DYSTOPIAN PERFORMATIVES:
NEGATIVE AFFECT/EMOTION IN THE WORK OF SARAH KANE

By

Copyright 2016

Scott C. Knowles

Submitted to the graduate degree program in Theatre and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

__________________________
Chairperson Dr. Henry Bial

__________________________
Dr. Rebecca Rovit

__________________________
Dr. John Gronbeck-Tedesco

__________________________
Dr. Nicole Hodges Persley

__________________________
Dr. Christopher Forth

Date Defended: May 10, 2016
The Dissertation Committee for Scott C. Knowles
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

DYSTOPIAN PERFORMATIVES:
NEGATIVE AFFECT/EMOTION IN THE WORK OF SARAH KANE

________________________________
Chairperson Dr. Henry Bial

Date approved: May 12, 2016
ABSTRACT

*Dystopian Performatives: Negative Affect/Emotion in the Work of Sarah Kane* seeks to combine three areas of theoretical inquiry to understand the way that affect/emotion operates on an audience in the theatre: affect/emotion science, performance theory, and utopianism. Utilizing Sarah Kane’s body of work as a case study, this dissertation connects each of her plays to a distinct basic emotion in order to bracket the vast interconnections between affect/emotion science and the theatre: disgust within *Blasted*, anger within *Phaedra’s Love*, fear within *Cleansed*, memory within *Crave*, and sadness within *4.48 Psychosis*. Specifically, *Dystopian Performatives* investigates the negatively valenced experiences that occur in the theatre as a kind of dystopian practice that seeks to critique the present and promote action to adjust the future. The dystopian performative theory demonstrates the way in which experiential and viscerally impactful moments in the theatre potentially create change within an audience that directly attacks social and cultural issues relevant to the content of Kane’s plays. The experience of affect/emotion, I argue, performatively “does,” or acts, on the body of the audience in a way that has a meaningful impact on cognition, behavior, ideology, and morality.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and support of a multitude of individuals who have given their time and expertise generously. Thank you to the Department of Theatre for the Joseph R. Roach Dissertation Research Award that helped fund my initial exploration of this topic, and thank you to the School of the Arts for funding multiple conference trips to present pieces of this work and receive invaluable feedback.

My dissertation committee members have guided and directed me as a student throughout my time at KU. Thank you to Christopher Forth for serving as the non-departmental member. Your support of my research from my first year at KU in many ways gave me the confidence to continue to write and research. Thank you Nicole Hodges Persley for your questions and demand for clarity. Thanks to John Gronbeck-Tedesco for your wit and ability to make me think deeply. I am grateful for Rebecca Rovit’s constant attention to detail and desire to push the limits of my ideas and theories. Many thanks to my dissertation advisor Henry Bial, who has always pushed me, questioned me, and demanded excellence. Without his guidance and keen insights this dissertation would not have been possible. Thanks to Mary Karen Dahl who initially got me thinking about representations of violence and the general unpleasantness that is possible on the stage. Thank you Scott Magelssen for your interest in me as a scholar, for your desire to help me grow professionally, and for all the lessons you provided while I served as your Managing Editor.

I am forever grateful for all the encouragement, camaraderie, and disagreement I have received from my colleagues, particularly Jeanne Tiehen, Danny Devlin, Alison Christy, Amanda Boyle, Boone J. Hopkins, Chandra O. Hopkins, Jeff List, James Diemer, Zach Sudbury, and Rachel Blackburn. Thank you for all the wonderful memories, support, and ideas. Additional thanks to Rachel Blackburn for taking wonderfully detailed notes at my defense. A special thanks is owed to Ryan Lowe, who not only read many pieces of this dissertation and kept me on schedule but has served as a life-long friend and intellectual sparing partner. I must also thank Tyler Forbush who has encouraged me throughout my education.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my family for their unending support of my educational journey. While they don’t realize it yet, Addison Tyler Knowles and Kennedy Maree Knowles have provided significant moments of joy and pleasure throughout the formation and writing of this project. I can’t thank you enough for being there to
engage my mind in different, playful, and imaginative ways. Most of all, I want to thank my partner, friend, and ally, Ginae Maree Knowles. Without you I would not be the person I am today.
Dedicated to Addison Tyler and Kennedy Maree Knowles
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER 1: Dystopia, Performance, Affect/Emotion ................................................................. 1

CHAPTER 2: “The Disgusting Feast of Filth”: Blasted and the Elicitation of Disgust.......... 48

CHAPTER 3: The Effect of Affect: Anger, Fear, and the Promise of Affect/Emotion .......... 86

CHAPTER 4: Crave and the Impact of Affect/Emotion on Cognition .................................... 122

CHAPTER 5: Positive Sadness: Utilizing the Positive Side of a Negative Emotion to Understand Clinical Depression ................................................................. 166

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 200

NOTES .................................................................................................................................. 204

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 222
CHAPTER 1: Dystopia, Performance, Affect/Emotion

Introduction

There are moments in theatre in which the participants are transported into what Martin Heidegger called a “riff” or “somewhere else.” Bert O. States describes this riff: “This ‘somewhere else’ is not a spatial elsewhere in the sense that the mind thinks of being elsewhere […], but in the sense that what is before us, the painting itself, offers a different kind of here than we ‘usually tend to be’ in.” Moments in the theatre, according to Jill Dolan, achieve a similar goal through a utopian performative. Utopia, as will be discussed later, is a “no place,” or rather a “somewhere else” that in Dolan’s formulation is not spatial but embodied individually and communally. These utopian performative moments are affecting, emotional, and provoke feelings. For Dolan these moments are hopeful, and though they may come out of negative events, they ultimately provoke optimism and positivity. Concerned with the “somewhere else” that particular violent theatrical moments provoke, what I will call a dystopian performative, this dissertation will address the performative power of negative experiences, emotions, affects, and feelings in the theatre to demonstrate the potential community building effects of an embodied dystopic moment. To put it simply, what is the value of transmitting negative thoughts, affects, feelings, and emotions to an audience? The primary focus will be on affect/emotion as one potential cause for this transportation to “somewhere else.”

The centrality of the exchange of emotions, affects, and feelings between audience and performer has long been a concern of the theatre. The Natyashastra (200 BCE - 200 CE), an ancient Indian text on the performing arts, describes the audience’s reception of this emotion as Rasas:
There is no *Natya* [complete theatre/dance] without rasa. Rasa is the cumulative result of *vibhava* [stimulus], *anubhava* [involuntary reaction], and *vyabhicari bhava* [voluntary reaction]. For example, just as when various condiments and sauces and herbs and other materials are mixed, a taste is experienced, or when the mixing of materials like molasses with other materials produces six kinds of taste so also along with the different *Bhavas* [emotions] the *sthayi bhava* [permanent emotions experienced ‘inside’] becomes a rasa.\(^4\)

In the theatre the relationship between audience and performer is considered paramount and the controlling of that relationship (to the best of a theatrical artist’s ability) is essential to the transmission of rasa, or emotion, or affect.

Western traditions within the theatre also point to the importance of affect/emotion. For Aristotle, moments of recognition and reversal followed by a scene of passion could provoke a cathartic experience, variously now understood to be the purgation or purification of the emotions provoked—most essentially pity and fear. Seneca, and Roman tragedy (although Seneca is almost all we know of Roman tragedy) is also concerned with emotion. According to Gregory A. Staley’s *Seneca and The Idea of Tragedy*, Seneca—and in particular stoic philosophy—resolved the “ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy that led Plato to ban tragedy.”\(^5\) Staley later explains this resolution:

> For the very process of cognition is for the stoics a form of judgment in response to “aesthetic” impressions, to perceptions charged with potential emotion. That is why Seneca compares the first stage of emotion to the sensations we feel in seeing a play or reading a book (De Ira 2.2.5). What should come next, in both cases, is a discovery of what we think and the formation of judgment.\(^6\)
Tragedy in this formulation is the means by which we might model the process of emotions and how we think about them and their relationship to ourselves and the world. Joseph Roach meticulously outlines the actor’s concern with the emotions in *The Player’s Passion*:

“conceptions of the human body drawn from physiology and psychology have dominated theories of acting from antiquity to the present. The nature of the body, its structure, its inner and outer dynamics, and its relationship to the larger world that it inhabits have been the subject of diverse speculation and debate. At the center of this ongoing controversy stands the question of emotion.”

The concern with emotion in the theatre might also be understood from a phenomenological attitude. According to Bert O. States’s “The Phenomenological Attitude,” “Phenomenological criticism […] posits a stopping place, as it were, at the starting place, not of all possible meanings but of meaning and feeling as they arise in a direct encounter with the art object. A phenomenological approach offers a critique of what cosmological physics might call “the first four seconds of the perceptual explosion.”

To utilize a term popularized by Edmund Husserl, *epochē* or bracketing is used to suspend the phenomenologist’s biases based in the meaning and feelings mentioned by States in order to analyze and perceive the object of study on its own terms in the moment of experience.

At the heart of this dissertation is a confluence of three areas of inquiry variously utilized to explain the way dystopian performatives impact audience members on a visceral and cognitive level: utopian studies, performance theory, and science’s understanding of affects, emotions, and feelings. At stake is a comprehension of the embodied doings of the theatrical experience created through violence and the exploration of humanity’s negative side. Dystopian performatives begin in the viscera of a body’s interaction with the theatrical event and gains its full power as this experience interacts with culture and the thinking mind. Dystopian performatives explain the
impact of negatively valenced affect/emotion content within the theatre—particularly Sarah Kane’s work—and offers a tool for dissecting the human emotional and cognitive response to this specific kind of theatre. In what follows, this dissertation will demonstrate how affect/emotion has the potential to impact the body of an audience member, leading to changes in behavior, cognition, and the way that a community views itself and its issues. The theory of the dystopian performative will elucidate particularly powerful moments in the theatre that deal with tragedy, war, violence, abuse, and prejudice. It will outline how the human body responds to various types of negative stimulus through the use of affect/emotion science.

Sarah Kane’s body of work serves as the ideal site to demonstrate the workings of the dystopian performative and its relationship to utopianism, performance, and the experience of emotions, affects, and feelings. Kane was selected for this purpose for three primary reasons, 1) her work is extremely violent and lends itself to the kind of provocative bodily experience indicative of the dystopian performative. As Elaine Scarry’s book The Body in Pain suggests, language fails to communicate what any given individual actually experiences physically. You cannot know what the cut on another’s leg feels like for that individual. Essentially, the body in pain cannot in any meaningful way fully communicate that which it feels. Language fails, perhaps the affect/emotion tools of theatre succeed in creating moments of “somewhere else”—dystopian performatives—that lead to community building effects. 2) Kane understood her own work to be of a kind of experiential theatre where “performance is visceral. It puts you in direct physical contact with thought and feeling.” Experiential theatre attempts to provoke affects, emotions, and feelings, which I will argue—when focused on the elicitation of negative affects or emotions in theatre, what Kane might label as theatre that takes you “to hell”—is prone to produce the necessary mixture of viscera and cognitive complexity necessary for a dystopian
performative moment. 3) Kane’s relatively small body of work encompasses an array of various negative emotions or affects that allow for a bracketing of the vast field of affect/emotion science. Through Kane’s work, this study seeks to enhance knowledge about violence in performance, how emotion science might lead to a better understanding of the audience performer interaction, and ultimately how these theories of emotions, affects, and feelings; the performative; and utopianism influences how Kane’s plays effect a community of theatergoers in the moment of performance. The dissertation seeks to not only come to an understanding of the potential effects of an embodied dystopic experience, but to uncover how and why Kane’s plays have influenced and impacted the theatre community. In what follows, the three areas that encompass this study will be addressed, a section on Kane’s work will explore the ways in which scholars and performers have interpreted and analyzed the plays, and finally a brief outline of the remaining chapters will be provided with an emphasis on the basic emotion under consideration.

**Utopia / Dystopia**

In utilizing the concept of dystopia (in combination with the performative), I seek to further the work begun by Jill Dolan’s *Utopia in Performance* in which she builds the growing literature on the practice of utopia. Utopia and dystopia are attractive concepts in that they focus on the potential of humankind to improve its world and community, which I argue is at the heart of theatrical creation. As seen below, utopia and dystopia simply approach this improvement in different ways. When paired with the performative, I am investigating the “doings” that work to improve the world and community from a dystopic viewpoint. To understand this viewpoint, I will outline the concepts of utopia/dystopia as it applies to this study.

To begin, utopia, the term first coined by Thomas More in his novel *Utopia* in 1516, comes from the Greek terms *ou*, “not” or “no” and *topos*, “place.” Thus, utopia comes to mean
“no place” and is essentially a spatial and/or temporal designation. Utopian thought, from the ideal city in Plato’s *Republic* to More’s *Utopia* suggests a locale that doesn’t exist but in which society operates under principals removed, to varying degrees, from their originary society. Importantly, as Roland Schaer points out in “Utopia: Space, Time, History,” More, the “English humanist, good Christian though he may have been, described an ideal society achieved solely by human means: evil and vice are ousted after ‘the best state of a commonwealth’ has been instituted in the here and now, taking, in other words, the human condition as it is.”¹¹ Humanism, its potential and its vice, are central to both utopian and dystopian thought.

With the increasing reliance on science and the ideals of the continual progress of humankind, the focus of utopian thought from the seventeenth century forward shifted to emphasize the future possibilities of human culture and society, moving from a focus on a “no place” in the here and now to a “no time” in the distant future. As Gregory Claeys and Lyman Tower Sargent note in the introduction to *The Utopia Reader*, “scientific discovery and technological innovation […] began to hold out the promise of an indefinite progress of the human species toward better health, a longer life, and the domination of nature in the interests of humankind.”¹² Schaer attributes this movement from a spatial to a temporal focus—the realization of the prognostic capability of utopia and dystopia—to Abbé de Pure’s *Epigone, Story of the Future Century* (1659) and Louis-Sébasien Mercier’s *Memoirs of the Year Two Thousand Five Hundred* (1771).¹³ More importantly, according to Schaer, “Utopian society was no longer to be found […] at the end of a propitious journey, or as the result of a chance encounter, or in the happy contingency of a shipwreck that turned out well. Rather, it was to await us at the end of a process of rational discourse like a vista or a final destination of a history governed by meaning, not to say necessity.”¹⁴ In the twentieth century, utopianism shifted again, according to
Schaer, this time from the ideal of human progress as inevitable to the understanding that true utopia would only occur through “violence, by subverting the past and destroying the old tenacious ways.”  

Federico Cugurullo notes the longstanding moniker of the twentieth century as the dystopian century, or “the death of utopia.” This notion comes, of course, from the perceived loss of hope that followed World War I, The Great Depression, the testing of technology’s limits to improve human life, among others tragic events. While one scholar (Schaer) notes the belief in violence to effect a move to utopia, another (Cugurullo) suggests that violence was utopia’s death and dystopia’s birth.

At this point, it may be worthwhile to delineate a few terms common to the study of utopia. Utopia, according to many scholars, is in its simplest form, a society defined in a place and time that does not exist. Eutopia, what might be traditionally viewed as “utopia,” is a positive utopia, a happy place. Dystopia, coined in the mid 1700s and perhaps most famously used by John Stuart Mill in a “speech in Parliament in 1868,” means literally “bad place” or a negative utopia. Dystopia is a society that does not exist, intended to be, or at least appearing to be, worse than the reader or audience member’s own society. Anti-utopia is primarily a criticism of general utopianism (“social dreaming”) or a specific eutopia. Importantly, anti-utopia denies the hopefulness of the ideals of utopia in a way that dystopia does not. According to Tom Moylan’s Scraps of the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia, “clarity of terms and categories was often frustrated by the tendency to reduce dystopian and anti-utopian texts to a single “anti-utopian” category.” Moylan also notes the manner in which dystopia, still focused on the minutiae of utopian accounts, utilizes the potential of terror associated with the future as opposed to the hopefulness associated with what is generally termed utopia, but perhaps should be more accurately termed eutopia. In other words, dystopia does not act to destroy hope, but
rather becomes its limit case. Scholars such as Lyman Tower Sargent might also add satirical utopia, critical utopia, flawed utopia, and critical dystopia. All of these designations are generally used to refer to literary texts although they can be applied to other areas of utopian thought.

Sargent further describes the intricacies of utopia by suggesting three “faces” or more accurately three areas of utopian thought, that is, utopian literature, utopian practice, and utopian social theory. Utopian literature, perhaps obviously, relates to fictional works that depict any type of utopia or as Sargent notes, “they present non-existent good, bad or good and bad places.” Utopian practice involves the creation of “intentional communities” and runs the gamut from “Temporary Autonomous Zones” (TAZ) used in protests and other forms of “do it yourself” culture to the Jewish Kibbutz or Buddhist monastic orders. Utopian social theory includes philosophies, political theory, theology, and the study of ideology (specifically the connection between ideology and utopia). Necessarily, the three faces of utopia influence and shape each other.

These faces of utopia traverse along the evolutionary line of utopian thought discussed above, although only generally, from a focus on place to a focus on future potential. For example, utopian practices have continued to focus on a place/locale of utopian experimentation for hundreds of years, from my own heritage’s (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) search for a promised land, to practice a religion and establish a specific culture in the 1800s to the still functioning Twin Oaks Community located in Virginia. Utopianism continues to search for the betterment of mankind in the here and now and in the there and future.

The spatial and temporal facets of utopianism, utopia, eutopia, dystopia etc., I argue, focus to much on these external impingements of utopianism on the human subject and leaves that same subject necessarily outside of most criticism of utopianism. In other words, too much
attention has been paid to the place and time of utopia and dystopia and not enough to the human experience at the heart of such imaginings. Sargent’s discussion of utopian practice comes closest to discussing the actual experience of utopia, specifically, in his suggestion that performance art lends itself to a mode of utopianism he describes as the “potentially transformative experience of performance in theatre and the arts.”

Sargent then cites Jill Dolan’s *Utopia in Performance* as a means of discussing the “utopian nature of theatrical performance.” Dolan’s contribution to the field of utopian studies might be best understood as a contribution to the study of the experience of utopian thought, that is the practice of utopia. However, the transformative potential of performance, labeled by Dolan as utopian, is not a generally accepted concept within utopian studies. As Gregory Claeys’ “The Five Languages of Utopia” argues,

> temporary or episodic modifications of behavior, which either intentionally or accidentally increases sociability, whether via the sublimity of the idealized garden, the fervent loss of self in the religious ceremony or festival, or the carnival or musical or sporting event [“embody concepts of progress, but not of utopia”]. These represent, perhaps, utopic moments and / or spaces. But their limited temporality precludes using the term “utopia” to describe them, because the creation of newly-socialized beings en permanence is not intended.

Through Claeys the assumption of the importance of temporality is emphasized to the point of excluding what Dolan might refer to as utopian performatives from the realm of utopian studies. The potential for a utopian or dystopian performative is cast aside for its ephemeral and fleeting nature. And yet, as Dolan might argue, these fleeting moments in temporary, unfixed spaces offers a perspective, or further an experience, of being in the here and now or the there and then
of utopianism. It is a collective experience of social dreaming. The work I take up here is, in part, to move the conversation of utopianism from spatial and temporal considerations to a focus on the bodily experience, the affect/emotion of utopia/dystopia. The affect/emotion of utopia/dystopia, or what Dolan might call a utopian performative and what I am calling a dystopian performative, is embedded in Sargent’s notion of utopian practice while obviously drawing on the literary/artistic developments of utopian thought as well as the philosophical, ideological, utopian social theory.

Dolan defines utopian performatives as “small but profound moments in which performance calls the attention of the audience in a way that lifts everyone slightly above the present, into a hopeful feeling of what the world might be like if every moment of our lives were as emotionally voluminous, generous, aesthetically striking, and intersubjectively intense.”28 Dolan’s definition clearly follows the framework that I have already laid out. It includes both spatial and temporal considerations while also including “feeling,” the body, and experience.

Building on Dolan’s work, this dissertation seeks to understand what it is that negative experience accomplishes in performance, how it affects spectators, and to what extent dystopia can be developed as a theory to understand the affect/emotion of the theatre. Dolan’s utopian performative offers a model and springboard for thinking through a kind of theoretical apparatus for understanding representations of violence and other viscerally impactful theatrical moments. Where the utopian performative emphasizes hope for the future, my study will focus instead on feelings of skepticism that demand to know what the world would be like if every moment of our lives were as emotionally gripping, terrifying, aesthetically shocking, and “intersubjectively intense.” Where utopia imagines a hopeful future, dystopia imagines the terrors of future potentiality and present tragedy, trauma, and violence.
Importantly, dystopia and utopia share similar goals as noted by Dragan Klaić,
“dystopian drama is in fact utopian; it involves utopian ambitions while describing total collapse. Utopia is the deeper, disguised infrastructure of dystopia, the hidden premise of dystopian vision, and dystopia has become in our times a *via negativa* to express utopian strivings.” Klaić utilizes a literary perspective to study the utopian and dystopian strivings of dramatic literature while Dolan utilizes the body, affect, and feeling to understand the utopian practices of the theatre. My contribution to the discourse surrounding utopian thought in theatre is to explore the dystopian practices of theatre via a focus on the negative experiences of the body and subject created through negative affect and the excitation of specific negative emotions. Ultimately, how does the negative, bodily experience of the dystopian performative moment work to build and improve society, specifically the community within the theatre’s walls.

**Performance Theory and the Performative**

As has been well rehearsed in many volumes since J.L. Austin’s lectures titled *How to Do Things with Words*, a performative (or in Austin’s specific philosophy of language field, a performative utterance) is an utterance that “does.” The most canonical example, of course, being that of the marriage ceremony in which the official states “I now pronounce you man and wife” and with those words the groom and bride become married. The performative of this study relies on a more embodied focus as opposed to a language based model. The “performative” has branched out to encompass not only utterances and language, but events, rituals, performance practices, history, identity, art, the body, etc. It continues to expand its area of focus and application to multiple fields of inquiry. The notion of the performative and performativity does, in fact, have two separate, but perhaps overlapping, lineages. The first is the origin listed above with Austin’s *How to Do Things with Words*, to John Searle’s formulation of speech act theory,
further developed by Jacques Derrida in “Signature, Event, Context” and later defined by Judith Butler. Of particular importance to this study, Derrida took on Austin’s claim that “a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.”

Derrida takes issue with this notion on the basis that all performative utterances succeed only on the basis of their iterability: “Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?”

The potential of the performative utterance was moved beyond what is prescribed by Austin into the realm of theatre and performance via the necessary iterability of the performative utterance, its history, context, and all that makes it efficacious. Judith Butler takes this development further in discussing the performativity of gender:

Gender is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time—an identity, instituted through a stylized repetition of acts. Further, gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.

Building on Derrida and the citationality and iterability necessary for the performative’s operation, Butler distinguishes how gender as an identity, which of course in many ways can be expanded to the formation of any specific identity, is formulated through iterable processes which Butler labels as performativity. Marvin Carlson sums up this form of subject constitution
perfectly: “the ‘subject’ is itself ‘performatively constituted’ by acts, including acts that signify a particular gender.”

The other branch of the performative moves further toward the body to discuss not only “acts” as Butler suggests but the bodies reaction to acts as also performative, which deserves attention as the primary sense of the term espoused by Dolan’s utopian performative. It began in sociology and anthropology and has been further developed within the field of performance studies. Richard Schechner, considered the founder of performance studies, in an interview with Diana Taylor states,

At the same time that other people elsewhere—the French post-structuralists, as I noted, and people like Irving Goffman, Victor Turner in the United States—were seeing the performative qualities of everyday life. At that point at least I was not aware of Austin’s notion of the performative which arose at roughly the same time… but more conscious of Goffman’s work, Turner’s work and things of that sort.

developed through the work of Erving Goffman, specifically, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Kenneth Burke’s notion of dramatism or symbolic action, Victor Turner’s anthropological work connecting the profitable relationship between ritual and performance, and Richard Schechner’s lifelong engagement and promotion of performance studies as a unique discipline with far reaching effect, the performative cited and utilized in this body of work means something different although related to the performative of Austin, Derrida, and Butler. Schechner, perhaps, explains it best in his Performance Studies: An Introduction,

“‘Performative’ is both a noun and an adjective. The noun indicates a word or sentence that does something […]. The adjective inflects what it modifies with performance-like qualities.” Put
more simply in Schechner’s essay “Magnitudes of Performance,” “Performativity—or, commonly, ‘performance’—is everywhere in life, from ordinary gestures to macrodramas.”

This second quote, in a woefully simplistic way, illustrates the work done within anthropology, sociology, and literary theory by those scholars mentioned above who utilized the “drama analogy” to inform their work.

The performative taken up within this dissertation is necessarily a combination of the two lineages of the term. Following Dolan’s lead, the performative nature of dystopia that I am exploring relies on Turner’s reassessment of Arnold Van Gennep’s stages of transition, which he describes in *The Rites of Passage* (1909), resulting in Turner’s theorization of liminality and communitas. The performative moment of utopia and dystopia is necessarily fleeting and yet briefly brings a sense of communitas to the audience and performers. Turner defines communitas as “an unmediated relationship between historical, idiosyncratic, and concrete individuals.” He goes further to suggest that liminality offers the means by which a group or individual might experience communitas. Interestingly,

liminality may be for many the acme of insecurity, the breakthrough of chaos in cosmos, of disorder into order, then the milieu of creative inter-human or transhuman satisfactions and achievements. Liminality may be the scene of disease, despair, death, suicide, the breakdown without compensatory replacement of normative well-defined social ties and bonds. […] Liminality is both more creative and more destructive than the structural norm.

The communitas suggested within these kinds of theatrical moments might be described by Turner as spontaneous. In this sense, my project is in line with Dolan’s when she astutely points out that “Turner’s theory usefully describes the social potential of utopian performatives. That is,
rather than resting on an old humanist legacy of universality and transcendence, utopian performatives let audiences experience a processual, momentary feeling of affinity, in which spectators experience themselves as part of a congenial public constituted by the performance’s address.” Perhaps a “somewhere else,” as States and Heidegger might suggest. Turner, however, also suggests that his notion of ideological communitas might, in fact, be utopian. Ideological communitas relies on the memory of communitas and the desire to describe or recreate the experience of spontaneous communitas. Turner hypothesizes, “some of these sets of theoretical concepts [theoretical concepts of past experiences of communitas] can be expanded and concretized into a ‘utopian’ model of society, in which all human activities would be carried out on the level of spontaneous communitas.” This form of utopian communitas however, should not be conflated with the “manufacture” of utopia, as Turner describes it, that is far more structural and hierarchal. Whereas the utopia of much of literature describes a time and place removed from present culture and society which might be static, structural, and unchanging, the utopia of communitas, as Dolan might suggest, is far more anti-structural. Indeed, one might go as far as to suggest that communitas is the practice of utopia, the very phenomena considered by the study of utopian and dystopian performatives.

The difference between anti-structural and structural (static) utopia is essential to understand the formulation of utopia put forth by Dolan and utilized here to discuss dystopia. It is also, perhaps, the distinction and connection between the two lineages of the performative discussed above. That is, the utopian/dystopian performative is necessarily an embodied experience outside the logocentrism of the performative of Austin, Derrida, and Butler. For Schechner, “performance studies must refer to, come from, and come back to embodied behavior.” In this way the performative under consideration is not the ability of language to
“do,” but rather embodied behavior’s “doings” situated within its own iterability, citation, what Schechner might call twice-behaved behavior. While Diana Taylor argues, “it may be too late to reclaim performative for the non-discursive realm of performance” and thus suggests new terminology harvested from the Spanish language, the performatic, I do not fully agree that the new terminology is absolutely necessary to separate the visual, digital, embodied fields from logocentrism. In fact, the blurring of these two iterations of performative speaks to and adds upon the very nature of what Schechner calls embodied behavior. From the discursive elements of performativity is gained a robust understanding of the context, iterability, and citation necessary for the performative to operate. The concern for embodied behavior, on the other hand, adds to the processual nature, the emotional and affective impact, and the creation of communitas that Dolan suggests for utopian performatives and which I emulate for dystopian performatives.

As noted above in a quote from Turner, liminality (an essential ingredient to the production of communitas) deals with a break with order, a break with structure, the introduction of “chaos in cosmos.” Turner points to “disease, despair, death, suicide” to describe the potential scene of liminality. This is in stark contrast to the extraordinarily hopeful view of both liminality and communitas taken up in Dolan’s work on utopian performatives. Of course, as Turner points out, “Liminality is both more creative and more destructive than the structural norm.” The addition of the dystopian performative operates to allow for the liminal moments that are perhaps more destructive although still creative as opposed to the those moments focused on by Dolan that are more creative yet still potentially destructive. This is the way in which, as Dolan claims, “Utopian performatives exceed the content of a play or performance; spectators might draw a utopian performative from even the most dystopian theatrical universe.” For example, theatre
scholar Dragan Klaic’s *The Plot of the Future: Utopia and Dystopia in Modern Drama* offers a focus on utopian and dystopian themes and content within dramatic work. Dolan suggests that utopian performatives can be experienced in theatrical events that espouse dystopian themes and content, she is not suggesting that the notion of the dystopian performative is included within utopian performative but rather that utopian performatives can be found within dystopian content. Similarly, I would argue, dystopian performatives can be found within utopian content.\(^{45}\)

As I have already mentioned, Dolan utilizes Victor Turner’s notion of communitas and liminality as the primary vehicle to understand the doings of the performative moments that she is concerned with. But what are these doings, what does Dolan suggest these experiential, embodied behavioral moments accomplish. What do they do?:

The utopian performative moves me in to the theoretical and experiential realm of affect, into the live, present-tense relationship between performers and spectators in a particular historical moment and a specific geographic location. This work tries to describe the most ineffable, most difficult aspect of performance to capture, to manipulate and to “prove”: how it makes people feel.\(^{46}\)

Feelings, emotions, affects are three terms that our wrapped-up and tangled together in a web that is only understood from field specific perspectives. For example, in the field of psychology Elaine Fox defines emotions as “discrete and consistent responses to an internal or external event which has a particular significance for the organism.” She goes on to define feelings as “the subjective representation of emotions” and ultimately affect as the catchall term for emotions, feelings, and mood.\(^{47}\) Conversely, Erin Hurley, in the field of theatre and performance studies defines affect as “an organisms autonomic reaction to an environmental change.” She defines emotion via the James-Lange Theory of emotions which suggests that “emotion is the perception
of the physiological changes” of what Hurley refers to as affect. And, finally, feelings as the catchall term for emotion, affect, mood, etc. Neither of these definitions is the only one within their respective fields. The definitions to be used in this study will be defined in the next section, here I want to focus on the fact that Dolan does not define these terms in clear and explicit ways. She utilizes the terms feelings, emotions, and affects in almost an interchangeable manner (another perspective on how they should be defined). *Utopia in Performance* “ask[s] how might we document affect. How can we chronicle an audience’s response, in the moment of performance? […] Because that gesture—the doing of the utopian performative—is inarticulate, a structure of feeling prior to its enunciation, securing its end point in language is both improbable and undesirable.” Dolan utilizes Raymond Williams’s notion of a structure of feeling to suggest the emotional, feeling, affective quality—or the doings—of her utopian performative. Williams defines a structure of feeling as “concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs.” For Williams a “structure of feeling” is also “a social experience, still in process, often indeed not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating.” The similarities between this definition and the manner in which Dolan speaks of the utopian performative should be obvious, of particular importance is the same focus on the processual, the social, the present, and the meaning and values espoused by such instances. The evidence for such a performative is difficult to find, record, and analyze. It is nearly impossible to prove. Thus, Dolan relies on the subjective experience of her own theatergoing to develop her theory and her argument for hope and utopia in the theatre. I propose a different body of evidence to help bolster Dolan’s concept of a utopian performative and to supplement it with my own dystopian performative. While Dolan focuses on positive emotions, affects, feelings, and moods
provoked by powerful moments of theatre, this work focuses on negative emotions, affects, feelings, and moods and asks first what might provoke such negative affect/emotion and how might their embodied “doings” create moments of community, charged with the potential to change society and culture. Instead of building such a theory on the subjective experience of the author’s own theatergoing experience I will rely on cognitive neuroscience, affective neuroscience, and the scientific study of emotion to suggest the potential and likeliness of such dystopian performative moments.

**Affect/Emotion/Feeling**

“One may even say that the virtue of the aesthetic object is largely measured by its ability to seduce the body. If the idea of an aesthetic pleasure has any meaning, it is in terms of a pleasure experienced by the body…. It appears that the aesthetic object anticipates the body’s desires or gratifies them insofar as it awakens them.”

—Mikel Dufrenne, qtd. in Bert O. State’s *The Pleasure of the Play*

The turn to affect in the humanities has a great deal in common with the study of theatre and it is absolutely essential to understand the “doings” of the body, indeed embodied performative moments. As Erin Hurley and Sara Warner note in their introduction to a special section of the *Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism*, titled “Affect/Performance/Politics,” “the emphasis on ‘presence,’ for instance, or the invocation of transformation, or the centrality of embodiment” all remind one of issues and ideas that are frequent in performance and theatre studies. Take for example, Richard Schechner’s most recent addition (2003) to his field-defining book, *Performance Theory*, a chapter on Rasaesthetics (mentioned in the introduction to this chapter) in which rasas “(as flavors or moods) are feelings, but what is communicated or transmitted by means of rasas are emotions. One ‘has’ emotions even if one is not feeling them;
one ‘experiences’ feelings even if sometimes disconnected to emotions.” Erin Hurley, in her book *Theatre & Feeling*, might take issue with this distinction, as noted above, she generally includes affect, sensation, mood, and emotion all under the heading of “feelings.” Schechner’s distinction, however, points to a major concern of affect studies: the distinction between the autonomic response to stimulus and our cognitive process of that bodily response to create emotion. Ruth Leys in “Critique of Affect” puts it more eloquently: “whatever differences of philosophical-intellectual orientation there may be among the new affect theorists themselves and between them and the neuroscientists whose findings they wish to appropriate (differences do of course exist), the important point to recognize is that they all share a single belief: the belief that affect is independent of signification and meaning.” In this way, affect/emotion becomes the primary tenant of an embodied performative moment—one iteration of which is a dystopian performative—and moves away from its more logocentric theorization that relies on meaning and signification.

For the purposes of this investigation, these different philosophical-intellectual orientations can be reduced to two interrelated axes. As Melissa Gregg and Gregory J Seigworth note in their introduction to *The Affect Theory Reader*, these two axes can be defined by two important essays published in 1995: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” and Brian Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect.” For Gregg and Seigworth they can be broken down in the following manner:

Silvan Tomkins’s psychobiology of differential affects (1962) (Sedgwick and Frank) and Gilles Deleuze’s Spinozist ethology of bodily capacities (1988a) (Massumi). With Tomkins, affect follows a quasi-Darwinian “innate-ist” bent toward matters of evolutionary hardwiring. But these wires are by no means fully
insulated nor do they terminate with the brain or flesh; instead they spark and fray just enough to transduce those influences borne along by the ambient irradiation of social relations. Meanwhile Deleuze’s Spinozan route locates affect in the midst of things and relations (in immanence) and, then, in the complex assemblages that come to compose bodies and worlds simultaneously. There is, then, a certain sense of reverse flow between these lines of inquiry a certain inside-out/outside-in difference in directionality: affect as the prime interest motivator that comes to put the drive in bodily drives (Tomkins); affect as an entire, vital, and modulating field of myriad becomings across human and nonhuman (Deleuze). 57

Similarly, Erin Hurley’s *Theatre & Feeling* describes these two axes as the cognitive and affective turn, 58 distinguishing the two as those that explicitly utilize cognitive science and those that don’t. Interestingly, Sedgwick and Frank’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” is placed in the affective turn camp despite her reliance on scientific theories and research produced by Silvan Tomkins. For this reason, the separation suggested by Gregg and Seigworth seems more adept and accurate. In reality, as Leys argues, these philosophical-intellectual orientations have the same objective: to place the body and bodily experience into the formation of knowledge, identity, community, etc. The affective turn, then, might be considered theatre and performance studies’ most recent turn towards bodily and embodied knowledge production. Taking Leys’s argument further, it seems clear that the affective turn in the humanities is particularly invested in not only the “belief that affect is independent of signification and meaning,” but that it, in fact, comes prior to cognition, thought, social construction, etc. The argument is not just for the inclusion of the body in theories of culture, politics, society, or artistic practice, but rather for the
primacy of the body as the starting point of our understanding of the human condition. The processual nature of human interactions with the world is, however, not nearly so simplistic. For example, Stephen Di Benedetto’s *The Provocation of the Senses* states, “Sensations are triggered before thought and the intellect, though our senses are already interpreted by embodiment, so this pre-consciousness does not tell the whole story. Our neural pathways have preferences based on our own personal experiences of the world, and therefore, have already predetermined the eventual interpretation of sensory data.”

Benedetto points out the fact that past experiences also influence how bodies interpret the world and the events that impact each individual.

Elaine Fox’s *Emotion Science* distinguishes four different ideas about the process of emotions in the human body. First, “emotions as biologically given.” This process filters all eliciting events through the activation of “genetically coded emotion systems” (sometimes called affect programs) that have been hardwired into humankind through evolution. This allows for rapid response to the physical and social world that immediately benefits the organism. Second, “emotions are socially constructed.” This process filters all eliciting events through “learned social and cultural norms systems” and then leads to the activation of bodily sensations, expressive behavior, and subjective feeling or emotional states. Third, the James-Lange theory of emotion suggests that “emotions are a result of perception of bodily changes.” In simplistic terms, this theory argues that physiological changes occur before cognition, behavior, or feelings/emotions. Thus our bodies react to the physical and cultural world before we process it cognitively. This theory is in line with much of the research in theatre and performance studies that suggests affect occurs before thought, signification, or meaning-making. Finally, “emotions are the result of cognitive appraisals.” This theory suggests that cognition intervenes in the emotion elicitation process before the activation of various physiological experiences, behaviors,
or subjective feelings/emotions. This theory of emotion takes on the problematic idea that people respond to eliciting events with different emotions, a fact “not well explained by strict evolutionary-based accounts.”  

With the clear understanding that affect is not easily pinned down in either of the two axes suggested by Gregg and Seigworth, this study will utilize the following affect/emotion terms in these specific ways:

**Affect:** An autonomic bodily response that occurs prior to cognitive, social, or cultural interactions. Importantly, affect can also be triggered or elicited via cognitive processes in a kind of corporeal feedback-loop, as the result of social and cultural training and construction, and through the abstract quality of thought (for example, we might consider the way in which an actor utilizes emotional recall to experience a particular emotion and its concurrent psychophysical sensations).

**Emotion:** Richard S. Lazarus’s essay “The Cognition-Emotion Debate: A Bit of History” outlines quite clearly the way in which this study will view emotion. Whereas affect can occur without cognition, emotion is inextricably tied up with and in meaning, cognition, and thought: “Emotion is always a response to meaning, which includes the implications of a transaction for one’s personal goals, regardless of how that meaning was achieved. […] Emotion is never completely divorced from meaning.” Emotion is defined as the resulting effect of the combination of affect, cognition, and socio-cultural variables.
**Feeling:** Following Elaine Fox’s definition, feelings are the “subjective representation of emotions.” That is, feelings are the subjective way in which all individuals experience both affects and emotions in a wide variety of ways regardless of shared culture, class, race, or gender. This is not to say that overlap between individuals does not exist, but rather that emotion is the better word to describe the socio-cultural overlap, affect is more accurate to describe the physiological overlap (that is, we are all human) whereas feeling expresses the individualistic nature of the affective, emotional, cognitive system.

It is worth noting that many scholars name the entire system of emotions, affects, feelings, moods, temperaments, etc. under a few different key terms. As mentioned above, Hurley suggests that “feeling” is the overarching term while Elaine Fox suggests that “affect” is the term that should encompass the “entire topic of emotions, feelings, moods together even though it is often used interchangeably with emotion.” Along these lines, affect and emotion are the most commonly utilized words to define this area of study in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, affective neuroscience, and in the humanities. Therefore, when referring to the field of study that encompasses, affect, emotion, feeling, mood, etc. I will utilize the following construction: affect/emotion.

The above definitions are intentionally laid out along a pattern discussed by Bruce McConachie in *Engaging Audiences*:

> From a cognitive-evolutionary point of view, we are all alike in some ways, we share some attributes and practices with cultural groups in other ways, and each of us, as well, embodies qualities that are absolutely unique. Although we can speak abstractly of these as distinct levels, our species- [Affect], cultural- [Emotion],
and individual-specific traits [Feelings] are interdependent and cannot really be separated.64

Along these same lines, McConachie notes that the distinctions that are insisted upon between nature and nurture are no longer workable, nor is the division that is suggested between the mind and the body—put differently, between affect/emotion and cognition.65 Like McConachie, I am well aware that “for many humanists […] [the] attempted synthesis of the natural and the cultural will send up a red flag.”66 Regardless of the potential pitfalls and complications created by taking into consideration the interdependent relationship between the cultural and the natural, this relationship is absolutely essential to understanding and theorizing about audience reception and experience. Thus, the three-pronged understanding of cognition put forth by McConachie that I am embedding in my understanding of affect/emotion, allows for the complex interconnection between species, culture, and the individual with no hierarchy or suggestion that one is more or less primary than the other.

The work presented in this dissertation follows the tradition established by Sedgwick and Frank in examining the application of affect/emotion by utilizing the now vast field of basic emotion research (Sedgwick and Frank primarily built on Silvan Tomkins’s work). Basic emotion research’s origin is often traced back to Silvan Tomkins and his publication of *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* in 1962 in which he argues that there are exactly nine biologically-based affects, which are, Distress-Anguish, Interest-Excitement, Enjoyment-Joy, Surprise-Startle, Anger-Rage, Fear-Terror, Shame-Humiliation, Disgust, and Dissmell.67 In this formulation the first affect named in the pair is the more mild iteration while the second is of a higher intensity. The first six are basic and primary. The last three, Tomkins considered auxiliary, or the
incomplete reduction of a basic affect or a drive. “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” launched queer studies’s investigation of the auxiliary emotion, shame-humiliation.

The suggestion that basic emotions are biologically based and cross-cultural is not universally accepted. As professor of social psychology Margaret Whetherell notes in her book *Affect and Emotion: A new Social Science Understanding*, affect and emotion are misunderstood to be basic, when in reality the complexity of interaction between cognition, autonomic physiological responses, and the larger environment is too complex to be explained by a system of basic emotions. As Wetherell points out, “affective phenomena are now being analyzed as highly complex assemblies of smaller parts that might be found across a wide range of diverse emotional responses.” One particularly interesting re-adjustment in the analysis of affect/emotion away from the basic emotion approach is the circumplex model(s) of emotion initially suggested in 1980 by James A. Russell’s “A Circumplex Model of Affect.” As David Sander notes, “such an approach reduces emotion to nonemotional elements that can be felt on their own as distinctive dimensions.” The dimensions most often utilized according to Sander are arousal and valence. Russell describes arousal as occurring on a continuum from arousal to sleep. Sander describes valence on a continuum from pleasure to displeasure. Russell’s initial diagram for the circumplex model of affect has been adjusted in various ways over the years, but, in general, each iteration places basic emotions on the y-axis of arousal and x-axis of valence. So, for example, anger might be found toward the top of the y-axis (arousal) and in the left hemisphere on the x-axis (valence); indicating both high arousal and displeasure. In this model, emotional responses, what Tomkins and the proponents of the basic emotions approach would describe as basic or discrete emotions, are shown to be intimately connected with each other and simply a matter of the degree of arousal and valence. According to Sander the term “core-
affect” is often used to describe the experiential state on this diagram, that is, the degree of arousal and the degree of valence, positive or negative. Despite these divergent theories, a large amount of research is still being produced under the labels originally given to various basic emotions. Research on topics such as disgust, anger, happiness, etc. is still growing despite the concept of discrete basic emotions being challenged, complicated, and remapped with a variety of new theories and ideas. I suspect this is, in part, due to the organizational benefit of labeling research with a discrete emotion as understood by the general public.

Bearing the complexities of basic emotion research in mind, this study utilizes disgust, fear, anger, and sadness as an organizational framework to explore the negative affect/emotion’s prevalent in the theatrical experience of Kane’s body of work as they are connected to the notion of dystopia and the performative. The cognitive and affective neuroscience research utilized in this study recognizes the complexities and is mostly inline with Wetherell’s suggestion that emotions be considered “highly complex assemblies.” The scholarship cited throughout this dissertation often takes into account the biological, cultural, evolutionary, and social constructionist points of view, thereby allowing the humanities scholar to learn and engage in complexities without falling into the trap of essentialism so effectively danced with by Sedgwick and Frank:

regardless of whether this cognitive account of emotion is true, what we want to emphasize is that it is not less essentialist than an account, like Tomkins’s, that locates in the body some important part of the difference among different emotions. “Undifferentiated visceral arousal” is in no sense less biologically based than differentiated arousal, for all this article’s anti-Darwinist eagerness to disassociate Homo sapiens from “our pre-sapient past.”
From the cognitive and affective neuroscientific explanation of affect/emotion a clear sense of falsifiability, as called for by Bruce McConachie’s *Engaging Audiences*, can be worked toward in order to better understand the processes of the performative with regard to utopian and dystopian performative experiences.\(^7\) It is the degree of falsifiability that attracts me to the Tomkins inspired study of affect as opposed to Deleuze’s Spinozan affect. The affect espoused by Deleuze and Guattari, which deals with impingements—”those intensities that pass body to body”—and notions of intensity and force “in the very passages of variations between these intensities and resonances themselves” is far more wide-ranging but equally unwieldy and leads to, in my experience, a plethora of definitions and frankly confusion. While my use of affect may certainly be understood through and subsumed by Deleuze and Guattari’s now wide-ranging affect, I argue it has strength in its specificity and the ability to communicate more clearly.

With that in mind the affect proffered by Deleuze and Guttari is often taken up in research on race, gender, and class in a way that de-centers the universal subject that is sometimes implied in work within cognitive and affective neuroscience. Tavia Nyong’o’s *Amalgamation Waltz: Race, Performance and the Ruses of Memory* is one such example. Nyong’o utilizes the complexity of hybridity to point toward an affective experience that exists within a deleuzian “fold”: “It conveys a nonteleological and complexly affective relationship to an imminent future that the present is already caught up in. As an alternative to rigid anxiety, it spills out suggestive associations with texture and textiles that I will also exploit. I draw on both Foucault and Sedgwick in theorizing the fold within which modern conceptualizations of the human found a hollow in which the concomitant dilemmas of slavery, race, and hybridity appear.”\(^7\) For Nyong’o the fold is both a historical period and the problematic performance between black slavery and black freedom. This allows Nyong’o to contemplate the affective
experience of hybridity within black culture and how it is performed. It has specificity within the sociocultural field that is sometimes found lacking in cognitive and affective neuroscience.

Another example might be José Esteban Muñoz’s work on *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics*. Or, more specifically, his article, “Feeling Brown: Ethnicity and Affect in Ricardo Bracho’s *The Sweetest Hangover (and Other STDs)*.” Muñoz establishes an affective performativity as being specifically racialized by relying on the definition of affect proffered in the more philosophical study of affect: that is, that affect is the power and ability to affect and be affected by others. In this way Muñoz suggests a white-affect as well as a latino/a-affect. Presumably there could also be a black-affect, a gay-affect, etc. This allows, again, for a specificity in issues of identity linked to race, class, and gender but it ignores the scientific explanations of affect, emotion, and feeling that human beings share in a broader sense. Thus, while Deleuzian, Spinozist, and other philosophical perspectives on affect allow for cultural specificity based in race, gender, class and other identity markers it has the tendency to not take advantage of the work of cognitive and neuroscience that allows for a specific discussion of how affect/emotion works in a broader sense in that the work is meant to apply to all races, genders, and classes and a more specific sense in that the work attempts to clarify very specifically the actions of the sensorium and brain to understand how an affective moment operates.

As the quote above from “Shame in Cybernetic Fold” suggests, impingement, intensity, the fold, or ways of being with and around others people (force between bodies, the world, and other bodies) may be no less essentialist than a focus on “differentiated arousal” or rather my focus on specific affect/emotion experiences. Through affect/emotion this study attempts to more
carefully codify the negative affect/emotion experiences of the body, the body’s doings, during a
performance to understand how these embodied experiences can shape and change a community.

Kane

“This was a project [Jeremy Weller’s *Mad* (1992)] that brought together professional and non-
professional actors who all had some personal experience of mental illness. It was an unusual
piece of theatre because it was totally experiential as opposed to speculatory. As an audience
member, I was taken to a place of extreme mental discomfort and distress and then popped out
the other end. What I did not do was sit in the theatre considering as an intellectual conceit what
it might be like to be mentally ill. It was a bit like being given a vaccine. I was mildly ill for a
few days afterwards but the jab of sickness protected me from a far more serious illness later in
life. *Mad* took me to hell, and the night I saw it I made a decision about the kind of theatre I
wanted to make—experiential.”

—Sarah Kane, Letter to Aleks Sierz, 4 January 1999

*Mad*, according to Kane, was number one on her list of top “ten shows of the past 30
years.” Number two “was a live sex show in Amsterdam about a witch sucking the Grim
Reaper’s cock.” Sarah Kane was born on 3 February 1971 in Brentwood Essex, the daughter of
two journalists. She had a taste for theatre early in her life and first acted in the Basildon youth
theatre group. While attending Bristol University in the late 1980s and early 1990s, she began to
write and ultimately graduated with a “first-class honours degree.” While at Bristol, she
became involved with Sore Throats Theatre Company. As part of this group she performed what
is considered to be her first theatrical work, *Comic Monologue* and later *Starved* and *What She
Said*. It was at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival in 1992, where Kane performed *Starved* and *What
She Said*, that Kane saw the performance that solidified her theatrical focus on the “experiential.”
That same year, Kane began a Masters in playwriting at Birmingham University, which she would never finish. During her time at Birmingham she produced the first half of what would become *Blasted*. On 20 February 1999 Sarah Kane hanged herself in her hospital room after being admitted for attempted suicide. The years between that first iteration of *Blasted* in 1993 and the posthumously produced *4.48 Psychosis* (23 June 2000) encompass her artistic career in the spotlight as England’s “Enfant Terrible.”

Kane’s body of work is understood primarily through three fields of inquiry: Based in her biography and suicide; as part of the In-Yer-Face theatre movement (and the various iterations there of); and finally in what Hans-Thies Lehmann might call postdramatic theatre, what others might connect to Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty or Howard Barker’s Theatre of Catastrophe and what, as illustrated above, Kane herself labeled experiential theatre. It is this third category that most concerns the present study. Kane’s direct desire and her play’s ability to provide an experiential performance makes her oeuvre the perfect location to inquire into the power of negative affect/emotion systems to work on and within the audience and performer’s body to provoke a unique performative doing, a dystopian performative.

It is interesting that almost all scholars of Kane have the tendency to disavow the importance of her suicide to her work for fear that she might be made into a Sylvia Plath type literary figure. This has led to the creation of the first category of inquiry noted by scholars and a surprising lack of actual work that does the thing everyone is concerned about, that is, reading Kane’s play only through her suicide—more specifically reading her final play, *4.48 Psychosis* as a suicide note. This fear and its continual disavowal has more to do with the culture surrounding Kane and the academic desire to curb such a culture. Specifically, Aleks Sierz in an interview with Graham Saunders discusses his labeling of Sarah Kane as “Saint Sarah” while at a
conference in Berlin: “when I got to the theatre it was full of young women with short hair dressed in black—and, I thought, ‘Yes, it must be Easter because the pilgrims are gathering at the shrine of Saint Sarah.’” Sierz goes on to note the “prurient” way in which student’s seemed interested in her death. He further describes this fascination: “I really loathe the way that some people see suicide as glamorous, and as validating a writer’s life: Sarah Kane killed herself; therefore, she really meant it, whatever that ‘it’ was.” The concern with Kane’s suicide therefore, as Sierz would later point out in the same interview, give’s the author a degree of iconicity which is perhaps not overly useful. David Greig’s plea in the introduction to Kane’s complete plays serves as an example, “it would be a pity if […] in attending to the mythology of the author, we were to miss the explosive theatricality, the lyricism, the emotional power, and the bleak humor that is contained within the plays themselves.” Alisa Solomon more specifically informs us where this cult of Kane gained its momentum: “Kane’s suicide in February 1999, at the age of 28, was, even more disturbingly, picked up by the same disparaging critics as an explanation for her ‘dark,’ ‘sick’ work, clearly they diagnosed, the product of a ‘diseased’ imagination.” As Solomon points out it was the critics who, reviewing her final show (posthumously performed) began to associate the playwrights life and mental health problems with her work. Kate Basset of the Daily Telegraph, claims, “For this short chamber piece is an acutely painful, manifestly personal study of despair.” Michael Coveney unceremoniously began his review for the the Daily Mail, “NOT really a play, more an extended suicide note.” Similarly, Rachel Halliburton began by noting Kane’s suicide and stating “4.48 Psychosis, will more than satisfy the death-imitating-art hounds sniffing around for macabre psychological details.” What Halliburton does not disclose is that she too might be a “death-imitating-art hound” as she claims the play is “representative of the fragmented sense of identity that haunted
Kane’s existence,” and further claims that “her [Kane’s] despair follows you from the theatre, and stays with you like damp.” Without rehearsing this kind of reading of Kane’s work any further, it seems clear that Kane is read through her suicide by society and culture at large (whether in the college classroom or from the critics of London), but is decidedly not read through her biography in academic and scholarly work.

The next method of approach to Kane is based in the idea that her work can and should be categorized to make clear her relationship to theatrical history, the 1990s in Britain, Cool Britannia, and in some cases feminist politics. Aleks Sierz was perhaps first to label Kane and place her within a movement. In-Yer-Face Theatre is the title given to this group and it includes work by such writers as, Antony Neilson, Mark Ravenhill, Judy Upton, Martin McDonagh, and Naomi Wallace. Sierz defines the movement widely as “any drama that takes the audience by the scruff of the neck and shakes it until it gets the message. It is a theatre of sensation: it jolts both actors and spectators out of conventional responses, touching nerves and provoking alarm.” Ken Urban’s “Towards a Theory of Cruel Britannia, Coolness, Cruelty, and the ‘Nineties,’” however, notes “given the formal disparity of the plays, the case for a movement is hard to make.” Instead, Urban suggests that we examine the historical moment that the playwrights and plays labeled by Sierz as In-Yer-Face Theatre sprang from, that is the 1990s and the cultural phenomena of “Cool Britannia.” Urban defines this phenomena as the moment “when Britishness became Britain’s favored fetish.” It is characterized by pop music and the resurgence of the art and culture scene in Britain at large and London specifically. The idea of “cool” is particularly important to the movement and artists are seen as celebrities, with their image and persona becoming just as important as the art itself: “The image of the artist smoking,
looking pensive, or talking on the phone affirms the work’s coolness.\textsuperscript{92} Urban identifies the connections between this coolness and the cruelty suggested by the In-Yer-Face playwrights:

The melding of coolness and cruelty is clear in these productions. The stance of ironic detachment gives way to a violence that impels a sense of commitment. The plays demonstrate nihilism as a philosophical world view and as an affect. There is a crisis of meaning and it produces a profound state of psychological turmoil.\textsuperscript{93}

Urban takes the idea of a movement and turns it into a critique of a cultural moment, one that is perhaps mirrored in the present study that seeks to understand particularly affecting moments in the theatre and how they demonstrate a “crisis of meaning.” As Saunders notes in ‘\textit{Love Me or Kill Me}’ this group of playwrights became known by many names, including “‘the Britpack,’ ‘the New Brutalists’ and ‘the Theatre of Urban Ennui.’”\textsuperscript{94} Each of the writers mentioned above (Urban, Sierz, and Saunders) note the affective, experiential quality of Kane’s and the other In-Yer-Face writer’s work, they also delineate a theatrical history for Kane and her peers. They note the In-Yer-Face writer’s similarities with Jacobean theatre, John Osborne’s \textit{Look back in Anger} (1956), and the spawning of the Angry Young Men movement that followed. They all pay tribute to the connection between this group of writers and Antonin Artaud, particularly the work of Kane. Kane specifically, is often linked to Howard Barker and his Theatre of Catastrophe. In this way it becomes obvious that the desire to categorize the group is deeply interconnected to the third manner in which Kane’s work is read: her connection to the history of violent theatre, the theatre of cruelty and catastrophe, the absurdist movement, modernism and postmodernism, as well as Hans-Thies Lehmann’s postdramatic theatre.
Sarah Kane, as seen above, connected her work to what she called experiential theatre. In an interview with Aleks Sierz in 1999 she acknowledges that *Blasted* is a shocking play, “but only in the sense that falling down the stairs is shocking—it’s painful and it makes you aware of your fragility, but one doesn’t tend to be morally outraged about falling down the stairs.”⁹⁵ In a journalistic piece Kane describes her work as “visceral, it puts you in direct physical contact with thought and feeling.”⁹⁶ These, and comments like these, have led scholars to connect Kane’s work most predominantly to Antonin Artaud’s notions of Total Theatre and the Theatre of Cruelty. The connection is not hard to make, take for example this oft quoted passage: “But ‘theatre of cruelty’ means a theatre difficult and cruel for myself first of all. […] It is not the cruelty we can exercise upon each other by hacking at each other’s bodies […] but the much more terrible and necessary cruelty which things can exercise against us. We are not free. And the sky can still fall on our heads.”⁹⁷ Pair this with the manner in which Artaud suggests we treat the spectator: “like the snakecharmer’s subjects and conduct them by means of their organisms to an apprehension of the subtlest notions.”⁹⁸ The desire to affect spectators on a bodily physical level, by means of their organisms, aligns neatly with the visceral, experiential theatre of Kane, making it the perfect site to investigate the embodied performative doings of negative affect/emotion, a dystopian performative. However, as Clare Wallace’s “Sarah Kane, experiential theatre and the revenant avant-garde” points out, “beyond their interest in expressing extreme states of being, it is more difficult to find commonalities between Artaud and Kane.”⁹⁹ She goes on to cite Artaud’s reliance on ritual, archetypes, and focus on breaking the boundaries between audience and performer as being separate from the project of Kane’s theatre. Hans-Thies Lehmann on postdramatic theatre suggests,
The adjective ‘postdramatic’ denotes a theatre that feels bound to operate beyond drama, at a time ‘after’ the authority of the dramatic paradigm in theatre. What it does not mean is an abstract negation and mere looking away from the tradition of drama. ‘After’ drama means that it lives on as a structure—however weakened and exhausted—of the ‘normal’ theatre: as an expectation of large parts of its audience, as a foundation for many of its means of representation, as a quasi automatically working norm of its dramaturgy.\textsuperscript{100} Kane’s play, to some degree or another, could be described by this kind of theatre. More than that, however, as Eckart Vügts-Virchow’s “‘We are anathema’—Sarah Kane’s plays as post dramatic theatre versus ‘dreary and repugnant tale of sense’” suggests, “this kind of theatre turns the normative dramatic text into a loose theatretex.” Which is eventually transformed into “an ‘energetic theatre’ in which affects are disentangled from representations.”\textsuperscript{101} Kane’s movement in her work form \textit{Blasted}’s physical assault on both audiences and performers to her more linguistically based texts (\textit{Crave} and \textit{4.48 Psychosis}) reflects this shift into theatretex. As Kane states about \textit{Crave}, “Increasingly, I’m finding performance much more interesting than acting; theatre more compelling than plays. Unusually for me, I’m encouraging my friends to see my play \textit{Crave} before reading it, because I think of it more as a text for performance than as a play.”\textsuperscript{102} This focus on experiential theatre has spurned a significant amount of scholarship, from Allyson Campbell’s “Experiencing Kane: an affective analysis of Sarah Kane’s ‘experiential’ theatre in performance,”\textsuperscript{103} Helen Iball’s “Room Service: En Suite on the \textit{Blasted} Frontline,” which explores the phenomenology of Kane’s experiential theatre via Bert O. States,\textsuperscript{104} as well as no fewer than five articles found in \textit{Sarah Kane in Context}, edited by Laurens De Vos and
Graham Saunders, which in some way touch on the experiential nature of Kane’s work whether through Artaud, postdramatic theatre, and other notions like the implacable (Peter A. Campbell). Affect is generally handled throughout this body of literature by means of Deleuze’s Spinozan influenced brands of the theory, with the exception of Elaine Aston’s “Reviewing the Fabric of Blasted” which does rely on some social scientific explanations of affect/emotion.105 This study situates itself clearly within this body of literature and differentiates itself by focusing on scientific research in cognition, affect, and emotion instead of relying on Deleuze’s notion of affect or connections to Artaud, Barker, or postdramatic theatre—although many of these ideas will be cited in support of and to expand upon the research in affect/emotion. Following the trajectory laid out above, Kane’s dramaturgy will be shown to be exemplative of the cognitive, affective, and emotional processes associated with various negative emotion categories: Blasted, disgust; Phaedra’s Love, anger; Cleansed, fear; Crave, memory; and 4.48 Psychosis, sadness. By looking at these plays as paired with negative basic emotions, a specific embodied, dystopian performative can be bracketed and investigated to understand the potential of these embodied doings embedded within Kane’s work to alter communities, change behavior, and influence the course of culture and society.

The Emotions of Kane

The chapters in this dissertation are arranged chronologically following the production of Kane’s work. Thus I begin with Blasted and end with 4.48 Psychosis. Additionally, the affect/emotion research utilized in each chapter to discuss the potential embodied, dystopian performative moments—found in each of Kane’s plays—are loosely arranged from more simple, biologically based autonomic reactions (disgust in Blasted) toward more complex processes like the relationship between memory and emotion (memory in Crave). Importantly, even the most
biologically based autonomic reactions can be complicated, altered, repurposed, etc. by various cultural processes. Building in complexity with each chapter demonstrates the potential, complicated, and diverse consequences of embodied, dystopian performative moments.

Disgust serves as an interesting microcosm of the larger trajectory toward more complex reactions between basic emotions and cultural constructionist viewpoints on human behavior.

Paul Rozin, Jonathan Haidt, and Clark R. McCauley’s essay titled “Disgust” delineates five different levels of disgust that progressively become more inflected by culture: 1) Distaste, as a basic biological reaction, 2) Core Disgust, protection against offensive entities and contamination, 3) Animal Nature Disgust, the threat and reminder of humankind’s animal nature, 4) Interpersonal Disgust, which “discourages contact with other human beings who are not intimates,” and 5) Moral Disgust, caused by embodied and disembodied moral violations. Based in an evolutionary perspective, Rozin, et.al. demonstrate a congruence between evolutionary biology and more constructionist approaches to understanding human interactions. Chapter two takes this formulation and tracks it within *Blasted* and its critical response to show 1) how the play appropriates the various evolutionary levels of *Blasted* to arrive at an illustration of the complex responses involved in moral disgust and interpersonal disgust, and 2) to demonstrate how autonomic reactions like vomiting, becoming queasy, or feeling sick lead to complicated processing within an individual. That is, how the embodied experience of disgust can occur on a spectrum from visceral autonomic reaction to complex cognition on culturally based moral understandings. Finally, I examine the way Kane manipulates these embodied processes to create dystopian performative moments, where the doings of the body force attention on issues the culture of the time (and still today) chooses to ignore: war, rape, genocide, etc.
Chapter three takes two plays and two emotions as its center: *Cleansed* (fear) and *Phaedra’s Love* (anger). Fear, as a basic emotion, begins with an unconscious autonomic response to a fear stimuli. According to Arne Öhman’s “Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations” fear is elicited from perceived threat based in four factors developed through the factor-analysis of around 200 studies: 1) “interpersonal events or situations,” 2) “death injuries, illness, blood, and surgical procedures,” 3) “animals,” and 4) “agoraphobia.” Öhman outlines the processing of a threat through the body and brain from the initial unconscious autonomic response to “strategic” or “controlled” processing to suggest that fear is experienced first and foremost unconsciously and then given priority over other stimuli for strategic or controlled processing. This priority is granted based on an evolutionary perspective in which “false negatives (i.e., failing to elicit defense to a potentially hazardous stimulus) are more evolutionarily costly than false positives (i.e., eliciting the response to stimulus that in effect is harmless). […] Therefore it is likely that perceptual systems are biased toward discovering threat.”

In order to demonstrate the unconscious and bodily response to fear based stimuli Öhman created a study which selected participants who had preexisting phobias of snakes and not spiders and spiders but not snakes. They then exposed the participants to a series of pictures of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms and measured skin conductance to serve as a control. Next, pictures similar to the target stimuli (spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms) in both color and texture but that did not contain the central object, that is for example a spider or a snake, were presented. Participants were asked to identify the target stimuli in the masked images and could not determine the masked stimuli. Based on the results, “it is evident that the fearful participants responded specifically to their feared stimulus, but did not differ from the
controls for the other stimulus categories, independently of masking. This enhanced responding to the feared stimulus cannot be attributed to conscious perception.\textsuperscript{109} Despite this, participants viewing the masked stimuli did still become indirectly conscious of the perceived threat. Their self-report of the stimuli for “arousal,” “valence,” and “control/dominance” remained consistent whether the stimulus was masked or unmasked.\textsuperscript{110}

Closely related to the more easily observable behavior, aggression, anger is also often identified as a basic emotion. The debate around anger’s status as a basic emotion revolves around the theory that anger is one possible outcome of a more general distressed state, until later socialized and adjusted via culture.\textsuperscript{111} Lemerise and Dodge’s “The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions,” however, goes on to provide evidence of anger’s discreet or basic state by noting several studies that demonstrate distinctions between various emotions. For example, in “a study by Buss and Goldsmith (1998) […]. In separate sessions, 6-, 12-, and 18-month-old infants were exposed to two anger-eliciting stimuli (a barrier problem and arm restraint) and two fear-eliciting stimuli, which elicited the predicted emotions. Anger and fear were distinct and not significantly related to one another, as might be expected if they were really ‘distress.’”\textsuperscript{112}

Anger, the discrete emotion, is then a pre-determined neurological reaction to stimuli that is manipulated, altered, and adapted to various cultural mores.

Jaak Panksepp’s \textit{Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions}—which examines the “affective nature of the human mind” by putting research on the mammalian brain into conversation with studies of human emotions and affects—suggests that anger is most commonly stimulated through “irritations and frustrations” related to the restriction of “freedom of action or access to resources.”\textsuperscript{113} Panksepp, recognizing the significant connection between aggression and anger, suggests three distinct kinds of aggression based on
studies implementing direct electrical stimulation to the brain (ESB): 1) “predatory aggression,” 2) “angry, ragelike aggression,” and 3) “intermale aggression” (which he considers the least likely, as the experiments indicated some overlap between this third type and the first two).

Through this taxonomy of aggression, Panksepp argues that anger and aggression are in fact separate, based on the obvious fact that human aggression does not always include anger, but can sometimes include positive affects associated with, for example, hunting. The second kind of aggression, “angry, ragelike aggression,” is what Panksepp connects to the emotion of anger.

Anger has an autonomic component which is tempered and regulated by cultural and social learning. Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love* contains characters that rely on the expression of their anger, as their objects of desire are removed, to reassert their control over their situations. Phaedra kills herself and leaves a suicide note accusing Hippolytus of rape. Theseus vows to kill his son in rage, and in the throes of his anger also rapes and kills Strophe, Phaedra’s daughter. Unlike other discrete emotions; however, anger, according to Neil A. Harrison, Sylvia D. Kreibig, and Hugo D. Critchley’s “A Two-Way Road: Efferent and Afferent Pathways of autonomic activity in emotion,” does not always suggest a mirroring response in participants: “This pattern of physiological responses is suggestive of a fear, rather than an anger response and is likely the result of the inherently threatening anger expressions inducing reciprocal fear, rather than mirroring anger. Thus it seems the effects of anger expressions are less contagious than, for example, those of fear and happiness, but rather elicit a reciprocal response.” For this reason both *Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love*, the emotions of fear and anger, will be addressed in the same chapter. Specifically, both plays can be understood through the two responses to threat, that is flight (fear) and fight (anger).
Cleansed utilizes primarily fear based stimuli that fall under the second factor, that of “death, injuries, illness, blood, and surgical procedures.” Cleansed’s utilization of autonomically induced fear responses acts on the body to bring attention to the fear and anxiety surrounding the issues of love, romance, gendered violence and power dynamics, as well as the only true escape from a fear inducing world, death. The play utilizes fear to create understanding of the more complicated emotions surrounding the social predicament of various love-based relationships, effectively communicating the anxiety, stress, and fear associated with love for various gender identities. Comparing this neuroscientific approach to understanding the affective and experiential power of Kane’s play with other studies of Kane’s work as experiential or affective will provide credence for a neuroscientific interpretative methodology and further the understanding of the relationship between violent performed stimuli and the spectator. That is, how performed violence can evoke an embodied experience, how that experience is processed, and ultimately what effect it has on the community of spectators as well as the individual. The dystopian performative moment potentially caused by the elicitation of fear is attached to more complex social and cultural ideas about love, gender, and sexuality.

Phaedra’s Love offers the potential to examine the differences in the stimulation of fear through representing fear (as in Cleansed) and the stimulation of fear through representing anger. It also provides the opportunity to explore how anger can be elicited in an audience despite the general reciprocal fear response. Phaedra’s Love is often staged in close quarters meant to intrude upon and even harass the audience. This kind of environment is ripe for eliciting anger. Thus, the chapter will examine the use of anger’s effects on potential audiences as well as its potential for creating action via the fight response to threat (in this case harassing environmental stimuli), as Hippolytus’s final line suggests, “If there could have been more moments like
In addition, a comparison between the expression of Senecan Stoicism (Kane based her play on Seneca’s *Phaedra*) and the commentary on emotion provided by Kane, in particular the apathetic, un-reactive character of Hippolytus will be made to further understand Kane’s criticism of stoicism and contemporary western culture’s common derision of emotion(alism).

The fourth chapter takes the interaction between cognitive processes and affect/emotion further by exploring the way that memory can be altered by evoking particular emotions at a given moment. Elaine Fox in her comprehensive book, *Emotion Science: Cognitive and Neuroscientific Approaches to Understanding Human Emotions* states, “There is a widespread belief that affective events are better remembered than non-emotional events. In fact, it is often precisely the affective quality of the event that is remembered over and above other details of the event.”

Fox provides ample research to support this “widespread belief” noting several important factors about the relationships between affect, emotion, and mood and the creation and duration of memory. Kane’s *Crave*, I argue, is at its most basic level a memory play. Each of the characters recall traumatic and violent memories from their past in a cacophonous mixture that contains no obvious plot. Themes from Kane’s earlier work are apparent: rape, suicide, pain, love, gender, etc. The connection between memory and affect/emotion studied in the fields of cognitive and neuroscientific emotion research provides a tool to analyze not only the structure and content or the character’s memories but the ability of the audience to process the experience of the play. Specifically, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) suggests that the substantive processing strategy (a kind of information processing strategy) is “adopted when the task is difficult or complex or when it is novel and there is no motivational goal to guide processing. Affect infusion effects are very likely to occur with this strategy because of the reliance on constructive and generative processes that may selectively prime access to affectively congruent
thoughts, memories and interpretations." Crave allows for the study of the congruence of complicated, novel, and difficult theatrical techniques and strategies with both the playwright and the audience’s necessary use of affect/emotion as an interpretive framework. Violent images and representations (with both high negative valence and arousal), based on their ability to more effectively alter the processing of memories, offers the opportunity to examine the theatrical mechanisms of memory, trauma, witnessing, and political efficacy. Drawing on the dystopian performative’s connection to the linguistic theories of Derrida, such as citationality, the chapter explores how the embodied experience of emotions can impact the very way that we remember, repeat, and cite events, people, and ideas. Thus the chapter’s focus is on how affect/emotion interacts with and alters the way an audience thinks about the content presented within Kane’s Crave.

In chapter five the content of 4.48 Psychosis matches the form of the play, in that it provokes a mirroring sadness in its audience. In this chapter an exploration of sadness’s individual and cultural benefits is discussed with an eye toward how these benefits are deployed through the elicitation of sadness to help the audience rethink their attitudes on depression and mental health.

Like much research in basic emotions science, evolutionary theories are used to explain and understand the occurrence of sadness. George A. Bonanno, Laura Goorin, and Karin G. Coifman’s essay, “Sadness and Grief,” summarizes the literature’s evolutionary explanation for sadness:

A key adaptive function of sadness is to promote personal reflection following the irrevocable loss of a person or object of importance to the self (Lazarus, 1991). The experience of sadness turns our attention inward, promoting resignation and
acceptance (Izard, 1977, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Stearns, 1993). Physiological arousal is decreased, allowing for a “time out” to update cognitive structures and to accommodate lost objects (Welling, 2003). The reflective function of sadness, therefore, opportunistically affords us a pause, allowing us to take stock and to revise our goals and plans (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996).”

Importantly, several researchers (reviewed by Bonanno, et al.) take this concept further and argue that sadness makes its experiencer engage in further deliberation on important decisions. Perhaps most provocatively, Storbeck and Clore suggest, “with sadness comes accuracy.” The benefits to sadness, however, must also be counterbalanced with the more detrimental effects, including social problems, issues with certain types of memory recall, and anchoring bias (a cognitive bias that concerns the human tendency to rely on the first piece of information provided to make decisions).

This chapter will utilize research on sadness, grief, and depression to examine Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis, specifically to understand both the content and the experience of the play. The initial critical response to the play, which labeled it nothing more than a “dramatic suicide note” by the author, will also be analyzed to understand the cultural reaction to depression and sadness. Ultimately, the chapter will take stock of the empathetic response potential to a piece about depression that elicits the embodied experience of sadness, the benefits of which (when in healthy doses) could lead to a change in perspective by the audience and other culturally and socially useful behaviors. The dystopian performative creates a practice that allows for more understanding within the community of audience members and attempts to assist others dealing with mental health issues.
Conclusion

“When Tom Jordan Murphy’s Soldier raped Neil Dudgeon’s Ian, the experience was harrowing. The sounds that Murphy made as he transformed Ian’s body into his dead girlfriend Col, coupled with the duration of the sequence, was unlike any other experience that I’ve had in the theatre. Such a moment is many things, but it is not cynical. It makes an argument about our notions of sexuality and violence, an argument that is felt, not heard: no dialectical conversations, instead, the power of the image, of Dudgeon’s exposed buttocks and Jordan Murphy’s incessant sobs.”¹²³

—Ken Urban, “Toward a Theory of Cruel Britannia.”

Moments of experience like Urban’s, created through the theatrical innovations of Sarah Kane, are at the heart of this dissertation. In the following pages I will seek to parse out what these experiences mean physically, emotionally, and cognitively in an attempt to explain their strange power and its potential to challenge audiences to think and be differently. This effect, act, moment I call a dystopian performative, a moment of performance that causes the visceral arousal of an affect, an emotion, and a feeling—an embodied doing—that transports a spectator/the audience/a receiver to a “somewhere else” through its effects on cognition and psychophysical reactions. As Kane herself notes, “I was violent for the first time when I was eight years old, and I can never forget the feeling that it produced in me. Yet, very often, when suggestions of violent acts are on the news, or I see a violent film, those feelings are not completely subdued. The scale of emotions that become stimulated are completely different and often can escalate.”¹²⁴ Violence, in both experience and the experiential theatre of Kane, elicits these strong negative affects/emotions. The dystopian performative, a moment, a feeling, an experience of a “bad place,” unlike dystopia’s relation to one’s own culture and society (where it is intended to represent a limit case that demonstrates how bad things could truly get), makes
palpable the “bad place” already within one’s own culture that one successfully distances oneself from, ignores, and pretend is “not me.” In these elusive moments, much like their utopian performative counterpart, potential for change is opened up and communally experienced. This study explores what those potentials might look like, how they are unlocked through Kane’s experiential theatre, and ultimately an argument for the potential benefits of the elicitation of negative affects, emotions, and feelings through the representation of violence and other negative experiences.

**Introduction**

In 1995 Theatre Critic Jack Tinker labeled Sarah Kane’s *Blasted* “The Disgusting Feast of Filth.” According to Tom Sellar, *Blasted* “ignited a scandal in the British press that lasted months.”¹ Sellar attributed the animosity of the press to

the anger and near-total social alienation it revealed. They weren’t so much offended by the act as they were afraid of the underclass rage behind it. On stage, that sentiment was more palpable than it could be in any newspaper or film. It was real, it was immediate, and it was threatening. So critics called it disgusting, immoral, and disingenuous.²

Kane’s oeuvre, as Sellar, among many scholars illustrate, continues to be viewed through its seeming desire to shock audiences on a bodily level. Disgust, of all the basic emotions outlined in this dissertation, is most cleanly and clearly attached to a progression from pure viscera to cognitively and culturally implicated behavior. It serves as a dystopian performative baseline for the potential of an embodied theatrical experience to change communities. But how do we write about such an embodied and individual experience? How does the experience of watching performed violence impact an individual and the community? What was so disgusting about *Blasted*, and what does that even mean?

Disgust was and continues to be identified as a “basic emotion” by “research that argues that there are six (or maybe five or seven) universal primary human emotions—anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust and fear.”³ This is one of several ways in which affect/emotion has been studied by various fields. Others include the social constructionist view of emotions
influenced by anthropology and sociology,\textsuperscript{4} as well as more empirical approaches based in cognitive and neuroscience.\textsuperscript{5} It is the cognitive and neuroscientific explanation of disgust that I will rely upon in this chapter to argue for a method of understanding the violence of Kane’s play and its reception in 1995.

Rozin, et.al.’s essay titled “Disgust” in the \textit{Handbook of Emotions} outlines a theory of disgust that balances itself between the divisive attributes of the nature/culture debate.\textsuperscript{6} They outline a theory of disgust that utilizes falsifiable research to argue for the prevalence of disgust as a category across cultures and the differences in those culture’s use and adaptation of disgust. Rozin, et.al. suggest

that disgust originated as a rejection response to bad tastes, and then evolved into a much more abstract and ideational emotion. In this evolution, the function of disgust shifted: A mechanism for avoiding harm to the body became a mechanism for avoiding harm to the soul. The elicitors of disgust may have expanded to the point where the only thing they have in common is that decent people want nothing to do with them.\textsuperscript{7}

To summarize, according to Rozin et.al., disgust developed through five stages of ever increasing complexity: 1) Distaste, as a basic biological reaction, 2) Core Disgust, protection against offensive entities and contamination, 3) Animal Nature Disgust, the threat and reminder of humankind’s animal nature, 4) Interpersonal Disgust, which “discourages contact with other human beings who are not intimates,” and 5) Moral Disgust, caused by embodied and disembodied moral violations.\textsuperscript{8}

The utilization of disgust to understand the communal and critical response to \textit{Blasted} is foregrounded in Richard Schechner’s theory of Rasaethetics. Studying performance in terms of
Rasaethetics, Schechner suggests, “means paying attention to the increasing appetite for arts that engage visceral arousal and experience; performances that insist on sharing experiences with partakers and participants; works that try to evoke both terror and celebration. Such performances are often very personal even as they are no longer private.”

Further, Rasaethetics focuses on what Schechner terms “the snout-to-belly-to-bowel” which he argues is managed by the enteric nervous system (ENS). Disgust’s biological basis in distaste and the mouth, is perhaps, not coincidental nor is Schechner’s use of science.

Schechner describes the rasic performer as one who “opens a liminal space to allow further play—improvisation, variation, and enjoyment.” The liminality of performance and its potential for the creation of communitas is not lost on Jill Dolan and it is central to her notion of the utopian performative:

Turner’s theory usefully describes the social potential of utopian performatives. That is, rather than resting on an old humanist legacy of universality and transcendence, utopian performatives let audiences experience a processual, momentary feeling of affinity, in which spectators experience themselves as part of a congenial public constituted by the performance’s address. Hailed by these performatives, these moments of what Marvin Carlson calls “apotheosis” or “epiphany,” spectators can be rallied to hope for the possibility of realizing improved social relations. They can imagine, together, the affective potential of a future in which this rich feeling of warmth, even of love, could be experienced regularly and effectively outside the theater.

The experience of disgust created within the liminal space of theatre has a different effect, although it could be argued to use the same performative apparatus. This chapter seeks to
understand the possibility of experiencing a richly negative affect/emotion in the theatre and to what effect such an experience might be brought. To this end, I will argue that disgust, a complex biological, cognitive, communal, and performance experience, solidifies the power of theatre to affect and be affected, a dystopian performative. Dolan suggests in a footnote that “Sarah Kane’s play, Blasted (in Sarah Kane, Complete Plays [London: Methuen, 2001]), while violent, dystopic, and nearly unwatchable on stage, might still promote an experience of the utopian performative in certain moments of production.”13 As outlined in the first chapter, utopia and dystopia often share the same objective: to imagine future possibilities for “improved social relations.” The embodiment or practice of dystopia while experiencing Blasted works to imagine improved social relations by forcing, through a dystopian performative, the confrontation with that which is most repulsive. Where the utopian performative elicits a desire to continue a “rich feeling of warmth, even of love” into the future, the dystopian performative demands action in the present—through negative experiences of affect/emotion—to stop horrific human actions as well as prevent these acts in the future.

The repulsive images of rape, cannibalism, abuse, and violence gave Kane immediate notoriety with her first play, Blasted. The play is broken into five scenes, the first half of which begin in the very realistic setting of a hotel room in Leeds. Cate and Ian enter the space and we quickly learn that Ian is a tabloid reporter and Cate a woman with some degree of mental disability. Ian has ordered some food and he quickly begins drinking and suggests that Cate drink as well. When the food arrives, Ian is suspicious about who may be at the door and is relieved to discover it is only the ordered sandwiches. After settling down with sandwiches and drink, Ian removes all his clothes and propositions Cate. She refuses and shortly thereafter begins to tremble and faints. When she recovers she does not recall what has happened while she was in
this altered state, which frustrates and worries Ian. After Ian attends to some business he once again makes sexual advances toward Cate and they start to kiss. Cate stops the interaction and Ian guilts/forces Cate into giving him a hand-job. The scene comes to an end after discussions of death, Ian’s bad health, and finally Ian’s declaration of love (seemingly only to get Cate to sleep with him) and Cate’s rejection of that love.

The second scene begins the next morning as Cate wakes up and Ian experiences another bout of pain from his lung cancer. Ian goes to take a shower and Cate rips his jacket, prepares to leave, and examines his gun. Ian returns before she can leave, notices his ripped jacket and Cate attacks him. She ends up with his gun pointed at his groin and eventually faints. Ian picks her up and lies her on the bed and with the gun to her head comes on top of her. After he is finished she wakes up. As the scene progresses, Cate continues to attempt to leave and Ian intimates that it is too dangerous to go out. He dives to the floor at the sound of a car backfiring and suggests someone wants to kill him. Seemingly to get more information, Cate comes on to Ian, kisses his neck, back, nipples, and eventually performs oral sex on him. As he comes—and with the word “Killer”—Cate bites down hard and doesn’t let go until Ian beats her off. They proceed to talk about the trouble Ian is in, the war zone that Leeds is becoming, and the pain Ian previously caused Cate during her rape the evening before and the pain caused by Cate when she bit Ian’s penis. Breakfast is delivered, causing more fear and anxiety at who might be at the door. Ian begins to eat breakfast and Cate goes to take a bath. A Soldier enters the room, eats Ian’s breakfast, and smelling sex asks who else is in the room. When he enters the bathroom to find Cate, he discovers she has gone out the window. The scene ends with a “blinding light, then a huge explosion.”
The third scene of act one begins in the same hotel room, blown apart by an explosion with a gaping hole in one of the walls. The Soldier tells war stories of violence, brutality, and rape. Eventually he explains that his girlfriend back home was raped and killed by a Soldier. Ian and the Soldier discuss the brutality of war in general, and eventually the Soldier rapes Ian, mirroring the manner in which Ian had rapped Cate earlier in act one. The Soldier than sucks out both of Ian’s eyeballs, bites them off, and eats them, apparently because the Soldier who raped and killed his girlfriend did the same to her.

In the fourth scene, Cate returns with a baby to find that the Soldier has shot himself in the head and Ian with no eyes, looking like a “nightmare.” They talk about the baby and Ian begs her to touch him. Eventually, Ian asks for his revolver. Cate finds the gun, and suspecting that Ian wants to kill himself, removes the bullets before handing it over. Ian attempts to kill himself, fails, and throws the gun away. Cate then notices that the baby has died and falls into a fit of hysterical laughter.

The fifth scene begins with Cate burying the dead baby under the floorboards. After discussing the innocence of the child, Cate leaves to find food. Several vignettes appear as time passes: Ian masturbates, attempts to strangle himself, shits and tries to clean it up, laughs, has nightmares, cries blood, eats the dead baby, and eventually dies in relief. The rain wakes him up and Cate returns with food purchased with her body and shares it with Ian. The play concludes.

**Artists and Academics Feast**

The response to the premiere of Sarah Kane’s *Blasted* in 1995 can be broken down into the three different receptive groups: theatre artists and practitioners, academia, and theatre critics and the United Kingdom’s media. The first two groups received the play in mostly a positive light while the last almost universally denounced the play. All three groups predominantly dwell
on the experiential quality of Kane’s *Blasted*, but approach it in different ways. I will examine the first two groups and then move into a discussion of the nature of disgust with relation to the theatre critics’s response in the next section. I will argue that the general response to *Blasted* by theatre critics, theatre artists, and academics suggests a common desire to understand the play through the body, feelings, emotions, and affects—through dystopian performative moments. The focus of the play on negative affect/emotion allows *Blasted* and its audience to engage in a dystopian performative that forces the confrontation with the disgusting, from the level of distaste to moral disgust, as Rozin et.al. might phrase it.

After the barrage of extremely negative reviews of *Blasted*, playwrights and other theatre artists came to Kane’s defense. Caryl Churchill states, “Far from its being a mindless string of violent events, as the press has suggested, I found it a coherent story, […] able to move into the surreal to show connections between local, domestic violence and the atrocities of war.”\(^{14}\) Harold Pinter, seeing the production on its second night is quoted as stating, “‘It was a very startling and tender voice, but she was appalled by the world in which she lived and the world within herself.’”\(^{15}\) The director of the first production of *Blasted*, James Macdonald, came out publicly in defense of the piece: “What would watching this play do to an audience? Does it simply set out to shock? No, we felt, it sets out to talk honestly about violence, but in order to do so it has to shock. […] People are either disturbed and provoked to thought, or disturbed and angry at the play. Theatre remains our most sensitive medium.”\(^{16}\) The successful dystopian performative would likely accomplish the former by utilizing a visceral provocation, in this case disgust, to force the mind to take notice of the issues of violence and war.
Perhaps most powerfully, Edward Bond expressed his admiration, “*Blasted*, I think, comes from [...] from the centre of our humanity and our ancient need for theatre. That’s what gives it its strange, almost hallucinatory authority. [...] The humanity of *Blasted* moved me. I worry for those too busy or so lost that they cannot see its humanity.”¹⁷ Bond, among others, note the play’s complexity, its strength in connecting events commonly held at a distance with an individual’s immediate presence, and its ability to provoke thought. It had, according to Kane’s peers, the power to affect and be affected and thus converse in action and experience about the larger issues of our violent and oppressive society.

Edward Bond later describes Sarah Kane as a “dramatist of the second sort,” in the afterward to Saunders’s ‘*Love me or kill me*: Sarah Kane and the Theatre of Extremes, which he defines as a type of dramatist that changes reality. This reality changing effect comes from a confrontation with the “implacable” or the “ultimate in human experience.”¹⁸ Bond, I believe, purposefully neglects to provide any sort of clear or reasoned explanation of the implacable or the ultimate which he references throughout this essay on Kane. These expressions seem to represent a coming to terms with one’s humanness or being. Often, he describes the implacable or the ultimate in relation to death: Kane’s death, religious ideas of death, war, revolutions, etc. We might see the implacable and the ultimate as the condition of changing our perception of mortality, a recognition of our corporeal state. The implacable and the ultimate in human experience defines the limits of what and who we are and *Blasted* forces this confrontation through the use of disgust, an emotion, initiated through our bodies outside of our conscious control and confronted by our thinking mind.

Dystopian performatives, embodied negative affect/emotions, are a way in, a way to touch and explore what Bond calls the implacable. Kane’s fellow artists understand *Blasted* as
profound not only because of what it makes us confront mentally but by how it demands that confrontation come from the unstoppable, implacable materiality of the body. They label this concept with terms like the ultimate, surreal, and shocking and thus having provided terminology to describe the ineffable move on to what their bodies have made them think.

In the past twenty years Sarah Kane’s *Blasted* has been categorized in multiple ways from a variety of academic perspectives. As noted in the first chapter, Kane’s work has generally been read biographically (based on her suicide); as a member of the In-Yer-Face theatre movement, the New Brutalists, or sometimes described as a response to the cultural phenomena of “cool Britannia” (Aleks Sierz, Graham Saunders, and Ken Urban); and finally as postdramatic theatre. *Blasted* has also been read as a feminist play by Elaine Aston and Kim Solga. Christine Woodworth has analyzed the play’s use of blood and the way performed violence’s presentational style effects the citationality and context of the work. The play has also been read through the lens of trauma theory by Catherine Rees’s essay on Kane in *Modern British Playwriting: The 1990s* and through Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection in Sarah Ablett’s “Approaching Abjection in Sarah Kane’s *Blasted*.” Most important to the matter at hand, *Blasted* has been frequently connected to a wide array of different perspectives surrounding the idea of experiential theatre. In Kane’s own words:

> It [theatre] should be emotionally and intellectually demanding. I love football. The level of analysis that you listen to on the terraces is astonishing. If people did that in the theatre … But they don’t. They expect to sit back and not participate.

> Performance is visceral. It puts you in direct physical contact with thought and feeling.
Mad took me to hell [...] And the night I saw it I made a decision about the kind of theatre I wanted to make—experiential.24

Personally, I think the press outrage was due to the play being experiential rather than speculative.25

Kane’s experiential theatre has been taken up by phenomenologists, those interested in connecting Kane’s work to the work of Antonin Artaud and his Theatre of Cruelty, as well as several scholars who have utilized affect theory to describe Kane’s plays.

In particular, Allyson Campbell’s “Experiencing Kane: an affective analysis of Sarah Kane’s ‘experiential’ theatre in performance,” suggests utilizing Jeremy Gilbert’s notion of affective specificity and affective analysis to understand Kane’s idea of theatre, that is, “experience as the key to eliciting change in the spectator.”26 Campbell does a good deal of work towards arguing for the importance of an affective reading of the plays vs. a focus on meaning or signification. Unfortunately, much of the affective analysis remains vague. For example, Campbell states, “the one element that remains constant in Kane’s continual experimentation is her ability to exploit the ‘lived bodiliness’ of the spectator to create a visceral, corporeal response. This is not to suggest that Kane’s work does not seek to arouse an intellectual response, but rather that this response is deferred by the immediate physical reaction of the spectator through the body.”27 Campbell goes on to explain one technique that Kane utilizes to exploit lived bodiliness: “Whether it is the shock of the early blood, shit and mutilation variety, or the shocking lack of ‘shocking’ graphic images later on, it is certainly the most obvious form
taken by her attempts to create affect.” While I agree with Campbell that shock, in its most basic sense, serves as a primary technique in Kane’s dramaturgy, it is revealing of a major problem of studying theatre through affect that this is as far as Campbell’s argument goes. The dystopian performative, the affect/emotion experienced and embodied during performance, allows me to go deeper in discussing the specifics of lived bodiliness through basic emotion research, in the case of *Blasted*, disgust. Ultimately Campbell accomplishes the goal of convincing the reader that experience, affect, phenomenology, is more vital to understanding the work of Kane than words and meaning; but it lacks the specificity to really discuss what affect means or does, what the interaction between audience and performer is and how it operates. Instead, she relies on terms like “shocking,” “visceral,” and “bodily” which are, frankly, vague and tell us little about the actual exchange.

Similarly, Elaine Aston’s “Feeling the Loss of Feminism: Sarah Kane’s *Blasted* and an Experiential Genealogy of Contemporary Women’s Playwriting” invests considerable space in arguing for the need of an experiential theatre, in this case as a means of “feeling the loss of feminism,” but also simply assumes that the audience “feels” and offers no concrete understanding of how this interaction of feelings occurs. Instead, Aston’s focus remains on the potential political affect/effect of experiential theatre for feminism and feminist theatre. In Aston’s “Reviewing the Fabric of *Blasted,*” she comes closer to the specificity I am suggesting in looking to affect/emotion science to understand the elicitation and potential of specific emotions in theatre. In an analysis similar to my own with regards to the nature of disgust in the critical response to *Blasted*, relying on sociologist Beverley Skeggs, Aston demonstrates the way that disgust played a part in critics’s lambasting of Kane and how they failed to understand the purpose of the disgust they experienced: “[A]s much as the critics did their best to bury *Blasted*
with their affect-stripping, disgust-making tactics, the irony is that [...] this puts us back in touch with the dis-ease core to the composition and performance affects of the play.”^{29} However, as with Aston’s “Feeling the Loss of Feminism,” the focus primarily remains on the political outcomes of these affective experiences. In contrast, I am arguing for a more complete understanding of the experience of disgust in Kane’s play. Where Aston suggests that disgust is a technique used by reviewers to distance themselves from the dis-ease or “social sickness” represented in Kane’s play, I argue that the feeling of disgust, in fact, forces the audience, critics included, to face this social dis-ease in a more fully engaged manner and that rather than being affect-stripping and disgust-making tactics of the reviewers, the emotion of disgust belongs to the play. Aston, of course, points to this very fact as “ironic,” suggesting that the reviewers are playing into Kane’s hand while they are attempting to perform a different task. I argue that there was no different task. The reviewers responded to the elicitation of disgust inherent within the play, dystopian performative moments meant to elicit disgust to get at issues of violence. As Macdonald might note, the reviewers simply were disturbed and became angry instead of thoughtful.

Ian Ward’s “Rape and Rape Mythology in the plays of Sarah Kane” offers up the experiential nature of rape in Kane’s Blasted and Phaedra’s Love as a deus ex machina to the problem of representing rape and as a tonic for the way rape is understood in culture, politics, and legal theory. While Ward provides a strong analysis of how Kane’s representation of rape responds to what he outlines as four myths about rape: 1) that only women are raped, 2) that only certain women get raped (I.e. those who “deserved” it), 3) that men are often enticed to such a degree that they can’t be held accountable, and 4) that rape must be physically violent; he fails to
address how and in what way Kane’s work operates experientially in conjunction with his more traditional textual, semiotic analysis of the rapes in Kane’s plays.

Other scholars, such as Sean Carney, utilize Bert O. States notion of “Binocular Vision—that is “semiotics and phenomenology as modes of seeing, […] one eye enables us to see the world phenomenally; the other eye enables us to see it significatively”30—to strike a balance with overly phenomenal readings of Blasted. However, Carney seems far more persuaded by the semiotics of Kane’s play. By utilizing Rei Tarada’s conception of the link between semiotics and phenomenology, we can see Carney’s shift towards the semiotic. Carney quotes, “‘our own emotions,’ she [Tarada] continues, ‘emerge only through the acts of interpretation and identification by means of which we feel for others. […] We are not ourselves without representations that mediate us, and it is through those representations that emotions get felt.’”31 I agree with the interpretative connection between emotions and signification/meaning/interpretation; however, emotions do occur without interpretation. Disgust, for example, originated as a rejection system to bad tastes. One can feel nauseated by any number of representations before the interpretive apparatus of cognition begins to make sense of it. Without a clear understanding of Carney or Terada’s definition of “emotions” or “feelings,” Carney’s quotation of Terada operates to give preference to the semiotic. I would suggest, instead of a binocular vision which artificially separates the phenomenal and the semiotic, a focus on the feedback loop between the feeling body and the cognitive mind would give clarity to the analysis of Blasted. Thus, Carney, like other scholars perpetuates the tendency that to simply state that the play makes us “feel” or is “affective” is a phenomenological, affective, or bodily reading of the play.
An affective analysis of dystopian performatives based in cognitive neuroscience offers the specificity to understand the affective exchanges identified by artists and scholars but not fully analyzed and opens the door to additional analysis. The scientific study of disgust helps to label the emotion of the experience and offers a specificity on how it operates within *Blasted* that more fully explains the play’s dystopian performative moments, the moments described by the above scholars as feelings, lived bodiliness, affect, or shock.

**Unsettled Critics**

As noted above, Tinker labeled the play “The Disgusting Feast of Filth.” *The Independent*’s Paul Taylor, argued that “watching her [The Soldier’s Girlfriend] avenged in this gory way is of interest predominantly to one’s stomach [in reference to the rape of Ian and his eye’s being sucked out and eaten].”\(^{32}\) The *Financial Times*’ Sarah Hemming concluded that “There is not enough [in *Blasted*] besides the degradation so it emerges as gratuitous, oppressive and, finally, tedious.”\(^{33}\) Or, consider, *The Evening Standard*’s Nick Curtis, who claims “I do not think I’ve yet seen a play that can beat Sarah Kane’s sustained onslaught on the sensibilities for sheer, unadulterated brutalism. Heaping shock upon shock, *Blasted* is a powerful experience in the same way that being mugged is a powerful experience. Rape, torture, cannibalism, death: they’re all here, over two uninterrupted hours.”\(^{34}\) All of these critics viewed Kane’s first play as nothing more than horrific violence portrayed with the singular goal of shocking or disgusting an audience. Several other critics including those cited above make laundry lists of the violent acts and provide little by way of thoughtful criticism, and yet this disgusting gustatory menu provided by scandalized critics somehow interested spectators. As Tom Sellar notes, “the critics’ vituperation put Kane and the company on the defensive, but the entire run of the production subsequently sold out.”\(^{35}\) William Ian Miller’s *The Anatomy of Disgust*, suggests “It is a
commonplace that the disgusting can attract as well as repel [...]. The disgusting is an insistent feature of the lurid and the sensational, informed as these are by sex, violence, horror, and the violation of norms of modesty and decorum. And even as the disgusting repels, it rarely does so without also capturing our attention. It imposes itself upon us.\textsuperscript{36} The attraction and repulsion of disgust makes it an ideal theatrical affect/emotion strategy for invoking dystopian performatives. If the dystopian performative provokes the desire to stop horrific acts and within the theatrical context it also attracts spectators, then there is the potential to prevent the audience from simply stopping the experience (by leaving or not going) and instead focus on what the experience is highlighting outside the theatre.

At this point it is perhaps overly obvious why I might find it attractive to connect the shocked critics’ response to \textit{Blasted} and the emotion of disgust, however, I suggest that understanding these responses and their utilization of imagery related to disgust, distaste, sickness, and the stomach allows for particular insight into the embodied cultural experience of \textit{Blasted}. As Diana Taylor suggests in \textit{The Archive and Repertoire}, “By shifting the focus from written to embodied culture, from the discursive to the performatic, we need to shift our methodologies. Instead of focusing on patterns of cultural expression in terms of texts and narratives, we might think about them as scenarios that do not reduce gestures and embodied practices to narrative description.”\textsuperscript{37} While Taylor might not immediately leap to the use of affective neuroscience and the scientific study of disgust as a methodology that encourages and supports a focus on embodied practice as opposed to narrative description, I argue that it is, in fact, one such path to understanding the performative doings of dystopic practice or experience.

Rozin, et.al. offers a series of elicitors that correspond to the five stages of disgust’s development mentioned earlier. They are, “distaste,” “food/eating, body products, animals,”
“sex, death, hygiene, envelope violation,” “direct and indirect contact with strangers or undesirables,” and “certain moral offenses.” These are arranged in a continuum from what is believed to be the origin of “disgust” as an emotion and its “pre-adaptation” into more complicated emotional, cognitive, cultural, and embodied experiences. Jonathan Haidt, Paul Rozin, Clark McCauley, and Sumio Imada describe how they imagine this pre-adaptation occurred:

the major source of evolutionary “novelties” is the co-opting of an existing system for a new function. We suggest that core disgust be thought of as a very old (though uniquely human) rejection system. Core disgust was “designed” as a food rejection system, as indicated by its link to nausea, its concerns about contamination, and its nasal/oral facial expression. [...] Core disgust may have been pre-adapted as a rejection system, easily harnessed to other kinds of rejection. This harnessing, or accretion of new functions, may have happened either in biological evolution or in cultural evolution (Rozin, 1976; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993).  

Haidt, et.al. suggests the concept of “embodied schemata”: “imaginative structures or patterns of experience that are based on bodily knowledge or sensation” as a means to understanding the process of experiencing linked to cognitive systems. However, one might just as easily rely on the concept of “mirror neurons” defined by Naomi Rokotnitz as neurons “activated by merely observing another individual execute a purposeful activity.” This elicits what Rokotnitz, following Vitorrio Gallese, calls “action simulation,” or put simply, “the simulation involves neither overt knowledge nor conscious inference but is achieved by physically participating in the observed actions.” Bodily knowledge or the manner in which the body determines our
cognition and emotion thus feeds into the manner in which disgust potentially caused the dystopian performative experienced by the critics reviewing *Blasted*.

The textual traces found in the reviews reveal the embodied schemata of disgust and suggests that the play was experienced at this visceral level of emotion. Even defenses of *Blasted* provide similar expressions of the use of the embodied schemata involved in disgust. For example, *The Times*’s Jeremy Kingston suggests, “Kane writes vivid dialogue, skillfully paces disclosures, and is not afraid to introduce quite lengthy silent scenes [...] Artfully constructed and distressingly watchable, its unmitigated horrors and numbing amorality leave a sour taste in the mind.”\(^{42}\) *The Observer*’s Kate Kellaway describes the experience of the play in a similar fashion, “It does not deserve attention, but it demands it. It made me feel sick, and giggle with shock.”\(^{43}\) Relying on the developmental scale of disgust provided by Rozin, et.al. it then becomes easier to understand the two primary responses to the play, at least as described by reviewers, letters to the editor, etc. Those who rejected *Blasted* based on its arousal of disgust, suggesting that tax payer money had been wasted, that the money would have been better spent on psychiatric care for the author,\(^{44}\) or those who simply believed the play had no merit and viewed the play as an infectious contamination effecting bodily concerns that fall within stages one through three. That is, they viewed the play as having little to no attachment to social, political, or cultural contexts and their bodies responded with core disgust. Conversely, those who praised the play and still relied on the “embodied schemata” of disgust, focused on its morality, its critique of war, abuse, and violence being disgusted not by the play but by what the play revealed about culture and their complicity in that culture. The dystopian performative was only efficacious in the second instance, when the embodied doings led to understanding and a
desire to change culture and society. This also happens to be when the disgust reaction moves into the fifth developmental stage of disgust: moral disgust.

This confusion between more basic disgust responses and more culturally specific responses is why Blasted, much to Kane’s disgust, is often compared to the work of Quentin Tarantino. In an interview with Dan Rebellato, Kane reveals her frustration with a German production of Blasted that depicted Ian as a character out of a Tarantino movie: “trendy leather jacket, greased-back hair, sunglasses wraparound.” Kane went on to say, “my heart just broke. I could hear this cracking in my chest. And actually, in some way, that becomes quite insulting. The work is seen as part of a school, which actually I abhor. And it gets put into that bracket and then reinterpreted in that way. That’s really very insulting.” The difference between Tarantino’s simulation of violence and Kane’s deals with the pleasure of experiencing disgust and how one seeks to utilize this attraction. Edward Bond in an interview on a BBC radio program called Nightwaves reiterates this difference: “Both [Tarantino and Blasted] deal with chaos. One [Blasted] says chaos is dangerous for us but we have to go into chaos to find ourselves. The other [Tarantino] says chaos is a gimmick, a new device—it’s a trick.” Bond suggests that Tarantino’s depiction of violence is a trivialization of the type of encounter that Kane makes readily available in her work. Thus, the disgusting violence of Blasted offers an interaction with something deeper and more experiential than the simple depiction of grotesque violent acts. It offers an embodied experience, a dystopian performative, reliant on the advanced cultural pre-adaptation of core disgust to point to the amorality of news media, the war in Bosnia, and abuse in general.
**Digesting Blasted**

To acknowledge disgust’s role in the response to *Blasted* requires a reevaluation and analysis of the play itself and how it might be understood to have occurred in performance on an affective, emotional level. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce an accurate and detailed record of how *Blasted* affected its various audience members over the years, a textual analysis clearly points to the potential of the play to disgust, how disgust reinforces the objectives of the play, and ultimately how the body, constructed and developed by culture and society, experiences the play. In short, how disgust, elicited within *Blasted*, creates the potential for dystopian performative moments. Disgust and its elicitors are strewn throughout the play. Ian and Cate are variously disgusted, ill, sick, retching, etc. in response to violent, sexual actions. The play’s use of cannibalism, perhaps *Blasted*’s most overt technique for creating the affective experience of disgust, will serve as a starting point for a conversation that will then branch out into a discussion of the trajectory of disgust within the play as it relates to colonialism and racism, the gender politics of the various rapes and sexual violations that occur, and will conclude with an examination of the final moments of the play.

Cannibalism, within the world of anthropology, is a hotly contested concept either relegated to a taboo that is mislabeled and over-reported throughout history (see William Arens’s 1979 monograph, *The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy*) to a fact of human existence (see Carole A. Travis-Henikoff’s 2008 book, *Dinner with a Cannibal: The Complete History of Mankind’s Oldest Taboo*). There is no denying that cannibalism has occurred in the distant past and more recently. The now famous Uruguayan rugby team that practiced cannibalism to survive in the Andes for around two months after their plane crashed in 1972 is only one example.⁴⁸ Research on the emotion of disgust clearly takes for granted the idea that cannibalism is a universal disgust elicitor. Many scholars simply list cannibalism among the
elicitors of disgust and either provide no detailed analysis or evidence as to why that is the case or suggest something similar to what Rachel Herz’s *That’s Disgusting: Unraveling the Mysteries of Repulsion* suggests, “Cannibalism, necrophilia, cloning, and the commerce of plastinated corpses all involve violations and distortions to the body and as such are viscerally repugnant to most of us. These behaviors also directly remind us of that terrifying elephant in the room—death.”

Thus, cannibalism, as an elicitor of disgust, traverses most of Rozin et al.’s stages of development. It variously involves body envelop violation, the reminder of humankind’s animal nature and mortality, body products, potential interaction with strangers or undesirables, and for many cultures a violation of morality.

There are a series of four different disgust eliciting moments that occur on a spectrum from biting to cannibalism within *Blasted*: 1) Ian bites Cate’s vagina during her rape between scene one and two, 2) Cate bites Ian’s penis just as he climaxes while she provides oral sex, 3) when the Soldier eats Ian’s eyes, and 4) when Ian digs up and eats the dead baby in the final moments of the play.

Take the moment in *Blasted* when the Soldier sucks out Ian’s eyes as a primary example: “The Soldier grips Ian’s head in his hands. He puts his mouth over one of Ian’s eyes, sucks it out, bites it off and eats it. He does the same to the other eye.”

The scene has a number of disgust elicitors, including envelope violation (the penetration of the body envelope, the skin), eating animal products (cannibalism, in this case), and direct contact with an undesirable stranger. As suggested by Rokotnitz, mirror neurons effectively allow for the transfer of experience from the simulated action to the body of the spectator. Rokotnitz explains,

This theory suggests not that mirror neurons provide a magically all-inclusive explanation of how humans perceive and interpret actions and their implied
intentions, but that connectivity is at the heart of all human understanding. […] [P]lays and movies that present touch elicit “tactile empathy” in the observer, reflecting a “systematic tendency of our brain to transform the visual stimulus of touch into an activation of brain areas involved in the processing of our own experience of touch.”

To become disgusted involves a process of bodily experience, cognition, and ultimately some form of the varied emotional response labeled disgust. Watching the Soldier suck out and eat Ian’s eyes is experienced viscerally in the body as a community sensitive to the elicitors of disgust. This dystopian performative, then, creates a tactile empathy between the audience members and the performers relying on the connectivity of human understanding suggested by Rokitritz. An audience member may variously, find the witnessed pain in their own eyes, experience (to a degree) the act of pulling an eye into their mouth and biting, and/or become nauseous or sick because of the experience.

Cannibalism, in this case, according to Carole A. Travis-Henikoff’s Dinner with a Cannibal could be classified as exocannibalism, or rather, cannibalism of an enemy. Travis-Henikoff states, “Cannibalism does not occur solely on snowbound passes or high mountain peaks. It can rear its ugly head whenever people are schooled to think of others as less than human, during wars, or when a lack of resources bring forth survival tactics inherent within the form.” In the case of Ian and the Soldier, both starvation and lack of resources as well as the nature of war could be argued to contribute to the consumption of Ian’s eyes. The act is reasonably understood within these contexts; however, within the play the act reverses the affective experience of disgust involved in exocannibalism and starvation cannibalism in which the act is rationalized and disgust abetted by the suggestion of a deserving enemy or extreme
hunger and a need to survive. As Kristen Guest in her book, *Eating Their Words: Cannibalism and the Boundaries of Cultural Identity*, suggests, the cannibal, “long a figure associated with absolute alterity and used to enforce boundaries between a civilized “us” and savage “them,” may in fact be more productively read as a symbol of the permeability, or instability, of such boundaries.” Thus, the savage “them” of the Soldier consuming Ian’s eyes and the other soldier that did the same to the Soldier’s girlfriend might be understood as a blurring of permeable unstable boundaries. The blurring is made more palpable with both Ian and Cate’s act of biting each other’s genitals to painful, as opposed to pleasurable, effect. The Soldier, significantly, implicates Ian in behavior similar to what he perpetrates:

**Soldier.** Didn’t you ever - [rape someone]

**Ian.** No.

**Soldier.** What about that girl locked herself in the bathroom.

**Ian.** *(Doesn’t answer.)*

**Soldier.** Ah.

**Ian.** You did four in one go, I’ve only ever done one.$^{54}$

The boundary between perpetrator and victim$^{55}$ begins to blur and the rape of Ian, the cannibalism of his eyes, and other abuses comes to be experienced as the earlier rape of Cate, the rape and death of the Soldier’s girlfriend, and ultimately the rape experienced in the rape camps of Bosnia. All of this information is given within the text, the argument is made, as Kane suggests, for the connection “between a common rape in a Leeds hotel room [in a production of *Blasted*] and what’s happening in Bosnia.”$^{56}$

In staging this cannibalism, showing the envelope violation of Ian’s body (and notably not Cate’s) during his rape and loss of eyes, connecting the Soldier and Ian as Kane does, and
demonstrating that Cate herself is capable of acts of violence by having her bite Ian’s penis, the play works to confront the audience with the very humanness of violence, its animality, and its construction and deconstruction of the self and the other. Placing all humanity on the same level as the rapist, the cannibal, the self, and the other through the embodied experience of disgust, the potential viewer is forced out of the comfortable position of assigning guilt, declaring savagery in a specific character, or distancing themselves from the acts portrayed. The dystopian performative acts to ensure the uncomfortable and distasteful are fully acknowledged by taking advantage of “[a] mechanism for avoiding harm to the body [that] became a mechanism for avoiding harm to the soul.” The embodied experience of disgust begins to activate culturally relevant moral assumptions about what is presented on stage. By engaging the body through this basic emotion, Kane allows for the possibility of moral outcry, which she saw lacking in news media reportage.

In fact, the play takes this relationship between disgust and morality further in the minutiae leading up to the extreme violent acts. Less complex forms of disgust on the level of core disgust and distaste include references to foul smells, Cate’s refusal to eat meat, Ian’s penetration of Cate’s mouth with his tongue, the imagery of Ian’s rotting lung as rotting pork, Ian’s breath, the comparison of genitals to “meat,” and the expulsion and sharing of bodily fluids (including the Soldier peeing on the bed, and cate retching up Ian’s sperm). Other more complex notions of disgust appear in discussions of mortality, specifically Ian’s lung cancer, the various levels of disgust at different wanted and unwanted sex acts, and the co-optation of disgust as a means of justification for racism and xenophobia. All of this begins with the first line of the play. Ian states, “I’ve shat in better places than this (he gulps down the gin) I stink.” Soon after Ian has an extreme coughing fit off stage involving the expulsion of bodily fluids and linking Ian to
sickness, disease, and potential contamination.\textsuperscript{59} This is juxtaposed with a more insidious form of
disgust as Ian proclaims, “Hate this city. Stinks. Wogs and Pakis taking over” translating the
elicitors of disgust into questions of morality, ethics, and racial politics.\textsuperscript{60} While Ian literally
stinks and is disgusting via his illness and the increasing permeability of his body’s fluids with
his environment, his invective against the “other” that he perceives as destroying his country
utilizes disgust elicitors to reinforce and bolster a racist, colonial worldview.

As Daniel R. Kelly notes in his book \textit{Yuck!: The Nature And Moral Significance Of
Disgust},

Perhaps unsurprisingly, disgust has been linked to the most extreme cases of
prejudice and xenophobia toward other groups. Indeed, researchers have found
that different emotions are associated with the subtly different forms of prejudice
that one group directs at another, and have confirmed that disgust is the emotion
most often operative in driving attitudes about the most vilified and dehumanized
of out groups.\textsuperscript{61}

Of particular interest, Kelly cites a 2006 study conducted by L.T. Harris and S. T. Fiske, in
which they find that the dehumanization of a group of people is linked to brain activity
associated with disgust and confirmed by their study’s participant’s self reported feelings of
disgust.\textsuperscript{62} Ian’s continual spouting of dehumanizing, racist language is directly connected to
elicitors of disgust. For example, Ian’s suggestion that Cate is “after a bit of black meat, eh?”\textsuperscript{63} in
scene one, in which a black man is dehumanized through the suggestion that he is food stuff,
hyper-sexual, and animalistic. Or, a moment in scene three in which Ian is “forced” by the
Soldier to imagine raping then killing “foreign slag” and the stage directions suggestion that this
makes Ian \textit{look sick}.\textsuperscript{64} Or even the Soldier’s own dehumanization of the enemy as he describes
them as “pigs,” notes his rape of a young girl who had her “hand up inside her trying to claw my [the Soldier’s] liquid out,” and the Soldier’s enemy’s resorting to cannibalism: “Starving man eating his dead wife’s leg.” The play makes no secret of disgust’s effectiveness in dehumanizing a group of people, but blurs the boundaries between the in-groups and out-groups, perpetrators and victims. It attempts to elicit disgust in the audience but alters the target of dehumanizing disgust frequently enough to cause the embodied affect/emotion to be paired with incongruent cognitive notions of racism and other forms of othering. The dystopian performative effect is unsettling and hopefully once processed with cognition enlightening in the way out-groups are treated.

Kelly notes two predominant perspectives on disgust’s place in various culture’s understanding of morality and ethics. In one camp, labeled by Kelly as Deep Wisdom Theory, proponents suggest that disgust acts as a bodily indication of what is natural or unnatural and thus what is acceptable and what is morally reprehensible. Obviously, this line of thinking could quickly lead to the justification of prejudice and discrimination—or far worse, genocide. The other camp, which Kelly labels Terror Management Theory, is highly skeptical of Deep Wisdom Theory, and suggests instead that disgust is no more than our body’s attempt to protect us from the anxiety associated with mortality. Kelly suggest a combination of Entanglement Theory and Co-opt Theory to provide a more complete and accurate portrait of disgust’s effect on our affective, behavioral, and cognitive reactions to disgust elicitors. Co-opt Theory is particularly important to the matter at hand. Kelly argues that Co-opt Theory, holds that once formed, the disgust response acquired a number of auxiliary functions in addition to protecting against poisons and parasites. The cognitive system was co-opted, recruited to also play a number of roles in regulating social
interactions. More specifically, it became systematically involved in the cognition of social norms and group boundary markers.\textsuperscript{66}

It is the cognition of social norms and group boundaries that Kane’s play works to disrupt by establishing a visceral disgust elicitor tightly linked to core disgust alongside what Rozin, et.al. would call “moralization,” the practice of utilizing disgust in understanding social situations, practices, groups, or beliefs (the most adaptive and culturally specific of Rozin el.al.‘s various classifications of disgust). Thus Ian and the Soldier’s disgust moralizations of minority groups, enemy civilians, and combatants is tied to the experience of disgust in watching Ian cough up blood or sputum, watching the Soldier suck out and eat Ian’s eyes, or cringing as the Soldier sodomizes Ian with his rifle. But how is this connection made and why does it persist through performance?

Kelly points out the nature of the disgust response, suggesting, that “the emotion is in a sense ballistic: once activated, it runs its course, generating the full, coordinated package of affective, behavioral, and cognitive components, and influencing downstream cognitive activity in typical ways, regardless of the actual character of the eliciting entity.”\textsuperscript{67} Once disgusted, then, other more culturally specific elicitors, which an audience or viewer may not necessarily espouse, can be caught up and experienced in the same reaction. When Kane suggests in an interview “if we can experience something through art, then we might be able to change our future, because experience engraves lessons on our hearts through suffering, whereas speculation leaves us untouched,”\textsuperscript{68} it could be argued that her use of disgust fulfills this objective. Kane, by forcing the experience of disgust through strong core disgust elicitors challenges audiences to deal with moralizations normally left “untouched” in “speculation.” It is this creation of the emotion of disgust in audience members at \textit{Blasted}, what I am calling a dystopian performative,
in which the body is made to perform an action. Disgust, initially presented, begins the process of affective, behavioral, and cognitive responses and Kane’s subsequent reversals or inclusions (at who or what disgust is directed) and offensive disgust moralizations are carried along that process forcibly creating the experience of disgust at out-groups not normally held as disgusting and thus a cognitive dissonance that opens up the space for a viewer or audience member to recognize their potential complicity in acts of war, rape, terrorism, and atrocities.

To further this line of reasoning, take the various rapes that occur throughout the play: 1) Cate is forced to give Ian a hand-job, 2) Cate is raped during the night, offstage, 3) Kane’s stage directions describe a “simulated” rape: “He puts the gun to her head, lies between her legs, and simulates sex” during one of Cate’s fainting spells, 4) When Cate bites Ian’s penis, 5) The Soldier’s rape of Ian, and 6) whatever Cate had to endure to acquire the food she shares with Ian at the close of the play. Kim Solga’s “Blasted’s Hysteria: Rape, Realism, and the Thresholds of the Visible,” points out the invisible nature of Cate’s rape and, utilizing Peggy Phelan’s theory of the unmarked, suggests that the absent representation of Cate’s violation is an indication of power and opens up the possibility of critique. Solga quotes Phelan, “he who is marked with value is left unremarked.” The unremarked nature of Cate’s rape, Solga argues, allows the play to critique “rape’s history of cultural disavowal, its ambiguous performance history, as well as the vexed history of the female body in realist representation.” Solga continues this argument to suggest that Cate’s invisible rape offstage is rehearsed and repeated in Ian’s simulation of sex during Cate’s fainting spell, in Cate’s performance of desire that ends in her biting Ian’s penis, and ultimately in the Soldier’s rape of Ian. This is done, according to Solga, to demonstrate the “vanishing point” of realism and it raises many questions about the politics of seen and unseen violence, particularly in the case of rape.
Rape falls under the category of animal-nature disgust and moral disgust. It includes “inappropriate sexual acts” and “violations of the ideal body ‘envelope’ or exterior form (e.g., gore, deformity, obesity).” As Rozin et.al. suggests, animal-nature disgust refocuses threat “from the mouth to the body in general.” Rape, however, also has a strong moral disgust component as Paul Rozin, Laura Lowery, Sumio Imada, and Jonathan Haidt suggest in there essay, “The Cad Triad Hypothesis.” Rozin, Lowery, et.al. categorize moral disgust as an other-critical emotion, meaning an emotional reaction directed towards someone else’s moral violation. “The Cad Triad Hypothesis” sets out to test a presumed link between contempt, anger, and disgust to three ethics, proposed by R. A. Shweder, N.C. Much, M. Mahapatra, and L. Park, used by various societies to deal with moral violations: “the ethics of community, autonomy, and divinity.” Divinity is defined by Rozin, Lowery, et.al. As “Divinity/purity violations. In these cases a person disrespects the sacredness of God, or causes impurity or degradation to himself/herself, or to others.” Jesse J. Prinz’s The Emotional Construction of Morals usefully adjusts this definition to include violations not necessarily connected to religion or god, “moral disgust is directed at transgressions against the perceived natural order.” The word “perceived” in Prinz’s definition is crucial as it recognizes the importance of perspective, varied cultural practices, and different ideologies.

Rape, in Blasted, has an intended impact on the audience that has to do with the point expressed by David Greig in his 1995 letter to the editor: “Ironically, in the journalists’ treatment of Sarah Kane, her analysis is borne out. On a day when a 15-year-old girl was raped and murdered, both the tabloids and the Guardian felt it necessary to devote more space to attacking a young writer who has done nothing more than represent the abuse she sees in the world around her.” It is the representation of the violation that arouses disgust (albeit in the case of the critics
misdirected disgust at Kane herself). More importantly, Kane’s representations move the treatment of rape or Bosnia from an “its not my community or my individual problem” to a personal and societal problem. This transition is created by the dystopian performative, the embodied experience of disgust which causes unsettlement and deeper cognition. This embodied doing is born out in the various rehearsed iterations of Cate’s initial rape suggested by Solga.

As noted earlier, Solga argues that the various rapes in Blasted open the possibility of critiquing “rape’s history of cultural disavowal, its ambiguous performance history, as well as the vexed history of the female body in realist representation,”\textsuperscript{79} a suggestion with which I very much agree. I argue that this occurs not only because of carefully thought out signification, but because of the way in which the various rapes alter our perspectives through the elicitation of animal-nature and moral disgust. The initial rape of Cate between scenes one and two is only ever confirmed much later in the play when Ian admits to the Soldier, “You did four in one go, I’ve only ever done one.”\textsuperscript{80} Prior to this, Cate’s relationship to the audience is akin to many rape victim’s relationship with their community after being raped. That is, their statements are questioned and scrutinized in an effort to suggest sexual consent. For example,

\begin{verbatim}
Ian. Loved me last night.
Cate. I didn’t want to do it.
Ian. Thought you liked that.
Cate. No.
Ian. Made enough noise.
Cate. It was hurting.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{verbatim}

Cate makes it clear that what occurred was against her will, was rape, and Ian utilizes various strategies to imply that she was consensual. The rape of Cate off-stage allows the ambiguity of
this “she said/he said” battle to recreate the experience of many rape victims and the communities that often fails to believe them.

The next iteration of Cate’s rape occurs when Ian simulates sex on top of Cate, a gun to her head, while she is passed out. This is the kind of rape typically abhorred (read: believed) by all—that is, the far less common violent, gun to your head, rape—and Kane makes it clear that it should appear fake, theatrical, as a simulation. It is this theatrical, simulated moment that will first elicit the feeling of disgust in the audience. Indicators of the rape that occurred in the night are only Cate’s generally changed attitude, desire to leave, and clear anger at Ian. Cate calls him “Cunt,” The bouquet of flowers Ian gives to Cate the night before are torn apart indicating a struggle, and Cate tears the arms off of Ian’s leather jacket. What constitutes an audience’s response to and disgust at rape is not induced by these textual clues to the sexual violence that occurred but only when the audience see’s Ian simulate rape with a gun to Cate’s head. It is clearly an “inappropriate sexual act” but doesn’t involve a body envelope violation and is interrupted by Cate’s hysterical laughter that turns to tears. The common disbelief of a girl raped in a hotel room by her former lover is replaced by the disgust invoked at a fake, specifically violent gun-to-head rape, which again leaves the audience ambiguously disgusted and unsure if “rape” has occurred, the disgusting rape was fake and the actual rape wasn’t (yet) disgusting. The dystopian vision of gun-to-head rape elicits the embodied queasy feeling of disgust and is paired with the rape not seen and not believed. The dystopian performative in this instance creates a feeling of disgust that invokes the questioning spirit desired for the less culturally disgusting rape, the one so often ignored.

The next rape act complicates and alters the position of victim and perpetrator. Cate performs oral sex on Ian and bites his penis as he comes. Importantly, Kane does not describe
this action as simulated: “[Cate] begins to perform oral sex on Ian,” and “As soon as Cate hears the word [killer] she bites his penis as hard as she can.” The audience is exposed to several disgust elicitors based in the embodied schemata of disgust suggested by Haidt et.al. There is body envelop violation, an element of cannibalism through biting, bodily fluids exchanged and rejected, and the distaste of the sperm in Cate’s mouth. The play has escalated from the unseen rape of Cate (recreating one way that the experience of rape occurs in contemporary society) to a fake rape (that provokes elements of disgust through a clearly inappropriate sexual act) and now to the elicitation of disgust through several elicitors in a way not intentionally presented as fake. The tactile empathy invoked in this latest moment effects various genders differently. In men a tactile empathy of having one’s penis bitten is immediately created, provoking the kind of embodied schemata for disgust normally experienced by those that are raped in higher numbers, women. That is, the male body envelope is violated in a way that is not normally connected with sex, but clearly has a historical and cultural basis in the folk tale of the vagina dentata. Women, on the other hand, are confronted with the body envelope violation that Cate experiences in order to cause harm to Ian. After she is beaten and releases Ian’s penis, she “spits frantically, trying to get every trace of him out of her mouth.” This is not to say that men and women cannot be equally disgusted by the various acts, only that their physical bodies prepare them to be more effected by one experience or the other.

Finally, Ian is raped by the Soldier and sodomized with the end of a revolver. Men, who do not typically see themselves in representations or culture being raped are exposed to a graphic image of what that might mean, experience tactile empathy finding the pain in their anus, and are disgusted at the reminder of their own animal nature, mortality, and loss of morality. Within Blasted, men rape women, women rape men, men rape men, and it is clear through Kane’s
suggestion of staging which group of people is targeted for a more extreme affective, emotional experience, (men are raped on stage, women are raped offstage or in “simulation”) those who disavow rape and have historically represented rape in theatre and literature, that is, mostly men. Women need no reminder of the potentiality of rape. What I might call the embodied schemata of rape—referring to the “imaginative structures or patterns [of] experience that are [known through] bodily knowledge or sensation.” — experienced by women within the contemporary world is clear: Women carry pepper-spray when walking alone at dark, hold their keys in a way that would allow them to stab a potential assailant, frequently go to various locations in groups, mobile phone applications are being created in droves to alert police immediately if attacked, etc. Kane relies on the embodied schemata of disgust, primarily the passing of unwanted, harmful, substances into the body via the mouth and later any envelope violation, to create in those who do not normally experience the potentiality of rape a strong embodied response to its provocation. Kane plays on the co-optation of disgust for the moralization behind societies condemnation of sexual violence to allow empathy to cross the out-group and in-groups of women and men. Further, it extends this disgust moralization to a scenario, unseen in the play, of a rape that society has not continually condemned as morally disgusting, the rape of a woman by someone she knows or a past lover. The affective, behavioral, and cognitive responses of the audience are potentially manipulated by the play to create moments of recognition and empathy across groups and call attention to problems of society often discussed in discourse but rarely “touched,” as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick suggests, “even more immediately than other perceptual systems […] to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle, to heft, to tap, or to unfold, and always also to understand other people or natural forces as having effectually done so before oneself.” The cumulative effect of Blasted’s rapes culminating in the rape of Ian by the Soldier
create a dystopian performative where the audience is touched and touching through the experience of disgust the connection that Kane sought out to represent in her play: common rape with rape as a weapon of war, “One is the seed and the other is the tree.”

_The Observer’s_ Kate Kellaway, acknowledges the experience of touching performatively and its connectivity to others, “After the press night, strangers were talking to each other. Sarah Kane will hope that this is an inverted tribute to the piece. I see it more as the sudden solidarity that descends when people have been involved in the same calamity.” The connectivity suggested by Rokotnitz and the solidarity described by Kellaway strikes a familiar cord with Jill Dolan’s utopian performative and its reliance on affective moments. Dolan states, “Utopian performatives, in their doings, make palpable an affective vision of how the world might be better.” She points toward the way in which a communitas inflected affect might establish “doings,” future goals, worlds, and political actions. Utopia, however, hardly suggests the communal bodily experience of watching a Soldier suck out a journalist’s eyes and eat them, the racist invective spewed by Ian, or the various rapes throughout the play. Nor does it really suggest the hopeful nature of Dolan’s utopian performative. While Dolan’s work relies on what might be termed positive affects and emotions, disgust and its affects—nausea, sickness, reduced heart rate, etc.—can be interpreted as negative. A dystopian performative, then, might better capture the experience of these particular moments of communal disgust. Negative affect/emotion may have even more power to bring people together and demand social change.

The dystopian performative of these moments, relying on a communal, bodily knowledge brought forward through mirror neurons and embodied schemata establishes the opportunity for simulated violence to create meaning and perhaps effect change. David Graver’s “Violent
Theatricality: Displayed Enactments of Aggression and Pain” notes the difficulty of simulated violence to establish meaning:

Although violence can disguise itself as meaning and join the semiotic transactions of the stage, its presence generally threatens both to escape the meaning assigned to it and to disrupt the delicate balance theatricality establishes between the ontological priorities of display and enactment. Consequently, violence is hard to hold within a theatrical context. It has a volatility that either writes its own burning meaning upon the world or wipes out all meaning in a fire storm of senseless eradication.92

The escape mentioned by Graver might actually be the embodied experience of an audience that foregoes the semiotic transaction. In Blasted, the disgust elicited throughout the play allows the dystopian performative moment to create embodied meaning that doesn’t remain safely between display and enactment but creates dissonance. This is perhaps best seen in the simulated rape of Cate by Ian, where the most common signifier of sexual violence throughout theatrical realism is made overtly fake, causing a dissonance between the embodied feeling of the moment and the “meaning assigned” Cate’s earlier rape. Dystopian thought is itself concerned with volatility, specifically the precarious nature of utopian thought and its relation to the future and the present. Put simply, it either critiques new ideas by pointing out potential consequences or critiques current situations by demonstrating their extremes. The potential failure of such a performative is illustrated in the negative critical response, while its success is made manifest in the positive response from Edward Bond, Caryl Churchill, academics, and a select population of theatre critics.
Conclusion

*Blasted* is most often interpreted as a denunciation of The War in Bosnia (1992-1995) specifically, and abuse and violence tolerated within the western world more generally. I argue that a relatively shared bodily knowledge might provide the most fully realized context of any act of simulated violence. Shared bodily knowledge and embodied schemata understood through cognitive and affective neuroscience—in this case the shared emotion of disgust—inflected and adjusted through culture, provides the performative “doing” of the dystopian performative moments within the play. While several critics complained about the lack of context to give the simulated violence of *Blasted* meaning, the reality is that their bodies received Kane’s message, as illustrated through the text of their reviews. But to take their point consider the final vignettes at the end of the play performed by Ian between moments of darkness and light:

*Ian Masturbating*

Ian. cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt cunt

*Darkness.*

*Light.*

*Ian Strangling himself with his bare hands.*

*Darkness.*

*Light.*

*Ian Shitting.*
Darkness.
Light.

Ian Laughing Hysterically.

Darkness.
Light.

Ian having a nightmare.

Darkness.
Light.

Ian crying, huge bloody tears.
He is hugging the Soldier’s body for comfort.

Darkness.
Light.

Ian lying very still, weak with hunger.

Darkness.
**Light.**

I *Ian* tears the cross out of the ground, rips up the floor and lifts the baby’s body out.

_He eats the baby._

He puts the remains back in the baby’s blanket and puts the bundle back in the hole.

_A beat, then he climbs in after it and lies down head poking out of the floor._

_He dies with relief._

_Blasted_’s second to last moment is a barrage of highly affective images that, if done well, run the gamut of life’s experiences day in and day out and the relatively disgusting nature of our world today. Disgust elicitors abound: *Ian* releases sperm, shits, cries blood, deals with mortality through the dead Soldier, baby, and eventually his own death. Ultimately, of course, the most disgusting portion of these vignettes is the eating of the dead baby, which according to Michael Billington’s response to the original production, “by the time the blinded, hungry hack is reduced to digging up the floorboards to devour a dead baby (I did warn you) we have supped so full with horrors that we are reduced to bombed-out indifference.” Similarly, Peter Campbell says of the same moments in the New York premiere, “These scenes happened too quickly, barely giving the audience time to recognize what was happening, as an offstage white noise that increased in volume provided the only indication of narrative or emotional climax.” In both productions it
would seem that the affective and emotional punch of this final moment failed, or at the very least was perhaps not fully successful at eliciting outright disgust as earlier moments, if that is what was intended. The critics complained that no context explains the play and Kane provided a series of vignettes that appear truly detached from context. Each moment individually might provoke disgust and thus cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses that cause action. Together they seem to mark time and the degradation of each passing day. As a disgusting emotional elicitor these moments may be designed to fail, or rather to return the audience to the representation of violence they often receive day in and day out and fail to recognize and be disgusted by. This final moment then might be staging the reality of our violent world: a series of atrocities that effects no one. It is in this moment, I argue, that Kane allows her experiential theatre to fail and begins the process that Aleks Sierz alludes to: “On the train home, I wrote: ‘Kane’s play makes you feel but it doesn’t make you think.’ This turned out to be wrong: it does make you think, but only after you’ve got over the shock of seeing it.”96 The last moment is the start of getting over that shock. The interplay between the body, cognition, and emotion within *Blasted* begins with the body to create powerful emotional responses that are only ever cognitively processed when finally, the “disgusting feast of filth” ceases to disgust. It is this moralization that is perhaps the most important to be experienced in Kane’s play: To experience the disgusting with no response and action is, in fact, disgusting. The dystopian performatives throughout the play work to take advantage of the body to redirect its responses toward what Kane feared was a major problem in societies nonchalant attitude towards the horrors of others. *Blasted* utilizes the negative affect/emotion of disgust to bind the audience together in meaningful ways in order to comprehend the necessity for collective action, a doing I am calling a dystopian performative.
CHAPTER 3: The Effect of Affect: Anger, Fear, and the Promise of Affect/Emotion

Introduction

“We made a decision that I would try to do the violence as realistically as possible. If it didn’t work then we’d try something else. [...] The very first time we did the final scene with all the blood and false bowels by the end of it we were all severely traumatized. All the actors were standing there covered in blood having just raped and slit their throats; and then one of them said, ‘this is the most disgusting play I’ve ever been in,’ and he walked out. But because of the work we’d done before, all of us knew that point was reached because of a series of emotional journeys that had been made. So none of us felt it was unjustified, it was just completely unpleasant … And it turned out to be a lot easier than you would think it is.”

—Sarah Kane, Interview with Nils Tabert

The original 1996 production of Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love, directed by Kane at London’s Gate Theatre, may very well be the most realistically staged version of any of Kane’s work. As one of the actors suggests, the violence is “disgusting.” More than that, however, the violence in the final moments of Phaedra’s Love is a display of aggression and anger by a mob bent on avenging the rape of Phaedra. This rage like anger leads to the rape and murder of Phaedra’s daughter, Strophe. Conversely, the original production of Cleansed, directed by James Macdonald in 1998, went “for a stylized violence” as Jane Edwardes notes in her review of the play for Time Out. Indeed, Kane herself suggests that in writing Cleansed her goal was, in part, to write a play that could never ever be turned into a film, that could never ever be shot for television, that could never be turned into a novel. The only thing that could ever be done with it was it could be staged. Believe it or not, that play is
Cleansed. That play can only be staged. Now you may say: “It can’t be staged”, but it can’t be anything else either.³

While both Cleansed and Phaedra’s Love depict horrific violence and atrocity, they do so in wildly different emotional contexts. Where Phaedra’s Love’s characters act out of anger and the violence occurs because of uncontrolled emotional outbursts (or even the desire for such raw emotion), Cleansed’s violence is carefully articulated and manipulated by the character of Tinker, it induces fear, anxiety, and dread.

This chapter explores how the negative affect/emotions of anger and fear create dystopian performative moments in scenes of extreme, almost unbelievable, violence. Cleansed and Phaedra’s Love depict worlds filled with threat and two disparate articulations of how we deal with that threat. While Cleansed’s characters are often immobile, Phaedra’s Love’s characters act rashly. At base, the plays deal with the two most common responses to threat: flight (fear) of fight (anger). The plays dystopian performative moments elicit fear and anger to provoke responses to complex ideas of love and death.⁴ Kane engages the body to effect the cognition of its viewers about specific cultural and social ideas embedded in what it is to be human.

Both anger and fear are generally considered to be primary, basic, or discrete emotions. As Jonathan H. Turner’s On the Origins of Human Emotions suggests, based on a composite of approaches from such fields as “psychology, sociology, biology, psychiatry, physiology, and neurology,” “there is complete consensus among researchers that fear is a primary emotion; virtually all agree that anger is also primary.”⁵ That said, the elicitation of both fear and anger are difficult to measure and to achieve in artistic mediums. Jonathan Rottenberg, Rebecca D. Ray, and James J. Gross’s “Emotion Elicitation Using Films,” ultimately suggests that both fear and anger are difficult to elicit with short film clips, from films like Cry Freedom and Bodyguard
(anger) to *The Shining* and *Silence of the Lambs* (fear), such attempts generally resulted in a mixture of negative emotions, including sadness, disgust, tension, and interest. do, however, acknowledge the limitations of using short film clips: “we have been repeatedly surprised at the fragility of the film extraction process. Often, film segments that are powerfully emotionally evocative in the context of the larger film fail to elicit emotion when the film clip is viewed on its own.” A similar effect, I would argue, can be found in theatrical performance for the same basic reasons. The quote by Kane above illustrates how emotional impact requires a journey of sorts. An emotion evoked by art strikes in a moment, but, especially with more complex and culturally inflected emotions, is the result of the entire experience. It is not surprising that Rottenberg, et.al. found reliability in short film clips to elicit disgust as it is less culturally differentiated (as discussed in chapter 2) than anger or fear.

In this chapter, the emotions of fear and anger are linked specifically because of the difficulty in their elicitation and their ability to create for audience members similar emotional reactions. As Harrison, et.al. suggest “This pattern of physiological responses is suggestive of a fear […] and is likely the result of the inherently threatening anger expressions inducing reciprocal fear, rather than mirroring anger. Thus it seems the effects of anger expressions are less contagious than, for example, those of fear and happiness, but rather elicit a reciprocal response.” Specifically, responses to “pictures of angry facial expressions” rather than “harassing material” seemed to elicit a fear response rather than an anger response. This finding is particularly important to understand the nature of anger elicitation in theatre and its connection to fear stimuli. Of course, there are examples of theatrical experience in which “harassing material” is utilized and anger is elicited, but the audience, in general, can maintain at least some distance from the material, as one would from a picture.
With the caveat that anger often elicits fear rather than eliciting a mirroring of anger, and
the idea that fear and anger are both emotional responses to a variety of different types of threat,
the moment of fear or anger elicited in a theatrical context can be understood to be a potentially
transformative moment for the audience, a dystopian performative, because of the way it can be
used to complicate more traditional artistic themes. Ed S. Tan’s “Emotion, Art, and the
Humanities” defines an aesthetic emotion as an emotion “caused by art”\(^{11}\) and importantly
discusses this caused emotion as “potential.”\(^ {12}\) That is to say, like the elicitation of any emotion
in both laboratory settings and within a performance space, there are no guarantees only
potential—individual and cultural differences abound. Tan goes on to describe the connection
between aesthetic emotion and the themes of art, or rather the meaning of art. He outlines three
potential types of themes or types of meaning tied to emotion: popular themes, emotion as a
theme, and themes specific for art works. The first, popular themes, details the themes of myth
and folk tales that can be seen in various iterations through history, and is the primary focus of
this chapter. Tan calls these “Eternal themes (death, sex, violence, good versus evil, fate, threat,
error, betrayal, love, fortune, misfortune, hubris, etc.)”\(^ {13}\) The connection between affect/emotion
and eternal themes, what Tan calls aesthetic emotion, will be utilized to understand the way
affect/emotion can create dystopian performatives that deal with more traditionally artistic
subjects.\(^ {14}\) While Tan states, “we all know that the comic makes us laugh, the tragic weep, the
fantastic wonder, and the uncanny shiver,”\(^ {15}\) he goes further to suggest that art provides themes
not connected to the “physical or social world.” In this way, he argues, that aesthetic emotion
may have its own “particular appraisals that appear to be related to their functioning.”\(^ {16}\) In other
words, art can act as a frame in which to experience communitas and liminality, a separation
from the normative world.
The two plays under consideration focus the affect/emotion of fear and anger toward creating dystopian performatives that allow for an exploration of more general “eternal themes.” Obviously, *Phaedra’s Love*, based on a Greek myth, deals with topics that easily fall under Tan’s topology: love, death, violence, betrayal, etc. *Cleansed* likewise deals with love, death, violence, loyalty, etc. These two plays focus on eternal themes through the creation of what Tan refers to as “themes specific for art work.” That is, themes unconnected from the physical and social world of the audience. Victor Tuner’s notion of anti-structure through communitas and liminality offers a clear connection to the notion that art creates a space unconnected to the physical and social world. This productive disconnection to the world beyond the performance through the elicitation of affect/emotion is the dystopian performative moment. The negative emotional experience of fear or anger in *Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love* connects to themes which Tan argues elicit and co-create meaning alongside emotion. This chapter will examine the two responses to threat (anger and fear) to understand their evocation in the theatre, but more particularly how dystopian performative moments based in the embodied experience of fear and anger provoke an audience to comprehend on a bodily level complex socio-cultural themes, specifically that of love and death.

Sarah Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love* is loosely based on Seneca’s *Phaedra*; however, the lead role has been given to the emotionally “bored” Hippolytus. Unlike Seneca’s classic, the violence portrayed in *Phaedra’s Love* is represented on stage. The performed violence is similar to that portrayed in *Blasted*, in particular, the rape and cannibalism. The disgusting nature of Hippolytus and Phaedra’s unusual fixation on this disgusting figure continues the domination of this particular affect/emotion in the work of Kane.
The play begins with a slice of Hippolytus’s life. He blows his nose in dirty socks, masturbates with out any sign of pleasure, passively watches violence on TV, and eats hamburgers.

Scene two opens with a discussion between Phaedra and a doctor she has hired to diagnosis and treat Hippolytus. The doctor notes that he is clearly depressed but refuses to provide any treatment or other diagnosis. For the doctor, Hippolytus will not get better until he changes his life and has a desire to help himself. Astutely, the doctor recognizes Phaedra’s attraction to her stepson while he is questioning her about Hippolytus’s habits and behaviors. The scene ends with the doctor advising Phaedra to “get over him.”

The third scene follows a similar pattern but this time in a conversation between Phaedra and her daughter Strophe. Strophe questions her mother on her attraction to Hippolytus and Phaedra admits to her that she is in love with him and wants to sleep with him. Strophe warns her repeatedly to get over Hippolytus and, if nothing else, have an affair with another man. The scene ends with Phaedra assuring her daughter that she will “get over him.”

The next scene opens with Phaedra carrying birthday presents for Hippolytus that the poor have left by the gate. Hippolytus is unimpressed and laments his royal birthday taking precedence over more important news effecting the country. As the scene progresses, Phaedra attempts to clean up his room, questions him about his sexual habits, and eventually confesses her obsession and desire to sleep with him. He spurns her and generally acts disinterested until Phaedra finally just undoes his pants and performs oral sex on him. As he is about to come, she looks up to see his face and he forces her head back down on his penis. He comes in her mouth. He continues to abuse her emotionally until he reveals that not only has he slept with her daughter, Strophe, but that her daughter has slept with her husband Theseus.
Phaedra hangs herself and accuses Hippolytus of raping her. Strophe confronts Hippolytus about this in the fifth scene. During the scene Strophe continually attempts to get at the truth of Hippolytus and Phaedra’s sexual encounter; however, Hippolytus, bored with life, only finds the accusation invigorating and describes his future condemnation and death as the fate he has been waiting for. Hippolytus leaves to turn himself in and happily accept his fate.

The sixth scene is a discussion between Hippolytus and a priest. The priest wants Hippolytus to confess to lying about raping his stepmother. They discuss the existence of god and the nature of sin. The scene closes with the priest performing oral sex on Hippolytus. Scene seven follows immediately and depicts Theseus burning Phaedra’s body on a funeral pyre. The only words spoken are by Theseus: “I’ll kill him.”

The final moment of the play is the most violent. Hippolytus, while being transported to court and presumably his trial, is accosted by a crowd, which includes a disguised Theseus and Strophe. Theseus is particularly instrumental in whipping the crowd into a frenzy to incite an attack on Hippolytus. Hippolytus breaks free from the police and throws himself into the crowd to accept his fate. He recognizes Theseus but is shortly choked into semi-consciousness. His penis is cut off and barbecued. During the fray, Strophe tries to stop the murder of Hippolytus. Theseus, not recognizing Strophe in disguise, rapes her and slits her throat. Theseus guts Hippolytus and throws his entrails on the barbecue. As he lays on the ground next to the recently dead Strophe, he recognizes her face and repeats her name. Theseus, overhearing Hippolytus examines the girl he has just raped and killed and realizes he has killed his stepdaughter. Theseus cuts his own throat and bleeds to death. The final line of the play comes from a nearly deceased Hippolytus: “If there could have been more moments like this.”
Cleansed, unlike Phaedra’s Love violent conclusion, presents horrors throughout. Originally produced at the Royal Court Theatre Downstairs on 30 April 1998, the play is set at a university run by a fiendish doctor named Tinker. The play focuses on the themes of love, gender, discrimination, and, of course, violence and death. Some have speculated that the character, Tinker, was named after Jack Tinker, the critic who blasted Kane’s first play Blasted, in his review, “The Disgusting Feast of Filth.”

The play begins with Tinker heating up “smack” in a spoon for Graham, one of his patients. Graham dies from the over-dose. It quickly moves to a conversation between two lovers, Rod and Carl, about the nature of their relationship. Carl wants more commitment and Rod insists on being honest about his position. Rod believes he loves him “now,” is with him “now,” but cannot make any commitment for the future.

The third scene introduces Grace, Graham’s sister. Graham has died and Grace wants to claim his clothes, which Tinker initially refuses but eventually provides by making another patient, Robin, strip his (Graham’s) clothes. Grace has an incestuous relationship with Graham that continues as he appears to her throughout the play, and a relationship with Robin because he has fallen in love with her.

The next scene depicts the torture of Carl who finally begs that Tinker kill Rod instead of him. Rod falls from the sky, and Tinker cuts out Carl’s tongue and forces him to swallow the ring that he gave to Rod earlier. Next, Graham appears to Grace and they make love.

Revealing the final relationship that occurs within the play the next scene involves the relationship between Tinker and a dancing woman (who is eventually revealed to be Grace). Tinker enters a peep-show booth and pays tokens to open a slat and watch a woman dance. He
insists that she sits down so he can see her face. The moment ends when Tinker runs out of
tokens.

The play progresses through a series of scenes that develop the relationships of each
color. Grace teaches Robin to read and write. Carl continues to try and express his love for
Rod, Tinker removes each expressive possibility by cutting off Carl’s hands and other
appendages. Grace is beaten and raped by a group of unseen men under Tinker’s orders. Tinker
continues to visit the dancing woman. Robin is tortured and attacked by Tinker because of his
love of Grace. Grace slowly transforms from female to male. Rod sacrifices himself to save Carl
from Tinker. Tinker transplants Carl’s penis to Grace. And finally the play ends with Carl
wearing Grace’s clothes and Grace wearing Graham’s clothes near the perimeter fence of the
university. Grace talks, Carl cries, they hold each other.

**Shock Value**

The original production of *Phaedra’s Love* was directed by Kane herself, after severing
ties with the hired director, Cath Mattock. Kane became frustrated with the director because she
felt that Cath was “not directing the play as it should be directed—‘she’s just staging it.’”22
David Farr, the artistic director, decided to go with the writer and the result, in Farr’s words, was
“ninety minutes of the most intense belief—belief in the vivid necessity of what [was] happening
on stage.”23

The response to the original production, and a number of the productions that followed,
vacillated from boredom to viscerally and intellectually stimulating, from exceptionally serious
to darkly comic. As Aleks Sierz describes in his review for the *Tribune*, “the dialogue veers from
exchanges that are genuinely disturbing to such boneheaded declarations as ‘Fuck God; fuck the
monarchy.’”24 Almost all reviewers admit to the experiential power of the play, specifically the
play’s first production directed by Kane. In the original production, Kane sat the audience in the middle of the action. Samantha Marlowe’s review for *What’s On* describes this arrangement:

> the boundaries between audience and actors are deliberately blurred—there is no single playing space, and the seating is dispersed so that involvement is unavoidable. Not that you would want to avoid it, when there is so much going on that’s too good to miss. Sexual hunger, hypocrisy, rape, suicide—it’s all uncompromisingly here, but in a manner that somehow avoided deteriorating into lurid voyeurism.

Charles Spencer of *The Daily Telegraph* describes the incident with perhaps a touch less awe:

> It is impossible to deny that Kane’s production of her own play, in which the audience is seated among the rampaging actors, achieves a visceral impact. But then, it’s hard not to shudder when a penis is being severed under your very nose and you are in grave danger of being covered with gore.

Michael Billington in his review for *The Guardian* sums up the general response in one simple sentence: “Viscerally, her play has undeniable power: intellectually it’s hard to see what point it is making.” Kane’s production of *Phaedra’s Love*, unlike the original production of *Blasted*, does not clearly produce a single basic emotion like disgust, but instead creates a hard to describe visceral experience, which based on reviews, stems primarily from the last scene in the play. In short, the original production produced a dystopian performative moment of threat that forced the audience to respond physically. In this play the dystopian performative is found most obviously in the final scene of the play. In fact, while Spencer describes the physical experience with the word “shudder,” the final scene in Kane’s staging seems aimed at the elicitation of anger through “harassing materials” as Harrison, et.al. might suggest. Kane’s original
production’s reliance on the creation of a semi-threatening environment is similar to what Amy Hughes’s Spectacles of Reform: Theatre and Activism in Nineteenth-Century America investigates: moments of visceral, experiential impact. Hughes argues for “spectacle as methodology” to understand the communicative, affective, and political power of spectacle. For Hughes, spectacle harnesses sensation, emotion, feeling, and affect to make “visible the invisible” and potentially “destabilize, complicate, or sustain sedimented ideological beliefs.”

One of the defining features of spectacle according to Hughes is the body in extremity, “the dazzle of visual effects, the cacophony of crisis, and the chaos of movement all contribute to the scale and intensity of the spectacular instant; but impressive stage technology is not enough. To be unequivocally sensational, a scene requires a virtual/actual body experiencing a fictional/factual peril.” This virtual/actual body’s experience of something fictional/factual occurs for both audience and performer in Kane’s original production of Phaedra’s Love. Kane’s reliance on spectacle is a reliance on the body’s experience of threat and represents a powerful tool deployed by Kane to do just as Hughes suggests, “destabilize, complicate […] ideological beliefs.” Kane, again, utilizes an embodied performative of a negative affective/emotional experience to get to the heart of a problem in British culture and society. It is the combination of the virtual and the actual, the fictional and the factual suggested by Hughes that makes this particular dystopian performative so intriguing. As has been mentioned, to create anger in a theatrical environment often requires “harassing material,” and it seems the balance of that material between an actual threat and the perceived theatricality of the event is important to the dystopian performative’s effect. To put it another way, the brain (cognition) knows the “harassing material” is not actual while the body (affect/emotion) experiences the virtual.
Based on the reviews the results are obviously mixed. For Charles Spencer “the actual writing remains dismayingly flat and prone to bathos.” For Aleks Sierz, “Kane’s play is less a satire on a modern royal family than a weird nightmare [...] It tells you little that’s new about the illogical power of love or the confusion of untamed feeling.” Conversely, Kate Stratton, writing for the Evening Standard, suggests “the bloodiness is carried off with a strength and dignity [...] that you are constantly gripped by the themes of the fable as well as provoked by its grotesque passions.” David Tushingham, writing for Time Out, sums up the performance: “The hour-long performance is a rapid and exhilarating ride packed with silences to remember and words to reflect on.” This illustrates the very personal feelings of individual audience members, that is, how an individual processes the affective and emotional stimulus provided in the show.

What is striking is the consistent division between those who viscerally experience one of Kane’s productions and those that do not. The 2005 revival of Phaedra’s Love, as noted by most reviews, failed to be as efficient in the creation of a visceral experience: “If anything Anne Timpton’s pared-down production needs to be more revoltingly bloody, more poetically searing. In Kane’s gruesome world, you can’t stint on the ketchup,” as Robert Gore-Langton noted in the Independent. Creating the correct mixture of fiction and fact of the virtual and the actual reality of threat for an audience is no easy task. The same division can be seen in reviews of Cleansed and serves to illustrate this facet of Kane’s work.

Cleansed (30 April 1998) marked Kane’s return to the Royal Court Theatre and received considerable attention in the press, largely due to the controversy surrounding Blasted. Like Kane’s previous work, reviewers continued the tradition of listing the various atrocities found in the play in question. Unlike Kane’s previous work, Cleansed moved away from depictions of realistic violence towards a more stylized aesthetic, perhaps necessitated by the extreme, poetic
nature of the play’s stage directions. Where *Phaedra’s Love* focused on depicting gore, as noted above by Charles Spencer, *Cleansed*, under the guidance of James Macdonald’s direction (and what was remarkable stage design by Jeremy Hubert) garnered “power from being savagely precise and almost elegantly stylised. The production [had] a lyricism that [was] frightening,” as John Peter wrote for the *Sunday Times*. While many critics noted the stylized violence’s ability to actually heighten the visceral, experiential impact of the play—Jane Edwards, writing for *Time Out* notes, that the stylized violence “reduces giggles and makes it easier to focus on the play as a whole” along with David Benedict, writing for the *Independent*, who notes “Everything is done through suggestion, which, of course, is far more harrowing”—others simply found the production boring and without meaning. The response to *Cleansed* like *Phaedra’s Love* suggests the distinction between the virtual and the actual and the fictional factual. Most notably, Charles Spencer of *The Daily Telegraph* unequivocally proclaims, “Kane entirely fails to touch the heart. Though the cast do their best, her one-dimensional characters seem little more than shadows in an unhealthy imagination, while the writing has a dreary, linguistically impoverished flatness.” Sheridan Morley, writing for the *Spectator*, comes to a similar conclusion: “like a naughty schoolgirl desperately trying to shock an increasingly bored and languid audience she piles horror upon horror without ever bothering to give us a character or a situation to care about.” Conversely, Aleks Sierz, writing for the *Tribune*, notes “as Kane’s characters […] struggle to save themselves through love, or by means of sado-maschoism, a lot of raw emotion gets flung around the stage. Pretty strong, intimate stuff—but only one person walked out.” David Benedict, perhaps writes the most flattering pronouncements about *Cleansed*’s affective power:
hard as you try, its compelling, horror-soaked atmosphere refuses to be shaken off. It clings to you like a shroud, [...] a world which seeks to deny the power of positive emotion, [...] whether flinching or shuddering, your reactions to the violence are extremely physical, [and] this fiercely powerful realisation of a profoundly dystopic vision is one of the most disturbing productions you will ever see. To some it will be repellent. Others will recognize it as absolute proof of the power of live theatre.\textsuperscript{41}

Still others suggested a middle road to these two extremes. Susannah Clapp, writing for the \textit{Observer}, notes, the play “is a howl of horror. It has the sense of outrage and the lack of nuance of a protest song.”\textsuperscript{42} Samantha Marlowe, writing for \textit{What’s On}, suggests the production was suffused with a weighty sense of ritual [...] although the action is horrific, its also oddly unmoving. [...] The struggle to overcome the crushing inhumanity with the receptive power of love is clear enough, and has an undeniable visceral impact. But to touch our hearts and minds as well as our stomachs, the play needs to offer more than a series of grotesque, if fascinating, tableaux.\textsuperscript{43}

As we can see from all the above examples, the division between the response to \textit{Cleansed} and the response to \textit{Phaedra’s Love} is similar and illustrative of the potential affective power of her work. More importantly, it illustrates the saliency of Hughes suggestion that a certain degree of threat is necessary in the theatre to create affectively powerful and moving moments in the theatre. The dystopian performative’s efficacy relies on virtual/actual and fictional/factual peril to truly induce the necessary affect/emotion to create an embodied performative, in this a case a dystopian performative.
In addition, Marlowe’s words reflect the three levels of affect/emotion, in which hearts represent emotions, minds represent feelings, and stomachs represent that visceral, basic affect. The complexity and interconnection of emotions, feelings, and affects is strongly seen within the critical response to the plays. Unlike the response to *Blasted*, where clear connections can be drawn to the basic affect/emotion of disgust, *Phaedra’s Love* and *Cleansed* offer only glimpses of connection to fear or anger, often in single words like, shudder (Spencer), horrific (Marlowe), and harrowing (Benedict). Beyond the basic response of disgust to *Blasted*; however, these plays—based on reviews—largely depict a visceral, experiential impact that is challenged and altered in the emotional and feeling response to the shows. In particular, the final moment of *Phaedra’s Love* has the potential to physically move an audience to a dystopian performative moment. A moment in which the virtual/actual bodies in the space (performer/audience) react to the fictional/factual threat of the event (play world/world of the audience). This is accomplished, in Kane’s original production, through a blending of spaces, the use of ultra-realistic violence, and the uprising of what appeared to be audience members.\(^4^4\) As Dolan suggests in *Utopia in Performance*, Turner’s theories of the “anti-structural” nature of liminality and communitas allows for a theatrical performance to be experienced, seen, or read as “processual.” The dystopian performative allows, within the liminal space between virtual/actual bodies and fictional/factual events, a communitas inflected moment of chaos, destruction, “disorder into order,” of which the collective destruction of social order (anti-structure) “raises basic problems for social structural man, invites him to speculation and criticism.”\(^4^5\)

*Cleansed*’s power to create a dystopian performative rests instead in mediated stylization, a device placed between the boundaries of the virtual/actual and the fictional/factual that connects it to the normative structure of the event. In the case of *Cleansed*, as Turner suggests,
“communitas does not represent the erasure of structural norms from the consciousness of those participating in it; rather its own style, in a given community, might be said to depend upon the way in which it symbolizes the abrogation, negation, or inversion of the normative structure.”

While *Phaedra’s Love* relies on the affective impact on the body to push the audience into a liminal communitas, *Cleansed* relies on the more socially determined emotion and feeling of the event, mediated through stylized violence. These two approaches are mirrored in two contrasting ways in which science attempts to understand the interaction between cognition and emotion. The James-Lange theory suggests, “we feel sad because we cry. The sensation of tears on the face constitutes the emotion of sadness.”

The James-Lange theory of dystopian performatives, if you will, would suggest that the strategy employed by *Phaedra’s Love* is most effective. *Cleansed* takes an approach more similar to Antonio Damasio’s notions that cognition and emotion “go hand in hand, without one we would not have the other.” In other words, the mediation of the violence through stylized theatrical techniques engages cognition more specifically alongside the visceral impact of the stage effects. In both cases a combination of affect, emotion, and feeling is utilized to bring about the (anti)structure of the experience, they simply emphasize different elements in the triad of affect/emotion. Or, to put it another way, they focus more or less on cognitively inflected experiences of affect/emotion. The moment of the dystopian performative connected to Turner’s notion of communitas and liminality spurns creativity and destruction and allows the “basic problems of social structural man,” to come under scrutiny.

The reviews of both *Phaedra’s Love* and *Cleansed* point to this sort of visceral experience, but, in general, they fail to indicate what “basic problems” are called into question or what potential possibilities are explored. The next section will examine these “basic problems” by looking at the scholarly response to both *Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love*. 
Violent Love

Most commonly, the “basic problem” of Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love* and *Cleansed* is argued to surround the issue and nature of love. Dan Rebellato’s “Sarah Kane: An Appreciation” notes, “looking across the span of Sarah’s work, her faith in love, however minimally advanced, emerges more and more strongly from the pain of the work. Hers was, as a character says in Eliot’s *The Cocktail Party*, ‘the kind of faith that issues from despair.’”50 This connection between love and despair or pain is manifest in both plays under consideration here. Saunders’s chapter on *Cleansed* in ‘Love Me or Kill Me’ argues very strongly for the plays connection to love demonstrated by Kane’s reading of *A Lover’s Discourse* by Roland Barthes:

There’s a point in *A Lover’s Discourse* when he says the situation of a rejected lover is not unlike the situation of a prisoner in Dachau. […] If you put people in a situation in which they lose themselves and what you’re writing about is an emotion in which people lose themselves then you can make the connection between the two.51

Kane likens obsessive love to imprisonment at Dachau. Both experiences, according to Kane, cause dehumanization, a loss of self, and as Dror Harari’s “Artificial, Animal, Machinal: Body, Desire, and Intimacy in Modernist and Postmodernist Theatre,” suggests a subjectivity constructed through the nature of desire. Harari’s article goes on to argue for the construction of the postmodern subject through a desire inflected by capitalism’s construction of an artificial, machine like subjectivity that serves the economic imperatives of the time. The final scene of *Phaedra’s Love* returns the subjectivities represented to a more intimate animalistic existence (what I would categorize as an affective level of bodily experience). Harari defines intimacy following Georges Bataille’s definition in his book, *Theory of Religion*: 
Man is afraid of the intimate order that is not reconcilable with the order of things.  

… Because man is not squarely within that order, but only partakes of it through a thing that is threatened in its nature (in the projects that constitute it), intimacy, in the trembling of the individual, is holy, sacred, and suffused with anguish.  

For Harari, this explains Hippolytus’s final words: “if there could have been more moments like this” and points to the failure of capitalism to liberate humankind. What Harari doesn’t recognize, however, is the notion that Hippolytus’s death, provided by what one might considered Phaedra’s final act of love, could also be read as a transmission of economic desire when considered from the perspective of the ravaging crowd. While for Hippolytus his death is the penultimate moment of his life, for the crowd it might be read as the sacrificial consumption of a celebrity and celebrity culture in general. This is recognized by Hallie Rebecca Marshall’s essay when she notes, “Kane is interested in the modern phenomenon of the adulation of celebrity.”

The three above readings suggest that the dystopian performative moments of these plays are provoking this bodily experience to deal with relevant cultural issues such as love, love and desire’s connection to subject formation, and perhaps most concretely Phaedra's Love’s critique of celebrity culture. The social, cultural issue of love—explicitly connected to affect/emotion—brought to bare by the embodied dystopian performatives of the plays will be the concern of the remainder of this section.

The connection between love and death is made in more religious terms in Annabelle Singer’s discussion of Cleansed in her article “Don’t Want to Be This: The Elusive Sarah Kane,” where the suggestion is made that the sacrifice of oneself for love is, in fact, the sacrifice of Jesus Christ in Christian mythology, perhaps supported by the Serbian method of crucifixion.
performed on Carl.\textsuperscript{54} The interconnection of love/death into the construction of identity within Kane’s work is also noted by, fellow playwright, Edward Bond in his article “Epilogue: ‘The Mark of Kane,’” where he muses on the causes of Kane’s suicide as an extension of the philosophical mindset suggested by her plays. Bond states, “The logic is simple and inescapable; the search for the perfect lover is the search for someone to murder you. The murderer is the invisible object.”\textsuperscript{55} Love and death, eros and thanatos or what Freud might have called the sexual or life drive and the death drive run throughout Kane’s work and in the case of Cleansed and Phaedra’s Love have strong connections to the experiential affect/emotion potential that these texts promote in performance.

Somewhat surprisingly, of the two articles that discuss Kane’s adaptation of Seneca more explicitly, only one actually makes mention of Seneca’s stoic philosophy, which I view as a strong connection to the focus of Kane on both the shared passion of love and death and the overwhelming power of affect/emotion. Zina Giannopoulou’s “Staging Power: the politics of sex and death in Seneca’s Phaedra and Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” is one of these essays and while it clearly deals with love/death it veers away from the affect/emotion of such topics and instead describes the political context in which they exist. Giannopoulou argues successfully for both Seneca and Kane’s work being a critique of monarchical power. While the argument for a critique against monarchical power is strong, an understanding of stoicism and its tenants would have broadened the essay’s reach beyond a critique of specific political contexts (the royal family for Kane, and Nero’s Rome for Seneca). This would have fit well with Giannopoulou’s assertions about the nature of death: “Both playwrights use death as a powerful tool for criticising the slavish conventions of a hierarchically structured royal power that locks individuals into prescribed social roles. Death makes possible the abandonment of these roles
and the experience, albeit temporarily, of complete freedom.” The other essay, “Re-writing Seneca: Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” by Stefani Brusberg-Kiermeier, follows a similar tact suggesting that Kane “appropriates the classical versions for a post-modern British audience” adding that the themes and ideas of both revolve around “political collapse and personal waste.” Based on the essay’s focus on these two topics, it is surprising that the essay concludes, “In Phaedra’s Love Kane presents another very personal appropriation of Seneca’s stoicism. Here the virtue of exercising one’s free will becomes more important than the virtues of endurance and never yielding. Through the freedom of the will suicide achieves a different quality than death. In Hippolytus’ words it is ‘suicide, not death.’” The final paragraph of Brusberg-Kiermeier’s work is the only mention of stoicism and takes the conclusion in an unexpected direction that my focus on affect/emotion may help to make more clear.

Seneca was not only a playwright but a philosopher and an advisor to two different Roman Emperors (Caligula and Nero). As a philosopher, Seneca helped develop the concepts and ideas of stoicism. According to Collin Burrow’s *Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity*:

Stoic ethics had as their goal life according to nature, which stoic thinkers aligned with life according to reason. The passions should be mastered so that man (stoic thought is quite emphatic that ‘virtue’ is about being a ‘vir’, a man) can avoid unnecessarily subjecting himself to fortune. A ‘vir virtutis’ (a man of virtue) stands constant, is firm and secure in himself, and controls passions within him so that he can avoid subjection to the world around him. Anger with those more powerful than yourself is pointless. It perturbs the reason, and it might also potentially destroy the self and the body too if the objects of one’s anger retaliates against it. If the man of virtue, or the ideal figure of the ‘sage,’ was finally
overwhelmed by Fortune and rendered unable to control his passions, he would rationally choose to kill himself in order to avoid subjecting himself to external events, achieving sovereignty over his own being even when he had lost control of his body and his fate.\textsuperscript{59}

Stoicism’s concern with the passions, emotions, feeling, what I am calling affect/emotion, directly relates to the experiential model of theatre attempted by Kane’s work. Gregory A. Staley, makes this connection to stoicism even more clear:

> When he [Seneca] describes how the “beauty of the subject matter” in a lecture or a play “stirs the hearer with a longing for what is right” (ep. 108.7-8), he suggests that “we discover what we think about these events partly by noticing how we feel.” Aesthetic emotions can shape judgments, both moral and immoral ones. For the very process of cognition is for the stoics a form of judgment in response to “aesthetic” impressions, to perceptions charged with potential emotion. That is why Seneca compares the first stage of emotion to the sensations we feel in seeing a play or reading a book (De Ira 2.2.5). What should come next, in both cases, is a discovery of what we think and the formation of judgment.\textsuperscript{60}

These sentiments, quoted by Staley from Seneca’s Epistles, particularly the final sentence, reverberates with Aleks Sierz’s remembrance of his initial experience with \textit{Blasted}: “On the train home, I wrote: ‘Kane’s play makes you feel but it doesn’t make you think.’ This turned out to be wrong: it does make you think, but only after you’ve got over the shock of seeing it.”\textsuperscript{61} I argue that Kane’s attraction to Seneca, as she searched for a classical text to adapt for the Gate Theatre, was not only connected to his use of violence or the similarity in political situations but also the stoicism embedded in his plays that suggests that emotions or passions play an integral role in
the development of an individual’s ethics and morality. As “[t]he Stoics turned to tragedy both
because it modeled the cognitive process and because it helped to clarify the emotions,” so too
did Kane turn to experiential theatre in an effort to recapture the performative power of the
theatrical moment to discuss the over-wrought emotional experience of love. In the way that
Seneca used theatre to portray the dangers of various passions, “an angry Atreus, afrighened
Oedipus, or a lovesick Phaedra,” Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love* and *Cleansed* also reflect specific
emotions, anger and fear respectively, in order to comment on the major themes of both plays:
love and death.

The experiential, affect/emotion filled work of Kane is also, according to Ken Urban’s
“An Ethics of Catastrophe,” filled “with the possibility that an ethics can exist between wounded
bodies, that after devastation, good becomes possible.” Urban proposes Kane’s work be viewed
as a search for ethics. With regard to *Cleansed*, he states, “Like her Hippolytus, Tinker conveys
that ethical uncertainty, enacting Kane’s continual collapsing of the simple binary oppositions
that provide an audience with a comforting moral assurance. During the reading, the sense of
uneasiness in the room was palpable.” The collapsing of binary oppositions, as a central piece
of *Cleansed*, is reiterated by Hillary Chute’s “’Victim. Perpetrator. Bystander’: critical distance
in Sarah Kane’s Theatre of Cruelty.” Chute argues that the opposition between victim and
perpetrator is dismantled through Kane’s use of violence, which she aptly connects to Artaud’s
Theatre of Cruelty: “*Cleansed* renders ‘realistic’ a present where the boundaries—and sadism—
of a concentration camp are at large: in culture, in every spectator.” This is accomplished,
according to Chute, through the plays use of metonymy: “This suffering is part of Kane’s violent
and ethical economy: it refuses the idea of the body as metaphor through demanding its
conspicuous suffering—both psychical and physical […] *Cleansed* demands a performative
response from its viewers in presenting this material suffering." Where *Phaedra’s Love* is directly connected to Seneca and his use of stoicism, *Cleansed* is connected to a search for ethics based in the way the play implicates and makes “real” the violence suffered by students, the mentally disabled, racialized others (references to both the Holocaust and South African Apartheid seem obvious), and non-cisgendered people. What is left unexplored in this scholarship on both *Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love* is the experiential affect/emotion potential of each play and how this remains at the center of her search for an ethics, which Kane justifies alongside the likes of Seneca as the probability of affect/emotion and embodied experience to alter and adjust how one thinks about a given topic. This aligns neatly with the dystopian performative, an embodied doing that effects not only the way participants think but how they then choose to interact with the world.

In connection to this idea consider Dror Harari’s argument that Kane investigates what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the Body without Organs. Antonin Artaud’s radio play, *To Have Done with the Judgment of God* (the origin for Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of a Body without Organs), states, “When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom.” This notion, a freedom from automatic reactions created within the body, might be read as the extreme desire of stoicism’s mastery of the passions or Kane’s search for an ethics within the embodied experience of dystopian performatives. While I would not argue that Kane’s work creates a Body without Organs, this concept’s recognition of the primacy and tying force of the body’s emotional, physical, autonomic reactions to a person’s ethics or morals is at the heart of Kane’s *Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love*. In an analysis of the plays I hope to demonstrate the
affect/emotion potential (that of both fear and anger) expressed within the plays as being instrumental in creating meaning through dystopian performatives.

**Love and Death / Anger and Fear**

As Nancy Nyquist Potter articulates in her article “The problem with too much anger: A philosophical approach to understanding anger in borderline personality disordered patients,” “anger is a moral emotion, which is to say that moral judgments are normatively paired with particular emotional responses.” Anger is elicited predominantly by “irritations and frustrations that arise from events that restrict freedom of action or access to resources.” Jack Panksepp provides an excellent example by describing the way that babies are frequently (not always) enraged when their arms are held to their sides. Unlike many other basic or distinct emotions, anger is not easily created and manipulated in the theatre because, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is not mirrored or reproduced in others that view those who are angry. Kane’s original production of *Phaedra’s Love* in some ways restricted the options of audience members by forcing the interaction between performance and spectator using a variety of techniques: seating the audience in the same space as the performance, seating performers among the audience, and by having a veritable splash zone of gore and blood. The play, as staged by Kane, refuses to allow for distance to be created between the performance of violence and the audience.

As we saw from many of the reviews, *Phaedra’s Love*’s most impactful scene was the last one, in which a veritable riot takes place in and among the audience that involves rape, blood, murder, cannibalism, etc. The provocation of anger, is at the heart of the performance techniques employed by Kane. It is the attempt to provoke a reaction or what J.L. Austin might call uptake, “I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense […] Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the
understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.” Potter, interpreting Austin, suggests a connection between a performative speech act and being angry, “expressions of anger are acts of claiming that call for a response to a person’s claim that she has been wronged.” Being angry can be read as a performative act and I would argue the final scene of Kane’s Phaedra’s Love is an attempt to force the audience through irritation and the restriction of freedom to become angry and performatively seek uptake. Of course, the act, in a variety of productions, including Kane’s original, might be said to have failed to achieve uptake.

Peter Campbell’s “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love: staging the implacable” explores the many ways in which Phaedra’s Love both succeeds and fails at achieving uptake, and thus the performative moment I am calling dystopian:

she [Kane] wanted to give the audience a visceral experience, not necessarily just bombard them with visceral images. The specific difficulty of this is evident in productions of Phaedra’s Love; unlike Blasted, which has graphic images of sex and violence that are difficult to represent, Phaedra’s Love’s demands for dogs and a vulture are practically impossible without using directorial strategies of suggestion or symbolism. Whereas Seneca created his plays (It is not clear whether they were ever performed) to debate the potential destructive power of emotions (or passions) gone awry, Kane depicts the emotions gone awry, such as the final scene and the rage of Theseus as he rapes and murders Strophe. Kane also attempts to provoke that emotion within the audience. Seneca’s stoic philosophy preaches control of the passions and Kane provokes them in hopes of effecting change.
Campbell points out several productions that failed at creating uptake, including the original production in which audiences were sometimes driven to laughter. Or, for example, Lisa Rothschild’s production at Chicago’s Defiant Theatre in 1998: “Despite Rothschild’s ambitions, again the dog was not done according to the script; there was a moving dog puppet manufactured, but it ‘got cut after final dress, as it was simply too distractingly funny.’”

Another difficulty in staging the final scene of Phaedra’s Love is the mention of children: “A crowd of men, women, and children has gathered.” The presence of children is not mentioned in discussions of most productions, and the reason is perhaps given by Jason Nodler, the director of Infernal Bridegroom Productions’s version of the show produced in Houston, 2002. When Campbell interviewed Nodler about his highly realistic staging of the play, he stated, “the absence of the children (we just felt it would be too scaring), and the absence of a live vulture were my main regrets about the production.”

The use of children speaks to, perhaps, one element of meaning that Kane was attempting to provoke with her use and attempted elicitation of anger: The production of fear by media. Barry Glassner’s The Culture of Fear succinctly suggests ideas that are seen within this final moment of Kane’s play:

> Our fear grows, I suggest, proportionate to our unacknowledged guilt. By slashing spending on educational, medical, and antipoverty programs for youths we adults have committed great violence against them. Yet rather than face up to our collective responsibility we project our violence onto young people themselves, and onto strangers we imagine will attack them.

Take for example the following lines spoken from various members of the mob in the final scene:

> Woman 1: Don’t deserve to live. I’ve got kids.
Man 1: We’ve all got kids.

Woman 1: You got kids?

Theseus: Not any more.

[…]

*Man 1 takes a tie from around a child’s neck and puts it around Hippolytus’s throat.*

[…]

Policeman 1: Poor Bastard.

Policeman 2: You joking? (*He kicks Hippolytus hard.*) I’ve got two daughters.

Policeman 1: Should move him.

Policeman 2: Let him rot.⁷⁹

The justification for killing Hippolytus in the street is at least partially laid upon the notion that children would be threatened if he were allowed to live or somehow got off after confessing to the crime of raping Phaedra. As Marshall points out, “post-Thatcherite culture exerts a destructive influence on the family unit and wider social bonds,” at least implicitly within *Phaedra’s Love.*⁸⁰ While the text of the play implicitly suggests that the current and recent-past government and monarchy of Britain is the threat that the audience should be angry about, the play in production induces anger through techniques that break the boundaries between audience and performer.

Campbell’s own production of *Phaedra’s Love* (the New York premiere of the play in 2004), according to the author, was seemingly successful at uptake in two particular instances during the final scene, the rape and murder of Strophe and the grilling of Hippolytus’s entrails. Campbell describes his staging of the rape/murder:
Strophe’s face was visible on the monitors as Theseus pushed up her dress and forced her over the side of Hippolytus’ couch. He then tore off her underwear and began thrusting at her from behind as the audience could see her face in close-up. Theseus thrust for almost a minute before taking the knife in his hand and pulling it across Strophe’s throat, again in close-up. He then let her head drop onto the side of couch; it remained on the monitors to the end of the play.\(^{81}\)

Campbell does not describe the audience response in this case beyond suggesting that it provoked the “strongest reactions.” It seems clear that the intimacy created by live feeding Strophe’s face to the monitors as she is raped and killed paired with the actuality of the physical bodies in the space (it is suggested that the rape was staged further away from the audience in the article) created the appropriate mixture of fictional/factual and virtual/actual that Hughes suggests is necessary for the most affecting spectacles that “destabilize, complicate, or sustain sedimented ideological beliefs.”\(^{82}\) In the case of Campbell’s production the affective experience, I argue, is based on the intimacy of the moment paired with the realistic (although distanced) detail of what is happening: tearing off Strophe’s underwear and the persistent thrusting of Theseus, for example.

The other moment of uptake that Campbell describes from his own production deals with the barbecuing of the entrails, which was actual animal meat:

The grill on the other hand, was downstage and almost centre, close to the audience. It was an electric grill that heated in silence, and there were visible gasps when the chorus dropped the meat on and it sizzled sharply. The smoke it generated stayed in the space through the end of the piece, with some audience members responding so viscerally that they had to leave because of nausea.\(^{83}\)
Here Campbell succeeds in creating the disgust response that, as I argued in Chapter 2, was so important in *Blasted*. The gasps and nausea, however, also have to do with the threat of the fictional/factual and virtual/actual. The entrails, which the audience thought they knew were fake, suddenly take on a realistic quality that leads to the smell of burning flesh and thus nausea. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, displays of rage and anger often produce the arousal of a number of negative emotions, including disgust and fear. The threat that a human was actually disemboweled and is now being cooked, supported by unexpected evidence, creates both disgust and potentially fear within the audience.

Campbell’s review of various productions of *Phaedra’s Love* as well as his own leads him to conclude that “this sensory experience is what Kane and others were trying to achieve by staging the play in close proximity to the audience, in hopes that the shared space would create shared emotional and sometimes physical elements, generating actual heat and at least the potential for contact between performers and audience.” He goes on to suggest that the play is another move in Kane’s trajectory of experimenting with metatheatricality and that this is, in fact, its primary purpose. While I agree it certainly experiments with metatheatricality and clearly hopes to achieve contact between performers and audience, Kane was writing about *something* other than theatre, as evidenced by the various articles cited above discussing the politics of *Phaedra’s Love* as well as the theme of love/death within the play. While I have mentioned the post-Thatcherite influence on the play above, an examination of the theme of the love/death in the final moment of the play fits more closely into the dystopian performative moments discussed.

Edward Bond may agree that Hippolytus actually found the perfect lover in Phaedra when she sealed his fate by committing suicide and accusing him of rape. Hippolytus considers
this act a testament to her love, “She really did love me.” Strophe, unlike the rest of the characters in the play, seeks the truth and her anger stems from Hippolytus’s cagey responses to the question of rape and her own betrayal of her mother with Theseus. Theseus’s anger is more basic and simple. He presents behavior tied to impulsive-emotional violence, affective/defensive anger or reactive anger. These terms represent one half of three different typologies for human anger cited by Angela Scarpa and Adrian Raine in their article “Violence Associated with Anger and Impulsivity.” The typologies (impulsive-emotional vs. controlled-instrumental; affective/defensive vs. predatory, and reactive vs. proactive) break down essentially in the same way in that the first type in each pair is based in “perceived threat, provocation, or insult […] high emotionality, and high impulsivity,” while the second type in each pair involves “a relatively nonemotional display of aggression and manipulation.” Importantly, Theseus’s anger provokes all of the events in the final moments of the play: He incites the mob, he rapes and kills Strophe, he kills Hippolytus, and eventually he kills himself. The kind of anger that motivates Theseus is also the anger that Kane and other director’s have tried to evoke in their presentation of the final scene (It is also the kind of anger Theseus seeks to provoke in the mob as he taunts them with the suggestion that Hippolytus will go free). An affective experience based in the boundaries between performer and audience being broken, a lack of control (for example, the generous sharing of blood with the audience in Kane’s production), and a generally stressful environment. As Scarpa and Raine point out, “emotional aggression [the first item in all three pairs of anger/aggression typologies listed above] is related to 1) a predisposition to experience negative affect and arousal, 2) the inability to regulate or soothe negative affect or arousal, and 3) through processes that will increase the likelihood of experiencing anger or making a decision to
Here again we see a blending of both biological and cultural factors effecting the way in which an audience experiences one of Kane’s plays.

In the final moments of the play the romanticization of the connection between love and death that we see so often in film, literature, and theatre is called into question. Here are people killing and dying for love in a state of aggressive anger. Theseus and Strophe both die recognizing the mistakes they have made. Hippolytus, however, dies in a state of excitation, happiness, or perhaps contentment. His final line, “If there could have been more moments like this,” indicates his belief in the value of such violence and even his own death. Hippolytus in many ways might be read as Kane’s view of the average British citizen and their approach to life and the violence in the world around them. Kane explains the violence:

The press kept asking why it was necessary to show such acts of violence on stage. I think it was necessary because we normally see war atrocities as documentary or news footage. [...] So suddenly all those familiar images were presented in an odd theatrical form which provided no framework within which to locate oneself in relationship to the material.

Hippolytus is essentially desensitized to violence, sex, and the realities of the world around him. He is in many ways emotionless and only truly experiences anything in the final moments of the play after he has been accused of rape and eventually killed and eaten by animals. Only when the gap between himself and the world is closed and he no longer experiences life from his room, through a TV, and the apparently long line of individuals begging to fuck him does he finally experience something worth experiencing. The effort to viscerally impact the audience is an effort to give the audience their moment, akin to Hippolytus’s final moment, in which they can start to formulate their own positionality in a world where rape and death are common. For Kane
this kind of important life experience is strongly felt in the notions of love and death explored within the play. In *Phaedra’s Love* the audience’s potential affective emotional reactions to the grotesque display at the end of the play, the performatively enacted anger and other negative affects, attempts to create a dystopian performative moment in which the negative emotion of anger might enhance the reasoning of the audience to a point of understanding the problems of our society and culture. As Keith Oatley and P.N. Johnson-Laird note in “Cognitive approaches to emotions,” “when an emotion arises from the task, a recent hypothesis is that reasoners are more motivated and more likely to consider possibilities that they would otherwise neglect.”

Here we might call Kane’s work neo-stoic philosophy in that it believes the emotions must be controlled and experienced in order to effect meaningful changes in behavior and world-view. The play, much like *Blasted*, contains a veiled attack on the news media and the apathetic stance to atrocities Kane believed audiences generally embodied. The dystopian performative moment provides the experience necessary for audiences to recognize the reality of the world around them.

*Cleansed*, when considered from the thematic perspective of love/death, goes further toward its traditional use in culture to link the two drives, unlike the characters in *Phaedra’s Love* who seem to not fear consequences (with perhaps the exception of Strophe). Tinker works diligently in an attempt to condition the fear of death into the idea of love for each character. Much like Pavlov’s behaviorist experiments, Tinker waits for the conditioned stimulus, a behavior associated with love, sex, lust, to occur and introduces a painful, often life-threatening, unconditioned stimulus. For example, one of the moments between Rod and Carl:

*Carl: (Tries to speak, nothing. He beats the ground in frustration)*

*Carl scrabbles around in the mud and begins to write while Rod talks.*
Rod: And the rats eat my face. So what. I’d have done the same only I never said I wouldn’t. You’re young. I don’t blame you. Don’t blame yourself. No one’s to blame.

Tinker is watching

He lets Carl finish what he writing, then goes to him and reads it.

He takes Carl by the arms and cuts off his hands.

Tinker Leaves

Carl tries to pick up his hands—he can’t he has no hands.

Rod goes to Carl.

He picks up the severed left hand and takes off the ring he put there.

He reads the message written in the mud.91

Carl wants to speak to Rod about his betrayal of him while he was being partially crucified by Tinker. He realizes he can write and attempts to express himself. Whatever he writes, it convinces Rod to ask for Carl’s forgiveness and to promise him that he’ll never lie to him. This expression of love is met with Carl’s hands being cut off by Tinker. The unconditioned response to such violent, painful stimuli is fear, and the associated conditioned response to love should become fear. As Panksepp notes in his chapter on fear and anxiety, “external stimuli that have consistently threatened the survival of a species during evolutionary history often develop the ability to unconditionally arouse brain fear systems. For instances, laboratory rats exhibit fear responses to the smell of cats.”92 Further, Panksepp notes, “that in addition to such inborn tendencies, a variety of specific anxieties [or fears] can be acquired during the life span of each individual. These are usually triggered by specific external events that have been paired with pain or other threatening stimuli.”93 Fear is both instinctual and learned. But the trajectory of
Rod and Carl’s story throughout the play suggests the opposite: Carl’s initial response to having a pole shoved through his body in a form of Serbian crucifixion is, out of fear of death, to finally betray Rod: “Not me please not me don’t kill me Rod not me don’t kill me ROD NOT ME ROD NOT ME.” After this, Carl sacrifices every piece of his expressive body to communicate his rejuvenated love to Rod. He loses his arms, his tongue, his legs, and finally his penis. Lucy Nevitt’s *Theatre & Violence* argues “once the effects of suffering are embodied […] the imaginative connection is somewhat easier to begin and maintain.” Embodiment of violence and pain in the theatre, even stylized violence, like that found in *Cleansed*, makes visible—to use Elaine Scarry’s parlance—the pain experienced and opens it up to being understood. The pain and fear created through the use of violence in *Cleansed* is resistant to the learning mechanism of conditioned response and relies on what Arne Öhman argues is the priority granted based on an evolutionary perspective in which “false negatives (i.e., failing to elicit defense to a potentially hazardous stimulus) are more evolutionarily costly than false positives (i.e., eliciting the response to stimulus that in effect is harmless). […] Therefore it is likely that perceptual systems are biased toward discovering threat.” Witnessing the removal of limbs effects the audience, who fully recognize the fictional and virtual nature of the representation through its stylization, in a bodily and affectual manner because of the propensity of the fear system to produce false positives to the possibility of threat.

Scarry’s work can, in fact, be read as another version of the connection between love and death: that between destruction and creation. *Cleansed* demonstrates this throughout the play: Carl’s love is reconstructed out of the destruction of his body and loyalty to Rod; Grace/Graham is the result of the creation of a male body from that of a female body—Grace’s response to Robin’s question “If you could change one thing in your life what would you change?” with “My
body. So it looks like it feels. Graham outside like Graham inside.”—as well as Tinker’s experiments and tortures throughout. In this way Kane takes two extreme states and utilizes the one’s affective, emotional power to relate the importance of the other to the audience.

The experience of fear, brought on by an over zealous perceptual system that reacts to any and all threat, is a moment for the viewer of Cleansed to react to what Kane considers one of the central themes of the play:

When you love obsessively, you do lose yourself. And when you then lose the object of your love, you have none of the normal resources to fall back on. It can completely destroy you. And very obviously concentration camps are about dehumanizing people before they are killed. I wanted to raise some question about these two extreme and apparently different situations. That is, the way in which subjectivity is created and lost in moments of extreme love and extreme violence and fear. Throughout the play subjectivity is called into question, Grace becomes Graham, the dancing woman becomes Grace, Robin becomes a woman, Carl is stripped of his sexuality, expressivity, and ultimately of his love—left as an abject body. Chute contends, “Cleansed insists on making its spectators aware of temporality; the present that Kane metonymically represents is indubitably an encounter with anxiety” and “renders ‘realistic’ a present where the boundaries—and sadism—of a concentration camp are at large; in culture, in every spectator.” The relationship of fear with anxiety is explicitly stated by Panksepp’s work on anger in his Affective Neuroscience but it is Kane’s connection between love and death (one of humankind’s strongest fears, that of mortality) that establishes the power of the play. Through the use of fear producing stimuli, Kane demonstrates the capability of love. Like Phaedra’s Love, Kane again attempts to persuade her audience to experience the affective/emotional
journey of the main character. At the end of *Cleansed*, Grace/Graham sitting next to a stripped of all identity Carl, states, “felt it. Here. Inside. Here.”¹⁰⁰

Dystopian performative moments of fear and anger in both *Phaedra’s Love* and *Cleansed* potentially occur when audiences have an embodied experience that connects that affect/emotion to an idea, to the thinking that Sierz believes Kane’s plays force you to have “after you’ve got over the shock of seeing it.”¹⁰¹ In the case of *Phaedra’s Love* an affected audience considers the nature of extreme emotions and their repercussions, experiencing a version of the emotion and hopefully controlling their response. In *Cleansed*, the liminality between fear and love, creation and destruction, structure and anti-structure produces a performative moment of understanding the way in which we create the other and our own subjectivity. Both plays pair the elicitation of an affective/emotional response from an audience with the discussion of popular and eternal themes, most notably, love and death. Through this collaboration, an audience, fully involved in the experience on an emotional/affective level has the chance to gain deeper more meaningful understanding of the fear and anger that makes us human.
CHAPTER 4: Crave and the Impact of Affect/Emotion on Cognition

Introduction
“The retelling of stories already told, the reenactment of events already enacted, the reexperience of emotions already experienced, these are and have always been central concerns of the theatre in all times and places.”

—Marvin Carlson, The Haunted Stage

Crave was first produced by the theatre company Paines Plough at the Traverse Theatre in Edinburgh on 13 August 1998. It is Kane’s fourth play and marks a stylistic transition from her earlier plays’ stark representations of violence. The themes of Crave remain similar to the rest of Kane’s oeuvre, including, love, pain, rape, gender, drugs, murder, suicide, and mental illness. In fact, the play was first presented by Kane under a pseudonym, “Marie Kelvedon,” to avoid the preconceived negative opinions of critics of her earlier work. The play is non-linear, has no determined setting, no scene or act breaks, and is highly poetic. The play’s four characters, C, M, B, and A speak to, with, and at each other. They interrupt each other’s stories, challenge details and nuances presented by another character, and ultimately disclose personal details that speak to the themes mentioned above.

The play calls for a director and actors who will take a writerly approach to its production. The play’s characters are not assigned sexes, although contextual clues within the script reveal them. C and M are female and B and A are male. With no stage directions or obvious dramatic action, the play is left largely in the hands of the artists producing the work. The text clearly recalls the work of Samuel Beckett among other absurdist dramatists as well as the poetry of T.S. Eliot, specifically, The Waste Land.
The play, perhaps, is not divergent with the style and form of her earlier work, but rather
the fulfillment of what the earlier plays promise. An experiential, affective theatrical event. The
objective of affecting the body of an audience remains the same as Kane’s earlier plays and still
deals with the same themes. Only the form has changed.

Crave is a memory play. It is a memory play in a multitude of different ways. The play’s
citationality recalls a rich theatrical and literary history. It is a memory play in the way that it
reuses previously written material and the way it recalls previously written characters. For
example, Saunders points out the connections between Blasted’s Ian and Cate and the
relationship between A and C. It is a memory play in its reception and immediate and pervasive
comparison between it and Kane’s other works. Most importantly, it is a memory play in its
content and its form. The theme of memory can be seen throughout the piece in the language.
Each character recalls the past (although they also discuss the present and point toward the
future),

A: A small boy had an imaginary friend. He took her to the beach and they played
in the sea. A man came from the water and took her away. The following morning
the body of a girl was found washed up on the beach.

M: I ran through the poppy field at the back of my grandfather’s farm. When I
burst in through the kitchen door I saw him sitting with my grandmother on his
lap. He kissed her on the lips and caressed her breast. They looked around and
saw me, smiling at my confusion. When I related this to my mother more than ten
years later she stared at me oddly and said ‘That didn’t happen to you. It
happened to me. My father died before you were born. When that happened I was pregnant with you, but I didn’t know it until the day of his funeral.¹⁵

These two examples show two different kinds of memory and there are multiple types of memory that are expressed throughout the performance. The first is a memory told as though it could be taken from a newspaper or from the personal life of the character. A, a pedophile, might be read as the man that took the girl away while the boy apparently understood his memory of her as imaginary. The second memory is more complicated; it is a memory supposedly experienced in utero. In it we gain an understanding of the confusing nature of memories and their lack of accuracy.

Yon Chae, Christin M Ogle, and Gail S Goodman, link false memory to attachment theory, suggesting that the attachment style between parent and child effects not only the relationship but the child’s memory, even the creation of false memories. Results show that children with less positive attachment to parents are more likely to produce false memories.⁶ Further still, false memories, even traumatic memories, can be “mistaken in significant respects.”⁷ H.C. Ellis and B.A. Moore note that “Mood effects appear in everyday memory situations with emotional as well as neutral materials, including false memories, autobiographical memory (including flashbulb memories) and eyewitness testimony.”⁸ Even the play itself notes the effects of mood on memories when C states, “That a mood can be repeated even if the event that caused it is trivial or forgotten.”⁹

Conversely there is also evidence that highly emotional events create what are called flashbulb memories in which an individual remembers things with great vividness and detail. For example, many US citizens can recall exactly where they were when the first plane hit the twin towers or when John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Ultimately, as Eric Eich and Jonathan W.
Schooler conclude, “emotion can make at least the central details of memories more vivid and memorable. At the same time, however, experiencing intense emotion during the encoding of an event does not ensure that the memory will necessarily remain accessible and accurate; indeed, emotional experiences can be misrecalled and sometimes even forgotten entirely.”

The range of memories and their various level of affect/emotion potential allow audiences to individually connect to or ignore various moments of Crave. This chapter utilizes the complexity, atypicality, non-referentiality/super-referentiality of Kane’s Crave to demonstrate the way that affect/emotion provoking theatre interacts with the cognitive process of memory to create performative moments and how the emotional/affective state induced, changes the performative moment’s valence and impact. The importance of memory within Crave will help to illustrate the dystopian performative’s connections to and influences on the nature of memory within the theatre, specifically its connection to trauma theory.

**Affect Infusion and Cognition**

The study of memory in the theatre has been explored from a wide variety of different perspectives, including Carlson’s The Haunted Stage, Peggy Phelan’s “Broken Symmetries: memory, sight, love” in Unmarked, Joseph Roach’s Cities of the Dead, Schechner’s notion of twice-behaved behavior, Odai Johnson’s Absence and Memory in Colonial American Theatre, Stanislavsky’s emotion memory, and even Tennessee Williams note on The Glass Menagerie: “being a ‘memory play,’ The Glass Menagerie can be presented with unusual freedom of convention.” Indeed, memory has become (perhaps it always was) a central concept within both the study and practice of the theatre arts. Its direct connection to emotion is far less prolific or demonstrated. David Krasner suggests, “empathy in theater is achieved by spectators through intuition, imagination, and memory, whereby audiences associate certain feelings or observations
with personal experiences.” Krasner’s focus, however, is not on the connection between empathy and memory but on the complexities of theatre’s creation of empathy. Attilio Favorini’s work on memory plays and their early twentieth century connections to the same ideas and concepts explored by the likes of Freud, Jung, and other early psychologists is closer to my own perspective as he relies on psychology and cognitive science to demonstrate how theatre, too, explores the psychological nature of memory. While Krasner focuses on the emotional, feeling, empathic capabilities of theatre ignoring the connection to memory, Favorini focuses on theatre’s relationship to memory while ignoring its connection to affect/emotion.

The connection between emotion and memory, or rather the way in which thinking shapes and alters emotional experience and emotion shapes and alters thinking/thought/reason, is an interplay recognized throughout most the literature on affect/emotion. Exploring the connection between affect/emotion and more cognitive processes is another step toward understanding affect/emotion’s impact on the theatrical experience of dystopian performatives. Krasner also recognizes this connection (although not specifically to memory): “Empathy, I maintain, works in conjunction with reason, rather than in opposition to it.” While most contemporary cognitive and affect/emotion scientists clearly recognize this connection, the necessity to state it explicitly, as Krasner does, may be motivated by the long time reliance on the Cartesian dualism of mind/body, the separation of emotion and reason within the humanities. Willie Van Peer’s “Toward a Poetics of Emotion” succinctly sums up the general problem:

I propose that the source of the problem is located in the opposition between emotions and reason. This opposition forms the core of what could be called the “folk theory” of emotions. It argues that emotions are unimpeded by our reasoned selves. […] According to the folk model, “one can direct one’s thoughts but one
cannot control one’s feelings, which are a natural consequence of events. And feelings can become so strong they prevent clear thinking and lead to irrational action” (D’Andrade 1995, 218). The view would be innocent, and the debate over the opposition it paints between reason and emotions would be futile, if it were not so deeply entrenched in our culture. Plato is certainly not the only philosopher who propounded the view. […] The point is, however, that the folk theory of emotions is wrong; if there is one point on which all emotion psychologists concur, it is the conclusion that reason and feeling are not in fact opposites.15

Following Van Peer’s call for a more nuanced understanding of emotion, this chapter will take the connection between cognition and affect/emotion in a more specific direction than Favorini or Krasner to explore how the emotions specifically effect one of the primary constructing ideas of theatre, memory.

Of all Kane’s work, her transition into what many refer to as postdramatic theatre verges most clearly into the realm of memory. Crave, in particular, mirrors the ethereal and illusive nature of memory, as it is often misremembered, jumbled, and sometimes difficult to sort. Within affect/emotion research memory stands as one mode of cognition that has been well studied. Most researchers agree there are two primary types of memory, implicit and explicit. Taking a cue from David Freedberg’s “Memory in Art: History and the Neuroscience of Response” we might understand the distinction between these two types with regard to art in the following terms,

Explicit memory includes recollection of events and facts, of the textual sources for particular images, and of whatever may be acquired from the oral tradition (tradition being an especially salient term when it comes to explicit memory). The
kinds of implicit memory most relevant here include the performance of actions (involving motor cortex and cerebellum) and the feeling of emotions (particularly involving the amygdala) without conscious awareness of drawing on experience or memory.\(^{16}\)

Explicit memory, then, is that of which we are cognitively aware, while implicit memory is that which we know or experience without cognitive awareness. Leonard Berkowitz in *Causes and Consequences of Feelings* relies on a well-known example of a Vietnam Veteran who, when participating in a parade on the Fourth of July, experiences a flashback to his wartime experience when a child throws a firecracker into his jeep. The veteran slammed on the gas and crashed the vehicle. According to Berkowitz, “The veteran had retained an implicit memory of a traumatic wartime experience that was suddenly reawakened by the exploding firecracker, even though he consciously knew he was safe at home.”\(^{17}\) With regard to a traumatic memory like that experienced by the Vietnam veteran, a number of theories have been put forward according to Eich and Schooler: repression, dissociation, and pure-sensory processing. Repression is explained as an “ego-defensive function” that actively keeps the traumatic memory out of consciousness. Dissociation “suggests that traumatized individuals detach or dissociate themselves from ongoing experience, thereby radically altering the way in which the experience is encoded and later retrieved.” And pure-sensory processing, much like dissociation’s effect on the encoding of a memory, argues that traumatic events are only encoded in sensory form.\(^{18}\)

Of particular interest here is the notion of dissociation and pure-sensory processing. Dissociation, in particular, has been used to study the history of traumatic events. Dominick LaCapra’s *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, for example, provides a more poetic definition, “Trauma brings about a dissociation of affect and representation: one disorientingly feels what
one cannot represent; one numbingly represents what one cannot feel.”\textsuperscript{19} What LaCapra is describing is a view shared by scientists such as Sven-Åke Christianson and Elisabeth Engelbert, who note, “Several cases in the literature suggest an interesting double dissociation between memory for emotional information and memory for specific event information. That is, sometimes people seem to exhibit retention of the emotional component of an event without having access to specific event information, or remember specific event information without having access to the emotional component of the event.”\textsuperscript{20} In general, affect/emotion related memories are tied to implicit memory systems and as will be argued in this chapter, \textit{Crave} strives to tap into and create implicit memories far more than explicit declarative knowledge.

Beyond explicit and implicit memory, cognitive and affect/emotion research has worked diligently to determine how affect/emotion states of being effect memory in a wide range of ways.\textsuperscript{21} The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), which actually developed out of research into conflicting data within results testing the voracity of the Affect Priming Theory, is particularly salient for this study. The primary difference between the two theories is that AIM takes into consideration the effect of different cognitive processing strategies while the Affect Priming Theory tests only whether an induced mood effects memory in any way (recall, encoding, judgment based, etc.). AIM successfully accounts for the conflicting data collected in earlier studies in which one experiment would produce congruence between mood/emotion and memory while another would not. Elaine Fox’s \textit{Emotion Science} offers a concise definition of this theory: “The AIM defines affect infusion as the process by which affectively salient information becomes incorporated into cognitive and behavioral processes and exerts a congruent influence.”\textsuperscript{22} To put it simply, experienced affect/emotion has a direct effect on the way we think
and behave in a given moment, depending on the context and the processing strategy of the subject in question.

AIM theorizes four types of processing relevant to the study of affect infusion. The low-infusion strategies of “Direct Access” and “Motivated Processing,” and the high-infusion strategies of “Heuristic Processing” and “Substantive Processing.” A short description of each is provided below from Gordon H. Bower and Joseph P. Forgas’s “Affect, Memory, and Social Cognition”:

1. The direct access strategy is the simplest method of producing an opinion or evaluation, based on the strongly cued retrieval of stored cognitive contents. Most of us have a rich repertoire of such crystallized, predetermined opinions to draw on when conditions do not warrant more extensive processing.

2. The motivated processing strategy assumes that a strong, preexisting objective guides information processing; thus, little constructive or unguided processing occurs, reducing the likelihood of affect infusion. […] Motivated processing involves more than just a motivation to be accurate (cf. Kunda, 1990): it also suggests that a specific directional goal will often dominate and guide information search and judgments.

3. Highly vulnerable to affect infusion through mechanisms such as the affect-as-information heuristic, heuristic processing tends to occur when neither a crystallized response nor a strong motivational goal influences subjects’s
processing strategies, and they lack either personal involvement or sufficient processing resources. Therefore, they follow a heuristic strategy to compute a response with the least amount of effort, relying on limited information and using whatever shortcuts are available to them.

4. Substantive processing, the most extended and constructive strategy for information processing, has the greatest susceptibility to affect infusion. During substantive processing, people need to select, learn, interpret, and process information about a task and relate this information to preexisting knowledge structures using memory processes. Most single-process models [like those used in the Affect Priming Theory] imply that such vigilant information processing is the norm. In contrast, within the AIM, substantive processing is essentially a default option, adopted only when one cannot use simpler and less effortful processing strategies.\(^\text{23}\)

Several cognitive theories have been put forward to understand exactly what the processing in each of the above instances actually entails. I will provide a brief description of two related kinds that are well respected: Gordon Bower’s Associative Network Theory and the less clearly defined Schema Theory.

Associative Network Theory is based in the idea that facts, ideas, concepts, emotions, images, etc. held “in our long-term memories are stored as nodes within a complex network.”\(^\text{24}\)

To formulate a theatrical example, method acting might be in a node near and connected to other nodes, such as, Stanislavsky, Adler, Brando, The Group Theatre, realism, emotion memory, famous, plays, theatre, blocking, motivation, etc. The nodes are organized based on semantic
relationships, thus method acting-Stanislavsky would be found closer together in the network then method acting-Grotowski. According to Fox, “the assumption is that when a particular node is activated […] an activation spreads out around the network like a wave, activating closely related concepts more than distantly related concepts.”25 The idea that a mood, emotion, affect, can represent such a node and thus assist in the connection of various concepts is one explanation of how affect/emotion effects cognition.

Schema theory, first developed by Jean Piaget in the 1920s is connected to Associative Network Theory in that both suggest a structure to memory that operates in an interconnected way; however, schema theory is also more of a framework, perspective, or world view that colors the interpretation of memories and ideas. For example, Gender Schema Theory as put forward by Sandra Lipsitz Bem suggests, “sex-typing derives in large measure from gender-schematic processing, from a generalized readiness on the part of the child to encode and to organize information—including information about the self—according to culture’s definitions of maleness and femaleness.”26 Other common schemas include negative schema, which is used to cognitively explain depression and depressive behavior. Ellis and Moore state, “depression is associated with biased attention and memory for affectively negative information.”27 Thus, a person with a negative schema disproportionately runs cognitive processes through negative networks of ideas, concepts, and affects. Schema theory, unlike Associative Network Theory, can be more specific to a given set of circumstances. AIM suggest, as seen above, four different processing styles that are determined on the basis of the features of the task (“familiarity, typicality, complexity, difficulty”), the task’s influence on the individual (“goals, personal relevance, cognitive capacity, affective state”), and features of the situation (“publicity, social desirability, accuracy need, and scrutiny”). The processing styles determine, for example, how an
individual will cognitively move through the associative network or schema to come to a conclusion or resolution of the cognitive task.

Memory is an active process that is, or rather, can be influenced by the affect/emotion state of an individual or, in the case of this chapter, an audience member. The complexity of remembering and the seemingly infinite variables that can effect the cognitive and affect/emotion process, is reminiscent of Derrida’s description of the inevitability of citationality in his “Signature Event Context”:

Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoke or written (in the current sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring [ancrage].

This breaking with a given context and lack of absolute anchoring is only partially accurate when considering the AIM. Low-infusion processing strategies function on the basis of clear contexts utilized to minimize effort in the cognitive process. Within these processes (direct and motivated) affect/emotion has very little effect on cognition and behavior. It is only in the high-infusion processing strategies (heuristic, and substantive) in which the mind more freely breaks with given contexts to explore the infinity of possible contexts within the memory, that affect/emotion becomes a salient factor. The iterabilty, citationality, performativity, twice-behaved nature of, and even the theatre as memory-machine that is claimed for performance events may actually be more cognitively and affective/emotionally effective in contexts that require substantive processing: contexts that are atypical, complex and require openness. As Fox
puts it, “this strategy [substantive processing strategy] is most likely to be adopted when the task is difficult or complex or when it is novel and there is no motivational goal to guide processing. Affect infusion effects are very likely to occur with this strategy because of the reliance on constructive and generative processes that may selectively prime access to affectively congruent thoughts, memories and interpretations.”

The shift in Kane’s work, marked by *Crave* and followed up subsequently in *Psychosis* seeks to create an event that requires substantive processing, an event with character names like C, M, B, A; scripts with no discernible plot; atypical characters that are not clearly defined; etc. The infusion of affect/emotion into the cognitive process, where feelings, emotions, and moods become just as important in cognitive work as facts and data, allow for performative moments that are liminal, anti-structural, open, and that ultimately allow for utopian thought (both utopic and dystopic).

Further still, these Barthesian writerly approaches to cognition may be differently created when paired with negative affect/emotion as opposed to positive affect/emotion. Fox points to studies that show,

that people in happy mood states are more likely to endorse ethnic names as being members of stereotypical categories, while those in negative mood states are more accurate in recognition judgments and are less likely to be lured by stereotypical information […] these studies indicate that positive mood states can result in a greater reliance on general knowledge and stereotypes with a resulting increased number of intrusion errors in memory.

This serves to illustrate that the type of affect/emotion experienced is important to the creation of either a utopian or dystopian performative moment. While Dolan suggests that utopian
performatives may be found in dystopic content, it seems that the creation of negative affect/emotion in an audience might also create a different experiential performative moment, a dystopian performative. This distinction is particularly evident when considering the connections between emotions elicited and the cognitive processes they influence and alter. Kane’s *Crave* offers the complex, atypical, non-referential contexts that are required to engage substantive processing and allow for affect infusion. *Crave’s* reliance on the complexity of memory engages the substantive processing strategy and creates the potential for dystopian performative moments linked to not only variation in affect/emotion but the social and cultural ideologies of an audience.

**Craving Anonymity: The Power of Ambiguity**

“Memories of abuse, pain and the terrible inequality of love pulse through the play like a throbbing, infected wound. Death Beckons, with an enticement that proved irresistible.”

—Charles Spencer, *Daily Telegraph* 14 May 2001

Marie Kelvedon’s *Crave* sought to break with the playwright that penned *Blasted*, *Cleansed*, and *Phaedra’s Love*; however, based on the fact that I could not locate a single review that didn’t acknowledge Sarah Kane as the playwright, it seems her pseudonym was either exceptionally short lived or more or less ineffective. This may be in no small part because of the biography that Kane penned for her fictional self:

Marie Kelvedon is twenty-five. She grew up in Germany in British Forces accommodation and returned to Britain at sixteen to complete her schooling. She was sent down from St Hilda’s college, Oxford, after her first term, for an act of unspeakable Dadaism in the college dining hall. She has had her short stories published in various European literary magazines and has a volume of poems
Onzuiver (‘Impure’) published in Belgium and Holland. Her Edinburgh Fringe Festival debut was in 1996, a spontaneous happening through a serving hatch to an audience of one. Since leaving Holloway she has worked as a mini-cab driver, a roadie with the Manic Street Preachers and as a continuity announcer for BBC Radio World Service. She now lives in Cambridgeshire with her cat, Grotowski.33

The obviously outlandish biography would alert any regular theatre goer that Marie Kelvedon was not a real person. Kane’s construction of Crave and the press that she created around the piece, including her biography of Marie Kelvedon play with the concept of memory, specifically in theatre. Here was a playwright according to Vicky Featherstone (the director of the premiere in Edinburgh) trying to escape the memory of her previous work, “In one way, she thought it was funny. Marie was her middle name, Kelvedon was a town near where she was born. But, in another way, it was deadly serious. She had spent a lot of time shaking off the negative effects of Blasted. She really wanted to write something that could be judged for what it was, rather than for the fact that it had been written by Sarah Kane.”34 The mode of escape is also a memory, the pseudonym being based on part of her name and where she was born. There is also a dissociation between the Kane that delivered Crave to a writer’s workshop hosted by Paines Plough and the Kane that included the above biography in the program at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival. As Simon Hattenstone’s remembrance of Kane’s work, “A Sad Hurrah,” notes, “the beginnings of Crave were read out, in front of Sarah, to the workshop, and the writers decided Marie Kelvedon was a great talent.”35 What perhaps started as deadly serious concern that the play wouldn’t be taken for what it was, turned to an almost comic take on the self. The biography of Marie Kelvedon, while clearly comic, doesn’t necessarily deviate from what might be believed about Sarah Kane. For example, the oft told anecdote involving one of Kane’s tutors at Bristol
University accusing her of writing a pornographic essay and Kane’s response of throwing a pile of pornographic magazines at him in their next session. As Hattenstone tells the story, Kane also added, “that if he wanted to wank he should do it with these instead.”

Hattenstone boils the mythicness of Kane’s bad “girlness” down in a few simple words: “everyone who knew Sarah Kane has an anecdote. The world is full of Sarah Kane anecdotes. She was such a wild child, she savaged the drink, said what she wanted to, did what she wanted to.” That is, all the wild stories are perhaps nothing but anecdote, exaggerated or not, they don’t tell who Kane was as a person. Marie Kelvedon’s biography might be read as a satiric take on the biographies written and told about Kane herself. Importantly, this was a satiric read of not only how she was viewed, but how she also contributed to those perspectives. Kane’s “The only thing I remembered is” essay published in *The Guardian* in 1998 lists her second favorite play as “a live sex show in Amsterdam about a witch sucking the Grim Reaper’s cock.” Kane was well aware of the perspectives and memories of the British public, well aware of how she had contributed to them, and how she might work against them.

All of this play with memory and public perception is directly connected to the kind of theatre that Kane hoped to create (visceral, experiential, Artaudian, Beckettian, corporeal, etc.). Memory was an important part of these bodily experiences. As Kane writes, “Theatre has no memory, which makes it the most existential of the arts. No doubt that is why I keep coming back, in the hope that someone in a dark room somewhere will show me an image that burns itself into my mind, leaving a mark more permanent than the moment itself.” This is the desire for dystopian or utopian performative moments. An embodied doing capable of leaving a mark long after the theatre event itself is gone. Somewhat confusingly, Kane suggests that memory is absent from the the theatre. She isn’t denying that theatre is a mechanism for creating memories
or images burned into the mind, but that it often fails and that its ephemeral nature compounds
the issue. Part of this failure rests in the way that affect/emotion does or does not effect the
memory. Bower and Forgas discuss this kind of possibility with regard to mood congruence:
“The absence of mood congruence has been documented when happy or sad subjects are asked
to process information about highly familiar and specific issues about which they already possess
extensive knowledge that can be directly accessed.”40 In other words, mood does not effect what
and how well we remember something if the subject of attention is typical or highly familiar. As
Kane challenges theatrical conventions with regard to content, form, and the very nature of the
experience, she forces audiences into a substantive processing strategy improving the possibility
of burning an image into someone’s mind that is specifically linked to the experiential
affect/emotion of the play. An atypical experience, that requires careful attention, and is open to
a wide range of disparate interpretations stands the best chance of initiating a dystopian
performative that creates a lasting mark.

The critical response to Crave was quite possibly the most positive reaction to any of her
plays, although it still had its detractors. What is interesting is the way that reviews heralded
Crave as a changing point in the history and memory of Kane. Most tellingly, in a single line
from Benedict Nightingale’s review in the Times, an understanding of the critical response to
Crave can be had: “Who would have predicted Kane could write so beautifully?”41 Similarly,
Kate Stratton, writing for Time Out, asks, “So Sarah Kane isn’t a wordsmith, eh?”42 Almost all
the reviews are framed in the memory of what they thought Kane was and what they now saw in
Crave. Michael Billington, writing for The Guardian, states, “The effect is liberating rather than
anarchic; and, in the case of Kane, it means she has been able to escape from the imprisoning
image of her as a lurid sensationalist. After Crave, she is able to walk free,”43 Nicholas De Jongh
proclaims, “Sarah Kane has been born again as a playwright.” John Peter begins with a series of questions, “Where are the frontiers of pornography and voyeurism? Is it the task of the arts to shock people? If you feel driven to expose something shocking, are you still a moral being?” Peter does all of this to distinguish the earlier work of Kane, which many have considered pornographic and voyeuristic, with Crave, a play of “personal pain,” and mostly of language.

Samantha Marlowe’s review for What’s On similarly compares her overtly violent early plays to Crave: “Beneath the gore and the cruelty, Kane’s plays are connected by a thread of fascination with love and the problem of expressing it. Crave proves beyond doubt, if proof were needed, that she can explore this territory with all her usual vibrancy when the violence is psychological and internalized rather than overt.” Others compare the vastly different setting of the plays, Jeremy Kingston for example compares the “blasted hotel room” of Blasted and the “fouled space” of Cleansed with the “disconcertingly clean and precise” set of Crave.

On one level the response to Crave was initially one of comparison and memory, and specifically an attempt to reconcile the two Kanes (the violence laden early work with the now extremely poetic voice of Crave). The response was also one of tracing the theatrical genealogy of Kane’s plays. All of Kane’s work has been connected to a rich theatrical legacy, mostly by academic scholars as opposed to critics, the likes of which include Shakespeare, Artaud, Brecht, Edward Bond, Caryl Churchill, Howard Baker, Greek and Roman Tragedy, Beckett, and T.S. Eliot, to name the few that immediately spring to mind. With Crave, however, these influences and predecessors are noted far more frequently by the critics. Paul Taylor’s review for the Independent links the play to both Beckett’s drama and T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land. Billington specifically links Crave to the lyrical rhythms of Waiting for Godot. Both Kate Stratton and Susannah Clapp mention the allusions to the Bible that are found in Crave.
recalls Wallace Shawn’s *The Designated Mourner* that appeared in the same theatre the year before. Large portions of a significant number of reviews of the original production are dedicated to remembering who Kane was pre-*Crave* and who she was in connection to theatrical genealogy, post-*Crave*. That is, *Crave*’s lack of connection with her previous productions and its remarkable connection to a wide swathe of literary traditions. This illustrates further the way in which the play generates substantive cognitive processing in its audiences. The active and engaged search for meaning in atypical, complex situations allows for higher degrees of affect infusion, that is affect/emotional effects on memory and cognition. Fox states, “affect infusion is most likely to occur when one of the high infusion strategies is adopted [substantive processing], that is, when the overall situation promotes an open, elaborate and constructive information-processing style.” Whereas the reviewers active search for connections to previous theatrical tradition and comparison to Kane’s previous work suggests a more open cognitive process—then, for example, Jack Tinker’s initial response to a play like *Blasted*, that is, “A disgusting feast of filth,”—it also suggests that the potential dystopian performatives of the show will have a larger propensity to effect the cognitive and behavioral response of *Crave*’s audience. This is the symbiotic relationship between cognition and affect/emotion that gives Kane’s plays their power to seriously comment on social and cultural issues. For example, the experience of sexual abuse embodied in C is brought into conversation with rape culture and gendered power dynamics by coaxing the audience to first process this information with a substantive strategy and experience the pain involved through affect infusion. In Kane’s open text, the social and cultural issues brought to bare through substantive processing and affect infusion (i.e. a dystopian performative) are likely personal and tailored to each individual audience member’s experience of the feelings generated.
The third focus of the general response to the original production deals with the heart of the matter: the experience of the play in performance. Dominic Cavendish’s review for the *Independent* aptly describes the experience:

*Crave* is a 45-minute verbal assault: line after snappy line of thought and feeling so at odds with each other that your responses are pushed to polarities. One minute, it’s as though you are being subjected to piercing insight, the next, light-headed nonsense. Although there’s not a torture implement in sight, this doesn’t make for any easier viewing than *Blasted, Cleansed*, or the Seneca update *Phaedra’s Love*.53

Mark Fisher, for *The Harold*, labels the play “compelling” noting that its dialogue, is “spare, enigmatic, and disturbing” and describing the overall performance as “a cerebral experimental experience, and a rewarding one.”54 Michael Billington suggests the play “is full of neurotic tension,”55 Jeremy Kingston specifically notes a moment in the play that was particularly salient for him personally, “but then out comes a line like ‘The scream of a daffodil’, that for personal reasons of my own has a terrible resonance, leading me to suppose others may find its equivalent elsewhere.”56 Paul Taylor describes the performance, “Powerfully attuned to the writing’s rhythmic urgency, Vicky Featherstone’s excellent production sweeps you up into a world of dreadful emotional and spiritual blight.”57 As a final example of the plays affect/emotion impact, take Kate Stratton’s review for *Time Out*,

This is a play you have to follow with the concentration demanded by a poetry recital. It’s rarely clear what is happening to these characters—are they fully fleshed individuals or conflicting parts of a collapsing mind? But as the piece progresses, Kane adds a little shading here, a little depth there, until she envelopes
the audience in emotional debris. The result is a hugely unnerving theatrical experience, shot through with the language of the Bible and a genuine poetic richness.58

Throughout these examples an emotional and cognitive experience is described. “Emotional debris” is mixed with “concentration.” “Piercing insight” is paired with “torture implement.” Crave is described as “cerebral” while also recognizing a powerfully embodied affect/emotion. I interpret these pairings and congruencies as an indication that affect infusion is, on some level, taking place within the audience of critics who saw the original production. The demand for “concentration,” the suggestion that “your responses are pushed to polarities,” and the resonance of particular lines to particular audience members who might have “personal reasons” indicates a level of substantive processing that is directly related to affect/emotion experience and in some cases connected to past memories, affective or otherwise—although “terrible resonance” does suggest more than a simple cognitive connection. The combination of both cognitive and emotional processing seen in the reviews of Crave demonstrates the potential of the dystopian performative. It can be individual and communal, but most importantly it places affect/emotion into a conversation dominated by cognition and recognizes the power of the body to contribute to our actions, behaviors, thoughts, judgments, and social/cultural attitudes.

True to form, Kane’s play also impacted the actors of the original production. Kane notes,

We also had a nasty injury scare. During the second preview, Paul Hickey had to stop the performance due to sudden paralysis on one side of his face. The entire company was aghast, fearing he’d had a stroke. The doctor assured us it was
merely hyperventilation (read ‘overacting’) caused by the ludicrous demands set by my text and Vicky’s insistence on performance.⁵⁹

An injury scare in a play in which the actors primarily sit in chairs facing the audience is an impressive feat in itself, but the fact that it had to do with ludicrous—I assume cognitive, psychological, and emotional—demands of the text and performance gives an indication of the psychophysical ramifications of Crave. Considering the operation of mirror neurons within the audience, one would assume that an actor experiencing this serious of a psychophysical response would provoke a strong empathetic response in the audience.

Negative reviews of the performance can also be interpreted through dystopian performatives created via the affect infusion model. Michael Coveney’s review for the Daily Mail states, “Four unnamed characters sit on chairs and talk of love, loss, and desire like wound-up automatons, not anyone pulsatingly human. Abstract emotions are itemised as undramatic poetry.”⁶⁰ Nicholas De Jongh ultimately describes the play as “emotionally overwrought” and suggests that, “in her effort to mine a vein of poetic lyricism Kane unearths no more than leaden deposits.”⁶¹ In both these cases, echoed in later reviews of future productions, affect infusion can fail and the play becomes lead, automatic, and doesn’t communicate the emotions portrayed in the piece. The opposite of the substantive processing model is provoked in which preconceived notions of either Kane or this style of theatre limit or eliminate the potential of dystopian performative moments. The direct access strategy seems the most obvious possibility, as both reviews by Coveney and De Jongh clearly understand the underlying meaning of the play—De Jongh even recognizes its affinity to Beckett, Pinter, and T.S. Eliot—they simply seem to disagree that the meaning is communicated in an affective, experiential way. In direct access processing the audience member experiences the show and makes a judgment on what it is
quickly without divergent thinking. Another possibility is motivated processing. In this case, the audience member would attend the production perhaps knowing something of Kane’s reputation. This cognitive process involves a preconceived notion of what their response should be and they are motivated to fit their objective in watching the show with their experience. Ken Urban’s review of Randy Sharp’s production of *Crave* (at Axis Theatre Production’s US premiere of the play) makes clear the potential failure to create an affective/emotionally impactful production stating that Sharp “failed to capture Kane’s strengths […] turn[ing] *Crave* into a static and dull piece of theatre.” For Urban this occurred because the production attempted to make clear through the use of “‘real’ emotional moment[s],” contextualizing video, and too strong of a focus on the author’s biography, the meaning of the play. Ben Brantley, reviewing the same production for the *New York Times* similarly notes, “having the actors, who stand through the whole of the hour long performance, turn to each other and make contact, as they sometimes do, seems too literal-minded; it focuses attention on the wrong things, like the possibility of a plot.” He goes on to similarly critique the color video screens stating that “if this is meant to underscore their [the characters] isolation and psychological splinteredness, it is belaboring the obvious.” These reviewers understand the importance of the complexity, confusion, and atypicality of the production to its theatrical impact. In scientific terms, they understand that substantive processing will allow for more affect/emotion congruence and thus a dystopian performative moment. It also points out the necessity of the embodied affect/emotion of the dystopian performative. Without affect infusion via substantive cognitive processing, the play is left lifeless, boring, and static. Cognition alone does not provide the same potential to alter a spectator as the combination of the body and mind.
When it comes to *Crave* it seems that less is often more. In reviews of productions from the last two decades critics tend to agree that *Crave* is more successful in its complexity of thought and simplicity of staging. Attempted clarity for the audience seems to end in a lack of uptake. Lyn Gardner, in her review of a 2012 production of *Crave* at Hull Truck Theatre, describes the staging as containing “Beckettian simplicity and brittleness” while concluding that the performance is “a demanding evening on the audience” that leaves them “clinging to the cliff face overlooking the abyss.”³⁶⁴ Three years later, Lyn Gardner in a 2015 review of a revival by Sheffield Theaters simply concedes, “I’ve seen *Crave* produced in many ways, and a straightforward approach seems to suit it best.”³⁶⁵ Of the same production Ian Shuttleworth calls *Crave*, “one of the purest examples of theatre: It is of the essence of the piece that we hear and see these words being delivered by people in the same time and space with us, sharing the moment of utterance.”³⁶⁶ *Crave* creates these dystopian performative moments explicitly by connecting cognition with affect/emotion. The probable invocation of a substantitive processing model which can produce congruence with the negative emotions presented in the script creates an experience in which the audience is confronted with traumatic memory. This notion of a dystopic performative experience is directly tied to literary theories of trauma and their representation. For example, it may actually lead to a strategy for producing what Dominick LaCapra calls “empathic unsettlement” and be related to what he calls the “middle voice.” Empathic unsettlement for LaCapra involves the disruption of identification with a traumatic experience while maintaining a degree of empathy that allows for understanding. As LaCapra states, “empathic unsettlement poses a barrier to closure in discourse and places in jeopardy harmonizing or spiritually uplifting accounts of extreme events from which we attempt to derive reassurance or benefit.”³⁶⁷ LaCapra also suggests that middle voice may be the appropriate form
to approach the representation of trauma. Middle voice is in-between the passive and the active modes of speech: “The middle voice would thus be in the ‘in-between’ voice of undecidability and the unavailability or radical ambivalence of clear-cut positions.”\textsuperscript{68} Middle voice is a strategy meant to evoke substantive cognitive processing. Atypical, complex situations are connected to affect/emotion experiences that empathically allow the audience members to experience without identification, to be unsettled. This effect, I argue, is born out in the reviews of the show.

Further, LaCapra connects the notion of middle voice to the ideals of utopia, in a “more affirmative register, there is a sense in which the middle voice may be related to an unheard-of utopia of generosity or gift giving beyond, or in excess of, calculation, positions, judgments, and victimization of the other.”\textsuperscript{69} While LaCapra is unsure whether the discursive leap to utopia would yield positive results in communicating trauma, I would argue that the experience of Dolan’s utopian performative or my own dystopian performative allows for a communal experience that very much speaks to the in-between nature of the middle voice on a larger scale than a single reader.

While LaCapra’s theorization of writing trauma through a middle voice to achieve empathic unsettlement matches well with the cognitive/memory connections to affect/emotion, the ideas presented by E. Ann Kaplan aren’t as clear cut. Clearly, Kaplan’s focus on vicarious trauma, defined as, a witness “feel[ing] the pain evoked by empathy arousing mechanism interacting with their own previous traumatic experience,” lines up with the notion of affect/emotion altering the way in which an audience remembers and thinks about a performance.\textsuperscript{70} Kaplan’s notion of empty empathy; however, posits more of a problem. Empty empathy, for Kaplan, is “empathy elicited by images [or performance, or speech, etc.] of suffering provided without any context or background knowledge.”\textsuperscript{71} Kaplan is specifically
talking about the way in which the media used images from the Iraq war to control the action of US American people through empty empathy, or empathy that has no correlate in action. The way in which the images told personalized stories instead of focusing on the larger issues is one way in which the media evoked empty empathy. *Crave* is a play without much context or knowledge that bolsters it or prescribes interpretation and judgment. In fact, John Peter notes the shift from “public apocalypse to personal pain” in his review of *Crave.* Here he is referring to the more global coverage of the atrocities of war and violence in Kane’s earlier plays, *Cleansed* and *Blasted* in particular, instead of the more personal trauma of the nameless characters in *Crave.* Indeed, the dystopian performative or Dolan’s utopian performative cannot be readily linked to the action suggested by Kaplan’s question of a viewer’s response to violent imagery: “yet what action is commensurate with the agony witnessed?” Kaplan is correct in suggesting that empathy elicited through clearly packaged and focused portrayals of war for a specific public doesn’t yield changes to the way the US supports, accepts, or contributes to wars and that this is, in fact, the purpose of such portrayals. We might equally say that *Crave* doesn’t elicit immediate or recognizable change to the way we handle rape, abuse, or any of the other traumatic memories described within the performance. But there are directed purposes to such portrayals. The distributed images of the Iraq war steals focus from the ethical problems of war. *Crave*’s manipulation of cognition and affect/emotion forces a dystopian performative moment in which the audience—through more complex cognitive processes and affect infusion—are highly impacted on an individual and communal level. Empathic unsettlement or empty empathy both point to the power of empathic response to fuel cognition and behavior. Based on the affect infusion model we know that higher degrees of atypicality and complexity and less generalized knowledge and context increase the congruency between cognition and affect/emotion. Not all
such infusions are necessarily empty because they take advantage of the interaction between cognition and affect/emotion. Kane perhaps sums up this problem best herself when discussing the genesis of *Blasted*, “‘what could possibly be the connection between a common rape in a Leeds hotel room [in a production of *Blasted*] and what’s happening in Bosnia?’ And then suddenly the penny dropped and I thought: ‘Of course, it’s obvious. One is the seed and the other is the tree.’” Kaplan points out a real problem with the way US media represents war to the public, labeling the effect empty empathy. *Crave*, however, through dystopian performatives produced by an unfocused, affective/emotional experience, with little context and a high degree of interpretation can avoid the pitfalls of empty empathy used to further an agenda or to benefit one group over another.

**Craving a Reading**

Next to *Phaedra’s Love*, *Crave* is possibly Kane’s least written about play. It doesn’t have the appeal of being her final play and it is stylistically similar to *4.48 Psychosis*. Presciently, Aleks Sierz’s 2001 monograph on the In-Yer-Face theatre movement posits four different “reading strategies” to understand *Crave*: the “rationalist approach,” the “Eng. Lit approach,” the biographical approach, and the “experienced as performance” approach. These general categories serve as an excellent framework for understanding the academic response to *Crave*.

The rationalist approach as defined by Sierz is the “attempt to work it out as a coherent play.” For Sierz this approach primarily indicates critics, audience members, and scholars who try to define the plays characters, plot, story, theme, message, etc. It delimits the play’s interpretation in such a way that I argue is damaging for the elicitation of a dystopian performative. While the scholars themselves are engaging in substantive processing the
rationality of the work seeks to actually undo the atypicality of the play. Through explanation substantive processing is reduced and affect infusion is limited. While there are not any number of scholars explicitly stating what the play means, this type of understanding can be seen in the reviews of critics such as Michael Coveney and Nicholas De Jongh. There is perhaps no source that is guiltier of prescribing meaning onto the play that delimits interpretive potential, than Sarah Kane herself. As she notes in an interview with Dan Rebellato, A, B, C and M for me do have specific meanings, which I am prepared to tell you: which is, A was (A is many things) is the author, abuser, Alistair as in Alistair Crowley, who wrote some interesting books which some might like to read. Antichrist. My brother came up with Arsehole, which I thought was quite good. There was also the actor who I originally wrote it for, who was called Andrew. So that was how A came about. M was simply mother. B was Boy. And C was Child. But I didn’t want to write those things down because then I thought they’ll get fixed in those things forever and never ever change [sic].

Perhaps, somewhat ironically, it is this interpretation of the characters that most often shape casting for the play, although not always.

As Sarah Kane delivers at least some specific meaning to the text itself, other scholars focus their rationales on the form of the play more than the content and meaning. For example, Eckart Voigts-Virchow, “‘We are anathema’—Sarah Kane’s plays as post dramatic theatre versus the ‘dreary and repugnant tale of sense’” concludes that Crave and 4.48 Psychosis are the most formally post-dramatic texts of Kane’s, but that based on reception of her earlier work, specifically Blasted and Cleansed, these earlier plays produced more of the effect that is desired
within post-dramatic theatre. Voigts-Virchow relies on Hans-Thies Lehmann’s definition of post-dramatic theatre,

Roughly, post-dramatic theatre may be defined as a set of theatrical means that transform the Aristotelean formula (mimetic illusionism, narrative, impersonation and dialogue) in performance spaces. This kind of theatre turns the normative dramatic text into a lost theatretext, which simply triggers off an autonomous performance seeking to go beyond dramatic action, beyond impersonation, beyond dialogue and, finally, beyond illusionism, referentiality and representation.

In this regard *Crave* (as well as *4.48 Psychosis*) are clearly closer to theatretext than Kane’s earlier work, as they lack narrative, character, and “meaningful” dialogue. But what is beyond referentiality and representation? According to Voigts-Virchow, it involves the disentanglement of affects and representations. If it is an embodied experience free from the cognitive apparatus of representation, then Voigt-Virchow is perhaps picking up on the trajectory of Kane’s work that is laid out here in this dissertation: a move from less complex embodied dystopian performatives (autonomic activation of various affects) to more complex dystopian performatives (affect/emotion infused into the cognitive processes of the audience). This trajectory maps the necessity of removing cognition from understanding theatre (an apparently post-dramatic emphasis) in order to allow for the more complex dystopian performative, a mixture of cognition and affect/emotion. In this regard, Bert O. States’s notion of binocular vision is in-line with the dystopian performative, particularly as found in *Crave*.

Defining *Crave* through theatrical form is not limited to an exploration of post-dramatic theatre. Clare Wallace’s “Sarah Kane, experiential theatre and the revenant avant-garde,” sets up
Kane’s body of work as not avant-garde but as an extension of the avant-garde. She tracks Kane’s connection to avant-garde theory (as defined primarily by Christopher Innes insistence that “the recurrent feature of avant-garde theatre is primitivism, ‘an aspiration to transcendence, to the spiritual in its widest sense.”79) and establishes how even as her later work became more distanced from the primitive or primal focus of the avant-garde, they extend the methods and viewpoints of modernist and avant-garde movements through other means. In her own words, “it is an uncompromising but irreverent mix of anti-naturalistic experiment, absolutist in timbre, truth-seeking in aspiration, provocative in its viscerality, fragmenting of character and excessiveness. It extends the traditions upon which it draws.”80 Still, resonances to the combination of affect/emotion and cognition, a complex dystopian performative moment, can be seen.

Christina Delgado-García’s “Subversion, Refusal, and Contingency: The Transgression of Liberal-Humanist Subjectivity and Characterization in Sarah Kane’s Cleansed, Crave, and 4.48 Psychosis” perhaps offers the most theoretical approach to Kane’s Crave. Specifically, Delgado-García utilizes Judith Butler’s notion of performativity to analyze the way that Crave operates under what Butler terms, “performativity proper to refusal,” by which Delgado-García suggests that the text of Kane’s play performatively refuses to engage in the creation of liberal-humanist subjectivity or even subjectivity itself. While Delgado-García makes an excellent point when only examining the text, she also realizes that in performance the impingement of actual bodies on stages upsets the performativity proper to refusal and suggests ultimately that this kind of performativity is only reclaimed “diachronically,” in the multiple and continual performances of Crave, which then “highlight[s] the fact that identity is always already contingent and subject to change.”81 In other words, only in multiple performances does the script in performance
operate with performativity proper to refusal, in each individual performance the presence of actual bodies performatively takes on the already determined identity of those bodies. Of course, you could potentially make the same argument for all theatre and its variety of performance.

Kane makes it clear that *Crave* is meant to be a “text for performance” (more than a play script) and I argue that rather than hope for a play that does not operate within the performativity of gender and refuses it, that we recognize that in the impingement of particular bodies on stage we can actually find value and meaning. That is that the bodies are, in fact, essential to the dystopian performatives that operate within the play, something we will explore further when discussing the experiential interpretive strategy.

*Crave* is frequently viewed as an exploration of form connected to a theatrical history and past. In this way the rational and Eng. Lit approaches to *Crave* connect. Dan Rebellato’s “Sarah Kane before *Blasted*: The Monologues,” works within both the rational and Eng. Lit approaches.

The essay utilizes Kane’s self-plagiarism of her earliest pieces of writing, three monologues presented in 1992 in North London, titled, *Comic Monologue, Starved, and What She Said*, to formulate an argument about the development of a political identity for both Kane and her plays. As Rebellato points out, *Crave* relies on the monologues as source texts more than any of Kane’s other works. He concludes, “what they also show, very clearly, is a deliberate reconstruction of political playwriting: away from the models that had dominated the two decades before and towards a revaluation of formal experiment as a locus for a new utopian politics.” While Rebellato does not define his usage of utopian politics, I would argue he is referring to the hopeful nature of Kane’s work that suggests a mindset in which a future can be imagined where things have changed. As Kane herself notes with regard to *Crave*, in an interview with Nils Talbert translated from the German by Graham Saunders, “I actually think *Crave*—where there
is no physical violence whatsoever, its a very silent play—is the most despairing of the things I’ve written so far.”

Kane is responding to the common assumption that after the line “something has lifted’ [that] from that moment on it becomes apparently more and more hopeful. But actually the characters have all given up.” Of course, playwrights are not always already correct about their plays, but as Rebellato suggests Crave does seem to rely on past experiments with political issues including, “rape, sexuality, and eating disorders,” to explore potential consequences to our current social, cultural environment. Where Rebellato sees utopia I see dystopia, both building on the past (read: memory) to envision in different ways the future.

Other textual analysis of Crave relies on memory and the connection to a literary past to assign meaning in the play. As I discussed earlier, Crave contains literary references to T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, Samuel Beckett, the Bible, William Shakespeare, W. B. Yeats, as well as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, among many others. The search and study of the citationality of Kane’s Crave can be found in Graham Saunders’s “The Beckettian World of Sarah Kane,” Eckart Voigts-Virchow’s “Sarah Kane, a Late Modernist: Intertextuality and Montage in the Broken Images of Crave (1998),” and Ruby Cohn’s “Sarah Kane, an Architect of Drama.” All of these essays rely not only on citationality but an acute attention to literary techniques, including as Cohn describes them,

The “glorious technicolour” of Kane’s Crave is composed of her epigrammatic flair and such verbal techniques as rhyme, meter, fragmentation, contradiction, yes-no sequences, macaronics, quotation, and occasional word-awareness. These devices are pervasive, and they recur in various blends, which are often infused with humor.
These authors utilize this focus on the textual to achieve various goals from establishing the influence of modernism on Kane’s work (Voigts-Virchow) to understanding the trajectory of Kane’s use of structure and form (Cohn). Ultimately, however, the focus on textual citationality and reference while astonishingly impressive and demonstrative of the true genius of Sarah Kane, might be barely noted in performance. As Voigts-Virchow suggests,

> As a self confessed “emotional plagiarist” she [Kane] did not want to diminish the emotional impact of the words by deflecting attention from the affirmatively used expressions of suffering, but made it quite obvious that she was conscious of her montage technique. Welcome cognitive process of de-coding allusions in print might be felt to be detrimental to the affective potential of the theatrical performance.\(^{87}\)

This again alludes to the experience of the play in performance, but as I have been suggesting it is actually the combination of the cognitive process and the affective potential of the performance that provides a potential dystopian performative moment. Surely, audience members will not produce an exhaustive understanding of Kane’s citations and references, but the ones that they recognize build on particular connections within the audience that create specific meaning and feeling. For example, the allusion to *Hamlet*:

C: To die.

B: To sleep.

M: No more.\(^ {88}\)

This reference is hard to miss for a large number of theatre goers and connects the affect/emotion memory of past performances of *Hamlet* with the play at hand. In this way, the citationality of the play allows audience members to cognitively connect a wide arrange of experience in theatre
and literature with their current experience based purely on an individual basis—some may know T.S. Eliot’s *The Waste Land* others might be far better versed in the Bible. For myself, the strongest referents involve Beckett. The complexity of Kane’s technical form and her vast reliance on her literary heritage, in performance, opens the text to multiple interpretations, substantive processing and the infusion of affect on a more personal level. The dystopian performatives of *Crave* make us question what we know, how we know it, and why it matters in relationship to social issues.

There is another kind of citationality that is sometimes studied with regard to Kane’s *Crave*, and that is the biographical approach. In this approach, connections to the life of the playwright are drawn upon to examine the meaning of the play. For example, Steve Earnest’s “Sarah Kane’s *Crave* at the Schaubühne am Lehniner Platz, Berlin” at one point suggests, “The ‘cultural wasteland’ of America (as Kane defined it) provided the unique urban landscape for *Crave*, as did her intense feelings of isolation and separation during that time.” While Earnest’s interpretation of *Crave* is also tempered with a strong examination of the experience as a whole, including textual analysis, this one instance of relying on biographical detail serves as a good example of this sort of work. Obviously, some connections are suggested by Kane herself, “*Crave* was written during a process of ceasing to have faith in love,” a statement that some argue confirms depression’s instrumental role in her last two plays. Others cite the allusion to the hospital ward where Kane was a patient, “ES3”—which is also included in the dedication to *Cleansed*: “for the patients and staff of ES3.”

Ellen W. Kaplan perhaps goes further than most scholars in relying on the connection between depression and *Crave*. In her article, “The cage is my mind: Object and image in depicting mental illness on stage,” she begins by pointing out the way that abused children
respond artistically to various prompts to demonstrate the connection between their condition and the art they produce. This results in statements such as, “Kane’s catastrophic memories, in Crave and again in 4.48 Psychosis, and the disembodied voices that give them voice, seem to echo the ‘insane’ split between body and self. The disconnection is the hallmark of a society ‘which is chronically insane.’” \(^92\) Kaplan goes on to argue that Kane uses her theatre to express the inexpressibility of trauma. Relying on Susan J. Brison’s understanding of traumatic memory: “Traumatic memory is not narrative. Rather, it is experience that re-occurs, either as full sensory replay of traumatic events ... with all things seen, heard, smelled and felt intact, or as disconnected fragments (which may be) inexplicable rage, terror, or disconnected body states and sensations.” \(^93\) This notion recalls the story of the Vietnam veteran who wrecked his jeep during a parade in response to a firecracker—in short, dissociation and pure sensory processing as discussed by Eich and Schooler. \(^94\) While Kaplan doesn’t explicitly state something to the effect of “Crave represents Kane’s traumatic past on stage,” it is implied throughout. While I don’t condone the suggestive nature of Kaplan’s piece, her use of psychology and cognitive science to understand the representation of trauma on stage is useful. I also agree with her conclusion that Kane “experiments with form to describe consciousness and illness experientially, as states that can be approximated through word, sound, and image. But language runs out, description runs dry; the experience of mental illness cannot be so much explained as depicted, embodied in form, structure, object as metaphor.” \(^95\) The experience of dissociation or pure sensory processing within the play points to the importance of dystopian performatives, doings connected to embodied memories only recalled through the sensorium. Crave sets out to make this experience palpable for the audience, but doesn’t stop at disconnected sensory
experience. Instead, through complex citationality, the play allows the audience to consider the effects of trauma and a potential future where things have changed.

Cohn distinguishes two types of plays within Kane’s oeuvre: violent and linguistic. While earlier chapters have demonstrated the affective potential of actual/factual violence on stage, these final two chapters work to demonstrate how the affective potential of Kane’s linguistic plays also create a bodily affect/emotion experience, tied to what Kane herself called experiential theatre. *Crave* (and also *4.48 Psychosis*) rely more heavily on cognitive processing and its interaction with affect/emotion systems to produce dystopian performative moments. In this way, citationality and meaning are perhaps more directed and specific while maintaining the open visceral experience. For example, having taught *Blasted* more than a few times to undergraduates, not one has ever come back with an understanding of its connection to Bosnia. Conversely, a general audience can be expected to understand that *4.48 Psychosis* is about mental health. The final interpretive strategy of Sierz involves understanding the play in performance, the next section will take into consideration the scholarship that relies on this interpretive framework and provide an analysis of the text, based in the connections between cognition and affect/emotion.

**Desiring Memory**

Memory runs throughout *Crave* in a variety of ways. For example, memory is discussed and transmitted in *Crave* via genetic impossibility, where B states that he has never broken a bone, “But my dad has. Smashed his nose in a car crash when he was eighteen, And I’ve got this. Genetically impossible, but there it is. We pass these messages faster than we think and in ways we don’t think possible.” The transmission of memory in impossible ways also recalls M’s memory of her grandparents in utero. Memory is connected to the notion of death:
C: To be free of memory,
M: Free of desire,
C: Lie low, provoke nothing,
B: Say nothing.98

This is the conclusion of C’s journey into the light that Kane suggests is not hopeful but a giving up on the part of the characters and perhaps a moment of clarity and light at the thought of death. C states just above, “Fat and Shiny and dead dead dead serene.”99 Understanding the complexity of the script and the difficulty of deciphering it, especially in the moment of performance, the repetition of the word “dead” is particularly salient.

Memory is also expressed in the form of traumatic memory:

A: In a lay-by on the motorway going out of the city, or maybe in, depending on which way you look, a small dark girl sits in the passenger seat of a parked car. Her elderly grandfather undoes his trousers and it pops out of his pants, big and purple.100
C: I feel nothing, nothing.
I feel nothing.
A: And when she cries, her father in the back seat says I’m sorry, she’s not normally like this.
M: Haven’t we been here before?
A: And though she cannot remember she cannot forget.
C: And has been hurtling away from that moment ever since.101

A presents a simple definition of dissociation: “And though she cannot remember she cannot forget.” The sense that this is a story about C is indicated by C’s incantation of “I feel nothing”
and her assertion that this is the moment that defined the rest of her journey. A similar line is used by A towards the middle of the play:

And I am shaking, sobbing with the memory of her, when she loved me, before I was her torturer, before there was no room in me for her, before we misunderstood, in fact the very first moment I saw her, her eyes smiling and full of the sun, and I shudder with grief for that moment which I’ve been hurtling away from ever since.102

Kane points out the high emotional valence of both being abused and being the abuser. She provides lines that are evocative of memory for both abused and abuser.103 The play is also, importantly, focused on traumatic memory that often seems to contain a high affect/emotional valence. In Alyson Campbell’s “Experiencing Kane: an affective analysis of Sarah Kane’s ‘experiential theatre in performance’” she notes, how “The visceral punch of Kane’s late theatre seems to come in large part from poetic devices that, despite being literary, function in a non-cerebral way, impacting almost surreptitiously on an audience that tends to spend its conscious energy looking for signification.”104 In other words, when the audience engages a substantive cognitive processing strategy, the linguistic plays are capable of creating a visceral reaction. Campbell’s exploration of the experiential nature of Kane’s plays as she experienced them in performance is fascinating in the way that it matches up with cognitive and affective neuroscience as seen above. These connections between science and the actual experience of the show as read through a phenomenological lens allows for the phenomenological experience, extremely individualistic and personal, to be expanded to a more general audience.

While Campbell argues that “At their best, the linguistic devices of Kane’s later work are an attempt to unravel the significative coding of the words and invoke the spectator’s sensory
engagement through the sonic wash of the words,” through an understanding of the way that memory processes are triggered throughout the play in a search for meaning, or signification as Campbell puts it, it becomes clear that it is not actually an unraveling of significative code but rather relying on that codes implicit connection to citationality and reference on an individual and personal level. Here is where Delgado-García’s suggestion that Crave creates a performativity proper to refusal might operate in performance as opposed to textually. The play, while rife with citationality as seen in Saunders, Rebellato, Voigts-Virchow, and Cohn, is equally rife in citationality that is purely individual and absolutely connected and unconnected to the identity of the bodies in performance. Consider again, Paul Taylor’s personal connection to the line “the scream of a daffodil.” Resonances, citations, performative cues run rampant through the script as it is experienced and interpreted. The sheer volume of interpretations on the part of a substantively engaged audience connecting what it hears and sees with affective memories that are being infused into their interpretations and judgments creates the unfixed potentialities for subjectivity. In other words, the lack of clear signification in performance, although perhaps less so then simply reading the text, still offers a refusal of standard interpretations while simultaneously offering heteronormative interpretations, the performative enactment remains in the individual viewer.

To interpret the play from the perspective of a dystopian performative, recognizing the way in which affect infusion is occurring within the script thanks to its various theatrical techniques, including, non-realism, poetry, montage, as Cohn would note its Macaronic lines, its contradictions, blending of characters, its lack of plot, etc. an understanding of the plays use of time becomes important. Throughout the play the characters switch between past tense, present tense, and discussions of the future. As already demonstrated above, the past tense deals
with the subject of memory and is the baseline for understanding the moments in the play spent in the present and those spent thinking about the future. It is also the basis for the traumatic memories being explored within the play. One of the most salient moments of present tense within the play revolves around C as she talks in the third person:

C: She is currently having some kind of nervous breakdown and wishes she’d been born black, male and more attractive.

[…]  
C: She ceases to continue with the day to day farce of getting through the next few hours in an attempt to ward off the fact that she doesn’t know how to get through the next forty years.

[…]

C: She’s talking about herself in the third person because the idea of being who she is, of acknowledging that she is herself, is more than her pride can take.

[…]

C: She’s sick to the fucking gills of herself and wishes wishes wishes that something would happen to make life begin.

This might be paired with a section in which C and M seem to be having something of a therapy session and M’s later listing of symptoms: “Impaired judgment, sexual dysfunction, anxiety, headaches, nervousness, sleeplessness, restlessness, nausea, diarrhea, itching, shaking, sweating, twitching.” Followed by C’s acknowledgement, “That’s what I’m suffering from now.” In this world of the present, C is trying to work through her traumatic past but expresses her rather bleak future desire or craving: “Put me down or put me away.”
The name of the play is actually always already marked in the future. To crave is to desire something in the near or far future as well as in the present. Each character, of course, craves something within the play. M craves a baby, A craves a rekindled love affair with an ambiguous person (although most would argue it is C), B craves sex, mostly, and C craves an end to the hold her traumatic past has on her. All of these cravings are set in a perpetual future sometimes controlled by the character and sometimes not. In fact, in my interpretation of C committing suicide at the end of the play, she possesses the only craving that she can actually control to some degree. Every other craving in the play is at the mercy of other’s cooperation. This is a reflection of the difference between utopian and dystopian thought. A utopian vision of thought is of a hopeful world in which change is possible and new beginnings occur in an ideal manner. Utopia, like the cravings of most of the characters, require the cooperation of others. Dystopia is a vision of a bleak future that is often controlled by some group of people or an individual, it is the result of cravings that are selfish, individualistic, and generally uncooperative.

C throughout the play evokes her lack of control in the world in which she lives. For example, during A’s long monologue in which he asserts his desire for a future with the person he presumably loves (C), C repeats throughout the monologue at various levels of intensity the words: “this has to stop this has to stop this has to stop.” In the moments within the play that have C and M interacting as therapist and patient, C recognizes the dissociation she experiences: “I am here to remember.” C also has the desire to record her memories:

C: I buy a new tape recorder and blank tapes.

B. I always do.
C. I have old ones that will do just as well in actuality, but the truth has little to do with actuality, and the point (if there is one) is to record the truth.\footnote{112}

The attempt to record the truth ultimately fails as the cast in unison says “Forget.”\footnote{113} To forget, to lose memory, to not remember, “to be free of memory,” reinforces the state of being that C claims throughout, “I feel nothing, nothing. I feel nothing.” This line is repeated four times throughout the play with a different variation occurring once, “I feel I just feel.” On the same page, C loses her memory, can’t remember, her “minds a blank.”\footnote{114} Pure-sensory processing and LaCapra’s definition of dissociation suggests a disjuncture between the cognitive and the sensorium. The trauma of C’s past cannot be held in both the mind and the body at the same time and the ultimate separation of these two parts of the subject is death, where the body and mind split. As C invokes Hamlet, “And no one can know what the night is like,”\footnote{115} the dissociation between mind (cognition and perhaps being) and the body (corporeal mortality) is made clear.

In this way content matches the form of the play. What is experienced by C (who I consider to be the main character) and what is experienced by the audience as I have argued in earlier sections of this paper follows the same trajectory. That trajectory is the citational, performative examination of the individual’s memory as they connect to affective/emotional experience. Whereas C’s one moment of feeling leads to dissociation and forgetting, the audience through the provocation of substantive processing allows their own affective/emotional experience to infuse with their interpretation of the play. Of course, this does not always occur, as was noted by several reviewers when they failed to feel anything. Campbell provides an excellent example of one such case that she experienced:

My own first encounter with Crave at the Storeroom, Melbourne, was to feel disconnected from the world onstage, and uninterested in the “voices” presented
to me. The stark and fairly static aesthetic of the four bodies held separately in
space did not provoke any kind of emotional engagement in me and, whatever
else is true of Kane, as Saunders asserts: “emotional intensity is undeniably
integral to Kane’s drama.”

My own experience in watching a production of *Crave*, presented by Aaron C. Thomas at
Florida State University, also felt disconnected and uninteresting. In Thomas’s production a
series of chairs was set into a jumbled circle and the four actors sat amongst the audience
entering the central circle when interaction was called for. The opposite effect occurred in my
experience compared to Campbell’s. In this case the incorporation of too much blocking and
movement made the text less musical and more difficult to connect to. The emotional
engagement of the piece stems from the ability of the performance to create an empathic link
between the performers and the audience. This allows the connection between cognition and
emotion to occur. When successful, the audience performatively experiences traumatic memory
in an individual and unique way. The audience will be unsettled empathically because of the lack
of clear and specific citationality. The ambiguous citation creates individual difference in
interpretation and engages a wide swathe of memory and emotion, guided mostly toward
negative emotions such as depression, anger, and fear. Lines like “The scream of a daffodil” are
unlikely to foster connections to positive emotions. The experience of these emotions, of
traumatic memory rests in the lack of control of an individual who experiences this and thus a
dystopian ideal of the future unless control is taken, and even then the result is not a wished for
hopefulness but a suicide.

As the play often runs in forty-five minutes or less, the impact of emotions is often
implicit, the audience has a sense of memory connected to a feeling or emotion or mood, but
does not register it cognitively. The lines are often described as “snappy” and “rapid.” While citations in careful reading are abundant as seen above, the experience in performance occurs bodily as the brain searches for referents that connect affect/emotion experience with meaning. When successful the play creates a dystopian performative in which an audience member implicitly recalls a particular way of feeling that helps them interpret the nature of a traumatic past without vicariously abusing such a connection: empathic unsettlement. It allows an engagement with complex and difficult to discuss topics such as sexual abuse, failed love, mental illness, and ultimately suicide. These topics are engaged via an embodied, impactful performance that relies on a substantive processing strategy to promote affect/emotion infusion. This infusion of affect/emotion into rationality, thought, discourse, cognition, or meaning on relevant topics represents a complex form of dystopian performative. One that takes the assertion that the body matters further to suggest how that body interacts with cognition, which it turns out has always already been a part of the body. Kane’s plays recognize the impact affect/emotion can have on the way human beings think and act in hopes of burning something into the mind of the audience. Crave promotes affect infusion through an atypical, complex, open, writerly “text for performance.” The experience, if successful, has the ability to change the way an audience interacts with the world. This is the power of theatre; this is the potential of dystopian performatives.
CHAPTER 5: Positive Sadness: Utilizing the Positive Side of a Negative Emotion to Understand Clinical Depression

Introduction

“I’m writing a play called 4.48 psychosis. It’s about a psychotic breakdown and what happens to a person’s mind when the barriers which distinguish between reality and different forms of imagination completely disappear. So you no longer know where you stop and the world starts. So for example, if I was psychotic I would literally not know the difference between myself, this table, and them. Various boundaries begin to collapse. Formally I’m trying to collapse a few boundaries as well, to carry on with making form and content one. And for me there is a very clear line from Blasted to Phaedra’s Love to Cleansed to Crave and this one is going on through where it goes after that I’m not quite sure.”

—Sarah Kane, Blasted: The Life and Death of Sarah Kane

In both chapter two and three, this dissertation has concerned itself primarily with the autonomic affective reaction provoked by triggers or elicitors that are found in Kane’s earlier work (for example the autonomic reaction to body envelope violations that produce the basic emotion of disgust). In the fourth chapter I began to deal more specifically with the connection between cognition (in this case memory) and affect/emotion. This breakdown roughly translates on to what Joseph LeDoux’s The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life explains as the low and high road to the amygdala. LeDoux states, “Information about external stimuli reaches the amygdala by way of direct pathways from the thalamus (the low road) as well as by way of pathways from the thalamus to the cortex to the amygdala. The direct thalamo-amygdala path is a shorter and thus a faster transmission route than the pathway from the thalamus through the cortex to the amygdala.”

Patrick Colm Hogan makes LeDoux’s distinction more clear by labeling this “direct” and “cognitively mediated” emotion. In other
words, the low road, or “direct” pathway, moves from sensory information directly to the amygdala where an emotional response occurs. The high road, or cognitively mediated pathway, sends the sensory information through to the cortex before arriving at the amygdala allowing cognition to clarify the sensory information and thus alter the response. This explanation is well understood by recalling the last time in which someone startled you and you “jumped” only to immediately relax because you recognized the person. LeDoux states, “The subcortical pathways provide a crude image of the external world, whereas more detailed and accurate representations come from the cortex.”

Importantly, this process is not binary. Information goes through both pathways in a parallel fashion, the direct route simply happens to be quicker. This is mirrored in my discussions of autonomic reaction’s movement into more culturally constructed responses to affect/emotion stimulus. It can also be seen in the way in which Kane adjusted her artistic style to achieve different affect/emotion experiences in her audiences. While her early plays took the direct route to emotional response, her later plays (Crave and 4.48 Psychosis) rely on cognitively mediated emotions to more carefully direct her audience to a specific experience.

4.48 Psychosis, more than any of Kane’s other work, directly confronts an emotional disorder, clinical depression, which is a pathological extension of the basic emotion, sadness. Depression according to Mick J. Power’s “Sadness and Its Disorders” occurs because of an over-valuation of a specific role or goal of an individual that is then lost. This fits well with Richard Lazarus’s notion of core relational themes connected with specific basic emotions. As Jesse J. Prinz’s Gut Reactions points out, sadness’s core relational theme is “having experienced an irrevocable loss.” Core relational themes come out of appraisal theories of emotions, or rather affect/emotion theories that rely on cognition to explain the experience of emotion, as LeDoux
might put it, the high road. Core relational themes are defined as “a relation that pertains to well-being.” In the case of sadness that turns into depression, Power’s suggests that depression derives from the emotions of sadness and disgust, or in other words a loss that causes self-loathing. As Power points out, “much of what we think about as sadness should more correctly be viewed as sadness combined with other basic emotions, such as fear, anger or disgust, because of the fact that sadness seems to be the basic emotion that most readily combines with the other basic emotions.”

4.48 Psychosis’s provocation of sadness on the autonomic level is directly geared toward the connection between sadness and other emotions and most importantly between sadness and the cognitive practice that leads to depression. As we can see in Sarah Kane’s discussion of the play in the opening quote of this chapter, the author is trying to represent the irrevocable loss of self, a person who has lost touch with the boundary between the self and the world.

As discussed in the first chapter there are theories of emotion that suggest that basic emotions can actually be placed along two axes of valence and arousal. The valence of emotion on a continuum from positive to negative (or approach and withdrawal) and the arousal of emotion on a continuum from high levels of arousal to low levels of arousal. This is referred to as the circumplex model of affect and was originally formulated by James A. Russell in 1980. Unlike many of the basic emotions discussed thus far, sadness can find itself in two different locations in the circumplex model. Harrison, et.al.’s “A Two-Way Road: Efferent and Afferent Pathways of autonomic activity in emotion,” distinguishes these two types of sadness as crying and noncrying sadness. In other words, sadness is negatively valenced but can produce both high and low arousal. Harrison, et.al. attribute this difference to the current state of whatever is about
to be lost (as in the core relational theme of sadness). Activating sadness is generally in response to a future loss while deactivating sadness is in response to a past loss.\(^9\)

As may be clear by this point, scientific work on emotions generally seeks to understand the practical purpose of an emotion, this normally is theorized from an evolutionary perspective for basic emotions and a sociocultural perspective for more complex emotions. James W. Kalat and Michelle N. Shiota in *Emotion* suggests three potential hypotheses for the evolution of sadness: “sadness=pain,” “sadness=I’ll leave you alone,” and “sadness=help me.”\(^{10}\) The first, sadness=pain, represents the evolutionary perspective linking brain activity observed during pain to brain activity observed in sadness.\(^{11}\) The sadness=pain hypothesis is explanatory of deactivating or non-crying sadness as is sadness=I’ll leave you alone, in which a person retreats socially after becoming aware that their presence is not desirable to others. Sadness=help me is one hypothesis that provides the possibility for activating higher arousal. This hypothesis is made possible by the fact that sadness is an emotion that creates sympathy in observers reciprocally. As George A Bonanno, Laura Goorin and Karin G Coifman’s “Sadness and Grief” point out, “Sad images evoke both sad affect (Gross & Levenson, 1995) and increased amygdala activation in observers (Wang et al., 2005).”\(^{12}\) In other words, a person faced with the sadness of another person generally responds with brain activity indicative of activating sadness that does not cause withdrawal, decreased activity, etc. These are, however, not the only hypotheses on the evolutionary benefits of sadness. Joseph P. Forgas’s “Can Sadness Be Good for You?: On the Cognitive, Motivational, and Interpersonal Benefits of Negative Affect” specifically tackles the evolutionary benefits of sadness, which include “improving memory, reducing judgmental errors, and improving communications.”\(^{13}\) Beyond these, Forgas goes on to outline multiple studies demonstrating how the affect/emotion of sadness “reduces stereotype effects,” “reduces
gullibility and increases skepticism,” “improves people’s ability to detect deception,” and how sadness can even “increase perseverance.”

Much of the aforementioned benefits of the elicitation of sadness are a direct result of the different cognitive strategies that are employed in various situations as outlined by the Affect Infusion Model (described in detail in chapter 4). Substantive processing strategies are more likely to occur when experiencing both deactivating and activating sadness because of its close association with loss. This is explained in more basic terms by Forgas as assimilation and accommodation:

assimilation involves greater reliance on preexisting internal knowledge when responding to a situation, greater use of heuristics and cognitive shortcuts, and more top-down, generative, and constructive processing strategies in general. Accommodation, in contrast, involves increased attention to new, external, and unfamiliar information, increased sensitivity to social norms and expectations, and a more concrete, piecemeal, and bottom-up processing style. This affectively induced assimilative–accommodative processing dichotomy has received extensive support in recent years, suggesting that moods perform an adaptive function, preparing us to respond to different environmental challenges.

Positive moods, affects, and emotions promote an assimilative processing style while negative moods (like sadness) rely on an accommodative processing style. Importantly both sadness and happiness, as Forgas notes, can lead to beneficial results depending on the circumstances that are encountered. In addition, as Power is careful to suggest, “On a more general level it should also be noted that a positive self that is unfettered by negativity is as pathological as a negative self unfettered by positivity.”
For Dolan, utopian performatives are described as profound, uplifting, hopeful and generous. This description leaves the reader thinking about these types of affective experiences as being situated on the positive end of the circumplex model of emotion’s valence axis. It is here where the difference between the dystopian performative and the utopian performative becomes most obvious: it is primarily the difference between positive and negative affect/emotion. As I discussed in the first chapter, both utopian and dystopian performatives are embodied experiences, embodied doings that remain outside the logocentric concerns of other types of performatives (Austin, Derrida, etc.). It is put simply, embodied behavior’s doings understood through their own context and past iterability. Dystopian performatives are the “doings” of negative affect/emotion, in the current chapter the negative emotion of sadness. This is a distinction not made clear in Dolan’s work on utopian performatives. Take for example her description of her experience of *The Laramie Project*:

I nonetheless appreciated this communal gesture, this chance to lend my body, my candle-holding hand and my heart, to honor Matthew Shepard’s life and to embody my own sorrow at his death, my own knowledge that in other places and at other times, his fate could have been mine or one of the people I love. Call this identification; call this empathy; call this naive emotional sentiment. I’d rather call it a utopian performative. I was glad to be invited to stand in that theater with other spectators after that play to enact our hope that what happened to Matthew Shepard wouldn’t happen again. In that moment, the theater opened itself to the city and the nation outside; performance became a public practice that modeled civic engagement.
While I think Dolan’s description of her affective experience of *The Laramie Project* absolutely helps to illustrate the power of performance, I wonder how we might think different about the experience through a dystopian understanding inflected through a scientific reading of affect/emotion. Dolan describes her embodied sorrow at the death of Matthew Shepard. The core relational theme of sadness is clearly seen in her statement, “his fate could have been mine or one of the people I love.” Her sorrow might be read as an activated sadness as it is concerned for the potential future loss of her own life or those she loves. (Importantly this is imagined both as a past event, “could have been,” and a future event as she has not experienced that loss. It is an imagined sorrow of both what could have been and what could be.) Her own words don’t necessarily reflect the hopeful view she suggests. The death of Matthew Shepard, in my estimation, is a dystopic reflection of our culture and society meant not to instill hope in a future utopia where no one is killed based on their sexual preference, but rather to refute and build opposition to the utopic vision of rural America that caused his death based on the future potential of loss that may have caused the sadness within the audience.

Of course, as Bonanno, et.al. make clear, “Sadness can sometimes deteriorate into more chronic dysphoric mood states, or, in extreme cases, depressogenic states. In contrast to the cognitive and social benefits associated with brief sadness episodes, more prolonged dysphoric states have been associated with withdrawal and despair, as well as with the elicitation of rejection from others (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).” It is this prolonged dysphoric state that makes up the content of Kane’s *4.48 Psychosis*. While the clinically depressed character of the play clearly states about her planned suicide attempt, “It couldn’t possibly be misconstrued as a cry for help,” the play’s effect seems to accomplish just that, as the depiction of dysphoria is reciprocally experienced as sadness by the viewers, creating
a cognitive process that might eliminate the effect of negative stereotypes about mental illness and move the audience toward a greater understanding. This empathic, embodied response results in useful behaviors and actions, that is, the dystopian performative created by sadness. This resultant behavior is described by Bonanno, et.al., “physiological responses accompanying sympathy in adults, including concerned gaze and reduced heart rate, are predictive of altruistic or helping behaviors. Such reciprocal responses increase the probability that individuals expressing sadness will receive needed attention and/or assistance from others (Keltner & Kring, 1998).”

4.48 Psychosis premiered at the Royal Court Jerwood Theatre Upstairs in London on 23 June 2000, almost a year and a half after Sarah Kane’s suicide in 1999. Aleks Sierz, Graham Saunders, and David Greig all begin their discussions of Sarah Kane by recalling the two things that haunt her writing most: her suicide in 1999, and the “shocking” imagery of her work. As Saunders notes, “the majority of British theatre critics [viewed Psychosis 4.48] as little more than a dramatic suicide note,” and that her suicide led to the biographical reinterpretation of her previous work. The urge to approach Kane’s work through the biographical lens of her own depression and suicide remains strong, but many scholars and playwrights resist this temptation in favor of focusing on the true merit and excellence of her plays. Aleks Sierz, Graham Saunders, David Greig, Mark Ravenhill, and Edward Bond all take pains to avoid interpreting Kane’s work through her depression and death. Powerfully, Bond chooses to see 4.48 Psychosis “as a sort of treatise about living consciously,” instead of a work about her path to suicide.

Following the form and style of Crave, 4.48 Psychosis presents a text with no set characters, stage directions, or dramatic action. The play is also poetic and leaves much of its production in the hands of the actors, director, and designers. Unlike Crave, 4.48 Psychosis has something of a
plot, which follows a woman’s treatment for depression and her eventual suicide at 4:48am by overdose, slashing her wrists, and hanging. The play focuses on the rhythm of insanity to attempt to impart to an audience what the experience of depression is like on a bodily level. There is a focus on the negative affects throughout the play, with a specific emphasis on anger, shame, fear, and sadness. A few of the primary moments handled by the play include, the decision to medicate, the effects of medication, the cause of depression, and the desires of a depressed person. The play concludes poetically by stating that no suicide ever had a desire for death and that the “I” of the voice had never had that desire either.

“An Imaginative Suicide Note”

“The thing that she said about it [4.48 Psychosis] at a point where she was early on in working on it, was that she wanted to write an experiential picture of what depression is like, so to give an audience an impression an experience, to allow them to experience that.”  

—James Macdonald, interviewed by Aleks Sierz, 23 May 2008

Not only did Sarah Kane’s suicide spurn a rush to recontextualize her dramatic work, it was the predominant lens that critics used to analyze, describe, and judge Kane’s final play, performed posthumously under Kane’s long time director James Macdonald. Macdonald’s production would later tour Europe and the United States. If any of Kane’s plays are haunted by her suicide in 1999, it is her final play 4.48 Psychosis. Almost all reviews of the original production begin by noting Kane’s suicide. Rachel Halliburton’s Evening Standard review for example, “It is a suicide note that poisons the audience with its clinging bleakness.” Or consider, Benedict Nightingale’s review for Times, “So how am I to compose a conventional review for what is an imaginative suicide note, the last work of Sarah Kane, who last year killed
herself in a mental hospital?” Sarah Hemming, perhaps, treated the issue more fairly as she notes, “4.48 Psychosis is a difficult play to review, because the writer, Sarah Kane, killed herself not long after it was written. […] I tried, watching it, to imagine how the play would come over if I didn’t know that the author had later committed suicide, but you cannot banish that knowledge. So you find yourself reacting to the piece as a 75-minute suicide note. It is a disturbing experience in many ways.”

Even on tour, four years after its appearance at the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs, Ben Brantley begins his review of the touring production with, “Words are powerless in the predetermined universe of ‘4:48 Psychosis,’ Sarah Kane’s breathtakingly beautiful and ugly suicide note of a play.”

Even fifteen years later, critics seem incapable of discussing the play without mentioning Kane’s suicide: Ian Shuttleworth’s Financial Times review, “4.48 Psychosis, which premiered in 2000, a year after Kane’s death, immediately seemed like a direct, inescapable announcement of her imminent suicide.”

Dystopian performative moments of embodied affect/emotion are not limited to the performance as such. In the case of Kane’s final play, it seems clear that the dystopian performative achieves uptake with those who mourn Kane’s suicide as well as with the actual performance.

Unsurprisingly, the social and cultural import of Kane’s death has continued to be connected, almost relentlessly to 4.48 Psychosis. Suicide notes, however, are actually fairly rare when you consider how often the trope is used in literature and the arts. As Antonios Paraschakis, et.al., notes, “Only a minority of suicide victims leave notes. Generally, the incidence of note-leaving, according to the literature, varies considerably, with reports of incidence ranging from 3% to 42%.” The purpose of such notes also varies significantly. While Paraschakis, et.al. posit several possibilities based in the literature including, “suicide notes are considered sensitive markers of the severity of a suicide attempt (Rhyne, Templer, Brown, &
Peters, 1995),” Valerie J. Callanan and Mark S. Davis’s review of the literature and multivariate analysis of a specific case found almost no differences between suicide victims who wrote a note and those that did not.\textsuperscript{33} Paraschakis, et.al. suggest the most salient argument as to a note’s purpose when considering the idea of Kane’s final play as suicide note:

Perhaps one of the most important differences between notewriters and nonnotewriters is that the former have an urge to communicate their psychic pain, while the latter don’t. This was already mentioned by Stengel nearly half a century ago (Stengel, 1964). It is worth mentioning that, for a considerable part of the deceased’s relatives in our study, the suicide note provided (sometimes for the first time) an insight into their loved one’s suffering. As for the rest, the two groups seem to be much more similar than different.\textsuperscript{34}

Artists and family close to Kane are generally in staunch opposition to the suicide interpretation of her body of work and, in particular, her last play. This does not mean they don’t understand it or acknowledge it. Dan Rebellato, in his documentary on Kane’s work and life, describes the press night performance of the original production:

The press night for 4.48 Psychosis was a highly charged and emotional affair. Crammed into the tiny theatre upstairs were Sarah’s friends, her family, and also the theatre critics who had once savaged her work and would now write of her last play in largely respectful often regretful tones. It was fractured, raw, complex in its shifts of register and style, frenzied in its attempt to capture a mind passing through torment and suicide, but it stood up and still stands up as a play in its own right, separate from that evening. And the facts of its author’s life which have in any case have become much exaggerated in the telling.\textsuperscript{35}
In the same documentary, Simon Kane, the playwright’s brother and executor of her estate, explains, “I also really don’t like the suggestion that Sarah is only as popular as she is because she committed suicide. You know lots of people kill themselves, they don’t all end up as famous playwrights or artists or musicians.”

It is difficult to separate her final piece of work, where Kane “wanted to write an experiential picture of what depression is like, so to give an audience an impression an experience,” and her well documented personal contact with the illness. Based on this statement and her long standing desire to create an experiential theatre it seems likely Kane’s final work tried to communicate something of her “psychic pain,” and it is certain that the memory of her death will continue to inflect interpretations of her final work.

How successful was Kane at creating the experience of depression for the play’s viewers? After reviewers completed their obligatory reference to Kane’s death, they are generally positive and speak about how the play made them feel. Dominic Cavendish’s Time Out review claims, “Sarah Kane’s final play […] is as compact and beautiful as a diamond in structure—and yet the mood it inspires is as black as coal. You come away from James Macdonald’s production at the Royal Court Upstairs both dazzled and dispirited.” Halliburton suggests, “The fear of the despair envelops you from the beginning.” Robert Gore-Langton describes it as “chilling.”

Lucy Powell’s Time Out review for the 2001 revival of the original states, “4.48 Psychosis’, on the other hand, is so stunningly staged and dangerously beautiful that it all but leaves a bruise.” Of the same restaging of Macdonald’s original, Charles Spencer’s Daily Telegraph review claims “4.48 Psychosis shows us what suicidal depression feels like from the inside” and “It is one of the bravest and most distressing plays I have ever seen,” ultimately concluding that “[t]he technique creates an appropriately disorientating impression of disintegration and mental anguish.” Hemming, specifically points to the successful elicitation of sadness: “Words such as
‘shame’, ‘betrayal’ and ‘anger’ echo through the writing, and it is driven by merciless self-scrutiny. You start out feeling alienated by the savage bitterness of the state of mind revealed here and end up deeply saddened by it.”

In all of these statements, which are indicative of the reviews on the whole, an experience is explained that lines up neatly with the creation of sadness as a result of a truthful and powerful representation of depression. Jack Panksepp’s biological/evolutionary take on the “chills” seems particularly relevant, “A common physical experience that people report when listening to such moving music, especially melancholy songs of lost love and longing, as well as patriotic pride from music that commemorates lost warriors, is a shiver up and down the spine, which often spreads down the arms and legs, and, indeed, all over the body.” The chills are a physiological response that can be connected to many affect/emotions, but particularly sadness. He goes on to connect this response to the “perceptually induced affective experience of social loss, an experience that, in the human mind, is always combined with the possibility of redemption—being found and cared for when one is lost.” Sadness’s connection to the experience of loss is also noted by Lazarus to be the core relational theme of sadness and represents one perspective on its evolutionary purpose. These dystopian performative moments are created through the experience of sadness and what it helps the audience to understand about mental health, specifically depression. 4.48 Psychosis as a stand alone piece of art and Kane’s suicide cannot be separated. The performance elicits reciprocal sadness from the audience while that same audience mourns the social loss of a young and talented playwright.

The critical reviews also note another common characteristic of sadness as it is experienced: its common combination with other basic emotions, such as fear, disgust, and anger, but also happiness. Basic emotions are often found in combination according to Power,
but, “sadness was found to be the emotion that was most likely to occur in combination, providing 77% of all such examples.”\textsuperscript{45} It seems all the more likely that what the reviewers are describing is the successful mirroring of an emotion portrayed within the play (albeit in the extreme form of depression). But more than just the experience of an emotion, the elicitation of sadness, even in combination with other emotions, has a variety of positive effects. As Bonanno, et.al. note,

A key adaptive function of sadness is to promote personal reflection following the irrevocable loss of a person or object of importance to the self (Lazarus, 1991). The experience of sadness turns our attention inward, promoting resignation and acceptance (Izard, 1977, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Stearns, 1993). Physiological arousal is decreased, allowing for a “time out” to update cognitive structures and to accommodate lost objects (Welling, 2003). The reflective function of sadness, therefore, opportunely affords us a pause, allowing us to take stock and to revise our goals and plans (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996).\textsuperscript{46}

While the audience is experiencing reciprocal sadness, depending on the individual,\textsuperscript{47} the emotion causes a slow-down that promotes reflection and taking stock of the ideas and concepts presented. Whereas fear and anger often presented options directed at a specific threat, disgust elicited bodily reactions meant to prevent bodily penetration, sadness promotes a moment of stillness and reconsideration. In other words, the elicitation of sadness allows for Kane to not only give the audience an emotional taste of what this kind of despair is like, but the actual emotion reinforces the moment and creates a dystopian performative experience where the
audience gains understanding through their own body’s performative action. Affect/emotion performs on the body and adjusts are thinking about the content presented: depression.

The thinking (cognition and appraisals) that is adjusted by the affect/emotion experience is also clearly present in the reviews of the original production and its tours. Michael Billington’s review for The Guardian is one such example,

I cannot speak for others, but what it taught me was the frustration of the potential suicide at the way the rest of the world marches to a different, rational rhythm, and assumes there are cures and answers for a state of raging alienation. […] As a piece of theatre, 4.48 Psychosis is grave and haunting. […] But the play is as much a literary as a theatrical event. Like Sylvia Plath’s Edge, it is a rare example of the writer recording the act she is about to perform.”

John Nathan’s review of the revival in 2001 for the Jewish Chronicle says as much, “I can’t claim to have left the theatre with an understanding of depression. But I have glimpsed something of the sense of entrapped despair that led both Kane and that poor girl to take what, to them, must have seemed the easier way out.” One particular review of the 2001 production even gleaned an aspect of depression that is a cornerstone to cognitive therapy and understandings of the illness. Charles Spencer notes, “Anyone who has suffered from depression will recognize the way Kane’s language pins down the way in which its victims become trapped in repetitive loops of useless thought and feeling, and the desperate desire for peace or mere oblivion.” As Bonanno, et.al. point out, one of the things that leads sadness to develop into depression is “rumination,” which is defined as “repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms’ (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, in press).” The dystopian performative elicited by 4.48
Psychosis assists its audience in cognitively thinking about depression to promote a better understanding of the illness. In Spencer’s case, an understanding of depression backed-up by cognitive psychologists. It also might create more acceptance of mental illness in general.

One of the effects of negative affect, as outlined by Forgas is the reduction of stereotyping. In a study performed by Forgas (most recently in 2007), in which participants shot people in a video game that was manipulated to have both Muslim (wearing a hijab) and white targets that were either holding a gun or some other object, “It was positive affect that increased a selective bias against Muslims, consistent with more top-down, assimilative processing that facilitates reliance on preexisting knowledge such as stereotypes in subliminal responses (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 1998a, 1998b, 2007).” In other words, when induced into a negative affect (like anger or sadness), participants became more accurate while targeting only those avatars that were actually holding a gun. Participants in a good mood relied more on stereotypes to make judgments and thus shot at more Muslim avatars regardless of the object they were holding. This is representative of the kind of accommodative cognitive processing discussed earlier in which humans have “increased attention to new, external, and unfamiliar information, increased sensitivity to social norms and expectations, and a more concrete, piecemeal, and bottom-up processing style.” In this way, the play, by eliciting negative affect within the audience, creates a situation where stereotypes about mental illness, specifically depression, are more easily avoided. The play helps the audience slip into a more substantive processing style (as defined by the Affect Infusion Model) or an accommodative processing style as suggested by Forgas, both of which encourage longer cognitive processing times and deeper exploration of the topic at hand.
Of course, dystopian performative moments in which cognition is changed by the
performance of affect/emotion within the body of an audience member, does not always occur,
nor can anyone (without extensive testing in real theatre situations) determine for certain that
more than one person within the audience has had such an experience. While negative reviews of
_4.48 Psychosis_ were rare, one is telling of the failure for the performative moment to have any
uptake. Alistair Macaulay writing for the _Financial Times_ had this to say about the 2001 revival
of the original production:

> What an odious work it is, however; and how thin her artistry always was. Flashy,
to be sure. The tight little metric patterns, the neurotic utterances served up like
tennis rallies, the attempts at musical construction: nobody could miss them, and
many have mistaken them for beauty. […] _4.48 Psychosis_ records very precisely
the interior workings of the suicidal mind, and I recommend it to those with a
specialist interest in that. […] It is the fanciest suicide note any of us are ever
likely to read. […] Kane was not much of an artist, and her death, alas, did not
make her a better one.\textsuperscript{54}

Macaulay, it will be noted, does not describe any physical or emotional reaction to the piece. In
at least one case, affect/emotion did not perform upon an audience member to create a dystopian
performative moment that could slow down judgment, reduce stereotypes, and create more
complicated cognition. Macaulay at times describes the play and Kane in terms of prescriptive
stereotypes, he describes Kane and her work as “Victim Art,” and recommends the play only to
those with a special interest in depression and other mental illness, as if to indicate the very
content is not worthy of stage time. Finally, he intimates that the play was not only “outrageous”
but was “intended to be.”\textsuperscript{55}
What most saw and experienced as a moving portrait of the way in which depression makes a person feel, Macaulay describes as outrageous. Steve Earnest reports the audience response to *4.48 Psychosis* at UCLA Live in 2005 (a part of the original production’s tour in the United States), “At the UCLA performance, audience members vacillated between laughter (Kane’s fabled gallows humor) and tears; a number of people were visibly (and audibly) moved by the performance and after the production there was an inexplicable sense of shock in the theatre.” It is equally true to suggest that at least one person experienced the negative affect induced dystopian performative that could potentially lead them to greater empathy and understanding of depression.

**The Experience of Loss**

While the response of critics to *4.48 Psychosis* emphasized Kane’s death and the experiential nature of the play, academic work took a more theoretical approach. There are four primary avenues of inquiry within academic work on *4.48 Psychosis*: 1) examining the play as it is related to the theories and practices of postdramatic theatre, 2) following the lead of the critics, an approach that focuses on the representation of mental illness on stage, 3) a textual approach that focuses on the citation practices of the play and its intertextuality, and 4) what I will refer to generally as the psychoanalytic approach. The work that utilizes the postdramatic approach generally covers both *Crave* and *4.48 Psychosis* and thus has already been covered in some detail in chapter four. Approaches 2 and 3 will be discussed in the analysis of the play script. The representation of mental illness on stage is somewhat aligned with my analysis of the play based in affect/emotion and the work on the intertextuality of *4.48 Psychosis* helps to demonstrate where Kane got her information on depression. The psychoanalytic approach will be explored in
the final section of this chapter as it directly relates to the theoretical apparatus of the dystopian performative.

4.48 Psychosis is a text made up of twenty-four scenes separated by five dashes in the middle of the page. There are no character designations and the play has been produced with as few as one actor. It could potentially be performed with an unlimited number of actors. As Matthew Roberts’s “Vanishing Acts: Sarah Kane’s Texts for Performance and Postdramatic Theatre,” notes “the printed language of 4.48 Psychosis instead requires spectators, readers, and performers to become actively involved in creating the mise-en-scène itself.”58 In the terms of Roland Barthes, the script is a writerly text.59 For each iteration of the play, discussions must be had on the number of characters and the distribution of lines. At the most fundamental level the text must be added to. Change in voice within a scene is likely indicated by a dash, although Kane never explains this technique, it is generally believed to have been copied from Martin Crimp’s Attempts on Her Life. For example,

- Have you made any plans?
- Take an overdoses, slash my wrists then hang myself.
- All those things together?
- It couldn’t possibly be misconstrued as a cry for help.60

While this dialogue could easily, and perhaps most logically, be read and performed as a session between therapist and patient, it is not the only way to perform it. The script requires substantive processing from all those involved: designers, actors, directors, as well as audience members. Substantive processing, again, is a cognitive style of processing that has the largest chance of allowing affect infusion to occur. Catherine Rees’s summary of Kane’s career in Aleks Sierz’s Modern British Playwriting: The 1990s argues against Kane’s final play being labeled as post-
dramatic theatre, suggesting that Kane’s continued use and reverence for “text” necessarily disqualifies as post-dramatic. The label, however, is unimportant when considering the necessary cognitive capabilities in both watching and producing the play. As Bower and Forgas suggest, “During substantive processing, people need to select, learn, interpret, and process information about a task and relate this information to preexisting knowledge structures using memory processes.” In short, 4.48 Psychosis requires more cognitive work from all those involved at a level that will allow affect/emotion to effect cognitive processing and perceptions about the play’s content. In this way, the play text promotes dystopian performatives and operates in a similar fashion and with similar goals to post-dramatic theatre.

The play’s experiential nature relies on the nature of the memories of those who are watching or performing. Bower and Forgas emphasize the necessity of “preexisting knowledge structures” during substantive processing. An individual performing or watching 4.48 Psychosis will have a more powerful experience if they possess knowledge structures that deal with depression and sadness, through their own personal experience or the experience of those they are close to. Take for example another moment in which two voices—perhaps a therapist and a patient—seem to be present:

- Do you despise all unhappy people or is it me specifically?
- I don’t despise you. It’s not your fault. You’re ill.
- I don’t think so.
- No?
- No. I’m depressed. Depression is anger. It’s what you did, who was there and who you’re blaming.
- And who are you blaming?
Not only does this reflect Power’s thoughts on sadness’s combination with other basic emotions, but it also specifically reflects his thinking on the nature of depression being a combination of sadness and disgust directed toward the self, or self-loathing. For those with direct experience with depression this sequence has a ring of truth. For those with no experience with depression it provides additional information for an individual to perform simulation as suggested by McConachie. Utilizing the philosopher Robert Gordon, McConachie explains, empathetic simulation can best be understood as “personal transformation” through a “recentering of my egocentric map” (Gordon 1995b: 56), in which the empathizer makes adjustments “for relevant differences” (Gordon 1995a: 63) with the other person. In attempting to understand the actions of a person in history, for example, a historian interested in applying Gordon’s empathetic simulation would ask, “If I had been that person in that historical situation, what would I have done and why?”

While McConachie is specifically talking about simulation performed by a historian, it illustrates an interesting point about the content being presented in 4.48 Psychosis. Simulation does not occur for the historian without information about the historical situation nor does empathetic simulation occur for those who do not have any knowledge of the experience of depression. Empathetic simulation seems particularly adept for understanding the theatre when considering, as McConachie notes, Stanislavsky’s “magic if.” Much of contemporary theatre is built on the idea of simulation and the content of 4.48 Psychosis offers not only a representation of a depressed individual’s journey toward suicide but a chance to simulate for oneself the given circumstances of such a person.
Kane did not, as is often suggested, supply information about the experience of depression solely from her own experience with the illness. As Antje Diedrich’s “‘Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs’: Intertextuality in Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis,” points out, “4.48 Psychosis – I argue – is constructed from and refers to a significant number of texts outside itself, and Kane’s engagement with depression, psychosis, and suicide is mediated through ideas and structures that she adapts from a range of sources.” For example, Diedrich notes the use of “Serial Sevens” in the two instances in which numbers are included as part of the text of the play. Serial Sevens is a test used to determine cognitive impairment. In the first instance where the numbers appear the test is clearly failed. The numbers are jumbled and fail to count down in increments of seven. In the final scene with numbers, scene nineteen, the cognitive test is passed:

100
93
86
79
72
65
58
51
44
37
30
23
16
While Diedrich remains silent on the interpretive meaning of the final scene where the "I" of the play is not cognitively impaired it may be connected to the critique within the play of the psychiatric system that defines the emotional pain of individuals as individuals to be treated with pharmacology. As Diedrich notes, Kane borrows the concept of the "vital need" from Edwin S. Shneidman’s book *The Suicidal Mind*. Shneidman, a specialist in suicidology, suggests that suicide is predominantly psychological in nature and is played out in the suicidal person’s mind; it “is chiefly a drama in the mind” (4). He regards most cases of suicide in the western world as caused by intense psychological pain, which he terms “psychache (sīk-a’k)” (4). The primary source of intense psychache is frustrated psychological needs.

While the vital need of the “I”—which according to Lublin goes through three different strategies in order to resolve: love, chemical lobotomy, and death—is never explicitly stated it does seem resolved with suicide. This also touches on Shneidman’s assertion that the suicidal mind limits itself to binary choices, “yes or no, life or death.” The successful Serial Sevens test appears after the “I” has refused treatment and thus might be an indication of some of the negative side effects listed during scenes eleven through thirteen. It might also send a signal that suicide can be a sane choice. This interpretation is also reflected in Kane’s citation of Artaud’s essay on the suicide of Van Gogh, when the “I” in 4.48 *Psychosis* discusses the “chronic insanity of the sane.” While the intertextuality of the script remains hidden to most viewers and readers of the play it speaks to the literary ability of Kane as a writer and suggests the author’s desire to
create an expansive experience of depression and sadness for an audience. This isn’t just Kane’s depression or suicide put on stage, as so many of the critics suggested, but rather a carefully thought out script meant to impact a wider swathe of individuals through dystopian performatives.

Several productions worked to enhance this breadth of experience that Kane included within the play, albeit in a wide variety of ways. The original production, directed by James Macdonald, included three actors to work within the triad of victim, perpetrator, bystander suggested within the text. Others avoided characters altogether, such as Allyson Campbell’s production at Red Stitch Actors Theatre in Australia (2007) in which the lines were broken up specifically to avoid characterization. Similarly, Brink Productions’ 2004 performance of 4.48 Psychosis specifically had the same actor jump from being the patient to being the therapist to prevent “the actors from ‘locking onto character.’” David Barnett’s “When Is a Play Not a Drama? Two Examples of Postdramatic Theatre Texts,” describes this very concept:

4:48 on the other hand elicits a different kind of response. The removal of the individual from the performance generalizes the circumstance of profound depression away from more personal manifestations. […] the thrust of the play seems far more to allow an audience an experience which is not tied down to the vagaries of biography. The result of this engagement is, naturally, unknowable, but will tap into the individual memories of each spectator and contrast them with a corpus of material on stage that may be accepted, rejected, challenged, or met with indifference.”

In short, it seems clear that those that work on the play recognize an implicit drive to provide a broad context that allows for multiple interpretations and experiences. In general, the practice
seems to be directly focused on keeping the text and performance as writerly as possible. In effect, theatre workers seem to implicitly acknowledge that for the play to be impactful on the level of dystopian performatives, it must be broad enough to engage a variety of people.

4.48 *Psychosis*’s most powerful moment comes at the very end of the play when the line “please open the curtains” is uttered by one of the voices. In the original production the windows of the Theatre Upstairs were opened to let in light and the sounds of the street. In the Brink Productions’ performance a water mister that runs throughout the performance was turned off “at the very end.” The possibilities for performance with this abrupt change, marked by the common theatrical action of of opening the curtains, sends a rather distinct message. Based on the rest of the script’s attention to detail and attempt to make clear the experience of depression through, for example, the scenes depicting the “chemical lobotomy,” the last moment is strikingly different:

Zopiclone, 7.5mg. Slept. Discontinued following rash. Patient attempted to leave hospital against medical advice. Restrained by three male nurses twice her size. Patient threatening and uncooperative. Paranoid thoughts—believes hospital staff are attempting to poison her.

Here the results of trying to find the “right” medication are presented and a sense of the loss of control experienced by the “I” is made palpable. Again, those with knowledge structures based in experience immediately recognize the significance of such descriptions and those that don’t are given additional information to aid in simulation. The final moment of the play, however, is different. It indicates a kind of reintegration of the audience and actors into the world outside the play. The curtains open and the world of representation and reality are mixed. I would label this moment, and moments like it in other plays, as a potential dystopian performative moment. Of
all the scenes within the play, it is the opening of the curtain that requires the most cognitive energy. It is the moment where the mood, affect, and emotion elicited in the audience has the best chance of infusion. For 70-90 minutes the audience has been subjected to a fragmented vision of a person in deep psychic pain. If the play’s content can touch the audience, Bonanno, et.al. point out, “physiological responses accompanying sympathy in adults, including concerned gaze and reduced heart rate, are predictive of altruistic or helping behaviors. Such reciprocal responses increase the probability that individuals expressing sadness will receive needed attention and/or assistance from others (Keltner & Kring, 1998).” The successful production of 4.48 Psychosis will then elicit empathy and sympathy from its audience members while creating an experience that elicits the basic emotion of sadness. The opening of the curtain and the experience of simulation and emotional mirroring through the production, I would argue, have the most potential to elicit an activating sadness and thus points to the future potential loss, a dystopic vision of loss not necessarily personally experienced. The dystopian performative moment of opening the currents points this empathic response at the outside world and asks the audience, in this moment of relief, what they might do to make the world a better place when faced with the dystopic potential future of depression. The audience in a state of negative affect will be primed perfectly for such a moment. As Forgas points out, negative affect can slow-down judgment, reduce stereotypes, increase skepticism and perseverance, and ultimately produce an accommodative processing strategy. In this state, Kane’s assertion of the following seems not only possible but plausible:

If we can experience something through art, then we might be able to change our future, because experience engraves lessons on our hearts through suffering, whereas speculation leaves us untouched. And anyone—politician, journalist,
artist—who attempts to give people that imaginative experience, faces defensive screams that it’s too much from all sectors of the artistic and political spectrum. It’s crucial to chronicle and commit to memory events never experienced—in order to avoid them happening. I’d rather risk overdose in the theatre than in life. And I’d rather risk defensive screams than passively become part of a civilisation that has committed suicide. 

At bottom, Kane is describing what I call the dystopian performative: a moment of experience created through affect/emotion in which our hearts have lessons engraved upon them through suffering, through a recognition of the potential of tragedies that have already occurred and those that might occur in our future. Both within the text and within performance, 4.48 Psychosis possesses the content and writerly possibility to elicit the basic emotion of sadness and prompt substantive, accommodating processing strategies that create several positive effects. The play’s text is written, I argue, to accomplish such a goal and the performance of the piece seems to obtain such a result. Theatre, as Kane argues, has the potential to provide an experience through suffering that might change the future. As difficult as these types of dystopian performatives are to endure, it seems worth it.

The Psychoanalytics of 4.48 Psychosis

The psychoanalytic approach to 4.48 Psychosis is the most common and most relevant to the theory of the dystopian performative. In chapter one I traced two different lineages of the performative, one that followed a language based trajectory and included such thinkers as Derrida, Butler, and Searle (for the current discussion, Lacan should probably be added to this list) and one that followed anthropology and sociology and included such thinkers as Schechner, Turner, Goffman, Dolan, and Taylor. I labeled the second approach as more focused on
embodiment and the first as far more logocentric. My main contention is that while the logocentric theories of the performative developed the concept to its current form, that applying it to an embodied approach (like affect/emotion science) could produce a greater understanding of the experience and meaning of a wider swathe of human life. That is to say that the dystopian performative benefits from both the iterability and citationality of the logocentric performative and embodiment as connected to affect/emotion. The dystopian performative argues for the confluence of both cognition (more akin to logocentricism and the mind) and affect/emotion (the impact of the body).

The question of why psychoanalysis is used to understand 4.48 Psychosis might be traced back to one of Kane’s most oft quoted remarks on the play (also quoted at the top of this chapter): “It’s [4.48 Psychosis] about a psychotic breakdown and what happens to a person’s mind when the barriers which distinguish between reality and different forms of imagination completely disappear.” Graham Saunders points to a quote given by Kane in an interview with Nils Tabert to discuss the psychoanalytic ideas present in the play. Kane suggests 4.48 Psychosis is “yet another play, that is about the split between one’s consciousness and one’s physical being. For me that’s what madness is about.” Robert I. Lublin’s “I love you now’: time and desire in the plays of Sarah Kane” discusses these issues of subjectivity as connected to Lacan: “In Lacanian psychoanalysis, desire is the consequence of the fracturing of identity that occurs upon entering into language as a child, when one first realises that there is a separation between the individual perceiving and that which is perceived. Desire is one’s wish to fill the gap or ‘lack’ between the wholeness that precedes language and the uncertainty that defines individuals who have entered into social construction.” This lack and the desire that it creates is tied up in Lacan’s notions of child development as they relate to the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the
Real—three orders that determine and control our interaction with desire, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis. Mark Fortier’s *Theory/Theatre: An Introduction* provides a brief breakdown of these three orders:

Because our subjectivity exists in language, Lacan distances our mental life from the ‘real’—the actual world, the way things really are. The subject lives inescapably in a mental world, not a real one. We can live in the mental world in one of two registers: the imaginary or the symbolic. The imaginary is an inflexible and delusory state associated with infancy and later various arrested psychotic conditions; [...] The imaginary is associated with the ‘mirror stage’ in childhood development: the point at which a child is able to recognize an image (in a mirror for instances) as ‘me’. The symbolic entails a more mature engagement with reality and a dialogue open to change and development.  

Importantly, as Fortier notes, both the Imaginary and the Symbolic are entirely dependent upon language for their formulation and maintenance. The Real is inaccessible after a human enters the mirror stage and recognizes themselves as separate from the world around them, as a self.

The theories of Lacan are used by a variety of scholars for, mostly, the same purpose, which is to analyze the play for how it critiques, impacts, supports, etc. the linguistic psychoanalytic theories of Lacan. If human understanding is completely structured by language and the Symbolic as Lacan suggests, then this project would absolutely yield important results to understanding depression, suicide, and the emotions. For example, we might take Elzbieta Baraniecka’s “Words that ‘Matter’: Between Materiality and Immateriality of Language in Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis.” In this essay, Baraniecka suggests that “Choosing death is seen by the voice as an act of indulging in the self by finally satisfying the desire to fully become what it is:
nothingness as the unimaginable state that cannot be grasped by language.” In this explanation, suicide is a result of a desire for that which was lost during the mirror stage, a connection to the Real.

In this respect, suicide can be seen as a radical act of rebellion against the hegemonic order structured by language and the Symbolic. Some of the lines of 4.48 Psychosis can certainly be read in this way: examples provided by Baraniecka include, “Here I am and here is my body,” “tell me there is an objective reality in which my body and mind are one,” or “how can I speak again.” There are, however, a number of lines that fail to speak to a desire for the Real, such as “I do not want to die […] I do not want to live,” “I have no desire for death / no suicide ever had,” or “some will call this self-indulgence / (they are lucky not to know the truth) / Some will know the simple fact of pain.” The self-indulgence noted in this last line seems to be the exact kind of suicide described by Baraniecka, “Choosing death is seen […] as an act of indulging in the self.” This is in direct opposition to what the “I” of the play states about the desire to commit suicide. In many ways Baraniecka is romanticizing death by suicide. More importantly, as discussed by Kalat and Shiota, depression is understood biologically as a pain or illness. While depression is linked to the core relational theme of sadness, an irrevocable loss, it seems odd to analyze the representation of depression under a system that suggests that suicide caused by depression is most likely linked to the loss of the Real during the mirror stage (a suggestion that perhaps all loss in life is tied back to this single developmental moment).

These ideas are furthered in almost the opposite way in Laurens De Vos’s “Sarah Kane and Antonin Artaud: Cruelty towards the subjectile,” in which De Vos suggests,
Cruelty, thus, plays an ambiguous role, as it occurs on the brink between the Symbolic and the Real. If it provides an escape route form the chain of signifiers, it will simultaneously produce signifiers that cut short this escape and come to the rescue of the subject that is in danger of meeting the Real. Cruelty withholds the subject from erasing their essential human lack and, with it, themselves. Even the auto-mutilation that they have recourse to in *4.48 Psychosis* should be seen as an extreme attempt to comply with the Symbolic. The body is, as it were, called back in extremis to the law. Signifiers are literally carved or slashed into the skin (Verhaeghe, 1999: 172)."94

Here the act of self-cutting is discussed in relation to signifiers that construct the Symbolic order. The knife in this metaphor is the Symbolic order as it insists physically (oddly enough), through cutting the body, on its hegemony. Utilizing Lacanian psychoanalysis Baraniecka demonstrates how suicide “satisfies” the desire lost during the mirror stage. De Vos suggests that self-cutting re-instantiates the Symbolic order. De Vos explains this seeming contradiction, “the cruelty that permeates Kane’s first three plays fulfills this double function. On the one hand, the wish to break through the wall of language necessitates violence yet, on the other hand, the same violence also prevents this transgression by alarming the body. As much as cruelty tears down the walls of the Symbolic in an attempt to attain the Real, it remains—however rudimentary—a kind of language too.”95 Thus, the answer for De Vos is simply to suggest that violence and pain, as attempts to obtain the Real, fail in that they are also a language.

This might be viewed as a tautological argument for the primacy of language in the way humans comprehend the world. Elaine Scarry might disagree with this premise on the simple basis of her claim that “[pain’s] resistance to language is not simply one of its incidental or
accidental attributes but is essential to what it is."96 The desire to remove the body from consideration in psychoanalytic treatments of the play is detrimental to understanding the physical, painful experience of depression. Like De Vos, Baraniecka also falls into the trap of suggesting languages primacy at the expense of the body, “the voice from 4.48 Psychosis seems to be disembodied, at least in the conventional understanding of dramatic character. The voice, after all, consists of language itself. It is therefore language that attempts suicide in the play and tries to unmake itself and its fixed net of signifiers.”97 Baraniecka ignores the play in performance where there are often several bodies on stage that embody the voice of the various characters to remain within the logocentric realm of psychoanalysis.

The body, however, should not be so easily set aside. The split between the mind and the body, as I hope is obvious by this point, is a false dichotomy. More specifically, Bruce McConachie’s essay “Cognitive studies and epistemic competence in cultural history: Moving beyond Freud and Lacan” concludes that,

For Lacan, the human subject is necessarily tied to language; the Freudian unconscious of the self is structured as a language, and adult humans relate to themselves and each other through symbolic communication. The only other register available to humans in everyday life is the imaginary, an inflexible state associated with infancy and various delusory conditions. Humans learn about the world and produce knowledge through the register of the symbolic; Lacanian psychoanalysis does not recognize a pre-symbolic capability of simulation as a mode of knowing.98 Simulation here refers to the cognitive capacity to “put ourselves in the shoes of another person, imagine the world as it would appear from her or his point of view, and ‘then deliberate, reason,
and see what decision emerges’ (Goldman 1995: 185).” Mirror neurons, schemas, the enteric nervous system, affect/emotion, etc. like simulation, all have the ability to act as a mode of knowing that is not supported through psychoanalytic theory. To study an author interested in creating an experiential theatre through a psychoanalytic framework where, as Kane suggests, “performance is visceral. It puts you in direct physical contact with thought and feeling” seems a misstep, which the current study works to rectify. For this reason, the work of scholars who try to understand the experience of Kane’s theatre seem more useful. An excellent example lies in Ellen W. Kaplan’s “The cage is my mind: object and image in depicting mental illness on stage,” where she notes, “Like Kane, she [Virginia Woolf] experiments with form to describe consciousness and illness experientially, as states that can be approximated through word, sound, and image. But language runs out, description runs dry; the experience of mental illness cannot be so much explained as depicted, embodied in form, structure, object as metaphor. Even these strategies are partial, calls from the edge. Artaud’s words, perhaps, are best: ‘Nobody ever wrote or painted, sculpted, or modeled, constructed or created, except to get in fact out of hell’ (Artaud 1976: 497).”

By examining Kane’s attempt to depict the experience of mental illness through affect/emotion, dystopian performative moments, embodied performatives, I argue the play allows audiences to grasp the nature of depression on a physical, potentially pre-verbal level. These moments challenge the stigmatization of the mental illness by offering a glimpse of its experience on a bodily, visceral level. While some scholars have focused on the experiential nature of Kane’s work, most notably Allyson Campbell, the over-reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis to interpret Kane’s final work necessitates the argument presented in this chapter: that the affective/emotional experience of 4.48 Psychosis on a bodily level disturbs the audience
into dystopian performative moments that allow for a slow-down in cognition, healthy skepticism, a reduction in stereotypical judgments, and other positive benefits to the negative emotions provoked.

Sadness can be positive and dystopia can result in a greater understanding of the perils of not only how our current culture and society operate but how it might operate in the future. I argue *Psychosis* successfully communicates depression to an audience. More than that however, the interconnection between cognition and affect/emotion allows this communication to happen on a level that might change behavior, help various groups understand each other, and promote the action required to meaningfully move society and culture forward towards a better world.
CONCLUSION

Sarah Kane did not invent the affect/emotion potential of the theatre nor is she the first to explore negative experiences like violence, rape, or mental illness, but she has (arguably) taken this embodied performative experience to extremes we haven’t seen before. As a result, Kane’s work challenges us to think not only about why theatre can provoke pleasure in unpleasantness, but also how our affective/emotional responses can be a catalyst for social change. Affect/emotion is of course far more complicated than the evidence provided in this dissertation could allow. The fact is that without far more detail with regard to demographics and the cultural differences inherent in various identity groups, including race, gender, class, and disability only a broad picture can be drawn of how affect/emotion might operate in any given theatrical context. This limitation points the way toward additional research that relies on case studies where such data is available and would add to the complexity of our knowledge about how dystopian performatives operate.

The dystopian performative is a way of understanding how bodies interact within the theatre through what are often negative affect/emotion experiences. Sarah Kane’s work has allowed me to trace a trajectory of response that moves along the spectrum of behavior created through embodied affect/emotion to more complex interactions between cognition and affect/emotion. As has been seen, the two cannot and should not be separated. Even with basic emotions directly tied to more immediate bodily responses, such as disgust in *Blasted*, culture and cognition intervene and complicate the response with what scientists call moral disgust, linked to ideas of racism, prejudice, and in-groups vs. out-groups. Within *Blasted*, the academic understanding of the play has always been linked to these same ideas. The dystopian performative, as seen in the potential elicitation of disgust, describes how these ideas are transmitted not only cognitively to an audience but how the information is transferred between
bodies. In short how the body “does,” not only to itself but to other human beings and the world they inhabit.

*Cleansed* and *Phaedra’s Love* utilize the two basic, bodily responses to threat, fear and anger, to create dystopian performative moments in the theatre. In this chapter a stronger connection can be seen to the way theatre and performance has been theorized outside the realm of neuroscience. Connections are made to Seneca’s tragedies and stoic philosophy, Amy Hughes’s theorization of spectacles, and the very pervasive exploration of how theatre and performance helps us to understand subject formation. Ed. S. Tan’s work on the connections between science and the arts, specifically his theorization of “aesthetic emotions,” allows the chapter to work toward understanding how theatre artists might use affect/emotion science (perhaps unknowingly) to strengthen the transmission of themes and ideas through engagement with the body.

Memory is yet another important and dynamic way in which theatre and performance has been understood to interact with the audience. Utilizing Kane’s *Crave*, the importance of affect/emotion to the formation, elicitation, and understanding of memories becomes clear. In particular, how theatre can effect the cognitive processing strategy of the audience is integral to creating the desired response. In the case of *Crave*, its atypicality, writerly construction, and ambiguous nature elicits substantive processing that allows for a deeper infusion of affect/emotion. Dystopian performatives are found in the moments that connect cognition and affect/emotion to tackle complex problems like mental health, trauma, and abuse. Integrating the body into these discussions elicits more empathy, understanding, and a willingness to act when compared to purely reasoned arguments. The power of theatre to effect change is directly connected to its ability to impact the body which then impacts the mind.
The importance of the connection between cognition and affect/emotion is more specifically engaged in the final chapter on 4.48 Psychosis. Sadness, a basic emotion generally avoided, is shown to have positive repercussions, especially when paired with substantive processing strategies that promote deeper thinking. The importance of negative affect/emotion is made clear by exploring the elicitation of sadness in 4.48 Psychosis, which works to help the audience understand the experience of depression and suicidal ideation.

At the heart of the dystopian performative theory is the suggestion that information, ideas, and knowledge are embodied. How embodiment effects the way human beings behave and interact in culture and society is assisted by understanding affect/emotion systems and how they interconnect with cognition. According to Nicholas Ridout’s Stage Fright, Animals, and other Theatrical Problems, “if the experience of affect is where we perhaps get a little closer to the drive that seems to be the basis of theatre and the occasion of some of its most intense pleasures and discomfort, then the development of a critical language to deal with this seems essential.”

Affect/emotion science provides that critical language and, more importantly to dystopian performatives, it demonstrates the positive potential of negative embodied experiences. As Joseph P. Forgas makes clear,

feeling good can signal a safe, familiar situation requiring little effort and motivation to respond. In contrast, negative affect operates like a mild alarm signal, triggering more effort and motivation to deal with a more challenging environment. Thus negative mood, although unpleasant, may increase engagement and motivation. In contrast, positive affect may not only “feel good” but may also produce disengagement, reducing motivation and attention to the outside world (Forgas, 2007).”
Negative affect/emotion and the way it interacts with cognition and effects how human beings operate within culture is based on a need. The fight or flight response to threat is based on self-preservation, as are many other basic emotions studied within this dissertation. Theatre that fully engages the body utilizes long-formed affect/emotion systems to tap into the most important and basic needs. Engaging the body at a level in which an audience feels a need to comprehend, change, avoid, or in some way act, is essential for creating meaningful and impactful theatre. Affect/emotion science provides the tools to understand the embodied doings that I am arguing take play in the theatre of Sarah Kane. These kinds of performatives, however, are not limited to Kane’s work or even to negative affect/emotion. While Jill Dolan does not rely on affect/emotion science, she is still discussing moments of embodied doings that she argues creates hope in the theatre and the potential for change.

The theatre is utopian in that it seeks to engage society and culture in debates, arguments, and controversy. It is an art form dedicated to reflecting culture and society back on itself to resist various ideas and cultures and embrace others. As Anne Bogart suggests, “Utopia is now. The act of making theatre is already utopian because art is an act of resistance against circumstances. If you are making theatre now, you have already successfully achieved utopia.” Utopia, I argue, is here used as an overarching term for utopianism, which includes both dystopia and positive utopia among other variations. The practice of utopia or dystopia, the dystopian performative, involves engaging the body in an experience of a world that does not, in fact, exist. The purpose of which is to resist the circumstances of culture and society in hopes of creating change. Dystopian performatives specifically focus on the more negatively valenced experiences of the theatre, these are not limited to violent, offensive, disturbing, oppressive, or highly experiential theatre events. The theory could be applied to any theatre that works on the body
through engagement with a negative experience. Further research, for example, might use dystopian performatives to understand tragedy and Aristotle’s notion of catharsis. Dystopian performatives explain how the machine of theatre and performance works on the bodies of its audience and why this kind of work matters within culture and society.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1
3 The term “dystopian performative” has been earlier employed by David Roby, “Crust Punk: Apocalyptic Rhetoric and Dystopian Performatives,” Master’s thesis, Texas A & M University, 2013. While Roby relies on Raymond Williams’s notion of a “structure of feeling” via Jill Dolan to define and deploy his version of the term, my dissertation provides a different affect lens, the use of cognitive and neuroscience.
6 Staley, Seneca and the Idea of Tragedy 92.
13 Schaer, “Utopia, Space, Time, History” 5.

Claeys and Sargent, *The Utopia Reader* 1.

For further definitions and more detail see Claeys and Sargent, *The Utopia Reader* 1-5.


Moylan, *Scraps* 111-112.

Sargent, “Theorizing Utopia” 17.


Sargent, “Theorizing Utopia” 18.


See also Anne Bogart, *A Director Prepares: Seven Essays on Art and Theatre* (London and New York: Rutledge, 2001) 151. “Utopia is now. The act of making theatre is already utopian because art is an act of resistance against circumstances. If you are making theatre now, you have already successfully achieved utopia.”


Dolan, *Utopia in Performance* 5


Diana Taylor, “Interview with Richard Schechner,” *What is Performance Studies* (California, University of Southern California, Scalar) http://scalar.usc.edu/nehvectors/wips/richard-schechner-what-is-performance-studies-2001-


Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre* 46-47.


Taylor, “Interview with Richard Schechner.”


Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre* 46-47.


See also, Ruth Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010).


60 Fox, *Emotion Science* 17.
62 McConachie, *Engaging Audiences* 4. “But the primary assumption of social constructivism—that social and cultural learning (nurture) operate separately from genetics and “hard-wired” cognition (nature)—is no longer tenable.”
63 McConachie, *Engaging Audiences* 5. Also: “This concern, however, is based on Jameson’s and others’ assumption that the natural and the cultural can be easily distinguished and divided, when they cannot be. It also conflates the natural with the ethical. Just because evolution may have favored the survival of aggressive males and care-giving females, this does not mean that males have a right to be aggressive in all situations and women must always remain in care-giving relation- ships. Our human nature is flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of behaviors and ethics.”
65 For a wonderful synopsis of Tomkins work see The Tomkins Institute: http://www.tomkins.org
66 Margaret Wheterell, *Affect and Emotion: A new Social Science Understanding* (Los Angles: Sage Publications Ltd., 2012) 45. For a summary of the research involving basic emotions, the research that refutes such conclusions, and the state of the field of emotion research see pages 39-50.
68 For an example of this diagram see, J.A. Russell, “A Circumplex Model of Affect,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 39.6 (1980): 1161-78. Other iterations can quickly be gleaned from a google image search.
70 Sanders, “Models of Emotion” 33.
72 For more information on falsifiability see McConachie, *Engaging Audiences* 8-14.
78 qtd. Saunders, “‘Just a Word on a Page and there is the Drama’” 99.
81 This basic summary is paraphrased and shortened from Saunders, ‘Love me or Kill me’ and Saunders, About Kane.
82 Saunders, About Kane 124.
83 Saunders, About Kane 124.
93 Urban, “Towards a Theory of Cruel Britannia” 368.
94 Saunders ‘Love me or Kill me’ 5.
95 qtd. in Saunders, About Kane 51.
98 Artaud, The Theatre and its Double 81.
101 Eckart Voigts-Virchow’s “‘We are anathema’—Sarah Kane’s plays as post dramatic theatre versus ‘dreary and repugnant tale of sense,’” Sarah Kane in Context, eds. Lauren De Vos and Graham Saunders (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010) 197. See Also, David Barnett’s “When is a Play not a Drama? Two Examples of Postdramatic Theatre Texts,” New Theatre Quarterly 24.1 (February 2008): 14-23
102 Sarah Kane, “Drama with Balls” 12.
103 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 80-97.
108 Öhman, “Fear and Anxiety” 712. For summary of these ideas see pages 712-713.
109 Öhman, “Fear and Anxiety” 714. The rest of this paragraph is summarized from 713-715.
Öhman, “Fear and Anxiety” 713-715.


112 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 194, 187.


114 Phaedra’s Love 103. For ease of reference, all page numbers referencing a Sarah Kane play can be found in Sarah Kane: Complete Plays (London: Methuen, 2001).

116 Fox, Emotion Science 191.

117 Fox, Emotion Science 223.

118 See Fox, Emotion Science 4-7


120 For a chart of these stages see Rozin et.al., “Disgust” 764. Also see Shannon Marie Reynolds, “The Development of a Comprehensive Disgust Scale” the University of Tulsa, Diss. 2012; and Joshua M. Tybur, “Disgust Dissected: An Investigation of the Validity of the Three Domain Disgust Scale,” University of New Mexico, Diss., 2009. Tybur breaks up these developments into three stages instead of 5: Pathogen Disgust, Sexual Disgust, and Moral Disgust. Reynolds provides a lovely summary of current research on disgust.

121 Schechner, Performance Theory 358.

21 qtd. in David Benedict, “Disgusting violence? Actually it’s quite a peaceful play; In her first interview Sarah Kane, a 23-year-old playwright, answers the critics who were outraged by her first play,” *The Independent* 22 January 1995.
22 Kane, “Drama with Balls.”
23 Letter from Kane to Aleks Sierz (4 January 1999), qtd. in Sierz, *In-Yer-Face Theatre* 92.
24 qtd. in Sierz, *In-Yer-Face Theatre* 98.
25 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 81.
26 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 85.
27 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 85.
29 States, *Great Reckonings in Little Rooms* Loc. 92.
34 Selling, “Truth and Dare” 29.
44 See Tinker, “The Disgusting Feast of Filth”
45 Dan Rebellato, Interview with Sarah Kane, “Brief Encounter Platform,” Royal Holloway College, London 3 November 1998: 4
46 Rebellato, Interview with Sarah Kane 4.
47 Saunders, “Love Me or Kill Me” 25. This quote comes from a BBC radio broadcast that I was unable to locate and examine in its totality.
50 Blasted 50.
51 Naomi Rokotnitz, “Too far gone in disgust”: Mirror Neurons and the Manipulation of Embodied Responses in The Libertine” Configurations 16.3 (Fall 2008): 412-13
54 Blasted 43-44.
55 The blurring of victim, perpetrator and bystander is a common interpretation of much of Kane’s work. See David Greig, “Introduction,” Sarah Kane: Complete Plays (London: Methuen, 2001) xvii.
56 Alex Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre: British Drama Today (London: Faber and Faber, 2001) 101. Quotes from Sarah Kane that are pulled out of Aleks Sierz’s In-Yer-Face Theatre, like the one above, originate from Sierz’s personal interviews and correspondence with Kane.
57 Rozin, “Disgust” 771.
58 Blasted 3.
59 See Blasted 4.
60 Blasted 4.
63 Blasted 17.
64 Blasted 45.
65 Blasted 50.
66 Kelly, Yuck! 144.
67 Kelly, Yuck! 142. Kelly goes on to suggest, “In light of these features of the response, once something triggers disgust, the underlying cognitive system causes an agent to think about and treat the offending entity as if it were revolting, dirty, impure, and contaminating, whether or not it really is, or whether or not those assessments or inferences are endorsed by the person, or whether or not they are in any way reflectively justifiable.”
69 Blasted 27.
70 Solga, “Blasted’s Hysteria” 354.
71 Solga, “Blasted’s Hysteria” 355.
73 Rozin, et.al., “Disgust” 761.
74 Rozin, et.al., “Disgust” 761.
75 Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., and Haidt, J., “The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping between Three Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy,
76 Rozin and Lowery, “The CAD Triad Hypothesis” 576.
79 Solga 355.
80 Blasted 44.
81 Blasted 31.
82 See Blasted 27.
83 Blasted 24-26.
84 Blasted 30-31.
86 Blasted 31.
89 Sierz, *In-Yer-Face* 101. We might also consider the relationship between hunger and Cate’s willingness to allow her self to be used sexually later in the play to obtain food.
90 Kellaway, “Theatre: Throwing Out the Blasted Hatred Bag.”.
93 Blasted 59-60.
96 Sierz, *In-Yer-Face* 99.

**CHAPTER 3**
3 Rebellato, Interview with Sarah Kane 9
4 This is most certainly attributable to the fact that Kane is adapting Seneca and working within a theatrical framework that recalls Seneca’s Stoic philosophy and belief that emotion should be controlled and a stoic life lived.
8 Harrison, et.al., “A Two-Way Road” 91.
9 Harrison, et.al., “A Two-Way Road” 91.
For a good example of performances involving “harassing materials”, see Geoff Pywell, *Staging Real Things: The Performance of Ordinary Events* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1994). Specifically, the first chapter in which he describes *Hunchback*.


Tan, “Emotion, Art, and the Humanities” 117, 121


The second possibility, emotion as theme, is simply a piece of art that represents an emotion either in a person or as an expressive whole. Finally, themes specific for art works, suggests a focus on the emotions tied to the arts for an extended period of time.


Phaedra’s Love 68.

Phaedra’s Love 73.

Phaedra’s Love 98.

Phaedra’s Love 103.

Tinker, “The Disgusting Feast of Filth”

David Farr recalls the thrill of working on the play with its controversial author Sarah Kane, “Walking into her rehearsal was like entering a religion’ As ‘Phaedra’s Love’ is revived David Farr recalls the thrill of working on the play with its controversial author Sarah Kane,” *The Daily Telegraph* 26 October 2005: 033.

Farr, “‘Walking into her rehearsal’


Hughes, *Spectacles of Reform* loc. 691.

Spencer, “Phaedra’s Love” 653.

Aleks Sierz, “Phaedra’s Love” 651.


Edwards, “Cleansed” 563.


Benedict, “Cleansed” 564-65


Another avenue of research might be examining these types of theatrical techniques that are familiar in the work of the Performance Group, which have distinct connections to the structure of ritual.


Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre* 47.
76 conducted with Rothschiller in 2005.

75 Laurens De Vos and Graham Saunders (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010) 176.

74 73

72 71

70 69

68

67

66

65

64

63

62

61

60

58

57

56

55

54

53

52

51

50

49

48

47

46

45

44

43

42

41

40

39

38

37

36

35

34

33

32

31

30

29

28

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

---


45 Turner, From Ritual to Theatre 47. Turner states, “Liminality is both more creative and more destructive than the structural norm” (47).

44 43

42

41

40

39

38

37

36

35

34

33

32

31

30

29

28

27

26

25

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

---


38 Staley, Seneca and the Idea of Tragedy 92.

37 Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre 99.

36 Staley, Seneca and the Idea of Tragedy 93.


33 Urban, “An Ethics of Catastrophe” 43.


30 Antonin Artaud, To Have Done with the Judgment of God, “Surrealism-Plays,” Trans. unknown. <http://www.surrealism-plays.com/Artaud.html>. This was the only readily accessible version of the play I was able to obtain, the language does however match up with those used in other sources.


28 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 187.

27 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 189. As a general note, and because I just happen to have a newborn in the house, I attempted this small experiment and based on a very small sample size I can confirm that (at least my baby) becomes enraged when I hold her arms to her side...
Campbell, “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love,” 179. Campbell is quoting from an email interview he conducted with Nodler in 2005.


Campbell, “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” 100-102.

Marshall, “Saxon Violence and Social Decay” 172-173

Campbell, “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” 181.

Hughes, Spectacles of Reform loc. 154-171.

Campbell, “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” 181.

Campbell, “Sarah Kane’s Phaedra’s Love” 183.


Scarpa and Raine, “Violence Associated with Anger and Impulsivity” 321.

qtd. in Saunders, ‘Love me or Kill me’ 28. Quote comes from a personal letter from Sarah Kane to Graham Saunders.


Cleansed 129.

Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 207.

Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 207.

Cleansed 117.

Lucy Nevitt, Theatre & Violence (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 65.

Nevitt, Theatre & Violence 712. For summary of these ideas see pages 712-713.

Cleansed 125-126


Chute, “Victim, Perpetrator, Bystander” 162.

Cleansed 150.

Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre 99.

CHAPTER 4


2 Saunders, ‘Love me or kill me’ 102.

3 Saunders, ‘Love me or kill me’ 105-06

4 Crave 163.

5 Crave 159.


9 Crave 155.

14 Krasner, “Empathy and Theatre” 262.
17 Berkowitz, *Causes and Consequences of Feelings* 68.
19 Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2001) 42.
21 For an excellent summary of some of the ways in which mood and memory has been linked see Henry C. Ellis and Brent A. Moore, “Mood and Memory,” *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, eds. Tim Dalglish and Mick J Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) 193-210.
22 Fox, *Emotion Science* 221.
27 Ellis and Moore, “Mood and Memory” 200.
28 Derrida, “Signature Event Context” 12. original emphasis.
34 qtd. in Hattenstone, “A Sad Hurrah.”
35 Hattenstone, “A Sad Hurrah.”
36 Hattenstone, “A Sad Hurrah.” For another description of the incident see Sierz, *In-Yer-Face Theatre* 91.
37 Hattenstone, “A Sad Hurrah.”
39 Kane, “The only thing I remember is…”
40 Bower and Forgas, Affect, Memory, and Social Cognition” 129
49 Billington, “Crave” 1153.
52 Fox, Emotion Science 221.
54 Fisher, “Crave” 1153.
55 Billington, “Crave” 1153.
57 Paul Taylor, “Crave” 1154.
58 Kane, “Drama with Balls” 12.
60 Nicholas De Jongh, “Crave” 1153.
66 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 41-42
67 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 20.
68 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 30.
70 Kaplan, Trauma Culture 93.
71 Kaplan, Trauma Culture 94.
72 qtd. in Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre 101. Quotes from Sarah Kane that are pulled out of Aleks Sierz’s In-Yer-Face Theatre, like the one above, originate from Sierz’s personal interviews and correspondence with Kane.
73 Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre 118-119.
74 Sierra, In-Yer-Face Theatre 118.
75 Rebellato, Interview with Sarah Kane 16
76 Voigt-Virchow, “We are anathema” 197.
77 Wallace, “Sarah Kane, experiential theatre and the revenant avant-garde” 90.
78 Wallace, “Sarah Kane, experiential theatre and the revenant avant-garde” 98.
81 qtd. in Saunders, ‘Love me or Kill Me’ 108.
82 qtd. in Saunders, ‘Love me or Kill Me’ 108.
85 Rebellato, “Sarah Kane before Blasted” 39.
88 Crave 158.
91 Crave 187; Cleansed 105.
93 qtd. in Kaplan, “The cage is my mind” 126.
95 Kaplan, “The cage is my mind” 127.
96 Cohn, “Sarah Kane, an Architect of Drama.”
97 Crave 162.
98 Crave 198.
99 Crave 198.
100 Crave 157-58.
101 Crave158.
102 Crave 177.
103 For an interesting discussion of the impact of violence on both the abuser and the abused see John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture (New York: Knopf, 2000).
104 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 88.
105 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 94.
106 Crave 179.
107 Cohn, “Sarah Kane, an Architect of Drama”
108 Crave 182-83
109 Crave 187.
110 Crave 187.
111 Crave 170.
112 Crave 174.
113 Crave 199.
114 Crave 167-77. The other instances of “I feel nothing, I feel nothing” occur on the following pages: 156, 158, 175, 199.
115 Crave 187.
116 Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” 92.

CHAPTER 5
4 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain Loc. 2575-2576
When you are sick or in pain, your body reacts with increased sleep, decreased activity, decreased appetite, and decreased sex drive. Those reactions help you conserve energy and resist behaviors (like foraging for food) that would risk further harm. The body reacts in much the same way to highly stressful events as to pain. […] Some people react this way even to the stress of having to give a public speech (maker & Watkins, 1998). That is, the body treats stressful events like an illness.”

Bonanno, et.al., “Sadness and Grief” 799.


Forgas, “Can Sadness Be Good for You?” 3-36.


Dolan, Utopia in Performance 5.

Dolan, Utopia in Performance 243.

Bonanno, et.al., “Sadness and Grief” 800

4.48 Psychosis 210

Bonanno, et.al., “Sadness and Grief” 799.

Greig, Sarah Kane: Complete Plays ix; Saunders, ‘Love me or kill me’ ix-xi; Sierz, In-Yer-Face Theatre 90-91

Saunders, ‘Love me or kill me’ x

See Mark Ravenhill, “The beauty of brutality: In 1995, Sarah Kane rocked the theatrical world with her play, Blasted; less than five years later, she took her own life. As the Barbican prepares to stage a German-language version, Mark Ravenhill remembers a rare talent,” The Guardian 28 October 2006, Guardian Review Section: 14+.

qtd. in Saunders, ‘Love me or kill me’ 116. This quote comes from a personal letter written to Graham Saunders by Edward Bond on 27 May 2000. It is not available anywhere else.


<http://www.theatrevoice.com/audio/director-james-macdonald-on-kane/> 1 April 2016

Halliburton, “4.48 Psychosis” 826.

Nightingale, “4.48 Psychosis” 828.


provided from the literature by Paraschakis are included here for reference as they were too extensive in this case:”(Beck, Morris, & Lester, 1974; Chavez-Hernandez, Paramo, Leenaars, & Leenaars, 2006; Demirel, Akar, Sayin, Candansayar, & Leenaars, 2008; Eisenwort et al., 2007; Goren, Subasi, Tirashi, & Ozen, 2004; Koronfel, 2002; Kuwabara et al., 2006; Leenaars, 1988; O’Connor, Sheeby, & O’Connor, 1999; O’Donnell, Farmer, & Cata-Ian, 1993; Tuckman, Kleiner, & Lavell, 1960; Wong, Yeung, Chan, Yip, & Tang, 2009).


34 Paraschakis, et.al., “Differences between suicide victims” 347.

35 Rebellato, “Blasted: The Life and Death of Sarah Kane.”

36 Rebellato, “Blasted: The Life and Death of Sarah Kane.”


38 Halliburton. “4.48 Psychosis” 826.


42 Hemming, “4.48 Psychosis” 828.

43 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 278.

44 Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience 279.


47 For example, a person with a family member who suffers from depression will recall memories that might make the sadness they experience even more relevant, while others may not experience the emotion at all


50 Spencer, “4.48 Psychosis” 606.

51 qtd. in Bonanno, et.al., “Sadness and Grief” 800.


55 Macaulay, “4.48 Psychosis” 605.


57 There may be another category that utilizes Kane’s suicide and her final play to discuss her legacy and life, such as Saunders, “Just a Word on a Page and there is the Drama.’ Sarah Kane’s Theatrical Legacy” 97-110.


60 4.48 Psychosis 210.


4.48 *Psychosis* 232.


68 Diedrich, “‘Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs’” 391; *4.48 Psychosis* 229.


71 Barnett, “When Is a Play Not a Drama?” 22.

72 *4.48 Psychosis* 223.

73 Mcauley, “Not Magic but Work” 284.

74 *4.48 Psychosis* 223-24.

75 Bonanno, et.al., “Sadness and Grief” 799.

76 Harrison. et.al., “A Two-Way Road” 94.

77 Forgas, “Can Sadness Be Good for You?” 3-36.


79 Rebellato, *Blasted: The Life and Death of Sarah Kane*

80 qtd. in Saunders, *Love me or kill me* 113. The original interview is in German, thus I rely on Saunders translation.

81 Lublin, “‘I love you now’” 116.


84 *4.48 Psychosis* 230.

85 *4.48 Psychosis* 209.

86 *4.48 Psychosis* 205.

87 *4.48 Psychosis* 207.

88 *4.48 Psychosis* 244.

89 *4.48 Psychosis* 208.


92 De Vos, “Sarah Kane and Antonin Artaud” 135-36.


95 McConachie, “Cognitive studies and epistemic competence in cultural history” 72.

96 McConachie, “Cognitive studies and epistemic competence in cultural history” 54.

97 qtd. in Saunders ‘Love me or Kill me’ 15.

98 Kaplan “The cage is my mind” 127.

CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY


“4.48 Psychosis.” *Theatre Record* 30.6 (March 2010): 295-96.


---. “Disgusting violence? Actually it’s quite a peaceful play; In her first interview Sarah Kane, a 23-year-old playwright, answers the critics who were outraged by her first play,” *The Independent* 22 January 1995.


---. “Afterword: Sarah Kane and theatre,” ‘Love me or kill me’: Sarah Kane and the Theatre of Extremes, by Graham Saunders (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002) [inclusive pages?]


“Crave and 4.48 Psychosis.” Theatre Record 35.6 (March 2015): 275.

“Crave and Illusions.” Theatre Record 32.10 (May 2012): 548.


Farr, David. “‘Walking into her rehearsal was like entering a religion’ As ‘Phaedra’s Love’ is revived David Farr recalls the thrill of working on the play with its controversial author Sarah Kane.” *The Daily Telegraph* 26 October 2005: 033.


Holland, Patricia. “Monstrous regiment; Men can get away with depicting violence. Women are attacked for it. Time for a change, writes Patricia Holland.” The Independent 27 January 1995: 25.


Kane, Nina Rosanne. “‘F-Felt it’: Breathing Feminist, Queer and Clown Thinking into the Practice and Study of Sarah Kane’s Cleansed and Blasted.” Diss. The University of Huddersfield, 2013.


Keeping, K. “‘Oh that this too, too solid flesh would melt’: A Phenomenology of Sadness in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*.” *Philosophy Today* 52.2 (2008): 116-125.


Ravenhill, Mark. “‘Suicide art? She’s better than that.’” *The Guardian* 12 October 2005: 18.


---. “‘Too far gone in disgust”: Mirror Neurons and the Manipulation of Embodied Responses in The Libertine.” Configurations 16.3 (Fall 2008): 399-426.


“Sarah Kane Season: *Crave* and *4.48 Psychosis.*” *Theatre Record* 35.6 (March 2015): 275.


---. ‘Love me or Kill me’: *Sarah Kane and the Theatre of Extremes.* Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2002.


<http://www.theatrevoice.com/audio/director-james-macdonald-on-kane/> 1 April 2016


Thomas, Aaron C. “Enter the Man.” Diss. Florida State University, 2012.


---. “‘We are anathema’—Sarah Kane’s plays as post dramatic theatre versus ‘dreary and repugnant tale of sense.’” Sarah Kane in Context. Eds. Lauren De Vos and Graham Saunders. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010. 195-208.


Ward, Ian. “Rape and Rape Mythology in the Plays of Sarah Kane.” Comparative Drama 47.2 (2013): 225-48..


