THE PROBLEM OF IMMEDIATE
KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL AND
MR. BERNARD BOSANQUET.

A thesis
by

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of Immediate Knowledge is one that has been variously discussed by philosophers, mathematicians, and theologians. The philosopher has been interested in it mainly in connection with such knowledge as claims self-evidence, what it is and whether or not it is valid. The mathematician faces it in the problem of mathematical axioms, why he accepts these axioms and not others, why they claim such certainty. And the theologian is interested in it because he desires to know whether revelation and mystical insight really give us anything new and trustworthy. Thus it is undoubtedly true that there is some knowledge which claims immediacy. And by different persons it has been variously called "intuition," instinct, feeling, insight, a priori, self-evidence, etc.

The following study is an attempt to understand the nature of knowledge and especially of that which may be called immediate. This will be done by examining the philosophies of two thinkers of the present century, namely: Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. Bernard Bosanquet. After an examination and comparison of their respective positions, we will attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the nature and value of immediate knowledge. We shall investigate Mr. Russell's ideas first.
CHAPTER I

WHAT IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE IS FOR MR. RUSSELL

If one in reading Mr. Russell's writings expects to find a unitary point of view he will be disappointed, for his thought seems constantly to be changing. This is most obvious between certain books separated by longer intervals, such as the "Problems of Philosophy" and the "Analysis of Mind" which were nine years apart in their writing. This will render the exposition of his thought more difficult, in that his thinking must be described as it presents itself at the various stages of its development.

Before we discuss what Mr. Russell means by immediate knowledge, it will be necessary to discover what he means by knowledge in general. But before we can do that adequately we must observe Mr. Russell's conception of the world which is known in knowledge.


Although fundamentally the same throughout his thinking, Mr. Russell's conception of the world undergoes development, so in order to understand his position it will probably be best to trace his progressive conceptions of the nature of the world.

In Mr. Russell's earlier thought the external world
of physical objects is assumed to exist, although it is pointed out that it is always inferred and never known of itself. The things we do know about the external world are "sense-data". Yet the "public neutral object" is assumed to be real as the "cause of our sense-data." Thus at this stage of Russell's thought a physical object resembles the Kantian "Ding an Sich", not known itself, but assumed to lie back of what we do know.

Now these "sense-data" which we know directly seem to have an existence of their own, and belong to a group of similar objects which are called "particulars". Other particulars beside the sense-data known in sensation are certain mental things and the Self, and certain things in memory.

In addition to "particulars" there are also "universals", and a "universal" is anything which may be shared by many "particulars". Of universals there are two varieties, relations and sensible qualities. These have as much being as particulars do, although universals are said to "subsist" whereas particulars "exist". Of the two varieties, relations are the most important. They are external, and belong "to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create". Relations are what relate particulars, etc. They are not limited to hold between only two terms, but may hold between any number. Examples of sensible qualities are "whiteness", "hardness", "similarity". Sense-qualities are later rejected as a part of the world.
In Mr. Russell’s later thought, the "public neutral object" is rejected as unwarranted hypothesis. All that we are aware of in our experience are sense-data (or similar particulars), and there is no need of assuming something behind them. The world consists wholly of particulars and universals. Each particular has its being independently and is logically dependent on nothing else for its existence. These entities, both particulars and universals, are called "logical atoms"; and he now names his philosophy "Logical Atomism".

There seems at first to be a dualism in Mr. Russell’s thought, which is expressed in his idea of an "external world". Although he would redefine the meaning of "external", he seems to assume a mind or a subject, more or less permanent, which experiences this external world. This suggests both an internal and an external world facing each other. This difficulty disappears altogether, however, in his later thought, when the "subject" is declared a fiction and everything seems to be "external". This has important consequences for his conception of particulars. At the first we find a distinction drawn between sense-data and sensation. The latter, it is held, is a mental occurrence, while the former is one of the ultimate particulars of which our world is constituted. With the dropping of the subject, however, it is declared that the sensation itself is one of the ultimate things of our world. Another result of the dropping of the subject is the reclassification of particulars. The kinds of parti-
cullars are reduced to two, namely, sensations and images. Images are copies of sensations, and differ from sensations mainly in their causes and effects, and in their relations.

In Mr. Russell's earlier thinking particulars do not appear as belonging to any ordered system. They are thought of as being essentially related to the physical object which "causes" them. However, when the external physical object is cast aside a new principle of unity has to be sought. This Mr. Russell finds in his conception of the world as construction, in which each particular is given a place in a well-ordered system.

When several persons simultaneously see the same table; for example, they each see something different. What each one sees is a particular "aspect" of the table, and each such particular, we remember, is one of the ultimate constituents of our world. From every possible point of view there would be visible a different "aspect". Now there is no reason why the table should be considered as anything more than simply the sum total of all these particular "aspects", of both the perceived and the unperceived, for the latter are as real as the former. Thus a physical thing is a mere logical construction, the system of all its particular "aspects". And a particular is a member of the system which is the thing at that moment. Such a system as it exists at any one moment is called a "momentary thing". But there are many of these "momentary
things", some earlier and some later, so a "physical thing" is really a series of such systems of "momentary things".

All these particular "aspects" which taken together are a "physical thing", may also be classed in a second way. At one place there will be visible, for example, particular aspects of a great many different "physical things". For instance, as I sit in my study I see not only an "aspect" of the table, but of many other things, such as pen, books, ink, lamp, window and so on. This way of organizing "aspects" with reference to a point of view is called a "perspective". A "perspective", however, is momentary; a series of such "perspectives" is called a "biography". Thus every particular aspect may be classed in two ways: (1) As a member of a "physical thing", or (2) as a member of a "biography". The former way of classifying is the way of physics, and the latter the way of psychology. Thus the ultimate constituents of our world are particulars, which when taken one way are physical, and when taken another way are mental. Sensations are such particulars which may be either physical or mental; images differ from sensations in that they are always found in groups classed as mental and never as physical. That is, they are always members of "biographies", and never members of "physical things".

Summary:

Mr. Russell's view of the world is what he calls "Logical Atomism", that is, he believes that the world consists of many
particular "things", such as we know in sensation, each of which is logically distinct, and has its own independent existence; and along with these are certain "relations" which are external, and which serve to relate the particular "things". In his earlier thinking, "sensible qualities" are declared to be also among the constituents of the world, but these are later rejected.

It is at first thought necessary to assume external physical objects as a part of our world, as the "cause of our sense-data". Later, however, it is asserted that the external physical object is an unnecessary hypothesis, and the physical thing is described wholly in terms of particulars and relations.

Among particulars there are enumerated several different kinds, namely, sense-data, certain mental particulars, certain particulars of memory, and the Self. Later this list is reduced to two, sensations and images.

While at first these particulars are thought of in a haphazard fashion, they are later conceived as belonging to a well-ordered system where each particular is a member both of a "physical thing" and of a "biography". The particulars are so related by "relations".

There is at first a dualism suggested in Russell's idea of an "external world", that is, of an internal and an external world, but this disappears altogether in his later thought. The subject is now declared a fiction and everything is "external". Whereas in his earlier thinking the distinction was drawn between sense-data and sensation, the former being a part of the world and the latter merely a mental occurrence, this dismissal of the sub-
ject leads him to insist that the sensation itself is one of the ultimate constituents of the world.

The world is finally declared then to be composed of neutral stuff, that is, particulars, which are arranged by relations. And particulars are either physical or mental according to their arrangement.


How then do we come to have knowledge of this world? What is knowledge, and what is its structure? It is to answer such questions that we now turn.

a. Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.

A fundamental distinction in much of Mr. Russell's thought is that between Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.42

Knowledge by acquaintance is a direct cognitive relation between a mind and an object. We have knowledge by acquaintance when, for example, we are directly aware of a particular patch of green in sensation. Particulars, then, are among the things which we may know in this manner. We also may be acquainted with universals. At first Mr. Russell suggests that it is possible under certain conditions to know facts by acquaintance, but he later seems to reserve this term for our direct knowledge of particulars and universals.47

All other knowledge is "knowledge by description". When we do not know a thing by acquaintance, we can only know certain
truths about it. This sort of knowledge is sometimes called "knowledge-about". The chief importance of knowledge by description or knowledge-about is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience.

In Mr. Russell's later thought, however, when he has dropped the subject this distinction no longer holds. Since there is no longer a subject, we can never have that relation of awareness between the subject and object which constitutes acquaintance. We now have no datum which is not presented in the form of a judgment, that is, when we believe that something is so-and-so. Thus now all our knowledge may be described as "knowledge about".

b. Knowledge of Things and Knowledge of Truth.

We also find in Mr. Russell's earlier thinking the distinction between "knowledge of things" and "knowledge of truths". By the former he means knowledge of the particular existents which constitute our world; by the latter knowledge of a fact. In each there is both immediate and derivative knowledge. Immediate "knowledge of things" we have in acquaintance with particulars; derivative "knowledge of things" in knowledge of particulars by description. Immediate knowledge of truth is called "intuitive" knowledge or primitive knowledge and it is this which furnishes the basis of all knowledge of truths. "Knowledge of things" is of course dropped later when all knowledge is declared to be knowledge of facts.

"Knowledge of truths" occurs when we have knowledge of
a fact, and takes the form of a belief or judgment. By a fact he does not mean one of the simple particulars of the world; but that a certain particular has a certain quality, or that certain particulars have a certain relation. Thus, for example, the daffodil which I see in my garden would not be called a fact, but it would be called a fact that it is yellow or that it is north of a rosebush. For any fact there is an assertion which expresses it. Such an assertion is called a belief or a judgment, and when put into words is called a "proposition".

Now Mr. Russell has two different analyses of belief or judgment. One belongs to his earlier thought when he accepted the subject and the other to his later thought when the subject is rejected. In Mr. Russell's earlier analysis a belief or judgment consists of a relation binding together several terms, one of which is a mind. For example, in the judgment "I believe that this patch of red is darker than that patch of red", the terms are the mind which judges, the two patches of red, and the relation "is darker than". All these are related into a complex unity by the relation "believing". Such a complex unity so related constitutes belief. When a belief is true, there is another complex unity, a fact, to which the belief corresponds.

Mr. Russell's later analysis is much more complex. Here belief is analysed into the "content", the "objective", which is a fact, and the relation of "reference" connecting the
two. The objective is defined as "the particular fact that makes a given belief true or false". It is the object of the belief. The content is what is believed, and "may consist of words only or of images only, or of a mixture of the two, or of either or both together with one or more sensations". These constituents, along with certain relations, are arranged, when the belief is true, in the same order that the corresponding particulars and relations are in the objective. The content is such that we believe that something is so-and-so. When expressed in words the content is called a "proposition". The relation of reference is what relates the content to the objective; if it points toward the objective it makes the belief true, if it points away from the objective it makes the belief false. Accompanying the content is a specific feeling or complex of sensations called "believing". This is what makes us feel that the content is being believed. There are three different kinds of such belief-feelings, namely, memory, expectation, and bare assent. The only necessary difference between a memory-belief and a belief of expectation is in the nature of the belief-feeling that accompanies it. We notice that there must also be a specific relation between the content and the belief-feeling.

Such a belief then, of either kind, if it is true, yields knowledge. And such knowledge is that which we have described above as "knowledge of truths".

c. Definition of Knowledge.

How then shall we define knowledge? Of what does it consist?
Throughout Mr. Russell's thinking knowledge seems to be spoken of in two different senses: (1) As the body of things we know, and (2) As the process of knowing.

The former consists of our true beliefs, both those which are primitive and those which are inferred from them. This knowledge we must accept as a whole, even though we may be skeptical regarding every part of it. This is not because knowledge must be true, but because we have no radically different kind by which to judge it. The various parts must also be consistent with each other, for we cannot allow two contradictory beliefs to stand together. Knowledge is, however, not a precise conception but merges off into "probable opinion".

The process of knowing in Mr. Russell's earlier thought is held to be of two kinds: (a) that kind of knowing in which we know that something is the case, as in judgments, which express our beliefs and convictions; and (b) that kind of knowing called "acquaintance", which we have seen is the direct relation of awareness between the mind and something other than the mind. The former kind seems to be amply defined by saying that knowing is judging or believing truly.

We have already seen that in his later thought Mr. Russell rejects acquaintance, thus confining all knowing to certain acts of judging or believing. Here, with the subject left out, he redefines the process in wholly external terms. Knowing is now held to be simply a very external and complicated relation which arranges sensations and images in a certain way.
d. Knowledge as Linear.

From our foregoing exposition it is plain that Mr. Russell thinks of knowledge as being linear. That is, if we should be driven back from point to point in our knowledge, we would finally reach that which is believed on its own account and not because of something else, and beyond which we cannot go. Such basic knowledge consists of primitive knowledge of truths, together with primitive knowledge of certain a priori logical principles. In Mr. Russell's earlier thought there is of course added to this list "knowledge by acquaintance". Now in the reverse process of building up our knowledge we begin with those things which are certain, and with the help of the a priori principles of implication, etc., we are enabled to infer new knowledge. Gradually thus we construct a stable body of knowledge.

9. What Knowledge is True?

One more question faces us as we are dealing with knowledge. How are we to know that our knowledge is true? What is truth?

Although at first he declares it incapable of analysis, Mr. Russell comes to hold that truth always consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact. Since truth has to do with beliefs, his theory will necessarily vary according to the two views of belief described above.

According to his earlier view we have in belief a complex in which there is a mind related to the terms of the belief
by the relation believing. And among the terms there is at least one relation. Now if there is also a corresponding complex unity, an objective fact, in which there are "object-terms", which correspond to the terms of the belief (exclusive of the believing mind), and if the same relation which unites the terms also unites the object terms, then the belief is true. If there is no such corresponding fact the belief is false. Thus if we believe that today is Tuesday, this belief is true if there is a corresponding fact "today's being Tuesday". It is false when there is no such fact, say, when today is Wednesday instead.

In the later theory of belief we have seen that there is a relation of reference which holds between the content of the belief and the fact to which it corresponds. Now there are two kinds of reference, "true" and "false". A true reference points toward the fact, and a false reference points away from the fact. Thus the truth or falsehood of a belief depends wholly upon its objective reference. For example, if we believe that today is Tuesday, our belief will point toward the fact if it is Tuesday, and away from it if it is Wednesday.

If either case, however, the truth or falsehood of a belief always depends upon a correspondence with something outside the belief itself.

Self-evidence as a guarantee of truth apart from correspondence, while at first apparently admitted is later rejected.

Summary

Mr. Russell thinks that all knowledge is essentially
linear, that it all rests ultimately on certain premises which we know immediately and as they are. From these premises the structure of knowledge is built by means of certain self-evident logical principles. Such inferred knowledge is called "knowledge about" or "derivative knowledge". The premises of knowledge are thought, at first, to consist of knowledge by acquaintance of certain particular and universal existents, and of primitive knowledge of truths; later, however, it is all reduced to primitive knowledge of truths. The process of knowing, while at first involving a mind which knows and which is in a certain way related to the fact known, is at last described as simply a very complex relation which subsists between the various terms said to be known. That knowledge is true for which there is to be found a corresponding fact.


What then, from Mr. Russell's point of view, is immediate knowledge? It is evident from our previous analysis that this is to be found among the ultimate premises of knowledge upon which all other knowledge rests, such as our knowledge of "things" by acquaintance, and our primitive knowledge of facts and principles. Immediate Knowledge is that which we know directly without any inference and which furnishes the foundation for all further knowledge.

a. Immediate Knowledge of "Things" by Acquaintance.

The earliest example of immediate knowledge in Mr. Russell's thinking is in his conception of knowing "things" by
acquaintance. And by "things" he means "particulars" and "universals". Among the particulars so known the most notable are the sense-data which we know in sensation, such as the particular patch of green now present to my vision. Other immediately known particulars are certain particulars of memory which give us immediate knowledge of things in the past, and of introspection which give us immediate knowledge of such mental things as desires, thoughts and feelings. At first the "subject" or "ego" is added to this list, later declared not so known, and finally is even denied existence. Both kinds of "universals" are known by acquaintance, both "qualities" and "relations".

Among relations, known thus, there are spatial relations and time relations, and resemblance. Among qualities there are whiteness, yellowness, hardness, loudness, etc. Universals we come to know by abstracting them from the particular instances of their occurrence.

We have seen above that the rejection of the subject finally leads Mr. Russell to reject all knowledge by acquaintance. He is henceforth convinced that all knowledge must take a judgment or "propositional" form. Nevertheless, we must note acquaintance as historically one of the views of immediate knowledge held by Mr. Russell.

b. Primitive Knowledge of Facts.

The next kind of immediate knowledge we find in the primitive knowledge of facts. There are some facts which are known immediately without any inference. Chief among these are the facts of sense-perception, that is, the facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing. Such facts are known in judgments of perception.
We also know immediately certain facts of memory; certain introspective facts; and some facts of comparison, such as the likeness of two shades of color. Later this list seems to be reduced to two, namely, judgments of perception and judgments of memory.

C. Primitive Knowledge of Principles.

Now in addition to knowledge of "things" and facts we also have immediate knowledge of certain general principles. Our knowledge of these general principles is sometimes called a priori, in that, while they are found in experience, they can neither be proved nor disproved by it. The best example of such a priori knowledge is in our knowledge of certain principles of logic, mathematics and ethics.

The logical principles include the principles of induction and implication, also the so-called laws of thought, the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. These are the principles which enable us to infer true knowledge from our premises.

Of the a priori mathematical principles we have an example in the general principle that two and two are four. It is later suggested, however, that this principle is simply a purely logical deduction from definitions, that is, its seeming immediate character results from the meanings of symbols which have been agreed upon beforehand. This is only suggested, but if adopted would certainly rule out mathematical principles from being considered a priori.

Knowledge as to ethical value, such as we have in the
principle "we ought to pursue what is good", is also a priori, though it seems to have less certainty than the previous ones. The immediate knowledge, then, as we have followed it in Mr. Russell's thinking, is to be found among the premises of knowledge. The chief examples of these are the judgments of perception and memory, and the principles of logic. The principles of mathematics and ethics he is not so sure about. To this list must also be added the knowledge by acquaintance of his earlier thought.
CHAPTER II.

WHAT IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE IS FOR MR. BOSANQUET.

In the philosophy of Mr. Bosanquet we find a very different interpretation of knowledge and experience than we have found in that of Mr. Russell. Before we take up an examination of Mr. Bosanquet's ideas of immediate knowledge let us, by taking a broad view, see where he places the world and knowledge.

1. Relation of Knowledge and the World.

2a. No Distinction Between World and Knowledge.

What is the nature of the world to be known? What sort of relation to this world constitutes knowledge for the knowing mind? Such inquiries beg the question for Mr. Bosanquet, because he insists that no distinction can be made between the World and Knowledge. The world cannot be outside our thought and still be laid hold on by thought. If the object-matter lay genuinely outside the system of thought, thought would be unable to lay hold of it. What the mind apprehends then must at least participate in its own nature. In fact, in knowing we are not apprehending from without something finished and complete apart from us, but rather we are cooperating in the self-maintenance of Reality, as ourselves organs within it. In other words, knowledge is the form which Reality assumes when expressed through ideas in particular minds.

So far as we know things then we know them as they really are. Their reality for us is in their ability to maintain them—
selves under the completed conditions of experience. The world of objective reference and the world of reality are the same world. In the former case it is regarded as composed of isolated contents; and in the latter case as composed of contents determined by systematic combination in a single coherent structure.

While Reality for any one person is no broader than his experience, there is, however, an Ultimate Reality in which our experience and those of others participate.

b. World as Construction.

For Mr. Bosanquet our intellectual world is a construction, constructed as an interpretation which attempts to restore the unity which reality has lost by our making its diversity explicit in judgment. Our individual world is one form of Reality, but there are also other forms, both higher and lower, as expressed in the experiences of other individuals. It seems that ultimate Reality might also be described as that logical construction which gives meaning and harmony to these different intellectual worlds of various persons.

Now my present contact with reality is in my sensuous perception. Not all of reality, however, is given in my present perception; the Real World as a definite organized system, is for me an extension of this present sensation.

c. Reality Not Contradictory.

When we speak of a thing as being real, or of possessing the character of Reality, we mean, according to Mr. Bosanquet, that
that it is complete and not either self-contradictory or contra-
dictory with other parts of experience. We say that dreams, for
example, are not real because they do not fit consistently into
the experiences of our waking hours.

2. The Character of Knowledge.

Knowledge is not "about Reality", but may be said,
according to Mr. Bosanquet, to be simply Reality in the form of
ideas. Hence knowledge will partake of the essential character-
istics of Reality.

a. Knowledge is Systematic.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of knowledge
is that it is systematic, that is, knowledge forms a systematic
whole. In such a whole its different features and properties are
such that without being at all similar or repetitions of each other
the variation of one is an index to the variation of others.

Another way of saying the same thing is to say that
Knowledge is of the nature of a Concrete Universal. Now a concrete
universal must be distinguished from an abstract universal. Sup-
pose I find in a room a large box containing a hundred different
articles all marked with the same label, say, the owner's name.
This label might be called a "universal", because it is a character-
istic which all the articles have in common. Yet this must be called on
"abstract" universal because it is reached by dropping out all the
different articles which are thus marked and abstracting only the
label. Moreover, in such an abstract universal, the different
articles are not interrelated by means of the universal. If the first
ten articles prove to be books, that is no assurance that the eleventh
article will not be a china teapot or a sporting rifle. These dif-
ferences which we find are not the differences of the universal.

In a concrete universal, however, the differences are the
differences of the universal. We have a good example of this type in
the orbit of a planet. The orbit is the law which governs the various
positions of the planet. And the orbit is exhibited in these different
positions no two of which are exactly the same. It might be said then
that the different positions are the differences of the orbit. The
orbit then included all these differences, and is not reached by ab-
stracting them. In addition, if a variation is noted in one part of
the orbit, there is, through the law of the orbit (the universal), a
direct index to a corresponding change in other parts of the orbit.
Thus the two chief characteristics of a concrete universal are (1) that
the universal is exhibited in its various differences, and includes
them all, and (2) that the universal so interrelates these differences
that a variation in one is an index to a variation in others.

Now knowledge is such a concrete universal. For "the
world as known consists of universals exhibited in differences, and
the contents from which and to which we proceed are not shut up with-
in their respective selves, but depend on a pervading identical chara-
cter or universal of which they are the differences".

b. Truth in Relation to Knowledge.

Another characteristic of knowledge is Truth. It is a
contradiction in terms, Mr. Bosanquet holds, to repudiate knowledge
as a whole, for that would destroy the basis of all affirmation.

Hence some knowledge must be true. What then is its criterion?

(1) Criterion is Immanent. For Mr. Bosanquet the criterion of truth is wholly immanent. There is no external standard, and no possibility of applying it if there were one. Truth "can only be tested by more of itself."\(^\text{141}\)

(2) Coherence as Criterion. The test of truth is coherence, which means the consistency, so far as attainable, of the whole body of experience with itself. In other words, knowledge is true when it is free from self-contradiction and from contradiction with the rest of experience. For example, if I judge that this table is made of mahogany, my judgment is true if the results of further investigation prove to be consistent with it, and if there is no knowledge which would contradict it.

(3) Error. That is error which claims to be truth yet contains contradictions either within itself or with other parts of knowledge. In other words, error is incomplete or inadequate coherence. In the above example of the mahogany table, for instance, my judgment would be in error, if I discovered that the grain of the wood was that of oak instead of mahogany. This further knowledge would contradict my judgment, and make it impossible for me to hold it any longer as true knowledge. It would also be error if it were discovered that the table was only veneered with mahogany. Although a partial truth, it would contradict my judgment and render it false.
3. How We Acquire New Knowledge.

It is common experience that our knowledge grows and increases, but how does this take place? According to Mr. Bosanquet, every operation by which knowledge extends itself is an inference. What then is the nature of inference, and how does it work?

a. Nature of Inference.

(1). Inference Mediate. We have already seen the nature of knowledge as a concrete universal and have noticed that it is possible to pass from content to content in knowledge because the contents from which and to which we proceed are not shut up within their respective selves, but depend upon a pervading identical character or universal of which they are the differences. How this passing from content to content by means of the universal constitutes inference. That is, you effect an inference whenever, by reason of one or more things that you know, you believe yourself to have arrived at the knowledge of something further. Inference is always by means of the universal, hence is always essentially mediate. For example, I find in a wooden fence post a number of small holes which at first I take to be worm holes. I discover, however, that on the front of the post they are all uniform in size and round. On the side, I discover that the holes are long and rounded at the ends. On the other two sides of the post I find no such holes. These cannot be worm holes, for they would not be of such regular size and order. They look as if they had been made by shot; and it must have been from a shotgun for they all have the same angle. I infer, then, that these holes
were caused by the firing of a shotgun from a position in front of and a little to one side of the post. I also conclude that if I investigate further I shall discover more which will substantiate my inference. I inquire at the farmhouse nearby whether they have heard a shotgun discharged in the direction of my post recently. They answer in the affirmative. Another man I meet says that he saw some hunters the day before, and saw them shooting a rabbit which was running near the fence. Later still I find the man who says he fired the shot. All that I discover upholds my inference. Now in this case the universal is the whole complex of facts relating to the holes being shot in the post. Each fact which I discovered was a member of that universal and there were probably others that I could have found if I cared to look for them. This is what happened then in my inference. From the few facts which I first knew, I discovered the nature of the universal which bound them all together into a unity. Having discovered the nature of the universal, I was then able to go to its other "parts", as when I judged that the holes were caused by the shotgun. The further data which confirmed my inference were simply other parts of the universal, and served to make my inference even more sure.

It should be noticed, however, that seldom in inference are we ever dealing with knowledge as a whole. We usually deal in actual inferences with some significant portion of our knowledge or experience. In our illustration above we were dealing with only
the relevant complex of knowledge. Such a complex possesses, however, the same character of systematic connection as the whole possesses, and the whole is always in the background. For example, in making an inference concerning the action of an acid, we would limit our thinking to the field of chemistry and would not need to bring in history and grammar, although these latter also belong to the same reality. Or rather in actual practice we would more probably be dealing with only a comparatively small systematic complex of data within the broader field of chemistry. Any new knowledge reached in one of these smaller complexes is held to be asserted ultimately of the whole of knowledge.

(2) Necessity of Inference. An inference from a definite complex always claims necessity, that is, an inference claims to be the necessary implication of that complex of data. In other words, it claims that it must be true, and truth seems to have something compelling about it so that we say, "This or Nothing". We must either accept this as the implication of the data or reject the data. This necessity attaches to an inference because it is bound up with the whole of knowledge. If our inference were otherwise, reality would be different from that we know. Thus in the above example of the post and the shot-holes, there is a certain impelling nature about the inference which was drawn which made one feel that it must be accepted. If it is rejected we feel as if we have attacked the basis of all true thinking.

c. Three Terms in Inference.

While Mr. Bozanquet does not agree with the traditional
account of inference in the syllogism, he agrees that inference always has three terms and no more. There is "the starting place, the middle operation, and the modification of the starting place".\textsuperscript{149}

Or more explicitly, in inference there must always be (1) the data or parts directly asserted to be real, (2) the universal nature which binds these data or parts into a whole, and (3) further parts, identified as being differences within the Whole, and on the strength of this identity asserted to be real.\textsuperscript{150} This we see to be true in the above example of the post:

In inference the action of the universal is usually explicit. Not all of our advances in knowledge, however, are thus explicit, although the universal may assert itself if doubt is allowed to enter.\textsuperscript{151} In a great share of our progress in knowledge then our process is not explicit but implicit. Such implicit inference is called judgment.


(1) Universal Implicit.

Whereas inference is the mediate reference of an ideal content to Reality, Judgment might be called the direct reference of an ideal content to Reality. While the universal or identity may be equally operative in both, in Judgment it is not obvious, but is operating implicitly. Thus the act of reasoning in both is fundamentally the same.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, to refer again to our illustration of the post, I might judge at once that these were shot-holes. My
friend may deny it, and insist they are worm holes. Then I proceed
to show him why I believe as I do. I point out the size and shape
of the holes, their location, and finally call in the testimony of
others. Here I am making explicit the universal which was implicit
in my original judgment.

(2) Ultimate Subject Reality.

The immediate subject of a judgment is always a smaller
or greater element of Reality as it is known in the experience of
the person judging. This immediate subject always represents
Reality as a whole, which is the ultimate subject. For example, in
judging that the table before me is brown, one might, without alter-
ing its meaning, say "Reality is such that the table before me is
brown", or "The real world is characterised by the table before me
being brown".

(3) Relation of Subject and Predicate.

Now according to Mr. Bosanquet, the relation of the sub-
ject and predicate of a judgment, traditionally symbolised by $S - P$,
is not a relation between ideas. It is rather the relation between
a universal and its differences or parts. It is traditional to
speak of passing from $S$ to $P$ in judgment. But such a transition is
false. "We never have on $S$ first, and then tack a $P$ on to it."
Even in the beginning we have an inchoate judgment with its $S$ and $P$.
"The process is not like adding one piece in a mosaic to another;
it is more like enlarging a hole, which has center and circumference
from the beginning." For example, in the above instance of the
shot-holes, we first met them with the judgment that they were worm
holes. This we held till it was displaced by another judgment.
It is important to notice the distinction between a judgment and a proposition. The proposition is the actual spoken or written enunciative sentence, while the judgment is the intellectual act which depends in various degrees upon words or other symbols, but is different from any mere combination of words or symbols. In the proposition the S and P are isolated parts of an extended whole, whereas in the judgment they are differences within an identity.

**c. Impossibility of Immediate Inference.**

We have seen that for Mr. Bosanquet, all thought claims necessity, both inference and judgment, because all thought is rooted in the Whole. That is, all thought is essentially mediate. Every truth must, so far as it is necessary, present itself as the conclusion from an antecedent. Therefore, if we should have a judgment which claims necessity and yet claims to be immediate, that is, excluded mediation, we would have a contradiction. Apparently, then, an immediate inference is an impossibility. Does this then exclude the possibility of there being any immediate knowledge?

4. **What is Meant by Immediate Knowledge?**

We have noticed above the impossibility of necessary inference which is at the same time immediate; yet there are some judgments which seem to be at the same time necessary and immediate, and there are logicians who contend that some judgments may possess necessity or self-evidence in isolation, a necessity inherent within their own four corners.
While Mr. Bosanquet does not hold that a judgment may possess self-evidence or necessity in its own four corners, he does admit that there are judgments which are self-evident and are\textsuperscript{161} a priori in character. But he maintains that these too rest upon the systematic organization of knowledge which characterizes the more ordinary types of inference. He says that sometimes the implication of a system "may be so direct that we are not aware of any operation intervening between starting point and conclusion, such as we should call an inference".\textsuperscript{162} Such directness, however, is due to two things: (a) the lack of confusion and irrelevant matter in the inference, and (b) the distinctness of the systematic organization within the whole of knowledge.

a. Ordinary inferences are loaded with irrelevant matter, which in various degree embarrass our insight into necessary connection. But in the a priori the absence of complication and confusion makes the inference seem direct and immediate.\textsuperscript{163}

b. In addition, in ordinary inferences, the Whole which is the basis of the inference is not distinct; but in the a priori intuition there is a distinctness of the systematic organization within the immediate whole in which it reposes, together with the depth or comprehensiveness with which that whole is rooted in reality.\textsuperscript{164}

Such then is the explanation of knowledge that at once seems to be necessary and immediate.

1. \textbf{Instances of Immediate Knowledge.}

Now of such a priori knowledge there are two main kinds,\textsuperscript{165} namely, judgments of value, and the axioms of mathematics and logic.
a. Axioms of Mathematics and Logic.

Logical axioms such as the Laws of Contradiction, Identity, and so on, are held to be a priori in this manner. They are not abstract principles which, when postulated at the beginning, furnish a starting point for knowledge. They are general characteristics of known Reality, and are involved in every part of it. They are principles according to which we discover all knowledge proceeds. They, themselves, are inferences, not postulates. Yet they are not inferred by a conscious inference, they seem to be there. Their systematic connection with the whole of knowledge is shown by the fact that if any of them were denied we would destroy the basis for all truth.

Similar observations apply to the axioms of mathematics, such as "two straight lines cannot enclose a space". These too are unconscious inference, resting upon the whole of our mathematical knowledge, not postulates with which we begin. In denying such an axiom we would soon be brought to assert contradictions which would destroy our basis of assertion.

Yet such axioms of mathematics and logic seem a little unsatisfactory, in that the systems on which they depend, however intricate, seem to be constructed out of restricted features of experience. Their a priorism seems a little too transparent to be taken as typical of all a priori knowledge.

b. Judgments of Value.

In the other kind of a priori inferences, judgments of
value, we do not meet this difficulty. These judgments are the implications of highly individual systems deeply inter-dependent with our whole experience, the worlds of religion, morality, truth, and beauty. Such judgments command even a higher truth than the axioms of mathematics and logic, and are equally certain. Of this type we have an example in an artist's judgment that a certain combination of two tones is musically wrong. If this judgment were doubted, he would probably feel it impossible to bring forward his reasons for thinking so; yet he might truly say, "I cannot, consistently with the laws or principles of musical thinking, conceive or hold together those two tones, for they contradict one another." The judgment comes from the depths of his musically trained experience, and to deny a judgment based upon that would be as disastrous to knowledge as a whole, as to deny the mathematical axiom that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. He would feel that he could not retain his basis for asserting anything truly if he denied this judgment. Other examples would be judgments as to what would be right morally, or judgments of religious insight.

This, then, is for Mr. Bosanquet the highest type of immediate knowledge. It is that knowledge which is the implication of complexes which are connected with the whole system of experience by ramifications both wide and deep. He admits that objections to such knowledge are valid when it is considered as a detached procedure of the mind possessing no logical content.

Mr. Bosanquet recognizes that some persons insist that the feeling of certainty in such knowledge is due to emotion.
objection, he says, is irrelevant. "What is necessary is the appreciation of, — the sense of specific difference made by, — complexes of particular kinds with their intrinsic implication on the one hand and their degree of inherence in the whole of experience on the other. If you say it is thinking that does it, it is, you must add, thinking geometrically or musically or artistically or morally or religiously as the case may be. If you say it is feeling that does it, it is, you must add, the trained sensitiveness of the geometer or the musician, the painter or the man who cares for conduct or who possesses the religious frame of mind."
CHAPTER III.

COMPARISON OF THE VIEWS OF MR. RUSSELL AND MR. BOSANQUET.

We will now turn to a comparison of the positions of Mr. Bosanquet and Mr. Russell in order to see wherein they differ or agree.

I. On the Nature of Reality

We realize that both men are facing the same reality, or nearly so, and each is giving his own intellectual interpretation of it. Each describes the same experiences but sees them from a different angle.

In Mr. Russell's interpretation we have an extreme pluralism. Reality consists of innumerable particulars, each as independent and self-existent as one of Leibniz's monads, yet with their relations and interaction provided for by certain external "relations". Such relations possess as real a being of their own as do the particulars they relate. Such a reality, however, does not depend upon a knowing mind for existence and would exist the same without it.

In Mr. Bosanquet's interpretation, on the other hand, we have a monism. Reality is a unity. If our discussion of Reality is to be definite we must refer to that reality we know. And that is never known apart from the mind which knows it. In fact, our
reality always includes mind as an integral part of it. Indeed, reality as I know it is not to be distinguished from the whole system of my knowledge.

It is an interesting fact that both men look upon Reality as a construction, though the two constructions are very different in character. For Mr. Bosanquet Ultimate Reality, as distinguished from the partial views of it which occur in the various finite experiences, is that construction which gives meaning and coherence to the many finite views. This also is systematic and coherent, in fact, completely so, for incompleteness is that which characterizes a part. It would be the only real and complete Whole. Various limited portions of reality may for certain purposes be treated as wholes, but when tested further reveal their incompleteness.

For Mr. Russell, on the other hand, the construction consists of placing these multitudinous particulars and relations in some sort of order and system. They are arranged in groups. Certain groups of particulars, which are related by certain relations, are what compose "physical things". Different groupings of the same particulars, by means of certain other relations, give a "biography". The former is the physical and the latter the mental way in which the neutral world-stuff is organized. Thus the whole of Reality would be simply the sum-total of all these particulars and universals with their various arrangements. Nevertheless it would have no sense of "wholeness" about it, simply of "totality". In fact, Mr. Russell maintains that there is no "universe". The sense of unity, which some
persons claim, is due to the fact that my experience is what one 185
experience selects from the sum-total of existence.

Another difference in the conceptions of Reality deserves
attention. This is the nature of relations. For Mr. Russell,
relations, as we have seen, are external. They are subsisting
entities which serve to relate two or more particulars. Yet is, say,
A has the relation R to B, it would make no difference in the chara-
cster of A and B if we should replace the relation R by the relation
X. A and B are independent and their intrinsic nature is not
affected by changes of relation. Now for Mr. Bosanquet this is very
far from being the case. For him all relations would, in contrast
to "external", be called "internal", although Mr. Bosanquet prefers
to call them "relevant". In other words, he believes that the
terms and their relations are so intricately bound up together, that
a change in any of the relations would change the character of the
terms. This makes it impossible for him to consider "relations" as
entities which can be separated out and treated by themselves. No
more, however, can even the terms be treated so. All reality is
systematic, and neither terms nor relations have any significance
except when taken within the system to which they belong.

2. As to the Nature of Knowledge.

At first the two men disagree as to the form in which
knowledge occurs. Mr. Bosanquet insists that all knowledge from
the beginning is in the form of a judgment. While Mr. Russell holds
that in addition to this judgment-knowledge we also have knowledge
of various particulars and relations by acquaintance, a direct cog-
nitive relation. Later, however, as we have seen, he rejects acquaintance and declares that all knowledge is of the judgment type. This brings the two men into substantial agreement then as far as that point is concerned.

The problem of how we arrive at such a judgment is, however a different one for each. For Mr. Russell with his pluralism, the problem is one of synthesis. The synthesis is accomplished, however, by means of the various relations. Even knowledge itself is finally declared to be simply a very complicated and external 189 relation.

With Mr. Bosanquet’s monism it would seem superficially that the problem is one of analysis, but this is not the case. We never take reality as a whole and set about to analyse it. We always, in knowing, begin with such a significant and systematic 190 portion of reality as we have in a judgment. It is from the beginning synthetic, and analytic too, in that knowledge is whatever form possesses the character of a concrete universal, always a whole binding together its parts, a unity being exhibited in its differences. And our knowledge as it grows, continues to possess this systematic character.

Perhaps the greatest contrast in the views of knowledge of the two men, lies in their respective conceptions of knowledge as linear and as systematic. In Mr. Russell’s linear conception we begin with certain things which we know immediately and without inference, such as judgments of sense-perception and logical principles. This basal knowledge provides us with all that we need, for with these
premises and principles we are now able to infer all further knowledge. And as new data come in they enter into new inferences and thus rear the structure of knowledge. Thus knowledge seems most appropriately likened to a brick wall, with its foundation bricks at the bottom upon which all further ones rest.

In Mr. Bosanquet's conception of knowledge as systematic, there are no foundation principles. The first bit of knowledge we know is, as a judgment, already systematic in form, already a universal with its differences. As our knowledge grows it retains its systematic nature, and gradually approaches in a greater or less degree the completeness and organization of the Whole. As Mr. Bosanquet himself says, the process is best compared to the enlarging of a hole, which has diameter and circumference from the beginning.

In accord with the two different conceptions of knowledge we have two differing views of truth. True knowledge for Mr. Russell is that which corresponds to a fact; while for Mr. Bosanquet it is that which "hangs together", not only with itself but with the rest of our knowledge. For the former, truth is defined as Correspondence, and for the latter as Coherence or Consistency. Mr. Russell, while insisting that truth consists in such correspondence, admits that it is often difficult in actual cases of knowledge to know when correspondence really occurs. Coherence he admits as a useful test of truth, but never as a definition. In some passages, however, Mr. Russell's description of knowledge would make one think he thought of it as systematic and that truth was coherence. For example, "The philosophical scrutiny, therefore, though skeptical in regard to every
detail (of our common knowledge), is not skeptical as regards the whole. That is to say, its criticism of details will be based upon their relation to other details, not upon some external criterion which can be applied to all the details equally", and "Although data can only be criticised by other data, not by an outside standard, -". Or again, when we are told that "confirmation (of a belief), where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs"; or that some beliefs are "held with such determination that no degree of consistency with other beliefs leads to their abandon-ment", as if "consistency" or "agreement with other beliefs" constitutes the mark by which we accept or reject knowledge. It seems as if Mr. Russell at such moments is abandoning his recognized position, and substituting consistency for correspondence. Whenever he is con-sciously dealing with truth, however, he defines it as correspondence.

3. As to Immediate Knowledge.

Immediate knowledge for the two men occurs at opposite ends of knowledge, if we may speak of knowledge in this fashion. For Mr. Russell it is that knowledge which is found at the very bottom, that most certain and direct knowledge which furnishes the premises for all other knowledge. All knowledge reached by inference is derivative, hence none which is inferred can lay any claim to being primitive or immediate.

For Mr. Bosanquet, on the other hand, immediate knowledge is always an inference; in fact, it is considered the highest type of inference. So that we might say that for Mr. Bosanquet immediate knowledge comes at the top of knowledge. Instead of being a basal
sort of knowledge, it, itself, rests upon, or is supported by, a very wide portion of experience. Indeed, it is characteristic of the judgments which Mr. Bosanquet considers immediate, that they are rooted in greater portions of experience than any other.

It is also interesting to note that, at least during Mr. Russell's earlier thought, the two men had very much the same list of things which were considered immediate. Both listed logical principles, mathematical axioms, and certain judgments of value. The judgments of value mentioned by Mr. Russell, however, seem to be limited to knowledge of certain ethical principles. And these last, it would seem, are later abandoned. Of course in addition to those mentioned, we remember that Mr. Russell included originally certain judgments of perception and knowledge of things by acquaintance.

Later on, as we have seen, Mr. Russell explains mathematical axioms as deriving their self-evident nature from the fact that they proceed from certain symbols which mean whatever mathematicians choose. By similar argument he disposes of logical principles, — at least some of them. So that finally we have Mr. Russell with only certain judgments of perception and memory on the one hand, and Mr. Bosanquet with his principles and axioms and judgments of value on the other.

Mr. Bosanquet, we find, places judgments of perception among the very lowest forms of judgment. He classifies them among those farthest from being immediate. This then leaves the two men finally with neither accepting as immediate knowledge that which the other accepts.
In an interesting essay on "Mysticism and Logic", Mr. Russell gives his appraisal of insight as a process of knowing. While the essay is directed primarily against the Bergsonian "intuition", it reveals his attitude toward insight in general.

Mr. Russell admits that there is insight but denies that it deserves the important place given it by mystics and the "mystical logicians". In insight there are certain judgments which occur with such vividness and intensity that they are taken by mystics to be certainly true beyond a doubt. In fact, it is claimed, they are so certain that even the reality of the world of sense is denied, if necessary, to support them. This certainty, however, must be explained as due to a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed. Indeed, it usually happens that this intense feeling occurs first and then attaches itself to any content which it happens upon. After the emotional conviction subsides, the man who has been in the habit of reasoning is likely to search for logical grounds for the belief which he finds in himself. Insight may suggest a great deal of valuable knowledge, but it is to reasoning that we must turn for its confirmation. The value of mysticism, Mr. Russell thinks, is mainly in its reverent attitude toward life than any sort of knowledge which it brings.

This estimate of insight, we observe is the exact opposite of Mr. Bosanquet's. For him, insight's clarity and intensity have perfectly logical grounds. The judgment comes directly out of its logical background, and is not to be explained as being hit upon at
random. And instead of having little logical value, it has the highest validity. Both, however, agree that insight must be "supported" in order to guarantee to us truth. By this Mr. Russell means that it must be confirmed by logical reasoning, and Mr. Bosanquet that it must be rooted in a system of experience.
CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSIONS.

The foregoing study of the thinking of these two men has lead the writer to certain definite conclusions regarding the nature and importance of immediate knowledge.

First, I think that immediate knowledge is fundamentally of the type described by Mr. Bosanquet rather then that described by Mr. Russell. This decision, of course, depends pretty largely upon the whole philosophy of experience and knowledge which one accepts as the most adequate interpretation. Mr. Russell's description of the world as consisting ultimately of logical atoms seems to me wholly inadequate. Experience does not seem to be given in such atomic form as Mr. Russell suggests. If we agree that all knowledge comes in a judgment form, as Mr. Russell later declares, then I think we must admit that the logical atoms are wholly hypothetical constructions which lie, if they exist at all, beyond any knowledge we may have.

Thus Mr. Russell's own principle of not multiplying entities beyond need, would compel us to admit the impossibility of their being known or asserted.

Mr. Russell suggests that all knowledge is ultimately based on sense-data or sensation. Yet there seem to be many forms of knowledge in which the data of the senses are so vastly transcended that they fail to furnish any real explanation of what occurs. This is especially true of all our judgments of value, which present what is not sensed. This fact was apparently recognized in Mr. Russell's
earlier thought when he described ethical principles as being *a priori*, that is, as being elicited by experience but not sensed. But his later desire to be thoroughly "scientific" leads him to reject them as not "given".

Furthermore, knowledge and experience truly seem to be systematic and coherent in character. Reality for each person seems to be synonymous with the Whole of his knowledge. And by "the Whole of one's knowledge" we would mean all that has been known by or has entered into the experience of the person knowing. The experience of other persons, while necessarily different from our own, seem to be of essentially the same type. They point in the same general direction as ours. And the similarities and differences seem best understood by assuming that they are all different parts of one great Whole of Reality, whose nature is essentially coherent and systematic. This conception would necessarily preclude the thought that knowledge is linear or based ultimately on certain primitive, immediately known premises. It is by its coherence with itself and with the rest of knowledge, that all knowledge must ultimately be tested.

Moreover, all knowledge which we receive, must come by inference, either implicit or explicit, that is, it must come as the implication of a certain more or less limited systematic portion of our knowledge. Certain limited and poorly organized portions necessarily lack the coherence to present their implications with much force and certainty. The more complete and better organized the portion or complex in which the implication rests, and the
greater the inheritance of this complex in the whole of our knowledge, the more certain and more convincing is the implication which results.

I agree with Mr. Bosanquet that it is such implication which rests in complexes especially wide and deep and coherent that gives us that knowledge which forces itself upon us as most convincing and most immediate. Thus immediate knowledge, as I understand it, is not immediate, in the sense that it is mediated by nothing and rests on its own feet. It is immediate in the sense that it comes without any conscious process of reasoning, and seems to come to us without any background. This occurs, however, because its background is so deeply rooted in our whole experience that it is not recognized as being different from it.

This conclusion, I think, is plainly illustrated in the various types of knowledge which claim immediacy. Logical principles, for example, such as the Law of Contradiction which says that "a thing cannot both be and not-be", are certainly fundamental in all thought. They seem to underlie it all, for wherever we turn, there we meet them. It might seem that their omnipresence is due to their being premises of knowledge, and many would interpret it thus. But on the other hand, it is equally plausible, and I think it more plausible, that they are general characteristics of knowledge which we infer from the whole of our knowing. Thus the Law of Contradiction is really a statement of the fact that two things which are inconsistent with each other cannot belong to one consistent whole.

Similarly mathematical axioms seem rather to be inferences as to the nature of space or of things in general which we derive from
our whole experience with them, rather than certain self-evident principles with which we start. They are more than mere conventional statements which are accepted because mathematicians agree to use them. They seem to have something compelling about them, which makes us feel they must be accepted. In some parts of mathematics, I understand, certain axioms are arbitrarily dropped in the consideration of different kinds of space. This does not prove that they are either arbitrarily chosen or self-evident. It proves simply that those retained are the general characteristics of the kind of space under consideration, and that those rejected are not. The axioms are asserted or denied according to the inclusiveness of the system which is under consideration.

Judgments of value likewise owe their peculiarly dogmatic character to this same characteristic of inherence in an unusually wide systematized portion of experience. To a person who has thought carefully on moral living there will come instantly sometimes, when confronted by certain situations, the judgment, "This is wrong". This is not reasoned out but is nevertheless the necessary implication of that person's moral point of view. Similarly, judgments of beauty, such as, "This lily is beautiful", or "That strain from this concerto is sublime", are compelling. If we were asked to explain our judgment, we would find it impossible to do so adequately. Its complex is rooted so deeply in our experience and is so far-reaching in its extent that we could never bring it all to the surface.

Judgments of mystical insight seem to owe their clarity and convincingness to this same inherence in an unusually wide complex of
experience. What seems to happen is this. In certain times of meditation or of rest from activity the experience of the mystic comes to be integrated so that he is enabled to look at things in the large. His whole experience is more completely systematized than it is under ordinary conditions. From such an integrated systematic whole there then spring certain implications or inferences which are compelling and indubitable because rooted so deeply in the whole of the mystic’s experience. This does not mean that such judgments must always be reached in this manner, they may be reached in more laborious ways too, that is, by more reflective reasoning.

An example of such insight may be found in the experience of one of the seventeenth century English mystics, George Fox. In his Journal he records certain occasions when he had "openings", in which he felt there were revealed to him certain new truths. These "openings" are plainly instances of insight. Because of these new truths which Fox and his followers held they were much persecuted by the religionists of their age. But as time has gone on other religious thinkers have been brought by more circuitous and laborious routes to the positions which Fox reached long before in his "openings". William James has formulated the classic declaration of this fact, "So far as our Christian sects today are evolving into liberality, they are simply reverting in essence to the position which Fox and the early Quakers so long ago assumed". This is a splendid instance of insight being supported by later experience and thought, and one which would lead us to think
that such true insight can be trusted.

Having adopted the point of view that immediate knowledge is the implication of a complex of knowledge which is rooted deeply in the whole, there are several further conclusions to which we must come, some of which have been hinted at above but which may well be stated explicitly.

1. No knowledge is really "immediate". It is all immediate in the sense that it is through the "universal" or the system to which it belongs. Yet there are some judgments which come with extraordinary clarity and certainty, and are not consciously inferred.

2. All immediate knowledge is really rooted in experience. We should not look for it to come to us "out of the blue", without a wide background in which it may be rooted. For example, we may not expect to have whole symphonies surge into our heads, as they did into Mozart's, unless we have thought long and deeply in the field of music.

3. Thus immediate knowledge is seen to have as sound a basis as reflective reasoning. This explains why insight has often been verified later by reflective thought; and why certain knowledge has often been reached by insight before it has been reached by conscious thinking. Thus we must conclude that immediate knowledge may be trusted, and is not a magical, nor a miraculous thing, and is not merely the result of emotion; although it is not denied that some so-called judgments are really due to emotion and not to real insight. The difference is demonstrated by further experience.
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6. p. 81.
7. p. 76.
8. p. 81, 145.
17. Cf. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 129. Note — At one time Mr. Russell added to this list "facts", or certain combinations of particulars and universals; but this view does not seem to remain a permanent part of his thinking, Cf. Monist, 1918, p. 502.
18. Monist, 1919, p. 32.
20. Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 4; Monist, 1918, p. 496.


32. External World, p. 89.

33. p. 111.


35. External World, p. 92; Analysis of Mind, p. 128.


40. pp. 301, 302, 297.


42. Problems of Philosophy, pp. 72, 73; Cf. Mysticism and Logic, pp. 209ff.

43. Mysticism and Logic, p. 209.

44. Problems, p. 171; Mysticism, p. 212.

45. Problems, p. 81.

46. pp. 211, 212.


49. Problems, p. 92.

50. Analysis of Mind, p. 141; Cf. pp. 18, 297.

51. pp. 297, 298; Cf. p. 255.

52. Problems, p. 72.

53. p. 170.

54. p. 171.

55. External World, p. 68; Problems, p. 17.

56. Problems, p. 172.


58. Problems, p. 186; Cf. pp. 73, 197.


60. External World, p. 52.


63. p. 196.

64. p. 200.

65. Analysis of Mind, p. 252.

66. p. 234.

67. p. 236.

68. p. 278.

69. p. 235.


73. pp. 176, 250.
74. p. 177.
75. p. 250.
77. Problems, p. 217.
78. External World, p. 67.
86. Problems, p. 175; Cf. External World, p. 68; Analysis of Mind, pp. 297, 298.
88. Problems, pp. 109, 110, 171, 172; External World, p. 56, 57. Note — Logical principles are not mentioned as among the data of knowledge in Mr. Russell's later works. Since logical inference occurs, however, there seem to be assumed some logical principles which are known by which it occurs. Cf. Analysis of Mind, p. 298.
89. Problems, pp. 90, 91, 76.
90. pp. 171, 175, 207; External World, p. 68; Analysis of Mind, p. 297.
91. Mind, 1904, p. 524.
92. Problems, pp. 92, 190; Philosophical Essays, p. 178; Analysis of Mind, p. 232; Russell, Principia, p. 46.
93. Problems, p. 197.
96. Analysis of Mind, p. 252.
98. Problems, pp. 98, 176, 183, 214.
100. Problems, p. 171.
101. Mysticism and Logic, pp. 210, 211; Problems, p. 75.
102. Problems, p. 76.
103. pp. 76, 80.
104. Cf. Mysticism and Logic, p. 211; Problems, p. 78; External World, p. 74; Monist, 1914, p. 441; Analysis of Mind, p. 141.
105. Mysticism and Logic, p. 213.
111. External World, p. 53; Monist, 1914, p. 9.
112. External World, pp. 55, 68.
113. Cf. Problems, p. 211; Analysis of Mind, p. 266.
Note. — While he later denies self-evidence of judgments of perception, he seems to mean that they are true not in vacuo but as they correspond to a fact. Cf. Analysis of Mind, p. 266.
116. p. 72.

118. External World, pp. 56, 70; Problems, p. 176.


120. p. 125, cf. 119.

121. pp. 106, 111.

122. p. 115.

123. Note. — In his later thought Mr. Russell denies that some logical principles are self-evident, (Analysis of Mind, p. 264.) Their apparent self-evidence, he says, lies in the fact that they result logically from certain definitions. His example of such a logical principle, however, would indicate that he does not have in mind those principles of thought which I have mentioned above. Moreover he is here interested in showing that there is no truth apart from correspondence. Apart from this place he does not discuss logical principles in the Analysis of Mind.


125. Analysis of Mind, p. 264.

126. Problems, pp. 119, 176, 171.


131. Logic I, p. 5.

132. II, pp. 264, 318, Ch. VIII.

133. II, p. 265.

134. II, pp. 5, 72, 73.

135. II, pp. 192, 265.


139. Logic II, p. 2.
142. Cf. Logic II, pp. 45, 267, Chap. IX.
143. Implication, pp. 154, 155.
144. Implication, p. 2.
146. Cf. Logic II, p. 3.
147. Cf. Logic I, p. 6; Implication, pp. 4, 10, 158.
149. Implication, p. 136.
151. Logic I, p. 74.
154. Cf., p. 3.
155. Cf. pp. 73, 77.
156. Cf. p. 77.
158. Cf. Logic I, pp. 75, 76.
162. Implication, p. 9.
165. Cf. Implication, pp. 91, 95. Note. — In his Logic II, p. 19, Bosanquet discusses what he calls "true immediate inferences", but he declares that these are based upon very restricted features of experience and would not possess the certainty which is possessed by a priori judgments.

166. Cf. Logic II, pp. 208, 216; Implication, pp. 91, 162.


170. pp. 91, 92.

171. Cf. pp. 92, 94.

172. p. 95.

173. p. 94.

174. ibid.

175. Cf. p. 95, 15; Logic II, pp. 235, 256.


178. p. 94.

179. pp. 95, 96.

180. Cf. Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 87; Monist, 1919, p. 32.


182. Logic I, p. 5.


187. Logic I, p. 91.

188. pp. 277ff.
189. Analysis of Mind, p. 234.
190. Logic II, p. 7.
191. Logic I, p. 91.
192. p. 91.
199. Logic I, pp. 98ff.
201. pp. 8ff.
202. ibid.
203. pp. 8, 9, 12; Cf. External World, p. 53.
204. Mysticism and Logic, p. 3.
205. pp. 9, 19.
208. pp. 11, 12.
209. Cf. p. 12; also Bosanquet, Implication, p. 95.