RECONCEPTUALIZING SOCIAL WORK'S PERSON-IN-ENVIRONMENT PERSPECTIVE: EXPLORATIONS IN RADICAL ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT

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Social work's person-in-environment perspective has been a professional guide for many decades. A major difficulty is its tendency to minimize conceptualization of the person/nature construct. This study generates a reconceptualization of person-in-environment that articulates a distinct description of connections between person and nature.

This study uses a qualitative methodology combining phenomenological and grounded theory approaches. It investigates the research question: What are key themes in radical environmental thought, particularly deep ecology and ecofeminism, that may be useful in reconceptualizing person-in-environment?

The major finding is a proposal to replace person-in-environment with the terminology of person-with-environment. This formulation derives from a revised theoretical basis allowing for the integration of a more theoretically congruent and descriptive language of person/nature relationship. It establishes a new link between theory and practice having specific implications for a range of professional thoughts and activities.
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PREFACE

The human race has entered a critical stage of reflection about how it will continue its existence on this earth. Issues concerning human survival are ever- looming; the determination to ignore nature and her limits and our accelerated drive towards consumption and affluence as we have known it, must be examined.

The social work profession has also come to a turning point; a critical apex of self-examination. The looming environmental catastrophe in which we find ourselves must inspire an attempt to discover more refined alternatives to theory and practice that would better correspond to our own and our clients' humanity. In order to fully address the problems facing the profession and our clients, we must step back from our everyday lives in the technological setting and think differently; even radically.

Developing an appreciation for the attractiveness of the natural world and what is effectual and possible in the face of it, the argument in the following pages illustrates a new kind of thinking we must do in order to reason maturely and act more effectively as professionals. My greatest aspiration for this project would be that it launch a radical reorientation within the profession.
This work represents a culmination of several years of scholarly examination, reading, thinking, writing, and rewriting. It is also a reflection of very personal stirrings in my soul which began to emerge some twenty years ago; the growing awareness that for many of my adult years I have been missing something in and about this huge world which seemed so apparent to me at an earlier time.

My beginnings as a small boy growing up in central Kansas provided me with the deepest personal appreciation for wide-open natural spaces, for the ever-present wind blowing across the prairie and for the marvel of nature’s ceaseless cycles of quietude and bombast. I was at home in my small place on earth. Nature wasn’t frightful; she was companion, comforter, an unending, almost speechless, marvel. I even now, find that my soul races with an impending thunderstorm. It harkens a connection back to an earlier time of finding the simple excitement of watching the rain roll in, the lightening crack the prairie like a large neon whip against the dark sky. I can even now clearly recall a time when, upon discovering I was lost during explorations away from home, I actually found a familiar tree and hugged it, until I regained my sense of direction toward home. As I moved to the city and fell deeper into the modern era’s focus on control
and consumption I could, and still can, feel the longings for a place unobstructed by buildings and cement, billboards and traffic, devices and deadlines.

I have often wondered what my life would be if not for at least the memory of wind, trees, the tall grass, and the open range. Would I have the appreciation for it, had I not had the memory of it? The greater question aroused within me is how, as a human race, will we function together as we get further and further from the memory of being at home on earth?

The reader will find that some of the ideas and concepts of this work may be difficult to understand, are not easily captured and organized, and are somewhat abstract and outside one’s conventional frame of reference. These ideas, however, are also an attempt to put into words what has, and continues, to be at its very core, a deeply personal, experiential journey of life transition; a transition fraught with struggles to again be at home with and to live out of a deeper connection with the beauty, the wonder, and the values which are found in nature.

So, though the current work may be abstract and theoretical, I assure the reader that the history of my ideas are not born exclusively of intellect. They are a culmination of not only scholarly examination of
historical literature and current critical thinking, but perhaps most importantly they flow out of a sense of personal passion and experience.
Research Problem

Early on social work writers clearly recognized that humans are related to and impacted by the environment. In fact social workers began to separate themselves from other helping professionals by claiming as their particular jurisdiction a unique and dual concern for both person and environment. In practice, however, the person-environment orientation has become problematic partly because of the difficulty associated with attending equally to personal and environmental issues. The persistent tendency has been to focus on knowledge and services directed to the personal domain while the breadth of knowledge concerning the environment has become constricted (Weick, 1981; Saleebey, 1992; Kemp, 1994). Much of what social work finds troublesome in satisfying its primary goal of optimizing fulfillment of both person and environment in combination (National Association of Social Workers, 1993) has to do in one way or another with its struggle to conceptualize and act upon its person and environment commitments.

Nowhere is this conceptual difficulty more profound than in social work’s nearly complete disregard for integrating a comprehensive understanding of the natural
environment and its influence on human behavior, quality of life and the definition of self. While social work’s person-environment focus is routinely affirmed in the literature and in leading social work textbooks (Pincus & Minahan, 1973; Germain & Gitterman, 1980; Dorfman, 1988; Compton & Galaway, 1989; Hepworth & Larson, 1993), the literature itself contains little explicit discussion of the natural environment. With the exception of a few recent contributions (Resnick & Jaffee, 1982; Gutheil, 1992; Rosen, 1993; Hoff & McNutt, 1994), the concept of natural environment is rarely delineated in the literature even though it is addressed, albeit tertiarily, in larger thematic discussions. Throughout its century-old history, social work has tended to view the natural environment as the broad, static, benign and somewhat vague backdrop for more fundamentally important personal processes (Ewalt, 1982; Waldfogel & Rosenblatt, 1983, Gutheil, 1992; Kemp, 1994). It has not recognized the deeper influences that natural environment has on these processes.

Weick (1981) has suggested that though social work’s person-environment construct implies synthesis, it is, in reality, a problematic "ideological seesaw" (p. 141). A conceptual dichotomy has arisen which, in practice, makes the person-environment construct highly problematic in at
least three ways. First, attention is pulled from the environment to the person, resulting in an imbalanced emphasis on knowledge and skills directed toward individual functioning. The tendency is thus to elevate the personal construct over the environmental. Secondly, the preoccupation with the personal dimension of human development has tended to narrow the definition of environment. Environment has come loosely to mean the immediate personal space and/or the social situation (the cluster of immediate relational and situational factors) affecting the individual (Siporin, 1972; Strean, 1978; Weick, 1981; Kemp, 1994). Finally, this has resulted in the failure of social work to articulate a distinct description and explanation of the connection between person and the natural environment even though the profession rhetorically conceives of its orientation as uniquely situated at the interface of these constructs. This continues a long history of neglect of the natural world in social work’s person-environment construct. This trend continues to persist even now in the midst of mounting evidence that degradation of nature has profound implications for human well-being.

Critical theorists and historians have identified a number of possible explanations for the bias toward the personal and the constriction of the environmental in
social work. Weick (1981), Rosen (1993), Specht and Courtney (1994), and Kemp, (1994) see the profession’s early reliance upon psychoanalysis, and its later psychodynamic orientations that situate problems in the person, as significant contributory factors. Popple (1985), Trattner, (1989), Wenocur and Reisch (1989) and Kemp (1994) see social work’s tilt toward an individualistic orientation to human behavior as strongly influenced by its drive for professional status and its search for a consistent body of knowledge to support this aspiration. Psychodynamic theories provided this accessible and, apparently, coherent framework.

Another factor has also been suggested for social work’s configuring of its professional identity in ways that minimize the environmental construct. Weick (1981, 1987, 1991), Imre (1982, 1991), Roberts (1990), Saleebey (1991, 1992) see this as resulting from social work’s embeddedness in the logic and methodology of the modernist worldview and its associated scientific and technological paradigm. The philosophical assumptions of modernism typically narrow the definition of person and environment by removing the idea of nature from both constructs. The result is an alienation of person from environment. Nature becomes essentially other—separate from any identification with person (Berman, 1984;
Rochberg-Halton, 1986; Griffin, 1988). Person as a constellation of natural processes and environment as an aggregate of natural phenomenon are unrecognizable. In effect environment and self become de-natured (Fox, 1990; Roszak, 1992). This has resulted in social work’s being unable to develop a language necessary to describe and explain the character of the connection between self and the natural realm. Even though the profession conceives of itself as uniquely situated at the interface of person-environment, it is hard-pressed to describe what this means in practice (Weick, 1981; Saleebey, 1992; Kemp, 1994; Rogge, 1994; Tester, 1994).

Provisional Definition of Environment

It is difficult to provide a comprehensive definition of environment within the social work profession because the concept has been both compressed and enlarged in different historical periods. The aim here will be to give a general view of the parameters of the concept from the perspective of current social work theory. More detailed discussion of the concepts of environment and person will ensue in chapter three of this dissertation. What follows will be a provisional working definition which will function as a embarkation point for further elaboration in this study.

Several social work theorists have provided helpful
typologies of environment (Germain, 1979, 1983, 1991; Weick, 1981; Saari, 1992; Hoff & McNutt, 1994). Germain (1979, 1983, 1991) defines environment as having physical, social, and cultural aspects which are involved in complex interactions between their different elements and the person. Germain understands the physical environment as comprising the natural as well as the built world. The social environment comprises the network of human relations while the cultural environment constitutes larger interplay of persons within specific community matrices. Germain also differentiates between the broader macro-environment and the immediate micro-environment. Siporin (1983) has added to this characterization the idea of the mezzo-environment which is an intermediate layer constituting a series of life situations such as work, school and church. Recently, Germain (1991) has suggested that social work's traditional person-in-environment specification should be replaced by person:environment in order to signify a more holistic, unitary merger between the concepts.

One of the most helpful definitions of environment has been developed by Weick (1981). She distinguishes among four multi-dimensional aspects of environment which she calls the internal-social, external-social, internal-physical, and external physical. The first two include
intrapsychic processes—emotions and thoughts—as well as social structure, technology and economic/political arrangements. The last two include the concepts of organ functioning, adaptive capacity and genetic traits, as well as biological, climatic, and atmospheric conditions. Weick suggests that:

The internal and external social environments together have formed the basis of the person-in-environment paradigm...this emphasis on social environments has produced a peculiar one-dimensional focus. Attention has been paid to the social environments to the exclusion of the physical ones. Hoff and McNutt (1994) extend the definition of environment to a deeper appreciation for nature. They see nature as having a complex link to personal development and address the implications of nature's degradation and its transcendent value for social work theory and practice. For perhaps the first time in social work history, Hoff and McNutt (1994) explore the reenchanted, more wholistic, interconnected side of nature.

Building on the work of Thomas Berry (1988), Hoff and McNutt conceptualize the natural environment as spheres of activity made up of interconnected elements. Human life and development are integrally related to, dependent upon, and emergent from the natural
environment. The natural environment is thought to consist of the geosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, biosphere, and noosphere. The first of these alludes to facets of the soil, water, air, and biological species which impact human survivability. The noosphere, on the other hand, represents a deeper, atavistic connectedness with nature which lies beyond physical existence but which is nonetheless absolutely indispensable for human development.

Hoff and McNutt argue that by destroying and disregarding the natural environment:

...we destroy ourselves -- our irreplaceable source of sheer physical sustenance, as well as the source of our imaginative capacities for experiencing the penultimate realities of the good, the true, and the beautiful. Moveover, without the metaphorical resources from nature, to express those realities, our unique capacity to communicate consciousness of self and other would be severely impoverished, if not impossible. (p. 5)

It is clear that social work’s person-environment perspective has not led social workers to place emphasis on assessing the significance of nature on human development. Hoff and McNutt’s definition suggests that nature affects not only our biological existence but the
way we relate to others. At a more fundamental level it has consequences for the way we perceive ourselves. Berry (1988) captures something of this relationship with this image:

If we lived on the moon, our mind and emotions, our speech, our imagination, our sense of the divine would all reflect the desolation of the lunar landscape (p. 11).

Social work’s failure to attend to the deeper relevance of nature exists at the very same time that the larger society is sensing a growing awareness of the separation between humans and nature. The perception is widening that self must again be defined in terms which include the natural world (Capra, 1982; Berman, 1984; Schmookler, 1984; Brown, 1988; Sancton, 1989; Rifkin, 1991; Sine, 1991; Smart, 1992; Piacenti, 1993). This recondite interdependency of self and nature represents a primordial connectedness which endures beyond cultures, religion and time itself (Rifkin, 1983; Berry, 1988; Fox, 1990, 1991; Macy, 1991; Berry & Swimme, 1992; Callicott, 1994a, 1994b). Even though the philosophical assumptions of modernity and the accompanying scientific, technological paradigms have obscured our memory of this tie, a need is being expressed to find a way to regain entry into nature.
This archaic connection with nature has not found reputability in social work's consideration of development (D. Saleebey, personal communication, May 5, 1995). Social work doesn't generally see the connection between person and nature or inquire into it, or develop theory around it, or place it in its computations of what's important to those the profession serves. Searching for language and descriptions to help social work better depict and explain the relationship between self and the natural realm will and should change the character of all transactions with which social work concerns itself. It is entirely possible that, with a deeper consciousness of nature, social work will become more than environmentally sound. This consciousness may, in fact, be physically, socially, spiritually and transpersonally indispensable to social work's role in supporting the full range of human development.

The purpose of this dissertation is thus not to add to the roster another thing to which the profession should attend. Rather it is intended to broaden and clarify the way we conceptualize person and environment by focusing on the character of the relationship between person and the natural realm, and on the way we derive individual and collective meaning from this connection.

Taking as a starting point a provisional definition
of environment as inclusive of nature; understanding nature as the sphere of influence which has not only biological and social interconnections with human development but also resonant, atavistic attachments, the goal of this study will be to develop a comprehensive reconceptualization of the relationship between person and environment that is not limited to conventional and prevailing social work perceptions of these constructs. This research goal will be undertaken through a thorough and careful critique and analysis utilizing insight from two contemporary ecophilosophies: deep ecology and ecological feminism. It will also address issues and present implications for social work knowledge, theory and professional practice.

These research goals will be pursued in the context of a thorough historical and sociocultural review of the emergence of social work’s conventional and current ideas of person-environment. Because this dissertation is focused on developing a reconceptualized perspective based on different assumptions about the relationship between person/environment, it is appropriate to examine how these concepts evolved within the assumptions of a very distinct sociocultural worldview.

Individuals and professions interpret connections between themselves and environment through their own
highly specialized set of lenses. This is no less true of social work whose views of person and environment reflect not only its distinctive intellectual legacy but the current working model of the profession (Weick, 1981; Kemp, 1994). This contextual orientation has been referred to by many names (O’Riordan, 1976; Harman, 1979; Drengson, 1980; Catton, 1980; Coates, 1981; Cotgrove, 1982; Dunlap and Van Liere, 1983), but for purposes of this study the term modernity or its derivative modernism will be used (Lyotard, 1985; Habermas, 1987; Vattimo, 1988; Giddens, 1990; Goldsmith, 1993).

Modernity is a ethos, a mood, and a feeling as well as a series of characteristics and attributes of contemporary life which "...imposes itself throughout the world" (Baudrillard, 1987, p. 63). The context of modernism and its technoscientific paradigms have defined both the development and trajectory of social work’s person-environment perspective. Without a critique of the logic and culture of modernism it would be difficult to conclude how social work came to uniquely configure its own person and environment constructs.

Summary of Research Problem and Research Goals

The research problem addressed in this study can be summarized as involving (1) social work’s neglect of a distinct description and explication of the atavistic
connection between person and the natural environment, and (2) this exists even though the profession conceives of its orientation as uniquely situated at the interface of person-in-environment. The research goals are summarized as follows: (1) To generate a comprehensive reconceptualization of social work's person-in-environment perspective that will aid in the development of a more expansive, theoretically congruent view of these constructs and that will contribute to furthering a balanced view of this significant guiding principle (2) To specify implications of a reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for a range of social work thoughts and activities.

Perspectives, Rationale and Assumptions of the Dissertation

Professional perspectives

This research began as the quest to explore the temper of emerging ideas in ecology and environmentalism and their potential relationship to social work's knowledge development, theory and practice. In particular, I have been influenced by the methodological insights and experiential/spiritual ideas of Canda (1986, 1991, personal communication 1996), the theoretical thoughts of Weick (1981, 1991), Saleebey (1990, 1992), and the historical ideas offered by Franklin (1990) and
Kemp (1994) in helping to frame the problem of person and environment in a social work context. I was drawn to the areas of deep ecology and ecological feminism by observing the remarkable similarity between their processes of defining connections between persons and environments and what social work claimed, at least rhetorically, to be its particular domain. I had been troubled for some time by the almost complete absence of comprehensive discussions of the natural environment in social work literature. It is difficult to comprehend how social work could claim an environmental concentration while at the same time overlooking the natural facet of the environmental construct. To date only a very few social work writers have begun to address systematically relationships between persons and the natural realm.

I was also drawn to this topic by a deep wish to extend my own professional work toward understanding both the problems and potential of nature for how social work defines person and environment and how it goes about its work with these concepts in mind. I had an intuitive feeling that approaches to deep ecology and ecofeminism might be a "good fit" to social work's person-in-environment perspective.
Research rationale

Given the uncertainty and longevity of social work's mixed relationship to its person and environment constructs, as defined in the research problem, it is timely and important to evaluate and reconceptualize these from a critical perspective. Since social work is committed to action, its theoretical preferences are not simply a matter of scholarly debate but have a direct impact on what social workers actually do (Kemp, 1994). The decision to pursue this study is logically grounded in a number of factors. (1) If social work claims it works at the person-in-environment interface but, in fact emphasizes individualistic psychotherapy, a serious question must be raised: At what point does social work dominated by an individualistic orientation implicit in psychotherapy and inattentive to natural, environmental issues cease to be social work as generally defined? (2) If social work claims concern for people in context of environment but knows and, therefore, does more relative to person than environment, then in practice social work is something other than what it claims. (3) If social work defines its professional commitment in terms of person and environment but depends nearly exclusively, for explanation and method, on narrow bands of psychological theory, the result is a continuation of the
polarization between professional purpose and practice. (4) If social work is to continue to meet pressing human needs and to foster development of full human capacity, then revised conceptualization of person’s integral relationship to the natural realm must emerge. Current guiding principles of practice must be reappraised, and social workers must reorient themselves to the development of new models of both individual and collective meaning. (5) If an emergence of a new epistemology of self and nature calls for humans to be reawakened to the association between their essential identity and nature, then it is significant both to reflect critically on the historical, contextual trajectory and logic underlying social work’s conventional person-in-environment perspective and to reconceptual this perspective in the light of this changing epistemology. (6) If depletion and pollution of the natural environment becomes a major influence on the welfare of individuals and entire societies, then social work must pay more refined attention to understanding and conceptualizing its personal and environmental constructs to better forge a integrative language tailored to respond to these exigencies.
Research assumptions

A number of major assumptions underlie the pursuit of this study. This dissertation assumes that (1) without clarity concerning (a) the meaning of person and environment in social work discourse, (b) the extent to which these constructs have been and are conditioned by historical and dominant contextual factors, and (c) how these constructs may be reconceptualized in more expansive, resonant, cohesive ways; social work will continue to give priority to personal inner life domains while ignoring the reality of the deeper, natural environment.

This dissertation further assumes that (2) critical reflection on the intellectual, theoretical development of an important guiding principle of practice and particularly on the larger sociocultural forces that influenced it, can (a) illustrate traditional processes of knowledge acquisition and development and (b) illuminate application of these. Critical reflection will facilitate new conceptual and practical directions in social work. Finally, this dissertation assumes that (3) critical awareness of the development of conventional concepts of person and environment and reconceptualizing these concepts will contribute to narrowing the dualism that now exists between these constructs.
Research Questions and Structure of Dissertation

Research questions

Building on the research problem and research goals thus far established and having considered the researcher’s professional perspective, rationale, and major presuppositions, the central and adjunctive research questions can now be addressed. This dissertation is organized around two central research questions:

1. What are the key themes, and key concepts in deep ecology and ecological feminism that may be useful in reconceptualizing social work’s person-in-environment perspective?

2. What are the specific conclusions and implications of a reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for social work knowledge, theory and practice?

Three adjunctive and preliminary questions are also considered in preparation for the primary research tasks:

1. What are the philosophical assumptions underlying the modernist worldview and its associated technoscientific paradigms and how have these constrained or supported the development of social work’s person-in-environment perspective?
2. How have the conventional ideas of person and environment historically developed in social work theory over the course of the last number of decades?

3. What is the current status of person-environment as it is configured in contemporary social work?

**Structure of dissertation**

The dissertation proceeds through six chapters. In addition to the current introductory chapter, chapter two summarizes the major assumptions of the modernist worldview and its associated scientific, technological paradigms. Chapter three reviews the historical development and the current status of social work's person and environment concepts. It will critique these conceptualizations by examining the impact of the larger context of modernism (summarized in chapter two) on the trajectory of the person-environment concept. Chapter four discusses methodological considerations. Chapter five will summarize the results of an analytical literature review of deep ecology and ecofeminism and discuss major similarities and differences between the two approaches. Chapter six will reconceptualize social work's current person-in-environment perspective. This will be generated from the insights gained through
analysis of the literature in deep ecology and ecofeminism. It will also present the conclusions of the present analysis through a discussion of implications for social work thought and activity.

Limitations and Anticipated Outcomes

Limitations

Limitations of this study center around methodology and scope of content. Methodologically, this study is limited to a qualitative, descriptive design. While allowing for robust depiction and imaginative innovation in concept generation, descriptive methods also preclude the development of precise "testable explanatory theories or hypotheses" (Goldstein, 1993, p. 89). The open-ended character of the research process does not mean that the process lacks rigor. As chapter four will describe in detail, the current study is driven by a clearly defined and precise research strategy. The current study will contribute to an ongoing exchange among theorists rather than attempt to provide a definitive account of conclusive meaning.

A second limitation of this study involves the content area. Several features of ecophilosophies make exploration with any precision problematic. First, they are not a product of a single individual or a particular group or organization of people. Second, because
ecphilosophies are contemporary phenomenon, they are still in the process of developing. New ideas, individuals, writings, and organizations representing some form or aspect of ecophilosophy continue to come into existence, and the thoughts of the individuals and groups involved continue to evolve. Consequently, this work is limited to writings which are available in English and which are accessible in the United States and Canada. This means that the current study will have a decidedly North American cast.

Another limitation of the current study related to the content involves the range of inquiry. Ecophilosophies are analyzed predominantly as philosophies rather than as political movements. This study focuses on the ideas of ecophilosophy-how it conceives of problems and how it envisages addressing them. This study does not attempt to canvass the various individual and group efforts to bring about transformation or discuss the merits or effectiveness of such efforts. These issues will not be ignored but will not be a principal focus of the current study. The primary interest will be to understand what meaning ecphilosophies provide for social work rather than to examine the actual or attempted accomplishments of a political movement.
Anticipated outcomes

The anticipated outcomes of this study are:

1. Development of a reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for social work based on the ideas discovered through the analytical literature review.

2. Refinement of the concepts of self and nature applicable to enhancing social work's models and methods.

3. Alerting the profession to the influence of socio-cultural factors impinging upon model development.

4. Informing the profession of a different kind of awareness with relevance to the epistemological enterprise of social work.

5. Cultivating a collaborative base that will increase alliances and dialogues with diverse individuals and professionals in a consideration of alternative systems of meaning.

6. Engendering implications for social work's knowledge, theory, practice and research activities.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODERN, WESTERN WORLDVIEW: CONTEXTUAL BACKDROP FOR PERSON AND ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIPS

Purpose
This chapter is essentially a critical reflection on the origin, development and character of the modernist worldview and its associated scientific and technological paradigms which support a highly restrictive view of both person and environment. This will provide a context in which to observe and evaluate social work’s conventional and current construction of person-in-environment and how it has been and is being used to define problems and generate solutions in the profession’s theory and practice.

The Core of Modernism: Anthropocentrism
Many have suggested that we are living in a time of great transition which is characterized by a growing belief that Western Culture has outgrown the institutions and doctrines that have served it in the past (Capra, 1982; Schmookler, 1984, 1988, 1989; Eisler, 1987). One of the seminal features of this time of transformation has been a growing willingness to analyze critically the beliefs, values and assumptions which underpin the modernist view of reality (Geertz, 1979; Capra, 1982;

The ongoing critique of modernism has emphasized challenging its anthropocentric core. Anthropocentrism assumes the universe to be essentially human-centered. Fox (1990) describes anthropocentrism as "human self-importance" and suggests it has:

been the single deepest and most persistent assumption of all the 'dominant' Western philosophical, social, and political traditions since the time of the classical Greeks. (p. 9)

Anthropocentrism fundamentally separates and differentiates persons from the environment in which they live and from all other creatures on Earth, over which they have dominion (Catton and Dunlap, 1980; McLaughlin, 1993). From this perspective the natural environment is seen as devoid of any subjective, experiential reality (Griffin, 1988). Environment is purely objective in character and merely a collection of largely unlimited natural resources which humans are entitled to use and
Anthropocentrism understands people as masters of their own destinies and capable of independently and individually choosing their own goals and learning to do whatever is necessary to achieve them. The anthropocentric bias of modernism rejects any inherent connection between the person and the natural environment. Creating this dichotomy between humans and the natural environment has narrowed the conceptualization of both people and environment. Nature has been removed from our understanding of environment and from our understanding of person. In effect both have been denatured (Roszak, 1992). The divorce of western humanity from nature is described clearly by Berman (1984):

... there is no ecstatic merger with nature, but rather total separation from it. Subject and object are always seen in opposition to each other. I am not my experiences, and thus not really a part of the world around me... everything is an object, alien, not me; and I am ultimately an object too, an alienated 'thing' in a world of other, equally meaningless things. This world is not of my own making: the cosmos cares nothing for me, and I don’t really feel a sense of belonging to it. What I
feel, in fact is a sickness in the soul. (p. 3)

The modernist, anthropocentric view of separated person and environment sharply contrasts with what was for all but the last few hundred years a far more compassionate, wholistic and balanced view of humans and nature (Oelschlaeger, 1991; Ponting, 1991; Scheffer, 1991; Hughes, 1975). Although the debate over the essential cosmology of primal peoples is hotly contested; it seems clear, based on a large body of recent scholarship, that most societies in prehistory and those emerging into the historical period were infused with a organic, nature-oriented cosmology that expressed itself in all of life’s activities. For them an intuitive awareness of the natural, organic processes included the all of everything, from soil to sun, the magna mater (Oelschlaeger, 1991, p. 2).

These sacred, organic cosmologies ordered the lives of most hunter/gatherer and many pre-enlightenment peoples and determined their values. They acted as both an individual and social ethic. As Merchant (1992) observes the analogy of earth as nurturing, sustaining mother permeates many early organic cosmologies through the Renaissance period. This earth/mother metaphor limited action for "one does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body. As
long as the earth was conceptualized as alive and sensitive, it could be considered a breach of human ethical behavior to carry out destructive acts against it" (p. 43).

The modern anthropocentric mindset tends to block consciousness from conceptualizing systems of meaning which differ substantially from conventional wisdom. Prehistoric and early historic organicism is of course a significant case in point. The modern, anthropocentric mind typically believes that atavistic peoples and societies wanted desperately to escape their primitive, wilderness wondering and simple, monotonous lifestyle while dreaming of the dawn of a more civilized existence.

This view has been rigorously reinforced through conventional education and socialization. It represents a subtle perceptual prejudice which fails to conceive of a positive alternative framework to explain reality because one is so bound up with ones current vantage point. The modern mind "cannot imagine any desirable form of existence or definition of human beingness save their own. So viewed, prehistory is little more than a story of degraded savages living lives that were nasty, brutish, and short" (Oelschlaeger, 1991, p.6).

Antithetical to this modernocentric contextualization of early people as ignorant brutes
longing for a more civilized existence are the conceptualizations of a relative new counterrevolution arising is natural history, archaeology and paleoanthropology. These new views have begun to understand our early and recent ancestors as living well within their organic framework. Anthropologist Herbert Schneidau (1976) commenting on the impact of this revolution of ideas, particularly in paleolithic studies, observes "perhaps someday it will be maintained that the most important development of consciousness in the twentieth century had to do not with moon walks or atomic bombs, but rather with the new availability of an adequate sense of prehistory" (p. 130).

It appears an inescapable conclusion from this new sense of antiquity that for ninety-nine percent of the two million years on earth our ancestors lived as organicists having an understanding of nature’s ways which reflects an intelligence at least equal to our own. Their beliefs concerning nature, land, place, plant and animal life, divinity, time, myth and ritual expressed in their art and cultural artifacts reveals a rich and imaginative life which is perhaps the most successful and enduring that humankind has ever achieved.

And yet the modern conviction that prehistoric, and archaic people were primitive because of their organicist
beliefs in myth, magic and animism still goes largely unchallenged in most sectors of modern life. It is presumed that modern people and civilization have triumphed. Most moderns still think of themselves as "rational and therefore superior since they have achieved a factual and lawful scientific understanding of the world, dominated nature through technology, and abandoned mythological belief and magical practice" (Oelschlaeger, 1991, p. 9). But, as Drew (1995) soberly observes, we have not triumphed:

Ecologically our civilization is as mindless as a cancer, and we know that it will destroy itself by destroying its host. Ironically, any remnants of humanity to survive the apotheosis of civilization will be returned, genetically mutilated, to that state which we have thought contemptible. If man does not survive, interplanetary archaeologist of the future will classify our planet as one in which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of technology and society leading rapidly to extinction. Stratigraphically, the origin of agriculture and thermonuclear destruction will appears as essentially simultaneous. (p. 118)
Social work also has had difficulty developing a cohesive perspective of person and environment in its discourse and practices (Weick, 1981; Rosen, 1993; Mullaly, 1993; Kemp, 1994; Tester, 1994). For the most part, social work's current theories of person and environment were developed in the midst of modernism and are perhaps apt representations of modernist views. As the connection between catastrophic environmental degradation and human functioning becomes more clear (Johnson, 1993; Bullard, 1993; Hoff & McNutt, 1994) and if there is a major rethinking of western culture's view of reality then social work is challenged to reexamine its current theories of person and environment.

This chapter contends that social work's conceptualization of person and environment must be viewed within the larger culture of modernism. In addition to the core anthropocentric ontology previously discussed, other modernist assumptions have profoundly influenced how person and environment came to be articulated, and the character of the relationship between both constructs.

This chapter will present the views of a number of authors regarding the origin, development and current assumptions of the modern, western worldview and the implications of these factors on person and environment.
relationships. It will delve into the question of how earlier, more wholistic constructs were supplanted by what critics view as more exploitive, hierarchial and dominating views.

This critique is necessarily limited in scope to writers who have written in or who have had their works translated into English and which are readily available in the United States. Additionally, it will focus specifically on those issues related to the impact of the modern worldview and scientific paradigm on social work’s views of person and environment. Though it is recognized that the implications of modernism to various systems of oppression such a racism, sexism and classism (issues of historical importance to social work) are of critical importance, they are outside the scope of this dissertation and will only be touched upon where appropriate.

**Worldviews and Paradigms**

Though worldview and paradigm are often used interchangeably by many writers, they are not necessarily equivalent concepts. A brief examination of their differences and similarities will assist in providing some clarity and interpretive boundary around these ideas for the subsequent discussion. A worldview is, broadly speaking, a map of the surrounding cultural landscape.
It is extremely encompassing in content and pervasive in adherence. The dominant worldview of any given culture or society:

... normally pertains to the totality of human existence and most aspects of social life. Virtually everything that we experience is shaped by the perceptions provided by our view of the world. Since the dominant worldview is generally held by most members of that society, it normally establishes the culturally accepted definitions of social reality. We unconsciously and uncritically take our worldview for granted as 'the way things are'. It therefore pervades and influences most of our thinking and actions; it is not often questioned or doubted; and it is rarely altered in any significant way. (Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlap, 1992, pp. 13-14)

A paradigm is more limited than a worldview. The concept of paradigms was popularized by Thomas Kuhn (1970) to explain the manner in which science operates and develops over time. He discusses the different meanings of paradigm and how, in particular, paradigms in science shift when the prevailing view appears to no longer be useful. Paradigms pertain only to certain aspects of life rather than the totality of existence.
In contrast to worldviews, paradigms are more limited in scope and acceptance and are constituted around beliefs and belief systems as well as the values associated with them. Embedded within a worldview, paradigms describe not only what is but proscribe what ought to be. Paradigms "provide the framework of meaning within which 'facts' and experiences acquire significance and can be interpreted" (Cotgrove, 1982, p. 26).

Devall and Sessions (1985) summarize the elements of a worldview by addressing its general character and the paradigms (assumptions) nested in it:

1. There are general assumptions about reality, including man's [sic] place in Nature.
2. There are general "rules of the game" for approaching problems which are generally agreed upon.
3. Those who subscribe to a given worldview share a definition of the assumptions and goals of their society.
4. There is definite underlying confidence among believers in the worldview that solutions to problems exist within the assumptions of the worldview.
5. Practitioners within the worldview present arguments based on the validity of data as
rationally explained by experts--be they scientific experts or experts in the philosophy and religious assumptions of the worldview. (p. 42)

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a critical reflection on factors shaping and consequences of the modernist worldview and its associated scientific and technological paradigm. Important contributions from a number of theorists frame this discussion. First, the foundational works of Andrew Bard Schmookler (1984, 1988, 1989) and Riane Eisler (1987) will be assessed to understand the prehistoric origins and development of the modernist mindset. Second, the works of Fritjof Capra (1975, 1982) and Lynn White Jr. (1973) will be summarized to clarify current configurations of the modernist worldview through identification of historic, causal factors associated with its particular tendency to alienate humans from themselves and their environments. Thirdly, the work of Albert Borgmann (1984) will be utilized to critique the implications of modern technology on our understanding of both person and nature. The final section of this chapter will be devoted to summarizing the important points of the above review and drawing some implications of these on conceptualizations of person and environment and the
relationship between the two.

Prehistoric Origins and Development of the Modernist Worldview

The tribes theory

Andrew Bard Schmookler, researcher, writer and social critic, received his Ph.d from the University of California, Berkeley. He has been a researcher for the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Public Agenda Foundation and is currently the senior policy adviser for Common Ground. Schmookler has written a number of books critical of the way the current political and economic system creates an illusion of power and personal choice while leading the world precariously close to an inhumane civilization governed by war and domination.

Schmookler (1984) suggests that early society was much different; mostly unstratified and basically egalitarian. It was made up of relatively tranquil communities which existed not to dominate and conquer but to cultivate the earth and to provide the material as well as the spiritual means for a satisfying life. Individuals were connected to their local tribal units and to the nurturing earth in non-hierarchial, non-authoritative ways. Schmookler suggests that a struggle for domination between tribes arose because of increasing
population growth and resulting resource scarcity. Once the struggle for power began, it took on momentum of its own so that eventually power was sought for its own sake. Schmookler (1984) describes the parable as follows:

Imagine a group of tribes living within reach of one another. If all choose the way of peace, then all may live in peace. But what if all but one choose peace, and that one is ambitious for expansion and conquest? What can happen to the others when confronted by an ambitious and potent neighbor? Perhaps one tribe is attacked and defeated, its people destroyed and its lands seized for the use of the victors. Another is defeated, but this one is not exterminated; rather, it is subjugated and transformed to serve the conqueror. A third seeking to avoid such disaster flees...others decide to defend themselves... But the irony is that successful defense against a power-maximizing aggressor requires a society to become more like the society that threatens it. (p. 21)

Human development was being driven in a direction that most did not intend nor would they have consciously chosen. Expansion created a situation of complete anarchy in which no one could choose to cease the struggle for domination. According to Schmookler (1984)
"no one is free to choose peace, but anyone can impose upon all the necessity of power. That is the lesson of the parable of the tribes" (p. 21).

It is important to note that Schmookler’s theory does not rest on any belief that sees aggression, domination and control as an innate, biologically driven human instinct. The parable of the tribes theory: ... offers no indictment of human nature. The irresistible social evolutionary forces that have swept us along since the breakthrough to civilization have depended very little on human nature for their origin and their direction. All that was required was that we be creative enough to develop culture to a certain point of freedom from natural limits, and that we be capable of (not necessarily inclined toward) aggressive behavior. Almost any animal can be aggressive under the right condition. (Schmookler, 1984, p. 31)

The unintended struggle for power in early society had many unforeseen, if not predictable, consequence for ongoing human development. First, exploitation of other peoples and of nature itself became a dominant social ethos.

The selection for power can discard those who revere nature in favor of those willing and able to exploit
it. The warlike many eliminate the pacifistic; the ambitious, the content. Civilized societies will displace the remaining primitives, modern industrial powers will sweep away archaic cultures. The iron makers will be favored over those with copper or no metallurgy at all, and the horsemen will have sway over the unmounted. Societies that are coherently organized and have strong leadership will make inviable others with more casual power structures and more local autonomy... Power therefore rules human destiny. (Schmookler, 1984, p. 23)

A second consequence of the struggle for power was the emergence of domination hierarchies. Schmookler (1984) suggests that the ways of power create an:

...intrasocietal selection for power, compounding the tendency for civilized societies to become polarized between a powerful elite and a subordinated majority. Thus with power uncontrolled in human affairs, the emergence of civilization cast human beings into the new roles of ruler and ruled. These new roles demanded new psychologically structures among the players in the human drama. (p. 168)

In a related point Schmookler suggests that "this new regime of power necessitates, among other things,
environmental destructiveness" (p. 255). Not only was there a willingness to exploit nature, but the ways of power created a drive to control it as well. Human control of nature is, from Schmookler's perspective, inseparably linked with technological growth and the willingness of humans to use this new technology for exploiting nature:

As the parable of the tribes would predict, the struggles among human societies have inexorably spread power-conferring technologies. ... these more exploitive technologies were accompanied by a new attitude that facilitated the more complete overthrow of the natural order for the enhancement of human power. ... This ideological change is inseparable from the technological revolution that so explosively has escalated the growth of power. Those who can eye nature with an uninhibited urge to use her are far more likely to discover the techniques for manipulating her. And those who hold to an ideology than encourages the unlimited exercise of power are the more likely to put their technology to use. The selective process that has favored the technologically advanced has therefore also favored the spread of the less pious, more exploitative and rapacious attitude toward the
A third consequence of Schmookler's theory is the way in which the spread of power reshaped human consciousness. He (1988) theorizes that the pre-civilized sense of self was characterized by a "whole consciousness" in which there was no inherent separation between the conscious and unconscious mind. As the rule of power gradually became the global ethos, the belief that humans could control the natural environment according to their own desires gave rise to the belief that the conscious mind was in control of the unconscious mind. Jeremy Rifkin (1991) characterizes this as an attempt to control our animal nature:

The rapid urbanization of Western culture after the seventeenth century went hand in hand with the severing of the remaining bonds between people and animals and the detachment of human beings from their own animal nature. Enlightenment thinkers joined with church authorities in condemning human behavior that they considered bestial, brutelike, and unworthy of the new civilized man and woman of the Age of Reason. Man's animal nature become something to overcome, a dark force to suppress and defeat. Bacon and other modern thinkers were as concerned with subduing the wild forces of human
nature as they were the wild forces of the rest of nature. Exercising rational, detached, objective power over animals in nature and the animal inside human nature become equally important. (pp. 189-90)

Schmookler (1988) refers to 20th century views of self as a kind of "sick consciousness". From this perspective person is separated from his or her own deeper, instinctive, animal nature. The solution to this separation is the creation of a new consciousness "that is the expression of the harmony and integration that characterized the system of life before civilization" (p. 311). According to Schmookler (1989) the striving for wholeness is inborn. The capacity for human fulfillment, the drive to achieve our potential are not a push for greater individuation, greater separation from our unconscious, our bodies and nature. New consciousness, whole consciousness is discerning that a deep river of "energy that seeks harmony" (p. 85) flourishes within humanity. It is only through creating the conditions to nourish this can humanity achieve wholeness.

Models of social organization

Riane Eisler’s book, The Chalice and the Blade (1987), draws on archaeological data and theories to describe the character and limits of the modernist worldview. She is among a growing number of writers who
suggest that the current sociocultural worldview originated from patriarchal dominator societies of past epochs (Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1980; Capra, 1992). Eisler, writer, researcher, lecturer in women's and cultural issues and attorney, was educated at UCLA and is currently the codirector of the Center for Partnership Studies in Pacific Grove, California. She has been involved in activist issues and feminist scholarship for many years, particularly those involving changing social paradigms and the emerging new vision of reality.

According to Eisler recorded history has not been a simple linear progression from simple to more complex levels of technological and social development, but has been characterized by regressive periods such as the Middle Ages when the dominant culture returned to previous models of social organization. Eisler suggests that this return to previous models of social organization represents an intuitive, cultural recognition that in earlier times there had existed a sociocultural worldview that was far more complex and differently organized than previously thought.

Eisler’s Cultural Transformation Theory proposes that two basic models of society underlie all human cultures: the dominator model and the partnership model. The theory holds that there existed in prehistorical
times a society structured very differently from our present one. Through the use of archaeological data, such as that unearthed of ancient European and Cretan culture by archaeologists Marija Gimbutas (1982), James Mellart (1967, 1975) and Nicolas Platon (1966), Eisler hypothesizes that society was partnership dominated, equalitarian in its social structure and emphasized a joy and celebration of the harmonious relationship between human beings and the natural realm. This societal structure collapsed with the persistent attacks of aggressive bands of nomads who were originally fringe groups to the larger more peaceful society. Though providing no reason for the aggressiveness of these nomadic tribes, Eisler does suggest that their persistent attacks eventually lead to gradual disintegration of the peaceful, nature-centered civilizations and to the emergence of dominator societies. Eisler notes that although the course of cultural evolution since prehistorical times has included various social movements that have variously challenged the dominator model, the underlying assumption of that system has remained in place. The remainder of this section will summarize the assumptions of Eisler’s view of the dominator model.

The first assumption of the dominator model is that
systems evolve linearly from simple to complex forms. This belief has been used to support the notion that present social structure is defined as best because it is the most highly complex. Because the direction of change is from simple to complex and because this is perceived to be a natural process, there is no possible room to question the current structure of society. This belief also excludes the possibility of the existence of a complex and differently organized society in archaic times. To ensure the maintenance of this belief, dominator societies systematically distort, undermine, and destroy the symbols and structures of societal structures different from their own. This has been particularly true in the way dominator societies have emphasized control of women and nature.

Another primary assumption of the dominator society is a social order organized around a hierarchical, ranking process. Hierarchical structure is assumed to be the norm while person-to-person interaction and relationships, if they exist at all, revolve around a one-up/one-down dichotomy. Thus, diversity is equated with either inferiority or superiority with, for example, men ranked over women, light skin color over darker skin color, adults over children, humans over nature and animals, rationality over intuition, consciousness over
sub-consciousness, and logic over myth. Eisler suggests that dominant societies retain hierarchies with force or threat of force. The power of the blade is idealized, in that strength and power are equated with the capacity to destroy. Warfare against persons or nature is redemptive, and power is equated with privilege, oppression and fear.

Following understandably from the above assumption is the dominator society’s emphasis on technologies, particularly those which tend to destroy, dominate and maintain distinctions. Eisler suggests an important distinction between development of technologies applied to peaceful, and sustaining purposes, and technologies developed for destruction, control and violence.

Another assumption of the dominator society deals with the normative form of leadership. According to Eisler, there is an assumption that leadership is in the form of a small elite making decisions for the larger group. Collaborative and participatory leadership is ignored or devalued. Eisler especially focuses on the fact that these elite leadership positions have historically been held by males. Those perceived as strong by virtue of position or influence are most likely to attain leadership positions. Females, members of other groups and those with little status or influence
are not likely to lead.

A final assumption of Eisler’s dominator society is that multivoiced forms of myth, ritual, spirituality and sacredness are excluded from and separate from everyday life. From this perspective, spirituality and sacredness are singularly skewed toward experiences of redemptive violence (Wink, 1991) and coerciveness rather than benevolence and nurturing. This isolated and refracted view of spirituality and sacredness carried with it a presumption that persons are separate from and above nature. Nature is objectified and placed below humans. Belief structures emphasizing feminine and natural spirituality and lifegiving nurturing are replaced with the reverence for death and war as divinely sanctioned.

To this point this chapter has presented Eisler’s and Schmookler’s prehistorical perspectives on the origins and development of what has become known as the modernist worldview. Others have approached this issue with an examination of causal factors and current societal attitudes associated with the modernist view. The following section will present three such critiques central to understanding the modern worldview and its technoscientific paradigm.
Current Configurations of the Modern Worldview

\textbf{Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm}

Fritjof Capra (1982) examines the contemporary values, beliefs and consequences of the modern, scientific paradigm and suggests that its socio-historical underpinnings lie in what he terms the Cartesian-Newtonian Paradigm (p. 15). Capra holds a Ph.d in physics from the University of Vienna and is a writer and lecturer on the philosophical implications of modern science, particularly the parallels between physics and the basic ideas in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. For purposes of this dissertation, emphasis will be on the essential points of Capra's theory rather than on an attempt to fully summarize his complete work.

Capra suggests that between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries a radical shift took place in the way people perceived the world and in the way the world and universe came to be understood. A major part of this shift was a new view of the earth as a machine rather than a living organism. Concomitant with this view was a lofty valuing of mathematical description, analytical reasoning and quantification of objective data. The goal of modern science came to be the acquisition of knowledge that could be used to control and separate nature from human intuition. Sir Francis Bacon, one of the fathers
of the mechanistic viewpoint, writes in his Novum Organum, first published in 1620: "we must therefore completely resolve and separate Nature, not by fire, certainly, but by the mind, which is a kind of divine fire" (Bacon, 1994, p. 169). Capra states of Bacon:

The terms in which Bacon advocated his new empirical method of investigation were not only passionate but often outright vicious. Nature, in his view, had to be "hounded in her wanderings", "bound into service", and made a "slave". She was to be "put in constraint," and the aim of the scientist was to "torture nature’s secrets from her." ...his view of nature as a female whose secrets have to be tortured from her with the help of mechanical devices is strongly suggestive of the widespread torture of women in the witch trials of the early seventeenth century. Bacon’s work thus represents an outstanding example of the influences of patriarchal attitudes on scientific thought. (p.56)

Capra suggests that Cartesian philosophy is the basis for many of the assumptions of the current scientific paradigm. A major presupposition of the Cartesian-Newtonian model is revealed by its process of organizing differences among and between organisms within a hierarchical structure. This general organizing
principle is reflected in, and supported by the belief that mind and matter are separate and that there is no essential sacredness in nature. This point is particularly important, as it represents a shift away from the organic view of nature characterizing previous epochs. From this perspective human consciousness came to be viewed as immaterial; self was set above the rest of nature and above ones bodily processes.

A second major presupposition of the modern, scientific paradigm that has its historical roots in the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is reductionism. Reductionism understands all complex phenomena as being reducible to their smallest parts. Change consists in the rearrangement of the parts, which themselves do not change. The reductionist view was applied to the larger society by philosopher John Locke. Just as Newton’s laws of mechanics were seen to govern the physical universe, Locke attempted to reduce the patterns of social behavior to the behavior of individuals. In his classic *The Second Treatise on Government* (1983) Locke spells out his unqualified belief in the absolute individuality and unrestrained freedom of all persons. He writes:

To understand political power right and derive it from its original, we must consider what state all
men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. (p. 118)

Capra suggests that Locke’s theory was pervasive, having a profound sway over all modern political, economic and social life. He observes:

Locke’s ideas became the basis for the value system of the Enlightenment and had a strong influence on the development of modern economic and political thought. The ideals of individualism, property rights, free markets, and representative government, all of which can be traced back to Locke, contributed significantly to the thinking of Thomas Jefferson and are reflected in the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution. (p.69).

Capra also suggests that one of the major consequences of the mechanistic, reductionist universe of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is the development of technology which contributes to the control, domination and power over others by force. He writes that modernist ideas of science and technology:

... are based on the seventeenth-century belief that
an understanding of nature implies domination of nature by "man." Combined with the mechanistic model of the universe, which also originated in the seventeenth century, and with excessive emphasis on linear thinking, this attitude has produced a technology that is unhealthy and inhuman; a technology in which the natural, organic habitat of complex human beings is replaced by a simplified, synthetic, and prefabricated environment. (p. 44)

**Christianity and alienation**

Capra has identified the values, beliefs and consequences of the Cartesian-Newtonian framework as a significant historical contributor to the modern scientific paradigm. From Capra’s perspective the assumptions of the Cartesian-Newtonian model have separated individuals and society from themselves and from the essential sacredness of nature. While Capra suggests the historical roots of humanity’s current alienation lie in the mechanistic worldview, others have suggested that the historical roots of modern alienation, particularly human/nature alienation, lie in the powerfully exploitive and dominating character of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

This association between Judaeo-Christian beliefs and the modern separation from nature was raised
originally and forcefully by then U.C.L.A. professor and historian Lynn White Jr. in his 1967 article *The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis* (1973). White’s critique of the Judaeo-Christian heritage has met with substantial criticism by those who suggest that the Judaeo-Christian tradition does not consistently or unanimously adopt a negative attitude toward nature and to suggest such represents a simplistic and mischaracterized understanding of the historical and canonical data (Dubos, 1973; Passmore, 1974; Santmire, 1985; Cohen, 1989; Attfield, 1991; Kinsley, 1995). His ideas have, however, added important initial insight into understanding the philosophical and religious orientations and values giving raise to modernist conceptions of the relationship between person and environment.

White indicts the Judaeo-Christian tradition as encouraging both social and ecological exploitation by rejecting a much earlier pagan worldview in which nature is inhabited by spirits which humankind relied upon to inform their view of human/nature interaction. According to White (1973):

Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion that the world has seen....Christianity, in absolute contrast to
ancient paganism and Asia's religions...not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends. (p. 25)

In the view of White popular religion of antiquity was animistic. "Every tree, every spring, every stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit" (p. 25). Before one could cut a tree or alter nature in any way the spirit in charge of that particular entity or place had to be assuaged. Christianity, White argues, desacralized nature thus encouraging its exploitation by humans who were seen as separate from nature and superior to it. In opposing and destroying pagan animism "Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects" (p. 25). It replaced all the old gods, many of whom were nature deities, and to a great extent demystified nature making it nonsacred and a passive resource to be controlled and manipulated by human beings.

White claims that modernism and its techno-scientific paradigm are in large measure a logical result of Christianity's insolent view of nature. Christianity's predisposition to desacralize nature laid the foundation for the rise of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm and the resulting scientific and technological
manipulation of nature. White notes that the modern and distinctively Western version of science and technology are permeated with a religious, particularly Judaeo-Christian, justification of human dominance over and arrogance toward nature. He writes:

From the 13th century onward, up to and including Leibnitz and Newton, every major scientist, in effect, explained his motivations in religious terms. Indeed, if Galileo had not been so expert an amateur theologian he would have got into far less trouble: the professionals resented his intrusion. And Newton seems to have regarded himself more as a theologian than as a scientist. It was not until the late 18th century that the hypothesis of God became unnecessary to many scientists. (White, 1973, p. 27).

There are several key passages (The Holy Bible, 1952) in the Old Testament that White alludes to as supporting a view of the world created primarily, if not exclusively, for human purposes. They are (1) Genesis 1:26-29, in which God says to men to "fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over...every living thing that moves upon the earth", (2) Genesis 9:1-3, in which God says to Noah and his descendants "the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast...every moving
thing that lives shall be food for you: and as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything", and (3) Psalms 8:5-8, in which the Psalmist praises God’s creation of mankind by saying "thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honor. Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet".

For White, these passages suggest a view of reality in which God is primarily interested in human beings and delegates to them mastery over his natural creation. Nature becomes a mere backdrop for the more fundamentally important human-to-human or human-to-divine interplay. White suggests that the human-centered essence of these passages are almost universally, though perhaps unacknowledged or unconsciously, accepted by the Christian as well as the so called "post-Christian" era (p. 24). He further argues that this religiously justified domination of nature permeates all western socio-political ideologies. For White Capitalism as well as Marxism are essentially Judaeo-Christian heresies because, despite apparent differences, both are rooted in a antinaturalist, anthropocentric Judaeo-Christian teleology. Referring to this pervasiveness White notes:

Certainly the forms of our thinking and language have largely ceased to be Christian, but to my eye
the substance often remains amazingly akin to that of the past....We continue today to live, as we have lived for about 1700 years, very largely in a context of Christian axioms. (p. 24)

White (1973) concludes that the modernist project's science and technology, irrespective of what socio-political ideology embraces them, offers no singular solution to the current crisis of person and environment. "Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not" (p. 30). White’s alternatives are to disavow any ongoing allegiance to orthodox Christianity and its "axiom that nature has no reason for existence save to serve man" (p. 29), or to attempt to reform Christianity ecologically by returning to or affirming a minority tradition existing within Christianity which valued the essential and positive interrelationship between the divine, humanity, and nature. For White this minority tradition is best represented in the life and works of St. Francis of Assisi.

**Technology and contemporary life**

In the following section the researcher will summarize Albert Borgmann’s (1984) theory of the technological character of modern life and offer some
suggestions concerning its impact on the way humanity understands its relationship to nature. Borgmann is a writer and teacher of philosophy. He received his Ph.d in philosophy from the University of Munich in 1963. He has been a faculty member at the University of Illinois, De Paul University, the University of Hawaii and is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Montana. Borgmann has been most influenced in his thought by Martin Heidegger and John Rawls. He has been involved in refining his theory of technology which builds on Heidegger's insights and the commitment to justice exemplified by Rawls.

Borgmann points out that critique of technology must not be centered on understanding the nature of research and development and machines in a narrow sense but rather on what, from a philosophical view, is the significance of technology. The significance of technology is best brought out through a consideration of "the antecedents and consequences of applied science and engineering" (p.8).

Borgmann argues that an antecedent social agreement precedes technological development both historically and logically. Historically, the character of this agreement shows up in the writings of Bacon and Descartes as a promise of liberation, enrichment and conquest of all
scourges of humanity. This promise of technology is taken "to mean that implied in the technological mode of taking up with the world there is a promise that this approach to reality will, by way of domination of nature, yield liberation and enrichment" (p. 41).

Borgmann does not question this aspiration for liberty and enrichment but rather the technological means by which the promise is realized. For Borgmann means are associated with the technological device to be distinguished from the more essential and somewhat pre-technological thing.

What are a device and a thing? The most fundamental and important feature of the device is that unlike a thing, a device divides sharply and exclusively into means and an end. Machinery is the means of a device while the commodity is its end. A device's only purpose is to secure a commodity in the simplest most efficient way possible. On the other hand "a thing is inseparable from its context, namely its world, and from our commerce with the things and its world, namely engagement" (p. 41). A thing has a context which makes certain claims and demands on us in a way which goes beyond the simple procurement of a commodity. It demands our engagement on many levels.

Borgmann illustrates the association between
devices, things and commodities by drawing on the examples of the connection between a stove, central heat and warmth. A wood burning stove is a thing which produces warmth but it is more than a mere means of warmth. The uniqueness of a thing is described by Borgmann:

The experience of a thing is always and also a bodily and social engagement with the thing’s world... Thus a stove is used to furnish more than mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a family and gave the house a center. Its coldness marked the morning, and the spreading of its warmth marked the beginning of the day. It assigned to various family members tasks that defined their place in the household... It provided the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together with the threat of cold and the solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of sawing and carrying, the teaching of skills and the fidelity to daily tasks... Physical engagement is not simply physical contact but the experience of the world through the manifold sensibility of the body. That sensibility is sharpened and strengthened in skill. Skill is
intensive and refined world engagement. (p. 42).

A device transforms a thing by transforming our experience of engagement with it and thus drawing our attention solely toward the commodity. Central heating is a device which transforms the simple stove. It amplifies the warmth, the commodity because it is so easily expanded with little or no effort. Warmth stands out, is focused upon and draws our attention. It alone remains crucial to our well being.

The transformation of a thing into a device not only amplifies the commodity, pushing all other experiences into the background. Central heat reduces the features associated with the stove. They withdraw into the background, unnoticed. Borgmann suggests that not only are they overlooked and misplaced into the recesses of unconsciousness, they tend to be repressively withdrawn into a ontological unfamiliarity, perhaps irretrievably.

If warmth is taken to be what the device is for, then progress, as the standard of technological advancement, is simply the replacement of one means for the procurement of the same end. Means are "better means" of accomplishing the same end but in a less burdensome way. The commodity is less burdensome if it meets the standard of being easier, safer, more ubiquitous and more instantaneous. It can be a burden to
chop and haul wood, build a fire, wait for the room to warm, attend to the dangers of a wood-burning stove, or not to have the room or whole house uniformly warm. The goal of technology becomes the procurement of commodities with no strings or burdens attached. Paradoxically, the ongoing adjustment of devices tends to make them "inconspicuous", while, at the same time inculcating the attitude that commodities are readily available and accessible. The amplified foreground of the commodity, mere warmth, has expanded and increased in prominence by becoming free of all limits of space, time, danger and availability, and free of all burdens of skill, exertion and attention.

Borgmann argues that mere warmth, no matter how expanded this commodity has become, is not a substitute for the thing of the stove. In fact as warmth becomes ubiquitous throughout the house, it fails to provide a focus and becomes no substitute for the thing because it lacks a world with its demand for engagement. Mere warmth cannot become the essence of a house because it does not warrant our attention and care. Transformation of the thing into a device does not merely tend to obscure possibilities of experience, rather its very structure makes rich experience impossible.

Borgmann’s thing-device distinction and his critical
description of the ways devices call for consumption, and nothing more, becomes more than a matter of psychological interest. At their core, the structure and construction of devices create a compelling challenge to the very essence of our existence. Here the matter becomes ontological rather than psychological.

In unburdening us, technological devices disengage us from a profound depth of interest in the natural world and establish the ground from which the normal operation of existence is viewed. This way of splitting means and ends -- devices and commodities -- and ontologically reshaping existence into the model of a device, patterns human relationships, organizations, institutions, structures of civilization, professional practices, and the ways nature and culture are arranged and accessed.

To move within the realm of devices and commodities is then entirely normal, and to exchange the engagement with things for the consumption of commodities is to extend the range of normalcy...Living in an advanced industrial country, one is always and already implicated in technology so profoundly and extensively that one’s involvement normally remains implicit. The rule of technology is not the reign of a substantive force people would bear with resentment or resistance. Rather
technology is the rule today in constituting the conspicuous pattern by which we normally orient ourselves. (pp. 104-5).

Borgmann’s argument is not that we presently live in the midst of technological totalitarianism, but rather that the range of normalcy is changing as we make more decisions for consumption and against engagement. In doing this the pervasiveness of the devices pattern becomes so entrenched that few contrasts or visions exist to set off the current pattern or suggest alternatives. Our ontological ground becomes disengagement, separation, the essential annihilation of the thing.

The implications of Borgmann’s theory are stunning. Because our basic daily orientation is that of consumption through the patterned use of devices, the central concerns of the modernist mindset become those of a preoccupation with economic contrivances such as gross national product. Modern technology cultivates an outlook on government and social services as metadevices whose ends are to unburden us from personal engagement in our own, as well as other’s, human fulfillment. Borgmann also suggests that the technological paradigm has contributed to an absence of genuine class struggle and the persistence of social and economic inequality. In the end, modern technology prescribes our discourse and
agenda, informs our theories of social order, and determines our values.

Summary of Assumptions of the Modernist Worldview

A summary of the assumptions of the modernist worldview and its related scientific and technological paradigms is drawn from integrating the perspectives of the various theorists presented above. The intent is to aid the reader in perceiving and examining the different facets of the modernist worldview. In chapter three these will be used to provide a socio-historical backdrop for understanding the development and current constellation of social work's person-in-environment perspective. It is important to note that modernism, like most systems, consists of a complex web of non-linear interrelationships which do not easily lend themselves to concise presentation. Consequently, there is some overlap among the concepts since many of the beliefs and assumptions mutually influence one another.

A worldview is defined as a set of beliefs, values and assumptions held by a group of persons, which organizes their perceptions of the world around them. In examining the previous theorists, two overarching maxims appear to characterize the modernist worldview: (1) a hierarchical, dualistic conceptual framework, and (2) an overvaluation of personal, environmental and
technological capacity.

The modernist worldview rests upon a basic assumption that relationships exist within a hierarchical, dualistic framework (Capra, 1982; Schmookler, 1984, 1988, 1989; Eisler, 1987). This maxim holds that the natural progression of all systems is linear, from simple to complex (Capra, 1982, Eisler, 1987; Berman, 1984). This view purports to make sense of reality by oversimplifying complex situations and seeking to understand differences between things through a sorting and ranking process. Consequently, interrelationships are seen from a dualistic up/down, above/under, win/lose frame of reference which excludes the possibility of more communal processes.

Hierarchy is intimately related to the process of emphasizing separateness over connectedness. It produces the ranking of the process of separateness over connectedness. These two concepts weave through a number of modernism’s beliefs and assumptions. Capra (1982) points out than mind and matter are separated, that mind is valued over matter, that analytic thinking is valued over intuitive thought. Persons are viewed as separate from and above the natural environment (White, 1973; Capra, 1982; Eisler, 1987, Berman, 1984, Rifkin, 1991). Complex phenomena are seen through a reductionist lens
which contracts the separate parts and uses them to explain the behavior of the whole (Capra, 1982; Colwell, 1987; McKibben, 1989). This process consequently emphasizes the development of human selves which are separate from others, their own animism, and from nature itself. Perception of self is, thus, split into categorized parts as being of greater or lesser value. Bodily functions are associated with nature and are perceived as dirty or of only secondary importance to the mind. Such individualized selves are characterized by self absorption, lack of concern for other humans and other species and preoccupation with the present generation and those closest to the individual (Ehrenfeld, 1981; Wilber, 1980, 1981, 1986; Milbrath, 1984; Gergen, 1991). Kanner and Gomes (1995 p. 77) call this self-centered, modernist personality the "all-consuming" self, while Lasch (1984, p.16) prefers the "minimal self" to describe the character of the modern individual. Devall (1995) traces the contours of the minimal self:

The minimal self has contracted to a defensive core concerned primarily with psychic survival and making a good impression on certain significant people - bosses, clients, potential sexual partners. Seeing the problems of living in modern times - crime,
increasing air and water pollution, terrorism, long-term economic decline, nuclear arms race, cynicism in major institutions in society - the minimal self prepares for the siege, retreats to private pleasure domes and withdraws from community service or any form of commitment....Rootless, alienated from human community and from wild nature, from the will-of-the-land, besieged with propaganda from scientists...that nature should be controlled by human technology, the goal of the minimal self is survival, not personal growth. (p.112)

Hierarchial separation is also reflected in the splitting off of spirituality and sacredness from nature and the concerns of everyday existence (White, 1973; Capra, 1984; Eisler, 1987; Fox, 1995).

The second overarching maxim which appears to characterize the modernist worldview is the process of overvaluation of personal, environmental and technological capacity. A number of assumptions and beliefs of modernism may be seen to be characterized by a process of overvaluation.

First, there is a belief in unlimited resource capacity (Capra, 1984; Borgmann, 1984; Milbrath, 1984; Myers, 1993). From this perspective, humans are entitled to control and exhaust resources, including anything non-
human and some categories of humans judged to be non-human (McLaughlin, 1993; Singer, 1994). Related to this is the belief that because of humankind’s superior status relative to other beings, there is infinite capacity for growth. This stance denies population problems (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990) while emphasizing production, economic consumption and a steady pattern of progress. Because growth has become associated with progress, it implies an inevitability to changes and eliminates the possibility of considering alternatives to modern society’s current direction. This perspective is clearly illustrated in Jeremy Rifkin’s (1985) discussion of the decision to split the atom:

Even if the harm has exceeded the benefits, ... to say no to splitting the atom seems unthinkable ... Our mind simply will not allow us to say no to the splitting of the atom, despite what we know about where that decision has led. It’s as if we are compelled by some sacred pact, some higher form of allegiance we all share, to make the decisions to go ahead, even against our own best judgment. Our instincts might well stir us to saying no, but the rational side, our conscious mind says we must, we have no choice, it is fated, there is no alternative, it is our burden to bear. To say no is
to condemn everything we hold dear. To reject the experiment is to threaten our world view, to question our approach to knowledge and to undermine our traditional relationship to technology. We are convinced that in saying no, we would be giving up the dream that has sustained so many generations, the dream of unfettered progress, the dream of building our own earthly eden. (pp. 30-1)

A second set of beliefs reflecting the process of overvaluation may be seen in the inflated view of human capacity. Nested in this notion is the belief that humans can choose whatever goals they want by rational, logical and objective processes and learn to acquire whatever is needed to accomplish them. Nothing is impossible for human progress, given enough time, study and favorable economic conditions (Berry, 1977; Spangler, 1984; Schwartz, 1986). It has become increasingly clear that vaunted belief in human capacity and the denial of human limits has often been accompanied by tragic consequences for humans and for the natural domain.

Technological development and science are also related to the process of overvaluing capacity. Milbrath (1989) cites the belief in science and technology as a kind of sanctifying balm to modern society because of its stated ability to predict and control and to turn this
into swift development of products that maximize usefulness and efficiency. Technological mentality and structure, which Ellul (1964) calls technique, has not only pervaded industrial processes, but also all social, political and economic life. It has its own inherent logic and inner necessity which coalesces into a kind of technological determinism since it is self-perpetuating, all-pervasive and inescapable. In modern society, a legitimate concern for material necessity quickly becomes a frantic pursuit of comfort, a total dedication to self-gratification (Gilkey, 1970; Winner, 1977, 1986). Such an obsession with devices distorts our basic values as well as our relationships with nature and other persons. It leads to a abridgement of imaginative experience and authentic human existence requiring the engagement and depth that occur when simple things and practices focus our attention and center our lives (Borgmann, 1984). Overvaluing science and technology generates a quest for unlimited power which in the final analysis becomes imperialistic and addictive.

The optimists may think that, by fulfilling our material needs, technology liberates us from materialism and allows us to turn to intellectual, artistic, and spiritual pursuits. But it does not seem to be working out that way. Our material wants
have escalated and appear insatiable. Yesterday’s luxuries are today’s necessities... Once we allow technology to define the good life, we have excluded many important human values from consideration (Barbour, 1993, p. 14).

This chapter has described the major assumptions of the modernist worldview. A central theme which has emerged as a consequence of the assimilation of the assumptions of the modernist mindset is the sense of alienation, isolation and separation experienced by people and, as we shall see, by institutions as they accommodate themselves to the dominant paradigm. Current, western culture has adopted a belief system which alienates humanity from the remainder of nature. This belief system has become so ingrained that it has not only separated humanity into single individuals but has separated each individual’s intellect (rationality) from the rest of him/her self. Almost nothing has escaped the pervasive influence of the modernist worldview. It has changed the very face of reality. It has altered nearly all facets of life in the western tradition. This can be seen in the development of the social sciences and in particular the development of social work.

The following chapter will articulate the
development of social work's conventional idea of person and environment and trace the current status of these concepts within the socio-cultural backdrop of modernism. It will utilize the insights gained in the current chapter to understand the contextual development of these constructs. Chapters two and three, together, will form the basis of the background literature review for this dissertation.
CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF SOCIAL WORK’S PERSON AND ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTS

Social work’s ideas about person and environment have been shaped by many factors. The current chapter consists of a contextual review of the development of the concepts of person and environment within social work. Structuring this review is the assumption that conceptual development is not simply the deliberate and collective contemplation of influential leaders but is, in fact, influenced by the socio-cultural contexts in which such concepts arise (Barthes, 1979; Weick, 1981; Megill, 1985; Poster, 1990; Fillingham, 1993; Kemp, 1994) including as well political differences and conflicts within the profession. This chapter situates social work discourse on person and environment within this broader context.

The current chapter is organized around two general themes: (1) tracing the conventional idea of person and environment constructs as they developed during the beginnings of the profession, and (2) sketching the status of these constructs as they are currently conceptualized. It is important for the reader to keep in mind that though this chapter is loosely framed around historical periods, it would be inappropriate to assume that the selected ideas discussed as emanating from a
particular period represent the totality of pertinent meanings.

Conventional Ideas of Person and Environment

The early years

The rapid industrialization, urbanization, territorial expansion and economic uncertainty which marked the post-Civil War period was a time of great change in American culture. But change does not come without great human and social cost. Though spurred by unblemished confidence in the notion of industrial progress, frontier minded individualism and the belief in self sufficiency, these heady ideas were gradually coming under increasing criticism (Bremmer, 1956; Axinn & Levin, 1975; Boyer, 1978).

"Prior to industrialization, most people lived in communities with an array of institutions that afforded a high degree of self-sufficiency. Survival necessitated a degree of solidarity, or interdependence, that was taken as a law of nature" (Karger & Stoesz, 1990, p.35). Social welfare in America during this period was largely viewed as the responsibility of private efforts to enhance the welfare of the community. Reliance on voluntary associations to solve problems characterized nineteenth century relief efforts. Poverty was viewed as a limited though inevitable result of the economic
structure, but with faith and effort individual opportunities existed within the economic system for many if not most to overcome its restrictive bounds (Kemp, 1994). It was "pauperism rather than poverty as such" (Spano, 1982, p.12) which captured the attention of many involved in relief efforts. Pauperism was thought to be more widespread than poverty and existed more or less independent of the economic system. It was thought to result from some defect in individual character such as drunkenness, idleness or moral laxity and was best enervated through personal rehabilitation (Bremmer, 1956; Chambers & Hinding, 1968; Spano, 1982; Franklin, 1990; Kemp, 1994).

As population increased, the magnitude of an escalating number of social problems could no longer be easily attributed to lack of effort or individual defect. Spano (1982) summarizes the changing social organization:

Due to this tremendous growth, cities faced nearly overwhelming problems in housing, health, sanitation, crime, unemployment, transportation and poor relief. The existing social institutions lacked both the technological capacities and the philosophical foundations to cope with these problems. The combination of sheer numbers, combined with the heterogeneity of the new arrivals
in American cities, increased the complexity of the problems and the frantic search for their solutions (p.14).

The ideas that evolved from this national reappraisal coalesced into an identifiable entity commonly thought of as the Progressive Movement (Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 1967; Leiby, 1978; Spano, 1982). It was the Progressive Era which also shaped the identity and purposes of the emerging profession of social work and determined the contours of social work's early understanding of person and environment.

The progressive era

What evolved during the Progressive Era was a robust belief in the environment as a powerful and dynamic force shaping human development. Concomitant with this reform-minded thinking on environment was a growing conviction that persons had the inherent capacities to achieve positive change through a deliberate modification of their environment (Goldman, 1977). This emerging focus on change through personal capacity and environmental reform however was limited in scope. Though it shifted attention from individual deficiency and passive adaptation toward the impact of environmental factors and the individual's capacity to change them, Progressive reform tended to restrict its views of environment to
very limited social and economic factors (Kemp, 1994).

This is not to say that this era’s views of environment were exclusively defined in such narrow bands. The romantic view of primitive or preindustrial modes of living as attractive alternatives to the prevailing progress-oriented, mechanistic worldview found expression in the works of early twentieth-century writers. D.H. Lawrence, William D. Howells, and Jack London among others began to speak of nature as unity, as an organism which has value for its own sake, where persons are seen as one coequal partner in the process of emergence of the whole (Janik, 1981). In 1913, Lawrence proclaimed his dissatisfaction with Western culture’s proclivity for splitting mind from body:

My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what our blood feels and believes and says, is always true. The intellect is only a bit and a bridle. (cited in Sola Pinto & Roberts, 1971, p. 268)

In addition to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century romantic novelists’ perspective, naturalistic views of environment were also prevalent in the works of the two great preservation and conservation writers of the period; John Muir (1838-1914), and Gifford
Pinchot (1865-1946). It would be hard to imagine two men with like goals more different in specific ideology and philosophy. Much of Muir's nature consciousness was shaped by his appropriation of Transcendentalist ideas of the natural world (Fox, 1981; Nash, 1989). Nourished by his reading of Emerson and Thoreau, as well as by his years of personal wilderness experience, Muir believed in trying to merge his consciousness with nature, to seek unity in its complexity (Cohen, 1984). Nature, Muir wrote in My First Summer in the Sierra (1911) is a "window opening into heaven, a mirror reflecting the Creator" (Nash, 1982, p.125). For Muir, it was a dangerous heresy to measure the natural world by its utility for humanity. Instead, he affirmed that there was inherent value in all organic and inorganic forms.

Muir's actions focused on educating the eastern establishment to protecting and preserving western wilderness (Nash, 1982). By the turn of the century Muir had become the primary spokesperson for this cause. As one historian has noted "Muir promoted his cause with the passion of a zealot, for to him nature was a sacred reservoir that must be preserved for future generations...He believed that by shedding the artificialities of civilized society and penetrating the wild one could experience the rapture of Divine presence"
Muir’s efforts were important in helping create national parks and in establishing a forum for urban nature enthusiasts. His challenge was not simply to the newly emerging scientific management of wilderness, but was indeed aimed at the entire belief system about the relationship of humans and nature that had prevailed in the Western world since the time of the ancient Greeks (Rodman, 1983).

Muir’s philosophy stands in sharp contrast to that of Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot was primarily concerned with the protection of natural resources for practical use by future generations. His ethic was driven by utilitarian ideas and infused with principles of scientific management and genetic improvement. It emerged in large part as an attempt to constrain the wholesale destructive impact of individuals and corporations who exploited nature for profit without sufficient regard for the larger social good or welfare of future generations (Rodman, 1983; Sessions, 1995). Pinchot had no illusions concerning the deeper meaning of nature, so unabashedly trumpeted by Muir. To his mind there were only two relevant, guiding interests to be considered: "humans and natural resources" (Fox, 1981, p. 22). Pinchot vigorously opposed the allocation of land for parks and other noncommercial purposes. He played a major role in
establishing the dominant mood concerning the management of natural resources in the progressive era as efficient, scientific, professionalized, economic development (Hays, 1959; O’Neil, 1976).

The clash of the romantic and modernistic ideologies represented by Muir’s and Pinchot’s positions was dramatized in their fight over the Hetch Hetchy Dam project near San Francisco from 1902 through 1913. Essentially the dispute entailed whether the Tuolumne River of Yosemite Park should be dammed in order to provide power and water for the burgeoning population of San Francisco (Jones, 1964; Nash, 1982). Allied with the persuasive force of President Theodore Roosevelt’s commitment to Manifest Destiny and his disdain for sentimental views of nature, Pinchot’s side won, and Congress passed the Baker Act granting the city its rights to the water and the dam (Worster, 1973, 1985).

The victory of Pinchot over Muir established the contours of American views on the natural environment during the later Progressive era and for many decades to come. It legislated and legitimized the modern, industrial era’s faith in science and technology in the service of human needs (Kasson, 1976). Hetch Hetchy became the proxy fight for a battle of competing moral visions. The lines were drawn between nature as a moral
or an economic resource. The latter had ultimately won because Americans of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had become increasingly ambivalent about nature and increasingly enamored with the prospects of the modernist project. Quite willing to control nature, they at the same time sought to reform its unscientific and wholesale exploitation and to preserve a certain portion of it (Kasson, 1976). Wise use, it was believed, would assure its availability for both agendas (Murphy, 1967).

This overvaluation of environmental and technological capacity, core maxims of modernist ideology, increasingly moved the natural environment into the background of the American psyche. It was believed to be in the good hands of scientific, technocratic managers. To the foreground emerged the humanistic, existential principles of environment which passed over nature in favor of the mitwelt—the social world—and the eigenwelt—the personal world. The natural world was oversimplified by simple linear thinking and explained in reductionist terms. Individuals and the social world became separate from and above the natural environment. It was "understood to be little more than the sum total of thwarting physical necessities" (Roszak, 1992, p.65).

It was into this world that the newly emerging
profession of social work was born. The Progressive Era was a conflicting mix of fear, dissatisfaction, reform and rising confidence. While reformers condemned the social and economic consequences of industrialism:

...the spokesmen for this new revolt against the system accepted its central premise--the need for technology to flourish unchecked and to dominate the economy and the life of the nation. This ambivalence was the essence of the movement that come to be known as progressivism. The adherents of progressivism differed on many issues, but all were united in the belief that it was too late for society to reject industrialism. (Ferkiss, 1993, p.99)

The social work profession emerges

Conventional ideas of person, environment and their relationship within social work can best be understood by viewing these concepts within the framework of social work’s early history. This early history is the story of the evolution of two organizational movements which assumed the major share of responsibility for social welfare during the rapidly expanding industrial era- Charity Organization Societies and Settlement Houses.

Charity Organization Societies (COS) began as an effort to coordinate relief giving by operating
community-wide registration bureaus in order to provide direct relief and education for both the poor and the upper class (Lieby, 1978). The work of COS was carried out by volunteer committees which examined needy applicants and decided upon a course of action. Friendly visitors had the task of investigating the circumstances surrounding the applicants' needs and to instruct the poor in ways to better manage their lives (Lubove, 1971). The belief that the poor were morally responsible for their own circumstances is unmistakable. Chambers and Hinding (1968) point out that friendly visiting was driven by a fear of the early leaders of the COS that providing relief solely on the basis of expressed need separated from the question of worthiness would undermine the structural foundations of economic capitalism and would be practically very difficult to control. Relief was to be dispensed "only when starvation was imminent" (Axinn & Levin, 1975), for as Alexander Johnson (1901) decried "the first taste of alms is often like a tiger's first taste of blood" (cited in Kemp, 1994, p. 68).

Though friendly visiting was the heart and soul (Paine, 1901) of the COS, its intellectual grounding rested clearly in the scientific paradigm. Scientific charity stressed rationality, efficiency, and careful investigation by committed observers (Chambers & Hinding,
1968). Science, particularly the emerging social sciences, was thought to offer the best chance of bringing order and control to the uncertain and dramatically changing social environment. It was thought that the scientific enterprise could be harnessed to the service of society (Bannister, 1987).

Social workers and others of their day saw no inherent conflict between the reformist impulse and the scientific endeavor. They were not viewed as incompatible (Fitzpatrick, 1990; Kemp, 1994). Many social scientists, particularly sociologists, were committed to social reform and many volunteered for the COS and the settlement houses (Ross, 1991). The interesting relationship between social work and what was then still conceived to be an applied sociology has been often considered (Diner, 1980; Spano, 1982; Deegan, 1988; Ross, 1991). For a time prior to World War I the stark objectivism and the inherent hierarchial dualism so characteristic of modern natural sciences had not yet embedded themselves into the social sciences.

By the early 1900s, COS workers became increasingly aware that the abysmal urban conditions so rampant during this time could not simply be attributed to faulty character. As one charity leader said, "I have done some psychological reading and I have still to find a single
author who is willing to agree that hunger is psychical..." (Frankel, 1901, p.382). Gradually, COS leaders began to acknowledge weaknesses in the friendly visiting model. In its place arose the belief that poverty was a function of environmental circumstances (Stadum, 1990; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989).

Although not making explicit mention of Pinchot, the general influence of reform environmentalism on much of early, modern society is suggested in many of the early writings of COS leadership. Edward Devine (1906) chided the charity movement "...with not having at all appreciated the importance of the environmental causes of distress, with having fixed their attention far too much upon personal weakness" (cited in Kemp, 1994, p. 79). Porter Lee (1911) argued that the foundation of social casework rested in environmental change.

Central to this new environmental awareness was the contribution of Mary Richmond (1861-1928), one of social work’s most ardent and influential spokespersons. Richmond’s extensive writings give us keen insight into the forces beginning to shape the social work profession’s views of person and environment. When Richmond wrote Social Diagnosis in 1917, she was concerned with responding to a growing desire among many social workers to "...abandon claims of respect based on
good intentions alone..." (p.25).

Though initially defensive regarding Abraham Flexner’s (1915) judgement that social work was based on something less than the independent, self-generated, and positivist derived knowledge typical of the major professions of law and medicine, Richmond tended to accepted Flexner’s conclusions. She was instrumental in advocating professional training and in developing professional associations patterned on the positivist paradigm proposed by Flexner (Lieby, 1978, Austin, 1983). She defined the purposes of social casework as dualistically involving attention to the individual as well as his or her environmental context. Casework was "...doing different things for and with different people by cooperating with them to achieve at one and the same time their own and society’s betterment" (Richmond, 1917, p. 43).

Richmond framed her specification of casework by adopting the medical study-diagnosis-treatment model (Woodrooffe, 1968; Germain, 1970). Study and diagnosis together constituted social diagnosis which she defined as:

...the attempt to make as exact definition as possible of the situation and personality of a human being in some social need-of his situation and
personality, that is, in relation to the other human beings upon whom he in any way depends or who depend upon him, and in relation to the social institutions in his community (Richmond, 1917, p. 363).

While *Social Diagnosis* (1917) concentrated on issues of adjustment within the larger rubric of social environment, Richmond also sought to identify what she meant by person. Richmond's notion of the wider self connected the person with a matrix of influences within the social environment (Germain, 1970). Self was viewed as the sum of one's social relationships. The focus of intervention for Richmond was therefore at the level of interaction between external circumstances and the socially emergent self (Deegan, 1988). This idea of personality was more fully explicated in Richmond's second comprehensive work *What is Social Case Work?* (1922). By this time Richmond was increasingly aware that forces both within and outside social work were moving the profession inexorably toward a very bounded, exclusively psychological definition of person.

Reiterating her commitment to the wider self--as personality socially constructed--Richmond suggested that personality:

signifies not only all that is native and individual to a man [sic], but all that comes to him by way of
education, experience, and human intercourse...it is
our personality which relates us closely to our
human kind; to all the communities and institutions
he has developed (Richmond, 1922, p.92).

Expanding further on her social view of personality, she
writes:

...we all need to get rid of whatever vestige of an
idea still remains with us that a man's [sic] mind
is somewhere in his head...a man's [sic] mental
makeup is the sum of his natural endowment and his
social experiences and contacts up to that time.
(Richmond, 1922, p. 131)

At the center of the COS movement was the belief
that services should be fashioned around the specific
needs of individuals. It is also true that by this time
the COS movement was talking almost exclusively of the
social environment when they spoke of environmental
factors. Mary Richmond took this idea and built a
contextualized definition of need which recongnized the
social and internal environment as the most influencial
forces. Neither Richmond nor the COS movement were able,
however, to completly abandon the deep well of older
tradition that located individual responsibility of the
person for her or his own circumstances (Kemp, 1994).
Although deeply knowledgeable about the environmental
circumstances of clients, their interest began and ended with the study, diagnosis and treatment of the individual.

The second organizational movement which assumed a major share of responsibility for social welfare in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were settlement houses. The Settlement House movement like that of the COS was a response to the urban, industrial conditions of the times. Unlike the COS however, settlements were expressly different in structure and orientation (Chambers, 1962, 1963; Trattner, 1989). Settlement houses were established in immigrant neighborhoods by educated young men and women who themselves moved into the slums as residents. Their model was not that of friendly visiting but rather was infused with a genuine desire to bridge class differences and to develop a less patronizing form of charity (Trolander, 1987). A distinctive form of liberal Christianity and socialism were fused to form the basis of the settlements' unique outlook (May, 1977; Szasz, 1982).

The environment, not the individual, was the locus of change for the settlers. In a address to the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, Jane Addams (1904) suggested that families experience great
difficulty not because of defective character but as a result of "influences from the outside" (p.457). Manthey (1989) writes of the settlement movement:

The environment was both the cause and the healing agent of social problems. Social, economic and political factors had to be taken into account in understanding social problems. In contrast to the position of the charity organization societies, the settlement believed that the government had a responsibility to improve the environment. The neighborhood was viewed as a laboratory for social study. The settlements were concerned with creating a healing environment by educating the immigrant in literature, poetry, and the arts...recreation and leisure time activities (pp. 106-107).

Methodologically, the settlement movement was oriented toward group change rather than individual adjustment. The focus of change rested in the collective as the source of community development (Boyer, 1978). Mutuality and shared responsibility and the desire to harness the social initiative of the poor was a driving force behind the settlements (Leiby, 1978). While not rejecting individual services to the poor, the settlements were essentially reform oriented. Like the COS the settlement movement thought of the environment in
relatively restricted ways. While the COS tended to see environment as immediate social circumstances filtered through the lens of individual character, the settlers viewed environment as the larger economic, political, social situation refined through group organization.

The ascendancy of Jane Addams to the presidency of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections in 1910 marked a figurative turn to environmental factors as the center of change activity and suggested an "increasing commonality between the charities and the settlements" (Kemp, 1994, p. 80). Addams remarked, "It is as if the Charitable had been brought, through the care of the individual, to a contemplation of social causes, and as if the Radical had been forced to test his social doctrine by a sympathetic observation of actual people" (Addams, 1910, p.1). Although the philosophy and methodology of the COS and the Settlements were in many ways markedly different, the differences were more rhetorical than substantive relative to how each understood the constructs of person and environment.

The early history of social work, especially during the Progressive era, was pivotal to its developing conceptualizations of person and environment. The COS and the Settlements, though often involved in rancorous discord relative to the delivery of services, clearly...
established a philosophical link between the person and environment. The work and writings of their leaders, especially Richmond and Addams, established the parameters for social work's ongoing dual concern for both constructs. At the same time the seed was planted which bore fruit in a continuous, almost exclusive neglect of the natural element of environment and failure to develop a more expansive sense of person in relationship to it.

It would be unwise and unjustified to assume that this tendency to ignore nature and limit person was somehow a deliberate attempt to subvert a more fully cultivated and extended view of professional development. Mary Richmond, Jane Addams and their fellow social workers were creatures of their times (Kemp, 1994). They operated within the cultural framework of their day. Though marked by reformist fervor and environmental concern the view of nature in the Progressive era was largely framed in Pinchotian terms. Early social workers were clearly involved in limited ways with issues of natural environment (Brandt, 1910; Kellogg & Harrison, 1910; Lovejoy, 1911) and the constructed physical environment (Kelly, 1895; Sanborn, 1898; Deforest & Veiller, 1903; Addams, 1909; McDowell, 1917), but this represented an application of the rational
instrumentalist, scientific conservationism so dominate
during this time (Rodman, 1983).

Early social workers defined persons in relationship
to their immediate circumstances, resulting in a view of
the environment focused on social relationships and on
the internal subjective environment, as experienced
within these relationships. The natural environment was
merely background clutter providing the medium through
which social circumstance and person interacted. The
period of social work history between the end of World
War I and the early 1960’s marked a deeper entrenchment
of restrictive notions of person and environment and saw
the rise of the psychodynamic paradigm as a grounding
force in social work practice.

Separation of person and environment

The mood of American culture after World War I,
between 1917 and 1930, was much different from before the
war started. The reform spirit of the pre-war days was
gone, largely replaced by growing self-absorption and
scientific managerialism in the arena of public interest.
Business idealogues endeavored to create a new popular
faith in American capitalism and in the "American Way"
(Akin, 1977). The total acceptance of the dominance of
science, technology and professional expertise "is
symbolized by the Chicago World’s Fair of 1933 glorifying
a ‘Century of Progress’ with its slogan, ‘Science Discovers-Technology Makes-Man Conforms’" (Ferkiss, 1993, p.102). The rise of communism in Russia created a suspicious atmosphere where reform of any sort was viewed as a threat to the traditional social order.

During the period of the 1920’s the American scene was characterized by a rising confidence in individual effort, private enterprise, technical rationality and intolerance for social reform (Akin, 1977). Social work attempted to exert its influence in a society increasingly preoccupied with self-indulgence, disillusionment and with the power of individual and collective action to alter historical events (Ross, 1991). Although the reform spirit was not entirely dead (Chambers, 1963), its influence was largely overshadowed by social work’s drive for professional status and a search for body of knowledge which would lead to a more refined technical expertise based on a foundation of science (Popple, 1985). The profession’s shift from social action to more individual interests at this time was strongly influenced by the profession’s alliance with psychiatry and its adoption of Freudian psychoanalytical theory as the scientific framework most informing to social work practice (Lieby, 1978; Ehrenreich, 1985; Specht & Courtney, 1994).
Psychoanalytical theory provided social workers with an accessible, effective, coherent body of knowledge that supported their professional ambitions. Even though social workers could not by training do psychoanalysis, the theory drew their attention away from environmental factors and towards the primacy of personal adjustment and contributed to the development of a hierarchy of professional skill and methods favoring individual treatment through therapy (Lubove, 1965; Popple, 1985; Trattner, 1989; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989).

Psychoanalytical theory is marked by a distinct attempt to disconnect from the supposed subjectivity of the non-scientific disciplines of philosophy and religion. In order to understand the development of human psyche, psychoanalytical theory presumed that the environment to which an individual made accommodation was external to the person, stable, and knowable. Sigmund Freud (1962) makes this point by recognizing that "in an individual neurosis, we take as our starting point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'" (p. 91). For the analyst, complexity is located internally, within the mind of the patient. The environment, especially the natural environment, was more or less the repository of ambient commotion. Roszak (1992) says of Freud,"he seemed
to find nothing in the outer darkness of the universe that was of practical therapeutic use" (p. 68).

The adoption of psychoanalytic theory as the dominant practice strategy suggests that the concern of social work during the period after World War I was the adjustment of people to their environment. This view placed change within the individual rather than in environmental conditions. In her speech to the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, Mary Jarrett (1919) portended the trajectory of social work when she said:

The special function of social case work is the adjustment of individuals with social difficulties. It is the art of bringing an individual who is in a condition of social disorder into the best possible relation with all parts of his environment (cited in Kemp, 1994, p. 125)

Porter Lee (1923) also defined the concern of social work as being change, focused on individual adjustment. Inherent in this approach was the shift to center stage of the helping relationship as the medium of change activity (Lee, 1923; Stapleford, 1926). Lee (1923) did recognize that social work’s knowledge of environmental factors was underdeveloped: "we have still much to learn...about the environment in which we live-both
natural environment which was created for us, and the social environment which we have largely created for ourselves" (p.191). He nonetheless appeared to ignore the significance of this concern by suggesting that the "psychological problem of treatment is at the heart of all good case work" (p.194). In a similar expression of social work's rhetorical acknowledgment of environment, Carpenter (1923) asserted that "the case worker views her problem and finds the center of the picture occupied by personality, with the material factors as background on the canvas, necessary, vital to the whole, but subordinate" (p. 245).

The years immediately following World War I were marked by great ideological and epistemological change within social work. Driven internally by the impetus to professionalize and externally by renewed interest in the power of science, social workers took the first determined steps towards a person-centered, therapeutic model of practice (Kemp, 1994). This shift away from the situated practice of Jane Addams and the person-environment approach of Mary Richmond and others in the Progressive Era meant that social work was becoming increasingly abstract and disconnected from any environmental frame of reference.

While the progressive reformers were able to
maintain a precarious symmetry between personal and environmental interests, the years following ushered in a dissolution of this early balance. The polarities between person and environment were magnified significantly during the 1920’s. The boundaries between the two were widened while the conceptual borders within the constructs shrank (Kemp, 1994). Person became a matrix of internal psychological drives and impulses. Those environmental factors impacting on individual development were essentially restricted to proximal relationships: person to person, family to person, specialist to person. Larger environmental factors, economic, social and natural, were increasingly separated from issues of personal development. Nature, particularly, became a problem to be controlled by scientific manipulation or was so familiar as to be commonplace. Attention to it was minimized, abstracted, ignored or left in the hands of scientific managers. It was of little interest to a profession absorbed in a effort to establish its place and to develop its expert knowledge in professional, bureaucratic and objectivist terms. Alfred North Whitehead (1958) speaking at the Lowell Lectures in 1925 provides this description of the narrowed focus so characteristic of the emerging professional class of his day:
Each profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is paid, but there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete facts (p. 4).

A commitment to the individual

The years between 1930 and 1960 are characterized as a period of constancy, continuation and conservativism in social work’s understanding of person and environment. The idealism and reform spirit of the Progressive era and the rampant individualism and boundless confidence of the 1920’s gradually gave way to the turmoil and overwhelming social problems of the Great Depression (Lawson, 1971; Wenocur and Reisch, 1989) Confronted with problems of hunger, unemployment, and relocation on a scale hitherto unknown, most Americans increasing looked to the federal government for solutions. Private social agencies and philanthropy were stretched beyond their capacity to
provide relief (Fisher, 1980).

In the face of increasingly overwhelming demands for assistance, social workers also began to realize that social casework was inadequate to the tasks of this tumultuous period. In 1931, the Social Worker’s Conference on Federal Action petitioned the federal government for relief programs (Bruno, 1948; Franklin, 1990). In 1934 the American Association of Social Work, in a letter to President Roosevelt, expressed support for unemployment relief and public works employment programs (Franklin, 1990; Kemp, 1994).

The New Deal aims of the Roosevelt administration were not intended to break new ideological ground. The New Deal sought to serve the welfare needs of the poorest one-third of the nation within the confines of the existing socio-economic, technocratic culture (Bernstein, 1969). Ecological sensibility and consciousness of environmental issues were not matters of great public concern. American wild places were still seen largely as vast resource pools which could be tamed in service to the pressing economic and social needs of the time (Worster, 1985). Few voices of support for the natural environment were heard. The one notable exception, inaugurated by a group of literary intellectuals at Vanderbilt University, argued that only a return to the
agrarian values and natural reverence of the past could restore decency, order, and prosperity to the country (Nash, 1979). This Southern Agrarian movement argued that the technological, industrial centered New Deal endangered nature and future hopes of American development. The impact of the movement was negligible and most Americans remained resolute in their faith that America "was not only the greatest country on earth but owned most of that greatness to its willingness to use technology to exploit the natural resources a beneficent God had provided" (Ferkiss, 1993, p. 104).

The history of environmental concern during World War II is one of continued dominance and an ever increasing willingness to strip nature of its bounty if it insured success in the world wide conflagration. The damage to the natural environment during the war, both on the battlefield and though industry, was profound; though most Americans agreed that any damaged would eventually be remedied through technological advance and was certainly a small price to pay for victory (Ferkiss, 1993).

During the Depression and immediately beyond World War II, the diagnostic and function schools were the two primary viewpoints associated with social work practice. The most influential of these was the diagnostic school
which emphasized a therapeutic understanding of the person's individualized problem and focused treatment towards assisting the client in functioning socially (Franklin, 1990). Its theorists included Florence Hollis (1936, 1939), Fern Lowery (1936, 1939) and Gordon Hamilton (1937; 1940), all of whom were strongly influenced by Freudian psychoanalytical theory.

The diagnostic school emphasized the client/worker relationship but tempered this with a belief in the importance of environmental factors that framed individual functioning. Larger environmental factors such as economic, political and cultural structures were considered part of the fixed environment largely beyond the control of the client or worker. Florence Hollis (1939) suggested that the "immediate individual environment" (p.265) was more open to change.

Some within the diagnostic school worked to develop a more sophisticated understanding of environment which moved beyond the traditional equating of environment with social or economic conditions. Fern Lowery (1938) included in her understanding of setting a belief that the physical environment, including climate, the physical arrangements of the agency, and geographical space was an important factor affecting practice. Gordon Hamilton's (1940) efforts to develop an integrated conceptualization
of person-in-environment, marking a shift from the relationship between person and environment of previous years, also found a place for at least recognition of environment beyond social and economic. Her explication of the living event framed the focus of casework on the more expansive case rather than the client. She writes, "A social case is a 'living event' within which there are always economic, physical, mental, emotional, and social factors in varying proportions. A social case is always composed of internal and external, or environmental factors" [italics added] (p. 34).

The functional school, led by Virginia Robinson, Jessie Taft and others, stressed the importance of the client/worker relationship but moved away from diagnosis as the cornerstone of intervention (Franklin, 1990; Kemp, 1994). This approach was influenced by neo-Freudian theorists, particularly Otto Rank, and by the educator and social philosopher John Dewey (Dore, 1990). The functional school interpreted environment as always shaped by individual perception and thus unable to be known or understood except in terms of the client's personalized narrative. Austin (1938) saw the environment as an "idealistic conception of reality as not existing at all or existing largely in the terms through which it is perceived through the senses" (p. 103).
Active engagement with an external environment beyond individualized perception was of little concern to functional theorists (Yelaja, 1986). The focus tended to center on internal processes. Interaction between person and environment was, thus, limited and defined by the psychology of the client. Jessie Taft (1928) concluded that all environmental problems "...are at bottom the inner problems of the human beings involved" (p. 105).

The functional-diagnostic debate was not simply a disagreement about methods and techniques, but a debate over the character of person, environment and the appropriate relationship between them and the social work enterprise (Franklin, 1990; Ehrenreich, 1985; Kemp, 1994). Both approaches diminished the environmental construct. The diagnostic approach denied the subjective experience of environment, relegating it instead to the essential ground within which personal processes were operational. The functional approach denied any objective experience of environment apart from individualized perceptual mechanisms. Both schools adopted psychodynamic approaches which, though conceptually different in relation to the evolution of psychic development, had the same consequence of refining a technique of individual treatment which, as Saleebey (1991) has suggested, distorted "the nature of human
experiences of the world" (p. 56).

Though a few isolated voices during the Depression persistently attempted to develop a consistently integrative approach to the question of person and environment as well as a more radical vision of casework theory (Reynolds, 1933, 1934, 1935; Lurie, 1930, 1939; van Kleeck, 1934), their work was bypassed by the mainstream because it denied the supremacy of psychological approaches and did not fit satisfactorily with the dominant psychodynamic paradigm (Kemp, 1994).

Although widely proclaimed as a consummulate period of social activism and of expanding theoretical orientations, the Depression years were more a period of constancy and continuation of the primary interests of professional identity, scientific credibility and refinement of individualized, psychological treatment which had been given shape a decade earlier (Constable & Cocozzelli, 1989; Franklin, 1990; Courtney, 1992; Kemp, 1994). As the world turned upside down, and the apparent unmanageability of environmental factors became magnified, the ongoing expressed commitment of social work to the person-environment imperative remained, but it was increasingly barren. The upheavals of the period and the dominance of psychodynamic theory limited and narrowed both constructs. The legacy of social work’s
preoccupations during this period is captured by Lasch (1984) who suggests that "those who turned to psychoanalysis welcomed it as another form of mind-cure, another system of self-improvement and personal growth. From the beginning, the American version of psychoanalysis minimized the power of instinctual drives and stressed the possibility of subjecting them to rational control" (p. 208).

The period between the end World War II and 1960 was characterized as a time of mounting international crisis, domestic tension, and personal vulnerability. Americans had seen a great victory on the fields of war in Europe and Asia while, at the same time, Communist power and expansionism presaged a dire new threat to peace and stability (Link & Catton, 1974). This was a time marked by growing affluence coupled with the terror of destruction. The American sense of how the world worked, in the aftermath of the war and the Depression, had coalesced into a mood of national vulnerability to the largely unmanageable temper of global geopolitics (Potter, 1954; Pells, 1985). Historian Todd Gitlin (1987) describes this era in terms of the prevailing middle class ambivalence: "The middle class furnished its islands of affluence, but around it the waters kept rising. Popular culture and politics ran rife with
foreboding" (p.22).

One response to the widespread anxiety and uncertainty was a turn toward self-indulgence (Graebner, 1991). Consumption and affluence was assumed to be a national condition, an irresistible economic and psychological fact. Nature and her resources seemed plentiful, her supplies stable, and science mobilized industry and government to exploit her apparently limitless bounty. Expanding natural resource development was not only required to fuel the boom of economic development, it was an unconscious confirmation of what made America great (Gitlin, 1987). Spurred on by grand developers, new technologies and generous appropriations from Congress, nature at last could be harnessed to serve the purposes for which it existed. As Worster (1985) laments regarding the ongoing developmentalism of the post-war period, scientific technology and the halls of government:

...tirelessly asserted that ‘achieving national goals for a stronger and more prosperous American’ was what was at stake.... In all these minds, the dream of domination was powerfully compelling despite its loose and rigorless logic: the West is America, money is peace, control is freedom, survival is domination (p. 265).
In a similar vein, addressing the ideology and unprecedented power of the federal Bureau of Reclamation during the 1950's, Worster adds that the bureau:

...set itself the target of achieving nothing less than total control, total management, total power, or as the Bureau's own slogan, emblazoned on the covers of reports and project summaries and public relations material, put it, 'total use for greater wealth.' The war against European fascism and Asian militarism was over, a war waged for 'unconditional surrender.' Another war, the Cold War, pitting two superpowers armed with nuclear weapons against each other, had begun. And still a third war was under way in earnest, this one to be waged against the western American landscape of scarcity; it too would not stop short of total victory (1985, p. 266).

Against this backdrop of anxiety, headlong development, self indulgence and a growing tendency toward political conservatism, social work continued to struggle to find its place. In the main, social work attention continued to be drawn to previous concerns: the desire for professional status, refinement of scientific technique, fitting psychodynamic theory to practice, pressure for a stronger and more unified professional voice and increasing movement of social
workers into private practice (Barker, 1984; Trolander, 1987; Roberts, 1990; Karger & Stoesz, 1990; Mullaly, 1993; Kemp, 1994). The debate between the diagnostic and function schools became increasingly vindictive while tending to converge in directing psychotherapy toward effecting change through a modification of personality (Franklin, 1990). This ongoing internal squabble further removed casework from interest in the environmental domain of practice.

One significant attempt to bridge the gap between the diagnostic and functional factions is found in the work of Helen Harris Perlman (1957). Perlman’s approach incorporated both diagnostic and functional concepts. Perlman conceived of casework as a problem-solving process:

...the case work process is a problem-solving process in that it employs the orderly, systematic methods which are basic to any effective thinking-and-feeling-toward-action. Since the problems with which it deals are those of the individuals social living, their solution must take place by and through the persons involved in those problems. For this reason casework attempts to mobilize himself to act in consonance with his understanding. In cognizance of those potent emotional factors that
may variously block or promote the person's functioning, casework provides and emotional freeing and sustaining "climate" and bond which is known as the casework relationship (Perlman, 1957, p. 63).

Coping and adaptation were key elements in Perlman's thoughts. Her emphasis was on how a person perceived or felt their problem and how they participated in coping through the adjusting experience of the helping relationship. Although Perlman attempted to ground casework in commitment to interaction between internal and external circumstance, her method structured practice in such a way that environmental factors were interpreted though a very constricted, individualized lens (Kemp, 1994). She describes her understanding of the relationship between person and environment:

...the environment, it must be remembered,...consists of the continuous interactions of people, of circumstances and condition, of ideas, of institutions. To human beings it is always personal in import. Even to the impersonality of weather we react in psychological, not only physical, ways; and in ancient days, when man's social environment was relatively simple, he cast his physical environment into social-personal terms and made gods of the physical forces which
shaped his life. (Perlman, 1957, p. 18).

Columnist Max Lerner, in a 1957 paper delivered to the National Conference on Social Welfare, was highly critical of 1950's American culture and spoke very disparaging of social work's emphasis on what he called the "neutrality of the technician" (p. 43) and its obsession with the "notion of the primacy of the physical sciences and of research" (p. 47). This criticism fell mostly on deaf ears in the profession, however. In spite of attempts by some to revitalize the traditional focus on person and environment and to broaden the environmental definition (Pollak, 1956; Stein & Cloward, 1958), there was no real challenge to the preeminence of psychodynamic theory while the environment continued to be defined primarily in social, relational terms.

Current Ideas of Person and Environment

The period between the 1960's and the 1980's has been described as a "multiple historic watershed" (Gitlin, 1987). This period was marked by racial and social upheaval, gender and class polarization, wars in Vietnam and on poverty, shifts from liberal reform to quasi-conservatism to neo-conservatism, rising environmental consciousness and unprecedented developments in science and technology (Suttles, 1968; Wittner, 1974; Dickstein, 1977; Leuchtenberg, 1982;
Marable, 1984; Siegel, 1984). Americans and others around the world were beginning to question anew the cost of unrestricted economic and technological growth. A new environmental movement was gathering pace. Its message was that humans were endangering their own lives through an arrogant, manipulative attitude toward other forms of life. A singularly important factor contributing to this feeling of national doubt was the publication of Rachael Carson's (1962) powerful book *Silent Spring*. It captured the interest of broad audiences at a time when more and more citizens seemed to be sensing that nature itself was under attack and that defending it required a more radical way of thinking. The older far more restrained Pinchotian conservationism so characteristic of the environmental ideology and policy of the first half of the twentieth century was gradually thought to be incapable of meeting the challenges of global environmental degradation (Hays, 1987). This new environmentalism shifted the meaning of the term environment away from social contexts and toward nature. Worster (1994) describes this change:

In the earlier part of this century the word "environment" referred mainly to the external social influences (as opposed to genetic endowment) working on the individual. Environmentalism referred to the
belief that the "physical, biological, psychological or cultural environment" was a crucial factor shaping "the structure or behavior of animals, including man". But increasingly as the battle of heredity versus environment lost saliency after World War Two, environment came to mean, particularly and especially, the natural influences surrounding people, including flora, fauna, climate, water, and soil; human beings, it was understood, were not passive victims of their surroundings-they were imbedded in them, they interacted with them, and they could have an effect. [italics in original] (p. 350)

In social work, professional self-scrutiny of the effectiveness of traditional person-centered paradigms was growing (Woodward, 1960; Briar, 1968; Fischer, 1973, 1975 Grinnell, 1973; Hashimi, 1981). In particular Herman Stein (1963) re-examined the conceptualization of environment in social work theory. He identified three major misconceptions associated with the concept. First, he noted the tendency to regard the environment as very narrowly related to immediate contexts such as housing, jobs, families, face-to-face relationships. Second, he identified the inclination to view environment as external to the individual who "stands alone, an isolated
complex of intra-psychic processes" (p. 68). Third, Stein noted the tendency to view the environment as static, unchanging, background clutter. From these perspectives, Stein argued, that social work's view of environment was unnecessarily restrictive and merely a second-rate activity compared to the more distinguished method of psychological treatment.

To bridge the gap between person and environment and to overcome what was increasingly perceived as a false dichotomy between individual services and environmental action, social work experienced a rush of activity aimed at developing a unifying conceptual framework that would revitalize its dual concern for person and environment (Gordon, 1969; Siporin, 1970, 1972; Meyer, 1970, 1973; Brieland, 1977).

Significant among the early contributions towards developing an integrative perspective was the work of William Gordon (1969) and Harriet Bartlett (1970). Their transaction or goodness-of-fit model relied on the notion that contact between person and the environment was reciprocal and circular rather than simply linear (Kemp, 1994). Gordon and Bartlett viewed coping with current social demands brought about by an "impinging environment" (Gordon, 1969, p. 10) as the central focus of social work practice. Though differing somewhat in
their understanding of person-environment interaction, they understood the ultimate goal of all social work activity as centering on, as Bartlett (1970) suggests, "the growth of the individual" (p. 103). Lack of clarity in explicating what constituted the environment and how it impacted persons kept their approach too narrow to encompass all of social work's interests (Burns, 1971; Roberts, 1990).

A search for new ways to conceptualize the relationship between personal and environmental dimensions of practice lead some theorists to explore emergent ideas in General Systems Theory (GST) (Leighninger, 1977, 1978). GST was seen as a way to explain the complexity of human phenomena from a process orientation, without giving exclusive attention to either the person or the larger environment (Petr, 1988; De Hoyos, 1989). Early social work writing on systems theory by Germain (1968), Hearn (1969) and Hartman (1971) attempted to shift attention from a limited person-situation frame to one that was multi-dimensional, filled with complexity and potential.

Notable among those social work theoreticians who worked at synthesizing the systemic perspective with traditional dual concerns with both person and environment was Carol Meyer (1970). In Social Work
Practice: A Response to the Urban Crisis Meyer defined social work's purpose as being "to individualize people in the mass urban society" (p. 4). In this early work environment took on the meaning of the broader life space of the individual and community affecting the person. Meyer attempted to hold on to a central concern for the individual, so central to the diagnostic school from which she received her tutelage, while at the same time focusing on issues of the environment. Although Meyer placed her first work within the framework of developing a unitary theory while using systems as a practice metaphor, her emphasis on individualization tended to be interpreted as sanctioning an individualized treatment approach (Kemp, 1994).

In 1976, Meyer published a new edition of her earlier book in which she framed her strategy not in terms of individualizing practice but as social work from an ecological-systems approach. This broadening of her previous integrative effort used the language of both ecology and systems theory, which by this time had become common vernacular for many in the scientific community and in the general population (Evans, 1976; Cowell, 1985; Haila & Levins, 1992). Meyer conceived of her ecosystems perspective as a conceptual framework, a metamodel rather than a particular model or theory:
...a metatheory that offers social work practitioners/clinicians a way of thinking about and assessing the relatedness of people and their impinging environments; it does not specify the what (problem-definition) or the how (methodology) of practice. For that it relies upon the increasingly large repertoire of available practice models, each one to make those specifications consistent with its particular theoretical orientations (1983, pp. 29-30).

Meyer's approach invites the practitioner to attend to the adaptive fit between people and environments. Rather than a prescriptive system, it is one potential focus of intervention that the social worker could draw upon. Its basic problem is that it had no workable methodology to verify the propositions of the theory (Roberts, 1990). Wakefield (1996) notes that the ecosystems perspective is:

...essentially just a collection of concepts and a general assertion that the concepts are applicable to all social work practice situations....By placing no constraints on the application of the connectedness principle, the perspective's claims become overly universalistic and implausible, and its concepts become useless for making critical
Eventually the popularity of both general systems theory and ecosystems thought "waned because its basic assumptions never fit some of the assumptions of social work practice" (De Hoyos, 1989, p. 132).

At about the same time the ecological approach of Carol Germain (1973, 1976, 1978, 1980) evolved as an attempt to bridge the gap between the abstraction of general systems theory and the growing trend of conceiving of the world in ecological terms. The ecological approach understood human behavior as inseparably linked with the environment. In order to fully enhance human functioning the physical and social environment of the person must be assessed concurrently. In the words of Germain (1978), "People and their environments are viewed as interdependent, complementary parts of a whole in which person and environment are constantly changing and shaping the other" (p. 539).

The concept of adaptation is a cornerstone of the ecological perspective. It focuses on how an individual’s needs, capacities, and opportunities for growth and the individual’s ability to adapt to changing external demands are met by, provided for, and challenged by the environment" (Saleebey, 1992, p. 113). Though appearing to be inherently compatible with many core
social work values, the ecological approach is not unproblematic. It assumes that individual human agency has the capacity to overcome external obstacles when, in reality, the individual may have little ability to exercise her or his will, especially in response to institutional oppression (Lichtenberg, 1990). It lacks a critical perspective and tends to support conventional norms and the status quo (Saleebey, 1992). It lacks significant explanatory power to illuminate the nature, strength and changeability of causal processes (Wakefield, 1996). Finally, the ecological approach very narrowly understands environment (Weick, 1981) as relatively static and thus, focuses attention on the person and the person’s ability to negotiate and accommodate environmental conditions. Though Germain’s (1978) views were consistent with the unfolding trend in social work (Seabury, 1971, Walz, Willenberg, & Demoll, 1974; Resnick & Jaffee, 1982) to explore the impact of the natural and human-made environment on human functioning, the ecological approach still heavily emphasized individual function in an environment that was likely to impinge upon optimal coping capacity.

In an attempt to articulate the ecological perspective for practice, Germain and Alex Gitterman (1976, 1980) joined forces in order to apply the
ecological metaphor to direct social work practice. Their life model conceives of problems in living as a result of stress associated with inadequate fit between people and their environments. These problems revolve around stressful life transitions, maladaptive interpersonal processes, and unresponsive environments. For Germain and Gitterman:

- The environment is dynamic and complex. It comprises many kinds of systems, each with its characteristic structure, level of organization and spatial and temporal properties. The social environment comprises human beings organized in dyadic relations, social networks, bureaucratic institutions, and other social systems including the neighborhood, community, and society itself. The physical environment comprises the natural world of animals, plants, and land forms, and the built world of structures and objects constructed by human beings. The social and physical environments are related to each other in complex ways [italics in original] (1980, p. 137).

From this definition of environment Germain and Gitterman draw attention to the coping capacities of the person who many either "alter, use, or support properties of the environment" (Gitterman and Germain, 1976, p. 602). This
strengthening of personal coping patterns and altering of environmental factors was in keeping with the general thrust of ecological theory which emphasized adaptive processes.

In their development of environmental issues, Germain and Gitterman chose to focus on very limited domains of environment important in shaping individual coping. Organizations and a relatively narrow component of the social environment referred to as the social network were at the heart of their conceptualization.

The life model made a significant contribution to social work by concentrating on environmental intervention as a core social work function (Kemp, 1994). The decisions, however, not to attend to broader dimensions of the environment limits the environmental focus to issues in the immediate vicinity of the client. In addition, the heavy reliance upon adaptive processes perpetuates a decades-old social work proclivity to discuss environment while at the same time to concentrate predominantly upon individual agency. The essential focus of ecological theory and all its variants is, according to Saleebey, "...on how individuals adapt to environmental demands. While there is talk of changing environments, the message of the ecological approach in general is that, in many cases, it is the client(s) who
will have to adapt..." (1990, pp.10-11). The "individual determinism" (Gould, 1987) so characteristic of the ecological model’s preoccupation with adaptation increases the likelihood that other important factors related to human development will be disregarded. Again, Saleebey (1990) notes that "the realities of power, conflict, oppression, and violence, so central to the survival of many groups, are given a curious and unreal patina by the adaptation perspective" (p. 11). This epistemological blind spot also inhibits conceiving the natural environment as anything more significant than data to be studied and/or resource to be procured or regulated. Social work’s application of the system and ecological model’s adaptive component creates a state of consciousness which suggests that a person already exists on a plane of profound division between oneself and one’s place in the larger environment. Person-in-environment becomes a kind of euphemism for what is in reality person on environment. Deeper understanding of identity with nature is then excluded and becomes an abstraction which leads to concepts and actions that cannot be reconciled with either the health of the person or of nature. Living in nature, on the other hand, suggests a complex relationship pieced together over time through patterns of value and restraint, through memory, familiarity, love
and respect. The result of being in nature is both knowledge of object and particular experience of the world, but also (and this is what is missing) deep reverence for the mystery of the world and for its patterns which lie beyond expressive understanding.

Person-In-Environment: Concepts in the Modern Era

Because social work grew out of the late 19th and early twentieth centuries modernist traditions, its theoretical frames and methodology are built on the ideological foundations of a mechanistic, hierarchial, rationalistic and scientific/technological model. Its attempts to develop a comprehensive conceptualization of person and environment and to maintain a balance between dual concerns for both realms has been largely unsuccessful precisely because it relied so heavily on the modernist project for its conceptual base.

The environmental consciousness of early social workers in the Progressive era reflected the emerging belief of early twentieth century American that the goal of environmental intervention was to study the problem of person-environment relationships and to develop useful, technological, solutions to reform perceived imbalances. Environment became divided and compartmentalized because of the reductionism inherent in the scientific paradigm. A domination hierarchy of expert knowledge directed at
discreet specialization became the standard for environmental study. Thus the economic environment became the province of economists, the personal environment of psychiatrists, the city environment of urban planners, the social environment of sociologists, and the natural environment of scientific ecologists. Social work’s real world experience and knowledge appeared simplistic and imprecise in comparison (Kemp, 1994).

Particularly important from the perspective of this dissertation was social work’s ever increasing abdication of responsibility and concern for broader environmental contexts. No where is this more apparent than in social work’s treatment of nature within its conceptualization of environment. Social work unconsciously withdrew into the language of scientific abstraction. Promising to bring control and certainty, social work’s adoption of normative scientific theory in its early history narrowed its interest to assessing and intervening in ever narrowing bands of environmental context. Nature came to be viewed as separate, out there; it was difficult to manage, not easily reducible to guidelines for practice and its seemingly inexhaustible resource base was more appropriately managed by technical solutions formulated by other scientific professionals.
As social work moved indoors into institutional settings what remained of an appreciation for the client's direct experience with physical and natural environmental factors was exchanged for technical, bureaucratic knowledge. Though maintaining the environmental vernacular, social work's widespread acceptance of psychiatric and psychological theory moved the profession inexorably toward a central concern with changing the person through the process of relationship with the specialist and corresponding manipulation of the environment.

Social work in the period between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II, with but few exceptions, fully emersed itself in the theory and technique of psychoanalysis and other psychodynamic theories. Reflecting modernism's economic, industrial conception of self-contained individualism, psychoanalytic theory conceives of person as consisting of a bounded, isolated, and potentially masterful self. Locus of control resides internally and change is expressed in a wish to manipulate the external world for one's own personal ends. Modernism has shaped an empty self that experiences a significant absence of community, tradition, shared meaning and a deep organicism with nature. Psychoanalytic theory became the means to both
respond to and further develop the new configuration of self without being encouraged or prompted to address or perhaps even see the socio-political and transpersonal causes of the emptiness.

No true commitment to understanding and applying broader environmental factors to practice existed in social work from this period onward. Technique distorted social works' understanding of the character of human experience in the natural world and replaced with a figurative environment; the environment of restricted context, defined by science, described by client and dependent on animation by human stratagem.

One last attempt remained for social work to more fully develop its dual concern for person and environment and expand its environmental conceptualizations. Beginning in the late sixties and continuing until the present social work has aspired to an epistemological clarity in its enunciated dedication to person and environment by the application of systems and ecological theory to its guiding principles (Kemp, 1994). Person and environment was now thought to be encompassed more completely through a conceptualization of person-in-environment. The ecological, ecosystems, and life models were seen to represent a holistic approach to person and environment in social work. But, once again social work
was blinded by uncritically appropriating a system of knowledge which on the face of it promised integration but whose underlying assumptions rested squarely on the modernist worldview and its scientific/technological paradigm. The results were predictable.

The language and knowledge of systems and ecological theory is clearly scientific. They simply replace the Progressive and post World War I period's conservation rhetoric of efficiency and production with the ecological/systems language of equilibrium and adaption. The primary method of scientific, ecological theory is to study the adaptive interaction (seen as a competition for higher position and/or material goods) of humans and habitat and to help develop responsive technologies to reform existing imbalances. Person-in-environment from an ecosystems perspective considers persons as experiencing themselves as separate from the environment but existing "in" it. Order and coherence become the end toward which a closed ecological system maneuvers. In the words of Sampson (1985) ecosystem models maintain that:

(a) order and coherence are achieved by means of (b) seeking control and mastery over the world through (c) a person system designed to achieve control, which is thereby characterized as (d) a centralized
equilibrium-preserving structure. (pp. 1204-1205)

From this vista a dualistic classification develops between that which is adaptive and that which is maladaptive. The clear conforming message in this arrangement from a psychosocial perspective is that persons are the closed, centralized unit for maintaining equilibrium within the ecological system. The unfortunate result is that expansive, openly systemic views of persons which offer an alternative to this cherished equilibrium structure are considered to be foolish or mad. This closes off a view of person truly in environment; a view which allows for multiplicity and deep interconnectedness.

It is evident from this brief historical summary that social work has had a rhetorical rather than a actual commitment to a comprehensive, deeply situated person-in-environment perspective. In addition, the evidence also suggests that social work has maintained the status quo view of shallow environmentalism and self-contained, alienated personhood by (1) endorsing and reflecting the dominant values and methodology of the modernist project, by (2) disseminating those values and methods in the form of ostensibly value-free scientific, professional statements and practices and by (3) normalizing a denatured image of person and environment
which in turn portrays the individual as essentially independent from deeper identification with the organismic whole (Hoff & McNutt, 1994). The essential incongruity of this part/whole dictotomy is suggested by Wendell Berry (1983):

Nothing is meaningful or valuable alone...Nothing can be its own context. Meaning and value are not generated by parts, but are conferred by the whole. The only safe contexts are, first, the natural order and, second, a human culture formed in respect for nature (p. 167).

The next chapter will address methodological considerations of the dissertation. Chapter five will explore major themes in deep ecology and ecofeminism. Chapter six will then consider how these themes challenge and inform social work’s person-in-environment perspective.
A dissertation, much like the process of adopting a child, arises out of passion. The decision to study social work’s person-in-environment perspective evolved from a personal passion to both appreciate and understand the importance of nature to our conceptualization of ourselves. This passion and interest was forged in my early experience with the familiar terrain of the wide open spaces and subtle beauty of the western Kansas plains (see Preface) and has developed in recent years as an experiential journey to more fully appreciate the meaning nature holds for human beings, and what are our human responsibilities are to the non-human world.

The current project also arose out of a professional interest to contribute to both the current cultural debate which increasingly questions the pace and direction of modern modes of progress and development, and the professional controversy which has raged in the social work literature surrounding the viability of its conventional guiding principles of practice. This has become essentially a question of how the profession comes to know and therefore how it goes about doing.

The current project will challenge existing theory
surrounding social work's person-in-environment paradigm by providing alternative ways of filling in theory and bridging gaps in the profession's knowledge base.

This project involves an ideological commitment to the idea that practice cannot be devoid of theory. It attempts to avoid what Thompson (1995) calls the "fallacy of theoryless practice" which assumes, quite incorrectly, that complex actions can be divorced from complex thought. It further recognizes that frameworks of ideas and values influence how professionals act and interact. To insure that professional ideas are appropriate and constructive in addressing client needs and demands social workers must be about the business of questioning conventional notions in order to foster an ongoing intellectual flexibility which allows the profession to confirm, adapt, or abandon those ideas in the light of changing circumstances. This dissertation confirms that social work's person-in-environment construct is an appropriate and useful guiding principle, but it also suggests that it must be adapted. This dissertation offers a creative and innovative approach to think about conventional ideas in new ways.

The logic of this study is both analytical and dialectical. The review of the literature is analytical in that it involves a breaking down of complex ideas in
deep ecology and ecofeminism, but it is not simple reductionism-analysis as an end in itself. The results, conclusions, and implications go beyond the analytic, towards a synthesis involving a dialectical linking, rather than a simple "lumping" (Thompson, 1992, p. 22) together of parts, so that a revised position or understanding is achieved. This is essentially a process of critical reflection. Critical reflection recognizes the central role of conflicting ideas as a pivotal factor in accounting for change and revision. Conflict between competing ideas is to be embraced as essential to more complete understanding.

A revitalized person-in-environment framework aims at having both theoretical as well as practical relevance to the profession. In this regard the results of the current project are aimed toward furthering a link between person/environment connections and issues of social justice and empowerment. The way in which individuals and societies conceive of their connection to environment prescribes the way they act towards it and towards each other (Berry, 1988). Problems in the natural environment cannot be understood in isolation. Human relationship to the natural environment is interconnected with social issues of population growth, income distribution, the persistence of poverty and
hunger, toxic waste and racism, and environmental hazard and health (Rogge, 1994). For instance, only when the mind and body, and person and nature are seen as two facets of the same phenomenon will we be able to understand many of the problems of health and growth in meaningful ways. Similarly, only if we see economics, politics and social policies imbedded in larger natural systems will we be able to resolve issues of inequality and perpetuation of disempowerment (Capra & Steindl-Rast, 1992; Hoff & McNutt, 1994).

This study is both supported and constrained by a number of factors related to feasibility. First, there is an established, though small, body of scholarship in social work on the deeper relationship of person to nature, which can be developed and broadened. This, coupled with a fairly substantial body of scholarship in the two ecophilosophies, support the decision to pursue the current task. Related to bodies of scholarship is the fact that the researcher has relatively easy access to the data through a wide variety of site locations. Being a large research institution, the University of Kansas has considerable textual sources available through its network of libraries and support services. In addition, my current residence allows access to library facilities located within reasonable driving distance.
such as Kansas State University and the University of Missouri, Kansas City. The metropolitan area of Kansas City also provides rich opportunities to canvas used and rare book stores and collections for appropriate data as well as providing opportunities to develop conceptual breath through the involvement in seminars and presentations which focus on issues of earth spirituality and mind/body healing.

The feasibility of this study was also supported by encouragement and guidance from doctoral faculty and committee members who sanctioned the pursuit of this study and provided technical and personal support in its framing and continued development. This provided the researcher with the needed support to create a fascinating research opportunity which fulfilled a personal passion and interest, and met the requirements for doctoral degree completion.

The feasibility of the current project is also supported by several factors related to the researcher’s competence and research opportunities. Much of the last six years of my doctoral work has been involved in the study of research processes or the actual carrying out of research. Though this is my first effort in fully developing a qualitative research project, it is not the first time to experience the intense preparation and
ongoing rigor which is required to complete a research project. There have been several opportunities to contribute to quantitative studies and professional article development. From this my level of competence at actually doing research has been refined and enhanced. It has been a stimulus for the development of the current study.

Lending further support to the feasibility of the current study has been the realization that social work and related fields (Morse, 1991; Neuman, 1994; Tyson, 1995) have a rich and varied tradition in research. Recent work on the employment of qualitative studies in social work (Pray, 1993; Sherman & Reid, 1994a; Riessman, 1994; Carrizosa, 1995;) and the availability and refinement of research methods (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1978; Berg, 1989; Tyson, 1995) which help create an appropriate match between research questions and design choices contribute to the feasibility of the current project.

Several factors constrain this project. The first is related to the researcher’s time. Reasonable time constraints were placed on design implementation components of this study. Though the study proceeded in a series of phases, in a somewhat linear fashion, the phase approach is always interactive and requires
reassessment and revising. This is a time intensive process. The preparation, question development, data collection and preliminary data analyses components have to date occupied almost two years of the researcher's time. This represents a revision of a tentative time line which conceived of these tasks as being of considerably shorter duration. Delays resulted from personal lifestyle changes, and due to the researcher's naivete of the process. The researcher has, however, learned much about the intended topic, approach, and myself from the mistakes which have been made. It is anticipated that the completion of this project will take another nine months, inclusive of allowances for unforeseen delays.

A second constraint upon this study concerns issues of funding. The current project does not involve any support from funding agencies or other interested parties. Fees for the purchase of books, tapes, copying and transcribing expenses, recording equipment and seminar registration were covered by the researcher. This represented a considerable outlay of monies at a time when the researchers income from professional teaching responsibilities were curtailed to allow time for this project. In addition the adoption of a child during the early stages of this work represented a
further financial drain and a loss of income due to our families decision to curtail my spouses employment so she would have full time to devote to child rearing.

General Considerations

The interpretive paradigm

This theoretical dissertation consists of textual analysis of the concepts of person, environment and their relationships within the fields of deep ecology and ecofeminism. The current approach to inquiry is consistent with a over-arching social scientific tradition which Neuman (1994) calls "interpretive social science" (p. 61). This orientation shares similarities with approaches suggested by social work writers such as Leashore and Cates’ (1985) and Goldstein’s (1986) "humanistic approach", and Peile’s (1988) "normative approach". It is also consistent with Heineman-Pieper’s (1981, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1994) and Tyson’s (1994) heuristic paradigm which according to Heineman-Pieper (1994):

... conceptualizes science broadly as a systematic inquiry into some aspect of reality that is communicated in a way that will allow an interested person to make an informed evaluation of the process of inquiry and its conclusion...The heuristic paradigm emphasizes both that there is no cookbook
approach to science and also that there is no intrinsically superior methodology for getting at truth. Rather any number of equally valid scientific methods are available, any one of which may be especially appropriate for researching a given problem in a specific setting. (pp. 71,75-76)

The interpretive paradigm in general consists of a detailed reading or examination of text. Text could refer to conversations, written words or pictures. The reading of text is intended to discover meaning by absorbing or getting inside the viewpoints that are presented as whole text and then developing deep understanding of how the parts relate to the meaning of the whole. The interpretive approach also recognizes that there is reciprocity between the textual data, the interests of the researcher and contemporary concerns and that these will shape the conclusions of the study.

Assumptions of the interpretive paradigm

Neuman (1994) suggests there are several varieties or specific types of research which fit comfortably with the interpretive paradigm including: hermeneutics, phenomenology, and qualitative approaches. He contrasts interpretive approaches in a general way by comparing them with the assumptions and ideas of positivist social science along eight domains: (1) the reason for research,
the nature of social reality, (3) the nature of human beings, (4) the role of common sense, (5) the nature of theory construction (6) the nature of truth claims, (7) the nature of evidence, and (8) the place of values. Though many proponents of the interpretive paradigm level substantial criticism at traditional positivist approaches to science, Neuman suggests this should not be taken to mean that interpretists find no value in more traditional approaches. It does suggest, however, a continuum of research strategies which are appropriate depending in large measure upon the purpose of the research and the questions being asked. As Neuman (1994) observes:

...there is no single, absolutely correct approach to social science research. This does not mean that anything goes; rather, it means that the basis for doing social research is not entirely settled....more than one approach is in the running. Perhaps this will always be the case (p.76).

What becomes very important is that the researcher explicitly tell the reader which approach is being used and establishes the link between it and the questions under consideration. The interpretive paradigm is the over-arching approach to research which best fits the purpose and questions of the current project.
The following explication of the eight domains, as suggested by Neuman, provides a basis for referencing the interpretive paradigm as an appropriate approach to study the questions of this project. Support is drawn from the insights of Imre (1985), Leininger, (1985), Allender (1987), Barrell, Aanstoos, Richards and Arons (1987), Morse (1991), Riessman (1994), Neuman (1994), Tyson (1995), and (personal communication with E. Canda, associate professor of Social Welfare, University of Kansas, September 19 and 26, 1996).

The reason for research: The interpretive paradigm suggests the reason for research is to discover embedded meaning. It attempts to clarify the textual accounts within the framework of the text. Deep ecology and ecofeminism are heavily dependent on both philosophical and visionary interpretations to establish the validity of their particular ideas. In fact they have been criticized somewhat because their ideas are not particularly accessible to the average reader (Watson, 1984). One cannot approach the study of these belief systems in a cursory manner. The interpretive paradigm provides an appropriate referent for examining difficult concepts through engagement and dialogue with the text. The intent here is not, nor is it perhaps possible without damaging the integrity of complex, interrelated
phenomenon, to specify positivistic "a priori" hypotheses or to operationalize concepts in a way which make them suitable for quantifiable measurement.

The nature of social reality: The positivist paradigm assumes that everyone shares relatively the same meaning system which can be explained by normative, logical theories. By contrast, an interpretive orientation assumes that multiple interpretations of human experience are possible. All conclusions are then tentative and provisional; open to questioning and new interpretations. The current project's reliance on the interpretive paradigm supports the examination of ideas which posit a different interpretation of human experience. Deep ecology and ecofeminism challenge the conventional penchant to deny alternative realities. The interpretive approach is consistent with this challenge by suggesting that the focus of research is on a process of listening and describing alternative views and using these as a tool for existing in diverse and complex relationships.

The nature of human beings: The nature of human beings from the interpretive perspective is not dictated by causal laws that determine patterns of external behavior and development. Rather, human behavior and development is created out of evolving meaning systems.
that are generated in context. Ideas of deep ecology and ecofeminism have followed an generative trajectory. In some ways they are not new in the sense that they have evolved from earlier transcendentalist traditions and previous versions of feminist thought. In other important ways the ideas of deep ecology and ecofeminism are very evolutionary in the sense that they have incorporated current cultural concerns and exigencies into the framing of their positions. Utilizing the interpretive paradigm, the current project provides a mechanism to account for the extremely unique and evolving patterns of meaning communicated in the textual sources on deep ecology and ecofeminism. The descriptive rather than numerical nature of interpretive studies permits the researcher to account for unique circumstances in the data analysis narrative.

The role of common sense: The interpretive paradigm values the role common sense plays for the researcher and the research process. Common sense from this perspective means a strong reliance on intuition, imagination, experiential encounters and emotion as primary components in the research process (Ladd, 1987). The researcher’s reliance on experiential strategies such as nature meditations, free writing, and reflective journaling ensure that the narrative results of the current project
are rigorous while at the same time artful and venturesome. From the interpretive perspective results are always tentative and subjectively shaped, rather than attempting to give the impression that the results are derived from some sort of objective detachment. The current data collection and analysis leads to continually emerging information and interpretation and relies on the use of descriptive language to frame the portrait of results.

**The nature of theory construction:** Interpretive research rejects claims that the construction of social theory should be similar to natural science, which relies heavily on deductive axioms, theorems and interconnected causal laws. The current project is idiographic. "Idiographic means providing a symbolic representation or 'thick' description of something else" (Neuman, 1994, p. 64). Interpretive theory construction or for the current project reconstruction reads more like the interpretation of a "literary work" (p. 65). It is rich in detailed description, has internal coherence and is grounded in the text.

**The nature of truth claims:** The interpretive paradigm evaluates the truth claims of the research results by whether they make sense, are accountable to interested professionals and readers and if they allow
others to understand deeply the reality of the text. The current project aims at establishing the truth value of the results by conveying a depth understanding of the text through fully documenting ways the texts reason, feel and view reality. Included in this is a careful translation of the textual experience into a form that is organized and intelligible and which is able to be assessed by other interested professionals and readers.

The nature of evidence: What is the nature of good evidence or factual information from the interpretive perspective? Evidence or facts from the positivist paradigm are thought to be observable, precise, and generally independent of values. The current project sees the unique features of text as essential for describing evidence. Evidence cannot be isolated from context and researcher values and philosophy. This means that the current research process has had to accommodate a considerable measure of ambiguity. The discovery of straightforward, objective facts is virtually impossible. Facts from the standpoint of the current project are interpretive facts. It is accepted that they may have several meanings and thus their evidentiary value is dependent upon the meanings assigned them and the textual circumstances in which they exist.

The place of values: The positivist paradigm
generally asserts that values have little place in the research enterprise. High quality research attempts to be value free. Consistent with the interpretive approach the current project adopts the stance that value free research is impossible and that researchers should reflect upon and reexamine personal values as a part of the process of study. This portion of the current chapter is directed at making the researcher’s values and guiding orientations as explicit as possible. I do not assume that they are superior to others but rather are delineated as a means to allow the reader access to the governing views which guide the current research process.

**Design Details**

*Statement of focus*

This conceptual-theoretical dissertation consists of an effort to deepen social work’s traditional conceptualization of person-environment by demonstrating the ways in which newly-emerging ideas in ecophilosophy can be useful in redefining this construct. Because the idea of person-in-environment in social work has tended to be viewed within a very constricted modernist, technoscientific framework, this study is significant because it will contribute to a redefinition that is oriented toward recovery of the vital connection between these two seemingly disparate constructs. The primary
orientation of this study is to stimulate rich insights for purposes of developing a framework of ideas for viewing conventional social work principles. Specifically, this framework of ideas from deep ecology and ecofeminism is intended to contribute to a reconceptualized view of person-in-environment which then can be utilized as a perspective for viewing social work knowledge, theory and practice.

Two central research questions will be addressed. They are:

1. What are the key themes and key concepts in deep ecology and ecological feminism that may be useful in reconceptualizing social work’s person-in-environment perspective?

2. What are the specific conclusions and implications of a reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for social work knowledge, theory and practice?

Three adjunctive research questions will also be considered in preparation for the primary research task described above. They are:

1. What are the philosophical assumptions underlying the modernist worldview and its associated technoscientific paradigm and how have these constrained or supported the
development of social work's person-in-environment perspective?

2. How has the conventional ideas of person and environment historically developed in social work theory over the course of the last number of decades?

3. What is the current status of person-environment as it is configured in contemporary social work?

Conceptual framework

Strategies for this study represent a composite of research methods based upon the over-arching framework of the interpretive paradigm and are drawn primarily from hermeneutical (Barrell, Aanstoos, Richards & Arons, 1987), phenomenological (Reiman, 1986; Anderson, 1991) and grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) methods.

These three approaches are exemplars of what some have come to call, very broadly, qualitative research (Munhill & Oiler, 1986; Neuman, 1994; Riessman, 1994). Qualitative methods are consonant with the interpretive paradigm in that they share a concentration on the qualitative nature of human meaning and investigative techniques "that generate narrative as opposed to numerical data" (Knafl & Howard, 1986, p.267).
The focus is on identifying the "qualitative features and characteristics that make a phenomenon what it is" (Leininger, 1985, p.5). Qualitative research is defined by Sherman & Reid (1994) as:

...research that produces descriptive data based upon spoken or written words and observable behavior. And qualitative methods can be defined as procedures for identifying the presence or absence of something, or describing the amount of something in words, in contrast to quantitative methods, which involves numerically measuring the degree to which some feature is present. The elements of judgment, choice, interpretation, and naturalistic situations are actually coterminous with the major elements of direct practice in social work. (p. 1)

Qualitative, descriptive designs are particularly suitable for the discovery, formation and revision of concepts, and relationship among concepts (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Gilgun, 1994). The qualitative researcher "can be thought of as an explorer entering an uncharted terrain" (Goldstein, 1993, p. 89) with the purpose of taking a fresh look at phenomena. Qualitative designs operate with a degree of structure which is appropriate for exploration, discovery and emergence of ideas. Though open-ended, they are
nonetheless rigorous in the way the researcher painstakingly devises an overall plan and set of procedures for analysis of the domain of inquiry. Goldstein (1993) notes:

The open-minded character of qualitative inquiry should not be confused with anything resembling a seat-of-the-pants, slipshod disposition. It is because this investigation does not proceed according to a standard formula that the researcher is obligated to set certain limits and yet not compromise the unique nature of the inquiry. (p. 89)

**Methodology**

The character of qualitative methods require that the researcher view the research design as an emergent process and regularly evaluate and alter elements of the research plan as needed. Consistent with this tradition details of focus, methodological decisions and analytical procedures remained open to modification while this investigation was in process. Major methodological considerations will be identified and discussed in the following sections.

**Phases of inquiry**

Methodological considerations will be reported as a sequence of phases that guided the current research. Though these phases are reported in a linear fashion, the
process was interactive throughout the research study. The phases that guided this inquiry were:

   Phase 1) **Building foundations**: involved a number of steps including the preparatory work of focusing ideas, advancement of a research proposal, explicating rationale for the research, and preliminary definitions. Phase one included establishing the research problem, specifying research goals, and formulating major and adjunctive research questions. During his initial phase of development the researcher relied on a number of philosophical perspectives derived from hermeneutical and phenomenological research traditions.

   Hermeneutical and phenomenological research approaches are multifaced but share a number of common features which guided the development of the current research. Ray (1985) discusses constituents or guidelines of phenomenological and hermeneutical research which she calls "identification, intentionality, bracketing, intuiting and describing" (pp. 89-90). Although all of these features are relevant to the complete research process the latter three have been specifically associated with data analytic procedures (discussed later) while the first two are associated with the tasks involved in phase one of the current inquiry: problem, goal and question development.
Identification is an awareness of the totality of relationship between the focus of inquiry and the inquirer. For example, the current project understands the problem of person-in-environment not just as a matter of underdeveloped knowledge concerning these constructs, but also a matter of failing to develop the meaning of these phenomena for those who engage with them. For me, this meant I could not place myself outside the problem as I understood it. Posing the research problem and the research questions were not something I had to necessarily search out. They came from life—my life. The problem of person-in-environment within a social work frame and the question of themes from deep ecology and ecofeminism appropriate for reconceptualization are not very far from my own personal experience. The problem of person-in-environment is my problem. I identify in it the reality of myself. And in its reconceptualization I begin to understand myself and the world in new ways.

Intentionality is related to identification in the sense that research involves intentional activity directed toward elucidating the experiential meaning of phenomena which are more conventionally viewed as mere symbolic abstractions. From this perspective person and environment are not things. They are not dependent variables as might be suggested in the parlance of
experimentation. There are experiential roots to which these concepts refer. The task of the current research was to begin preconceptually in order to elucidate the experiential meaning and contextual backdrop of these concepts. Several intentional actions assisted in this process. One was to explicitly reflect upon a kind of experiential protocol whereby my own sense of person and environment came into view. For example, I relied upon a kind of nature meditation where before and during intense periods of thought, analysis and writing I spent time at a secluded natural setting where I could experience and ponder the sights, sounds, and lessons of the organic world. The researcher also attended a series of reflective seminars conducted over the course of several months on such topics as mind/body healing, psychological health and the natural environment, and the spiritual and religious meaning of everyday life. Notes were taken at each of these seminars and personal reflections were recorded on audio cassette immediately following each seminar for future review. Each of these activities allowed me to sense my own spiritual and lived experience as person within nature and acted as a catalyst for the development of this topic as well as the procedures whereby it could be explored.

A second activity of intentionality important to
this phase of inquiry was the development of a succinct, preliminary literature review which established the professional and contextual contours of social work's person-in-environment perspective. This is an important aspect of hermeneutic, phenomenological approaches, for in order to understand the fortunes of the concepts of person and environment one must also attempt to provide some interpretive understanding of the concentration of ideas that a particular construct represents at any point in time. The sociocultural and professional context in which concept development occurs influences the progress of any given conceptualization. Beneath the surface of an apparently orderly and rational progression of ideas are found discontinuity, uncertainty and the influence of the conscious and unconscious interests of both the culture and professional sphere that shape these ideas. Interpreting the values, ideology and power shaping person and environment are more important than simply observing their utility, rationality and efficacy as a guiding principles of practice.

Results of phase one are contained in the preface, introduction and chapters two and three of this work.

Phase 2) **Determination of the approach to inquiry:** began during phase one and proceeded iteratively throughout topic development, collection and analysis of...
Here the intent is to develop a consistent process that would sustain a focused exploration. This phase of inquiry included the setting of a time line which would encourage an ordered pacing of all phases of design implementation but also allow for maximum flexibility. This included planning for delays and revising the time line periodically to reflect shifts in implementation strategy. The professional relevance, significance, feasibility, design components, guiding conceptual framework, and methodological considerations such as data collection, data analysis and issues of trustworthiness are described in detail in the current chapter.

Phase 3) **Analytical literature review:** involved a detailed collection and analysis of literature in deep ecology and ecological feminism that aided in reconceptualizing social work’s person-in-environment perspective. This phase involved a four step process: a) selecting the literature, b) accessing the literature sources, c) reading the sources and d) making analytical comparisons and contrasts of content patterns and themes. This phase will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections of the current chapter. Results of the analytical literature review will be reported in chapter five.

Phase 4) **Developing reconceptualizations:** pulled
all the literature together into a reformulation of person-in-environment. This will be reported in the first portion of chapter six.

Phase 5) **Suggesting implications**: involved critical reflection upon conclusions and implications supported by the reconceptualization of person-in-environment. These implications and conclusions will be reported in the latter portions of chapter six.

**Data collection**

The researcher developed data collection strategies based upon the research questions, insights from the literature and from suggestions provided by members of the dissertation committee.

**Specification of data sources.** Data sources were specified based upon the research purpose and research questions to be addressed in the current study. The purpose and questions of the study suggested a detailed examination of literature as the most appropriate way to develop exploratory and descriptive insights on the topic under consideration. The data are consequently in the form of words or text. Words are a mode of expression with greater open-endedness, "more capacity for connecting various realms of argument and experience and more capacity for reaching wider audiences" (Collins, 1984, p.353). And, in the study of text Neuman (1994)
suggests that researchers are required to "absorb or get inside the viewpoint it presents as a whole, and then develop a deep understanding of how its parts relate to the meaning of the whole" (p. 61).

There has been a certain ambiguity related to the notion of what constitutes data (Strauss, 1987). Many researchers generate their data, for example, through interviewing, field observation, or videotaping. But, there are also other sources of primary data which are textual in nature such as letters, diaries and published documents which are exceedingly important to many research interests. The study of textual sources requires a level of sophistication and rigor similar to other types of data generation. Strauss (1987) observes that the use of these textual sources involves considerable work, such as:

...searching for the data, getting access to them, taking notes on them, and nowadays xeroxing those data. In some kinds of research, the researcher will even use the library much like an ethnographer, deciding upon which shelves to find the data sources (books, periodicals) and like the ethnographer happily coming upon fortuitously useful data. (p. 26)

Textual sources for the current study included
published literature from deep ecology and ecofeminism, ancillary reviews and summaries of these movements and related radical environmental ideologies sharing at least some philosophically similarity to deep ecology and ecofeminism. Text included mostly books, journal articles, book reviews, magazines, and promotional pamphlets. However, several audio cassette recordings of topics related to deep ecology and ecofeminism where also considered textual sources and were used for analytic purposes. Access to the literature took multiple routes. These included consulting cumulative and specialized bibliographies, indexing and abstracting resources and contemporary periodical reviews (Bart & Frankel, 1986). Additionally, textual sources were accessed by tracking frequently cited references, by locating specialized anthologies through the researcher’s personal and professional contacts, and by perusing the shelves of new and used book stores and rare book collections.

For the current study primary data collection sites were several large university research libraries (described previously) located in close proximity to the researcher. Research libraries, with their rich source of textual information, are considered key primary data collection sites (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Royse, 1991; Salkind, 1991).
The rationale for relying on data acquired from libraries is suggested by several factors. First, using libraries as a primary data collection site is considered very useful when the purpose of the research is to discover and explore ideas based on purposely acquired and analyzed data. According to Marshall and Rossman (1989), libraries are "particularly useful in obtaining knowledge of previously unexamined areas and in re-examining questions for which answers are not as definite as desired" (p. 95).

The second factor is associated with both the breadth and depth of data availability. Barzun and Graff (1992) suggest the importance of libraries in providing breadth of information:

That "the library" is the repository of by far the largest part of our recorded knowledge...Aside from the direct knowledge of an event by an eyewitness, or a firsthand investigation on the scene through interviews, laboratory or field work, or the study of relics, the shortest path to the facts is library research. (pp. 48-49).

Libraries also contain multiple layers of imaginative voices which clamor to be heard and to be culled of their collective meaning. Glaser and Strauss (1967) understand the depth potential of the library by comparing it to
field work:

There are some striking similarities-sometimes obvious although often overlooked-between field work and library research. When someone stands in the library stacks, he [sic] is, metaphorically, surrounded by voices begging to be heard. Every book, every magazine article, represents at least one person who is equivalent to the anthropologist’s informant or the sociologists’s interviewee. In those publications, people converse, announce positions, argue with a range of eloquence, and describe events or scenes in ways entirely comparable to what is seen and heard during field work. The researcher needs only to discover the voices in the library to release them for analytic use. (p. 163).

There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to the use of libraries as data collection sites. One advantage is related to accessibility. Glasser and Strauss (1967) suggest there are at least five aspects of accessibility which makes its properties appealing to the library researcher. First, information gathering is not limited to current circumstances. Library sources allow the researcher to hear the voices of those long-deceased as if they were actually still living. Secondly, library
materials bring distant sources into the close proximity of the researcher. Difficulties often experienced around space, locale, time, travel and expense makes the accessibility of library sources very attractive to the researcher.

Another aspect of accessibility pertains to the informants' willingness to be scrutinized or interviewed. Library materials make accessible the voices of those who for whatever reason may otherwise be relatively reluctant or guarded in sharing themselves with the researcher. A fourth aspect of accessibility is linked to the later stages of a research inquiry. Frequently, a researcher may discover well into the process that something is missing in the data. A researcher using library resources may return again and again to the data to fill in any gaps remaining after initial inquiry. A final aspect of accessibility is related to problems associated with scheduling. Frequently, data gathering has to be confined to extended periods of relative open scheduling when the researcher has the requisite time to pursue data collection. Library data requires no such considerations. The researcher can work intermittently, often at home, and with a greater degree of flexibility.

A second advantage of using libraries is the diverse range of materials available for theory development. The
library offers the researcher an opportunity to have her/his "...theorizing impulses aroused by the happily bewildering, crazy-quilt pattern of social groups who speak to him [sic]" (Glasser & Strauss, 1967, p. 179).

A final advantage of library data is that it lends itself to being assessed chronologically which enhances its usefulness in establishing a historical development of a phenomenon and any change that takes place over time.

Glasser and Strauss (1967) suggest a number of limitations associated with library data. The first involves the fact that many views of the world and its operation evolve and disappear without leaving any or much documentary traces. It is certainly the case that most libraries are "richer in materials about certain given substantive areas and particular groups than about others" (p. 180).

A second potential disadvantage of library materials is the inherent difficulty in determining whether the data has been purposely misleading. Glasser & Strauss (1967) note this is the situation with all statements made whether in print or in conversation. The researcher must exercise careful scrutiny of the materials but "probably no more or less than interview of field materials" (p. 181).
A third potential disadvantage of library material is related to accuracy. The possibility always exists that information and events reported by authors may simply be inaccurate. This is not to suggest that the library materials can never be trusted but does imply that the careful researcher must use these materials with their best judgement and in accordance with a meticulous methodology.

A fourth potential disadvantage of library materials is related to adequacy. There may not always exist sufficient material in enough detail to satisfy the researcher needs. Glaser & Strauss (1967) note: "In some part, the adequacy of the library materials depends on the sheer bulk of material available concerning the topic under study, and also on who has produced it" (p. 182).

An additional source of data was the researcher's personal notes generated from critical reflection on the topics and processes involved in this study. Data collected from informal conversations with committee members and interested colleagues, though not used for analytical purposes, were very helpful in generating insights and suggesting new areas of inquiry or in-depth contextual information. Notes were kept on these conversations. The researcher also relied on a supportive technology of audio recording of these conversations in
order to facilitate future review.

The researcher also conducted semistructured, exploratory experience surveys of selected social work scholars who have published on the relationship of natural environmental factors to social work theory and practice. As the preliminary literature review has shown, little explicit writing exists on natural environment from a social work perspective. Several authors (Hoff & McNutt, 1994), however, have recently published an edited collection of essays and research studies which begin to address issues of the natural environment. It was from this edited work that the researcher chose to draw informed consultants. It was anticipated that these scholars would be able to contribute meaningful and concise insights about the research topic and about potential applications to social work research and practice. These interviews augmented data collected from textual sources and contributed to a modified form of data triangulation (Pray, 1993; Neuman, 1994).

An initial letter of inquiry was sent to two interviewees explaining the purpose of the interview, a request for participation, and information necessary for scheduling the interview (see Appendix I). A one page orientation was mailed with the inquiry letter in order
to help familiarize the respondents with the research topic and to help them prepare for questions to be asked during the interview (see Appendix II). Because respondents were located in widely separated areas of the country, one-shot telephone interviewing was the method of choice. Each interview was scheduled to last for approximately one hour. With the permission of the respondent each interview was audio recorded in order to capture conversational detail which would have been impossible with only the use of interview notes. Reflective notes were also kept during the interview. Interview summaries were recorded immediately after the interview in order to help the researcher consider emerging insights and methodological refinements.

Prior to beginning formal interviews, the interview procedures were pre-tested for feasibility with a social work doctoral student who has interest in the connection between natural environment and social work. This process also familiarized the researcher with the interview process to increase skill and level of comfort during the actual interview.

Content of the interview guide was derived from insights which emerged from the preliminary literature review, early development of analytic coding categories, the researcher's very initiatory data analysis, and
conversations with committee members. All questions were open-ended by design, but were organized within conceptual categories based upon insights developed from the procedures mentioned above. They were intended as guidelines rather than as prescriptive of a rigid format. Order and pacing of question asking varied somewhat according to the reflexive process which emerged between the researcher and the interviewee, however, each content area was addressed with each respondent. The researcher asked probing questions, summarized responses, and clarified understanding of the interviewee’s intent.

Sampling. Rationale for selecting particular literature was determined from a purposive sampling strategy of textual sources. The initial elements of the strategy focused on a number of diverse, radical environmental philosophies and movements. These included such movements as Greenpeace, the ecotage coalition, the stewardship movement, bioregionalism, and earth first, as well as related ecophilosophies such as deep ecology, ecological feminism, social ecology, and mainstream environmental ethics (List, 1993).

As the methodological process unfolded, the sampling became more focused and was adapted to include only deep ecology and ecological feminism. The current study focused on these two content areas because of the
feasibility constraints associated with using all of the textual sources mentioned earlier. These constraints centered on the need to establish reasonable limits to the time required for completion of this project and on issues of relevancy. Deep ecology and ecological feminism were considered to be more conceptually relevant to the goals of this research because they explicitly discuss the deeper connections between person and environment.

The volume of literature in both deep ecology and ecological feminism is immense. This made extensive sampling unrealistic. Consequently, sampling was limited to the use of critical case examples of prominent theorists within each discipline, influential intellectual contributors, and theorists who share similar philosophical understandings (though not identifying themselves specifically with either movement), and critical reviewers of both deep ecology and ecofeminism.

Decisions concerning to what extent data should be collected and issues of termination were based on a criteria of redundancy. That is, around the questions of whether any more new information is being generated, or, whether the same ideas are appearing over and over again (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Gilgun, 1994). Gilgun (1994)
describes this criterion:

... successive cases are chosen on the basis of the likelihood that they will advance the development of findings. The type of case with which to begin the research depends on the research question. Once the first case study is completed, researchers continue to choose cases similar to the first until they are finding no new information. The point at which the researcher is not discovering new information is called theoretical saturation. (p. 117-118)

Approximately 100 sources were sampled in the areas of deep ecology, ecological feminism and related venues. Sources were fairly equally distributed, primarily between books and journal articles. In terms of the published time frame of the textual sources attained, the majority were written in the 1980s. The next largest group were written in the 1990s, with fewer still in the 1970s and previous decades.

Data analysis

In qualitative investigation, it is common for data analysis to begin almost simultaneously with data collection. The process is interactive and dynamic. That is, at times data analysis for this study was conducted synchronically with data collection, though time was also allocated for intensive periods of analysis with
cessation of data collection.

**Preliminary procedures.** Data analysis is perhaps the most crucial phase of the current study. Consequently, the researcher relied upon several data analytic assumptions and methods associated with the interpretive paradigm discussed earlier in this chapter. From a hermeneutical, phenomenological perspective data analysis involves a number of preliminary procedures including: bracketing, intuiting and describing (Anderson, 1991; Berg, 1989; & Ray, 1985). Bracketing means that the researcher suspends judgment; refuses to take for granted, as correct, one's beliefs about a phenomenon as an objective reality, but rather attends to it precisely from the meaning which is supplied by the text. From the current study this implies that the researcher's gaze was intentionally redirected away from person and environment as objective things toward meanings. This is important because one of the intents of the current study is to achieve an empathic, experiential contact with these constructs as furnished from the textual perspective.

A second procedure consistent with hermeneutical, phenomenological analysis is intuiting (Anderson, 1991). Intuiting is a technical term related to the mode of awareness or reflective discernment of the essence of a
phenomenon. From the current perspective it became important to be very aware of the subtle shifts in meaning within the textual description of the constructs under study. For it is in the demarcation of shifts of meaning that the researcher is able to develop understanding of the constituent parts of the construct and then relate those to the experience as a whole. For example, intuiving involves noticing recurring themes in the text and then reflectively varying those in order to dialogically explore and engage with other emerging phenomenological themes. For instance preliminary analysis of the current study identified a recurrent theme of connectedness as important in understanding the textual essence of both deep ecology and ecological feminism. By varying connectedness, that is by imagining connectedness from the contextual perspective of the particular writer and also the researcher, discernment emerged concerning how the phenomenon might be experienced and described differently and thus led the researcher to intuit additional themes and subthemes which became essential to full understanding.

A final preliminary procedure consistent with hermeneutical, phenomenological analysis is describing. Description is a process where essential, individual meanings are related to each other through a process of
formalized description in order to clarify how each meaning coheres to constitute the full experience. Reflection is directed toward each meaning in relation to each of the others. Though description depends on imaginative variation between meanings, the ultimate focus is on coherence in order to determine the essential generality of phenomena. A reflexive log file was kept where notes on ideas and themes emerging from the intuitive and descriptive procedures were recorded for concurrent and subsequent data analysis.

Coding. The researcher analyzed textual data by organizing it into categories on the basis of themes, subthemes and similar features. This was an ongoing process that evolved into the development of new themes, formulations of conceptual definitions and examinations of relationships among themes.

A coding instrument was developed in a series of iterations in order to organize information which emerged during analysis. Coding categories were developed deductively based upon researcher expectation, prior research, and prior experience. In order to increase a sense of confidence in code categories, and consistency in their application, the researcher relied on members of the dissertation committee for clarification of meaning and applications of the categories. The coding
The instrument was in a continual state of development and revision throughout data collection and preliminary analysis.

Inductively derived coding categories, also emerged during data collection and initial analysis. These were cross-checked with the deductively derived categories discussed above. This process led to formation of a final coding scheme which was used to consistently code all relevant textual data (see Appendix III). Final coding was manually done on all text using the categories that reflected the patterns and themes identified.

Because of the potential of generating a considerable volume of data, and feasibility constraints, coding was not made on every individual textual segment of the articles and/or books under review. A modified coding strategy was adopted which coded selected paragraphs or pages based upon a criteria of conceptual relevance. Deep ecology and ecological feminism address a wide-range of issues; not all of which are related to a philosophical understanding of the constructs of person and/or environment. There are political, social, historical and eschatalogical dimensions which, though important to each movement’s development and credibility, are not relevant for the purpose of this study. The decision to code portions of each textual document was
based on whether the textual segments fit the relevance criteria established by several guiding questions prepared prior to intensive analysis. These guiding questions were:

(1) Does this textual segment have things to say about the constructs of person and environment?

(2) Are there descriptive terms used in this segment to describe these constructs?

(3) Are there basic, related ideas or dimensions which have some correlation to the constructs under consideration?

(4) Are there ideas which support, foster, facilitate, or constrain the constructs of person and environment?

(5) Are there conditions or contexts which affect the constructs of person and environment?

**Constant comparative analysis.** Classification of data and analytic procedures involved a series of comparisons; a process Glaser & Strauss (1967) called "constant comparison" (p. 102). This data analysis process involves data collection; identification of principal issues and concepts; construction of coding categories; revisions of data collection strategies; development of insights concerning evolving patterns; illumination and revision of categories; and explication
of the patterns, meanings, and relationships within and between sources of information. Though constant comparative analysis is generally associated with the development of grounded theory as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is not limited only to this use. Canda (1996a) suggests:

It is useful for any qualitative analysis of text (word) based data that involves the generation and refinement of understanding based on themes and patterns of similarity and difference. Basically, this method involves constantly comparing portions of text both within and between sources of information. (p. 1)

As suggested earlier the data sources for the current study were word based text collected from published authors in deep ecology, ecological feminism, and ancillary sources. Selection of these data were based on the relevant question criteria described previously. This selective within and between case comparisons meets the requirement suggested by Glaser & Strauss (1967) that constant comparison necessitates intense "saturation of data-not consideration of all available data" (p. 104).

Instrumentation of analysis for the constant comparative method involved the use of a system of
orderly files in order to organize and synthesize, in
detail, the information gathered from the data sources.
The essential mechanics of this included the development
of a series of files; one of which included the
untouched, photocopied article or section/chapter of a
book for each author; a second which included the article
or section/chapter of the book which is fully coded for
each author; and a third file for each code category.
These last files contain every text or segment of text
from every data source that pertained to the code
category. Each textual segment was coded so that it
could be identified according to (a) the author’s
identification number, (b) a number specifying the
article or book from which the segment came, and (c) the
relevant thematic code identifier. These files also
contained selected notes developed by the researcher from
several topical audio cassettes relevant to the code
category. The structuring of the code file insures that
everything a author wrote about the topic can be compared
(within comparison) and that everything every author
wrote on the topic can also be compared (between
comparison). The structure of the code file also ensures
that each text segment can be traceable to the original
article or book.

As mentioned previously, in addition to the system
of files described above, a reflexive log file was developed and maintained throughout the research process. Contents of the reflexive log file included: records of methodological procedures and refinements; notes of insights and hunches around emerging patterns, themes and conclusions; tentative outlines of relationships in data; draft developments of the analytical chapter; notes and audio recordings of peer debriefing sessions with committee members; and diagrams or charts of methodological procedures or emerging relationships and patterns which had relevance to the implications and conclusions of this project.

Planning for trustworthiness

The time, thought and energy spent in the process of developing a trustworthy qualitative research study will according to Marshall and Rossman (1989):

... create a final product that convinces readers and...will reap rewards throughout the research endeavor. (p. 153)

Trustworthiness is the overarching criterion for testing the rigor of qualitative studies and specifically refers to "how well one can trust that the data collected and the conclusions reached accurately reflect the phenomenon studied" (Salkind, 1991, p. 297). Lincoln and Guba (1985) have suggested several criteria for
establishing the "truth value" (p. 209) or trustworthiness of qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. These terms will be used to organize this section.

**Credibility.** The first criterion for establishing trustworthiness, or what Marshall and Rossman (1989, p. 144) call the "criteria of soundness" is credibility. Here the goal is to demonstrate that the inquiry was carried out in a manner so as to ensure that the object of the study is accurately identified and described. A variety of techniques were employed to improve the likelihood of credible findings and interpretations. For the current project these included: prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefings, and refining heuristics by negative case analysis (Canda, 1996b). In this study prolonged engagement was addressed by extended periods of time utilized for data collection. Data were collected consistently over a period of approximately one year (June 1995-June 1996) beginning with phase one of the current project. This collection strategy began rather slowly in the early months, but increased at an accelerated pace as the researcher moved toward the latter phases of the inquiry. Intense periods of data collection lasted for approximately three months where the researcher set aside three to four day
intervals for intense review and retrieval of data sources.

Persistent observation also contributed to the credibility of this study. In the current study observation is related to the amount of time the researcher spent with the data sources and analytical components of the study. The data are in the form of words, which can be relatively imprecise, diffuse and context based, requiring a great deal of reading, rereading, conceptualizing and summarizing of textual distinctions. The researcher developed a flexible schedule allowing on average from four to six hours per day, four to five days per week for living with the data; becoming emersed in the textual world under study. Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 225) suggest something of this idea in describing the researcher’s persistent involvement with the data:

...he himself knows what he knows about what he has studied and lived through. They are his perceptions, his personal experiences, and his own hard-won analyses....He has been living by his analyses, testing them not only by observation...but also by daily living.

Triangulation of multiple sources of literature and collection sites which involved the synthesis of insights
from professional journals, more widely read books, audio presentations as well as collection from several libraries, book stories, personal and professional contacts, ensures that the data reliably reflects an extensive spectrum of viewpoints on the topic (Canda, 1986).

Informal peer debriefing involving frequent corrective feedback from the researcher’s dissertation committee functioned to challenge consideration of researcher biases, and interpretations imposed on the data, as well as to improve adequacy of methodological procedures, and analytic techniques. In addition reliance upon expert interviews will ensure development of a broad range of insights and conceptual breadth of the project (personal communication with Consultant 1 & 2, November 12, 1996 and February 3, 1997).

Refining heuristics by negative case analysis involved a comparison of disparate viewpoints in the textual accounts, looking for rival and competing patterns of understanding, as well as consciously noting what the authors did not say or how the nonappearance of a phenomena or concept in the text reveal latent meaning. Negative case analysis will ensure consideration of the entire scope of textual perspectives.

**Transferability.** The second criterion Lincoln and
Guba (1985) propose to ensure trustworthiness is transferability. The idea of transferability is to demonstrate the applicability of research findings to other contexts beyond the study. This was of critical importance to the current study since the goal was to provide a reconceptualization of person-in-environment that has likely application to a multiplicity of social work settings. Transferability of study outcomes (or portions of them) is supported by providing thickly descriptive, analytically derived accounts of diverse perspectives in the reconceptualization process allowing for multiple comparisons and applications within and across different social work settings and practice domains (Skrtic, 1985). In addition, the process of conclusion formation was aimed at establishing theoretical referencing by linking conclusions with prior social work research, theory and practice modalities. Engaging in theoretical referencing assists in the development of functional implications; allows the reader to assess the degree of fit between prior knowledge and current reconceptualizations and assists the reader in determining transferability to other settings. In this regard it is important to remember that this study presents a tentative, flexible and expanded conceptual framework of person-in-environment which attempts to
contribute to an ongoing process of professional reformulation and revision.

Finally, transferability is also supported by the researcher's intent to present findings in publication and conference formats in order to solicit reflection and dialogue from interested professionals.

**Dependability.** Dependability is a determination of the accuracy of data collection processes and products as well as concept generation strategies. Here the researcher systematically and explicitly accounted for modifications in the design, data collection strategies and concept reformulations processes by incorporating an inquiry audit into the methodological development of this project (Carrizosa, 1995). An inquiry audit involves an inspection of research procedures, protocols, decisions, and data by a qualified auditor who is familiar with the findings and analytical strategies of the study, has knowledge and expertise of the methodology and techniques of qualitative inquiry, and who has had experience as a research auditor. The researcher's dissertation committee methodologist functioned as the inquiry auditor for the current project.

**Confirmability.** Associated with dependability is the idea of confirmability. Confirmability appropriates the conventional concept of objectivity and emphasizes
whether the findings of the study could be confirmed by another researcher (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). In order to safeguard this the researcher was careful to leave an audit trail of data collection and concept generation processes and products (see Appendix IV). An audit trail is essentially a meticulous preservation of records involving the research which are made available for review to other interested parties. An audit trail allows tracing back from conclusions through each step of the research; invertedly toward the original material (Canda, 1996b). The components of the audit trail for the current study will include:

1. raw data consisting of original published material and notes on pertinent audio material as well as bibliographic citations.

2. data reduction products consisting of coded data files as well as notes and outlines on emerging conceptual insights.

3. data synthesis products including rough draft and final text of dissertation, proposal development documents and documents related to the defense of study methodology.

4. instrument development information including expert interview request forms, preliminary and final coding considerations and reflexive log file.
CHAPTER V

MAJOR THEMES OF ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AND DEEP ECOCOLGY

Introduction

press publications (Gaunt, 1992). Such diversity of thought reflects the distinctive values, beliefs and practices of both perspectives and contributes to the strength of their ideas.

The current chapter will exam the results of an analytical review of relevant textual sources in deep ecology and ecological feminism and related areas. This chapter represents phase three in the research methodology and focuses on the results of the analytical comparison within the substantive areas for content patterns and themes.

Building upon the preliminary framework and definitions established in chapter one, this chapter will elaborate, clarify and summarize theoretical conceptualizations from the perspectives of deep ecology and ecological feminism as well as explicate similarities, differences, and key criticisms of each movement.

As the first central research question of this study was to discover patterns and themes in the literature that may be useful in reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment perspective, the current chapter will reveal key understandings toward this end that emerged in the literature. This will be accomplished by exploring the views of both deep ecology and ecological
feminism through provision of exemplars, descriptions, comparisons and contrasts from the literature for purposes of illustration. The final chapter will then organize the information so that the challenges each philosophy poses to social work's person and environment conceptualizations may be understood, and specific conclusions and implications may be discussed. With this in mind the current study will draw from critical case examples of prominent theorists within each content area, intellectual contributors, and theorists who share similar philosophical understandings (though not identifying themselves specifically with either movement), and critical reviewers of both ideologies.

It is important to reiterate that the subsequent analysis of ecofeminism and deep ecology will be consistent with the methodological considerations discussed in chapter four. This implies that the approach will be methodologically rigorous in the sense that it involves clearly prescribed procedures for the researcher's concept generation process as well as for making comparison both within and between content areas. But, in addition, it also implies that for reasons discussed earlier, developing a definitive expression of each philosophy will at best be only tentative. As with Zimmerman (1994) my views are "inevitably colored by my
own interests and limitations" and as such my conclusions are "not singular and fixed, but rather multiple, open-ended, and malleable" (p. 17).

Andrew Dobson (1995) has noted the difficulty of trying to write about ecological ideologies, which he refers to as ecologisms:

...just as there are many socialisms and many liberalisms, so there are many ecologisms. Writers on ideologies are consistently confronted with the challenge of defining the apparently undefinable, in the sense that the historical and therefore changing nature of their subject makes simple elucidation very difficult. (p. 11)

Dobson suggests two ways of handling this dilemma. The first is simply to take on, in a very broad way, the multiplicity of definitions and make it the organizing principle of the study. The alternative is to make an explicit argument for a specific understanding of the ideology.

Consistent with the researcher's methodological framework the current approach is more of an amalgam of both choices discussed by Dobson. First, the discussion of deep ecology and ecofeminism will not be comprehensive because this approach is neither practical nor desirable. The vast scope of the existing literature in the content
areas precludes taking a comprehensive approach that gives equal treatment to every manifestation of each ideology. The current analysis does not attempt to discuss every expression of deep ecology and ecofeminism. It is a selective summation. The concentration will be on aspects of each ideology that are relevant for understanding the distinctiveness of each, and how these may be important for helping social work understand its professional guiding principles.

Secondly, while the treatment of ecofeminism and deep ecology is not comprehensive, it does present a point of view on the meaning of each worldview that emerged with increasing clarity during the course of analysis. Because of the amorphous, fluid nature of deep ecology and ecofeminism, it would be inappropriate to try to rigidly define each ideology. From the researcher’s perspective there are a variety of ways of understanding deep ecology and ecofeminism and none should be excluded by defining the topics in a fixed manner. Consequently, there is no claim to offer a definitive understanding of deep ecology and ecofeminism, or that the current view is the one and only true perspective. I offer my point of view as a carefully developed way of thinking about each content area.

The current study has yielded seven major theme
areas. They have become the basis for the organization of this and the final chapter of the current work. Each major theme area has subthemes which will be discussed in conjunction with the major themes. The major theme areas are:

Theme one: Contemporary environmental thought
Theme two: Historical and theoretical influences
Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts
Theme four: Major distinctiveness
Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview
Theme six: Comparisons and criticisms
Theme seven: Implications for social work

Themes one through six will be addressed in the current chapter while theme seven will be fully developed in the final chapter of this current work. Themes two through five will each be addressed in conjunction with the discussions of ecofeminism and deep ecology.
**TABLE 1**

**OVERVIEW OF MAJOR THEMES IN DEEP ECOLOGY AND ECOFEMINISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Themes:</th>
<th>DEEP ECOLOGY</th>
<th>ECOFEMINISM</th>
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</table>
| **Historical/Theoretical Influences** | * Eastern Religious Traditions  
* Feminist Movement  
* Ghandi  
* Heidegger  
* New Physics  
* New Systems Models  
* Non-traditional Western Religions  
* Political Activism of the 1960's  
* Spinoza  
* Transcendentalism | * Environmental Movement/ Green Politics  
* Liberal Feminism  
* Marxist/Social Feminism  
* Nature/Spirituality  
* Radical Feminism:  
  - Radical Cultural  
  - Radical Rationalist |
| **Definitions/Preliminary Precepts** | * Deep Ecology Platform  
* Deep Questioning  
* Ecological Consciousness  
* "Ecologism"  
* Experiential Philosophy  
* Ecocentric Grassroots Effort  
* Inherent Value in Nature  
* Interrelated Body of Ideas  
* Interdependence of all forms of being  
* Limited Interference with Nature  
* Non-anthropocentric  
* Non-dualistic  
* No Ontological Division  
* New Vision of Nature  
* Radical Eco-philosophy  
* Reversal of Shallow Environmentalism  
* Transpersonal Ecology | * Biodiversity  
* Domination Critiques  
* Interconnectedness  
* Mutual Respect vs. Oppression of Women/Nature  
* New Vision of Self  
* Political/philosophical Project  
* Rejection of Patriarchal frameworks  
* Radical Reconstruction of values/beliefs  
* Theory/movement bridges feminism and ecology |
| **Major Distinctiveness** | * Biocentric Equality  
- Intrinsinc Worth  
- Vitalness and Nearness  
* Self-Realization  
- Ecosophy T  
- Ever-Widening Identification | * Analysis of Social Domination  
* Challenging Power Relationships  
* Critique of Oppressive Power Structures  
* Transformation of Power  
* "Wild Justice" Grounded in Political Action |
| **Challenges to Modern Worldview** | * Interconnectedness  
* Non-anthropocentrism  
* Non-Hierarchialism  
* Phenomenological and Experiential Bases of Deep Ecology | * Denial of Limits  
* Interconnectedness  
* Non-hierarchialism  
* Spirituality |
Theme One: Contemporary Environmental Thought

Devall and Sessions (1985) and Devall (1979) have presented a structure for understanding and critiquing conventional approaches to environmental issues. This structure contains four components: (1) reform environmentalism, (2) tactics of the new right, (3) new age/aquarian scenario and (4) revised libertarianism.

Clearly, Devall and Sessions do not speak for all deep ecologists or ecofeminists. Their ideas are reflections of their profound dissatisfaction with mainstream attempts to remediate a range of environmental problems. Their commitment is to an alternative vision of reality which changes the character of environmental problem definition and solution. So, while Devall and Sessions’ framework is useful for understanding deep ecology’s and ecofeminism’s evolution as critical responses to one or more forms of conventional environmental thought; their analyses should not be taken as final statements on the issue. It provides a useful structure for clarifying similarities and differences between conventional approaches to environmental issues and for making sense of deep ecology’s and ecofeminism’s discontentment with these.

The current section will provide an overview of this structure. The components will be summarized with brief
discussion of the underlying assumptions and values of each. This will act as a point of departure for comparing and contrasting the ideas of ecofeminism and deep ecology.

**Reform environmentalism**

Reform environmentalism is, according to Devall and Sessions (1985), what most people think about when the issue of environment is under discussion. Various movements and ideologies are identified by the authors as consistent with reformist thinking. These include wilderness preservation, public health and safety, wise-use land management, resource conservation, population control, limited growth movement and animal rights. Reform thinking tends to view individual problems with environment as technical and solvable within a modernist, technoscientific framework. Operating within the modernist worldview that assumes both problems and solutions are technical in nature, the reform movement has given rise to learned experts whose task it is to develop technical solutions to thorny environmental problems. Solutions have consequently been technically oriented and primarily aimed at reforming policies involving the use of natural resources.

The problem solving attempts of the reformist movement have been characterized by battles between
competing specialists who develop reasonable, rational and professional technicalities of scientific expertise which are then applied to the management of a full range of environmental concerns. According to Devall and Sessions reformist environmentalism gives the illusion of a reasoned search for fundamental solutions to person/environment problems.

Citing governmental reports of the U. S. Forest Service, the National Park Service and the Bureau of Land Reclamation; Devall and Sessions claim that reformist efforts serve to justify the policies and practices of a governmental/technoindustrial aristocracy whose primary concerns are with their own expansionary and pecuniary interests. For example, reformist forestry ideology operates out of an industrial model that views natural, old-growth forests as standing, economic reserve. With the exception of a few, relatively small protected areas, old-growth cutting is technically and expertly justified on the grounds that these forests can be replaced quite adequately with technologically designed and managed tree plantations (Drengson & Inoue, 1995). This perspective destroys the genetic diversity of forests, weakens the natural nutrient cycle of soil replenishment and dilutes ecosystem viability.

The powerful influence of reformist environmental
thought is also supported by prevailing sociocultural attitudes which give more weight to the voice of experts and professionals with licenses and advanced degrees than to persons whose learning and expertise may have developed through personal experience or intuition.

The language and practices of reformist ideology reveal a great deal about its underlying philosophical assumptions according to Devall and Sessions (1985). For example, the rhetoric of stewardship, wise-use, conservation, and scientific management often means in practice the economic development of resources as quickly as technically possible. This means altering nature to produce more or better products for human consumption. Framing person/nature issues as technical abstractions reveals a strong adherence to a anthropocentric cosmology where humans are seen as separate from and above nature. Nature’s value lies only in its usefulness to humankind, and change involves improvement or development of an imperfect natural realm. Devall and Sessions (1985) describe it this way:

...the Earth is seen primarily, if not exclusively, as a collection of natural resources....There is an overriding faith that human civilization will survive. Humans will continue to dominate Nature because humans are above, superior to or outside the
New right tactics

A second scenario proposed by Devall and Session (1985) as important in understanding traditional environmental thinking is what the authors refer to as the "new right" movement (p. 4). This movement is not so much characterized by an ideological framework different from the reformist approach, but rather by its organizational structure and its strategies for consciousness raising and information dissemination.

The new right environmentalists such as The League of Conservation Voters, the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth adopt the political strategies which right wing extremist groups have used successfully for many years. These include the targeting of particular groups of people for mass mailings, media advertisements and promotions geared for psychological impact through playing on the fears and insecurities of the public. The danger of this approach, according to Devall and Sessions, resides in the movement of environmental initiatives towards a structure of professional leadership in large, centralized, bureaucratic organizations making it much harder for small grassroots organizations to play meaningful roles in advocating for
change in their local communities.

A major philosophical assumption underlying this scenario is the explicit belief that problems of persons and nature are broad and moderately uncomplicated. Centralized strategies emanating from the new-right scenario tend to oversimplify environmental problems, which are inherently complex and localized, while at the same time lobbying for simple, short-term solutions which have the least chance of alienating the prevailing political/industrial power structure.

The new age scenario

A third scenario consistent with traditional environmental thought is the New Age/Aquarian movement which views the earth primarily as a resource for human use and regards humans as divinely chosen instruments of progress. This view, developed largely from the earlier writings of Jesuit scholar Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and technologist commentator R. Buckminster Fuller, has a devout following of thousands of "articulate, upscale, youngish professionals who are turned on by high technology, visions of human colonies on Mars, space travel and humans as co-pilots of spaceship earth" (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p.5). In this scenario humans are perceived as valiant planetary doctors whose technology has now given them "the skills to work with
natural systems to derive benefit from them, without
destroying their integrity and ability to renew
themselves" (Meyers, 1993, p. 259).

The new age scenario makes a number of assumptions
concerning the character of the human enterprise and
environmental systems. Practically, its strategies do
not differ significantly from the reformist position. It
assumes that degraded ecological systems can be
controlled and improved by application of human
rationality in the form of advanced technologies. It
differs in the sense that it views humans as heroic
saviors of the earth rather than purely technical experts
managing a plethora of environmental assaults. This
 techno-celestial position over-values human ingenuity by
believing it is possible to regain control over an
exploited nature. It also over-values natural capacity
in believing that many, if not all, environmental
problems can be dealt with by high technology or by
transporting the most bothersome person/environment
difficulties to colonized outposts in space.

**Revised libertarian movement**

A final scenario consistent with conventional
environmental thought is what Devall and Sessions call
the revised libertarian movement. Essentially this
ideology focuses on a revitalized interest in ownership
of private property and an acceptance of laissez-faire economic policy as a rational foundation for developing environmental policy and resource conservation. Influential theorists from this tradition include biologist Garret Hardin and economist John Bade. This approach involves private ownership of wilderness areas by special interest environmental groups such as the Audubon Society and the Sierra Club. These groups manage the areas in such a way as to conserve biological diversity but also to allow for some restricted resource development to enhance the financial stability of the organization.

A core value assumption of the libertarian view is the belief that private ownership of wilderness by concerned environmental entities will ensure the land's long-term survivability. Libertarians argue that when people are granted use of land that is held in common; the land is ultimately degraded because "each seeks to maximize short-term gain at the expense of the commons" (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 6). Contrastingly, private ownership by groups with environmental knowledge and expertise ensures a more utilitarian balance between potential damage and potential economic benefit of a parcel of land.

Devall and Sessions suggest that the danger of the
The libertarian approach is that it is deceptively appealing because it fits very well with current society's heightened devotion to free enterprise economics. However, economist Adam Smith's conceptualizations of maximization of self-interest does not, as supposed, operate to protect the interests of society in general or of nature in particular (Swartz, 1986). Unless the larger issues of domination and control (so subtly embedded in current economic and supportive political systems) are addressed, the libertarian approach will tie environmental groups even more firmly to existing anthropocentric versions of environmental management and will ultimately lead to continued misguided views of person/environment relationships.

To summarize, the reformist, new right, new age and libertarian approaches to person/environment problems are incomplete. They tend to oversimplify difficulties and overvalue technical solutions, while they at the same time maintain a myopic disregard for the destructive purposes and values inherent in the prevailing worldview (Skolimowski, 1990, Merchant, 1992; Wittbecker, 1994).

From the perspective of most deep ecologists and ecofeminists these conventional environmental approaches provide important short-term measures to slow environmental destruction and interim protection for the
biosphere (Zimmerman, 1994). But, these efforts will fail unless accompanied by changes in the basic structures of modernist worldview. There is a need for a change in the deeper structures upon which modern society rests. Deep ecology and ecofeminism call for a new ontology leading to a non-anthro/androcentric and non-hierarchial view of human/nature relationships.

The change toward a new ontology that ecofeminism and deep ecology are seeking to bring about is buttressed by a variety of evidentiary supports. Generally speaking, the contours of these evidentiary claims can be grouped into four broad categories. First, ecofeminism and deep ecology marshall empirical support by drawing upon new approaches to science now emerging in quantum physics, conservation biology and chaos theory. Secondly, both movements rely on spirituality and a variety of sacred impulses to support the development of a new ontology. Thirdly, they also regard philosophical explication, particularly like that found in the Postmodern, philosophical critique of modernism, as important in understanding fundamental change. Finally, ecofeminism and deep ecology value an individual's intuitive/experiential capacity to conceptualize and analyze significant issues. This unique mix of new science, philosophy, spirituality and one's intuitive
sense lie at the core of deep ecology’s and ecofeminism’s evidentiary claims.

**Ecofeminism**

According to Carolyn Merchant (1990) the term ecofeminism was coined by French writer Francoise d’Eaubonne (1994) in 1974 to illustrate the potential of women for bringing about an ecological revolution to guarantee human survival. Since that time there have been numerous writers who have formulated a variety of perspectives on ecofeminism. There is one element which some suggest unites ecofeminist perspectives: the belief that human/nature relationships and all forms of social domination are feminist concerns (Warren, 1987; Birkeland, 1991). The sense of this is summarized by Ruether (1989):

> There can be no ecological ethic simply as a new relation of "man" and "nature". Any ecological ethic must always take into account the structures of social domination and exploitation that mediate domination of nature and prevent concern for the welfare of the whole community in favor of the immediate advantage of the dominant class, race, and sex. (p 149)

For while there may be some unanimity on a statement of fundamental concern over care of nature and quality of
social life (Merchant, 1992), ecofeminists have varying perspectives around specific ways to develop and apply this concern. This is not a surprising complication given the multiple sources from which ecofeminism arose. The following discussion of ecofeminism is organized around themes two through five (see p. 187) and shall include discussion of its historical and theoretical influences, definitions and preliminary precepts, its major distinctiveness, and its challenge to the modern worldview.

Theme two: Historical and theoretical influences

The current section will analyze the multi-layered character of ecofeminism's historical and theoretical development. It will briefly review three historical precursors to ecofeminist thought including the study of historical and political theory, nature-based religion and spirituality, and environmental activism of the 1960s and 1970s. It will then address the major theoretical influence on ecofeminism of traditional forms of feminist thought.

Spretnak (1990) describes three historical precursors or paths which have influenced ecofeminism. The first path was the study of history and political theory. Feminists who were exposed to Marxist theory in the 1960's as well as critical theory and social ecology
in 1970's began to develop a theory of domination which was not based solely on classical Marxist belief; that domination is related to wealth, property and class. From their own life experiences, these feminists gave increasing attention to the twin oppressions of women and nature within the dominance structure of patriarchal social conventions. What evolved was a feminist/ecological dominance theory rooted in the destructive ethos of patriarchy.

A second historical path into ecofeminism has been feminist exposure to nature-based religion and spirituality. Spretnak (1990) suggests that in the mid 1970’s feminists discovered, through historical and archaeological data, ancient religions which honored both nature and femininity. These religions were not matriarchal but rather were focused on experiencing and knowing the Divine as immanent in themselves and in surrounding nature. These discoveries became a vital force shaping a ecofeminist spirituality which is concerned ultimately with:

... the resacralization of Nature, of the "divine feminine" inherent in all living beings. It is seen as part of a process of reconnection, a re-establishment of ways of knowing and being in the world that have been lost in the history of
patriarchal domination. The Goddess, in myriad forms, represents an ultimate vision of connectedness... (Sandilands, 1991, p. 93)

A third historical influence on ecofeminism, according to Spretnak (1990) was women's involvement in the environmental movement and Green politics. As women began in the 1970's to move into careers in public-interest environmental organizations, environmental studies and public policy a growing awareness developed around the inequities associated with being a woman in previously male dominated entities. As feminists began to encounter early ecofeminist analysis they began to view their careers and conventional notions of environment and environmental policy with an entirely new perspective.

In addition to the historical influences contributing to a ecofeminist position, critiques of leading versions of traditional feminist thought have also contributed important theoretical insight to ecofeminism. Several ecofeminist writers and other theorists (Warren, 1987; King, 1990; Merchant, 1990, 1992; Zimmerman, 1994) have examined both the contributions and deficiencies of liberal feminism, Marxist/socialist feminism and radical feminism to an emerging ecofeminist perspective.
Liberal feminism is rooted in the liberal political tradition which views society as composed of autonomous individuals who have optimal freedom to maximize their own discrete interests. From this perspective persons are viewed as rational agents who compete for scarce resources. The essence of human nature lies in the ability to reason and act in accordance with objective, rights-based principles which tend to give humans moral considerability over and above nature. Zimmerman (1987) suggests that this kind of theorizing tends "to restrict rights (and moral standing) to human beings, and...portray nonhuman beings as being virtually devoid of intrinsic worth" (p. 29).

The liberal feminist approach to human/nature issues tends to focus on the lack of equal rights and unfair advantage. It tends to endorse reformist and libertarian environmental action such as legal protection of species, resource conservation and wilderness preservation. It has been an important source of limited short-term change from within the framework of the liberal democratic tradition, and has drawn attention to the emancipatory aspects of modernism, but ultimately it fails because it does not challenge the philosophical underpinnings of the patriarchal oppression of women and nature (Warren, 1987).

Warren (1987) argues that liberal feminist
viewpoints have given theoretical guidance to ecofeminism but any ongoing reliance on them by ecofeminists is severely problematic. First, because the highly individualistic rights orientation reflects the hierarchical, dualistic thinking of the modernist project; seeing humans over-and-against nature, and mind over-and-against body. Secondly, liberal feminism has uncritically adopted modernism's patently anthropocentric leanings in the extension of rights to nonhuman beings. Arrogant moral extensionism assumes that humans have the power and inherent right to grant moral consideration to nonhumans, and without this granting of standing, nonhuman nature is essentially valueless. Finally, liberal feminism tends to overlook a view of relationships existing within a interconnected web or community of beings. This disregard thus colludes with the modernist penchant to ignore, minimize or suppress different values which conflict with the dominant paradigm.

Marxist/socialist feminism sees "nonhuman nature as the material basis of human life, supplying the necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and energy" (Merchant, 1990, p. 103), and the importance of "transformation of nature by science and technology for human use" (Merchant, 1992, p. 186). It views women's
oppression as only ancillary to an ongoing class struggle. Liberation occurs when men and women together overthrow the oppressive forces of capitalism and replace it with some form of egalitarian socialist state (Warren, 1987).

Though Marxist/socialist feminist analysis has contributed much to ecofeminism in its criticism of the impact of environmental degradation on working-class persons, it has failed to provide an exacting analysis sufficient to develop a consistent ecofeminist ethic. King (1990) suggests that its greatest weakness is its reliance on the centrality of economics as a principal premise for its theory and practice. From this perspective it is not much different from capitalism with its emphasis on the production of economic goods and its domination and control of nature as a way of acquiring these. The underlying philosophical assumptions of the modernist project remain intact. Warren (1987) suggests that an even more serious flaw in Marxist/socialist feminism is its gender blindness in the analysis of women's oppression. Its focus on class, to the exclusion of gender issues, "serves to distort rather than clarify the nature of women's oppression" (p. 13).

Of the three traditional feminist ideologies, radical feminism has been the one most closely associated
with ecofeminism (Spretnak, 1990). From this perspective the oppression of women is accomplished by men's control over women's bodies. Women are defined in the patriarchal system as child-bearing and child-rearing vehicles whose value lies in their instrumental ability to satisfy male sexual appetites (Merchant, 1990).

Radical feminism holds that women and nature have been associated with each other and devalued together within modern Western culture.

Radical feminists are split over the issue of connection between women and nature. While there is general agreement that "the oppression of women and the domination of nature in patriarchal society are interconnected and mutually reinforcing" (Berman, 1994, p. 173); opposing positions have evolved around whether this connection is a source of freedom or a source of further domination. Radical rationalist feminists (King, 1990) take the position that connecting women to nature is a backward step that reinforces gender differences and sex-role stereotyping. For radical rationalist feminists "freedom is being liberated from the primordial realm of women and nature, which they regard as an imprisoning female ghetto" (King, 1990, p.110). Radical rationalist feminists maintain that associating women with nature is a sexist ploy to keep women in subordination to men.
Radical cultural feminists, on the other hand do not wish to undue the connection between women and nature but rather focus on challenging the male domination system instead of strategizing or joining with it. They celebrate women’s commonalities and attempt to "articulate and even create a separate women’s culture and have been major proponents of the identification of women with nature and feminism with ecology" (King, 1990, p.111).

The obvious similarity of these ideas to ecofeminism is clear, however, a number of objections have been noted concerning radical feminism. King (1990) points out that radical feminism has served a vital function of addressing the need for spiritual mystery and community connectedness which the modernist project has tended to ignore. But, by itself, the "femininity culture" (p. 110) and politics of radical feminism does not provide an adequate basis for ecofeminist theory and practice. Ecofeminism understands the need to appreciate the mystery of current cultural connections, but also understands the need to address history as a succession of mysteries of human/nature relationships. King (1990) also suggests that radical feminists have tended to emphasize what women have in common, thus diluting the complexity of feminine identity. She points to the
important but often overlooked contribution of women of color as crucial in the continued development of the radical feminist perspective.

Warren (1987) also notes a number of worries involving the radical feminist approach. First, radical feminism's exclusive focus on women as embodied spiritual beings lacks the broadness necessary to be a theoretical basis for ecofeminism because it tends to neglect other forms of body bound oppression such as racism and classism. Secondly, radical feminism unknowingly conspires with an oppressive patriarchal framework by attempting to locate women's experience as closer to nature than men's. This maintains the competitive, values hierarchical, dualistic thinking of patriarchal framework. Even asking the question, are women closer to nature than men, according to Warren, perpetuates the very system that radical feminism purports to reject. It can also be added that many radical feminist devotees unwitting collaborate with the new age/aquarian approach to environmental issues (King, 1990; Devall & Sessions, 1985) by attempting to see women (rather than men) as uniquely qualified, spiritually ordained instruments of protection and progress.

Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts

Ecofeminism defies clear and precise definition
partly because its origins are very diverse. Some, however, have attempted to give ecofeminism a more precise character by attempting to give definition to it and by looking at some of its perceptual formulations. The current section of this analysis will explore several definitional statements of ecofeminism, and discuss preliminary precepts common to ecofeminist thought.


Mathews (1994), for example, suggests that the current status of ecofeminist thought is not developed enough to allow ecofeminists to be referred to as a theory. "Ecofeminism is by no means a position or a theory, but simply a fairly open field of inquiry" (p. 162). Berman (1994), however, argues forcibly that ecofeminism "is a theory and movement for social change that combines ecological principles with feminist theory" (p. 173). Sandilands (1991) agrees with this assessment and defines ecofeminism as "a theory and movement which bridges the gap between feminism and ecology, but which transforms both to create a unified praxis to end all forms of domination" (p. 90). Later, Sandilands (1994)
expands upon this understanding and calls ecofeminism a political and philosophical project which "places a heavy analytic emphasis on the ways in which dualism works to bifurcate and lobotomize aspects of human experience" (p. 169). Perhaps the most developed definition of ecofeminism is provided by Warren (1988). Ecofeminism is:

...both a critique of male domination of both women and nature, and an attempt to frame an ethic free of male-gender bias about women and nature. It not only recognizes the multiple voices of women, located differently by race, class, age, and ethnic considerations, it centralizes those voices. Ecofeminism builds on the multiple perspectives of those whose perspectives are typically omitted or undervalued in dominant discourse. [It is]....structurally pluralistic, inclusivist, and contextualist, emphasizing through concrete example the crucial role context plays in understanding sexist and naturist practice. (p. 151)

Several authors have also identified a number of preliminary precepts which characterize ecofeminist thought. There is in some cases considerable overlap among these, but they are illustrative of general features which many, if not most, ecofeminists might
Ynestra King (1983 pp. 119-120) citing the connection between social ecology and feminism suggests that ecofeminism is based on four overarching beliefs. One, modern western industrial civilization dominates nature, and because women are believed to be closer to nature, modern industrialism also subjugates women. Second, there is no natural value based hierarchial ordering of nature but rather a series of interconnected communal webs. Hierarchies are human inventions used to define and dominate both nature and women. Third, healthy ecosystems exhibit biodiversity rather than biosimplification. The tendency to simplify biological existence corresponds to a simplification of social life, thus reducing human diversity, devaluing difference, and homogenizing culture for the convenience of a mass consumer, market oriented society. Finally, there is a need for radical restructuring of society which removes the nature-culture dualism of modern society and renews understanding of our relationship to nature, to our bodies and to all non-human beings around us.

In another early critical review ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1986, p. 120) identifies the single overarching construct of ecofeminism as its devotion to "the problem of women and nature", by which she means the link between
the domination of women and the domination of nature. Plumwood suggests that there is substantial unanimity on this point. Differences among ecofeminists can be understood primarily as related to three different views of the origins of this domination mentality. The origins are seen variously as emerging from the dualistic (humanity versus nature) character of classical philosophy, the mechanistic model of the enlightenment or from the early belief in sexually-differentiated personality formation.

Birkeland (1991 p. 74) understands ecofeminism as a conceptual framework that includes seven overarching precepts to which most ecofeminists would subscribe. These include a reconstructing of underlying values and structural relations of modern society; a belief in the intrinsic value of nature as an essential element in social transformation; an ecocentric ethical frame which comprehends the interconnectedness of all life processes; and the idea that human relationship with natural place should be guided by an ethic of reciprocity, diversity, and limited interference. Additional overarching precepts described by Birkeland are the belief that power-based, hierarchical relationships must be eschewed in favor of a relationship ethic based on mutual respect; the notion that all dualisms have a bases in the
male/female polarity and ultimately divide persons from others, themselves, and from nature; and the principle that processes are as important as outcomes--for how things are done is as important as what is done.

Kheel (1991, p.63) suggests that ecofeminism is united in its sharing of three general premises. These are the belief that the devaluation of women and nature have historically gone hand in hand; the notion that the domination of outer nature is linked to the domination of inner nature; and the idea that domination of inner nature is rooted in psychic identity, particularly that of men who deny their vulnerability and dependency.

Agreeing with Kheel’s first point, Berman (1994, p. 173) suggests there is general consensus on two general bases of ecofeminism; oppression of women and domination of nature in a patriarchal society is interconnected; and human beings are only one constituent part of a much larger community of all life and living systems. Sandilands (1991 p. 90) also sees two common elements which inform ecofeminism. These are mutual reliance on certain ideas on the origins of domination of women and nature, and a particular understanding of the essential relationship between humanity and nature.

Warren (1987, 1988, 1990, 1994) has provided perhaps the most thorough analysis of the more specific,
philosophically grounded axioms of ecofeminism. In many ways her thought summarizes and elucidates the ideas discussed above. To begin with, Warren (1987 pp.4-5) has suggested a framework for establishing the minimal philosophic conditions upon which any ecological feminism must be based. From her perspective a thorough ecological feminism is based on the specific axioms that: (1) important connections exist between the oppression of women and oppression of nature; (2) understanding the character of these connections is necessary to appreciate both the oppression of women and nature; (3) if oppression of women and nature are connected and if there is some adequate understanding of these, then feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective; and (4) if oppression of women and nature are connected and if there is some adequate understanding of these, then solutions to ecological issues must include a feminist perspective. Thus, Warren suggests that on the basis of these claims an identifiable ecological feminism is a plausible alternative to traditional feminist frameworks which lack a transformative and integrative perspective.

has at least eleven specific action principles flowing from her philosophic axioms. For Warren a transformative feminism opposes all forms of oppression or all isms of domination. It is structurally pluralistic in the sense that it affirms the value of differences in an inclusive, nondominaing manner. It involves a rejection of a patriarchal conceptual framework which functions to maintain and perpetuate domination hierarchies. In addition, a transformative, ecological feminism values and prefers the felt-experience claims of oppressed persons and believes to ignore these perpetuates a patriarchal, non-inclusive bias. It reconceptualizes theory as theory-in-process; theory should never be universalizing, and theory building is always situated within a set of historical, sociocultural, conceptual and environmental circumstances. An ecological feminism exposes and challenges the use of power domination tactics in socioeconomic and environmental contexts. It involves a rethinking of what it means to be person, such that self is viewed simultaneously as a co-member of an ecological community while at the same time being a unique individual in webs of communal relationship. It makes a central place for values of reciprocity, friendship, kinship and appropriate care for both other persons and the nonhuman natural environment. Ecological
feminism also provides a place for psychologies, and theologies or spiritualities of liberation as a part of its theoretical base. It provides practical guides for action within the dominant, patriarchal paradigm. And, finally, it involves challenging traditional scientific and technological approaches to person/environment relationships. From Warren’s perspective it is these action principles which characterize ecofeminism and make it a truly transformative, ecological feminism.

Theme four: Major distinctiveness

Up to this point the current analysis has looked at major theme areas organized around historical and theoretical influences as well as definitional statements and preliminary precepts. Unlike deep ecology’s platform principles and ultimate norms ecofeminism has no agreed upon standard or seminal theorist, like Arne Naess, who has established a framework for further development. Ecofeminism is a far more diversified movement than deep ecology in this regard.

Ecofeminism is at an awkward stage of development and, as has been shown, it is a highly diverse field of discourse. This has lent to it not having the same precision and clarity in the development of normative standards, as has been more typically the case for deep ecology. While subsequent discussions will illustrate
marked similarities between the two movements; the ecofeminist literature shows that the major distinctiveness of ecofeminism lies in its focus on critiquing all oppressive power structures as the first step in forging a new standard of human/nature relationship. Ecofeminist writer Ynestra King (1989), for example, argues that any movement claiming an ecological interest is simply incomplete without a critique of power. She observes that "without a feminist analysis of social domination that reveals the roots of misogyny and hatred of nature, ecology remains an abstraction: it is incomplete" (pp. 23-24).

Ecofeminism asserts that the split between humanity and nature in turn reflects a split between man and woman. This split between man and woman and between all comparative spheres is supported by a dualistic power hierarchy of existence which "creates a logic of interwoven oppression" (Plumwood, 1994, p. 211) In the words of ecofeminist Susan Griffin (1989):

We divide ourselves and all that we know along an invisible borderline between that we call Nature and what we believe is superior to Nature....According to this worldview--a view whose assumptions are so widely accepted by this civilization that we do not even think of it as an ideology--there is a
hierarchy in existence. (p. 8)

From the ecofeminist perspective hierarchy is inextricably linked with power. Thus in proposing that humanity give up hierarchical thinking, ecofeminism also exhorts us to give up power as we traditionally conceive of it and move toward what Sandilands (1994) calls a "wild justice" grounded in political action. Challenging all existing power relationships is, according to Starhawk (1989), the unique contribution of ecofeminism. It is ecofeminism's normative goal. Power critiques are essential for societal transformation because "powerlessness and the structures that perpetuate it is the root cause of famine, of over-population, of the callous destruction of the natural environment" (p. 180). This point of view is expressed very clearly by Petra Kelly:

Our aim is radical, nonviolent change outside--and inside of us! The macrocosm and the microcosm! This has to do with transforming power! Not power over, or power to dominate, or power to terrorize--but shared power; abolishing power as we know it, replacing it with the power of nonviolence or something common to all, to be used by all and for all! (Kelly, 1989, p. x).
Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview

Drawing from the previous discussion and relying on the works of several ecofeminist authors and other relevant theorists for illustration there are a number of important subthemes which emerged from the literature related to ecofeminism’s challenge to the dominant, modernistic worldview. These have been organized around non-hierarchicalism, interconnectedness, spirituality, and the over-valuing of human and environmental capacity.

Ecofeminists adopt a non-hierarchical conceptual framework as a guiding alternative to modernistic ways of understanding and organizing difference. Hierarchies are human derived systems of ranking which define and circumscribe relationships among complex phenomena. They have become the accepted way to understand differences that exist in the natural as well as the social realm. Hierarchies have two elemental characteristics which help clarify the features of this conceptual frame. The first is linear sorting and ranking of complex relationships among phenomena as a way to understand differences. The second feature, related to and perhaps flowing from the first, is the tendency to interpret these linear relationships as organized around a superior to inferior polarity which then legitimizes the belief that domination and control is the preferred method for
maintaining distinctiveness among phenomena (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion).

Ecofeminists believe that hierarchies destroyed the original balance that once existed in the premodern world and that today hierarchial dominance permeates all aspects of life (Merchant, 1992). The non-hierarchial framework of ecofeminism challenges all forms of domination (Starhawk, 1990) and has a commitment not only to reversing the domination of nature, but also to removing social domination.

As has been suggested earlier the distinctiveness of ecofeminism's challenge to hierarchial dominance is best understood in its emphasis on patriarchalism as a model for all other forms of domination. Ecofeminists tend to agree that hierarchies and the logic of domination stem from patriarchy and that patriarchy historically functions to sustain and justify the ongoing domination of women, nature and social structures (Warren, 1990). Warren (1988) understands patriarchal conceptual frameworks as a domination system which:

...explains, justifies, and maintains the subordination of women by men. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks place higher value, status, or prestige on what is traditionally associated with males than on what is traditionally associated with
females. A patriarchal conceptual framework puts men "up" and women "down", minds "up" and bodies "down", culture "up" and nature "down". Underlying patriarchal conceptual frameworks is what I call a "logic of domination" which incorrectly assumes that superiority justifies subordination....Patriarchal conceptual frameworks...sanction the subordination of both women and nature....by feminizing nature and then assuming that both women and nature are inferior ("down") to men...[and] by failing to see the ways in which the exploitation of nature is historically and conceptually tied to the subordination of women. (p.144)

Thus, the nonhierarchical framework of ecofeminism reorganizes human relationships and relationships with all other beings so that diversity and difference are not equated with superiority or inferiority. Ecofeminists understand that hierarchies exist in nature and that hierarchical thinking is inescapable in some contexts. At issue for them is not hierarchies per se but the value humans ascribe to entities which are up as opposed to down on the hierarchical scale. Warren (1990) observes:

Hierarchical thinking is important in daily living for classifying data, comparing information, and organizing material. Taxonomies (e.g., plant
taxonomies) and biological nomenclature seem to require some form of "hierarchical thinking". Even "value-hierarchical thinking" may be quite acceptable in certain contexts....The problem is not simply that value-hierarchical thinking and value dualisms are used, but the way in which each has been used in oppressive conceptual frameworks to establish inferiority and to justify subordination. (pp. 128-129)

A second subtheme emerging from the literature in connection to challenges to the modern worldview is the idea of interconnectedness in complex webs of communal networks. Interconnectedness for ecofeminists is a view that the parts of all energy, matter and reality are related to the greater whole. This whole is not a abstract mentalism but has infinitely complicated characteristics somewhat analogous to the way communities of beings manage individual and collectivist realities. Ecofeminist writers suggest that humans have lost their integrated wholeness through a gradual deprogramming initiated and sustained by modern institutions, economies and educational systems. Swimme (1990), for instance, compares the fragmentation of the modern mind with a frontal lobotomy which essentially shuts down a person's fundamental cognitive and sentient powers. This virtual
lobotomizing began with the introduction of positivist scientific protocol and is sustained through all other educational and economic processes based on positivist premises. By the time formal education is complete:

...we have only a sliver of our original minds still operative....It is a sliver chiseled to perfection for controlling, for distancing, for calculating and for dominating....Our insistence on analysis, on computation, on categorization has blinded us to the reality of the whole. We have been seated at a table heavy with food, and instead of realizing that this is a feast we are meant to join, we occupy our minds with counting the silverware over and over as we starve to death. (Swimme, 1990, p. 16)

Ecofeminism seeks to heal this lobotomy by reweaving the inherent interconnectedness in all of the universe through a revitalization of each person's direct, lived, and sensual experience with the complex whole of nature. Griffin (1989) suggests that modern civilization's root metaphor is division rather than connection. She concludes that:

We no longer feel ourselves to be a part of this earth. We regard our fellow creatures as enemies. And, very young, we even learn to disown a part of our own being. We come to believe that we do not
know what we know....dividedness is etched into our language. (Griffin, 1989, p. 7)

From this complex ontology of interconnectedness ecofeminists understand human beings as not being separate from or above nature. They are one small part of a whole, rather than the pinnacle of nature. In separating nature from persons, humanity creates a nature which is made up of dead, unintelligent matter. Ecofeminists like Griffin (1990 p. 88) offer an alternative view of nature which suggests that "consciousness is an integral part of nature" and that nature is soulful. It is this great soulfulness of nature which connects, deeply, unalterability nature with humanity.

Given this, ecofeminism rejects the reductionist tendencies of the modernist project by emphasizing that the organic wholeness of the universe is greater than the sum of its parts. Reductionism understands all complex phenomena as being reducible to their smallest parts. Change consists in rearrangement of the parts, which themselves do not change. By manipulating the parts of any system the whole is changed (i.e. the whole is the sum of the parts). The corresponding change is always or perhaps presumably for the better. This point is strikingly illustrated in Swimme's (1990) comparison of
the violent, fragmented, reductionist big bang theory of the origin of the universe with the ecofeminist vision of a great birth. Instead of bombs, explosions, and shrapnel as the root metaphor for creation, ecofeminists envision a complex and mysterious birthing process, swelling and growing, connecting and reconnecting. Nature was and is birthed as we are. It is a mystery to be experienced rather than explained. And because it is a living entity, not simply a random reassembly of billions of pieces of cosmic dust and debris, there is an essential organic unity between nature and ourselves. This interconnected unity leads to action motivated by compassionate understanding and appreciation rather than competition; the experience of feeling with all beings now (Starhawk, 1990) and into future generations.

Ecofeminism thus rejects the dominance, competition, materialism and technoscientific exploitation inherent in modernist, economic based social systems. Ecofeminism instead assumes that healthy interactions are based on caring and compassion and the creation and nurturing of life (Christ, 1990). Compassion and caring for nature are part of ecofeminist processes because all of nature is seen as intimately connected with humans and as having intrinsic value. Thus, in the decision making process of ecofeminism, nature also has a voice deserving to be
Ecofeminists value nature’s complex cycles of renewability, and the integrity and harmony of people with nature. Their analyses of human/nature issues do not follow problem specific, conventional environmental strategies but rather center around raising consciousness concerning the destruction of the cyclic integrity, the life giving and sustaining quality of nature, particularly under the modernist pretense of development. For example, Shiva (1990), discusses how current economic strategies continue the process of colonialism under the modern guise of development and points out how Third World peoples, particularly women, are struggling for liberation from the violence of development just as they struggled for freedom from colonialism in the past. Shiva observes that western economic interests view Third World peoples as living in poverty by defining all work that does not produce capital and profits as unproductive; and peoples who do not have accumulations of material goods as impoverished. The evidence shows that while both men and women in Third World countries have been impoverished due to western development practices, it is women who bear the brunt of the losses and oppression:

Development projects have destroyed women’s
productivity both by removing land, water, and forests from their management and control, as well as by the ecological destruction of soil, water, and vegetation systems so that nature’s productivity and renewability have been impaired. The assumptions are obvious. Nature is unproductive. Organic agriculture based on nature’s cycles of renewability is unproductive. Women and tribal and peasant societies embedded in nature are also unproductive...because it is assumed that production only takes place when it is mediated by technologies for commodity production, even when such technologies destroy life. (p. 191).

Shiva (1990) has called this debilitating phenomena "maldevelopment" because of the violence and destruction that has followed in its wake. The modernist project, with its narrow vision of absolute truth, and confident that its vision of the world is the best view, has perceived Third World cultures as simple and impoverished because they did not have accumulations of material wealth, and as unproductive because their work did not produce capital and profits. Subsequent development projects to improve this perceived impoverishment has resulted in destroying the natural connectedness between people and their environment, removing life essentials
such as land, water and forests from the management of the people who live with them and disrupting and destroying nature's complex cycles of renewability. In contrast, the interconnected standard of ecofeminism redefines productivity by viewing nature's cycles and the peoples who live in harmony with them as naturally efficient and productive.

A third subtheme emerging from the literature in ecofeminism is their view of the importance of spirituality to human functioning. Ecofeminism views spirituality and sacredness as primary foundations of social structure. Spirituality is related to everyday activities and is the bridge which connects nature and self. Sandilands (1991) understands ecofeminist spirituality as:

...being concerned with the resacralization of Nature, of the "divine feminine" inherent in all living beings. It is seen as part of a process of reconnection, a re-establishment of ways of knowing and being in the world that have been lost in the history of patriarchal domination. The Goddess...is the intricate (simultaneously fragile and powerful) web of life which is the Earth: She is...immanent and alive in all people as parts of Nature, rather than as beings trying to transcend the material
world. (p. 93)

Not all ecofeminists agree with the spiritual perspective. Some, like Janet Biehl (1991), base their transformative notions strictly on secular principles and ardently criticize the spiritual perspective. In a strongly worded condemnation of the implications of the spiritual grounding of many ecofeminists Biehl writes that this:

.... sweeping but highly confused cosmology introduces magic, goddesses, witchcraft, privileged quasi-biological traits, irrationalities, Neolithic atavism, and mysticism into a movement that once tried to gain....the most valuable features of civilization for women, on a par with thinking and humane men. (p. 6)

Biehl's critique, though strongly worded, finds little resonance with the majority of ecofeminism theorists. Most appear quite comfortable in openly and frequently expressing their spirituality in a multitude of forms. For example, Gunn-Allen (1990), advocates healing ourselves spiritually and emotionally through respecting and loving our bodies and the fullness of our sensual experiences. She suggests that a society "based on body hate destroys itself and causes harm to all" (p. 53). Razak (1990) and Spretnak (1989) address the
spiritual nature of women's bodily processes and their connection to the cycles of nature. LaChapelle (1989) speaks of the sacredness of sex and Macy (1989) suggests that our spiritual response to the pain we feel over threats to the earth determine our capacity to heal ourselves and the planet. Griffin (1995) reconnects spirituality to everyday life by suggesting that our meeting with God is not above or outside ourselves but rather "...God exists in every meeting. In meetings of minds, or of bodies, between humankind and animals, plants, earth" (p. 151).

Ecofeminists suggest that while the western and eastern traditions accept religion and spirituality as important components to human need, they often split spiritual consciousness away from everyday experiences (Eisler, 1990). In contrast, ecofeminist spirituality holds the view that all things are connected in a living global community and stresses responsibility to community. This spirituality is earth based. It is built on the belief that everything is connected, that everything affects everything else, and that humans are part of a living community. Rather than individual enlightenment, the goal of ecofeminist spirituality is to create a community where people can come together to connect with the earth and do what needs to be done to
heal person and planet. The challenge of ecofeminist spirituality is to distinguish "between a spirituality that is practiced versus an intellectual philosophy" (Starhawk, 1990, p. 74).

A final subtheme emerging from the ecofeminist literature related to challenges to the modern worldview is the idea of over-valuing human and environmental capacity. Ecofeminism holds that the modern mechanistic model of nature (Merchant, 1992) as well as patriarchal perceptual frameworks (Warren, 1990) replaced previous animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos, leading to a fragmentation of the human self and denial of human mortality, dependence, and finitude. This led to a simplistic overvaluing of personal, environmental and technological capacity and projection of denial onto the body, women and nature. In an essay on ecofeminism and deep ecology Michael Zimmerman (1990, p. 114) suggests the character of this denial:

... as men became individuated by their identification with the Father God, the terror of individuation led them to construe him as an all-powerful, separate, other-worldly self. This conception of God led men to dissociate themselves from women, from nature, and from their own bodies--from everything that reminded them of dependence.
According to this view, men "have sought to deny their feelings of vulnerability and dependency in relation to women and nature" (Kheel, 1991), and in so doing have sought to control and dominate function of both women and nature in order to maintain denial of the split off parts of the self (Griffin, 1989). Zimmerman (1987) adds that mankind's drive for immortality "may be said to motivate both the technological domination of nature as well as the nuclear arms race" (p. 26).

In contrast ecofeminists emphasize the essential wholeness of the human self. They encourage healing by overcoming the fragmented self and its numbing of innate, organic sensibilities (Swimme, 1990). Humans are seen as humble members of a greater organic cosmos, rather than as superior to it. Human finitude is acknowledged and accepted as creating limits to human achievement as well as our understanding of environmental capacity, and technological capability. Unlimited capacity, pure rationality, ultimate control and unadulterated objectivism become illusions of humankind's fragmented selfhood and can only be healed by encouraging a sense of spiritual wonder through experiences of feeling with other beings (Griffin, 1989, 1990, 1995; Starhawk, 1990).
Deep Ecology

According to Bill Devall and George Sessions (1985) the term deep ecology was coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in his 1973 article The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movements. In this article Naess attempted to describe a deeper and more experientially grounded approach to human/nature relationships. He describes a distinction between what he calls the shallow and deep ecology movements. From Naess's perspective there is a difference between an environmental movement which is concerned with ecological problems because of their impact on humans in the developed world and one which is more deeply concerned with issues of ecological equality in humanities fundamental relationship with nature. It is a difference "in the depth of our philosophical and practical attitudes" (cited in List, 1993 p. 17).

Since the writing of this seminal article other theorists, including Naess himself, have amplified and expanded upon his original conceptualizations in an attempt to provide a thorough grounding for a new experiential philosophy of nature (Naess, 1984, 1989; Devall & Sessions, 1985; Rothenberg, 1995; Fox, 1990, 1995a; Sessions, 1995b; Drengson & Inoue, 1995; Drengson, 1995). The central aim of deep ecology is to move beyond
a shallow, problem-specific approach to environmental problems characteristic of reformist environmentalists (see pp. 189-199) while attempting to articulate an ecological worldview that reflects a deeper connection and more sensitive openness between humans and between humans and the non-human world.

According to Jung (1990) there are two governing principles of deep ecology. They are (1) "reverence for" and (2) "harmony with Nature" rather than "the utility and domination of Nature solely for humankind" (p. 95). These ideas are suggested in Naess's (1973) description of ecosophy which differentiates between ecology as a science and ecology as a philosophy:

...in so far as ecology movements deserve our attention, they are ecophilosophical rather than ecological. Ecology is a limited science which makes use of scientific methods. Philosophy is the most general forum of debate on fundamentals, descriptive as well as prescriptive, and political philosophy is one of its subsections. By an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy is a kind of sofia wisdom, is openly normative, it contains both norms, rule postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our
universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, and prescription, not only scientific description and prediction. (cited in List, 1993, p. 22-23) There is general agreement among deep ecology theorists with Naess's assessment of the need for reverence and to articulate the inherent harmony of persons with nature. But, as Zimmerman (1994) and Drengson and Inoue (1995) observe, deep ecology theorists and followers may not always agree with the precise application of these governing principles to political activism or to cultural specific issues.

The current discussion of deep ecology is organized around major themes and ancillary subthemes which emerged in the course of the current analysis. As with the review of ecofeminism the following discussion of deep ecology is organized around themes two through five (see p. 187) and shall include discussion of its historical and theoretical influences, definitions and preliminary precepts, major distinctiveness, and its challenge to the modern worldview.

Theme two: Historical and theoretical influences

Deep ecology has had a variety of both historical and theoretical contributors. These historical and theoretical roots are difficult to trace given the diversity of their own intellectual development.
Merchant (1992) for example has noted a large number of religious, philosophical and scientific influences on deep ecology. These include: (1) alternative Western religious traditions, particularly that of Saint Francis of Assisi; (2) Eastern philosophy, such as that described by Daisetz Suzuki; (3) Eastern religious traditions, for instance Taoism, Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, and Hinduism; (4) Native American traditions from such leaders as Black Elk and Luther Standing Bear; (5) alternative western philosophy represented in the works of Giordano Bruno, Gottfried Leibniz, and George Santayana; (6) radical scientific critiques of modern ecology, particularly the work of Paul Shepard; (7) radical sociological critique of the dominant western worldview in the work of William Catton and Riley Dunlap; (8) the new physics represented in the work of Fritjof Capra, and (9) the new systemic challenge to the mechanistic model of nature predicated upon the wholistic, self-organizing character of systems and represented in the works of David Bohm, Ilya Prigogine, Edward Lorenz, Charles Birch and James Lovelock.

The current section will analyze the multi-layered character of deep ecology's historical and theoretical development. It will briefly review two historical precursors to deep ecological thought including the
political activism of the 1960s and the mid-nineteenth century and contemporary socio-political movements. It will then address the major theoretical influences of Gandhi and Spinoza and the postmodern philosophy of Martin Heidegger.

Sessions (1995c) suggests that the flowering of deep ecology was influenced by the political activism of the 1960s, particularly that of the so-called Environmental Revolution. The birth of deep ecology paralleled escalating environmental concern. Both grew out of the newly emerging science of ecology and a often unconscious sense experienced by many related not only to protecting the environment but developing a closer relationship with it. This need to reconnect with nature was popularized in Aldo Leopold’s (1949) ethics of the land and Rachel Carson’s (1962) pivotal book, *Silent Spring* (Sessions, 1995c). Carson’s book dealt specifically with the use of pesticides and their impact on small animal life, but her ultimate concerns went far deeper. She was in fact questioning:

...the direction and goals of Western society, including the human competence and "right" to dominate and manage the Earth. More generally, she posed a philosophical challenge to the anthropocentrism of Western culture. She claimed...
that "the 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man". (Sessions, 1995c, p. X)

Two prominent sociopolitical movements, the first of recent vintage and the other of an earlier period, were significant contributors to emerging deep ecological thought. These include feminism and the tradition of naturalism and pastoralism in America, particularly in the legacy of the Transcendentalists (Devall and Sessions, 1985). The connection between deep ecology and feminism has been suggested by deep ecologists Bill Devall & George Sessions (1985, p. 93):

There are important parallels between the themes of some feminist writers and social activists and the ultimate norms and principles of deep ecology. Indeed, some feminists claim that deep ecology is an intellectual articulation of insights that many females have known for centuries....feminists deepen our sense of wonder in our lives and our commitment to creative, nonviolent, empowering social activism. They praise the work of early feminist writers such as Mary Austin (Fink, 1983), and more contemporary theorists as Rachel Carson (1962), Delores LaChapelle (1978) and
Elizabeth Dodson Gray (1982). The contribution of feminism to deep ecology has been its clarity in providing critical examinations of the dominant western worldview, its call for all people to mend personal, social and ecological relationships and its questioning of modern forms of egoism, competition, abstraction and domination through which the voices of women and nature have been effectively silenced.

In addition to the feminist contribution, Devall and Session (1985) give extensive attention to the mid-nineteenth century Transcendentalist movement, especially the influence of Henry David Thoreau (1990), and the organismic inherent in their understanding of human/nature relationships. Deep ecology is not simply a recent reincarnation of the organismic Transcendentalists, but it is clear that deep ecology is heavily indebted to them for much of their own movement's early development.

The Transcendentalists acquired their name through the particular relationships they developed with nature. They served as place-bound critics of the expansionary fervor prevailing in the United States during the mid-19th century. The transcendental movement began with the coming together in September, 1836 of a small group of young men from Massachusetts, most of them Unitarian
ministers, who met with the express purpose of discussing transcendentalist values and beliefs (Marx, 1964). Two weeks before, Ralph Waldo Emerson's work, Nature, had been published and served as their manifesto. The meeting marked the formal initiation of a movement.

For the Transcendentalists nature was divinely inspired, yet humans, with effort, could understand its mysterious divinity. Access to the divine spirit of nature came through retreats into wilderness. These retreats endowed this group of men with spiritual fulfillment that uplifted them beyond the petty concerns of daily life, into a transcendental realm (Ekrich, 1973). Through observing what they believed to be the true relationship between humans and nature, transcendentalists condemned technological advancement and the excessive, exploitative and greedy misappropriation of nature's bounty.

The literature of the Transcendentalists deeply question a society dominated by a mechanistic and materialistic system of values. They viewed the system as destructive and flawed in its "innermost essence" (Marx, 1964, p. 248). In seeking an alternative to the established order, Transcendentalists cultivated a sense of relationship with nature that approached ecstatic fulfillment. Such ecstasy was regarded as a visionary,
prophetic experience. It was this spiritual or transcendental encounter that fueled the politically oriented literature embodying "values, attitudes and modes of thought and feeling alternatives to those which characterized the dynamic, expansionary life-style of modernizing America" (Marx, 1970, p.950). A psychological balance was also generated by the transcendentalist's retreats. The aim was to attain a mental equilibrium through a renewed emphasis on inner needs and was the psychic equivalent of the notion of harmony with nature (Marx, 1970).

Several influences on deep ecological thought can be noted from the ideas and actions of the Transcendentalists. First, the divine inspiration that Transcendentalists felt in their retreats into nature were transformational and helped generate the belief that creation has a spiritual quality which is larger than the human capacity to intellectually comprehend it. Zimmerman (1994) suggests that "many deep ecologists believe that the views of Henry David Thoreau" are the historical catalyst for their view that God is immanent in nature rather than "wholly other than Creation" (p. 65). Secondly, Transcendentalism emphasized that retreats into nature must be repeated to reinforce the transformational feeling of inspiration. Retreats into
wilderness are regarded by many deep ecologists (Turner, 1995; Sessions, 1995a) as essential to physical and spiritual health. Wilderness reinforces the ongoing "need for nature-affirming rituals" in the daily lives of individuals (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 64). A third aspect of Transcendentalism appealing to deep ecology is the kind of behavior that humans derive from retreats into nature. Sessions (1995d, p. 165) observes that "Thoreau’s 1851 statement ‘in wildness is the preservation of the world’ provides the basis for modern ecocentric environmentalism". That is, one’s connection to the wild found in wilderness is the basis for how one acts towards others. More importantly it is the basis for what humans do to protect, enhance and preserve the integrity of the natural realm.

In addition to the previously described historical influences; Arne Naess, the acknowledged founder of deep ecology, often cites Gandhi and Spinoza as being two of the most significant theoretical progenitors of his ecological thought. Naess had been a student and admirer of Gandhi’s non-violent direct actions against British colonialism since the early 1930s. Naess was influenced by Gandhi’s metaphysical orientation which provided the leader with powerful personal motivation and strength to confront the onslaughts of colonialism. Naess (1995a)
Naess believed that Gandhi's liberation of the individual implied a view of selfhood which moved beyond the narrow Western sense of self; an isolated ego concerned with its own self-interest. For Gandhi, it was the supreme self—the universal self which was to be realized. This self-realization is achieved not through catering to the needs of the narrow egoistic self but rather through selflessness which diminishes the narrow self. Naess (1995a) cites Gandhi:

What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain Moksha (liberation). I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end. (p. 233)

Gandhi also inspired Naess's conviction that
personal satisfaction can only occur in connection with the fulfillment of all beings—including all non-human beings found in nature (Zimmerman, 1994). Gandhi (1958) writes:

Man [sic] should earnestly desire the well-being of all God's creation and pray that he might have the strength to do so. In desiring the well-being of all lies his own welfare; he who desires only his own or his community's welfare is selfish and it can never be well with him.... (p. 79)

From this perspective flows Naess’s view that in achieving the wider self one must recognize that every living being is intimately connected, and that from this intimate connection follows the capacity to realize self-identification and the practice of non-violence. Fox (1995b) calls Gandhi’s influence on Naess regarding this point a "monistic cosmology that emphasized the fundamental unity of all existence" (p. 146). Sessions (1995e) makes this observation concerning Gandhi’s influence on Naess’s conceptualization of the interrelatedness of all things:

From Gandhi...Naess reinforced his intuitions about the equal "right" of all species to flourish on the planet (ecocentric egalitarianism) together with the Eastern doctrine of ahimsa--the avoidance of causing
unnecessary harm and suffering. Naess likes to tell the story about Gandhi refusing to let people in the ashram kill poisonous snakes or other creatures. In lectures, he shuffles his feet across the floor to show how the residents of the ashram avoided stepping on the snakes to avoid being bitten. (p. 60)

Naess (1995a) sums up the importance of Gandhi’s thought and activities in suggesting that he "recognized a basic common right to live and blossom, to self-realization in a wide sense applicable to any being that can be said to have interests or needs" (p. 234).

Naess and several other prominent deep ecologists also appeal to the thought of Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza to support the non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic character of deep ecology. Sessions (1995f, p. 193) correctly observes that "much of Naess’s thinking about ecophilosophy...has been inspired by Spinoza’s ethics". Speaking of himself and Naess, Sessions (1995e, p. 54), adds that "Arne and I also independently shared the conviction that Spinoza, more than any of the other major Western philosophers, provided a good model and inspiration for a contemporary ecological philosophy". Sessions (1995f) cites Naess as pointing out "no great philosopher has so much to offer in the way of
clarification and articulation of basic ecological attitudes as Baruch Spinoza" (p. 194). Naess (1995b) himself suggests that:

The specific thing to be learned from Spinoza is...to integrate value priorities themselves in the world. We tend to say "the world of facts," but the separation of value from facts is, itself, mainly due to an overestimation of certain scientific traditions stemming from Galileo which confuses the instrumental excellence of the mechanistic worldview with its properties as whole philosophy. (p. 253)

For Spinoza, Nature and God are identical, they are a single energy. He suggests that "in Nature there is but one substance--God--and no other affections than those which are in God and that can neither be nor be conceived without God (Spinoza, 1992, p. 52). The highest end to which humans can aspire is to acknowledge the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature. Spinoza’s essential metaphysics is:

....a conceptualization of the idea of unity; there can be only one Substance or non-dualism which in infinite, and the Substance is also God or Nature. What we experience as the mental and the physical have no separate metaphysical reality, but rather are aspects or attributes of this one Substance.
Humans thus realize the truth of existence or attain self-realization "when they realize that they arise out of and so are united with 'the whole of nature,' the single substance (or energy) that constitutes all modes of existence" (Fox, 1995a, p. 260). Spinoza suggests that human bondage develops from ignorance about the interrelated self-manifestation of God/Nature and human freedom arises from intellectual intuition about such interrelationship. This intuition inspires compassion for all things and reduces exploitation because exploitation "reduces the potential for self-realization on the part of the exploited beings, and because it thus reduces my own capacity for self-realization" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 39).

A final theoretical influence on deep ecological thought comes from the first generation postmodern theorist Martin Heidegger. Many deep ecology followers have been influenced by his critique of modernism even though as Zimmerman (1994) observed, several have disavowed this connection because of Heidegger's support for German National Socialism.

For Heidegger, western philosophy had taken a wrong turn after Plato by rejecting the centrality of being in understanding human relationships to the world.
(Heidegger, 1958). Heidegger argued that the world had become nihilistic or insensitive to the beingness of things. As a result the world became simply an accumulation of lifeless-beingless objects over which the subject or humankind exercised mastery. Heidegger sees this estrangement from being as the root of the failure of Western philosophy (Ferkiss, 1993).

For Heidegger the essence of existence was humans living in a total field or region of being. By looking at things simply as individual objects, subject to human interpretation and manipulation, humans have destroyed their ability to relate to them. "Living in light of the fundamental mystery of existence, Heidegger felt, was something that could not be explained, only experienced" (LeMay & Pitts, 1994, p. 98). This experiencing, for Heidegger (1995), is found in the essence of what he calls "self-transposition". He writes:

In this connection self-transposition does not mean the factical transference of one existing human being into the interior of another being....Transposing oneself into this being means going along with what it is and with how it is. Such going-along-with means directly learning how it is with this being, discovering what it is like to be this being with which we are going along in this...
The link between Heidegger's philosophy and deep ecology's philosophical base is well established (Zimmerman, 1994). Naess (1995c, p. 208) for instance refers to the "Heideggerian literature" as important to constructing the terminology of deep ecology's deep questioning. Heidegger's influence is also clearly present in Naess's discussion of his ideas on "being in the world" (Naess, 1995a, p. 225). Devall and Sessions (1985, p. 98) have identified three contributions Heidegger made to deep ecology. He criticized the anthropocentric development of western philosophy which paved the way for a technocratic mentality dedicated to the domination of nature. He also encouraged people to begin a kind of contemplative thinking which stood in sharp contrast to the traditional reliance on analytical thought. Finally, he called on people to dwell authentically on earth which paralleled deep ecology's call to dwell alertly in natural bioregions. For deep ecologists Heidegger's focus on letting things be is the clearest expression of what to them is his biocentric emphasis. Devall and Sessions (1985) cite Heidegger in this regard:

Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky.
They leave to the sun and the moon their journey, to the stars their courses, to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest. (p. 99)

Zimmerman (1994, p. 109) also notes the similarity between Heidegger’s ideas and deep ecology in at least two ways. Both argue that attempting to reform existing institutions in order to halt environmental degradation would only reinforce and increase the destructive urges of control-obsessed humans. Both argue that the ethics needed to improve human treatment of nature cannot arise from the anthropocentric framework of traditional humanism. Rather a new ethos of human/nonhuman relationships is necessary. However, Zimmerman (1994) also observes that one of the most seminal features of Heidegger’s thought, and one which deep ecology has yet to fully develop, is his contention that humanity’s mistreatment of other humans and nature can be traced to humankind’s denial of and anxiety over death. Elaborating on Heidegger’s ideas Zimmerman (1994) suggests:

...that modern Western humanity as a whole is in the grip of certain moods that disclose things in constricted ways. Descartes’s quest for absolutely
clear and certain truth arose from early modern humanity's mood of insecurity and uncertainty. The modern subject seeks absolute truth as a way of controlling nature and thus of avoiding death. Making itself the measure of all truth, reality, and value, the subject compels things to show themselves solely according to dictates of rationality: to be means to be a clear and distinct idea....Objects are "representations," in that for them to be, they must be re-presented, that is, re-positioned by the subject in accordance with its own standards. The death-denying subject portrayed itself as a substance striving to actualize its potential...
(pp. 111-112)

Theme three: Definitions and preliminary precepts

Much like the discussion of ecofeminism, deep ecology's historical and theoretical development is multi-layered, though certainly not at complex as that of ecofeminism. The current section of this analysis will explore several definitional statements of deep ecology, and discuss preliminary precepts common to deep ecological thought.

Drenson and Inoue (1995, p. xxi) make the point that the terms deep ecology have been confusing to many who are unfamiliar with them. They suggest that there
are two meanings of the terms, one of which refers to "a broad ecocentric grassroots effort" to achieve an ecologically balanced future. The other meaning is reserved for the "specific ecological philosophy" of Arne Naess, and to a lesser extent, theorists who have expanded upon his original thought. While admitting the difficulty in separating the movement from its philosophy and that the environmental literature often fails to make such distinctions; Drengson and Inoue suggest that the term deep ecology be used to refer to the philosophy while the phrase deep ecology movement be used when referring to the movement. Naess (1995d, p. 67) appears to make a similar point himself, though far less clearly, in attempting to distinguish between the "criteria, or set of proposed necessary conditions" of his deep ecological philosophy as the "bases to deep ecology" the larger ecological movement.

In its simplest sense Glasser (1995) suggests that deep ecology is a movement that is primarily focused on "the reversal of the ecological crisis" (p. 138). From his perspective it is consistent with peace and social justice movements since ecological degradation is closely proximated with corresponding human oppression. Jung (1990, p. 97) emphasizes the cognitive shift necessary for one to become a deep ecologist in a somewhat generic
sense. He defines deep ecology simply as "a new way of thinking about our relationships with Nature. It replaces the old conceptual grids of utility and domination with the new wisdom of reverence and harmony".

Fox (1990, p. 75, 90) prefers alluding to deep ecology as "transpersonal ecology" since at its most fundamental level deep ecology is a distinctive, experiential form of ecophilosophy which emphasizes a transcendent "wide, expansive, or field-like conception of self" in comparison to the modern "narrow, atomistic, or particle-like conception of self". List (1993, p. 17) also calls deep ecology an ecophilosophy but refers to it as a "radical ecophilosophy" in order to distinguish it from more traditional ecological philosophies which are concerned with "ecological problems because of their effects on people in the developed world", as opposed to deep ecology "which is more deeply concerned with such issues as biospherical equality and our basic relationships with nature".

Dobson (1995, p. 48) uses the term "ecologism" to distinguish between radical green politics and mainstream environmentalism. He suggests deep ecology is an "ethical position" that informs ecologism by providing radical reasons for restraint in person/nature interactions and by providing a code of conduct for how
Zimmerman (1993, p. 196) is less abstract in his definition of deep ecology, preferring not only to mention its ideas but to emphasize the originators of its system of thought. For him deep ecology is "the interrelated body of ideas developed in various ways by Bill Devall, Alan Drenson, Warwick Fox, Arne Naess, and George Sessions, all of whom emphasize the promoting of self-realization for all beings as crucial for solving the ecological crisis".

Perhaps the most concise definition of deep ecology comes from The Institute for Deep Ecology, located in Boulder Colorado. In a small announcement for a recent national conference on deep ecology entitled Restoring the Vision (1995), the institute provides this definition:

Deep ecology is about transforming our way of life. This loosely-knit movement is a grassroots awakening to the root causes of our culture’s degradation of nature and peoples. As it seeks to heal contemporary alienation from self, community, and the Earth, deep ecology encourages a fundamental shift in the way we experience nature and how we respond to the environmental crisis. Deep ecology arises from the basic intuition of the essential value and interdependence of all forms of being. It
is committed to minimizing humanity's destructive interference with the natural world and to restoring the richness and diversity of ecosystems and human communities. ("Restoring", 1995, p. 2)

There are a number of overarching precepts to deep ecological thought which in some ways act to consolidate the beliefs of many who identify themselves as deep ecologists. Drengson (1995, p.143) suggests simply that what unites people from different religious and philosophical backgrounds in the deep ecology movement is "a long-range vision of what is necessary to protect the integrity of the Earth's ecological communities and ecocentric values".

Fox (1984, p.196) argues the "central intuition" of deep ecology is that there is no ontological divide in the field of existence. That is, the world is not divided into subjects and objects nor is there any separation in reality between the human and nonhuman realm. Rather "all entities are constituted by their relationships". "To the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of a deep ecological consciousness". Similarly, Zimmerman (1993) suggests that a unifying theme of deep ecology has been its emphasis on a cognitive shift in understanding human/nature relationships. This new understanding would
be ecocentric, non-anthropocentric and non-dualistic. He explains (p. 198) that "deep ecologists argue that a change in ontology must proceed a change in ethical attitudes"... A non-dualistic, ecocentric understanding of what things are would lead us to treat nonhuman beings with compassion and care".

Skolimowski (1990), at times an ardent critic of some aspects of deep ecology nonetheless admires its central distinctiveness. He notes that:

...deep ecology constitutes a distinctive approach to ecophilosophy....that distinguishes "deep ecologists" from other ecophilosophers....deep ecologists are not primarily concerned with environmental axiology (i.e., environmental value theory). Rather, deep ecologists are primarily concerned with advocating the realization of a certain state of being, specifically, the worldly realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible. (p.49)

McLaughlin (1987, p. 2) agrees with this assessment, suggesting that the heart of deep ecology is the cultivation of "ecological consciousness" by which he means deep ecology's insistence upon bringing "to the fore the normative question of how should I be, rather than addressing the more abstract and impersonal
questions about the nature of value, the structure of moral argument, and so on". Later McLaughlin (1995a, p. 263) adds that deep ecology’s heart--expansion of self toward ecological consciousness--is the primary basis for "rejecting consumerism" which for him creates and sustains "the loss of traditional ways of forming one’s identity and their replacement by material possessions".

In a new work, Capra (1996), a recent supporter of deep ecology and contributor to its epistemology, characterizes the unifying elements of deep ecology, as its emphasis on interconnection and intrinsic value, and its skill in contrasting these with contemporary, shallow environmental thought.

Shallow ecology is anthropocentric, or human-centered. It views humans as above or outside of nature, as the source of all value, and ascribes only instrumental, or "use", value to nature. Deep ecology does not separate humans--or anything else--from the natural environment. It sees the world not as a collection of isolated objects, but as a network of phenomena that are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. Deep ecology recognizes the intrinsic value of all living beings and views humans as just one particular strand in the web of life. (p. 7)
Zimmerman (1994, pp. 80-88) identifies the common features of deep ecology by noting the similarity between deep ecological thought and what he calls "new paradigm" thought represented by such writers as Harman (1979, 1990), Roszak (1992), and Roszak, Gomes and Kanner (1995). He suggests that deep ecologists and new paradigmers hold in common these eight propositions: (1) we are in the midst of a global crisis that heralds a paradigm shift to a socially harmonious and ecological age; (2) personal transformation is necessary for cultural change; (3) a reenchantment of the world/nature is necessary; (4) an ecological sensibility must be developed; (5) a relational self must emerge that is inextricably involved with the larger cosmic whole; (6) cosmic holism is consistent with and important to human holism (i.e., health and well being); (7) the new ecological wisdom is available in the beginning only to a few iconoclastic visionaries who then must reach out to teach the many; and (8) it is important to think globally but to act locally.

As the previous discussion indicates, analysts and supporters agree on overarching precepts which tend to characterize deep ecology though they may disagree over particular emphases. What remains of this section is to explore the works of some of deep ecology's principal
thinkers on some of the more specific precepts that circumscribe the ideology.

Sessions (1995f) has made the observation that there are at least three different characterizations of the deep ecology position. They are the intuitive attitudes held by deep ecologists and the manifestations of these in the public and political arena, the deep ecology platform and its eight points, and Naess's own personal philosophy grounded in the idea of self-realization. Selected features of the first two will be explored in the remainder of this section.

In his 1973 article The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movements Naess (cited in list, 1993, p. 19) suggests that cultivating ecological consciousness involves moving away from a view of "humans-in-environment" to one of self as part of a "relational total-field". That is, rather than experiencing ourselves as separate from our environment and existing "in" it, we begin to cultivate the insight that we are "with" our environment. Being with environment means appreciating that we are part of a complex totality of interconnected relationships, and that these connections with human and non-human others is the very essence of ourselves.

For Naess (1995c, 1995d) cultivating a total view of
human/human and particularly human/nonhuman relationships necessarily requires engagement in a process of deep questioning. In a 1982 interview, Naess argued:

The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions...ecology as a science does not ask what kind of a society would be the best for maintaining a particular ecosystem--that is considered a question for value theory, for politics, for ethics. As long as ecologists keep narrowly to their science, they do not ask such questions....in deep ecology...we question our society's underlying assumptions...We are not limited to a scientific approach; we have an obligation to verbalize a total view...In general, however, people do not question deeply enough to explicate or make clear a total view. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 74)

Naess makes clear that deep ecology's approach to a broad range of environmental and social issues involves integrating one's intuitive take on person/other relationships and manifesting these by questioning "deeply and publicly, insistently and consistently" (Naess, 1995d, p.75) the societal paradigm within which burdensome social and environmental problems reside. In taking such an approach Naess insists upon fundamental change but rejects the problem resolution approaches of
shallow environmentalists and social reformers as solutions which ultimately fail at the task of long-term change. These approaches are seen as stop-gap measures. Naess, explicitly connects a rejection of the person-in-environment image—toward a relational, total view—with a kind of epistic activism—a deep questioning of the knowledge and institutions which maintain a abstract, overly intellectualized, and scientifically derived social and environmental structure.

Naess (1989; 1995d; 1995f; Naess & Sessions, 1995) also describes some specific precepts of deep ecology in his presentation of the Deep Ecology Platform. The platform has discrete categories but was never intended by Naess to be the final expression of deep ecology. The individual tenets are specific in that they address clearly identified categories of interest, but their wording has been framed "with a high degree of generality", so that others may (and should) modify them (see Rothenberg, 1995 as an excellent example) based on the unique attributes of various cultural contexts (Naess & Sessions, 1995, p. 49). On this point Naess (1995f) later writes:

Maybe it should be repeated more often they only present an attempt to formulate what might be accepted by the great majority of the supporters of
the movement at a fairly general and abstract level. Different sets of formulations are needed to express something similar, but in the language of supporters in the non-industrialized parts of the Earth. (p. 220)

Naess (1995d, p. 68) offers the following eight points to the platform:

1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.

2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.

3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.

4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population.

5) Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.

6) Policies must therefore be changed. These
policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.

7) The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.

8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

The first point underscores one of the most significant assumptions of deep ecology, the intrinsic worth of all living things. From this assumption flows the ideas of non-anthropocentrism, biospheric egalitarianism, tolerance of different views, open relational communication with nature, the inclusion of animals and plants in the community and creating the need for heightened preservation and conservation efforts (Naess, 1995d).

The second tenet clarifies the meaning of intrinsic value by upholding the qualities of richness, complexity diversity, and symbiosis. "It involves a re-visioning of life and evolution, changing from understanding evolution
as 'progress' from 'lower' to 'higher' forms to understanding evolution as a magnificent expression of a multitude of forms of life" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 87).

It is here that Naess (1995f, p. 215) discusses Fritjof Capra's (1975) suggestion that the platform include the idea of ecological interdependence--"all things hang together". Capra pointed out to Naess that atoms are seen to have tendencies to exist in one place and another, that is, they hang together, but cannot be pinned down exactly. He suggests that the relativity of matter and the fact that at the atomic level, all things appear constant and paradoxically in a state of change can act to substantiate this point in Naess's platform. In essence, Capra says that quantum, theoretical physics can be used to demonstrate that boundaries are constructed experiences and perceptions rather than reflections of reality. The best one can say is that there is a kind of unquantifiable union which keeps things together. Thus, all essences have inherent value by virtue of this hanging together for there is no way to determine their extrinsic value.

The third tenet, that humans have no right to reduce diversity except to satisfy vital needs has been controversial because of the ambiguity of vital needs. Naess (1995d) leaves the term deliberately vague to allow
for latitude in judgement in various contexts. McLaughlin (1995) stresses that vital needs must not be interpreted from the stance of industrial consumerism which repeats cycles of deprivation and temporary satiation. From this perspective all needs are quantitatively defined and so in fact can be interpreted as vital needs and if this happens to coincide with the marketing demands of a given producer, all the better. Rather, vital needs refers to a qualitative opening to the possibility of more enduring forms of happiness and joy unrelated to consumption.

The fourth point makes the claim that a reduction in human population will contribute to flourishing of human life and culture. Naess (1989) points out that because this reduction must be gradual it could conceivably take up to one-thousand years to fully stabilize. This fourth platform principle has been criticized by some for implying a misanthropic view of humanities place in nature and ignoring the role that First World countries play in the population explosion (Zimmerman, 1994). Platform proponents have countered that population reduction must be gradual and humane-not ignoring the special needs of Third World countries, and that any reduction in population must include First World countries which consume a disproportionate amount of the
world's resources and energy (Naess, 1995d; McLaughlin, 1995).

The fifth tenet, that present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and that the situation is rapidly worsening, supports the above view of population reduction. The principle "does not imply that humans should not modify some ecosystems". The "issue is the nature and extent of such interference" (Naess, 1995d, p. 69). McLaughlin (1995) offers two illustrations of how human interference, though intending to enhance the resource capacity of the environment, in fact ends up worsening it. He refers to the unrelenting destruction of old growth forests and to the practice of monocropping. Both practices deplete the soil's organic fertility and recuperative capacity while creating a continued need for chemical fertilizers and pesticides thus interfering with natural restorative cycles, further depleting its fertility and reducing its resource capacity.

The sixth tenet, that policies must be changed, stems directly from the above five points. It implies basic changes in current economic, technological and ideological structures. For example, contrasting a new economic ideology with current practices, Naess and Sessions (1995, pp. 52-53) note that "present ideology
tends to value things because they are scarce and because they have commodity value. There is prestige in vast consumption and waste (to mention only several relevant factors)".

Points six through eight of the platform again suggest the importance and interrelatedness of ecological and sociopolitical activism. However, unlike activism aimed at violent confrontation and based on secular rationality, it must be a activism exercised out of a spiritual context, "that is, acting from the basis of a fundamental philosophic/religious ecosophy (or total view) and acting nonviolently" (Sessions, 1995f, p. 191).

The seventh tenet addresses in greater detail the issue of ideological and policy transformation. The predominate intuition of this point is "dwelling in situations of inherent value" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89). This would replace the current industrial society's ideology of progress measured by continual increases in gross national product, material wealth and standard of living. Dwelling in situations of inherent value places the focus on quality of life rather than quantity of things. "With a focus on quality, people can see that existing patterns of labor and consumption are not satisfying, but rather involve chronic dissatisfaction" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89).
The final principle stresses the importance of individual and cooperative participation in change. No particular priorities are spelled out because at this stage in history "no one now knows exactly what positive changes are necessary" (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 89). Many conceivable avenues of change are possible, through for example individual behavior with regard to consumption, through policies effecting production, through national transformation of industrial practices, or through applications of appropriate technology and sustainable development. For deep ecologists participation is the key.

**Theme four: Major distinctiveness**

Up to this point the current analysis has looked at historical and theoretical influences on deep ecology as well as definitions and preliminary precepts. The current section will explore the two major distinctive themes of deep ecology; self-realization and biocentric equality (Naess, 1995a; 1995b; 1995g; Devall & Sessions, 1985). In developing these it is important to first look at Arne Naess's personal philosophy of human/nature relationships, what he has come to call Ecosophy T, for it provides the intuitive, experiential basis of both self-realization and biocentric equality (Zimmerman, 1994).
For Naess, Ecosophy T is a very personal and highly experiential formulation which he hopes will help authenticate self-realization and biocentric equality and also may be of assistance to others in authenticating their own ecological sensibility. He refuses, however, to privilege his own ecosophy with the almost reverential acclaim ascribed to many philosophical treatises. Naess seeks to eliminate the absolutism and arrogance which characterize contemporary attempts to validate basic principles and norms. In fact his use of the terms Ecosophy T underscores the emphasize that other possible ecosophies ranging from A to Z can exist, his being only one which he has chosen to call T. T also supposedly refers to his mountain hut, Tvergastein, where much of his own personal reflection on human/nature relationships were formulated. Naess (1995g, p. 47), suggesting the tentativeness and limitations he felt concerning his ecosophy has said that "a philosophy centered on human-nature relations, touches upon so many complex questions that the explicit formulations can only comprise a small part".

Before discussing in more detail the norm of self-realization some clarification of the idea of the individual self is necessary. Naess (1988) points out that there are difficulties in approaching questions
about what actually constitutes a person's self and in
defining what the boundaries of this self might be. He
quotes William James (1890) concerning the constitution
and limits of self:

The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he
[sic] is tempted to call by the name of me. But it
is clear that between what a man [sic] calls me and
he [sic] simply calls mine the line is difficult to
draw...We see then that we are dealing with a
fluctuating material. The same object being
sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times is
simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to
do with it all. (Naess, 1988, p. 259)

Naess understands this fluctuating sense of self in
terms of the processes of identification and alienation.
That is, one's self is that with which one identifies,
and not-self is that from which one is alienated. If one
thinks of this fluctuating sense of self in terms of a
continuum, self-realization at its maximum is
identification in its widest sense, a oneness in
diversity (diversity here meaning all beings in the
universe) while a limited self-realization is a maximum
of alienation and a narrow, constricted sense of what
constitutes one's self (Naess, 1989).

Naess (1988) distinguishes between his concept of
maximum self-realization and that commonly used in modern society to mean the "competitive development of a person's talents and the pursuit of an individual's specific interests" (p. 263). From this view an inherent conflict is seen between developing a sense of individual self and cultivating bonds with significant others, family, community and most importantly extending to nature.

Naess points out this conflict reflects Western social theory's dualistic, egoism-altruism distinction. According to this view, altruism (care for others) is a moral quality developed by suppression of selfishness, by sacrificing one's own self-interests in favor of others. Naess challenges this thinking by proposing that one can cultivate connections with others, with family, with nature, without losing some part of self. In fact he suggests that maximum self-realization arises only in the context of maximum diversity "by an increase in the number of ways in which individuals, societies, and even species and life forms realize themselves" (Bodian, 1995, p. 30).

As one develops an ever-widening identification with the whole, there is no need for a self-sacrificing, moral altruism; a need, as some critiques would suggest, to sacrifice self in preference to nature, since the
interests of those with whom we identify, nature included, may be seen as one's own interests as well. Self becomes most fully realized not solely when self-interest and wants are met, but rather when one begins to identify with more than one's own self. By reframing the developmental process in this way, Naess challenges the shallow theories of self differentiation and the inherent conflicts arising from competing needs.

From Naess's perspective self-realization requires an extension of the process of identification beyond humanity to include the non-human world. From this viewpoint, maturing involves a process of widening one's sense of self and identifying with others-family, friends, communities, our own species, and then all species of non-human life.

The second major distinctiveness supported by Naess's Ecosophy T and which helps define the deep ecology worldview is that of biocentric equality. Biocentric equality holds that all beings in the ecosphere have intrinsic value and have an equal right to flourish and grow and reach their individual self-realization within the greater wholistic Self-realization (Naess, 1988). Biocentric equality views natural entities to be independent of their perceived usefulness for human purposes. Naess (1995e) says that the
principle is a:

...deep seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life...a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men [sic] and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life...an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom...Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. (p. 4)

Biocentric equality suggests that humans should live in ways which have minimum impact on the rest of nature, and that humanity’s role is that of "plain citizen" (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 68) rather than that of "master-slave" (Naess, 1995e, p. 4) which has contributed to alienation of humans from nature and themselves.

Biocentric equality stems from the view of all beings as interrelated parts of a greater whole. Since all are part of the greater whole, all are equal in intrinsic worth. Naess (1988) has given this principle more substance by suggesting criteria for resolving the inevitable question; that if all life has intrinsic value, then how much value does one ascribe to other life forms when conflicts between each entity’s equality
claims arise. He suggests the use of two factors, vitality and nearness and offers an example of how these two factors can help resolve such conflicts:

Under symbiotic conditions, there are rules which manifest two important factors operating when interests are conflicting: vitality and nearness. The more vital interest has priority over the less vital. The nearer has priority over the more remote--in space, time, culture, species. Nearness derives its priority from our special responsibilities, obligations and insights...It may be of vital interest to a family of poisonous snakes to remain in a small area where small children play, but it is also of vital interest to children and parents that there are no accidents. The priority rule of nearness makes it justifiable for the parents to remove the snakes. But the priority of vital interests of snakes is important when deciding where to establish the playgrounds. (Naess, 1988, p. 266)

Theme five: Challenges to the modern worldview

Drawing from the works of several theorists the remaining pages of this section will explore a number of subthemes related to challenges to the modern worldview and organized around non-hierarchicalism, non-
anthropocentrism, interconnectedness, and the phenomenological and experiential bases of deep ecology.

Very similar to ecofeminists, deep ecologists adopt a non-hierarchical conceptual framework as a guiding alternative to modernistic ways of understanding and organizing difference. Echoing this sentiment Cheney (1987, p. 116) suggests that one of the appeals of deep ecology is the fact that it has "answered the call for a non-hierarchical, non-domineering attitude toward nature". Deep ecology holds that natural processes are interconnected and cyclical and are composed of complex webs of relationships. Modernism's view of natural systems conceives a progression up a hierarchical ladder, from simple to complex.

Similarly, McLaughlin (1995) suggests that one of the implications of deep ecological thought is that it involves "a re-visioning of life and evolution, changing from understanding evolution as process from lower to higher forms to understanding evolution as a magnificent expression of a multitude of forms of life" (p. 87). Naess (1995e), in more philosophic terms, contrasts the place of persons in a hierarchical framework with his wholistic, interconnected view that persons are:

...knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between
two things A and B is such that the relations belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The...model dissolves not only the man[sic]-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept...(p. 3)

Deep ecologists believe that uncritical reliance on hierarchical conceptualizations have supported a full range of domination theories and practices over the course of many centuries. This has been particularly true with respect to nature. The sorting posture of hierarchicalism in human/nature relations has lead to planetary degradation and a entire range of activities suggesting the supremacy of humans over the environment in which they live. By contrast Zimmerman (1990) suggests that it is humanity’s commonality with nature and its willingness to reject hierarchical domination that will lead to its ultimate preservation. He supports deep ecology’s non-hierarchical emphasis that:

...only by recognizing that humanity is no more, but also no less, important than all other things on Earth can we learn to dwell on the planet within limits that would allow other species to flourish and to follow out their own evolutionary destiny... hierarchies would be replaced by biocentric...
egalitarianism. (p. 140)

The significance of deep ecology’s challenge to hierarchial dominance is best understood in its emphasis on anthropocentrism as a underlying cause for all forms of domination. Deep ecologists believe that the way to change destructive relationships among people, and between people and nature is to shift away from a human-centered perspective. In the words of Warwick Fox (1989):

In making human-centeredness (rather than humans per se) the target of their critique, deep ecologists have contended that the assumptions of human self-importance in the larger scheme of things has, to all intents and purposes been the single deepest and most persistent assumption of (at least) all the dominant Western philosophical, social, and political traditions since the time of the classical Greeks... (p.21)

Several theorists have contributed to the development of this non-anthropocentric position. Deep ecologist George Sessions (1995d) has sketched the rise of anthropocentrism and notes the fundamental difference between it and deep ecology’s idea of ecocentrism. Environmental activist Dave Foreman (1995) has chronicled the anthropocentric core of the modernist perspective on
environmentalism and, in agreement with deep ecology, offers a appraisal of non-anthropocentric ways humans could relate to nature. Thomas Berry (1988), a deep ecology sympathizer, extends the critique of anthropocentrism in his criticism of the human-centered norm of reality:

We cannot expect life, the earth, or the universe to fit into our rational human designs of how life, the earth, or the universe should function. We must fit our thinking and our actions within the larger process. We must move from democracy to biocracy. (p. 161)

Deep ecologist's critique of the modernist anthropocentric worldview goes further than chastening a simple lack of appreciation for non-human life-forms. Rather, for deep ecology, anthropocentrism is the human arrogance that assumes "with both religious and scientific rationalizations, that we as a species are superior to other species and life-forms, and therefore have the right to dominate, control and use them for our own purposes as we see fit" (Metzner, 1993, p. 4) For deep ecologists advocacy for a non-anthropocentric cosmology is not just a matter of academic debate over philosophical premises, having no real relevance. For them anthropocentrism has its "precise parallel" in every
form of sexism, racism, nationalism and classism (Metzner, 1993, p. 4) and is not just a simple failure to appreciate nature.

Deep ecology’s focus on critiquing anthropocentrism has been criticized, particularly by ecofeminists, who hold the view that androcentrism is the primary cause of human domination of nature. This point will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this current work.

A third subtheme emerging from the literature in deep ecology and offered as a challenge to modernism’s oversimplified, atomistic, and particle like character of relational processes is the idea of interconnectedness. Interconnectedness between person/environment, perceptually focuses on the "complex web" (Naess, 1995g) of relations, and the processes surrounding them rather than focusing on the perception of partialness. Partialness attempts to divide and sort relationships into discrete categories. Mathews (1994) notes:

All exponents of deep ecology seem to agree that individuals, to the extent they can be identified at all, are constituted out of their relations with other individuals; they are not discrete substances capable of existing independently of other individuals. The whole is understood to be more
than the sum of its parts, and the parts are defined through their relations to one another and the whole. (p. 159)

Interconnectedness from Naess’s (1995h) perspective implies the central ontological idea of gestalt. A gestalt is a recognition of "one single experience" (p. 242) not simply defined by its parts. Gestalts are whole experiences of which the parts thereof are mere abstractions that have no separate identity. That is, there is no spontaneous experience of a part merely as a part, separate from the experience of the whole.

Naess (1995h) illustrates the application of gestalt conceptualizations to very real environmental issues. He offers the example of a proposal to build a road through a large forest. While preservationists reject the proposal, proponents argue that the area despoiled by the road will be less than a tiny fraction of the forest. "But they are neglecting the gestalt character of the forest" (p. 244). That is, the forest would no longer be spontaneously experienced as a whole whatever the fraction of the area that is destroyed.

Fox (1990) correctly observes that the idea of interconnectedness is inexorably linked with the process of identification spoken of so often in Naess’s (1988, 1995a) work. The fact that persons are interconnected

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with the natural whole should not be taken to mean, as some critics of deep ecology would suggest, that persons are in fact so fully identified that they are no different from the natural whole.

For Fox, similarity and commonality are important components in understanding identification. A person may have a sense of similarity with another entity in the natural realm without necessarily experiencing a sense of commonality with that entity. Fox notes:

What identification should not be taken to mean, however, is identity—that I Literally am that tree over there, for example. What is being emphasized is the tremendously common experience that through the process of identification...my self...can expand to include the tree even though I and the tree remain physically "separate"...Expressing this point another way, the realization that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality—that "Life is fundamentally one"--does not mean that all multiplicity and diversity is reduced to homogeneous mush. (Fox, 1990, pp. 81-82)

In addition to the link between interconnectedness and identification there is also a link between interconnectedness and self in understanding the convergence of person/environment. For deep ecologists
interconnectedness cannot be fully apprehended without paying very close attention to the ways self are developed and understood. Although deep ecology's idea of self was discussed earlier in connection with the ultimate norm of self-realization a few additional points are worth noting.

Deep ecology's reconceptualization of self goes beyond the modern Western sense of how the human self is fashioned. Devall and Sessions (1984) describe the modern Western sense of both a individualized and a socialized self:

....growth begins when one starts the long process of separating out our individual uniqueness from our socially programmed sense of self. Growth and maturity also occur when we cease to see ourselves as isolated egos and begin to identify with other humans, from our family and friends to eventually the whole of humanity. (pp. 302-303)

Conventional human development then, according to Devall and Sessions (1984), is limited to identifying self with other humans--a social self. Deep ecology extends the concept of self to encompass a deep interconnectedness with other people and with nature--an ecological self. "When a person stops defending an old ego identity--an image of oneself which does not
correspond to current experience--and disidentifies with his or her rigid social identity, growth can occur. Exploring our ecological self openly and with acceptance no judgement is made, nor is there a pursuit of anything. The self is not an entity or a thing, it is an opening to discovering what some call the Absolute or in Sanskrit, atman" (Devall, 1995, pp. 103, 104).

A significant point to be made here, complementary to the previous discussion, is that interconnectedness presupposes more than the modernist sense of ego-self and more than the modern sense of social-self. A new category of ecological-self arises which has implications for a whole range of human endeavors. One of the most important of these, from this author's perspective, is related to ethics.

Merchant (1992) places the deep ecology idea of ecological self in an ethical context. She suggests that in the 1800s, what she calls homocentric ethics displaced egocentric ethics as the dominant Western view of ethical behavior. While egocentric ethics is based on individual ought "what is good for the individual will benefit the society" (p. 63), homocentric ethics is grounded in society--what is good for society will benefit the individual. According to Merchant homocentric ethics are "consistent with the assumptions of mechanistic science,
especially as extended by nineteenth century scientists". (p. 72).

Merchant notes that a new moral philosophy is now emerging. Broadening one's conceptualization of self--recognizing the complex web of connections between self and nature--has expanded ethics and is gradually ushering in a new ecocentric ethics. Ecocentric ethics are "grounded in the cosmos" (p. 74). A major difference between ecocentric ethics and homocentric ethics is that ecocentric ethics is not simply an extension of rights to include nonhuman entities, what deep ecology supporter John Rodman (1983) calls moral extensionism. Ecocentric ethics is really concerned with a general sense or condition of being as the grounds for right action rather than elaborating on the rights, duties and oughts of behavior.

From a deep ecological perspective right action toward other beings will naturally arise from a broadened understanding of self and its interconnectedness with all of existence. Contrasting an ethics arising from a narrow, atomistic, mechanistic sense of self with an ethics arising from an expanded ecological self Fox (1995a) notes that deep ecology's conception of self: ...

...is a wide, expansive, or field-like conception from the outset. This has the highly interesting,
even startling, consequence that ethics (conceived as being concerned with moral "oughts") is rendered superfluous! The reason for this is that if one has a wide, expansive, or field-like sense of self then (assuming that one is not self-destructive) one will naturally (i.e. spontaneously) protect the natural (spontaneous) unfolding of...(the ecosphere, the cosmos) in all its aspects. (p. 217)

A final subtheme emerging from the deep ecology literature related to the challenges it poses to the modernist worldview is its phenomenological and experiential bases. Direct experience with nature is highly valued in deep ecology in keeping with its emphasis on broader self realization and inherent value of all things. Devall and Sessions (1985) point out that deep ecological thought has an emphasis on direct experience with nature and on conducting research which actually takes place in the field. Rather than studying predominantly in laboratories and books, deep ecology believes that students should be required to go into the field to see, but more importantly to experience the interrelationships at work and "to go beyond the narrow definition of scientific data and look to their own consciousness to develop their own sense of place" (p. 85).
This emphasis on experiencing human/nonhuman connections is a rejection of modernism’s belief that it is possible and even desirable for reasonable people and scientists to be totally logical, rational and objective. In an insightful essay, deep ecology supporter Delores LaChapelle (1995), contrasts industrial culture’s limited experientiality with the deep experience of existence celebrated in ritual:

Our Western European industrial cultures...have idolized ideologies, "rationality", and a limited kind of practicality, and have regarded the conscious rituals of these other cultures as frivolous curiosities, at best. The results are all too evident. We’ve been here only a few hundred years and we have already done irreparable damage to vast ares of the country... (p. 58)

There is a spiritual component to deep ecology’s experiential connection with nature. It is somewhat less explicitly stated, however, than the spiritual expressions discussed in connection with ecofeminism. For deep ecology, experientiality is less a matter of mystical identification with nature than it is a kind of practical involvement in its everyday realities. For example, deep ecologists are critical of national parks and wilderness areas for tending to make persons
spectators of nature rather than inviting them to experience it (Drew, 1995; Turner, 1995). From Naess’s (1989) perspective:

To "only look at" nature is extremely peculiar behavior. Experiencing an environment happens by doing something in it, by living in it, meditating and acting. The very concepts of "nature" and "environment/milieu" cannot be delimited in an ecophilosophical fashion without reference to the interaction of elements of which we partake. (p. 63)

In contrast to modernism’s limited view of reality which tends to ignore, minimize, or oversimplify complex phenomena by reducing them to unidimensional terms, deep ecology adopts a phenomenological viewpoint which holds that the observer and the observed are always fluctuating and changing (Naess, 1989). From this perspective human beings perceive things differently, and the same individual perceives differently at different times. For deep ecologists "everything flows. "We must abandon fixed, solid points, retaining the relatively straightforward, persistent relations of interdependence" (Naess, 1989, p. 50).

Much of Naess’s theorizing supports this view. His writings are characterized by comments that suggest his views are tentative, open to change, and infinitely
revisable. Rather than dealing with ultimate or definitive provability of moral injunctions, deep ecologists are "inclined far more to what might be referred to as experiential invitations" (Fox, 1990, p. 91). Thus, for example in a lengthy chapter on self-realization Naess (1989) suggests:

In this chapter a basic positive attitude to nature is articulated in philosophical form. It is not done to win compliance, but to offer some of the many who are at home in such a philosophy new opportunities to express it in words. (p. 164)

And, while discussing deep ecology’s connection to Spinoza, Naess writes:

In what follows I do not try to prove anything. I invite the reader to consider a set of connections between Spinoza’s ethics and the trend in thinking and living inspired in part by ecology and sometimes called the deep ecological movement. (cited in Fox, 1990, p.91)

The phenomenological basis of deep ecology values the intuitive aspects of human reasoning (Naess, 1995g). It increases the diversity and depth of questions generated and proposes substitute, depth understandings about complex, multi-layered situations. In so doing deep ecology challenges the purely abstract reasoning and
limited sensationism of the modernist mindset and reduces the likelihood that alternative perspectives will be suppressed or marginalized.

Theme Six: Comparisons and Criticisms

The preceding discussions have explored and illustrated significant features within the emerging worldviews of ecofeminism and deep ecology. These two ecophilosophies share much in common and the reader would have undoubtedly noted some overlapping aspects on several points, as well as observing that the two philosophies also consequentially differ on certain distinctives. The current section of this chapter shall explore several subthemes related to similarities and major difference between ecofeminism and deep ecology and specific and general criticisms of both. It shall be organized around: (1) a comparative overview of similarities between deep ecology and ecofeminism as noted by several authors; (2) a comparison of deep ecology and ecofeminism, highlighting significant differences in the context of the deep ecology-ecofeminism debate; (3) a description and exploration of specific criticisms made of both deep ecology and ecofeminism by transpersonal psychologist Ken Wilber; and (4) a description and exploration of more general criticisms of deep ecology and ecofeminism, as both
philosophies and political movements.

**Similarities**

Ecofeminism and deep ecology share broad similarities. Both arose out of a concern for the destruction humans have inflicted on the environment and how questioning the root causes of environmental problems is important in determining appropriate relationships between humans and nature. In addition to these and others noted earlier, several authors have identified other general similarities. Zimmerman (1994) suggests that the essential connection between both lie in the facts that like postmodern theory, both share a criticism of modernity's dualism, its subject/object distinction and domination of nature but reject postmodern theory's pessimism, indifference and deconstructionism. Likewise, both criticize the doctrine of natural rights for being hierarchial and abstract. Both recognize as well that altered consciousness and attitudes are important in the transformation of dominating and destructive institutions. Finally, both value intersocietal and intercultural dialogue as contributing to solving social and ecological problems.

Similarly, Spretnak and Capra (1986) advance the view, in connection with their discussion of the political principles of green politics, that deep ecology
and ecofeminism believe that basic social change can occur only if people adopt a different narrative of who they are and of what the future might be. They each also stress the spiritual core of social/ecological transformation which is centered not on doctrinaire, intellectual religiosity but on interconnectedness flowing from flexible, intuitive experience.

Several other authors have identified general similarities. Deep ecology and ecofeminism recognize that their belief systems do not express or capture the whole truth of environmental consciousness--that they share compatible values but express them differently; some politically and some not (Starhawk, 1989). Both views customarily agree that the split between humans and nature is in many ways a psychic split within ourselves (Griffin, 1989). And, both share a complementary interpretation of the interconnectedness of humans and nature, though with contrasting emphases (Mathews, 1994).

Deep ecology/ecoemfeminist debate

While the similarities between deep ecology and ecofeminism are substantial, and widespread division between them is not sharp, there are nonetheless some major differences on several key points. This has generated an ongoing dialogue between proponents of both movements in the context of what has become known as the
deep ecology/eco-feminism debate (Zimmerman, 1994).

A major issue in the dialogue has centered around contrasting perspectives on androcentrism and anthropocentrism. Zimmerman (1987) has noted that ecofeminist critics of deep ecology:

...assert that it speaks of a gender-neutral "anthropocentrism" as the root of the domination of nature, when in fact androcentrism is the real root. Only the interpretive lens of androcentrism enables us to understand the origin and scope of dualistic, atomistic, hierarchical, and mechanistic categories. (pp. 37-38)

Ecofeminism has been critical of deep ecology for being thoroughly androcentric in that the ecosophiology has been "formulated almost entirely by men and is characterized by unintended patriarchal prejudices" (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 142). An early ecofeminist proponent of this view, Ariel Salleh (1984), has suggested that men dominate both women and nature because they have an "impulse to compete and dominate the Other" (p. 343). Salleh points to the use of androcentric language by deep ecologists, such as the use of the generic term "man" (p. 340) to refer to humankind, as illustrative of their latent patriarchal tendencies.

Others, including Ynestra King (1990, p. 109) have
supported Salleh's premise that the "root cause of oppression" is "the subordination of women in society" and because "men identify nature with women," men seek to control nature as well. Since deep ecology fails to appreciate the character and implication of this patriarchal misrepresentation in the oppression of nature, deep ecologists are suspected of meaning something quite different than do ecofeminists when they talk of appropriate human/nature relationship. From the perspective of both King and Salleh, then, the oppression of women and nature cannot be alleviated "unless men can come to grips honestly with the impulse to compete and dominate the Other within themselves" (Salleh, 1984, p. 343). Deep ecology has failed to come to terms with these challenging notions and so cannot speak convincingly on a new kind of ecological existence.

Michael Zimmerman (1987, 1994) and Warwick Fox (1989, 1995a) have raised the question as to whether it is appropriate to locate the source of ecological problems in men. One must legitimately ask, they contend, that if men's attitudes and behavior reflect patriarchal culture, why can't the same be said about women? Are not women also part of the patriarchal culture? Referring to Salleh's arguments, Zimmerman (1987) inquires:
If deep ecologists cannot get to the heart of the matter because their experience is too deeply distorted by patriarchy, cannot we say something analogous about women? How can authentic female experience and self-expression be possible under patriarchy...since human experience is always culturally mediated....Does feminism pretend to provide a nondistorted, impartial way of interpreting experience? (p. 40-41)

From Zimmerman's (1987) perspective ecofeminism makes patriarchy responsible for too much. It portrays "men as the villains of world history" while portraying women as "peaceful, charitable, concerned about others, compassionate, more in harmony with nature and more truly human" (p. 41). Countering, Zimmerman (1989) asks, can such good characteristics belong only to one sex? Women too have a dark side which is all too easily projected onto men. Ecofeminists must realize "that men, too, are the victims of patriarchy, they lack a real voice of their own, apart from the impersonal voice that they have assumed in the process of having to split off their own feelings" (p. 41). In a concluding statement Zimmerman suggests that ecofeminists:

...can say that patriarchal categories are the problem, and that changing those categories
according to feminist principles will bring about an end to the domination of woman and nature. Yet there is no assurance that new forms of domination and power will not arise in the process... We must be careful... not to fall prey to the sex-based stereotyping that has been so crucial to maintaining patriarchy. Men and women are both capable of becoming more open to and at harmony with the natural world. Deep ecologists and ecofeminists need to unite in reconstructing Western humanity's current attitudes toward nature. (p. 42)

Warwick Fox (1989), in a conciliatory appraisal, concludes that the anthropocentric/androcentric difference between deep ecology and ecofeminism is simply a contrast of theoretical flavor and emphasis rather than suggesting real substantive differences. For Fox anthropocentrism and androcentrism are essentially two sides of the same coin. Deep ecology's anthropocentric critique focuses on the underlying, bottom line ideology of human-centeredness which legitimizes social domination and ecological destruction by whatever class of social actors (whites, capitalists, Westerners) may be involved. Ecofeminism's androcentric critique, on the other hand, focuses primarily on the role that the class of social actors known as men have played in this
domination and destruction.

Fox (1989) contends that no matter which of a number of social classes may dominate in a particular historical period they all tend:

...at the most fundamental level to find a common kind of legitimation for the alleged superiority of these classes over others and, hence, for the assumed rightfulness of their domination of these others. Specifically, these classes of social actors have not sought to legitimate their position on the grounds that they are, for example, men, capitalists, white, or Western per se, but rather on the grounds that they have most exemplified whatever it is that has been taken to constitute the essence of humanness....These classes of social actors have, in other words, habitually assumed themselves to be somehow more fully human than others...women, the lower classes, blacks, non-Westerners...The cultural spell of anthropocentrism has been considered sufficient to justify not only moral superiority....but also all kinds of domination within human society--let alone domination of the obviously nonhuman world. (p. 22)

From Fox's perspective, anthropocentrism is common to men and women, and all dominating persons or groups in
the sense that it is the grounding force sanctioning all forms of domination and oppression. What ecofeminism's criticism of deep ecology overlooks on this point is that deep ecologists are not primarily concerned with exposing the actors who have historically been most responsible for domination, but rather with the task of "sweeping the rug out from under the feet of these classes of social actors by exposing the most fundamental kind of legitimation that they have habitually employed in justifying their position" (Fox, 1989, p. 24). Fox suggests that deep ecologists and ecofeminists must learn from each other and appreciate the uniqueness of their respective positions not as fundamentally different but as two among a varied range of perspectives on the distribution of power in human society.

The debate between deep ecology and ecofeminism on this point has often been acrimonious. It is an essential clash between two competing visions of the original cause of the current social and environmental crisis. From this author's perspective neither is necessarily more realistic, more true than the other. There is particular cogency in the view that androcentric and anthropocentric analyses represent complementary rather than contradictory positions.

For example, both deep ecology and ecofeminism
identify major, though not ultimate, causes of the oppression of humans and nature. The significant point is that the aims of each are remarkably similar; a thorough transformation of human consciousness. The task of deep ecologists and ecofeminists, from this author's viewpoint, is not to concentrate on pursuing their own truth of original cause to the exclusion of all others, but rather to see their efforts as one manifestation of a general stimulus for change that may take many different forms. The most effective dialogue is one which shifts emphasis from which analysis of cause is really deeper toward how can each perspective enhance and empower a ongoing transformational impulse.

A second important part of the deep ecology/ecofeminism debate is related to the differing ways each philosophy conceives of the manner in which persons expand themselves to become identified with the whole of nature. Cheney (1987) contends that despite initial congruences, deep ecology's holistic interconnectedness thesis--of self being broadly identified with a relational, total field image of nature--promotes a masculine image of self that contrasts with ecofeminism's self in a community of relationships.

This has lead, according to some ecofeminists, to deep ecology's speaking of interconnectedness in terms of
abstract rights rather than in terms of concrete, personal relationships (Zimmerman, 1990). For Cheney (1987), the deep ecology notion of rights arises from a view of humans as isolated egos seeking broader expansion with nature. He contends for them the way to identify more deeply with nature and to limit competition between self and nature is to grant nature rights that the isolated ego is obliged to respect. Relying on the notion of rights in the conceptualization of interconnected relationships, say ecofeminists, reveals underlying atomistic, separatist assumptions of a patriarchal system (Zimmerman, 1994).

From a slightly different vantage point ecofeminist Marti Kheel (1990) maintains that when deep ecologists speak of expanding the self toward deep connections, one must question what self it is that is being expanded. Ecofeminists hold that men’s and women’s development of self take very different paths, and support their view with the work of such feminist theorists as Gilligan (1982) and Chodorow (1990). For ecofeminists, a central assumption of the patriarchal system is "the notion of an autonomous (masculine) self, established through the defeat of a female-imaged other" (Kheel, 1990, p. 130). From this viewpoint, the male experience of the world is influenced by his early self-differentiation experiences.
and simultaneous induction into a social context which defines the meaning of his difference from his mother as a denial of any aspect of sameness with her. Deep ecologists do not challenge these basic assumptions and simply attempt to extend their self concerns toward nature. This extension is at its core only a recognition of Other in terms of a masculine self rather than a true identification with Other. Ecofeminists point to these unacknowledged assumptions in explaining how some deep ecologists, particularly Devall and Sessions (1985), can hold an identification with nature and yet also hold a desire to kill (hunt) that with which one deeply identifies (Kheel, 1990). For most women, in contrast, an identification with animals means a desire to avoid harming them.

Ecofeminists point to two dangers which stem from deep ecology's conceptualization of interconnectedness. First, individuals could presumably be sacrificed for the good of the whole, that is the self "may widen beyond the reach of individual beings" (Kheel, 1990, p. 136). Secondly, ecofeminists point out that defining self in terms of wider merger with a somewhat abstract Other in nature leaves out the notion of relationship with Other. The danger then is the possibility of an even more inflated sense of ego simply granting rights to Other.
instead of attempting to create a genuine relatedness with Other.

Deep ecology has responded to these criticisms in several ways. One, by simply pointing out the corresponding danger in ecofeminism's relational/identification premise. Two, by pointing out that ecofeminism's critique misreads or misinterprets deep ecology's ideas. And thirdly, by attempting to find common ground between the two positions. Proposals from this third perspective have come from both deep ecologists and ecofeminists.

Deep ecologists have been quick to point out the danger in ecofeminism's own view of interconnectedness. They suggest that ecofeminism's relational/identification premise implies that humans can care for non-human beings only after they have learned to care for each other. The danger, state deep ecologists, is that such a view may reinforce the lack of concern that some ecofeminists have historically displayed toward environmental issues (Zimmerman, 1990).

Sessions (1995g) adds that ecofeminism's relational emphasis remains essentially anthropocentric in practice for it creates a situation where ecofeminists "continue to focus on their respective human, social and political agendas while practice strategies and the activism needed
to ameliorate the ecological crisis, itself, receive from them a low priority or are ignored entirely" (p. 266).

A second response of deep ecology to ecofeminism's critique involves the contention that ecofeminism misreads and/or misinterprets what deep ecology means in its attempt to describe human/nature relationships. With respect to Cheney, Zimmerman (1994), suggests that he misinterprets deep ecology's use of the term rights with respect to human/nature relationships. Rather than imply a masculine biased, technical sense of rights as an extension of viability to nonhuman nature as Cheney contends, deep ecology uses rights in a nontechnical sense to describe the attitude of respect that spontaneously accompanies ecological sensibility. Ecological sensibility arises from wider self identification and fosters "attitudes and relationships that take into account, as much as possible, the striving of human and nonhuman alike" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 287).

In a similar response Fox (1989) contends that ecofeminists' fears that deep ecology's interconnectedness thesis will lead to diminished care for individual entities, is in fact a crucial misreading of what is deep ecology's critical task; what he calls the "fallacy of misplaced misanthropy" (p. 20). For Fox misplaced misanthropy is a misreading of deep ecology, by
ecofeminists, which suggests that deep ecology shows a genuine preference for nature while disdaining—even hating—the interests of humans. It is the mistaken idea of ecofeminists that deep ecology’s interconnectedness thesis will somehow lead to a disregard for humans and preference for nature. For Fox (1989) deep ecology’s interconnectedness thesis, if properly understood, has a constructive task of encouraging "an egalitarian attitude on the part of humans toward all entities in the ecosphere—including humans" (p. 21). Deep ecologist’s version of interconnectedness does not hold to a preferential view of nature against the interests of human beings. "Far from being misanthropic, deep ecologists celebrate the existence of these human beings" (Fox, 1989, p. 21).

A final response to ecofeminism’s critique of deep ecology’s interconnectedness thesis has been to propose alternatives which may bring the two positions into closer alliance. These proposals have come from both deep ecologists and ecofeminists. For instance feminist and deep ecology supporter Freya Mathews (1994) views the particular emphasis of deep ecology’s holistic versus ecofeminism’s individualistic perspectives on interconnectedness as complementary in most respects. She offers an evenhanded characterization of their
essential elements:

Deep ecology tends to take a basically holistic view of Nature--its image of the natural world is that of a field--like whole of which we and other 'individuals' are parts. It encourages us to seek our true identity by identifying with wider and wider circles of Nature, presenting the natural world as an extension of ourselves, the Self-writ-large. In this view our interests are convergent with those of Nature, and it becomes incumbent on us to respect and serve these common interests....

Ecofeminists, in contrast, tend to portray the natural world as a community of beings, related, in the manner of a family, but nevertheless distinct. We are urged to respect the individuality of these beings, rather than seeking to merge with them, and our mode of relating to them should be via open-minded and attentive encounter, rather than through abstract metaphysical preconceptualization. The understanding born of such encounters should result in an attitude of care or compassion which can provide the ground for an ecological ethic. (p. 159)

For Mathews the difference between these views lies in the vantage point taken by the protagonists. She insists that deep ecology and ecofeminism "each captures
an important aspect of our metaphysical and ethical relationship with Nature" (p. 162). If reality is internally interconnected as both camps propose then it may be seen as both a whole and as a manifold of individuals without destroying the essence of either position. Mathews (1995) has, in another work, explained it this way:

It should be pointed out that interconnectedness does not imply that organisms do not possess a genuine individuality: their functional unity confers on them an essential ontological distinctness and integrity, but this individuality is strictly relative—it is itself a function of the particular environment which is capable of sustaining such a self-realizing, self-maintaining system. A relative ontological individuality, on the one hand, an interconnectedness, on the other, are thus not in the framework mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they entail each other. (Mathews, 1995, p. 127)

The key for both deep ecology and ecofeminism is to be "committed in the end to an irreducible moral ambivalence" that appreciates "intervention on behalf of nature on the one hand" and a recognition of "our humanity--our very finitude and limitation" on the other
(Mathews, 1994, p. 162). This is what Mathews calls "cosmic ecology" (p. 164) for it reduces the sharp dualism at the heart of the interconnectedness debate which tends to suggest that one should ally either with nature in preference to humanity or humanity in preference to nature.

Deep ecology supporter Joanna Macy (1989) and environmental philosopher Michael Zimmerman (1994), each of whom have endorsed aspects of both ecofeminism and deep ecology, point to the adoption of a Buddhist framework as a potential coupling alternative to the interconnectedness debate. As the previous discussions have suggested both deep ecology and ecofeminism call for wider identification. The first calls for a wider identification with the wholistic character of the natural realm while the latter speaks of identification in the widening context of relationship with a community of individual entities. Buddhism provides a potential synthesis to the polarity engendered by this debate. From this perspective identification is not an enlargement of self with the Other of nature, whether defined wholistically or communally, but is rather a recognition of the self's emptiness and the emptiness of all other beings. Such insight dismantles the model of an expanding, perfecting self toward a discovery "that
the world is constituted by a myriad of interrelated phenomena that manifest themselves moment by moment. No one and no thing is radically other" (Zimmerman, 1994, pp. 315-316). This discovery creates not a perfecting self but an inward sensitivity where:

...we learn to listen to our world and to each other. We hear the pain of the alienated, the sick, the lonely, the angry, and we rejoice in the happiness, the fulfillment, the peace of others. We are touched deeply by the pain of our planet, equally touched by the perfection of a bud unfolding....We learn to respect the heart for its power to connect us on a fundamental level with each other, with nature and with all of life. (Macy, 1989, p. 208)

From Macy's perspective this view requires action. To awaken to the experience of emptied, interconnected existence one must not concentrate on estatic mentalisms. Rather, the point is that the experience requires activities that are directed toward preserving or sustaining entities greater than one's own self. The decisions to act is that which ultimately extends self, whether it be through activities on behalf of homeless humans or endangerd whales.

Finally, ecofeminist Judith Plant (1990) suggests
that deep ecology and ecofeminism must find a common
ground of cooperation, not in attempting to reconcile
their varying views of the self/nature
interconnectedness, but rather in emphasizing the reality
of a practical, place-based identification found in the
bioregional vision. Bioregionalism means fitting oneself
to a place, becoming native to it, and living within the
limits of the gifts it gives. Bioregionalism is much
more than developing appropriate technology, or home
growing food. It offers "a praxis--that is, a way of
living what we’re thinking" (p. 159). It means
developing a new attitude toward living with the earth,
of redefining the meaning of home. Bioregionalism can
bring deep ecology and ecofeminism together not by
focusing on the intricacies of ontological essence but
rather focusing on rebuilding both human and natural
community. Together deep ecology and ecofeminism can give
the world hope of a new vision of person/environment
relationship based on "thinking feelingly" (p. 160). The
real work Plant points out, is at home, where both men
and women will learn to mend their relationships with
each other and with the earth.

Criticisms from transpersonal psychology

Ecofeminists and deep ecologists have had many
critics, none more strident in their criticism than
transpersonal theorist Ken Wilber. In his extensive recent work *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution* (1995), Wilber takes on all comers in his wide ranging criticism of what he perceives to be the regressive evolutionary tendencies of Nature Religions, among which he includes deep ecology and ecofeminism. Wilber views deep ecology and ecofeminism as beckoning their adherents back to a pre-modern level of intellectual and spiritual development. This regressive trend is best illustrated in the Nature Religion’s unfounded emphasis on a kind of psychic mysticism where spirit and nature are joined. Wilber argues "in their view [the Eco camp’s view] man and nature are indissolubly joined". Things are ultimates, and they never look beyond their sphere" (p. 469).

For Wilber, *eco-romantics*, another term he coined for the followers of Nature Religions, adhere to an interconnected wholism that in reality represents an attempt to recapture some sense of "the archaic Paradise Lost" (p. 670) which is concieved of as the "Promised Land" (p. 670) of human evolutionary development. This belief in a pre-modern, interconnected wholism, according to Wilber, is far more narrow-minded and dangerous than the secular rationalism that the eco-romantic groups soundly reject.
For Wilber, nature worship or nature immersion—union with the greater whole of nature—of which deep ecology’s and ecofeminism’s interconnectedness premise is one manifestation, "prevent the realization of Nature, or the spirit within and beyond. Nature worshipers are the destroyers of Nature and destroyers of Spirit" (p. 288) because their nature worship blinds them to a deeper search for the Over-Soul. The over-soul is a kind of metaphysical essence which exists beyond the identifiable, sensory reality of nature and culture. But, it is the essence out of which loving embrace of both culture and nature emerge. One must connect with the over-soul, the spirit within nature and culture, rather than nature or culture itself.

Contrary to this perceived view of deep ecology and ecofeminism is Wilber’s own understanding of social evolution. For Wilber the cure for ecological crisis and social inequity is not the attainment of unity with the whole of nature, but rather an enlightenment which views the separateness of things as an illusion and not a reality with which one should seek merger. According to Wilber, such new insight can occur by virtue of an evolutionary ascent to a higher stage of consciousness that integrates all previous stages and represents a transpersonal level of awareness. For Wilber, when deep
ecologists and ecofeminists encourage a regressive identification with the whole of nature, "they are committing the 'pre-trans-fallacy', which encourages people to regress to an earlier level of consciousness" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 202). In other words, deep ecologists and ecofeminists confuse movement toward transpersonal levels of consciousness by inadvertently suggesting movement toward prepersonal levels. The fallacy for Wilber is that deep ecologists and ecofeminists ask persons to move forward by first moving backward. They "may claim to be transpersonal, [but] in fact they are prepersonal to their core" (diZerega, 1996, p. 57).

Wilber's theoretical framework conceives of an ascent through a series of evolutionary stages toward full spiritual enlightenment. The current level of individual and social consciousness is not to be retreated from. In fact despite external appearances to the contrary, the secular West exemplifies a higher stage of consciousness development than all earlier societies and most non-Western societies. The attainment of the final, planetary stage of cultural development must first precede through a transitional period; what Wilber calls the vision-logic stage. This stage of consciousness is a more fully realized rationality--the integral-
aperspectival mind.

Wilber writes that "it is the integrative power of vision-logic, I believe, and not the indissociation of tribal magic or the imperialism of mythic involvement that is desperately needed on a global scale. For it is vision-logic with its centauric/planetary worldview that, in my opinion, holds the only hope for the integration of the biosphere and noosphere" (p. 187). Wilber contends that the persistent evidence of degradation of nature and social inequality visited on humankind by the many manifestations of Western rationality are simply stresses and wrong turns of modern cultural civilization that must be addressed. But, he insists that an emerging world culture, though not inevitable, "is being built by international markets of material-economic exchange, and by the increasingly free exchange of rationality structures, particularly empiric-analytic science and computer-transmitted information" (p. 197).

Of particular importance to Wilber in setting the groundwork for his critique is the view that deep ecology’s and ecofeminism’s egalitarian view of relationships between persons and nature, and particularly its attendant non-hierarchial framework, represents an ill-conceived understanding of human evolutionary development. He observes that deep
ecologists and ecofeminists advocate the transformation of a fractured worldview that separates mind and body, subject and object, human and nonhuman in a dualistic, mechanistic and hierarchical manner. And, in its place they advocate for a "worldview that is more holistic, more relational, more integrative, more Earth-honoring, and less arrogantly human-centered" (p. 4). But, the problem for Wilber with this conceptualization is that it ignores a critical element of both natural and social systemic development: the notion of holons.

The linchpin of Wilber’s criticism of eco-romantics rests in his belief that they have misunderstood the importance of hierarchies in system functioning. He says of them:

All sorts of theorists, from deep ecologists to social critics, from ecofeminists to postmodern poststructuralists, have found the notion of hierarchy not only undesirable but a bona fide cause of much social domination, oppression, and injustice. (p. 15)

Wilber says that the opponents of hierarchy, particularly social hierarchy, are concerned with the ranking and domination associated with the rule of an elite few and prefer instead to replace hierarchy with heterarchy—rule or governance "established by a pluralistic and
egalitarian interplay of all parties" (p. 16). At issue then is whether one's emphasis is on the parts of the whole--hierarchy, or on the whole as a whole--heterarchy. Wilber maintains that this is a too simplistic either/or dualism. He insists that the emphasis on the whole of eco-romantics is really not wholistic at all. If one were to ask these "Wholists" what is included in their wholeness "you find out immediately that there are an enormous number of things that they do not include in their version of 'the Whole'" (p. 37).

In order to counter the persistent charge of deep ecology and ecofeminism that all hierarchies are wrong and should be replaced with heterarchy, Wilber suggests the adoption of the concept of holon as a more appropriate conceptualization of system functioning. A holon is:

...that which, being a whole in one context, is simultaneously a part in another...The whole, in other words, is more than the sum of its parts, and that whole can influence and determine, in many cases, the function of its parts (and that whole itself is, of course, simultaneously a part of some other whole...reality is not composed of things or processes; it is not composed of atoms or quarks; it is not composed of wholes nor does it have any
parts. Rather, it is composed of whole/parts, or holons. (p. 18, 33)

Wilber concedes, in fact, that his entire book "is a book about holons--about wholes that are parts of other wholes, indefinitely" (p. viii). For Wilber perpetually emerging holons or what he calls a "holarchy" (p. 21) is the best qualitative descriptor of systemic function, both naturally and socially. Holarchies represent organization of increasing complexity and complex levels of consciousness.

For Wilber attempting to conceive of hierarchies and heterarchies as essences of reality is tantamount to rejecting holarchies and is at best, self-contradictory and at worst, dangerous. Denying hierarchies and embracing wholism "is itself a hierarchical judgement" (p. 25), according to Wilber. Thus deep ecologists and ecofeminists incoherently affirm the very thing they so vociferously condemn--the ranking of one thing (wholisms) over another (hierarchies). This stance, claims Wilber, is simply a polemic with dangerous implications for it tends to totalize its own universal claim by rejecting, on the grounds of being not universal, the claims of others. "It exempts its own universal claims from any scrutiny by simply claiming they aren’t claims" (p. 29). As Wilber sardonically describes it:
In essence, their stance amounts to: "I have my ranking, but you shall not have yours. And further, by pretending that my ranking is not a ranking--that move is done unconsciously--"I will say that I am without ranking altogether: and I shall then, in the name of compassion and equality, despise and attack ranking wherever I find it, because ranking is very bad". (p. 25)

The upshot of Wilber’s argument is that "deep ecologists and ecofeminists reject the notion of holarchy, for rather confused reasons" (p. 50), though much earlier he admits the difference between his view and that of deep ecologists and ecofeminists is partly a matter of "semantic confusion" (p. 16) that needs to be clarified.

Only a very few radical ecophilosophers have attempted to specifically address Wilber’s criticism. It appears clears however, that a full and fair reading of deep ecology and ecofeminism on the above points can clarify much of the confusion. A few brief points shall be made in that regard.

Deep ecologist Gus diZerega (1996) suggests that Wilber’s reading of much of deep ecology’s philosophical premises is taken grossly out of context and relies too much on secondary sources--those who have attempted to
develop and expand the earliest propositions—rather than on the original ideas developed by Arne Naess. Wilber (1995), in fact, champions Naess's thought and suggests that "if deep ecologists and ecofeminists would follow Naess's lead, the whole discussion could move forward much more rapidly" (p. 51).

With regard to Wilber's critique that deep ecologists and ecofeminists are somehow mired in a neo-romantic longing for an earlier, mystic union with nature, diZerega (1996) correctly observes that deep ecology never suggests the regressive dissolution of "self into a primordial ooze" (p. 58). Previous discussions in the current work make it patently clear that deep ecology's and ecofeminism's conceptualization of identification of person with nature is not a romantic longing for what was, but is rather an optimistic anticipation for what can be. The differences lies in what Wilber himself has suggested to be semantics.

It appears clear that what Wilber views as a regression to some pre-egoic stage of undifferentiated individual/organic nexus, deep ecology and ecofeminism view as widening expansion of individual self to include the nonhuman other. For while sharing similarities with more atavistic conceptualizations of human/nature merger they are not synonymous. As Naess (1989) observes, "Self
realization....breaks in and reinstates the central position of the individual--even as the capital S is used to express something beyond narrow selves. The widening and deepening of the individual selves somehow never makes them into one mass" (p. 173). To this ecofeminist theorist Marti Kheel (1990) adds that ecofeminism's interconnectedness is not based on some regressive longing but on current "lived awareness that we experience in relation to particular beings as well as the larger whole" (p. 137).

In summing up Wilber's misinterpretation of Naess on this point diZerega says: "Naess is hardly advocating a return to paleolithic hunting and gathering--which is one of Wilber's favorite [though unfounded] characterizations of 'deep ecology'" (p. 59). And the sentiment could be applied equally well to his misrepresentation of ecofeminism.

Wilber's second criticism of deep ecology's and ecofeminism's non-hierarchical perceptual framework also obscures the essential meaning of both movements on this point. Interestingly, Wilber (1995) actually quotes Naess approvingly as supporting his insistence upon the existence of hierarchical/holons. His lament is that other deep ecologists--Naess's followers, "have such a difficult time grasping his notion" (p. 50).
Deep ecology's and ecofeminism's non-hierarchical perceptual frameworks have been discussed earlier in some detail so only a few additional points will be necessary. Neither deep ecology or ecofeminism are suggesting, as Wilber contends, that somehow wholism is all good and hierarchy is all bad. What deep ecology means from its hierarchy/wholism distinction--its focus on the whole rather than the parts--is a point of emphasis, a perspective at a given moment of observation but never a denial of the existence of the parts or even that their ordering in relation to one another is morally deplorable (i.e. bad). Naess (1989), referring to the work of David Bohm (1980), makes the relevant point:

...that the work with the 'unfolding' of a view of the 'totality of all that is', is itself a part, a subordinate gestalt, of that very totality. We are, when active in unfolding our views, creative in shaping and creating 'what there is' at any moment. (p. 80)

Similarly ecofeminism's non-hierarchical perceptual framework also does not propose the kinds of things suggested of it by Wilber. In an insightful essay on feminism and ecology, ecofeminist Patsy Hallen (1995) suggests that ecofeminists do recognize that the systemic whole is more than the some of the parts, but there is no
suggestion that the parts do not exist or should not count. Again, as with deep ecology, this is a point of emphasis. Acknowledging that the parts exist and far from saying that the parts of system are bad in preference to the whole, Hallen (1995, p. 213) suggests simply that "the parts take their meaning from the whole". This does not deny the existence or importance of hierarchies but rather the inseparability of both whole and part. For Hallen, just as it "is valid to interpret the higher in terms of the lower, so it is also valid to interpret the lower in terms of the higher" (p.213).

One could conclude from this brief review that sometimes deep ecology's and ecofeminism's language of wholism and hierarchy is unfortunate in the sense that it is not always clear, lacks specificity and has some considerable way to go in fully explicating these ideas. But, one should not conclude, like Wilber (1995), that deep ecology and ecofeminism support a view that "hierarchy and atomism are 'bad' and that their 'wholism' is the opposite of both" (p. 50). Like diZerega (1996) any honest attempt to grasp their meaning on this point "would show that one can indeed make distinctions between human beings and others while respecting and honoring all life" (p. 59).
Additional criticisms

In addition to Wilber's specific criticism of both deep ecology and ecofeminism and criticisms arising from the ongoing debate between deep ecology and ecofeminism, other general criticisms of each movement have been suggested. They have come from a wide range of historians, social ecologists, postmodern theorists, and social critics. They range from simple caustic rejoinders like Bookchin's (1987) suggestion that deep ecology is a "eco-la-la, a blackhole of half-digested, ill-formed, and half-baked ideas" (cited in Zimmerman, 1994, p. 166) to very lengthy and detailed philosophical discourse (Biehl, 1991). The following overview makes no attempt to discuss the validity of these criticisms for that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. Neither is there any attempt to distinguish between them and similar critiques highlighted in our previous discussions. The inventory is offered as a means to help the reader appreciate the broad scope of current critiques as well as identify and distinguish between the salient issues. The hope is to stimulate thought and ongoing dialogue.

The reader will note some commonality between the criticisms of each group and should be aware that generally the tenor of these critiques are on the

Deep ecology has been criticized for being an immature ecological movement which engages in questionable forms of earth worship to the point of being an idolatrous religion. It has been accused of being willfully ignorant of new developments in ecological science that undermine its reliance on traditional systems thinking and for advocating a view of wholism that sacrifices individuals for the good of the larger natural whole. It has also been scolded for claiming to be more radical and revolutionary than contemporary environmentalism while supporting many of its reform efforts, and for projecting its own voice onto nature and then claiming that it is nature itself speaking.

Some deep ecology critics see it as being an extension of modernism’s rights-based, democratic liberalism even though criticizing modernity and its more oppressive manifestations. On the other hand, others criticize it for uncritically exporting unrelated, postmodernist ideas into a unified but questionable
conceptual frame. Many disapprove of its rhetorical support to individual self-realization while at the same time suggesting that individual development only occurs by regressing to a preindividualistic level of consciousness. This psychological and sociological regressive proclivity ignores the dangers of tribalism while demanding unqualified conformity to laws of nature.

Deep ecology has also been harshly denounced by those suggesting that it shares theoretical similarity with National Socialism because of its heavy reliance on the thinking of Heidegger. Similarly, others suggest that it propagates a vision of transformed humanity dwelling in harmony with nature which parallels the mystical features of German Nazism.

Some political activists have suggested that deep ecology is nothing more than a wilderness cult that separates the ecology movement from struggles of women, gays, the poor and oppressed, and Third World nations while relying on personal transformation rather than political action to usher in a new epoch. Similarly, others have chided it for turning Asian and Tribal peoples into mystical Other, thus marginalizing their socioeconomic and political needs.

The criticisms of ecofeminism share some of the same features as those of deep ecology. It has been blamed
for having reversed the previous dualism between men and women such that this time women are on top of the hierarchical ladder because they are essentially kinder, more life-affirming and relational than men. This belief has been supported by a kind of biological essentialism (i.e. women are biologically more attuned to nature than men) which makes their message ineffective and politically dangerous. Ecofeminism has also been criticized for having alienated Third World women by subtly asserting that experiences of educated, Western, middle-class, ecologically conscious women are representative of all women. This seeks to give voice to common experiences of women but is in fact totalizing and imperialistic because it does not adequately take into account racial and ethnic diversity of Third world peoples.

Some have found fault with ecofeminism for concentrating on the internal, wholistic character of all female experiences thus leading to a kind of feminist totalitarianism where individual expression is sacrificed for the sake of communal meaning. Their religious-like goddess worship, some say, also promotes a mystic escape from real social and ecological problems. From a political perspective some rebuke ecofeminism for not being more forceful in demanding the end of political
domination expressed in patriarchal capitalism and state socialism. Others suggest that they have thoroughly shunned political involvement in favor of a mythical narrative; thus potentially leading to a fascist society where secular rationality, clothed in spiritual garb, is pandered in order to minimize collective political action. Finally, ecofeminism has been chided for ignoring the emancipatory aspects of modernism like individual freedom, justice and peace, in favor of a strident critique of its mechanistic rationality.

Conclusion

This exploratory analysis has demonstrated the unique and diverse ways in which deep ecology and ecofeminism have emerged from the inability of conventional thought to address the underlying reasons for social discord and environmental degradation. These are seen, from the perspective of deep ecology and ecofeminism, as individual and institutional manifestations of the oppressive and dominating features of modernity. Modernity conceives of natural processes as lifeless, inert collections of material which can be manipulated for the perpetuation of its project; to increase its knowledge of and to exert its control over all which is natural. Deep ecology and ecofeminism have responded to this domination penchant on at least two
levels.

For deep ecology and ecofeminism the solution to human and environmental crisis first lies in addressing the fundamental assumptions of modernity; particularly its worldview and conceptions of knowledge. That is, they radically bring into question those notions which are embedded in modern human consciousness. The second level of response is the worldview deep ecology and ecofeminism offer in place of the existing tradition. Each attempts to re-enliven a lifeless, meaningless world of matter, albeit each with somewhat different emphases. Both see a interconnected person/nature world. This is a place that offers a rich and creative source of life and being; where all reality is developing, changing, in a constant state of becoming.

For deep ecology and ecofeminism this re-enlivened worldview is the matrix for a new ethos of person and nature which is based on a way of being or identification rather than on a set of rationalistic principles and narrowly developed concepts. As the world is re-created, new attitudes, new actions, new applications shall emerge; all changing the very face of conventional ideology and consciousness.

The next chapter of this work shall explore the ways deep ecology and ecofeminism may assist social work in
reconceptualizing its own person-in-environment perspective. This reconceptualization will then be discussed in the context of its impact on various components of social work thought and activity.
CHAPTER VI
RECONCEPTUALIZING PERSON-IN-ENVIRONMENT:
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This study's previous discussions have suggested that social work's of person-in-environment construct is conceptually troubled. Person-in-environment has been largely influenced by the profession's embeddedness in the logic and methodology of the modernist worldview. The philosophical assumptions of modernism have typically narrowed the definition of person and environment and disengaged the concept of nature from both constructs.

The result has been an conceptual alienation of person from nature. Person tends to mean almost solely, a psychodynamically derived, narrowly defined ego self which adapts to environmental constraints and changes. Environment tends to be roughly defined as the immediate personal, social, human-to-human relationships affecting the individual. Direct concern for relationships between humans and the natural world is thus superseded by concerns for specific interhuman and intrahuman issues. The natural, nonhuman world remains the background against which more fundamentally important intrapsychic and interpersonal action take place. Nature and person become essentially other--separated, isolated, surrounded
by impermeable barriers.

The current chapter presents a revised theoretical proposal of person-in-environment. This is the centerpiece of the present research project. It is a response to the first of two central research questions involving key themes in deep ecology and ecofeminism important in reconfiguring person-in-environment. This revised theoretical framework also represents the culmination of the concept generating components of this project that were discussed in conjunction with methodological concerns (see Chapter 4). In particular it relies on the themes developed in the analysis of textual sources as well as the researcher’s own intuitive experiences and insight, exploratory interviews with key, social work theorists and conversations with members of the researcher’s dissertation committee. Each of these sources contributed varying degrees of creative and corrective insight that enhanced the development of this theoretical reconceptualization and the implications that derive from it.

The current chapter will also, in response to research question two, specify implications of person-with-environment on a range of social work activities. The organization of this chapter shall be around one, the specification of a reconceptualized person-in-environment
perspective and two, implications for social work ontology/epistemology, practice, social justice, ethics and values, research and education.

**Reconceptualizing Person-In-Environment**

In a general sense the findings of this study suggest the need to replace the current person-in-environment formulation with, from the author’s perspective, the more appropriate terminology of *person-with-environment*. My intent is to suggest that by changing *in* to *with* a conceptual marker is being placed on a commonly accepted social work perspective. This marker centers the profession’s attention toward the need for a radical shift of focus. Person-with-environment derives from a revised theoretical basis for thought and action which differentiates it from conventional notions of person-in-environment. It aims to encourage social workers to consider the connections between this revised framework and concrete social work activities.

The reconceptualized framework will be presented in the following pages by focusing on the three component parts of the construct; person, environment, and the relationship between them.

**Expanding the view of person**

Deep ecology and ecofeminism offer social work the important insight that modernism’s understanding of
person as an isolated, ego bound self alienated from body and nature, is no longer tenable. In its place deep ecology and ecofeminism propose an expanded view of self that replaces separated self with ecological self.

Conventional notions of human development consider the maturation of self from the perspective of individual ego expanding toward the social realm. But, this conceptualization largely ignores identification with nature and with all other nonhuman beings. The ecological self suggests that persons are not just in nature but are in fact of nature. Nature is that which constitutes both the beginning and the ongoing essence of human self.

The ecological self posits the importance of individual and social relationships, but suggests that the self has much richer psychological, emotional, and transcendent potentialities. Self is capable of extending beyond the narrow, egoic/social self. Neither the physical boundary of one’s skin or one’s purely abstract reasoning capacity can define the frontier of self. The ecological self reveals a self enlivened and extended by nature rather than threatened by it.

The unique contributions of deep ecology and ecofeminism to expanding the self construct are important. Deep ecology’s emphasis is on breaking down
the barriers that maintain an anthropocentric—strictly human-centered—conceptualization of self. For deep ecologists, the ecological self is a deep, philosophical identification centered in increasingly wider levels of maturational development. That is, a maturing ecological self sees itself as linked in complex patterns of relationship with others, both in the human and the non-human realm.

Self-realization, the term deep ecologists use for the gradually maturing self, is hindered when the self-realization of others, to whom self is inextricably linked, is also hindered. Deep ecologists conclude from this that beneficent action toward other, whether human or nonhuman, should not come grudgingly. Action toward other is not a dutiful sacrifice of a self which needs to be guarded and defended from onslaught. But, in enhancing the actualization of other, persons simultaneously widen and deepen themselves.

Ecofeminist contributions to expanding the construct of self is best understood in the context of gender oppression. Their androcentric analysis shows that since women have been traditionally identified with devalued aspects of the natural world, expanding the concept of self must first be sensitive to an appreciation that men and women experience themselves and the natural world in
dissimilar ways.

For ecofeminists, conventional notions of self do not imply a gender-neutral, rather universally understood, alienated ego seeking to regain deep identification with nature. This is typically a male perception and does not necessarily represent that of women. For ecofeminists the traditional, western idea of the male self has been viewed in opposition to nature. Self expansion toward ecological self represents a move to connect with nature for perhaps the first time in male psychosocial development. In contrast, the feminine self has always been more experientially connected to nature. Yet women have experienced the same alienation from nature as men, not because of any inherent gulf, but because they have accepted the patriarchal schema that identified women and nature in cynical terms.

For ecofeminists self-expansion cannot be based on the masculine model of overcoming opposition. Rather, the task for women is to remember and reclaim the past and the connections they as women had with the earth. The ecofeminist sense of ecological self implies a recognition that self is most fully realized not by a drive to fuse an alienated self with nature but rather by reinstituting the felt sense of connection women shared with the natural world. Ecological self is understood as
self realized in the context of communal membership in a wider family of life. These kinship ties between self and both human and natural other motivates action toward other out of a sense of maternal care and consideration.

While the debate between deep ecology and ecofeminism on expanding definitions of self has been considerable there are complementary elements in both positions from which social work may draw. Whether social work understands the newly emerging idea of ecological self in anthropocentric or androcentric terms, does not necessarily detract from the fact that, fundamentally, both deep ecology and ecofeminism seek to deepen conscious awareness of and reanimate connection between self and the natural world.

In summary, there are a number of important elements which can be derived from the previous discussion. First, attempting to demarcate self apart from nature is an arbitrary external distinction. Two, self and nature constitute a network of internal relationship. Three, this internal relationship of self and nature is such that they together constitute the fundamental norm of reality--the ecological self. Four, the ecological self is an ontologically essential component of human development and personal identity. Five, by attempting to ignore or alter conceptualizations of self with nature
humans alter the very essence of self since it does not fully exist apart from this relationship.

**Expanding the view of environment**

Previous discussions has suggested that social work's notion of environment is unnecessarily constricted in several ways. First, social work tends to define its nexus of activity in terms of the immediate personal and social environment of the individual. This notion of environment tends to obscure broader elements of the environment. Secondly, though not totally ignoring the concept of natural environment in its understanding of human purpose and function, social work tends to accept the modernist conceptualization of the natural realm. This conceptualization views nature as other, something quite separate from human beings.

Ecofeminism and deep ecology offer a radically different view of the environmental construct. They suggest the necessity of discussing questions of human meaning not in the context of relationship between persons and the environment but in the context of relationship between persons and nature. For them human crisis and environmental crisis are problems of the androcentric (ecofeminists) or the anthropocentric (deep ecologists) ethos of nature. Both understand that the way persons conceive of nature and portray it through
language have serious implications for the natural and human world.

For ecofeminists, patriarchal conceptual frameworks confer similar characteristics on women and nature, and then systematically devalue both. Each are seen as irrational, uncertain and difficult to control. This often unacknowledged negative association between women and nature in environmental and social discourse perpetuates constricted and largely oppressive views of both constructs.

Deep ecologists believe that the anthropocentric or human-centered norm of reality, which has been thoroughly shaped and maintained by the modernist worldview, is generally responsible for the exploitive and dominating view of nature. Modernity makes the claim that nature is mechanistic, wholly void of purpose and meaning and that humans are in large measure separate from nature. Such claims, according to deep ecologists, have led to a view of nature understood as object and resource, separated from human purpose.

Together, deep ecology and ecofeminism argue that human and nonhuman survival necessitates a renewed appreciation of human relationship to nature. This means a substantial reorientation of human consciousness from being in environment to being with nature. Since
language plays a significant role in constructing experiences and actions, it is important to grasp that use of the abstract, and narrowly defined terms in environment in social work's theoretical discourse in many ways perpetuates the devalued and objectivist views of nature. The way social work conceives of environment has serious implications for how the profession understands relationships between persons, the natural realm, and how the profession goes about its activities.

In summary, there are a number of important elements which can be derived from the previous discussion. One, by defining nature as essentially hostile or by separating it into benign other, humanity simultaneously defines itself in a way which severely constricts its ability to create individual and collective meaning. Two, there is no natural enmity and separation between humans and nature. Nature is one with and beneficial for humanity. Three, in large measure social, political, economic and environmental problems are associated with humanity's philosophical understanding of its relationship with nature and the practices that stem from it. Four, by constructing a new language of environment, one that fully incorporates the powerful dynamic of human/nature relationship, all aspects of society (including social work) enhance their ability to
understand and thus act upon a broader range of human issues. Five, adopting an alternative metaphor of human/nature relationship, for example that of a nurturing mother who kindly provides for the needs of her children, suggests something uniquely different and transformative in the ways humans sense their place with the larger natural environment. It dramatically reconstructs inimical nature toward a nature which provides life giving and life sustaining sustenance.

Expanding the view of relationship

Social work’s conventional notion of person-in-environment is insufficient to capture the deeper sense of interrelationship between person and nature. Most definitions of the concept, even by the most notable of social work’s ecological theorists (Germain, 1979; Germain & Gitterman, 1980), are not untypical of that found in an influential Human Behavior and the Social Environment (HBSE) textbook written by Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman (1987). Here person-in-environment is defined as a conceptual perspective where:

...a person is thought of as being involved in constant interaction with various systems in the environment. These systems include the family, friends, work, social service, politics, religious, goods and services and educational systems....Social
work practice, then, is directed at improving the interactions between the person and the various systems in the environment. (p. 8)

This view of interaction, suggested by the use of in, creates a state of consciousness that identifies a person as already existing on a plane of profound division between her/himself and a narrowly defined environment. Person-in-environment becomes a kind of euphemism for person-apart from-environment. Identity with nature is excluded or becomes a mere abstraction. This leads to ideas and actions that cannot be harmonized with either the well being of person or nature.

By contrast, the person-with-environment construct suggests that social work’s conventional ideas of interaction are based on incomplete theoretical models. Modern, western ideas of relatedness imply a linear, causal connectedness. That is, things are interrelated in the sense that the energy/force necessary to affect a change in one element is directly proportional to the energy/force necessary to affect a linear and predictable change in the other. An example of this would be touching one side of a child’s mobile which affects a change in the other component parts directly proportional to the energy applied initially.

For deep ecologists and ecofeminists, relationships
between person and nature require viewing reality though a new set of conceptual lenses. Their view of interconnectedness goes beyond simple, linear models and implies far more than a trivial acknowledgement of some ethereal oneness of nature and humanity. It stresses a commitment to ideas and practices that are greater than the individual’s own pleasure, material gain, ego enhancement and sense of separateness from other. Interrelationship understood in this way necessarily calls into question the way in which human development has been traditionally understood and the criteria by which its ongoing advancement is assessed.

There are several integral components to a new view of interrelationship inherent in a person-with-environment perspective. First, this view rejects the conventional notion of relationship purely in terms of spatiotemporal location and linear causality. Humans exist in complex human/nature relationship patterns that involve a continuous flow of interaction, biologically, psychologically, and sociologically, which humans can understand and for which they are responsible. Second, persons can no longer be understood as just living in environment. Living in environment gives way to living with environment--with nature. Third, interrelationship is defined more from an internal, intuitive perspective.
rather than from the perspective of loose associations between external phenomena. Fourth, self and nature are not two separate entities joined by external relation. They are part of a relational field, a complex web; neither of which can be isolated from their milieu. Finally, once humans understand, but more importantly experience, this new meaning of interrelationship they begin to sense, deeply, intuitively that what is good for one part of the relational field, the communal web, will be good for the another. Conversely, humans may not sacrifice any part without affecting every other.

Implications for a New Ecological Social Work

The contribution of person-with-environment is its focus on a new language of person, nature and interrelationship. This is a language providing alternative understandings of these constructs which diverge significantly from the profession’s conventional conceptualizations. The continuing task is to suggest in what ways person-with-environment potentially alters, in some respects significantly, social work thought and activity. The question becomes what would social work operating out of a person-with-environment perspective be like? That is, how would it be different in thought and action from the way the profession currently configures itself?
The current section will develop implications of person-with-environment for social work thought and activity. It is the last of seven major themes identified in the previous chapter (see p. 187). It will concentrate in the areas of ontology/epistemology, practice, social consciousness, ethics and values, research and education. The following implications are offered as general statements of initial ideas. The advantage of general statements is that they allow the opportunity for people unacquainted with new concepts to feel more comfortable with unfamiliar ideas. They ask persons to explore and shape these ideas and to seek their relevance in their own way.

In addition, the implications that follow confirm and build upon the work of current and earlier social work theorists who have developed alternative views on the content domains mentioned above. For instance, Weick (1987) and Canda (1986, 1991) have previously explored important ontological and epistemological concerns of social work, particularly those emerging in the fields of philosophy and spirituality. McNutt (1994) and McNutt and Hoff (1994) address the issue of social justice from the vista of new environmental thought while Cataldo (1979) formerly explored utilizing wilderness in social work practice settings. Weick (1991), Saleebey (1990,
1992), and Rogge (1994a) have also generated implications of differing social work perspectives on research and education. Roberts (1990) and Tester (1994) have confronted values and ethical interests of social work form alternative, theoretical viewpoints.

This section will include concrete examples, where appropriate, to enhance clarity. There is no claim that these are the only possible implications or that they are necessarily the most important for social work. They are, however, the ones which seem most apparent and pertinent.

**A spiritual ontology and epistemology**

A new ecological, person-with-environment social work would be an extended profession. The emphasis would shift from a limited person-in-social environment centered dynamic to one of expanding interrelationship. This means in a broad sense an acknowledgement that humans are *in fact* involved in a deep, experiential connection with the earth that extends beyond the bounds of mere instrumental association. The implication: how social work understands the essence of being and what it values as appropriate for its knowledge base must be conceptually reoriented to recognize the existence of a powerful intuitive, spiritual element that binds humans to the natural realm.

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Recognizing the spiritual connection between humans and nature means more than adding another dimension to the way social work understands human identity. It challenges the very core of assumptions and distinctions that have principally shaped the social work agenda.

For the most part the modernist, western worldview rejects the language and experience of spirituality. It is especially suspicious of attempts to articulate a spiritual connection between a reanimated nature and resacralized humanity. Social work is in large measure a professional reflection of the modern mindset. It has become predominantly a profession of mechanisms, secular rationality, and linear relationships.

Social work has, in line with most aspects of modern society, gradually grown suspicious of knowledge and experiences which cannot be quantified or rationally derived. It has endeavored to free itself from the so-called imprecision of philosophy, and the irrationality of spirituality, in order to secure for itself the status of scientific profession. The result is a profession that tends to distrust the language of mystical connection, reverence and intuition. Direct knowing, intuitive grasp, and subjective experience of the other, especially nature, has been replaced with a reverence for numbers and mechanistic metaphors.
Social work has often kept from itself and from its clients the explicit reasons for the modern sense of alienated existence. A person-with-environment perspective demands that social work must no longer ignore that it has, sometimes unwittingly but often deliberately, cooperated in creating a disenchanted world and desacralized humanity characterized by a kind of synthetic, spiritually muted, alienated feeling and lifestyle. Person-with-environment clearly identifies the modern proclivity to sever the spiritual bonds between humans and nature as the quintessence, the epicenter of an alienated humanity.

Alienated, desacralized humanity has led to a broad range of ecological problems, but is also extended to individual and social problems including emotional, familial, economic, and class issues. A person-with-environment perspective suggests that the profession can no longer look at these in isolation or separate them from the domain of human/nature relationship. Many of these issues are where the profession finds itself intimately involved. It has an obligation to open itself and those it serves to a realm of deeper connection; grounded in nature and experienced spiritually.

A practice of reconnection

A new ecological social work implies that the
profession abandon its reliance on modernist metaphors and acknowledge the spiritual interconnection between persons and nature. By extension this implies that social work must develop practice methods that alter traditional conceptualizations of human identity by encouraging greater identification with nature. It is a very literal revisioning of a previously held social work commitment to the idea of outdoor relief (personal communication with Consultant 1, November 12, 1996).

Deep ecologists, ecofeminists and particularly ecopsychologists have been in the vanguard of creating methods for helping people reconnect with nature from which social work can draw. For instance ecopsychologist Steven Harper (1995) suggests utilizing the experiential, imaginative and consciousness altering properties of wilderness as a way to help people realize a deeper sense of interconnectedness. As Harper suggests, the experience of wilderness undercuts the dualistic categories of civilized versus primitive and challenges practice wisdom that restricts helping to a fifty-minute hour within the confines of agency or office.

Wilderness practice is a powerful encounter that seeks to restore overall physical, emotional and social health and wholeness rather than seeking to cure specific psychological ills. It embraces experience with
wilderness as having a unique potential for providing transformative engagement impacting a wide array of personal and social issues. Its focus is not on analysis, interpretation or advice but rather that a whole, reconnected self reemerges as one experiences the instinctual basis of identity found in wilderness.

For example, wilderness practice shifts attending skills toward a more complete sensory awareness of the rhythmic/cyclical character of life. It alters perceptions of time and space by seeing both as cycles to be experienced rather than to be linearly measured by clocks or calculations of acreage. Wilderness breaks down familiar patterns of individual, cultural and gender separateness by viewing diversity as a fundamentally important and absolutely necessary part of system health. From the perspective of gender, for example, wilderness evokes the often unacknowledged feminine/masculine dynamic of women and men. It challenges gender-bound role identity by observing that in nature there is often an obscuring of these humanly derived boundaries.

Additionally, wilderness practice challenges the romanticized and stylized idea of being in nature. It contests the image of wilderness conveyed in recent marketing campaigns for a popular beer portraying mountain vistas as the diminutive backdrop for colossal,
athletically endowed and scantily clad young men and women frolicking over and around peak and precipice in a playful pursuit of football, frisbee or bowling ball. Rather, wilderness practice recognizes that feeling at home with nature is a recognition of its wholeness, of both life and death, darkness and light, sunshine and rain. In Harper’s (1995) words wilderness practice: 

".... breaks down the emphasis on the Disneyland sense of "beauty". The look of the land often determines that response. Many tourists, for example, confronted by a scene that is "pretty as a picture", react to natural beauty by rushing for their cameras. But sight is only one of our senses. I try to encourage letting the wilderness in through all the senses: touch, hearing, smell and taste. Above all, I try to make the experience whole and honest. It must include what happens and what you feel when night falls, when the weather turns hot or cold or rainy, when the bugs come out, or when the cute little rabbit you have been watching screams a death-call as it is whisked away in the talons of an eagle. (p. 187)"

Wilderness practice is a clear example of how a new ecological social work could promote human well-being by seeking ways to heal the split between humans and nature.
It alters conventional forms and strategies of social work helping. It is a recognition that humans and nature share a core state of being which transcends cultural and individual boundaries. In one sense humans do not need to have more nature, but must fully recognize that they are nature. Humans don’t come into this world they come out of it and must begin again to live with it.

One population group, of particular interest to social workers, who stand to benefit from wildness practice are children living in large urban centers. There is ample evidence suggesting that interventive methods based on the healing effects of nature have important social and psychological effects (Marx, 1988; Nebbe, 1991; Lovell & Johnson, 1994). Wilderness practice does not necessarily require busing large groups of children to the High Sierras. It can be as simple as bringing the natural environment to children through the introduction of household pets, or horticultural interests in the environments where the children live. Caring for and playful interaction with small animals, tending flowers or gardens, or experiencing urban green spaces can facilitate empathetic capacities, develop responsibility, inner confidence and relaxation skills.

Additionally, even the largest urban environment has, within driving distance, surrounding rural settings
which could be visited and experienced. For instance, introducing a group of inner city children to the lifestyle experienced on a small farm can be an exciting, moving and lasting experience: petting the soft, velvety nose of a dairy cow, watching a mother sow gently nursing her piglets, burying small hands into the warm, woolly sheep’s coat, seeing the close bond between a mother horse and the wobbly new colt. These simple, yet meaningful encounters can have profound impact on anyone, young or old. Yet children, by virtue of their innocence, are curious and open learners. Their first experience with a grove of trees, a prairie preserve or a small farm setting can foster an enduring sense of connection with the earth and its nonhuman creatures.

A commitment to social justice

Deepening conscious awareness of and reanimating spiritual connection with nature and developing practice methods to accomplish this are important implications for a social work operating out of a person-with-environment perspective. But, for social work to be a truly ecological profession it must also address those powerful systemic realities which maintain human alienation. Person-with-environment recognizes that just as humanity and nature need to be interrelatedly understood, so too must modern social, political and economic realities.
That is, issues of environmental degradation and concerns for a reanimated human/nature consciousness cannot be separated from those systemic forces which function to maintain all forms of injustice, whether toward nature or other human beings (personal communication with Consultant 2, February 3, 1997).

There is a strong social justice logic inherent in the person-with-environment perspective. Its premise of interrelationship suggests that struggles against oppressive, systemic forces which denigrate nature are intertwined with struggles against all forces which also oppress humans. The oppression which keeps realization of a dynamic, harmonious human/nature relationship out of consciousness is connected to other forms of human oppression including economic exploitation, racism, sexism and patriarchy. Oppressive social institutions are an expression of an alienated collective psyche but also structure and maintain an alienated collective psyche. Though human oppression and oppression of nature appear to exist in separate form, struggle against any one in isolation cannot be effective. Concern for any oppression necessitates concern for all oppression.

The justice logic of person-with-environment portends nothing short of radical change in the social, political, and economic structures of modern, industrial
society. Adopting this new ecological framework changes the identity of conventional social work. It suggests that the profession must return to and significantly expand upon its progressive, activist roots.

Person-with-environment establishes the foundation of a new socio-political mandate. It suggests the profession has an obligation to examine all oppressive political, social and economic structures of modern society and the policies which extend them. It requires that social workers become professionally involved and personally committed both within and outside the confines of office, agency and academy to implementing change.

Though there are many exemplars of how a newly activist social work can collaborate in fundamental change, there are at least two areas where systemic change is essential if social work is to challenge the oppression of both humanity and nature. The first of these is economics.

Western economic ideology tends to appreciate only those entities and practices which have market value; material things and the flow of goods and services to satisfy consumptive need. Industrial economies, whether capitalistic or socialistic, tend to create need for products even if needs for such things do not legitimately exist or they turn natural things and
experiences into commodities. Needs and wants become relatively indistinguishable. This practice tends to foster the illusion that consumption and human happiness are essentially equivalent.

This illusion of consumer happiness creates inequality as an ever increasing number of people scramble to get their piece of the relatively scarce, good life (happy=materialistic) pie. In an effort to keep pace with an ever growing, consumptive penchant natural resources are systematically destroyed. Fewer people are able to realistically share in this good life vision. More and more are marginalized as they are recruited to fuel the productive fires which feed the material appetites of an ever smaller elite few.

There are several ways social workers may think about altering this malevolent cycle. In the short term advocating a commitment to the value of material equality, in their own and their client’s personal and social life, would be important. Until individuals and societies can agree to a new collective vision of the good life, the idea of material equality offers a limited corrective to the individual and social demand for economic expansion. If material equality becomes recognized as a social priority, then the incessant process of trying to achieve higher and higher privilege
though material possession and consumption would be diminished. In a society where having more devices, or at least having more than others, is regarded as impertinent and tawdry, rather than an identifier of merit and status, demands for economic growth and its resulting inequality and depletion of natural resources would be slowed, though not eliminated.

Ultimately, however, economic principles of the kind envisioned by a person-with-environment perspective must extend beyond a equitable redistribution of material wealth. This redistributive focus of justice does not change the underlying reliance on resource expropriation to satisfy human need/want. What becomes necessary is an alternative vision of the good life. That is, a new insight into what constitutes a joyous and satisfying, rather than satiated, life. It is a vision which must be compatible with a natural environment that can support the continuation of human life and well being.

This alternative vision must reflect a long-term commitment to identifying sources of human satisfaction that can intergenerationally flourish in harmony with nature. The focus of human satisfaction changes from quantity of life's possessions to quality of life. This will not be an easy undertaking because Western society has lost or has yet to develop the language and capacity
to assess satisfaction apart from material consumptionism.

Social work can contribute to a new view of human satisfaction by helping people appraise ways of being that are rewarding, not damaging to nature, and not based on consumptive materialism. Things to be considered would include simple conversations, spiritual rituals, neighborhood/community gatherings, family outings, artistic pursuits, music, dance, literature, experiencing nature. All are ways of life and being which can endure through countless generations. This is a kind of simple life vision adorned with nonmaterial sources of fulfillment. It includes the kinds of activities and associations which most people would admit are the main determinants of happiness.

For example, one might visualize an inner city neighborhood that has been depleted, polluted and virtually destroyed in the wake of modern economic/consumptive policies and practices. The question would then be how might a new vision operate in this setting? An initial step would be for social workers to again take on the role of becoming community/neighborhood organizers in an effort to confront current economic and/or environmental issues. This would mean developing mechanisms that promote
participation by every member of the neighborhood and acting as advocates who apply pressure and call attention to the need for both local and national intervention. It also would mean social workers would function as facilitators of skill development in order to allow residents to act on behalf of themselves and their neighborhood.

Eventually, however, social workers would need to recognize that the crisis of this neighborhood is a crisis of vision. Social workers would need to take an active lead in helping residents construct a new conceptual vision of a revitalized and satisfying neighborhood. This is a vision of neighborhood that, though not complete or perfect in any utopian sense, fosters local strength and interdependence, and that is not continually subject to the debilitating economic cycles and social inequities associated with the modern, consumer oriented culture. There are many models of economically viable, personally satisfying and socially flourishing alternative community/neighborhoods, both traditional (i.e. the Amish and Bruderhof communities) and contemporary (i.e. the St. Martin’s community of Minneapolis and Urban Habitat program of San Francisco), that social work may effectively draw from (Sine, 1991; Anthony, 1995).
A second way social work can collaborate in systemic change is in the realm of technology. Modern technocratic culture is often a reflection of how people perceive the character of their existence— their relationship to themselves, to others and to their place in the world. The consciousness of modernism is predominantly mechanistic; prizing rationality, specialization, utility, efficiency and detachment. The kinds of technology that result reflect these factors and functions to maintain individual and collective oppression by disengaging humans from one another and from the natural realm. Technological culture enfranchises a social order inherently conservative and centralized while consolidating existing power structures that are harmful to both communities and nature.

Modern culture, individually and professionally, is enamored with technical solutions to problems. The message is seductively simple. With the application of enough money and intelligence over enough time technical solutions emerge. The appeal of the "technological fix" (Saleebey, 1991) is on one level its promise to cure a whole range of human problems without requiring society or its institutional structures to consider the habits or ideas that may have caused the problems in the first place. As social work critical theorist Frank Tester
(1994) has observed, the essential ideology and practice of "Western-style liberal democracy has become a matter of technique" (p. 92).

The advantages of technology and the reign of technique in the professions are in most cases illusory. Each carry a price tag and penalties for use and maintenance that are at least equal to the problems they tend to ameliorate. For example, the toxic by-products of technological advancement pose increasing threats to the physical, mental and social health of many populations in this country and around the world. Many, including some social workers, are beginning to recognize that one of the most harmful crises facing many people are the efforts to dispose of the toxic by-products of technology in poor and exploited communities of color. These communities have traditionally had little voice in protecting their local place against the marginalizing influences and disposal practices of the larger culture (Rogge, 1994).

A new activist conscious social work can collaborate in fundamental systemic change in several ways. First, by making a commitment to challenge contemporary technological ideology and secondly, by pledging itself to a principle of appropriate technology.

Challenging conventional technological culture
suggests there must be an appreciation that technologies are never separate from the prevailing political and economic culture. The conventional belief that a technology is neutral and therefore dependent only on how people employ it must be understood as a fiction. Rather, social work must recognize that all technologies are structured to reflect and serve specific, powerful interests. The reality is that often only a small, affluent group enjoy the benefits of technologies while larger, less affluent groups are exposed to its risks and relatively high human and environmental cost.

Challenging conventional technological culture also suggests that social work must be attentive to the often unacknowledged, personal view of modern technological devices as fundamental requisites to human self-fulfillment. A person's insistence on the indispensability of some personal technology (i.e. computers, high-definition television) often denies the wider individual, social and environmental consequences of that technology's use.

As suggested social work must also pledge itself to a principle of appropriate technology. This is not to suggest that social work is to become an anti-technological profession. But, rather a belief that social work must stand in opposition to those kinds of
technologies that degrade people and diminish their freedom and control. Technologies that are destructive to individuals, communities and the environment or which promote material acquisition as the central aspiration of life must be opposed. Any new technology must be evaluated on the basis of how it affects environmental health, and how it impacts human dignity, social institutions, traditions, and values.

For example, social work has become enamored, along with other professions and most in contemporary western society, with the potential of the new computer driven, information age to enhance and simplify its professional activities. The allure of the information super highway and personal computers are powerful. This new technology clearly has the potential of making valuable contributions to human communication, professional development and the distribution of knowledge. However, what seems to be lost in the promise of a new cyber-world is the fact that this technology also carries with it many potential risks.

The production of computer circuits and cabinetry require toxic acids and solvents that present a variety of disposal problems for manufacturers. Computer automation provides a limited number of high-paid, high-skilled jobs, but for many workers it leads to
unemployment or a proliferation of low-skilled jobs. Additionally, problems of cost and access to computers and information technology also tend to widen the gap between the information rich and the information poor thus restricting opportunities for developing personal, social and political power. Social work will need to seriously consider the impact of this technology upon its professional ideas and activities as well as the impact on the clients it serves.

An ecocentric ethical and value standard

A social work informed by a person-with-environment perspective must consider a new standard for assessing ethical conduct and establishing value priorities. This standard must be ecologically informed. Traditional social work ethics are grounded in intra-human relationships; person to person, professional to client, professional to professional. They, however, tend to ignore that humans are tied to and have relational obligations to all other beings in the natural world.

Social work ethics are construed as an arena of human enterprise where only humans have inherent value. A casual reading of social work's Code of Ethics illustrates this point. The categories of conduct included in the profession's ethical statement include such things as social worker's responsibility to client,
to colleagues, to employers and employing organizations, to the profession and to society. But, there is no statement in the code concerning the profession’s responsibility to matters beyond the human-to-human world. Responsibilities to non-human entities and beings in the natural world are ignored.

An ecocentric ethic of the kind envisioned here for social work is a radically different orientation. It is not simply a reordering of professional commitments and tasks applied to an ecological context. An ecocentric ethic stresses that humans are social beings and they have ethical responsibilities to other human beings. More essentially, however, humans are ecological beings whose ethical responsibilities extend to all non-human beings.

For example, the current ecological crisis is on one level clearly a problem of social ethics. There are disastrous potentials in the ways pollution, overpopulation, and excessive consumption impact human interaction. But, the ecological crisis is also a moral issue of a different order. The broader context of the ecological crisis is also biological, biospherical and atmospheric. Its potential negative impact extends to all beings, to all spheres of the ecological order. It is not simply an anthropological issue.
While a social work ecocentric ethic cannot be separated from the profession's traditional ethical focus on social interactions, neither should it be subsumed under this as simply a subdivision or an additional focus of attention. Social work ethics must now think in terms of interrelationships among social, professional and ecological responsibility. In all its activities it must consider moral responsibility to all existence. For instance, a ecocentric ethic understands that social and ecological problems can no longer be just problems requiring refined technical solutions. They are moral issues that have to do with all beings, both human and nonhuman. They pose a severe threat to human welfare, but they are also a form of oppression destroying the space, sustenance and diversity of all other non-human life forms.

An ecocentrically informed social work also has an impact on the profession's value system. Social work has traditionally advocated for core values that are personally and socially relevant. For example human dignity, self-determination, and client autonomy are basic value orientations of the social work profession. An ecocentrically informed social work must advocate for a broader range of values that are not only personally and socially relevant but which are ecologically relevant.
and compatible.

One example of a core value important for social work's consideration is the concept of sustainability. Given the current state of ecological crisis a social work ethic is not adequate until it supports the idea of sustainability. Though perhaps not an all-encompassing norm, sustainability does suggest a number of complementary values and activities that extend it. One of these is, what might be called, biospherical responsibility.

Bio-responsibility means valuing the diversity and otherness of nature for its own sake. It suggests non-human entities are ends in themselves rather than instruments for human need or wealth. It involves a commitment to sustaining ecosystems and other species in healthy habitats. Bio-responsibility means that all species human and nonhuman alike are entitled to an equality of existence that ensures their inherent well being and ability to thrive. It recognizes that there is no genuine human existence, in fact no human existence at all, without a moral imperative to protect and sustain the diversity of the biospherical order of which all human life depends.

Another extension of the idea of sustainability has been suggested by social work theorist John McNutt.

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(1994). He has elaborated on several principles that would be the hallmark of what he calls a sustainable social welfare system. One feature of this system is its emphasis on local community, decentralization, and grassroots organization. The suggestion is that in order for the world to survive, in order for it to sustain itself into the future, human culture must be conceptualized and lived out at a different level.

This emphasis on localized, decentralized, participatory community life brings it into conflict with the prevailing trend to conceive of human and environmental issues on a global scale. A sustainable social welfare system does not ignore global thinking but it does advocate for a philosophy suggesting that effective action always begins locally. It understands, as many social critics have observed, that the most effective and ultimately most oppressive global thinkers have traditionally been imperialistic governments and multi-national corporations.

Referring to human-to-human and human-to-nature problems as global problems defines them in ways that makes their solution highly improbable. This is so partly because global problems have a shadowy aura surrounding them. They don’t seem real. They are reduced to a kind of shallow statistical description.
This opens the door to solutions fashioned by the same organizational patterns and institutional thought which have created many of the problems initially.

Social workers have a role in a sustainable social welfare system as activists and facilitators. One facilitative role might be assisting people in defining solutions which are modest and which begin communally. People must think, feel, and act locally in order to bring issues within the scale of human competence. By considering such concerns as how will this effect community, neighborhood, one's local place, answers will be generated which have global significance. Effective action begins as people develop the affection, the knowledge, the skills that make good local sense.

An alternative research process

Social work, operating out of a person-with-environment frame, must attend to new ways of knowing and experiencing the world. It must challenge the assumptions of the modern, scientific project and its heavy reliance on quantitative method. Conventional modes of scientific inquiry and research stratagems have developed within the context of modernism. This has resulted in a social science, and by extension a social work, which neglects or distorts the study of human/nature relationships. Modern science’s insistence
upon control, predictability and distance of the knower and known continues an epistemological oppression which subordinates the interests of nature and other marginalized groups.

The contours of new strategies of inquiry for social work are not yet fully developed. Some within the profession (Weick, 1991; Sherman, 1991; Hudson & Nurius, 1994) and in allied disciplines (Gergen, 1988; Riger, 1992; Mack, 1992) have been actively involved in formulating guidelines for an alternative research perspective which are consistent with a new ecological view of person-with-environment. In general these suggest a number of priorities. First, social work must replace the implicit hierarchial tradition in the profession that values empirical evidence and methods over more intuitive knowledge. This has led to a distinction between quantitative method as being more scientific or objective than qualitative method.

Secondly, social work research must recognize the interrelationship between subject and researcher. This suggests that the subject of study as well as the researcher reside within a relational field (to use a concept from deep ecology.) Attempts to study discreet aspects of phenomena independent of the whole context provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena. There
is a part/whole interrelationship existing within the natural and social world requiring that research methods recognize this relationship and develop rules of inquiry that systematically take this into account.

Finally, social work research must cooperate in developing and utilizing research methodologies that explore the multi-dimensional aspects of human's relationship to the earth. A new priority must become understanding how alienated humanity and degraded nature interact and impact all aspects of human well being. Linguistically, this might mean helping to configure a new language of non-linearity. This new language would supplant terms such as orderly, predictable, and completely knowable with such terms as openness, interrelatedness, co-determined, and multiplicity. A new language of non-linearity is indispensable in understanding complex individual, social and natural problems from a holistic, more egalitarian perspective.

Exploring the multi-dimensional aspects of human's relationship to the earth might also mean that social work will need to become more actively involved in creative research to assess the impact of environmental destruction and disaster on various populations. For example social worker Susan Dawson (1994) has recently utilized an innovative case study/empowerment methodology
investigating the impact of long-term exposure to uranium on Navajo mine-workers. She recognized that merely documenting, through statistical data, the toxic, long-term health consequences of uranium exposure was not enough to understand this situation. In order to gain a more complete grasp of these worker’s situation, Dawson incorporated an analysis of governmental and industry assumptions and policies which openly encouraged employees to work in dangerous uranium mines while knowing well in advance that miners could incur serious illness and death. She also collaboratively studied and suggested ways indigenous workers could promote social change and alter their environment rather than teaching people how to accommodate to their illnesses.

A framework for education

According to Berry (1988) traditional educational philosophy at all levels in western society is a reflection of the larger socio-political culture. It is: ...more an external conditioning than interior discipline, more a training in manipulative techniques than initiation into religious rituals. The skills to be mastered were not the contemplative skills or imaginative capacities for dealing with numinous presence or with the aesthetic insight into the inner structure of reality; they are rather
skills needed by industry to bring forth the natural resources from the hidden depths of the planet, the skills to shape them in the manufacturing establishments and to make them available to a consumer-oriented society. (p. 94)

From Berry's perspective modern western culture is an all encompassing ideology. For one to live, to prosper, to find genuine fulfillment, one must first learn and then live within the confines of this system. Education is particularly involved in the support of this system. Its primary concern becomes developing and refining technological definitions and controls over all human and natural function. This typically diminishes spiritual values, philosophical insight, and perspectives on the character of life which do not fit easily within a technoscientific framework.

Professional and graduate education in modern culture has become primarily concerned with producing specialized experts who become society's sanctioned bearers of authoritative knowledge and skill. Social work has not escaped this trend toward specialization. Unfortunately, specialization tends to fragment professions and knowledge into narrowly defined compartments. Disciplines lose sight of the effects of their work on allied professions as well as losing sight
of how knowledge development impacts and is impacted by others. Professional training of knowledgeable specialists values the gathering of information for immediate use, while ignoring the potential long-term effects of such information on both the human and non-human environment. The dynamic of specialization is also fragmentary and alienating. It becomes an issue of control and predictability within a isolated, linear framework.

The logic of person-with-environment challenges modern notions of educational philosophy and practice and offers a number of potential implications for social work. First, person-with-environment suggests that social work's educational philosophy must be reconfigured. It must change from being grounded in a human-centered, linear, techno-specialized dynamic toward being grounded in the natural/systemic reality of earth. This suggests a role for a new generation of skilled, ecologically informed, generalist social work educators whose task becomes preparing ecologically reflective theorists, researchers and practitioners.

A recent work by Mitchell Thomashow (1995) offers some important insight concerning the reorientation of the modern, educational project. He describes six foundations of a new ecological, earth/oriented
education. First, all education is environmental/ecological education. That is, the educational enterprise, no matter what the disciplinary focus or subject matter, must emphasize the kinds of creative thought and learning activity that integrate ecological principles into the core of its instructional processes. Two, the way education occurs is as important as its content. Three, experience in the natural world is both an essential part of understanding the environment, and conducive to good thinking. Four, human and environmental issues are complex and interrelated and cannot be understood through a single discipline or department. Five, education occurs in part as a dialogue with a place and has characteristics of a good conversation. Six, all education must be relevant to the challenge of building a sustainable society and must enhance the learner’s competence with natural systems. These foundations suggest that the challenge for social work education, whether in the classroom or any of its other structured educational environments, is to integrate all aspects of human activity—linking professional practice, personal growth, community participation into a dynamic web of reflective learning.

A second potential implication for social work education is adaptation of its practicum placements and
curriculum to reflect a focus on issues of the natural environment. For example, social worker Mary Rogge (1994a) offers ways to integrate issues of environmental hazard into field practicum experiences. She suggests that multiple opportunities already exist for social workers to integrate issues of the natural environment. Traditional social work settings in health care, community practice, and mental health offer a starting point for the profession. For instance, Rogge suggests that at the community level problem assessment must give attention to the relationship between poverty, discrimination and environmental hazard. Incidents of environmental racism have increased significantly where low-income groups and people of color reside.

In a similar manner, Kauffman, Walter, Nissly and Walker (1994) critically review social work’s human behavior in the social environment (HBSE) curriculum. They offer suggestions for its enhancement by incorporating issues of environment degradation. They suggest that environmental problems are experienced at each stage of human development and carry a high human cost. These must be included in an expanded HBSE curriculum.
Conclusion

The current project has substantially met the research goals established in chapter one for reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment perspective and specifying implications for social work thought and activity. It has briefly reviewed the socio-political context and historical trajectory of conventional notions of person/environment and incorporated ideas and insights from several eco-philosophical perspectives.

Conclusions generally intend closure and some degree of finality, a coming to "The End". The conclusion of this project, however, is an invitation for a new beginning in social work. It is a call for the profession to revitalize itself through a profound questioning of its deepest assumptions and a re-imagining of the world in which its professional endeavors take place. This is and will be a pivotal task that the current project seeks to assist. The results are offered to the profession as a challenge to its creative and critical faculties. They are submitted with a fervent expectation that the profession can continue to make a difference.

As the global environmental crises grows and as the world continues to shift toward a different mode of
collective understanding and social organization; the profession of social work must also adjust. The next millennium will bring new, perhaps unprecedented, demands and opportunities. Whether the profession is prepared to meet these depends in large measure on the flexibility and innovation of its theoretical frameworks to guide its tasks. This project is one step toward helping the profession intellectually prepare itself for the challenges that lie ahead.
POSTSCRIPT

This dissertation began with a conviction that social work has long ignored its responsibility to both the demands and possibilities of nature in its operating paradigms. The current project has been an attempt to change that. My hope was and still is that the profession can reorient itself, that it can re-enliven its own professional consciousness to an appreciation for the attractiveness and effectualness of the natural world in the way it speaks and in what it does. My role and the goal of this project has been to provide a theoretical framework by which the profession could consider at least one possible alternative that would better correspond to the reality of a changing world.

The challenge for me personally in developing this framework has been to move beyond the purely abstract, toward a merger of intellect and experience, reason and emotion, science and art, in the construction of a meaningful framework of understanding. The methodological design and specific activities of this dissertation were intended to provide a mechanism for my accomplishing this challenge. Yet, I am struck with a degree of uncertainty as to whether my efforts to merge intellect and experience, reason and emotion, have been successful. At this moment the best I can say is that I
believe I have done so. It remains for you, the social work reader, to determine how successful my efforts have been. Perhaps it will be by virtue of what you find here to be helpful or inspiring that will be the ultimate gauge of my success.

One of the unfortunate realities of our culture is the fascination we maintain for the end product, the culmination, the final outcome of any human endeavor. It is as if we find the process to be somehow unimportant; we often ignore the value of the process required to inspire real change. I view this dissertation as far more a process than an outcome. So, though the body of work is complete, and there is indeed an end product—the task is yet unfinished. This work represents many things, but from my perspective it is a work in progress and perhaps shall be so for quite some time to come. In fact one could say that our profession is a work in progress. The challenge to you is to join with me and other dedicated social workers in the process.
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I am currently conducting doctoral research on the meaning and importance of deep ecology and ecological feminism for informing a reconceptualized view of social work's person-in-environment perspective. During the literature review, I have discovered that you have made significant contributions to understanding the connections between human well-being and environmental factors within the social work context. In particular, your contribution to the work The Global Environmental Crisis: Implications for Social Welfare and Social Work has been very helpful. Since there is a scarcity of published material on this topic, I am seeking to interview several persons such as yourself who are able to contribute further insights to my research interests. Your contribution would be extremely valuable to my study. Given your knowledge and experience on this topic, I would be deeply grateful for your assistance.

I would like the opportunity to interview you by phone for 45 to 60 minutes. In the overall study, I am exploring eco-philosophical viewpoints of deep ecology and ecological feminism particularly as they relate to the expansion of conventional notions of the person and environment constructs. The historical tendency in social work has been to ignore or limit the inclusion of nature in the way the profession defines one of its most basic paradigms. The unstructured interview with you would primarily explore your ideas, both practically and philosophically, on the interdependency of person and natural environment and the relationship of this to social work knowledge, values, practice, education and research. I hope, however, to keep the conversation very flexible in order to address related issues should they arise. I would like to be able to cite your ideas in the study, but your remarks will be kept strictly confidential if desired. With your permission, the interview would be tape recorded for future reflection and concept generation. I will be happy to provide you with a more detailed explanation of the study and a summary of the research results upon its completion in spring of 1997.
APPENDIX I (continued)

If you are able to assist me with this study, please complete the enclosed card and return it with the stamped, self-addressed envelope by December 15 indicating a phone number(s) and times which are most convenient for you to be contacted. I will contact you by phone shortly after receiving your reply to schedule a time to conduct the interview. I have enclosed a brief description of my dissertation topic and tentative open-ended questions in order to give you some idea how my thinking on this topic has evolved thusfar. Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Fred H. Besthorn
Dissertation Topic Summary
Fred H. Besthorn, M.Div., MSW, Ph.D. candidate

Early on social workers began to separate themselves from other helping professionals by claiming as their particular jurisdiction a unique and dual concern for both person and environment. In practice, however, the person-environment orientation has become problematic. The persistent tendency has been to focus on personal constructs while the breadth of knowledge concerning environment has become constricted.

This problem is most profoundly illustrated in social work's nearly complete disregard for integrating a comprehensive understanding of the natural environment and its influence on human development. While social work's person-environment focus is routinely affirmed in the literature, few explicit discussions of the natural environment are found. With the exception of a few recent contributions, the concept of natural environment is rarely developed in the literature. Social work has tended to view the natural environment as the broad and benign backdrop for more fundamentally important personal processes.

The purpose of this dissertation is to broaden and clarify the way social work conceptualizes person and environment by focusing on the character of the relationship between person and the natural realm, and on the way we derive individual and collective meaning from this connection. The goal will be to develop a comprehensive reconceptualization of the relationship between person and environment. This goal will be undertaken through a careful critique and analysis utilizing insight from two contemporary ecophilosophies: deep ecology and ecological feminism. It will also address issues and present implications for social work knowledge, theory and professional practice.

This dissertation is organized around two central research questions: (1) What are the key themes in deep ecology and ecological feminism that may be useful in reconceptualizing social work's person-in-environment perspective? (2) What are the specific implications of a reconceptualized person-in-environment perspective for social work knowledge, theory and practice?
Since the telephone interviews I have requested with you will be brief, I have structured several open-ended questions to help promote thorough and concise answers while allowing for some degree of flexibility. Several specific questions will also be tailored to your professional interests as indicated by your publications. The open-ended questions are:

1. Interviewee's most important conclusions about concepts of person/self, natural environment and relationships between them.
2. Sources and development of your own interest in natural environment and social work.
3. Interviewee's ideas concerning important philosophical themes of deep ecology and ecological feminism (for example connectedness, complexity, control/domination, intrinsic value).
4. Views of most important skills and practice strategies as applications of a "re-natured" person-in-environment perspective.
5. Concluding reflections on reconceptualizing person-in-environment and implications for social work theory, values, practice, policy, research and education.
APPENDIX III: CODING CATEGORIES (THEMES & AUTHORS)

A. Contemporary Environmental Thought
1- Reform environmentalism
2- The New Right
3- The New Age
4- Revised Libertarianism

B. Historical and Theoretical Influences
1- Historical/Political Critique
2- Nature Spirituality
3- Activism of 1960s
4- Feminist Movement
5- Liberal Feminist Thought
6- Marxist Feminist Thought
7- Radical Feminist Thought
8- Transcendentalism
9- Gandhi
10- Spinoza
11- Heidegger

C. Definitions
1- Body of Ideas
2- Theoretical Movement
3- Critical Theory
4- Experiential Philosophy
5- Radical Eco-philosophy
6- Grassroots Ethical Movement

D. Precepts
1- Anthropocentrism
2- Androcentrism
3- Modern Societal Critique
4- Contemporary Environmentalism Critique
5- Social Domination Critique
6- Experientially Focused
7- New Vision of Nature
8- New Vision of Self
9- New Vision of Interrealtionship/Connectedness
10- Societal Transformation
11- Limited Human Interference with Nature
12- Inherent Value in Nature
13- Local Structure
14- Political Activism
CONDING CATEGORIES (continued by theme)

E. Unique Distinctives
1- Critique of Power
2- Self-realization
3- Biocentric-equality

F. Contesting Modernism
1- Human-centeredness
2- Strict Rationalism
3- Secularism
4- Linear Hierarchies
5- Limited Relationalism
6- Denial

G. Comparisons and Criticisms
1- General Similarities
2- Anthropocentrism/Androcentrism Difference
3- Communal/Self Interconnectedness Differences
4- Regressive/Progressive Criticism
5- Wholism/Hierarchy Criticism
6- General Criticisms

H. Implications
1- Person-in-Environment
2- Practice
3- Theory
4- Research
5- Education
6- Social Policy
7- Ethics and Values
CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author)

A. Alpa Group: (Deep Ecology)

1- Berry, 1988
2- Bodian, 1995
3- Capra, 1996
4- Devall, 1995
5- Devall and Sessions, 1984
6- Devall and Sessions, 1985
7- diZerega, 1996
8- Dobson, 1995
9- Drengson, 1995
10- Drengson and Inoue, 1995
11- Drew, 1995
12- Ferkiss, 1993
13- Foreman, 1995
14- Fox, 1984
15- Fox, 1989
16- Fox, 1990
17- Fox, 1995a
18- Fox, 1995b
19- Gaunt, 1992
20- Glasser, 1995
21- Jung, 1990
22- LeMay and Pitts, 1994
23- List, 1993
24- Marx, 1964
25- Marx, 1970
26- McLaughlin, 1987
27- McLaughlin, 1995
28- Metzner, 1993
29- Meyers, 1993
30- Naess, 1973
31- Naess, 1988
32- Naess, 1989
33- Naess, 1995a
34- Naess, 1995b
35- Naess, 1995c
36- Naess, 1995d
37- Naess, 1995e
38- Naess, 1995f
39- Naess, 1995g
40- Naess, 1995h
41- Naess and Sessions, 1995
42- Restoring the Vision, 1995
43- Rodman, 1883
44- Rothenberg, 1995
CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author)

45- Sessions, 1995a
46- Sessions, 1995c
47- Sessions, 1995d
48- Sessions, 1995e
49- Sessions, 1995f
50- Sessions, 1995g
51- Skolimowski, 1990
52- Spretnak and Capra, 1986
53- Swartz, 1986
54- Turner, 1995
55- Wilber, 1995
56- Wittbecker, 1994
57- Zimmerman, 1987
58- Zimmerman, 1990
59- Zimmerman, 1993
60- Zimmerman, 1994

B. Beta Group: (Ecofeminism)

1- Berman, 1994
2- Biehl, 1991
3- Birkeland, 1991
4- Cheney, 1987
5- Christ, 1990
6- d’Eaubonne, 1994
7- Eisler, 1990
8- Griffin, 1989
9- Griffin, 1990
10- Griffin, 1995
11- Gunn-Allen, 1990
12- Hallen, 1995
13- Kelly, 1989
14- Kheel, 1990
15- Kheel, 1991
16- King, 1983
17- King, 1989
18- King, 1990
19- LaChapelle, 1989
20- LaChapelle, 1995
21- Macy, 1989
22- Mathews, 1994
23- Mathews, 1995
24- Merchant, 1990
25- Merchant, 1992
26- Plant, 1990
CODING CATEGORIES (continued by author)

27- Plumwood, 1986
28- Plumwood, 1994
29- Razak, 1990
30- Ruether, 1989
31- Salleh, 1984
32- Sandilands, 1991
33- Sandilands, 1994
34- Shiva, 1990
35- Spretnak, 1989
36- Spretnak, 1990
37- Starhawk, 1989
38- Starhawk, 1990
39- Swimme, 1990
40- Warren, 1987
41- Warren, 1988
42- Warren, 1990
43- Warren, 1994
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<td>Research Proposal; Research agreement and methodological considerations; Preliminary definitions and literature review</td>
<td>Design specified and refined; Bibliography; Identification; Intentionality (Experiential protocol- nature meditation, reflective seminars)</td>
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<td>Research protocol; Preliminary coding guide; Feasibility supports and constraints</td>
<td>Procedure/instrument revised; Time line; Rough draft</td>
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<td>Raw Data</td>
<td>Textual sources; Primary published literature; Reflective notes;</td>
<td>Description of phenomena, context, philosophy, of authors and inquirer</td>
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<td>Data Reduction and Analysis</td>
<td>Personal notes; Final coding guide</td>
<td>Theme/category files</td>
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<td>Data Reconstruction and Synthesis</td>
<td>Notes/ outlines emerging patterns concepts; Bracketing, intuiting, describing; Brainstorming notes, audio recording-committee and colleagues; Semi-structured exploratory interviews</td>
<td>Arrangement of concepts and categories; Drawing of relationships; Integration of experiential protocol, exploratory interviews and analytical comparisons</td>
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<td>Analysis notes</td>
<td>Reflective log-organized and expanded; Protocol and rationale-literature support; Peer debriefing notes; Exploratory interview notes; Personal notes</td>
<td>Insights and organizational structure refined</td>
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<td>Findings/Conclusions</td>
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