

RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO CHINA AND DISRUPTION OF MILITARY POWER IN EAST
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 2000-2013

BY

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Abstract

Russian arms sales to China have brought about security concerns from China's neighbours. From 2000 to 2013, Russia sold more arms to India than to China. However, China's neighbours and policymakers assert that China's arms purchased from Russia have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. The purpose of this study were to explore how the quality of arms plays a major role than the quantity of arms in the theory of military balance of power. A mixed method of descriptive statistics and comparative case study were used to determine the findings. The key finding of this thesis is that Russian arms sales to China from 2000 to 2013 have not disrupted the balance of military power in Asia.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Trends in international arms sales may help to have an idea of the security policy of nations in a region. The volume of weapons purchased by a country is an indicator of the domestic and international policy of this nation. While global arms sales continue to decrease, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2013, sales of Russian companies that produce weapons, such as Tactical Missiles Corporation, and Almaz-Antey have increased by 118 and 34 percent, respectively. However, the American firm that produces major weapons, the United Aircraft Corporation, increased its sales by only 20 percent¹. From 2000 to 2013, Russia exported 30 percent of its arms to India while 29 percent went to China. Furthermore, with 32 percent of the volume of all arms imports, both India and China topped the list of the five main arms importers from 2009 to 2013 following by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia (SIPRI). Thus, the arms sales are noteworthy in regional level as well.

The Asian region is the largest arms importers in the world. The breakdown of trends in international arms sales reveals that Asian countries are actively engaged in the purchase of weapons. This regional interests in arms, as pointed by (Mitchell, 2009), fit in Russian goals to diversify their arms markets in Asia. This diversification of Russian arms markets in Asia is materialized through important arms sales, especially in the 2000s. Thus, Asia has experienced an increase in arms imports by 34 percent between 2004-08 and 2009-13 while the East and Southeast regions have respectively imported 27 and 23 percent of weapons from 2009 to 2013 (SIPRI). It is interesting to know that China and India were the two largest arms importers from

¹ <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background>. (Accessed February 3, 2015).

2009 to 2013. Such a disparity in rankings between China and India can be explained by who the suppliers of weapons in East and Southeast Asia are.

The United States and Russia dominate the weapon marketplaces in East and Southeast Asia. Arms sales, according to SIPRI, are limited to aircraft including drones with minimum loaded weight of 20kg, air defense systems, anti-submarine warfare weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, engines, missiles, sensors, satellites, ships, all turrets for armored vehicles tailored with a gun of minimum 12,7mm caliber or with guided anti-tank missiles, all turrets for ships tailored with one or several guns of minimum 57 mm, and air refueling system similar to that of tanker aircraft (SIPRI). Most of American major weapons exported to its Asian partners including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan consist of aircrafts including AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters, some latest generation of HA65E Apache Guardian, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), some F-16s equipped with high-tech radar system, and the fifth generation of F-35s. In the navy, there are some GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs, PAC-3 ballistic missile interceptors, Harpoon UGM-84L -Submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles- (Cabestan, 2014). The list of the American major weapons exported in East and Southeast Asia is not comprehensive in this study, it remains important to acknowledge that these arms share the same regional destinations with these of Russia.

Russian major weapons sold to its Asian recipients including China, India, and Vietnam encompass combat aircrafts including Sukhoi SU- 27/30, SU-30MKI, and MIG29SMT. In naval level, exports combat ships including the latest aircraft carrier exported to India and the only carrier exported from year range 2009-13; Project 956EM (Destroyer) nuclear-powered submarine; and T-50s/90s, Tanks used both by navy and ground forces (Mitchell, 2009). While

the inventory of Russian and American major weapons sold to their Asian military partners is far from being complete, the comprehension of the reasons behind such arms sales is critical for this study.

American and Russian arms sales to East and Southeast Asian countries can be explained through some patterns of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, marking the end of the Cold War between the United States and Russia, gave the impression of the reduction of threats between nations around the world. Thus, it was almost unnecessary for Asian countries to increase their arms purchase. However, such a period of security that reduced the need for arms acquisition by Asian nations (Blanton, 1999), has been disturbed by two factors, hence, incited the need for some countries in East and Southeast Asia to strengthen their military capabilities. The first factor is globalization. Defined as a system characterized by market economy and reduction of the sense of isolation, globalization also brings about the sense of insecurity and instability in some part of the world (Stiglitz, 2003). These sense of insecurity and instability are triggered in the Asian region by the increase in proliferations of illicit arms sales, mostly Russian-made. The instance of the Russian, Victor Bout who has made fortune selling Russian arms around the world thanks to globalization is interesting. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the new Russia with a huge stockpile of arms. Bout took advantage of its relationship with a corrupted Russian military personnel to establish, in the word of Moises Naim, “the weapons Wal-Mart” (2005). Bout sold to Asian countries different type of arms including some MANPADs (Man-portable air defence systems), and aircraft. Thus, the proliferation of arms in the Asian region in the post-Cold war era prompted the regional countries to reinforce their military capability.

Second, China's military modernization is an incentive for its neighbours to resort to arms purchase as they grow worried about the military superiority of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Finally, territorial disputes between countries in East and Southeast Asia, can also explain why some nations in these regions continue to reinforce their military capabilities (Fravel, 2005; Womack, 2011; Bae, 2012; Zhao, 2013). Examples including disputes between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo; disputes between China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan over Spratly Islands; disputes between Taiwan, China, India, and Pakistan over Kashmir; disputes between Japan, China, and Taiwan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Moreover, it is noteworthy to point the dispute between mainland China and Taiwan, knowing that both continue to purchase arms in case of a potential breach in the current status quo.

It is important to point out that all the Russian and American arms importers encompassed in the sampling of this thesis such as China, India, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are involved in territorial disputes. The reduction of the presence of American military who plays, in the words of Mearsheimer (2010), the "role of a pacifier" in East and Southeast Asia, constitutes a source of concerns to American allies who recourse to self-reliance policies to defend their territory integrity and regional interests. Furthermore, the quality of their military supplies has crucial implications on the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

The quality of weapons and troops matters more than the quantity because in combat modern arms are more efficient and capable of shifting the balance of military power. The balance of power consists thus of reducing military capabilities between states so that no state has an overwhelming power over the others. The distribution of power among states must be

checked and balanced because an increased military might of a state over others in a region or system will upset the balance of military power (Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz, 1979). However, unlike these previous studies that suggest that the sole superiority of quantity of weapons (Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz, 1979), or/and military expenditures (Deger and Smith, 1983) are sufficient for a nation to shift the balance of military power, this thesis argues that the quality of weapons is an essential feature contributing to upset the balance of power because in combat between states, as stated by Shambaugh (2000), the quantity of arms is irrelevant compared to the quality of manpower, weapons, and training .

Thus, this study argues that for China to upset the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia by purchasing Russian arms, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will need to show a combination of features such as a) high quality of arms, b) a larger quantity of arms, and c) a larger military expenditure than those of India, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Thus, these three variables (quality, quantity, and military expenditure) that bring about shift in balance of military power are examined in this thesis in order to determine whether Russian arms sales to China upset the military balance in East and Southeast Asia.

The purpose of this study is to explore how the quality of weapons held by China, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea can contribute to upset the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. Many scholars and policymakers have done research on arms sales and their implications on balance of military power. While their approaches may have been different, given that they focused either on quantity of weapons, or/and military expenditure, they have come to the same finding. This finding explains that the superiority of the quantity of arms of a country compared to other nations in a given region upsets this regional balance of

military power. Despite the political and security significance of this finding, there is still room for another factor of influence of arms sales on the balance of military power. That is the quality of arms sold. Moreover, few studies have examined the quality of Russian arms sales to China to determine their implications on the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

To determine the influence the quality of weapons exerts on the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia, this study used a mixed methods approach. It consisted of a sampling of six countries located in the Eastern and South-eastern regions of Asia such as China, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. These Asian countries imported major weapons from Russia, or from the United States, from 2000 to 2013. These major weapons were analysed according to their type and capability in combat. Data collection on international arms transfers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) served as critical resources that lead to the findings in this thesis. Thus, this study uncovers that Moscow sells its most sophisticated arms to New Delhi, and also sells India more arms (aircraft and ship) than to China. Furthermore, the quality of Russian weapons purchased by China were expected to be inferior than American arms held by Washington's Asian military partners including Taiwan, and South Korea from 2000 to 2013.

In this thesis, Arms Sales is the independent variable. One of the key interests of this thesis is to examine the impact of Russian and American arms sales to their military partners in the East and Southeast Asian regions on the balance of military power in these regions. The independent variable (arms sales) encompasses the quality, quantity, and military expenditure. A comparative case study will be used to assess the independent variables for Russian arms

sold to India, China, and Vietnam, and to American arms sold to Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan during the time frame from 2000-13. The operational definition of Arms sales, in this study, consists of the annual amount spent in \$ US on major weapons including planes, ships, and missiles sold per year to the sample countries of this study; the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) as a share of the total annual money spent by China, India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. It is important to note that the terms *Arms sales*, *Weapons sales*, and *Arms transfers* are interchangeably used and are synonymous in this study.

Moreover, *Balance of military power* is the dependent variable in this thesis. The Balance of power consists, in a system, of a relatively equal distribution of power within the nations so that such a power is checked and balanced by other nations. Thus, the absence of this power constraint causes a shift in the balance of power in that system². In this study, the operational definition of the balance of military power is a relatively equal quality, military expenditure, and the total number of planes, ships, and missiles that China has purchased from Russia compared to those purchased by India, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from 2000 to 2013. The balance of military power is measured through data collections and documentations from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As a result, the balance of military power is known when the quality, the quantity, and the military expenditure in military of China, India, and Vietnam compared to those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are proportionally equal on figures based on the collected data. As example on quality, Russian

² See "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" Paul W. Schroeder [The American Historical Review](#) Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992) (pp. 683-706). Page Count: 24

SU-27s are less sophisticated than the SU-30s. However, the SU-30s are qualitatively low compared to American F-35 fighters sold to South Korea.

The puzzle of this study is that there is much press on Russian arms sales to China, but there are not sufficient evidence that support how these arms sales have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. This study was to explore how Russian arms to China was perceived by China's neighbors, including India, Vietnam and the U.S. through its military allies in East and Southeast Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Since the collapse of the ex-Soviet Union in 1990s, Russia has increased its arms sales to the Asian region. Although Russia has sold more arms to India than to China (Kapila, 2012), China's arms purchase from Russia has been perceived as cause of disruption of the balance of military power in East Asia. Thus, my contribution to this study is that, while most studies examine Russian arms sales to China to determine their influence on the Asian balance of military power, few have tested several features of arms sales by stressing on the comparison between the quantity and quality of the arms sold, and the military expenditure. To address the quality and quantity of the purchased arms, the analysis of data from multiples sources including the Western Convention Arms Control Regime (WCACR), Congress on Military and Security Development (CMSD), and National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) would be relevant.

To determine whether China's arms purchased from Russia from 2000 to 2013 has disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia, I examined and compared the quality and quantity of arms that Russia sold to China with those sold to its other Asian military partners, including, India, and Vietnam. I then examined and compared the quality and

quantity of Russian arms with American arms that the U.S. sold to its military allies in East and Southeast Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The reason why I compared Russian arms with American arms was that, according to SIPRI, the U.S, and Russia are the two major arms suppliers in Asia. Therefore, any potential shift of the balance of military power caused by arms sales from 2000 to 2013 in this region would more likely take in consideration these two arms suppliers. Moreover, I examined and compared the military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) of these Russian and American arms partners in East and Southeast Asia, respectively.

As a result of this study, while a larger quantity of Russia's arms sold to its Asian partners were obsolete because they arms were mostly dated from the Cold War era, the U.S. sold mostly modern arms to its military partners in Asia. Furthermore, Russia and the U.S. seem to maintain the balance of military power through arms sales to their Asian partners, respectively.

Do Russian arms sales to China upset the balance of military power between the United States and Russia in East and Southeast Asian?

The significance of this thesis lies in the fact that although I utilized only three weapon systems (Aircraft, Missiles, Ship) out of ten from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, the findings are significant, and could be a reflection of an ultimate finding if all the weapon system were used as independent variable to determine the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

This thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter is the literature review. I give a brief insight on the balance of power theory. Then, I explain how some countries use arms sales as a

foreign policy instrument. I also address, in the literature review, the implications of American and Russian arms sales to their partners in East and Southeast Asia while highlighting the quality of arms being sold. Then, I explain the significance of military expenditure for a country. The third chapter of this thesis is the research design. It encompasses the methods I utilised in this study. These are a descriptive statistics and comparative case study. In the fourth chapter, I examine the data related to quantity and quality of arms sales, and the military expenditure for each country covered by this study. Discussions of my key findings are presented in the fifth chapter. I conclude this thesis with some suggestions for a future study on arms sales and their implications on the balance of military power theory.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

International relations scholars have developed the balance of power theory to explain international peace and conflict. They propose that reducing military disparities between states will allow no state to have an overwhelming power over the others (Waltz, 1979; Vasquez and Elman, 2002). This proposition has been made to explain the reason behind the frustration of some states toward others whose power became overwhelming. Similar frustrations from nations were noticeable toward the pursuit of supremacy of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte of France, Charles I of Spain, and Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany. Thus, the absence of order in the world will result in an anarchy where security and stability are only concepts (Vasquez and Elman, 2002; Waltz, 1979). To prevent disorder, the distribution of power among states must be checked and balanced because increased in military might of one state over others in a region or system will upset the balance of military power. There are two types of power balancing.

First, there is external balancing of power (Waltz, 1979). The external balancing of power consists of the creation of alliances with other states in order to balance out the shifted power. Such alliance, in this study, can be virtually perceived between Russia and India as Moscow prefers to trade its modern weapons to India at the expense of China in order to balance Beijing's military power (Kapila, 2012). As the assumed relationship between the key dependent and independent variables stipulates that an increase in Russian arms sales to China will result in the shift of balance of military power in the Asian region, it is pertinent to point that this study is mainly focused on internal balancing.

Second, there is internal balancing. It consists of an increase in military capabilities such as the rise of military expenditure, an acquisition of sophisticated weapons, and an enlistment of more troops with a better training (Morgenthau, 1959; Waltz, 1979). According to Barron (2001-02) China resorts to internal balancing by increasing its military expenditure to purchase Russian weapons. The Chinese's need for internal balancing at this level can be explained by the fact that not only is China aware of its vulnerability due to domestic social and political instability (Whyte, 2010), but Beijing is also frustrated by the superiority of Washington naval, aviation, and troops in its backyard including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thus, internal balancing in the case of China is aimed at managing domestic social and political unrests by reinforcing military capabilities in order to prevent any escalations over its borders.

Arms sales are used as a foreign policy instrument in International relations arena during the period of the post-Cold War. While the post-Cold War era has tended to bring countries closer one to another on political, economic, and social level, it does not necessary dissipate the perception of threats between nations that nurture grievances toward each other for decades. The response to such threat, in some cases, consists of purchasing arms to deter rivals. Such an intention of a state to dissuade its foes by buying arms can be interpreted as a foreign policy instrument. For instance, while the U.S. had been delaying the purchase order of advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), beyond visual range air-to-air (BVRAAM), that Taiwan had placed for years, the U.S. only consented to complete the sale and delivered the missiles after China displayed its newly purchase of the Russian-made AA-12, considered by Defense Technical Information (DTI) as sophisticated as its other version AA-X-12 (Hewitt, Waltz, and Vandiviere, 2002). Thus, at some extent, the United States and Russia

continue to utilize arms sales as a tool of foreign policy to settle their political divergence. While Robert S. Ross (2002) argues that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan show Washington support to the independence of Taiwan, Johnston Alastair Iain (2003) justifies the China's militarization as aiming at the reunification of Taiwan. Thus, while American arms sales to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea increase, Russian arms sales to its Asian partners including China, India, and Vietnam grow, as well. It is interesting to find out whether Russian arms sales to China between 2000 and 2013 upset the balance of military power between Russia and the United States in East and Southeast Asia.

American and Russian arms sales to Asia raise concerns. While some scholars and analysts (Garnett, 2001; Wishnick, 2001; Lo, 2004) view China's purchase of arms from Russia as a policy aiming at reinforce its domestic and territorial integrity, others (Shambaugh, 2005 and 2013; Mearsheimer, 2010; Cohen, 1976) believe that China's military buildups upset the balance of military power in the Asian region. Their argument is based on the fact that an expanding Chinese military capabilities has the potential of heightening regional territorial and Islands disputes between China and its neighbors, namely Taiwan. From China's perspective, the choice of the United States to reinforce its military partnership with China's traditional neighbors including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, is perceived as provocation and a way to contain China's economic and military development (Barron, 2001-2002). Thus, the balance of military power, as noted Mearsheimer (2010), is upset in East and Southeast Asia when the volume of one country's arms purchased is significantly larger than that of other countries in the region. Mearsheimer's findings, however, seem not take into considerations the quality of Russian arms purchased by Chinese.

Although the volume of arms China has purchased from Russia is significant, the quality of these arms is low according to the Western Conventional Arms Control Regime (WCACR). The inventory of the People's Liberation Army, as stated by Ronald O'Rourke (2011), included Russian-made older generations of fighters, Tanks, and submarines purchased in 1990s. While the focus of O'Rourke is on the Chinese military modernization, he finds that despite Beijing's effort to expand its military capabilities, the discrepancy between the quality and the quantity of weapons is huge. He then concludes that the gap between quality and quantity of weapons and human resources remains the fundamental weakness of the PLA.

The superiority of military capabilities of American allies including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in East and Southeast Asia remains unquestionable. Thus the possibility for China to disrupt the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia remains disputable. The superiority of military capabilities of American allies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) in East and Southeast Asia is interesting. While the Japanese constitution renounces war, conforming to its article 9 (Hughes, 2006), the Japan-United States military alliance based on the American defense of the Island since the end of the World War II remains intact. This military cooperation remains crucial to Tokyo as it helps enhance its amphibious capacity in the Self-Defence Force (SDF), should Japan come under amphibious attacks from its Southwestern coast. Thus, Japan is well equipped with some high-tech arms including MK-45-4 127mm (Naval gun), SAM System, KC-767 GTTA (Tanker/Transport ac), AN/SPY-1D (Air search radar), and BGM-71 TOW (Anti-tank missile). Furthermore, the superiority of American military partners in East and Southeast Asia can be perceived through the inventories of South Korea and Taiwan. These two countries benefit from the newly produced American fifth generation of F-35s, for which purchase orders

are limited to America's closest allies in Asia (Cabestan, 2014). It also should be mentioned the existence of F-16s among these inventories. This suggest that the U.S. relies on the quality of its arms sold to partners in Asia to balance Russian arms sales in this region.

Russia prefers to sell its most sophisticated weapons to India. Considered as the major arms supplier to China and India, the military inventory of Russian weapons held by India is qualitatively remarkable than that of China. Thus, while Moscow refuses to sell its Sukhoi SU-30s (fourth generation fighters) to Beijing, as pointed Kapila (2012), yet Russia accepts to sell these weapons to New Delhi. The rationale goes on saying that, not only does Russia sells its more advanced weapons to India, Moscow also prefers to transfer a larger quantity of its weapons to India than to China. This preference, according to Kapila (2012), is based on the 1971 Indo-Soviet "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation", which explains Russia's special treatment toward India. The content of this treaty, as Kapila pointed out, aimed at containing China and Pakistan. It also suggested that while New Delhi continued to enjoy the Indo-Soviet/Russian military relations, India had to stay away from any strategic alliances with China, or western powers, including the United States.

Moreover, the Indo-Soviet Treaty is a strategic alliance on the ground of strategic benefits for the Soviets. Besides the containment of China, and depriving Beijing of taking advantage of becoming Asian regional power, Russia viewed in the Indo-Soviet Treaty an opportunity to undermine the American clout in the Asian region. Thus, Kapila (2012) continues stating that Russia needed India's status as a spearhead of the non-aligned movement to strengthen Soviet foreign policy in non-developed nations. Furthermore, a declined American influence in Asia would be an opportunity for Russia to be more comfortable in the region to fill

the gap as weapons supplier. However, it must be brought to attention the potential turmoil that would occur between Mainland China and Taiwan in the instance of Washington's decline from the Asia-Pacific.

An increase in military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) of a state is a signal of threat and potential disruption of the balance of military power. The military expenditure is important to help the administration of a State to provide for the necessary service and asset in order to protect and serve the security of the public. Conversely, while the military expenditure is significant for the above mentioned reason, its increase in a country could also suggest a sensation of threat of this country (Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel, 2004). The argument goes saying that the greater the threat, the higher the military expenditure of the neighbouring countries. So, the smaller the threat, the lower the military expenditure of the neighbouring countries. As a result, the military expenditure, as Deger and Smith (1983) point out, contributes to shift the balance of military power in a region. Thus, this thesis will examine the military expenditure of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China, India, and Vietnam to determine to what extent their military expenditure constitutes a threat to their neighbours, hence leads to the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3: Methods

This study used a mixed methods approach to understand the implications of Russian and American arms sales in East and Southeast Asia. Descriptive statistics and comparative case study analysis were used for the purpose of “cross-unit comparison where both qualitative and quantitative comparisons are generally made” (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001). This study utilized data of International Arms Transfers’ database from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This international Institute is independent and a valuable source of academic data for researchers, and policymakers.

The sample drawn from this database encompassed China, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Thus, this study relied on second sources data. Data of Russian arms sales to China, India, and Vietnam; and that of American arms sales to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, were compared in a case study approach to determine these nations’ military capabilities. The military capabilities included the quality and quantity of weapons sold, and the military expenditure of each country of this sample. The data on quality of American and Russian arms sales to their Asian military partners were collected from archives, mainly consulted online at the library of the University of Kansas. Thus, I consulted the 2014 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments (CMSD) involving the People’s Republic of China. I also consulted documents from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Moreover, used data from SIPRI to generate trends and types of arms purchased. Furthermore, I checked the types of arms purchased in this study against criteria on generations of arms (based on Western Conventional Arms Control Regime, WCACR) described in the 2014 Annual Report to CMSD. I also utilized measurement under the Western

Conventional Arms Control regime as suggested by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). According to the NASIC, when it comes to define the age (or the quality) of fighters, there are two categories: legacy fighters and modern fighters. While legacy fighters encompass fighter aircraft under the WCACR of third generation or below, modern fighters include combat aircraft of fourth generation and above. It is important to note the difference between the Western and the Chinese classification of fighter generations. While for example the Russian SU-30 falls under the WCACR of the fourth generation, the People's Liberation Army considers it as a third generation fighter aircraft. The reason behind such a discrepancy is blurring, given that China is more inclined to indigenize its aircraft, hence, moves away from western convention that might 'undermine' the security and military capabilities of Beijing. Finally, I used descriptive analysis of data that I found from the documents to determine the quality of arms sales by country. To measure Russian and American arms sales to their Asian partners, SIPRI uses Trend Indicator Value (TIV), unique system generated by SIPRI to analyze the volume of international transfers of major weapons. According to the SIPRI, the TIV represents "unit production cost of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial values of the transfer."³ In this thesis, the TIV allowed me to generate and examine trends of American and Russian arms sales to their Asian military partners, respectively. Moreover, I exploited data collection from academic literature related to the quality of arms purchased by each of these six Eastern and Southeastern countries in Asia to determine their proficiency in combat.

³ See "http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/measuring_aprod."

Furthermore, I used unclassified American government publications including the United States Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2014 annual reports on the People's Liberation Army, and the 2014 Congressional Research Service (CRS) that addressed topics regarding Chinese military capabilities in Asia. This unclassified literature reviewed the background of American and Chinese military capabilities in air, sea, and land domain. I was able to identify and analyze Quality versus Quantity of American and Russian weapons sold through the Word Bank, and Jane's Defence weekly databases. It is important to mention that while I used data from SIPRI to examine the quantity of arms sales between countries in this study, other aforementioned literature sources have helped me to examine the quality of arms sales.

Case Sample Selection

This thesis focused on arms sales to East and Southeast Asia by Russia and the U.S., former rivals of the Cold War. Russia sells most of weapons to its Asian military partners including India, China, and Vietnam, while the United States continues to supply, in the same region, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I chose these six countries for three reasons. First, these six arms importers were listed among the 2013 top ten of American or Russian arms importers in Asia, according to SIPRI. Second, I chose China because its military rise turns spotlights on the People's Liberation Army, and I was interested to know whether the Chinese military really has the quality of military structures to shift the balance of military power, and hence assume a superior status on the regional and international arena. Finally, I am curious and fascinated by how these former intimate competitors of the Cold War –Moscow and Washington- use arms sales to their Asian military allies as a foreign policy instrument on the current political platform that seems to be a proxy Cold-War era.

Hypotheses

The present study refers to three different hypotheses in order to test the assumed relationship between the key dependent and independent variables:

H1: Russian arms sales to China have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

H2: The U.S. sales modern arms to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea and disrupts the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia.

H3: The U.S. sales more arms to South Korea than Japan and Taiwan to balance China's military capabilities.

Analysis

I used the Western category of fighter, navy, and missile generations to determine the quality of arms sold, knowing that the Western Conventional Arms Control Regime (WCACR) uses World War II as reference to determine the age or quality of weapons. That is, all weapons produced prior or during the World War II are considered by the WCACR as weapons of first generation. Thus, I was able to determine the quality of the arms sold to each country in this study. Then, I compared Quality with Quantity in order to determine the real value of these arms. The balance of military power would be upset by China's arms purchased from Russia if the PLA had more modern (fourth generation or newer) and a larger amount of arms, and had a higher rate of share of GDP. If China fitted one or two of these variables (or conditions) and the other variables were filled by other countries in the sample, then the balance of military power

was maintained in Asia. If another country besides China filled all the criteria, I determined that that country upsets the balance of military power.

To calculate the quality level of military capabilities of each country in this study, I applied the estimated number of modern arms that I found in the literature to the quantity of these sold arms by the United States and Russia to their allies, respectively. Thus, I used the formula: $Tm = T \times Nm\%$, where Tm is total modern arms, T means total arms held by country, and $Nm\%$ is percent number of modern arms purchased. For example, the number of modern Russian ships bought and held by the People's Liberation Army's in 2000-13 was calculated as follows: $4270 \times 27\% = 1152.9$. Thus, China's military has a total of 4270 ships, of which 27 percent are of 4th generation and newer, meaning about 1,153. Although, the percentage of quality of arms purchased for Japan, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and Vietnam were not available in the SIPRI's database, key scholarly literatures, including the 2014 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments (CMSD) involving the People's Republic of China, reports from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have been helpful to address the analysis of the quality level of arms purchase of the aforementioned countries. For example, from the literature helped me find that from 2000 to 2013, China purchased 27 percent of modern aircraft, 56 percent of modern missiles, and 27 percent of ships from Russia.

I calculated the quantity of aircrafts, missiles, or ships sold to China, India, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from 2000 to 2013 by adding the yearly number of aircrafts, missiles, or ships sold to each country during the same period using the following formula: $T = ty1 + ty2 + ty3... + ty14$, where ty means total yearly purchased, and $ty1$ is total yearly purchased in year 1 (2000), $ty2$ is total yearly purchased in year 2 (2001), and $ty14$ is total purchased in

year 14 (2013). For instance, the total number of aircrafts purchased from 2000 to 2013 was calculated as follows: $TA = tay_1 + tay_2 + tay_3 + \dots + tay_{14}$, where TA means Total Aircraft purchased, and $tay_1 + tay_2 + tay_3 + \dots + tay_{14}$ is the total sum of aircrafts purchased during 14 years. To calculate the number of troops for each of these six countries, I just considered the total number of troops documented for the last year of this study (2013).

To determine the military expenditure of these nations, I calculated the average of fourteen years of money spent on military as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To calculate the average of the military expenditure (Av. MilExp) for each country (China, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea), I added the yearly amount of GDP of the country and divided the yearly total amount of GDP by 14 (the number of years covered by this study) using the formula:

$$\text{Av. MilExp.} = \frac{\text{GDP1} + \text{GDP2} + \text{GDP3} \dots + \text{GDP13}}{14}$$

where GDP1 means Gross Domestic Product for year 2000, and GDP13 is Gross Domestic Product for year 2013. To highlight changes (increase or decrease) in the military expenditure of the countries in this thesis, I calculated the percent change from year 2000 to 2013 using the formula:

Percent Change = Difference/Original X 100, where *Difference* is merely the result from subtracting the smaller number from the larger number. The *Original* is the starting number. For instance to calculate the percent increase for the Taiwanese military expenditure that was 10385 in year 2000, and 10530 in year 2013; I proceeded as follows:

$$\text{Percent increase} = \frac{10530 - 10385}{10385} \times 100$$

= 1.4 %

Thus, from 2000 to 2013, the Taiwanese military expenditure has increased by 1.4 percent. The quantity of aircrafts, missiles, ships and the number of troops by country are summarized in

Table 1

Chapter 4: Results and Analysis

Table 1. Quantity of Arms and number of Troops by Country, 2000-2013

Country	Aircraft	Missile	Ship	Troop
Japan	3128	633	56	259800
South Korea	7733	1262	1115	659500
Taiwan	1250	1001	1150	--
India	16845	4466	5205	2728700
China	14989	4849	4270	2993000
Vietnam	1478	574	1074	522000

Sources: The World Bank and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Table 1 shows that while China had more aircrafts than Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan, Russia sold more aircrafts and ships to India than the U.S. sold Aircraft and Ships to

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, the quantity of Russian aircrafts and ships purchased by India was larger than that of China and Vietnam. This suggests that Russia has sold more planes and ships to India than it has to China from 2000 to 2013. Such a discrepancy in quantity of Russian arms sales to India and China suggests that Russia is contributing to either shifting the balance of military power in favor of India, or maintaining the balance military power in the region, as claimed by Kapila (2012).

Moreover, among the United States' military allies in this study, Table 1 shows that military capabilities including the quantity of aircrafts and missiles of South Korea was higher than that of Japan or Taiwan, altogether. Nevertheless, the quantity of American ships sold to Taiwan was larger than that of Japan and South Korea, together. This suggested that South Korea was one of the U.S.'s key Asian partners. The difference in number of troops between Chinese and Indian military was not significant. However, while it was difficult to compare the number of Taiwanese troops (due to missing data) with troops of the rest of the countries in this study, Table 1 shows that China has the highest number of troops.

Table 2: Quality of Arms Sales to Country, 2000-2013

Country	Aircraft	Missile	Ship	Quality Level
China	0	1	0	1
India	1	1	0	2
Vietnam	1	1	0	2
Japan	1	1	1	3
Taiwan	1	1	1	3
South Korea	1	1	1	3

Sources (Multiple):

- National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
- Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- The 2014 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
- The 2014 Report to Congress on Military and Security Development (CMSD)
- The World Bank database
- IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

Notes:

a) For the purpose of this thesis, the quality level of arms is **0** when the number of type of arms purchased from 2000 to 2013 contains 50 percent or less of modern arms. The quality level is **1** when the number of type of arms purchased from 2000 to 2013 contains more than 50 percent of modern arms. Thus, 0 is the lowest quality level, and 3 is the highest.

b) For the purpose of this thesis, all arms created in late 1990s to 2013 and equipped with advanced military technology are considered modern.

Quality of arms sales to country

-China and quality of Russian arms purchased

Efforts are being made by China toward the modernization of China's military capabilities. While the 2014 Congressional Research Service (CSR) expected that 75 percent of the People's Liberation Army will be modern by 2020 (O'Rourke, 2014), it is interesting to know the account for modern arms that China had purchased from Russian from 2000 to 2013.

Aircraft: The Russian aircraft sold to China from 2000 to 2013 were mostly of an older generation. The inventory of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) consists of 27 percent modern Russian aircrafts (Chase et al., 2015), including the SU-30MK/Flanker (Combat fighter); Ka-27PL/Helix-A (ASW helicopter); Il-76M/Candid-B (Transport aircraft); and Mi-8MT/MI-17/Hip-H (Helicopter) to name a few. The Chinese air force has made some modifications on a few older generation of Russian-made SU-27s from its inventory to turn them into J-11, advanced generation fighters.⁴ Despite the larger number of Russian legacy fighters, 73 percent of old generation of combat aircrafts, a few were still capable of carrying missiles.

Missiles: Russian missiles sold to China from 2000 to 2013 were mostly modern. A missile is modern, according to Western convention, when it is from second generation and newer (Chase et al., 2015). The 2013 National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report

⁴ See <http://csis.org/files/publication/120621_Chinese_Military_Modernization.pdf>.

stated that Beijing had the most modernized, active and diverse missile expansion on the planet (NASIC, 2013). Thus, 56 percent of the missiles China has purchased from Russia were modern. They included 48N6E2/SA-10E (SAM); RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder BVRAAM; 9M311/SA-19(SAM); and 3M-54Klub/SS-N-27(Anti-Ship MI/SSM

Ships: Most ships China has bought from Russia were obsolete. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had only 27 percent modern Russian ships purchased from 2000 to 2013, including Project-636E/Kilo (Submarine) and Project-956/Sovremenny (Destroyer).

- **India** and quality of Russian arms sales

Aircraft: Most aircraft India has purchased from Russia were modern. More than 50 percent of the Russian aircraft purchased by the Indian Air Force (IAF) from 2000 to 2013 were fourth generation or newer, including SU-30MK/Flanker (Fighter); and Fighter Ground Attack aircrafts such as T-50 PAKFA, and MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F; and Il-38/MAY (ASW aircraft). Although the Il-38/May was a second-hand, it has been modernized by India⁵.

Missiles: While some of Russian missiles were produced in India under Russian license and technology, the majority of Indian missiles purchased from Moscow were modern. The inventory included Anti-tank missiles, such as 9M119Svir/AT-11, and 9M113Konkurs /AT-5; Surface-to-Surface and Air-to-Surface missiles, such as PJ-10BrahMos SSM/ASM to name a few.

Ships: All of the ships India has purchased from Russia from 2000 to 2013 were obsolete, and consisted of Project-1241/Tarantul (Fast Attacks Craft).

- **Vietnam** and quality of Russian arms purchased

⁵ See <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/researchissues/measuring_aprod>.

Aircraft: The Vietnamese air force has purchased more than 50 percent of high quality of Russian arms from 2000 to 2013. The aircraft was mostly consisted of SU-30MK/Flanker (Combat fighter).

Missiles: Most of the missiles that Vietnam has purchased from Russia from 2000 to 2013 were modern. The list included Igla-1/SA-16 (Portable SAM); Kh-35Uran/SS-N-25 (ASM); R-73/AA-11 (SRAAM); and AS/ASW torpedo.

Ships: Nearly all of the ships that Vietnam has purchased from Russia were obsolete. They consisted of Project-1241/Tarantul, and BPS-500/Type-1241A (FAC).

- **Japan** and quality of American arms purchased

Aircraft: The inventory of the Japanese aircraft purchased from the United States from 2000 to 2013 encompassed a mix of old and modern arms. However, more than 50 percent of the aircraft were of high quality, including F-35A (JSF); TH-28/480 (Light helicopter); and AH-64D Apache (Combat helicopter).

Missiles: There were a blend of obsolete and modern generations of American missiles that Japan has purchased from the U.S. However, more than 50 percent were modern, including BVRAAM (Beyond-Visual-Range-Air-to-Air Missile; BGM-71 Tow (Anti-tank missile); MIM-104F PAC-3; JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition); and GMLRS (Guided-Multiple Launch Rocket System).

Ships: All of the Japanese ships purchased from the U.S. from 2000 to 2013 were modern. They were mostly LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion).

-Taiwan and quality of American arms purchased

Aircraft: The majority of the aircrafts that Taiwan has purchased from the United States from 2000 to 2013 was modern, although there were a few obsolete planes. The aircraft included AH-64D Apache, and AH-1W Super Cobra, (both are Combat helicopters); and P-3Cup Orion (ASW aircraft).

Missiles: all the American missiles that Taiwan has purchased were modern. There were MIM-104F PAC-3 (Anti-Ballistic Missile); AGM-114K Hellfire (Anti-tank missile 2010); RGM-84L Harpon-2 (Anti-ship MI/SSM); and AIM-102C AMRAAMBVRAAM, to name a few.

Ships: More than 50 percent of the Taiwanese ships bought from the United States from 2000 to 2013 were modern. The inventory included Anchorage and Perry.

-South Korea and quality of American arms purchased

Aircraft: All of American aircraft that South Korea has purchased from 2000 to 2013 were modern. Some were produced or assembled in South Korea under American license. This category included F-16Block-52Version; F-16D; and FK-16. The rest of the inventory encompassed AH-64D Apache (Combat helicopter); F-15E Strike Eagle (Combat fighter); Shadow-400 (UAV); and RH-800RA/SIG (Reconnaissance AC).

Missiles: Nearly all of South Korean missiles purchased from the United States from 2000 to 2013 were modern. There were models including FIM-92 Stinger (Portable SAM); AIM-9X Sidewinder (SRAAM); Paveway (Guided Bomb); RGM-84L Harpon-2 (Anti-ship MI/SSM); Standard Missile-2MRSAM; and AGM-65 Maverick (ASM).

Ships: All of American ships that South Korea has purchased from the U.S. were modern, including Anchorage and Perry.

Table 3. Military Expenditure as a Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Country, 2000-13

Country	Military Exp. In 2000 in US \$ Million	Military Exp. In 2013 In US \$ Million	Share of GDP, 2000- 13
Japan	60,288	48,604	1 %
South Korea	20,031	33,937	3 %
Taiwan	10,385	10,530	2.3 %
India	27,653	47,653	3 %
China	37,040	188,460	2.1 %
Viet Nam	-	3,387	2 %

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure database

The average of 14 years (2000-2013) of the military share of gross domestic product for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, and Vietnam are illustrated on Table 3. While there

was missing data for Vietnam for year 2000, Table 3 shows the military expenditure for the rest of the countries encompassed in this thesis. The unit for the military expenditure was in United States dollars. There was an increase in the military expenditure of China, India, and Taiwan from 2000 to 2013. But the military expenditure of Japan has significantly declined. The Japanese share of GDP was the lowest of this sample, (1%). This suggested the Japanese complied with the Article 9 of their constitution, which stipulates the country does not militarize (Hughes, 2006).

It is critical to point out that despite the decrease in the Japanese military expenditure (from \$ 60,288 in 2000 to \$ 48,604 in 2013), Japan has a higher military expenditure, but this increase is not relative to GDP, and compared to that of South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Vietnam. In contrast, the Chinese military expenditure from 2000 to 2013 has quintupled, while it only accounted for 2.1 % of GDP. Such discrepancies suggested that an increase in China's military expenditure did not necessarily mean that China's military capability was growing. However, when one closely looked at the percent increase in China's military expenditure from year 2000 with \$37,040 to year 2013 with \$188,460, the result was striking (See Table 3). China has registered 409 percent increase in its military expenditure. Such a percent increase was noteworthy and more likely to be perceived by China's neighboring countries as a threat to their security (World Bank, 2002).

Additionally, while the percent increase of military expenditure for South Korea was 69 percent, India has recorded 72 percent of percent increase in its military expenditure from 2000-13, suggesting that India and South Korea were respectively ranked the second and third country in military expenditure, preceded by China. Besides missing data for Vietnam's military

expenditure for year 2000, making it difficult to calculate the percent change for this country, Japan was the only country in this study to record a percent decrease. The percent decrease is the difference between the original amount (\$60,288) and the last amount (\$48,604) divided by the original amount, multiplied per 100. Thus, Japan had a percent decrease in its military expenditure of 19 percent from 2000 to 2013.

The Japanese article 9 states discourages any maintenance of aircrafts, ships, missiles or other war potential. The article 9 goes on by stating that the right of belligerence of Japan will not be acknowledged (Hughes, 2006). Thus, that the Japanese military expenditure from 2000 to 2013 was the lowest among the United States military partners in this study (Table 3) was consistent of the Japanese share of gross domestic product for the same time frame. This finding, which was presented through trends on arms sales to countries on (Figure 2).


The trends of Russian arms sales to its Asian partners in this study were remarkably disparate (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows that the arms race between China and India was significant, knowing that from 2000 to 2001 Russian arms sales to China increased, but rapidly decreased between 2001 and 2003. However, Russia increased its arms sales to India beginning in 2000 to 2003, with a slight superiority over China's arms purchases. Russian arms sales to India encountered some periods of decreases in 2005, and 2008.

Meanwhile, China significantly increased its Russian arms purchases from 2003 to 2007. Such an important increase suggests that the admission of China to the World Trade Organization in December 2001 had positive impacts on China's arms trades with Russia, given that, as mentioned by Phillip Saunders (2006), both countries tried to undermine the influence of the

United States in that part of the world. However, from 2009 to 2013, the volume of Russian arms sales to India took off drastically. The increase in volume of Russian arms sales to India at the same time it decreased arms sales to China suggests that Moscow, as a supplier, used arms as a leverage to maintain the balance of military power in the Asian region (Agadzhanian, 2012). It also suggests that Russia's arms sales to China do not upset the balance of military power in the Asian region as pointed out by Mearsheimer (2010). Moreover, Figure 1 shows that Russian arms sales to Vietnam were steady from 2000 to 2010 with some timid increases in 2001, 2005, and 2008. However, Russian arms sales to Vietnam have taken off in 2010 with a peak at the onset of 2011, but decreased from then to 2013. Thus, Russian arms sales to Vietnam have not had significant implications on the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows trends of American arms sales to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Trends of American arms sales (see Figure 2) to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were diversely distributed. There was a significant increase in trends of American arms sales to South Korea than to Taiwan and Japan, creating important gaps in Trend Indicator Value (TIV) between these three Asian military partners of Washington. For instant the greatest gaps in TIV between South Korea and Taiwan occurred in 2007 when South Korea advanced Taiwan by about \$ 1200 million in TIV. About the same value was notices between South Korea and Japan in 2013 when the former advanced the latter (Figure 2). While American arms sales to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have decreased from 2000 to 2002 for South Korea, and 2003 for Taiwan, the sales picked up for both countries from these years respectively to reach a peak in 2004 for South Korea, and 2005 for Taiwan.

Figure 1. Russian arms sales to Asian countries, 2000-2013




Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Between 2005 and 2013, the trend of American arms sales to South Korea was characterized by periods of sharply decreases, especially during the periods between 2006 and 2009, and 2011 and 2013 (Figure 2). However, periods between 2005 and 2006, and 2009 and 2011 have been characterized by important increases in American arms sales to South Korea. Meanwhile, from 2003 to 2013, American arms sales to Taiwan have decreased between 2005 and 2007, before encountering a period of steadiness from 2007 until after 2009. Nevertheless, arms sales have increased from the United States to Taiwan between 2003 and 2005, and 2009 and 2013. Figure 2, also shows trends of American arms sales to Japan. This sales were mostly

steady throughout the 14 years covered by this thesis with some timid period of decreases in 2002 to 2005, and from 2008 to 2013.


Figure 2. American arms sales to countries in Asia, 2000-2013



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers database

From 2004 to 2008 the trend of the Japanese arms purchase from the United States has increased. Thus, while Figure 2 shows that the trend of American arms sales to South Korea was more important and has created noteworthy gaps between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, Figure 3 is more illustrative as it allows one to compare the volume of American and Russian arms sales to their Asian military partners in this thesis. Thus, Figure 3 shows American and Russian arms sales to their Asian military allies, respectively from 2000 to 2013.

Figure 3. American and Russian arms sales to countries in Asia, 2000-2013



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers database

Trends comparison of American and Russian arms sales to their respective partners and allies in the Asian region (see Figure 3) shows that while China’s arms purchase increased from 2000 to 2007 -leaving remarkable gaps between Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan-, India closed the gaps and created another one between itself and the rest of the aforementioned countries by increasing Russian arms purchase from 2009 to 2013. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the volume of China’s arms purchase from 2000 to late 2003, and from mid-2003 to mid-2006 were the largest compared to the rest of American and Russian military partners encompassed in this thesis. However, India’s arms purchases from 2009 to 2013 have significantly outsized arms purchases of the rest the countries. The wax and wane in volume of

Russian arms purchases between New Delhi and Beijing suggests that India tried to avoid arms discrepancy between itself and China. It also suggest that Russia has maintained the balance of military power in that region by adjusting its arms sales to both India and China.

Table 4: Arms Sales and Implications on the Balance of Military power in East and Southeast Asia

Country	Quantity of Arms	High Quality of Arms	Military Expenditure	Disruption of the Balance of Mil. Power
China	24,108	NO	2.1 %	NO
India	26,516	NO	3 %	NO
Vietnam	3,126	NO	2 %	NO
Japan	3,817	YES	1 %	NO
Taiwan	3,401	YES	2.3 %	NO
South Korea	10,110	YES	3 %	NO

Note: "Quantity of Arms" in Table 4 consists of the total of aircrafts, missiles, and ships purchased by country. "High Quality of Arms" refers to highest outcomes of Quality Level (see Table 2). "Disruption of the Balance of Military Power" is the outcome that derives from the quantity, quality, and military expenditure for each country.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The key factors that enable a country to disrupt the balance of military power in a region lie in the combination of the increase in the military expenditure, quantity and high quality of arms purchased or held by this country. While China is often pointed by some policymakers and its neighbors as causing the disruption of the balance of military power in Asia because of its military expansion characterized by an increase in Russian arms purchase, the findings in this thesis show inconsistency with such argument. Among Russian military partners in this study, China, India, and Vietnam, the larger quantity of Russian arms sales from 2000 to 2013 went to India (26,516), not China (24,108), as shown on Table 4. This discrepancy in quantity of Russian arms sales to India and China suggests that Russia has contributed to either shifting the balance of military power in favor of India, or maintaining the balance of military power in the region, as claimed by Kapila (2012). Therefore, my first hypothesis of this thesis stating that Russian arms sales to China have increased the quantity of China's arms and upset the balance of military power in Asia does not hold. Moreover, the quality of Russian arms purchased by China were questionable.

Russian arms sold to China were mostly obsolete. This is the second finding of this thesis. In fact, much attentions seem too focused on the quantity of Russian arms sold to China from 2000 to 2013 that one overlooks that the importance of arms, as Shambaugh (2000) and Shlykov (2004) observed, entails their quality in combat (2000). Unlikely, Russian arms that China purchased were deprived of required quality, and hence inefficient for combat. While, in this thesis, three (3) was the score of quality level required for arms to be considered high quality or modern, the quality level (see Table 2) of China's arms purchased from Russia was

only one (1). This score was attributed to china because only Russian missiles bought by China in 2000 to 2013 were modern.

In addition to the quantity and quality of China's arms purchased from Russia, China's military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was believed to be significantly high, and hence a disruptive factor to the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. However, this study shows that China only accounted for an average of 2.1 percent of GDP, and has one of the lowest GDP in this study. Such a small amount of GDP suggests that China is not in position to shift the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia, leading thus to my next finding in this thesis. Despite China's low military expenditure from 2000 to 2013, the percent increase in China's military expenditure was 409 percent during the time frame. This salient increase suggests that China spent a significant part of its military expenditure on other aspects of its armed forces other than arms purchases. Moreover, this finding suggests that China had (an) other arms supplier(s) besides Russia.


Notwithstanding the large quantity of Russian arms sold to its Asian military partners in this study, the U.S.'s arms sold to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were modern. This finding shows that not only the Asian region is of American concerns, but also policymakers in Washington are aware of the importance of the quality superiority of arms over quantity in instance of defense and combat. Moreover, this finding corroborates my second assumption for this thesis, asserting that the United States sold modern arms to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Additionally, another relevant finding is that despites its article 9 of the Constitution that recommends to Japan not to militarize, this country had more modern arms, including fifth generation of Joint Strike Fighters, F-35s, than Taiwan- a militarized country. While the dividing

line between defense and combat arms is blurring in International relations (a point outside the scope of this thesis), the purchase of F-35s by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) could be explained by territorial and Island disputes that involves Japan with its neighbors, including China, in the case of disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyu. Thus, Japan needs some modern arms to defend its regional interests, even if the presence of these high tech arms serve as deterrence to Japan's rivals in the Asian region. Finally, the finding on South Korea is the one that impresses me the most in this thesis.

The increase in American modern arms sales to South Korea reinforces American presence in East and Southeast Asia. This finding could be considered as the key one, given that South Korea is, in the words of Hillary Rodham Clinton, "an advanced democracy and key ally living in the shadow of a repressive and bellicose neighbor to the north" (2014). Thus, the increase in modern arms sold to South Korea finds some explanations in the belligerent behavior of a nuclearized North Korea. This country's obstinacy to continue its nuclear program despite the Six-Party Talks (SPT) led by China, and including North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia (Chou, 2005), the regime of Pyongyang is source of security and stability concerns to Asia and the rest of the world. The choice of China to lead the SPT was based on the close relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing. According to Marc Lanteigne (2013), China is the North Korean only main economic support. The argument goes on stating, for instance, that from 2005 and 2011 trades between both countries went from US\$1.5 billion to 6.3 billion. Despite the increase in economic trades, friendship, and the choice of its closest partner (China) to run the SPT, North Korea did not refrain from the 2006, 2009, and 2013 nuclear tests. Such provocative behavior of the regime of Pyongyang could explain the reason

why Washington reinforced its military presence in the Asian region, and strengthen South Korea's with more arms. Such a U.S. behavior toward North Korea by increasing arms sales to South Korea underscored the use arms sales as a foreign policy tool by the United States. It is important to note that both North Korea and China share the same goal in terms of territorial disputes as both states aim at the reunification of their countries. In other words, while North Korea wants to take the South Korea back, China also want to take Taiwan back (Johnston, 2003). Figures 2 and 4 show evidence of increase in American arms sales to South Korea in 2006 and 2010 following the first two nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009) by North Korea. This reaction from the U.S., which itself was another example of American foreign policy behavior in Asia, suggests that the United States cannot afford to lose its interests and allies in that part of the world to an unpopular nuclearized North Korea.

Figure 4. American arms sales to South Korea, 2000-2013



Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers database

Additionally, by the end of 2009 to mid-2012, South Korea has increased its arms purchases from the United States, surpassing those of Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, and China. This suggests the implementation of the military facet of America's 'pivot' to Asia as Washington continues, according to Mearsheimer, to act "as a pacifier in this part of the world" (2010). America's 'pivot' to Asia is a strategy of an adjustment in American foreign policy toward Asia, which consists of increasing the presence of American naval forces, hence reinforcing American defense relations with countries in the Asian region (Ross, 2012). The defense relations between the U.S. and its Asian allies is more visible through the importance of American arms sold to South Korea. Such significant arms trades with South Korea suggest that the U.S. transmit the task of the Asian "pacifier" to an Asian country, namely South Korea for the sake of the pivot. The choice of South Korea to convey the American pivot to Asia is another key finding in the thesis.

It is important to mention that this study has encountered some limitations. First, the selection of a small sample size. The selection of this small sample size was based on observation of trends in international arms sales from SIPRI arms transfers' database. Thus, from 2000 to 2013, India, China, and Vietnam were the top 3 Russian arms importers in Asia. During the same year period, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan were the top 3 American arms importers in the Asia. As a result, this study used these 6 countries in East and Southeast countries. Second, the study has come across few missing data. Finally, the short time frame allotted to this study has certainly reduced the exploration of a larger literature for this thesis. However, these diverse aforementioned limitations have not impeded the academic integrity and findings of this thesis.

The findings of this thesis also suggests that the two main arms suppliers in the Asian region compete with each other through their Asian military allies. On one hand a large quantity of arms were sold (in the case of Russia), on the other hand, a stress was put on quality of arms sold (in the case the U.S.). To grasp the extent to which Russian and American arms sales to Asia impact on the balance of military power in this region, it will be relevant for a future research to take in consideration a larger sample of Asian countries, and their whole arms inventory.

Conclusion

This thesis is about Russian arms sales to its military partners in East and Southeast Asia, and the implications of these arms sales on the balance of military power between the U.S. and Russia in these regions. Chiefly this study addresses the question regarding whether Russian arms sales to China have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia. To address the question, I set a premise that would determine whether the balance of military power is disrupted or not in East and Southeast Asia. The reason for that premise is that while there is much press and scholarly literature on Russian arms sales to China as a factor that has upset the balance of military power in the Asian region, the evidence showing such a disruption remain inconsistent. Thus, the premise in this study states that, for a country to shift the balance of military power in a region, this country would necessary show three independent variables, including the highest military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the highest quantity and quality of arms compared to these of other countries in the region. My sample consists of Russian military allies in East and Southeast Asian, including China, India, and Vietnam; and American military allies in the East and Southeast Asia,

including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, given that the U.S. is one of the biggest arms suppliers in this region. I used descriptive statistics and comparative case study to get my results.

The results for this thesis are summarized in Table 4 above, and suggest that Russian arms sales to China have not disrupted the balance of military power from 2000 to 2013. Actually, no single country in the sample had upset the balance with its arms purchase because none of them had all three independent variables required to shift the balance of military power. While China is the second buyer of Russian arms, Russia has sold more arms to India. Moreover, had the quality of Russian arms purchased by India been the highest, India would have disrupted the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia because it had a high GDP (3%), the highest quantity of arms, and would have had a quality level of 3 for its arms. But that was not the case in this study. While Russia used arms sales to India to position itself in the Asian region, the United States reassured its positions in the region through its military cooperation with South Korea that had not only the highest quantity of American modern arms, but also the one of the highest GDP, advancing Japan and Taiwan. Following the rationale by Shambaugh (2000) who argues that quantity of (obsolete) arms is irrelevant, in combat, compared to quality, I would continue his rationale by saying that South Korea has all three necessary variables to shift the military power in Asia if one considered that the quantity of the Chinese and Indian arms were obsolete, albeit higher.

I am aware that this is an unpopular theory to assert. Because South Korea is an “advanced democracy and a key ally” (Clinton, 2014). Nevertheless, if one sticks to Shambaugh’s (2002) argument, it seems logic to argue that the superiority in quantity of

Russian arms sold to India (26,516) and China (24,108) were irrelevant against the U.S's arms held by South Korea (10,110). Therefore, India was left with 3 percent of GDP, which was high, but not enough because it needed the other two variables to stay in the course, needless to mention the 2.1 percent of China's GDP that could not hold. Japan, and Taiwan were disadvantaged by the inferiority of GDP and quantity of arms. As a result, South Korea was the perfect candidate for the shift of the military power in East Asia from 2000 to 2013, based on Shambaugh's theory of the significance of the quality of arms in combat. However, this thesis downplays such argument and conclude that the balance of military power in East and Southeast Asia has been maintained from 2000 to 2013 through arms sales by Russia and the United States to their Asian military partners, respectively.

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