


China & Japan;
Political Relations Since 1914

by


Bowen Djang, A. B. Park College, June 1924.
(Undergraduate degree, institution and date)

Submitted to the Department
of Political Science and the
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Approved by:



Instructor in Charge



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Chapter I

The Situation Before 1914

In the beginning the relations between China and Japan were very intimate, because of their geographical propinquity. For the first decades friendliness marked the intercourse of the two peoples. In the third century before Christ, under the Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 214 A.D.) the Chinese empire distinguished herself in Asia both in expansion of territories and her civilization. In fact at that time and during the centuries that followed the Han, Japanese embassies were actually sent to the court of China to learn the Chinese writing, the Confucian philosophy, and the ways of living. Also, the Chinese artisans and merchants were eagerly welcomed in Japan by the Japanese people. Again, during the Tang dynasty (620-907 A.D.) Japanese came in numbers to the capital of China (then Si-An-Fu), some of them as students supported by the government, and carried back with them to their country the arts, Buddhism, and the political system. Again embassies were sent to the Chinese capital and came back to spread its fame. Chinese scholars, artisans, and missionaries journeyed in numbers to the island empire through Korea¹.

This friendly communication was continued in the succeeding centuries in spite of occasional interruptions.

1. Latourette: The Development of China. Chapter III

From the beginning of the 17th century up to the time of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, which made possible the closer contact between the East and the West, there seems to have been no significant intercourse between China and Japan¹. This was probably because both of them were occupied by interior disorders and domestic problems.

Hence, the ties which bound China and Japan in the earlier centuries were not only their close geographical contact, but even more their moral teachings, religious beliefs, and peaceful philosophies. In brief, this was possible only because the peoples of the two nations were taught to seek for high ideas of peaceful living instead of merely material or physical comforts. But unfortunately, this mutual friendliness was interrupted by the sudden advent of the Western civilization which can be justly characterized as materialistic. This intrusion occurred during the time of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and under this foreign pressure China and Japan were both ultimately compelled to open their doors. Under similar circumstances, however, the reaction of China and Japan to the Western civilization was different -- Japan adopted but China rejected.

Under the reign of emperor Meiji (1868-1894), in conforming with the new civilization of the West, a rapid change was taken place in Japan. Revolutionary movements

1. Chinese Encyclopedia Vol. I Chap. IV pp 62, 63.

affected almost every aspect of Japanese society. The government was reorganized and strongly centralized. A national army and navy was developed after Western models. A written constitution was completed in 1889. A modern school system was in operation with compulsory military training. Tariff jurisdiction and judicial autonomy which were lost before the reign of Meiji were almost regained from the treaty powers. Industry, commerce, and communication were multiplied. Japan thus became a modern industrial nation and a competitor of Europe for Asiatic trade¹.

But in the meantime China hesitated to conform herself to this new influence. In fact she had a highly developed civilization and for the first time her people and her ancient culture were brought into intimate contact with strong peoples possessing an alien civilization equally strong but fundamentally opposing to her own. Though she was defeated at the hands of her western enemies, she still remained absolutely hostile to the western civilization. Foreign aggression soon took the form of annexations in outlying portions of Chinese territory. Great Britain appropriated Burma; France, Indo-China; and Russia, the Amur district. And Japan with her newly learned European arts, sciences, and industries lost no time in this competition. Her merchants and capitalists also wanted opportunities for money-making in China; above all, in her new policy of national expansion, she looked enviously across the sea to

1. Latourette; The Development of Japan. Chap. VIII & IX

Korea, then a tributary kingdom of China¹.

As a result of these changes of policies and civilization in Asia, the relation between China and Japan inevitably became less friendly and finally a war was fought in 1894. In this war China was defeated and was compelled not only to renounce all claim in Korea, but also to surrender to Japan the islands of Formosa and the Pesadores, a group of islands between Formosa and the mainland. She also ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, although Japan was later forced by other powers to recede it in return for an additional indemnity².

The Chino-Japanese War rendered China materially more impotent and the powers subsequently proceeded to divide China into spheres of influence. The Partition of China seemed at hand. But the foreign powers were not to have their way in China. A secret society called the "I-Ho-Tuan" or the "Boxers" was organized and spread rapidly throughout the country. They urged war to death against the foreigners in China. This uprising was so strong that it was suppressed finally only by an international army of eight foreign powers. A heavy indemnity (450,000,000 taels, or roughly, 3000,000,000 dollars gold) was levied on China by the powers³.

Ten years after the Chino-Japanese War, in 1904, Japan and Russia clashed over the disposition of Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula. Prior to this war, in 1902,

1. Chinese History - and Webster's Modern European History p. 415.
2. Development of Japan, Chap. X.
3. Chinese Encyclopedia Vol. I Chap. IV.

Japan succeeded in concluding with Great Britain the so-called Anglo-Japanese Alliance which gave her not only moral support in the war, but in fact, an assurance that if any second power should help Russia, Great Britain would immediately help Japan. And by this war, Japan blocked the Russian advance and established herself firmly in Korea and Southern Manchuria. Russia also transferred to Japan the lease of the portions of the Liaotung Peninsula held by her¹.

Thus after these two victories, Japan had now gained a stronghold in China, renewed the Alliance with Great Britain and was waiting eagerly for the next opportunity to come so she might gain more control in China. This opportunity at last came in 1914, when the other powers were busy in the World War. Her action will be shown in later chapters.

Events now moved rapidly in China. Thoughtful Chinese saw clearly that China must adopt at least a portion of this materialistic civilization in order to keep China from partition. The demand for thorough reforms in government soon became revolutionary propaganda directed against the Manchu dynasty. As a result, in 1912, China became a republic. She lost no time in reforming herself. When the World War, preoccupying the European powers, broke out, the young republic was trying to make the most of this opportunity for reshaping her own affairs without interference from Europe. But this opportunity was frustrated by Japan's unfriendly action toward China from 1914 to the end of the War.

1. Hershey's: Russo-Japanese War.

Chapter II

During the World War

Up to 1914, Japan, with all the other Powers, participated in enjoying in her relations with China the special right of extra-territorial jurisdiction and the benefit of a fixed five per cent customs tariff. In addition, politically she had her special interest in Manchuria; and the leased territories -- Port Arthur and Dalny -- on the Liaotung Peninsula; with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed for mutual help. Economically, she was recognized by other Powers as being in a preferred position in their common interest of the "open door" policy. Yet the imperialistic ambition of Japan was not satisfied. With continued policies of aggression, exploitation, and intervention, she was eagerly awaiting the next opportunity to accomplish her selfish motive in China.

This opportunity came at last in August 1914, when the Great War broke in Europe. With the European Powers busy elsewhere, Japan rapidly decided to take this opportunity and act without giving the Powers a chance to object. On the 15th of August, consequently she delivered to the German Government the following ultimatum:

" We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the far East, and to

safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of the alliance Japan and Great Britain.

In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following propositions:

First -- To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

Second -- To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao Chau, (with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China)

The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying its unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may deem necessary to meet the situation.¹

Since Germany made no reply to this, Japan declared war on the 23rd of August. The ostensible motive behind

1. Millard: Democracy and the Eastern Question, page 87.

Japan's action was nominally her obligation under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to assist her ally, Great Britain, but actually she was directed by a selfish purpose to create a situation thereby to profit herself by seizing German possessions in the Far East -- especially those in China. Her later actions in China clearly show that the object of this move was not only to disobey the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which "guarantee the integrity of China and equal opportunity of all nations," but unmistakably to destroy the independence of China and the peace of the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not bind Japan to go to war unless Great Britain was attacked in the Far East, and even then the Japanese were under no obligation to do more than to help protect British shipping and colonies against the enemy. Furthermore, Japan's ultimatum was delivered at the time when China and some of the powers were exerting their efforts to neutralize the German leased port Kiao-Chau in China to protect the Far East from hostility. Had there been any need of Japan's action at all, she should have waited until this step was taken. But Japan did not wait. Instead she delivered the ultimatum, which was written in such a way that Germany could make no reply^{1.?}

China was not informed of this action prior to Japan's communication with Germany but afterward through the Japanese minister at Peking the Chinese Government learned the situation. China then offered to join with

1. Millard: Democracy & The Eastern Question

Japan in sending troops, but this was absolutely opposed by Japan. Finally Japan with slight assistance from her ally, Great Britain, captured Tsingtau and occupied the German railways and mines in Shantung. This disregard of China's right to send joint troops to Tsingtau clearly showed the intention of Japan to ignore China, and raised the definite presumption that she planned to keep that territory for her own use. The retention of this territory would be manifestly advantageous to Japan as Tsingtau is a military harbor and a trading port of the highest class, with abundant and safe anchorage. It is directly connected by railway with Peking from Port Arthur. Also a railway runs via Dalny and Mukden directly to the Chinese capital, which thus lies between the two, in the very center of the Japanese influence.

Japan not only violated China's rights by refusing her the opportunity to send joint troops but in the attack on Tsingtau China's neutrality was brutally violated. Without having real military necessity and also disregarding the definite war zone made by China, the Japanese troops landed at points in the Chinese mainland some 150 miles away from the German leased territory and advanced overland to besiege Tsingtau. Spreading over the inland beyond any legitimate military necessity, the Japanese troops occupied important cities and towns, controlled means of communication, posts, and telegraphs, and subjected the natives to many hardships, deprivations, and indignities. Under such humiliation, China was not in a position to use armed resistance because the revolution had left the nation decentralized and also

in sad financial straits. Besides, China was no doubt afraid to be misunderstood by the world as helping Germany if she declared war with Japan in such a chaotic moment^{1,3}.

In November the occupation of Tsingtau was completed by Japan and civil administration was restored in January, 1915. But Japan still maintained her troops in Shantung. Garrisons were stationed at Tsinan-Fu, the capital of the Shantung province and along the railway from Tsinan-Fu to Tsingtau and in many other important cities and ports. Because of this China, on the 7th of January, sent a note to Japan asking her to withdraw her troops from the Chinese territory and declared the war zone be vacated. Instead of withdrawing her troops however, Japan dropped her mask and presented to China the famous 21 demands which were virtually an ultimatum.

The demands contained five groups and twenty-one articles. The essentials are as follows:

Group I. In regard to the province of Shantung, China was to promise to give her assent to anything upon which the Japanese and German governments might agree in regard to the disposition of the rights which the latter possessed in the province. China was not to cede or to lease to any third power any territory within or along the coast of Shantung. She was to give Japan an additional railway concession and to open new ports to trade.

1. China's White Book on Shantung.

Group 2. In regard to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the leases on the railways and ports held by Japan were to be extended to 99 years instead of twenty-five years for which they were first made. Japanese officials and civilians were to have right not only in the railway zones and treaty ports, but every where in the two regions to travel, to reside, to lease or buy land for trading, manufacturing or agricultural purposes, to engage in any business they wished, and to open such mines as China and Japan might agree upon.

Such extensive privileges of residence and ownership of land had not been granted elsewhere in China to foreigners other than missionaries: extraterritorial rights had had as a corollary the restriction of most foreign residence and business to treaty ports, where the necessary consular courts could be operated.

China was to promise, too, that the Japanese Government would be consulted before any foreign advisers were employed for South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, and that before Peking Government granted a railway concession or made a loan on the security of the taxes of these districts, Tokyo's consent would be first obtained. A lease was to be given Japan on a railway (from Kirin to Chang-Chun) hitherto outside its control.

Group 3. The Han-yeh-ping Company, a Chinese privately owned enterprise which operated the greatest iron works in China (at Hanyang, across the Han river from Hankow, the great river port in central China), and which controlled ex-

tensive bodies of iron and coal, was, when the opportune moment arrived, to be made the joint undertaking of Japan and China. Without the consent of the former, the latter was not to dispose of her rights in the company, and without the company's permission she was not to permit mines in the neighborhood of those owned by it, to be worked, or any enterprise affecting its interests to be undertaken. The properties of the Han-yeh-ping Company were in the heart of China, within the region that less than twenty years before, had been marked out by the British as a sphere of influence. The company was in financial straits and had already borrowed from Japanese.

Group 4. China was not to cede or to lease to any other power than Japan any harbor, bay, or island along her coast.

Group 5. The demands of this group would, if granted, have placed China more completely under the tutelage of her neighbor than the other four. The Chinese Government was to employ Japanese as advisors in political, financial, and military affairs; the police departments of important places in China were to be under joint administration of the two nations; China was either to purchase of her neighbor fifty per cent or more of her munitions of war, or a joint arsenal was to be established employing Japanese experts and using Japanese material. Japanese hospitals, schools and churches might own land in the heart of China, and the right to propagate religious doctrines was to be acknowledged. Certain railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley

were to be granted, and no foreign capital for the development of Fuhkien, the province opposite Formosa, was to be employed without first consulting Japan.

For such demands we can find no parallel in history. They were demands from a conqueror to the vanquished. They not only injured severely the friendly relations between China and Japan but also the stability of international relations. As Dr. Wong Chung Hui later said in the Washington Conference: "A still more dangerous precedent will be established, with consequences upon the stability of international relations which can not be estimated, if without rebuke or protest from the Powers, one nation can obtain from a friendly, but in a military sense weaker neighbor, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiations and signing of the treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies, and for which no quid pro quo was offered¹."

It is significant to note that these demands were presented under secrecy and compulsion. Instead of being communicated through the Japanese minister, to the Chinese foreign office, as is customary, the Japanese minister, Mr. Hioki, formally requested an interview with Yuan Shih Kai, the President. On the morning of the day appointed, January 18, the Japanese legation sent direct to the President a copy of the demands, and then followed the interview. After

1. Minutes of The 16th Meeting of Committee on Pacific & Far Eastern Questions. Washington Conference. Also Chinese Students' Monthly Vol. 17, No.8. Page 688-693.

presenting the demands Mr. Hioki made some extended remarks, in the course of which he said that his Government considered it very desirable in order to prevent "complications" that neither the Chinese nor Japanese Governments, nor officials, would give out any information about this interview until the two Governments had settled the questions between themselves. Mr. Hioki further said that it was the earnest desire of his Government that an agreement on the questions presented should be concluded without delay, in order to prevent "outside complications." Mr. Hioki further said that if China failed to meet Japan's advise in a satisfactory manner, and caused delay in adjusting the questions, it might not be possible for Japan to continue to restrain the activities of the Chinese revolutionists then sojourning in Japan. As Mr. Millard put it, "In short, Japan put the sword at China's throat, and intended to impose Star Chamber proceedings until China's assent was procured¹."

The Chinese Government was at first stunned by the Japanese demands, and took a little time to reflect about the best course to pursue concerning Japan's insistence on secrecy, which, coupled with an implied menace, made caution necessary since Japan insisted on prompt action, conferences were commenced in Peking immediately. It was believed that the information was first slipped quietly and "unofficially", by the Chinese, to the legation of a neutral nation in Peking. Japan's menacing attitude, brought out

1. Millard: Democracy & The Far Eastern Question. Chap. IV on "21 demands"

at the first conference, probably caused the Chinese confidentially to inform some of the other nations what was going on. Of course, the news soon did get around, and created a sensation.

One of the most important facts was that, in order to accomplish her demands, Japan had continuously tried to delude other nations, including and especially her allies, about the extent and character of these demands. This was because she knew that her action was contrary to the existing international agreements. The London Daily News protested as follows: "A scheme of this kind, if carried through, would put all China under Japanese suzerainty. Of course, it could also imperil extensive British commercial interests in China, and it would knock the bottom out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which guarantees the integrity of China and equal opportunity to all powers."¹

The preamble and body of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (renewed 1911) stated the following:

"A. The consolidation and the maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India."

"B. The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all nations in China."

"Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the

1. Asia: Vol. 19, Page 350

opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governements will communicate with one another fully and frankly, etc."

"Article III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this agreement¹."

In the same way these demands violated the agreement of November 30, 1908, between the American and Japanese Governments regarding their policies in China, commonly known as the Root-Takahira Agreement. After a reaffirmation of the integrity of China and the "open-door" principles, that agreement states: "5. Should any events occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take."²

This action of the Japanese Government, in privately presenting and pressing such demands on the Chinese Government without informing the British and American Governments, constituted the gravest and most radical revision of the status quo of China that ever has been attempted.

When first it was reported that the demands had been presented at Peking, Japan took refuge behind a general

1. J.V.A. MacMurray: Treaties & Conventions with & Concerning China. Vol. I. Pages 324, 516.

2. Millard: Conflict of Policies in Asia. Page 478.

denial, describing the reports as "rumors". Then when that attitude was rendered untenable, the facts gradually coming out, Japan's next evasion was to admit that certain questions had been raised with China, but that they were solely for the purpose of friendly discussion, and were not being pressed. When asked by other Powers for more definite information Japan handed them a memorandum of eleven articles, embracing matters under discussion with China¹.

In these eleven articles, however, the whole of Group V was omitted, as also was the article in Group III giving the Hanyehping Company a monopoly in central China; and other provisions of the original demands were changed to be apparently innocuous, or less objectionable to other Powers.

During the time of conferences Japan threatened China with reinforcing her military forces in Shantung and Manchuria, and made strategical dispositions unmistakably directed against China. Although taken by surprise and being unwilling to settle such important questions at such a time, China did not adopt dilatory tactics in the negotiations until toward their end. On April 26, 1915, Japan consented to some modification of her original twenty-one demands, presenting the revised demands in three groups and twenty-four articles². These were concessions more in phraseology than spirit by making it sound easier for China to accept.

1. Democracy & the Far Eastern Question: Chap. on "21 demands"

2. China's White Book on Shantung.

According to these revised demands, in respect to Manchuria, Mongolia and Shantung, Japan still insisted on her demands in principle. Article 2 of Group III of the original demands, which was designed to give Japan a practically monopoly in central and western China, and would have superseded the British "sphere" in the Yangtze Valley by a Japanese "sphere" there, was dropped. Group V also was omitted; but an exchange of notes was insisted on, China to consent to certain matters, if such steps should become necessary.

By this time the real character of Japan's policy was fully exposed, and foreign influences, and some developments of the Great War, were injected into the situation as restraining influences upon her. Nevertheless, she continued to press China steadily, culminating in the ultimatum¹ delivered at Peking on May 7, 1915.

Under this menace, China yielded, and on May 8th accepted the Japanese ultimatum and an agreement based on the revised demands of Japan.

1. China's White Book on Shantung.

Chapter III

Secret Diplomacy.

It has been already stated in the foregoing chapter that the Twenty-one Demands cannot be recognized as valid treaties under the principles of International Law because they were forced upon China by means of an ultimatum threatening war. Moreover they were in violation of treaties between China and other Powers, and in direct contradiction with the principle of the integrity of China and the doctrine of the Open Door. For these reasons the exposure of these demands at once aroused not only a storm of protest in China but also vigorous opposition from other Powers. Four days after the delivery of the ultimatum by Japan to China on May 7, 1915, United States formally sent the following identic note to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached and as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic (Japan) that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the U. S. and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy, commonly known as the open door policy.¹"

1. Millard: Our Easter Questions; Page 163.

Realizing this situation, Japan recognized the U. S. as the nation most likely to oppose Japan's claims in China after the war. Japan took the opportunity when her Allies were hard pressed in the war, resorting to making secret treaties and agreements with Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy.

In July, 1916, Japan entered into a secret agreement with Imperial Russia, fundamentally directed against the United States, and in essence running contrary to a real meaning of the alliance with Great Britain. It follows:

Russo-Japanese Treaty

The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, aiming to strengthen the firm friendship between them, established through the secret agreements of July 17-30, 1907, June 21-July 4, 1910, and June 25-July 8, 1912, have agreed to supplement the aforesaid secret agreements with the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

Both the high contracting parties recognize that the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia or Japan: and therefore mutually obligate themselves, in the future at all times when circumstances demand, to enter into openhearted dealings, based on complete trust, in order to take the necessary measure with the object of preventing the

possibility of occurrence of said state of affairs.

ARTICLE 2

In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the preceding article, a declaration of war is made by any third Power contemplated by Article I of this agreement, against one of the contracting parties, the other party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid. Each of the high contracting parties herewith covenants, in the event such a condition arises, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without preliminary consent therefor from its ally.

ARTICLE 3

The conditions under which each of the high contracting parties will lend armed assistance to the other side, by virtue of the preceding article, as well as the means by which such assistance shall be accomplished, must be determined in common by the corresponding authorities of one and the other contracting parties.

ARTICLE 4

It is requisite to have in view that neither one nor the other of the high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article 2 of this agreement to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give its assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict.

ARTICLE 5

The present agreement shall have force from the time of its execution, and shall continue to be in force

until July 1-14 of the year 1921.

In the event the other of the high contracting parties does not deem it necessary twelve months prior to the end of said period, to declare its unwillingness to continue the present agreement in force, then the said agreement shall continue in force for a period of one of the contracting parties disclaiming the said agreement.

ARTICLE 6

The present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the high contracting parties.

In witness whereof the persons invested with full power by both parties have signed and affixed their seals to the present agreement at Petrograd on June 20-July 3 of the year 1916, which corresponds in the Japanese calendar to the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of the reign of Thais¹.

Sazonoff.

Motono.

From this secret treaty Japan not only procured the recognition of her special position in China, but was also to have military support from Russia in the event that a "third power" would attempt to disturb the arrangements of Japan in China. Beside this secret treaty which was published by the revolutionists after the collapse of the Czar Government in 1917, there was another public treaty. The difference between them was pointed out by the Manchester

1. Ibid: Page 488.

Guardian¹.

"The public (Russo-Japanese) treaty professes to aim at maintaining a lasting peace in the Far East, and makes no specific reference to China; the secret treaty (made public by the Bolshoviki) is not concerned with peace, but with the interests of both contracting Powers in China. The public treaty indicates consultation between the contracting parties as to the measures to be taken, the secret treaty points to military measures and is definitely a military alliance.²"

Shortly after this secret alliance was signed two important events took place, these events were the entrance of the United States and China into the war and the revolution in Russia which finally put to naught the secret agreement.

Japan from the beginning was afraid of China's entrance into the war because she knew that if China joined the Allied Powers then she would have a voice in the peace conference. That is why in August 1914, Japan refused to permit China to send a joint troop to attack Tsingtao. Again in November China approached the Allies with a proposal that China should make a declaration of war in their favor but it failed to be carried out owing to the strong opposition of Japan. But in the meantime, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany, on February 3, 1917, and the next day the Chinese Government was

1. Asia 19: P. 350

2. Asia 19: P. 350.

invited to join with the U. S. in taking action in protest at Germany's submarine policy. Japan knew that she could no longer bar China from entering the war. Hence, while China was trying to obtain guarantees regarding the disposition of China's territories, Japan, for further assurance of her claims in Shantung and her position in the peace conference, lost no time to press on and concluded with the Allied Powers a series of secret agreements¹. The agreements follow:

DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ALLIED POWERS

As to the Disposal of German Rights in Respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea Islands North of the Equator.

The British Embassy to the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. (February 16th, 1917)

Monsieur le Ministre:

With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo when Your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace Conference, His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the Islands North of the Equator, I have the honor, under instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

1. Conflict of Policies in Asia P. P. 57-63.

to communicate to Your Excellency the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government:

His Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on the occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands South of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: Conyngham Greene,
H. B. M. Ambassador,
Tokyo.

His Excellency,

Viscount Ichiro Montono,

H. I. J. M. Minister for Foreign Affairs,

etc., etc., etc.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
British Embassy

(February 21, 1917)

Translation

Monsieur L'Ambassadeur:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 16th instant, giving assurance that

His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims to be advanced by the Imperial Government in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of the Equator on the occasion of a Peace Conference.

The Japanese Government is deeply appreciative of the friendly spirit in which your Government has given the assurance, and is happy to note it as fresh proof of the close ties that unite the two allied Powers. I take pleasure in stating that the Japanese Government, on its part, is fully prepared to support in the same spirit the claims which may be put forward at the Peace Conference by His Britannic Majesty's Government in regard to German Possessions in Islands South of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur l'Am-
bassadeur, to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my
highest consideration.

Signed: Ichiro Motono,
etc., etc., etc.

His Excellency,

Sir Conyngham Green,
etc., etc., etc.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs To

The Russian And French Embassies

(February 19, 1917)

Translation

The Imperial Government has not yet formally enter-

ed into conversations with the Entente Powers concerning the conditions of peace it proposes to present to Germany, being guided by the thought that such questions out to be decided in concert between Japan and the said Powers at the moment when the peace negotiations start.

Nevertheless, in view of recent development in the general situation, and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace conditions, such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, having already been entered into by the Powers interested, the Imperial Government believes that the moment has come for it also to express its desiderata relative to certain conditions of peace essential to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Government of Russia (of the French Republic)

The Government of Russia (of the Republic) is fully aware of all the efforts the Imperial Government has made in a general manner to accomplish its task in the present war, and particularly with a view of guaranteeing for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and of the security of the Japanese Empire, for both of which it is absolutely necessary to deprive Germany of its bases of political, military and economic activity in the Far East.

Under these conditions the Imperial Government intends to demand from the German Government at the time of peace negotiations the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in

Shantung and in the Islands belonging to her, situated to the North of the Equator in the Pacific Ocean.

The Imperial Government ventures to hope that the Government of Russia (of the French Republic), in view of the legitimacy of these claims, will give the assurance that, whenever the case arises, the Imperial Government may count upon its full support on this question.

It goes without saying that reparations for damages caused to the lives and property of the Japanese people by the unjustifiable attacks of the enemy, as well as other conditions of peace of a character common to all the Entente Powers, are entirely outside the consideration of the present question.

The French Embassy to the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
(March 1, 1917)
Translation

The Government of the Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its assistance in regulating, at the time of the peace negotiations, questions essential to Japan concerning Shantung and the German Islands in the Pacific situated in the North of the Equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and the islands.

M. Briand requests, on the other hand, that the

Japanese Government give its support to obtain from China the rupture of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that she push this act to a desirable extent. The consequences of this, according to him, would be:--

1. The handing over of passports to the German diplomatic and consular agents.
2. The obligation of all German nationals to leave Chinese territory.
3. The internment of German ships having sought refuge in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies following the example of Italy and Portugal. From the advices which reached the French Government, there are fifteen German ships in Chinese ports totaling about 40,000 tons.
4. The sequestration of German commercial houses established in China.
5. The forfeiture of the rights of Germany in the concessions she possessed in certain ports.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
French Embassy
(March 6, 1917)

Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the French Embassy, under the date of March 1, 1917, informing that the French Government is disposed to give the Imperial Government its

assistance in regulating, at the time of the peace negotiations, questions essential to Japan concerning Shantung, and the German Islands in the Pacific, situated to the North of the Equator, and that it agrees to support the demands of the Imperial government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and in the aforesaid Islands.

The Imperial Government takes note of this communication with profound gratitude for the friendly sentiment which inspired the French Government in giving its full assent to the desiderata of the Imperial Government.

The aforesaid Note equally set forth the desire of His Excellency, M. Briand, of ensuring the support of the Imperial Government with a view to obtaining from China the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Germany, to its full, desirable extent. Concerning the question, the Imperial Government, as the French Government was constantly kept informed if it did not fail to make all efforts from the beginning, consequently, the Imperial Government has hereby only to confirm its intention of giving its entire support to the desire expressed by M. Briand, in accord with a view to bringing about the consequences unnumbered in the above-mentioned Note.

The Russian Embassy to the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
(February 20, March 5, 1917)
Translation

In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the North of the Equator.

The Japanese Embassy to the Italian Government

(March 23, 1917)

Translation

The Imperial Japanese Government intends to demand from the German Government at the negotiations of peace, the surrender of the territorial rights and special interest which Germany possessed, before the war, in Shantung and in the German Islands in the Pacific, situated North of the Equator.

In view of the present phase of events, the Imperial Government believed it bound to ensure forthwith the entire support of the English, French and Russian Governments, in case the foregoing claims should be presented to Germany at the peace negotiations.

In bringing to the knowledge of the Royal Government of Italy as a very confidential information that an arrangement has recently been entered into between the Imperial

Government of one part and the British, French and Russian Governments of the other part, relating to the foregoing, the Imperial Government has the firmest conviction that the Royal Government of Italy, being inspired by the sentiments of friendship which animate the two countries, and considering the necessity of mutual assistance for the triumph of the common cause in the present war, will be good enough to welcome with satisfaction the conclusion of the above-mentioned arrangement.

Italy's Reply to the Note of the Japanese Embassy
(March 23, 1917)

Upon reading the foregoing Memorandum, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to the Japanese Ambassador that the Italian Government had no objection regarding the matter.

It is significant to note the dates of this series of secret agreements concerning China's territorial and other rights made by the Allied Powers with Japan. The dates of the agreements are: February 16, 19, 21: March 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 23: all in 1917. They were signed at the very time when China was being urged to sever relations with Germany. This unfair play clearly shows that the Powers were intentionally making China their sacrifice of war for their selfish benefits.

It is also important to remember that all these secret treaties and agreements were made without informing the U. S. of the least idea of their contents. Had not the Russian revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Imperial Government and disclosing and annulling all the secret treaties, Japan most probably could have been successful in barring the influence of the U. S. in the Far East, and in enjoying the entire freedom of action in China in the future.

But after the downfall of the Czar, the Russo-Japanese treaty became valueless and Japan's policies were consequently compelled to take a new form. She feared an active American program in China, for it had been the example of the U. S. which had had much to do with China's entrance into the war. U. S. had protested in 1915 against the twenty-one demands and had in June, 1917, addressed a note to China to advise her to maintain her internal unity. This new policy of Japan was to make some definite understanding with U. S. in regard to their policies in China.

On November 15, 1917, accordingly, an understanding was exchanged between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii. It follows:

"The Governments of Japan and of the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China nevertheless remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, it has no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in the treaties with other nations.

The Governments of Japan and of the United States deny that they have any purpose of infringing in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity of commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.¹"

This agreement was made without consulting the Chinese government and furthermore Japan was acting with a purpose to defraud the U. S. by signing such agreements which contained the phrase "special interests" in China which Japan interpreted as recognizing "A condition that would to some extent establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China."² After the signing of this

1. Treaties of the U. S. Vol. III pp.2720, 3825.

2. Asia 19: P. 350.

treaty Japan's diplomacy at Peking moved steadily to put in-
to practice Japan's interpretation of that agreement, and to
make that agreement conform with the "inside" meaning of all
other "regional understandings" concerning China. This na-
turally at once aroused the public opinion in China to doubt
or rather distrust the sincerity of the U. S. policy toward
China. This can be well represented by the following pass-
age by a Chinese writer:

"The term 'special interests' is exceedingly vague,
and it is not clear whether it is confined to those already
obtained by Japan or can be extended to those that may be
acquired by Japan in the future. Should it happen that Japan,
in pursuance of her policy of expansion, exacts from China
further territorial and economic acquisitions in regions
contiguous to her leased territory or where her economic
interests are already strong, would the Government of the
United States be obliged to recognize her claims and sup-
port her demands? Such a recognition or support would not
only reverse the friendly attitude which has characterized
its diplomacy towards China, but would also be inconsistent
with the novel ideals of right and justice so loudly pro-
nounced by President Wilson. Should she
enforce her claims to the full extent, Japan might assert
that the U. S. should recognize her special interests in all
the coastal provinces of China -- from Manchuria to Canton.
In time, she would be able to control the greater part of
China, as it has been her intention to do. Such a condition

would be destructive of the principle of "the open door" and equal opportunity for the commerce of all nations.¹"

Another Chinese writer even goes further, saying that "With the signing of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, by which the sponsor of equal opportunity recognized the 'special interests' of Japan in China, the open door policy became virtually a dead record."²

The Chinese Government also was humiliated that it should be ignored in the negotiation and in signing of an agreement which related exclusively to its territory and prerogatives. In a few days after the agreement was published, the Chinese Government issued the following declaration concerning it:

DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1917.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have recently, in order to silence mischievous reports, effected an exchange of notes at Washington concerning their desires and intentions with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have been communicated to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Minister at Peking; and the Chinese Government, in order to avoid misunderstanding, hastens to make the following declaration so as to make known the views of the Government.

The Principle adopted by the Chinese Government to-

1. Cheng: The Present Problem of China.
2. The Chinese Students' Monthly: Vol. XX No. 5, Page 4.

wards the friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality; and consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties have been consistently respected, and so, even with the special relations between countries created by the fact of territorial contiguity, it is only in so far as they have already been provided for in her existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principle hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations.¹"

Chinese Legation, Washington. (November 12, 1917)

The declaration was very sound and farsighted and the disregard of it by both Japan and U. S. A. soon resulted in serious conflicts of policies between them in China. The later Washington Conference was called greatly for the purpose to settle such conflicts arising under this Lansing-Ishii agreement.

1. Liu Yan: Relation between China & Japan during the World War. P. 103.

Chapter IV

At the Paris Conference

It has been pointed out clearly in the foregoing chapters that Japan's occupation of Kiao-Chau, Shantung and the exaction of the demands were in violation of the principles of the international law. Fearing that opposition might come after the war, she further entrenched her position by concluding with the powers a series of secret agreements to confirm her action. With these secret assurances, Japan came to the Peace Conference at Paris on January 18, 1919.

China, on the contrary, without knowing these agreements, came to the Conference with a hope of securing justice on her problems. She based her claims on the Allied war-aims and principles announced by President Wilson who during the war was the most effective influence of the public opinion and the chief counsel of the world. The following is one of his public and official utterances:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, or economic arrangement, or political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

The destruction of every arbitrary power, anywhere, that can separately, secretly and of its single choice dis-

turb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence.

The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which every international readjustment that cannot amicably be agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned.¹"

From January 18 to April 30 China presented her case in the conference. Her delegation had asked that the former German holdings in Shantung be returned to her, and that the concessions made to Japan in 1915 be cancelled. She demanded the return of Kiao-Chou and other German holdings as a matter of right. Seven main reasons adduced may be summarized as follows:

"1. The leased territory of Kiao-Chau, including the bay and islands therein, is and always has been an integral part of Chinese territory; the lease to Germany was granted only under coercion, while the railway and mining rights possessed by Germany before the war were part of the same grant. Restoration on this territory and of these rights to China would be a mere act of justice.

2. The test of nationality shows that Shantung Province, of which Kiao-Chau is a part, and in which the German-built railway, now held by the Japanese, stretched

1. Hays: Social & Political History of Europe. Vol.II. and Millard: Conflict of Policies in Asia. Page 51.

from Tsingtao 254 miles into the interior, contains a population of 38,000,000 patriotic inhabitants who are part and parcel of the homogeneous Chinese race, alike in language and religion, and whose earnest desire to free their province from foreign domination is beyond dispute.

3. Shantung is the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius and the cradle of Chinese civilization, the Chinese Holy Land Mecca, on which the eyes of the whole Chinese people are focused, and which has always played and still plays an important part in China's development.

4. The dense population of Shantung, whose 38,347,000 inhabitants are limited to the resources of agriculture in an area of barely 35,347,000 square miles, or a population almost equal to that of France in a territory only one-quarter as large, shows that there can be no room for the inflow of the surplus population of Japan without unjustifiable exploitation of the Chinese inhabitants.

5. Shantung Province possesses all the elements for the economic domination of North China, a growing market for foreign merchandise, rich mineral resources and abundance of raw materials; the Bay of Kiao-Chau has been the principal port of Shantung for many centuries; it is destined to be the chief outlet for North China products and main port entrance for foreign goods for the same regions. The port of Tsingtao, the new emporium since the influx of the torrents emptying into the Bay of Kiao-chau filled up the northern part, occupies a position on the coast corresponding to

that held by Kiao-Chau. Reinforced by new trade arteries, including the Tsingtao-Kiao-Chau-Tsinan railway, the port of Tsingtao is in a position to tap the trade of the whole of North China. The building up of a foreign sphere of influence here, therefore, is dangerous to international trade and industry; and no country is in a better position to uphold the principle of the open door in Shantung than China herself.

6. Strategically the Bay of Kiao-Chau commands one of the gateways of North China. By the existence of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, connected at Tsinan with the railway of Tientsin and Peking, it controls one of the quickest approaches from the sea to the capital of the Chinese republic. In the interest of her national defense and security, China must retain these strategically vital points in her own hands.

7. By restoring the leased territory of Kiao-Chau to China the Peace Conference would be redressing a wrong committed by Germany, and would also serve the common interests of all nations in the Far East; it would eliminate future conflict between a resentful people and the future rulers; it would insure the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.¹"

China demanded the nullification of the Chino-

1. N. Y. Times Durrent History Aug. 1919: P. 202-5.

Japanese treaties of 1915 on three grounds: First, because they were made under duress; second, because they destroyed the independence of China, and third, because they could not be enforced without menacing the peace of the world. The Chinese delegates took instances of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest which were annulled because they were made under duress. They further emphasized that the recognition of the Chino-Japanese treaties of 1915 was a sanction of imperialism and will be sure to result in further conflicts among nations having interests in the Far East, again setting the world on fire. China depends upon three important things for her development: 1, territorial integrity; 2, political independence; and 3, economic independence, and her delegates made it clear that the Chino-Japanese secret treaties in 1915 were contrary to these three points which are the salvation of China's reconstruction. They further insisted that the Chinese nation should not be bound by the treaties and other agreements with Japan made during the period of 1915-1918, because all of them lacked parliamentary approval¹.

Despite China's hard effort and reasonable request, the conference finally was unable to render an impartial decision because the Powers were afraid that such a decision might force Japan to withdraw from the conference, since, in fact, she had already expressed such intentions. Furthermore the Powers were bound by the secret agreements² with

1. N. Y. Times Current History Aug. 1919: P. 202-5 and Willoughby: Foreign Rights and Interests in China.

2. See Chapter III.

Japan made during the war time. On the 30th of August the Shantung articles of the treaty was made public by the Supreme Council as follows:

Shantung Clauses of the Versailles Treaty.

Article 156

"Germany renounces in favor of Japan all her rights, title and privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiao-Chau, railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.

All German rights in the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material, for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.

The German state submarine cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attached thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Article 157

The movable and immovable property owned by the German state in all territory of Kiao-Chau, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in the consequence of the works or improvements made, or of the expenses incurred

by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with the territory, are and remain acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Article 158

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty the archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial, or other, of the territory of Kiao-Chau.

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the right, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding articles¹."

It is significant to note that, throughout the conference, even after this decision was actually rendered, China had been assured verbally by the council:-

1. That the rights which Germany renounced in Kiao-Chou Shantung to Japan are only economic rights formerly enjoyed by Germany, but not the political rights which were sure to be restored to China;

2. That Japan in exercising the rights thus given her, would strictly observe the principle of the open door, in letter and spirit;

3. That Japan's policy was to restore full sovereignty in the Shantung Peninsula to China, and that she would not make any exclusive economic use of the port of

Tsingtao or any discriminatory rates, rules, or regulations for railways.

4. That Japan would at the earliest possible moment hand back all the political rights to China, and withdraw all Japanese troops from Shantung.

These statements, in such a manner however, have never satisfied the Chinese. The dissatisfaction was shown in the protest handed to the council by the Chinese delegates:

"The declaration of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary on August 14, 1917, expressly abrogated all treaties, agreements and conventions between China and those powers, a fact which was officially notified to and taken cognizance of by the allied and associated powers. By this declaration the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung became null and void, and China, as the sovereign power of that province, became automatically re-vested of them. It is difficult to see on what ground these rights can be taken from China and transferred to Japan.

Japan has presumably based her claim on the agreement of 1915 and on the notes of 1918 with China. The 1915 agreements were, however, concluded by China under the coercion of a Japanese ultimatum threatening war. The Chinese Government was obliged to exchange the 1918 notes because the continued presence of the Japanese troops in the interior of Shantung and the unauthorized establishment of a Japanese administrative bureau which attempted to govern Shantung as Japanese territory aroused such popular indignation and opposition that no other course seemed open to

the Chinese Government to rid the province of their presence.

If the Shantung Peninsula is to be restored in full sovereignty, according to the proposed agreement, to China, the reason does not appear clear why recourse should be had to two steps instead of one, why the initial transfer should be made to Japan and then leave it to her to "voluntarily engage" to restore it to China.

Notwithstanding the proposed division of political and economic rights, the substitution of Japan and Germany in Shantung so intrenches the Japanese influence in this province as to expose China to a greater menace than before, because Japan is nearer to China than Germany.

China in coming to the Peace Conference, has relied on the fourteen points set forth by President Wilson in his address to Congress on the 8th of January 1918, and the principles laid down in his subsequent addresses and formally adopted by the powers associated against Germany. She has relied on the spirit of honorable relationship between States which is to open a new era in the world and inaugurate the League of Nations. She has relied, above all, on the justice and equity of her case. The result has been, to her, a grievous disappointment.¹

China finally remained away from the historic event of June 28 at Versailles and refused to sign the German treaty, although later in September, 1920, she concluded a separate agreement with Germany.

1. N. Y. Times Current History, Aug. 1919: Page 202.

To have signed the treaty would have seemed like a surrender of Chinese claims. The refusal to sign left Chinese diplomats in a much better strategic position in the future. It gave China later opportunities to bring about readjustments of the unfavorable provisions concerning Shantung by the Versailles Treaty.

Chapter V

At the Washington Conference

The aftermath of the war and the result of the Paris Conference created two emergent problems in the world politics. The overgrowth of armament, caused by the war, demanded a mutual reduction; and the conflict of policies in the Far East required a mutual understanding. Though the conference was called nominally for discussing the Far Eastern questions, still its aim was not the settlement of the disputes between China and Japan, but rather the balancing of powers among America, England, France, and Japan in China and the Pacific Ocean.

America, after her refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty and her denial to join the League of Nations, was left aloof from the rest of the powers. Her navy program, which she had inaugurated during the war, was greatly feared by Great Britain. The misinterpretation of the Lansing-Ishii¹ agreement by Japan created critical misunderstanding with Japan in China. She was rather afraid that such misunderstandings would eventually result in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a new competition in naval armaments, and a war in the Pacific. The United States on the 11th of August, 1921, accordingly, called a conference to discuss limitation of armaments and questions of the Far East and Pacific Ocean.

Both China and Japan were invited to take part in this conference. Knowing the situation of the Far East and the purpose of the Conference, China without hesitation,

1. See Chapter III.

decided to take active part in it. Moreover, conscious of her position in the Far East and understanding the game which the powers were to play in the Conference, China was ready to seize this opportunity in the hope of correcting some of her mistreatments and humiliations in the past and of restoring some of her lost prestige. Japan, on the contrary, with great hesitation, finally chose to come to the Conference instead of isolating herself by staying out.

In the very beginning of the Conference, the Chinese delegation was conscious of the fact that China ought to take the earliest opportunity to bring up her case in the conference and to keep them to the fore as a principal issue.

There were two different classes of questions China wished to bring to the Conference. They were (1) those general questions which the powers as a whole, including Japan, dealt with China and (2) those in which Japan alone dealt with China.

Despite the various extreme, over-ambitious, public opinions in China, the Chinese delegation proceeded with a well-planned program. They might have thought that China's case was complex and that it was impossible for them to bring up so many concrete problems at the beginning of the Conference. But on the other hand, they probably feared that secret terms or agreements concerning these problems might be exchanged among the powers, as was done in Paris Conference, before the problems could be brought up. So the Chinese delegation thought it was wise to reach some

fundamental understandings by asking the Powers to agree upon certain principles as basis of discussion.

So before any concrete problem was discussed, on Nov. 16th, China presented the following General Principles:

"In the conformity with the agenda of the Conference the Chinese Government proposes for the consideration of and adoption by the Conference the following General Principles to be applied in the determination of the questions relating to China:--

1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese Republic.

(b) China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.

2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called Open Door or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception.

3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying and giving to her an opportunity to participate.

4. All special rights, privileges, immunities or

commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and commitments, now known or to be declared are to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity and, if valid, to harmonize them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference.

5. Immediately or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitation upon China's political jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.

6. Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitments which are without time limits.

7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights or privileges, the well established principle of construction that such grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors, is to be observed.

8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party.

9. Provision is to be made for future Conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East, as a basis for the determination of common policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto¹."

1. Chinese Students' Monthly: Vol. XVII No. 3, Page 241.

Nothing could be more reasonable and sound than the request China made in the beginning of the Conference at Washington. She did not intend to dictate any rules for the Powers to follow, but merely called the attention of the Powers to certain old principles of International law. These principles included the territorial and administrative integrity of China; the open door; the publication by the Powers of all treaties and agreements affecting her; and the examination of all rights, privileges, immunities and commitments now known or to be declared so that they may be brought into accord with the principles now laid down to respect in future wars of China's right as a neutral, and a provision for the peaceable settlement of future disputes in the Pacific and the Far East. Nothing shows more conclusively the desire of China to promote peace and a general understanding and goodwill among the Powers having interests in the Pacific and Far East than the statements made before the Conference by China's delegation. The history of the Far East shows that the conflicts among the Powers in the Far East were due to the fact that these old principles had been violated. Therefore China's reaffirmation of these principles must not be construed as manifesting a selfish desire to get the most out of the conference.

Five days after the presentation, on the 21st of November the Powers adopted the following resolutions,

"It is the firm intention of the Powers attending this Conference hereinafter mentioned, to wit, the United States of America, Belgium the British Empire, France, Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or the citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States¹."

These four principles were the same as the ten points in essence only differed in wording. Upon the basis of these general principles, the Conference proceeded to discuss the questions of the Far East. The Conference finally drew the following conclusions:

1. The "Four Powers Treaty", between the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France reinforced for ten years the status quo in the Pacific by pledging these powers to respect each other's insular possessions and dominions in the Pacific and to confer if any controversy arose which threatened these and which could not be settled by diplomacy.

1. The Chinese Students' Monthly: Vol.XVII No.3, Page 244.

2. The nine powers agreed, moreover, to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give her opportunity to develop and maintain a stable government, to use their influence to establish and maintain the Open Door--"The principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China"--to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges which would abridge the rights of citizens of friendly states, and to give no efforts by their nationals to create spheres of influence. The other powers having treaties with China and having governments recognized by the nine powers were to be invited to sign the treaty.

3. Provision was made for increasing the tariff and for revising it every seven years.

4. A plan was adopted for establishing in China a board of reference to which questions connected with the observance of the Open Door could be referred.

5. The Powers declared that they were "prepared to relinquish extra territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant" them in so doing and to agree to appoint a commission to investigate conditions and to make recommendations.

6. Foreign postal agencies in China were to be abandoned by January 1, 1923.

7. The Powers declared their intention to with-

draw the armed forces that had been in the country since 1900 whenever China should assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners, and promised that when China should so request, they would make an official inquiry to see whether conditions would warrant such step.

8. Certain resolutions were passed regarding foreign radio stations in China.

9. The Chinese expressed their intention to develop and unify their railway system under their own government "with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may be needed". Certain resolutions were passed regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway.

10. The powers agreed on machinery for notifying each other of all treaties, conventions, and agreements with or concerning China.

11. After these general questions were decided, finally the Shantung question was brought up. China was anxious to have this question discussed by the whole Conference and asked for the unconditional return of Shantung. But Japan objected to submitting to be reviewed by this Conference questions which had been decided and fixed by the Treaty of Versailles; and an embarrassing impasse threatened. After hesitation, finally, through the suggestion of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, the Chinese and Japanese delegations held separate discussions in the presence of observers of other powers, and then reported their agreement to the Conference. The result of these discussions was that a treaty, "The

Shantung Treaty" was concluded. The content of which was that Japan agreed to return Kiao Chau and the railways and mines in Shantung under certain conditions, the most important of which was probably the purchase by China of the former German lines by treasury notes which had as their security the roads and their revenues. Pending the redemption of these notes Japanese were to be appointed as traffic manager and joint chief accountant of the railway.

13. China, finally, presented a statement urging that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 be reconsidered and cancelled. But she was told that treaties entered into and signed by sovereign powers could not be made void by an intervention of other powers.

As a whole the Washington Conference was a success because it accomplished what it aimed to accomplish; namely, temporary peace in the Pacific establishing a balance of power. As regards the relation between China and Japan, the Conference also accomplished many things. Besides the agreement that Japan and other Powers should respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, Japan was actually weakened by the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had been derogatory to Chinese dignity and interests. Another result, indirect and intangible, though it may be, was that Japan's policy in China seems to have been modified following the Conference.

Chapter VI

The Present Relationship

One of the most outstanding results of the Washington Conference was the readjustment in foreign relations or the new balance of power in China. These readjustments have been so fundamental in character as to materially alter the political situation among the Powers in China. Great Britain, Japan, and the United States became the most active and capable competitors in the Chinese Market.

Germany, as the result of the World War, lost her possessions and special privileges in the Far East and was no longer able to play any part in Far East politics, at least temporarily¹. Russia, after her revolution, had denounced all her traditional aggressive policy in China, and a new relationship was established, based on the principle of equality. Of course she still has powerful influences in China, which, however are not imperialistic in character², France and Italy, due to the great loss in the World War, have been preoccupied with conditions in Europe and, for the time being, actually have become powerless in the Far East.

Not only has the number of Powers been altered by these readjustments, but there has been also, a marked shift in the degree of importance among the remaining Powers in the Far East. In brief, the United States has become the most important and Great Britain and Japan have become secondary in importance.

1. Review of Reviews 68: Page 435.

2. Liv. Age 316: 73-6.

The Washington treaties have weakened Japan's position in the Far East. First of all, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance detached Great Britain from Japan. This Alliance was considered by Japan as the keystone of Japan's diplomatic influence before the World War, as Baron Kato remarked, "the shaft on which the wheels of Japanese diplomacy revolve"¹. Therefore the loss of the alliance with Great Britain compelled Japan to begin to construct a new foreign policy. Meantime, the Four Powers Treaty, signed at Washington to take the place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, bound the Powers to maintain the status quo in the Pacific.

Japan, under such conditions, was bound to pursue a more moderate policy than it had during the war. Therefore the months immediately following the Washington Conference marked, on the whole, an improvement in the relation between China and Japan. In regard to Shantung, the Japanese Government proceeded with the agreements, and has gone as far in carrying them out as time has permitted. Soon after the Washington Conference, Japan transferred the Shantung properties to China as the treaty provided. Japan, too, withdrew her troop from Siberia, thus removing a menace to China from the north, and, more important to China still, also withdrew her troops from Hankow where they had been stationed for some time².

There are additional indications which warrant the

1. Millard: Conflict of Policies in Asia. Page 370.
2. Latourette: The Development of China. Page 245.

assumption that Japan, from sheer logical necessity must continue to modify her former policy. The earthquake in Japan in September, 1923, effected severely the national finances. It is estimated that it will cost five billion yen or more, to restore normal conditions. Under such difficulty, it was believed that Japan probably will be financially unable to maintain very aggressive tendencies in China¹.

Furthermore, the Exclusion Act of 1924, which prohibited Japanese from U. S. A. has also some influence in Japan's new and more friendly attitude toward her racially related neighbor. Indeed, it was reported that after the passage of the Japan Exclusion Act, the journalists in Japan actually advocated the convocation of a conference of Colored Races in Tokyo, and the formation of a League of Yellow Peoples².

The last but not the least is the Nationalistic Movement in China which is termed the Chinese Renaissance. The entire movement presages as a whole a new, strong, constructive national culture. It tends to evaluate both the old and the new ideas from both the East and the West. From many visible manifestations, such as boycotts and through many experiences of the strong national patriotism in China, Japan actually realized the political importance of China in the future and her policy toward China is bound to be changed.

1. Millard: Conflict of Policies in Asia. Page 376.

2. Japanese Immigration, Buell: Page 314.

Perhaps nothing could show Japan's changed attitude more clearly than her moderation in connection with the so-called Shanghai Massacres in 1925. "Japan has learned it (moderation) through her own Twenty-one Demands and all the infamy that was done at the Paris Peace Conference. Although, if responsibility were to be fixed, Japan would bear an unpleasantly large portion, the Shanghai trouble having started from mills owned by her nationals, she has throughout the course of the incident been riding the fence, with a slight inclination toward professing sympathy for China. Considering her traditional imperialistic and aggressive policy toward her continental neighbor, this is decidedly the most passive attitude Japan has ever shown. She desires no increase of China's hatred; she covets England's China trade -- this is the whole secret in a nutshell. She has been pulling celestial chestnuts out of the fire for others to share; she has many a time burned her claws; it is time for Great Britain to do some pulling and to get burned. There is no other explanation for the action of a well-known Japanese publicist like Mer. Kawakami in championing China's cause, (Baltimore Sun July 10, 1925) or for the Japanese Government's unhesitating response to American's desire for customs and extra territoriality Conferences.¹"

However such indications as we now have cannot yet give us assurance of the sincerity of Japan's ostensibly friendlier attitude towards China. It remains at present

1. Foreign Affairs Oct. 1925: Page 25-26.

an unanswerable question whether Japan has really changed heart or merely adopted opportunist tactics toward China. On the other hand, as long as the question of the Twenty-one Demands and the future disposition of Manchuria remain unsettled, there will be undoubtedly a continued distrust of Japan among the Chinese people.

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