

The 'Importance of Winning': Affect, Just War and the 'Familiarization' of Success

By

© 2015

Luke B. Campbell

Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Chairperson Dr. Mariya Omelicheva

---

Dr. Brent Steele

---

Dr. Paul Schumaker

---

Dr. Burdett Loomis

---

Dr. Dave Tell

Date Defended: July 7th, 2015

The Dissertation Committee for Luke B. Campbell  
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

The 'Importance of Winning': Affect, Just War and the 'Familiarization' of Success

---

Chairperson Dr. Mariya Omelicheva

Date approved: July 7th, 2015

### Abstract

The primary aim of this dissertation is to engage critically a puzzling element of Just War Theory (JWT): that ethical criteria for justifying decisions to go to war have been augmented by an important prudential consideration—the probability that engaging in war will (or will not) be successful. If this is to continue to be a part of JWT, the criteria of probable success must be fleshed out. I argue that the objective indicator that the decision to go to war will be successful is lacking or misconstrued. Against the notion of success as prudential, this dissertation will show that the probability of success is not a matter of rationality or prudentiality but rather becomes *essential* or *expected* when attached to specific emotional memories, metaphors and cultural symbols; and central not secondary (as suggested in JWT) to particular war aims. This is, furthermore enabled by a recent culture of permissibility in the use of JWT and augmented by important internal and structural inconsistencies which are incompatible with conflict realities. In order to demonstrate the complicated reality of action beyond prudentiality, the dissertation employs an important and appropriate method, Weber's "ideal-types", in order to demonstrate that success in war for the United States is "affectively familiar" action, not merely prudential. The dissertation concludes by suggesting that JWT scholars must get outside of the instrumental structure itself, take a look back and examine if and how the assumptions about criteria and their placement enable this problem in the first place.

## Acknowledgments

First, a very special thank you to Tanna. In all honesty, thank you is really not enough. You've supported this seemingly never-ending goal with optimism, love and unwavering encouragement, which is exactly what was needed to remedy the isolation of this endeavor. Another very special thank you goes to my little boy Reed Bradley. You've shown me over and over again what's really important and will always give me a reason to be eagerly distracted from my work.

To Brent and Mariya, thank you for very patiently shaping me into the scholar I have become, for teaching me key lessons about life and academia, and for modeling what a scholar should be; you've both given me something to which I can continually aspire. Thank you to the other members of the dissertation committee: Paul Schumaker, Burdett Loomis, and Dave Tell. I would also like to extend a general thank you to the entire Political Science faculty at the University of Kansas. A very big thank you also goes to Linda and Betty Jo for putting up with me and the other graduate students, for always having the right answers to our myriad of questions, and for doing it all with grace and kindness.

Finally, I have to thank Gary Armstrong and Alan Holiman, professors, mentors and now dear friends. You started me on this journey and it is only fitting that you both have worked closely with me as it has come to an end.

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Back to Back World War Champs.....	1
Dissertation Aim.....	1
JWT and “Success”.....	3
Methodology: Ideal-Types, Action and Rationality Reconsidered.....	7
Weber’s “Forms of Action”.....	9
Outline of the Dissertation.....	13
Chapter 2: Prudential and Its Critics.....	13
Chapter 3: Success: That Old Familiar Feeling.....	14
Chapter 4: WWII, Our Best Days?.....	15
Chapter 5: Rethinking Success.....	18
Chapter 2: Prudential and Its Critics.....	19
Introduction.....	19
An Ontological Note.....	21
Success in the Evolution of Just War.....	22
The Evolving “conversation”.....	23
Prudential’s Proponents.....	28
Prudential’s Critics.....	34
Alternative Conceptions of “Success”.....	35
Chapter 3: Success: That Old Familiar Feeling.....	39
Framing, Acceptability, and Action.....	40
Frames.....	41
Framing and Weber’s Forms of Action.....	43
Action and Meaning.....	44
Weber’s “Forms” of Action.....	45
Affective Familiarization.....	47

The Complicating Notion of Habit .....	48
Habit: The individual and the social .....	49
The Breaking of Habits .....	51
Familiarization: The Past as Present; The Past as Future .....	52
The Past as Present.....	52
The Past as Future .....	55
“In this great future, you can’t forget your past.” -Bob Marley.....	55
Rhetorical Familiarity .....	57
Affect .....	59
Affective Familiarization: “Wartime Consciousness” and Connecting the Past, Present and Future ....	60
Conclusion .....	60
Chapter 4: World War II: Our Best Days?.....	62
Introduction.....	62
The Origins and Persistence of “Success” Culture .....	63
Total and Limited War.....	65
WWII and the “Ideal” .....	67
Winning WWII .....	69
Vietnam and Mixed Affective Familiarization .....	72
Gulf War I, Saddam as Hitler, and “No Room For Defeat” .....	75
“Winning” The War on Terror.....	84
The Antithesis of Success in Vietnam .....	92
Conclusion .....	97
Chapter 5: Rethinking “Success” .....	99
A Tentative Way Forward for JWT .....	100
Bibliography .....	104

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Back to Back World War Champs

One recently observed display of patriotism and irony, bravado and humor served as an important impetus for this project: the popularity of shirts, hats, and other items boldly emblazoned with an American flag and the words “back to back world war champions.”<sup>1</sup> As if this were not enough, many of the shirts in particular also come with a caution on the back: “don’t make us three-peat.”<sup>2</sup> These items are at best a trivialization of the horror of two world wars and at worst largely inappropriate. Yet the sale of these items and their relative popularity (at least by this author’s observations) are also incredibly intriguing especially as an easily-received reminder *and* as a way to display a certain expectation of what happens when the United States goes to war.

Over the course of this dissertation, I seek to achieve two major goals. First, I intend to illustrate and detail the irony of a restrictive condition of Just War Theory (JWT) being utilized for permissive purposes. Second and directly connected to the first, I provide a theoretical device to understand how this comes to pass.

### Dissertation Aim

The primary aim of this dissertation is to critically engage an element of JWT by exploring the way in which past success in war is constructed as an indicator for the meaning of success in the present. The probability of success, one of the specific criteria found within the JWT canon, is commonly assumed to be prudential, fixed, or of secondary hierarchical importance in the Theory’s “usage” as an ethical model for limiting the frequency and nature of

---

<sup>1</sup> Found at: [www.rowdygentleman.com](http://www.rowdygentleman.com)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

conflict. Within JWT, the specific function of the probability of success, understood as one of practical guidance to be relied upon *after* the cause of war has been deemed just by a proper authority, belies a potentially problematic construction in that the nature of success is central to war aims but also bound-up in and reliant upon common emotional triggers and historical metaphors and analogies. In fact, the probability of success is traditionally categorized *normatively* in such a way that its prudentiality *should* or *ought* to constrain the use of force (Young, 2001; Johnson, 2005).

My aim, however, is to move beyond these normative debates within JWT, those utilizing the framework to debate “oughts” and “shoulds”; debates wherein standards of “justice” are assumed, fixed, and given and against which conflicts can be judged “just” or “unjust” (Johnson, 1999, 2005; Elshtain, 2003). Rather, the purpose here is to approach the study of JWT in a way that addresses questions concerning the role that it *actually plays* as a guide for scholars and policy-makers alike. Indeed, two of the most widely cited Just War theorists, Michael Walzer and James Turner Johnson, have each argued for a recognition that JWT is almost certainly *not* limited to the purview of scholars but rather connected to the political community writ large (Walzer, 2004; 3-23; Johnson, 1999; 26). As such, I engage in a study aimed at uncovering a particularly important problem for JWT, as a normative and empirical model for the limitation of conflict: that the normative treatment of the probability of success, as hierarchically secondary within recent conceptualizations of Just War is fundamentally ill-suited to engage with the incredibly important role that success in war *actually plays* in conceiving and executing a stated model of success. Specifically, I argue that the understanding of success in war is not actually rooted in normatively hoped-for assumptions of prudentiality intending to limit the use of force.



Rather, success as a social affect transcends any secondary considerations of a limiting war aim, instead centralizing it in a specific, shared social experience.

Against the notion of success as prudential, this dissertation will show that the probability of success is not a matter of probability (however conceived). Rather success in war, particularly in the United States is *essential* or *expected*; attached to specific emotional memories, metaphors and cultural symbols; and central not secondary to particular war aims. In this way, a criterion of JWT, thought to *limit* the frequency and effects of war may in fact constitute a specific context through which a broad and grandiose rendering of “success” is sustained beyond any prudential limit.

### **JWT and “Success”**

In order to fully understand the particular problem I seek to uncover, it is important to first clearly situate the probability of success within the present JWT framework and outline the notion of “prudentiality” within the Theory’s success criterion that is central to the dissertation. Structurally, JWT is divided into three specific sections: 1) *jus ad bellum* (JAB); 2) *jus in bello* (JIB); 3) *jus post bellum* (JPB). Each component is intended to provide specific constraints on different aspects of the use of military force, or read another way, ethically *justify* military force; either way a differentiation of ethically *just* conflict from simply large-scale murder is sought. The three components are further broken into specific conditions aimed at the regulation of force in different ways. In line with the specific focus of this dissertation, the theoretical and empirical nature of success, the JAB only will be unpacked further below simply because the success condition is only found in the JAB; the other two elements of JWT follow a similar structure, but with different specific conditions.

Translated from Latin, JAB essentially means justice of war, or more broadly, the ethical constraints on the *decision* to use force. Intuitively, JAB is the main focus of the dissertation since expectations of success (a central focus here) are connected to the decision to use force in the first place, practically and ethically. As such, this component expects the following conditions to be met in order to have a “just war”: just cause, right (sovereign) authority, right intention, proportionality (ends), last resort, probability of success.

As a brief reminder, the basics of how these criteria are satisfied are as follows.

- 1) *Just cause*: War is only to be waged for one (or more) just causes that include self-defense, humanitarian intervention, punishing evil and righting a grave wrong.
- 2) *Right authority*: War is only to be waged by those widely recognized as having the “right” to wage war and generally refers to states.<sup>3</sup>
- 3) *Right intention*: Essentially war can only be waged for the purposes of satisfying the just cause and not some other hidden or ulterior reason.
- 4) *Proportionality of ends*: The anticipated good of going to war must outweigh the expected and assumed harm or cost that the war will likely bring. Obviously measuring or calculating good and harm is difficult and usually subjective.
- 5) *Last Resort*: War is to only be pursued if other non-violent means have been exhaustively pursued.
- 6) *Probability of success*: Covered in full detail below.

What is most striking about these conditions, however, is that they are often ordered in a hierarchical manner, separating “primary” from “secondary” or “prudential” criteria.<sup>4</sup> This

---

<sup>3</sup> For critiques of the notion of authority, especially “states only” see: Heinze and Steele, 2009; Lang, O’Driscoll, and Williams, 2013; Calhoun, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Many times these are separated as such (Johnson, 1999; 2005) or the language of primary and secondary is used (McMahan, 2005) or simply prudence is used to mean a practical placement as opposed to the higher normative

supposed stratified ordering specifically calls into question the “check-list” use of JWT that requires that *all* conditions be met in order to have a just war. Those criteria occupying the position of “primary” are often right authority, just cause, and right intention (Johnson, 2005; 38).

It follows that the other criteria are understood to be of “secondary” importance; that their validation is somehow tied to and a product of those in the primary position. In this way, certain criteria of JWT are given privileged position over others and are subsequently seen as the lens through which all other criteria are interpreted, perhaps problematically discounting or otherwise ignoring them in the process. Indeed, with important exceptions (Harbour, 2011; Steele, 2008), the probability of success is one of the least-studied criteria in JWT. The inclusion of these secondary or prudential criteria into the JAB framework is supposed to signal to us that there are “other moral values at stake in the decision to go to war than simply the cause” (Harbour, 2011; 230). The underlying idea behind relegating this decision to a prudential calculation is that wars that are otherwise just may not be deemed wise or “prudent”; in other words, not ultimately “successful” in achieving the stated just objective of winning the war. The problem is that if the purpose of JWT *really* is to limit the frequency and effects of war, then the under-theorized nature of a number of its principles seems antithetical to this end. As a result of both its position and perpetuation *through* the primary criteria, the probability of success seems to necessarily hinge on a proper or right authority to determine what that “success” means according to certain objective or fixed criteria.

There is, however, an inherent normative element to the probability of success. In fact, this criterion is traditionally categorized in such a way that its objective or fixed standard of

---

assumptions of other such as just cause (Bellamy, 2006; Heinze and Steele, 2009; Harbour, 2011; Coppieters and Fotion, 2002). For a critique of the placement see: Ish-Shalom, 2014.

prudentiality *should* or *ought* to constrain the use of force. The blending of morality and “objectively” defined laws or fixed precepts of costs and benefits by which specific conflict goals can be measured in order to determine how wise or practical a conflict would be seem to be the *theoretical* purpose of this criterion, the treatment of which is largely a constant since the inclusion of the probability of success in the JWT canon. (Butler, 2012; 18-45). Intriguingly, the expectations put upon this criterion are actually at odds with the Theory’s social use, evolution, and *application*. In fact, the purpose of not only the probability of success, but of the Theory itself, has evolved and recently re-engaged with centuries-old debates about its limiting or permissive nature (Ibid.). This interpretation of its application is subject to varying specific “social practices, conditions, and structures” (Butler, 2012; 65; also see O’Driscoll, 2008; 1-8). To expect, therefore, that one of JWT’s criteria be of a fixed, unchanging, variety sits uneasily with its broad social development; a development intended, at times, to limit the nature and frequency of conflict, but also more recently construed permissively as an enabler of conflict understood through absolute moral and religious terms (Johnson, 2005; Elshtain, 2003; Butler, 2012; 18-45).

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to cast aspersions on the scholastic treatment of JWT and its development as a moral or social guide to the use of force. Nor am I particularly interested in evaluating how “wise” or just it was for the Bush Administration to launch a “war on terror” (WOT), for example (see Elshtain, 2003; Rengger, 2004; and O’Driscoll, 2007 for competing treatments on this). Instead, I intend to investigate the probability of success, its social understanding and particular meaning construction in an empirical social scientific manner. In so doing, the ontological predisposition of this research assumes that JWT, and the probability of success more specifically, are connected to the changing and evolutionary nature of social

narratives about war and its purposes. These social narratives can provide boundaries on understanding and particular spaces in which certain metaphors and memories of war “make sense” through action. As such, Wittgensteinian philosophy offers the opportunity to undertake an “analysis of meaning” through the use of language in a *social* context.

### **Methodology: Ideal-Types, Action and Rationality Reconsidered**

If, as I argue, history and metaphor matter in shaping particular expectations of success, beyond the notion of prudence found in JWT at the outset of war and in important “moments” of its prosecution, a more important question concerns *how* exactly these social products enact particular affective appeal? Even so, these metaphors may rely upon particular evocations, held out as standards by which to measure and understand success; this provides an analytical framework for the evaluation of how success is understood socially, particularly as it bumps up against an “objective” evaluative measure, as held out by JWT. The frame of Weber’s ideal-types, properly understood, is particularly helpful here to begin to structure affect and the *use* of these social ideal-types analytically against what is assumed “rationality” or prudence in the probability of success. Much has been made above of the particular importance of meaning and interpretation *socially* as a way of creating a boundary around how certain historical events and metaphors are understood presently. It is important, therefore, to provide preliminary commentary on social meaning and action, especially as it exists in relation to the key methodological approach of this dissertation, ideal-types.

Weber’s notion of “meaning” provides an opportunity to study and interpret social conduct. Meaning is a fundamentally social concept that in turn provides a frame to interpret and evaluate requisite conduct against that notion of meaning. As a result, meaning has two important *representational* qualities, especially as it helps structure expectations and attendant

action in line with those expectations. The representational qualities of social meaning are as such: 1) “actual conduct by a specific actor in a given historical situation”; 2) “conceptual ‘meaning’: subjective meaning attributed to a hypothetical actor in a given type of conduct.” (Weber, 1980; 30). It seems entirely possible that these two qualities could be conflated or used to structure meaning, especially when derived from historically-understood and constructed “lessons”. The actual becomes the hypothetical and the *hypothetical becomes the actual* in a sort of misplaced metaphor assuming a “context of meaning within which the actual course of action occurs” (Ibid.; 35). This is precisely why being able to “put oneself in the place of an actor is important for the clearness of understanding” (Ibid.; 30).

Another important aspect of structuring the analysis and framing the approach in this way is Weber’s assertion about the merits of systematic scientific analysis. In order to do this well, it is crucial to “represent all irrational, emotionally conditioned elements of conduct as deviations from a conceptually pure type of goal oriented behavior” (Ibid.; 32). But this is goal-oriented behavior of a specific type and fashion. “Pure types” of goal oriented behavior rarely, if ever, actually occur and only in “approximate form” to an ideal-type. Yet, it is through this *approximation* or comparison to an ideal-type socially that scholars are “aided in our understanding of the way in which actual goal-oriented behavior is informed by ‘irrational’ factors of every kind...” (Ibid.; 35). Indeed, ideal-types are the “concepts by which we apprehend society” (Portis, 1986; 64). Echoing Weber’s procedural warning, it is crucial to note at this point that my methodological orientation is not to be misinterpreted as a way to provide evidence of the “predominance of rationalism in human existence” (Weber, 1980; 35). Instead, it is *against* the assumed, but seldom seen, pure rationalism that conduct is ordered and understood socially.

Weber further provides an important, albeit brief, outline for how to attempt an analysis of an ideal-typical nature and what to expect out of such a systematic process. First, it is vitally important to determine how an event, moment, metaphor, etc. might “run its course” or exist in the absence of irrational factors (Ibid.; 35). Next, using the foregoing as a *hypothetical premise*, the irrational components are singled-out as a deviation from the stated norm. In this way, “empirical observations can be generated and sorted...” in an effort to uncover “those moments where the messy complexity of actual concrete experience *resists* such categorization (the ideal) [and] an analytical narrative really takes off” (Jackson, 2011; 154). Ideal-types tell us (scholars *and* social agents) what to expect under “ideal” conditions; analytically, “keeping [that] ideal firmly in mind helps us make sense of what actually did happen, and why” (Ibid.; 115).

I cover this process much more fully in chapter 3 but briefly, this aids in understanding the context of meaning in which an actual course of action occurs, and within which emotions and the supposedly *irrational* matter to the course of action more than rationality or an expected pure ideal type. Essentially, the way in which Weber’s ideal types are used in the dissertation is to investigate a particular process that can explain how success can be transformed from a restrictive to a permissive condition for war by articulating, contrasting and blending Weber’s “forms of action”.

### **Weber’s “Forms of Action”**

The key to understanding the nature of Weber’s “forms” is that the ultimate end in using them to apprehend social action is a more thorough understanding of “the way in which goal-oriented behavior is informed by ‘irrational’ factors of every kind...” (Weber, 1980; 35). It is further critical to note that social action *rarely* conforms to any of the “ideal” categories that Weber articulates. Rather, social action is most often a mix of one or more categories. This is

especially important to consider in chapter 3 as I unpack how specific forms, traditional and affectual blend together through habit, memory and familiarization to provide boundaries on the social expectation of success from the past into the present. Briefly, Weber's four "forms" of action as specific ideal-types are: 1) Goal-Oriented (pure rationality); 2) Value-Related; 3) Affectual Action (emotion-based); 4) Traditional Behavior (habit, familiarization) (Weber, 1968). In chapter 3, I will more fully situate these in a comprehensive discussion about the interaction between traditional and affectual.

Furthermore, it is crucial to understand that conversations and debates about potential action and its attendant expectations are formed *inside*, and not necessarily exogenously given by the international system or the perceived sociality of state and actor relations (Steele, 2008; 29-39). Rarely does social conduct align to any "pure forms" or "types" of action around which certain expectations are structured; yet they could conceivably be (and are) categorized accordingly for purposes of organizing events into more easily-definable and easily-understandable forms of conduct (Weber, 1980). Further understanding of the way in which emotional elements of decision-making structure action and effect arguably one of the most important decisions, that of using military force and the means by which the stated measure success is understood, adopted and pursued, is thus of great importance.

The social effect of an affective understanding of success in war (based on evoked, emotional metaphors of meaning) can thus be discerned as it provides the supposedly "irrational" or emotional space in which action is not only understood but taken as well. This is a shared representational space in which social agents *and* those acting on their behalf pursue a common goal measured against an ideal. The narrative, meaning, and interpretation of specific metaphorical familiarizations "make sense" within this space, providing expectations that are



achieved only through certain actions. These metaphors garner and achieve social purchase through this process and in turn inscribe familiar meaning into certain images, moments, and words.

It is important to clarify that the particular methodological orientation herein is not a type of counter-factual examination. This type of approach attempts to reconstruct the trajectory of certain events or decisions with the goal of providing commentary on how much better (or worse) these *could have* turned out with the benefit of knowing how it turned out (Biddle and Feaver, 2013; 27). While particular event details used to construct a counter-factual will be used, my approach is much different than this type of after-the-fact re-tracing. Instead, I attempt a Wittgensteinian “analysis of meaning” informed by Weber’s ideal-types to understand meaning in a particular context of its own construction. I am not guided by an attempt to discern how things *could have* turned out, rather I examine how they *did* turn out and more importantly *why*; doing so requires a different analytical process, a process that shares a particular ontological orientation with the social agents who are the subjects of my investigation.

The way in which language can structure, contextualize, impart meaning, and “present the possibility of agency” in that context is an important part of this investigation (Fierke, 2010; 83-94). It is through this kind of narrative development that JWT and its principles remain most relevant, as even past wars are continually measured against the current application of standards of “justness” (Butler, 2012; 18-46). This relevance, however, seems to be attached to specific political usage, employed to legitimate conflict and to provide a justification for the use of force so long as it lines up to some (possibly contrived) interpretation of JWT’s perceived permissibility (Butler, 2012; 18-46). For example, Walzer (1977; 109-117) argues that WWII is a prominent example of a war prosecuted with frequent appeals to JWT. Yet, JWT’s perceived

permissiveness *at the time* obscures the subsequent moral evaluation that “the war was one of the least justly prosecuted wars in history” (Butler, 2012; 38). Further, it is even more curious that subsequent presidential administrations after Truman raised the estimated number of American servicemen saved by the use of *two* atomic weapons on civilian targets (Torgovnick, 2005; 6).

I argue that these distinct “mutable social narratives” (Butler, 2012; 18) can impart certain meanings, images, and “lessons” that provide the fodder for sustained emotive and socio-culturally powerful constructions of expected success derived from that of the past. This process is especially powerful in conflicts where “success” is nebulous, uncertain, or both; a prime example of which is the so-called WOT. In this way, these social experiences and narratives can help to perpetuate a war effort beyond its “rational” or “prudential” ends or expectations and with it create grandiose notions of success at the start of conflict. As a result, the seemingly objective identifiers of “just” and “prudential” become socially constructed, creating their own boundaries on meaning and interpretation that can exist outside of the assumed “rationality” of war aims. The focus, therefore, is to identify and analyze the *understanding* and *meaning* of “success” in the United States, not to evaluate the level of success achieved (or not) or whether the stated aims of success are prudent or just, except as a way to measure them against different categories of action, namely tradition and affect.

Aiding the particular social affective power of this process is the fact that war and conflict have a relatively small “sample size”. The nature and infrequency of wars, particularly ones that loom large in the legacy and identity of societies, provide perpetuating and powerful social narratives through which JWT and certain of its principles are understood. Exploring the social meanings and requisite space for expected action carved-out by those meanings, I argue that the understanding of success in war is not actually rooted in normatively hoped-for

prudentialisms intending to limit the use of force. Instead, success takes on a socially affective meaning that transcends any supposedly “secondary” considerations of a limiting war aim. Instead, success is centralized in a specific, shared social experience (Johnson, 2005; 38).

In this way, a criterion of JWT, thought to limit the frequency and effects of war may in fact constitute a specific context through which a broad and grandiose rendering of success in war endures *even when* it makes no rational or prudential sense at all (as measured by the prudential consideration), or when prudence would dictate a termination of the war effort and/or avoidance of its prosecution altogether. This is the power of affectively familiar metaphor; it transcends rationality and becomes the lens through which decisions, narratives and expectations “make sense” in specific contexts. It is because of the social nature of war and conflict that the context, narrative, and shared experience matter.

## **Outline of the Dissertation**

### *Chapter 2: Prudential and Its Critics*

The second chapter entitled “Prudential and Its Critics” reviews contributions to the debate on Just War’s “prudential” criterion, especially the commentary on the probability of success. As the literature *directly* interested in the probability of success is somewhat limited, this review will proceed by evaluating the position of the prudential criterion, the reasons for this positionality, and the problems, as pointed out by others, of continuing to treat this criterion in this manner. The chapter also importantly traces the debates, scholarly and beyond, regarding the relative limiting or permissive nature of not only the probability of success but the whole of JWT in particular. The goal of this chapter is to synthesize the debates over the purpose and limits of this positional conceptualization by drawing in scholarship from different perspectives and inquiry objectives. Finally, the chapter serves a methodological purpose as well as it is intended

to connect to yet complicate and extend the notion of “rationality” found in Weber’s “goal oriented conduct”.

### *Chapter 3: Success: That Old Familiar Feeling*

This chapter introduces and details my particular novel theoretical construct that interacts and competes with JWT’s prudential account of success, affective familiarization. Drawn from sociologist Maurice Halbwach’s theory of “familiarization”, this concept is extended and connected to the likewise social concept of affect (1992). The blending of these two concepts, each explored and theorized fully in this chapter, leads to the novel concept of affective familiarization.

This phenomenon is a particularly powerful force, generating shared affective experiences that connect and transcend individuals. These experiences are not only shaped by historical and socio-cultural factors but also, and in turn, play a key role in constituting collective identities and the type of political values and practices associated with them. A common affective experience that connects and transcends individuals, it will be argued, is war; specifically the successful (or not) outcome of war. War as both a physical and perceptual stimuli can trigger visceral emotions, somatically and cognitively connected as anger, fear, and hatred while at the same time drawing from socio-historical understandings of a particular social identity that the state embodies.

The chapter also introduces the notion of tradition (or habit as it has been termed in IR scholarship; Hopf, 2010) as a way to anchor the familiarization of the past through and beyond simple elements of metaphors and narrative that are used as rhetorical familiarizations to help “make sense” of action.

Essentially, the familiarization of narratives or metaphors rooted in shared (constructed) understandings of the past become affectively linked through the habitual or traditional expectation of success on display in symbols, images, rhetoric and “moments”. The nature of success rendered in this manner exists outside of prudential as grounded in JWT. The intent here is to help structure the nature of the *actual* not hoped-for understanding of success at play and as such provides more easily interpretable meaning drawn-in later in the dissertation.

#### *Chapter 4: WWII, Our Best Days?*

This chapter serves as the main empirical section of the dissertation by detailing the end of WWII relative to the initial understandings or expectations of “success” in three subsequent wars: Vietnam, the Gulf War and the WOT. The chapter also briefly engages the way in which WWII was “successful”, as that model of success structured language and action in the three wars investigated. The main spatial parameter of the empirical investigation is public speeches made by three U.S. presidents and high-ranking administration officials in charge of policymaking during three different wars that, as will be shown, are linked together metaphorically in powerful ways. This chapter is the real “heart” of the dissertation, and thus the longest, as it not only presents a narrative of these speeches relative to the ideal outcome, but it demonstrates how and why the language used has particular socially affective force and meaning, subsequently providing a context for expected, traditional and affective action

Further, it is important to investigate the influence and effect of these stated metaphors from administration officials as either susceptible to analogy or suspect in order to more comprehensively the social effect of the language in-line with an Wittgensteinian understanding of what the language is doing. This will be done by juxtaposing media coverage of these metaphorical employments *and* the subsequent action of the actual prosecution of the wars. Since

each of the three wars investigated used the notion of success in WWII as a model, this investigation is an important part of tracing action within its own rhetorical construction.

Specifically, the chapter engages chronologically with three important U.S. conflicts in the following manner. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: this section investigates Johnson's use of the Munich analogy in WWII as offered in an important video produced by the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1965. The section then turns to the *ineffectiveness* of the analogy by detailing how it became mixed in an effort to sustain the "traditional" element of success as deployed at the outset of conflict.

Next, George H.W. Bush in the Gulf War: this section traces a number of important "moments" throughout the Gulf War. It begins with a description of and subsequent reaction to the "victory" parade through New York City at the end of the war, shows many instances in which George H.W. Bush employed the "Hitler analogy" to link success in WWII to success in the Gulf, illustrates Norman Schwarzkopf's specific experience in Vietnam as something to be avoided, and further details how the success of the Gulf War was at once to be like WWII and *unlike* the perceived failure of Vietnam.

Finally, George W. Bush and Barack Obama in the so-called WOT: The events of 9/11 represented many things; perhaps one of the most striking is that this was the first "on-soil" attack since Pearl Harbor. This is especially important because the trajectory and "ideal" by which subsequent success in the WOT was measured was specifically and *continually* related to the "success" of WWII.

Over the course of this war a number of important "moments" offer the opportunity to further illustrate, through case investigations, the changing (or not) nature of conceptualized "success". These "moments" include: 9/11 first public comments; September 20, 2001 speech to

joint session of Congress which was the first public parallel to WWII; the “ultimatum” to Iraq 2003; the “Mission Accomplished” speech and aircraft carrier landing; the requisite “anniversary” speeches.

Further, public statements, some officially prepared, some uttered in morning talk shows by various Administration officials *throughout* the prosecution of the WOT that not only hold out and reinforce the notion of “success” against the ideal-type but this is also contrasted with the presentation of an “un-ideal-type”, specifically identifying and condemning the “lost will” and failure to “stay the course” in Vietnam as something to be avoided. These statements will be woven into and through the examination of the language in conjunction with the “moments” listed above. Other aspects of Bush Administration language with regard to the measure of “success” in the WOT will be examined through the stated aims and assessments of this war relative to the ideal notion of “success” as found in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* document.

The assassination reaction to the of Osama bin Laden will also be investigated. While obviously this took place post-Bush administration, this long-sought-after “moment” had particularly powerful affective force, as demonstrated by the subsequent celebrations. This case further offers a particularly striking way to understand the most closely approximated U.S.S. Missouri-type moment in the WOT, and is, potentially, the exception that proves the rule that we *do not* or *could not* have this type of moment in the WOT, but feel the need to.

The evidence put forth in this chapter is from a variety of sources, both primary and secondary. I rely upon published verbatim accounts of speeches from both Presidents and Administration officials, secondary accounts of these speeches and moments from various newspapers reporting on the event, speech or moment, and also other scholars who build upon

both primary and secondary source material to build a more holistic account of the various moments. More specifically, it is important for the purposes of apprehending the “messy reality” (Jackson, 2011; 154) to not only examine the language in its attempt to familiarize, affectualize and traditionalize subsequent action but also the corresponding accounts of exactly what the language is doing socially; how the language is received and perceived as an accompaniment to expected success in particular wars.

#### *Chapter 5: Rethinking Success*

The fifth and final chapter ties together the theoretical and empirical elements of the dissertation, assessing the problem for the future and structure (hierarchy) of JWT in particular and begins to provide a preliminary way forward for the continued ethical relevance of JWT and the connected concept of “action” through JWT.



## Chapter 2: Prudential and Its Critics

### Introduction

The previous chapter briefly identified important elements that structure debate about JWT in general and the probability of success in particular. Specifically, the hierarchically determinative primary and secondary criteria structure carries with it important ontological considerations of the notion of “success” and particularly its purpose as one of enabling or limiting conflict. This purpose and interpretation is connected to an ongoing and evolutionary “conversation” about JWT formed and shaped by shifts in legal and philosophical developments internal to the JWT tradition as well as key historical events. As an overview of the literature will show, the attachments to a hierarchical separation of criteria, that which has produced the “prudential” rendering of the probability of success, can actually have the theoretical and practical effect of changing the question from a prudential and moral consideration of “can” the war be successful into a statement of the war “must” be successful.

In this chapter, I explore the evolutionary transformation of JWT’s ontological understanding from one of constraint into the more recent articulation of a justificatory or permissive rendering, commensurate with a “desire to advance a compelling rationale for the use of force” (Butler, 2012; 34). This is an important background from which to understand the “prudential” and hierarchical nature of the success principle. As I will demonstrate, these permissive interpretations have become linked quite closely with the “moral authority” responsible for determining a prudential course of action. This conflation in turn reproduces the permissive and problematic “must win” view of success, for the very nature of success is thus wrapped up in the moral nature of the agent as such; in other words, moral agents engaged in a just cause *must* be (or need to be) successful. In effect, this almost certainly transcends the notion

of “prudence”. Indeed an important part of the problem surrounding the position of prudence as secondarily attached to a moral agent is its very foundational assumption: that the condition of success in the war decision is actually a practical consideration separate from *moral* reasoning, as if launching a war with no probability of success is only a prudential problem. Without question, it seems that this would be highly imprudent *and* immoral (Eckert; 2014; 62-75). It is therefore necessary to unpack this evolving interpretation from the perspective of JWT’s purpose before turning to the requisite social consequences of JWT’s use as connected to important historical developments. To know why JWT has unfortunately come to be an *enabler* it is important to know that it was, at one point, focused on the constraint and limitation of the use of force.

The chapter will proceed by first highlighting the (relatively) recent introduction of the probability of success into the JWT canon. As the literature *directly* interested in the probability of success is somewhat limited, this review will evaluate the position of the prudential criteria, the reasons for this positionality and the problems, as pointed out by others, of continuing to treat these criteria in this manner. Next, I examine the transformation from restrictive to permissive philosophical and social usage of the criterion of probable success to foreshadow consequences for the understanding of success in the more recent JWT canon. The evolutionary and transitive nature of JWT will stand in sharp contrast to the assumed objective, fixed nature of the prudential success criterion. I then shift the focus to the specifics of the debate regarding the purpose and understanding of “prudential” as tied to the probability of success. I unpack the arguments for this type of understanding and then draw in more recent scholarship that is critical of this notion for reasons of perpetual “must win” objectives beyond the “limiting” assumption of prudentiality. Finally, the chapter draws in some of the big themes from the introduction in an

effort to synthesize and point the way forward for the rest of the dissertation by highlighting key terminology and connecting important elements of the methodological approach. The goal of this chapter is to review the debates over the purpose and limits of this positional conceptualization by drawing in scholarship from different perspectives and inquiry objectives on the very nature of JWT itself.

By the end, this chapter will have achieved two things: 1) an explanation of the transformation of JWT's ontology broadly and related specifically to the probability of success; 2) an introduction of themes that structure the dissertation moving forward. Namely, a problematic alternative conceptualization of success beyond that of the traditional prudentialist: the idea that success in war "is a force that gives us meaning" (Hedges, 2002); it helps understand the incomprehensible and give meaning to the irrational; it sustains our belief and pursuit of an outcome beyond the limits of rationality and prudence.

### *An Ontological Note*

It is important to once again articulate the specific ontological predisposition here, crucial to the trajectory of this chapter as well as the main thrust of the project overall: JWT and its criteria are connected to the changing and evolutionary nature of social narratives about war and its purposes; it does not assume that these criteria are the "fixed output of an unyielding scientific proposition defined by an unyielding set of laws" (Butler, 2012; 18; Rodin, 2005) or guided by a one-dimensional moral language that "portrays the world as we want it to be, not as it actually is" (Fiala, 2008; xi). In fact, the relatively recent development of prudential success as a [supposedly] fixed and objective evaluatory frame of success is highly inconsistent with the broader social development and transformation of the tradition itself, more akin to a "conversation" (Butler, 2012; 18-46). Furthermore, it is important to note that "wars are evolving

historical events” (Fiala, 2008; xi). A fixed, one-dimensional understanding of a moral consideration attempting to structure the use of force seems inconsistent in this regard as well. The elements and trajectory of this conversation are explored in detail below.

### **Success in the Evolution of Just War**

In order to fully understand the specific focus on success unpacked below, it is necessary to trace the broader transformation of the social use and understanding of JWT. This includes both philosophical, scholarly treatments as well as the evolutionary social narrative connected especially to certain international conflicts and positive law-notions of the state itself, the historically assumed arbiter of the “just war” (for a critique, see Steele and Amoureux, 2009; 177-204). While a comprehensive history of this shifting “conversation” is not attempted here (see Butler, 2012; 18-46; Bellamy, 2006; Johnson, 1975), I will briefly trace the important social and scholarly developments about JWT broadly as a background for the understanding of success specifically.

The condition of success is a relatively recent addition to the JWT canon. In fact, for many centuries, the notion that just wars actually be able to succeed in achieving the stated just cause largely did not enter the conversation. One of the first known inclusions of such a criterion into the discussion of JWT is Hugo Grotius’ largely underdeveloped treatment in the early seventeenth century. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is given only passing consideration in his massive *Rights of War & Peace*. Identified as the “hope of success” Grotius folds the following broad definition into a discussion about proportionality of ends: “we should compare not only the ends with one another, but the *capacity of the means for bringing about those ends*” (Grotius, 1925; 1140; emphasis added).

It seems fully appropriate to infer from this meager definition that a limiting or constraining understanding of success was intended from its earliest conceptualization: the ends considered simply cannot exceed the means to achieve them. It is crucial to understand however, that although the means to achieve certain ends may have in fact been available, the ends themselves were still tempered by proportionality. Certainly this requires knowledge of one's own means in order to draw commensurate ends that can be achievable. Intriguingly, this type of logical "reading" of a situation seems to transform the name and ethos of success from one of simply "hope" to "reasonable chance" or even "probability" (Johnson, 2005; Elshtain, 2003; Bellamy, 2006). Moreover, the confusion and conflation of hope, reasonable chance, or probability belies what may actually be a deeper debate about what *success* really is, what scholars and policymakers *want* it to be, or more importantly what it can be understood to mean.

### **The Evolving "conversation"**

It is important to read Grotius and his introduction of "success" against the philosophical and ontological understanding of JWT at the time. This first consideration of a notion of "success" as articulated by Grotius, albeit quite basic in nature, is situated essentially in the middle of an important shift in JWT thought from divinely-inspired influences in statecraft and matters of war first, to natural-law origins and then to a positive-law influenced emphasis on popular sovereignty that came out of the Enlightenment and Westphalian period.

In the earliest era of JWT formation, stretching back as far as Christian antiquity, the question of war was heavily influenced by considerations and appeals to divinity and attempts to achieve a temporal version of the "city of God". While Augustine, and later Aquinas, recognized that this was unachievable, the pursuit of this inspired their writings on the morality of war. The result was a tension that, while imbuing those in divinely-appointed positions of authority with

the right and *duty* to conduct just war, its use and prosecution was to be of a highly limited nature, specifically “obliged to maintain peace and pursue justice” (Butler, 2012; 23). The divine right to rule was explicitly connected to the divine duty to pursue peace and usher in a temporal “city of God”. Balancing the evils of war with the evils of a temporality devoid of divine peace was a delicate matter; one in which the utmost restraint must be taken when considering the decision to use force.

The Reformation and subsequent Enlightenment periods ushered in transformative social attitudes, institutions, and relationships between state(s) and subject that were less divinely-inspired and more grounded in universal natural law (Johnson, 1975; 150-207). Against this changed social environment, JWT scholars such as Suarez, Vitoria, and Grotius sought to maintain the relevance of moral questions and limitations on the use of force, while still being sensitive to shifting social expectations placed on those responsible for making decisions about when to use force. Appeals to a temporal “city of God” were replaced with natural law-informed approaches to morality based on the “law of nations” (Grotius, 1925). Yet the overall limiting framework of JWT and its conditions were carried over from Augustine and Aquinas. For example, Grotius’s references to proportionality (in which the notion of success was embedded) were at least broadly informed by Aquinas’s treatment of the same even if they were different in detail and purpose: it “proved vital to the just war ‘conversation’, decoupling the quest for establishing constraints on war from an explicitly religious basis and rooting them instead in appeals to human rationality...[and] adapting and advancing effective standards for the conduct of war within a radically changing social *milieu*” (Butler, 2012; 28, 30).

The rise of positive-law and the associated concepts of sovereignty and *raison d'état* further changed interpretations and the social “conversation” of JWT. The progression toward

ultimate state authority as begun in the early Enlightenment period was nearly complete after the Treaty of Westphalia. Subsequently, considerations of the justice or morality of the decision to use force were “effectively banished from legal and political discourse” (Ibid.; 31) and instead rooted in the “authority” of the state. What may seem a subtle shift in the nature of the war-decision from the previous period had, and continues to have, important implications for the interpretations of JWT’s purpose, particularly one of permissibility instead of constraint, and with it the notion of success rooted in the notion of ultimate state authority.

Specifically, during the Enlightenment period questions of morality and justice in war were connected to the “authority” of those making the war-decision but only through expectations of reason and rationality; gone were appeals to divine authority. The subsequent rise in positive-law and *raison d'état*, however, changed the nature of the war decision by removing the question of morality and justice from the considerations based in rationality, instead vesting full authority for the war-decision in the state *because* of its moral authority. Morality and justice were now connected to state authority instead of existing *only* in the decisions. As a result, *raison d'état* was effectively the only “deliberation” needed for the use of force, and nothing mattered “beyond consideration of its strategic implications and its utility in advancing the interests of the nation-state...” (Ibid.; 33).

The allocation of complete and total political authority in the modern state is a product of the legal positivism connected to notions of state sovereignty. The ultimate function of positive-law and *raison d'état* was that national sovereigns were judge, jury and executioner of the war decision and that decision *itself* was expressly connected to the assumed “moral authority” of the sovereign. This transformation has produced, largely in the last century-and-a-half, an appeal to the JAB that has a permissive and at times baldly justificatory rather than limiting interpretation.

As a result, JWT has become the “moral” basis for justifying the use force rather than arguing from a position that promotes its judicious use. In fact, Butler (2012; 32) contends that the permissive shift in considerations of JWT’s purpose was solidified in the statecraft of the late 19th century. The culmination of the philosophical transformations from divine-to-natural-to-positive law resulted in the establishment of the norm of *competence de guerre*, (which translates roughly into ability to conduct war effectively) that had effectively “supplanted the earlier concept that a just cause had to exist for war; reason of state was by definition...such a cause” (Johnson, 1975; 261).

The scale of destruction wrought by WWI tempered the extent of *competence de guerre* and *raison d'état* that had effectively comprised the extent of the deliberation on the war “decision”. As a result a more idealistic view captured the aim of western foreign policy in the post-war years. In this case, many statesmen, including those from the U.S. and European nations actually did re-engage elements of JWT beyond simply the reason of state-motivated actions of a previous generation. Yet, these calls for a foreign policy that re-engaged elements of “morality” were largely meant to help rectify, for those states, what has been called the liberal contradiction: a problem in which “liberal society bent on expanding its ideals through the force of arms...appeals to the just war tradition in constructing an argument in favor of the use of force” (Butler, 2012; 35). Essentially, a justificatory reading of JWT assured that this important ontological contradiction be eased and the League of Nations’ “justice” of liberal interventionism could be sustained.

The brief rise of constraint-focused JWT ontology following WWI was largely stymied by the alarming pace at which fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan were established. This development, coupled with those regimes’ increasingly belligerent outward behavior once



again shifted the social focus of JWT. In response, the language of the JAB was employed in a permissive and justificatory manner, denoting an almost obligatory call for action. The very nature of the assumed enemy in this case, combined with the transitive interpretive frame of JWT's use and purpose effectively re-shaped a permissive JAB. Indeed, as Walzer has noted appeals to JWT in WWII were quite evident (Walzer, 1977; 109-117). No doubt part of the need felt to appeal to the language of JWT was due to a perception that "confronting fascism was a *moral duty* in that it was the only hope for a lasting peace" (Butler, 2012; 38). There is also almost no contention that a just cause was well-established. Yet, against frequent appeals to the JAB, WWII eventually turned out to be "one of the least justly prosecuted wars in history" (Ibid.; 38). While is this judged in terms of the JAB, an important dichotomy is revealed here: there is almost a hierarchical separation of JAB (primary) over JIB (secondary). That is because the cause was *so undeniably just* and obligatory, many of the means ordinarily in violation of major *JIB* tenets were employed in pursuit of what eventually became "total war". In many cases, JWT arguments "were used for the justification of obliteration bombing and the destruction of two Japanese cities by nuclear weapons" (Verstraeten, 2004; 99).

Of the many important elements of WWII that continues to have profound lingering effects on the understanding of JWT today is the notion of "total war". The way in which this lingering conflict strategy has shaped how JWT is understood socially and philosophically is important; it intersects many of the issues brought to the fore in the evolutionary tracing of JWT above. Specifically, the hierarchical separation not only of JAB and JIB but more importantly the stratified treatment of conditions *within* the jus ad bellum today has been shaped by the "total war" legacy of WWII.

This type of warfare, in which rigid alliances of states mobilize against one another is, at this point in time, largely an anachronism. Its objective, however, is a product of WWII era conceptualizations of JWT and points up the important hierarchical problem not only of JAB over JIB but also this important structure *within* JAB. Total war's objective is straight-forward: "to defeat the whole of the enemy society" (Fiala, 2008; 5). This objective is compatible with the evolved understanding of JWT *at the time*: the already-established permissive shift in the interpretation and use of JWT coupled with the rise of an enemy, the evil of which prompted a "moral duty" beyond which any further moral deliberation was unnecessary. The pursuit of total war and its grandiose objectives led, especially in JIB terms to highly problematic consequences even if the outcome was successful as measured against the objectives of total war described above. Perhaps the most problematic consequence or "lesson" is that WWII continues to demonstrate the "potential for widely accepted just causes to enable and sustain a close approximation of total war" (Butler, 2012; 40). This important culmination in JWT's social use and philosophical understandings has very real and demonstrable implications for the way in which the current notion of "prudentiality" is treated in the (somewhat limited) direct engagements with success in JWT literature. As I seek to point out, "prudentiality", thought to be a consideration within the sphere of rationality, is fundamentally a moral problem often read through the lingering assumption of moral necessity and duty. This is crucial to the production of a "must win" type mentality, robbing success of any intended "prudentiality" at the *start*.

### **Prudential's Proponents**

Recently, JWT's unique origin in Christian antiquity has formed the basis of calls for a normative re-engagement with the theory itself akin to an "original intent" reading, problematically couching the ethics of war in terms of a good vs. evil or a right vs. wrong

dichotomy, also reminiscent of the “moral duty” arguments that structured JWT thinking before, during, and after WWII. This “re-reading” of JWT provides the moral impetus to counsel that wars waged by actors with “right authority” (read: states only) for the perpetuation of the good ends wrought by that actor are justified simply because the actor endowed with the “right to the sword” is a moral authority as such (Johnson, 2013; 19-34). It is through this very connection to historically-understood, absolutist, or divinely-inspired justifications of the recourse to war that certain narratives of the use of force are rendered more important than others. As a result certain criteria of JWT are given privileged position and are subsequently seen as the lens through which all other criteria are to be interpreted, perhaps problematically discounting or otherwise ignoring them in the process. For example, recall the hierarchical separation problem I referred to above: that because the cause was *so undeniably just*, many unjust means were used in pursuit of that just cause.

Thus the criterion of just cause is most often used in this way and understood as “central to arguments justifying war in moral terms at all” (Harbour, 2011; 230). However, the inclusion of subsequent criteria into the jus ad bellum framework, developed over a centuries-long “conversation” is supposed to signal to us that there are other “moral values at stake in the decision to go to war than simply the cause” (Ibid.; 230). If the purpose of JWT *really is* to limit the frequency and effects of war, then the under theorized nature of a number of JWT’s principles and an explicitly stratified scale by which “just” is to be considered seems antithetical to this end.

One of the least studied criteria is the probability of success, with important exceptions (Harbour, 2011; Steele, 2008; 229-235). Commonly grouped with the “other” criterion as articulated in the introduction, the probability of success is often relegated to an afterthought or a

position of “prudential” guidance *after* the cause of war has been deemed just by a proper authority (Johnson, 2005; 38). This criterion seems to necessarily hinge on such an authority to determine what that success means: “the ‘who’ determines the ‘what’ of [international] society” (Steele and Amoureux, 2009; 181). The underlying idea behind relegating this decision to a prudential calculation is that wars which are otherwise just may not be deemed wise or “prudent”; that is, unlikely to be “successful” in winning the war and thus not undertaken. Yet the extent to which this theoretical prudence affects the calculation of the use of force is an important part of understanding the justification for war in the past and present.

It was briefly mentioned above that normative understandings of the probability of success in the *jus ad bellum* are varied. Much of this variance is based on interpretations of what this criterion *should* be used for or what specific end it is intended to aim. Even so, to the extent that this criterion is even included as an important part of this evolving tradition, it is most often relegated to a position of a “prudential” or “secondary” consideration. As a result, it seems to be under theorized while at the same time occupying a position of social importance in framing a critical aspect of warfare. This is a curious dichotomy and a problematic oversight in the literature on the ethics of war. If JWT scholars are then to be engaged in a project of re-reading the theory with the aim of discerning a transcendental “original intent” it is perhaps not surprising that the result is a lack of substantive engagement with what success looks like and means in warfare.

To be fair, however, this criterion and especially debates over its positionality have been dealt with by JWT scholars, some much more explicitly (and fully) than others. The prudential consideration of success in warfare is intended to “impose important checks on decisions to wage what would otherwise be justifiable wars” (Bellamy, 2006; 123) thus, at least theoretically, re-

invigorating JWT with an important level of constraint. Of vital importance to the effect that this criterion is supposed to have in limiting war is that it is unconnected to the justice or morality of the “primary” criteria: just cause, right authority. Rather, prudentialist role in this case is to serve as a “check” on the decision to use force when the just cause is already secured. This is a vital assumption, often meant to involve the “assessment of military capabilities on both sides...” (Eckert, 2014; 64) effectively situating the consideration of success squarely in the realm of cost/benefit rationality.

While some scholarly and rational debates exist over what exactly that probability calculation of capacity of means actually involves or whether these considerations can be accurate, the focus of the debate regarding this principle seems to be on the notion of “success” itself (Coppiters and Fotion, 2002; 79-90). As articulated more fully below, however, what is assumed to be competing conceptions within this criterion that of probability and success, are actually difficult to separate. The current interpretation, while situated within the “prudential” assumption, consequently links these two parts of the definition together in an important way. The fact that a pure calculation of probability, as determined by competing means, cannot accurately be measured is not as much of a prudential hurdle when a “must win” view of success renders the probability of succeeding quite high, regardless of any consideration of “cost” however accurate.

The pervasive prudentiality assumption is reflected in much of the literature providing an “overview” of sorts of the JAB criteria. In *Just Wars*, Alex Bellamy argues that the primary prudential “check” on the decision to use force is the probability of success (Bellamy, 2006; 123). For Bellamy, this criterion holds that “it is wrong to wage war for a justifiable purpose unless those instigating it can reasonably expect to prevail” (Ibid.; 123). In other words,

prudence is essentially a calculation about the overall likelihood of success and evaluations regarding the incurred costs relative to the achievement of success or chances of prevailing. What this seems to boil down to is an interpretation of the probability of *winning the war*. Success is thus understood in terms of “winning” and justified through inherently subjective calculations about costs relative to outcomes: “a state may be able to prevail but the cost of prevailing may be higher than it wishes to pay to satisfy a particular just cause” (Ibid.; 123). However, a separation of these criteria into distinct moral and prudential camps seems theoretically problematic especially since the prudential criteria need the *moral authority* of a particular actor (already established by the hierarchical separation of criteria) to interpret the prudence of the war itself.

This connection seems to be borne out by James Turner Johnson’s categorization of the probability of success. Like Bellamy, Johnson (2005; 38) divides the jus ad bellum criteria into two categories: primary and prudential. Johnson, however, does not privilege the probability of success as the top or most important prudential check on the decision to use force. The argument presented by Johnson is that a prudential calculation must be made that the “likelihood that the means used will produce the justified ends sought” (Johnson, 2005; 38). Interestingly for Johnson, there is no adoption of Bellamy’s assumption that the moral justification for war in the first place be separated from the prudential or wise calculation about the likelihood of winning the war. In fact, the probability of success is intertwined with other jus ad bellum criteria to determine the “level, type, and duration of force employed” (Ibid.; 38). The connection to other jus ad bellum criteria seems to necessarily hinge on a political authority to determine what that success means. Although the moral/prudential separation does not come through in Johnson’s

categorization of the probability of success, he does argue for the normative necessity of separation of a different kind.

The distinction raised by Johnson in *Can Modern War Be Just?* concerns the ends by which a successful war should be judged or evaluated. Johnson argues that success understood in terms of militarily “winning” the war is incorrect since most goals are political and wars themselves have military or strategic aims (Johnson, 1984; 28-29). As such, success for Johnson should be about order and not only about peace as regards the end of military conflict (Ibid.; 28-29). The important point of this argument is that “expecting a goal to be achieved by the war that is fought for it is unrealistic...” (Johnson, 1984; 28-29; paraphrased by Sjoberg, 2006; 80). However, the confluence of the probability of success as necessarily contingent upon the interpretation of moral agents from the “primary” criteria seems to be incompatible with the argument for the separation of political goals and military aims in evaluations of success. Specifically, evaluating success in war in particular contexts calls into question the normative attempt to keep these domains separate. In the case of the war on terror, if success is to derive its meaning and calculation from the other JAB criteria (namely just cause and right authority) then success could mean “complete and total destruction” of the enemy, as explicitly noted by Vice President Dick Cheney highly reminiscent of the “total war” objectives from WWII.<sup>5</sup> If and when the moral agent is allowed to characterize success in this manner, the political goal and military aim are conflated such that the military aim of “complete and total destruction” is necessary for the achievement of the political goal of “order”, as Johnson argued (1984; 28-29). In other words, without the eradication of “evil”, “order” cannot be sustained. Without the complete and total surrender of the enemy, the political goal of democratizing an entire region is

---

<sup>5</sup> ABC News: “Cheney: War on Terror ‘On Course’”, October 19, 2001.

futile. It is perhaps not difficult to see that this connection with regard to the probability of success may actually enable and perpetuate the use of force, especially when the military aim is “complete and total destruction”.

### **Prudential’s Critics**

The prudential condition in the probability of success is not without important critics. Laura Sjoberg, an outspoken critic of JWT’s perpetuating gendered power dynamic (Sjoberg, 2006; 2009; 2013), likewise exposes the prudential argument for the folly of possibly *perpetuating* conflict rather than serving as an important “check” on the otherwise just use of force. Couched in terms of being reasonably expected to prevail in war, the prudential reading of the probability of success may actually be inappropriately permissive. Sjoberg contends that this permissiveness is glaringly problematic: “wouldn’t a strong state have a reasonable chance of winning *every* war?” (Sjoberg, 2006; 79 emphasis added). Sjoberg also seems to be pointing out an important flaw in the “permissive” rendering of JWT that is outlined above. Subsequently, a not so narrow reading of the prudential probability of success holds that war could then be about destroying things and may not be conducive to “order” at all (Ibid.; 79). Even the other aspect of the prudential argument for success in war (cost/benefit) is grounded in a morally problematic assumption. Laurie Calhoun’s (2002; 41) assessment of the realist-inspired cost/benefit analysis poignantly argues that success could actually be evaluated in terms of how high a price a belligerent is willing to pay to achieve their goal(s), possibly even the “ultimate cost” especially if the morality of the cause and the nature of the enemy dictate a “must win” because in that case, anything less than total victory could be failure.

Although highly critical of the prudentialist argument, Sjoberg does offer an alternative, feminist-inspired, approach to the probability of success. Borrowing from Walzer’s argument



that war should be about fixing things, not destroying them, Sjoberg contends that war be fought such that “it is not humiliation but induction into the rules and norms of international society” (Sjoberg, 2006; 81). The important calculation for success according to Sjoberg is whether the war itself will encourage or discourage the opponent to behave in a manner conducive to justice in international politics in the future (Ibid.; 81). Crucially, war should not be about punishment or show, “but an attempt to fix a problem” (Ibid.; 81).

These are important and insightful deconstructions of the assumptions that pervade the prudential renderings of the probability of success. Yet while they do detail the shortcomings therein, the proscriptive arguments for alternative understandings of the probability of success (feminist-inspired in Sjoberg’s case) are also inherently normative and undermined by the “oughts” and “shoulds” that plague other normative approaches to the study of ethics and JWT in particular (Young, 2001). Even further, the transcendent nature of these proscriptions makes a critical analysis framed by feminism difficult from the perspective of addressing ethical dilemmas in terms of the contingent problems of international politics. Finally, it seems inherently possible, to borrow from the discussion of the conflation of political goals and military aims above, that “fixing things” in international politics (a political goal) cannot be completed until the military objective of complete destruction has been achieved.

### **Alternative Conceptions of “Success”**

Recalling Calhoun’s contention that success may actually be interpreted in relative cost/benefit terms (Calhoun, 2002; 41), it is important once again to consider the contingent meanings that can comprise “success” in different contexts and for different actors. Detailing the important effect that “ontological security” can have on motivation for state action, Brent Steele (2008; 100) documents an alternative understanding of what “success” can mean in war. Steele’s

illustration of Belgium's decision to fight Germany in WWI empirically demonstrates what Calhoun problematizes. In the specific context of Belgium's decision, "success" can be understood as "*whether it strengthens community support for the principle that is the basis for the resistance*" over and above any considerations of cost/benefit. (Steele, 2008; 100, emphasis in original).

A prudential consideration at the time *should* have led to a decision not to fight. However, the prudential consideration intended to limit the use of force clearly did not have this effect. Once again, this example opens the possibility for alternative understandings of success *in practice*, especially if the moral agent conceptualizes success in terms of the ontological aspect of security, in this case drumming up support for principles that form the basis of resistance in the first place. Although Steele's argument here is aimed at understanding how ontological security can have a profound impact upon state action, the generalizeable lesson is important for the interpretive meaning of success in practice, against a prudential ideal-type. The prudential consideration of success as presented above did not hold in the case of Belgium's decision to fight Germany. Further examples of alternative considerations of success demonstrate the relative malleability of what it means to be successful in war and conflict. Coppieters and Fotion (2002; 79-89) provide many instances in which "success" was fundamentally connected to some specific aspect of each state's ideological, historical, or identity goals; success was constructed to help reinforce these certain elements. In each case, recognition of specific aims wholly unconnected to any sort of *military* victory. Indeed, there is the very real possibility that success could mean simply "putting up a noble fight" (Coppieters and Fotion; 2002; 79).

One of the most important points of this chapter is to contrast JWT's evolutionary social development with an assumed and fixed prudential criterion of success, residing in that changed

social narrative. The details of JWT's evolutionary transformation from limiting to permissive (where it seems to have settled) is important because it provides the necessary theoretical background against which to understand the role and "authority" of state actors to determine "success", especially in a permissive era. Further the details of the current "prudential" reading of success provide an important methodological frame moving forward: goal-oriented or rational action as an ideal-type. The examples found in Steele (2008; 100) and Coppieters and Fotion (2002; 79) demonstrate what Patrick Jackson (2011) has called the "messy" reality against an ideal-type.

The pendulum-like transformation of JWT's interpretation has swung historically from limiting war actions to permitting them, both in terms of philosophical understandings and important international developments. In many ways, the elements of this "conversation" have culminated in a JWT that is informed by permissive "moral duty" just cause notions in which the moral authority is still vested with the responsibility to determine the notion of prudentiality. Indeed, the post-WWII era has important elements of both constraint and permissiveness found in an evolutionary conversation. Elements of constraint have been codified in the structure of the UN and its explicit charter aimed at restricting the use of force, especially poignant in the early aftermath of WWII (Butler, 2012; 40). Yet, the permissive legacy still lingers, and alternative conceptualizations of success *beyond* prudentialist are quite possible within this specific ontology.

In fact, the explicitly social nature of war and conflict allow for the continuation of a permissive and justificatory appeal to the language of JAB or more curiously, appeals to past wars that were steeped in JAB language. Further, it is because wars and their lessons are evolving historical events that certain conceptualizations of success can take on meaning;

meaning that is connected to specific elements of the past and explicitly takes the shape of Weber's representational meaning. In this case, the actual becomes the hypothetical and the hypothetical becomes the actual in a misplaced metaphor that *assumes* a "context of meaning within which the actual course of action occurs" (Weber, 1980; 35). The process by which these meanings can achieve such powerful force metaphorically and emotionally is important and will be explored in the next chapter.

### Chapter 3: Success: That Old Familiar Feeling

*“Forget about the notion that our emotions can be kept at bay.” -Dave Matthews*

The purpose of this chapter is to first unpack the unique theoretical elements that inform two of Weber’s “ideal” forms of action: affectual and traditional. Both types of action are more fully detailed below in order to enhance the understanding of their particular elements, especially those used and effective in a more social manner. Unique to affectual behavior is a social notion of affect that is a more holistic “emotion feeling” than simply the individualistic element of emotions. Unique to traditional behavior is the important concept of “habit” or expected action in line with a particular social identity of the state that instills unthinking, historical and “traditional” “expectations” when encountering “familiar” situations. One of these situations that is unique to the United States, of course, is the expectation of success in war, based largely on appeals to success in the past. These dual forms of action, affectual and traditional, are combined to form “affective familiarization” an action component based on the ideal forms laid out by Weber (1968; 62).

“Rationally” pure social action is, as Weber notes, quite rare as is action based entirely on one of the four ideal forms. Many actions seem to defy what would be considered “rational” from an observed or impartial point of view because other elements inherent in the formation of social action complicate and extend what seems to be “rational” in any given situation.

It is especially important to point out here that as far as JWT’s notion of success is viewed, affective familiarization is a way in which social action is understood in a particular manner. It gives meaning to social action; it provides a frame through which a certain understood meaning can be ascribed to a particular action. Recall that the “prudential” criteria, as currently rendered, of success in JWT presents a particular standard of achievability: “going to war without a reasonable chance of prevailing is imprudent” (Eckert, 2014; 64). Recall also that one

of the biggest challenges of “sorting out” prudentialist perspective is that the hierarchical separation of JWT’s criteria can have the practical effect of shifting success calculations out of prudential considerations of “can win” to culturally, historically and affectively derived statements of “must win”.

With this in mind how does this kind of socially-constructed frame of success structure subsequent action and how is that shift understood socially, especially as success is pursued? How does a particular action re-inscribe the “meaning” of success beyond a “rationally” considered calculation of achievable goals to an affectively assumed outcome? And how does this particular meaning and shared emotional frame help perpetuate the pursuit of a goal of “success” beyond what may be understood as, at least superficially, “rationally” expected in that particular circumstance? These questions regarding how action is understood socially serve important organizational purposes for an explication of “affective familiarization” below.

### **Framing, Acceptability, and Action**

The connection between frame and action requires further exploration. What I intend to do in this chapter is articulate a particular novel frame, affective familiarization, the tenets of which shaped important aspects of the three subsequent war decisions to be investigated in chapter 4, namely that of the measure of “success”. The model of success pursued by a number of presidential administrations was, I argue, derived from a type of historical frame that subsequently structured policy, action, and expected outcomes. Before proceeding to articulate the elements of affective familiarization, it is important to more fully explore what it means to say that affective familiarization can be framed as a specific ideal type. First a more clear treatment of frames is necessary, as well as the connection between frames and action. I then use Weber’s “forms of action” to explore how rationality vs. affectual and traditional behavior can

inform action through affective familiarization and *beyond* the assumed rationality of goal-oriented behavior.

### *Frames*

The concept of “frames” serves an important function in this project. Frames function as “ways in” to the situational milieu by which actors understand, apprehend and function within their social realities. Aided by accepted frames of understanding and action, scholars can more easily “make sense” of social conduct in much the same way as the subjects of investigation. Indeed, this type of framing analysis provides researchers an alternative point of view, moving “away from what structures have done to actors to what actors do within the space produced by the limits and possibilities thrown up by structures” (Bartholomew and Mayer, 1992; 153) that may be of their own creation.

At a fundamental level, frames “help to render events or occurrences meaningful” and as such provide organization to events and provide space for action (Benford and Snow, 2000; 614). In this way, a crucial aspect of the purchase of frames is that they are not exogenous phenomena. Instead, the credibility of frames is based largely on the “efforts of agents concerned with, and actively engaged in the production of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders/observers” (Butler, 2012; 51). This suggests that the “responsibility” for framing actions through which meaning is shared is *not fully rested in foreign policy decision-makers*. In order for frames to be effective in intent and meaning, a shared process of acceptability is required, in which the frame on offer is in part “accepted” and also “transformed” or “made suitable” in implementation. In other words, the formation of frames is an active social process, the content and importance of which is based in social acceptance. This is an important point to

make note of as the struggle to effectively “familiarize” WWII in Vietnam is directly related to this notion of “acceptance”.

An important source of organization for what follows is derived from Michael Butler’s (2012; 56) taxonomy of frame social legitimation. Butler articulates three such criteria by which frames are evaluated and accepted socially. Inherent in these three criteria are elements of not only a rationality between decision-maker and public, but also the structure by which frames are fundamentally connected to action, a crucial aspect of the origin *and* effect of framing in this chapter and beyond. Indeed as Butler points out, exploring the connection between the origin and effect of frames is a crucial part of understanding their fundamental social purchase for imbuing action with certain meaning.

The first element of social frame legitimation is **credibility**. As a social phenomenon, frame credibility is something of a two-way street: not only is it important that the intended audience (the public) find the content credible, but the “architects” of the frame must also enjoy a social credibility such that they are perceived to “operate in a forthright manner, and one who is not entirely motivated by self-interest” (Ibid.; 56). Further, the credibility of the frame must be internally consistent, wherein there is internal harmony of “claims ideas, beliefs and values...” (Ibid.; 56). Finally, the beliefs and values embodied by the frame must be verified by actual events in the “real world”.

Butler’s next criterion for evaluating a social frame is the **salience** of the frame on offer. In terms of social “acceptability”, not only do the core beliefs, values and ideas associated with the frame need to correspond to the real world, these elements must also be consistently shared by the target audience. In other words, does content of beliefs, values and ideas in the frame



effectively reinforce the “cultural myths” (Campbell, 1988) that define “a particular socio-cultural milieu...?” (Butler, 2012; 57).

Finally, a social frame’s acceptability rests on the level of **dynamism** or adaptability with which it is comprised. The more dynamic the frame is, the more likely it is to be accepted because it has a greater chance to achieve “fidelity with the relevant prevailing cultural narrative” (Ibid.; 58). Evolutionary frames are also more effective largely because they can continue to carry out the first two criteria in a sustained manner, thus maintaining credibility over any potential attempts to revise the prevailing narrative. This element of acceptability is perhaps the most important, especially as it intersects Weber’s notion of rationality v. emotionality. It stands to reason that an emotionally-derived frame through which action is made meaningful could be challenged and replaced by a more rationally-constructed frame. This would not only change the elements of belief and meaning therein, but also re-direct the action and expected outcomes. The dynamism of an emotional frame able to adapt and sustain the first two elements of an effective frame is thus particularly important to consider, even if purely rational action is a rarity. Both the origin and effects of an emotional frame are thus characterized by particular forms of action derived from its social application and acceptance.

### **Framing and Weber’s Forms of Action**

Frames allow for an exploration of action in a “contextually” and socially sensitive manner. Perhaps one of the most important consequences of framing is that it not only structures a shared space in which the meaning of some particular situation or problem is more easily understood, it also “articulates a response to that problem,” providing and promoting moral evaluation and urging “members of the audience...to act, typically in accordance with that articulated, favored response” (Ibid.; 63). Thus there is an important connection between speaker

*and* listener in this regard; the frame of thought already in mind by the listener is activated by the framing of the speaker and received in the particular way. Importantly, there is a limiting function to the frame as well; choices of action are drawn into a realm of acceptable, shared, credible and even familiar options from which to “choose”. The relative agency involved in this choosing is debatable as well, especially if boundaries are drawn.

### **Action and Meaning**

A key thing to consider in the construction of particular social frames is the assumption of temporality in Weber’s definition of “social”: “social action is meant an action in which the meaning intended by the agent or agents involves a relation to another person’s behavior and in which that relation determines the way in which the action proceeds” (Weber, 1978; 7). Can temporality be interpreted here to include relations to behavior and actors in the past? Weber seems to suggest as much, especially when he details the way in which “meaning” is used socially. Meaning for Weber has two important representational qualities that may actually expand the notion of temporality for the “social” and subsequently the familiarity with which certain actions are understood in the representational space in which they are pursued. Meaning is both actual conduct “by an individual agent on a particular historical occasion or...a number of agents on an approximate average in a given set of cases”; and conceptual meaning, “subjective meaning attributed to a hypothetical actor in a given type of conduct” (Weber, 1978; 7; 1980; 30).

The second element of “meaning” is Weber’s notion of an ideal-type that is not to be thought of as correct, right, or true (Weber, 1978; 7). Therefore, social action takes place in the first of these representational spheres: actual conduct in which meaning is *intended* through a particular action. Temporally, these actions are meaningful across historical bounds because they

connect agents relationally to other agents in similar historical contexts, thus deriving subjective meaning and consequently imbuing present and future action with needed subjectivity and familiarity.

In order to more fully understand social action, adopting Weber's dualistic model of "action" is a particularly helpful point from which to evaluate the pull of affective or emotional meaning on subsequent action: "to grasp the complex of meanings into which a directly intelligible action fits in virtue of its subjectively intended meaning" (Ibid.; 12). The key dichotomy made famous by Weber is emotional v. rational action. As alluded to earlier in a discussion of "ideal-types" understanding the full expectations of a pure rational action helps draw out *real action*, "influenced as it is by all sorts of *irrational facts* (emotional impulses...)" (Ibid.; 9). Weber further categorizes action into specific forms by which actions are expected and judged, for it is "only in terms of categories such as these that it is possible to understand..." social actions (Ibid.; 10).

### **Weber's "Forms" of Action**

Weber's typology of "characteristic forms of social conduct" provides distinct elements of "ideal-typical" expectations by which attendant action is structured, measured, carried out, and *sustained*. Much like the analytical purpose of ideal-types as identified above, Weber is clear that these typologies of social conduct are "pure forms" to which "social conduct is more or less closely approximated" (Weber, 1968; 62). The specific nature of these forms of action are taken in turn below and are an important part of sorting expectations attached to action and as a way to understand that actions involve analysis. Whether action occurs isolated into one of these forms (unlikely, Weber argues) or whether social action extends to and captures elements of multiple "forms" (much more likely), "rational" and "irrational" is actually quite difficult to distinguish in

reality, even if it can be separated in theory or in form. The key to understanding the nature of Weber's "forms" is that the ultimate end in using them to apprehend social action is a more thorough understanding of "the way in which goal-oriented behavior is informed by 'irrational' factors of every kind..." (Weber, 1980; 35). As I proceed in articulating the particulars of both traditional and affectual action, the preceding statement is important to keep in mind.

Weber's separation of social action into four specific types is as follows:

1. *Goal-Oriented Conduct*: Weber holds out "goal-oriented" conduct as the rational kind when it is "engaged in with due consideration for ends, means, and secondary effects" all taken into account (Weber, 1968; 61). This classification of conduct is guided by the expectation that "objects in the external situation or other human individuals will behave in a certain way, and by the use of such expectations as 'conditions' or 'means' for the successful achievement of the individual's own rationally chosen goals" (Ibid.; 59).

2. *Value-Related Conduct*: this type of conduct is distinguished by its "conscious belief in the *value for its own sake* of some ethical, aesthetic, or religious form of behavior, independently of its own prospects for success" (Ibid.; 59).

3. *Affectual Action*: This type of conduct involves actors' "specific affects and feeling states" (Weber, 1978; 28). What is particularly important here is that the meaning of this action "does not lie in the consequences that result from it but is inherent in the specific nature of the action itself" (Ibid.; 28). Indeed, this is what distinguishes affective action from goal-oriented or "rational" action.

4. *Traditional Behavior*: This type of social conduct is seemingly more of a reactive sort, guided by practice-based tenets that are more or less ingrained in memory. Thus, there is far *less agency and deliberation* involved in this type of conduct. Further, in perhaps the most important way,

traditional behavior is “determined by ingrained habituation” (Weber, 1968; 24-25). This type of ingrained behavior is reinforced by habit and thus hard to be “dislodged” or “shaken” (though it can be) and it structures particular (emotionally-driven) behavior.

In the remaining sections of the chapter, I briefly detail the dual action concept of “affective familiarization”, as mentioned in the opening of the chapter, (based on combining Weber’s affectual and traditional forms) and then separate each concept individually to enable a more comprehensive treatment of the key concepts of each so they can better inform the empirical chapter that follows.

### **Affective Familiarization**

The concept of affective familiarization has deep roots in sociological theory as well as connections to previous theoretical work in emotions in the field of international relations (IR). Elements of “familiarity” are connected to two diverse but related literatures: “habit” as a type of action (or inaction) in IR and sociology and of collective memory as discussed in each. Affect is conceptually derived from the social production of emotions and emotional states explored theoretically in IR scholarship. Familiarity (or habit) and affect are very closely related in one key aspect that will be further detailed below: both are more automatic than reflective. This is a key element of extending and complicating the assumed notion of rationality, agency or prudence expected to inform the use of force in line with the probability of success. Yet, a number of prominent social theorists (Weber, 1968; Bourdieu, 1990; Durkheim, 1984) have observed that where the logics of habit and affect dominate, action takes the form of “ready-made responses” which is much more closely aligned with humans actually operate most of the time (Hopf, 2010; 541).

## The Complicating Notion of Habit

As a way to understand action, the unique aspect of habit is that it can be situated outside of speculating on the deliberative action of social agents. Most often, deliberative action corresponds to a logic of consequences, closer to the traditional rationalistic cost-benefit calculations thought to inform prudential decision-making, or a logic of appropriateness wherein decision-making is based consciously on norms and identity (Hopf, 2010; 539; March and Olsen, 1998).

Habit is the key element of familiarity and is the primary function of Weber's traditional form of action. Habit is practice-based, and thus characterized by a *lack* of agency and deliberation. This form of action is unreflective, assumed and lodged in particular expectations about outcomes. Once ingrained, habits are quite difficult to be broken, largely because of the relative comfort they provide. In a way, habit makes action "easier". What is crucial to note is that the logic of habit effectively limits choices; it isn't so much that there is *no choice*, it's just that ingrained, repeated exposure creates certain *unreflective expectations* about subsequent action and attendant outcomes associated with certain action. Ted Hopf (2010) argues that this is a particularly useful way to understand elements of international relations, where too much agency and rationality is assumed at the expense of certainty, predictability, and ingrained patterns of behavior.

The "responsiveness" of habit often precludes "any need to think about what we are doing" (Hopf, 2010; 541). Habit also prevents the consideration of, and follow-through on, certain behaviors because the lack agency in the process effectively marginalizes a broad array of responses in favor of those that are "ready-made" and situational (Ibid.; 541). So habit can both instruct behavior and suppress intentional action. Importantly, traditional action for Weber is not

based on apprehending alternative courses of action, categorizing them, and acting accordingly, much like a logic of consequences or appropriateness would assume. Rather, what is perceived is already “pre-cooked” and then matched accordingly (Hopf, 2010; 541 Dewey, 1983; 121). The development of “pre-cooked” is quite important, though Hopf does not fully explore this element of the habitual process. “Pre-cooking” seems to be the development of an expectation that is created through a repeated exposure. This is the element of habit that becomes lodged and unshakeable in terms of providing a reference for action and modeling an expectation, largely because it is *just the way things are done* because they have been done that way before.

The “pre-cooking” process also has an inverse association; an element of learning “what not to do”. It should be noted that this is different than breaking habits or tradition, which is explored below. Habit and tradition do not necessarily reflect positive enforcement and stickiness. It is entirely possible that the social reinforcement of habit deters certain action or makes less possible action that is out of line with accepted traditional social norms. The socialization of tradition through habit effectively restricts and punishes behavior such as critical assessments of deeply held, repeated offered, and accepted accounts of the past that form the habit process in the first place. For example, take the often-repeated phrase of “the good war” in reference to WWII or the “greatest generation”, the name given to those who grew up during the war. It has become marginally acceptable to critique the means of the conflict, but questioning the ends is, and has been, effectively off limits (Bodnar, 2010; 1-9). In this way, traditional norms about what not to do draws even more narrow boundaries around what we *can* do.

### **Habit: The individual and the social**

Research in neuroscience has produced the conclusion that individuals do *not* think before they act. Quite the contrary, actually; humans regularly, and most often, feel and act

*before* they think (Hopf, 2010; 544). This is usually attributed to the power of habit or “automatic cognitive processes” that are distinctly different from “conscious control processes” (Wegner and Bargh, 1998). In the latter, controlled processes are thoughtful, intentional and rational. The former houses the types of descriptors associated with habitual response and action: “unintentional, involuntary, and effortless” (Hopf, 2010; 541).

While the development of habit in individuals is indeed instructive, Weber and other social theorists remind us that human action is not isolated. Indeed the whole of Weber’s forms of action is built around the understanding of a socialized interaction with contingent meaning. Other social theorists such as Emile Durkheim observed a particular “common conscience” wherein the “totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life” (Durkheim, 1984; 79-80). Durkheim’s “common consciousness” resembles very strongly the traditional form of action and elements of habit, and derives its social power directly from its traditional appeal: “the authority of the collective consciousness is therefore made up in large part of the authority of tradition” (Ibid.; 233). The key here is that the collective practices that make up that tradition are “representations which reside both in the individual mind, and in [the] collective consciousness” (Hopf, 2010; 542).

Much like how the actual cognitive process of limiting choices works at the individual level, there is something of a disciplining that limits choices at the social level. Durkheim argues that ingrained tradition-based practice achieves a certain level of respect and thereby limits any deviation (Durkheim, 1984; 233). This process seems to help explain not only the social acquisition of certain traditions and habits and associated perceptions, but also their *maintenance*.



## **The Breaking of Habits**

While tradition is indeed ingrained, sticky and stubborn as a result of habit, it is not permanent. To be ingrained and achieve the power of unreflective habit, there does need to exist a degree of homogeneity in repetition and acceptance, particularly at the social level. Yet within the very structure of an achieved habit, the foundations for slippage arising from strange and powerful and counter experiences are evident as well. Most certainly, if all behavior was always governed by tradition, habit, and the ease of expectation, change would have no place in social movement. Yet, change does happen. There are circumstances in which the process of habituation is broken; tradition is challenged; given assumptions are eroded. While the erosion of habit and the breaking of tradition are very real circumstances, it is important to note that these powerful elements are only really eroded to one degree or another or broken for a relative period of time. In other words, habit and tradition are *rarely* destroyed.

The process of breaking a habit of mind and practice is particularly likely when the agent is confronted by and exposed to strange, “unassimilable and powerful...exogenous events” (Hopf, 2010; 543). These challenges are often found at the margins of society, by individuals least affected by the prevailing social structure; they arise during “political and economic crises”; and by “novelty and catastrophic failure” (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Hopf, 2010; 543). This process is extremely important. In terms of war and the traditional and affectual notion of “success”, one with a passing familiarity with U.S. conflict history is almost immediately drawn to the example of Vietnam as a “breaking” of the tradition or an erosion of habit of success; thus this period will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

### **Familiarization: The Past as Present; The Past as Future**

Another function at work in structuring this concept in line with traditional action is the historical analogical aspect, or “familiarization”. Familiarization can be further separated into two representative functions, each of which is a crucial element of connecting familiarity to affect: the past as present and the past as future. Familiarization is a distinct process associated largely with memory, ingrained memories and the act of miss-remembering, all of which are consistent with the traditional form of action found in Weber.

#### *The Past as Present*

To further articulate the elements and importance of familiarization, it is instructive to first consider how this concept shares elements of Maurice Halbwachs’ related notion of “de-familiarization”. Specifically related to the development and purpose of social memories, de-familiarization posits that over time, “the various groups that compose society are capable at every moment of constructing their past...but they most frequently distort that past in the act of reconstructing it” (Halbwachs, 1992; 182). Distorting, or more benignly, “mis-remembering” elements of the past is a key aspect of this concept; so too is the basic understanding that constructing the past in certain ways is an ever-present social capability. Indeed the social capacity to remember is the essence of familiarity; a certain shared understanding of “having done this before”, resulting in the production of a memory or “loop” by which to make a comparison to an idealized past.

Familiarization also implies an inherent level of “comfort” upon building comparisons and looking back. Comfort, or familiarity, found in the past is granted a type of legitimacy by the very nature of the looking back: “there is a kind of retrospective mirage by which a great number of us persuade ourselves that the world of today has less color and is less interesting than it was

in the past...” (Ibid.; 48). The reason, perhaps, is that memories are reconstructed under the pressure of society (Ibid., 49; Also Noon, 2004). Indeed the familiarity imparted by certain collective memories can serve important political and cultural needs in addition to satisfying psychological and emotional desires. Rather than popping up as isolated and disjointed “episodes”, the reconstruction of events is most often connected to similar spatial and temporal events previously experienced or understood (Ibid.; 48). Yet, the historical analogy function of familiarization does not in fact assume that the details inherent in the recreation of that analogy have to be factually accurate or even represent the “whole” picture. Indeed, it is when the messy complexities of reality bump up against the stated ideal that analytical ordering becomes possible (Jackson, 2011). Misremembering or incomplete analogies, intentional or not, can actually be an important part of the analogical process, as it privileges certain aspects of the analogy that are constitutive of the force the example can have. Thus it is not particularly important that an analogy be critiqued for its incommensurability to a particular reality or *the way things actually happened* so much that the purpose for which the analogy is enlisted is more fully understood; the more appropriate aim is to uncover what it is that the analogy is *doing*.

Theoretically, misremembering, memory adjustments or ellipses “are not so much a failure of cultural memory, as they are commonly conceived; they are not even, properly speaking, an erasure or a forgetting...instead, they form an integral and crucial part of how individuals and groups construct temporality...” (Torgovnick, 2005; 2). In fact, in a social bargain type scenario, groups of people may agree to look away from those details that rupture a specific image of the self. For example, a critical detail often left-out of recreations of America’s success in WWII is that the “total defeat” of Nazi Germany may not actually have been possible without great assistance on the eastern front from the Soviet Union (Ibid.; 4). A willingness to

suspend some of our “critical faculties”, particularly that the Soviet Union was an ally of sorts, probably distort and create holes in memory, all but “guaranteeing that the past will have a place to loop back into the present” (Ibid.; 4).

The key in the preceding example is that the familiarity of somehow being in an existential fight against pure evil overrides the “critical faculties”, specific elements of that analogy make the broader, mis-conceived analogy possible in the first place. It is critical to point out that this should not be misunderstood in such a way that blame and/or intentionality is sought after in a broader project of “fixing” the incorrect aspects of familiarity. Whether certain elements are forgotten intentionally or left out subconsciously because they complicate the story, is not as important as understanding simply *that* they were left out and that complicity, and in turn understanding, is shared by all. That is the analogical power of familiarity.

In order to distort or misremember in the first place, however, there must be “something” about how an event or its representation is reproduced visually or rhetorically. In some way, then, a present experience is comparable to the past in certain “familiar” ways. An historical analogy thus engages elements of temporality and spatiality in the reconstruction, providing the space for mis-remembering or interpreting the past in line with a present need, experience, or situation. There does seem to exist the social capacity to “evoke places and times different from those in which we find ourselves because we place both within a framework that encompasses them all” (Halbwachs, 1992; 50). In fact, temporality and spatiality are crucial to familiarizing the past in the most affectively effective manner. In order for the social *capability* to remember to fully connect with *something* to remember, familiar elements of temporality and spatiality, the timing of and particular circumstantial details therein, need to match ontologically. Through this familiar “matching” distortion or misremembering of certain elements of a past event or history

are most likely as the event and reproductions of it are brought into line; or at the very least when commensurability to the “ideal” is *attempted*. It is exactly because of this process that “not even June 6, 1944, let alone March 19, 2003, was the D-Day of our imaginations” (Torgovnick, x; 2005).<sup>6</sup>

The attempt to match the ideal, to attempt temporal and spatial familiarity to the past in recreations is when the familiar is most active and most easily retrievable out of social memory. Contributing to this effectiveness is the tendency to immobilize or compartmentalize the past into clearly-defined and preconceived frameworks of analogy. Perhaps this is why the complicated and unpleasant details of the past are “mis-remembered” or “distorted” in line with present needs. Halbwachs suggests that there may in fact be a direct connection between the tendency to immobilize frameworks of analogy and leaving out unpleasant details of memory: “the most painful aspects of yesterday’s society are forgotten because constraints are felt only so long as they operate and because, by definition, a past constraint has ceased to be operative” (Halbwachs, 1992; 51).

### *The Past as Future*

*“In this great future, you can’t forget your past.” -Bob Marley*

The second important aspect of familiarization is the role of the past in structuring expectations for the future. As above, the sense of “we have been here before” that characterizes familiarization and habit applies not only to recollections of the past, but also to ordering past experience as a way to understand and derive common expectations about the future (Osiel, 1999). Indeed the particular ways in which the past is misremembered or collected in line with present needs can serve as a pathway of sorts, providing reference points or ways to evaluate

---

<sup>6</sup> March 19, 2003 was the beginning of the war in Iraq.

progress in pursuit of some expected future. Thus, the “forward-looking” element of familiarity is at once characterized by two distinctive elements: a broader representation of past outcomes transformed into expectations of how a present will proceed into the future; and also as more specific evaluatory markers by which to measure progress towards the expected frame of a past future.

If familiarization is about the stories and narratives a society uses to remember and understand particularly momentous events in its past, then almost certainly these events have analogical power to create expectations for future outcomes as well; presenting the possibility for measuring how “the future will rise to the level of the past” (Noon, 2004; 342) This connection is therefore increasingly effective when particular past and future events are easily connected in temporally and spatially similar ways. Events such as war and conflict, especially on a mass scale, can profoundly affect the lives of a society’s members and “arouse their passions for long periods”, establishing the tendency to “hover over” subsequent events “providing compelling analogies [for] later controversies” (Osiel, 1997; 19). As such, familiarization has a distinctive *forward-looking* element in which conditions of possibility expand the present by “informing it with memories of the past and hopes for the future” (Lipsitz, 1990; 16).

Holes in memory and “misremembering”, intentional or not, serve an important purpose in constructing expectations for the future, especially for the purposes of national or military policy. Memory loops, the actual spatial and temporal parts of a past event that are left out or misremembered, allows for the present to be more easily connected to these missing “places” of memory and for expectations for the future to look like the past and to be more effectively placed. If connected into one of these “loops” or holes in memory especially in times of conflict military policy can be socially understood in line with that past, allowing for the suspension of

“critical faculties and feelings of dissent” (Torgovnick, 2005; 4), and the carrying forward of policies that stretch beyond what might otherwise be questioned rationally. While it may not be “rational” to expect the future to match up to what happened in the past, the nature of this expectation *created* by looping the future into holes of the past provides at least the assumption that it will; these patterns make a sort of intuitive “sense” within that specific framework allowing for the operation and continued pursuit of certain military policies.

### *Rhetorical Familiarity*

As a shared framework for making sense of phenomena, both past and present, rhetorical language serve an important social role, particularly in legitimating claims and making salient that which is “hiding in plain sight” socially; affirming through familiarity and simplicity what is most important, yet hidden because it is constantly before us (Wittgenstein, 1953; paragraphs 126 & 129). Further, language structures elements of social reciprocity, imparting legitimacy to meanings through which “possibilities for action are debated” and evaluated (Fierke, 2010; 87).

Social reciprocity through language is highly important theoretically for two distinct, but connected reasons. First, the nature of reciprocity intersects empirically in the dissertation in that the study of language, rhetoric and specific use herein is focused largely on how political leaders are communicating *to the public*, and the acceptance of that communication, the stated measure of success in the WOT. The nature of this communication, it will be demonstrated, helps structure this expectation beyond what should be rationally achievable. Second reciprocity allows a receiving public to evaluate and debate these specific policies and “possibilities for action” (Ibid., 87), providing a rationally-grounded “escape hatch” by which to reject the nature of the memory link as communicated. It thus becomes all the more interesting if and when this

social capacity is *not* utilized to re-ground debate and discussion about the nature of success in a way aligned closer to expectations of rationality.

Context is an active aspect in this agency process in that meaning is legitimated in certain ways only in that context (Fierke, 2010). Indeed, this is the very focus of Wittgenstein's "analysis of meaning in use", an analytic pursuit of the use, structures, and legitimation of action through language given meaning in conditional ways (Ibid., 87). In short it is an investigation into "what the language itself is doing..." (Steele, 2013; 83).

Specific to the notion of familiarity engaged here, legitimation of action and meaning in those contexts follows distinct patterns that are culturally and historically specific, and rely upon prior use of such language and prior dependence of meaning with which such language has come to be associated. Indeed, Fierke (2010; 94) notes that "the ability to make sense of social action, to imbue it with legitimacy, rests on..." distinct historical patterns. With regard to the specific empirical focus of this dissertation, these rhetorical patterns provide boundaries on understanding and particular spaces in which certain metaphors and memories of war "make sense" in a present conflict by imbuing an evaluatory frame of reference or experience. In this way, rhetoric and language patterns reinvigorate immobilized analogies in line with similar temporal and spatial occurrences, the specific nature of which Thomas Rickert calls "interactive" (Rickert, 2013; xv). "Interactivity", by making salient and focal that which is "hiding in plain sight", (Torgovnick, 2005; 1) "grants not just a greater but an interactive role to what we typically see as setting or context, foregrounding what is customarily background to rhetorical work and thereby making it material, complex, vital, and, in its own way, active" (Rickert, 2013; xv).



## **Affect**

The second function contributing to the concept of affective familiarization is “affect” itself. Like the related concepts of emotion and feeling, affect has no stable definition; it can mean many things at once. Affect is a constructivist concept, used to define and understand the full experience of feeling and emotion. The pursuit of affect involves a shift from an attempt to isolate specific emotions to make use of the more general recognition that emotion and feeling, when combined, generate social experiences that connect and transcend individuals. As such, affect has a distinctly social function that moves beyond the categorization of specific emotional responses to a more representative conceptualization. The social function of affect is twofold: 1) it is understood to contribute to the preservation of the moral rules of society and 2) constructed in such a way as to sustain and endorse cultural systems of belief and value (Harre, 1986). Karin Fierke (2013; 80) notes that affect intersects and transcends the individual level by enabling understandings of how emotional flows act upon individuals and enact particular socio-political norms and behaviors: “the stickiness of these emotions is a function of the connection to past social experience and norms.”

As distinct from the nature of emotions understood traditionally as an individualistic experience, affect is unique in that it “is neither deterministic nor biological, but socio-cultural” (Coulter, 1986: 127). What makes affect a unique concept is that it accounts for the distinct aspect of socially “constitutive connections of emotion-avowals and ascriptions, and conduct, context, appraisal, belief, and social convention” (Ibid.; 128).

## **Affective Familiarization: “Wartime Consciousness” and Connecting the Past, Present and Future**

“Wartime consciousness” is an extension of an observation made by Freud in 1915. Originally conceptualized as simply “wartime”, Freud was referring to an altered state of consciousness produced by the spectacle of total war. In this altered state of consciousness, individuals exhibit disillusionment and “inconsistent attitudes toward death: part coarsening and celebration with regard to enemy deaths; part mourning and apprehension of losses that come close to home” (Torgovnick, 2005; xi). But perhaps the most pervasive aspect of wartime for Freud was that it could persist beyond the formal end of combat. The somatic “residue” of this altered and inconsistent state of consciousness thus “heightens complex attitudes toward natural death, which, in its generational unfolding, remains a difficult and somber fact, one generally left veiled in daily life” (Ibid.; xi). Contributing to the pervasiveness and potentially the normality of conflict in wartime consciousness is that war “uses the structures of modernity (law, nation-states, technology), the recognizable and necessary structures of our lives, to enforce the brutality of conflict” (Ibid.: xi). As a result, the persistence and permanence of the wartime consciousness permeated the twentieth-century, sketching a template, imprinting those patterns and finally, after 9/11 and the subsequent WOT, “echoed in the American imagination because it brought those patterns home” (Ibid.; xii).

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have attempted to articulate and blend two important “forms” of action, affectual and traditional into a new action component, “affective familiarization”. As Weber (1968) has noted rarely does action conform to one “pure” or “ideal” type. Rather, action most often takes the form of one or more types, informed by meaning, and through which reality is

apprehended. The reality of success in war and the attendant “affective familiarization” of the subsequent action, moments, and events is, I argue in the next chapter, the most used model and expectation of success in conflict, beyond the prudential assumption that guides normative expectations of ethical action in JWT. To the empirical examination I now turn.

## Chapter 4: World War II: Our Best Days?

### Introduction

Appomattox. The courthouse site of the famous “Gentlemen’s Agreement” and surrender of Lee to Grant. Attracting more than 300,000 visitors annually, the site imparts on visitors the relief, celebration and bittersweet triumph felt when Grant remarked to his soldiers that “The war is over.”<sup>7</sup> Despite accessible historical accounts of the surrender and attendant “end” of the war, the myth of Appomattox persists today. The “myth” itself removes the important accounts of years-long struggle, occupation and continued trauma of the Union-occupied south. Instead the myth excavates more convenient narrative accounts of the surrender that “severs the war’s conflict from the Reconstruction that followed; it drains meaning from the Civil War and turns it into a family feud...”<sup>8</sup> This, consequently, has since fostered a “national amnesia” about not only how wars end, but what they are in the first place.

This example is emblematic of a number of important themes detailed in this chapter: militarily winning the war yet struggling through years-long, uncertain political occupations; a vivid contrast between what success or winning actually is or was and how that reality fails to measure up to what the proposed ideal was or what we recall that it “looked like”; a complicated relationship with outcomes in war and justifications for outcomes, which JWT tells us rely upon clear prudential criteria and outcomes that are in fact not at all clear.

Success in war is elusive. However described, “success” is at once two things: an instrumental goal and a justification. As I detailed in chapter 2, this is an important procedural distinction that makes both policy application and the JWT overlay especially difficult to apply or “use” in an effective manner. Yet I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapter that

---

<sup>7</sup> The New York Times: “The Dangerous Myth of Appomattox”, April 11, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

there are other uniquely social elements, namely habit and an affective pull to specific war memories, that further complicate, extend and also *clarify* the relationship of success and winning in war through the past into present war making efforts.

What is most striking about uncovering this complicated relationship is that the difficulty rests largely on the scholar to make sense of how these ideas and relationships work and “come alive” in social purchase. The unique themes and connections through symbol, word and memory tell a rich story with important implications. However, as I intend to make clear below, the same amount of processing, thought, and reflection is not necessarily taking place socially. Connections, relationships and meaning seem to be simply assumed, understood, and in some ways even intentionally offered or interpreted in certain ways in order to convey meaning or further a political point or policy effort. This is precisely the point: uncovering through example the *way it works* by examining and demonstrating that analogy, habit, affect and memory *do work* and are effective social ways in to a complicated social relationship with success in war.

### **The Origins and Persistence of “Success” Culture**

As mentioned in previous chapters, success in war is akin to “habit” or a reflexive, uncritical response to a particular stimulus (Hopf, 2010). The trigger for the habit, while enacting a particular response, seems to have to be developed over a certain period of time or at least be grounded in uniquely powerful events that leave such profound markers that they are easily discerned and uncritically processed later. The small-N problem of war and conflict makes this social process that much easier and *more* meaningful as a conduit through which specific elements of the past make sense as guides and “lessons” for the present.

Weber famously noted that man is like an animal “suspended in webs of significance he has himself spun...” (Geertz, 1973). The ultimate consequence for interpretation and

apprehending the world in which one exists is that the individual fibers of the web itself produce meaning, weaving an intricate whole through which “insight into and understanding of actions and behaviors is gained” (Lewis, 2012; 10). The small-N problem in war and conflict, for most countries, but specifically for the United States, provides the individual fibers of the web. The way in which they are spun, the patterns they produce, the connections made, the continuation of strands into each other, and the attendant shape and form weave a particular (and peculiar) story of American war culture and the affective familiarization with success. Each strand acts like a moment, an event, an idyllic or contested image, word, phrase or feeling that links the others. Because of the affective conditioning of war and conflict, winning and success become “momentous” and powerful due to their reactive, almost *habitual* associations.

Without question, certain wars and more specifically “moments” associated with them do have priority in the collective and historical memory of the United States. These conflicts have created lasting “ripple effects” through time “influencing behavior and decisions in the present” (Ibid.; 15). These momentous events and moments in history have left deep scars, required extraordinary sacrifice, produced significant casualties, and ushered in important eras in the national trajectory and position in the broader orbit of world history (Ibid.). These moments also function as reaffirmations, justifications, and a satisfaction of assumed identity. Only in America, argues Tom Engelhardt, could Pearl Harbor affirm the triumphalist narrative, the “processional of progress” and usher in a “renewed cult of victory” (Engelhardt, 1995; 11, 43). With this kind of narrative employed, shared and “passed down” to influence present behavior, its acceptance and assumed fealty becomes ingrained; it becomes almost beyond reproach or question because to question the meaning or *details* of the event is akin to questioning the broader “self-spun” ideational significance.

## **Total and Limited War**

In discerning the element of “significance” of the war to not only be remembered *at all* but also to play a role in shaping present policy, understanding the grandness of the war, and the scale of sacrifice and the totality of social and civilian engagement is vitally important. In an important study of the Korean War, T.R. Fehrenbach notes a powerful distinction between Korea and WWII linked by Harry Truman: “The Truman administration accepted the limitation of the war to Korea...[but] in 1950, even to fight an undeveloped nation in Asia, America had to fall back upon her citizens” (Fehrenbach, 1963). Most importantly, regarding the outcome of that conflict (or more appropriately and strangely insistent “police action”), unfortunately the “far frontier is not defended with citizens, for citizens have better things to do than to die on some forsaken hill, in some forsaken country...” (Ibid.). Beyond Fehrenbach, both Adrian Lewis (2012) and Jeffrey Kubiak (2014) have picked up on a peculiar but extremely important nuance at play here. Lewis (2012; 25) argues that “limited war caused consternation and uncertainty...looked too much like peace.” Likewise Kubiak (2014; 157) more bluntly suggests that “going to war for minor objectives may fail to stir the requisite passion in people to sanction such killing and dying.”

The total v limited war distinction was illustrated in an earlier chapter in an effort to detail the shifting assumptions about Just War’s “success” criterion. In a noted shift from limiting to enabling, one important element at play was the degree to which the war was total or limited. During and consequently after the Second World War, a more “enabling” tone was given to the probability of success. Michael Butler (2012) argues that this shift is an important element of the ability of policymakers to now “sell” a war utilizing JWT as the primary lens of

persuasion, an incorrect interpretation and reading by Butler's examination. This is an important element of a deeper problem and a more complicated puzzle.

The added complication is essentially inherent and endemic to the nature of the small-N problem. This cuts in two different ways. The small-N problem provides the historical and referential basis for recalling important, if not always accurate, elements of past war history. Broad lessons, even if only the outcomes of certain conflicts are generally recalled: ("We're ten and one!" - *Stripes*, 1981). But this ease of analogy and reference poses a more complicated problem for the way wars are fought, the nature of threats and enemy, and the expectations of *current* conflicts as measured against past conflicts. Roland Bleiker (2006) argues that this type of nostalgic focus and fascination presents a problematic strategic dichotomy, creating a paradoxical and complicated space in which action takes place: "security threats are becoming increasingly complex and transnational [but] our means of understanding and responding to them have remained largely unchanged." This problematic juxtaposition is clearly on display in the WOT. The details will be sorted out further below, but as a preview even attempts to adjust to the complex realities of a new security environment, that of transnational terrorism fought with fewer troops, more quickly, lighter military footprint (Rumsfeld, 2002) are still grounded in outcome expectations borrowed from the past: "complete and total destruction."<sup>9</sup> Although the detailed articulation of "new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting" (Rumsfeld, 2002) characterize the stated approach to the WOT, the US response is "characterized by a strong desire to return to the reassuring familiarity of dualistic thinking patterns...once again the world is divided into 'good' and 'evil'" (Bleiker, 2006).

Total war does provide the ability to "enable" conflict through JWT, but it also provides the *need* to do so. Fehreback tapped into an important element of the social aspects of war in the

---

<sup>9</sup> ABC News: "Cheney: War on Terror 'On Course'", October 19, 2001.



United States, and what he uncovered seemed to reveal particular elements of total war that make achieving its stated objectives necessary, even at any cost: a total societal engagement. Going to war in that manner (total war) meant an activation of cultural norms of war: the expectedness of total social mobilization towards the ultimate outcome, winning. Indeed, when engaged in “total” war the outcome is easier to understand simply because it engages an important cultural norm. Lewis (2012; 27) argues that there are few things that Americans have believed regarding total war, one of the most important of which is that “Americans do not accept defeat. They increase effort, employ more resources, improvise, adapt, and/or seek new solutions. Defeat is un-American.” This is exactly why the limited war or “police action” of the Korean War, for example, was difficult for citizens of the United States to comprehend, accept, and understand. Uncertainty raised important identity concerns and engaged key elements of victory and defeat simply by the nature of the conflict and expectations.

Lewis’s assessment of this conflict provokes some serious questions: “were the traditional American culture tenets for war being reactivated or not? Were we mobilizing for war in accordance with cultural norms or not?” (Ibid.; 25). Limited war in Korea had the very real effect of provoking important identity questions and serious “cultural contradictions” (Ibid.; 25). Most interesting, the effect of these contradictions make sense as instigators of contradiction *up against* an easily understood, well-known, and revered “ideal”, World War II. This is a key empirical dynamic that works to provoke the same affective reaction and habitual comparisons in subsequent policy-making and conflict culture, surviving through the present.

### **WWII and the “Ideal”**

The Second World War is the veritable “good war” in American conflict history; this war has been reduced to “a simple shining legend” (Adams, 1994; 2) about which any critical thought

seems inappropriate. Indeed, this war has come to represent the “default symbol of national virtue...the war to which all other wars are supposed to refer” (Noon, 2004; 343). To invoke the memory of WWII harkens back to images of the “greatest generation” and a time in which “America’s contributions during an era of global crisis” (Ibid.; 344) are forever mythologized in popular culture: ironic perpetuations of America as “back to back World War champions” plug into and reinforce this undisputed narrative of success in war as akin to achievement in an athletic event proudly displayed for all to see.

Even the surprise, vulnerability and insecurity provoked by the attack on Pearl Harbor was turned, *at the time* into something positive and reinforcing. This is perhaps unsurprising; the rally-around-the-flag mentality is certainly nothing unique or new in the United States or elsewhere. Yet, the specific “national mood” or social understanding of the event itself acted as a “springboard for victory” (Engelhardt, 1995; 11). Even in the “defeat” of Pearl Harbor, there was something of a “triumphal certainty” that was uniquely American (Ibid.; 13). This sort of triumphalist narrative is “victory culture”.

The U.S. cultural fascination with WWII has not only survived over the decades but, the further we get from its iconic beginning and triumphant end, it has indeed strengthened, become more visceral, real and engaging. Television and film, two of the most engaging and wide-spread mediums of communication have been replete with documentaries, mini-series and full-length feature films focused on the period of the “greatest generation”. Films such as *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), *The Thin Red Line* (1998), *Enemy at the Gates*, (2001) and *Pearl Harbor* (2001), which itself opens with the sort of micro ideal-type of boys “playing” fighter planes in WWI, while different in tone and certainly theatrical provide a glimpse into the struggle and triumph of that time and capitalize on and extend the cultural fascination.

Subsequent anniversaries both of Pearl Harbor itself and the dual “victories”, V-E Day and V-J Day are celebrated yearly with bigger events surrounding the milestone anniversaries. In 1995, 50th anniversary celebrations became much more than simply commemorations. The summer of 1995 was deemed the “summer of victory” with V-E Day celebrations beginning in May and culminating in August with the commemoration of V-J Day.<sup>10</sup> But these celebrations also provoked a veritable deluge of advertising, a media rush and marketing opportunities for many diverse companies. Automakers Buick and GM sought to capitalize on the nostalgic opportunity by reprinting ads from 1945.<sup>11</sup> On May 14, 1995 *Time Magazine* reprinted copies of the V-E Day issue and sent them to subscribers aged 50 and older.<sup>12</sup> Stroh Brewery once again began brewing Schlitz beer, poured into celebratory cans bearing B-24 graphics and iconic 1945 designs with wartime ad slogans such as “Every fourth bottle of Schlitz goes overseas.”<sup>13</sup> Even Diesel USA, a denim manufacturer not in business during WWII sought to capitalize on the nostalgia market. Their ad was even more direct: it recreated a “raucous victory celebration as a ship pulls into port.”<sup>14</sup> Indeed as one advertising executive remarked, tapping into the “positive emotions associated with V-E and V-J Day makes sense.”<sup>15</sup>

## Winning WWII

The Allied policy in “winning” the Second World War involved the fulfillment of two aims. With regard to the political goal of fixing things (to use Sjoberg’s suggestion discussed in the first chapter), the Allied governments decided that “no German government would be recognized as legitimate and authoritative until the Allies had *won the war*, occupied Germany,

---

<sup>10</sup> New York Times: “From the ‘Good War’ Comes Good Marketing Opportunities”, May 8, 1995.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

and established a new regime” (Walzer, 1977; 113). The second Allied aim was unconditional surrender of the German Nazi regime: defeat on Allied terms; total destruction and eradication of the Nazi regime was the only outcome amenable to the establishment of a new German government (Ibid.; 113). In this example, the fulfillment of the military aim of unconditional surrender and the complete destruction of the Nazi regime was necessary to achieve the political goal of fixing things, the establishment of a new German government more peaceful and consistent with Allied principles (and perhaps more amenable to justice in international politics in the future). Once the military aim of unconditional surrender was achieved, the political goal of implementing a new German government more peaceful and consistent with Allied principles could from then on be the focus. To the extent that unconditional surrender is consistent with JWT (for a lengthy discussion on this topic, see Walzer, 1977, 113-117), in the case of WWII this policy was aimed at a territorially-defined enemy with made the complete destruction or unconditional surrender more possible (although still very difficult).

Most interestingly, these official policies, while being endemic and (perhaps) appropriate to time and place in fact were *also* couched in the same “lessons learned” framework that would come to characterize the U.S. approach to success in subsequent wars. Harry S Truman, who was himself a WWI veteran and assumed the presidency at a key strategic moment in WWII remarked that: “Once hostilities are over, Americans are as spontaneous and headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people in history have been known to disengage themselves so quickly from the ways of war. But tragic experience following World War I taught us that this admirable trait could lead to catastrophe” (Truman, 1955). Previous research has demonstrated that American policy makers in particular understand and procure responses to events though analogies *and* personal experience (May, 1973; Khong, 1992).

The official “justification” and account of the decision to end decisively the Pacific front of WWII, while potentially connected to the historical experience recounted by Truman above does, at the very least, plant some seeds of potential dissention, questioning, and counter-narrative. The first official statement from Truman after the bombing of Hiroshima based the justification for its use largely on the estimation that it would save nearly 250,000 *American* lives by eliminating the need for a ground invasion. What is particularly striking about this estimation is that it has subsequently grown over time not only in cultural memory, but in official statements from successive presidents (Torgovnick, 2005). Even by the time Truman published his memoirs in 1955, the estimation of U.S. lives saved had doubled to 500,000 (Truman, 1955). That number has again doubled in collective memory, though the 1 million lives saved continues to be a hypothetical (Ibid.).

Though this event is certainly controversial, attempts to come to terms with it, debate its justification, and look critically upon the estimations have been replaced with other cultural elements feeding into the “victory culture” described by Tom Engelhardt (1995; 11). In 1995 (50 year anniversary, remember) an *Enola Gay* exhibit was slated to go on display at the Smithsonian. The original proposed display included graphic photographs of some of the first victims. Yet, the announcement of the proposed exhibit drew fire from many veterans groups who suggested that it “emphasized that the Japanese were the victims of American aggression”<sup>16</sup> and that it would “disrespect the military and be unpatriotic” (Torgovnick, 2005; 6). The exhibit was subsequently reduced to the sanitized display of the plane’s fuselage and smiling picture of the pilots.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> New York Times: “Enola Gay Reassembled for Revised Museum Show”, August 19, 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

It is even more striking to contrast this controversy and as yet inchoate coming to terms with this event to the yearly celebrations of V-J Day and the “summer of victory” referenced above. Further, the Japanese surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri would eventually become the iconic image associated with victory and the finality of the Pacific front. As I unpack further below, the extent of this image and its meaning is still profound in shaping subsequent action, imagery and language in celebrations of “victory” today.

### **Vietnam and Mixed Affective Familiarization**

*Why Vietnam?* was a short 1965 film released by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). In it, the Johnson administration attempts to justify involvement in the East Asian country by recounting the history, necessity, turmoil and strategic geo-political importance of Vietnam itself. Yet, the opening of the film is most important for the purposes of this chapter. In an attempt to “ground” the justification, one of the opening scenes summarizes the 1938 Munich agreement, critically arguing that this “agreement” actually “opens the door to the dreams of dictatorship.”<sup>18</sup> Curiously, President Johnson’s summation and public selling statement “aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed” is *supposed to be* the lesson learned not only from WWII, but up through the Korean War as well.<sup>19</sup> Connecting Vietnam to the struggle of two World Wars, Johnson remarked “retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace. It is this lesson that brought us to Vietnam.”<sup>20</sup> In the contestation of what success looks like in war, these themes become valuable tools for the presentation of conflict and expectations about war’s aims as well as vividly and affectively linking them to *known* elements of the past. To be sure, this sort of “framing” material was to be expected. For despite the ambiguous action in Korea, most Americans “from the president on down, still generally cared to live...” within

---

<sup>18</sup> “Why Vietnam”, DoD, 1965: found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEljbPwFQ9M>.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

the war story of WWII (Engelhardt, 1995; 11). Further, though strange, “Hanoi was imagined to exist somewhere just south of Munich” (Ibid.), suggesting that similarity in mission is somehow akin to similarity of outcome.

Critically, however, there is a certain degree of “indirectness” in the use and deployment of this analogy by Johnson at this time that quite clearly complicates the effect and power of the affective familiarization found in appeals to WWII. It is not at all clear or *explicitly* suggested how Vietnam is connected to Hitler and Munich other than to draw lessons of “appeasement” writ large; nor is there an explicit line drawn from Munich to the “present” conflict in Vietnam. Roland Paris (2002) suggests that ambiguity and indirect analogically familiar connections *can* be politically useful, if only to provide cover and deniability later. But this is usually characteristic of more “controversial” claims or comparisons (Paris, 2002). Some analogies, however are able to be invoked “subtly with trigger phrases or oblique references that evoke the metaphor without necessarily making it explicit” (Ibid.). The inherent danger in doing this, of course, is that the meaning of the metaphor itself is lost, misinterpreted, or *too* ambiguous to register affective meaning in line with the intended purpose for its use in the first place.

In a profound assessment of the confusion surrounding the employment of various attempts to analogize Vietnam to WWII, Yuen Foong Khong (1992) finds that misinterpretation, ambiguity and “crudeness” sapped the affective power that WWII was *supposed* to have as a model for the Vietnam conflict: “these memories by themselves were too crude to serve as a useful criterion...for options...” and that the resulting lack of perceived affective power in clearly linking the Vietnam necessity as akin to that in WWII, pushed the Johnson Administration to effectively mix metaphors, and confusingly try to force Korea into the analysis (Khong, 1992; 175).

Drawing “lessons” from the past is particularly important for the construction of a proper model of how future interactions and practices in war *should* look. The legitimacy and expected outcome of *present wars* relies to a great extent upon the success or failure of a previous conflict. It is the way in which this attendant meaning can “legitimize certain forms of practice, and thereby shape future interactions” that makes the past’s contestation important to examine as themes driving the perpetuation of present conflict in an effort to either avoid or replicate the constructed meaning of the past itself (Fierke, 2013; 97).

As a continuation of the noble fight in WWII, the lessons, necessity and *expectation* of the outcome of Vietnam, for example, are more easily discerned by a receiving public. As Hopf (2010) urged, however, habits as “ready-made responses” induce “rapid, not necessarily accurate, categorizations of people and events...” and that because people tend to “confuse easy categorizations with high validity, even ambiguous evidence is taken as highly diagnostic.”

The final scenes of the 1965 *Why Vietnam* film only seem to add to the film’s ambiguous metaphorical, habitual *attempt* to connect Vietnam to WWII. In fact the imagery behind the narration seems severely misplaced against the “victory” culture and triumphalism that characterized the end of WWII, the war this war was *supposed* to be like. Images of flag-draped coffins disembarking from a plane are somehow meant to connect to the words at play: “we did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler in Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression.”<sup>21</sup>

For Engelhardt (1995), this is simply the beginning of what he suggests is the *end* of the “victory culture” described earlier. Contributing to the end of victory culture is the lack of public mobilization. Clearly this is different than the effects of the “total war” scenario described in

---

<sup>21</sup> “Why Vietnam”, DoD, 1965: found at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEljbPwFQ9M>.



chapter 2 and referenced above. Engelhardt argues that “mobilizing the public was never part of the Vietnam agenda” (Engelhardt, 1995; 13). Lewis suggests this is largely correct because the Johnson Administration had planned to fight a “protracted, limited defensive war of attrition on the ground...” combined with offensive air power to decisively “win” the war, even though the extensive firebombing of the Japanese in WWII *did not* produce the anticipated surrender (Lewis, 2004; 228-229). And yet despite that the fact that the Vietcong were using highly effective guerrilla tactics, the public *tone* continued to be more conventional (Khong, 1992). Indeed, as early as summer 1965 many House and Senate members began challenging the “cognitive legitimacy of the war” by picking up on the explicit mismatch between the “vital interests at stake” and the nature of victory implied by references to Munich and the “seemingly timid manner in which the administration was prosecuting the war” (Kubiak, 2014; 63).

Affective familiarization gets us into tricky situations wherein we expect things because they are expected; we do things in a certain way because they are expected, but the actual “fighting” of the war, in line with the “limited” defensive strategy might have been a combination of escalation *and* containment (as suggested by Khong, 1992) was mismatched from the model provided by WWII.

### **Gulf War I, Saddam as Hitler, and “No Room For Defeat”**

6,000 tons of ticker tape. 10,000 lbs. of confetti. Hundreds of thousands of red, white, and blue balloons, perhaps realistically estimated to fill “a six story building.”<sup>22</sup> Enough shredded computer paper, telephone books and yellow ribbons to rain down from Manhattan’s skyscrapers onto 24,000 marchers. An estimated 5 million spectators fought for a clear sight-line. To avoid the obstructed view of individuals piled 30-deep, many people hung out of high-rise buildings, crammed into buses, and perched on roof tops and clock towers to witness the enormous, jubilant

---

<sup>22</sup> The Baltimore Sun: “Millions Attend Ticker-Tape Parade”, June 11, 1991.

parade down New York's "Canyon of Heroes."<sup>23</sup> Leading the parade: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Operation Desert Storm Commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, waving, cheering and smiling as they rode in vintage convertibles.<sup>24</sup> Along with the nearly 12,000 veterans of Desert Storm were over 6,000 veterans of *other wars*. In a unique nod to the novelty of this particular parade, a couple from England vacationing in New York at the time remarked that the British would "love this."<sup>25</sup> The reason had to do with the underwhelming nature of *their own* victory parade, the extent of which was a church service with the Queen.<sup>26</sup> "We're Americans for one day" the couple said.<sup>27</sup>

Though up to this point, there was a very real "celebration drought" in the United States, neither the parade nor its extravagant cost were well received by all observers. Countless editorials and letters to the editors in major U.S. newspapers, many from veterans of the war itself challenged the necessity of the parade on the grounds that the victory itself was *too easy*.<sup>28</sup> One such commenter took to calling it the "Victory Over Children Parade" because of the lack of "fight" put up by the enemy and that it "does us no credit to continually flaunt our...superiority over a poorly equipped foe."<sup>29</sup> In other words, this was hardly the occasion for such an extravagant celebration.

As it turns out, the parade itself *does* make sense when placed in the affectively familiar context in which it was likely intended: the culmination and "proper" demonstration of success in a conflict that was repeatedly "sold" to the public as akin to the battle of good vs. evil in WWII. On August 2, 1990 under the explicit direction of Saddam Hussein and despite multiple

---

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> The Washington Post: "A Mighty Expensive Parade", June 1, 1991.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

warnings of “consequences,” the Iraqi Army seized the oil-rich but small state of Kuwait. Once a key strategic ally, Saddam’s Iraq was almost immediately transformed into public enemy number one. In large part due to both the President’s personal and past national experience, the immediate comparison and analogy was clear: Adolf Hitler.<sup>30</sup> Immediate public statements from President Bush set the tone and drew the metaphorical battle lines and important positionalities: as a “naked act of aggression” there could be only one categorization, one easily-retrievable memory to “justify” what would inevitably be some type of military engagement: “good and evil”, Hitler’s aggressive and illegal seizing of the Sudetenland, and the obvious response and duty to counter this type of aggression.<sup>31</sup> In what was surely an exaggeration for emotional effect, Bush also remarked on one occasion just days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that Saddam Hussein was actually *worse* than Hitler.<sup>32</sup>

Drawing a clear parallel to Munich, in much the same way Johnson did in 1965, Bush’s appeal to the necessity of some type of action was grounded in an explicit point: “half a century ago, our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should, and could, have been stopped. We are *not going to make the same mistake again*” (Hilsman, 1999; 49, emphasis added). In another attempt to more explicitly link the end of WWII to what was to be the *expected* end of this new conflict, Bush left nothing to the imagination with a reference to “Hitler revisited”, imploring both the American public and perhaps Hussein himself to “remember: when Hitler’s war ended there were the Nuremberg trials.”<sup>33</sup>

The initial comparisons of Saddam Hussein to Hitler were surprisingly well-received by both members of the media and elected officials in Congress. Perhaps foreshadowing the deluge

---

<sup>30</sup> PBS: “American Experience: The Persian Gulf War”, found at: [www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/bush-gulf-war/](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/bush-gulf-war/).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> The Atlanta Constitution Journal: “Comparing Saddam to Hitler: Stop Splitting Hairs”, January 3, 1991.

<sup>33</sup> The Washington Post: “President Warns Iraq of War Crimes Trials”, October 16, 1990.

of comparisons to come, Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee at the time suggested that if the “stakes are explained, and the message is made very, very clear, I think the American public will stick with it [the decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia].”<sup>34</sup> Other members of congress explicitly picked upon the Hitler comparisons already on offer, echoing the emotive appeal and necessity of the conflict in this context: “we cannot afford to sit back like the world did when Hitler invaded...” and “Saddam Hussein is a modern day Hitler...”<sup>35</sup>

Journalists, some of which were initially skeptical of the highly “exaggerated” comparisons that Bush was trying to make, realized the power of the analogy to play on emotions, especially fear of an outcome enabled by ignoring the threat or appeasing it after Hussein gave a chilling speech in which *he called* President Bush Hitler. In a *New York Times* article that reads almost like an apology, William Safire confessed that what might have been an exaggeration (the analogy) was effectively removed by a speech in which Hussein threatened children.<sup>36</sup>

Further, directly in line with the familiarization strategy that the Bush Administration was attempting at the time, *The New Republic* ran a subtle yet poignant first issue after the invasion in which a picture of Saddam is front and center with the title: “Furor in the Gulf.” What is most striking about this particular issue aside from the clever word play is that the publication “shortened the corners of Saddam's...mustache, making it look something like that nasty little piece of shrubbery Adolf Hitler used to wear.”<sup>37</sup>

Apart from the positive, echoed reception received by comparisons to Hitler, the familiarization was also obvious to observers outside the country. In an article titled “The Return

---

<sup>34</sup> St. Petersburg Times: “Troop Deployment has Strong Support in Congress”, August 9, 1990.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> The New York Times: “The Hitler Analogy”, August 24, 1990.

<sup>37</sup> The Atlanta Constitution Journal: “Comparing Saddam to Hitler: Stop Splitting Hairs”, January 3, 1991.

of the Bright Shining Lie”, an obvious connection to the book of the same name recounting the failure of the Vietnam war, the *Sydney Morning Herald* piece articulates boldly and forcefully the clearest message of the attempts to familiarize Saddam Hussein: “Saddam is Hitler and sometimes Stalin. He is so evil that he could not have any support in his own country. America is so strong, its military so faultless, that war will be painless.”<sup>38</sup> The author then goes on to re-familiarize the reader with the main point of *A Bright Shining Lie* (published in 1989): “Sheehan’s argument is simple: generals and politicians believed what they wanted to believe. Truth-tellers were censored...but America’s leaders had committed the ultimate act of hubris: they believed their own publicity and thus destroyed their nation’s war aims.”<sup>39</sup> The point is obviously that drawing flimsy analogies for their power to condition expectations based on affective appeals is dangerous such that it *overstates* the ease with which a war can be won. He goes on to suggest that it is “unpatriotic to dwell on such matters.”<sup>40</sup>

Coupled with large advancements in military technology, showcased on many occasions by “Stormin” Norman Schwarzkopf, the deployment of analogies meant to suggest that Saddam would ultimately be defeated in the same way Hitler was were not entirely “overstated” as the author suggests.<sup>41</sup> In fact, in the victory parade described above, the famed Patriot Missile had a pride of place near the *front* of the procession.<sup>42</sup>

What is most fascinating about the above reference to Vietnam in this instance is not so much that it seems out of place considering that WWII, Hitler and victory were the oft-repeated familiarizations, but rather that this reference is not altogether out of context. For the message of victory and success to resonate fully, a familiarization of a different kind was offered as well,

---

<sup>38</sup> The Sydney Morning Herald: “Return of the Bright Shining Lie”, October 17, 1990.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> The Baltimore Sun: “Millions Attend Ticker-Tape Parade”, June 11, 1991.

something of an “antithesis” of success by which to measure success: Vietnam. In initial discussions over the war plan in the Gulf, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney referred to Bush’s plan and detailed preparation as a “post-Vietnam, don’t screw around school of military strategy.”<sup>43</sup> In fact with this experience firmly in mind, Bush insisted on a plan that “left no room for defeat.”<sup>44</sup>

Likewise in a January 1991 speech in which he articulated a surprisingly good command of the JWT’s basic tenets, Bush referenced the probability of success in the following manner: “[war] must never, ever be undertaken without total commitment to a successful outcome. It is only justified when victory can be achieved. I have pledged that *this will not be another Vietnam*. And let me assure you here today, *it won’t be another Vietnam*” (Johnson and Weigel, 1991; 144, emphasis added).

In the post-Vietnam era, a consistent moral language structure was needed to find a way to talk about conflict in a more responsible, universal and approachable way. Just war went through a resurrection of sorts not only among scholars but also among military officials, policy-makers, and the public at large (Walzer, 2004). Further, the Gulf War represented the first real opportunity to “try on” this language as regards the discussion in the lead-up to the use of force. Volumes have subsequently been written about the relative justice of this conflict (Johnson and Weigel, 1991; Decosse, 1992) and the nature and situation of the use of force is generally accepted as just, at least regarding proportionality and success (Coppitiers and Fotion, 2002). Further, this war was in many ways much more “limited” than that of the War on Terror. There was a stated military objective that, once achieved, subsequently ended the conflict as such. In

---

<sup>43</sup> PBS: “American Experience: The Persian Gulf War”, found at: [www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/bush-gulf-war/](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/bush-gulf-war/).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

fact, Bush was insistent that the war *not* exceed the authorization of the UNSC. At least as compared to the War on Terror, this conflict represents something of an “ideal”.

Yet, explicit rhetorical politicization was still a key part of the framing and “selling” of this conflict by George H.W. Bush. In fact, one particularly powerful connection was deployed in the lead-up to this conflict: WWII. Almost immediately after the August, 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, George Bush began to draw an important parallel through specific language: Bush condemned the Iraqi aggression and categorized in terms of good vs. evil: the war, while not a religious war “has...everything to do with what religion embodies-good vs. evil, right vs. wrong, human dignity and freedom vs. tyranny and oppression” (Johnson and Weigel, 1991; 142). More specifically, Bush publicly compared Saddam Hussein and the Nazi threat, framed the Kuwait invasion as a “blitzkrieg” similar to that of Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland, and suggested that terrorism was just as dangerous as Hitler in the 1940s.<sup>45</sup>

Along with the attempts to legitimate or justify the concept in a certain political and historical frame, President Bush also displayed an impressive knowledge of JWT. In fact, Bush specifically addressed many of just war’s conditions on his way to assuring that a just war is “fought for the right reasons-for moral...reasons” (Johnson and Weigel, 1991; 143). Against “naked aggression” Bush outlined the justness of the cause; displaying an important hesitancy, he listed the “extraordinary” efforts of those in his administration to deal with the situation peacefully; he checked the box of legitimate authority by declaring the impressive support of the UNSC and GA; and finally he weighed the goods achieved against the evil and the costs in service to proportionality and set futility against a successful outcome (Ibid.; 143-144).

What is really curious about the notion of success in Bush’s remarks is that there is similar tendency to wrap success *into* just cause. The problem I outlined above, that notions of

---

<sup>45</sup> The Sydney Morning Herald: “Return of the Bright Shining Lie”, October 17, 1990.

success can tend to transcend prudentiality when closely connected to just cause as reflected in Bush's consideration of the same: "The price of war is always high. And so it must never, ever be undertaken without total commitment to a successful outcome. It is *only justified when victory can be achieved*" (Ibid.; 144, emphasis added). Further: "we know that this is a just war. And we know that...this is a war we will win" (Ibid.; 145). Even though there is shared agreement that this conflict was just, largely because the limited scope of its notion of success and relative proportionality, the *affective* need to justify the conflict through a specific historical frame is curious.

Before, during and after the Gulf War, Vietnam as well as WWII had a central place in shaping strategic thinking about success. As mentioned, Vietnam had a connection to success in a different way, as something to be avoided. Yet, the power of Vietnam as an analogy, as a familiarization with particularly *negative* affective appeal was not lost on those shaping and conducting military strategy *at the time*. One of the most popular and polarizing figures of the Gulf War era was Desert Storm Commander Norman Schwarzkopf. As a Vietnam veteran, "Stormin" Norman had a particularly complicated relationship with that war, due to his role as Commander of a present war and a public figure involved in Vietnam veterans affairs. In a strange post-Gulf War documentary, filmed in Normandy on the eve of the 50th Anniversary of V-E Day, Schwarzkopf admitted the "redemptive" feel and reestablishment of winning credentials back into the United States (Shapiro, 1997; 164-166). Indeed, the contrast displayed by shots of Vietnam against those of WWII works as a way to "allocate the issue of sacrifice to a less contentious war that more readily solicits a model in which the 'victory' balanced the casualties" (Ibid.; 168). The Victory parade that Schwarzkopf led was also experienced as "redemptive" for Vietnam veterans who had received a different type of welcome upon their



return. In the parade, Vietnam veterans who were marching along with Gulf War “victors” received cheers and applause equally as loud as those who had just “won” the present war.<sup>46</sup>

Other important members of the policy-making community have also alluded to the notion of “redemption” that was to be felt by victory in the Gulf: “U.S. involvement in the Gulf War provided redemption after the damage to U.S. national cohesion as a result of the defeat in Vietnam” (Shapiro, 1997; 139). Indeed, Joseph Kruzal, a policy analyst and contributor to the *American Defense Annual* explicitly engaged this duality: “Defeat in Vietnam taught many powerful lesson, and military success in the Gulf was a direct consequence of failure two decades earlier” (Ibid.; 139).

Success in the Gulf War, ultimately, was *very much* a product of affective familiarization. Both in model for success and in the necessity of success, victory in the Gulf War thus operated “as a means for domestic healing, the restoration of a unified ‘national will’” (Ibid.; 139). It is in this context that the “unnecessary” parade over a “child-like” foe makes sense, as does the trimming of Saddam’s mustache to better reflect the powerfully affective analogy employed by the president. Even the reassurances that this war will not be another Vietnam seem to fully contextualize the purpose for war or at the very least suggest that success was something larger than simply the “prudential” rendering assumed by JWT, for many Just War Theorists have argued that the success criterion was indeed satisfied due to the overwhelming expectation that the war *could* be successful (Johnson and Weigel, 1991; Elshtain, 1992). These familiarizations then, “provide the contexts for valued models of subjectivity or identity, for the properties of various collective actions such as committing the national body to war, and for constructing a spatial imaginary...within which actions have meaning” (Ibid.; 138).

---

<sup>46</sup> The Baltimore Sun: “Millions Attend Ticker-Tape Parade,” June 11, 1991.

## “Winning” The War on Terror

In a September 20, 2001 message to a special joint session of Congress, President Bush publicly invoked, for the first time, the war against terror’s deep metaphorical and emotional connection to Pearl Harbor. Directly addressing the “enemies of freedom” and “evil” that committed an act of war, the President familiarized the struggle in the following way:

“Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, *except for one Sunday in 1941.*”<sup>47</sup>

Yet even before the President’s first of many attempts to contextualize and familiarize the coming struggle as akin to WWII, the power of that event, the specific feelings associated with the provocation of American into the Second World War (the “good war” as it has been so affectionately called) that specific reference had already been offered. In a now infamous, yet deeply prescient September 12th article in *Time* author Lance Morrow grounded a shared complex emotional state, what he called the “case for rage and retribution” in Pearl Harbor era “lessons”. In shockingly explicit language, Morrow said that “a day cannot live in infamy without the nourishment of rage. Let’s have rage. What’s needed is a unified, unifying Pearl Harbor sort of purple American fury, a ruthless indignation that doesn’t leak away in a week or two...”<sup>48</sup> Transforming the lessons of Pearl Harbor into a sort of righteous indignation, he further remarked that “America needs to relearn a lost discipline, a self-confident relentlessness...called hatred.”<sup>49</sup> One scholar has attempted a more nuanced appraisal of the collective emotional state of the country after 9/11 by connecting it to the sense of violation and vulnerability first felt on December 7, 1941, and that in this way the September 11th connection is appropriate “as a way of making historical, emotional, and moral sense of September 11” (Weber, 2003; 173).

---

<sup>47</sup> The Washington Post: “President Bush Addresses the Nation”, September 20, 2001.

<sup>48</sup> Time Magazine: “The Case for Rage and Retribution,” September 12, 2001.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Aside from affectively familiarizing September 11 in a comfortable way, the explicitness of Morrow's text is provocative, prescient and alarming in its clarity, specifically clarity of how the coming conflict would be waged, at the very least, rhetorically. The Pearl Harbor fury was soon channeled into the sort of rhetorical clarity needed to affectively ground what was to become a conflict without end. Commentators shared in the sense of expectation first offered by Lance Morrow and echoed by President Bush: "September 11 has an almost December 7 kind of clarifying impact for Americans. So I don't think that the war on terrorism is going to be fraught with ambivalence and ambiguity, at least in the American imagination."<sup>50</sup> Days later Dick Cheney (un)officially provided the explicit expectation of success in the war on terror: "We cannot deal with terror. It will not end in a treaty. There will be no peaceful coexistence, no negotiations, no summit, no joint communique with the terrorists. The struggle can only end with their complete and permanent destruction."<sup>51</sup>

Most clearly, Pearl Harbor seems to mean two things in both an historical context and a re-created affectively familiarized context. First, Pearl Harbor marks an important historical moment when the United States' "legacy of sustained heroic global engagement began" (Weber, 2003; 174). It also symbolizes "one of the last moments in American history when victory seemed to be inevitable" (Ibid.). The inevitable victory after Pearl Harbor was also and *is still* also seen as fully justified: "America as a force of pure good was morally warranted in defending itself against its evil enemy" (Ibid.). Thus the "triumphal certainty" (Engelhardt, 1995; 13) of Pearl Harbor that "steadfast resolve that made America freedom's defender...our great calling-continues to this hour."<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> BBC Radio: "Four Corners", November 5, 2001.

<sup>51</sup> ABC News: "Cheney: War on Terror 'On Course'", October 19, 2001.

<sup>52</sup> The White House: "President: We're Fighting to Win-and Win We Will", December 7, 2001.

The purpose of this illustration and important “moment” in the beginning of the War on Terror is to demonstrate and connect to the method outlined in the beginning of the dissertation that structures the entirety of the approach. The employment of the Pearl Harbor analogy by the Bush Administration and others complicates the attempt to unpack “action” and what type of action is most emblematic of the way in which the coming conflict would be characterized. Despite the deep *emotional* (affective) pull of the Pearl Harbor analogy and the very real *traditional* element of this attack as akin to September 11, there are a number of important differences that one does not have to dig too deeply to uncover: the attacks on September 11 specifically targeted symbols (of western institutionalized capitalism, of uncontested military might) and civilians while the Pearl Harbor attack was an offshore military base filled mostly with military personnel; the very nature of those instigating the attack itself was also different in almost every respect: de-territorialized terrorist organization as opposed to a nation-state.

Roland Bleiker (2006) articulates the profoundly important paradox at play here between affective, traditional, and “rational” ways of acting in an era of complex security threats: “our means of understanding and responding to [the threats] have remained largely unchanged” and that “the problem of terrorism is far too complex and far too serious not to employ the full register of human intelligence and creativity to understand and deal with it” (Bleiker, 2006; 77).

Crucially, and as a way to add further complexity, it is not as though the Bush Administration *did not* understand the profoundly complex nature of the task at hand and the enemy America was up against, nor how to deal with it. Specific Administration policy, as articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy document explicitly illustrated the difference between the “enemies of the past” and the “shadowy networks of individuals” that threaten us

today.<sup>53</sup> The way in which this threat is to be countered and defeated were also understood to be different and unique. In addition to the overwhelming military might that the U.S. could employ, other means would be necessary as well, “better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence...”<sup>54</sup> Indeed echoing, or perhaps selling this new Security Strategy, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued in a 2002 *Foreign Affairs* article that “our challenge in this new century is a difficult one...[it] may seem an impossible task. It is not. But to accomplish it, we must put aside comfortable ways of thinking and planning—take risks and try new things...” (Rumsfeld, 2002).

And yet the traditional and affective linkages persisted. Repeated invocations of the battle of good vs. evil from the Bush administration implicitly and explicitly attempted to connect to the WWII model of success in war. Couching themes of war in WWII-era dualisms meant separating the world into mutually exclusive good vs. evil, spheres wherein we *know* who is on the side of morality. The extent to which these constructed narratives are actually representative of current global conflict is less important than the fact that conflict *is presented* in this way. One only has to examine these repeated invocations to understand how the socialized construction of a past experience, in this case success, can be used to frame or impart meaning into a contemporary war that is, a priori, different in almost every respect. However, in the contemporary war against a tactic and an ill-defined enemy, the way that success is constructed (complete and total destruction) may potentially lead to perpetual war through the prosecution of an impossible goal: “the possibility that terrorism cannot be conclusively defeated...” makes the

---

<sup>53</sup> U.S. State Department: “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September, 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

war on terror inherently problematic from the standpoint of the limiting effect that the probability of success is *supposed* to have.<sup>55</sup>

The dualistic good vs. evil theme was repeatedly perpetuated by the Bush administration with regard to the war on terror. In fact, the administration explicitly painted the struggle against terror as akin to the struggle against totalitarianism and fascism in WWII. Connecting both the lessons of success in WWII *and* the model of failure to be avoided in Vietnam, Bush continued to cast the war as the “modern-day moral equivalent of the struggle against Nazi fascism and Japanese imperialism in WWII, arguing that the U.S. cannot retreat without disastrous consequences.”<sup>56</sup> Cheney also communicated this theme by “asserting that the U.S. is now paying the price for two decades of weak responses to terrorist attacks.”<sup>57</sup> Highlighting how these weak responses have only engendered further aggressiveness from terrorists, the terrorists “came to believe that they could strike America without paying any price. And so they continued to wage those attacks, making the world less safe and eventually striking the U.S. on 9/11.”<sup>58</sup> To further push this point, Cheney offered seven occasions when he felt the U.S. did not “hit back strongly enough” implying that *this time* we would hit back strongly enough; that we will not stop until our enemy is completely and totally destroyed.<sup>59</sup>

The commemorative construction of this struggle against terror “tends to define the experience of WWII in predominantly military terms and in ways that emphasize the ideological unity of the nation in the face of ‘evil’” (Noon, 2004; 348). Central here is the understanding that the U.S. is engaged in a fight for the very nature of morality and goodness in the world and it is

---

<sup>55</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

<sup>56</sup> The Washington Post: “Bush Calls Iraq War Moral Equivalent of Allies’ WWII Fight Against the Axis”, August 31, 2005.

<sup>57</sup> The Washington Post: “Weak Responses Led to 9/11 Cheney Asserts”, October 4, 2005.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

specifically because we are fighting “the successors to fascists, to Nazis...and other totalitarians of the 20<sup>th</sup> century” that the U.S. occupies the side of good and morality as such.<sup>60</sup> Even understood in these terms, it is clear that the only acceptable outcome in the war on terror was American victory of a specific sort. A good vs. evil dichotomous characterization of the nature of a conflict can on its own produce the pursuit of perpetual war. As mentioned above, however, the very conceptualization of conflict in these terms can also be detrimental to the supposed “prudential” criteria of war since any fight against “evil” has to be won at any cost; evil *cannot* prevail. Thus at this level, the prudential criterion, especially that of the probability of success cannot have the intended effect.

Strikingly, the Bush administration went even further to draw parallels to WWII, explicitly in terms of how the successful outcome of that conflict would be the model for *success in the war on terror*. One of the common themes of the success in WWII is that “peace would and could only come through the utter destruction of warlike nations...” (Butler, 2012; 39). Indeed Bruce Hoffman suggests that war typically “ends with the vanquishing of an opponent.”<sup>61</sup> Unconditional surrender and the complete destruction of the Nazi regime in Germany coupled with the aesthetic value of atomic bombs razing entire cities and populations as *finally* forcing the imperialist Japanese into capitulation reinforce the understanding of success in war possible only after the “utter destruction of warlike nations...”(Butler, 2012; 39). Once again recall that the publicly stated aim of the war on terror from Vice President Dick Cheney strikingly resembles this theme: “the struggle can only end with their complete and permanent destruction”<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> NBC News: “Bush: Iraq a ‘Decisive Ideological Struggle’”, August 31, 2006.

<sup>61</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

<sup>62</sup> ABC News: “Cheney: War on Terror ‘On Course’”, October 19, 2001.

As there was no doubt as to the outcome and success in WWII, there shall also be no doubt as to success in the war on terror since the enemies of the present are, as President Bush said “like the enemies of the past...the fundamental character of the struggle has not changed”<sup>63</sup> Because of this constructed connection, success in this war has to be the same as success in that previous war: “We are still in the early hours of the current ideological struggle, *but we do know how the others ended*—and that knowledge helps guide our efforts today.”<sup>64</sup> Once again pushing the dialogue towards the success in WWII, Bush rhetorically asked if “today’s generations of Americans [will] resist the allure of retreat...and [teach] those tyrants a telling lesson.”<sup>65</sup> Implying that the only lesson to teach them is that of certain defeat in the face of American determination, Bush posited that although the Islamic extremists of today are as certain in their cause as the Nazis and Imperialists were of theirs, “they are destined for the same fate.”<sup>66</sup>

Although each of these enemies may be theoretically or discursively “destined for the same fate”, the *present* war is one such that terrorism “cannot be conclusively defeated.”<sup>67</sup> This endless possibility means that the war on terror is in theory an endless war driven by an unachievable model through historical metaphor; “a war that approaches something closer to a way of life.”<sup>68</sup>

The lingering perpetuations of “victory culture” and persistent affective familiarizations are perhaps most useful *most useful* at moments of relative ambiguity or situational uncertainty. One such moment is the March 17, 2003 Iraq “ultimatum” speech from the White House directed to both the American public and Saddam Hussein. The speech itself was littered with WWII

---

<sup>63</sup> The New York Times: “Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention”, August 22, 2007.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.



analogies, including the price of appeasement in the 20th century, and the evil of this enemy (Saddam) as an evil carried over from the past.<sup>69</sup> He further reiterated the sure *justness* of this cause for its clear good vs. evil elements and the bearing the burden good as we “enforce the just demands of the world”<sup>70</sup> against an enemy “that has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality.”<sup>71</sup> The reception to the speech was exactly what the Bush Administration would have wanted: “Mr. Bush’s words were, in many ways, drawn straight from the days of World War II-- an era of *far clearer challenges and more obvious threats*” and much like his father, “described Mr. Hussein as a modern-day Hitler...an argument his critics were already saying tonight was exaggerated to justify a preventive war.”<sup>72</sup>

Perhaps the most visual representation of these lessons or metaphorical connections, seemingly meant to convey a message of unquestioned success through imagery was the now infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech. On May 1st 2003, President Bush addressed the nation from the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln to declare the end of major combat operations in Iraq. As the problems in Iraq were only just beginning, the enormous “Mission Accomplished” banner hung in the background is now looked upon as a major mistake even among those in the administration.<sup>73</sup> However, the imagery, symbolism and analogy of this moment are so powerful because of its explicit analogical connection to the success of WWII encapsulated by the Japanese surrender on the U.S.S. Missouri in 1945. This moment also illustrates the power of tradition or “habit” as articulated in an earlier chapter. Much like the

---

<sup>69</sup> The New York Times: “A New Doctrine for War”, March 18, 2003.

<sup>70</sup> The Guardian: “A Transcript of George Bush’s War Ultimatum Speech from the Cross Hall in the White House”, March 18, 2003.

<sup>71</sup> The Guardian: “George Bush’s Address on the Start of War”, March 20, 2003.

<sup>72</sup> The New York Times: “A New Doctrine for War”, March 18, 2003.

<sup>73</sup> ABC News: “Press Missed Mission Accomplished Meaning Says Bush Staffer”, September 19, 2001.

glossing over of very real differences between September 11th and Pearl Harbor, in this case difference also seems to be dissolved into tradition.

It is this powerful imagery that seems to have impressed upon individuals watching, sending a clear message of success and parallels drawn from a past generation. Even the left-of-center political commentator Chris Matthews, who would later come to be quite critical of the administration, fawned over the message sent by this symbolism and the atmosphere. On the May 1st 2003 edition of *Hardball*, Matthews praised the speech and the president saying “He won the war...Here’s a president who’s really nonverbal. He’s like Eisenhower. He looks great in a military uniform.”<sup>74</sup> A day later, New York Times writer David Sanger suggested that President Bush’s decision to fly onto the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in a Navy jet, to give that speech, to mingle with the troops on board the aircraft carrier and to spend the evening the captain’s quarters of the ship “conjured images of the presidency...not seen since Franklin D. Roosevelt.”<sup>75</sup> Mission accomplished, indeed.

### **The Antithesis of Success in Vietnam**

Interrogating lessons from the past is an important result of the constructed meaning also derived from the “failure”, for example, of the Vietnam War. In particular, the interrogated theme of this war is the image or metaphor of what *losing* in war looks like so that it may be avoided. Steele’s (2010) discussion of the photo of the Fall of Saigon argues that this image in particular vividly captured what “losing” or “failure” in war looked like, especially with regard to the re-presentation of this image as a “loss of will”. Though it is unclear as to what “winning” in Vietnam would have looked like, the image of losing is clearly captured in this photo. For the purposes of how success in war is understood, the constructed failure of Vietnam as captured in

---

<sup>74</sup> Media Matters: “Mission Accomplished: A Look Back at the Media’s Fawning Coverage of Bush’s Premature Declaration of Victory in Iraq”, April 27, 2006.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

this image became the site of “lost honor” narratives. These narratives surrounding a contested image of “losing” can “fuel a generation to win the next major conflict” (Steele, 2010; 149). In fact, Karin Fierke argues that the goal of winning (for *political* purposes) has been common for many nation-states, *especially* after a past loss, that in essence forces a “continuing need to repeat the past in order to do it differently in the future” (Fierke in Steele, 2010; 149).

The meaning of success in war is a site of continual contestation, especially as it concerns the lessons of past losses. The need to draw particular meanings from historical analogy offers a compelling reaffirmation of national purpose. In presenting failure in war, particularly the “lost will” narratives of Vietnam, analogies can offer “commentary on the present and generate expectations that the future will rise (or sink) to the level of the past” (Noon, 2004; 342).

Vietnam in particular was presented as a lesson about not sinking to the level of the past; an example of what the antithesis of success in war looks like as a “visual prop for the national greatness narratives of the neoconservatives” (Steele, 2010; 147). This is an important lesson, especially in terms of the war on terror, as lessons of Vietnam were once again re-presented by the Bush administration *and* opponents with regard to “getting bogged down” in the “quagmire” of the war on terror as clear connections to the “failure” in Vietnam.

The contestation in this case actually concerns what the image and the meaning of “losing” represents. For neoconservatives who would eventually influence the policies of the Bush administration, this loss represented a “lost honor” lesson; one of premature capitulation at a time when resolve was needed the most. Steele argues the attitude presented about this loss as being one snatched from the grasp of certain victory: “...the goal of winning was not only reachable but identifiable” (Ibid.; 146). Thus the loss in Vietnam was a catastrophic failure of

will, focus, and resolve at a crucial moment, almost exactly how Norman Schwarzkopf presented Vietnam as something to avoid in the Gulf War (Shapiro, 1997).

Understood in these terms, statements categorizing the war on terror thusly take on an important meaning: “The goal in this war is not complicated; *it is victory*. And let there be no doubt, we will prevail.”<sup>76</sup> In fact, President Bush enlisted the purported “lessons” of Vietnam explicitly as an example of *what not to do* and in specific opposition to what success is supposed to look like. Speaking to Veterans of Foreign Wars members, Bush decried the “unmistakable legacy” as the “price of our withdrawal from Vietnam.”<sup>77</sup> This price was paid by innocent civilians and became the model of failure invoked by Osama bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, demonstrating the lack of American credibility, and the “turn and run” nature of our leadership when there is political trouble.<sup>78</sup> The *real* lesson to learn here, according to Bush, is that we must “listen to our enemy”; we must caution ourselves against capitulation because “to withdraw without getting the job done would be devastating.”<sup>79</sup> Once again, recall what “getting the job done” or success looks like in the war on terror: “the struggle can only end with their complete and permanent destruction.”<sup>80</sup>

These re-presentations of the failure in Vietnam are responses to attempts by others to present the war on terror in terms of alternative “lessons” of Vietnam. Though the overall theme of Vietnam is communicated as one of failure, what the failure means in terms of future action is the contested political metaphor. Senator Ted Kennedy famously remarked that the war in Iraq, as part of the war on terror, would come to be viewed as “George Bush’s Vietnam”, invoking

---

<sup>76</sup> The Washington Post: “Bush Calls Iraq War Moral Equivalent of Allies’ WWII Fight Against the Axis”, August 31, 2005.

<sup>77</sup> The New York Times: “Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention”, August 22, 2007.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> ABC News: “Cheney: War on Terror ‘On Course’”, October 19, 2001.

memories of a failure characterized by an endless, quagmire of a war with no clear strategy for achieving victory other than complete destruction.<sup>81</sup> Striking a similar theme, Bruce Hoffman has argued that the war on terror is a “war without boundaries...it is a war directed against multiple enemies, not just one adversary.”<sup>82</sup>

This interpretation may have been prompted by news out of Iraq months before suggesting an “increased presence of guerilla forces taking the lives of U.S. soldiers ...” that brought forth images of “an organized people’s movement as in the Vietnam War.”<sup>83</sup> Bush acknowledged these connections and their apparent folly by suggesting that “then as now, people argued that the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.”<sup>84</sup> Yet the extent to which either one of these contested images is representative of “reality”, is less important than understanding that the metaphor itself is a site of contestation.<sup>85</sup> This contestation and alternative understanding of what success looks like in war has very important policy implications, especially with regard to the aims of the war on terror: “the problem arises...when the past is redone in a future that is itself, a priori, also different” (Steele, 2010; 149).

The presentation of what failure “looks like” as the antithetical model of success against an enemy that cannot be fully defined suggests a conflict without clear limits and without clearly-defined ends.<sup>86</sup> “Complete and permanent destruction” against terrorism, a tactic employed by “rootless, deterritorialized partisans, who are organized essentially as networks” (Steele, 2010; 158) defies any successful resolution of the kind to be explicitly avoided, as

---

<sup>81</sup> CNN: “Kennedy: ‘Iraq is George Bush’s Vietnam’”, April 6, 2004.

<sup>82</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

<sup>83</sup> New Straits Times Management: “A Second Vietnam War for America?”, June 11, 2003.

<sup>84</sup> The New York Times: “Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention”, August 22, 2007.

<sup>85</sup> See: National Review: “Senator, Iraq is no Vietnam”, 2004 for a re-re-presentation of the Iraq War and more largely the war on terror.

<sup>86</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

manifestly demonstrated by the “unmistakable legacy” of the Vietnam War. As such, when the model of success in war is presented as that which is to be avoided against an enemy wherein total destruction is the end-game, it is difficult to argue that this actually *limits* conflict. This is especially true when the apparent transcendent nature of the antithesis of success in war is applied to a war against a tactic that is potentially unable to be defeated. In order to achieve the stated goal of permanent destruction where victory is the *only option* and where war cannot and will not end without destruction of the enemy, perpetual conflict seems to be the unfortunate by-product of a constructed model of what success “looks like” in war as presented by an historic *failure* in war. This type of failure, this loss of will, is what was to be explicitly avoided in the prosecution of the war on terror. The probability of success in this conceptualization was not at all contingent upon the particularities of the war on terror; rather a constructed model of “failure” in a past war seems to have driven the achievement of success in a present war.

The elusive search for “success” in the War on Terror continues today. Relatively recent moments and occasions of concrete developments in the struggle have provided opportunity to reach, hopefully, for the finality and jubilation that comes with “winning” a war. Indeed, the morning after President Obama announced the killing of Osama bin Laden, which prompted all-night celebrations in front of the White House, CNN’s Peter Bergen quipped: “Killing bin Laden is the end of the War on Terror. We can just sort of announce that right now.”<sup>87</sup> Like many other Americans at the time the supposed finality of this moment, the expectation that “war ends with the vanquishing of an opponent” led to confusion as to *what exactly* to expect next.<sup>88</sup> For while commentators immediately rushed in to caution that this was *not* in fact a U.S.S. Missouri

---

<sup>87</sup> The National Review: “Bin Laden, No More Symposium”, May 2, 2011.

<sup>88</sup> NPR News: “Defining the War on Terror”, November 1, 2006.

moment, for many “Bin Laden’s death *feels* like that kind of event.”<sup>89</sup> Celebrations were in fact taking place, in Times Square, outside the White House and in many cities throughout the U.S.;<sup>90</sup> and while the revelry of celebration was to be encouraged, others cautioned explicitly that we “should remember that this is not V-J Day.”<sup>91</sup>

Most recently, anniversary celebrations marking 70 years since the end of WWII offered not only an opportunity to reflect on that war but also provide a way to measure the relative success of *current* military campaigns.<sup>92</sup> Nor is this particular phenomenon limited to the United States. Russia’s own recent WWII anniversary celebrations raised fears that “war memories were being exploited to justify belligerence toward Ukraine and the west.”<sup>93</sup>

## Conclusion

“History does remind us that there are lessons applicable to our time...and we can learn something from history.”<sup>94</sup> While this may be true, it is important to note that the use of these models as guides for present action may subsume the particularities of *present* conflict into the constructed narrative or images of the “lessons” of the past, producing and driving outcomes based on the modeled success of the past as a guide to success in the present. It is the “role of historical reflection in the construction of the self” (Kratochwill, 2006; 15) that is inherently problematic when that historical reflection is imbued with transcendent meaning about past conflict as a model for the present.

Evaluating and interpreting success in war is not “prudential”; success in war is also not only about fixing a problem or reincorporating the enemy into the rules and norms of

---

<sup>89</sup> The National Review: “Bin Laden, No More Symposium”, May 2, 2011.

<sup>90</sup> The Atlantic: “Osama bin Laden Killed: Worldwide Reactions”, May 2, 2011.

<sup>91</sup> The National Review: “Bin Laden, No More Symposium”, May 2, 2011.

<sup>92</sup> The Washington Times: “On 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of VE Day, Obama Honors Generation that ‘Literally Saved the World’”, May 8, 2015.

<sup>93</sup> BBC News: “Russia Awash with Symbols of WWII Victory”, May 8 2015.

<sup>94</sup> The New York Times: “Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention”, August 22, 2007.

international society. Success in war is a constructed ethic, imbued with transcendent meaning derived from the failure and success in war in the past modeled as success in war in the present. If success in war is subject to constructed narratives and imbued with meaning based on emotional appeals to the past, this limits the barriers of what the probability of success means in practice and encourages the pursuit of perpetual war through affectively familiarized rhetoric and action. This chapter has empirically engaged the practice of the probability of success in warfare within the context of three specific wars and various “moments” within those wars. Success seems to be less about what just war theorists *want* it to be, and more about how policymakers conceptualize its usefulness in enabling war.



## Chapter 5: Rethinking “Success”

This dissertation has uncovered and engaged with a complicated puzzle concerning both the normative assumptions behind and most importantly the *use* of JWT's criterion of the probability of success. The criterion is, as mentioned in chapter 1 and more fully developed in chapter 2, in a fundamentally paradoxical situation: as positioned within the Just War framework, it is supposed to provide "prudential" counsel for a war that is otherwise "just" based on the primary criteria. Yet, as I demonstrate both in chapter 2 and chapter 4, the notion of success in war is really anything but secondary. Rather than being "prudential" success is, problematically, "essential". Recent developments in JWT have unfortunately done little to draw down the permissive interpretation of its own usage, which, since the end of WWII has been the primary interpretation. By pointing out fundamental problems within Just War's own framework and inconsistencies in normative assumptions, the dissertation has critically re-engaged with one of the most important criterion, at least in terms of social use and end-of-war implications.

One of the dissertation's most important findings is that an important element of conducting war, the measure of success for the United States in three post-WWII conflicts, is far more complicated than the "prudential" or "secondary" nature in which it is understood in Just War. Rather, success in war, the rhetoric about what the stated objective of success is, and how the war is prosecuted is based on a combined form of action called "affective familiarization." Using Weber's "ideal-types" to uncover the complexity of action and the meaning that action has when framed in an emotional, historical, habitual and traditional form.

This finding has important implications not only for the notion of "success" even as that concept transcends JWT, but also for the study of action in international relations. Moving beyond assumptions of rational action and goal-oriented behavior, the findings suggest that actions and their attendant social meaning are bound-up in and a product of distinct social

histories, memories, and elements of the past. The problem is, of course, that in terms of conflict, de-territorialized terrorist groups are really nothing like a massive, totally-mobilized *state*. To assume that these enemies are the same simply does defy logic and rationality and yet is, and was incredibly sustained as the model of success.

### **A Tentative Way Forward for JWT**

The rampant “victory culture” (Engelhardt, 1995), expectations of success in conflict, and numerous attempts to “familiarize” past elements of success for present purposes are the important highlights. Yet, deeper engagements and more problematic elements of success in conflict found both in scholarship and conventional “usage” suggest a continued, critical engagement with this subject.

For starters, the under theorized nature of one of the key “limiting” criterion of JWT suggests a re-engagement with the entire JWT in an effort to discern *how* these criteria are used in practice. The transformation of the JWT canon’s *interpretation* into something of an enabling force is a relatively recent (by JWT standards) development. Chapter 2 argues that this transformation has had real consequences for the *usage* of JWT as a policy tool that is not even so much a hindrance at this point as it is a helpful way to morally ground a pre-given desirability for conflict.

A number of important scholars are beginning to discover the problems inherent to JWT’s inherent shift from moral conversation to policy-guidance, in an *enabling* form (see Gentry and Eckert, 2014). Important work is being done to this end, and yet more is necessary if Just War scholars are to fully evaluate the use of what should still remain an important barrier, not an enabler, to the use of force. The recent split of JWT into hierarchically-distinct spheres itself belies the fact that one criteria in particular, success, is in fact one of the *most important* in

not only the decision to use force, but also in *how force is used* and by what ends success is subsequently measured, and yet is artificially relegated to a position of prudentiality (the inherent problems of which are outlined in detail). This dissertation makes that abundantly clear through numerous examples. So does the apparent reality that scholars are not the only intellectuals “using” JWT.

JWT’s theoretical and normative perpetuation hinges on its historical reputation for proscribing conflict through morally-based limitations on the use of force. “Morally-based” limitations and argumentation about how and when to use force, while theoretically based in accepted, objective (and potentially universal) standards of morality, are necessarily subjective and contingent upon their use in specific contexts and through particularly understood frames of action. As a frame for understanding and even legitimating ethical action, this moral tradition should be “useful for addressing the dilemmas of international politics that we presently face” (Steele and Amoureaux, 2009; 177) but in ways that it currently is not. Some degree of flexibility in interpretation, then, is surely necessary. As the realities and dynamics of conflict continue to evolve, the mark of a useful measure of ethical debate is one positioned to fit, however messy, into the dialogue on the use of force. Indeed, this is precisely what Walzer had in mind as he wrote his seminal work on the subject: *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977).

The seriousness of this subject, then, necessitates honest, critical engagement with the tools, structure, and logic by which we argue and reason about its application. Since this moral tradition should indeed be useful for addressing problems, the way in which the tradition is *used* in this manner is of almost unparalleled importance. It seems to me that the tradition of just war is rare in that its *internal* logic, structure, and conditions have been the source of, and shaped by, a very public, *external* discussion and subsequently *application* (see: Butler, 2012 for a concise

history of this evolution). This is a discussion that encompasses scholars, elected officials, policy-makers, military personnel, and citizens in general, and indeed is the “triumph” Walzer so eagerly welcomed (2004). As such, the two spheres of logical coherence, internal and external, are distinct in structural logic and at the same time connected in application.

It simply is not enough to argue that, for example, the War on Terror was not just because of the politicized nature of its aims and the grandness of its ends against the accepted understanding of success, proportionality, and the others. Nor is it enough that we “raise the theoretical ante-to strengthen the constraints that justice imposes on warfare” (Walzer, 2004; 22). If we are to take seriously JWT’s purpose as a structure through which ethics and morality can be discussed in a responsible manner, then understanding what the language of just war as applied by policy-makers, theorists, military officials, and others *is actually doing* seems like an important endeavor. Indeed James Turner Johnson has quite correctly argued that just war’s purpose is not limited to the evaluation of specific wars but rather connected to political community and the conscience of its individual actors (Johnson, 1999; 26). The area of resistance is not found in doubling down on the “true meaning” or more forcefully repeating the nature of these constraints. JWT scholars have to get outside of the instrumental structure itself, take a look back and see if the assumptions in the structure and assumptions about conditions enable this in the first place. In other words, it is not only about proclaiming just or unjust any longer.

In many ways, the *perceived* universality JWT’s assumptions seem to contribute to a political effort to frame a war narrative in a certain way. Further, a contributing factor in this trend is *internal* inconsistency with regard to what exactly success is and its hierarchical placement. Similarly, assumptions of a “ready-made”, utilitarian equation of proportionality,

almost begets its fuzzy interpretation and application in addition to its own hierarchical placement, and conflation with success and just cause. Applying universal principles to one of the most ethically complex scenarios, war, is profoundly difficult even with a settled moral structure to guide decisions.

Lingering internal problems with just war, combined with, seemingly, a political *need* to use it prompts a serious re-engagement with the elements of the theory. Yet JWT is still relevant, as evidenced by the nature and importance of appeals to one of its key tenets. Transcending the theoretical-real world divide is important, especially when theorists of just war *do have* something important to contribute. Indeed, I believe we (if I may, very humbly, put myself in this category) have a responsibility to try to bridge the divide. As such, a serious consideration of how internal debates about just war affect the subject with which we are continually engaged is necessary.

## Bibliography

- A Mighty Expensive Parade. (1991) *The Washington Post*, June 1.
- A Second Vietnam War for America? (2003) *New Straits Times*, June 11.
- A Transcript of George Bush's War Ultimatum Speech from the Cross Hall in the White House. (2003) *The Guardian*, March 18.
- Adams, Michael C.C. (1994) *The Best War Ever: America and World War II*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Baer, Susan. (1991) Millions Attend Ticker-Tape Parade. *The Baltimore Sun*, June 11.
- Balz, Dan. (1990) President Warns Iraq of War Crimes Trials; Bush Calls Invaders' Acts "Hitler Revisited." *The Washington Post*, October 16.
- Barker, Peter and Josh White. (2005) Bush Calls Iraq War Moral Equivalent of Allies' WWII Fight Against the Axis. *The Washington Post*, August 31.
- Bartholomew, Amy and Margit Mayer. (1992) Nomads of the Present: Melucci's Contribution to "New Social Movement" Theory. *Theory, Culture, and Society* 9: 141-159.
- BBC Radio4. (2001) Four Corners, November 5.
- Bellamy, Alex J. (2006) *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-639.
- Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckman. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Penguin.
- Biddle, Stephen and Peter Feaver. (2013) Assessing Strategic Choices in the War on Terror. In *How 9/11 Changed our Ways of War*, ed. James Burk. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies.
- Bin Laden, No More Symposium. (2011) *The National Review*, May 2.
- Bleiker, Roland. (2006) Art After 9/11. *Alternatives* 31: 77-99.
- Bodnar, John E. (2010) *The "Good War" in American Memory*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990) *Logic of Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bradley, Tahman. (2011) Press Missed Mission Accomplished Meaning Says Bush Staffer. *ABC News*, September 19.
- Bush: Iraq a "Decisive Ideological Struggle." (2006) *NBC News*, August 31.
- Butler, Michael J. (2012) *Selling a Just War: Framing Legitimacy, and U.S. Military Intervention*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Calhoun, Laurie. (2002) Legitimate Authority and 'Just War' in the Modern World. *Peace & Change* 27(1): 37-58.
- Campbell, Joseph. (1988) *The Power of Myth*. New York: Doubleday.
- Cheney: War on Terror "On Course." (2001) *ABC News*, October 19.
- Coates, Sam. (2005) Weak Responses Led to 9/11 Cheney Asserts. *The Washington Post*, October 4.
- Coulter, J. (1986) Affect and Social Context: Emotion Definition as a Social Task. In *The Social Construction of Emotions*, ed. Rom Harre. New York: Blackwell.
- Coppieters, Bruno and Nick Fotion, eds. (2002) *Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Dewey, John. (1922) *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology*. New York: Holt.
- Downs, Gregory P. (2015) The Dangerous Myth of Appomattox. *The New York Times*, April 11.

- Durkheim, Emile. (1984) *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Eckert, Amy E. (2014) Private Military Companies and the Reasonable Chance of Success. In *The Future of Just War: New Critical Essays*, eds. Caron E. Gentry and Amy E. Eckert, 62-75. Athens: University of Georgia Press
- Elliott, Stuart. (1995) From the “Good War” Comes Good Marketing Opportunities-50 Years Later. *New York Times*, May 8.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. (1992) Just War as Politics: What the Gulf War Told Us About Contemporary American Life. In *But Was it Just?: Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War*, ed. David E. Decosse, 43-60. New York: Doubleday.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2003) *Just War Against Terror: Ethics and the Burden of American Power in a Violent World*. New York: Basic Books.
- Engelhardt, Tom. (1995) *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Fehrenbach, T.R. (1963) *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness*. New York: Macmillan.
- Fiala, Andrew. (2008) *The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Fierke, Karin M. (2007) *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2010) Wittgenstein and International Relations Theory. In *International Relations Theory and Philosophy: Interpretive Dialogues*, eds. Cerwyn Moore and Chris Farrands. New York: Routledge.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) *Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Freud, Sigmund. (1915) Thoughts for the Times on War and Death. In *On Creativity and the Unconscious: Papers on the Psychology of Art, Literature, Love and Religion*, ed. Benjamin Nelson. New York: Harper.
- Frost, Mervyn. (1998) A Turn Not Taken: Ethics in IR at the Millennium. *Review of International Studies* 24(5): 119-132.
- Geertz, Clifford. (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.
- George Bush’s Address on the Start of War. (2003) *The Guardian*, March 20.
- Grotius, Hugo. (1925) *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Council.
- Glover, Richard. (1990) Return of the Bright Shining Lie. *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 17.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. (1992) *On Collective Memory*. Edited and Translated by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harbour, Frances V. (2011) Reasonable Probability of Success as a Moral Criterion in the Western Just War Tradition. *Journal of Military Ethics* 10(3): 230-241.
- Harre, Rom, ed. (1986) *The Social Construction of Emotions*. New York: Blackwell.
- Hedges, Chris. (2002) *War is a Force that Gives us Meaning*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Heinze, Eric A and Brent J. Steele, eds. (2009) *Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hilsman, Roger. (1999) *From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World Without War: A History and a Proposal*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Hopf, Ted. (2010) The Logic of Habit in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 16(4): 539-561.
- Ish-Shalom, Piki. (2014) The Inversion of JWT. *E-International Relations*.

- Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. (2011) *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Johnson, James Turner. (1975) *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1984) *Can Modern War be Just?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1999) *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) *The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) "Right to Use Force: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the Common Good." In *The Just War Tradition: Practice of Authority and Authority in Practice*. Anthony Lang, Cian O'Driscoll, & John Williams, eds. (Forthcoming).
- Johnson, James Turner and George Weigel. (1991) *Just War and the Gulf War*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center.
- Khong, Yuen Foong. (1992) *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kratochwill, Friedrich. (2006) History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory. *European Journal of International Relations* 12(1): 5-29.
- Kubiak, Jeffrey. (2014) *War Narratives and the American National Will in War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lewis, Adrian R. (2012) *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Lipsitz, George. (1990) *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- March, James G. and Jonah P. Olsen. (1998) The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization* 52(4): 943-969.
- May, Ernest R. (1973) "Lessons" of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mayo, James M. (1988) War Memorials as Political Memory. *Geographical Review* 78(1): 62-75.
- McMahan, Jeff. (2005) Just Cause for War. *Ethics and International Affairs* 19(3): 1-21.
- Mission Accomplished: A Look Back at the Media's Fawning Coverage of Bush's Premature Declaration of Victory in Iraq. (2006) *Media Matters*, April 27.
- Morrow, Lance. (2001) The Case for Rage and Retribution. *Time*, September 12.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1989) *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Noon, David Hoogland. (2004) Operation Enduring Analogy: WWII, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory. *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 7(3): 339-364.
- O'Driscoll, Cian. (2007) Jean Bethke Elshstain's Just War Against Terror: A Tale of Two Cities. *International Relations* 21(4): 485-492.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2008) *Renegotiation of the Just War Tradition and the Right to War in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Olson, Elizabeth. (2003) Enola Gay Reassembled for Revised Museum Show. *The New York Times*, August 19.



- Osiel, Mark. (1997) *Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Paris, Roland. (2002) Kosovo and the Metaphor War. *Political Science Quarterly* 117(3): 423-450.
- PBS: American Experience. (2015) *The Persian Gulf War*.  
<<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/bush-gulf-war/>>  
(Accessed June 3).
- Portis, Edward Bryan. (1986) *Max Weber and Political Commitment: Science, Politics, and Personality*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- President Bush Addresses the Nation. (2001) *The Washington Post*, September 20.
- Raz, Guy. (2006) Defining the War on Terror. *NPR News*, November 1.
- Rengger, Nicholas. (2004) Review Article: Just War Against Terror? Jean Bethke Elshtain's Burden and American Power. *International Affairs* 80(1): 107-116.
- Rickert, Thomas J. (2013) *Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Rodin, David. (2005) *War and Self Defense*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. (2002) Transforming the Military. *Foreign Affairs* 81(3): 20-32.
- Safire, William. (1990) The Hitler Analogy. *The New York Times*, August 24.
- Sanger, David E. (2003) A New Doctrine for War. *The New York Times*, March 18.
- Senator Kennedy, Iraq is No Vietnam. (2004) *The National Review*, April 8.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1997) *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Shevchenko, Vitaly. (2015) Russia Awash with Symbols of WWII Victory. *BBC News*, May 8.
- Sjoberg, Laura. (2006) *Gender, Justice, and the Wars in Iraq*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2009) Gender, Just War, and Non-state Actors. In *Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition*, eds. Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, 151-176. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) The Inseparability of Gender Hierarchy, the Just War Tradition, & Authority in War. In *The Just War Tradition: Practice of Authority and Authority in Practice*, eds. Anthony Lang, Cian O'Driscoll, & John Williams. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Steele, Brent J. and Jacque L. Amoureux. (2009) 'Justice is Conscience': Hizbollah, Israel, and the Perversity of Just War. In *Ethics Authority and War: Non-State Actors and the Just War Tradition*, eds. Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, 177-204. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Steele, Brent J. (2008) *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State*. New York: Routledge.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2010) *Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2013) *Alternative Accountabilities in Global Politics: The Scars of Violence*. New York: Routledge.
- Taylor, Alan. (2011) Osama Bin Laden Killed: Worldwide Reactions. *The Atlantic*, May 2.
- The White House. (2001) President: We're Fighting to Win-and Win We Will: Remarks by the President on the U.S.S. Enterprise on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7. Washington: Office of the Press Secretary.

- Torgovnick, Marianna. (2005) *The War Complex: World War II In Our Time*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Transcript of President Bush's Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention. (2007) *The New York Times*, August 22.
- Trillinleaders, Calvin. (1991) Comparing Saddam to Hitler: Stop Splitting Hairs. *The Atlanta Constitution Journal*, January 3.
- Troop Deployment Has Strong Support in Congress. (1990) *St. Petersburg Times (Florida)*, August 9.
- Truman, Harry S. (1955) *Memoirs of Harry S Truman 1945 Volume I*. New York: A Da Capo Paperback.
- U.S. Department of State. (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September.
- Verstraeten, Johan. (2004) From Just War to Ethics of Conflict Resolution: A Critique of Just War Thinking in Light of the War in Iraq. *Ethical Perspectives* 11(2): 99-110.
- Walzer, Michael. (1977) *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books.
- Weber, Cynthia. (2003) Romantic Mediations of September 11. In *Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meaning*, eds. Francois Debrix and Cynthia Weber. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Weber, Max. (1968) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich. Translated by E. Fischoff. New York: Bedminster Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1978) *Selections in Translation*, ed. W. G. Runciman. Translated by Eric Matthews. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1980) *Basic Concepts in Sociology*. Translated by H.P. Secher. Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press.
- Wegner, Daniel M. and John A. Bargh. (1998) Control and Automaticity in Social Life. In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Why Vietnam? (1965) *Department of Defense*. Video.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953) *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Wolfgang, Ben. (2015) On 70th Anniversary of VE Day, Obama Honors Generation that "Literally Saved the World." *The Washington Times*, May 8.
- Wright, Brad and Jennifer Yuille. (2004) Kennedy: "Iraq is George Bush's Vietnam" *CNN*, April 6.
- Young, Oran. (2001) Environmental Ethics in International Society. In *Ethics and International Affairs: Extent and Limits*, eds. Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.