The Legality of Existence in Exile from National Socialism:
The Legal Delineation of Identity and Its Implications for Individuation and Migration as Manifest in German Exile Literature of the Period 1933-1945

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The Legality of Existence in Exile from National Socialism:
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the legal status of refugees from the National Socialist (NS) regime and explores thereby the implications of statelessness for the refugee’s experience in exile, specifically his sense of belonging and place in the world, as manifest in select works of German exile literature of the period 1933-1945. The thesis pursued in this analysis is that the identity of the individual is inextricably tied to notions of time and space. The loss of the legal right to exist in a specific space at a specific time, a loss that defined the exile experience of refugees from the NS-regime, meant the expulsion of the refugee from a time-space continuum at a given moment to which he could never return. This loss calls into question the possibility of reintegration into this societal continuum, of the possibility of notions of self and place in the world independent of a legally recognized and sanctioned existence. The analysis of select German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period evidences that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.

Integral to a discussion of the legality of existence in exile and its implications for identity is a comprehensive definition of identity itself. For this purpose, Richard Jenkins’ tripartite model of individual order, interaction order, and institutional order, as outlined in his work Social Identity (Third Edition), serves as a definition of identity and a foundation for the historical discussion and literary analysis of the four chapters.

Chapter One, entitled “The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: The Legal Status of German Refugees of the National Socialist Period (1933-1945),” provides a historical foundation for the subsequent three chapters in its discussion of the processes of legal
erasure evident during the NS-period and the implications thereof for the legal status of the refugee in exile from the NS-regime. In the following chapters, representative works of German exile literature in which the experience of the in-between in Niemandsland proves to be of particular significance are discussed under various sub-points of analysis.

Egon Schwarz’s autobiography is the focus of Chapter Two, which is titled “The Implications of Legal Otherness for the Refugee’s Notion of Identity: A Case Study of Egon Schwarz’s Keine Zeit für Eichendorff.” In this chapter Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland are discussed within the analytical framework of Jenkins’ tripartite model in order to determine the implications of exile and the consequent ruptures in the institutional order for Schwarz’s identity formation in the individual order, specifically his sense of personal agency in processes of identification and the interplay thereof with his notions of belonging and place in the world.

Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of Niemandsland, specifically how statelessness affects the refugee’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he has been legally expunged. Entitled “The Interplay between Legally Sanctioned Space and Notions of Place in the World as Manifest in Select Works of German Exile Literature, 1933-1945,” this chapter explores the incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin as manifest in select works. The chosen works are representative of the diversity of German writers’ responses to the experience of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across several genres. The argumentation of the chapter is supported by the analysis of excerpts from these works: non-fiction political writings and speeches by Thomas Mann, including “Schriftsteller im Exil” and Deutsche Hörer!, the novels Kind aller Länder by Irmgard Keun and Transit by Anna Seghers, the drama Jacobowsky und der Oberst by Franz Werfel, and the “dialogisierte Tagespolitik” Flüchtlingsgespräche by Bertolt Brecht (White 137). This chapter investigates
how the authors of these works employ various techniques to demonstrate the ruptures in the institutional order and their implications for the individual order and identity in exile. The existing scholarship on these works is extensive, but the contribution of this dissertation lies in the fact that these works and their authors are being discussed within a unified analytical framework. In contrast to Chapters Two and Three, the analyses of which deal predominantly with the legal complications faced by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of statelessness for processes of identification, Chapter Four, in its discussion of Mascha Kaléko’s exile poetry, focuses primarily on the devastating and irretrievable loss of home that exile represented for Kaléko. Titled “Exile in Nirgendland: The Poetry and Exile Experience of Mascha Kaléko,” this chapter explores a leitmotif in Kaléko’s poetry that the refugee is perpetually trapped in a Niemandsland, an in-between space that she refers to as Nirgendland.

The four chapters of this dissertation explore the varying implications of legal erasure and statelessness for the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world, proving that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Presentation of Topic

The refugee from the National Socialist (NS) regime faced innumerable challenges in his pursuit of the legal right to exist. The NS-regime sought to legitimize their agenda to ‘restore’ the racial and ideological homogeneity of the German people through the legal appropriation and codification of ‘German’ in the context of desired similarity and malignant difference. Refugees from the NS-regime, whose political views or race, if not both, left them with the designation of malignant other under NS-legal code, as outlined in the *Nürnberger Gesetze* of 1935, experienced in the period of 1933-1945 processes of legal erasure that often resulted in statelessness. Under the precarious designation of stateless, the refugee fled NS-Germany and entered into a world, divided into territories delineated along national boundaries, in which he was legally invisible. The innumerable complications encountered by the refugee in his attempt to secure for himself the legal right to exist within the borders of given national territories, whether temporarily or indefinitely, is a recurrent theme in German exile literature of the NS-period. It is in this depiction of the incessant pursuit to obtain valid identification and travel documentation that the profound significance of a legally sanctioned existence manifests itself in this literature. For the stateless refugee, to whom no nation would provide a legally sanctioned space in which to exist, the paradox arose that, despite this lack of sanctioned space, he still occupied, as a living human being, a physical and intellectual space in the world.

This official and legal denial of sanctioned space created more than just legal complications for the refugee; as is evident in many works of German exile literature of this
period, the process of legal erasure and the flight into exile indelibly affected the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world. It became readily apparent to the refugee that, given the inextricability of time and space and their coalescence into a sense of place, exile represented his expulsion from a time-space continuum at a point in time to which he can never return. In numerous literary works, the estrangement resulting from this impossibility of return is heightened by the consequent further impossibility of reintegration into that time-space continuum from which he has been expunged. The impossibilities of return and reintegration after exile proved for many refugees to have a profound effect of loss, a loss encompassed in the famous description by Carl Zuckmayer:

Die Fahrt ins Exil ist ‘a journey of no return’. Wer sie antritt und von der Heimkehr träumt, ist verloren. Er mag wiederkehren – aber der Ort, den er dann findet, ist nicht mehr der gleiche, den er verlassen hat, und er ist nicht mehr der gleiche, der fortgegangen ist. Er mag wiederkehren, zu Menschen, die er entbehren mußte, zu Städten, die er liebte und nicht vergaß, in den Bereich der Sprache, die seine eigene ist. Aber er kehrt niemals heim. (539)

For Zuckmayer, exile represents the irretrievable loss of home (Heim); the linear and perpetual unfolding of events and relationships in time renders impossible a return to the home from which he was expunged. Exacerbating the ramifications of this impossibility of return after exile on the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world is the simultaneous impossibility of arrival that manifests itself as the refugee attempts to integrate himself into the time-space continuum of a new place while in exile. Stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of return and arrival, the refugee occupies in exile an in-between space. The refugee’s perceived inability to reconstruct a sense of belonging in the world after exile manifests itself in several works of German exile literature of the NS-period in the refugee’s “extraterritorial existence without end,”
a notion evident in Kaléko’s formulation, “Wohin ich immer reise, / ich komm nach Nirgendland.” (Koepke 37; “Kein Kinderlied,” Werke 310). The experience of the refugee in the space of the in-between consists of multiple dimensions, and it is in the space where the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce that the refugee exists. The analysis of this dissertation focuses on the depiction of Niemandsland in select works of German exile literature of the NS-period as a means to explore the question of how and to what extent the Niemandsland of exile affects the refugee’s sense of belonging and place in the world.

1.2 Thesis Statement

The refugee’s frantic pursuit of identification and travel documentation, as depicted in various works of German exile literature of the NS-period, is suggestive of an inherent paradox in statelessness, a legal Niemandsland in which the simultaneous incongruous realities of legal erasure and human embodiment coalesce. As Jenkins posits, individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human world. For the refugee, statelessness represents the official and legal rejection of his person by the governments of national communities. The refusal of these governments to provide the refugee with the travel and identification documentation necessary to exist either temporarily or indefinitely within their given national territories represents the exclusion of the refugee from the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of identification. Inherent in statelessness is thus a rupture in this dialectic of identification, and the exclusion of the individual from the institutional order calls into question the possibility of identity formation for a stateless refugee. The thesis pursued in this dissertation is that the identity of the individual is inextricably tied to notions of time and space. The loss of the legal right to exist in a specific space at a specific time, a loss that defined the exile experience of
refugees from the National Socialist Regime, meant the expulsion of the refugee from a time-space continuum at a given moment to which he could never return. This loss calls into question the possibility of reintegration into this societal continuum, of the possibility of notions of self and place in the world independent of a legally recognized and sanctioned existence. The following analysis of select German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period evidences that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.

1.3 Methodology

The methodology that will guide the literary analysis of this dissertation will be a close reading of these selected texts with consideration of relevant secondary literature. Integral to a discussion of the legality of existence in exile and its implications for identity is a comprehensive definition of identity itself. For the purposes of the current analysis, Richard Jenkins’ tripartite model of individual order, interaction order, and institutional order, as outlined in his work Social Identity (Third Edition), will serve as a definition of identity and a foundation for the historical and literary analysis. This model is based on the notion that the world, “as constructed and experienced by humans,” is composed of three distinct yet inextricably intertwined orders that “are simultaneous and occupy the same space, intersubjectively and physically:”

- the individual order is the human world as made up of embodied individuals, and what-goes-on-in-their-heads;
• **the interaction order** is the human world as constituted in relationships between individuals, in what-goes-on-between-people; and

• **the institutional order** is the human world of pattern and organisation, of established-ways-of-doing-things. (39-40)

Jenkins’ model is informed by the work of American Pragmatism, specifically that of C.H. Cooley (1962, 1964) and G.H. Mead (1934) (40). In this scholarship, selfhood is understood as an “ongoing and…simultaneous synthesis of (internal) self-definition and the (external) definitions of oneself offered by others” (40). Although individuals are unique and dynamic, individual identity is “embodied in selfhood” and thus cannot exist in a vacuum; individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human world (40). Jenkins derives from these concepts of individual identity and selfhood the premise that is fundamental to his tripartite model of identity, a process that he terms the “internal-external dialectic of identification” (40).

The internal-external dialectic of identification is presented as the “process whereby all identities – individual and collective – are constituted” (40). Jenkins suggests a “unitary model of selfhood,” however this unity is derived from a synthesis of internal and external definitions (41). Paraphrasing Mead “in everyday terms,” Jenkins explains that “we can’t see ourselves at all without also seeing ourselves as other people see us,” further underscoring that individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human world. In terms of the individual order, it is imperative to note that individual identity and selfhood are inextricably tied to embodiment:

That human beings have bodies is among the most obvious things about us, as are the extensive communicative and non-utilitarian uses to which we put them. The human body is simultaneously a referent of individual continuity, an index of collective similarity and differentiation, and a canvas upon which identification can play. Identification in isolation from embodiment is unimaginable. (41)
As stated, the individual order, composed of embodied individuals and the processes of their individual minds, cannot exist in a vacuum, as outlined in the theory of a continuous internal-external dialectic. Rather, the individual order coexists simultaneously with the interaction and institutional orders, all three of which are in a state of continuous dynamism and interplay with one another.

The interaction among and between embodied individuals comprises the interaction order; as Jenkins states, in terms of identification, it does not suffice to “simply assert an identity; that assertion must also be validated, or not, by those with whom we have dealings” (42). In his explanation of the interaction order, Jenkins cites the scholarship of E. Goffman (1969), whose work dealt with the “presentation of self” and “impression management strategies” during interaction. Although people have, to a certain extent, control over how they present themselves, they cannot be certain of how others will interpret their presentations of self. Thus, impression management strategies, “the performative aspects of identity,” come into play, and an internal-external dialectic between self-image and public-image emerges (42). Integral to Goffman’s assertions is the assumption that people “consciously pursue goals and interests” (42).

Individuals, through presentation of self and the utilization of impression management strategies, seek to be perceived as a “something” or “somebody,” to “assume particular identities” (42).

The institutional order and its implications for selfhood are of particular importance for the current analysis given the relevant historical context of the NS-period. Jenkins appropriates the distinction made by Karl Marx between a “class in itself” and a “class for itself” in his presentation of the distinction between groups and categories, “a distinction [that] can be made between a collectivity which identifies and defines itself (a group for itself) and a collectivity which is identified and defined by others (a category in itself)” (43). Related to this group-category distinction is the distinction drawn between “nominal identity” and “virtual identity”: 
The name [nominal identity] can stay the same – X – while what it means in everyday life to be an X can change dramatically. Similarly, the experience [virtual identity] may stay relatively stable while the name changes. Both can change. Either group identification or categorization, or both at the same time, can contribute to the array of possibilities. (44)

Important to note in consideration of these processes is the influence of power and politics. As asserted by Karl Marx, it is a political process by which a category is transformed into a group, a process that may be influenced from either within or without, or both. The transformation from a category into a group is a change in virtual identity that may also be accompanied by a change in nominal identity (44-45).

Institutions are key players in these above-outlined processes of identification. Jenkins defines institutions as “established patterns of practice” that are recognized as such and are influential in the human world in so far as they “are the way [that] things are done” (45). An organisation is a type of institution; it is “task-orientated” and can be termed a group (45). Composed of “networks of differentiated membership positions which bestow specific individual identities upon their incumbents,” organisations exhibit a bureaucratic nature (45). Especially of significance is that organisations have the capacity to classify, in that they possess a “classificatory lexicon” (positions and categories) (45). The distribution of these positions and categories is determined by the political situation within and outside of a given organisation. Jenkins concludes:

Thus individual and collective identities are systematically produced, reproduced and implicated in each other. Following Foucault, Hacking (1990) argues that the classification of individuals is at the heart of modern, bureaucratically rational strategies of government and control…Identities exist and are acquired, claimed
and allocated within power relations. Identification is something over which struggles take place and with which stratagems are advanced – it is means and end in politics – and at stake is the classification of populations as well the classification of individuals. (45)

In the context of Jenkins’ model, the NS-regime can be interpreted as an organisation and “vehicle of classification” (45). Much scholarship has focused on the demonstrated capacity of NS-ideologues to manipulate processes of identification through classifications, such as the NS-legal classification of that which constituted a desirable citizen (Reichsbürger) in the Nürnberger Gesetze of 1935, in which spheres of desired similarity and malignant difference were clearly delineated. A less explored question is how the lack of a legally sanctioned existence, as experienced by many German exiles of the period 1933-1945, affected the individual’s notions of identity and place in the world. Of critical importance to the current analysis’ pursuit of this question is a further aspect of Jenkins’ tripartite model, namely the role of time and space in processes of identification. Jenkins asserts the “centrality of time and space to identification” and draws a direct connection between the internal-external dialectic and time and space:

The three dimensions of space, and their material coalescence into a ‘sense of place’, are implied by the interior-exterior metaphor. Identification is always from a point of view. For individuals this point of view is, in the first instance, the body. Individual identification is always embodied, albeit sometimes imaginatively, as in fiction or myth, or Internet chat rooms. Collective identities are usually located within territories or regions, and these too can be imagined, as in diasporic myths of return or charts of organisational structure. In that bodies always occupy space, the individual and the collective are to some extent superimposed. (48)
Time and space are the medium through which the individual experiences the human world, and as such time and space are inextricably bound. Time itself is a defining factor in processes of identification in that “continuity,” in which a notion of time is inherent, is attributed to identity (48). Continuity suggests a “meaningful past” and “possible future,” and further, it provides a lens through which to perceive and make sense of the human experience; the notion of continuity is at the pith of how the human world understands itself.

The indelible connection between identification and notions of time and space that Jenkins posits begs the question of the implications of the exile experience for identity, given the fragmented nature of time in exile. Günther Anders, who lived in exile from the NS-regime, touches directly on this impact in his autobiographical essay “Vitae, nicht vita,” asserting that, “Deine Bitte um eine ‘vita’ versetzt mich in Verlegenheit. Ich hatte keine vita. Ich kann mich nicht erinnern. Emigranten können das nicht. Um den Singular ‘das Leben’ sind wir, von der Weltgeschichte Gejagte, betrogen worden” (64). In this essay Anders explains that, in exile, the refugee experiences numerous ruptures in the time-space continuum as he is forced to move from one location to the next. Characteristic of exile from the NS-regime, he explains, is the collapse of a unified life into what seems to be numerous separate and disjointed lives. Anders’ description of exile touches on the question of the significance of spatial and temporal continuity for identity formation. The experience of continually changing location results in a perceptual loss of continuity for the refugee; although the continuity of time is inherently present, the refugee can no longer perceive it, and thus arises the notion of multiple disjointed lives experienced through a singular body. Edward W. Said’s discussion of the inherent discontinuity of exile in his essay “Reflections on Exile” resonates with Anders’ formulation of exile as an experience of innumerable ruptures:
[...] exile, unlike nationalism, is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles are cut off from their roots, their land, their past. They generally do not have armies or states, although they are often in search of them. Exiles feel, therefore, an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people. (177)

Said’s description rests on the notion that refugees, in an attempt to reconcile the discontinuity of exile, seek to restore the sense of belonging and place in the world that they lost through exile. Given the realities of the nature of time, however, restoration is impossible; the perpetual and irreversible unfolding of time renders a return to – or restoration of – the past inconceivable. Consequent of the impossibility of restoration is the notion of tenuousness that develops in the refugee’s relationship to the world. This seemingly warped nature of time and space in exile is a notion evident in numerous works of German exile literature of the NS-period, and the question of lost continuity is at the heart of this experience.

1.4 Gap in Existing Research

*Niemandsland* is a concept that found resonance with both German writers in exile from the NS-regime as well as the scholars who would later study their works. In his autobiography, *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff: Chronik unfreiwilliger Wanderjahre*, Egon Schwarz poignantly applied the concept of *Niemandsland* in the description of his experience trapped between the Hungarian and Slovakian borders in what had become a ‘dumping ground’ for the governments on either side, who pushed into this territorial in-between space the refugees whom no nation wanted. In what was “eine der absurdesten, ganz aus dem Rahmen der Herkömmlichkeiten fallende Episode [s]eines Lebens,” Schwarz experienced the materialization of legal erasure. In
the physical in-between space between Hungary and Slovakia, Schwarz realized that he, his family and the other Jewish refugees were “Niemande im »Niemandsland«” (51). The experience of erasure that Schwarz touches on here proves later in his autobiography to have rendered his sense of belonging and place in the world tenuous at best. Schwarz’s use of *Niemandsland* resonates with Kaléko’s formulation of exile as a perpetual journey through *Nirgendland*, a space from which the refugee cannot escape. Tied to notions of *Niemandsland* in German exile literature is the refugee’s experience of a warped sense of time once trapped in this in-between space of exile. Many scholars of German exile literature have discussed the perversion of time and space in exile, often in the context of making a distinction between the traveler and the refugee (C. Kaplan, W. Koepke, E. Said, H. Schreckenberger, J. Vansant). It is Wulf Koepke’s work on this subject, specifically “On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” that is of greatest relevance for this dissertation. In this article Koepke argues that the experience of time in exile is marked by the paradoxical simultaneity of rushed flight and indefinite waiting. Although the act of departure into and during exile assumes the quality of panicked flight, this is juxtaposed with the reality that the refugee must wait: “The arrival in a new land is mostly a non-arrival. The refugee is not welcome. He is told to wait. Waiting rooms, ugly, unfamiliar, unpleasant, are typical for the new condition. Exile turns into a ‘waiting room’ period without real hope for an ending” (35). Exile, characterized by this dissonance between flight and waiting, materializes in the image of the waiting room. It is in the seemingly endless repetition of waiting, flight and non-arrival that the devastating reality of exile reveals itself to the refugee: he is forever stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of return and arrival in *Niemandsland*. The connection that Koepke draws between the warped experience of time and space in exile to the concept of *Niemandsland* is integral to the analytical framework of this dissertation. The contribution of this dissertation lies in its pursuance of the
question that Koepke implores his fellow scholars to answer in the conclusion of his article: “The legacy of the exiles has not yet been adequately understood, and it may just fade away in the turmoils of the ‘postmodern’ mentality of the 21st century. Yet the perception of time and space of the ‘exterritorial man’ is so close to the life and mind of the present age that it cannot and should not be ignored” (49). This dissertation picks up where Koepke leaves off, pursuing the implications of exile in *Niemandsland* for the individual’s sense of place and belonging in the world, as manifest in select works of German exile literature of the National Socialist Period.

The thesis that informs this dissertation is pursued through an analysis of select works of German exile literature of various genres within a common analytical framework. Chapter One, entitled “The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: The Legal Status of German Refugees of the National Socialist Period (1933-1945),” provides a historical foundation for the subsequent three chapters in its discussion of the processes of legal erasure evident during the NS-period and the implications thereof for the legal status of the refugee in exile from the NS-regime. In the following chapters, representative works of German exile literature in which the experience of the in-between in *Niemandsland* proves to be of particular significance are discussed under various sub-points of analysis. As indicated by its title, “The Implications of Legal Otherness for the Refugee’s Notion of Identity: A Case Study of Egon Schwarz’s *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff*,” Chapter Two is a case study of Egon Schwarz’s autobiography. Schwarz explores in *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff* his identity formation prior to, during and after exile from the NS-regime, providing compelling insight into the irreparable rupture that exile in *Niemandsland* represents for such processes of identification. Some scholars, such as Linda Maeding, have formulated their analyses of *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff* from the perspective of genre, suggesting that the act of autobiographical composition in itself represents Schwarz’s attempt to discern unity and continuity in a life left seemingly fragmented by exile. Maeding
argues that Schwarz assumes a picaresque role in his autobiography that is evident in his depiction of self relative to the overarching socio-historical and -political forces that he must navigate in exile. Helga Schreckenberger makes a similar comparison of Schwarz’s autobiography with the genre of the picaresque novel in “Erwachsenwerden im Exil: die ungewöhnliche Bildung von Egon Schwarz” (200-202). Her argumentation in this article parallels that of Maeding to the extent that she interprets Schwarz’s autobiography, and his depiction therein of specific events over the course of his life, as a means through which Schwarz reformulates his experiences in exile as a means of self-realization. Schreckenberger’s analysis would seem to find confirmation in that of Hinrich C. Seeba, who notes in “Heimweh im Exil: Anmerkungen zu einer verdrängten Sehnsucht” that Schwarz mitigated the effects of exile through his career as a student and then scholar of German literature within the American university system, specifically the insatiable Heimweh and impossibility of reestablishing a sense of belonging in the world. Although the current analysis recognizes the validity in several of Schreckenberger’s points of analysis, upon close consideration of the conclusions that she draws in the above mentioned article, it is apparent that she does not adequately address Schwarz’s discussion of the implications of exile for his sense of belonging in the world. In her focus on Schwarz’s reformulation of his exile experiences in an attempt to determine to what extent exile had a positive effect on his conception of self, Schreckenberger disregards Schwarz’s enduring notion of the tenuousness of his belonging in the world. This dissertation attempts to reconcile Schwarz’s seemingly contradictory statements about exile as both a productive process and one through which the refugee is robbed of his individual agency in the unfolding of his own life. To this end, Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland are discussed within an analytical framework that seeks to determine the implications of exile for both Schwarz’s sense of personal agency in
processes of identification as well as for his corresponding notions of belonging and place in the world.

Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of Niemandsland, specifically how statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he has been legally expunged. Entitled “The Interplay between Legally Sanctioned Space and Notions of Place in the World as Manifest in Select Works of German Exile Literature, 1933-1945,” Chapter Three explores the incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin as manifest in select works. The chosen works are representative of the diversity of German writers’ responses to the experience of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across several genres. The argumentation of the chapter is supported by the analysis of excerpts from these works of varying genres: non-fiction political writings and speeches by Thomas Mann, including “Schriftsteller im Exil” and Deutsche Hörer!, the novels Kind aller Länder by Irmgard Keun and Transit by Anna Seghers, the drama Jacobowsky und der Oberst by Franz Werfel, and the “dialogisierte Tagespolitik” Flüchtlingsgespräche by Bertolt Brecht (White 137). The existing scholarship on these works is extensive, but the contribution of this dissertation lies in the fact that these works and their authors are being discussed within a unified analytical framework. The discussion of excerpts of Thomas Mann’s political writings and speeches in this framework evidences that, in his presentation of the intellect and the assertion thereof as an inalienable right of the individual, Thomas Mann re-appropriates the designation of German and contests the NS-regime’s desire to control processes of identification. Thomas Mann’s assertion of the inalienable right of the individual to a space – both intellectual and physical – in which to establish an identity resonates with a notion prevalent in the above-mentioned selected works of fiction, namely that the legal invisibility of the stateless refugee is incongruous with reality that,
as a living entity, he occupies a physical space in the world. These works of fiction are connected thematically in that, through their depiction of refugees navigating the seemingly endless bureaucratic mazes in pursuit of identification and travel documentation and the corresponding legal right to exist, they deconstruct and call into question the validity of nation-based identities. Although some scholars have already dealt with the role of identification and travel documentation in these works, their analyses do not reference the space of the in-between in their discussion of the depiction of these legal documents. Schreckenberger, in her analysis of the function of identification and travel documents in *Kind aller Länder*, asserts that it is upon consideration of these documents that the distinction between the traveler and the refugee becomes apparent. As opposed to travel, Schreckenberger explains, exile is characterized by the impossibility of arrival, a notion that in turn resonates with Brigetta Abel’s argument that, in exile, the refugee experiences a destabilization of identities, especially those “related to location” (96). Sabine Rohlf explains that the refugee’s loss of valid identification and travel documents represents the loss of the right to place in the world, the consequence of which is a destabilization of identity that Rohlf terms “radikale Ortlosigkeit” (150). The emphasis on place in Rohlf’s formulation of *Ortlosigkeit* parallels Patrick B. Farges’ description of recurrent “Ent-Ortung” in Seghers’ exile writings (283). Although these terms underscore the inherent incongruity between the refugee’s lack of legally-sanctioned space and the reality of human embodiment, they lack the analytical depth possible in the application of the concept of *Niemandsland*. The application of *Niemandsland* in the same analytical context evidences, beyond the incongruous realities of legal invisibility and human embodiment, overlapping experiences of the in-between, the intersection of legal, physical and socio-cultural *Niemandsländer*.

In contrast to Chapters Two and Three, the analyses of which deal predominantly with the legal complications faced by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of statelessness
for processes of identification, Chapter Four, in its discussion of Kaléko’s exile poetry, focuses primarily on the devastating and irretrievable loss of home that exile represented for Kaléko. Titled “Exile in Nirgendland: The Poetry and Exile Experience of Mascha Kaléko,” Chapter Four explores a leitmotif in Kaléko’s poetry that the refugee is perpetually trapped in a Niemandsland, an in-between space that she refers to as Nirgendland. Previous scholarship has considered how Kaléko’s biography and experience of multiple emigrations over the course of a single lifetime affected the processes of identification manifest in her poetry, but predominantly in support of the argument that she “assumed the elective identity of a ‘typical’ Berliner” (Karina von Tippelskirch 157). Other scholars have considered Kaléko’s exile poetry in relation to how it coincides and where it departs from that of other German exile writers (Hans-Jürgen Schrader). The specific contribution of this chapter to existing scholarship, the product of an analysis of the term Nirgendland as central to an understanding of Kaléko’s exile poetry and the corresponding discussion of Kaléko’s depiction of time in exile, is insight into Kaléko’s attempts to negotiate a sense of belonging and connection to the world from the space of the in-between.
2 The Necessity of a Legally Documented and Sanctioned Existence: The Legal Status of German Refugees of the National Socialist Period

In *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff: Chronik unfreiwilliger Wanderjahre*, Egon Schwarz points out the significance of a legally documented and sanctioned existence for the refugee through his description of the visa: “Die Furcht war aber ganz konkret: Würde es gelingen, die Grenze zu überschreiten?! Denn uns fehlte das Lebenselixier, von dem damals…Sein oder Nichtsein abhingen: ein Visum” (59-60). The conception of “Sein oder Nichtsein” as dependent on the possession of a visa, on legal documentation that grants an individual permission to exist within a given space for a given period of time, is a notion that defined the exile experience of many refugees who fled the NS-regime. The following chapter serves to outline the legal situation faced by the refugee of the NS-period (1933-1945) and the innumerable challenges that he faced in pursuit of the legal right to exist. In the current analysis, the government entities with which the refugee dealt during his flight through exile are understood as organisations that compose the institutional order within Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification. As organisations, these government entities were vehicles of classification and thus “authoritatively allocate[d] particular kinds of identities to individuals” (Jenkins 45). Thus, the NS-regime as well as the governments of those national communities from whom the refugee sought legal permission to exist played for the refugee an integral role in his attempt to reestablish for himself a legally sanctioned space in the world, both physical and intellectual. NS-ideologues were well aware of the power of law to legitimize and thus demonstrated great interest in manipulating processes of identification through legal classifications in their attempt to create a clear distinction between that which constituted a desirable citizen (designated by the term *Reichsbürger* in the *Nürnberger Gesetze* of 1935), and that which did not. For the refugee from the NS-regime, his precarious designation of malignant other under National Socialist legal code led to a process of legal erasure through
which he was rendered stateless. Once outside of NS-territory, the stateless refugee encountered innumerable legal complications in his attempt to secure for himself the legal right to exist, whether temporarily or indefinitely, within the borders of given national territories. The following chapter discusses the legal status of refugees from the NS-regime as a means to establish a historical foundation for the overarching question that informs this dissertation, specifically to what extent statelessness and the loss of a legally sanctioned existence impacted the refugee’s notions of identity, in particular his sense of belonging and space in the world.

2.1 The Initial Impetus for Emigration: National Socialist Legislation 1935-1935

A series of laws enacted by the NS-regime in 1933 ushered in an era of autocratic rule and demonstrated NS-ideologues’ desire to racially reconfigure German society. Although Adolf Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933, legal protection of individual freedoms remained intact until the Reichstagsbrand of 27 February 1933; the consequent institution of a single-party government played a critical role in the NS-reconfiguration of German society. Deeming the Reichstagsbrand indicative of an imminent communist uprising, the cabinet leaders instituted on 28 February 1933 the emergency measures outlined in the Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat, commonly referred to as the Reichstagsbrandverordnung (Wachsmann 166). The Reichstagsbrandverordnung instituted “the systematic repression of political opposition…and served as the basis for the police arrest and incarceration of political opponents without trial, the euphemistically named Schutzhaft” (166). The preamble and first article of the decree outline the nullification of the civil liberties guaranteed in the Weimar constitution:
Auf Grund des Artikels 48 Abs. 2 der Reichsverfassung wird zur Abwehr kommunistischer staatsgefährdender Gewaltakte folgendes verordnet:


The repercussions of the decree were immediately felt; the suspension of numerous human rights outlined in the constitution of the Weimar Republic, wide-scale arrests of political opponents, and the dissolution of parties and unions contributed to the political upheaval as a new autocratic order took hold. The Reichstagsbrandverordnung served as impetus for the first wave of German emigration, as opponents to National Socialism took flight. Intellectuals and political dissidents were the first to leave Germany, many of whom frequently traveled abroad and already possessed a passport (Dwork and van Pelt 11). Legislation cancelling passports of political opponents was at this point not yet in place, and although many successfully crossed the border, they did so with the notion that they would soon return. As Alfred Döblin explained, the perception was, “es war ja nur ein Ausflug; man läßt den Sturm vorübergehen; nur für drei bis vier Monate, dann sei man mit den ‘Nazis’ fertig” (Döblin 265).

The 1 April 1933 boycott of all Jewish professionals and Jewish-owned businesses, sponsored by the NS-state, made it clear that Jews were the specific target of, and of particular
significance for, National Socialist racial ideology (Dwork and van Pelt 13). The boycott was a preemptive measure by the NS-government, who had heard that the American Jewish Congress, “contrary to the wishes of German Jews,” had planned a worldwide boycott of German goods:

In the [NS-] party’s view, Jews had been reduced to resident foreigners who could be held hostage to ensure the behavior of the outside world toward Germany. This was pure racism at work: people were held responsible not only for their own deeds but for those of the imagined race-community to which they belonged as well. Just as the Germans belonged to a unified race-organism, so did the Jews. Thus, Jews living in Germany were responsible for the actions of Jews abroad.

(13-14)

Although the April 1933 boycott against Jewish businesses was not an economic success, it was a success as a maneuver of psychological manipulation, pushing the “Jewish Question” to the forefront of discussion (14-15). The NS-regime called into question the right of Jews to be part of German society, and thereby “forced a national debate” on the subject (15).

The situation in Germany in the beginning of April 1933 proved a major setback for German Jews, who had experienced in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries political emancipation under Bismarck that continued through the Weimar Republic. Although social discrimination had to an extent remained common practice up until the Weimar Republic (prior to which Jews were barred from government, civil service and diplomatic positions, as well as senior academic positions and commissions in the armed forces), the economy was open to the Jews, many of whom gained prominence in the financial and manufacturing sectors of the German Reich. As Dwork and van Pelt assert, “patriots, monarchists, and very proud of the German culture which they believed to be theirs too, German Jewry formed the most prosperous Jewish community in the world” (4). A testament to this prosperity is the fact that, initially,
relatively few German Jews chose to leave Germany for the New World. In contrast, from 1899 to 1914 more than 1 million Jews emigrated to the United States from the Russian Empire, as did 240,000 Jews from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 60,000 Jews from Great Britain, whereas only 10,000 German Jews chose to do so (4-5). Further, during the same time period, 60,000 Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia settled in the German Reich, “which made Germany a country of Jewish immigration” (5). Jews experienced further improvement of societal conditions during the Weimar Republic, during which time “the tension between formal equality and de facto second-class status in many spheres evaporated,” and many Jews advanced to positions in the government and societal institutions (5). Although the climate of political instability after World War I saw a rise of extreme anti-Semitism on the far right, Jews were, by and large, well protected under the law. For example, the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens was a well-organized entity that regularly brought civil suits against anti-Semitic agitators, who were then often ultimately convicted within the Weimar court system (6). In consideration of both the de facto and de jure legal status of Jews during Weimar Republic, it is evident that, in terms of the theoretical framework for the current analysis, Jews experienced during this time period significant validation in the institutional order. The government of the Weimar Republic not only legally acknowledged them as German citizens entitled to the rights associated therewith, but also in practice enforced these laws. What the vast majority of Germany’s 500,000 Jews could not imagine when the NS-regime assumed power, however, was that the protection provided to them through the legal system of the Weimar Republic would be rendered void by the National Socialists, who immediately sought to institute a legal system informed by, and in promotion of, their ideological agenda.

The first anti-Jewish legislation of the NS-period was passed shortly after the 1 April boycott; on 7 April 1933 the government passed the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des
*Berufsbeamten*ms, the third paragraph of which ordered the immediate removal of all “Beamte, die nicht arischer Abstammung sind,” from their positions in the civil service (“Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung”). As Dwork and van Pelt describe, “this affected thousands of Jews, as all teachers, professors, physicians employed in state hospitals, as well as government employees counted as civil servants” (as *Beamte*) (16). Another law, passed on 7 April 1933, the “Gesetz über die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft,” removed Jews from the judiciary (“Gesetz über die Zulassung”). Completing this initial attempt to purge Jews from the public sphere of German society through legislation, the NS-regime passed on 25 April 1933 the “Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen,” which set a quota of 1.5% of the total number of Jewish students admitted to German high schools and universities and a maximum of 5% for any individual school (“Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung”). Removed from occupations and barred from educational opportunities, many German Jews sought to move abroad in 1933, and they were initially welcomed by neighboring European countries. France, for example, waived its visa requirements, and 30,000 German Jews fled there in 1933. The Netherlands and Czechoslovakia also loosened documentation restrictions and admitted 6,000 and 5,000 refugees, respectively (Dwork and van Pelt 18). Dwork and van Pelt suggest that this sympathy is indicative of the fact that these host countries believed the refugee situation to be a temporary emergency (18). Further, the book burnings that began on 10 May 1933 “horrified many abroad” (18). Relief organizations in host countries raised temporary funds for refugees, many of whom had left the majority of their possessions behind due to various obstacles, including the *Reichsfluchtsteuer* (to be discussed later). This hospitality was limited, however, in that refugees were most often unable to find employment in the host countries, with the exception of agricultural work (22). In France, for example, German-Jewish refugees joined thousands of other refugees from various nations, including but not limited to Syrians, Turks, Bulgarians,
Hungarians, Russians, Armenians, Italians and Spaniards, which exacerbated the unemployment situation (22). Palmier summarizes the experience of German refugees in the 1930s:

Far from improving, their situation continued to deteriorate, despite international discussion of the refugee problem and the establishment of support committees. Each new wave of émigrés made the survival of the preceding wave more difficult. As the 1930s advanced, the conditions of reception became more draconian, and the reactions of public opinion to the refugees grew more hostile. (230)

The situation in Germany continued to deteriorate in the 1930s as the NS-regime tightened its grip on German society. Directly following the anti-Jewish legislation passed in 1933, however, the waves of emigration slowed in 1934, with 23,000 Jews leaving Germany that year as opposed to the 50,000 that had done so in 1933. Dwork and van Pelt explain that “planned emigration overtook panicked flight” as Jews sought to coordinate an escape abroad that allowed them to salvage some of their possessions and financial assets (92).

This period of calm after the initial storm was short-lived however, and it became evident with the *Nürnberger Gesetze* of 15 September 1935 that NS-ideologues sought to comprehensively eradicate Jews from German society. The *Nürnberger Gesetze* consisted of three laws, the *Reichsflaggengesetz*, the *Reichsbürgergesetz* and the *Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre*. The *Reichsbürgergesetz* effectively stripped German Jews of their German citizenship. In article 1, paragraph 2 of the law it stated, “Reichsbürger ist nur der Staatsangehörige deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes, der durch sein Verhalten beweist, daß er gewillt ist, in Treue dem Deutschen Volk und Reich zu dienen” (“Reichsbürgergesetz”). Here a manipulation of processes of identification in the institutional order is apparent. In this excerpt, there is a hierarchy evident in terms of qualifications that must be met in order to earn the designation of German citizen (*Reichsbürger*). The aspect of race is of greatest significance
here; as the law is structured, Germanic-ethnicity is the irremissible prerequisite for German citizenship. Secondary to Germanic-ethnicity is the demonstration of adherence to and support of NS-ideology in promotion of advancing the German state. This legal manipulation within the institutional order is indicative of the NS-regime’s desire to appropriate the term ‘German’ to serve its own ideological agenda. From its naissance, the NS-regime demonstrated an awareness of the association that is often made between law and the quality of legitimacy. Through the legal codification of that which constitutes ‘German,’ the NS-regime not only implemented a system of legal designations defining the identity-status of individuals within German territory, it also attempted to shape how the outside world would understand and answer the question of what it meant to be ‘German.’

Through the Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre (also from 15 September 1935) it became evident that the National Socialists sought to control the private sphere of German society as well. This law prohibited marriages and sexual relationships between Jews and so-called ethnic-German citizens or those of kindred blood. The preamble and article 1 of paragraph 1 stated:

Durchdrungen von der Erkenntnis, daß die Reinheit des deutschen Blutes die Voraussetzung für den Fortbestand des Deutschen Volkes ist, und beseelt von dem unbeugsamen Willen, die Deutsche Nation für alle Zukunft zu sichern, hat der Reichstag einstimmig das folgende Gesetz beschlossen, das hiermit verkündet wird:

§ 1

(1) Eheschließungen zwischen Juden und Staatsangehörigen deutscher oder artverwandten Blutes sind verboten. Trotzdem geschlossene Ehen sind nichtig,
auch wenn sie zur Umgehung dieses Gesetzes im Ausland geschlossen sind.

(“Gesetz zum Schutze”)

In the *Nürnberger Gesetze* a clear demarcation is evident between that which constituted a desirable, ‘German’ citizen and that which constituted the malignant ‘other.’ In consideration of the overarching NS-agenda to engender the transcendence of the ‘German’ people and the nation that they were intended to constitute, it is evident that the NS-regime’s legal delineation of ‘German’ identity was ultimately motivated by its eugenics-based ideology. In an interministerial discussion from 29 September 1936 regarding German policy toward the Jews, State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart of the interior ministry is quoted, “The fundamental principle of all measures is to foster the emigration of the Jews” (Eckert 210). The legal manipulation of identity terms (‘German,’ ‘citizen,’ ‘German citizen’) by the NS-regime is thus indicative of NS-ideologues’ desire to promote, through racial homogeneity, a unified and coherent notion of that which constituted ‘German’-ness. Stripped of German citizenship, barred from the economy and societal institutions, and now legally restricted in their relations with ethnic-Germanic Germans, many German Jews saw emigration abroad as their only choice. They joined the thousands of antifascist refugees who had emigrated abroad since 1933 and became similarly entangled in a bureaucratic web of legal documentation that deeply affected their emigration experience.

2.2 Logistics of Emigration: Navigating the Bureaucratic Maze in an Attempt to Secure the Legal Right to Exist

“Der Pass ist der edelste Teil von einem Menschen. Er kommt auch nicht auf so eine einfache Weise zustande wie ein Mensch. Ein Mensch kann überall zustande kommen, auf die leichtsinnigste Art und ohne gescheiten Grund, aber ein Pass
niemals. Dafür wird er auch anerkannt, wenn er gut ist, während ein Mensch noch so gut sein kann und doch nicht anerkannt wird.”

Bertolt Brecht, *Flüchtlingsgespräche* (203)

Brecht’s famous description of the passport points to the intersection of the refugee’s critical need for a legally sanctioned existence with the reality that, during the NS-period, government entities tightly controlled the conferring of documents that granted such permission, thereby ultimately limiting the legal rights and protections that such documentation could afford to the refugee. The exhausting and seemingly incessant pursuit of identification and travel documents is an experience frequently depicted in German exile literature of the NS-period.

There was an inherent contradiction in the refugee’s experience in attempting to secure these documents, particularly in consideration of Jenkins’ assertion that embodiment is a prerequisite to any identity. The stateless refugee of the NS-regime experienced, as a stateless person without the official right to exist within any given territory, the legal denial of a physical space within which to exist. The question thus follows: if an individual is legally erased, how does one reconcile this erasure with the reality that the individual still exists and occupies a physical space? The fact is that the refugee did occupy space, a space that was physical, but also intellectual. This situation begs the question of to what extent, through legal manipulations, could government entities reduce the refugee to the status of *niemand*. Further, what is the extent and quality of the agency that the refugee had in defining for himself a space in the human world, a sphere, both physical and intellectual, in which he could experience the dynamic processes of identification that intersect to form his notion of identity?

The history of the European passport system dates back to 15th century France, where it was instituted along with a system of royal couriers. In the following centuries the system remained almost continuously in place as a means through which to track and control
populations, although there was no international standard for the regulation of what constituted a passport and what rights and obligations were attached to it. Dwork and van Pelt explain that, “the liberalization of national economies and the advent of mass travel by train and steamship in the latter half of the nineteenth century led to the elimination of passport obligations. As laws requiring passports could not be enforced, they were canceled or, as in the case with France, lay dormant” (56). World War I marked a turning point in the European passport system. When borders closed in 1914, passport laws and regulations were reactivated, and “passport and visa requirements became standard throughout Europe” (56). Identification documentation became more complicated, as now a photograph and full physical description of the bearer were required for passports. When the war ended in 1918 these regulations were not dropped, however, but rather tightened as the passport became proof of citizenship and the corresponding entitlement to the rights thereof. In the economic crisis following World War I, a passport and the citizenship it represented corresponded to the right for employment, and thus passports were a means to protect labor markets from foreign workers. Further, in the context of the welfare state, proof of citizenship corresponded to rights for education, unemployment, health and retirement benefits (57).

Following World War I and the reconfiguration of European national boundaries, nine to ten million people sought asylum in Europe (57). Many of these refugees composed minority groups who fled to the countries where they were “nationally attached” and were ultimately “well absorbed” (57). There existed, however, a second type of refugee, namely those who did not have a national homeland to which to return. The Armenian genocide in Turkey prompted the flight of 200,000 Armenians into France and Syria. The Russian Revolution led 700,000 Russians to flee to countries throughout Europe, including, but not limited to, Germany, Poland, France, and Romania (57). These refugees did not possess valid passports, and they were legally
denationalized by the countries from which they had fled through a series of legislation in the 1920s (58). Stateless, these refugees lacked the protections afforded by citizenship to a given state, and thus hundreds of thousands of people existed precariously in Europe without any political or economic rights. The League of Nations recognized the direness of the situation and appointed the widely respected Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen to serve as High Commissioner on behalf of the League of Nations to deal with the refugee crisis. With the help of Philip Baker, Nansen sought a means through which to provide political and legal protection to these refugees (59). An identity document was thus conceived; officially named the *Certificat d’Identité*, Baker referred to it as the “Nansen passport,” a term that stuck (59). By the end of 1922, the Nansen passport was recognized by twenty-four nations as a valid international identity document, and within the years that immediately followed, that number reached fifty (59). As Dwork and van Pelt explain, “the Nansen passport did not grant the privilege of residence citizens enjoyed or the right to seek employment. But it looked like a passport, was called a passport, was associated with the most noble name of its day, and it worked” (59). Throughout the 1920s Nansen passport holders gained additional rights and benefits, including access to quasi-consular services, the right of return to the country that originally issued the document, limited diplomatic protection, and eased labor restrictions (59-60). Further, numerous nations agreed that Nansen passport holders were eligible for visas, similar to individuals in possession of a national passport (60). The response of the League of Nations in the 1920s to this refugee crisis is quite interesting when considered in juxtaposition to the comprehensive failure in the following decade of governmental entities within the international community to find a solution to the refugee crisis instigated by the rise of National Socialism. The creation and implementation of the Nansen Passport represents the acknowledgement of an organisation (the League of Nations) that the stateless individual is a human being entitled to a legally recognized and sanctioned
existence. On the level of the institutional order, this runs counter to the later failure of the League of Nations to either deal with the source of the issue in Germany or grant rights and protections to legally vulnerable and stateless refugees. There were many factors that contributed to the League of Nation’s sense of obligation to resolve the European refugee crisis of the early 1920s. Of these factors, the one that is of particular relevance to the current discussion is the acknowledgement by the League of Nations that the individual, as a member of the human community, is entitled to a space, both physical and legal, within the infrastructure of that community. Inherent in their action of establishing a system of identification documentation that legally acknowledged and sanctioned the existence of these refugees, was the implication that the League of Nations deemed those refugees worthy of the official designation of members of the human community and the rights associated therewith. The American activist and journalist Dorothy Thompson touches on this notion in her 1938 statement regarding the Nansen passport:

> It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times, that for thousands and thousands of people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and death, and that scores of people have blown their brains out because they could not get it. But there is no doubt that by and large, the Nansen certificate is the greatest thing that has happened for the individual. It returned to him his lost identity. (28)

It is evident that the correlation between identity and the passport that Thompson touches on resonates with the refugee experience and suggests the necessity of a legally documented existence for survival. This begs the comparison of the essentially successful handling of the European refugee crisis of the 1920s with the utter failure of the League of Nations to address, let alone solve, the dire situation of the thousands of refugees from the NS-regime. Much scholarship has addressed this question, but existing analyses tend to focus on economic factors,
such as the role of the Great Depression, as well as the interplay of those economic factors with the political situation of Europe during the NS-period, in particular the seemingly incessant shifting of political power. For the purposes of this dissertation, a comparison of the two different approaches implemented in the handling of these refugee crises, as well as the subsequent results of these approaches, compels a consideration of identification processes within the institutional order. The approach of the League of Nations in their successful attempt to resolve the 1920s refugee crisis quite clearly evidences the notion that, within the institutional order, refugees of this period in Europe experienced the official recognition of an organisation; their existence was both legally acknowledged and sanctioned. In the following decade, however, vast numbers of refugees of the NS-regime existed in a realm of overlapping Niemandsländer; in their situation, statelessness represented a legal erasure, and this status of being legally niemand created for them innumerable challenges in their attempt to reconcile this legal invisibility with the fact that physically, they still existed.

Although it would thus seem that the Nansen passport could provide a solution also for German refugees in need of an international identity document, there was much debate on this topic. Beginning in 1933, various parties voiced hesitancies, stating that the political situation surrounding the Russian refugee crisis was much different than that surrounding the German refugee crisis. The Russian refugees could not obtain passports, whereas the many German refugees were technically still German nationals and possessed German passports. This situation is complicated however by the fact that on 14 July 1933 the NS-regime passed the Gesetz über den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit ("Gesetz über den Widerruf"). The law served two purposes: it targeted both antifascist Germans abroad as well as eastern European Jews who had fled to Germany after World War I (Dwork and van Pelt 62). However, this law confronted all German refugees with the risk of becoming
stateless (62). A further difference between the Russian and German refugee situations was the fact that the USSR was not an important member of the League of Nations, as Germany had become by 1933, and other member nations hesitated to provoke Hitler. Other concerns regarding the extension of the Nansen passport to German refugees included the fear that doing so would only encourage the NS-regime to force further emigration of persons it deemed undesirable. This situation is an interesting example of the interplay between different organisations – here, member nations – within the framework of the overarching organisation, the League of Nations. The politics of power among the member nations, along with the unwillingness of member nations to risk conflict with Germany, contributed greatly to the League of Nation’s ultimate failure to protect refugees from National Socialism. Such practices of appeasement laid the foundation for the NS-regime to push refugees into legal Niemansländer, a major step in the process of legal erasure. This international hesitancy in regard to the German refugees was exacerbated by the fact that member nations also feared that it would be difficult to economically absorb German refugees; whereas the Russian refugees could be easily placed in agriculture and labor positions, many of the German refugees were accustomed to white-collared work (63).

Despite these apprehensions and widespread avoidance of the issue by main member powers of the League of Nations, the German refugee crisis was brought up by the Netherlands during the League of Nations Assembly in September 1933. The Netherlands, which believed itself to have “shouldered more than its share of the refugee burden,” called for the establishment of a new high commissioner to deal with the issue (64). What was not addressed, however, was the root of the issue, namely the reason why refugees were fleeing Germany. None of the member countries wanted to provoke Germany, and thus the refugee crisis was dealt with as if it were the natural byproduct of politics (64). The negotiations and debate surrounding the
establishment of the commission considerably weakened the proposal for the creation of a new high commission to deal with the refugee crisis. Ultimately, the International High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany was created, and James McDonald, an American professor and diplomat, was appointed as high commissioner (65). It was a weak entity, however, in that it received no funding from the League of Nations, and it did not report to the League Council (65). As Dwork and van Pelt describe, “treated like a cast-off child of the League and starved for resources, McDonald’s high commission consisted of two small rooms and a staff of six people located in Lausanne, physically and symbolically removed from the Geneva headquarters” (66). The tangible facts of this commission – the limitation of its resources and its physical distance from the League of Nations – are representative of its influence within the organisation of the League of Nations itself. Two years of effort yielded the creation of a new identity document, *Certificat d’Identité des Réfugiés Provenant d’Allemagne*. It provided crucial rights, including the right to return to the country of issue, as well as the right to apply for visas. It did not carry the influence or prestige of the Nansen passport, however, nor did it come with the quasi-consular services of the Nansen passport. For German refugees with expired passports, however, “it was better than no paper at all” (66).

McDonald’s efforts were, however, short-lived. As Palmier explains, McDonald attempted to open discussion with NS-officials upon taking up the position of high commissioner, but his success was limited to the coordination of relief projects with Jewish organizations (270). Further, his plan to evacuate 100,000 German Jews over the course of five years, which he submitted to the British Foreign Office, was met with defeat (270). Beyond frustration, McDonald realized with the NS-institution of the *Nürnberger Gesetze* that his efforts were futile if he were not able to attack the problem from its source. The League of Nations was not willing to criticize the NS-regime, and “try as he might to protect refugees from Germany, the Nazi
regime insolently created ever more. The heart of the matter lay in Berlin, not Paris, London or The Hague” (Dwork and van Pelt 68). On 27 December 1935, McDonald released a letter of resignation to publications around the globe in which he concluded that “the problem must be tackled at its source if disaster is to be avoided” (101). McDonald’s plea drew attention to the German refugee issue, although ultimately nothing was done, neither by the League of Nations nor its member nations. As Dwork and van Pelt conclude, “McDonald’s dramatic resignation and bold plea for direct intervention captured attention in many quarters. But the moment passed, the papers thrown away. And the sole attempt by a responsible official to change the paradigm from dealing with German refugees to dealing with the German regime became yesterday’s news” (68). The failure of the international community to act on behalf of German refugees in the mid-1930s further exacerbated the precariousness of the refugees’ existence, pushing them deeper into the Niemandsland of legal invisibility.

Throughout the remainder of the 1930s, leading up to World War II, the “International High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany” remained a weak entity. Its affiliation with the League of Nations remained loose, and the only funding it received was for its administrative costs. It could not financially assist refugees, and it had little success in compelling the member nations to act on behalf of the refugees. Further, the deteriorating political situation in Germany and the NS-regime’s agenda of territorial expansion led to an ever-increasing number of refugees. Hans-Albert Walter summarizes the conditions under which the High Commission operated in the late 1930s:

Hatte sich der Hohe Kommissar schon in den Vorjahren nicht gegen die restriktive Asylpolitik der Völkerbundsmitglieder durchsetzen können, so stand seine Tätigkeit in der mit der Annexion Österreichs beginnenden Phase der Vorkriegszeit unter einem noch schlechteren Vorzeichen. Die nunmehr sprunghaft
ansteigenden Flüchtlingszahlen und vor allem eine ebenfalls ständig wachsende Zahl von potentiellen Flüchtlingen, die vorläufig noch in den Herkunftsländern lebten, erweiterten nämlich seine zuvor relativ begrenzten Aufgaben ins nahezu Unüberschaubare. [...] Schließlich war er wegen seiner politischen Ohnmacht und organisatorischen Schwäche auch auf keine der neuen Notsituationen vorbereitet, so deutlich und lange sich diese auch vorher angekündigt hatten. (59)

Walter continues to cite the fact that, despite mass waves of emigration out of Austria following the Anschluss of 11 March 1938, the High Commission was not granted jurisdiction over these refugees by the Völkerbundsrat until nearly two months later, on 9 May 1938. Ultimately, the member nations of the League of Nations were concerned with their individual political interests and sought to avoid an inundation of refugees into their respective territories: “…die Haltung des Völkerbundes [spiegelt…] nichts anderes wieder als die Politik seiner Mitgliedsstaaten […]. Die Staaten [waren] nur daran interessiert […], Exilierte und Emigranten jeweils dem Nachbarn zuzuschreiben, ihr eigenes Territorium aber soweit als irgend möglich ‘flüchtlingsrein’ zu halten” (62). The depression of the 1930s heightened the fear of member nations that they would not be able to economically absorb refugees, a fear that superseded any notion of humanitarian obligation.

The politics of economics were an integral experience of refugees from the NS-regime. Beyond identity documents, financial constraints proved to be a primary obstacle to emigration. Permission to immigrate to a given country often depended on the financial means of a refugee. The economic depression of the 1930s left many nations with a critical unemployment issue, which led to strict regulation of the labor market. Refugees were often only admitted to a given country under the condition that they did not seek employment there. For “certain types of skilled labourers, technicians and agricultural workers,” there was a limited demand in various
foreign economies, but “the overwhelming proportion of emigrants from Germany, particularly the Jews, belonged to the professional or business classes” (Sherman 23-24). Even those refugees willing to learn a new profession faced seemingly insurmountable circumstances.

Sherman explains:

Those emigrants willing and able to learn new skills nevertheless faced grave financial difficulties; in the world-wide economic depression, no country was willing to risk the importation of potential or actual paupers, and practically every European and non-European country demanded of the would-be migrant some convincing demonstration of means sufficient to ensure his not becoming a public charge. (24)

The crux of the issue regarding the financial status of refugees lay in NS-policy, which sought to strip refugees of practically all financial means for the profit of the NS-state. Through the “aryanization” process, for example, businesses owned by Jews and non-Aryans were often sold at a fraction of the cost. Other property also needed to be liquidated, and often only a small percentage of an item’s true value was obtained. Further exacerbating the financial status of refugees was the Reichsfluchtssteuer, which was introduced in 1931 as a means to conserve Germany’s foreign exchange reserves (24). The NS-regime maintained this tax regulation, which it levied on any intending emigrant in possession of more than RM 50,000 or who had in any one year since 1931 earned more than RM 20,000 (24). The Reichsfluchtssteuer stipulated that the intending emigrant forfeit 25% of the last assessed value of all his property to the NS-regime, with the remainder of his capital placed in a blocked mark account, “which could only be realised abroad, at a rate which fluctuated but which tended steadily downward as the uses to which blocked marks could be applied were progressively limited” (24). Sherman cites the estimation that the material losses of refugees averaged 30-50% of a refugee’s entire capital for the years...
1933-1936, and that percentage increased to 60-100% from 1937 to the outbreak of World War II (25).

2.3 The Question of Minority Status for Jews in Europe

Following World War I, the Allied Powers met in Paris in 1919 to redraw the national boundaries within Europe. Nationalist principles guided this redistribution of territory; state borders were to encompass a national majority (Dwork and van Pelt 69). The issue that arose from this policy, however, was that in the reshaping of the European map, numerous minority groups found themselves within the new boundaries of a national majority. The division of the former Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian Empires, for example, aimed to redistribute territory to reflect the national majorities resident there, but this inevitably left minority groups within these new national boundaries. These minority groups “now found themselves in a much more awkward position than in the multination empires. The basic assumption that structured the new nation states gave rise to implacable hostility against these minorities. They did not belong” (70). Jewish communities existed in numerous European nations as minority groups, but unlike for other minority groups, there did not exist for the Jews a greater national majority to appeal to for protection. For example, after World War I, a significant German minority population lived within Polish territory, and Germany itself took an interest in the protection of these Germans living in Poland (71). The Jews, however, did not form a majority nation anywhere, and thus Jewish organizations from the United States and Europe sought a means of legal protection for the numerous Jewish populations residing across Europe. These organizations managed to merge into the Committee of Jewish Delegations (CJD), which proposed a document outlining minority rights to be submitted for consideration at the 1919 peace conference in Paris (71). The proposal
called for the right of minorities to citizenship, as well as political, civil, religious and national rights equivalent to those of citizens belonging to the national majority. The Committee on New States and the Protection of Minorities was founded by the Allied Powers at the peace conference, and its first task was to compose the Polish Minorities Treaty (71). The document formulated by the CJD served as a template for this treaty, and the treaty itself was ultimately accepted by Poland. With the subsequent formulation of the League of Nations, treaties protecting minority rights became a prerequisite for admission to the League, and thus numerous nations joined Poland in the early 1920s with the adoption of a minorities treaty. By the time Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926, however, “no one bothered to impose a minorities treaty. For many reasons, the League was eager for Germany to join and, as there had been no complaints against the new member to bring the issue to the fore, the opportunity just slipped away” (72).

The NS-regime was in an interesting situation politically, because, although its ideological agenda against the Jewish minority benefitted from the fact that Germany never signed a minorities treaty prior to entering the League of Nations, the minorities treaties signed by other member nations afforded legal protection to German populations living as minority groups across central and eastern Europe. The worry arose that the NS-regime’s legally enforced discrimination against the Jews would create bad publicity for the regime abroad, and possibly exacerbate the situation for ethnic German populations living outside of NS-territory (74). Ultimately, however, anti-Jewish measures were central to NS-ideology and thus a reformulation of the situation was sought. The German foreign office enlisted the help of Max Hildebert Boehm, a scholar and activist for German minorities in Europe, to assist in this reformulation. He produced an article entitled “Minderheiten, Judenfrage und das neue Deutschland,” which was sent to German embassies and consulates (75). In the article he argued that the fundamental
The purpose of minorities protections was to prevent the assimilation of minorities groups into the national majority, to protect the groups’ ethnic character. Since the Jewish policy of the NS-regime served to dissimilate and not to assimilate Jews, it did not conflict with this notion.

Further, Boehm argued, “if minorities as defined in a League treaty sought to be protected from pressure by the majority population to assimilate, German Jews sought a degree of assimilation that the majority population resisted and resented” (75). The German foreign office adopted Boehm’s reformulation of the question of the minority status for Jews and their official stance on the matter to serve the dual purpose of protecting German minorities outside of NS-territory, while simultaneously defending their ideological agenda against the Jews. Through this argumentation, the NS-regime expanded its reach as an organisation within the institutional order of the League of Nations.

Despite this argument, however, anti-Jewish NS-policy conflicted with Germany’s legal obligations in Upper Silesia, the only region for which Germany after WWI had signed a minorities treaty (74). In 1922, when the League of Nations partitioned the region of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany, a fifteen-year treaty was imposed on both governments that included the protection of minorities’ rights (75). The anti-Jewish NS-legislation of April and May 1933 applied to German Upper Silesia and thus violated the 1922 German-Polish convention (75). The CJD saw the German-Polish convention and the legal obligations that it stipulated as a means with which to attack National-Socialist anti-Jewish policies. The CJD chose the case of Franz Bernheim to appeal to the League of Nations against NS-policies. Bernheim, a thirty-four year old shop clerk from Upper Silesia, was born in Salzburg and later obtained citizenship in Württemberg and thereby German nationality (76). He moved to Upper Silesia for employment, but on 30 April 1933 he was dismissed from his position on the sole grounds that he was a Jew. A petition was submitted to the League of Nations that May by the
CJD on behalf of Bernheim, and it came before the Council on 26 May 1933 (76). The German delegation interpreted the petition as a possible attack on NS-policy in general, and attempts were made to have the petition dismissed (76). These attempts failed, however, and the Council announced its decision regarding the petition on 6 June 1933. This decision preoccupied Jews across Germany, who viewed it as determining the relationship between Jews and the NS-regime. As evident in an article by Alfred Wiener, “Zwischen Himmel und Erde,” published on 1 June 1933 in the newspaper of the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, German Jews, who had been well integrated into German society, sought to be classified as German citizens with the rights belonging thereto, and not as a minority group (78). The Council ruled, however, that Bernheim should be classified as a minority and was therefore entitled to minority rights as secured in the German-Polish convention. The German delegation did not protest, but rather openly claimed its acquiescence to the Council’s decision and that anti-Jewish laws would not be in effect in Upper Silesia (78). As Dwork and van Pelt explain, it was “a great public relations coup,” as Germany “publicized its acquiescence widely, to ensure that all the world knew how eagerly Nazi Germany fulfilled its legal obligations” (78). The Jews in Upper Silesia gained a few years of protection, and many felt that the Jews had won the battle against National Socialism (78).

The NS-regime was still focused on promoting its anti-Jewish agenda, however, and sought initially to do so within the framework of its international legal obligations. On 3 October 1933, Friedrich von Keller, the German representative to the League of Nations, made a speech before the Sixth Committee of the League of Nations, which dealt with political questions (81). In this speech, von Keller attempted to present Boehm’s reformulation of the question of Jews as a minority, but this attempt opened a discussion on NS-law itself, which von Keller had sought to avoid. Members present at the Sixth Committee meeting rejected von Keller’s formulation of
national homogeneity and insisted on the equal rights of all citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity (82). Further, the French representative Henri Bérenger proposed a resolution on the subject of minorities. The first paragraph stated that even nations who had not signed a minorities treaty were obligated in their policies and treatment of minorities to adhere to the standards set forth in minorities treaties already passed by the League of Nations (82). The second paragraph was a direct attack on the German attempt to redefine minority status, and it stated that groups were not to be excluded from minority status simply to serve the political agenda of a ruling government (82). Unfortunately, however, the resolution required a unanimous vote to pass, and von Keller voted against it due to the second paragraph. The League removed the second paragraph from the resolution, and Germany agreed to it. This represented the failure of the League of Nations and the international community to protect Jews under the legal designation of a minority:

A pivotal moment [was] lost. In autumn 1933 the League had power but chose not to use it. Too many of the key states had a version of minorities problems of their own. Britain and France, both colonial powers, well knew that while they could speak about equal rights at home, no such rights [existed for] the native peoples of their empires […]. In any case, Berlin got the message. The League posed no threat. The German delegation would walk out later that month. The immediate issue was disarmament. But the minorities question had opened the exit door. (83) The League of Nations proved itself to be a weak entity and set the precedence for the NS-regime to disregard its authority without fear of repercussion, strengthening thereby the NS-regime’s power to assert its agenda on the level of the institutional order.
2.4 The Legal Status of German Refugees in Various Countries and International Policies Governing Immigration

This section deals with the legal situation encountered by refugees of the NS-regime in specific countries and world regions. The subsections that elucidate the details of how individual nations dealt with the German refugee crisis provide interesting insight into the many factors – political, economic, socio-cultural – that contributed to the comprehensive failure of the international community to come to the rescue of the refugees of National Socialism. On the difficulties that refugees faced in this experience of being uprooted, Patrik von zur Mühlen asserts: “diese politische, soziale, kulturelle und mentale Entwurzelung hatte Folgen, an denen sich das Ausmaß der Entfremdung von der Welt der eigenen Herkunft und der übergroßen Distanz zur neuen Umgebung abmessen lässt” (74). Legal barriers preventing immigration of these refugees popped up across the world, making immigration in some cases complicated, and in many others impossible. Nations’ legal rejection of the refugee, their refusal to provide him with the travel and identification documentation necessary to travel through or even remain within their given territories, represents the exclusion of the refugee from the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of identification. Inherent in statelessness is a rupture in this dialectic of identification, and the exclusion of the individual from the institutional order of the international community raises the question of the impact of legal erasure and invisibility on the identity of the stateless refugee.

2.4.1 Initial Waves of Emigration: Central and Western Europe

When Hitler came to power in 1933, the predominant notion was that the NS-regime, just like the governments that had preceded it, would not last very long. The initial waves of refugees
from Germany were mainly composed of political opponents of the NS-regime: writers, intellectuals and political thinkers who had challenged National Socialism and were threatened by imminent imprisonment because of opinions and values that were central to their identity. Many of these individuals had contacts abroad and regularly traveled outside of Germany. They left Germany during the initial phases of the NS-regime with the notion that they would soon return, once things had settled and tensions had dissipated. They fled to the countries where they had contacts, but especially to those in close proximity to Germany with lax or nonexistent visa requirements. German-speaking countries were attractive in that they offered familiarity as well as the possibility for writers of publishing in the mother-tongue. Although some fled to Austria, the growth of Nazism there deterred many, and with the Anschluss of March 1938, new waves of refugees flooded out of Austria. Switzerland was often used as a transit station, a country through which one would travel en route to his ultimate destination, but overall it was adverse to admitting refugees for any period of extended stay. It worried about Überfremdung and had established in the 1920s a policing system of foreigners that sought to control, and even reduce, the number of foreigners in Swiss territory (Wichers 375-380).

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, and especially German-speaking Prague, initially offered German refugees some of the most favorable conditions in Europe. German refugees were not required to have a visa or special permit to enter the country, nor did they need a valid passport to remain there (Palmier 136). As of 1933, Czechoslovakia had 700,000 unemployed, and German refugees were thus allowed to stay within Czech territory as long as they did not seek work there. In 1933 the Czechoslovak National Committee for Refugees from Germany was founded, which brought together a number of relief organizations (136). The Committee issued to German refugees Evidenzbögen, paperwork that documented a refugee’s flight from National Socialism and provided legal protections. The welcoming attitude of the Czech
government and people toward German refugees is explained “by the liberal tradition of the
Czech government, the existence of a German-language Czech literature, and above all by the
close ties between Prague writers and those of Germany” (137). This “benign attitude” of the
Czech government toward German refugees, however, incited the hostility of the NS-regime
(136). With Hitler’s eventual takeover of Czechoslovakia, German refugees were forced to seek
asylum elsewhere abroad, but up until the late 1930s, the nation served as a refuge to many,
especially German writers and intellectuals who could contribute to literary life in Prague.

France had a long tradition of hospitality, and many German refugees emigrated there
during the 1930s in hopes of escaping Nazism. As the 1930s progressed, however, many found
themselves trapped in France, unable to obtain the documentation necessary to emigrate further
to a different location abroad. France had a mounting refugee crisis. In 1919, France had
absorbed numerous White Russians. Beyond the German refugee crisis of the 1930s, the collapse
of Republican Spain in 1939 sent hundreds of thousands of Spanish refugees into France (Dwork
and van Pelt 230). In 1939 alone, 465,000 Spanish refugees fled to France, compared with the
475,000 refugees who had fled Germany, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia from 1933-1941 (230).
France responded to the crisis by erecting large internment camps. “Intended to be temporary,
they soon became fixed, miserable institutions. These centers secured government control and
offered little to the refugees. Not even the legal protections afforded prison inmates applied to
camp inmates. They did not get food, clothing, or shelter as specified by penal code, and they
lost their civil liberties” (230). Once the Spanish refugees began to return to Spain at the end of
1939, and with the outbreak of World War II, the French government used the camps to
incarcerate enemy aliens, stateless persons, and people under suspicion (231). More people
flooded into France as the NS-regime attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Conditions at the camps deteriorated, as they were filthy, overcrowded and completely unable to
provide for the basic needs of the inhabitants. When France fell to Hitler, it agreed to turn over all German refugees, defying its promise of asylum. As Dwork and van Pelt sarcastically explain, “it was sheer luck for refugee Jews in France that the Germans did not want them. The Nazi government had gleefully bid them farewell in the 1930s, and they continued to do so in 1940. Now unoccupied France would serve as a fine dumping ground” (232). Within days of the NS-takeover of France, thousands of Jews were pushed over the demarcation line and into the unoccupied zone, where they were ultimately put into camps. With the implementation of the Holocaust and Final Solution, by 1942 the French internment camps served as holding cells for Jews who were to be shipped east for extermination. The government of Vichy France even granted Germany permission to deport foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone, and thus France and the French internments camps ultimately proved to be an “anteroom to Auschwitz” (240). The question of international complicity in the Holocaust is a complicated topic over which there continues to be debate. The political situation of France in the late 1930s and through World War II is one of numerous examples of how political volatility within a given country affected international politics and consequently the fate of thousands of refugees of the NS-regime.

2.4.2 German Jews as Refugee Misfits: Great Britain and Palestine

The British government demonstrated much hesitation in its handling of the German refugee question, a hesitancy characterized by the fact that refugee German Jews did not ‘fit in,’ socio-economically, with the greater needs of Great Britain. England itself had a looming unemployment issue, and the majority of German Jewish refugees were white collared workers, professionals and business owners, for which there was little demand in England. Further, the British territory of Palestine was in need of agricultural workers and tradesmen to help promote
its fledgling economy, positions for which many German Jews were ill suited. Although the initial waves of emigrants fell primarily upon nations of mainland Europe, Great Britain recognized early on the potential for a refugee crisis and sought to establish a political position on the issue that was as favorable as possible for its own interests. Especially considering its international jurisdiction over Palestine, which had become integral to Zionist ambitions, Great Britain perceived how it might inevitably have to take some sort of action regarding the German refugee issue. As early as 1933 private organizations concerned with the welfare of German refugees pressed the British government to act in favor of the refugees. As Sherman explains:

Those private organisations and individuals who interested themselves shortly after Hitler’s accession to power in the fate of German refugees recognized that the problem with which they were concerned raised issues of Government policy which went far beyond the immediate emergency and its concomitant relief effort. It was conceded by refugee groups that the economic situation in Great Britain, and the overwhelmingly middle-class character of the German emigration, made a large-scale absorption of refugees in Great Britain impracticable. Nevertheless, the partisans of more liberal immigration policies urged from the outset greater generosity on the part of the British Government, both at home and in the overseas territories for which Britain was responsible. (27)

Representatives of the Jewish community in Great Britain were especially vocal on the German refugee issue, and they pressed the British Government to exhibit leniency in its application of emigration policy. The Jewish community went so far as to propose to the Home Office in 1933 that all German Jewish refugees seeking refuge in Great Britain be admitted, and that all German Jews already resident in Great Britain be allowed to prolong their stay indefinitely (30). Integral to this proposal of the Jewish community, however, was their assurance that “all expense,
whether in respect to temporary or permanent accommodation or maintenance will be borne by
the Jewish community without ultimate charge to the State” (quoted in Sherman 30). Further,
German Jewish residence in Great Britain was to be seen as temporary, and the further migration
of refugees to ultimate destinations outside of Great Britain was part of the Jewish community’s
initiative. The Cabinet assigned a Committee to review the proposal of the Jewish community
and form a recommendation as to how the British government should proceed in regards to the
German refugee situation. The Committee concluded that the policy in Palestine should remain
that emigration to that territory be conditioned by what the economy there was able to absorb.
Further, the number of refugees admitted to the British Colonies in general should be “treated as
negligible” (quoted in Sherman 31). As far as migration to England itself was concerned, the
Committee concluded that policy governing admission and exclusion of German Jews should
remain the same, with the additional stipulation that refugees register with the police upon
reaching their British destination (31).

As emigration from Germany increased throughout 1933, debate in the British
government turned toward the question of whether or not Great Britain should raise the issue of
German refugees at the League of Nations. This proved to be a highly controversial matter, as:

Discussions within the Foreign Office revealed that the chief objection to taking
any initiative with the League was the conviction that the British Government by
so doing would inevitably assume the onerous responsibility for suggesting an
overall solution to the problem. While the delicate state of Anglo-German
relations preoccupied the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office was concerned lest a
British Government lead at Geneva imply a willingness to take some special action
on the refugees’ behalf, such as their admission in considerable numbers to
Palestine. (37)
The British Foreign Office refused to raise the question of German refugees with the League of Nations, citing the fact that, in comparison with other countries, such as those of mainland Europe, Great Britain had absorbed relatively few German refugees. An internal memorandum outlined the British government’s apprehensions:

The number of such refugees in the United Kingdom is still comparatively small…(according to the Home Office, round about 1,000), but the competent authorities have no desire to see it increased…the Home Office, Colonial Office, Dominions Office and Ministry of Labour are especially anxious to avoid being placed in the position of having either to turn down, or to act upon any immigration or settlement recommendations coming from such a source [the League]; and they therefore do not want the matter referred to the League at all if that can be avoided…they are a fortiori averse from any suggestion that HM Government should…take the initiative….It may be noted en passant that placing the matter on the agenda involves (1) giving notice three weeks in advance; (2) giving reasons before the Assembly for placing the matter on the agenda; and (3) proposing a definite course of action. Both (2) and (3) would be highly embarrassing to HMG. (Cited in Sherman 37-38)

Although the British government eventually conceded to the fact that the issue of German refugees would inevitably need to be dealt with by the League of Nations, it maintained its stance that it should not take the lead in resolving this issue. The government of the Netherlands ultimately brought the German refugee issue before the League of Nations, which it called upon to formulate an international solution to the crisis. The British Foreign Office carefully instructed the British delegation at the League of Nations on how to proceed in regard to any suggested resolutions to the German refugee problem. The delegation was warned that the British
government was not in any position to offer financial support in the resolution of the issue. Also, the policy regarding Palestine was to remain that immigration there was strictly limited to the economic absorptive capacity of the territory. Further, criticism of Germany and German policy was to be avoided as to not exacerbate Anglo-German relations. And finally, the British labor market would be the “paramount consideration” in regard to immigration policy (40).

The hesitancy of the British government to act on behalf of the refugees in fear of compromising its own interests characterized its stance on the German refugee issue throughout the 1930s. In terms of Palestine, Great Britain maintained the policy that emigration to that territory be conditioned by its economic absorptive capacity. The British government decided how many Jews could enter Palestine, but it was the Jewish Agency, a Zionist organization established to give the Jews voice in the governing of Palestine, who decided which refugees were granted permission to immigrate. This is where things became more complicated for German Jews. As previously discussed, up until 1933, German Jews were socio-economically well integrated in Germany. Due to this integration in German society, Zionism had not resonated with German Jews as it had with many Eastern European Jews. In 1933, only a small percentage of German Jews were registered members of Zionist organizations. With the NS-assumption of power and consequent impetus to emigrate, however, German Jews suddenly took an interest in Palestine. As Dwork and van Pelt point out, however:

It was those who had shown little interest in the project of Palestine before – the German Jews – who needed asylum now. They had few friends among the Zionist leaders who wrestled with the conflict between their established long-range vision and abandoning those plans in light of the crisis in Germany. (34)

The issue was further complicated by the fact that the majority of German Jews were white-collared workers, professionals and business owners, whereas the developing economy of
Palestine was largely agriculture based, and thus there existed a demand for manual laborers and tradesmen. There was a movement in Germany and later in Austria to re-train those wishing to emigrate in trades for which there was a demand abroad. Many organizations offered Umschulungskurse to support this effort (126).

In promoting Jewish emigration out of Germany, the NS-regime made a financial agreement with Zionists, termed the ha’avara agreement, to transfer Jewish assets to Palestine. Zionists and NS-ideologues agreed on a singular point, namely that Jews did not have a place in the diaspora, and both saw Palestine as the solution (35). To facilitate Jewish emigration to Palestine, the German government agreed to allow German Jews the sum of money required by Great Britain for entry into Palestine. The transfer of capital in the form of German products or commodities was also permitted. Jews sold their possessions in Germany, and then deposited the money gained into a German bank account. A trust company then spent the money on German goods, such as cars, pharmaceuticals, building supplies, etc., which were shipped to Palestine, sold for Palestinian pounds and given to the settlers (35). Although German Zionists abhorred having to make a deal with the NS-regime, the ha’avara agreement stimulated significant economic growth in Palestine, which in turn allowed for further emigration to the territory (36).

There was particular concern in Germany and Austria about the future of Jewish youth. Barred from institutions of higher education and ultimately the economy, many Jewish youth and their parents looked toward the youth aliyah movement to secure a safe future for Jewish children. The aliyah movement recruited Jewish youth and trained them for agricultural work so that they could emigrate to Palestine and live on the kibbutz agricultural collectives. Beyond agricultural training, however, participants were educated in Jewish culture and history, so as to foster a deep sense of community and belonging among the youth groups. Although settlement in Palestine through the aliyah movement provided an opportunity for survival, it meant for
German-Jewish youth the adoption of a radically different identity in a social and economic context foreign from what they had known in Germany and Austria.

2.4.3 The USSR: A Harsh Haven

The USSR became a haven to two types of refugees from the NS-regime: political refugees whose communist leanings put them in ideological conflict with the NS-regime, and non-communist Jews who became trapped in the political chaos of the ever-shifting national boundaries in Europe from the late-1930s through the end of World War II. The constitution of 1918 outlined how the USSR was to deal with refugees, and this tradition continued in Article 129 of the 1936 USSR constitution, which guaranteed the right to asylum to foreign refugees, “die wegen Verfechtung der Interessen der Werktätigen oder wegen wissenschaftlicher Betätigung oder wegen ihrer Teilnahme am nationalen Befreiungskampf verfolgt werden” (Schafranek 384). Despite this *de jure* legal tendency, however, the USSR was relatively restrictive in admitting political refugees. For example, it is estimated that, in the beginning of 1936, 4,600 political refugees from the NS-regime had been granted asylum in the USSR, whereas the immigration of non-communist refugees from the NS-regime was almost entirely restricted (384). Many of the communist political refugees from NS-Germany formed an intellectual community in Moscow, representative of which are such communist literary figures as Johannes R. Becher, Willi Bredel, Hans Günther, Alfred Kurella, Ernst Ottwalt, Karl Schmückle, Erich Weinert, and Friedrich Wolf (385). Communist German literary figures found further audience via organizations such as the *Verlagsgenossenschaft ausländischer Arbeiter in der UdSSR* (VEGAAR), which in 1937 consisted of over 300 members (386). The VEGAAR was founded in March of 1931 with the purpose of publishing “Broschüren, Hand- und
Nachschlagebücher über die Sowjetunion, politische und wissenschaftliche Literatur sowie Romane, Novellen und Reiseberichte, […] die geeignet sind, den Ausländer näher mit der Sowjetunion bekannt zu machen” (386). With the rise of National Socialism in Germany, the VEGAAR published after 1933 numerous works of anti-fascist literature. The authors of these works included the communist German writers listed directly above, in addition to other communist and anti-fascist writers, among them Bertolt Brecht, Fritz Erpenbeck, Lion Feuchtwanger, Oskar Maria Graf, Egon Erwin Kisch, Wolfgang Langhoff, Hans Marchwitza, Theodor Plievier, Ludwig Renn, Adam Scharrer, Anna Seghers, Bodo Uhse, Franz Carl Weiskopf, and Hedda Zinner (386). The VEGAAR also published four German-language newspapers before its dissolution in 1938 (387). After World War II, many of these communist German intellectuals returned to either the USSR occupied zone in Germany or to Austria, “um dort im Rahmen der SED [Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] bzw. der KPÖ [Kommunistische Partei Österreichs] im Bereich von Verwaltung, Politik und Kultur die Interessen ihres früheren Asyllandes zu vertreten” (394).

Few non-communist German refugees sought asylum in the USSR before the outbreak of World War II (Dwork and van Pelt 218). The USSR did not cooperate with the League of Nations in its establishment of the High Commission for refugees, as it still resented the League of Nations for protecting White Russians with the Nansen passport system, and essentially admitted only those officially invited by the government (218). Things changed, however, with Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and the subsequent Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which divided Poland between Germany and the USSR. Once Poland was divided, Jews in the German-occupied zone, having heard of the atrocities committed by the Germans against Jews elsewhere, fled east across the border into the Soviet-occupied territory. In total 300,000 Polish Jews fled across the border into Soviet territory, joining the 1.2 million Jews already resident in Soviet-
occupied Poland (218). Further exacerbating the situation was the involvement of German and Soviet forces in the exodus. When German forces began to push Jews over the demarcation line into Soviet territory, Soviet forces, overwhelmed by Jewish refugees, fought back by refusing Jews entry into their territory. What resulted in the fall of 1939 was thus a “no-man’s-land,” as Jews were “caught between German gun barrels and Soviet threats” (219).

Interestingly, where many countries were adverse to admit refugees, the USSR dealt with its refugee crisis by offering Jewish refugees citizenship. The Soviets wanted to put the refugees to work, and they adopted a policy of mass naturalization: “the Soviets simply did not want stateless people on their hands or people with Polish citizenship, which had no value since partition” (223-224). Although some were hesitant to accept the offer of citizenship – many Polish Jews hoped for the eventual fall of the NS-regime and reunification with German-occupied Poland – others saw naturalization and the opportunity to work in the USSR as an escape from the ever-encroaching NS-regime. In need of the refugees’ labor, the USSR, in June 1940, transported 200,000 Jewish refugees east to Soviet territory in a matter of a few days (225). The refugees were not sent to Birobidzhan, an autonomous Jewish region in Siberia, but rather to the Arctic region, Siberia and the Soviet republics of central Asia. The Soviet government used the refugees as labor for logging sites, mines, and the construction of infrastructure in these regions. The refugees met harsh conditions in the Soviet internment camps – with limited food and much disease, many died. At the same time, however, refugees did not face physical abuse at the Soviet camps, and the deportation out of Poland into remote regions of the USSR is ultimately what saved many of these Jewish refugees (225-226).
2.4.4 “Paper Walls:” The United States

David S. Wyman, in his study of the United States and the German refugee crisis of the NS-period, aptly refers to the situation in the title of the work: Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941. The “paper walls” put in place by the US government prevented many German refugees from emigrating to America. The German refugee crisis coincided with a period in US history in which there existed a great aversion to immigration. Roger Daniels cites the fact that about half of all people who ever immigrated to the US did so during the period of 1880-1924 (63). He explains further:

In addition to sheer numbers, the negative attitude toward immigration was undoubtedly exacerbated by the closing of the frontier and the psychic strains of increasing industrialization and urbanization. These factors helped produce a kind of American Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) between an old-stock, Protestant, rural-oriented America and an immigrant, non-Protestant, urban-oriented America. Immigration policy was but one of the battlegrounds of that struggle, a struggle that was heightened by the strains and stresses arising out of the nationalism and antiforeign reactions set off by World War I. (64)

These factors contributed to a drastic change in American immigration policy in the 1920s, which transformed from one that admitted immigrants with certain limited exceptions, to one that admitted only a strictly limited number of persons from particular places. The Immigration Act of 1924 set a limit on the number of immigrants who could enter the US in a given year, and then subdivided that number into quotas for individual countries. As Adam Cohen outlines in Imbeciles: The Supreme Court, American Eugenics, and the Sterilization of
*Carrie Buck*, the Immigration Act of 1924 was the product of the eugenics movement in the United States, which sought specifically to prevent the immigration of Italians and Eastern-European Jews. In his analysis, Cohen asserts that the 1924 act and related 1927 Supreme Court decision in the case *Buck vs. Bell*, which allowed for the forced sterilization of a woman deemed “feeble-minded,” brought momentum to the eugenics movement not only in the US, but abroad as well (10). In the German context, Cohen cites the fact that Hitler praises in the 1925 publication of *Mein Kampf* the Immigration Act of 1924 and that the NS-regime “used America as a model for its own eugenic sterilization program” (135, 10). Further, after WWII, the NS-party members “who had carried out 375,000 forced eugenic sterilizations cited *Buck vs. Bell* in their defense” (11). In an interview conducted with Terry Gross, broadcasted by *National Public Radio* on 7 March 2016, Cohen asserts that the eugenics-informed immigration quotas of the 1924 Immigration Act undoubtedly affected the survival of Jews fleeing the NS-regime:

> It [Immigration Act of 1924] absolutely did prevent many Jews from coming to America at the time. Under the old immigration laws, where it was pretty much, you know, show up, they would've been able to immigrate, but suddenly they were [...] trapped by very unfavorable national quotas so this really was a reason that so many Jews were turned away. And one very poignant aspect of it that I thought about as I was working on the book is, in the late '90s, some correspondence appeared - was uncovered - in which Otto Frank was writing repeatedly to the State Department begging for visas for himself and his wife and his two daughters, Margot and Anne, and was turned down and that was because there were now these quotas in place¹. And if they had not been, it seems clear that he would've

¹ There is a discrepancy between Cohen’s reference of “the late 90s” and his citation of this reference in his book. On p. 135, Cohen references Otto Frank’s correspondence with a US government official, in which he pleads for visas for his family. For this reference he cites the
been able to get a visa for his whole family, including his daughter, Anne Frank. So when we think about the fact that Anne Frank died in a concentration camp, we're often told that it was because the Nazis believed that Jews were genetically inferior, that they were lesser than Aryans. That's true, but to some extent, Anne Frank died in a concentration camp because the U.S. Congress believed that as well.

Through the example of the Frank family, Cohen suggests the complicity of the US government in the Holocaust, in its support of the eugenics movement and the consequences thereof for its immigration policy toward refugees of the NS-regime.

Although Franklin D. Roosevelt, a liberal democrat, acknowledged from the beginning of his presidency what was happening in Germany and “deplored it,” he did little to effect a change in the situation nor to help German refugees (Daniels 66-67). As Daniels explains, “irrefutable evidence exists in a number of places to demonstrate that […] the U.S. Department of State consistently made it difficult for most refugees to enter this country” (67). The quota system was maintained, but on top of that, a German refugee intending to emigrate to the US needed to provide ample documentation that he would not become a public charge. This required that a refugee obtain an affidavit, written by someone residing in the US on his behalf, ensuring that the refugee would have a place and means to exist once in the US, and would under no condition become a public charge. The person who wrote the affidavit would often be investigated, and if

*New York Times* article “In Old Files, Fading Hopes of Anne Frank’s Family” (Patricia Cohen, 15 February 2007). This article specifically mentions, however, that Otto Frank’s correspondence had been discovered in 2005: “It wasn’t until 2005 that YIVO received a grant to organize and index the 350 file cabinets worth of material it had warehoused in an off-site storage center. In the summer of that year, Estelle Guzik, a part-time volunteer, was sorting through files when she saw that a file jacket was missing the subject’s date of birth, said Carl J. Rheins, YIVO’s executive director. He said that she opened it and saw that the children’s names were Anne and Margot Frank, and said, ‘Oh my God, this is the Anne Frank file.’”
he had pledged financial support of the refugee, he would have to supply evidence of his own financial means. The process was complicated and time-consuming. Further, time was of the essence to the refugee, whose ever-present worries included the expiration of identification and travel documentation, as well as the advance of the NS-regime. A testament to the difficulty of emigration to the US is the fact that, from 1933-1940, over 200,000 refugees from Germany would have been eligible to immigrate to the US based on the quota system, but during that time only approximately 100,000 managed to do so (66).

2.4.5 Latin and South America

Many German refugees sought refuge in South America, several countries of which had a tradition of admitting German-speaking immigrants. Argentina, for example, had long ties to Germany, having absorbed a considerable German-speaking population since the turn of the 20th century, when South America experienced waves of European migration. In general, immigration policies of countries such as Argentina remained lax during the 1930s, which encouraged German immigration. The Argentinian economy proved able to absorb the influx of refugees from the NS-regime, and Walter cites the fact that, on average, it took only two months for a German immigrant to find work once he had arrived in Buenos Aires.

In the mid-1930s, however, immigration policy in South America changed. In 1936, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed a pact, in which they agreed to significantly increase controls over immigration, legislation that was not specifically intended to prevent emigration of refugees of NS-Germany, but rather that of refugees of the Spanish Civil War. Newly intensified visa restrictions affected German refugees, however, so much so that in 1938, the United States State Department sought to intervene on behalf of the refugees. The US intervention only
exacerbated matters, however, and the three South American countries increased immigration restrictions.

Bolivia became an important country of emigration for refugees only at the end of the 1930s, when other nations had significantly tightened their immigration controls in response to the flood of refugees from the NS-regime (von zur Mühlen 74). Bolivia represented to refugees, along with Shanghai, a last chance for survival (74). In the period of 1938-1940, Bolivian consulates in Europe granted approximately 12,000 entrance visas to refugees seeking to emigrate abroad, of which 10,000 were used, primarily by German-speaking Jews, as a means of establishing indefinite residency in Bolivia (75). Bolivia was, however, a harsh contrast to the Europe that had been the refugees’ socio-economic and -cultural context. Bolivia was, in comparison to Western and Central European, North American and many other South American countries, strikingly underdeveloped in terms of its economy and infrastructure and could thus in no way offer the predominantly white-collar refugees employment in the professional fields that Europe had once offered. Further, the political situation in Bolivia was unstable and plagued by rampant corruption. These conditions, combined with the fact that the natural environment represented, with its high altitude and consequent thin air, yet another difficulty for adjustment, led to the widespread emigration of German-speaking refugees out of Bolivia after WWII ended, predominantly to the more economically developed countries in the Americas or to Israel (84).

As von zur Mühlen summarizes, “Natürlich bildeten die wirtschaftliche Armut und politische Instabilität wichtige Motive zur Abwanderung, aber ebenso auch die Fremdartigkeit des Landes, das nicht in der Lage war, den deutschsprachigen Flüchtlingen auf Dauer eine materiell gesicherte, aber eben auch mental ansprechende Heimat zu bieten” (84).
2.5 Chapter Summary

The refugee of the NS-period faced innumerable challenges in his pursuit of the legal right to exist. The analysis of this chapter evidences that the situation of the German refugee was complicated by several political and socio-economic factors of the period 1933-1945. By putting German Jews in the precarious position of existence within a legal *Niemandsland*, the NS-regime economically and socially isolated German Jews in an attempt to eradicate them from German society. Prior to Hitler’s rise to power, however, German Jews were well integrated into German society and enjoyed financial and social success. Many German Jews belonged to the educated middle-class and were professionals and business owners. When it became apparent through NS-legislation that the Jews were a target for eradication, however, they joined the thousands of German political refugees who had fled abroad. Few realized that the NS-regime would remain in power as long as it did, however, and many Jews initially remained in Germany. The extreme legal restrictions surrounding German Jews’ ability to transfer capital abroad created further complications in their attempt to emigrate. As the 1930s developed, however, it became evident that the situation in NS-Germany was deteriorating as Hitler amassed power, and as refugees tried to flee with what little resources they had, few nations were willing or able to provide the asylum that these refugees needed. As is evident in the proceedings of the League of Nations and the failed High Commission for refugees, no single nation took the lead in solving the refugee crisis. Nations were primarily concerned with their own interests, and the unemployment of the world-wide economic depression of the 1930s was a domestic issue that affected many nations, who felt unable to economically absorb the predominantly middle-class German refugees. Further, in the 1930s many nations did not want to provoke Germany, and thus the source of the refugee crisis was never dealt with. The ever-expanding legal jurisdiction and international
influence of the NS-regime from 1933-1939, when compared to the weak and grossly insufficient international response to the refugee crisis resulting therefrom, represents a rupture in the institutional order that proved to be profound for the refugee of the NS-period. Nevertheless, refugees of the NS-regime flooded consulates as thousands sought a legally recognized and sanctioned existence through the procurement of valid identification and travel documents. With the help of numerous private organizations who worked on behalf of the refugees, some managed to escape abroad to various destinations. They often left everything behind in doing so – family, friends, possessions, Heimat – but they ultimately survived. Others, however, became lost in bureaucratic mazes of applications for travel and residency rights that never came to fruition, forever lost to the Niemandsland of statelessness.
Egon Schwarz, renowned Germanist and professor emeritus of German literature at Washington University in St. Louis, provides through his autobiography, *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff*, a compelling account of exile as he experienced as a refugee of the NS-regime, a memoir that touches on the indelible impact of exile on the individual’s notions of identity and belonging in the world. An analysis of Schwarz’s autobiography serves a dual purpose in the context of this dissertation. In terms of the theoretical framework for the current analysis, Schwarz’s experience as a refugee of the NS-regime was distinctly defined by the interplay between the institutional and individual orders in Jenkins’ dialectic of identification. His flight through exile is thus a first hand account of how the institutional order encountered by the refugee of the NS-period, as outlined in Chapter One, impacted his sense of place and belonging in the world as an individual subject to the overarching socio-historical and -political powers of that institutional order. Further, *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff* is representative of the genre of autobiography, which is considered integral to the canon of German exile literature of the NS-period. As Wulf Koepke argues in “Die Selbstdarstellung des Exils und die Exilforschung: Ein Rückblick,” many refugees of the NS-regime turned to the process of autobiographical composition as a means to process the experience of a sudden and traumatic “Bruch” endemic to the flight into exile (13). Of this process Koepke explains:

> Das kulturelle Exil […] alle diese Menschen waren des Wortes mächtig, alle hatten eine einzigartige Geschichte zu erzählen, alle hatten 1933 oder 1938 einen traumatischen Bruch in ihrem Leben erlitten, alle fühlten sich aus der Bahn geworfen und mussten in einem unwillkommenen fremden Land eine neue Existenz gründen, als anonyme Anfänger, auch wenn sie vorher berühmt,
wohlhabend und in bedeutenden Positionen tätig waren. Entsprechend groß ist die Zahl der Autobiografien aller möglichen Art […]. Solch Rückblick konnte der eigenen Existenz Sinn und Abrundung geben; die Erfahrungen vermittelten eine politische, philosophische, religiöse Botschaft an die ‘Nachgeborenen’: einen Selbstdarstellung konnte inneren Frieden des Schreibenden bedeuten, einen Abschluss vieler Konflikte mit sich und dem Herkunftsland. (13)

Koepke’s description of the autobiographical process touches on the notion of the individual negotiating an element of agency in terms of self-understanding within the individual order through autobiographical composition. Schwarz’s autobiography serves as a case study of the impact of exile on identity, and questions of identity therein within the theoretical framework of Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification. The analysis will evidence that Schwarz’s account of exile serves as an example of how exile, in which the refugee experiences a rupturing of temporal and spatial continuity, affects the refugee’s notions of self and how he understands his experience and place in the world. Further, the question of individual agency in determination of self relative to overarching socio-political and -historical forces, a question of great significance to Schwarz, will be discussed in terms of the implications thereof for identity formation. As Schwarz explains in the introduction to his autobiography:

Gerade weil ich von Anfang an eine Art Spielball geschichtlicher Mächte war, weil so ganz und gar nichts Spontanes, Selbststätiges an meinem Lebenslauf zu sein scheint, stellt sich mir das Problem der Willensfreiheit mit ungewöhnlicher Intensität. Nachdenkend über meinen Werdegang – dieses Wort scheint mir das Dilemma geradezu zu verkörpern, denn sein erster Teil deutet mehr auf die äußeren Zwänge, der zweite auf die persönliche Initiative – hoffe ich, zwischen
With this Schwarz sets the tone of his memoir, and alludes to the fact that through its composition he seeks to determine more definitively for himself the extent to which he has exercised agency in the unfolding of his own life.

3.1 Legal Otherness and Exile: A Loss of Continuity?

The indelible connection between identification and notions of time and space that Jenkins posits begs the question of the implications of the exile experience for identity, given the fragmented nature of time as experienced in exile. Whereas legal otherness constitutes a rupture, exile represents a further dimension of estrangement. In “Vitae, nicht vita,” Günther Anders explains that, in exile, the refugee perceives numerous ruptures in his experience of time and space as he is forced to move from one location to the next. Characteristic of exile from the NS-regime, he explains, is the collapse of a unified life into what appears to be numerous separate and disjointed lives. Anders asserts that the predominant tendency of refugees of the NS-regime was not a return to the lives they left behind in exile, but rather the process of an ever-growing sense of estrangement from their former, singular Leben:

Aber die Rückkehrfälle sind nicht die wichtigsten, mindestens (da ja die Zahl derer, die wie ich remigriert sind, verschwindend gering ist) nicht für uns Emigranten. Kennzeichnend für uns ist nicht, daß unser Leben durch ein (unerinnerbares) Intermezzo eine Unterbrechung erfahren hat, sondern daß die Zerfällung unseres Lebens in mehrere Leben endgültig geworden ist; und das heißt, daß das zweite Leben im Winkel vom ersten absteht, und das dritte wieder

(67-68)

Anders’ description of the exile experience touches on the question of the significance of spatial and temporal continuity for identity formation. The experience of repeatedly changing location results for the refugee in a perceptual loss of continuity; although the continuity of time is inherently present, the refugee no longer perceives it, and thus arises the notion of multiple disjointed lives experienced through a singular body. Schwarz’s memoir deals with, both directly and indirectly, the seemingly warped experience of time and space in exile, and an element of lost continuity is at the pith of this experience. Schwarz’s experiences in Niemandsland are discussed in this chapter within an analytical framework that seeks to determine the implications of exile for both Schwarz’s sense of personal agency in processes of identification as well as for his corresponding notions of belonging and place in the world.

3.2 The Complexity of Identity Formation as Experienced by Schwarz prior to the Anschluss

There is seemingly an inherent quality of continuity to the genre of autobiography, a ‘story’ of a given life composed of a series of events that often have a causal relationship. As implied in Anders’ assertion, quoted above, there is the notion that in an autobiography, one can look back on one’s life and see the path that one has followed, the past from whence one has come, and perhaps also down that path into the future. In a life interrupted by exile, however, the path is often not continuous, but rather fragmented, begging the questions of woher? and often more pertinent, wohin?. In Keine Zeit für Eichendorff, Schwarz deals with the question of fragmentation and its implications for identity through his account of his life, which was
tumultuously and suddenly cast off on a series of tenuously connected detours. Born 1922 in Vienna as the only child of lower middle class Jewish parents, Schwarz came into the world at a time of great socio-historical and -political upheaval, particularly for Jews. From the very beginning of the autobiography, Schwarz alludes to a quality of socio-historical estrangement that he experienced prior to exile and that defined his early life in Vienna. Schwarz’s parents followed a pattern of assimilation, of a movement out of the traditionally isolated Eastern European Jewish community and into urban and mainstream Austrian society. It was a pattern that led not only to a loss of community, but to a socio-economic position in-between two cultures as well: that of the old Jewish ghetto and that of the Germanic, Viennese middle class. Schwarz explains:

westliche Welt. Man steht vor einem gewaltigen Säkulisierungsprozeß, der zwei, drei, manchmal vier Generationen in Anspruch nimmt. So kam es, daß in Wien Juden auf den verschiedenen Ebenen der Assimilation zusammenlebten, von den eben Angekommenen, die in allem, sogar was Kleidung und Haartracht betrifft, noch ganz in ihren Traditionen lebten, bis zu den seit Generationen Ansässigen, oft längst Getauften, bei denen das Judentum nur noch eine vage, gern verleugnete Familienerinnerung war. (17)

The loss of a traditional Jewish identity through the process of assimilation that Schwarz describes meant not only the loss of community, but the loss of a socio-historical identity as well. Jews in various stages of assimilation into Viennese society left behind to varying degrees the traditional Jewish community’s culture, languages and shared history. This begs the question of what there was to gain for them in their new place in Viennese society, and further, if it were even possible for them to fill such a socio-historical void. The great influx of Eastern Jews into a Viennese society, which Schwarz describes as having been still a traditionally Christian one, led to a rise of virulent anti-Semitism that combined traditional and economic prejudices “mit sozialdarwinistischen, biologistischen Elementen” (17). Although Schwarz was raised and educated in Vienna and in a home with minimal maintenance and practice of Jewish heritage, his assimilation into mainstream, Christian Viennese society was superficial. In the discussion of his childhood in Vienna, he reflects on the psychological impact of this pseudo-assimilation on the young Jew:

Der junge Jude, der in einem solchen Klima aufwächst [...] spürt nur sehr früh, daß er „anders” ist, daß er nicht „dazugehört”. Als Mitglied einer verachteten und verfolgten Minderheit ist er gezwungen, mit dieser existentiellen Grundtatsache seiner Abstammung und seiner Sonderstellung fertig zu werden. Vom Selbsthaß

This excerpt provides insight into the immense complexity of Jewish identity as experienced by Schwarz in the Vienna of the interwar period. The multiplicity of identities that Schwarz describes as possibilities for young Jews, all pulling them in different directions in the process of identity formation, alludes to a sense of disorientation and confusion in terms of a notion of self. The simultaneous possibilities that ranged from suicide to Zionist pride in the Jewish heritage indicate that there existed a quality of vacillation to the processes of identification, a fact that suggests great disorientation in the young Jew’s determination of self. Here the question of continuity comes into play in that through assimilation, a socio-historical disjuncture occurred as Jews chose to move out of the isolated Eastern European Jewish communities and into mainstream Austrian society. This break with the Jewish community, the traditional source of identification, had great implications for Jewish identity in that Jews found themselves in a socio-cultural Niemandsland, outside of the Jewish community and yet not fully integrated into
mainstream Austrian society. In his notion that he was “anders,” Schwarz indicates this double-sided estrangement experienced by Jews of the interwar period in various stages of assimilation.

Finding themselves in a socio-cultural Niemandsland added another dimension of complexity to the situation of Jewish identity of the interwar period. The fact that in the process of assimilation many Jews lost the connection with the traditional Eastern European Jewish communities from which they originated, and yet at the same time never completely integrated into mainstream Austrian society, meant a significant rupture in processes of identity formation. Through assimilation, Jews lost much more than the Jewish religion, but the historical culture of the Jewish people as well, a loss of the connection to a common history with linguistic, religious, cultural, national and economic dimensions. Schwarz asserts that Jewish identity at this time was much more complex than a purely religious identity:

Jewish identity was thus an amalgam of numerous identifications that extended far beyond that of just religion. Even though Viennese Jews did not live in a traditionally isolated Jewish ghetto but rather amongst Christian Austrians, the interaction between Jews and Christians was superficial
and never breached more intimate spheres of human interaction: Jewish and Christian neighbors said hello in the stairwell of apartments, Jews shopped at Christian-owned stores, but a distinct separation and sense of otherness from both sides dominated the relationships (21). Although Jews and Christians attended the same schools, friendships and social circles were delineated along the Christian-Jewish boundary, a fact indicative of a strong notion, even on a primary level felt by children, of a Jewish otherness. This perception resonates with Jenkins’ theory of an internal-external dialectic of identification, based on the notion that the world, “as constructed and experienced by humans,” is composed of three distinct yet inextricably intertwined orders that “are simultaneous and occupy the same space, intersubjectively and physically” (Jenkins 40). Here the interaction order comes into play, in that the implication is that Jews, through the process of assimilation and gradual rejection and loss of the Jewish cultural heritage, sought to be recognized by mainstream Austrian society as Austrians, as members of that society. To a certain extent Austrian society acknowledged Jews as “Austrian” – the law did not distinguish them from Christian Austrians, and they were entitled to the same rights as other Austrian citizens. Jewish assimilation into Austrian society was not complete, however, in that socio-culturally an estrangement existed between Christian and Jewish Austrians, leaving Jews in an in-between space outside of mainstream Austrian society. In terms of Jenkins’ tripartite model of identity formation, the experience of Austrian Jews who followed the pattern of assimilation described by Schwarz was defined by contradictions. In the institutional order, the Austrian government, in not making a legal distinction between Christians and Jews, acknowledged Austrian Jews as citizens entitled to equal rights as other Austrians. In the interaction order, in which Christians and Jews engaged one another, there was however a notion of otherness that separated the two groups. Schwarz asserts that the resulting alienation was especially pronounced “bei Juden einer gewissen sozialen Schicht, die der einen Gruppe nur mehr lose, der anderen noch gar nicht
angehörten” (Schwarz 21). Schwarz further alludes here to the fact that through the process of assimilation, it was Jews of a certain class – the lower middle-class and middle-class – who experienced a particularly apparent sense of societal alienation. Schwarz’ allusion to the Jews’ existence in between two traditional identities, that of the Jewish ghetto and Christian Viennese society, introduces into his work the concept of Niemandsland, a leitmotif throughout his autobiography and an integral aspect of the development of his understanding of his place in the world.

Interesting is that Schwarz, during his Viennese childhood, at a certain point demonstrated a distinct desire to belong to a community, to be acknowledged in the process of the internal-external dialectic of identification as a completely integrated member of a social group. Schwarz’ maternal grandparents lived in the Jewish ghetto in the city of Preßburg (Bratislava), the capital of Slovakia. On certain occasions his family would travel to Preßburg, often on high holy days, and spend time with his large extended family. The community of Preßburg Jews made an indelible impression on the young Schwarz, who was touched by the harmonious and homogenous nature of their community, the continuity of its history and the interconnectedness of the lives of individuals who belonged to it. He describes how he experienced this community as an anachronism:

Bei weitem den nachhaltigsten Eindruck, den ich erst viele Jahre später zu benennen lernte, hinterließ mir jedoch das ungebrochene Stammesdasein der Preßburger Juden, ihr miserables Ghetto, das aber einen unschätzbaren Wert besaß, denn es war trotz seines Schmutzes und Elends nichts weniger als die vielgerühmte und –beschworene „Gemeinschaft“, das verlorene Traumparadies der Industriegesellschaft. (22)
Schwarz describes his experiences in Preßburg as magical. The anachronistic nature of the traditional Jewish ghetto that fascinated Schwarz suggests that the Jewish ghetto can be seen as a socio-historical place of origin, the past from which he had come, a past that had preserved its pre-industrial identity. Through leaving this traditional community, Jews created a rupture in the socio-historical continuity of their Jewish identity, the first step in the destabilization of identity that Schwarz describes.

Indicative perhaps of an inherent human desire to belong, the desire for an identity that one conceives of for oneself and that is simultaneously acknowledged and confirmed by others, Schwarz, at the age of fourteen, decided to become a pious Jew, and sought to resurrect Jewish cultural and religious traditions in the home of his Viennese parents. He explains:


This passage indicates Schwarz’s desire to remove himself from a socio-cultural Niemandsland and integrate fully into a traditional identity. His description of the Preßburg ghetto as an example of a true “Gemeinschaft,” a paradise lost with industrialization, is indicative of Schwarz’s awareness that his life in Vienna lacks a sense of belonging derived from a homogeneous and harmonious community. Schwarz’s inability to reconstruct his Preßburg
experience in his Viennese home, however, suggests the significance of time and space for identity formation. Schwarz, living in Vienna, was not only physically removed from the Preßburg ghetto, but temporally as well, finding himself in an advanced stage of assimilation toward mainstream Austrian society. Although Schwarz failed to reconstruct the sense of community that he experienced in Preßburg, his affinity to that community is a profound indication of the intrinsic human desire to belong to a group with a shared and validated identity.

3.3 Ruptures

With the Anschluss of 1938 and his consequent flight into exile, the perceived continuity of Schwarz’s life was lost. The continuous changing of place that defined Schwarz’s exile experience represented for him innumerable ruptures in the dialectic of identification on the level of the institutional order. This series of ruptures was preceded by an identity imposed upon him as a Jew in Viennese society, and the imposition of identity continued into his exile experience, where he became the undesirable refugee. In terms of Jenkins’ theory of identity formation, it is evident that socio-political and -historical forces project identities onto populations and onto individuals. Jenkins argues that, “the classification of individuals is at the heart of modern, bureaucratically rational strategies of government and control” and that “identities exist and are acquired, claimed and allocated within power relations” (45). For Schwarz and his family, this meant their classification by the NS-regime as the malignant other, and once in exile, by other nations as the undesirable refugee. The following section explores the various ruptures experienced by Schwarz in exile, both those of identity and that of the time-space continuum.
3.3.1 Rupture of Statelessness and the Loss of a Legal Identity

Not yet quite sixteen years old, Schwarz witnessed the NS-regime march into Vienna in March of 1938, an event that immediately and comprehensively interrupted his life and that of his family. As Schwarz points out, by the time of the Anschluss in 1938, the structure of the NS-regime was well established in Germany, especially legally. Whereas Jews in Germany had felt a more gradual shift in societal forces between the time Hitler came to power in 1933 and 1938, Austrian Jews felt the effects of NS ideology immediately. Overnight it became apparent that Jews were to be eradicated from Austrian society, and a sense of panic set in amongst Austrian Jews:


The NS-regime, in terms of Jenkins’ tripartite model, functioned as an organization and vehicle of classification, and with their takeover of Austria they legally classified Jews as an undesirable population and a target for eradication. The ideological and societal structure of the NS-regime left no room for Austrian Jews, who became essentially stateless, which Schwarz associates with
the strange feeling, “plötzlich vogelfrei zu sein” (37). Helga Schreckenberger analyzes Schwarz’s experience in NS-Austria prior to his emigration as an exile in and of itself: “schon vor dem Verlassen der Heimat erfuhr Schwarz eine Art von Exil durch den Verlust der elementarsten bürgerlichen Rechte auf Schutz und körperliche Sicherheit” (199). The result of statelessness, of having no legal protection was thus “tiefste Verunsicherungen und Desorientierung” (199). The loss of citizenship and the rights associated with it meant for Austrian Jews a disjuncture in the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of indentification in that they were not recognized by any given state as a citizen, but rather now instead were labeled a malignant ‘other.’ To lose legal validation of a state-based identity had profound consequences for Schwarz’s sense of place in the world, particularly as he was forced into exile to survive, entering the world as a stateless refugee and therefore also officially as one in between identities.

As the 1930s developed and the NS-regime tightened its ideological grip on German and Austrian society, it became more and more logistically difficult for individuals seeking to emigrate to do so. By 1938, emigration options were extremely limited, especially if one were not of significant financial means and did not have contacts abroad, a fact that incredibly complicated the situation of Austrian Jews. Schwarz notes, “der kleine Mann, der weder Geld noch Geschäftsfreunde in fremden Ländern hatte, mußte sich auf lauter launische und unzuverlässige Dinge stützen: sein Glück, das Mitleid und die Hilfsbereitschaft der Welt, seine eigene Tatkraft, Ausdauer und Schlaubkeit” (41). Schwarz’ reference to der kleine Mann is a poignant allusion to his experience of being an individual among the masses, subjected to historical forces beyond his control. Here Schwarz calls into question the agency of the individual and casts over it the shadow of doubt. For Schwarz and his parents however, fate and luck were with them, in that they managed to get their affairs in order and successfully reach
Preßburg, close to Slovakia’s western border with Austria, utilizing the little room they had for personal agency. Schwarz’ mother had already gone to Preßburg on a visit during the Anschluss, and so it was Schwarz and his father who needed to coordinate their departure from NS-Austria and join her in safety in Preßburg. After numerous frightening complications, they managed to put their affairs in impeccable order, pay the flight tax, and attempt a border crossing into Slovakia. They lacked one key element, however: a visa. Schwarz, in his description of the critical nature of the visa and its implications for survival, provocatively underscores the paradox of the exile experience: “die Furcht war aber ganz konkret: Würde es gelingen, die Grenze zu überschreiten?! Denn uns fehlte das Lebenselixier, von dem damals – in einem den meisten heutigen Menschen unvorstellbaren Maß – Sein oder Nichtsein abhingen: ein Visum” (43). The conception of “Sein oder Nichtsein” as dependent on the possession of a visa, on legal documentation that grants an individual permission to exist within a given space for a given period of time, is a notion that defined the exile experience of those who fled the NS-regime. The legality of existence as dictated by the NS-regime is a notion that touches on the role of the institutional order in the processes of the internal-external dialectic of identification. As discussed, in the context of Jenkins’ model, governments can be interpreted as organisations and thus “vehicle[s] of classification” (45). A government’s denial of a visa to an individual is an official form of rejection, and in the historical context of the late 1930s a rejection of the permission to exist within a given territory. Luck and fate combined so that Schwarz and his father successfully crossed into Slovakia through the help of their Preßburg family and a bribe, but Schwarz never loses sight of the fact that it was precisely this fortuity that contributed to his ultimate survival.

Although a reprieve, Preßburg was a temporary haven and turned out to be one of many stops in the family’s journey through exile, representing thus another rupture in the continuity of
space that the family experienced. Through the *Münchner Abkommen* (29. – 30. September 1938), Hungary, to the south and southwest of Slovakia, occupied border areas of Slovakia, which was consequently partitioned. Soon Schwarz’s family found themselves surrounded, as the NS-flag was visible in Preßburg across the Danube. Hitler facilitated the establishment of a fascist state in Slovakia, and thus the hope of a refuge there quickly dissolved. Through his description of the events that directly followed, Schwarz illuminates the inhumanity of this renewed rupture and its implications for identity and exposes an inherent paradox latent therein. Schwarz and his family, who did not have the proper visa nor residency rights, were forced to leave Preßburg, escorted by the Slovakian military on a journey toward the Hungarian border. After several days and under trying conditions, Schwarz’s family and several hundred other Jewish refugees were dumped in between the Hungarian and Slovakian border, a *Niemandsland* inhabited by people whom no one wanted. Finding himself in a literal human dump, Schwarz experienced perhaps the most paradoxical situation of his life:

Schwarz’s use of the term “Niemand” suggests a complete break in the internal-external dialectic of identification, in that through being pushed out of all societies and dumped in a Niemandsland, the refugees were no longer recognized by others as belonging to the human community. His description of being “ausgestrichen aus den Listen der standesamtlich Zugelassenen und Lebensberechtigen” attributes an ephemeral and insignificant quality to the existence of the individual who is deemed undesirable by a given state. Schwarz describes this experience as one that it is almost impossible to wrap one’s mind around – the bizarre position of having been legally deleted from society and yet still alive, of occupying a space outside of the human community.

Luck and fate interceded yet again on behalf of Schwarz and his parents, as a family member was successfully able to rescue them from the Niemandsland and facilitate their arrival in Prague, in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. As discussed in the previous chapter, Czechoslovakia, and especially German-speaking Prague, initially offered refugees from the NS-regime some of the most favorable conditions in Europe. The refugees were not required to have a visa or special permit to enter the country, nor did they need a valid passport to remain there (Palmier 136). In Prague, Schwarz and his family were still in late 1938 able to obtain residency permits, although the NS-regime was ever tightening its grasp on this refugee haven. Schwarz notes the generosity of the Czech government and how invaluable it was to again have a legal existence: “Darin zeigten sich die Tschechen ungemein großmütig. Irgendwo sein zu dürfen, legal mit Schein und Stempel, war für unseresgleichen im damaligen Europa kein verächtliches
Privileg” (57). Emigration options were extremely limited by late 1938, however, with opportunities for emigration restricted predominantly to Bolivia and Shanghai for the refugee of average means and connections. Through fortuity and the assistance of a Jewish aid organization, HICEM, Schwarz and his parents secured the necessary identification documents, a Bolivian tourist visa, and passage on a ship leaving France destined for the Chilean coast. This course of events raises the question of human agency relative to greater historical forces in Schwarz’s acknowledgement that if it had not been for the good will and help of individuals, he and his parents would not have survived. Human agency under these circumstances requires differentiation as indicated by Schwarz’s point of view:

Und da ich in diesen Erinnerungen auch der Frage nachgehe, welchen Anteil der einzelne Mensch an seinem Schicksal hat, was er zu seiner Gestaltung nach eigener Einsicht beizutragen vermag, wird sich niemand wundern, wenn ich an dieser Stelle nicht dazu neige, der Freiheit des Willens und der Selbstbestimmung eine übertriebene Bedeutung beizumessen. Und doch: ein Wille, eine individuelle Initiative hat bei unserer Rettung mitgeholfen. Vielleicht war es nicht eine einzige Tat, sondern das Werk setzte sich wie ein Mosaik aus vielen kleinen Teilen zusammen, vielleicht war es nicht immer unser eigenes Streben, das uns aus den Verstrickungen löste, sondern die Fürsorge anderer; aber selbst in diesen wilden, scheinbar von Zufall und Willkür regierten Zeiten, lassen sich die intendierten Akte der Beihilfe und Förderung von den chaotischen Mächten blinder Unterjochung unterscheiden. (63)

In this passage, Schwarz addresses the question of human agency in a much more positive light than in other sections of his autobiography. Although Schwarz interprets much of his life experience as evidence for an ultimate lack of power that individual agency has relative to the
greater historical forces at play, here he acknowledges that in his case, and assumedly that of
other refugees who survived, the acts of individuals, merged into a mosaic of acts of humanity
and good will, affected the outcome of the situation at hand in a positive way. In this instance the
processes of the interaction order of the internal-external dialectic of identification are apparent in
that the refugee and his worth are acknowledged by other individuals, and he is thereby again
engaged by and readmitted into the community of humankind.

Schwarz’s departure from Europe and journey into exile in South America was, however,
characterized by a quality of disorientation and alienation that further interrupted processes of
identification and thereby complicated his development of notions of belonging and place in the
world. The ship that brought Schwarz and his parents across the Atlantic to Bolivia via a Chilean
port was cramped with refugees traveling as third class passengers. Here again on the journey to
South America the notion of existence in a Niemandsland manifests itself in Schwarz’s
experience on the ship:

Man befand sich, unverkennbar, auf einem Emigrantenschiff, das aus einem
Frachter der plötzlichen Konjunktur zuliebe notdürftig zur Beförderung von
großen Menschenmengen hergerichtet worden war. [...] Der Kapitän soll gesagt
haben, er bedaure die Länder, in die sich der Inhalt seines Schiffes entladen würde.
Offenbar empfanden die Regierungen, deren Häfen man anlief, ebenso, denn in
den meisten wurden nur die Passagiere der ersten und zweiten Klasse vom Schiff
gelassen, während wir, Auswanderergesindel, an Bord bleiben mußten. (61)

Yet again Schwarz experiences the official rejection of government entities, which through their
actions acknowledge the legal otherness of the refugees and fear the possibility that he as a
refugee, and others like him, might somehow manage to stay within their territory. In terms of
Jenkins’ tripartite model, the refugees experience a rupturing of the internal-external dialectic of
identification in that governments refuse to acknowledge the refugees as fellow human beings with an inherent worth. The ship itself is a travelling Niemandsland in Schwarz’s autobiography, another manifestation of the existence in the space of the in-between, both physically and legally outside of human delineated national boundaries.

3.3.2 Rupture of European Identity

Schwarz acknowledges Bolivia as an opportunity to survive, but explains that it did not offer the European refugee any semblance of a second home. Bolivia at the time of Schwarz’s residence there was removed from Europe in all dimensions: spatially, culturally, and even, as Schwarz suggests, temporally. Hans-Albert Walter offers insight into the situation that the refugee faced in Bolivia. He notes that in comparison with the industrialized and urban Argentina, Bolivia was seemingly a place from a different era and “stellte dagegen beinahe den Prototyp einer in sich geschlossenen Gesellschaft dar, die mit ihrer Rückständigkeit eher dem 19. als dem 20. Jahrhundert anzugehören schien” (305). He cites the fact that while in the mid-20th century over 70% of Bolivians were illiterate and two-thirds of them lived in rural regions, in Argentina only 10% of the population was illiterate and only 37.5% lived in rural areas (305). Further, life expectancy in Bolivia at the time was less than 50 years of age, whereas in Argentina it was 65 years of age, similar to statistics in Europe at the time (306). Walter characterizes the refugee situation in Bolivia and the country’s motivation for accepting refugees:

Das von Sozialhistorikern als ein Land mit archaischer Gesellschaftsstruktur klassifizierte Bolivien besaß also so gut wie keine Voraussetzungen, um eine größere Einwanderung von Angehörigen der städtischen Mittelschichten aufnehmen und absorbieren oder auch nur einigermaßen sinnvoll beschäftigen zu
können. Wenn es dennoch zu einer solchen Einwanderung gekommen ist, so resultiert das vor allem aus der Geldgier und Bereicherungssucht einer korrupten Bürokratie. Man kann ohne Übertreibung sagen, daß fast die gesamte Einwanderung aus Deutschland, Österreich und ČSR auf dem Wege der Korruption zustandegekommen ist. (306)

Schwarz’s description of the situation faced by the refugee in Bolivia is almost exactly that of Walter’s explanation and analysis. Schwarz describes Bolivia as an almost pre-modern society, politically corrupt and unstable, that offered the refugees a safe haven but absolutely no semblance of a society or culture to which they as Mitteleuropäer could relate. Although, as discussed, Schwarz had experienced to a certain extent as a Jew in Vienna of the interwar period a sense of alienation, Vienna – a large, industrialized, Western and urban city – was his place of origin, providing a sense of home if he were to ever have had one. Consequently, his sense of alienation from Bolivian society was profound:


An adolescent raised in a middle-European context, Schwarz did not have the worldly experience to understand what he encountered in Bolivia; that which he witnessed was simply not
interpretable through a lens shaped by a Western, European identity. Schwarz was not alone in his alienation which affected the refugee’s identity in this utterly foreign environment of exile:

Ist es nötig, zu beteuern, daß wir Immigranten in diese Welt paßten – um ein populäres Wort zu gebrauchen – wie die Faust aufs Auge? Zwischen Indianern und Europäern klaffte ein unüberbrückbarer Abgrund von Kulturäonen, der eben nicht nur linguistisch bedingt war und jede Gemeinsamkeit außer der oberflächlichsten ausschloß. [...] Es gibt einen sozialwissenschaftlichen Begriff, der ihre Desorientierung suggestiv beschreibt, den heute allenthalben erwähnten „Kultur-Schock“. Der Ausdruck war damals noch nicht gebräuchlich, aber die Erscheinung wohl. Sie tritt immer dann ein, wenn jemand aus seiner vertrauten Umgebung in eine fremde gerät, wo alles anders ist als gewohnt, die Gesichter, die Kleider, die Sitten, wozu womöglich noch die fremde Sprache kommt, die man niemals völlig beherrscht und die einen zwingt, ständig unter seinem geistigen Niveau zu leben, die fremde Psychologie und Lebensauffassung.

(71-72)

In this comprehensive alienation from Bolivian culture as encountered by the Jewish refugees, there is inherently a break in the processes of the internal-external dialectic of identification in all three orders, but particularly in that of the interaction order as experienced between the Jewish refugees and native Bolivians. They each were people from completely different socio-economic and -historical contexts, and neither group had the proper lens through which to interpret and understand the other. Thus an interruption is evident in the interaction order, in which during the presentation of self the Jewish refugee was not acknowledged or validated by his Bolivian counterpart, who could simply not understand him. Further, the fact that the refugee lived and operated in a foreign linguistic context created additional difficulties in self-expression within the
interaction order. To express oneself in a language in which one is minimally proficient is not only frustrating but devaluing as well, in that one cannot readily and comprehensively explain ones thoughts. Alienation from Bolivian society was thus exacerbated by the linguistic divide and the limitations it placed on the refugee’s demonstration of self to the Bolivian population.

Schwarz employs the motif of the picaro in his description of how he survived his time in South America. The picaro is the antihero of the German *Schelmenroman*, the origins of which lie in Spanish literature of the sixteenth century. The genre of the *Schelmenroman* resonated with German society as it transitioned from a feudal system to early capitalism, a time in which individual agency in determination of place in the world became a question of great interest (Schreckenberger 202). The picaro is a figure of the lower-class who navigates socio-economic and –political forces through cleverness to ultimately secure his own survival (Frenzel 619). He is not traditionally a malicious figure, but he is also not particularly honorable; his main priority is survival and securing, however temporarily, a comfortable existence for himself (619). Schwarz employs the figure of the picaro in retrospect to make sense of his disjointed experiences in South America. During his time in Bolivia, Schwarz took on a series of jobs with which he had varying success, from a traveling salesman to a middle-range employee of a mining company, navigating the entire time the corruption that riddled the Bolivian government and economy. Like the other Jewish refugees, Schwarz and his parents arrived in Bolivia on visas sold to Jewish aid organizations by corrupt Bolivian bureaucrats looking to make a profit off of the desperate situation of individuals whose survival depended on emigration. These aid organizations were sold tourist and agricultural visas, yet another paradox in the exile journey in that the recipients of these visas were neither tourists nor by any means qualified to enter the agricultural industry. And thus it was in this tumultuous political and social climate that Schwarz
sought to survive, in ways that he later perceived as picaresque, and during which time he transitioned into adulthood:

Die Geschichte meiner ‚Berufe‘ und Anstellungen, der Wechsel meiner Rollen, Arbeiten und Tätigkeiten liest sich, das charakteristische Emigrantenmilieu wie in einem Prisma zeigend, ohne daß ich allzuviel dazu getan hätte, ebenfalls wie das Leben eines Pikaro, wie ein Schelmenroman, in dem sich eigene Initiative und äußere Determiniertheit durchdringen. (90)

Schwarz’s continuous switching of jobs indicates an element of fragmentation that defined his time in South America. Schwarz titled this chapter of his biography “Der Emigrant als Picaro,” and as Maeding asserts, “es handelt sich folglich beim ‘Emigranten als Picaro’ um ein auf den literaturgeschichtlichen Motiv- und Figurenfundus zurückgreifendes Konstrukt, das der Erzählbarkeit eines zerklüfteten Lebens halber die Literarisierung des autobiographischen Gedächtnisses betreibt” (497). Beyond the negotiation of greater societal forces, the Schelmenroman also depicted a life divided into seemingly disconnected episodes, as the picaro moved from one opportunity to the next in securing his own survival. This aspect of the picaro existence further resonated with Schwarz, who explains: “Zusammengehalten waren die nur lose miteinander verbundenen Episoden dadurch, daß sich aus ihrer Summe letzten Endes doch ein Gesamtbild ergibt: das einer durch und durch schlechten, dummen, boshafiten Gesellschaft” (91). Through the application of the figure of the picaro in interpreting his exile experience in South America, Schwarz demonstrates how notions of continuity, of the causal and connected relationship between events in a given life, are an inextricable aspect to how the individual conceives of his current place in the world. Schwarz thus perceives the Schelmenroman as a possible framework through which to unify his seemingly disconnected experiences in South America.
Despite the volatile instability that he experienced in exile, Schwarz asserts that exile represented to a certain extent a productive process that indelibly affected his sense of self:

Anders als andere Emigranten, die der Heimat nachtrauern, heiße ich daher die Emigration gut und bekenne mich zu ihr, nicht weil sie mir just passierte und man für gewöhnlich sein Leben billigt, sondern beinahe als Prinzip, als einen Prozeß, dem ich meine Befreiung und, so sonderbar das anmuten mag, die Gewinnung meines Gleichgewichts zu verdanken glaube. (121)

Schwarz’s assertion that exile was for him a process through which he developed his notion of equilibrium and liberation seems to contradict one of the dominant themes of his autobiography, namely that he has been “eine Art Spielball geschichtlicher Mächte,” subject to the greater historical forces at play. The one constant that Schwarz experienced prior to and during exile was the sense of existing in an in-between space. This placement in in-between spaces required Schwarz to reconceptualize the notion of belonging. One can reconcile these seeming inconsistencies if one considers the relationship between identity formation and the rupture of continuities:

Again, and almost summarily, Schwarz touches on a perpetual existence in a *Niemandsland*, one that he has learned to temper with the ability to be “überall zu Hause.” His age at the time of his family’s departure into exile played a critical role in his sense that he is neither entirely European nor Bolivian, but rather places himself in an in-between space existing between his societal experiences. It is significant that Schwarz does not use the term *Heimat*, but rather conveys a sense of belonging through the phrase *zu Hause*, thereby distancing himself from the concept of *Heimat* and calling into question whether or not it is a term that is even applicable to his experience in the world. Rather, by reconciling his simultaneous feelings of being nowhere and everywhere *zu Hause*, Schwarz alludes to a sense of belonging in the space of the in-between.

Schwarz ultimately survived exile in South America and traveled on to the United States, where Bernhard Blume, a Germanist also in exile, secured for him a fellowship to study at Ohio State University and support himself as a teacher of German at Otterbein College. Although “Blume ist und bleibt für Schwarz der Retter, dem er das Entkommen aus dem Picarodasein verdankt,” Schwarz’s autobiography begs a reconsideration of his personal agency in his own survival, and beyond that, his determination of self and place in the world (Maeding 497). As argued, Schwarz’s exile experience evidences numerous examples of disruptions in processes of identification and ultimately depicts numerous instances of fragmentation. His autobiography, in which he establishes a sense of belonging for himself in the space of the in-between, the socio-historical *Niemandsland* that he shares with other European Jews of the NS-period from whom the legal right to exist was taken, evidences the profound implications of exile for identity.
3.4 Individual Agency Relative to Greater Socio-Historical Forces

Reflecting back on his life, Schwarz explains how he has come to perceive his Jewish heritage in the context of its impact on his life and notion of self. In view of the multitude of options that existed for him in terms of Jewish identity, ranging from a complete rejection thereof to pride and religious piety, his notion of a Jewish identity is not religious, cultural or social, but rather historical:

Läßt sich dieser ganz im Zeichen bestimmter geschichtlicher Konstellationen stattgebahnten Entwicklung die Gewißheit abgewinnen, daß der Mensch einen freien Willen besitzt? Es ist schwer zu sagen. […] Ich habe mein Judentum nicht verleugnet, sondern es immer als gestaltende Kraft meiner Existenz anerkannt, allerdings in einem historischen, nicht in einem religiösen, kulturellen, nationalen oder gar biologischen Sinn. (29-30)

This retrospective conclusion in the first chapter of the autobiography foreshadows one of the notions with which Schwarz closes the work: that he ultimately found a sphere of belonging among European Jews of the interwar period who were subject to the same historical context and one of the most complicated and horrific occurrences of human history. Here the question of individual agency comes into play, as Schwarz attempts to reconcile his personal agency relative to the greater historical forces to which he was subject. While agency is difficult to ascertain, it can be said that it is evident in Schwarz’s consistent assertion of his free will in the unfolding of his own life relative to the impact of these overarching forces. As a Jew born in a certain place at a certain time – central Europe during the interwar period – he was subject to socio-political and -historical forces that irrevocably impacted the course of his life.
3.5 Conclusion

Schwarz’s exile experience was defined by innumerable ruptures in the internal-external dialectic of identification that resulted from processes of legal erasure. His experience in the space of the in-between, the space in which physical, legal and socio-cultural Niemandsländer overlap and coalesce, indelibly affected his notions of belonging and place in the world. Decades later, when composing his autobiography, he expresses the permanent effect of exile as manifest in his unrelenting notion that everything that he has in the world is merely borrowed. The process of legal erasure that Schwarz experienced is among the most inhumane which human societies over the course of history have ever devised, and in a legally designated, geographical as well as intellectual Niemandsland Schwarz experienced one of its manifestations. From that time on, Schwarz’ sense of belonging in the world has remained tenuous, underscored by the notion that at any given moment, his world can be irreconcilably altered by uncontrollable historical forces that have a broad impact on processes of identification. He concludes, “seither ist mir selbst in den besten Zeiten, als stünde ich nicht auf festem Boden, als spürte ich die Bewegung der Erdkugel und als sei mir alles, was ich habe und benutze nur geliehen” (54-55). Schwarz’s experience in Niemandsland left him with the unshakable notion that any sense of belonging is fundamentally tenuous, and all rights, possessions and identities associated with the belonging to a given place at a given time can suddenly be taken away by the greater historical forces to which one is subject. The constant of the Niemandsland that dominates Schwarz’s experience in the world is thus ironically the continuity of his identity, and ultimately where his sense of belonging in the world lies.
Identification documents were of particular significance in Europe of the NS-period, as they acknowledged an individual as a member of a given nation who, as a result, was entitled to specific rights and protections. Many German and Austrian refugees of the NS-period were stateless, however; their passports were nonexistent or expired, and no nation claimed them as a citizen. Stateless refugees existed in a legal Niemandsland, and their exile experience was defined by an incessant pursuit of the legally sanctioned right to exist. As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, most nations sought to avoid an influx of refugees by establishing legal barriers that tightly controlled emigration into their respective territories. The struggle to find a legally sanctioned space in which to exist is a dominant theme in German exile literature of the NS-period, and it is depicted in numerous works as an experience with profound implications for the refugee’s notions of place and belonging in the world. This raises the question of how the depiction of identification and travel documents in German exile literature serves as a commentary on identity formation in exile. Further, the legal jurisdiction over time and space in exile, as presented in select works, will be interpreted as a human construct incongruous with the fundamental human need for sanctioned space. In this analysis, statelessness is considered a legal reality, the result of a process in the interaction order through which the individual is legally stripped of a national identity. The following analysis pursues the question, on the level of the individual order, of the extent to which statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he has been legally expunged. It begins by exploring the incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin in the case of Thomas Mann. Further, the incongruity of the refugee’s legal invisibility with the fact that he still
occupies space – both physical and intellectual – in the world, is discussed in the context of how this experience is depicted in select works of German exile literature of the period, exploring the question of whether the refugee can reconcile these dissonant realities.

4.1 Thomas Mann’s Defiance of the NS-Regime’s Appropriation and Legal Codification of “German”

Thomas Mann, who fled Germany in 1933 and was stripped of his German citizenship in 1936, famously declared, “wo ich bin ist die deutsche Kultur,” a statement that served as a retort to the NS-regime’s legal appropriation of “German” as well as to assert the indelibility of his belonging to the German national community (Vaget 11). The question of sanctioned space in which to exist and, as a writer, to create, was of great significance to Thomas Mann, whose work and person the NS-regime sought to erase from the German national consciousness. In a letter to Karl Kerényi in 1935, Thomas Mann expresses his inability to dissociate himself from the world history that is unfolding around him: “was geht mich die ’Weltgeschichte‘ an, sollte ich wohl denken, solange sie mich leben und arbeiten läßt? Aber ich kann nicht so denken” (quoted in Bitterli 15). This quote is indicative of the complex interplay between Thomas Mann’s affinity for pure Künstlertum and yet simultaneous sense of responsibility as a German writer towards a societal and political engagement, a subject that scholars of Thomas Mann have already pursued. As Bitterli asserts, “beides tritt uns so in Thomas Manns Gestalt entgegen: das Bewußtsein einer gesellschaftlichen, mithin politischen Verantwortlichkeit des Schriftstellers und zugleich das Wissen um eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit des künstlerischen Bereichs…” (21). Although this issue is not the primary focus of the current analysis, it is of significance in so far as it relates to Thomas Mann’s notion of his purpose and place in the world as an exiled writer who was, for many Germans, an icon of intellectual leadership. As Bitterli further explains, “in jeder geistigen
Haltung…sah Thomas Mann eine politische latent vorhanden und vorgebildet, und diese Überzeugung ließ ihn auch den Schriftsteller in den Kreis des staatlichen und politischen Lebens stellen” (19). Thomas Mann’s conception of the writer, and thus himself, as a political figure is a notion manifest in the numerous essays and speeches that he composed in exile during the NS-period. In the letter to Kerényi quoted above, it is apparent that Thomas Mann is affected by the dynamic socio-political and -historical situation in which he finds himself; he cannot write and create in a vacuum of pure Künstlertum. Bitterli interprets Thomas Mann’s political engagement in the context of the volatile interwar period:

Ausschlaggebend für Thomas Manns politische Aktion wurde erst eigentlich ein zeitgeschichtlicher Impuls – der durch den Ersten Weltkrieg, die Krisis der Republik und das Heraufkommen des Nationalsozialismus herbeigeführte Ausnahmezustand –, der den Schriftsteller zwang, sich mit politischen Mitteln zur Wahrung seiner persönlichen Rechte einzusetzen…die Ordnung des Rechtstaates erschien Thomas Mann als Vorbedingung jeder künstlerischen Tätigkeit; war diese Ordnung in Gefahr, so mußte es Sache des Schriftstellers sein, zu deren Sicherung politische Anstrengungen zu unternehmen. (21-22)

In this passage the individual’s necessity for a legally sanctioned societal space is evident. In the context of the figure of the writer, space – both intellectual and physical – within which to create, is a prerequisite of all artistic pursuits. Like Thomas Mann, many writers were legally dispossessed of their German citizenship under National Socialism and denied intellectual space within the German national community through censorship and the threat of imprisonment. In consideration of the “centrality of time and space to identification,” as outlined by Jenkins in Social Identity, the repercussions of a lack of space for the writer’s notions of identity, of place and purpose in the world, are profound (48). Thomas Mann, in his writings and speeches,
employed his intellect as a means to go on the offensive against the NS-regime by calling into question its legitimacy as an institution of power and authority. Through his works Thomas Mann reclaimed the inalienable right to assert his intellect, which the NS-regime sought to mute through censorship and the legal erasure of his person. Underscoring his belief in the agency and subversive capacity of the human intellect is his statement in 1939 to German writers in exile:

Und eben dies ist der entscheidende Faktor. Denn der Geist ist entscheidend. Wir, die wir hier versammelt sind, sind nur Arbeiter im Reich des Geistes, ohne unmittelbaren Einfluß auf die Geschehnisse der Welt. Aber darum sollte man unsere Worte und Ermahnungen nicht unterschätzen. Der Geist, der keine materielle Macht besitzt, hat eine stille und doch unwiderstehliche, vernichtende wie formende Wirkung auf Erden, und seine Entscheidungen haben Gewicht.

(849)

Here Thomas Mann juxtaposes the physical (“materielle Macht”) with the intangible nature of the Geist, a comparison that parallels the question of physical and intellectual space. Although the NS-regime was successful in legally erasing German writers in exile within the jurisdiction of their institution, these writers maintained an intellectual space in the world through which they could assert their inalienable right of intellectual agency.

Thomas Mann recognized the power of language, both written and spoken, in processes of identification, and he promoted in his writings and speeches the use of language as a means with which to fight National Socialism. In a speech first given in Beverly Hills, California on 5 April 1939\(^2\) in front of the American Committee for Christian German Refugees, Thomas Mann drew connections between the writer, the power of language, and universal laws (gesittete Welt 915):

\(^2\) Although later given the German title “Feind der Menschheit,” the speech was conducted in English.
During this period of active vileness and passive weakness what is the mission of the individual who thinks and feels as a free human being, to halt the disaster and to serve the idea in which he believes and in whose future victory he trusts? Many avenues are open to him by word of mouth and action. We should be faint-hearted were we to underestimate even in times of apparent absolute violence, the effect of the intellect, of the judging, admonishing and summoning word. Language is the possession of mankind that unites not only man with man, but man with intellect.

(303)

His assertion that “language is the possession of mankind,” specifically his use of “possession,” suggests that language is an inalienable right of the individual, a medium through which he establishes an intellectual space for himself in the world, a space in which to assert his identity and thereby engage in the internal-external dialectic of identification. In terms of Jenkins’ theory of the internal-external dialectic of identification, language is a primary means of communication and therefore a means of interaction among the three orders as well. When language is restricted, controlled and manipulated by the institutions of a regime to serve a given political agenda, processes of identification are invariably and intentionally affected. The legal restrictions on language instituted by National Socialist ideologues posed a direct threat to the writer’s existence in that these restrictions sought to deny intellectual and physical space, a prerequisite to the free and voluntary formation of identity, to any writer whose work was incongruous with the newly ‘purified’ German Geist. In this speech, Thomas Mann called on the audience to reclaim the right of the individual to this space:

[...] it must not come to pass that this creature [Hitler, G.F.] shall be the sole spokesman, to the end that he may dishonor the spoken word, distort it, drag it through the mire and thrust into despair a mankind that hears nothing else but this
creature’s abhorrent dialect [...] The spoken word, still linked to honor, meaning and humaneness, must not be renounced, muted and banned from the world during its grotesque march through an age of brainless declines. Where this word is still free, has not been trampled under foot, where it has not been thrust back into a frightened spirit by physical threats, it must raise its voice --, not for a discussion with the enemy -- there is no regulated language in which discussion with him could be possible -- but rather its voice must be raised with inalienable authority, granted by God and reason, to protect the human spirit against the onslaught of devilish lies and confusion which it suffers. Its voice must be raised [...] to save this spirit from a despair that endangers its very life. (304)

In the act of giving this speech, Thomas Mann embodied the message therein, namely that to preserve the basic human right to intellectual space, one must assert that right and speak against any power that seeks to revoke it. Here and later in this speech Thomas Mann expounded on the perversion of political purpose inherent in National Socialism and its jurisdiction over intellectual space. He explained that although there may exist in a given free state a gamut of political affinities, ranging from “conservatives” to “revolutionaries,” that this diversity is possible in a free state because the various parties are united by a common concern for “the human being, his welfare, his dignity, his happiness, his divine calling” (306). This fundamental common ground was, however, lacking in National Socialism, which Thomas Mann deemed the “enemy of mankind” (306). To combat this common enemy, the individual must employ language and assert thereby his inalienable right to intellectual space: “the intellect, devoid of material power, has a quiet, yet irresistible efficacy on earth, an efficacy that is both annihilating and constructive and its decisions are of importance” (310; vgl. “Schriftsteller im Exil”). Thomas Mann leaves his audience with the imperative to assert and employ their intellect, an imperative that he himself
embraced, as is evident in his various speeches and written works from 1933-1945. Further, this speech serves as an attack on the National Socialist attempt to assert legal jurisdiction over national identity and the intellect of the individual through censorship of written and spoken language. In his presentation of the intellect and the assertion thereof as an inalienable right of the individual, Thomas Mann contests the NS-regime’s desire to control processes of identification and thereby alludes to the right of the individual for a space – intellectual and physical – in which to establish an identity.

In the autumn of 1940 Thomas Mann was given the opportunity to embody this message of resistance that he fervently promoted when the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) approached him with the request that he compose short messages to be broadcasted from London with the intent of them reaching Germany and the Occupied Territories via long wave radio (gesittete Welt 923). With the exception of the first four broadcasts, which were written by Thomas Mann and read by a German-speaking employee of the BBC, the broadcasts were composed and read by Thomas Mann himself and recorded in the United States, finally to be sent to and then broadcasted from London. Entitled Deutsche Hörer!, these talks were five to eight minutes in length and were broadcasted by the BBC approximately once a month from October 1940 to May 1945, with a final broadcast in November of 1945 (923). As Thomas Mann himself asserts in the foreword to the first edition of the texts of the talks (1942, Bermann-Fischer Verlag), these broadcasts provided him with the “Gelegenheit, hinter dem Rücken der Nazi-Regierung, die, sobald ihr die Macht dazu gegeben war, mich jeder geistigen Wirkungsmöglichkeit in Deutschland beraubt hatte, Kontakt zu nehmen […] mit deutschen Menschen und auch mit Bewohnern der unterjochten Gebiete” (473). Through Deutsche Hörer! Thomas Mann, in his use of the German language to engage the German national community to which he belonged, re-appropriates the German language to defy his legal statelessness and assert
inexorability of his German-ness. His mention of a “geistige Wirkungsmöglichkeit” is an allusion to his sense of societal place and self-conception as a German writer, whose role it is to engage his public in intellectual exchange. The NS-regime’s legal restriction of his “Wirkungsmöglichkeit” was perceived by Thomas Mann as a restriction on his intellectual space within German society, a restriction that he discusses, and ultimately sought to defy, in such works at Deutsche Hörer!.

In the first broadcast of Deutsche Hörer! in October of 1940, Thomas Mann introduces himself to his audience as a German writer whose person and work the National Socialist Regime outlawed:

Ein deutscher Schriftsteller spricht zu euch, dessen Werk und Person von euren Machthabern verfemt sind und dessen Bücher, selbst wenn sie vom Deutschesten handeln, von Goethe zum Beispiel, nur noch zu fremden, freien Völkern in ihrer Sprache reden können, während sie euch stumm und unbekannt bleiben müssen. Mein Werk wird eines Tages zu euch zurückkehren, das weiß ich, wenn auch ich selbst es nicht mehr kann. Solange ich lebe aber, und selbst als Bürger der Neuen Welt, werde ich ein Deutscher sein und leide unter dem Schicksal Deutschlands und all dem, was es nach dem Willen verbrecherischer Gewaltmenschen seit sieben Jahren, moralisch und physisch, zugefügt hat. (476)

In this excerpt Thomas Mann addresses the NS-regime’s attempt to assert jurisdiction over the national identity of the individual through the legal codification of what it meant to be “German.” He clearly states that he is a German writer, despite the fact that his work and person have been legally rendered incongruous with ‘German-ness’ as defined by NS-ideology. In terms of Jenkins’ claim that “identities exist and are acquired, claimed and allocated within power relations,” this passage can be interpreted as Thomas Mann’s assertion of the power and
inalienable right of the individual for self-determination through his rejection of the identity projected onto him by the NS-regime. The NS-manipulation of the interplay between law and processes of identification is further alluded to in his reference to himself as both “ein Deutscher” and “Bürger der Neuen Welt;” citizenship is a legal classification, but he does not conflate it with the identity of being German. Here Thomas Mann, by defining “citizen” and “German” in his own terms through drawing a distinction between legal and cultural identity, defies the NS-regime’s appropriation and legal codification of these terms to serve its ideological agenda.

4.2 The Intersection of Nation and Identity

The necessity of valid identification and travel documentation for survival as a stateless refugee in Europe during the NS-period is a prevalent theme in numerous works of German exile literature, a theme that calls into question the intersection of the term nation with identity. In her novel Transit, Anna Seghers depicts the infinite complications faced by stateless refugees of the NS-regime whom no nation would claim or protect. The notion of the stateless refugee’s precarious existence in a legal Niemandsland is evident from the opening passage of the novel, in which the narrator comments on a ship, rumored to be lost at sea, that was filled with refugees seeking to sail out of Europe to safety:

This passage sets the tone for the novel, in which the expiration of identification documents is a perpetual threat to refugees. Identification documents represented more than just a logistical issue for refugees seeking to emigrate to safety. Symbolically, to deny an individual the permission to exist within a specific space—a space delineated along national boundaries—is an official and legal rejection of that person by a given national community on the level of the institutional order. Refugees of the NS-period faced rejection from most nations, and this rejection is often depicted in exile literature as the exclusion and rejection of the individual by the greater institution of humankind. In this passage from *Transit*, the narrator’s description of ships carrying refugees whom no nation wants is suggestive of a *Niemandsland*, both physical and intellectual. The ship is travelling outside of national boundaries and thus is physically located in an in-between space. Further, the comprehensive rejection by national communities places the refugees socially in an in-between space, removed from the human community. Here, a disruption in the institutional order is apparent. As previously stated, in accordance with Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification, individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human world. Through the legal rejection of the refugee and refusal to admit him within their borders, nations exclude that individual simultaneously from the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of identification as well from the interaction order, rupturing the refugee’s physical and intellectual connection with the people within that national territory. Inherent in statelessness is thus ruptures in the dialectic of identification, and the exclusion of the individual from the institutional and interaction orders calls into question the possibility of identity formation and identity continuity for a stateless refugee, given that individual identity is inconceivable independent of the human world. Through the depiction of the ship of refugees, pushed outside
of all national boundaries, Seghers suggests that the refugees themselves exist outside of the collective human society, and thereby begs the question of the possibility of self existing independent of society. In “Zwischen den Welten: Zur Poetik des Transitorischen in Anna Seghers’ Roman Transit und ihrer Novelle Überfahrt,” Caroline Delfau discusses the leitmotif of the space of the in-between that materializes throughout Transit in Seghers’ depictions of locations occupied by refugees:

Indem Marseille entgegen der historischen Tatsachen zum letzten Hafen Europas stilisiert wird, steht es metaphorisch für Schnittpunkt und Schleuse zwischen Land und Meer, zwischen Heimat und Fremde, Vergangenheit und Zukunft – und damit für Grenz- und Übergangsräume im Allgemeinen. Durch den Hafen ist also nicht nur die Abfahrt, sondern auch das Zwei-Welten-Motiv omnipräsent. Auch die weiteren Handlungsorte – Hotels, Konsulate und ein Reisebüro – bieten nur kurzweiligen Aufenthalt oder verweisen auf die baldige Abreise. Selbst die Cafés sind spezielle Cafés für »Transitäre«, also diejenigen, die auf ihre Abfahrtpapiere warten. (41-42)

The places occupied by the refugee are places marked with an element of temporariness – hotels, consulates and travel agencies are associated with notions of impermanence; one must occupy these spaces as a means to arrive at a future destination. In exile, however, the experience of time is different from that of travel – the refugee does not have an ultimate destination, and thus these temporary locations become places of indefinite waiting. Whereas the traveler has the agency to leave these temporary spaces and arrive to a destination, the refugee does not. These in-between spaces become for the refugee a physical and temporal Niemandsland from which he cannot escape.
In *Jacobowsky und der Oberst*, Franz Werfel calls into question nation-based identities and the ability of a nation to strip an individual of his national identity. At the very beginning of the drama, Jacobowsky appears to casually explain to fellow hotel guests during an air raid in Paris how he had to switch national identities during his flight through Europe:


Und nun... (19-20)

Jacobowsky’s seemingly lighthearted presentation of his flight from the ever-encroaching NS-regime is juxtaposed with the serious content of the description as well as with the scene itself, in which war planes and bombs are audible, prior to the German invasion of Paris. The casualness of his demeanor while describing a traumatic experience creates a heightened sense of cognitive dissonance that extends beyond Jacobowsky’s positivity and adaptability in the face of grave danger to the exile situation itself. Through Jacobowsky’s adaptability to national identities,
Werfel calls into question nation- and place-based identities as well as whether or not the individual can be stripped of such an identity. In this same scene, Jacobowsky expresses that “[…]) Frankreich ist mein füntes und bestes Vaterland. Ich kann Frankreich nicht so schnell verloren geben,” and thereby completes the effect of calling into question the concept of a homeland with associated notions of identity (30). The use of Vaterland creates a further effect of perceptual disorientation in that Vaterland is a term traditionally associated with Germany, but here Werfel transposes it on France. As in one can only have one Vater, it is often assumed that one can only have one Vaterland. Thus through the figure of Jacobowsky, Werfel plays with common assumptions about identities associated with place in order to illuminate how the flight through exile and the consequent forced and constant change of place renders impossible the traditional model of place-based identity.

An element of skepticism is apparent in Werfel’s portrayal of nation-based identities and loyalties, particularly through the exile experience of Jacobowsky. In discussion with the Oberst Stjerbinsky, a Polish military officer whose figure, somewhat one-dimensional, represents blind and unquestioned national pride, Jacobowsky criticizes the actions of the Polish government and the international community as a whole for their lack of a timely and consolidated response to National Socialist aggression:

JACOBOWSKY: […] Sie sind Pole und auch ich bin Pole, wiewohl ihr mich als dreijähriges Kind aus meiner Heimat vertrieben habt...Und als dann in Deutschland im Jahre dreiunddreißig diese Pest und dieses Leid über mich kam, da habt ihr Polen euch die Hände gerieben und gesagt: ‚Recht geschieht dem Jacobowsky!’ Und als später dann in Österreich diese Pest und dieses Leid über mich kam, da habt ihr die Achseln gezuckt und gesagt: ‚was gehts uns an?’ Und nicht nur ihr habt gesagt, ‚Was gehts uns an?’, sondern alle andern habens auch
gesagt. Engländer und Amerikaner und Franzosen und Russen! Und als dann in
Prag diese Pest und dieses Leid ausbrach, da habt ihr noch immer geglaubt, es
gehe euch nichts an und habt sogar die Gelegenheit benutzt, dem armen Tschechen
in den Rücken zu fallen. Als es aber über euch selbst kam, dieses Leid und diese
Pest, da waret ihr sehr unschuldig erstaunt und gar nicht vorbereitet und in
siebzehn Tagen erledigt. (67)

In this passage Werfel criticizes nation-based loyalties and calls for an international
responsibility towards human rights. As a Jew, Jacobowsky was forced to flee Poland with his
family earlier in the century, essentially entering exile as a small child, and later as the NS-
regime came to power, he was forced out of Germany on an exodus through Europe. In Europe
of the NS-period, human society was organized and divided along national boundaries. Since no
European nation claimed the Jews or was willing to defend them, Jews were thus rendered
powerless within the construct of the European nation system, especially given that the League of
Nations did not grant Jews the designation of a minority group and thus left the Jews legally
vulnerable. Werfel reformulates the situation of European Jews through his rejection of the
hierarchy of institutions, placing the institution of the community of humankind above that of the
institutions of individual nations:

JACOBOWSKY: Hättet ihr aber, ihr und alle andern, am Anfang nicht gesagt:
‘Recht geschieht dem Jacobowsky!’ oder bestenfalls: ’Was gehts uns an?’,
sondern: ’Der Jacobowsky ist ein Mensch, und wir können nicht dulden, daß ein
Mensch so behandelt wird’, dann wäret ihr alle ein paar Jahre später nicht so
elend, läppisch und schmählich zugrunde gegangen, und binnen sechs Wochen
wäre die Pest ausgerottet worden und Hitler wäre geblieben was er ist, ein
Stammtischnarr in einem stinkigen Münchner Bierhaus. Somit seid ihr selbst, ihr
Addressing the responsibility of the international community towards the rights of all individuals, given the primary significance of the institution of humankind, Jacobowsky rejects the idea that the situation of European Jews is a problem that is unique to them as a specific religious and ethnic group. Rather, as fellow members of the community of mankind, all individuals should be concerned by and respond to situations in which the rights of other individuals are compromised. Through this reframing of the situation of European Jews, Werfel calls into question the status of the nation construct as the ultimate institution governing processes of identification and their link to a legally condoned existence. Analyzed in consideration of Jenkins’ tripartite model, this passage suggests the community of humankind as an alternative institution superseding that of the nation, and thereby restructures the hierarchy of processes of identification, placing greatest emphasis on the individual’s identity as a human being.

In *Kind aller Länder* Irmgard Keun similarly depicts the situation faced by refugees from the NS-regime and illuminates the role of the international community in exacerbating that situation. Keun implements the simplistic view of a child to deconstruct the exile situation: “Aber wir sind Emigranten, und für Emigranten sind alle Länder gefährlich, viele Minister halten Reden gegen uns und niemand will uns haben, dabei tun wir gar nichts Böses und sind genau wie alle anderen Menschen” (136). In a single thought, Keun summarizes the situation faced by refugees in exile and presents it as a straightforward situation. Many German exile writers of the NS-period highlight the complications of life in exile, the endless paper work and myriad of laws that govern their everyday lives. Here, Keun, however, deconstructs the exile situation and exposes it at its most basic level: no nation wants the refugees, even though they are fellow human beings who have not necessarily done anything wrong. The international community’s
response to the flood of refugees from NS-Germany and -Austria is thus criticized, and similar to Werfel, Keun, through her criticism, makes a case for international responsibility toward the universal protection of human rights.

4.3 The Paradoxical Complexity of Travel Documentation

A recurring theme in German exile literature of the NS-period is the complicated nature of identification and travel documents, imposed by a system that refugees were forced to navigate in their attempt to flee the ever-encroaching NS-regime. Indelibly tied to the depiction of these documents is the question of time. A paradox emerges in the situation of refugees in the latent incongruity between the time-limited nature of these essential identification and travel documents, contrasted with the continuity of the human lifespan. An integral aspect of travel and identification documents was the fact that they had expiration dates, and this fact, in combination with the military advance of the NS-regime, left many refugees seeking to emigrate with a permanent sense of Eile (haste). This ever-present sense of Eile is apparent in the novel Transit, in which Seghers presents how notions of time were a defining element of the exile experience. Seghers creates this effect of pressing Eile from the very beginning of the work, as is apparent in a letter sent between a couple in exile that the protagonist recounts:

Man brauche sicher noch sehr viel Zeit, um dieses verfluchte Land zu verlassen.
zugrunde gehen! Nur das Visum sei sicher! Und dieses auch nur auf Zeit! Jetzt geht es um das Transit! (29)

The short, abrupt nature of these sentences contributes to the sense of Eile in this passage. Contrasted with the sense of Eile, however, are references to the fact that it takes a long time to obtain the necessary documentation (“man brauche…viel Zeit;” “die dauerten lange”). In this passage the effect of Eile is juxtaposed with the fact that in order to obtain the necessary documents, one must wait. Through this juxtaposition, Seghers suggests a warped nature of time in exile. Further, the explanation of the situation surrounding travel documentation and the logical flow of that explanation are suggestive of a Teufelskreis (a vicious circle), which itself has a perpetual nature. A third element is thus added to Seghers’ commentary on the experience of time in exile, and the perpetual nature of the Teufelskreis situation of travel documentation is contrasted with the timed, limited nature of that documentation, thereby creating an element of cognitive dissonance.

Werfel similarly works with the concept of the Teufelskreis in his depiction of travel documentation in Jacobowsky und der Oberst. Jacobowsky exposes an element of latent futility in the refugee’s search for the proper documentation:

JACOBOWSKY: Oh, ich hatte in Bayonne für mich und Kamnitzer zwei kostbare Pässe eines exotischen Ländchens erworben. Einige Staaten aber liegen zwischen mir und meinem vermutlich reizenden neuen Vaterland. Um sie zu durchqueren, bedürfen wir ihrer Visa, der Visa von Transitania Numero eins, Numero zwei, Numero drei...

JACOBOWSKY: […] Transitania eins gibt die Erlaubnis zur Durchreise nur dann, wenn Transitania drei und zwei sie vorher erteilt haben. Ich schlug mich wie ein Löwe für mich und Kamnitzer. Doch immer, wenn ich das Visum eines
Transitanias erkämpft hatte, wurden die andern für ungültig erklärt. Ein Karussell der Vergeblichkeit! [...] (128-129)

The image of the Karussell underscores the Teufelskreis-like nature of the pursuit for valid travel documentation. Here again a similar reference to notions of Eile is apparent as the inevitable expiration of a given travel document renders the other documents in the constellation invalid. Jacobowsky’s tireless efforts to obtain the necessary documents are rendered futile by the paradox of the continuity of the individual’s lifespan and his occupancy of a physical space during that timespan with the impermanence of the permission to exist within a given space. The pursuit for sanctioned space through the necessary documentation is here again indicated as the pursuit of survival.

Similar to Werfel, Seghers introduces an element of paradox her depiction of identification documents and suggests thereby an incongruity in the nature of identification documents with the realities of the exile situation. In Transit, the narrator comments on the dynamic between the endless flow of refugees and the officials who tried to document them:

Eine unermüdliche Schar von Beamten war Tag und Nacht unterwegs wie Hundefänger, um verdächtige Menschen aus den durchziehenden Haufen herauszufangen, sie in Stadtgefängnisse einzusperren, woraus sie dann in ein Lager verschleppt wurden, sofern das Lösegeld nicht zur Stelle war oder ein fuchsschlauer Rechtsgelehrter, der bisweilen seinen unmäßigen Lohn für die Befreiung mit dem Hundefänger selbst teilte. Daher gebärdeten sich die Menschen, zumal die ausländischen, um ihre Pässe und ihre Papiere wie um ihr Seelenheil. Ich begann sehr zu staunen, wie diese Obrigkeit, inmitten des vollkommenen Zusammenbruchs, immer langwierigere Prozeduren erfanden, um die Menschen, über deren Gefühle sie schlechterdings jede Macht verloren hatten,
Here the narrator points directly to the paradoxical and corrupt nature of the system administering travel identification in light of the seemingly endless influx of refugees. The comparison of the masses of refugees to the *Völkerwanderung* (Migration Period) is a poignant reference to the inhumanity of mandating such a system, and serves to call into question the desire of officials to document and control each individual refugee in the flight through exile. Further contributing to the inhumanity is the fact that the refugees were fleeing to save their lives, and the grave danger of the encroaching NS-regime is juxtaposed with the unnecessarily complicated – and almost perfunctory – nature of the system of travel and identification documentation. The equivocation of human life to identification documentation suggests a parallel equivocation of the human body to what essentially amounts to a piece of paper with a registration number. The effect of overlapping paradoxes is thus complete in this depiction in which the warped nature of what constitutes significance is cast in a critical light.

Bertolt Brecht’s *Flüchtlingsgespräche* similarly exposes the inhumanity latent in the system governing travel documentation through its satirical commentary in support of exposing this critical shift in values. In the following passage, Brecht suggests that a codependent relationship exists between the individual and the passport:

> Und doch könnt man behaupten, daß der Mensch in gewisser Hinsicht für den Paß notwendig ist. Der Paß ist die Hauptsach, Hut ab vor ihm, aber ohne dazugehörigen Menschen wär er nicht möglich oder mindestens nicht ganz voll. Es ist wie mit dem Chirurg, er braucht den Kranken, damit er operieren kann, insofern ist er unselbstständig, eine halbe Sach mit seiner ganzen Studiertheit, und
in einem modernen Staat ist es ebenso; die Hauptsache ist der Führer oder Duce, aber sie brauchen auch Leut zum Führen. Sie sind groß, aber irgend jemand muß dafür aufkommen, sonst geht’s nicht. (8)

This passage suggests a perversion in the relationship between the passport and the individual by questioning which entity necessitates the other. Here the priority is placed on the passport, and the individual is secondary in the relationship between to the two. This perversion is illuminated in the comparison of the *Führer* with the people; the *Führer* is primary, the people whom he rules necessary yet secondary. This passage is essentially a perversion of symbiotic ‘chicken-and-egg,’ comparison in that the symbiosis between the two entities is lost as greater value is placed on one over the other. Rooted in the paradox that a change in values has taken place, Brecht equivocates the passport with the most noble part of the human body:

> Der Paß ist der edelste Teil von einem Menschen. Er kommt auch nicht auf so einfache Weise zustand wie ein Mensch. Ein Mensch kann überall zustandkommen, auf die leichtsinnigste Art und ohne gescheiten Grund, aber ein Paß niemals. Dafür wird er auch anerkannt, wenn er gut ist, während ein Mensch noch so gut sein kann und doch nicht anerkannt wird. (203)

Here again the primacy of the passport relative to the individual is apparent. Brecht casts this hierarchy in a critical light by exposing the disproportionate value placed on documentation over that of a human life: a human life is easily created, but a passport sanctioning and acknowledging that life is much more difficult to procure. A premise of Jenkins’ model of identity formation is that identity is embodied; the body is a prerequisite for an identity. Brecht’s commentary on the primacy of legal documentation relative to the body is the opposite of Jenkins’ model; it suggests an incongruity between the inherent human need for a space in which to exist and the difficulty in ascertaining that legally sanctioned space through a complicated system of legal documentation.
The arbitrariness of the bureaucratic maze described by Brecht in *Flüchtlingsgespräche* finds resonance in *Jacobowsky und der Oberst*, in which Werfel illuminates the inconsistencies between the reality of the refugees’ situation and the construct of the system governing travel and identification documentation. Jacobowsky, in his flight through France, encounters a French official who demands that he produce his *Carte d’Identité*:

**JACOBOWSKY**: überreicht seine *Carte d’Identité*, ein grünes Register, das so vielfach angestückelt und zusammengealtet ist, daß es bis zur Erde herabhängt

*Carte d’Identité!!* Sie beweist Ihnen, daß man trotz aller Anstrengungen dagegen stets mit sich selbst identisch bleibt, was nicht ungefährlich ist heute.

**BRIGADIER**: *Carte d’Identité!* Sie beweist mir, daß Sie beständig Ihren Aufenthaltsort wechseln...

**JACOBOWSKY**: *Carte d’Identité!!* Sie beweist Ihnen, daß ich ein nervöser Mensch bin, der sich unsagbar nach Ruhe sehnt und sie nicht finden kann.

**BRIGADIER**: Ausländer natürlich!

**JACOBOWSKY**: Gar so natürlich ist es nicht, keines Landes Inländer und aller Länder Ausländer zu sein... (77-78)

The *Carte d’Identité* was introduced in France in 1940 and made compulsory for all individuals over sixteen years of age. By 1942 the *Carte d’Identité* indicated if an individual were Jewish, which ultimately facilitated the deportation of Jews to death camps during the Holocaust. Werfel uses Jacobowsky’s *Carte d’Identité* to illuminate incongruities between notions of place-based identity and the reality of the refugee’s flight through exile. An element of arbitrariness is latent in this exchange through the emphatic repetition of “*Carte d’Identité!!*,” by which Jacobowsky mimics the French official and the gravity that he places on proper documentation. Further, it is a scene in which Werfel’s commentary on the destabilization of identities in exile is indicated.
Jacobowsky’s multiple additions to his *Carte d’Identité* are indicative of his flight across Europe, but he says with pride that, despite the extensive additions to his identity card, he remained during this time identical to himself, something that he notes is “nicht ungefährlich […] heute.” His comment suggests not only the danger inherent in the fact that such legal documentation (permitting travel or residency) clearly indicated that he was a refugee and thus marked him as someone who was undesirable, but it further implies the perversion of processes of identification as experienced in exile as well. Jacobowsky’s play on the Brigadier’s use of the word *natürlich* and his comment on the unnaturalness to be nowhere an *Inländer* underscore the significance of space and social context for identity and thus the inherent incongruity of the exile experience with the basic human need for space, itself a prerequisite to any identity. This scene is representative of the unique stylistic approach of Werfel in *Jacobowsky und der Oberst*, specifically the paradoxical lightheartedness of Jacobowksy in his exchanges with the numerous people whom he encounters during his harrowing flight through exile. Hans Wagener touches on the question of individual agency in his discussion of this seemingly paradoxical optimism:

*Jacobowsky and the Colonel* is an extremely optimistic play. It depicts the ability of the underdog to escape the overwhelming power of the seemingly almighty. His weapons are his intelligence, his wit, and particularly his ability to communicate. Thus the comedy shows the triumph of the intellect, of the mind, and of the word over brutal force. It offers the triumph of independent and free will over environmental or situational determinism. (65)

Wagener suggests here that this paradoxical optimism heightens the effect of the figure of Jacobowsky, who, in his reliance on his intellect as a means of survival, represents the enduring hope and agency inherent in the individual as a microcosm of mankind.
4.4 Incongruities: Inherent Need for Sanctioned Space vs. Legal Niemandsland

Throughout *Kind aller Länder*, Keun uses Kully’s perspective to describe the legal situation that the family faces in exile, specifically legal documentation related to sanctioned space. Kully explains:


Through the simplistic narrative perspective of a child, Keun distills the legal situation in exile to reveal how it is essentially incongruous with the fundamental human need for a space within
which to exist. As Jenkins outlines, individual identity and processes of identification are inconceivable independent of embodiment; space is thus a prerequisite for ‘being.’ As Kully describes in this excerpt, however, the experience of the refugee is defined by a perpetual struggle and search for legally sanctioned space, attempting to reconcile the impermanence of the permission to physically exist with the reality that the body physically remains even when it has been legally denied that space. Even when the refugee finally secures for himself this legally sanctioned space, it is likely only a temporary solution due to the impermanent nature of documentation permits such as visas. The transient nature of the visa is apparent to Kully, and her description of the visa as “etwas, das abläuft” and subsequent use of various forms of the verb *ablaufen* three times within a single sentence (“abzulaufen,” “läuft es ab,” “abgelaufen”) underscore the refugee’s heightened awareness of time and thereby indirectly ascribes an ephemeral quality to life as experienced in exile. There is validity to Abel’s assertion that, “through Kully’s naïve voice, the logic of the passport is placed in question, for example, when she talks about the passport being the proof that one lives and that the loss of the passport means the loss of life – really what is at stake is an officially documented life, a life that is recognized by others (‘für die Welt’)” (110-11). Missing from Abel’s analysis, however, is a discussion of the implications of a legally documented existence for processes of identification. In consideration of Jenkins’ tripartite model, and specifically the institutional order, Kully’s understanding of the exile situation can be seen to underscore the internal-external dialectic between the refugee and governments which, in the terminology of Jenkins’ model, can be designated as “organisations” and thus “vehicles of classification.” Legal classification is of critical importance to the refugee – in his search of sanctioned space, he seeks a given government’s classification in the form of legal documentation permitting residency or travel through its territory. What complicates the situation, however, is that such legal documentation is often temporary, and thus the internal-
external dialectic between the individual refugee and a given government is inevitably disrupted when, for example, the refugee’s visa (and thus his classification as a legal resident of that country) expires after a given period. The refugee must therefore continuously engage with new and various governments, which suggests numerous ruptures in the dialectic of identification and thus a lack of continuity inherent in the exile experience (Abel 96).

Helga Schreckenberger, through the compelling distinction that she draws between the refugee and the traveler, touches on the complicated issue of time and space in exile as manifest in *Kind aller Länder*:

> The difference between traveler and immigrant is clearly marked. For the traveler, the temporal limits on visa and residency are inconsequential since she is merely a visitor, planning on moving on or returning home. For the immigrant, such restrictions can be life-threatening [...] Contrary to travel with its implied destination, exile is characterized by the impossibility of arriving. (316).

The impossibility of arrival that Schreckenberger ascribes to the exile experience resonates with Abel’s assertion that, in exile, the refugee experiences a destabilization of identities, especially those “related to location” (Abel 96). In her analysis of *Kind aller Länder*, Sabine Rohlf explains of the complications securing valid identification and travel documents: “Bei Verlust der identitätsstiftenden Papiere erlischt die Existenzberechtigung und das heißt: das Recht auf einen Ort in dieser Welt” (148). The refugee’s loss of the right to place in the world results in a destabilization of identity that Rohlf terms a “radikale Ortlosigkeit,” a notion that serves as one of the “Grundmotive des Textes” (150). The term *Ortlosigkeit* contains within itself the paradox of lack of sanctioned space with the reality of human embodiment; the individual still exists even if he has been legally erased. A better term were perhaps *Niemandsland*, which is the intersection
of these incongruous realities, the physical and intellectual space occupied by the refugee outside of the legal bounds of the institutions that deny them sanctioned space.

In Kully’s description of life in exile as it is experienced by her family, “die rastlosen Reisen von Land zu Land, die alltäglichen Sorgen um Aufenthaltserlaubnis, Geld und Paß,” she notes that at times it contradicts her basic understanding of the human world, which is informed by Western, Judeo-Christian philosophy (Kreis 75). She explains:

Meine Mutter hat mir aus der Bibel vorgelesen. Da steht wohl drin, daß Gott die Welt schuf, aber Grenzen hat er nicht geschaffen.


Kully attempts in this excerpt to reconcile the world, as she understands God created it, with the human organisations that impact her immediate reality. Poignantly she notes the contradiction between these two systems, “aus einem Land muß man 'raus, aber in das andere darf man nicht 'rein. Doch der liebe Gott hat gemacht, daß Menschen nur auf dem Land leben können,” her inability to reconcile the two underscored by her use of “doch” (35). The intangibility of the
border strikes Kully, considering that, for the refugee, it is a major obstacle. Further, she notes that, unfortunately, a border is also “keine Erde,” for if it were, it could serve as the solution to the problem that it creates for the refugee; the refugee could simply exist on the border – an allusion, perhaps, to the fact that, in exile, the refugee often exists, on many levels, *im Niemandsland*. As Brigitte Abel comments:

> The border in Kully’s quote here is visible only through the action of officials as they cross over the border, only through process rather than through any type of physical evidence…Even as the meaning of concepts such as ‘border’ […] are deconstructed through Kully’s perspective (‘eine Grenze besteht aus gar nichts’) […] these meanings are imposed and enforced upon the situation by “ Beamte.”

(112)

Kully’s interpretation of the border as incongruous with her notion of how the Judeo-Christian God created the world and intended humans to exist in it indicates her failed attempt to reconcile government organisations with a universal law stemming from that God. Here Kully is perplexed by the incongruity that exists between two competing institutional orders: that of national governments and that which she perceives as a universal and unifying natural order. Her inability to synthesize these two systems of law exposes, ultimately, that something is inherently amiss with exile.

### 4.5 Chapter Summary

The interplay between legally sanctioned space and notions of place in the world is a prevalent theme in many works of German exile literature of the NS-period. The analysis of this chapter evidences incongruities between the legal jurisdiction over time and space through travel
and residency documentation and the inherent human need for sanctioned space, both physical and intellectual. As discussed, a notion fundamental to Jenkins’ tripartite model of identification is that embodiment is a prerequisite for any identity. Stateless refugees of the NS-period, to whom legally sanctioned space was denied, experienced the incongruity between statelessness and the inherent human need for space. Many exile writers of the NS-period cast this paradox in a critical light, calling into question both the capacity of a government to strip an individual of a national identity through legal erasure as well as the possibility of a sense of belonging in the world for the stateless individual. The designation of statelessness and the consequent existence of the refugee in a legal Niemandsland proves to have profound implications for the refugee’s notion of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.
A leitmotif in the exile poetry of Mascha Kaléko is her notion that, as a refugee, she is perpetually trapped in an in-between space that she refers to as *Nirgendland*. Whereas the works discussed in the second and third chapters dealt predominantly with the legal complications faced by the refugee of the NS-period and the implications of statelessness for processes of identification, the focus in this chapter lies on a primary concern in Kaléko’s exile poetry: the devastating and irretrievable loss of home that she experiences as a result of her flight into exile. The NS-regime’s outlawing of her person and work represented for Kaléko a rupture in the institutional order that rendered her sense of belonging in the world tenuous. In this chapter, an analysis of Kaléko’s poems that touch on the loss of home serves to illuminate her notion that, through exile, she has been expunged from the time-space continuum of home, a continuum into which it is impossible to reintegrate herself. Her descriptions of this loss echo the sentiments of Carl Zuckmayer, who noted:

> Die Fahrt ins Exil ist ‘a journey of no return’. Wer sie antritt und von der Heimkehr träumt, ist verloren. Er mag wiederkehren – aber der Ort, den er dann findet, ist nicht mehr der gleiche, den er verlassen hat, und er ist nicht mehr der gleiche, der fortgegangen ist. Er mag wiederkehren, zu Menschen, die er entbehren mußte, zu Städten, die er liebte und nicht vergaß, in den Bereich der Sprache, die seine eigene ist. Aber er kehrt niemals heim. (539)

In Zuckmayer’s description of the impossibility of a complete return after exile, he refers to the fact that time and space prove inextricably intertwined. The permanence of place is illusory, since place is carried perpetually along by the current of time and coalesces with time in the individual’s experience of a given space. Many scholars have written on the perversion of time
and space in exile, often in the context of making a distinction between the traveler and the refugee (C. Kaplan, W. Koepke, E. Said, H. Schreckenberger, J. Vansant). For the traveler, who voluntarily leaves home, home is a secured space to which he can return. For the refugee, however, travel in exile is necessitated by socio-political and -historical forces over which he has no control, and the consequence of the limited nature of his agency in the process of traveling is that he finds himself perpetually stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of arrival and return. In “On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” Wulf Koepke discusses in several subsections of his article the experience of the in-between space in which the refugee finds himself trapped: “Departure without Return,” “Disorientation and Non-arrival,” “Waiting for the Impossible Return” (35, 42, 43). Koepke references Zuckmayer’s description of the impossibility of a return home after exile (as quoted above) and explains that for many refugees of the NS-regime, the irreparability of their loss of home was often only evident to them after 1945, once a physical return seemed possible:

[...] in 1945 a return to the old country seemed to be possible. However, it was at this point that Zuckmayer realized: wherever he would go, his exile would be with him. The waiting time turned into an endless “Zwischenzeit”, an “in-between-time” without ending, except death. It is indeed wrong and misleading to speak of an exile “between 1933 and 1945”. For many writers at least, their real exile was just beginning in 1945; the awareness of an extraterritorial existence without end, wherever they tried to settle down – Switzerland, Italy, Israel for instance; even Austria and Germany remained “fremd”. (36-37)

The profound effect of exile on the individual’s sense of belonging in the world that Koepke describes, particularly the notion of an unshakeable feeling of Fremdheit that exile indelibly impresses upon those who experience it, resonates with the exile poetry of Mascha Kaléko, who
grieves in her works for the home irretrievably stolen from her by exile. Her loss of home is exacerbated by the simultaneous reality that she cannot integrate herself into a new time-space continuum anywhere; her inability to reconstruct a sense of belonging in the world is most evident in her assertion, “Wohin ich immer reise, / ich komm nach Nirgendland.” (“Kein Kinderlied,” Werke 310).

Kaléko’s work is relevant to the current analysis in that many of her poems deal with a concept integral to the theoretical framework of this dissertation, namely that time and space are intrinsically tied to the processes of identification and especially to the individual’s notion of belonging in the world (Jenkins 48). Her poems depict exile as a Nirgendland from which the refugee cannot escape, an in-between space analogous to the concept of Niemandsland. Both terms, Nirgendland and Niemandsland, reference a tangible space in their inclusion of -land. This reference to a physical space parallels the fact that individual identity and selfhood are inextricably tied to embodiment. As Jenkins explains, “the human body is simultaneously a referent of individual continuity, an index of collective similarity and differentiation, and a canvas upon which identification can play. Identification in isolation from embodiment is unimaginable” (41). The human body is the vessel in which the individual’s processes of identification occur, and the fact that the human body occupies a physical space necessitates that physical space serve as a prerequisite to the identity formation of the individual. Although the two terms both begin with a negation, they diverge slightly in terms of what they negate. In Niemandsland, the negation is of the person (nie negating man). Niemandsland is applied throughout this dissertation for that reason; the process of legal erasure and the consequent designation of statelessness experienced by the refugee leaves him in an in-between space in which ruptures in the internal-external dialectic of identification intersect. Statelessness represents a rupture in the institutional order as government entities, through their rejection of the
stateless refugee, refuse to engage him in the dialectic of identification; resulting from this lack of a sanctioned space in which to exist are ruptures in the interaction order, as refugees are legally, and often consequently, physically cut off from other individuals under the jurisdiction of those government entities. These ruptures coalesce to form a space, both physical and intellectual, that exists outside of the bounds of the institutional and interaction orders, which in turn raises the question of the implications thereof for the individual order. *Nirgendland*, however, diverges from *Niemandsland* in that *nirgend*, a reference to the adverb *nirgends*, is highly suggestive of place (*nirgends* – nowhere; compare to *nirgendwo*, in which -wo emphasizes the aspect of place (G.F.)). Interesting, however, is that *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm* notes in the entry for *nirgend* the possibility of a temporal element being ascribed to *nirgend*: “local, an keinem orte, an keiner stelle, wobei manchmal auch der temporale oder modale begriff (zu keiner zeit, auf keine weise) mitverstanden sein kann” (855). If the addition of a temporal aspect to *nirgend* is considered, it is apparent that *Nirgendland* represents a space outside of the boundaries of time-space continua. This resonates with the notion in Kaléko’s exile poetry that she can neither reintegrate into the time-space continuum of home, nor integrate herself into a new time-space continuum in an attempt to reconstruct the sense of belonging that she lost through exile. The following analysis explores Kaléko’s depiction of this in-between space in her poems that most clearly represent her travels in *Nirgendland*.

### 5.1 Expulsion from the Time-Space Continuum of Home

Essential to a discussion of Kaléko’s irreparable expulsion from the time-space continuum that she felt to be her home is an understanding of that home itself. Kaléko was born into a Jewish family on 7 June 1907 in Chrzanów, West Galicia (now Poland), but in 1914, at the
beginning of World War I, political instability in the region and the threat of pogroms prompted her family’s move to Germany. This move signifies in Kaléko’s biography the first of several emigrations, and, as Karina von Tippelskirch points out, the experience of multiple emigrations over the course of a single lifetime is something that Kaléko shared with numerous other German writers in exile (158). By 1918 Kaléko’s family resided in Berlin, which, although not her geographical origin, would become for her in the late 1920s and early 1930s the spatial reference point of her identity; it was in Berlin of this period that Kaléko found a sense of home and community within the literary circle of Berlin’s artistic Avant-garde, for whom the Romanisches Café served as a venue for intellectual exchange. In 1929 Kaléko’s poetry was published for the first time in Querschnitt, and it was in these early works that she demonstrated her melancholic yet humorous style through her portrayal of der kleine Mann and the Berlin of that era. Berlin, the city in which she was artistically engaged and achieved literary success, became for Kaléko her reference point of home. She published in 1933 with much success Das Lyrische Stenogrammheft, followed by Das kleine Lesebuch für Große in 1934 (Nolte 1-4).

Although her work was not initially banned by the NS-regime, as they did not know that she was a Jew, by August of 1935 Kaléko was excluded from the Reichsschriftumskammer, and in January 1937 NS-authorities prohibited her publisher, the Rowohlt Verlag, from printing and distributing her work. With her work banned and the situation in Germany rapidly deteriorating for Jews towards the end of the 1930s, Kaléko moved with her husband and son to New York City in September of 1938. Their first years in New York were difficult for the family, as they faced the challenges of exile: loss of homeland, language, and intellectual community, financial constraints, difficulty securing work, and fear for family and friends back home. As Irene Astrid Wellershoff explains, the flight into exile further represented for Kaléko a major issue in terms of identity:

Wellershoff summarizes here the identity conflict that informs Kalékos exile poetry. It is this conflict that Kaléko attempts to negotiate through her exile poetry, in which she attempts to locate her identity in the *Nirgendland* of exile.

Several of Kaléko’s poems deal with the notion that exile represented for her the irretrievable loss of home, which, for her, was Berlin of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In these
poems the passage of time in exile is depicted as an irreversible process that renders a return to the time-space continuum of home impossible. This is especially evident in “Emigranten-Monolog,” a poem that was first published in 1945 by the Schoenhof Verlag (Cambridge/Massachusetts) in *Verse für Zeitgenossen*, a collection of Kaléko’s exile poetry written prior to the end of WWII (*Kommentar* 48-49):

> Ich hatte einst ein schönes Vaterland,
> So sang schon der Refugee Heine.
> Das seine stand am Rheine,
> Das meine auf märkischem Sand.

> Wir alle hatten einst ein (siehe oben!)
> Das frass die Pest, das ist im Sturm zerstoben.
> O, Röslein auf der Heide,
> Dich brach die Kraftdurchfreude.

> Die Nachtigallen wurden stumm,
> Sahn sich nach sicherm Wohnsitz um,
> Und nur die Geier schreien
> Hoch über Gräberreihen.

> Das wird nie wieder wie es war,
> Wenn es auch anders wird.
> Auch wenn das liebe Glöcklein tönt,
> Auch wenn kein Schwert mehr kliert.
Mir ist zuweilen so als ob

Das Herz in mir zerbrach.

Ich habe manchmal Heimweh.

Ich weiss nur nicht, wonach... (Werke 186)

In the first stanza the reference to Heinrich Heine and his work *Deutschland: Ein Winternächten* is indicative of Kaléko’s affinity to Heine, whose work she admired and whose biography she perceived, to a certain extent, as being similar to her own (*Kommentar* 95). Heine, a Jewish-born writer whose works were banned in Germany in 1835, explored in his writings, in particular *Deutschland: Ein Winternächten*, the notion of *Heimat* in a critical light. Kaléko compares in the first stanza her loss of home with that of Heine, with the reference to *Vaterland* indicating specifically the German historical context and her use of the preterite verb forms *hatte* and *stand* emphasizing the complete nature of that loss. The loss of *Vaterland* can be seen here as not only the loss of a space within German geographical territory, but as a reference to a rupture in the institutional order as well; both Heine and Kaléko experienced the process of legal erasure, whereby a government organisation outlaws the person and the work of an individual whom it seeks to deny physical and intellectual space within the territory over which it has legal jurisdiction. Kaléko refers to the location of her home within the shared *Vaterland* as lying “auf märkischem Sand,” which indicates not only the geographical area of Brandenburg and Berlin (*märkisch*), but serves as an allusion to the German idiom *auf Sand bauen* as well. The idiom *auf Sand bauen* is used to express the notion that a foundation, whether physical or philosophical, is faulty and unsound, suggesting thereby its impermanence and inevitable disintegration. In the application of this idiom to describe the location of *Vaterland*, Kaléko alludes to her experience as a refugee of great instability on the level of the institutional order.
Kaléko acknowledged in an interview with RIAS Berlin (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) on 9 December 1958 her sense of connection to Heine, as manifest in “Emigranten Monolog.” To the interviewer’s comment, “nun gibt es einige Ihrer Kritiker, die Ihnen nachrufen, dass sie so ätzend scharf wie Heine sind, aber Heine war ja eigentlich auch ein Romantiker, wenn man’s genau nimmt, der hatte ja auch sehr viel Herz…,” Kaléko responded, “Na, das walte Gott. Das will ich wohl meinen. Er war ja auch beides, er war lyrisch und er war satirisch.” To the interviewer’s follow-up question, “also das ist ein Vorbild, dass Sie anerkennen würden?”, Kaléko answered, “ja, absolut, absolut. Und ich anerkenne auch das, was die Kritiker an Heine herumkritisieren, das sollen sie ruhig an mir auch herumkritisieren. Ich finde das wunderbar, dass man beide Ströme in sich vereinigt und beides hat” (Kommentar 95).

This exchange demonstrates the stylistic nature of Kaléko’s writing, on how she depicts subjects such as the exile situation in a lyrical yet satirical-critical manner. This is particularly evident in the second stanza of “Emigranten-Monolog,” in which she manipulates concepts of German-ness in her criticism of the NS-regime. The third line (“O, Röslein auf der Heide”) is a reference to Goethe’s poem “Heidenröslein,” which conjures up the association of Goethe, the quintessential German poet, representative of humanistic and ethical values that characterized the Classical period of German literature (59). This is then contrasted with a ‘new’ German-ness of the NS-regime in the fourth line, in which the Kraft durch Freude organization is referenced. Kraft durch Freude was an NS-organization that provided affordable vacations to German workers, and it was a major propaganda tool of the National Socialists (59). The image of a Röslein destroyed under the foot of enthusiastic vacationers suggests the destruction of the associated German cultural tradition through the rise of the NS-regime. It is thus through the manipulation of the reader’s associations that Kaléko formulates her critique.
In the third stanza, Kaléko references the situation of German writers in exile. The first line of the third stanza (“Die Nachtigallen wurden stumm”) is a reference to the NS-regime’s silencing of writers, who, as indicated in the second line (“Sahn sich nach sicherem Wohnsitz um”), fled into exile. The simple past of *werden* in the first line of this stanza, suggests a process, inherent in which is the passage of time. Putting the verb in the simple past, however, indicates that the process is complete, and thereby suggests an end. This is complemented by references in the third and fourth lines to death, which itself signifies an end. Kaléko refers to the National Socialists as *Geier*, birds that feed off of cadavers and thus are typically associated with death. Her use of *Gräberreihen* in the final line of this stanza completes her association of the temporal with the physical: here death, a temporal reference, is embodied in the image of a cemetery.

In the fourth stanza, Kaléko again employs *werden* in reference to the unstoppable passage of time. The first line of this stanza (“Das wird nie wieder wie es war”) is a reminder that the process of change is bound to the passage of time through the impossibility of *wieder* and the return to how things were prior to the National Socialist rise to power. Further, the alliteration of “w” in this line (“Das wird nie wieder wie es war” (emphasis G.F.)) underscores the notion of the impossibility of return. In the fifth and final stanza of the poem, Kaléko describes the devastating realization that her desire to return to her former cultural home can never be satiated; the possibility of reintegration into the time-space continuum of that home is an illusion. Her reference to *Heimweh* in the third line of this stanza touches on a basic human desire to belong and maintain a connection to home as a temporal-spatial reference point for the development of one’s identity. In the final line of the poem, however, Kaléko acknowledges the impossibility of a return to the time-space continuum that represented home to her; she feels *Heimweh*, but she no longer knows where *Heim* lies.
In “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«,” which also appeared in *Verse für Zeitgenossen* (1945), Kaléko elaborates further on the experience of time and space in exile, exploring the question of how time and place coalesce to form a sense of space:

In jenem Land, das ich einst Heimat nannte,
Wird es jetzt Frühling wie in jedem Jahr.
Die Tage weiss ich noch, so licht und klar,
Weiss noch den Duft, den all das Blühen sandte,
Doch von den Menschen, die ich einst dort kannte,
Ist auch nicht einer mehr so wie er war.

Auch ich ward fremd und muss oft Danke sagen.
Weil ich der Kinder Spiel nicht hier gespielt,
Der Sprache tiefste Heimat nie gefühlt
In Worten, wie die Träumenden sie wagen.
Doch Dank der Welle, die mich hergetragen,
Und Dank dem Wind, der mich an Land gespült.

Sagst du auch *stars*, sinds doch die gleichen Sterne,
Und *moon*, der Mond, den du als Kind gekannt.
Und Gott hält seinen Himmel ausgespannt,
Als folgte er uns nach in fernste Ferne,
(Des nachts im Traum nur schreckt die Mordkaserne)
Und du ruhst aus vom lieben Heimatland. (*Werke* 187)
In the first stanza of this poem, the inextricability of time and place is apparent in Kaléko’s description of *Frühling* (spring). *Frühling* references a period of time within the larger time frame of a year, but Kaléko associates with that period of time experiences related to place, specifically the weather and reemergence of nature that are characteristic of spring. From the perspective of Central Park in spring, Kaléko reflects on the fact that it is also spring in that space which was her home prior to exile (*Heimat*). Although she is physically removed from that space of home, Kaléko still knows the experience of spring in that space (“Die Tage weiss ich noch, so licht und klar, / Weiss noch den Duft, den all das Blühen sandte,”). In the first four lines of the first stanza, Kaléko ascribes to time a cyclical nature, as is evident when time is perceived in the context of the year and the associated predictable pattern of the four seasons. The last two lines of this stanza allude to a different aspect of time, however, namely the linear aspect of time as perceived through a socio-historical lens. Kaleko introduces this contradiction in her use of *doch*:

“Doch von den Menschen, die ich einst dort kannte, / Ist auch nicht einer mehr so wie er war.”

The comparison she draws is between the natural world, in which the cyclical nature of time is evident in the perpetually repeating pattern of the four seasons and their physical manifestations, and the socio-historical and -political human world, in which the unfolding of time is linear. In these last two lines of the first stanza, Kaléko’s reference to the fact that the people whom she knew in the space of home are no longer the same makes clear that, through her flight into exile, Kaléko experienced an expulsion from the time-space continuum of home, the perpetual linear unfolding of which renders a return to that space impossible. The second stanza references the dual nature of the foreignness that she feels; not only has she lost the shared experience of time and place with those people whom she knew in the space of home, she is also outside of the socio-historical and -cultural space shared by the people for whom New York, the physical location of her exile, represents home.
In the last two lines of the second stanza, Kaléko metaphorically references the natural world as a means to reconcile, to a certain extent, the foreignness that she feels in the human world. Here again she uses *doch* to introduce a shift in her discussion of time and place: “Doch Dank der Welle, die mich hergetragen, / Und Dank dem Wind, der mich an Land gespült.” Her gratitude to elements of the natural world that carried her into exile, the waves and wind – both metaphors for the agency of others –, indicates her awareness that the political conditions within the socio-historical time-place continuum that she considered home necessitated that she leave that space and receive assistance for a potential start in a new institutional order. In the third stanza, Kaléko seems to find solace in the notion that, despite occupying a space outside of the socio-historical time-place continua that compose the human world, she maintains, as a living entity whose being is the result of processes of the natural world and who occupies space in that world, a remnant sense of belonging thereto. To this point she explains that although the language used to describe elements of the natural world, such as the stars and moon, differs among individual socio-historical time-place continua, the experience of those elements is universal. In the third and fourth lines, “Und Gott hält seinen Himmel ausgespannt, / Als folgte er uns in fernste Ferne,” Kaléko emphasizes this notion of an over-arching, universal aspect of the individual’s experience in the natural world, an experience that the individual shares with all other living entities in that world and through which thus an inherent notion of belonging is evident.

Kaléko emphasizes the contrast of the human and natural worlds at the very end of the poem, the final line of which serves as an allusion to Kurt Tucholsky’s poem, “Parc Monceau,” which he wrote shortly after arriving in Paris from his native Germany in 1924 (*Kommentar* 60). In the first two lines of “Parc Monceau,” Tucholsky indicates in his contrast of *Mensch* with *Zivilist*, that there is a discrepancy between the individual’s experiences as a human-being, whose
existence is the result of processes of the natural world, and as a civilian, who occupies a space within the construct of a government organisation (“Hier ist es hübsch. Hier kann ich ruhig träumen. / Hier bin ich Mensch – und nicht nur Zivilist.”) (141-142). In “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«,” Kaléko appropriates Tucholsky’s concluding lines in “Parc Monceau” (“Ich sitze still und lass mich bescheinen / und ruh von meinem Vaterlande aus.”), to express a similar sense of peace that she has found in her sense of belonging to the natural world. Although time unfolds linearly in the socio-historical human world, it does so within the overarching space of the cyclical natural world. Kaléko contrasts these two spaces in her suggestion that the individual, in the fact that he exists and occupies a physical space in the world, cannot be expunged from the time-space continuum of the natural world except through death. Rather, it is from the socio-historical and -political time-space continua that compose the human world that the individual can be forcibly removed, and it is in the space outside of these continua that the Nirgendland of exile exists.

5.2 Insatiable Heimweh: The Simultaneous Impossibilities of Return and Arrival

Corresponding to the prevalent theme in Kaléko’s work that exile renders reintegration into the time-space continuum of home impossible, is the leitmotif in her exile poetry of an insatiable Heimweh (homesickness) that plagues her in exile. In “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste,” which was also included in Verse für Zeitgenossen (1945), a distinct shift in Kaléko’s perspective on the exile situation is apparent. Whereas in “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«” Frühling signifies a sense of peace and belonging in the natural world, in “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” Kaléko employs Frühling as a medium through which to depict the experience of an ever-present Heimweh that haunts her in exile:
Liebes fremdes Land. Heimat du, wievielte,
Park so grün wie dort, wo als Kind ich spielte.
Müsst ihr immer mich an daheim gemahnen?
Alles um mich her blüht im Sonnenlicht.
Doch der Frühling hier ist mein Frühling nicht.

Sagtest du: daheim? Räuber sind gekommen,
Haben Licht und Luft und daheim genommen.
Amsel, Fink und Star sitzen eingefangen.
Hör noch, wie daheim Küchenmädel sangen:
„Wenn der weisse Flieder –
wieder blüht...“
Ach, er blühet leider nur im Lied.

Lieber fremder Baum. Weiss nicht deinen Namen,
Weil wir von weither, aus dem Gestern, kamen.
Wenn bei uns daheim dunkle Weiden weinen,
Junge Birke lacht, weiss ich, was sie meinen.
Fremder Vogel du – sangest süß, verzeih,
Ist so trüb mein Herz. Wartet auf den Mai.

Träumt der Tor vom Mai: Alle Glocken klingen.
Schwalben ziehn im Blau. Kerkermauern singen.
In the first line, Kaléko imbues into the poem an element of dissonance through contradictory associations. The combination of the adjectives lieb (dear, beloved) and fremd (foreign, strange, unfamiliar) to describe the same place in the formulation “Liebes fremdes Land” creates a paradox in its application of seemingly incongruent descriptors, playing thereby on common associations with place. Similarly discordant is the reference to multiple Heimatländer (“Heimat du, wievielte,”), which contradicts the assumption that the individual can have only one homeland. In the lines that follow, Kaléko describes Frühlings as an incessant reminder of her insatiable Heimweh, a description strikingly different from that in “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«”. The experience of spring in exile approximates her experience of spring “daheim,” but it is not completely the same and therefore cannot replace her experience of spring in that time-space continuum of home (“Doch der Frühling hier ist mein Frühling nicht.”). As part of an interview with Sigrid Schenkenberger, broadcasted by Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) on 1 June 1956, Kaléko read “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” and gave prior to the reading a short introduction in which she described the context for the poem, specifically her exile in New York and the sense of estrangement that she felt while experiencing Frühling in a space other than home:

Wir leben in Greenwich Village, das ist so eine Art Montmartre in New York und wir leben so ganz ordentlich, wir haben wunderbare Menschen gefunden und

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3 Compare to Jacobowsky und der Oberst (Werfel 1942), in which the figure Jacobowsky makes a similar play on the term Vaterland: “[…] Frankreich ist mein fünftes und bestes Vaterland. Ich kann Frankreich nicht so schnell verloren geben” (30). See pp. 95-96 in Chapter 3.
haben auch Freunde und wir haben auch so etwas wie ein Heim gefunden und alles wäre recht schön und herrlich und das ist es auch bis vielleicht auf diesen Punkt, dass man so wenns Frühling wird, fühlt, es ist sehr schön und alles sehr fein, aber es ist doch nicht ganz unser Frühling, wir sind eben halt was andres gewöhnt und das hat mit Geographie nicht viel zu tun, es hat wohl mehr, na ich weiß nicht, ob man das Assoziationen der Kindheit oder was immer nennen soll, aber wir prägen doch der Landschaft etwas ein, was sie uns dann, wenn die Jahreszeiten wechseln in doppelter Weise wiedergibt. Na ja, also das habe ich öfter beschrieben, so ein bisschen Heimweh spukt in allen meinen Emigrationsgedichten [...] (Kommentar 61)

The notion that her exile experience in New York prior to the end of WWII approximated a sense of home and belonging is evident in her explanation that although they had found a space that was “etwas wie ein Heim,” it became apparent with the changing of seasons that, although the experience of spring in exile was, in and of itself, pleasant, the fact remained that it could not replace for Kaléko the experience of spring in the home that she had lost (“aber es ist doch nicht ganz unser Frühling”). She explains that this is not primarily due to the discrepancy in place between experiencing spring in New York versus in Berlin (“das hat mit Geographie nicht viel zu tun”). Rather, she does not have the same sense of connection and belonging to the natural environment of New York that she did to that of Berlin. Her explanation “wir prägen doch der Landschaft etwas ein, was sie uns dann, wenn die Jahreszeiten wechseln in doppelter Weise wiedergibt,” alludes to a rupture in the dialectic of identification between the individual and physical space that he occupies in the natural world. In Kaléko’s explanation, in which nature functions as a type of organisation, exile represents a rupture on the institutional level in the dialectic of identification between the individual and the natural world. This notion contradicts
“Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«,” in which Kaléko finds solace in her remnant sense of belonging to the natural world, a belonging derived from her self-identification as a living entity whose being is the result of processes of the natural world and who occupies space in that world.

“Frühlingslied für Zugereiste” underscores Kaléko’s heightened awareness of how extensive the rupture is. Frühling in the former daheim, Germany, is ambiguous because it still includes the imprisonment of those voices deemed undesirable by the institutional order there. In the second and third stanzas, Kaléko touches on how the inextricability of time and space renders reintegration into the time-space continuum of daheim impossible. She creates again an element of cognitive dissonance in her explanation that Räuber stole Licht und Luft und daheim, playing on the common association of robbery with tangible items. Her description that “Amsel, Fink und Star sitzen eingefangen” heightens this sense of perceptive friction in the poem, in that the image of birds sitting trapped is the antipode of the paradigmatic image of birds in free flight. An element of time is added to the place component of home in the third stanza, in which she explains that she has come from faraway, from yesterday (“Weil wir von weither, aus dem Gestern, kamen.”). In this line the inextricability of time and space is evident in the materialization of the temporal reference yesterday in aus dem Gestern, a play on the common German verb phrase kommen aus that is used to express one’s place of origin. The irretrievability of time passed, here, in the form of Gestern – from which she was uprooted unlike the blooming trees –, emphasizes the irreparable loss of daheim that exile represented for Kaléko. Her only remnant of home exists in her memories and dreams, which serve, in turn, to only exacerbate her Heimweh. Kaléko openly grieves her loss of home in such references as “er blühet leider nur im Lied” and “Ist so trüb mein Herz,” allusions to her ever-present awareness that exile has rendered her reintegration into the time-space continuum of daheim impossible.
The prevalent theme in Kaléko’s poetry published in *Verse für Zeitgenossen* (1945) of the irreparable loss of home after exile was confirmed for Kaléko in 1956 during her first trip back to Berlin after WWII. In “Wiedersehen mit Berlin,” Kaléko weaves together her impressions of the Berlin of 1956:

Berlin, im März. Die erste Deutschlandreise,
seit man vor tausend Jahren mich verbannt.
Ich seh die Stadt auf eine neue Weise,
so mit dem Fremdenführer in der Hand.
Der Himmel blaut. Die Föhren rauschen leise.
In Steglitz sprach mich gestern eine Meise
im Schloßpark an. Die hatte mich erkannt.

Und wieder wecken mich Berliner Spatzen!
Ich liebe diesen märkisch-kessen Ton.
Hör ich sie morgens an mein Fenster kratzen
am Ku-Damm in der Gartenhauspension,
komm ich beglückt, nach alter Tradition,
ganz so wie damals mit besagten Spatzen
mein kleines Tagespensum durchzuschwatzen.

Es ostert schon. Grün treibt die Zimmerlinde.
Wies heut im Grunewald nach Frühjahr roch!
Ein erster Specht beklopft die Birkenrinde.
Nun pfeift der Ostwind auf dem letzten Loch.
Und alles fragt, wie ich Berlin denn finde?
– Wie ich es finde? Ach, ich such es noch!

Ich such es heftig unter den Ruinen
der Menschheit und der Stuckarchitektur.
Berlinert einer: „Ick bejrüße Ihnen!“,
glaub ich mich fast dem Damals auf der Spur.
Doch diese neue Härte in den Mienen ...
Berlin, wo bliebst du? Ja, wo bliebst du nur?

Auf meinem Herzen geh ich durch die Straßen,
wo oft nichts steht als nur ein Straßenschild.
In mir, dem Fremdling, lebt das alte Bild
Der Stadt, die so viel Tausende vergaßen.
Ich wandle wie durch einen Traum
Durch dieser Landschaft Zeit und Raum.
Und mir wird so ich-weiß-nicht-wie –
vor Heimweh nach den Temps perдуs ...

Berlin im Frühling. Und Berlin im Schnee.
Mein erster Versband in den Bücherläden.
Die Freunde vom Romanischen Café.
Wie vieles seh ich, das ich nicht mehr seh!
Wie laut „Pompejis“ Steine zu mir reden!
Wir schluckten beide unsre Medizin,

Pompeji ohne Pomp. Bonjour, Berlin! (314-315)

Although Berlin was the city that Kaléko considered her cultural home and in which she established an intellectual sphere of influence in Berlin’s Avant-garde literary scene centered around the Romanisches Café, the dominant tone in “Wiedersehen mit Berlin” is that of estrangement. Kaléko describes the incomplete nature of her return home and the simultaneous feelings of familiarity and alienation. In the first stanza, she indicates that seemingly much time has passed since her flight into exile; “vor tausend Jahren” serves as a reference to the NS-propaganda slogan of the Tausendjähriges Reich as well as an indication of the depth of temporal separation that she feels from Berlin (Kommentar 121). Despite her notion that she is a tourist in the place that used to represent for her home (“Ich seh die Stadt auf eine neue Weise, / so mit dem Fremdenführer in der Hand.”), it is apparent in the first three stanzas that she still feels a sense of connection to the natural world of Berlin. The enduring nature of this connection is represented in her description of her lasting relationship with the various birds native to Berlin. The concluding lines of the first stanza create a juxtaposition between this sense of an enduring connection to the natural world of Berlin and the foreignness that she points out in the beginning lines of the poem; in these last two lines she describes that a chickadee had recognized her in the Steglitz district, where she had lived in 1938 prior her flight into exile (Kommentar 121). The chickadee not only addresses her, but, as is suggested in Kaléko’s use of erkennen, is able to recognize and identify her (“In Steglitz sprach mich gestern eine Meise / im Schloßpark an. Die hatte mich erkannt.”). Her connection to Berlin via her relationship with the city’s birds is

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4 Compare to discussion of Kaléko’s sense of an enduring belonging in the natural world in “Auf einer Bank im »Central Park«”. See pp. 121-123 in this chapter.

5 The use of erkannt here follows a theme in Kaléko’s poetry relating to the topic of home: unerkannt in “Einmal möchte ich dort noch gehn” (Werke 213); erkannt in “Kein Kinderlied”
further emphasized in the second stanza. This is evident in “Und wieder wecken mich Berliner Spatzen!”, in which her use of *wieder* is suggestive of the repetitive and cyclical nature of time in the natural world. This is echoed in later lines, specifically “nach alter Tradition, / ganz so wie damals […]”, in which she depicts her relationship with the birds to be exactly that which it was prior to exile. Interesting is that she describes her enduring sense of connection to the birds in the context of place-references, *Ku-Damm* and *märkisch*⁶, that are tied specifically to the human world of Berlin, (“am Ku-Damm in der Gartenhauspension,” “diesen märkisch-kessen Ton”). Striking is that these references, in which her remnant sense of belonging is apparent, are specific to places in the human world, from which she ultimately feels completely estranged.

It is at the end of the third stanza that the tone of the poem shifts, and her sense of being a foreigner in Berlin returns. Despite her enduring connection to the natural world, her return and reintegration into Berlin is incomplete, as is indicated at the end of the third stanza, in which she expresses being unable to find the city (“Und alles fragt, wie ich Berlin denn finde? / – Wie ich es finde? Ach, ich such es noch!”). Here Kaléko plays on the dual meaning of the verb *finden*; asked what she thinks of the city, she replies that she has yet to locate it. The fourth and fifth stanzas serve to elaborate on her inability to find the Berlin that she left behind upon her flight into exile. Kaléko’s nominalization of *Damals* in “Berlinert einer: „Ick bejrüße Ihnen!“, / glaub ich mich fast dem Damals auf der Spur” parallels her formulation “weil wir von weither, aus dem Gestern, kamen” in “Frühlingslied für Zugereiste,” and similarly serves as an allusion to the inextricability of time and and tangible place. It is in the fourth stanza that a disruption in the interaction order of the internal-external dialectic becomes visible. Her formulation of her search for Berlin indicates that her inability to find *Damals* is due to the devastating effect of WWII on

(oder *Werke* 310). In these examples Kaléko employs *erkannt* to describe being, or not being, recognized by others.

⁶ See p. 117 in this chapter.
the people of Berlin, evident in both “Ich such es heftig unter den Ruinen / der Menschheit und der Stuckarchitektur” and “neue Härte in den Mienen.” This failed search suggests that exile represented for Kaléko an expulsion from the time-space continuum of pre-WWII Berlin (a point in time to which she cannot return), the consequence of which is the impossibility of reintegration into the time-space continuum of Berlin. This impossibility is the result of an irreparable rupture in the interaction order; Kaléko can no longer identify with the people of Berlin on whom the experience of war left an indelible and devastating impression. The impossibility of reintegration into the time-space continuum of home once one has been expunged from that continuum is further evident in the fifth stanza of the poem. The Berlin that Kaléko was forced to leave behind in the late 1930s exists only in her memories (“In mir, dem Fremdling, lebt das alte Bild / der Stadt, die so viel Tausende vergaßen.”). The effect of this cognitive disconnect between her memories of Berlin and the city that she finds in 1956 results for Kaléko in a profound sense of estrangement: “Ich wandle wie durch einen Traum / Durch dieser Landschaft Zeit und Raum.” Kaléko ascribes to her experience in the Berlin of 1956 the quality of a dream; she is removed from this time-place continuum and perceives it as if it were an alternate reality. Her desire to reconcile this estrangement results in her longing for lost time, manifest in the lines “Und mir wird so ich-weiß-nicht-wie –/ vor Heimweh nach den Temps perdus ...”. Temps perdus is a reference to the multivolume novel by Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time, published between 1913 and 1927) (Kommentar 123). The irretrievability of time passed suggests an inherent futility in Kaléko’s search for the time that separates her from the Berlin she once knew.

As discussed, despite Kaléko’s lasting sense of connection to the natural world of Berlin, the time gap between her flight into exile and her first trip in 1956 created a rupture for her on the level of the interaction order; the devastation of WWII changed the people of Berlin, and the lack
of that common experience resulted in an irreparable rupture between Kaléko and the people with whom she once felt connected. In a letter to her husband Chemjo Vinaver on 11 March 1956, Kaléko comments on the changed nature of the people of Berlin:


Kaléko’s sense of estrangement from the people of Berlin is readily apparent in this letter and resonates with the notions of foreignness and alienation that she expresses in “Wiedersehen mit Berlin.” Her description to Vinaver of the changed nature of the people whom she encounters parallels her formulation in the poem of her search for Berlin “unter den Ruinen / der Menschheit.” In an interview with Journalist Alfred Joachim Fischer in Jerusalem during October 1973, Kaléko’s response to the question of why she waited until 1956 to travel back to Berlin touches on her worry that in doing so her fears would be realized: “Ich hatte einfach Angst,…ich hatte einfach Angst, vor dem, was sich mir da bieten würde. Ich konnte mir gar nichts unter dem vorstellen, was sich da inzwischen entwickelt hatte. […] Berlin bleibt für mich immer ein wunder und ein guter Punkt in meinem Leben” (Kommentar 121). Kaléko’s trip to Berlin in 1956 confirmed for her the fears that she depicted in her exile poetry leading up until that point, of the irretrievability of the home that she left behind in her flight into exile.
5.3 Affinities in *Nirgendland*

The analysis of Kaléko’s exile poetry has evidenced thus far that exile represented for Kaléko the expulsion from the time-place continuum of home, resulting from which were the simultaneous impossibilities of return and reintegration into the continuum of home and arrival and, thereby, integration into a new continuum. The intellectual and physical space occupied by Kaléko is thus an in-between space, a space outside of these time-place continua rooted in the human world. Kaléko refers to this in-between space as *Nirgendland*, and the current analysis has sought to explore this concept of *Nirgendland* as relevant to the overarching theme of exile in *Niemandsland* that informs this dissertation. The notion of an in-between space manifest in Kaléko’s poetry begs the question of if and to what extent Kaléko’s *Nirgendland* overlaps with Homi K. Bhabha’s conception of the “Third Space.” Lutz Winckler applies Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space in the context of German exile literature of the NS-period, specifically Seghers’ *Transit*, and concludes, “Der ‘dritte Raum’, in dem die kulturell entwurzelten Individuen agieren und miteinander kommunizieren, ist ein kultueller Hybrid” (204). Winckler’s formulation of a cultural hybrid as experienced in exile is a reference to Bhabha’s use of the term hybridity in his theoretical conception of the Third Space. In “The Location of Culture,” Bhabha rejects the notion that cultures, as manifest in the nation construct and its corresponding “People,” are homogeneous entities that derive their validity from an “original Past” and thus exist independently of one another (45-56). Bhabha calls into question the linear and insular development of a given culture over time and suggests that through the process of “enunciation,” in which individuals and groups interact in different social contexts, the possibility of an *international* culture in the Third Space emerges:
For a willingness to descend into that alien territory—where I have led you—may reveal that the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism or multiculturalism of the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity. To that end we should remember that it is the “inter”—the cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the in-between, the space of the entre that Derrida has opened up in writing itself—that carries the burden of the meaning of culture. It makes it possible to begin envisaging national, antinationalist, histories of the “people.” It is in this space that we will find those words with which we can speak of Ourselves and Others. And by exploring this hybridity, this “Third Space,” we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves. (56)

Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space rests heavily on the notion of the in-between, a space in which it is possible for Ourselves and Others to negotiate, through the processes of enunciation, a hybrid, international culture. This concept of the Third Space resonates most clearly with Kaléko’s exile work in her poem “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” (589). This poem, dedicated to a black woman whom Kaléko saw while on the New York subway, evidences the hybridity of the Third Space:

Dunkles Mädchen eines fremden Stammes,
Tief im Dschungel dieser fremden Stadt,
Deiner Augen schwarzverhangne Trauer
Sagt mir, was dein Herz gelitten hat.
Immer möchte ich dich leise fragen:
Weißt du, daß wir heimlich Schwestern sind?
Du, des Kongo dunkelbraune Tochter,
Ich, Europas blasses Judenkind.

Vor der Schmach, die Abkunft zu verstecken,
Schützt dich, allen sichtbar, deine Haut.

– Vor der andern Haß, da sie entdecken,
Daß sie dir »versehentlich« vertraut. (Werke 5897)

In consideration of the spatial location of the in-between, two aspects of the Third Space manifest themselves in “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express.” New York serves as the location in which Kaléko experiences the in-between space of exile, Nirgendland, as evident in her reference to the city as fremd (“Tief im Dschungel dieser fremden Stadt”). The Third Space of New York materializes in the subway car, a microcosm of New York, which in turn serves as the Third Space in which Kaléko negotiates sameness and otherness in her one-sided conversation with the black woman. Although skin-color and specific historical occurrences differentiate Kaléko from the black woman, they share the experience of being forcibly uprooted due to legally-sanctioned and implicated racism, which in turn set them down separate paths to this moment in which those paths intersect. In the case of Kaléko, her sense of otherness results not only from her experience as Jew in NS-Germany, but also from the prejudices against Eastern-European Jews that she

7 “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” was originally published in 1946 in Aufbau (No. 48, 29 November 1946) (Kommentar 589). Kaléko later reworked the poem, and the version quoted here is the one that was published by J. Rosenkranz along with 54 other poems from Kaléko’s Nachlass (Kommentar 248).
experienced in Germany when her family settled there in 1914 after fleeing Galicia (Nolte, von Tippelskirch). As Rosenkranz explains:

[Kaléko] erwähnte ihre Herkunft ungern, da es in Westeuropa als Makel galt, aus Galizien zu stammen. Das emanzipierte, liberale Westjudentum blickte auf die Ostjuden herab, die für übertriebene Religiosität, Armut und Ghettoisierung standen. MK spielt hier auf die ähnliche Situation der Schwarzen in den USA an, die damals noch um Anerkennung und Gleichberechtigung kämpften.

(Kommentar 151)

Kaléko’s assertion that she and the black woman are “heimlich Schwestern” represents her negotiation of sameness in the Third Space of the subway car. In terms of Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space, Kaléko engages in the process of enunciation, however rhetorically, in her discernment of where her notion of self, and the factors contributing thereto, overlap with that of the black woman. It can be argued that the rhetoric nature of Kaléko’s enunciation reduces her sense of shared sameness to an act of projection, but, although one-sided, Kaléko’s one-sided conversation with the black woman does resonate with Bhabha’s notion of an in-between space in which a culture of hybridity is negotiated.

This analysis of “Einer Negerin im Harlem-Express” in the theoretical framework of Bhabha’s Third Space begs the question of how and to what extent this analysis is congruous with the overarching theoretical framework of this dissertation. In this poem Kaléko finds sameness in the shared experience of otherness, and thereby negotiates a sense of belonging within the Third Space of the subway car that she shares with the black woman. The question of whether or not the refugee can reestablish for himself a sense of belonging, either through reintegration into the time-space continuum from which he was expunged or integration into a new time-space continuum, informs the analysis and argumentation of this dissertation.
Bhabha’s theory of the Third Space serves an alternate analytical perspective for Jenkins’ dialectic of identification, in which the same poem would serve as an example of Kaléko’s attempt to reestablish a sense of belonging through the interaction order, her conception of a sameness shared with the black woman thus an attempt to reconcile, to some extent, the ruptures that exile created for her on the level of the interaction order.

It is in the poem “Kein Kinderlied,” from which the term *Nirgendland* derives, that the implications of exile on the refugee’s sense of belonging are most evident, particularly on the level of the interaction order:

Wohin ich immer reise,
ich fahr nach Nirgendland.

Die Koffer voll von Sehnsucht,
die Hände voll von Tand.

So einsam wie der Wüstenwind.
So heimatlos wie Sand:

Wohin ich immer reise,
icch komm nach Nirgendland.

Wohin ich immer reise,
Zu Schiff und mit der Bahn,
Spricht man auf harte Weise
Ein fremd Kannitverstan.
Vom »allerhöchsten Kreise«
Hinab zum kleinsten Mann –
Wohin ich immer reise,
Ich komme nirgends an.

Die Wälder sind verschwunden,
die Häuser sind verbrannt.
Hab keinen mehr gefunden.
Hat keiner mich erkannt.
Und als der fremde Vogel schrie,
bin ich davongerannt.
Wohin ich immer reise,
ich komm nach Nirgendland. (3108)

Numerous references to ruptures in the interaction order are evident in “Kein Kinderlied,” most notably in the second stanza. A complete and irreparable rupture is depicted in Kaléko’s formulation, “Wohin ich immer reise, / Zu Schiff und mit der Bahn, / Spricht man auf harte Weise / Ein fremd Kannitverstan. / Vom »allerhöchsten Kreise« / Hinab zum kleinsten Mann –”, with the totality of the rupture emphasized in her inability to communicate with anyone, neither a person of the highest circle nor der kleine Mann, the most average person. In her description of the languages of the Other, she creates an element of redundancy in her formulation “Ein fremd Kannitverstan9.” This redundancy, to the extent that it adds a further dimension to the foreignness of Kannitverstan, seemingly parallels Kaléko’s formulation of a further removed Third Space of Nirgendland. Kaléko’s exile poetry, a space without geographical location,

8 “Kein Kinderlied” first appeared in 1958 without the middle stanza. Here the poem is quoted with all three stanzas, as it was published on 24 May 1964 in Der Tagesspiegel (No. 5684) (Kommentar 119).
9 “Kannitverstan” is an allusion to the calendar story of the same name by Johann Peter Hebel, published in 1808 (Kommentar 119).
functions for her as a Third Space in which she interacts with the world, exploring affinities in an attempt to renegotiate a sense of belonging in that world.

5.4 Chapter Summary

Kaléko’s exile poetry conveys her unshakeable feeling of being fremd in the human world and her awareness that this persistent notion of Fremdheit is the result of the destabilizing influence of exile on her processes of identification. Kaléko’s sense of estrangement evidences itself in the frequent depictions in her work of the irretrievable loss of home through exile and the consequent tenuousness of the refugee’s belonging in the world. This loss of home is exacerbated by the reality that integration into a new time-space continuum is also impossible. Stranded between the simultaneous impossibilities of return home and arrival somewhere new, Kaléko formulates her existence in the space of the in-between Nirgendland. The analysis of this chapter evidences that it is in Kaléko’s exile poetry that Nirgendland materializes, a Third Space that provides her with a forum in which to interact with the world from which exile rendered her estranged and thereby attempt to renegotiate a sense of belonging in that world.
6 Conclusion

The analysis of this dissertation evidences that the experience of the refugee from the NS-regime, as manifest in select works of German exile literature of this period, was defined by his attempt to reconcile the incongruous yet simultaneous realities of legal invisibility and human embodiment. Through processes of legal erasure, the refugee is rendered stateless and thereby finds himself in a precarious in-between space, a *Niemandsland* in which the sub-dimensions of this experience in the in-between – the legal, physical and socio-cultural *Niemandsländer* of exile – overlap and coalesce. An analysis of the depiction of *Niemandsland* in select works of German exile literature of the NS-period serves in this dissertation as means to explore the question of how and to what extent the *Niemandsland* of exile affected the refugee’s sense of belonging and place in the world.

Wulf Koepke’s work on the perversion of time and space in exile, specifically his article, “On Time and Space in Exile – Past, Present and Future in a No-Man’s Land,” provides both an analytical foundation for the implications of exile for the refugee’s experience of time and space in the context of German exile literature of the NS-regime, as well as a point of departure for the analysis of this dissertation. Building on Koepke’s reference to *Niemandsland* in the title of his article, this dissertation evidences that the warped nature of time in exile, marked by the paradoxical simultaneity of rushed flight and indefinite waiting, is an integral aspect of the refugee’s experience in the in-between space of *Niemandsland*. As outlined in the introduction, the contribution of this dissertation lies in its pursuance of the question that Koepke implores his fellow scholars to answer in the conclusion of his article: “The legacy of the exiles has not yet been adequately understood, and it may just fade away in the turmoils of the ‘postmodern’ mentality of the 21st century. Yet the perception of time and space of the ‘exterritorial man’ is so close to the life and mind of the present age that it cannot and should not be ignored” (49).
analysis of select German autobiographical and literary works of the NS-period within a unified analytical framework evidences that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world.

The four chapters of this dissertation explore the varying implications of legal erasure and statelessness for the refugee’s sense of belonging in the world within the theoretical framework of Jenkins’ tripartite model of identity, in which the individual, interaction and institutional orders engage one another in a continual and dynamic process which Jenkins terms the internal-external dialectic of identification. Chapter One provides the relevant historical foundation necessary for an analysis in the subsequent three chapters focused on the implications of processes of legal erasure and statelessness for the refugee on the level of the institutional order. Its discussion evidences that the refugee of the NS-period faced innumerable challenges in his pursuit of the legal right to exist, which was complicated by the political and socio-economic factors of the period 1933-1945. The NS-regime economically and socially isolated those individuals whom it perceived to be racially or ideologically incongruent with its interpretation of the German Geist. German Jews thus became a target for eradication under the NS-regime, despite the fact that prior to Hitler’s rise to power, German Jews were well integrated into German society and enjoyed financial and social success. Many Jews belonged to the educated middle-class and were professionals and business owners. When it became apparent through NS-legislation that the Jews were a target for eradication, they joined the thousands of German political refugees who fled abroad. Few realized that the NS-regime would remain in power as long as it did, however, and many Jews initially remained in Germany. The great restrictions on the ability of refugees to transfer capital abroad further prevented some trying to emigrate. As
the 1930s developed, however, it became evident that the situation in NS-Germany was deteriorating as Hitler amassed power, and as refugees tried to flee with what little resources they had, few nations were willing or able to provide them with the asylum that they needed. As evident in the proceedings of the League of Nations and the failed High Commission for refugees, no nation took the lead in solving the refugee crisis, which contributed to the comprehensive failure of the international community to intervene on behalf of refugees from the NS-regime. Nations were primarily concerned with their own interests, and the unemployment of the world-wide economic depression of the 1930s was a domestic issue that affected many nations, who were not able to economically absorb the middle-class German refugees. Further, in the 1930s many nations did not want to provoke Germany, and thus the source of the refugee crisis was never dealt with. Nevertheless, refugees of the NS-regime flooded consulates in an attempt to secure for themselves a legally-sanctioned space in the world.

Chapter Two, a case-study of Egon Schwarz’s autobiography *Keine Zeit für Eichendorff*, serves to provide insight into the irreparable rupture that exile represents for the refugee on the level of the institutional order. Schwarz’s exile experience was defined by numerous ruptures in the institutional order of the internal-external dialectic of identification, and his experiences in legal, geographical and socio-historical *Niemandsländer* indelibly affected his worldview. The process of legal deletion that Schwarz experienced as a refugee is among the most inhumane which human societies over the course of history have ever devised, and its impact on the processes of his identity formation are evident. Schwarz expresses that since exile, his sense of belonging in the world has remained tenuous, underscored by the notion that at any given moment, his world can be irreconcilably altered by over-arching socio-historical and -political forces over which he has no control. Schwarz’s experience in *Niemandsland* left him with the unshakable notion that any sense of belonging is fundamentally tenuous, and all rights,
possessions and identities associated with the belonging to a given place at a given time can suddenly be taken away by the greater historical forces to which one is subject. It is demonstrated that the constant of the *Niemandsland* that dominates Schwarz’s experience in the world is, ironically, where his sense of belonging in the world lies.

Chapter Three focuses on the legal dimension of *Niemandsland*, specifically how statelessness affects the individual’s sense of belonging to the national community from which he has been legally expunged. The incongruity between legal erasure and the linguistic, cultural and historical ties that endure between the stateless individual and his national community of origin is discussed relative to an analysis of excerpts of select works of German exile literature. The selected works are representative of the diversity of German writers’ responses to the experience of statelessness in exile from the NS-regime across several genres. The tendency of German exile writers of the NS-period to depict a latent paradox inherent in statelessness is interpreted as a means through which to deconstruct nation-based identities and thereby call into question the capacity of a government to strip an individual of an identity. The contribution of this chapter lies in its discussion of the selected works within a unified analytical framework informed by the concept of exile as an in-between space where legal, physical and socio-cultural *Niemandsländer* intersect.

Chapter Four explores Mascha Kaléko’s formulation of the in-between space of exile in her exile poetry, in which exile represents a perpetual journey through *Nirgendland*. Through an analysis of the centrality of *Nirgendland* to Kaléko’s depiction of exile, it is evident that exile represented for her the irretrievable loss of home, a loss exacerbated by the simultaneous impossibility of reconstructing that sense of home in a new place representative of a new institutional order. The analysis focuses on Kaléko’s attempts to negotiate a sense of belonging and connection to the world from the space in-between the simultaneous impossibilities of a
return home and an arrival somewhere new. In turn, Kaléko’s exile poetry is interpreted as the medium through which her notion of Nirgendland materializes into a Third Space that provides her with a forum in which to attempt to renegotiate the sense of belonging in that world that she lost through exile.

The findings of this dissertation prove that the existence of the refugee in the space of the in-between, the space in which the legal, physical and socio-cultural Niemandsländer of exile overlap and coalesce, has profound implications for the refugee’s notions of identity, of his sense of belonging and place in the world. The greater implications and relevance of such findings are evident if one reconsiders Dorothy Thompson’s distillation in 1938 of the refugee crisis: “It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times, that for thousands and thousands of people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and death, and that scores of people have blown their brains out because they could not get it” (Dwork and van Pelt28). Thompson underscores here the paradox latent in statelessness, evident in the necessity for the refugee to reconcile the incongruous yet simultaneous realities of legal invisibility and human embodiment to survive. The precariousness of the refugee’s existence in the in-between space of statelessness is an issue of obvious yet profound relevance for the current world of the 21st century, validating Koepke’s imperative to continually seek to understand the situation of the extraterritorial man.
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