THE NATION AND PRESIDENT GRANT

by

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16 August 1929
Date
I wish to express my thanks to Professor James C. Malin of the University of Kansas for his suggestions and guidance in the preparation of this thesis.

Mary L. Bertschinger.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter I. The Nation</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Its Editor</td>
<td>1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Its History</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter II. Attitude toward Grant's Civil Service Reform</th>
<th>12-21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preadministration Position</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Grant's Cabinet</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Signs of Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Civil Service Reform Commission</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Commission under Eaton</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter III. Attitude toward Currency Situation</th>
<th>22-28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Boutwell and Richardson</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inflation Fight</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Grant's Veto</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter IV. Attitude toward Louisiana Situation</th>
<th>29-36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Situation before 1872</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Interference</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Proposed Election and Compromise</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter V. Attitude toward Santo Domingo Affair</th>
<th>37-43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beginning of Annexation Scheme</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Treaty before the Senate</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Santo Domingo Commission</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. End of Scheme</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter VI. Attitude toward Indian Affairs</th>
<th>44-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government's Indian Policy</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Grant's Indian Program</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Red Cloud Treaty</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter VII. Attitude toward other Irregularities

1. Gold Ring
2. Law Violations
3. Salary Grab
4. District of Columbia
5. Belknap Case

Chapter VIII. Attitude toward another Term

1. Campaign of 1872
2. Third Term Boom of 1876
3. Third Term Boom of 1880

Footnotes

Bibliography
CHAPTER I.

THE NATION.

Edwin Lawrence Godkin, "an Irishman, English in blood," was born October 2, 1851, at Moyne, County Wicklow, Ireland. His mother's family belonged to the Cromwellian settlers of repute and property. His father, James Godkin, was in all probability a descendant of a small colony of Englishmen who settled in the twelfth century on the coast of Wexford, because the name of Godkin was found among them. James Godkin was a Presbyterian clergyman, devoted to the Young Ireland movement. He was the author of "Repeat Essays" which were prize essays. He won the prize but lost his pulpit. The national party came to his assistance and he identified himself till his death with the cause of Home Rule for Ireland. He became the editor of the Londonderry Standard and later of the Dublin Daily. He was an Irish correspondent to the London Times. His biographer says that, "Thus the original sin of journalism was fairly in the blood."

Edwin was a precocious, delicate child and learned to read at home. Before he was six he had read many books. When he was seven he entered a preparatory school at Armagh, his father's home. At the age of ten his father took him to England and placed him in Silcoates School at Wakefield, near Leeds. Edwin soon became a pleader in one of the school courts and an editor of one of the school newspapers. Thus he showed an early interest in those fields of work. In 1846, he entered Queen's College, Belfast. He was the first president of a
literary and scientific society organized by the college. During his attendance the first scholarships were granted and he secured one in law. He and a number of the other young men were Liberals in the English sense. John Stuart Mills was their prophet, Grote and Bentham their daily food and America their promised land. A description of him, when he took his degree in 1851, is given in a letter by his sister: "My childish recollection of my big brother at this period is that he was a very handsome, refined, delicate-looking young man—witty, brilliant, charming, proud with a fiery temper but lovable and affectionate."

In 1851, Godkin went to London to study law in Lincoln's Inn. He entered with zeal into the political agitations of the time. As a boy in Ireland, he had read the London Nation, edited by Gavan Duffy, Thomas Davis and John B. Dillon. He used to expound its doctrines to the neighbors and tenants of the Lawrences. In London he secured employment with the Cassells and wrote for their magazine.

On July 29, 1859, Godkin was married to Frances Elizabeth Foote, a refined and cultured woman, of New Haven. Their home was a happy one. It was endeared to many friends because of the social graces of both Mr. and Mrs. Godkin. There were three children, a son born May 31, 1860, a daughter born in 1865 and another son who died in infancy. The daughter died in 1873 and Mrs. Godkin never fully recovered her spirits and health and passed away in 1875. Only devotion to his work and his responsibilities to others kept Godkin in motion.
On June 14, 1884 he was married to Katherine Sands.

In 1853, Godkin was sent to Turkey as a special correspondent by the London Daily News during the Crimean War. This gave him a realistic view of foreign lands and people afterwards helpful in making his writings vivid. He said that he secured the appointment as the result of a letter to the Daily News advocating the claims of the Greeks to Constantinople although he knew nothing either about Greece, the Greeks or Constantinople. It was chiefly his facility in composition that secured the appointment.

Godkin was a moderate optimist and expected the world to grow better by degrees. He came to America because he believed he should find "more progress secured and more of further progress in prospect than any European country could show." He looked upon America as a living demonstration of the democratic principles of government which were bred in the bone. He landed in New York, November 1856, on the eve of a presidential election. He attended a political meeting in Tammany Hall and listened to a Southern Senator denounce the Northern abolitionists. His preconceived notions of senatorial dignity received a great shock from this. From December 6, 1856 to April 7, 1857, he spent in the Southern States. He went partly as an observant traveler and partly as a business representative of Neill Bros. to get information about the cotton crop. He made the journey on horseback and in reports sent to the London Daily News described conditions in the South during the troublous days preceding the Civil War.
There was no great issue in the discussion of which Mr. Godkin did not take a part. A tracing of the course he took in United States politics would be almost equal to an outline of United States history for about forty years beginning with 1860. He began an early attack on the spoils system and a demand for reform of the civil service. This brought him in conflict with Tammany Hall. In 1890, he began a hard fight by preparing a series of biographical sketches of many of the leaders showing their criminal and semi-criminal record. He defined Tammany as an association for plunder and not a political party. He was charged with criminal libel and arrested again and again but to the humiliation of Tammany the cases were always dismissed. The arrests were frequently made on Sunday morning as no bail could be secured then, and they could keep him in jail for a short period at least. In 1892, as well as in 1890. Tammany was successful in the New York city elections but its defeat in 1894, was reported as greatly due to Godkin's work. This caused great rejoicing and due recognition of Godkin's service came from various quarters. Wayne MacVeagh, in writing from Rome, February 5, 1895, to E. R. Robinson about the New York victory said, "Godkin has been the best force by far in American politics for the last thirty years and Christian civilization in America owes more to him than to any dozen of men I have known." Letters from friends including James Bryce, England, came to him congratulating him for his courage in stemming the evil tide and making for
good government not only in New York but United States generally.

From the beginning Mr. Godkin was the enemy of the "machine" and the "boss". He opposed the protective policy of the United States and supported Cleveland in 1884, 1888 and in 1892. He took part in the rejoicing in New York because of the 1892 election. For this Theodore Roosevelt criticised him severely in a letter to H. C. Lodge, Nov. 16, 1892, in which he said, "I read an article in the New York Nation. the other day so foolish, so malignant, so deliberately mendacious and so exultant that it fairly made me writhe to think of the incalculable harm to decency that scoundrelly paper edited by its scoundrelly chief Godkin has done."

Mr. Godkin's intention on coming to America was to practise at the American bar. He began his legal studies in New York in the office of David D. Field and was admitted to the New York bar February 6, 1858. He did not practise much because his health was poor and his interests lay more in journalism and politics. James Bryce in a biographical sketch of Mr. Godkin said that the great experience he had gained of the world in his travels abroad and wide reading and stock of positive principles fitted him for a weekly or daily public writer. He believed Godkin had a mind that thought logically and reasoned systematically. He considered his style as pungent, clearcut and to the point, and the sense of humor used to detect tricks and expose shams was frequently ironical and the irony so fine as to be mistaken for seriousness.
When a grouchy request came to have the Nation stopped, he would meet the grumbler with an explanation that it would be a great pleasure to send the paper free where he plainly saw it was so badly needed. He took great delight in "Journalistic rows" and especially when he was the object of the attack. After reading all the hard things said about him, he would say, fairly shaking with pleasure, "What a delightful lot they are! We must stir them again." This unfailing sense of humor kept him perpetually young.

On February 7, 1900, Mr. Godkin was taken suddenly ill while working on his reminiscences. Symptoms of cerebral hemorrhage showed themselves. After a long sickness he recovered slowly. In May 1901, he and Mrs. Godkin made their last trip to England. The end came to him painlessly at Greenway May 21, 1902. He was buried in the old churchyard at Hazelbeach, England. In 1903, a lectureship in Harvard University was endowed by his friends as a memorial to him. $12,000 secured by subscription was turned over to the University with the sole proviso that, "the income be used in providing for the delivery and publication of lectures upon 'The Essentials of Free Government and the Duties of the Citizen', or upon some part of that subject, such lectures to be called 'The Godkin Lectures', and of which there shall be at least one in every year." The trust was accepted by the University and James Bryce was the first lecturer, October 24, 1904.

For a long time Mr. Godkin felt the need of a high-grade weekly in America. He knew there were thinkers and writers
in America equal to the best in Europe. He believed the educated men were not fairly represented in the periodical press, that the daily newspapers were hurried, partisan, clamorous, interested and that the weekly papers were narrowly denominational or else gushing, superficial, inadequate. The great question was, how could the culture and sound judgment be given a fit voice. He often talked and debated this with his friends and especially with Professor Charles E. Norton of Harvard, and Frederic Law Olmsted, a landscape gardener on Staten Island.

On August 2, 1863, Olmsted wrote to Godkin from New York, in regard to a plan he had for such a paper. It was started just before the Battle of Gettysburg and provided for the raising of $15,000 in New York and $15,000 elsewhere by subscription. The money was to be held by trustees and be paid to Olmsted's orders unconditionally. He was to undertake the establishment and maintenance of a weekly paper for two years and if successful, he would pay back the subscribers with interest and if a failure he would not owe them anything. Olmsted was to be responsible for the entire paper. Soon after this he went to California to manage a mining enterprise but before he left he persuaded Godkin to undertake the editorship and turned the whole affair over to him. February 24, 1864, Godkin wrote to Olmsted that he had not been able to secure the funds and a rival paper the Round Table put out by the Sweetzer Bros. who had strong financial backing had appeared. It was not the type paper he had planned, however.
On May 5, 1865, Mr. Godkin wrote to Olmsted that the paper was assured at last and would probably be started July 1, 1865. A new and powerful ally, James Miller McKim of Philadelphia had appeared. He was an abolitionist.

Godkin, McKim and Norton had joined forces and formed a joint stock company with $100,000 capital. The editorship was first offered to George W. Curtis through the influence of George L. Stearns the largest individual stockholder. When Curtis refused it was offered to Whitelaw Reid. On his refusal E. L. Godkin was engaged. Wendell Phillips Garrison, a Harvard graduate and literary editor of the Independent, became its publisher. Godkin's salary was $5,000 a year with 12 per cent of the profits after a payment of 6 per cent on the stocks. July 5, 1865, Godkin wrote to Norton as follows:

"No. I is afloat, and the tranquillity which still reigns in this city, under the circumstances amazes me. The verdict here seems favorable."

The publishers prospectus ran as follows:

"The Nation
A Weekly Journal of Politics, Literature, Science and Art will be Published July 6, 1865.

Terms:—Three Dollars per annum, in advance; Six Months, Two Dollars.

Its Main Object Will Be

First. — The discussion of the topics of the day and above all of legal, economical and constitutional questions, with greater accuracy and moderation than are now to be found in the daily press.

Second. — The maintenance and diffusion of true democratic principles in society and government, and the advocacy and illustration of whatever in legislation as in manners seem
likely to promote a more equal distribution of the fruits of progress and civilization.

Third.— The earnest and persistent consideration of the conditions of the laboring class at the South, as a matter of vital interest to the nation at large, with a view to the removal of all artificial distinctions between them and the rest of the population, and the securing to them as far as education and justice can do it, an equal chance in the race of life.

Fourth.— The enforcement and illustration of the doctrine that the whole community has the strongest interest, both moral, political, and material, in their elevation, and that there can be no real stability for the Republic so long as they are left in ignorance and degradation.

Fifth.— The fixing of public attention upon the political importance of popular education and the dangers which a system like ours runs from the neglect of it in any portion of our territory.

Sixth.— The collection and diffusion of trustworthy information as to the condition and prospects of the Southern States, the openings they offer to capital, the supply and kind of labor which can be obtained in them, and the progress made by the colored population in acquiring the habits and desire of civilized life.

Seventh.— Sound and impartial criticism of books and works of art.

The Nation will not be the organ of any party, sect or body. It will on the contrary, make an earnest effort to bring to the discussion of political and social questions a really critical spirit, and to wage war upon vices or violence, exaggeration, and misrepresentation by which so much of the political writing of the day is marred."

The Nation from its first publication was patterned upon the London Spectator. It did well and by the third number a 5,000 circulation had been reached and it was still growing. It passed through various struggles. Misunderstandings among the stock-holders added to its difficulties. Not all the stock-holders conceded to the absolute independence which Mr. Godkin had insisted upon before becoming editor. He threw himself into the work unsparingly. Various
plans were tried. In the second volume the experiment was tried during May and June to make it a semi-weekly. At the end of the first year nearly all the capital had been drawn upon. Virtual liquidation followed. A few stockholders stood by Godkin who took over the property and instead of the Nation Association, the proprietors were there after E. L. Godkin and Company. The prejudice against Godkin of being foreign-born was one of the hard obstacles to overcome. The charge was often made that he was "and Englishman," a charge to which he was rather sensitive. In 1881, Godkin sold the Nation to Henry Villard and Horace White who held a controlling interest in the New York Evening Post an old and respectable paper but with small circulation. The Nation continued to appear but practically as a weekly edition of the Evening Post or rather as some one said, "The Evening Post became a daily edition of the Nation for the tone and spirit that characterized the Nation now pervaded the Post." Godkin remained with the Nation. The Nation never had a large circulation but it was read by two classes of people who have most to do with shaping the political and economical opinions—the editors and university teachers. Through these Godkin's views filtered down to the educated class and affected its opinions. He instructed and stimulated the men who instructed and stimulated the rest of the people. Because of poor health Mr. Godkin resigned from the editorship January 1, 1900. He continued to contribute occasional articles to it.
Recognition and praise for the Nation came immediately from various quarters. The Trübner's American and Oriental Literary Record, September 21, 1856, said, "The Nation now in publication in New York, is without exception, the best newspaper we have seen yet from America." J. R. Lowell said that Mr. Godkin had made himself "a Power" in the Nation. Emerson who was cold at first soon praised it for its "excellence and superiority", over any other journal. George W. Curtis considered it a "great influence and sanitary element in American affairs." Francis Parkman considered it as the most valuable of all American Journals. Bryce considered it the best weekly not only in America but in the world. Politicians recognized its influence and power. On June 23, 1872, Carl Schurz wrote to Godkin in the interest of the Greeley election asking him to suspend his final judgment for a little while on Greeley and said, "the influence of the Nation is so great and valuable that it ought not to redound to Grant's benefit as long as on the other side the possibilities are not all exhausted." Professor Norton in writing to Mr. Godkin, July 6, 1866, in answer to a letter of Godkin in which he had ascribed the success of the Nation to Professor Norton, said, "You are the making of the paper more than I ever hoped it could be. And after all, You are the Nation; without you it is not worth supporting."
CHAPTER II

ATTITUDE TOWARD GRANT'S CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

E. L. Godkin had not been long in the United States before he felt that what was most needed was a reform in the civil service. He was invited to a breakfast given by Henry Adams who was then spending the winter of 1860-1861 in Washington. There Mr. Godkin met a number of friends of reform including some Congressmen to whom he explained the meaning of civil service reform. He found an ally in Thomas A. Jenckes, United States Representative from Rhode Island, who became its champion in Congress. To introduce the subject favorably in New York Godkin with the help of Henry Villard, secretary of the Social Science Association, secured Mr. Jenckes to lecture. Civil service reform was one of the big subjects if not the big one taken up by the Nation during the more than thirty years of Mr. Godkin's editorship. Godkin threw himself into the work of exposing the spoils system in American politics and preached against it with infinite resources of argument and illustrations. Year after year he pushed civil service reform in the Nation and labored for it through organizations, correspondence and political appeal.

No sooner had the Republican Convention met in Chicago May 20, 1868 and nominated U. S. Grant for President than the Nation, a non-partisan paper but considered by men like Carl Schurz a great power and influence in shaping political opinion, began to trace out in Grant's character the qualifications characteristic of a President. This periodical noted
an absence of enthusiasm during the campaign; a matter of much concern to many good Republicans. It admitted that Grant did not have magnetism, that he was not a spectacular candidate but he was a silent, methodical man as George Washington had been; that he showed his honesty and good sense in avoiding all the "theatrical apparatus" so often used to excite enthusiasm; that he was honest in business as was illustrated by his refusal to give any special favors to the Mack Brothers, a cotton firm, even after his father had asked for it in a letter of introduction. One of the campaign stories circulated by the opposition party was that Grant was a frightful drunkard. The Nation branded this as a "rebel lie" and contradicted it by using a Western editor's statement that "Grant's complexion was beautifully fresh." E. L. Godkin, editor, of the Nation said that the expression of Grant's face revealed a man of firmness, self-possession and greatness of soul. During the Vicksburg campaign, 1863, General W. T. Sherman, Grant's most trustworthy friend, and President Lincoln differed with him concerning campaign plans, and the press was strong in declaring him incompetent. In this situation the Nation insisted that Grant's moral courage helped him to stand firm and silent and after the capture of Vicksburg to hand back Sherman's resignation which he had given to Grant when the difference arose.

The Nation was optimistic and expected great things from Grant's administration. The first of these was that Grant
and Schuyler Colfax, the candidate for Vice-president, would be free from party influence and "claims of localities", because they owed their nomination to their own qualities and careers. Grant, in addition, enjoyed the singular distinction of having been selected without ever having made a speech. Another cause for this optimism was that, while "Grant in the White House" would not mean an end to all the troubles in the South, it would mean a great reduction of them. It was further anticipated by the Nation that Grant's ability to judge men as shown by his army administration, would result in the selection of a cabinet in which knowledge and ability counted for more than "claims of localities."

This hope was strengthened by the fact that he favored the principles of Jenckes' reform bill. It was reported before February 11, 1869, that Grant had ordered an officer to burn the office-seeking letters and had made it clear that he would select the man he wanted. This circumstance led the Nation to conclude that he would not be a "mere puppet" in the hands of the party managers and while it conceded that he would not root out all political influences from the administration it fully expected that he would remove his administration from the corrupt influences. It was reported further that he had refused to permit the party managers to name a Pennsylvania citizen as a cabinet member who was to advise him and to let the "Ring" know how affairs were going. The Nation saw two facts revealed by this course; first, that the fears were groundless that Grant would not be equal to
the onslaughts of the party managers; second, that he would try to create in the government something of a real responsibility to the people; the lack of which was considered the cause of much corruption and disorder.

Free expression was made by the Nation on Grant's cabinet appointments. It considered that of Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois, a personal friend of Grant, to the State Department, a greater disappointment to Grant's friends than to his enemies, for it felt that, while Washburne was a very able, useful man, he had only a general knowledge of foreign affairs and it had hoped that some one who had a clear understanding of the controversies between the United States and foreign nations and knew the rules and precedents by which the controversies are settled, would be appointed. But since the State Department stands in such close relation to the President, it was explained by the Nation that General Grant probably wished someone to give him useful hints and helps while getting started and the appointment was only temporary anyway. A. F. Stewart an honest, painstaking business man of New York was Grant's selection for Secretary of the Treasury. This was another disappointment to the Nation which had hoped for a scientific economist like David A. Wells, but felt reasonably thankful because he was successful business man. The appointment of Judge E. R. Hoar of Massachusetts as Attorney General was the only one to which it did not make any objection. It thought that the appointment of Jacob D. Cox of Ohio to the Interior Department meant future trouble
for the Indian Ring. On March 18, 1869, the general feeling expressed about Grant's Cabinet was that it was a strong one—the best that could be formed out of the available material. Mr. Godkin hoped that Grant would infuse enough of his spirit into the heads of the Treasury and Post-office Departments so as to make them give up the old party rule in making and filling vacancies. The appointment of General W. W. Belknap of Iowa, as Secretary of War, October 1869, was one that the Nation thought would satisfy the average voter. This conviction was illustrated by a story, that Belknap, when he was Collector of Internal Revenue in an Iowa district, told a certain Mr. Hudson, a relative of Grant, when approached on the subject of disposing the patronage in his hands, "to go about his business." After Washburne had been in office about two weeks he was removed and made minister to France. The Nation said it was difficult to see what qualifications he had for that position, but it considered the new appointee, Hamilton Fish of New York, a skillful, experienced man and his appointment as generally satisfactory. The replacement of Stewart as Secretary of the Treasury by George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts was an indication, to Mr. Godkin, that Grant was coming under the influence of the politicians because Boutwell was the politicians choice and formed the point of contact between the administration and the extreme wing of the Republican party. Godkin could not see how a real reform in government was possible under the political system then existing and felt that more than a change in administration was needed to stop corruption.
In May 1869, the Chicago Tribune criticised Grant's administration because it had no statesmen in the cabinet except Boutwell. The Nation answered that Fish's stand on the Cuban situation proved his diplomatic ability and Judge Hoar's services as the best judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Bench proved his judicial ability, and it asked that Grant be given at least a six month trial before he be criticised. The Republican party was in a sorry plight in 1868. The Reconstruction work was hard and Johnson's impeachment had damaged party reputation. The general expectation was that Grant would redeem the party but according to the Nation's opinion, June 17, 1869, the history of his administration thus far, was not such as to give the party a new hold on popular confidence because hack politicians, especially in Pennsylvania, were beginning to cast about for means to stir up popular enthusiasm and to get a new lease of power.

The Nation believed that the first real signs of dissatisfaction with Grant came from his appointments outside the cabinet. Among the first of this kind was that of James M. Ashley of Ohio, as Governor of the Territory of Montana. While on the Committee of Territories he had entered into a formal partnership with the speculators to furnish them information and then to share in the profits, and for this reason, the Nation looked on his appointment as a great scandal. It considered that of General Daniel E. Sickles, as Minister to Spain, in the same class. At a public reception given him by his friends, many "inside politics" men
were present but also a few very good ones. The latter, as was the belief of the Nation, were probably intended as a formal ratification of the appointment which the Senate was to confirm. Up to the out-break of the Civil War, General Sickles was one of the lowest order of New York politicians. He entered military service as a refuge from disgrace. The Nation gave him credit for rendering good military service but doubted if it was good enough to entitle him to extraordinary distinction or to any of the more valuable offices in the hands of the President, and considered his selection as nothing short of an insult to the multitude of men who had served their country from purer motives, whose characters were unspotted and whose qualifications were at least as good. In July 1870, Grant appointed Thomas Murphy as Collector of the Custom-house in New York. The Nation regarded him a very questionable appointee because he was reported to have made much money during the war out of army contracts, and he had voted with Tammany Ring for the New York charter and had been a Tweed Commissioner in the "Broadway Widening" swindle. The fact that the Senate, after listening nearly three hours to speeches to show that Tom was a traitor to his party, a swindling contractor and a thief, confirmed the appointment by a vote of forty-eight to three, convinced it that the hopes for a reform in the civil service expected from Grant's administration were groundless. Changes in the city government in New York after the election in November 1871, caused Murphy to send in his resignation which
Grant accepted with profuse expressions of esteem and confidence. The Nation thought that perhaps these were due to Murphey but it was fully convinced that it would have been far better for Grant's reputation if he had refrained from offering them. It also thought that it would have been more creditable to Grant if he had remained in the White House and worked for the improvement of the whole system of reform instead of meeting so often with the Senate concerning appointments and bargaining with a body that would reject the nomination of Judge Hoar to the Justiceship and confirm that of Sickles as Minister to Spain. It voiced a warning that the public mind was beginning to think on these things. Godkin charged Grant as being guilty of committing a serious blunder when he gave free play to the influences that forced Cox to resign from the Interior Department in October 1870 but believed it was not too late, even then, for the President to retrace his steps and to retain the confidence and respect of honest men "outside of politics." Cox resigned because, as he said, he was not supported by the President in the reforms which he had introduced into the Department.

The Nation expressed considerable surprise when the forty-first Congress at the close of its last session, tacked on to an Appropriation Bill an authorization to the President to prescribe rules and regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service. But the President's inactivity for three months caused it to become doubtful about his sincerity in a reform program. This doubt was partly removed
when he appointed June 1871, a Civil Service Commission composed of G. W. Curtis, Alexander G. Cattell, D. C. Cox, E. B. Elliott and Joseph H. Blackman. Curtis who had been a warm and able advocate of the movement was made chairman. The reports from Washington concerning the President's enthusiasm in the cause of civil service reform did not excite the Nation because it considered his way of displaying zeal as rather peculiar and in view of all that had happened believed it wise to keep its judgment in suspense. In December 1871, the President announced that the Commission's rules had been adopted and would go into effect January 1, 1872. The Nation's belief was that perhaps enough reform would be carried on to make political capital out of it but not enough to displease the politicians. In March 1873, Grant re-appointed James F. Casey, his brother-in-law, as Collector of the Port of New Orleans. Casey had recently employed the United States Revenue Cutter for twelve days in carrying a number of State Senators up and down the river to protect them from arrest by the sergeant-at-arms and prevent him from compelling their attendance at the legislature. The re-appointment coming after such an adventure caused the Nation to come out in an article in which it expressed its belief that the President looked upon his re-election as an absolute pardon of his past offences and a full indulgence with regard to the future. After Casey's re-appointment, Curtis resigned from the Civil Service Commission because it seemed clear to him that the President was disregarding both the letter and the spirit of civil
Dorman B. Eaton of New York was appointed to succeed Curtis. The *Nation* considered this a good selection, one that would undoubtedly furnish strong proof of the President's sincerity if he had not failed so many times to carry out the spirit of the rules. In April 1874, Eaton reported the work of the Commission as a success, and that the President and each cabinet officer were in favor of it. Eaton's exhortations throughout the report that every one stand by the President and not lose faith in the soldier statesman, brought forth considerable ridicule from the press. The concluding opinion of the *Nation* was that as far as minor offices were concerned the President and the heads of the departments favored it, because it took disagreeable work off their hands; but as far as the more important offices were concerned, they were almost openly hostile to it because it took power away from them.
ATTITUDE TOWARD CURRENCY SITUATION.

Judging from the consideration given to the currency situation, one is reasonably safe in saying it was the second great question with which the Nation concerned itself during Grant's administration. The Nation was not very enthusiastic over Boutwell's appointment as Secretary of the Treasury because it believed he was put in by the politicians when they caught Grant off guard. It estimated that neither Boutwell's individual antecedents nor the characteristics of his political friends were such as to lead one to expect any constructive work from the department, but after four year's experience of his financial administration it admitted that his business-like management of the office was an agreeable disappointment and that he was entitled to sincere commendation. It said that his plan of announcing every important operation a reasonable time in advance, so the public could know what the transactions for each month would be and could arrange its business accordingly was good. In October 1872, various Republican newspapers published a number of money articles concerning a rumor that the Secretary of the Treasury intended to re-issue some four or five millions greenbacks which Hugh McCulloh, Secretary of the Treasury under President Johnson had retired. The Nation believed that the only advice Mr. Boutwell had taken about the legality of his $5,000,000 greenbacks issue of October 1872, came from these articles. It considered that his act was so grave as to involve a total change of policy on the part of the Govern-
ment in regard to currency; a substitution of the policy of expansion for that of contraction, and it insisted that Congress was the only body which could give an authoritative construction to the laws under which contraction was made.

The Nation in explaining the currency situation said that it believed that Congress in passing the Act of February 5, 1862, authorizing the issue of $150,000,000 Treasury Notes and the supplementary Act of July 11, 1862, authorizing the issue of another $150,000,000 and the Act of June 30, 1864, restricting the amount of paper money to $400,000,000 had one object in view—to raise money and that, since these promises to pay were constantly coming back into the Treasury, it was necessary that they be reissued, otherwise they would have lost their value as currency. It continued to say that it believed that Congress in passing the Act of April 12, 1866, and Act of February 4, 1868, providing for the reduction of the currency might have intended to leave the question of expansion open to a reissue of its own, but since nothing was said about expansion although the cry for expansion at that time was great, it believed Congress intended to adopt a permanent policy of contraction.

The Nation asserted that Boutwell's act of taking advantage of a doubtful and perhaps non-existing power and of flooding the country with a currency everybody supposed was gotten rid of, was a monstrous and reckless abuse of authority. When Mr. Boutwell appeared in the House in December 1872, to explain his conduct, the Nation said it suspected that Judge Wm. A. Richardson, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was
really the one responsible for the issue of the $5,000,000. Mr. Boutwell said that he based his authority on two decisions of the Supreme Court that the Acts of 1862 and 1864 contemplated a permanent circulation of $400,000,000 until resumption of specie payment. The Nation said it was not able to understand where Mr. Boutwell got his authority to say that the judgment of the Supreme Court on the intent of an act passed in 1862 deprived acts passed in 1866 and 1868 of their force; acts that were neither contradictory nor unconstitutional, and it asserted that his defense would permit him and all his subordinates the liberty of exercising a power that had never been conferred on a single man in any free country. Mr. Boutwell and Mr. Richardson appeared before the Senate Finance Committee and attempted to persuade it that they had the right to reissue the $44,000,000 greenbacks. The Committee acquitted them but condemned their act. The Nation in commenting on this decision said that its great objection to paper money was the uncertainty about its value, and it believed that this uncertainty was increased if the power of expanding and contracting its volume is placed in the hands of one single man.

In March 1873, Mr. Richardson was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. The Nation expressed itself as being unable to recall that he had ever given any evidence of any ability in any department, but it did recall that he firmly believed that the Secretary of the Treasury had the right to expand the currency of the country to the extent of $44,000,000.
in his own discretion. It believed that the President in making the appointment disregarded not only the opinion of the Senate Committee but also public opinion and adopted Richardson's doctrine. The September 25, 1873 issue of the Nation considered Grant and his secretary worthy of praise for their firm refusal to make any issue of the reserve and their frank admission that it was contrary to law, but when Richardson issued $2,000,000 of the reserve two weeks later it declared the refusal "to violate the law" a display of unscrupulousness; a little comedy staged by the President and his secretary to delude the public. Grant made his views on the financial situation public through the Associated Press. Mr. Godkin interpreted these views to mean that Grant considered the panic of 1873 different from former panics, because in the former there was a distrust of the currency and everybody wanted gold; in the 1873 panic there was no distrust of currency and everybody wanted more of it; that he considered passing events as the first steps leading to resumption; that he thought a greater use of silver could be made; that he believed he would recommend the reissue of the $44,000,000 reserve if Congress were in session; that he believed interest paying on deposits should be prohibited. Godkin supposed that Grant probably would recommend a post-office bank to pay four per cent on deposits which were to be converted into Government bonds, but he was sorry that the President injured his well-deserved reputation for good common sense by his utterances on financial and
commercial questions, and he believed that the public did not like to see a man of his ideas and views connected with the Treasury.

During the week ending January 22, 1874, the House made an unsuccessful attempt to commit its members to inflation. In February, the inflationists in the Senate carried a vote to increase the National bank currency to $400,000,000. The Nation concluded from this that the Senate was in favor of more money of some kind but hardly knew how to get it. On March 23, 1874, the House passed a bill by a vote of one hundred seventy-one to seventy declaring the limit of green-back circulation to be $400,000,000, or authorizing the issue of the whole $44,000,000 reserve. The Senate soon followed by a vote to strike out from the Sherman Bill the provision looking toward specie payment. The act led the Nation to conclude that the Senate was given over completely to inflation. By April 9, 1874, the Senate had perfected an $800,000,000 inflation bill, with a maximum amount of United States notes fixed at $400,000,000 and the amount of National bank notes fixed at $46,000,000. The Nation thought that because the President too seemed committed to the theory that $400,000,000 was the proper amount of legal-tender currency, the chances of the President using his veto on the inflation bill were very small. The anti-inflationists led in the Senate by such men as Carl Schurz and John Sherman and in the House by men as Cox and James Garfield put up a hard but apparently hopeless fight against the bill. There
was great consternation among the inflationists when they discovered that the Senate Bill by requiring three-fourths of the bank reserves be kept at home, would really cause immediate contraction equal or nearly equal to the amount of the new circulation. Godkin considered this a sad spectacle and said that the inflationists were like a parcel of savages playing tricks with a steam engine but really not knowing what they were doing. The Senate Currency Bill passed the House and was sent to the President who returned it to the Senate April 22, 1874, with his regret that he could not give his assent to it.

The Nation received his message with enthusiasm, and believed he had made himself clear on his financial policy when he said that in his opinion inflation was a departure from the true principles of finance, the national interests, the national obligations to creditors, the Congressional promises, the district party pledges, and his own personal views and promises advanced by him in every annual message to Congress and in each inaugural address. The President issued a memorandum in which he gave his views on desirable finance legislation. He favored a return to specie payment, an adequate plan for doing it, a definite time for accomplishing it and an adherence to it. The Nation in voicing its approval stated what it considered as results of the veto: a revelation of the President's great power over legislation when the parties are closely divided as they were on the currency question and the arousal of the President into taking an active position on the question
and by so doing revealing to himself a source of strength and popularity he scarcely knew he had. His financial views as given in the Memorandum were considered in the main, sound but the belief of the Nation was that they should have been given June 4, 1869, instead June 4, 1874, because if given then the country might be back on a specie basis and the 1873 panic might have been avoided.
ATTITUDE TOWARD LOUISIANA SITUATION.

When U. S. Grant became president of the United States there was trouble throughout practically all the South and it was hoped that he would greatly diminish the crimes and outrages. In Louisiana, the source of the trouble lay, as the Nation judged, in the extravagance of the carpet-bag rule and the Federal interference in State affairs. After Louisiana passed the constitutional amendments, it was taken over by the carpet-baggers and negroes. The Nation considered an adventurer, Henry C. Warmoth, as the head carpet-bagger and estimated that under his and his associates' rule taxes rose from thirty-seven and one-half cents on one hundred dollars in 1868 to two dollars in 1871, state debts from $14,500,000 in 1868 to nearly 49,000,000 in 1871, the cost of a sixty-day session of the legislature of pre-war days from $100,000 to $200,000, the cost of the regular and special sessions from $750,000 in 1870 to more than $900,000 in 1871 for the regular session alone. It believed that the cause of this extravagance lay in the fact that the legislature was composed in a large part of white rogues without any standing in the community they governed or any other and of ignorant negroes who had recently been emancipated and admitted to the franchise.

It asserted further that if the Federal Government subjected the Southern Communities to these conditions, it should have seen that the Federal officials at the South during this trial period were men who fairly represented
the intelligence, integrity and public spirit of the North, preserved the neutrality between the contending local factions, repressed corruption and started the negroes on the way of honest and orderly government; but in citing the results of its observations, it said that the President took sides with the local factions and sent officials who took part in the vices and disturbances. He had sent James F. Casey, his brother-in-law, as Custom-house Collector at the Port of New Orleans. Casey and Warmoth quarreled and during a fight over the organization of their legislatures Casey was reported actually to have used a United States Revenue Cutter to carry off and keep out of the reach of the sergeant-at-arms for twelve days a sufficient number of members to prevent the Warmoth party from getting a quorum. The Nation thinking that the President should have removed Casey or at least reprimanded him for this adventure, expressed its surprise at his approval of him by appointing S. B. Packard whose character it questioned, as United States Marshal and at his re-inforcement of him in March 1872, by appointing a certain Lowell, Massachusetts carpet-bagger named Parker, brother-in-law of B. F. Butler, as United States Surveyor at the Port of New Orleans.

In the Louisiana election of 1872 for a governor and legislature, a dispute arose between two factions; sets of rascally adventurers as the Nation branded them. Casey and the Custom-house party sided with what Godkin considered as the more disreputable of the two factions, that headed by W. P. Kellogg who had the Canvassing-board on
his side but no returns. Kellogg appeared before a Federal judge who in a case declared by Godkin as trumped up under the Enforcement Act, gave an order to Packard to take the State House with the aid of Federal troops and under such conditions, Godkin explained, Packard organized the legislature composed of such members as Casey and Kellogg chose to designate. Godkin considered the President guilty of undue haste when he promptly recognized the Kellogg Government by a telegram from Washington without making any inquiry into the situation. He believed he was upheld in his decision by the action of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate in declaring the judge's order as erroneous in point of law and void for want of jurisdiction. A body of citizens described by the Nation as being highly respectable and representing the real people and real interests of Louisiana, visited Grant and begged him to make a formal investigation and not to depend upon reports and telegrams from one faction in New Orleans. It was reported that he acted curtly and abruptly when he answered them that he would do nothing of the kind as he had no funds and that he had made his decision and would not change it. The Nation wondered if there ever was a harder, graver or more serious task given to a United States executive than to decide which of two bodies claiming to be the government of a state was the lawful one? It feared that this difficult task might fall on him often because the double government trouble in the South promised to continue for some time.
The Nation was glad to announce in January 1873, that the President had taken one step toward stopping much of the trouble by forbidding all Federal officials to hold office under the State government, and it seconded the Chicago Tribune's statement that the President should have taken that step a year earlier and should have included in his order that he would remove them if they did. Godkin believed one source of the Louisiana trouble was the interference in State politics of the politicians known as the Custom-house party, headed by Casey and Packard and their fights with the aid of United States troops for a share of the spoils. A Senate Committee sent to investigate the situation reported that if there was a legal legislature in Louisiana it was the McEnery legislature. In May 1873, the President by a formal proclamation recognized the Kellogg Government and ordered the opposition party under John McEnery to go home. Mr. Godkin was unable to give further expression on this situation except that it was a National disgrace to have United States troops used to sustain a State government which a committee of the Senate had declared utterly unauthorized and fraudulent.

Corruption continued and the Nation believed that contempt for public opinion was becoming more open and law-making more reckless but it was glad to announce that the Louisiana people went on with their business and hoped to turn the Kellogg government out at the end of its term by a legal vote. This hope was destroyed by a law of the
The legislature which placed the registry of the voters throughout the State in the hands of the Kellogg appointees. The Nation and New Orleans whites sensed a perpetual Kellogg regime from this and the latter demanded his resignation. When he refused street fighting and barricading occurred during which Kellogg took refuge in the Custom-house. The President by a proclamation ordered the citizens who had gotten possession of the State House to disperse within five days and said if they failed to do so he would enforce the laws with military aid. The McEnery faction surrendered immediately and Kellogg was re-instated. At this point the Nation urged that Northern voters demand the immediate and absolute withdrawal of Federal support from the knaves who had the upper hand in Southern politics and the filling of their places by a new and better class. It thought that there was enough stolid and selfish insensibility at the White House and enough lazy indifference in Congress to stand a dozen such affairs as that in Louisiana with perfect equanimity. It noted with satisfaction that a compromise was effected by which the Kellogg Party pledged itself to a fair election and the McEnery party to peace and order.

The returns from the election held during the first part of November 1874, showed that nine-tenths of the returns were illegal and void and a new election was ordered. This was held at the end of December and resulted in the election of three Democratic and three Republican members to
Congress and a slight Republican majority in the House. The Nation presumed that the two months between the two elections were spent by the Kellogg party in fixing the politics of the State so that the election would result in its favor, and maintained that the election was not held by the people of Louisiana buy by a half a dozen gentlemen assembled in a room in New Orleans. When the legislature met January 4, 1875, to organize, the Conservatives held the majority because the arrest and non-appearance of several Republicans had upset the Republican majority in the House. After several contesting Conservatives were seated the Radicals began to withdraw and soon General P. R. de Trobriand appeared with his staff and on Kellogg's orders declared the House an illegal body and all members not returned by the Returning Board ineligible to their positions and organized the House himself. Mr. Godkin in commenting on these events said he could not understand how a legislature of an American State, the judge of the qualifications of its own members and having a legal quorum could be turned out while in the act of discharging its duties by an armed force from Washington without any excuse; and he branded the entire proceeding as the most outrageous subversion of parliamentary government by military force ever attempted in the United States. It was not clear to him, he added, why troops could be brought in at one time to seat a favorable majority and two years later to turn out an adverse majority.
In its January 21, 1875 issue the Nation expressed great surprise that the President had advised Congress to order a new election and wondered on what grounds this order could be based. It admitted that the United States Constitution gave Congress the right to protect every State in the union against invasion and rebellion; but concluded that troops certainly were not needed to protect Louisiana from invasion, nor from rebellion after the Committee composed of Charles Foster, W. W. Phelps and C. N. Potter sent to investigate conditions, had reported that there was no domestic violence but a peaceful management of State affairs. It continued by saying, that, if there had been any violence needing troops to suppress it, the President and Congress would not have been justified in sweeping away the State laws and ordering a new election, because the controversy there between two persons claiming to be elected was the same as occurred in other states. On April 22, 1875, it reported that the Louisiana difficulty had been settled by the Wheeler Compromise under which a legislature composed of a Democratic House and Republican Senate actually had been organized and gone to work; the members unseated by the United States troops had been restored to their places; Kellogg was to remain governor till January 1877, and not to be impeached for past offences. The Nation voiced its willingness to be generous and forbearing toward any mistakes if the President or the majority in Congress ever had
given the slightest sign or intention to set up an honest government for the good people of Louisiana. It was convinced that every body in the North knew that Federal interference at the South was a connivance of a great government at the efforts of a small band of rascals to live by fraud and corruption and intrigue.
CHAPTER V

ATTITUDE TOWARD SANTO DOMINGO AFFAIR.

In January 1870, the Nation stated that the Santo Domingo annexation talk of which there had been so much during the last two years had resulted in a treaty of annexation. Some weeks later an editorial on the history of the Santo Domingo situation explained that it was not known under what influences President Grant conceived the idea that the United States ought to own one half of the island of Haiti and to get it immediately and to make the ignorant Catholic negroes citizens of the United States. It appeared that the negotiations for the treaty were conducted by the President's private secretary, Orville E. Babcock, who had been sent to the island to investigate the conditions and learn the terms by which the nominal President of the Santo Domingo Republic, Baez, would make the sale. It admitted it knew nothing about Baez's authority in the matter or his weight with his people. It did wonder, however, how Babcock without any knowledge of the Spanish language could not only investigate the conditions on the island but also conclude a treaty by which the Republic was ceded to the United States and bring the treaty home, cut and dried, in his pocket. It wondered all the more when it became known that the Secretary of State, H. Fish, knew nothing about the negotiations or the treaty. It understood that the treaty gave the whole concern to the United States for a million and a half dollars, most of which was to be spent in paying the debts of the Republic. It believed that
the addition of only 150,000 population to the United States would not be much of an increase in strain on the legislative wisdom in Congress and that the vital question was not, how much heavier would the tax burden become, but what state would get the governorship of the territory or who had the best claims for the Assessorship of Internal Revenue.

The Nation stated that the island of Haiti had declared its independence from Spain in 1809 and after a more than twenty year continuation of unsettled conditions, was put under a republican form of government from which Haiti separated when it became independent in 1844. It explained that rotation in office was carried out much farther in Santo Domingo than in the United States; for, when a man had been in office long enough as the majority of the people thought, they rose up and killed him and distributed the spoils among themselves, and that these uprisings and elections made Santo Domingo the office-seekers' paradise. It continued by saying that it had heard of only one Custom-house along the eight hundred miles of Santo Domingo's coast line and nothing at all about postoffices, but judging from the character of its 150,000 inhabitants, there was little need for postal facilities. These conditions led it to believe that a wonderful field would be thrown open to all unemployed collectors, assessors, appraisers, postmasters, consuls and district attorneys when the United States purchased Santo Domingo and developed it. In fact, it could imagine no better place for a combination office of assessor
and whiskey distiller than the interior mountain ranges which were from six thousand to eight thousand feet high, or no more pleasant one for retirement after a long political life than the Customs-house at Santo Domingo or Samana.

On March 24, 1870, the Nation reported the President as working hard to overcome the Senate's opposition to the Santo Domingo treaty. It cited the following as the probable reasons for the opposition of the Senate: an unwillingness to spend the money to complete the St. Thomas purchase if Santo Domingo were accepted; a slight unwillingness to carry out any proposition of the President; the strong and growing feeling in the public mind that there had been enough of annexing by secret treaty negotiated not only without the knowledge of the country but without the knowledge of Congress; a lack of public discussion before the addition of territory populated by voters whose vote might affect the destiny of the United States; the fear that the experience of Spain who got Santo Domingo as a gift but had to fight for its possession and found it too hard to keep, might be the experience of the United States; the over-importance given to the popular vote taken by the Dominicans. The Nation concluded that the Santo Domingo treaty practically had no chance of ratification and the President apparently was the only one to grieve over the situation, and that he in getting up the Santo Domingo scheme had chosen a most unfortunate subject for his enterprise.
Mr. Godkin believed that the President misunderstood the Monroe Doctrine because he argued that the United States should annex Santo Domingo because the Monroe Doctrine forbade American territory any longer being considered a fit subject of transfer to any foreign power, and he added, that if the United States did not annex it, a foreign country was ready to pay $2,000,000 for Samana Bay. Godkin explained that the Monroe Doctrine did not say that European countries could have what the United States did not want but that they could not have anything. The President's argument that the annexation would mean a partial restoration of the United States merchant marine and supply the United States with articles it consumed but did not produce was answered, Godkin thought, by Horace Greeley's statement, that he considered the commerce of the island a curse, because it brought in luxuries which the United States did not need or commodities which it could or ought to produce itself. The argument that annexation would produce a favorable balance of trade which the United States could use in paying its National debt, was a mystery to Mr. Godkin. He did not understand how it would be a loss of $20,000,000 to the United States if Santo Domingo Republic sent $100,000,000 of fruit to Massachusetts and Massachusetts sent $80,000,000 of shoes to Santo Domingo Republic, but it would be a gain if the same transaction took place between the State of Santo Domingo and Massachusetts. Mr. Godkin admitted that good government on the island undoubtedly would increase both the population
and the products but, he added, if the United States had to supply government without reform of the civil service and the morals of the politicians, the island would become a hotbed of other things besides bananas, sugar and coffee.

In June 1870, the Nation reported that the treaty was finding not much favor in the Senate but was creating a great deal of excitement. It appeared that Babcock, the President's agent in the negotiations of the treaty, was accused of having connived at the imprisonment by Baez of an American named Hatch who had gone to the island on business. It was believed that the imprisonment was intended to prevent him from giving testimony unfavorable to the treaty. The Nation said that Hatch petitioned the United States for fifty-odd thousand dollars for damages and losses he had sustained at the hands of Baez. It explained that at the investigation into this petition there was talk about a letter from Grant which declared that Babcock acted under instructions. Scandals of such nature, the Nation believed, could easily cause the intelligent citizen to wish Santo Domingo and its coffee, sugar and other products at the bottom of the sea.

The President's persistent urge for annexation in his December message, led the Nation to suspect that a ring of operators who hoped to profit by it was behind the whole affair. The Senate by a resolution provided for a Commission of Investigation and the President appointed
President Andrew White of Cornell University, Benjamin F. Wade, Doctor S. G. Howe and A. S. Benton as a Commission to go to the island and to investigate the conditions. The Nation admitted that perhaps the report would be an honest one because the men on the Commission seemed incapable of conniving at any fraud or job or concealing any traces of these it might find. It was sure, however, that the purpose of the Commission was to manufacture favorable public opinion for the annexation scheme. Godkin urged that the main question about the Santo Domingo affair should be whether the annexation would or would not prove an advantage to the United States. Since he noticed that the authors of the scheme were put to confusion easily on this point, he feared that the government would be largely in the hands of Northern sharpers, speculators and adventurers.

The March 30, 1871 issue of the Nation reported that the Commission had returned and it was understood that it would report unanimously in favor of annexation. The supposition was that the Commission gratified by the calm, peaceful, prosperous situation in the South, considered that the United States had ample time for the absorption of Santo Domingo and indeed the entire West Indies. It further supposed that perhaps the United States was not working up to its full power till it secured Santo Domingo which would help it to pay off its National debt, as General Grant said it would; and that the possession of other islands would produce a surplus which the United States could use to pay
the National debt of all Europe, and thus make the whole civilized world its debtor. These prospects were considered pleasing enough to make the coldest and most cynical weep tears of enthusiasm. The Commission as it was expected reported in favor of annexation. On February 22, 1872, the Nation reported that the Santo Domingo movement, a high-handed piece of lawlessness, had been successfully resisted by the Senate.
ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIAN AFFAIRS.

The United States Government conducted the Indian affairs, as explained by the Nation, through the Indian Office, a bureau in the Interior Department. A Commissioner of Indian Affairs was placed over the bureau and a number of agents were distributed among the different tribes. This plan, as the Nation noted, established a personal contact between the Government and the Indians. By various treaties the Government through Congress appropriated large sums of money for the Indians, part of which was given to them directly and the greater part was given in the form of supplies. The distribution of the appropriations, the Nation continued, came to be a source of much corruption and provided a fine opportunity for the operations of the Indian Ring which intercepted a large part of the provisions intended for the Indians. It was said that most of the Indian Wars resulted from the violations of treaty obligations and frauds and that a bad system had been established that would require years of earnest efforts by the ablest men to uproot.

The Nation believed that when Grant entered the Presidency, he was convinced that a reform in the administration of Indian affairs was needed, and that he favored a kindly and Christian like treatment of the Indian, and that he acting on this conviction, soon after his inauguration, had appointed two Quakers as Indian Superintendents.
A delegation of influential Philadelphia gentlemen visited Grant and revealed to him the corruptions of the Ring and urged a change. The Nation expressed its approval of the President's course in appointing a board of unpaid commissioners of the best and ablest men who were to have joint control with the Secretary of the Interior over Indian appropriations. Grant's appointment of Ely S. Parker as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was considered not a wise one by the Nation because he would not cooperate with the Advisory Board and evaded several laws of Congress and soon came under the control of the Ring.

Four of the ten Indian Commissioners appointed by Grant in 1869, resigned at an early date because, as they said, they had no time to give to it. The other six resigned after several years in the service because, as the Nation believed, they had not been supported by the Department of the Interior. This conviction was confirmed, the Nation said, by the explanation of one of their number, William E. Dodge, to a reporter of the Tribune, that the contracts which they wished to place outside the Ring were often placed in the Ring and the bills that they disallowed were allowed by the Secretary of the Interior. The cool way in which the President allowed the good men to be driven from the Commission by the Ring, was cited by the Nation, as a good example of the indifference at the White House, which it had noticed so long and led it to conclude that the President was not intending to carry out his policy.
It admitted that it was very difficult to discover what the President's policy in dealing with the Indians really was.

The December 3, 1874 issue of the *Nation* announced the appointment by the President of Orville Grant, his brother, to the fattest Indian trading post in the West. It explained that Orville who had been unsuccessful in everything in the way of making a living, thought perhaps, he could get an easy living out of the Government and so had asked his brother, the President, to license him as an Indian trader. In commenting on this circumstance, it said that the President apparently gave no thought to the inexpediency and impropriety of appointing one of his own family to such a position, but told the brother that there were four posts where the traders were to be removed soon, and gave him licenses to all of them. It did not know how the public would receive the news of the appointment but was almost convinced that if the President were not General Grant who had saved the Union, his impeachment for corrupt administration might be demanded. It was quite evident to the *Nation* that Grant was unable to understand what pure government was.

In May 1875, the *Nation* gave an account of the discovery of frauds committed at the Red Cloud Indian Agency. The discovery was made by Professor Marsh of Yale University while hunting for fossils in Wyoming. Godkin stated that Red Cloud, noted Sioux Chief, complained to Professor Marsh that the President was sending bad agents who cheated the Indians and as a proof of this he showed burned coffee,
dark flour, poor sugar and tobacco. He continued by saying that when the President heard of this he was moved greatly and said that justice should be done. He explained further that after the resignation of the first Commission members the President turned to the religious organizations for members to carry out what was considered as a humane and Christian policy. He doubted if the President's plan of dealing with the Indians really could be called a policy and especially since he did not uphold the Commission in the supervision of the distribution of the supplies, but allowed the good members to resign and retained Columbus Delano, Secretary of the Interior, in office.

The Nation reported September 14, 1876, that the Indian Commission had met at the Red Cloud Indian Agency and made a treaty with the Indians. The report said that, according to the treaty, the Indians gave up the Black Hills and confined themselves to a corner of the Dakota Territory between the Nebraska line, the Cannon Ball River and the Missouri River; permitted the peaceful use of the Missouri River; were to be subject to United States laws; and that in return for this the United States would supply all their needs till they would be able to keep themselves and preserve peace and order. It considered this a fine scheme on paper and did not doubt the Commission's intention to carry it out. It thought, too, that it offered an excellent opportunity for a reform of the civil service but hoped its execution would be delayed till R. B. Hayes should get into the Presidency and show the country what he could do.
CHAPTER VII.
ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER IRREGULARITIES.

THE GOLD RING.

On September 30, 1869, the Nation reported that the operations of the Gold Ring of which it had been hearing for some time had come to a crisis the previous week. It explained that gold had been pushed up by James Fish, Jr. and Jay Gould and their clan, till on Thursday evening the night before the memorable Friday, it had reached 143 and on Friday September 24, 1869, it went up to 162. The report continued by saying that while the wildest excitement reigned on the exchange and among the brokers, the rumor came that the Government would put $4,000,000 on the market and this caused an immediate drop in the price of gold resulting in many business failures. The worst thing about the affair, the Nation said, was the fact that no one knew when this would be repeated.

It continued a week later by saying that it was reported and generally believed that the gold operation was planned by Abel Corbin, the President's brother-in-law, with the approval of the President and carried out by General Daniel Butterfield, Assistant Treasurer of the City of New York, and Fisk and Gould were called in to aid it. The report stated that Fisk actually had been allowed to discuss the matter with Grant on his boat. The Nation said it did not know how much truth there was attached to these reports but one thing seemed quite certain that the New York
bankers saw or thought they saw in the operation the traces of the hand of some one in authority. It continued by saying that the President in a letter to Mr. Robert Bonner denied having any knowledge about the proceedings of the Gold Ring. It stated on what seemed good authority that one of the Wall Street rascals was reported to have shown a telegram to a reporter, which inferred that Grand had had an understanding with Fisk. It was the Nation's supposition that the Ring attempted to turn aside the hatred and danger threatening it by pretending that high officials were at the bottom of the scheme.

The Nation wondered what the Grand Jury that was investigating the gold conspiracy could do, because it considered the conspiracy as a combination to raise the price of a certain commodity; a combination which occurred almost daily in other commodities. In its opinion the Jury could render more useful service if it signed a petition to return to specie payment. The Nation suspected strongly that Butterfield had participated in the gold corner and declared that if the President allowed the charges made against him to go unnoticed he would make himself an accomplice to the performances of the Gold Ring.

LAW VIOLATIONS

The April 25, 1872 issue of the Nation announced that a meeting was held by the administration friends to answer the charges made by the Liberal Republicans against it.
The Nation explained that the charges were that the President had employed Horace Porter and Orville Babcock two military officers in the discharge of civil functions at the White House. It noted that the defense justified Grant's position by explaining that George Washington had sent General Henry Knox with his messages to Congress, that Andrew Jackson had employed Major Andrew A. Donelson as his private secretary and that Abraham Lincoln had employed Colonel John Hay as his private secretary. According to the Nation's opinion the defense was in error both on the historic point and on the legal point. It explained that Knox at that time was Secretary of War, Donelson had left the army seven years before and Hay was not in the army any more. It did not understand why Senator Wilson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs did not know that Congress had passed a law in 1870 making it illegal for a military officer to hold a civil office. It admitted that Grant probably kept these men near him because they were old friends and comrades, and agreeable to him and that no hostility was designed thereby. In its opinion, however, the keeping of them in defiance of the 1870 law was a serious offense and only one illustration of the easy good natured disregard for law so prevalent among Administration members.

On February 15, 1872, the Nation said that Senator Charles Sumner threw a war cloud over the Administration by asking for an investigation of the charges made against the
War Department about the sale of arms to the French Government during the late war. Mr. Godkin considered the War Department guilty of a serious violation of law when it sold arms to Messrs. Remington noted rifle manufacturers through Mr. Richardson their lawyer with a full understanding that they were intended for the French Government. In his opinion the Secretary's order for the manufacture of cartridges for these arms was an unprecedented act. He believed the Resolution authorizing the sale of old cannon, arms and other ordnance stores unsuitable any longer for United States military service was violated when good Springfield breechloaders slightly altered were included in the sale. He noted that the Secretary's report showed a $10,000,000 sale and the report of the French Government a $14,000,000 purchase, and it was a great question in his mind who got the $4,000,000. He believed the matter was serious enough to get an inquiry but hoped that when the truth was discovered it would not prove that Grant had been imposed upon by bad men. To Godkin the tendency to disregard law was a serious situation, it was like a disease running through the country. He admitted there was much truth in the remarks made by the Tribune in commenting on the French arms affair that, "it is said by independent Republicans and Democrats that there has been all through this administration a growing tendency to disregard law and conduct the affairs of the Government independently of its restraints."
The Salary Grab scandal was reported in the *Nation* March 6, 1873. That periodical explained that the Forty-second Congress at its last session voted an addition of $2,500 a year to the salary of each Senator and Representative, doubled the President's salary and raised that of the Chief Justice to $10,500 and that of each Justice and the Speaker of the House to $10,000. A further explanation was that the bill for the salary of the Senators and Representatives was made retroactive. In the opinion of the *Nation* nothing had been done by Congress for many years that excited as much public indignation as the vote of "back pay" to themselves by the Congressmen.

The *Nation* asked who was responsible for the country being robbed by its own representatives for their own profit without giving even a sign of a reason or right. There was no doubt in Mr. Godkin's mind that there would have been just grounds for complaint if one million six hundred and fifty thousand dollars had been taken out of the Treasury by misgovernment but he wondered what should be said when that same amount was voted into the pockets of the members of Congress. He could see no reason why it should not be repeated and the amount increased ten-fold. He believed there was no doubt in the mind of the world that the measure would have received a prompt veto if a General Washington or a General Jackson had been in the President's chair on March 5, 1873, and the provision of an increase of the Presi-
dent's salary would have made the veto more certain. It was his opinion that the President's veto would have been worth more than $100,000 to him in the opinion of the country. The Nation branded the whole circumstance as an extraordinary legislative trick designed to force one man, bribe another and offer loop-holes of escape to all. It denounced the act for forcing men like James Garfield who had spent the entire session forming the appropriation bill into voting for it or seeing the products of the winter's work destroyed, and for depriving the country of the Constitutional right of the veto by offering a $100,000 bribe.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

In explaining the government of the District of Columbia, the Nation said that in 1871 Congress created a reform government with H. D. Cooke as nominal President of the Board and Governor of the District and A. R. Shepherd as the real Vice-president. It continued by saying that the public improvement scheme carried on by the Board resulted in a $17,000,000 debt and a bankrupt District. It suspected that "Boss" Shepherd who was reported to have made much money in the Tweed Speculations in New York, probably knew where the money went. The President's commendation of Cooke on his resignation caused the Nation to wonder what he had done to deserve it but the appointment of Shepherd charged with the mismanagement of funds of the District as President, was regarded by the Nation as nothing short of a scandal. The
action of Congress in ordering an investigation of the management of the District on the request of a number of the best property owners of the District was approved by the Nation. It expressed its satisfaction when Congress recommended the abolition of the then existing Government and the substitution of a Provisional Commission till Congress could provide a permanent Government. When the Senate by a vote of thirty-six to six rejected the nomination of Shepherd as one of the Provisional Commissioners, the Nation expressed its hope that that would end the operations of the gang.

BELKNAP CASE.

On March 9, 1876, the Nation explained that a House Investigating Committee had charged Grant's Secretary of War W. W. Belknap and Mrs. Belknap with accepting certain sums of money from Caleb P. Marsh since 1870. Marsh, it explained further, had received it from John S. Evans for the privilege of holding a post tradership at Fort Sill in the Indian Territory. It believed that Evans had paid a yearly sum of $1,200 to Marsh who in turn paid one half to Mrs. Belknap. Although some reductions were made in the amount later on, it estimated that Mrs. Belknap had received about $20,000.

The Nation understood that when the Committee reported to the House, the House took immediate steps for Mr. Belknap's impeachment, but that Mr. Belknap, on finding out that the exposure was coming, sent in his resignation to the President who accepted it promptly. It believed that actual
holding of an office in the civil service of the Government was necessary to make a person liable to impeachment. It explained that the United States Constitution prohibits the President from pardoning any one convicted on impeachment. It declared that if an officer could protect himself against impeachment by placing his resignation into the President's hands and having it accepted at once, the withdrawal of pardoning power in impeachment cases becomes of no value. It saw no reason why other officers should not do the same and so develop a dangerous system, a system possible under the Presidency of an ignorant soldier who used the appointments in his hands for the benefit of his personal friends.

On August 3, 1876, the Nation reported that the Senate failed to convict Belknap and the case ended in a way satisfactory to no one except Belknap.
CHAPTER VIII.

ATTITUDE TOWARD ANOTHER TERM.

According to the Nation's own report of November 17, 1870, its first information about Grant's intention of being re-nominated came from statements made by Colonel John W. Forney who had been called to Washington to consult with Grant over the Cox correspondence. He was reported to have said that the President was going to rely on his friends from that time. The Nation inferred from this that Grant wished to be re-nominated and that the politicians had gotten hold of him and persuaded him that he could correct his mistakes if he depended on them. It reported a few months later, that Senator Morton had declared that Grant must be re-nominated and re-elected and the Republican party must make the fight on the old issues. It continued by saying that Morton had met Grant and some of his fellow-citizens "unexpectedly" in Indianapolis where Grant undoubtedly offered himself for re-nomination.

In September 1871, Godkin said that he had a strong impression that all the Administration forces were working hard in making Grant's chances of re-nomination as good as possible. He remarked that Executive favors were being bestowed on men who in some way or other would help to send Grant delegates to the Convention in 1872. He noted, too, that favors were withdrawn, where possible, from those who would not try to help the Grant movement. In his opinion, however, no other President ever had had so much patronage under his control nor been counted on so strongly to abolish
the use of patronage for personal and party ends. He explained, too, that the complaints against corrupt officials and the mismanagement of the Custom-houses had been met by the organization of a Civil Service Reform Commission. It was his opinion, however, that this Commission could not withdraw any official from office before the next presidential campaign. He believed that the Ku Klux outrages were used to cover up the corruptions of Grant's officials.

After Grant and Horace Greeley had been nominated as Presidential candidates, the Nation had to choose between the two. It admitted that Grant's disregard for law was a serious matter but considered Greeley's approval of the Force Bill as serious too. It continued by saying that at the time when Grant was being denounced for his Santo Domingo scheme, Greeley was giving his approval to a bill that gave the President the right to suspend the Write of Habeas Corpus throughout the South. It concluded by saying that it was possible to measure the present evils but no one was able to tell what troubles would result if Greeley were elected.

The Nation was certain that all its readers knew that it considered Grant's Administration a failure; a failure, not because he had made conditions worse but because he had not improved them. His dealings with civil service, as the Nation saw them, were no worse than those of Pierce, Buchanan, Lincoln or Johnson. It believed that
that the opposition to Grant secured most of its material from his failure with civil service reform. It explained that civil service reform was hardly mentioned in Greeley's canvass and Grant, at least, was pledged to it and had done something for it and probably was ashamed that he had not done more. It was afraid that worse and less experienced officials would be appointed by Greeley. The Nation wondered who disregarded the principles of civil service reform the more, Grant who appointed the disreputable George H. Butler as Consul-general to Egypt or Greeley who presided at a supper given in his honor after the appointment. The public was asked by the Nation not to belittle Grant's exploits which had won for him his popularity because they were a part of the National glory. It also asked that due credit be given to Greeley for the good he had done through the columns of the Tribune. In conclusion, however, it affirmed that it could not accept Greeley as a substitute for Grant or as an improvement on him.

The Chicago Tribune reproached the Nation for not continuing its criticisms of the Grant Administration during the campaign. The Nation admitted that it had not called attention to Grant's shortcomings in regard to civil service in the same manner as it had done several months before. Its keeping out of campaign stories did not mean, it said, that its opinion of Grant had changed or that any of the objections it had made against his Administration had lost any of their force. It believed that a criticism of Grant would not
help the reform movement but would help to put Greeley in the White House and for that reason it had kept silent.

Mr. Godkin considered that Grant began his first Administration at a most unfortunate time for a man without political training or experience of a statesman. His reasons for this conclusion were that the country's enthusiasm for his military exploits was dying out and that Johnson's Administration had taken away power from the presidency and lessened public esteem of the office. He believed that Grant had had a definite idea that the country needed something more than the management by professional politicians and that it looked to him to introduce an era of better things. His failure was attributed, by Godkin, to his yielding to the wily politicians in Congress. Godkin was optimistic and believed that Grant had learned much during his four years in office. He hoped that Grant's debt to the party managers was paid and he would be free to administer the affairs of the Executive Department for the best interests of the country.

The Nation reported that since Grant's use of the veto and the issue of his Memorandum there had been talk of a third term for him. It did not know where the idea originated but supposed it came from some of his more enthusiastic non-political friends. It said it approved the Tribune's hard work to keep the public mind awake to the dangers of a third term. It considered the Republican party's attempt to get Grant to declare his unwillingness to accept
a third term as an amusing incident. It thought that since he secured the first and second elections without trying, he probably felt the same about a third term. In June 1875, the Nation stated that Grant had said he was not a candidate for a third term but he believed that the people should have the right to elect a man for a third term if they wished. His explanation that he had kept silent because he considered it beneath the dignity of the office to speak on the subject before it had been presented to him was considered unnecessary by the Nation. This periodical believed that no President had ever shown himself so careless about the dignity of the office as Grant. It seemed strange to it that he should have waited to declare himself until he was repudiated by his party.

The Nation believed that the second third term boom for Grant showed itself soon after his arrival in San Francisco after his return from Europe. It was convinced that the enthusiasm about him among the Republicans everywhere could not be kept out of the Convention. It observed that his friend Belknap was welcomed at Chicago, Shepherd too was invited to meet him there. There was no doubt but that all his friends would appear gradually if fortune favored him. The Nation reported that during the week of December 11 to 18, 1879, several of Grant's friends came out openly and brought forward their candidate for the Presidency. The understanding was that they hoped to elect Don Cameron as a member of the National Committee and secure Chicago as
the meeting place of the Convention. These anticipations led the Nation to consider Grant's nomination as a foregone conclusion by all the regular politicians.

The Nation thought that fortune favored the Grant boom when its promoters claimed the election of Don Cameron as chairman of the National Committee and the selection of Chicago for the convention. The Grant boom was reported to be strong in Chicago. A Convention of eight thousand probably would be a noisy, yelling one, the Nation thought, but General Grant undoubtedly would be a weak candidate in a deliberative one. The Pennsylvania Republican Convention by a vote of one hundred thirty-three to one hundred thirteen instructed its delegation to the Chicago Convention to vote as a unit for Grant. The Nation reported that the Republican press considered the smallness of the majority equal to a defeat. It was the belief of the Nation, that the peculiar nature of the boom made it necessary for the nomination to be made without opposition. Since there was so much opposition, it concluded that Grant, in order to save his dignity, should have withdrawn. In reporting the progress of the third term boom the Nation cited that the New York delegation had been urged to use its united efforts to secure Grant's nomination at Chicago; that the Massachusetts Convention had charged its delegates to vote for a candidate having the requisite qualifications for the Presidency; that the machine had met a decided defeat in some of the Illinois primaries.
These results led the Nation to believe that the third term combination would break down. It concluded that when it should break up and the leaders should attempt to withdraw General Grant from the contest, he would not allow himself to be withdrawn. A further conclusion was that he would be determined to save the American people as long as there was any possibility of doing so and at any cost of personal dignity. In reporting the results of the Convention, it said that the Grant delegation stood by him though defeated.
FOOTNOTES.

Chapter I.


1a. Ibid., 1:1-3.

2. Ibid., 1:6-7.

3. Ibid., 1:9-12.


5. Ibid., 1:170.

6. Ibid., 2:94.

7. Ibid., 2:105-107.

8. Ibid., 2:128.

9. Ibid., 1:21, 23.


15. Ogden, Godkin, 2:174, 176, 177, 179.


17. Ogden, Godkin, 2:187.
18. Roosevelt, T. and Lodge, H. C., Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, Two volumes. New York, Chas. Scribner Son's, 1925, 1:130.
21. Ogden, Godkin, 2:54.
24. Ibid., 1:224.
26. Ibid., 1:235, 236, 239.
29. Ibid., 1:237-238.
30. By One Who Kenw Him, The Late E. L. Godkin, The Critic, 41:82.
32. Ibid., 2:119, 121.
34. Ibid., p. 378.
35. Ogden, Godkin, 2:221.
36. Ibid., 1:248, 249, 251, 252.


FOOTNOTES,

Chapter II.


2. Ogden, Godkin, 2:40-41. There is a question about the date of the breakfast. Adams says he was in Washington in the winter 1860-61 and again in 1868. Ogden is silent on the date. Since the Nation was founded in 1865, the earlier date is taken as the probable one.


4. Ogden, Godkin, 1:238.

5. Schurz, Carl, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers, 2:385.


7. Week, Nation, 7:41.

8. Ibid., 7:141-142.

9. Ibid., 7:42.

10. Fine Arts, Nation, 7:156. Fine Arts is a division of The Nation.

11. Week, Nation, 7, 222.


15. Editorial, Cabinet Making, Nation, 8:104.
18. Week, Nation, 8:201.
20. Editorial, The President’s Appointments, Nation, 8:204-205.
21. Editorial, Statesman in the Cabinet, Nation, 8:348-349.
27. Ibid., 13:170.
28. Ibid., 11:19.
33. Editorial, Mr. Cox’s Resignation, Nation, 11:252.
34. Week, Nation, 12:383.
35. Ibid., 13:345.
36. Ibid., 13:393.
38. Week, Nation, 16:190.
39. Ibid., 14:177.
40. Ibid., 16:209.
41. Ibid., 16:229.
42. Ibid., 16:277.
43. Ibid., 18:260.
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Chapter III.

1. Editorial, The President's Appointments, Nation, 8:204-205.

2. Editorial, Mr. Boutwell as Secretary, Nation, 9:5.


4. Ibid., 309.

5. Ibid., 310.


7. Ibid., 16:33.

8. Ibid., 16:189.

9. Ibid., 17:201.

10. Ibid., 17:233.

11. Ibid., 17:249.

12. Ibid., 18:51.


15. Ibid., 18:215.

16. Ibid., 18:228.

17. Ibid., 18:243.

18. Ibid., 18:244.


20. Ibid., 18:275.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 18:371.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV.

1. Editorial, What May be Expected from Grant, Nation, 7:344.


3. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Week, Nation, 16:326.


15. Week, Nation, 16:361.

16. Ibid., 16:325.


18. Week, Nation, 19:177.


22. Ibid., 19:429.
23. Ibid., 20:1
FOOTNOTES

Chapter V.

1. Week, Nation, 10:18
3. Week, Nation, 10:18
5. Week, Nation, 10:183.
6. Ibid., 10:199.
7. Ibid., 10:375.
8. Ibid., 10:375-376.
9. Ibid., 10:376.
10. Ibid., 10:411.
11. Ibid., 10:376.
15. Week, Nation, 12:133.
17. Ibid., 12:249.
Chapter VI

1. Editorial, The Recent Changes in the Indian Bureau, 

2. Ibid.

3. Week, Nation, 18:373.

4. Ibid., 19:33.

5. Ibid., 19:341.

6. Ibid., 19:357.


8. Ibid., 19:357.

9. Ibid., 20:305.

10. Ibid., 21:77.

11. Ibid., 19:341.

12. Ibid., 21:77.

13. Ibid., 23:158.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter VII.

The Gold Ring.

1. Week, Nation, 9:261.
4. Ibid., 9:281.
5. Ibid., 9:330.

Law Violations.

8. Ibid., 14:265-266.
9. Ibid., 14:98.
10. Ibid., 14:113.
11. Ibid., 14:98.

Salary Grab.


District of Columbia.

18. Ibid., 18:83.
19. Ibid., 18:388.
20. Ibid., 18:403.
Bellmap Case

22. Ibid.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter VIII.

2. Ibid., 12:297.
14. Ibid., 19:244.
19. Ibid., 29:413.
20. Ibid., 29:431.
21. Ibid., 30:105.
22. Ibid., 30:165.
23. Ibid., 30:259.
24. Ibid., 30:357.
25. Ibid.
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