THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA

by

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I. EARLY EXPLORATION.

Alaska was first discovered by Vitus Bering in 1728. The discovery was due to the enterprising spirit of Peter the Great, shipbuilder and reformer, who had worked in the shipyards of England and Holland. He desired to know whether Asia and America were one continuous continent, or whether they were separated by the sea. He wrote out the following instructions, which he ordered to be executed:

"One or two boats with decks to be built at Kamtchatka, or at any other convenient place, with which inquiry should be made in relation to the northerly coasts, to see whether they were not contiguous with America, since their end was not known. And this done, they should see whether they could not somewhere find an harbor belonging to Europeans and an European ship. They should likewise set apart some men who were to inquire after the name and situation of the coasts discovered. Of all this an exact journal should be kept, with which they should return to St. Petersburg."

The Czar died in the winter of 1725; but Empress Catherine carried on the expedition. She chose as commander Vitus Bering, a Dane by birth and an experienced navigator. With his officers and shipbuilders, he left St. Petersburg by land on the fifth of February, 1725; made his way, with infinite hardships and delay, across Siberia, Northern Asia, and the Sea of Okhotsk, to the coast of Kamtchatka, consuming more than three years in this journey. On July 20, 1728 the party set sail from Kamtchatka in the "Gabriel", a small vessel "like the packboats used in the Baltic"; went northeast, and discovered a large island, the St. Lawrence, named from the saint on whose day it was seen. This was the first point in Russian discovery. Continuing north along the Asiatic coast, Bering went as far as 67 degrees, 30 minutes, turning back because he thought he had reached the extremity of Alaska. Finding indications of a country not far east, he made an effort to discover this, before returning home, but was unsuccessful. After another land journey back to Russia, he reached St. Petersburg in March 1730 having been absent five years.

Interest in exploration increased in Russia; Bering was created commodore; his old lieutenants were made captains; and the Senate, the Admiralty and the Academy of Sciences all united in a new expedition. Though this was ordered in 1732, it was unable to leave the eastern coast until June 4, 1741.

There were two well appointed ships, "to discover the continent of America," St. Peter under Bering, and St. Paul under Captain Tscherikoff. For sometime the two kept together; then they became separated in the storm and fog, when each continued alone. Bering first saw the continent of N. America on the 18th of July, 1741, in latitude 58 degrees, 28 minutes. As seen from the distance "the country had terrible high mountains that were covered with snow*. Two days later he anchored in the sheltered bay near Cape St. Elias; and landing found huts, fire-places, hewn wood, furniture, arrows, a whetstone and a store of red salmon. Continuing his journey, he was compelled by the elbow in the coast to turn westward, then southward. Several times his voyage was arrested by islands, on some of which he landed.

The other ship under Tscherikoff, sighted the same coast on the 15th of July, 1741, in latitude 56 degrees. After anchoring, the mate and ten of the best men were sent in a long-boat, with small arms and brass cannon, to obtain fresh water and inquire about the country. The boat disappeared behind the headland and was never seen again; at the same time a great smoke was continually ascending from the shore. Then on the supposition that the ship was damaged in landing, the boatswain was sent with a small boat and carpenters well-armed. This boat disappeared also. Soon there appeared two boats with natives, crying "Agai, Agai", and put back to shore. This occurred not far from Sitka. Tscherikoff, being deprived of his boats and unable to land, turned homeward. After several delays, caused by adverse winds and severe tempests, the expedition reached Kamchatka Oct. 9th, with the company diminished to 49.

Meanwhile Bering was encountering even greater difficulties than Tscherikoff, for, in addition to storms and adverse winds, scurvy attacked the sailors and the commodore. After a raging tempest which lasted for seventeen days, the vessel was cast on a desert island. Here, on Dec. 8, 1841, Bering died, sheltered in a ditch and half covered with sand for protection against the cold. His body was "scraped out of the ground*, and buried on the island which bears his name.

The knowledge of this region was increased by individuals in search of furs. In 1745 the Aleutian Islands were discovered by an adventurer in search of sea otters. During successive voyages for the same purpose, all of these islands were visited. In 1768 an expedition, ordered by Empress Catherine, left Kamchatka and explored the whole archipelago and peninsula of Alaska.

All of these discoveries were verified in 1778 by the English Captain Cook, who was directed to go around Cape Good Hope in search of a passage to Hudson Bay. In Jan., 1778, he
discovered the Sandwich Islands; he then sailed along the northwest coast "near where Tschirikoff anchored in 1741"; then in sight of the snow-covered mountains, by the very place where Bering had anchored; then among the islands thru which Bering sailed; along the coast by the island of St. Lawrence; and thru Bering Strait to Icy Cape, in latitude 70 degrees, 29 minutes.

During the Nootka Sound controversy, Vancouver was sent out by the British government to make explorations in the interests of commerce. During the years 1792 to 1794, he made a most extensive and detailed exploration and survey of the coast from 35 degrees to 60 degrees. His Atlas, written in French, German, and English, published in 1798, after his death, has an important bearing on the Russian boundary question because Vancouver, to fill up his map, placed mountain ranges on the coast. The treaty between Great Britain and Russia in 1825, said that the boundary line should follow the crest of the mountains; but in 1885, at the time of the boundary dispute, it was found that there was no mountain range to follow, but only isolated peaks.

In addition to Bering's explorations, there were at least four other Russian expeditions to confirm the Russian title.

1. In 1785 an expedition was ordered by Empress Catherine, under the command of Commodore Billings, an Englishman in the service of Russia. Martin Sauer, the secretary of the expedition, narrated it from the original papers.

2. In 1803, in the interests of the Russian American Co., two ships were sent out, one under Captain Krusenstern, the other under Captain Lisiansky, of the Russian navy. This was the first Russian voyage around the world and occupied three years. Lisiansky visited the northwest coast of America, especially Sitka and the island of Kadiak.

3. In 1815, the minister, Count Romanzoff, at his own expense, organized an expedition under Lieutenant Kotzebue, an officer of the Russian navy, and son of the German dramatist. There were traces of the voyage on the coast as far north as the Frozen Ocean.

4. In 1826, Capt. Lütke, afterwards an admiral in the Russian navy, visited the Russian possessions with the German naturalist, Kittlitz. This expedition is fully described in French.
II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN CO. *

The first attempt at permanent settlement in Russian America is due to a company of Siberian merchants, of which Shelikoff and Ivan Golikoff were the principal shareholders. Three ships were fitted out for the purpose of trading in furs and exploring; and on Aug.16,1783, sailed from Okhotsk with 192 men, the largest force which had left the Siberian coast at one time. This expedition founded the Island of Kadiak, thus establishing the authority of the Russian government. An imperial ukase, issued Sept.28,1788, granted to the Company exclusive control over the region actually occupied, but no further; thus leaving rival traders free sway in adjoining parts. Assistance from the public treasury was refused because of foreign wars.

In 1790 the merchant Baranoff was sent to govern the new colony. Shelikoff died in 1795 and Natalia, his wife, continued his business, with Rezanof, her son-in-law, as chief adviser. Rezanof was on the point of getting a charter, when Catherine II died in 1796. The next year the Muilnikof Co. for fur trading, fearing complications, proposed to join the Shelikoff Co.; the offer was accepted; and on Aug.3,1798, an Association, which included two smaller concerns, was organized. All hunters or small traders were invited to become partners.

This act of consolidation was confirmed by an imperial ukase of July 8,1799, when Paul I of Russia granted to the Russian American Co. its first charter.*

The Emperor said that in view of the "benefits and advantages" resulting to his empire from the "hunting and trading" carried on by Russian subjects in the northeastern seas and along the coasts of America, he had taken under his "highest" protection the company which was organized for the above-named purpose of carrying on hunting and trading. He would allow the commanders of his land and sea forces to employ them to aid the Company in its enterprises, (if occasion should require). He conceded the following rights and privileges:

1. To *have the use of all hunting-grounds and establishments now (then) existing on the northeastern coast

* This account is based chiefly on the following; Bancroft, History of Alaska; Ex.Doc.House, 40 Cong. 2 sess., (1867-68) No.177.
of America; from the ------ 55th degree (of north latitude) to Behring Strait, and also on the Aleutian, Kurile, and other islands situated in the Northeastern Ocean;

2. "to make new discoveries not only north of the 55th degree of north latitude, but farther to the south, and to occupy the new lands discovered, as Russian possessions; if not previously occupied by or dependent upon another nation."

3. "To use and profit by everything which has been or shall be discovered in those localities, on the surface and in the bosom (interior) of the earth, without competition from others."

4. To "establish settlements in future times, ....... and fortify them to insure the safety of the inhabitants, and to send ships to those shores with goods and hunters, without any obstacle* on the part of the government."

5. "To extend their navigation to all adjoining nations and hold business intercourse with all surrounding powers, ...........

6. To "employ" persons for the purpose of "navigation, hunting, and all other business."

7. To cut timber "for repairs, and occasionally for the construction of new ships."

8. To buy at cost from the government powder and lead "for shooting animals, for marine signals, and in all unexpected emergencies on the mainland of America, and on the islands."

9. As to its property, to enjoy exemption from seizure for individual debts of the members of the Company.

10. To possess "the exclusive right" to "use and enjoy, in the above described extent and country and islands, all profits and advantages derived from hunting, trade, industries, and discovery of new lands."

11. To have "full control over all above mentioned localities, to exercise judicial powers in minor cases," and "to use all local facilities for fortifications in the defence of the country under their control against foreign attacks.

** Moore: International Arbitrations, 1
Bancroft: History of Alaska P.379
Literal translation of the ukase, taken from Golovnin, in Materialui, 1,77-80
Novo Arkhangelsk on the island of Sitka was founded by Baranoff, the superintendent of the Company, in 1799; but progress was slow, as the natives were against the settlement. Meanwhile the seat of government was at Kadiak. When Baranoff laid down the management of the Company in 1818, after almost 30 years of service, the dominion of the Czar was at its greatest extent. Outposts stretched from St. Michael to Ross, Cal.; and from Sitka to Attu Island.

Trade carried on by American ship-captains among the Indians of Alexander Archipelago had long troubled the Company, but Baranoff had removed competition by buying the cargoes. The naval officers now at the head of affairs, in order to discredit Baranoff's methods and remove this opposition, prevailed on the Russian government in 1821, to issue an edict forbidding foreign vessels to come within 100 miles of the shore under penalty of forfeiture.

This ukase forbidding foreign trade, which caused such spirited protests from United States and England, also granted exclusive privileges to the Company for another period of 20 years. The Russian government was aware that such a request for the renewal of the charter would be made, so Captain Golovnin, had been instructed to inquire into the conditions of the settlements, during his cruise in Kamchatka. He reported unfavorably, condemning especially the treatment of Creoles and hired laborers. The introduction to the ukase, in contrast to the report, said that the Company "has to the fullest extent justified our hopes and fulfilled our expectations, in extending navigation and discovery as well as the commerce of our empire, in addition to bringing considerable immediate profit to the shareholders in the enterprise". However, voluminous regulations were attached, in regard to the treatment of natives; obligations to maintain churches and schools; provisions for the importation of supplies; the privileges of Creoles; and the rights and duties of shareholders and of the Company's officials. The Chief Manager must now be selected from the staff officers of the Russian navy.

The result of the prohibition of foreign trade was a loss to the Company, for foreign boats delivered goods at Sitka for less than they could be brought from Russia by the Company. Freight from Russia across Siberia was from 540 to 630 silver rubles per ton and by the Company's ships from Kronstad, from 193 to 254 silver rubles per ton. The Hudson Bay Company's boats carried goods from England to the colony for 50 to 78 rubles per ton.

The treaty of 1825 granted to England the free navigation of the streams crossing Russian territory. Accordingly the Hudson Bay Co., with headquarters at London, had pushed
forward its trading posts to the upper course of the Stikeen and, in 1883, fitted out the brig Dryad for the purpose of a permanent station on that river. The Russian American Co. asked the Russian government to rescind the clause granting free navigation of the rivers, since the English Co. had violated the restrictions in regard to furnishing firearms and liquor to the natives. The Emperor granted the petition; but vigorous protests were raised, war-like preparations were made, and a serious dispute arose. But the difficulty was settled in 1839, in a unique way. The claim of the Hudson Bay Co. was waived on the condition that the Russian American Co. grant to the former a lease of all its continental territory between Cape Spencer and latitude 54 degrees, 40 minutes; for the annual payment of 2000 otter skins. The English Co. further agreed to supply the colonies with a large quantity of provisions at moderate rates. This lease, which extended for 10 years, was renewed for 10 years, and twice again, for periods of four years each.
III. RUSSIAN DECREES AND TREATIES.

Sept. 7, 1821, Emperor Alexander of Russia issued an edict, publicly giving his sanction to certain regulations adopted by the Russian American Co. respecting foreign commerce in the waters bordering on its possessions. "The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishing, and of all other industry, on all islands, ports, and gulfs, including the whole of the northwest coast of America, beginning from Behring's Strait to the 51st degree of northern latitude, also from the Aleutian islands to the eastern coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile islands from Behring's Strait to the south cape of the island of Urup, viz. to 45 degrees, 50 minutes northern latitude*, were "exclusively granted to Russian subjects." and foreign vessels were forbidden, except in distress; "not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than a hundred Italian miles." M. Poletica, the Russian minister at Washington, sent a printed copy of this ukase to John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, Jan. 30 (Feb. 11) 1822. On Feb. 25, Adams replied that the President had "seen with surprise, in this edict, the assertion of a territorial claim on the part of Russia, extending to the 51st degree of north latitude on this continent, and a regulation interdicting to all commercial vessels other than Russia, upon the penalty of seizure and confiscation, the approach upon the high seas within 100 Italian miles of the shores to which that claim is made to apply." The boundary should have been arranged by a treaty between United States and Russia; and since the question affected so deeply the rights of United States citizens, he asked an explanation of the grounds of the right, warranting the claims and regulations.

In his reply of Feb. 28th, 1822, M. Poletica reviewed the historical incidents, establishing the claim of Russia and said that the prohibition of vessels was a measure of prevention directed against foreign adventurers who carry on illicit trade and furnish arms to the natives, thus inciting them to revolt; that the majority of the adventurers were Americans, against whom the Russian government had remonstrated in vain; that the sea bordering Russian possessions in Asia and America was a closed sea where Russia is sovereign and has the essential right to interdict the entrance

*Authorities for Section III: Moore, International Arbitrations 1:755-60. United States Statutes at Large, 8:302.
of foreigners.

March 30, 1822, Adams wrote that the Ukase for the first time extended the claim of Russia on the northwest coast of America to 51 degrees; that the only basis for this claim was the small settlement of Novo Arkhangelsk situated, not on the American continent, but on a small island in latitude 57 degrees; and the principle of the claim appeared to be 51 degrees, equidistant from Novo Arkhangelsk and the establishment of the United States at the mouth of the Columbia River. The right to freely navigate those northern seas is a part of the independence of the United States; and the United States has a clear and indisputable right to trade with the natives even in arms and ammunition.

Great Britain also protested against the Ukase of 1821; and the British ambassador at St. Petersburg was given full powers to negotiate an adjustment. April 24, 1823, Baron Tuyll, the successor of M. Poletica, as Russian minister at Washington, told Adams that the Emperor, as well as the United States wanted a settlement; and requested instructions for Middleton, the United States minister. July 22, 1823, full power and instructions were sent to Mr. Middleton by Adams;

1. United States can admit no part of the claims of Russia to 45 degrees on the Asiatic coast and to 51 degrees on the American coast; nor the right to interdict commerce.

2. The right of the United States to the territory from 42 degrees to 49 degrees on the Pacific Ocean is unquestioned; and the government is willing to agree to 55 degrees as a boundary line.

A draft of a convention, consisting of three articles, was also enclosed.

But before sending these instructions, Adams in a note of July 17, 1823, informed Baron Tuyll, "that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

The treaty of April 5/17, 1824 was concluded by Middleton with Count Nesselrode and M. Poletica, as representatives of the Russian government. This treaty provided (1) that navigation, fishing, and resort to the unoccupied coasts in the Pacific Ocean should be free to both parties; (2) that the dividing line between the two nations should be 54 degrees, 40 minutes, south of which Russia agreed to form no establishments and north of which United States reciprocally agreed to form none; (3) that for a term of ten years, the
ships of both powers might frequent the interior seas, to fish and trade with the natives, provided that spirituous liquors, firearms and other arms should be excepted from this commerce.

Since the question of boundary between Russia and United States was settled, it now remained for Russia to settle the question with Great Britain. Feb. 16/29, 1825, a convention was concluded between Russia and Great Britain, giving Great Britain, for a term of ten years, substantially the same rights of navigation, fishing and landing, as the United States enjoyed. The boundary line between the two countries should begin at the southern point of Prince of Wales Island, which touches 54 degrees, 40 minutes north latitude between 131 degrees and 133 degrees west longitude; then the line should ascend to the north along Portland Channel till it strikes on the continent, the 56th degree of north latitude; that from this point it should follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude ...; and finally, from the said point of intersection, (should follow) the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean. Prince of Wales Island should belong wholly to Russia; and whenever the "summit of the mountains" should be more than thirty miles from the ocean, the boundary should extend by a line parallel to the winding of the coast and never to exceed ten marine leagues therefrom.

By our treaty with Russia in 1824, ships of both countries, might, for a term of ten years from that date, frequent the harbors and coasts, north or south of 54 degrees, 40 minutes, for fishing and trading with the natives. At the expiration of ten years, the Emperor declined to renew the treaty or to allow American vessels to trade on the unoccupied coasts north of 54 degrees, 40 minutes. In 1836 our plenipotentiaries at St. Petersburg were instructed to inquire into the cause of the refusal. The only reasons offered to our ministers, Messrs. Wilkins and Dallas successively, by Count Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was that the renewal of the 4th article of the Treaty of 1824 would enable Americans to furnish the natives with spirituous liquors and firearms.* Altho there is some foundation for this exclusiveness, since rum had demoralized the coast tribes, and arms had been found with hostile Indians, nevertheless

this result was doubtlessly produced by the representatives of the Russian American Trading Company, who were jealous of the enterprise and keen intelligence of the Americans.

In his message to Congress in Dec. 1838, Pres. Van Buren alluded very delicately to this refusal and, from that time, the whole subject quietly subsided, and the treaty was never revived. The Imperial concessions to the Russian American Co. granted them the exclusive right to trade in those regions, and consequently, American vessels could not be permitted to violate the privileges of that grant. Thus, while Russian ships were admitted freely to all American waters, the Russian government was unable, without violating private rights, to concede the same privilege to us.
IV. CONDITIONS UNDER THE THIRD CHARTER
OF THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY.

At the request of the directors and after careful investigation, the imperial council at St. Petersburg, on March 5, 1841, decided to renew the charter of the Russian American Company for twenty years. The opinion expressed by the council shows an appreciation of the real service rendered by the Company, in spite of unsatisfactory financial conditions. "In the variety and extent of its operations, no other company can compare with it. In addition to a commercial and industrial monopoly, the government has invested it with a portion of its own powers in governing the vast and distant territory over which it now holds control. A change in this system would now be of doubtful benefit. To open our ports to all hunters promiscuously would be a death-blow to the fur trade while the government, having transferred to the Company the control of the colonies, could not now resume it without great expense and trouble, and would have to create new financial resources for such a purpose."*

This opinion delivered by the council to the Czar, together with the charter defining the privileges and duties of the Company, received his signature Oct. 11, 1844. The new charter did not differ much from that of 1821. The boundary was changed in accordance with the treaties of 1824 and 1825, and additional privileges were granted, providing for trade with certain ports in China and shipping tea direct from Shanghai to St. Petersburg. The Board of Managers, thru its agent, the governor, was the supreme power, tho appeal might be made to the emperor thru the minister of finance.

That the Company was not indifferent to the mineral resources is shown by the fact that in the first charter obtained in 1799, it demanded the exclusive right to all the underground riches of Alaska. However, little was done in the first half of the 19th century in developing the mining industry, because the Company was too much occupied with the fur trade. But the gradual extermination of the sea otter and the discovery of gold in Alaska influenced the Company to give serious attention to the subject of mining. **


So in 1848, Peter Doroshin, a mining engineer, was sent out to look for gold. He found grains of gold, but not in paying quantities. Then in 1852 he was set to work to look for coal. Returning to Russia in 1854, he submitted a report, in which he urged the development of the coal beds at Port Graham. Because of this recommendation and because of the demand for coal in California, the Company decided to venture into the coal mining industry. Accordingly work was begun in 1855; a pump was installed in 1857; the buildings were completed in 1858; and by 1859 there was a tunnel 70 feet long. But in 1860, fire wiped out the whole plant and ruined the machinery. After five years' trial, the Company found it had lost money. The reasons for failure were two: First, the Company was working to obtain immediate returns, and not to develop a mining industry. By 1860 it had not yet touched the principal vein of coal. Second, the Company did not employ skilled miners nor make use of the best machinery. The work was done by Siberian soldiers, on garrison duty in Alaska, who knew nothing of mining, and worked or idled as they pleased. By the time they had learned enough to be useful, their term of military service, five or seven years, expired; and they departed for Russia. Then they were paid by the day, not by the ton; consequently they wasted much time. At one time the mine had one hundred and thirty-one men on the payroll; and the daily output was only from thirty to thirty-five tons.

In 1860 the Russian American Company submitted to the Minister of finance a draught of a new charter, with the request for the renewal for twenty years, commencing from Jan. 1, 1862. During the following year, 1861, Golovnin was sent to investigate. His report in the main was favorable, tho it contained much adverse criticism and suggested many changes. It was followed by a reply from the Creole, Kashevarof, exposing abuses, not known before. These statements were endorsed by Baron Wrangell. The government refused to renew the charter except on such conditions as the Company was unwilling to accept. The conditions determined by the imperial council in 1865 provided that Aleuts and other dependent tribes should be exempt from enforced labor, and that all the inhabitants of Russian America should be allowed to engage in whatever industry they preferred, except fur-hunting.

In order that the work of the Company might continue while negotiations were pending, Prince Maksutof, an officer appointed by the imperial government, took charge of the Company's affairs in 1864. That the renewal of the charter was contemplated, is shown by an extract from the decision of the imperial council, confirmed by its President, the Grand Duke Constantine, on April 2, 1866:
"The Company is allowed to increase its working capital by the issue of new shares, but at the final settlement of the Company's business, within twenty years hence, or later, all claims must be satisfied at the Company's expense, without assistance from the government."

Tho there was much intrigue, and some concessions were obtained, including the promise of a subsidy, yet no satisfactory arrangements were made, so that negotiations were carried on almost until the treaty of cession was consummated.

An added condition which facilitated the cession was the fact that the lease of the Hudson Bay Company was to expire in June 1867. Since the charter of the Russian American Company had already expired, and the lease of the Hudson Bay Company was soon to expire, Russia was at liberty to sell this territory unencumbered by any franchises, privileges, or reservations.

V. RUSSIA'S REASONS FOR THE CESSION.

In the Emperor's refusal to renew the charter of the Russian American Company, we find an important reason why Russia wished to cede this country to the United States. The Company yielded to Russia no adequate return in money and in the development of the agricultural and mineral resources, altho it had great financial advantages. It had a monopoly of all the profits, while sharing only a small part of the burdens of the government.

It had failed to meet the real objects of the concession; to encourage immigration to those regions and to induce settlement of a population which would develop its mining and agricultural resources. This the Company had no idea of doing; on the contrary their interests pointed to discouraging all branches of industry, save the fur trade, from which they derived enormous profits. This business was opposed to agricultural pursuits, since farming tends to clear away the forests and exterminate the wild beasts. The Russian government was much dissatisfied with the fact that the mining and agricultural advantages were thus studiously kept in the background. The development of California benefited the Company greatly in reducing the prices of their supplies of provisions and other articles from abroad; but not the least good resulted to Russia in developing the national resources.

A second reason for the cession lies in the fact that Russia failed to appreciate the real value of the country. This was partly due to ignorance, but chiefly to the unsatisfactory development of the known resources. Russia's real attitude toward the country is expressed in a memorandum written by Kostlivtzov, Oct.8,1867. This was sent by Clay to Seward Nov.21, in answer to Seward's request of Aug.6, asking for a description of the Russian imperial system of division of property in Alaska. *

"In this region no attempts were ever made, and no necessity ever occurred to introduce any system of land-ownership; the country occupied by savages is too vast; they use to camp in certain fit places, generally marked by mountains, rivers, and streams, each having its name, but no fixed boundaries whatever, and their migrations are guided by wild instinct and unbounded will.

*Ex.Doc.,House,2 sess.,40th Cong. (1867-'68) No.177.Clay to Seward,Nov.21,1867.No.25
All this region has neither past nor present, and it may be confidently said of the future, that it is far and impenetrable. Every attempt of civilizing that country will stumble against unconquerable obstacles: the complete absence of local topography, the wild character of the savages, and no less wild character of nature; but, above all, the rigor and inconstancy of climate. To achieve any good results for the future of that country, by means of conquest and violence, would hardly be possible; to drive the savages further into the interior of the American continent, however difficult, would be possible; but this plan will be connected with irrecoverable money and material losses; the more so, that a civilized population will never be attracted to that country; there can be expected speculators, but no permanent settlers; there can be expected no civilized population, no permanent industry, but rather spoilers of the natives and depredatory working out of the riches as well on the surface as in the womb of the earth. Such system can devastate but not organize the country. To civilize the savages would seem to be surer, altho a more difficult way of turning to account the country and its population. This could be affected by two means, working at the same time: by acquainting the natives with objects of material comfort and luxury, as, for instance, the use of bread, tea, and wearing ornaments, and by imparting to them religious instruction; but, to this last end, missionaries familiar with the local dialects are wanted."

Since conditions in Alaska were unsatisfactory and the Company had refused the fourth charter on terms which would improve the situation, something had to be done. The Russian government faced this alternative: either to take over the territory at a great expense, or sell to a friendly power. The Russia's policy was expansion, yet it must be remembered, that in giving up this territory, she was losing no actual portion of her empire, since she had never really occupied this region. Among the stockholders of the Company, there were several members of the Royal family; consequently the government had some control over the affairs of the Company. But Alaska, whose settlements were only encampments, did not share the vitality of Russia; and was not truly a Russian province. Russia realized the expense involved in establishing and maintaining the machinery of colonial government, and in protecting a region separated from the seat of government by the ocean and the breadth of her great empire. She also realized that in case of another struggle with England, all her resources would be needed, and men, ships, and money could not be spared for the protection of this region. Consequently Russia decided to sell to a friendly power.

The motive of friendliness, of good will, toward the
United States as a reason for the cession by Russia, has
been greatly exaggerated. Many think Russia sold Alaska
to United States just because she felt so kindly toward her
friend on the western continent. To be sure the two coun-
tries were friendly, and probably always would remain so,
but Russia was shrewd enough to see that that very friend-
liness would be of advantage to her. Alaska in the hands
of a friendly power would be a safeguard, instead of a
source of danger. Russia realized that under American con-
trol this country would develop more rapidly and be more
easily defended. Thus, as a fourth reason for the cession,
we find an appreciation of the advantage to Russia of Ameri-
can control of Alaska.

A fifth reason for Russia's willingness to sell to the
United States is seen in the desire on the part of Russia
to weaken English influence in America, by conveying the
Russian possessions to a people whose proximity and activity
would create a powerful rival to England. This policy of
yielding her American possessions to us commenced as far
back as 1847, shortly after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidal-
go and our acquisition of California. By a special treaty
with the Spanish government, the Russian American Company
in 1812, established Ft. Ross at Bodega Bay, just north of
San Francisco, as a trading and agricultural station. This
settlement was given up to the United States; but before the
cession and just prior to the discovery of gold, the Russian
Admiral Wrangel was sent out to examine the country and re-
port on the value, probably with a view of asking a consid-
eration for the lands ceded. Admiral Wrangel reported the
country of "no value" and the Russians sold out for a song
to private parties, among whom the pioneer Sutter was the
principal purchaser of crops and cattle. This grant faced
for many leagues on the Pacific coast, immediately in front
of the richest gold mines in the world, discovered very soon
afterwards. It may be a question whether Russia would have
so gracefully presented us with these lands had she known
the priceless value of what she ceded. The terms of the
grant prescribed boundaries north and south; but there was
no limit to its extent into the then unknown interior.

Thus an inquiry into the reasons why Russia was willing
to cede Alaska to the United States shows there were five
main reasons for the cession:

1. Unsatisfactory conditions under the government of
   the Russian American Company.

2. Russia's failure to appreciate the real value of
   the country.

3. The expense involved in governing and defending the
   territory if the Russian government should take it
   over.
4. An appreciation of the advantage to Russia, of American control of the region.
5. A desire to weaken English influence in America.
VI. HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

The idea of cession seems to have first taken shape during the administration of Polk in 1845, when the United States was very close to war with Great Britain over the northwestern boundary.* The suggestion was made that by insisting on 54 degrees, 40 minutes, as the dividing line, and by obtaining from the Emperor Nicholas the cession of his North American possessions, United States might own the Pacific as far as the Arctic Circle. The suggestion appears to have been discussed; but through the dominant influence of slave power in Congress, the project was given up, since Southern, not northern Extension was desired.

The first definite offer of cession was made in the summer of 1854, during the Crimean War, when Baron Stoeckl, the Russian minister in Washington, formally proposed the sale of the whole of Russian America to the United States.** The Russian government considered the time favorable for taking a step to hem in the British possessions on the northwest coast by transferring the Russian possessions to the United States and remove her American possessions from British attack.

The offer was refused by President Pierce and his cabinet for reasons never made public. It is probable that the same reasons induced Pierce, at the same time, to refuse the gift of the whole of the republic of Honduras, which, under the administration of President Cabanas, was tendered to the United States thru Senor Barrundia, a special agent sent hither for that purpose. The proposed cession of Russian America was regarded as the first step toward the acquisition of all the northern part of the continent by the United States. But Pierce and his cabinet timidly feared complications with England and United States was not so sure of her imperial position then, as she has been since the civil war.

*Fred W. Seward, Life of Seward, 3:347
Fred Bancroft, Life of Seward, 2:474
Mentioned by Sumner and several other Congressmen in their Speeches.

**Ex. Doc. House, 2nd Sess. 40th Con., Vol. 13, No. 177, No. 43
raised her to the rank of a great power. Undoubtedly, too, Russia in America was considered worthless by those who were ignorant of its commercial and political possibilities.

But in 1859, during the administration of Buchanan, the scheme was revived; and the Russian government was sounded by Mr. Gwin, Senator from California and Mr. Appleton, Assistant Secretary of State.* By this time there was some public sentiment in the Pacific states in favor of the purchase and Senator Gwin opened an unofficial correspondence and had more than one personal interview with the Russian minister at Washington. Sometime in Dec. 1859, speaking for the President unofficially, he declared that "Russia was too far off to make the most of these possessions, and that, as we were near, we could derive more from them." He further said: "The United States could go as high as five million dollars for the purchase." On another occasion Mr. Appleton said to the minister: "The President thought the acquisition would be very profitable to the states on the Pacific; that he was ready to follow it up, but wished to know in advance if Russia was ready to cede; that, if she were, he would confer with his Cabinet and influential members of Congress." Although this was unofficial, it was promptly communicated to the Russian government who gave it careful consideration. Prince Gortchakoff, in a despatch which reached here early in the summer of 1860, said: "The offer was not what might have been expected, but that it merited mature reflection; that the Minister of Finance was about to inquire into the condition of these possessions; after which Russia would be in a condition to treat." He added as his own opinion: "He was by no means satisfied personally that it would be for the interest of Russia politically to alienate these possessions, that the only consideration which could make the scales incline that way would be the prospect of great financial advantages, but that the sum of five million dollars did not seem in any way to represent the real value of these possessions." In conclusion he asked the minister to tell Appleton and Gwin that the sum offered was not considered an equitable equivalent. At this time slavery politicians still had power and it is doubtful if the acquisition of territory too far north for slavery, would have been sanctioned, even if Russia had been willing. Buchanan was soon out of office and the subject, never known to many persons, seems to have been entirely forgotten in the pressing interests of the Presidential election and Civil War.

A distorted account of these negotiations must have reached the region involved, for at Kodiak, not later than 1861, the transfer was regarded almost as a certainty.*

The manager of this district declared that arrangements with the United States were almost completed. However, nothing more was heard of the matter at Kodiak, until a few weeks before the transfer occurred. Mr. Clay, the American Minister at St. Petersburg, in a letter to Seward of May 10, 1867, tells of his indirect aid in keeping the subject before the Russian government.* His attention was first called to the matter in 1863, when coming over the Atlantic with Hon. R. J. Walker, upon whom he urged the importance of American ownership of the western coast of the Pacific in connection with the vast trade with China, Japan and the Western islands. Walker said that the Emperor was willing to give us Russian America if we would close up our coast possessions to 54 degrees, 40 minutes. But because of slave interests, we yielded the point and let England into the great ocean. Clay said that since then, in connection with the necessity of our owning one end of a European telegraph line, quite independent of England, he had urged the Russian authorities, in a private way, to put the privileges of the Hudson Bay Company in our hands, in view of having the natives friendly to us and having one telegraph line in time of war.

But a few citizens on the Pacific, who realized the value of Russian America to the fishing industry, did not allow the subject to be long neglected, but sought the intervention of the National Government in behalf of their interests. In Jan. 1866, the Legislature of Washington Territory passed a memorial, requesting the president to obtain such rights and privileges of the government of Russia as would enable American fishing boats to visit the ports and harbors of that region, to obtain fuel, water, provisions, and assistance for the sick and disabled, together with the privilege of curing fish and repairing vessels.** It was further requested that the Treasury Department forward the necessary licenses, abstract journals, and log books, in order that the fishermen might obtain the bounties provided and paid to fishermen in the Atlantic states; and that the United States Naval fleet explore and survey the fishing banks from Cortes Bank to Bering Straits. This memorial, presented to the President in February, was referred to the Secretary of State, who communicated it to Stoeckl, with the suggestion of some early and comprehensive arrangement to prevent the growth of difficulties over fisheries.

California also realized that her interests were involved with those of Russian America and thru Senator Cole, was work-

* Dip. Cor. 2nd Sess., 40th Cong. 1:390
** Ex. Doc. House, 2nd Sess., 40th Cong., Vol. 13, No. 177
Doc. No. 1
ing to establish an American Fur-trading Company. It must be remembered that Prince Gorchakoff, in reply to Senator Gwin's proposal in 1859, had promised an inquiry; and in 1861, Captain Lieutenant Golowin of the Russian navy made a detailed report on these possessions. Thus Mr. Cole had the advantage of his predecessor, in that the Russian government was in possession of exact knowledge of the unsatisfactory conditions in Russian America. In behalf of certain persons from California, Cole proposed an American Fur-trading Company with the same charter as the Hudson Bay Company, but held directly from the Russian government. It was even suggested that the Company should pay to the Russian government five percent on the gross proceeds of their transactions and should also aid in civilizing the Indians by employing missionaries.

Altho not authorized to act, Cole repeatedly saw the Russian minister at Washington on the subject, and had conferences with the State Department. He finally addressed Clay, the minister at St. Petersburg, who laid his applications before the Russian government. In 1867, February, Clay wrote to Cole that the President of the Russian American Company was in correspondence with the Hudson Bay Company about the renewal of the lease and could not enter into negotiations with United States or the California Company, until he had a definite answer. Clay added as his opinion that if the President could get off with the Hudson Bay Company, he would do so, when United States could make some arrangements with the Russian American Company.

In October, Stoeckl returned home on leave of absence promising his best exertions to further promote the good relations existing between the two governments. The application from the United States was under consideration while he was at St. Petersburg; but the Russian government was not inclined toward the arrangement proposed, as it was a time of crises with regard to these possessions, since the existing government was not adequate. As he was leaving for America in February, 1867, the Archduke Constantine, brother and chief adviser of the Emperor, handed him a map with the lines in our treaty marked upon it, and told him he might treat for cession within those boundaries. Returning to Washington early in March, he at once entered into negotiations with Seward; and terms were soon agreed upon and sent to Russia for approval.

The whole negotiation consists of two brief notes. On March 23rd, Seward wrote to Stoeckl:

"I must insist upon that clause in the 6th article of
the draught which declares the cession to be free and unincumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate, Russian or any other, and must regard it as an ultimatum; with the President's approval, however, I will add $200,000 to the consideration money on that account."

Stoeckel replied on March 25th:

"In answer, I believe myself authorized, Mr. Secretary of State, to accede literally to this request on the conditions indicated in your note."

Baron Stoeckly in person, communicated to Seward the contents of a telegram, which arrived at ten o'clock on the night of March 29th, in answer to one of 9000 words, written by him, and sent by the State Department's telegraph a day or two previous.*** This telegram, dated March 16/28, gave the Emperor's consent to the cession for $7,2000,000 in gold, and invested Stoeckl with full powers to negotiate and sign the treaty.

*** John Bigelow; Retrospections of an Active Life, 4:53.
VII. THE TREATY OF PURCHASE.

Friday evening, March 29th, Seward was playing whist with his family, when the Russian minister called.

"I have a despatch from my government by cable. The Emperor gives his consent to the cession. Tomorrow, if you like, I will come to the department and we can enter upon the treaty," announced Stoeckl.

Seward, with a smile of satisfaction, pushed the table away, saying:

"Why wait till tomorrow, Mr. Stoeckl? Let us make the treaty tonight."

"But your department is closed. You have no clerks, and my secretaries are scattered about the town."

"Never mind that," replied Seward, "if you can muster your legation together before midnight, you will find me awaiting you at the department, which will be open and ready for business."

Secretaries and clerks were summoned and the State Department was opened. To the Assistant Secretary of State was assigned the duty of finding Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to inform him of the negotiations in progress, and request his advocacy of the treaty in the Senate. Late that evening Mr. Sumner on reaching home found a note from Seward: "Can you come to my house this evening? I have a matter of public business in regard to which it is desirable that I should confer with you at once."

Without delay he hurried to Seward's home, only to find that the Secretary had left for the Department. His son, the Assistant Secretary, was at home and was soon joined by Stoeckl. From these two, Sumner for the first time learned that the treaty for cession was about to be signed. The Russian Minister, with map in hand, explained to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the proposed boundary, according to verbal instructions from the Archduke Constantine. After a brief conversation in which Sumner inquired and listened, without expressing any opinion, the two left together. The Minister was on his way to the Department where the treaty was copying and as they parted at twelve o'clock, he said, with significant interest: "You will not fail us."
The treaty was signed and sealed about four o'clock on the morning of March 30, the last day of the current session of Congress.

During the morning when the Senate was considering administrative delinquences, its favorite theme, the Sergeant-at-arms announced: "A Message from the President of the United States." Glances were exchanged and some muttered: "Another veto." Great was the surprise when the Secretary ejaculated: "A Treaty for the Cession of Russian-America." Then was read the Message from the President, transmitting the treaty to the Senate "for its consideration, with a view to ratification;" "which treaty was this day signed in this city by the plenipotentiaries of the parties."

Mr. Sumner, one of the President's opponents, rose and made a motion:

"Ordered, That the said treaty, together with the message and accompanying documents, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and printed in confidence for the use of the Senate."

The matter was talked over in the cloak room after adjournment. One Senator said: "I thought we were going to have another hack at Andy Johnson today, but it looks now as if we were going to vote for the biggest and most unheard-of thing the Administration has done yet."

On April first the Senate convened in Executive Session by proclamation of the President and the Committee proceeded to the consideration of the treaty. The Committee was composed of Sumner as Chairman; Harlan of Iowa; Morton, of Indiana; Patterson of New Hampshire; and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland. Sumner was controlled less by the desire of expansion; but more by willingness to dismiss another European sovereign from our continent and by a sense of gratitude to Russia for her uniformly friendly attitude towards the North during the Civil War. Only one member of the Committee, Fessenden of Maine, dissented.

On Monday, April 8th, the treaty was reported without amendment, with the recommendation that the Senate advise and consent. On the motion of Sumner, and by unanimous consent, the treaty was read the second time and considered as in Committee of the Whole. It was then ordered that the further consideration be postponed until the following day.

On the next day, April 9th, the Senate, in the Committee of the whole, resumed the consideration of the treaty. Sumner
made an effective and scholarly speech of three hours in favor of ratification. A motion by Fessenden to postpone its further consideration was voted down by twelve to twenty-nine. After further debate the final question of ratification was put and carried by a vote of thirty-seven to two. On the motion of Fessenden that the yeas and nays be made known, it was found that Fessenden of Maine and Morrill of Vermont voted against ratification.

The Senators interested in the question invited Sumner to write out his remarks and give them to the public. He hesitated, but taking advantage of vacation, applied himself to the work, following precisely in order and subdivision the notes of a single page from which he spoke. The speech appeared May 24. The Boston Journal published it at length with the following remark: "This speech...exerted a most marked, if not decisive, effect in favor of the ratification of the treaty."

The treaty, written in the English and French languages, was ratified by the United States May 28; ratifications were exchanged June 20; and on the same day the treaty was proclaimed by the President. The Preamble declares that the contrasting powers, "being desirous of strengthening, if possible the good understanding which exists between them, have for that purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries." *

Article I defines the extent of the territory. The Emperor agrees to cede, upon the exchange of ratifications "all the territory and dominion" possessed by him "on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands." The Eastern limit as described, is the line of demarcation between the Russian and British possessions, established by the Anglo-Russian convention of Feb. 28/16, 1825. It provided that, beginning at the southern point of Prince of Wales Island, which touches the parallel 54 degrees, 40 minutes north between 131 degrees and 133 degrees west longitude, "the line should ascend to the north along Portland Channel till it strikes, on the Continent, the 56th degree of north latitude; that from this point it should follow the summit of the mountains, situated parallel to the coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude ...; and finally from the said point of intersection, (should follow) the said meridian line of the 141st degree in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean." Prince of Wales Island was to belong wholly to Russia; and whenever the "summit of the mountains parallel to the coast from the 56th de-

*U.S.Statutes at Large 15: 539-43
gree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the
141st degree of west longitude "should" prove to be at a dis-
tance of more than ten marine leagues, (thirty geographical
miles), from the ocean," the boundary should be "formed by
a line parallel to the winding of the coast," and "never to
exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom."

The Western boundary of the territory was defined by a
water line, beginning in Bering Strait and proceeding north
and south. Beginning at a point in the Straits on the paral-
lel 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude at its intersection
by the meridian which passes midway between the islands Kru-
senstern (or Ingalook) and Ratmanoff (or Noonarbook) it "pro-
ceeds due north without limitation "into the "Frozen Ocean".
Extending southward from the same point, it "proceeds thence
in a course nearly southwest, thru Behring's Straits and Beh-
ring's Sea, so as to pass midway between the northwest point
of the island of St. Lawrence, and the southeast point of
Cape Chokotoki, to the meridian of 172 degrees west lon-
gitude; thence from the intersection of that meridian in a
southwesterly direction, so as to pass midway between the
Island of Atten and the Copper Island of the Kormandorski
couplet or Group in the North Pacific Ocean, to the meridian
of 193 degrees west longitude, so as to include in the terri-

tory conveyed the whole of the Aleutian Islands east of that
meridian."

Article II defines what the dominion includes. In the
cession are included "the right of property in all public
lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings,
fortifications, barracks, and other edifices which are not
private property." The churches are to remain "the property
of such members of the Greek Oriental Church resident in the
territory, as may choose to worship therein." Archives, pa-
pers, and documents relative to the territory will be left
in the possession of the agent of the Unites States but an
authenticated copy of such will be given by the United States
to the Russian government or to subjects that apply for them.

Article III refers to the rights of inhabitants of the
ceded territory. Inhabitants,"according to their choice,
reserving their natural allegiance, may return to Russia
within three years,"but if they prefer to remain: excepting
the uncivilized native tribes, they "shall be admitted to
the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities
of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, prop-
erty, and religion." "The uncivilized tribes are to be "sub-
ject to such laws and regulations as the United States may,
from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of
that county."

Article IV provides for the appointment of agents for formally delivering and receiving the ceded territory and "for doing any other act which may be necessary in regard thereto." The cession, with the right of immediate possession, is to be deemed complete and absolute on the exchange of ratifications without formal delivery.

By Article V, immediately after the exchange of ratifications, fortifications or military posts in the ceded territory shall be delivered to agents of the United States and any Russian troops withdrawn as soon as "reasonably and conveniently practicable."

Article VI provides that the United States shall pay at the treasury in Washington, within ten months after the exchange of ratifications, to the diplomatic representative or other agent of the Emperor authorized to receive, $7,200,000 in gold. The cession is declared to be "free and unincumbered by any reservations, privileges, franchises, grants, or possessions, by any associated companies, whether corporate or incorporate, Russian or any other, or by any parties, except merely private individual property holders." The cession conveys all rights, franchises, and privileges now belonging to Russia.

Article VII declares that when the treaty is ratified by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and by the Emperor, the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within three months from the date thereof or sooner if possible.

Bodisco arrived in Washington in June, and on June 20th, ratifications were exchanged. Captain Pestchaurof of the Russian navy and Major-General Rousseau of the American navy were commissioners appointed to affect the transfer.* Rousseau sailed from New York Aug. 31, via Panama, reaching San Francisco Sept. 22. As Halleck had the ships laden and ready, he embarked Sept. 27. The open sea was very rough, so the inland route, by Victoria and the Straits was taken. Oct. 4 he paused for coal at Victoria, and on Oct. 6 steamed for Alaska, reaching Sitka, Oct. 18, at eleven o'clock.

Three thirty was the time fixed for the transfer. The ceremony was begun by lowering the Russian flag and by firing salutes alternately from the American and Russians. An interruption occurred, occasioned by the Russian flag catching in the ropes. The United States flag was then attached and began its ascent, with the Russian battery leading in the salutes. When the salutes were finished, Pestchauroff stepped up to Rousseau and said: "General Rousseau, by authority from his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, I transfer to the United States the Territory of Alaska;" and, in as few words, Rousseau acknowledged the acceptance of the transfer, and the ceremony was at an end. Three cheers were spontaneously given for the United States flag by the American citizens present, an occurrence which formed no part of the program.

The ceremony was a christening as well as a transfer. During the progress of the treaty there had been frequent discussions in the State Department, and the cabinet as to the name of the new territory. The name "Sitka" was suggested from the capital, "Yukon" from the chief river, "Oonalaska" and "Aleutia" from the chain of islands, and "Alaska" or "Alastia" from its great peninsula. A strenuous effort was also made to have it called Walrussia. The final decision rested with Seward, who preferred Alaska. This name was generally accepted, and began to be used even before the transfer. It is an English corruption of the native word, "Al-ay-ek-sa," probably meaning "The Great Land," or "Mainland."

After the transfer, Pestchauroff, Rousseau, and the governor set to work to distinguish between public and private property. All government houses, schools, free lots of ground, and all buildings in any wise used for public purposes, were delivered to the United States commissioner, taken possession of, and turned over to General Davis, as were the public archives of the Territory, and, in a spirit of liberality, the wharf and several valuable warehouses belonging to the Russian American Company were included in the transfer by the Russian commissioner. Both the wharf and warehouses were very much needed by the United States. The Russian American Company left an agent for the disposal of furs, provisions, etc., at Sitka and Kodiak. Full inventories were taken; legalized certificates were given to owners of property; and it was decided that no tax should be levied until Congress should otherwise direct. Congress failed to provide for the government of the new territory, so it was added to the military department of Washington, and General Rousseau was assigned to the command, under orders of the War Department. The customs, however, were collected by the Treasury Department.

Alaska was governed by the War Department until 1877, when the Treasury Department took control. This lasted until
the passage of the Act of 1884, which extended over the territory, the laws of the State of Oregon, so far as applicable; created a judicial district and a land district; put in force the mining laws of the United States; and gave the country an administrative system. The influx of settlers after the discovery of gold rendered more adequate laws necessary, so in 1899 and 1900 Congress made provision for a code of civil and criminal law, and in 1903, passed a homestead act. By the Act of May 7, 1906, Alaska was given the power to elect a Delegate to Congress; and the Act of Aug. 24, 1912, provided for the creation of a Territory legislature. And, in passing, it might be said that Alaska has adopted prohibition, the eight-hour day, and votes for women.
VIII. THE RUSSIAN FLEET AND THE CIVIL WAR.*

An investigation of the reasons why the United States purchased Alaska, necessitates a consideration of the influence of the visit of the Russian Fleet to the United States during the Civil War. Russia played her diplomatic game so well that the idea was prevalent that the Fleet came here for the benefit of the North and the visit was regarded as the climax of the friendly relations existing between the two nations. Gratitude to Russia for her friendship, at a time when other nations were hostile, was the most powerful single motive which induced the United States to buy, when Russia wished to sell her America possessions.

During the Civil War Russia was having trouble with Poland. The Polish rebellion in 1830-31 was crushed by Nicholas I and followed by stern repression and autocracy. With the accession of Alexander II in 1855, a change for the better was expected, but year after year passed and conditions remained the same. Finally on Feb. 25, 1861, the discontent was first shown openly; and during the following two years became so formidable as to cause deep concern to the whole of Europe. On the night of June 15, 1836, the Russian police entered the homes of the most active participants in the revolt, and arrested the men with a view to putting them into the army. This act stirred all Europe to such an extent that Russia expected to have to defend her cause by arms.

In February of the same year, Prussia, desiring the friendship of Russia and the collapse of the uprising, had concluded a military convention, binding the two nations to aid one another in putting down revolt. On April 17, France, England and Austria, thru their representatives, addressed a note of remonstrance to Prince Gortchakov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, saying that the Polish question was an international one, having been made so by the Congress of Vienna, and consequently all those who signed the treaty of 1815 should have a voice in the settlement. Russia replied that the question was purely domestic and no intervention would be acceptable; but she would yield so far as to consult the powers directly concerned, Austria and Prussia. Since Prussia was already on her side, this reply was equivalent to a refusal.

Since in June 1863 war seemed inevitable, General-Adjutant Krabbe, who directed the navy while the Grand Duke Constantine was absent in Warsaw, began work on a plan of campaign; submitted his report on July 5; and on July 7 the Emperor accepted his proposition. The Russian fleet at that time was very weak, consisting of a small squadron in the Pacific, seven war vessels at Cronstadt, and a frigate in the Mediterranean. Nearly all the vessels were of wood and though they had engines, still the principle means of transportation was by sail, since steam was resorted to only in case of urgent necessity. Krabbe's idea was that the fleet was too weak for effective fight against the combined naval strength of England and France; but was strong enough to prey upon their commerce. If the fleet remained at home, it probably would be blocked in. Therefore the ships must be sent away; singly so as not to arouse England's suspicion, to an apparent destination in the Pacific or Mediterranean. If the purpose failed, the Russian cause would not suffer; if it succeeded, much good might result.

Rear Admiral Lisovskii, placed in command of the Atlantic fleet, was instructed to proceed directly to New York. It was considered preferable to keep all his ships there but if such an arrangement was inconvenient for the American government, he might, with the advice of the Russian representative in Washington, dispose of his vessels among the various Atlantic ports. The method of procedure was left to his judgment. Altho he was primarily to operate in the Atlantic, yet he was at liberty to shift to any part of the globe and to divide his forces as he might think best.

The fleet was accorded a warm welcome on its arrival in New York. The Brooklyn Navy Yard and other resources of the Navy Department were placed at the service of the Russian Admiral; deputations from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and other states came to pay their respects; balls and banquets were given; and the name of the Emperor was cheered as the emancipator of the serfs and the friend of America. All reference to the European situation was avoided. The real purpose of the visit was thus concealed and Americans believed that the fleet came especially for their benefit.

Popov in command of the Pacific squadron reached San Francisco Oct.12. During that winter San Francisco was without the protection of a man-of-war. When it was reported that two Confederate cruisers, the Sumter and the Alabama, were planning to attack the city, Popov gave definite orders to prevent such an attack. Copies of these orders, sent to Stoeckl, Krabbe and Gortchakov, brought forth replies and
comments which show clearly Russia's attitude toward the Civil War. March 13 Stoeckl wrote to Popov that so far as Russia was concerned, there was neither North nor South, but only a United States; Russia had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation; and Popov should keep out of the conflict. Only when a cruiser should pass a fort and threaten a city, would he "then have the right, in the name of humanity, and not for political reasons, to prevent this mischief". Stoeckl hoped he would not be obliged to use force and involve the Russian government in a situation which it was trying to keep out of.

Gortchakov disapproved of Popov's plans and urged on him the strictest neutrality. He had foreseen the possibility of such a situation, for in a letter to Krabbe on Jan. 27, 1862, he had pointed out that although Russia had not declared her neutrality in the war between the states, yet her status was exactly the same as if she had done so. Russia did not intend to support the North against the South and naval officers should be warned on that point.

Gortchakov had made his position clear to the American government more than once. In conversation with Bayard Taylor our charge d'affaires, on Sept. 27, 1862, he had said:

*"We desire above all things the maintenance of the American union. We can not take any part more than we have done. We have no hostility to the southern people."

Altho the cruise had nothing whatever to do with American affairs, nevertheless it is interesting to know why United States ports were selected as a base of operations. The friendly relations that had always existed between the two nations were strengthened by the fact that the two governments had similar problems and the same European enemies. Alexander had freed the serfs; Lincoln was emancipating the slaves. United States had been invited by France to join the European powers in dictating to Russia upon the Polish question and had declined; Russia had been asked by France to intervene in the Civil War and had refused. Russia was fighting against insurrection; United States to put down rebellion.

Aside from the motive of friendliness, the strategic importance of the United States ports is evident. To carry out Krabbe's plan, the ships could not remain in Russia; and no other place in Europe was friendly. If anchored in an Atlantic port, the ships, could dash out quickly and be on the trade routes in a short time. In the Pacific, every other available harbor was in the hands of Russian enemies.

*Ex.Doc., 38 Cong., 1 sess., II 840 (1863-64)
or under their influence. In Chinese or Japanese ports there was danger of being blockaded, since the enemy could hear two or three weeks earlier. The Northern Pacific stations had no communications, provisions, nor means of repairing ships.

During the winter the war clouds disappeared; the insurrection was gradually put down; and the excitement subsided. Officers of the Russian navy assert that the coming of the fleet to America was in a very great measure responsible for England's change of attitude and therefore for the prevention of the war. One writer, Voennaia Entsiklopediia, states that Alexander II regarded this cruise as one of the greatest practical achievements in the history of the Russian navy.

The moral support which this visit gave to the cause of the Union, no one can question. When European powers were plotting against us, and when conditions at home were discouraging, the fact that Russia was our friend put life and strength into the north. Every one regarded the visit as a special mark of friendship. Writing to *Bayard Taylor on Dec. 23, 1863, Seward said:

"In regard to Russia, the case is a plain one. She has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best."

Rhodes excellently states its effect on the whole nation:

"The friendly welcome of a Russian fleet---added another element to the cheerfulness which prevailed in the closing months of 1863."

Tho it is true that the fleet was not ordered to America for our benefit, nevertheless this should not blind us to the fact that we did profit by the event. The diplomatic situation is a most extraordinary one. Each nation rendered a distinct service to the other, tho not conscious it was contributing in any way to the other's welfare.

*Exec. Doc., 38 Cong., 1 sess., II 851
**Rhodes, Hist. of U.S. IV, 418
IX. AMERICAN REASONS FOR THE PURCHASE.

Thus the visit of the Russian fleet was interpreted by the American people as an expression of friendship. This friendship was the main reason why the purchase commended itself to the nation at large. These friendly relations were strengthened by other positive acts. In 1861 an agreement was made to establish a connection between San Francisco and St. Petersburg by inter-oceanic telegraph across Bering Strait. This agreement was sanction by Congress July 1, 1864.**

On Dec. 26, 1864, the Secretary of State invited the Archduke Constantine, the Emperor's principle adviser, to visit the United States, suggesting that such a visit "would be beneficial to us and by no means unprofitable to Russia," but forbearing to specify reasons." Coming as a national guest, he would receive a cordial and most demonstrative welcome." Affairs in Russia prevented the acceptance of this invitation.

On May 16, 1866 Congress passed a joint resolution, declaring the sympathies of the United States with the Emperor at his escape from the assassin.*** Assistant Secretary of Navy Fox was appointed to take the resolution to the Emperor, and embarked for Cronstadt in the Monitor, Miantonomoh, the most formidable ship of our navy. The monitor and the minister were received with unbounded hospitality.

The friendship was the main motive operating on the people at large, yet economic and commercial reasons dominated the people on the Pacific Coast, and in Massachusetts. In addition to the growing fishery industry carried on by the people of the Pacific, which will be referred to later, San Francisco had, for more than a decade, obtained a large amount of ice from Russian America.*' Prior to 1852 the ice used in California was brought from Boston around Cape Horn. In that year the American ship Bacchus, from San Francisco obtained a cargo of ice from Russian America, which consisted of 250

** U.S. Statutes at Large XIII. 340, 341
*** Statutes Vol. XIV, P. 355
tons, for which was paid $18,750 or $75.00 per ton. A company was then formed in San Francisco, called the American Russian Company, that entered into a contract with the Russian American Company to take one thousand tons of ice yearly, at $35 per ton. This contract continued until 1855, when a new contract was made, to last until 1860, which called for three thousand tons per year, at $7 per ton. Ice houses were built at Sitka; but, since the ice was not thick enough there, other houses were built at Wood Island, near Kodiak, with a capacity of six thousand tons. The ice was broken and sawed by a horsepower saw. For many years after the transfer to the United States, the American Company continued to conduct a trading business on the western islands.

Next to the Pacific the region most benefitted was Massachusetts, where there was strong public opinion in favor of the purchase. The whalemens from New Bedford and Nantucket; and the codfishermen from Gloucester and Cape Cod had already monopolized a branch of industry which was yearly becoming of vast importance. A whaler fitted out in New Bedford for forty men, at a cost of $40,000, would come around the Horn, thus consuming two-thirds of the time in making the passage, while at the same time, paying and feeding forty men, and have to compete with a vessel sailing from Puget Sound or Sitka and making a successful voyage in four months. The whaling interests were heaviest in the seas adjacent to Russian America, above and below Bering Strait, where the whalers were liable to interference and absurd regulations from Russia and England, who dominated Baffin's Bay. The purchase of Alaska was of great benefit to the Massachusetts whalers, since whaling ports could now be established along the whole coast and products could be shipped home on coasting voyages.

Seward was known as an expansionist. The speech he delivered at St. Paul, in Sept., 1860, is significant as showing his attitude toward Russian America.

"Standing here, and looking far off into the Northwest, I see the Russian, as he busily occupies himself in establishing seaports, and towns, and fortifications, on the verge of this continent, as the outposts of St. Petersburg; and I can say: Go on and build up your outposts all along the coast, up even to the Arctic Ocean; they will yet become the outposts of my own country—monuments of the civilization of the United States in the Northwest! So I look off on Prince Rupert's land and Canada, and see there an ingenious, enterprising and ambitious people, occupied with bridging rivers and constructing canals, railroads, and telegraphs, to organize and preserve great British provinces north of the great lakes, the St. Lawrence, and around the shores of Hudson Bay, and I am able to say, "It is very well,
you are building excellent states to be hereafter admitted into the American Union."

While expansion was Seward's main motive for the purchase of Alaska, yet the American people were rapidly becoming convinced of the value of expansion as a means to supremacy. There was no longer any doubt of the wisdom of rapid aggrandisement. The people were satisfied that a republic flourishes best by a constantly aggressive policy; that the best thing to do is to annex as much territory as possible, and as fast as it may be obtained. It was felt to be the duty and destiny of the United States to go on expanding, since no alliances could be made with safety, and the fate of any portion of the continent must ever be a matter of vital concern. The trouble and anxiety experienced by having such neighbors as England in Canada, France in Mexico, and Spain in Cuba, were beginning to convince the most skeptical that the aim of the United States should be to have no neighbors at all. Annexations would serve to show the world that the great republic, so far from having culminated and begun to decline, as was supposed from the Civil War, was really only on the threshold of its greatest era; and would prove that the war had not weakened or deprived the United States of the strength and ambition to go on expanding.

Since the time of the Monroe Doctrine, the idea had steadily grown that United States was destined to extend its republican institutions to all of North America. The purchase of Alaska was thus regarded as one sure step toward the acquisition of the whole continent and particularly toward the acquisition of British Columbia. Letters were sent to Seward from different parts of the country urging that initiatory steps at once be taken to close up the gap by negotiating with England for British Columbia. The people felt that it must be acquired some time; that Great Britain herself knew it was only a question of time, and that, tho reluctant to part with the territory, she would do so then with better grace than later when the question might be presented in a disagreeable aspect. The argument was that the interposed territory would enhance the value of that just acquired in an eminent degree; would silence the opposition or convert the opposition into approval.

There was a good foundation for the expectation that British Columbia would some day be a part of the United States, judging from existing conditions. The formation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867; by the Union of Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, brought vividly before the public the question of the future of British Columbia. Victoria had steadily decreased in population; nearly one third of the houses were untenanted; and brick and granite buildings had decreased

* Seward's Works 4:333
in market value fully 75%. It is true that Victoria had been built under the gold excitement; but her resources were not exhausted, for partial developments had greatly increased their known extent and real value. The main reason for this depletion and depreciation was the fact that six thousand poor but enterprising immigrants to a new country were taxed beyond endurance to support a horde of useless officials, sent ten thousand miles to govern a sparsely settled country. To pay the annual budget, every white man, woman, and child in the colony must pay in some form or other, a tax of $125 each. The public debt of $1,200,000 was unprovided for; annual expenses were estimated at more than #700,000 while the annual income amounted to only $325,000.* The remedies proposed for the improvement of the situation were confederation with Canada and the retrenchment of expenses in the administration of government affairs. The Colonists had no faith that either or both of these measures could do them any good. Confederation with the other British Colonies two thousand miles over the mountains was regarded as utterly at variance with the true interests of British Columbia, and few thinking men in that region favored it. It was urged that the governor's salary be reduced to $12,500 a year, and other officials pro rata; but this partial retrenchment would hardly begin to cover the evil; and if it could, it would not be possible for the British government to make such an innovation in her general colonial policy to suit a special case.

From private advices through an authentic source it was known that public sentiment in British Columbia was almost universally in favor of annexation to the United States. The salaries of our territorial governors were about $2100 a year and under United States jurisdiction that would be the salary of the governor of British Columbia. The progress of American enterprise in the adjoining states and territories presented a marked contrast to conditions in that tax ridden country. The people realized that if they would place their fortunes with the United States, property would soon increase in value 50%; the public debt would be assumed or paid; taxation would be equalized and diminished; and pomposity and extravagance would be exchanged for republican simplicity and rigid economy in public matters.

The resolutions passed by the State Legislature of Minnesota, on March 31, 1868, are significant as an expression of public opinion on this subject. These resolutions requested Congress to confirm by the requisite legislation, the annexation of Alaska to the United States; and further urged the President and Congress to represent to the government of Great Britain that

the purpose to transfer the territory between Minnesota and
Alaska to the Dominion of Canada by an order in council at Lon-
don, without the vote of the people of Selkirk and the settlers
upon the sources of the Saskatchewan River, largely emigrants
from the United States, would be an unwarranted interference
with the principle of selfgovernment and could not be regarded
with indifference by the people of the United States.

Another motive actuating the purchase was to anticipate
the supposed schemes of Great Britain. Sir George Simpson, the
governor-in-chief of the Hudson's Bay Company, declared that,
without the strip of country on the coast, underlet to the Hud-
son Bay Company, the interior would be "comparatively useless
to England". An article, purporting to be taken from the "Brit-
ish Colonist," a newspaper of Victoria, and translated into
German for the instruction of scientific readers, was published
in Berlin in 1863. This article stated that it was unreasonable
to suppose that the strip of land three hundred by thirty, used
by the Russians for the collection of furs and walrus teeth,
would forever control the entrance to the immense British po-
sessions. The sea coast, or some harbor of export, was needed
to protect and maintain commerce; and the necessity of speedy
measures was manifest, for, if the opportunity were let slip,
Great Britain would live to see a Russian city at the gates of
a British colony.

The treaty further commended itself to the public mind,
because it would facilitate and secure the advantages of an un-
limited American commerce with the friendly powers of Japan and
China. The absence of harbors belonging to the United States
limits the outlets, for in all the coast belonging to the United
States, San Francisco is the only valuable harbor, which is ac-
cessible to vessels of heavy draught and at the same time de-
fensible. Puget's Sound with all its bays and harbors, is en-
tirely at the mercy of the English fleet, which, secure in the
easily fortified ports of Vancouver island, commands the whole
strait of Fuca, its entrance. Further north harbors are more
abundant, besides being nearer to Japan and China. The distance
from San Francisco to Hong Kong by the common way, the Sandwich
Islands, is 7,140 miles; by the Aleutian Islands it is 6,060
miles, thus saving 1000 miles. From Sitka or Puget Sound, the
terminus of the Northern Pacific Railroad, the distance would
be shorter yet.

In case of war with any maritime nation, our commerce
need not again be swept from the North Pacific by a single
cruiser, as it was in the Civil War, for, with invulnerable
bays among the islands and the coast, we could protect it against
the world, without keeping a powerful fleet on that sea. Thus
the acquisition of the new territory gives the United States
a foothold for commercial and naval operations, accessible from the Pacific States.

Increased commerce would give a great impetus to ship building and easy communications would have the added advantage of binding the people more closely to the Union.

Thus from our study of the reasons why the United States bought Alaska, we find the following motives paramount:

1. Friendliness and sense of gratitude toward Russia for her uniformly friendly attitude, which reached its climax in the Civil War.
2. The desire of the citizens of the Pacific, and of Massachusetts, to share in the economic advantage of the region, particularly in the prolific fisheries.
3. Expansion as a means to supremacy and position in the eyes of the world.
4. One sure step toward the occupation of the whole continent, and particularly toward the occupation of British Columbia.
5. Anticipation of England's supposed schemes for acquiring the sea coast.
6. To facilitate and secure the advantages of an unlimited American commerce with Japan and China.
X. RECEPTION OF THE TREATY.

The treaty of purchase immediately encountered popular opposition. It was natural that a treaty, negotiated by one man, with the utmost secrecy, should be greeted with raillery in conversation and ridicule in the press. The New York Tribune, the leading Radical organ, accustomed to dictation, instantly pronounced against it. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, did not consider this opposition of much consequence. Wednesday, April 17, 1867, he wrote in his diary: "Mr. Greeley made a ferocious attack on the treaty, ridiculed and denounced the acquisition; but he found he had no influence, where he thought himself all powerful.*" Inside and outside of government circles, the purchase was freely characterized as "Seward's Folly", "Seward's Icebox" and Johnson's "polar bear garden". Seven million dollars for this "remote, inhospitable, and inaccessible" region, was considered a "bad bargain," palmed off on a "silly administration" by "shrewd Russians". It was a "barren, worthless, God-forsaken region", whose only products were "icebergs and polar bears." The ground was "frozen six feet deep"; the "streams were glaciers"; vegetation was "confined to mosses"; and "no useful animals could live there" except a few "wretched fish" fit only for "wretched Esquimaux" to eat.

A New York member of the House of Representatives said:

"The people of this country do not want these possessions. If submitted to them, they would reject the treaty by a majority of millions."

B.F. Butler of Massachusetts declared if it was necessary to pay this amount to Russia for her friendship, we should give her the money and let her keep Alaska! "I have no doubt that any time within the last twenty years we could have had Alaska for the asking......No one, except one insane enough to buy the earthquakes of St. Thomas, and the icefields in Greenland, could be found to agree to any other terms for its acquisition by the country."

One important reason for the opposition was undoubtedly the unwillingness to admit that anything wise or right could be done by "Andy Johnson's Administration". However in view of the fact that Alaska was explored but little by Russia at the time of the purchase, and not at all by the United States

*Diary of Gideon Welles, 3:83
and in consequence of which there was such absolute and universal ignorance of any of its great possibilities, the foregoing sentiment undoubtedly represented the opinion of a large majority of the Nation at that time.

Mr. Clay, the American ambassador at Russia, in a letter to Seward, written May 10, 1867, summarized the popular attitude in Russia toward the treaty.* He said that in Russia, as in England and the United States, there was beginning to be a party of "ins" and "outs"; and the "outs" attacked the treaty, to make interest against the administration. Russians are very jealous of foreigners, and are opposed traditionally to the ceding of territory; yet in consequence of the good feeling everywhere prevailing toward the United States, the opinion may be regarded as popular. Some said: "Well, we have sold to you too cheaply, but 'tis all in the family;" others favored the treaty because Americans, perpetual friends of Russia were to be near their eastern possessions, in the hopes it might ultimately lead to the expulsion from the Pacific of nations whose power in the east was justly feared.

The treaty had a deep significance in world politics, as a public expression of friendliness between two vast powers, engaged in the same work of expansion. Despite the aggressive policy of Prussia, or the menacing silence of France, no two nations were watched with more solicitude, as likely to accomplish such stupendous results. The specific, ultimate object at which Russia aimed was the acquisition of the European possessions of the Sultan. United States did not define her aspirations, but looked quietly forward to the time when the"whole boundless continent "would form one unbroken republic." The remarkable "entente cordiale", which for a quarter of a century had been increasing between the two nations, reached its climax in the Alaska Treaty. Besides Russia and United States were apt to remain friendly, since they had neither territorial nor maritime jealousies to cause disputes.

The treaty vexed England and France. If time and publicity had been given to the movements of the United States, there is no doubt there would have been most energetic protests, if not positive armed intervention to prevent it. The existing "entente cordiale", between England and France began in a common understanding to limit the power of the United States on the American continent and elsewhere. The strange and unexpected alliance between Russia and the United States took them by surprise. England and France realized that they were now no match for the United States and

*Dip. Cor. 2nd Sess, 40th Cong. 1; 39D-392
Russia; and that the weight of power with the coming years would be still more on the side of the United States.

France feared American aid in European troubles. The cession, so contrary to Russian policy and traditions, was much discussed in all the political circles of Paris, where it was regarded with far more real anxiety than by the Parisian press, often grossly ignorant of foreign questions.* French politicians thought that Russia drew closer to the United States because she saw the moment approaching when a powerful navy ally would be invaluable to her in European waters; that she was already secretly bound to Prussia with the understanding that if matters should come to a crisis, Prussia should not yield to France on the Luxemburg question; and in consequence of this alliance, and with regard to events which might develop out of it, Russia strengthened the bond of unity already existing between herself and America...

In contrast to the speculations of politicians, Prevost-Paradol expressed conservative French opinions in a letter to John Bigelow, written April 24th, 1867.** He approved of the treaty as far as territorial expansion was concerned, having always considered the possession of the whole of the North American continent by the United States as an unavoidable event, and also rather favorable to the interests of France and of mankind itself. But he should see with regret and anxiety and alliance of the United States with Russia in European troubles, especially on the Eastern question. He hoped we were still far from this meddling policy.

The Canadian press expressed its disapproval in sarcasm. The Toronto Globe declared that the sole object of the United States in acquiring this territory was the miserable advantage of shutting off the northern portion of British Columbia from direct access to the Pacific.*** It might afford United States the opportunity of making themselves as unpleasant as possible to the bold pioneers who penetrated the northern regions of British Columbia. But the acquisition of 481,276 square miles of ice, with a population of three thousand Cossacks and fifty thousand savages was hardly to be coveted by anyone not afflicted with the insatiable craving for useless territory. The exultation of the United States over so sterile an acquisition gave some estimate of the cruel longing that afflicts them for the possession of British America.

*National Intelligencer, Our Paris Cor., Tues., Rpr. 23, 1867
**John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, 4:67
*** National Intelligencer, Tues. April 9, 1867
The Montreal Gazette declared that Russia administered this "howling wilderness, famous for its annual crop of icebergs," as a salve to the national vanity of the United States; the United States government had jumped at the bait; and Congress doubtless would eagerly accept the extremely generous gift. The one thing necessary was that the North Pole be thrown into the bargain.

England regarded the treaty with no little suspicion, especially in view of the "groundless jealousy" aroused by the consolidation of Canada and the maritime provinces into a confederacy under the British Crown.* She had a clear view of the situation and insight into the real motives for the purchase. Since the value of Alaska was little known, the cession was not supposed to add much to the commercial wealth of the United States; but it did attest the "mysterious sympathy", which had so long existed between Russia and the United States. To England the cession meant one thing: United States was invited to take possession of the whole of North America under the patronage of Russia. The purchase was made with a view of asserting the claims of the United States to supremacy on the North American continent. According to English ideas, the United States did not really further her design, since England retained Canada, more to please the Canadians than the English, and had no intention of selling to the United States, but desired to make the country independent, leaving it to choose its own destiny.

American politicians had not concealed their belief that French imperialists and English constitutionalists were in a conspiracy to propagate their despotic principles in the new world. Consequently the purchase was regarded as a counter demonstration against English aggressive tendencies. The London Times of April 2, 1867, warned the English against placing themselves in a false position by vain remonstrance against an act entirely within the jurisdiction of Russia and the United States, against which they had no right to protest.

* National Intelligencer, Wed. April 17, 1867.
XI. THE STRUGGLE IN THE HOUSE.

The most serious opposition to the Alaska treaty was encountered in the House of Representatives when it was asked to appropriate the amount necessary to fulfill the obligation. $7,200,000 in gold represented more than $10,000,000 in government currency; and many Republicans felt that speculation in rocks and ice was a hazardous political step, on the eve of a Presidential campaign, with the government deeply in debt and paper money still at a heavy discount.

The main objection, however, was found in the fact that Seward, a representative of "Andy" Johnson's administration, utterly disregarding the agency of the House, had taken possession of the territory even before the Appropriation Bill was considered. This apparent forcing of the House to pass the bill revived the old question of the power of the House in regard to treaties; and caused the party of opposition to unearth all possible objections to the purchase.

The struggle in the House over the Appropriation bill started Nov.25,1867 with a resolution, presented by Cadwalader C. Washburn of Wisconsin. This resolution is significant as indicating the character of the opposition which prevailed for the ensuing eight months. "Resolved, That in the present financial condition of the country any further purchases of territory are inexpedient, and this House will hold itself under no obligations to vote money to pay for any such purchase unless there is greater present necessity for the same then now exists."

Upon the inquiry of Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts, as to the meaning of the word "further", Washburn explained that the resolution was not intended to apply to Walrussia, as that was something that had already transpired. But because of the rumors in the papers that the Secretary of State was negotiating for the purchase of St. Thomas, without consulting anyone, and in the absence of public sentiment requiring it, the purpose of the resolution was to serve notice on the kingdom of Denmark that the House of Representatives would not pay for that purchase, and to serve notice on the world that no purchase would be sanctioned or paid for, unless demanded by public sentiment and the best interests of the country.

Bank's objection was that the resolution, if passed, would not bind the House in any way in regard to voting
future appropriations; and if it failed, it would imply that the real objection to the Alaska appropriation bill concerned the question of the power of the House in making treaties.

On Saturday, Dec. 7, 1867, Benj. F. Butler, of Massachusetts offered an amendment to the resolutions by declaring that so much of the President's message as relates to the payment of money for the Russian possessions be referred to the Committee on Appropriations. This amendment was disagreed to; but was submitted again Dec. 9, when a prolonged discussion occurred. Mr. Butler stated that he wished to assert the privileges of the House, "that we shall have the right to say what of the people's money shall be appropriated, how it shall be appropriated, and for what object, without the intervention of any other department of the government binding us. "Because of a feeling abroad that the Senate can, by treaty, bind the House to spend the people's money, thus usurping the control of the revenues of the country, the House should stand on its privilege, where the Constitution has placed it; and should assert its entire independent control over the expenditures of the nation.

This assertion was followed by a spirited controversy concerning the duties of the Committee on Appropriations, as set forth in the 76th Rule of the House; the meaning of the term treaty; the power of the House in treaties requiring appropriations, with special attention to the precedents established by Jay's treaty in 1794 and by the Louisiana purchase in 1803. When the question was taken, the amendment was disagreed to by 73 yeas, 82 nays, and 32 not voting.

On Dec. 11, C.C. Washburn of Wisconsin made a long speech, opposing the Alaska treaty, in which he reviewed the history of Alaska; declared that in the absence of public opinion, favoring it, the House was under no obligations to vote the money, unless the treaty commended itself to their judgment; and claimed that the cession was a poor investment, because of the expense of maintaining a government in that country, the rigorous climate, and the rapid extermination of fur-bearing animals.

John V. L. Pruyn, of New York, briefly answered this speech, refusing to consider the question of value, but looking at it simply as a question of obligation, in which the honor and national position of the government were involved.

On Dec. 16, Fernando Wood of New York offered a resolution stating that the House would reserve to itself the right to judge of the necessity and propriety of making disbursements of the public money without reference to any action of the
President and Senate in the acquisition of territory. This was objected to.

On Dec.19, Washburn of Wisconsin submitted a resolution calling for all correspondence in regard to the question of Russian America, which was considered and agreed to.

Friday, Jan.10, 1868, Butler of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling for information in regard to the reported suffering of soldiers in Alaska. This was objected to, but was again considered on Wednesday, Jan.22, when it was agreed to.

Saturday, March 14, Wm. Higby of California spoke in behalf of the appropriation, since it was a question between two governments, ours and a foreign government, and could not be settled between the House, and the President and Senate alone. He showed the analogy between this situation and the case between the United States and France during Andrew Jackson's administration, when the Legislative department of the French government refused to make the appropriation necessary to pay the $25,000,000 due United States citizens as indemnity. Jackson advised Congress to pass a law authorizing reprisals and spoliations upon French commerce, unless France settled the demand. The measure had the desired effect and the Legislative department of France did its proper work.

Wood of New York objected to the analogy as not justifiable. Then followed a long, heated argument concerning the climate of Alaska.

On March 21, Halbert E. Paine of Wisconsin made a long speech against the treaty.

Monday, May.18, N.P. Banks from the Committee on Foreign affairs reported a bill making the necessary appropriation for the purchase of Alaska, and accompanied it with reports and statements relating to the same. He carefully defined the term treaty, and discussed the status of the treaty-making power under the Articles of Confederation; the Creek Nation Treaty of 1790; the British treaty of 1794; the Spanish treaty of 1819; the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on Treaties; and the Treaty with France of 1831. He next gave a brief history of the origin of the treaty of 1867; and the important provisions of the Russian treaties of 1824, 1832, and 1854; and the treaties between Russia and Great Britain of 1825, and 1859. He discussed in full the character of the country ceded and concluded with a summary of the advantages to be derived from this cession:
1. It adds extended territory to the United States.
2. It tends to the consolidation of the North Pacific coastline.
3. It creates an entirely new industrial interest.
4. It makes the telegraphic communications between the United States and China, Asia and India simple and feasible.
5. It concentrates the power of Russia and extends that of this country.
6. It adds to the productive wealth of the country.
7. It furnishes indispensable ports for whalers and fishermen.
8. It furnishes a basis for Arctic exploration and discovery.
9. It encloses British Columbia within American jurisdiction.
10. It removes the danger of territorial or maritime jealousies.
11. It strengthens the military position of the United States.

On the same day, C.C. Washburn of Wisconsin submitted the minority report. He declared that the treaties of 1824 and 1832 were in full force when the treaty of cession was negotiated and that, before the acquisition, we had every right we can have after it. The four questions involved in the issue were then considered, with emphasis upon the power of the House in respect to treaties.

1. Is the territory valuable and desirable for the United States to possess?
2. Is its present possession of such value and of such importance as to demand so great an outlay at this time?
3. Since the treaty has been ratified, can the House refuse the appropriation without subjecting the government to the charge of bad faith with the government of Russia?
4. Has the House the right to withhold the necessary appropriation to carry the treaty into effect.
The National Intelligencer of Saturday, June 20, 1868, in commenting upon this report, said that it "abounds in great and important errors" and conclusively proved the fallacy of the statements in regard to the fishing rights possessed by the United States before the cession.

Wm. Longbridge of Iowa, by unanimous consent submitted the following preamble and resolutions which were read, considered, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs:

Whereas the treaty of purchase with Russia of March 30, 1867, having been communicated by the President to the House, and it being necessary, before the stipulations of such treaty can be carried into effect, that laws for that purpose should be enacted by Congress; and it appearing by the stipulations of said treaty that the cession with right of possession was to be deemed complete upon the exchange of ratifications; and it appearing further that the President of the United States had already taken possession of said territory without authority from Congress so to do; thus, by the provisions of the treaty and by such subsequent acts thereunder, apparently denying the right of this house to exercise its discretion in relation to the passage of the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect; to the end that the opinion of the House in relation to its powers and prerogatives may be understood, and that no action in relation to this treaty may be misconstrued;

1. Resolved, That as the Constitution delegates to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the treaty-making power, the House of Representatives claims no agency in making treaties. Yet as the Constitution provides that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and provides further that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, where a compact made by the treaty-making power with a foreign government stipulates for the purchase of territory from such foreign government, and for the payment of money by the United States therefore, such stipulation for the payment of money cannot be carried into effect without an act of Congress making an appropriation for that purpose; and that it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives in such case to deliberate upon the expediency or inexpediency of making such appropriations and to determine and act thereon as in their judgment will be most conducive to the public good, and to that end either to make such appropriation or refuse it, in their discretion.

2. Resolved, That the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, has not the constitutional power by
treaty to extend the area of this government and bring within its jurisdiction foreign territory, without the consent of Congress, and until such consent is given no compact to that end is valid or binding upon the government of the United States, and no officer of the United States has any right or authority to take possession of such territory for the government until authorized by law of Congress so to do.

3. Resolved, That having taken into consideration the treaty of purchase between the United States and the Emperor of Russia, communicated by the President, in the opinion of the House it is expedient to pass the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect.

On Saturday June 27, Halbert E. Paine of Wisconsin asked if the Perkins claim would be presented at the same time or before the bill for appropriation. Banks replied that the claim could not be offset against a money appropriation under a treaty which requires a stipulated sum paid in a stipulated manner. Upon the request of Washburn of Wisconsin, the consideration of the bill was decided for the following Tuesday.

Accordingly on Tuesday, June 30, the bill came before the House for discussion. Gen. Banks, as leader of the party favoring the treaty, spoke for an hour and a half in behalf of the appropriation bill. He held that, since a treaty was the "supreme law of the land", it was the duty of Congress to pass the necessary appropriation. He showed the important position of the territory as being substantially contiguous; pointed out the advantages of the cession in reducing the frontage of Great Britain; discussed the intrinsic value of the timber and fisheries; reminded the House of the French precedent of 1831; and maintained that, since one party to the agreement was Russia, our consistent friend at every step of our history, we could not afford to refuse to execute the treaty.

Columbus Delano of Ohio, by unanimous consent, submitted the following resolutions, which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed in the Globe:

Resolved, That all treaties made by the President and Senate which embrace stipulations on legislative subjects expressly vested in Congress by the Constitution, are in their nature incomplete and imperfect until Congress shall have passed such laws as are necessary to carry such treaties into effect; and that this house is not required, by a just interpretation of the Constitution, to pass laws necessary to the execution of such treaties unless it approves the objects
and stipulations therein embraced.

Resolved, That a treaty which stipulates for the payment of money undertakes to do that which the treaty making power cannot do without the aid of legislation, and therefore such a treaty is not the supreme law of the land until the required legislation has been obtained; and members of this house, while deliberating upon propositions for executing such treaty, act on their own judgment and responsibility, and not on the judgment and responsibility of the treaty making power.

Resolved, That foreign governments are presumed to know that the power to appropriate money is vested in Congress, and that no act of any one part of the government can be regarded as a law until such act has the sanction of all departments of the government required by the Constitution to give it the force of law.

Resolved, That the integrity and limits of the territory of this nation cannot be altered or changed except by the will of the nation, given by express grant or implied by acquiescence; and the treaty-making power has no authority under the Constitution to dispose of the nation's territory nor to acquire new territory without obtaining the assent of the nation therefor in one or the other of the forms herein indicated.

In the evening Loughridge of Iowa made a long speech concerning the limits of the treaty-making power. His theory was that the Constitution, by specifically granting certain powers to other departments, thereby limits the treaty-making power. Since all bills for raising revenue must originate in the House, it is the prerogative and duty of that body to deliberate and act according to its judgment in regard to the merits or propriety of an appropriation. Thus while the House has no agency in making treaties, yet when their execution depends upon laws appropriating money, the House by its power to accept or reject an appropriation, thus limits the treaty making power.

He also discussed at length and denied the power of the President with the advice of the Senate, and without that of Congress or of the people of the United States, to extend the area of the government and bring into its jurisdiction foreign countries and people.

Mr. James A. Johnson of California showed how the interests of California were involved in the N. Pacific fisheries and what great advantages would result from the purchase of
Alaska. He considered the House obliged to make the necessary appropriation. Pruyn of New York and Boyer of Pennsylvania also made long speeches; and at 10:10 p.m. the House adjourned, having come to no resolution.

C. C. Washburn of Wisconsin assumed the leadership of the opposition; and answered the speech of Gen. Banks on the following day, July 1st. He submitted five propositions which he wished to demonstrate:

1. Not a soul in the Unites States asked for the treaty at the time it was negotiated.
2. It was secretly negotiated, and in a manner to prevent the representatives of the people from being heard.
3. By existing treaties we possessed every right of any value to us, without the responsibility and expense of governing the savages.
4. The country is absolutely without value.
5. The right and duty of the House to inquire into a treaty, and vote or note vote money, according to its best judgment.

His speech, which lasted for two hours, was an able attempt to demonstrate his radical propositions.

Loughridge of Iowa moved to amend the appropriation bill by inserting first the following preamble and section:

"Whereas the President of the Unites States, on the 30th of March, 1867, entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, by the terms of which it was stipulated that in consideration of the cession by the Emperor of Russia to the United States of certain territory therein described, the United States should pay to the Emperor of Russia the sum of $7,200,000 in coin, and whereas it was further stipulated in said treaty that the United States shall accept of such cession and that certain inhabitants of said territory shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights and immunities of citizens of the United States; and whereas the subjects thus embrace in the stipulations of said treaty are among the subjects which by the Constitution of the United States are submitted to the power of Congress, and over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction; and it being for such reason necessary that the consent of Congress should be given to the said treaty before the same can have full force and effect, having taken into consideration the said treaty, and approving of the stipulations therein, to the end that the same may be carried into effect: Therefore,

Section I. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the assent of Congress is hereby given to the stipulations of said treaty."
Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts moved to amend the bill by adding to it the following:

"Provided, That no purchase in behalf of the United States of foreign territory shall be hereafter made until after provision by law for its payment. And it is hereby declared that all powers vested by the Constitution in the President and Senate to enter into treaties with foreign governments do not include the power to complete the purchase of foreign territory before the necessary appropriations shall be made therefore by act of Congress."

Wm. Mungen of Ohio proposed that twenty days after the date when Congress assents to the proposition, a Company of gentlemen should pay into the Treasury of the United States, $10,000,000 in gold, for the territory of Alaska, taking fee-simple therefor and leaving the right of eminent domain in the government of the United States. Some of the wealthiest men in the United States stood ready to make good his proposition. He favored the treaty because it caged the British lion on the Pacific coast, and crippled the Hudson's Bay Company, which had so long monopolized almost exclusively the fur trade of North America, which justly belonged to the American people.

Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota said he did not give any attention to the question of the control possessed by the House over the treaty-making power, for the House was the ultimate judge of the propriety of such an appropriation, and practically had the power to give or refuse its consent. But he favored the treaty, because it was one of the necessary steps in the expansion of our institutions and nationality over the entire domain; and pointed the way to the acquisition of that great and valuable region of Western British America.

Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania regarded Alaska as valuable, since it contains enough territory for twelve states like Virginia. The exclusive right to take and procure fish and to use timber in repairing ships would greatly add to the resources of the country. He interpreted the Constitution as giving to the President and Senate the sole right to make treaties, which, when made, are the supreme law of the land.

In the evening, Horace Maynard of Tennessee stated as his object to inquire into the nature and legal effect of a treaty; whether it has obligatory force or is a mere proposition to be accepted or disregarded at pleasure. He favored the appropriation because he wished to keep the plighted faith of the nation.
Then Leonard Myers of Pennsylvania declared that the action of the President and Senate did not bind the House to complete the purchase, for the people of the United States might thus be compelled to accept a country, tho inhabited by millions of slaves. He thot the rejection of Alaska unwise, for Russia, having once determined to part with it, would sell to England, who would never let such an opportunity slip, but would jump at the chance to take it off our hands. He discussed the great value of the fur trade and fisheries; and refuted the argument that the place was worthless and the country a bleak, inhospitable, northern region.

Orange Ferris of New York said that the House had never surrendered the right, given to it alone, of originating bills for raising revenue, and the right to refuse or grant appropriations. He hoped the House not only would assert its right, but would, in an emphatic manner, refuse the appropriation, so that all future treaties would be made contingent upon the appropriation by Congress. He followed with a long discussion of this power, in its extent and limitation.

John A. Peters of Maine considered the territory utterly worthless; The proofs of this are: "the fact that Russia is willing to sell, for in all her history she has never surrendered territory unless it was a burden to her; (2) the want of population; (3) the lack of a popular demand for annexation; and, (4), the fact that the territory is not contiguous and neither the language nor the modes of life are like that of the United States. The President and the Senate cannot complete a treaty, which primarily calls for the appropriation of money, without the assent of the Representatives, of the people.

If the treaty making power can buy, it can sell; if it can buy land with money, it can buy money with land. The House should not allow the opportunity to go by for the practical assertion of the fallacy of a doctrine which might at some day destroy the liberties of the people.

James Mullins of Tennessee said that if there were no power to resist a treaty, concluded by the President and the Senate, it would preclude the idea of a three-fold government, with executive, judicial and legislative departments. He, however, would vote for the appropriation, because the American nation in its mighty march onward, was bound to have this territory, and he wished to procure it peacefully, if possible.

The House came to no resolution and accordingly adjourned at 10:10.

On July 7, the House again went into a committee of the whole and resumed the consideration of the Alaska Appropria-
Sam. B. Axtell of California discussed the question of value, asserting that the standards of value for individuals and nations are very different, since the extinguishment of a foreign flag and title on this continent is of itself of immense value. Had this purchase been as valueless as represented, the men of the Pacific States would have forewarned the government and raised their voices against it. Since the Republican party was responsible for the action of the House, he wished to remind them, that no political party could be sustained in the Pacific states that acted in opposition to the acquirement of this territory.

Wm. Higby of California answered the objections to the climate of Alaska; and opposed incorporating in the bill the expression about the right and power of the House, because the Senate would never assent to its passage in that shape. If the emergency is of sufficient magnitude to justify the House in intervention, it should be taken promptly and firmly. Nothing is more humiliating to the national character of the Republic among nations than bickerings among the different branches of government. By withholding the money, United States would give an occasion for war according to international law.

Dennie McCarthy of New York objected to the treaty on the ground that Russia's friendship is only self interest. She, the absorbing power of the eastern continent, recognizes the United States as the absorbing power of the western continent; and thru friendship with us, desires to override and overbalance the governments of Europe which lay between her and us. No real friendship, no true interest is possible between a one man government, a despotism, and a representative government of the people. Voting the money and protesting is mere child's play. The question of the right of the House over appropriations must be settled and a precedent established.

Benj. F. Loan of Missouri regarded Alaska of no use unless to demonstrate the extent of folly to which those in authority are capable of in the acquisition of useless territory. If Russia had asked for the money as a donation, because she was in distress, there would be no objection. But we should never consent to buy her friendship on terms that imply our inferiority. The real question, tho, is not of value, but the establishment of a dangerous precedent, that the President and Senate can acquire territory, annex it, and pledge the credit of the government for such sums as they please, without the consent of the representatives of the
people and against the will of the people.

Since no one desired to speak at the evening session, the afternoon session was extended until five thirty. Rufus P. Spalding of Ohio then read his resolution, introduced some months before, affirming the constitutional right of the House to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying a treaty into effect, which depends for its execution upon a law to be passed by Congress. He favored the appropriation, for he believed it would be possible to sell the territory to individuals and thereby gain two or three million. If we refuse, we are in the same position as was Louis Philippe by his non-compliance with the treaty made at Paris in 1831.

In Dec. 1834, the House by a large majority passed a resolution sustaining the President in his declaration that it was the business of the French government to make the appropriation and that, if not paid within a reasonable time, the first resort under the law of nations would be to make reprisals upon French commerce.

Butler spoke at length, answering the argument that the United States should pay from a spirit of friendship.

On July 1, a motion had been made and carried to postpone voting until Thursday, July 9. On July 9, Banks again moved for postponement, this time until Tuesday, July 14. The motion was decided in the affirmative, by 96 yeas, 35 nays, and 67 not voting.

Thomas Williams of Pennsylvania maintained that the House had a right to refuse an appropriation in the case of negotiations for foreign territory.

At the evening session, July 10, Godlove S. Arth of Indiana, Austin Blair of Michigan and Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois, obtained leave to have printed, as part of the debates, their speeches on the bill.

July 13, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania asked and obtained leave to print his speech on the question of the purchase of Alaska.

July 14, Butler moved an amendment, asking that $500,000 be withheld until Russia should signify her willingness to refer to an impartial tribunal for the settlement of the claims investigated by the State Department. Delano addressed the chair, and after debate, the first amendment introduced by Loughridge July 1, was read, and accepted by a vote of 98 to 49, with 53 not voting.
The second amendment introduced by Eliot, July 1, was then read. The vote on this amendment was 78 yeas, 80 nays, and 42 not voting.

Then the vote on the question, Shall the bill pass, was taken and decided in the affirmative, by 113 yeas, 43 nays and 44 not voting.

On July 18, a message from the Senate by Gorham, their Secretary stated that the Senate had passed the House Bill 1096. The bill passed the Senate July 17 with three amendments.

1. The first was to strike out the 1st section, after the enacting clause, as follows: "That the assent of Congress is hereby given to the stipulations of said treaty."
2. The second proposed to strike out the enacting clause of the second section of the bill.
3. The third further proposed to strike out the entire preamble of the bill.

On July 22, the House, on the motion of Banks, proceeded to the consideration of the Alaska Appropriation Bill with the Senate Amendments. These were severally taken up and disagreed to. It was then ordered that the House request a conference with the Senate on the subject, and Banks, Loughridge, and Randall were chosen to serve on this conference committee. The Senate sent back word, insisting upon its amendments, but agreed to the conference, and named Sumner, Morton, and Doolittle as the conferees.

Thursday, July 23, Banks from the Committee of Conference, submitted his report, recommending that the Senate recede from its 1st amendment, and amend the preamble of the bill as follows; after the word "Russia" in the fourth line, insert the following words: "and the Senate thereafter gave its advice and consent to said treaty"; and strike out all after the words "United States", in the 12th line, and insert instead: " and whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect except by legislation, to which the consent of both houses of Congress is necessary". It was further recommended that the House agree to the second and third amendments of the senate.

Paine moved that the bill be laid on the table, but the question was decided in the negative, with 37 yeas, 80 nays and 99 not voting. The report was then accepted with 91 yeas, 48 nays and 77 not voting.

July 24 the House received word that the Senate had ac-
cepted the report; and on July 27 the bill became a law by the President's approval.

The preamble as agreed upon was regarded as a victory for the House. The issue was an old one, agitated at different periods ever since the controversy over the Jay treaty in 1794-5. The question is simply this: Is the House under constitutional obligations to appropriate money in support of a treaty, the provisions of which it does not approve? Now, the universally accepted opinion is that, pronounced by Judge John McLean of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Turner V. American Baptist Missionary Union: "A treaty is the supreme law of the land only when the treaty-making power can carry it into effect."

"A treaty which stipulates for the payment of money undertakes to do that which the treaty-making power cannot do; therefore the treaty is not the supreme law of the land."

"To give it the effect the action of Congress is necessary. And in this action the Representatives and Senators act on their own judgment and responsibility, and not on the judgment and responsibilities of the treaty-making power."

"A foreign government may be presumed to know the power of appropriating money belongs to Congress."

"No act of any part of the government can be held to be a law, which has not all the sanction to make it law."
The controversy over the Alaska treaty did not end with the proclamation of the Appropriation Bill on July 27, 1868. During the fifteen months which elapsed between the ratification of the treaty in the Senate and the approval by the House of the necessary appropriation, rumors of bribery were widely circulated. These rumors were put into shape and given to the public in an article, which appeared in the Worcester "Spy" in Dec. 1868. This newspaper published the following statement:

"Of the $7,200,000 in gold voted for Alaska, the amount it is now reported Russia actually got was $5,000,000 in gold, about $1,000,000 sterling. This leaves $2,200,000 to be accounted for. But with regard to the outside ring, the third house—the press, editors, and correspondents—it is reported that above $300,000 in greenbacks was spent among them. Mr. Riggs, a banker here, is said to have obtained from the Secretary of the Treasury just at the close of the debates, which terminated by the purchase of Alaska, a loan of the amount just specified. That loan was, if it had any real existence, for obvious reasons, never made public. Immediately on the receipt by Mr. Riggs, newspaper men, and others, known as lobbyists, were the owners of drafts and various amounts on the Treasurer of the United States, which it was declared Gen. Spinner's books will show were cashed. Among the sums specified in the reports are such items as New York Tribune, $20,000, manager of its Washington bureau, $5,000; publisher of Washington Chronicle, $25,000. The correspondents of the Times, World, Boston, Journal, Philadelphia Press, Chicago Tribune, Boston Advertiser, Evening Post, and others are all down as having been paid various sums each, from $2,500 upwards. Some of them are anxiously inquiring what has become of the money, as it has never been paid to them. The daughters of a member from Ohio got $10,000 each, but this, it is affirmed was immediately sent back. Robert J. Walker got $25,000 in gold. The certificate for this amount was, I believe, stolen from him in Boston or New York? He says it was a professional retainer from the Russian government. He appears also to have been acting professionally for his

own government as some part of the Riggs $300,000 appears to have passed into his hands;"

In studying the charges of bribery we have three sources from which to derive the facts of the case: the diary of John Bigelow, entitled "Retrospections of an Active Life"; the Johnson memorandum; and the report of the investigation made by the House of Representatives.

On Sept.22,1868, John Bigelow, in his diary, relates a conversation he had as a dinner guest at Seward's home.**

"Do you wish to know how that treaty was consummated,"? said Mr. Seward.

I answered I did.

"Then, I must put you under oath. Before that money could be voted, $2,000 had to be given to Robert J.Walker, $10,000 to his partner, F.P.Stanton, $10,000 to two members of Congress, and $20,000 to Forney, who had lost $40,000 by the defalcation of his clerk. $1,000 more were to have been given to poor Thad Stevens, but no one would undertake to give that to him, so I undertook it myself. The poor fellow died, and I have it now."

That gave me much food for reflection on my way back to the hotel."

Bigelow further states his own impressions of the situation: "I had been struck by the oracular manner in which Sumner (though known to be politically more or less hostile to Seward and opposed to the Alaska purchase) had stated in my hearing and in a mixed assembly that the appropriation for the purchase of Alaska would be made the following day. He could only have said that knowing that at least some of these graft-ed gentlemen, whose lead the House was in the habit of following, were in favor of the purchase. Though speaking so confidently Sumner said nothing to vindicate his own approval of the measure. Whether he learned how Thad Stevens and Company were going to vote, from themselves or from Seward or Stoeckl, are problems of great interest which are not likely ever to be solved." Sumner's statement that the necessary appropriation would pass Congress in twentyfour hours was made March 30,1867, at the home of Congressman Hooper, where Bigelow, Sumner and several others were discussing the new Alaska treaty.

The Johnson memorandum,* written in Johnson's own hand-

** Bigelow:Retrospections of an Active Life. Vol.4.
writing, and discovered in 1905 by a "browsing student of history" is hearsay in the second degree, being Johnson's account of Seward's report of what Stoeckl said. Among the papers preserved in the Library of Congress, there are few examples of Johnson's handwriting, due to the fact that for him writing was a most difficult operation, since the muscles of his arm had been seriously injured several years before he became President. The fact that this memorandum was penciled by Johnson himself indicates that he attached some importance to Seward's story.

"On the 6th Sept. Sunday 1868 Mr. Seward and myself rode out some seven or eight miles on the road leading to Malsboro Md.----near place called old fields, we drove out into a shady grove of oak trees----While there taking some refreshment, in the current of conversation on various subjects, the Secretary asked the question if it had ever occurred to me how few members there were in congress whose actions were entirely above and beyond pecuniary influence. I replied that I had never attempted to reduce it to an accurate calculation, but regretted to confess that there was a much smaller number exempt than at one period of life I had supposed them to be--He then stated you remember that the appropriation of the seven million dollars for the payment of Alaska to the Russia government was hung up or brought to a dead lock in the House of Representatives. While the appropriation was thus delayed the Russian minister stated to me that John W. Forney stated to him that he needed $30,000 that he had lost $40,000, by a faithless friend and that he wanted the $30,000 in gold. That there was no chance of the appropriation passing the House of Representatives without certain influence was brought to bear in its favor. The $30,000 was paid, hence the advocacy of the appropriation in the Chronicle. He also stated that $20,000 was paid to R.J.Walker and F.P.Stanton for their service. N.P.Banks chairman of the committee on foreign relations, $8,000, and that the incorruptable Thaddeus received as his "sop" the moderate sum of $10,000. All these sums were paid by the Russian Minister directly or indirectly to the respective parties to secure appropriation of money the government had stipulated to pay the Russian government in solemn treaty which had been ratified by both governments.

Banks and Stevens was understood to be the counsel for a claim against the Russian Government for Arms which had been furnished by some of our citizens--known as the Perkine Claim--Hence a fee for their influence in favor of the appropriation,etc--Banks was chairman of the Committee on foreign relations".
The results of the investigation, reported by the House Committee on Public Expenditures Feb. 27, 1869, though proving certain definite facts, are yet unsatisfactory in two respects. The whole tenor of the report shows a purpose to vindicate any Congressmen concerned; and indicates a desire to avoid probing into transactions that might involve Banks and other Congressmen. The testimony given by one witness, Mr. Tasistro, is entirely omitted from the printed report of evidence. This omission is significant since Tasistro's statements concerned the relations between Banks and the Russian legation.

A second weakness in the report lies in the fact that the investigation was necessarily exparte in an undesired sense. The chairman of the committee, early in the investigation, tendered to the Russian legation the opportunity of making to or before the committee any statement, informal or otherwise, pertaining to the acquisition of Alaska. The Russian legation, for reasons not publicly stated, failed to embrace this opportunity of making some revelation which would clear away the clouds of suspicion in the public mind regarding the acquisition.

The testimony of Mr. Skinner, Treasurer of the United States, and of Mr. Riggs, banker agent of the Russian minister, in checking out and receiving the purchase money, concurred in establishing the following facts:

On Aug. 1, 1868, a warrant on the Treasurer, payable to Stoeckl, was drawn for $7,200,000 in coin; and by endorsement was assigned to Geo. W. Riggs, banker. He, on Aug. 1, took transfer checks on the subtreasury in New York for $7,100,000; the remaining $100,000 being left some days in the treasury subject to Riggs' check, was not all drawn out until about the middle of September.

Riggs made the additional statement that he immediately transmitted to the agent of Messrs. Barring Brothers and Company at New York, $7,035,000, less his commission of one twentieth of 1%: that by direction of the Russian minister he paid $26,000 in gold to Robert J. Walker, and the remainder was paid by sundry checks to the Russian minister in person, between Aug. 1 and Sept. 16, as nearly as he could recollect in four amounts; $18,000; $35,000; $45,000 and $41,000.

He declared he did not pay one cent to any man directly or indirectly, nor did he know of any being paid except to the three mentioned. Walker was paid as counsel for the legation. Riggs did not know the use Stoeckl made of the money; he supposed the Russian ambassador rendered an account to his gov-
ernment. "I wish to make my answer strong and comprehen-
sive, so strong and comprehensive that there shall be no
opportunity to misunderstand it.......I will go further and
state that I have no reason to suspect any money being paid
otherwise than as I have stated."

Further testimony proved that the following is a defi-
nite statement of the distribution of the appropriated gold:
$7,035,000, less the bank's commission, was sent abroad: Of
the $165,000 deposited with the bank; $26,000 was paid to
R.J.Walker and the remaining $139,000 was paid to the Russ-
ian minister in various amounts between Aug.1 and Sept.16,
1868. Of this $139,000, only $4,000 was definitely traced;
$3,000 in gold was paid to the brother of John W. Forney;
and $1,000 in greenbacks to a California newspaper man,M.M.
Noah; leaving $135,000 in Stoeckl's possession, unaccounted
for. Walker's remark that the Russian minister had com-
plained about the excessive cost of telegrams; and Riggs' testi-
mony that one telegram alone cost $10,000, would ne-
cessitate making a liberal allowance for these heavy ex-
penses. But making such allowance, so far as records or
 testimony show the expenditures, there would yet remain e-
ough to cover the $68,000 referred to in the Johnson memo-
randum.

The testimony of Walker before the committee threw light
on the meaning of the memorandum. The $20,000 mentioned as
paid to R.J.Walker and F.P.Stanton for their services, was
Walker's fee when employed by Stoeckl to press the bill.
According to Walker's testimony, early in May,1868, Stoeckl
employed him as counsel for the Russian government in aid of
the passage of the Alaska appropriation. Since there was a
tendency to economize in that session, he feared the approp-
riation would be postponed, a fact which would seriously dis-
turb the cordial relations of the two governments. Walker's
work was to argue and discuss the question; print pamphlets
and write articles for the newspapers, presenting all the
arguments in favor of the purchase. Stoeckl wished him to
confer with Sumner and Banks, who were warmly supporting the
measure. He called on Banks about the time of his report;
and as far as he remembered had not called on any other mem-
er of Congress until within two or three days of the final
passage of the bill, when he called on Sumner. Stanton, ac-
cording to his own testimony did not converse with many; only
Stevens of Pennsylvania, General Schenck and several others.
The question arises: To what extent did Walker converse with
Congressmen, outside of the official capacity of a call?

But Walker's chief activity consisted in pamphlets print-
ed in the "Intelligencer" and distributed extensively; and
in articles written for the "Intelligencer" and the "Chronicle," generally published editorially. Though these were not published over his name, yet many knew he wrote them. Whether or not this activity was the cause of arousing the Congressmen, and ending the deadlock in the House, is not known, still one fact remains. The committee's report in favor of the appropriation was presented by Banks May 18, just after this activity began.

Walker's fee was originally $20,000; but after the passage of the appropriation bill, it was increased by $1,000 in gold and $2,300 in addition in greenbacks, a voluntary offer from Stoeckl. All of this was retained by Walker, except $5,000 in greenbacks paid to Stanton, who had been employed as associate counsel, with the consent of Stoeckl. This money was not paid him until after the passage of the bill, though Walker first spoke to him on the subject some time in June.

Walker's account of Forney's relation to the purchase is quite different from the account given in the Johnson memorandum. Walker told the Russian minister that since the "Chronicle" had rendered such an important service, without any promise or expectation of reward, $5,000 in gold ought to be paid to the editor, to which Stoeckl cheerfully assented. This occurred some time after Walker received the $26,000. Walker accordingly called on Col. Forney and stated his proposal. Forney replied that his unofficial position before the people would cause him to refuse; although he had a moral right to receive the money, since it had not been promised beforehand as an inducement to support the measure in the press, and since he now held no public office. Although this account differs from the Johnson memorandum; still the two are not diametrically opposed, for the one throws light on the other.

The memorandum says that while the appropriation was delayed by a deadlock in the House, John W. Forney told Stoeckl that he needed $30,000 in gold, since he had lost $40,000 by a faithless friend; and added that there was no chance for the appropriation to pass the House without certain influences being brought to bear in its favor. The memorandum states that the $30,000 was paid; and the Chronicle immediately became the advocate of the appropriation.

In the amount paid to Forney, Bigelow's account of what Seward said does not agree with Johnson's account. The one written Sept. 22, 1868, states that $20,000 was paid to Forney; the other account, probably written soon after Sept. 6, 1868
gives $30,000. The one statement was made after dinner; the other while partaking of refreshments, so Seward's mental equilibrium was undoubtedly as good on one occasion as on the other. This discrepancy in amount, however, does not alter the essential fact of the case.

The query naturally occurs; Why did Walker insist on paying Forney? Shrewd politician that he was, well versed in the ways of political life, did he not suspect some arrangement with Stoeckl, and accordingly try this method of finding out the inside history of the Alaska treaty?

The two versions of the story then are as follows; While the legislation was pending, Forney, a public official demanded and received $30,000. After the bill had passed, Forney, no longer a public official, refused a gift of $3,000. It is not difficult to harmonize these two stories. Stoeckl's arrangement with Forney was undoubtedly made prior to Jan. 1868, when hostility first appeared in the House and when the Chronicle's energetic advocacy of the appropriation began. When Walker appeared in May as counsel for the Russian government, he was impressed with the ready aid the Chronicle furnished his cause. His proposal to reward Forney placed Stoecklin in an awkward position; but rather than be compelled to reveal his arrangement with the Chronicle, he allowed Walker to carry out his idea.

The testimony of Seward, when viewed in connection with his two previous statements, as recorded by Bigelow and Johnson, proves to be literally but not actually true. It is interesting to notice how the committee in its report, passed Seward by with little attention, saying that on request he came before the committee and in the most emphatic manner denied all knowledge whatever of any payments or distribution of any part of the money, other than to representatives of the Russian government or trifling sums for printing, purchasing or distributing documents by or from the State Department pertaining to Alaska.

Seward had to reply to the charge that the State Department had spent much public money in subsidizing the press and in other devices for creating opinions favorable to the purchase. He said he thought the Alaska purchase was a good, proper, and national achievement, and out of the funds of the State Department he subscribed for a small number of speeches made by Sumner, to be used for the information of the public and of Congress. Various persons, patriotic gentlemen, some connected with the government and some not, gave him their cordial support and co-operation in the matter, among whom were Sumner and Walker. Whenever he found they were in possession of useful information, he received it and transmitted it to Congress, who had it published. His impression was that
the whole expense and cost to the United States government for negotiation, payment and everything did not exceed $500.

Seward's testimony in regard to Mr. Walker is significant:

"I do not know from Mr. Walker that he was ever paid a cent; I never paid him a cent. But I remember hearing the Russian minister speak in terms of thankfulness and appreciation of his efforts. . . . That is all I know about Mr. Walker. I do not know that he ever had $25,000, never heard from him that he was to have it, and I know nothing about it now."

It was undoubtedly true literally that the knowledge had not been obtained "from Mr. Walker", and the question concerned $20,000, not $25,000.

Upon being asked if he had any knowledge of money or presents being made from the fund at the disposal of the Secretary of State or any other fund to subsidize or propitiate the press, he replied:

"On the contrary I have knowledge that no fund at the State Department went to subsidize or propitiate the press anywhere."

He did not disclose his knowledge of any other fund but referred to the attacks on Jefferson for the Louisiana purchase and his publication of articles on that subject. In regard to the Perkin's claim, his argument was that since there were lawyers employed on one side, the Russian government might also employ lawyers; and the interest Walker had taken in the question, probably commended him to the Russian government. R. J. Hinton, author of the "Spy" article disavowed all personal knowledge of the facts, saying he had heard rumors and put them into shape in order that they might be known to the public. He declared he stated in his communication: "The Alaska purchase lobbying is a current theme of talk. I give the substance of rumors now afloat, not vouching for, or affirming my belief in, any of them". He did not try to justify the article beyond the fact that it was common talk among newspaper men. The general impression was there was something in it, and since there was so much smoke, there must be some fire.

Several other newspaper men were called before the Committee; but all disclaimed any personal knowledge and knew neither fact, person, nor circumstance that could throw light on the subject.

From Frederick P. Stanton's testimony, it was learned that while the bill for the appropriation was pending in the
House, Uriah H. Painter, the correspondent of the Philadelphia Inquirer, met Stanton in the rotunda of the Capital and inquired about his relations with the government and with Walker. Stanton replied that he and Walker were not partners now; but merely friends. Painter said he supposed that Walker who was managing the Alaska Bill, had a good deal of money to distribute; and since he could render some service by influencing the votes of the opposition, asked if Stanton would apply to Walker in his behalf. Stanton, without revealing that he was associate counsel, replied that he would. According to his own testimony, his motive in carrying this message was that Walker might know that his agency in the matter was known, and that this man was proposing either to assist or oppose the measure. Robert W. Latham, connected with the railroad business, said that Painter had requested him to make the same suggestion.

Stanton's reply to Painter, when the two next met, was that Walker had no money and no authority for such transactions; whereupon Painter, who became very angry, declared he would oppose the measure and do his best to defeat it. On several other occasions when they met, Painter denounced the rascals who had lied to him, saying they had no money while they were distributing large sums. Since they would not employ him, he intended to expose them.

Painter, in his testimony, denounced Walker and told how, on the day when the treaty came up in the Senate, Sumner had ridiculed the idea of entertaining a proposition for the purchase of Alaska. In his later testimony, he said he wanted to know whether there was money in it or not, for the purpose of tearing it all to pieces. He was well acquainted with Butler and Washburn who were assailing the measure and whenever he got any points, he would give them to those gentlemen.

While the results of this investigation are unsatisfactory in establishing definite conclusions, nevertheless there are four facts which are fraught with deep significance.

1. The testimony of one witness, Mr. Tasistro, is entirely omitted from the printed report of evidence, although this testimony, concerned the relation of Banks to the Russian government, as disclosed by Mr. Martin.

2. An Ex-Congressman sold the extraordinary influence of his former high public position, and the trust and confidence of his fellow citizens to a foreign government, as an attorney in a case in which his own government was deeply interested; and kept the fact of his position from the knowledge of those with whom his business brought him in
contact.

3. The Russian legation did not embrace the opportunity, tendered it by the chairman of the investigation committee, of making some statement pertaining to the acquisition of Alaska, in the face of universal charges of corruption and traffic in the votes of public men.

4. There is a wide discrepancy between Seward's testimony before the committee of investigation, and his statements made to John Bigelow and Andrew Johnson, as recorded in Bigelow's diary and the Johnson memorandum.
XIII. THE VALUE OF ALASKA.

The prolonged controversy and debate over the purchase naturally leads one to inquire: "Was the game worth the candle?" Did we get our money's worth in buying this region, estimated at the time to be 577,390 square miles, or 369,529,600 acres, for which we paid $14.00 square mile or a fraction over two cents an acre? A consideration of the present value of the country reveals the fact that the development of Alaska's resources has exceeded the most sanguine predictions of its most ardent advocates.

*Alaska, in its greatest extent, is included between the meridians 130 degrees west and 173 degrees east longitude, and between the parallels of 51 degrees and 72 degrees north latitude. Approximately it is in the same latitude as the Scandinavian Peninsula. It has an area of about 590,884 square miles; one-fifth of that of the United States. A map of Alaska, superimposed on a map of the United States of the same scale, shows that the distance from the easternmost to the westernmost point in Alaska, is equal to the distance from the Atlantic to the Pacific, in the latitude of Los Angeles; and its northernmost and southernmost points are nearly as far apart as the Mexican and Canadian boundaries of the United States.

The climate of this region is grossly misrepresented. Tho referred to as the arctic province, yet nearly three-fourths of its area lies within the North Temperate Zone. The climate of the coastal province is comparable with that of Scotland and the Scandinavian peninsula in Europe, but is somewhat warmer. The inland region is like Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba in Canada. The northerly province, bordering the Polar Sea, is the only one in which Arctic conditions prevail.

Population.

According to Lippincott's Gazetteer, the whole population in Alaska, in 1855, aboriginal, Russian, and Creole, was

61,000. The same estimate is found in the London Imperial Gazetteer and in "geographie" of Wappaus. "Allemanach de Gotha" for 1867 gives 50,000. This estimate is most reliable, as it is adopted substantially from the great work, "Les Peuples de la Russiam. The following census of the dependents of the Russian American Company in all its districts shows that the population had remained practically stationary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1839</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1857</th>
<th>1860</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>&quot;some hundred&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creoles</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aborigines*</td>
<td>8,882</td>
<td>7,055</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,812</td>
<td>9,263</td>
<td>9,792</td>
<td>10,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men........4,918..........................5,733....5,382
Women......4,804..........................4,659....5,158

At the time of the purchase, the number of Russians and Creoles could not have exceeded 2,500. The number of aborigines under the direct government of the Company was estimated at 8,000. There yet remained a large mass of aborigines outside the jurisdiction of the Company, and having only a temporary or casual contact for purposes of trade, whose number was estimate at 40,000 or 50,000. Professor Agassiz, in writing to Sumner at the time of the purchase, commented upon the significance of the lack of population: "To me the fact that there is yet hardly any population would have great weight, as this secures the settlement to our race."

The census of 1910 showed a population of 63,700, of which 36,000 were whites. This census was taken in the winter, when only permanent residents could be enumerated; therefore these figures should be increased by many thousands, representing the annual summer migration of miners, cannery employees, and others, not including tourists. The governor of Alaska in his report for 1915, estimates the white population as 44,000. According to the 1910 census, the population of four largest cities is as follows: Fairbanks, 3,541; Cordova, 1,152; Skagway, 872; Valdez, 810; These figures do not include the districts contiguous; and allowance should also be made for the increase during the last seven years.

Commerce.

The commerce of Alaska consists of northward shipments of food products, merchandise, machinery, lumber, coal, etc., and return shipments of gold, silver, copper, salmon, halibut, etc. In addition the Territory produces some lumber, farm products
which are consumed locally, and estimated at about half a million dollars in value.

The following statistics are taken from the annual report of the governor of Alaska for 1915.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1914</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mds. from U.S.</td>
<td>15,169,149</td>
<td>21,992,761</td>
<td>21,669,690</td>
<td>21,610,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mds. from For. Pts.</td>
<td>519,221</td>
<td>925,034</td>
<td>751,173</td>
<td>662,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold &amp; Silver from For. Pts.</td>
<td>3,520,170</td>
<td>3,840,546</td>
<td>4,320,985</td>
<td>3,576,090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Imports......19,208,540:26,758,341:26,761,848:25,849,944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mds. to U.S.</td>
<td>19,318,859</td>
<td>24,793,886</td>
<td>22,252,942</td>
<td>25,609,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mds. to For. Pts.</td>
<td>1,174,395</td>
<td>1,452,955</td>
<td>1,141,660</td>
<td>1,006,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Gold &amp; Sil. in U.S.</td>
<td>14,699,694</td>
<td>16,031,705</td>
<td>12,959,366</td>
<td>14,729,905</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Exports......38,546,307:45,982,719:40,660,459:44,796,780

Grand Total of Imports and Exports.

...........57,754,847:72,741,060:67,422,307:70,646,724

Agriculture.

We have found that the Fur Trading and Fishing monopoly was opposed to Agriculture and consequently Agriculture was discouraged. The Company invariably kept a year's supply of food on hand in the store houses at Sitka; enough for the employees to provide against the possibility of scarcity or the loss of the annual ship loaded with supplies. A short time prior to the purchase not even a kitchen garden was cultivated; but, from this total neglect, the people were gradually awakening to the consciousness that the soil could be made productive, and were raising vegetables and wheat and barley. Prince Maksontoff, who imported a cow for a sick child, found it necessary to bring hay to keep the animal from starving. Ploughing and farm implements were almost as unknown as in California during the days of the Spaniards.

Now there are four agricultural experiment stations at Sitka, Fairbanks, Rampart and Kodiak. The great hindrance concerns markets, for the only ones available are local ones, since transportation is too expensive to seek outside or distant markets. The cost of clearing the land of trees and removing moss is so great as to seem almost prohibitive. Every
indication shows that the development of agriculture must be gradual; must grow with the construction of highways and railroads, with the development of mining industries, and the accompanying increase of population.

The timber of Alaska has always been used to a limited extent for local consumption. But, up to the present time, the resources of the country have hardly been touched. The most heavily timbered areas, and those most accessible, are in southeastern Alaska and in the vicinity of Prince William Sound, where the trees are chiefly Sitka spruce and western hemlock. The coast forests are nearly all included in the Tongass and Chugach National Forests, having a combined area of 20,948,850 acres, slightly less than 6% of the total area of Alaska.

The forests of the interior are of a different type from those on the coast, being mainly white spruce, white birch, and cottonwood. The yield is not so large and heavy as in southeastern Alaska, yet these interior forests are of great importance locally in furnishing material for construction for domestic use, and saw mills for local consumption abound. There are excellent opportunities for wood-pulp industries, since timber of the right size and quantity is plentiful, is accessible to water transportation and easily logged. Unlimited water power for manufacturing purposes is available; and may be used without charge for the manufacture of national forest products.

Fisheries.

The first Alaska industry to be developed was its fisheries. Between the years 1840-45 the right whales abounded upon what was called the north-west ground, the region from Prince of Wales Island on the south to Bering Strait on the north; and every year about three hundred American whale ships were found in that location. They were not admitted into Russian ports, unless in distress, for the ports were considered contraband for any trade, except the port of Sitka. After the years 1845 and 1846, the whales gradually changed their feeding ground and were not so abundant altho many ships took a fair catch, in that vicinity, every year. The right whale changes his feeding ground every few years, and for two or three years prior to the purchase, they seemed to be returning to the north west ground.

The San Francisco Quarterly report of Trade and Commerce, dated Sept. 30, 1867, stated that the dried cod fish brought from the coast of Alaska by fourteen vessels, amounted for the season to 788 tons. During the previous year, the first of the business, 255 tons were taken in the same time, and the
yield for the entire year was 902 tons. Carrying out the same proportions, the yield for 1867, the second year of the fishery, was estimated at over 3,000 tons.

Though the first Alaska industry to be developed was its fisheries, and for years prior to the purchase, American vessels from San Francisco carried on cod fishing in Alaska waters, still this was a very modest effort as compared with the present great industry, valued approximately at $20,000,000 per year. Since 1867 Alaska has produced fisheries products to the value of $254,000,000, almost equal to the total value of the mineral output during the same year. (This total includes fur-seal skins and other aquatic furs.)

The salmon industry is the most important fishery. Next in importance is the halibut fishery, which offers great promise for the future, but, as yet, has been only partially developed. To assist in the support and maintenance of the fisheries, seven salmon hatcheries are operated, two of which are owned by the Government, while five are the property of companies engaged in canning salmon.

The herring fishery is also very important, and many other food fishes abound, as yet utilized only to a limited extent. The whale fishery also is important, and in many places there are quantities of clams, mussels, crabs and shrimps.

In 1914 there were 21,200 persons engaged in all branches of the fisheries industry, of which there were 11,178 whites, 4,184 natives, 2,138 Chinese, 1,318 Japanese, and 2,382 miscellaneous, including Filipinos, Mexicans, Koreans and some others.

The total value of fisheries products produced in 1914 was $21,242,975, as compared with $15,739,069 in 1913, showing an increase of $5,503,907. This includes 4,056,653 cases of salmon, valued at $18,920,589; and 15,057,797 pounds of halibut, valued at $782,757; and 15,045,378 pounds of cod, valued at $438,208.

Fur Trade.

The value of the fur trade at the time of the purchase is not definitely known; but it is certain that, throughout the possessions of the Russian American Company, two fine steamers, and six or eight sailing vessels were used, with numerous factories or stations, and a large retinue of employees. It is said that they insured their furs for nearly one million dollars in gold each year.

The following table shows the value of pelts of fur-bearing animals, shipped from Alaska. This does not include
either fur-seal or fox skins shipped from the Pribolof Islands.

Yr. ending Nov. 15, 1915 .................. $630,656.40
Yr. ending Nov. 15, 1913 .................. 678,062.91
Yr. ending Nov. 15, 1914 .................. 649,692.90

The census of the Pribilof Island seal herd shows the following figures:

1912 .................. 215,738
1913 .................. 268,306
1914 .................. 294,687

Mineral Resources.

The imperial government was long desirous that the Russian American Company should thoroughly explore the interior, which seemed to promise valuable mineral resources. This was one of the objects of the grant made to that Company; but since their aim was immediate profit, and knowing their lucrative fisheries would suffer in mining excitement they shrewdly raised every possible objection against the practicability of prospecting the interior, urging as the principal reason the hostility of the natives. The Emperor then offered additional troops, as many as they wanted, to be maintained at the expense of the Company. This offer was declined; and the government allowed the subject to subside, altho convinced that gold existed in that region, especially after its successive discovery in Oregon, Washington Territory and British Columbia, in regular progression northward. At the time of the discovery of gold in British Columbia in 1858, the Hudson Bay Company, realizing that their lucrative fur trade would be ruined by the desertion of their employees to the placers, hastened to assert that it was all a humbug, and with their traditional dislike of immigration, advised strangers not to visit British Columbia. The coal mining experiment, carried on from 1855 to 1860, also failed, as has been shown. Thus, at the time of the purchase in 1867, the mining industry in Alaska was a negligible quantity.

At the present time, the mineral resources are the most important. The total output of the placer mines alone has paid the purchase price twenty-five times over. The developed resources consist of gold lodes and placers, copper, tin, antimony, and silver deposits, together with petroleum, marble and gypsum. There are also extensive field of subbituminous, bituminous, and lignitic coal, and some iron ones, practically undeveloped.
Gold lode mining, a large and well developed industry, has been carried on in southeastern Alaska since 1882. The total lode production is valued at $74,850,000, of which $6,800,000 is credited to 1915.

Placer mining was begun at Juneau in 1880, and extended to the Yukon Basin in 1886. There were no very important discoveries of placer gold until after the Klondike rush in 1898. This brought a large number of people to the territory and led to the finding of gold at Nome in 1898, at Fairbanks in 1901, and the Innoko-Iditarod region in 1908. Meanwhile other smaller regions were developed, the Yukon, the Copper, and the Susitna Basins. The total output of all the placer mines is $186,200,000. The placer-mine output of 1915 is estimated at $10,500,000.

The copper industry began in 1900; and has made rapid strides during the last few years. The total production is about 207,250,000 pounds, having a value of $34,150,000. The output of 1915 is represented by 83,850,000 pounds, valued at about $14,400,000.

The total output of silver has a value of $2,650,000, while that of tin, marble, gypsum, petroleum, lead, etc, to the close of 1915, has a value of about $2,150,000.

The exploitation of the coal deposits on Cook's Inlet begun by the Russians in 1855, was the first attempt at any form of mining in the territory. No coal mining has been carried on except that of exploiting the lignitic deposits for local use, begun in 1903. To the close of 1915, the total output is insignificant, being less than 43,000 tons. During this period of thirteen years, more than 1,750,000 tons of coal have been imported into the Territory.

To sum up the mineral resources of Alaska, at the end of 1915, the mineral wealth has an aggregate value of $300,000,000 of which about $32,000,000 is to be credited to the year 1915. This output is remarkable, considering that large mining operations are practically confined to the coastal region, easily accessible to ocean transportation, and that the vast mineral wealth of the interior, except the richest of the gold placers, is almost untouched.

As one concludes the study of the purchase of Alaska, it is with a feeling of satisfaction, both because of the method of acquisition, and because of the great promise for the future. In this year of world-wide war, the fiftieth anniversary of the purchase, the very background of war makes the acquisition of Alaska stand out as an instance of peaceful expansion; territorial adjustment for the best interests of both countries in-
volved, without the necessity of war giving a "biologically just decision." But the future outlook is still brighter. This region, literally a "pot of gold", is an undeveloped country, limitless in its possibilities. To the indomitable American spirit, it offers a vast field of endeavor. The Western frontier has disappeared; the Northern frontier commands attention. The same challenge which sent hardy New Englanders west, will send hardy Westerners north, to build a new nation in the wilderness.
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