heteronormalization and the reduction of all gender and sexual categories to two" (“Women With Mustaches” 16). She goes on to say that "this is congruent with a concept of desire that did not consider same-sex desire as derivative from other-sex desire," and that calling these desirables effeminate forces authors, regardless of intention, to "transcribing homoeroticism as frustrated heterosexual desire" ("Women With Mustaches” 16). Though the association of Foucault’s “homosexual as a human type” places a certain reluctance to map modern-day concepts of homosexual desire on periods prior to 1895, this can have profound implications for
the scholar aiming to remain neutral within a socio-historical framework. Najmabadi argues expertly on this topic, as she states that “by locating same-sex identification in modern Euro-America, one renders homosexuality external to other places, an alien concept for formation of desire in these other cultures, an argument fully used by homophobic cultural nativists who are happy to (al)locate homosexuality in ‘the West’,” while also introducing “a radical alterity with the past, producing the premodern as a radically different time,” making it difficult to “distinguish historical specificity from unreproducible peculiarity” (“Women With Mustaches” 19). So while sexual types may not have existed prior to the modern day, it would be a mistake to completely remove this historical analysis from its modern implications.

The countries herein defined as restrictive tend to hold more traditional stances, particularly with regard to heterosexual norms and assumptions. This translates to a greater restriction of rights as a result of resistance to change in favor of traditional values. It should be noted, however, that this label is not meant to denote a value judgment, and instead functions simply as a descriptive marker. In order to back up this grouping, I will be incorporating a small amount of quantitative analysis into my paper, based on a nation’s LGBTQIA* rights laws.8

In addition to this terminology, within the context of this study, I define “modernization” as the Western notions of industrialization and westernization spanning from the mid- to late-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. As such, this notion of “modernization” is simultaneously rooted firmly in a basis of Victorian Era-sexuality, which involved strict notions of androcentric sexuality, which brought alongside it a careful confining of sexuality. As sexuality became bound to the private sphere, Foucault explains that ‘the conjugal family took

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8 These include the status of same-sex unions, the existence or lack of anti-homosexual “propaganda” laws, prohibition of the incitement of hatred, hate crime laws, employment discrimination laws, anti-discrimination laws within the constitution, the legality of same-sex adoption, the year(s) same-sex intercourse was decriminalized, and the year(s) same-sex marriage was made legal.
custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction. On the subject of sex, silence became the rule" (3). These repressive notions of Victorian Era sexuality occurring simultaneously alongside the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the West is crucial to the concept of modernization.

In order to avoid confusion, I will be consistently using the term modernization to define this process of “exporting or importing Western models of development (grounded in the liberal, utilitarian, and capitalist ideas of the European Enlightenment) beyond the developed nations of the North Atlantic" (Botting & Kronewitter 468). This language is, of course, deeply nuanced and contested, but I would like to establish early on that it is not my intent to make use of the current substantive understanding of the term. Instead, it is meant for historical and descriptive usage, understood as a modernization project embedded in a Western normative approach. It is as a result of the unquestioned use of the term during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that it lends itself most effectively to the understanding of the socio-cultural context surrounding this definition, therefore making it most relevant to this analysis.

In discussing concepts of sexuality, I would be loath to omit any mention of the concept of citizenship. It should go without saying that trying to concretely define the concept of citizenship is akin to wading through a minefield unless several pages are devoted to the topic, or an author is content to be thoroughly reductionist. As I hope to do neither, I will focus instead specifically on the concept of sexual citizenship, as there is "no consensus within the citizenship debates on the nature of citizenship," though it involves "at its most general [...] the idea of membership" (Cossman 5). And while sexual citizenship is similarly contested, Cossman establishes that "citizenship has always been sexed, but in very particular ways. Citizenship [...] has presupposed a highly privatized, familialized, and heterosexual sexuality. Citizenship in the
public sphere was predicated on appropriate practices in the private sphere" (6). Foucault's explanation of the movement of sexuality from the public into the private sphere is in line with this notion. As such, this thesis will be using the concept of citizenship-- and, in turn, sexual citizenship in particular-- as one perpetually predicated on the notions of inclusion and exclusion based on specific sets of practices dubbed either acceptable or unacceptable by society at any given time, influenced oftentimes by government policies, and, in turn, pressures by the West on these respective governments, thus echoing Foucault's ideas on the concept of governmentality.

In the instances where some sources herein utilized British English, I have not attempted to convert spelling to suit American convention.

**Analysis**

**The Before**

As aforementioned, Iran, Japan, and Russia all held stark similarities to Greek and Roman antiquity with regard to gendered roles and hierarchical implications within same-sex relations. In Japan, the language used for sexual partners as well as sartorial and tonsorial markers helped to structure Japanese sexuality where age/gender hierarchy was perceived as a fetish (Pflugfelder 964). The thus-dubbed “way of youths,” or shudō, was a widely-accepted cultural model of homonormativity wherein the male object of pursuit was classified as a “youth” or wakashu opposite an older pursuer, typically categorized as an adult male having previously held the status of wakashu (964-965). In other words, all males in Tokugawa Japan had at one point held the title of wakashu, a term that simply delineated the stage separating
childhood and manhood, thus rendering them worthy of “aesthetic appreciation and erotic pursuit by fellow males” within the shudō tradition, which mirrored culturally and socially established hierarchies of class and status in society (Pflugfelder 965; McLelland 19).

Falling under the larger umbrella of this tradition, male-male sexual relations were common between samurai, masters and servants, and customers and prostitutes, which came in a wide variety of forms (McLelland 19-21). These systems of homonormativity were sustained in the military, Buddhist monasteries, the Kabuki Theater, and urban area brothels (Hawkins 36). Servants, apprentices, actors, and young salesmen frequently prostituted themselves for either money or favors as part of a wider barter system (19-21). While samurai sexual relations were based on age differences, brothels involved gender-play where the wakashu would play the role of a woman or echo the associated sexual hierarchy of female passivity and male activity (21). Widely accepted, male-male sexual relations were viewed as a hobby distinctly separate from the procreative duties of the home, a model quite similar to those found in both Imperial Russia and Qajar Iran (McLelland 19; Hawkins 36). In this way, homosexuality was viewed as a harmless diversion that did not impinge on the reproductive responsibilities of the home (Hawkins 36).

Similar trends can be observed in Russia, where male prostitution⁹ echoed the Japanese forms of sexual barter between a typically older, wealthier man and a younger, poorer adolescent, typically resulting in either physical rewards or money for the disadvantaged younger man in exchange for sexual favors (Healey 236).

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⁹ I should note at this juncture that, while Healey acknowledges that his analysis of Russian male prostitution cannot compare to a history of its same-sex relations or relationships, he acknowledges the struggles of operating with an “absence of sustained scholarly discussions of Russian homosexuality,” while establishing that various biographies do make it clear that “Russia’s homosexuals were capable of sustained and loving relationships,” but for the purposes of this analysis, this more limited spectrum will have to suffice, as “with a handful of significant exceptions, historians continue to write about Russian sexualities as though only heterosexuality mattered” (236-237, 233).
These interactions occurred without the participants deeming themselves as homosexual, which stands out as similar to Schalow’s observation on male love in early modern Japan that male-male sexual patterns “occurred almost exclusively within a context of bisexuality” (Healey 237, 119-120). Indeed, the absence of a homosexual “identity” in these encounters is stark, as the context of these relations could not be viewed through the Western lens of a hetero-homo binary; instead, male-male sexual relations were part of a wider patriarchal system wherein older men felt free to engage in sexual relations with both men and women, many of them married with children (238-239). Much like in Tokugawa Japan, homosexuality was seen as a casual diversion that did not interfere with their reproductive responsibilities at home.

Qajar Iran saw a great deal of similarities to the above. In premodern Islamic literature, Najmabadi explains that gender was considered either irrelevant to love and beauty, or that same-sex relations were considered superior to heterosexuality (“Women With Mustaches” 17). The former is not surprising, as beauty was a largely androgynous concept in which men and women alike were depicted with similar features and language utilized the same words to remark upon male and female beauty alike (11). Much as was observed in the Japanese and Russian models, these desires were not considered improper or sinful (17-18). The latter, however, isn’t surprising, either, as “vaginal intercourse with wives was aimed to fulfill procreative obligations, while other acts were linked to the pleasures of power, gender, age, class, and rank,” and provided that men fulfilled said obligations, same-sex love was deemed perfectly acceptable, as procreation and sexual inclinations— as well as love-- were believed to belong to separate domains without any need of applying the ideas of the homosexual as a type (20, 21).

Also similar to Russian and Japanese same-sex inclinations was the idea of transgenerational homosexuality. In the instance of Persian male homoerotic culture, roles in
same-sex relationships were separated into the categories of *amrad*— a younger man, typically an adolescent— and adult male. While it was proper for the former to be an object of desire and for the latter to be the desiring, these expectations of gender were as firm as previously observed. The *amrad* would remain as such until he possessed a fully visible beard, and the appearance of facial hair was seen as the transition from adolescence into adulthood, and, as such, from “object of desire to a desiring subject” (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 15).

This lack of facial hair was also to be found amongst Russian youths, whose subordinate age and status was inevitably highlighted by the lack of a beard, implying the youth of the desired object (Healey 242). In line with this logic, “Orthodox clerics […] condemned men who shaved off their beards for inciting immorality, apparently because smooth faces were an invitation to sodomy,” and, despite having taken up shaving under Peter the Great’s reign, prior to the eighteenth century, residents of Moscow were censured on the occasion of shaving as they were said to resemble women too closely, thus “departing from the image of God” (242).

The same was true for Qajar Iran, as well, where severe edicts existed in books of etiquette and morality that proscribed the act of shaving, an act closely related to the critical transition of adolescent to adult male (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 15). In shaving, the fear was that an adult male, no longer meant to possess the title or status of *amrad*, would nevertheless wish to retain his position as sexually passive. While, it was perfectly acceptable for a male adolescent to be an object of desire— unavoidable, even— for an adult man it meant taking on an unacceptable role— that of the effeminate, beardless, passive sexual partner (“Women With Mustaches”15-16). As such, the idea of the *mukhanna*, an adult male who chose to make himself look like an *amrad* was often linked with women and womanhood in general (“Women With Mustaches”15-16). These edicts thus expressed sincere cultural anxieties over
the prospect of men wishing to retain their adolescent position instead of accepting the inevitability of transition, which frequently carried with it negative connotations (“Women With Mustaches” 16). As the beard was considered a sign of domination, adult men frequently had their beards shorn as a method of humiliation while those that did so voluntarily were “largely considered abject characters, subject to religio-cultural approbation and sometimes severe punishment” (“Women With Mustaches” 16-17).

Tokugawa Japan found a different way of typifying youths. While Iran considered age to be an appropriate measure of acceptability of status in male-male relations, Japan did not consider age, physiological traits, or biology, instead focusing on hairstyles and clothing to label whether or not an adolescent was of the correct age and thus an appropriate object of desire for other men (Pflugfelder 966). As such, the status of youth possessed a certain plasticity, though it remained that the primary locus of the aesthetic of shudō was “focused on an appreciation of the youth’s visible differences from the adult male” (966). This marks a notable separation between Iranian and Japanese same-sex erotic desire and that of modern homosexuality, fixated on the biological uniformity between desiring subject and desired object instead of presuming men and youths to be part of dissimilar and separate categories, an erotic relationship that hinged on the idea of “age asymmetry” instead of the sameness of genitalia (966).

Russia, as aforementioned, is a bit more complicated. For one, Russia was the first major power after France to decriminalize consensual male same-sex relations in 1920 following the 1903 Code in attempt to modernize, but even despite a fleeting flourishing of queer writing between the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, this freedom ultimately disappeared in the 1920s with the Bolsheviks, who, in spite of their decriminalization of homosexuality, nevertheless increasingly restrained its artistic license and expression (Healey 253; Karlinsky 347). As such, it
comes as no great surprise that “a hidden world of sexual contact between males preceded the appearance of Russia’s urban homosexual subculture,” and the existence of this world is indicative of a distinct gender boundary differentiating between acceptable masculinity embodied by means of a dominant sexual position and one ideally hidden away as a result of its submissive, effeminate, subordinate sexual position (Healey 238).

This is an important point to observe more closely. Russia has always been more closely connected to the West, and has held in its possession the power afforded by traditional Western hegemony before, thus connecting it more closely with the associated repression while also continually dancing with isolationism and rebellion. As a result, outside appearances are not nearly as indicative here as they are in Japan or Iran, and a reading between the lines becomes necessary. It can generally be assumed, then, that the strategies used to hide deviant sexual encounters can lend itself nicely to discerning the socio-cultural climate at the time to which the behavior was a response (Healey 238).

Most traditional encounters of sexual exchange involved the subordinate partner receiving some form of compensation, taking place within patriarchal relationships that echoed those seen in Tokugawa Japan—masters and apprentices, householders and servants, clerics and novices, and bathhouse attendants and customers (Healey 238). The Russian bath was considered “a place of particular opportunity,” as “the luxurious bania of the 1890s was evidently admired as far away as New York City and San Francisco, where promoters opened ‘Russian’ and ‘Turkish’ imitations for a middle class clientele,” eventually leading to the debut of the American gay steambath as gay clients came to realize the opportunity these locations afforded them—a characteristic, in this instance, that these locations shared in kind with ancient Rome,
where public bathhouses were frequently used as enclaves for same-sex encounters (Healey 245; Simon & Brooks 26).

In these instances of exchange between subordinate and dominant parties, context was telling of the nature of these encounters (Healey 238). As aforementioned, most constructivist historians would be loath to connect the Western homo-hetero binary to these situations, which, much as in Tokugawa Japan, should be read through the lens of occasional bisexuality, as these individuals were unlikely to have conceived of themselves as homosexual in terms of identity (238-239). This is important when considering Healey’s example of a Moscow merchant who kept a diary during the mid-19th century, in which he recorded his indulgences in “lustfulness” with both female and male partners, reflecting a culture that, on the one hand, preferred to keep same-sex encounters hidden in a manner akin to “don’t ask, don’t tell,” while at the same time maintaining a lack of established significance based on the gender of the person involved in any given sexual encounters, which were all deemed equally sinful—in the case of the merchant, “all unchaste urges inspired pangs of shame in [him]” (239).

Similarly, in Qajar Iran, reports of homosexuality, while not always viewed through the lens of approval or neutrality, in comparison to the twentieth century, the lack of judgment and, at times, even outright sympathy granted to same-sex encounters is downright shocking (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 21). Najmabadi summarizes this socio-cultural topography nicely:

In the sociocultural world of the Qajars, despite theological condemnations and punitive actions aimed against same-sex practices, in particular against sodomy, the domain of paradisiacal pleasures was populated by the [male adolescent] and [virginal female adolescent], and male love was focused on the beloved male. Ideas of beauty were ungendered. Within this cultural world, certain same-sex practices occurred in daily life, in spite of the edicts of kings and the clergy to the contrary. In fact, these relations were at
times implicated in the construction of “relations of patronage, pedagogy, apprenticeship, and alliance.” (25)

Western-Oriented Modernization Pressures

Russia

In Russia, the impact of modernization manifested itself via an increasingly complex interaction with both modernism and the West. At the same time wishing to emulate the West and remain wholly unlike it, Russia set on a path that strikes one as profoundly bipolar. On the one hand, the European model of modernity and the sexual and family mores that came alongside it was exactly what Russia was hoping to find. However, the country’s long-standing absolutism was hard to shake, ultimately resulting in what Engelstein dubs an “imperfectly actualized transformation” (“The Keys to Happiness” 9).

In seeking to fit into the Western-established, Western-run hierarchy of power, Russians sought to mimic whatever was necessary in order to attain what the “core” considered to be the qualifications for modernity. In other words, as “the great European powers codified their laws and Russian rulers coveted the symbols of national and cultural prestige, the nineteenth-century tsars authorized the production of codes as an attribute of modern statehood” (Engelstein, “The Keys to Happiness” 20-21). While Western Europe’s newly defined model of modernist sexual practices was based on a Christian heritage that both it and Russia shared, the Orthodox canon had held sexual deviancy in far less contempt than their Byzantine cousin had (57). On a moral, secular front, too, Russia had not held itself to the same standards as Christian Europe had, the first non-religious legislation on sodomy having been brought about by Peter the Great’s
campaign toward increased modernization, and thus aiming for an increase in social regulation and social control to instill compliance with Western expectations (59). This raises the question of exactly where Russia’s profound modern-day homophobia came from, and why, precisely, this change occurred.

At first, homosexuality flew under the radar. Russians had considered sexuality to be a solely heterosexual concern, believing the problem of homosexuality to be inapplicable to their nation-state (Engelstein, “The Keys to Happiness” 422). Instances of same-sex eros occurred outside of Foucault’s framework of medical interpretations of homosexuality as the Russian legal community argued for the lack of significance behind homosexual behavior, far more concerned with the strict maintenance of gender roles, with the primary goal being the reconceptualization of homosexuality as prohibited on a secular basis (57-58). While the gender of the participants was not specified, the wholesale proscription of sodomy instead served as a catch-all, with gender implied via context clues (58). In this way, the legal conceptualization of maleness—and, by extension, male citizenship—became more narrowly defined. The first of these legislations was passed as part of Peter the Great’s attempts at modernization in 1716, and though meant to regulate the behavior of soldiers, the law nevertheless applied to the public, as well, in an attempt at social regulation (58). At the same time, Russia could not escape the winds of change.

By the late nineteenth century in Russia, formerly established patterns in male prostitution were starting to take on new shapes (Healey 246). As such, Russia established the vocabulary to differentiate between commercial sex workers, their clients, and the tetka. Derived as a European import from both French and German, where the word tante—German for aunt—

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was in use, “Russians began to employ tetka […] almost simultaneously” (246). Though initially used to describe male prostitutes, by the end of the century, the word had come to denote those men who stepped outside of the bounds of traditional conceptions of homosexuality as a coincidental byproduct of bisexuality, instead establishing themselves as only interested in men and thus causing the establishment of the homosexual as type in Russia (246). This term did not come without its own use of gender stereotypes—whereas, in German, tante carries with it blatant implications of femininity, so was tetka in Russian used to “refer pejoratively to any middle-aged or older woman (especially in peasant contexts),” which “added a nuance of gendered irony and ruralizing deprecation in Russia’s urban homosexual milieu” (246).

Prior to the Foucauldian establishment of the tetka as “type,” “sex between men in Russia belonged to a patriarchal masculinity that viewed subordinate men and boys as sexually accessible,” and, as such, its establishment “significantly divided ideals of Russian manliness” (Healey 251). The tetka stood apart from previous inclinations embodied in opportunism, instead being rooted firmly in the “vice” of rejecting female bodies, its character established as emphatically effeminate, affluent, and bored— in this case, with heterosexuality (251). Here, once again, gendered stereotypes became the norm, as the tetka and his partner were satirized as exaggeratedly effeminate and lasciviously ostentatious while language and grammar were employed to establish them as existing outside of the norm, male prostitutes taking on aliases such as baroness, duchess, and baby (peasant woman) and beginning to wear rouge to transmit signals of femininity (251-252).

Though Western European scandals that stigmatized the homosexual in Britain, such as Oscar Wilde’s case or the Cleveland Street scandal, “had no parallel in imperial Russia,” Wilde’s martyrdom nevertheless became cause for celebration for self-proclaimed Russian modernists as
these new identities quickly became associated with industrialization and the changes it brought to the social landscape (Healey 237-238, 252). In particular, Russia’s fixation on Wilde illustrates this beautifully, as he was particularly influential “as a model of the new, poeticized life for the Russian modernists,” as “Wilde became a model for the ‘new men’ of the 1890s and early 1900s, the initiators and bearers of cultural revitalization” seeking to emulate Wilde (Moeller-Sally 459-460). This new man was the personification of the European “dandy” who felt profoundly apart from society and, as such, superior to it, Wilde’s utopian and socialist inclinations located at the heart of this idealism (460-461). As such, it is not particularly shocking that this was the Russian modernist response to Victorian social ideals as promoted by the West, Wilde—rather the revolutionary himself—having been a particularly vocal critic of Victorian social ideals for most of his adult life (460).

Though Russia’s decriminalization of male same-sex relations was mentioned previously, its cause should be noted here. Sodomy, the Bolshevik regime had reasoned at the time, carried alongside it an ethos too profoundly religious and moralistic, thus rendering it antithetical to Russia’s newly minted modernization. Having taken Russia by storm, modernism carried alongside it a period of rapid cultural transformation in both public and private domains that ultimately resulted in a series of consequences for both women and the homosexual community alike (Moeller-Sally 459).

For the early Russian homosexual, the revolution brought alongside it some profound changes to the institution of male prostitution, as bathhouses no longer provided a viable commodified space in which same-sex eros could continue to be practiced, thus forcing public toilets to become a viable alternative (Healey 256-257). This came coupled with the Bolshevik ignorance over the existence of homosexual prostitution, imagining prostitution to be a solely
heterosexual concept involving only women, who were believed to be victims of female unemployment and the exploitation of the patriarchy (254). Thus, their refusal to criminalize (female) prostitution came with some unintended, decidedly modernist consequences for the homosexual community at the time. In other words, Russia’s modernists, wary of the uncritical import of Europe’s tendency to pathologize sexuality, were content to continue in their tendency to pretend homosexuality to be an exclusively European problem that didn’t particularly concern them (Watton 371).

This resistance is not too surprising. Femininity in men was, as expected, believed to be a “tragic marker of backwardness,” but this marker was generally applied to foreigners, and “rarely as a characteristic of the Russian homosexual,” and Russian discourses were unlikely to touch on the idea of the homosexual as flamboyant and effeminate (Healey 259, 264). But this link between homosexual subculture and female prostitution came as a boon— albeit minor— to the Russian gay man even when sodomy was recriminalized by Stalinist leaders across the Soviet Union in 1933 and 1934 as it relieved these men of the permanent stigma frequently associated with the effeminate sexual degenerate of Western Europe, instead allowing them to be viewed as salvageable, their masculinity believed to be a “renewable resource” (265).

This peace of mind, however, was not to last. Previously resistant and rebellious against its Western cousins, Russia’s crisis over a profound lack of power in a world systems-ruled world flourished alongside communism and during the Cold War in its battle for hegemony against dominant Western ideology. Tsygankov and Tsygankov argue that this identity crisis can be traced back to before the Bolshevik revolution. Faced with the proud notions of liberté, égalité, and fraternité as promulgated by the French following the 1789 revolution, Western Europe experienced a split between progressive and anti-revolutionary viewpoints. This left
Russia in a difficult position, forced to choose between revolution and tradition, inevitably rendering it divided. This split later proved to be embodied in stark relief with Russia’s own revolution in 1917 as the Bolsheviks chose to distance themselves from the West, ultimately granting the newly minted Soviet Union an anti-European, socialist identity that sought to proclaim its own superiority in the midst of the struggle between the two Europes (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 4-5). Aware of the threats of modernization in producing a growing dependence on “the Western knowledge and— with it— Western cultural values and political ideology,” the Bolsheviks instead chose to reject modernization altogether, electing to propagate the notion of their superior advancement when compared to the rest of the developed world (9, 6).

The Bolsheviks brought alongside them a sense of "widespread 'sexophobia,' if not explicit homophobia," which eventually led to the wholesale outlawing of homosexuality from 1934 to 1993, implying a slow but steady movement away from the west (Baer 499). This included a "broad repression of sexual discourse" as Russian paranoia over any association with the West took hold, choking any form of discussion on the matter, a sense of separation only intensified with the advent of the Cold War, which "made discussions of sexual life in Russia especially susceptible to Western fears and fantasies" (Baer 499). At the same time, the West came to gauge Soviet modernity by means of their treatment of homosexuals, thus rendering Russian pride as inherently trapped in continued resistance against the West (500). If Russia was going to modernize, it was going to do it on its own terms.

In writing on the issue of modern homosexuality, Ken Plummer confronts the reality that globalization brings alongside it a renewed intensification of local characteristics and culture, situating the opposition of local and global along a traditional East/West divide, with Russia poised on the border (17). In a similar model that could be argued to be perfectly representative
of the core in opposition to the semi-periphery, Larry Wolff argues that Western Europe was culpable in its creation of Eastern Europe as a complementary “Other” (4). This ideological bisection was solidified by Churchill’s 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri. Speaking on the Iron Curtain, dividing Christian Western Europe from the Communist East, Churchill called for Western unity, eager to solidify the divide in light of fears regarding ideological contamination (2). But this separation had existed long before the rise of the Iron Curtain, with its creation dating back to the Duke of Marlborough over two centuries prior (4). Where the Renaissance had marked a distinction between a cultured Southern Europe and a barbarian Northern Europe, as the Enlightenment moved the centers of culture from Venice, Rome, and Florence to Paris, London, and Amsterdam, so was the barrier geographically resituated to reflect an East/West divide, instead (5). As the Enlightenment established Western Europe as the pinnacle of ‘civilization,’ Eastern Europe was established as its complement, sadly lacking the same structures of civility that the West possessed (4).

It was this particular placement, “Eastern Europe’s ambiguous location, within Europe but not fully European, that called for such notions as backwardness and development to mediate between the poles of civilization and barbarism,” providing the dominant West “with its first model of underdevelopment, a concept that we now apply all over the globe” (9). This rejection of Russia from the development and modernity of the Western core was thus instrumental, as Russians, “uncomfortable with being consigned to the political and economic periphery in the developmental model of East/West” felt desperate to catch up to Western Europe (Baer 501).

In the area of sexuality, however, Russia felt no particular need to catch up. Situated firmly in the semi-periphery between a “civilized” Western Europe and the “backward” East, this geographical configuration allowed Russians to situate their country outside of the “sexual
geography produced by the East/West binarism, imagining instead a “tripartite geography of perversity” in which they existed as wholly heterosexual (Baer 502). As Healey explains, pederasty was something confined to Russia's bourgeoisie and aristocracy and the Caucasus, leaving the ordinary Russian proletariat comparatively innocent, positioned somewhere between the perverse urban centers of Western Europe and the depraved "Orient," leaving the common man profoundly and universally heterosexual (253). This makes an unfortunate deal of sense when considering Russia’s view of European sexuality at the turn of the century. Richard Kraus, writing in 1900 in Russia on the topic of the country’s approach to deviant sexuality, brings up a point of particular fascination when he states that “the criminality of [acts such as sodomy] is deeply rooted in the popular consciousness. In Russia we have not yet reached the degree of depravity of the big European centers, where acts of unnatural sexual gratification are considered an acceptable diversion” (qtd. in Engelstein, “The Keys to Happiness” 63). He goes on to state that external factors alone tend to account for the existence of these trends, highlighting modernization and education in particular (63). This is profoundly interesting when one considers that the climate in Europe toward homosexuals at the time was anything but accepting. At the same time, Kraus’ attitude is indicative of a greater trend amongst semi-periphery countries in their attempts to modernize. In seeking to maintain national and cultural pride in lieu of their failure to modernize at the rate of the Western European core, Russia sought to highlight and uphold its own “moral high ground,” pitting it opposite the “depraved” non-normative West. Unable to showcase the strength of their industry and economy, the moralities and virtues embodied by the Russian worker and peasant take their place.

It was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union that the “tripartite geography of perversity” was contested, thus returning it to the traditional East/West divide in which Russia
was moved into the sexual periphery opposite Western Europe, thus alienating it once more via the acknowledgment of its presence outside of the modern Zeitgeist (Baer 502). While Europe had come to embody an increasingly tolerant view of homosexuality, Russia fell behind, its gay community appearing as underdeveloped as its country. At the same time, the East presented a similarly stark contrast with its polymorphous model of sexuality, placing Russia squarely between the two (502).

Russia’s refusal to acknowledge its native homoeros may not be surprising—after all, Russia’s rural life was not believed to be particularly conducive to deviant sexuality such as Western European urban centers were—but a note should be added about the outcome of the woman question through all of this, as one cannot so much as pretend to have a comprehensive conversation regarding the role of homosexuals without also considering the very reason they are being rejected from a given society—namely, profound anxiety over the feminization of a gender meant to hold and maintain its place at the top of the patriarchal food chain (Engelstein “The Keys to Happiness” 65).

As Russia’s gays were being ignored in the 1903 criminal code, women, viewed as potential victims of the male gaze in need of protection, were stripped of their sexual agency in exchange as they were redrafted as weak and vulnerable. Here, secularization became key. Where previously, sexual offenses were viewed as violations of hierarchy and existing social norms, the new criminal code redefined notions of hierarchy and status not by social position, but by biological sex (Engelstein, "Gender and the Juridical Subject" 459). In this way, citizenship and sexuality became inherently intertwined, with female citizenship continuing to be defined in relation to patriarchal authority (461). Within this system, male prostitutes were believed not to exist while female prostitutes were regarded as victims at the hands of their male
managers (463). As women escaped criminal prosecution, so did they lose agency that their male managers retained.

The intention on the part of Russian lawmakers was likely to promote progress and sensitivity in the name of modernism, but one cannot deny the profound presence of patriarchal tradition in the social structures these mechanisms maintained. In this way, even as modernism worked to dismantle old systems by freeing serfs, decriminalizing prostitution, and providing “special treatment” to women across Russia as a result of their delicate constitutions, the execution nevertheless endorsed the continued subordination of women (Engelstein, “The Keys to Happiness” 94-95) As a result, it comes as no surprise that Russia’s long-standing sexism would have profound consequences for its homosexual community, as well.

Japan

In considering the aforementioned plasticity of Tokugawa-Era Japan’s systems of erotic desire, the “association of male erotic objecthood with specific sartorial and tonsorial markers, and the susceptibility of those same cultural forms to modification through human agency” would profoundly influence the viability of continued same-sex erotic activity following Western interference (Pflugfelder 970). As such, it was possible for these patterns of desire to experience a rapid shift from the accepted to the rejected following the Meiji Restoration and the ensuing modernization of Japan (964). The rapidity and substantiality of this transition is a considerable one, and, as such, an external locus responsible for change in the form of outside Western pressures for modernization seems to be the most logical conclusion to draw (Pflugfelder 964).
Indeed, the link between discourses on sexuality and nationalism and state formation is one that seems only all too obvious (Robertson 425).

Exposure to Western influence and homophobia opened the door to a variety of anxieties. On the one hand, Japan was profoundly aware of the humiliation suffered by China as a result of the Opium Wars, but on a more personal level, their culture’s exposure to foreign eyes gave the Japanese an acute sense of self-consciousness with regard to their own customs, and Japan’s elite were quick to adopt European customs while shunning their own (Crompton 433, Hawkins 36). This interaction, however, functioned as a two-way street, as well, as a number of Japanese scholars were eager to journey abroad for study. As previously discussed, this period was as much one of change for Europe as it was for Japan, the West engaged in the development of new sexual discourses based on biology and the newly minted sciences of psychology and sexology that led to the labeling of a vast variety of sexual behaviors as deviant, a trend that, needless to say, quickly transferred to Japan (Hawkins 36; DiStefano 1429). Only in 1994 did the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology cease to classify homosexuality as a paraphilic disease (DiStefano 1429).

In this configuration, modernization became key in forming new structures, these shifts occurring alongside the creation of a modern, international engaged nation-state up to Western standards. As such, state authorities and ensuing administrative processes set about rapidly changing behaviors in order to conform with Western norms and expectations via modifications to clothing and hairstyles, seeking to remove the eroticized and fetishized styles of hair and garments to function as a “signal of gender intensification as well as of age transition,” as the adolescent male was made to look more like a man and decidedly less androgynous, a change
that we’ll also be able to note in the transition Qajar Iran experienced (Pflugfelder 966, 973; Robertson 242).

Specific hairstyles and dress were prescribed along European lines to differentiate between male and female while simultaneously erasing age hierarchies among males, and standards of feminine beauty were transferred from male bodies to female bodies (Pflugfelder 972; Robertson 242). This shift occurred alongside the criminalization of sodomy and cross-dressing in 1873, and though the penalty of the former was minor compared to those of European laws at the time and hardly enforced, Japan nevertheless permanently repealed the law after ten years based on advice given by a French legal consultant (Hawkins 36; Crompton 433; Pflugfelder 971). But even in spite of this, Japan was left with the same deep-seated amnesia over their former homonormativity as Russia and Iran were following the Western push to establish heteronormativity as the norm opposite homosexuality’s “Other” (433).

The new nation-state, eager to pursue political ends and employ the mechanisms of “civilization and enlightenment,” had no choice but to institute a variety of European-endorsed regulations as part of its agenda for change following the 1868 Meiji Restoration (Pflugfelder 965, 970-971). A profound intensification of gender ensued. As gender categories were solidified and realigned, genitalia came to outweigh others as the most distinct marker used to establish differences (970). Where previously Japan had used a three-sided configuration of gender divided up into women, youths, and men, gender and consent instead became established along European lines where legal gender was determined by biological sex (970-971). This distinction was an important one, as sex became a determinant, in true European style, of legal, social, and civic consequences (970).
These consequences came fully into force with the advent of the Taisho period (1912-1926) as Japan began to rapidly industrialize and urbanize, the nation-state slowly transforming into a well-oiled machine of institutional synchronization on a national level (Hawkins 36; Pflugfelder 971). Alongside Western values of production came Western values of reproduction, and a pro-natal stance was adopted in favor of any and all nonprocreative sexual activity (Hawkins 36). However, much as Kraus had speculated about Russia, Japanese exposure to urban centers nevertheless led to breakdown of the traditionally imposed rigidity behind sex and gender roles (36). It was out of this period of increased libertinism and socio-sexual upheaval that the all-female, gender-bending Takarazuka theater emerged, cause for considerable ire on the part of the imperialist government, and ultimately resulting in a return to pronatalist values and a ban on the publication of “articles on sex and sexuality that did not trumpet the state’s patriarchal values and pronatal policies” in women’s journals (Robertson 419, 426; Hawkins 36). Part of this return was the partial resurrection of the samurai code, though any mention of the former samurai homoeros was decidedly excluded, and “homosexuality continued to be devalued while its practice grew increasingly clandestine,” forced to disappear into underground, highly secretive subcultures (Hawkins 36).

Much like in Russia’s development, where homophobia led, sexism was sure to follow close behind. In a strikingly similar fashion to Iran’s post-Qajar transformation, Japan’s patriarchal Meiji Civil Code brought alongside it the ideal conception of what the ideal female citizen was in relation to the state, the notion of “good wife, wise mother,” and outside of the home, sexism and ageism were profound for women daring to enter the workforce, as employers were reluctant to hire any woman over the age of 30, instead preferring to hire women up to 24 years of age (Robertson 425-426). As such, most women had no choice but to leave behind the
prospect of singlehood and work, instead being forced to seek out marriage as an alternative means of financial support (426).

Iran

For Qajar Iran, the primary instigator of change came in the form of European travelers and the criticism of Iran’s sexual morality they brought alongside them (Ze’evi 168). And while the shaping of Iranian modernity was found in the “rearticulation of concepts like nation, politics, homeland, and knowledge […] these reconceptualizations depended on the notions of gender,” a transformative process that inevitably came to involve marked changes in Iranian sexuality, as well (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 1). Most notably, Iran’s native homonormativity was cause for its declaration as backward while heteronormalization of the public space was established as a necessary condition that had to be met prior to achieving modernity in the European sense, much as was the case in Meiji Japan (3).

But while Japan’s propulsion to change was motivated by a need to mimic the West following a sudden removal from isolationism and exposure to Western norms, Iran’s transition was more subtle and occurred more slowly. Europeans considered Iranian sexual practices as vices when compared to their Victorian Era sexuality and accompanying two-sex binary. As Najmabadi explains, the presence of the European gaze upon Iran caused a considerable increase in sensitivity as they realized that they were under scrutiny, and, as such, homonormative tendencies had to be concealed, as a key marker of modernity was the establishment of European gender roles and sexuality (“Women With Mustaches” 4).
The stage had been set in Europe as a result of political and social changes that Iran itself had not experienced, and thus was simply forced to replicate as a result of European judgment. As Europe had solidified its conception of heterosexuality as normal in opposition to its “deviant” margins, this established Iran itself as marginal (Ze’evi 168). And while Middle Eastern travelers to Europe conceived of European sexual mores as similarly distasteful, this resistance to change on the part of Ottoman writers is important to the ensuing development of gender roles in the country, as the Iranian social morality was presented as far superior to the European one, as it provided definitive social spaces intended to protect Iranian women from the ills European women had been exposed to as a result of the West’s “rampant” public heterosociality, and, in turn, heterosexuality (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 169, 52). For the Iranian traveler in Europe, the experience of seeing women out of the private sphere proved as stimulating and intriguing as it was shocking, and this sentiment carried alongside it a sort of jealous longing for the same experience with their women (54-55). Back at home, traditional Iranian gender roles separated by public and private were inevitably pitted against the new conceptualization of womanhood, fueled by the drive to modernize, thus establishing discourses both in favor and against modernity, issues that “continue to be central to contemporary politics of Iran and many other Islamic societies of the Middle East” (8). The same can be said for Japan.

But if Iranian society was to be modernized, the concepts of beauty and desire experienced not only an intensification of gender and gendered differences, but found a new feminized locus in striking similarity to Japan’s sexual “makeover,” removing the amrad and any memory of same-sex desire from the new sexual topography of Iran (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 26). Iran’s traditional, veiled, hidden woman became a profound symbol of Iranian
backwardness. Instead, women came to be reimagined as citizens of the state, wherein citizenship, alongside their status as mothers and wives, involved the responsibilities of greater visibility in the public sphere (51). And while this increased visibility allowed for a substantial increase in freedom and access to education—a way to claim citizenship previously denied—it likewise carried alongside it the demand for the removal of male same-sex relations (7-8). In this way, an increasingly heterosexual public sphere came to define the homosexual as unnatural, an unfortunate consequence of Iran’s long-standing gender segregation (39, 240).

Here, Europe was meant to serve as a model for the new Iranian state and its gendered citizens. But while the formerly traditional woman could be transformed into a more European version of herself, the European man presented some profound challenges. Clean, unshaven faces had previously been associated with the amrad and his accompanying homoeros. Caught between an attempt to modernize and prevent a return to Qajar Iran’s homonormativity, this profound anxiety manifested itself in Iran’s legal texts as the need to avoid looking like a European man came coupled with edicts against the shaving of a man’s beard lest he be deemed too feminine (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 144, 154).

A note, here, should be added about Turkey. Iran’s certainty of its ability to transform itself into a modern, European nation-state came, in part, as a result of Turkey’s already-existing model of an already-modernized state under Ataturk (Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity” 54). With another Islamic state having accomplished what Iran had set out to do, this lent legitimacy to their reformation efforts (54). However, this model came with profound caveats, the most obvious one being that the new Turkish nation-state had been founded “on the ruins of the Ottoman Caliphate,” thus allowing it to enact reforms at a rate quite advanced compared to Iran.
As such, Iran’s status as a secular state meant that its attempts were severely hindered, as we will come to see in the next section.

**The After**

As mentioned in the previous section, with the rapidly expanding level of acceptance of homosexuality in Western core countries, so is the border of binary sexual identity pushed further back into the more polymorphous East, causing Russia to become heavily contested ground (Baer 502). This can be—and has proven to be—problematic, as Western ethnocentrism is generally met with nationalistic backlash in cultures unlike its own (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 10). As Iran, Japan, and Russia alike moved to suppress their native homonormativity in response to indirect Western pressures, so would resistance and hostility to the West’s rapid evolution in the realms of sexuality and gender inevitably follow. Though initially comfortable in a place of relative isolation, Tsygankov and Tsygankov argue that modern-day “isolationism has developed in response to Westernization,” wherein isolationism—with its close ties to vehemently maintained ignorance—is deeply rooted in a nation’s inferiority complex, a fact especially true in the case of Russia, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, where modernization is hailed as a Western conspiracy perpetuated in order to maintain the world system with them at the core (10). For Russians, the matter of homosexuality is tied directly to Russia’s relationship with modernity and its place in a globalized world (Baer 513).

It is in this contested space that Russia—and its constituents—inevitably find themselves. In a nation that had previously assumed a system of ignorance with regard to its
native homoeros, Russian gays and lesbians, on the one hand, came to support the
decriminalization of homosexuality, while simultaneously rejecting activism as a result of its
consequence—increased visibility that could prove disastrous (Baer 507). This comes as no
great surprise. A 1989 survey of Russian public opinion with regard to homosexuality was met
with a shockingly hostile response, as thirty percent of respondents felt that homosexuals should
be “liquidated” while just under thirty percent wished for them to be “isolated” (507). David
Tuller, in chronicling his travels through Russia in his work *Cracks in the Iron Closet*, describes
meeting two lesbians, one of whom explained their reluctance with regard to activism, stating
that “I don’t want to fight for the rights of lesbians— they never repressed lesbians here because
no one ever knew that they existed. . . . No, the problems for lesbians only start when they fight
for their rights. Because now the Russian public knows the word. They know that lesbians exist”
(qtd. in Baer 507). This offers a profound insight into the concerns that arise as a result of
increased visibility, further complicating the matter of applying patterns of Western activism to
other cultures.

A similar pattern emerges when one considers modern Japan, where a great number of
gays and lesbians reject the American model of activism to improve their lives, as the
government, church, and legal system do not partake in institutionalized oppression— so long as
one remains in the closet and keeps one’s identity hidden from public view, systematic
persecution does not take place (McLelland 235). A great deal of this comes down to culture.
Activism and legal battles are conceived of as a “public embarrassment” that has the
repercussions of attracting increased negativity to the community that could otherwise be
avoided (Hawkins 36). Amnesia of male same-sex desire is all-encompassing. Openly “gei” men
make up a small minority, as most Japanese gay men feel a profound anxiety at the prospect of
the ostracization that could occur as a result of their family or coworkers discovering their identity (36). As activism carries alongside it exposure, it is thus avoided.

Though instances of direct confrontations with homophobia are rare, Japanese sexual minorities nevertheless are subject to discrimination, experiencing physical, psychological, verbal, and sexual violence, perpetrated both in public and private (Hawkins 36, DiStefano 1429). Just as in Russia, mainstream Japanese culture stigmatizes the presence of gays and lesbians that is manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from medicalization and pathologization to outright dismissal (DiStefano 1429). In part to blame for this profound socio-cultural conception of homosexuals as abnormal is the media, where gender ambiguity and homosexuality are treated as comic relief (DiStefano 1429; McLelland 43). When these individuals show up in reality, however, their existence occasions a great deal of anxiety, at times even seen as constituting a threat (McLelland 51). As such, the lives of gay and lesbian-identified individuals in Japan are compartmentalized into distinct private and public spheres (Hawkins 36).

This carries with it an undeniable level of irony when one considers the previous make-up of private and public spheres in both Iran and Japan—where once the private sphere was ruled by the reluctant heterosexual marriage in which men fulfilled their procreative duties only to return to the public, homonormative sphere, now any and all homoeros is closeted away into the private sphere.

This same irony can be found in Iran on a different level. Despite the formerly heteronormative West’s pressure on Iran to reject its native homoeros, the roles would seem to have been flipped over the course of Iran’s careful denial of any past homoeroticism. As same-sex eros and other sexual deviancy has come to be deemed as “vice,” contemporary Islamists has
been content to place that vice on solely Western ground, wherein the rejection of homosexuality comes coupled with the rejection of the West and its secular lack of cultural morality (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 56-57). Interestingly, this is where Islamists and secular modernists differ, the latter content to read Sufi male homoeroticism as non-allegorical (56). In this way, Iran’s Western-focused hostility in the form of nationalistic backlash comes to make sense as the West becomes designated as the site of all social ills (Najmabadi, “Hazards of Modernity” 51). In this context, the rise of Islam can be read as an intentional political rejection of modernization and its distinctly Western association to be replaced with “moral purification and ideological reconstruction” (64). Out of this shift emerged the Islamic Revolution of 1979 alongside the complete rejection of reform politics of the previous century.

Russia carries with it similar biases, believing sexual minorities to have gained too much traction in the West, rendering these nations sexually backward and anti-heterosexuality (Baer 515). Though homosexuality can be tolerated, it must remain nevertheless remain hidden from view while heterosexuality is upheld as inherently superior (515). As such, laws against sexual harassment and activism in support of sexual minorities are read as “sexual terrorism against normal sexuality through government support of abnormal forms of sex,” a blatant patriarchal rejection of modern sexual progressivism responsible for restricting the male gaze (515-516).

Curiously, as the homosexual came to be declared as deviant in Iran—sodomy carrying with it the charge of capital punishment—new spaces were created for transsexuality to emerge (Najmabadi, “Professing Selves” 1). A practice dating back to the early 1970s, sex changes were framed, on the one hand, as a cure for gender identity disorder, and on the other, a viable option, endorsed both by Islam and Iranian law, allowing homosexuals to transform their same-sex practices into heterosexual ones with the aid of hormone treatments and surgery (1). As such, as
a result of intense pressures to marry, Iran’s gays and lesbians frequently choose to undergo sex changes in order to avoid having to abandon their partnerships and sexual preferences (7). This system echoes Foucault’s “techniques of domination” as intentions and context are determined by governmental hegemony (2). Similarly, Essig explains that in Soviet Russia, a medical policy allowed homosexual women to be diagnosed as transsexual “and given the necessary permission to undergo a sex change operation,” and Japan echoes the right for transsexuals to obtain sex reassignment surgery and change their legal gender (qtd. in Baer 509; Carroll & Itaborahy 112).

This is odd for societies that are frequently romanticized by Westerners as fluid in their conception of sexuality and sexual identities, wherein “the traditional opposition of East/West continues to structure the Western gaze,” continuing nineteenth century “orientalist” trends (Baer 512, 505). In Iran, regulation of sexuality has continued to be based on practices instead of on the conception of the homosexual as type even in spite of twentieth century Iran’s attempts to reconfigure homosexuality as a coincidental consequence of gendered segregation (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 57). Instead, same-sex acts continue to be conceived of as a casual diversion among men outside of their reproductive duties, a trend that can be seen in Japan, as well, where older, married men with children claimed that homosexuality was a “hobby” that occurred outside of and separate from their responsibilities at home (Najmabadi 57, Hawkins 36). This makes sense when one considers the previously mentioned “marriage imperative” driving many Iranian sexual minorities toward sex changes. In this instance, Japanese sexual minorities “are expected to marry and carry on homosexual affairs discretely behind a façade of conformity” (Crompton 443). This accompanies a general reluctance to claim a gay or lesbian identity, echoing patterns prior to the Meiji restoration wherein sexual object choice was not indicative as gender performance (McLelland 237). This concept, however, “marginalizes same-
sex desire through temporal boxing rather than through minoritization,” a pattern that has become less and less viable with increased heterosexualization (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 58).

But this is where a discussion on sexism becomes vital to this analysis, as a society’s perception of women will have profound effects upon its views of homosexuality, wherein homophobia is frequently tied to anxieties of effeminization. In Iran, Russia, and Japan alike, the conception of active and passive sex roles factoring into the context of any sexual desire contribute to both sexism and homophobia, as passive sexual roles carry stigma alongside them where sex and power are starkly articulated through the existence of gender roles as heterosexuality is declared the societal “norm” (Baer 513-514). It comes as no surprise, then, that Russian female-to-male transsexuals considerably outnumber male-to-female ones, or that Russian gays markedly prefer straight partners (514).

In a Russian system of gender-based homosexuality, the active participant is deemed a “man-man” while the passive participant is a “man-woman,” an idea that is even translated onto the sphere of heterosexual relations, where the popular discourse claims that women are not meant to be sexually dominant (515). As such, a “man-man” permanently maintains not only his masculinity, but also his heterosexuality regardless of the sexual object of his desire while homosexuals are emasculated (515-516). In Iran, active and passive partners are deemed as hypermasculine and feminine, respectively, as the only acceptable object of sexual desire for a man has to be necessarily feminine, as our contemporary binary forces any split from the traditional conception of masculinity as effeminate (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 3). Similarly, many Japanese and Iranian men maintain stereotypical ideas of homosexuality, assuming that it implies effeminatization, though medicalization, typing, psychologization, and
exteriorization\textsuperscript{11} are likewise applied in order to perpetuate marginalization of sexual minorities (McLelland 53; Najmabadi 58).

Iranian attempts to distract from modern issues of homosexuality has allowed attention to instead fall on women as contested ground (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 238; “Hazards of Modernity” 70). State and social control was exerted through the manipulation of women via the veil. Formerly outlawed to align with concepts of Western modernity at the turn of the century, its return in the 1970s coincided with renewed mechanisms of control exercised via the regulation of modern gender and sexual relations (“Women With Mustaches” 132). While the public space continues to be profoundly heterosocial, the state nevertheless occupies itself with obsessive control over heterosexual interaction, indicating its preoccupation with female sexuality (“Women With Mustaches” 244). In this way, the previously modernized woman had to undergo a transformation by means of mechanisms of social control in the name of cultural purification (“Hazards of Modernity” 51, 65). As the state sought to promote specific gendered visual markers, the veil was reinstated for women as men were urged to maintain a beard and avoid the wearing of ties as a result of their association with Western culture (“Women With Mustaches” 242).

As lesbians are systematically erased and the West promotes the idea of sexual fluidity and increased themes of liberation, continued persecution is often overshadowed. Sexism breeds homophobia as homosexual men are deemed emasculated in a variety of ways, from being labeled as “receptacles of male sperm,” “members of a third sex,” and “women in men’s bodies,” ultimately amounting to their embodiment of the inferiority complex experienced by these

\textsuperscript{11} Attribution to cultural disruptions of the West.
nation-states in response to Western imperialist history (Baer 503, 516). And while modernization is no longer viewed as solely a Western concept that required outside nations to conform if they wished to partake, at the root of modernization remains the fact that “industrialization produces pervasive social and cultural consequences” for those nations deemed “backwards” (Inglehart & Baker 19-20). Persecution of homosexuals translates to modern-day anxieties over the haunting prospect of the previously denied homonormativity’s return, “reminding us yet again that studies of gender and sexuality cannot be divided and demarcated into separate proper domains and objects” (Najmabadi, “Women With Mustaches” 244).

The current climate is less than accepting in Russia, Japan, or Iran with regard to same-sex partnerships and sexual activity. According to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, Iran, for one, goes beyond the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts (both male and female) and goes so far as to implement the death penalty countrywide under Sharia law, though the implementation varies depending on the number of instances, consent, soundness of mind, and gender, and can only be proven via testimony or confession (Carroll & Itaborahy 74; Cviklová 53). Russia, meanwhile, has taken to criminalizing "homosexual propaganda" since 2006, acting as a hugely influential leader in the Eastern European countries surrounding it, thus “creating a new ‘ideological wall’ to the West,” where “the backlash against human rights in Russia is spreading beyond the country’s borders [...] positioning the Eurasian bloc as fiercely traditionalist when it [comes] to family” (Carroll & Itaborahy 10, 33, 117). As such, “European equality politics were further criticised as a Western ‘cradle of decay’ [...] or as ‘discrediting the institution of family’” (118). Beyond this, marriage, civil partnerships, and adoption are out of the question in these countries, even with same-sex sexual activity having been legalized in Japan and Russia (41-42, 44-45, 27). Discrimination based on sexual or gender identity is not
prohibited in or out of the workplace, hate crimes cannot be classified as having been motivated by sexual orientation, and incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation is not prohibited (34-37, 38-39, 40).

**Conclusion**

This analysis set out to explore the reasons and motivations behind the increasingly restrictive nature of sexual mores in Russia, Iran, and Japan over time, spanning from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, with the hypothesis being that Western patterns of globalization placed pressure on these nations to modernize in accordance with Western European Victorian ideals, causing modern-day policies and norms to reflect the lingering effects of this pressure. Though secondary sources were available on the effects of modernization and the transformations undergone on a nation-by-nation basis, an overarching analysis tying these processes together with theories on LGBTQIA* policy changes had not been conducted. With modern-day consequences of these historical patterns currently affecting the LGBTQIA* populations in these regions, a greater understanding of the historical background behind current policies could prove valuable with respect to future international relations.

In following Mill's Most Different Systems Design, the similarity between these cases was situated in the realm of sexual norms prior to and following Western influence. While both were rooted in inherently heteronormative systems, the scenario prior to modernization was a far more Hellenistic one, in which women were restricted to the private sphere and the realm of reproductive responsibilities, and men dominated the public sphere and the realm of comradery
and hierarchical sexual gratification. Following modernization, this model was altered to reflect the Western Victorian norm of strict heteronormativity and the presence of women in the public sphere. The presence of Western influence upon these otherwise vastly different nation-states, as well as their then-status as semi-periphery nations completes this comparison.

The primary mechanism enacting these changes proved to be governmentality, with respective governments using a top-down bureaucratic approach in order to either alter or hide existing homoeros to reflect the Western-promoted heteronormative ideal. The reasons for this particular focus were multi-fold. First, other sectors of government influence, such as industry, did not prove to be as efficiently malleable as socio-cultural patterns, which could easily be altered by means of government policy. Second, the need for national pride in the midst of a nation-building project rooted in a Western Modernist model was profound. The presence of increasingly permissive urban centers in the West presented the semi-periphery nations with an opportunity. Pride could be found in relation to the decadence of the West in a space of superior moral ground to cultivate.

As such, the uniformity evident in these three cases is specific to semi-periphery nations during this time period and would not be reflected in other groups of nations not meeting the same criteria. These patterns are directly historically contingent to what the West was at this time. Periphery nations were too far removed from the core and its cultural advancement to be able to mobilize the necessary resources to modernize in a swift enough manner to make the struggle worthwhile. After all, world-systems theory maintains itself-- at least in part-- by means of the semi-periphery and its hopes of attaining a place in the core. This has been the outcome for Japan, which is curiously also the only nation of the three having made strides in the direction of increased LGBTQIA* rights in their recent legalization of same-sex marriage. And while
Russia has established the anti-homosexual propaganda law in recent years, Iran's current place in the periphery is reflected in their current death penalty policy in response to homosexuality.

In this way, these mechanisms of social tension explain recent policy changes, including the leniency with regard to transgender individuals in these nations. Where being gay is frowned upon, maintained systems of heteronormativity carried over from the turn of the nineteenth century are reflected in transgender policies allowing for sex changes in the place of homosexual relationships.

Similarly, those nations in the core, but not directly of it, would not have experienced the same patterns, either, with the most notable examples being the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Though certainly not part of the semi-periphery, these nations maintained a sense of cultural isolation to varying degrees. Able to engage with the West both economically and politically through mechanisms of trade and alliances during the twentieth century, these nations nevertheless were able to avoid the notions of Western cosmopolitan ideals, instead maintaining a sense of homogeneity amongst themselves.

Patterns of Western influence following the Post-Colonial Era of modernization may have had a profoundly differently effect. Instead of a focus on sexual norms and mores, other areas of morality and governmentality may have been the focus. Undoubtedly, this would depend on the time period of a given nation's semi-periphery status and the presence of Western influence upon nation-building efforts. This may prove to be an enlightening area for further study and analysis.

As this study was hardly exhaustive, there are a multitude of avenues that could benefit from closer analysis. Briefly touched upon in the discussion of Russia’s present political climate,
NGOs and their presence in countries not as adapted to a Western rights model deserves greater attention than I have been able to give it here, particularly in light of Russia’s so-called foreign agent laws lending itself to a less-than-welcoming climate for NGOs who are frequently met with backlash in their attempts at generating social change, something that comes as no surprise when one considers the nature of homosexuality in more restrictive countries (Carroll & Itaborahy 117). In locations where a call for increased social rights in the form of gay parades and legal battles attracts unwanted attention and leads to negative repercussions, ignorance on the part of well-intentioned NGOs can be deadly.

Similarly, the (hetero)normalization of homosexuality in the Western sphere is deserving of greater attention. Areas esteemed to possess great tolerance with regard to homosexuality frequently do not succeed in transferring this feeling of inclusion to their sexual minorities, and even as gay men have come into greater favor within the “charmed circle” in a great number of Western nation-states, this newly-minted citizenship is not always inclusive of other sexual minorities, many of whom are frequently rendered invisible as a result of the present framework. The neoliberal nature of this citizenship likewise deserves deeper investigation in light of Western patterns of (hetero)normalization. Patterns of socio-cultural domination must continue to be problematized if change is to occur, and room must be made for the existence of sex and gender identities outside of the Western hetero-homo binary (Hagland 374-375).

Transnational bodies have been a great help to establishing uniform human rights laws, but their implementation has been less than stellar, as the world attempts to choose between the sovereignty of nations or supranational governance as more important. If the former, we must content ourselves with human rights abuses and turn the other cheek. If the latter, we run the risk of letting “virtue run amok” (Kagan 127). At the present time, it would seem as though the world
had chosen the former in the name of cost-effectiveness—both politically and financially. As the UN relies on consensus, it is rendered useless, and NGOs cannot be expected to achieve world peace, and at the end of the day, Human Rights Institutions can only do so much.

One thing is for certain. On-going patterns of discrimination and violence enacted against LGBTQIA* individuals are rampant and devastating, as much in core countries as otherwise. If one cannot apply a Western rights model to these other cultures, what is to be done to prevent the wholesale harassment often experienced by sexual minorities?

In Iran, this danger goes far beyond harassment and into the arena of execution, rendering this an international problem of significant heft where legal policy is in desperate need of revision Western nations of the world are met with over one hundred applications seeking asylum every year (Cviklová 54). However, the need to provide “reasonable probability” of execution hinders the process of granting asylum substantially (54).

Bibliography


