A THEORY
OF WORLD ORGANIZATION.

by

Ralph W. Nelson.

A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology
and the Faculty of the Graduate School in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Master's degree.

September, 1916. Approved by

Department of Sociology.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.


Addams, Jane: War and Social Reconstruction, Survey, March 6, 1915.


Arms and Industry, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y. 1914.


Aristotle: Politics, (Any translation.)


Bernhardi, Friedrich von: Germany and the Next War, Longmans, Green and Company, N. Y., 1914.

Bible.

Britannica, Encyclopedia: Articles on Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, and St. Augustine.


Human Nature and the Social Order, Scribners, 1902.


Our Educational Ideal in Wartime, New Republic, April 15, 1916.

Universal Service as Education, New Republic, April 22, and April 29, 1916.


Pulpit Thrusts at our Militarism, Literary Digest, November 20, 1915.


Independent, January 3, 1916: Editorial: Can War be Prevented?


Lindsay, A. D.: State Against Commonwealth, Atlantic, August, 1915.


April 22, 1916: Editorial: An Appeal to the President.

North American Review, August, 1915: Editorial: Will the War Bankrupt Europe?

Oliver, Frederick Scott: Ordeal by Battle, Macmillan, N. Y., 1915.


Putnam, George Haven: The Defense of the Republic, Outlook, October 20, 1915.


Unpopular Review, July-September, 1915: German Statecraft and Democracy.

Unpopular Review, October-December, 1915: The Real Cause of the War.


White, William Allen: Government, of the People, by the People, for the People; Independent, February 7, 1916.


CONTENTS.

Chapter I.
THE KEY TO A PURPOSED CIVILIZATION.

   1. Increase of population and resulting problems.
   2. Increase of wealth.
   3. Increase of knowledge.
   5. Problems of government.

   1. They of its own household.
   2. World too big for little men.
   3. Social forces have outgrown their channels.
   4. Breakdown of historic institutions.
   5. Necessity of facing the problem.
   6. The Opinion of James Bryce.
   7. Indisposition to think.

II. Corrective Theories. Page 11.
   1. Numerous inadequate theories.
   2. The real social problem.
   4. The importance of pragmatism.

1. Men are the key.
2. Living men the criteria of choices.
3. Empiricism.
4. Social forces made constructive.
5. The factor of social organization.
6. Democracies not too huge for their rulers.

Chapter II.
THE PURPOSE OF STATES.

I. The Classic Model.

1. According to Plato.
   a. Based on an abstraction.
   b. Theory of ideas.
   c. Justice the true end of society.
   d. An ideal state.
   e. An estimate of his system.

2. Aristotle.
   a. A practical scheme.
   b. Forms of government.
   c. Stability the criterion.
   d. Restricted citizenship.
   e. Slavery justified.
   f. Weaknesses of his system.

3. Classic liberty.
   a. Absolutism, a freedom of conformity.
II. The Middle Ages. Page 28.

1. The Christian Church.
   a. Essentially paganized.
   b. Adopted classic idea of freedom.
   c. Personified in Papacy.
   d. The word of the church was truth.
   e. Temporal power.
   f. A mental slavery.

   a. A product of his time.
   b. Power rather than justice, essence of state.
   c. Unification of Italy.
   d. Emphasized monarchy as most powerful form of government.
   e. Separation of politics and morals.
   f. Historical and empirical method.
   g. Influence on European politics.

III. The German System. Page 36.

1. History and philosophy.
   a. Relation to Machiavelli.
   b. Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
   c. Napoleon and Bismark.
   d. Popular loyalty.
   e. The gospel of Duty.
   f. "The State is God on Earth."

2. Political aims.
a. Germany, bearer of World Spirit.
b. Hegel's definition of patriotism.
c. Efficiency and expansion.
d. "Might is the supreme right."
e. Central location.
f. An absolute bureaucracy.

   a. Real freedom.
   b. Systematic education.
   c. A lay religion.
   d. Absolute evolution.
   e. The spread of Kultur.

IV. Empiricism.

1. The rise of the masses.
   a. Early crude forms of popular government.
   b. Growth in spite of opposition.
   c. Purpose of democracy not adequately defined.
   d. Democracy has but groped its way.
   e. Always a possibility of failure.
   f. Natural tendency toward absolutism.
   g. An estimate of absolute perfection.
   h. The failure of German absolutism.
   i. Absolutism is but empiricism on a grand scale.

2. Empiricism criticized.
   a. Democratic practices far from ideal.
b. Laissez-faire.

c. Equality, a negative doctrine.

d. Snobbishness.

e. The party system, bossism, graft.

3. Empiricism justified.

a. Opportunity to correct evils.

b. The use of precedents; experimentation.

c. The value of an occasional successful experiment.

d. Public opinion the dominant factor.

e. Reciprocity between individual and society.

f. Leadership.

g. Theory and practice not separated.

h. Newman criticized.

i. An empiricist's definition of the best state.

j. Endless progress.

k. Opportunity for free education.

l. National sovereignty not an end but a means.

Chapter III.

DEMOCRACY.

I. A definition of democracy.

1. Not a form or system of government.

2. But an underlying ideal.

3. Not a static ideal,

5. The basis of rational and limitless progress.

6. The conscious object of the democratic ideal, not Man, but men in the concrete.


1. Group consciousness.

2. Family the primary group.

3. Clans.

4. Tribes.


6. A continual process of socialization.

7. Difficulties in free government.

8. Extension of principles of face-to-face groups.

9. "We-groups" and "other-groups."

10. Barriers to "we" consciousness.

11. Spread of social consciousness in United States.

12. The fundamental meaning of the democratic ideal.

II. Patriotism. Page 72.

1. Defined.

2. Benefits of government brought home to each individual.

3. Not paternalism; but reciprocity.

4. The conscious symbol of patriotism.

5. Group consciousness has outgrown political limits of nations.

6. Not degeneration, but a sign of social growth.
IV. The Deceptive View-point.  

1. A hierarchy of social groups.
2. Nationalistic philosophy,
   a. At first a unifying principle,
   b. Now stands in the way of further unification.
4. "The 'state' no longer a reality."
5. Nationalism, a temporary end; the view criticized.
6. Reciprocity between highest and lowest group.
7. Nationalism, a deceptive view-point; humanity, the true one.
8. The opportunity of democracy.

Chapter IV.

WORLD ORGANIZATION.

I. "The Field is the World."

1. Democracy not yet achieved.
2. National isolation no longer possible.
3. World organization an immediate problem.
4. Democracy the only feasible scheme.
5. The European war and the responsibility of autocrats.
7. Fundamental ideals at issue, democracy and bureaucracy.
II. Democracy, A Factor in Present World Politics. Page 88.

1. Democratic nations as peaceful neighbors.

2. Nations have grown larger, but autocrats less successful.

3. Revolutions in New and Old Worlds.

4. Democracy, the strength of the British Empire.

5. Self-governing dominions of the British Empire a beginning of world organization.

6. Nothing but harmony anticipated among democratic nations.

7. Autocracy, the basic cause of war, should be eliminated.

8. Democracy must eliminate autocrats by methods consistent with its character.

III. Education, the Means. Page 93.

1. Education, the only agency for permanent social uplift.

2. A psychological prerequisite to all social organization.

3. The civilized world one great community.

4. Men have learned to think in world terms.

5. World organization merely an educational problem.

6. Cooperation in world education, the only consistent plan of defensive preparedness for democratic nations.

7. Culmination of European crisis an unequaled opportunity for United States to take initiative in formation of League of Nations to Enforce Peace.

8. "America first in world service!"

9. The beginning of ultimate world democracy.
Chapter I.

THE KEY TO A PURPOSED CIVILIZATION.

To undertake in the brief space of an introductory chapter, to point out an underlying principle by which the conflicting and complex interests of human life may be essentially harmonized, and by which the deep undercurrents of civilization may be rendered subject to rational control, will of necessity require a hasty, yet careful reference to factors relevant to our purpose, in a field as wide as human experience. An attempt to give adequate consideration to all questions that might bear even directly on the theme in hand, would preclude all possibility of a clear presentation of the theme. We shall seek, therefore, in the present chapter merely to discover the key to a purposed civilization and allow its real significance and value in the application of a constructive theory of world organization to become apparent in the development of ensuing chapters.
The complexity of modern life has come to be a trite expression of a generally accepted fact. It is evident that a world of teeming millions of intermingled races and cultures presents problems unknown to primitive man. The isolation and freedom of pioneer life has ceased to exist except in reminiscent minds. If we do not like our neighbors, the best we can do is to exchange them for other neighbors, for a change of residence can no longer take us very far from the habitat of civilized men.

There are still people who profess not to care what the rest of the world is doing, but they cannot live in the midst of modern civilization and remain long oblivious to the actions and thoughts of their fellows. The telegraph and the daily press bring to the consciousness of every individual the doings and feelings of the millions around him regardless of their race or color. We touch elbows across continents and oceans. We buy and sell and travel; we exchange commodities and ideas; we barter raw material for finished products and we throw in our sentiments for good measure. No civilized man of the Twentieth Century is sufficient unto himself.

New problems present themselves on all sides. For example only, take feminism. Woman has learned to
be no longer the unquestioning servant of man. She has demanded her rights in terms not hard to understand. But because she has no precedent by which to determine her rights, she opens up vistas endlessly complicated.

Increasing wealth has brought its train of problems. Men have heaped up gold faster than they have begotten sons and daughters, and when there was more wealth than they could dispose of by the accustomed "start in life" and dowry, they have further complicated the social situation by scouring land and sea in search of new desires. Standards of living and the cost of living reach higher levels with every new economic achievement. New inventions and scientific methods in manufacture, organization, and the elimination of waste continually augment the rate of production. Organized labor has come to stay; the same is true of organized capital. The man who seeks to frame and enforce an effective anti-trust law is prying at Gibraltar with a toothpick. No one can deny that we are face to face with questions of government or municipal ownership, the regulating commission, or some form of cooperative society.

Civilized man meets his problems with replenished stores of knowledge. The accumulation of learning has allowed each generation to stand on the shoulders of

1. Lippman: Drift and Mastery, pp. 121-143.
all its predecessors. Art and literature now rival the palmiest days of Greece. Scientists are continually adding to human wisdom by new discoveries and inventions, until we are prone to believe nothing is impossible. But each new addition to knowledge adds also to human problems, for knowledge misused is a means of untold evil. Many are the beneficent discoveries that have been turned into destructive channels, and often have both philosophers and scientists cursed where they meant to bless. The wisdom that has made possible our Twentieth Century civilization is a responsibility we have as yet learned to bear but lamely. But increased knowledge is here to stay, indeed is here for further growth; there is no turning our backs upon it. We can but shoulder its responsibility and strive as best we may to learn to use it wisely.

Continued growth of learning must perforce affect the beliefs and philosophies of men. Scientists and philosophers have assumed a critical attitude and in their search for truth have questioned all things. Nothing is commoner these days than the overturning of cherished notions. Philosophies based on static conceptions of the Absolute have all but lost their hold on the minds of thinking men. Skepticism has become the thought-fashion of the day; no institution or dogma is too sacred to be criticized and many are
the popular philosophies of "new thought" and "new freedom." Herein lies the danger: there is always a tendency for the pendulum to swing to the other extreme. There are enthusiasts who, in emphasizing truth discovered by their own research, are liable to overlook or undervalue whatever truth may have been bequeathed by former ages. To establish criteria of criticism that cut loose entirely from the past or that insist on taking an ancient record or institution out of its historical setting that it may be judged by modern minds solely in the light of modern scientific methods, is to run the risk of near-anarchy in the fields of thought.

But the hopeful sign in modern philosophy is the school of pragmatism and its functional point of view. Institutions and beliefs and even truth itself are judged not in the abstract but in the light of their practical, concrete value in a world of present day human society and the actual relations of men to one another. All conceptions, certainly including those that were formerly accepted as a priori, are tested and modified or rejected or retained because of their success in meeting the needs of men.

Governmental institutions were among the first to be questioned. In fact they were judged by their utility in the promotion of general welfare long before
anyone dreamed of collaborating the principles of such judgment into a system of pragmatic philosophy. The doctrine of the divine right of kings was accepted for centuries, and for centuries more few thought of questioning the right of monarchs and autocrats to rule under the Machiavellian theory of power. But growing knowledge and civilization could not maintain this state of things. It was long ago that a dawning sense of human freedom and human rights gave birth to a crude and undeveloped ideal of democracy, an ideal however, clothed with unlimited possibilities and potential force sufficient to meet the most enlightened needs of our present civilization.

But here again are problems. Old difficulties have been surmounted only to give us a clearer view of greater ones yet. Nationalism was a beneficent and unifying goal for a mediaeval world of a thousand hostile tribes, but now that it has completed its work of the peaceful organization of smaller groups under national governments and ideals, it becomes a menace and a negation to the internationalism and cosmopolitanism demanded by a humanity whose interests have outgrown the political boundaries of nations.

II

Such is the modern world---an intricate and
unlimited tangle of unsolved problems, problems of such vital import that on their solution hangs the future of civilization itself. Crime is on the increase and we are learning that our prisons do not reform. The murmur of the masses is growing ominous, and those of the upper crust have heard it and are entrenching even deeper in their smug conservatism.

Civilization does not fear attacks from scattered barbarous tribes; it has triumphed over all external dangers. But the real foes of civilization are they of its own household, and even then the menace is not from the outcasts or hangers-on that permeate our society, but from the elite, those to whom we look as the captains of our hopes.

We might as well admit that the unsettled condition of the modern world is grave indeed and that the possibility of reversion to semi-barbarism is by no means as remote as complacency might wish. In the words of a recent writer, "The problem of our civilization is something more than the mere threatened overthrow of existing political and industrial institutions. The problem before us is not how to avoid political revolution, but rather how to avoid the decay and disintegration of civilization itself."

It has been said that the world is growing too big for little men, and as we sum up the varied complications of the life in which we find ourselves, we must agree that the statement is considerably more than a half-truth. Society is no longer amenable or subservient to the institutions and rules that have served to maintain equilibrium in former times. Unmanageable is a word that accurately characterizes a society in which forces have outgrown their accustomed vehicles and now toy in wanton carelessness with men and groups of men. Knowledge and wealth have accumulated much more rapidly than man has learned to use them and often have they usurped his place as master.

States have been the main channels for the flow of social forces, but they are no longer great enough or sufficiently diversified to restrain and properly direct the individual and group impulses of men. States have sought to retain the forms and practices that they inherited from the Middle Ages while political forces and social forces in general have increased with every onward step in science and discovery. The inevitable has happened: the stream of human reactions and emotions has here and there re-formed its channel or broken away completely to pursue its destructive,

1. I refer of course, primarily, to social forces that are at the same time political forces.
random course. The people of Europe did not desire the war that is now upon them, but their national governments were inadequate to stem the rising tide.

By their inherited theories of government, European nations placed the direction of their governmental organization in the hands of one man or a select group of men, and in this they built on changing sand. While the mass of human knowledge has steadily increased, the frailties of human nature and the inherent capabilities of human intelligence have remained proximately the same. When we stop to consider the matter, we know that we have no reason to expect that the wisdom of a king or an assemblage of aristocrats would be capable of wisely and beneficently directing the multiplied forces of human society by means of governmental machinery, even the best that former centuries could devise.

But here we are, living in the twentieth Century, in the midst of our knowledge and our wealth. It matters not whether we rejoice in the power of our position or bewail its dangers, we are here and the situation is upon us. If we meet it, if we solve it, we have taken one more important step in the path of progress. If we fail to solve it, our civilization will in due time find its sepulcher with that of Egypt and Babylon. As long as we succeed in postponing the day of our decision
and seek our solution in a forlorn hope of returning to the simpler life of a former time--- we drift.

James Bryce, in his Presidential Address to the British Academy, stated the situation thus:

"Sometimes one feels as if modern states were growing too huge for the men to whom their fortunes are committed. Mankind increases in volume, in accumulated knowledge, and in a comprehension of the forces of nature; but the intellects of individual men do not grow. The disproportion between the individual ruling men with their personal prejudices and proclivities, their selfish interests and their vanities, and the immeasurable consequences which follow their individual volitions, becomes more striking and more tragic. Enormous nations are concentrated under one government and its disasters affect the whole. A great modern state is like a gigantic vessel built without any watertight compartments, which, if it be unskilfully steered, may perish when it strikes a single rock."

If even the basic idea of Mr. Bryce's remarks is true--- and we have pointed out undeniable indications that similar conditions prevail in our most important social institutions other than government--- it is time that the men and women of the Twentieth Century faced

1. Quoted by L. P. Jacks in the Atlantic of March 1916, p. 298.
the issue and its consequences squarely. We are prone to let well enough alone. The doctrine of *laissez-faire* has sunk so deeply into our subconsciousness that it is safe to assume the necessity of a cataclysm no less terrible than the present European war to arouse us from our lethargy. If we are living under a monarchical government that fosters our industries and husbands our resources, we are well content to live a quiet life little troubling ourselves about society at large. If we are citizens of a great republic, we can take a mild interest periodically in civic or national affairs, and between times—well, the world can take care of itself. We do not want to think—-as long as our dreams are pleasant—-that is why we drift.

III

Of late years there has been a constantly increasing number of social philosophers and reformers who have pointed out defects in the mechanism of our social machinery or in our methods of running it; it would not be too sweeping to accord to them all the credit for real service to humanity. But too many of them have seen but one phase of our social situation or have emphasized one specific defect to the neglect of others needing equal attention. They are inclined even to
deny the existence of problems outside their special field, or at least to minimize their importance. They have foisted upon the world and have spent their lives teaching narrow or socially-negative theories, theories irreproachable in themselves and highly necessary as parts of a comprehensive, systematic plan of social uplift, but powerless to bring about the desired result when offered to men as a panacea in the form of a single detached principle.

There are the labor leaders with their thousands of followers who would make heaven on earth by a proper adjustment of labor difficulties. There are economists to whom nothing is so important as their suggested solutions of financial questions. Eugenists see only the necessity of properly and scientifically breeding the normal, physical man. To feminists the social problem centers in "the woman problem." The pacifists would make all things well by arranging for the amicable settlement of international differences.

All these views are well enough, but in their isolation they are totally inadequate. "They are all to be welcomed as tending, at least, to bring out the larger human elements in the problem. Some of us, at least, are beginning to perceive that the social problem is now, what it has been in all ages, namely, the problem of the relations of men to one another. It
is the problem of human living together, and cannot be confined to any statement in economic, eugenic or other one-sided terms."

In thus pointing out the social problem we must take care to be broad enough to see it in its fullness. The greatest possible broadmindedness is necessary to enable one to specialize upon his individual part in life and at the same time to understand the view-points and the attitudes of men in other industrial, religious, or national groups well enough to be able to see his own immediate interests in their true perspective with relation to the interests of all other human beings. In fact, the requisite broadmindedness is so great that no unsentimental person will profess his ability to perceive the social problem in its ultimate totality. But our present powers of observation are sufficient to discern many agencies by which we may strive toward the needed breadth of vision. In the first place, we must keep a synthetic yet common-sense, functional view of the world and its activities. We must be pragmatic and functional in our methods of study and in the application of principles. We must bear in mind that we have abundant stores of information as to how human groups and individuals do actually live together and that we can be systematic and practical

along the lines of establishing more rational and effective methods in education, social cooperation, and industrial organization as well as in the fields of international and super-national administration and governmental organization.

A drifting civilization can never be made purposeful and subject to the rational control of man's highest intellectual powers by resort to negatives and half-truths. It is because of our failure to face actuality particularly and yet synthetically that we have so muddled our modern civilization. We shall not find any ready-made solution for the social problem. We shall be obliged to work one out through painstaking centuries of thought and toil and disheartening failures. But the time has come when we must admit the existence of our problem and recognize its character and gravity. We must be ready immediately to fix our attention on the crux of the problem and place our hand on the only available key to its solution.

IV

There is such a key. There is a guiding principle by which the forces of civilization can be harnessed and directed and essentially harmonized. Not in an ultimate sense, to be sure, for the wisdom of man is not sufficient to select absolute goals for himself. But on the basis
of the social problem as we have sought to state it, there is a key by which we may choose consecutively each next step in the path of social progress. The key is man. Not Man in the abstract, as philosophers have so often taught, but the fellow who works in our factories or who tills the soil and produces the wheat and the cattle that find their way to our dinner table. The key refers to the man who sits in our presidential chairs and the man who is out of a job and gets evicted by the landlord. With all the men in all the walks of life, the men who must live together as men, the social problem has to do. It is concerned with all the forces that fashion and sway their lives from earliest infancy to old age, concerned in devising a way by which we human beings may guide these forces for the conservation and uplift of all our kind.

With living men as the criteria by which to readjust our scale of values for the gleaning of truth from the past, and with actual men before us as the ones for whom we shape our future course, we shall reject or reconstruct many an institution that has come down to us from mediaeval times. The evils to which our modern social system is heir, have been to a great extent the result of wrong choices, and we have chosen incorrectly largely because we took our standards of choice from absolute philosophies and failed to check them up with
the needs of the men for whom they were designed.

We must go on choosing in the future, for that is our lot as humans; but if we would make our civilization answer to the needs of men, we must revise our standards of choice to fit the men for whom we choose. The test of any institution or teaching will be its actual fruits in the lives of men; that which makes for human misery will be discarded and that which makes for happiness will be retained and fostered.

The work of fashioning a civilization according to the requirements of men is fundamentally an empirical undertaking--- trial and error if you please, but trial and error with a definite end in view. That is the very best that finite minds can do. With all deference to the wisdom and the good intentions of the apostles of absolutism, we must remind them that their absolute systems are but trial and error on a large scale. German absolutism is on trial today. Science is on trial in all its fields. Pragmatic philosophy and the functional method are on trial. The thoughts we are presenting in this thesis are offered with the intent that they be submitted to trial and rejected to whatever extent they may fail to be of practical value to men. Nothing is sufficiently sacred to be exempt from trial at the bar of human need.

Then we shall not seek complete or absolute con-
trol of social forces, but shall merely endeavor to

guide them into constructive channels where they will
be of service to men. We shall not presume to judge
with infinite accuracy the ultimate boundaries of any
channel, but we will determine by our humanitarian
standards whether a social force working in a certain
direction is destructive or helpful to men. Rather
than attempting to thwart, we will encourage the ac-
quision and spread of knowledge, but we will not for-
get that an indispensable part of all knowledge is the
accompanying knowledge of how to use it wisely and for
worthy ends. Knowledge will be a means and not an end.
We shall seek wealth also; but with men as the object
of our endeavors, wealth will be but a means and men
will be the end. Ownership of wealth and property will
be conceived in the light of stewardship for the welfare
and uplift of men.

But purposive civilization cannot be attained by
merely eulogizing the men in the factories, and the pal-
aces and on the farms and the lecture platforms. We
are indiscriminately scattering our forces, until we
utilize the factor of social organization and view
men collectively as well as individually. Men are so
constituted psychically and physically that, as men,
you cannot live apart from their fellows; and to live
together they must be organized. We need organization
for education and industry, we need organization for all group life whether the group be family or nation. But the organization and the machinery of organization must be looked upon as a means and not an end. This is a point of all the greater importance because it is so commonly overlooked in our actual practices. And the end of all human organization is men and man, both collectively and individually conceived. There are social philosophers who urge as little organization as possible—this is the prevalent view and practice of our time—-but it is a negative teaching, a component part of the doctrine of laissez-faire; and the liberty that its adherents profess is a negative liberty—-every man works for himself until he approaches the equal rights of another; then he stops. Rather will we say, according to our functional view, that the more organization the better as long as it is controlled by and answers to the needs of men.

National organization then, will have an important place in our scheme. And it is obvious that by our principle the governments of states must be completely in the hands of their citizens. In our quotation from James Bryce above, it seems to be assumed that the fortunes of modern states must of necessity be committed to "individual ruling men with . . . their selfish interests and their vanities." Of course this
is true according to the prevailing theory of government in Europe; but it is not true of any government that can play its real part in a rationally purposive civilization based on the rights of men. And Mr. Bryce feels that modern states are growing too huge for the intellects of their rulers. This also is true of all governments except those that are based on our key. It was because the social forces of Europe were used to bolster up systems of absolute nationalism instead of being applied to the service of men, and because the guidance of the nations was intrusted to the individual volitions of ruling men, that these forces are now working for destruction. But how can a state become too great for her rulers if the rulers are the whole people, the very people who constitute the state? If state and rulers are one and the same, how can one be greater than the other? Herein is the very heart of the application of our key to a purposed civilization to the organization and the governments of nations.
Chapter II.

THE PURPOSE OF STATES.

"The best state is a brotherhood of men of full stature, intellectual and moral, animated by a common aim--- the aim of living and helping each other to live the noblest life, active and speculative, that men can live."

We are a race of idealists. Political and social philosophers from Plato down to the present time have given us their best thoughts along the line of what a state ought to be and what constitutes its purpose. Throughout their writings we perceive a steady growth in clarity of conception and statement, and we have chosen the passage from Newman, just quoted, as the most complete and concise summing up of the essential attributes of the best state that human thought has yet produced. But in this we have merely stated a functional ideal and we have implied that it is the purpose of states to strive toward this ideal. Well enough, but it is one thing to formulate an ideal and assert the advisability of striving to attain it, and quite another to map out a definite and practical program for its realization.

Here we are face to face with the difference between idealistic and pragmatic philosophy. Idealism has been the predominant thought fashion of the past; men did not deny the need of devising ways and means for the solution of problems, but they felt sure that if ideals were right, human practices could be trusted to take care of themselves. Now a new note has made itself heard in the fields of philosophy. Idealistic speculation is giving place to practical examination of concrete causes and their attending phenomena. We no longer take it for granted that if a man knows what is right, we can therefore depend on his doing it. We are becoming aware of the need for practical programs as well as ideals, and our thinkers are searching the motives and achievements of men in the past as a guide for our conduct in the immediate future.

This is our plan for a study of the purpose of states. We contend that the problems of nations and national governments are but a part of the all-inclusive problem of human relations, but a part sufficiently important in a cosmopolitan age to warrant at least a hasty scanning of the development of social theories with regard to the manner in which thought leaders in different periods of the world’s history have sought to achieve the ends for which they felt that their states should exist.
Plato based his whole philosophy on an abstraction. "The abstract ideal of the good, as determining fixed and immutable canons of morality, was the standpoint from which he assailed the utilitarian ethical and political doctrines which he ascribed to the Sophists. In his view right and justice remained always the same; the demands of a narrow and temporary expediency could never change them---could never convert them into injustice and wrong." To be sure there is an intimate relation between the doctrines he enunciated and the currents of practical Greek politics, but he interpreted politics to fit his theory rather than shaping his theory to fit the facts.

The theory of ideas developed by Plato is a fundamental and inseparable part of his philosophy. "Instead of having its existence in the human mind, truth is conceived in the form of abstract, self-existent ideas, having their abode in a supernatural region above the skies. Instead of being cognizable by any human mind that employs the proper dialectic processes, truth is considered as something knowable only by an exceptionally endowed few, who, by developing their intellectual powers to an extraordinary degree,

1. Dunning: Political Theories, p. 27.
and by working themselves into a sort of metaphysical frenzy, are able to grasp its principles."

By far the greatest and most enduring point in Plato's system was his conception of justice as the true end of society, justice consisting in the concord and harmony of the citizens. Then true to his nature as a poet-philosopher, he proceeds to build out of his imagination an ideal state wherein justice may be best attained. He divides society into four stereotyped classes; he suppresses the family and private property; he lays aside all laws in the state and replaces them by education alone; he makes philosophers the ruling class and leaves everything to the care of their speculations. While we cannot but reject all these utopian figments from the mind of a political dreamer, yet we may profit by many of the ideals of human relations that Plato has given to the world.

Subsequent history confirms his assertion that the true strength of a state is virtue and that virtue is based on education. Education cannot take the place of laws; but it is education that gives soul and spirit to the laws. It is not utopian in Plato "to have perceived before Aristotle that it was in a well-moderated and well-balanced constitution that the only guarantee of

liberty resided; to have exacted of legislators that they should give the reason for their laws when they promulgated them; and to have demanded for criminals, not only punishment, but amendment and amelioration."

It remained for Plato's distinguished pupil and critic to give us a revised and more practical view of the politics of the Grecian city-state. Aristotle was by inclination and early training a practical scientist as well as a speculator in the realm of ideals. His *Politics* is a work predominantly practical in character. "Ideals are framed, to be sure, and the means for their realization stated, but they are ideals such as lie within the ordinary competence of a civil organization to secure. Moreover, while Plato had been content to portray an ideal polity without attempting to describe the practical, technical means by which the scheme was to be inaugurated and maintained, Aristotle's genius leads him not only to outline what he desires, but to give in explicit details the mode in which political prosperity and perfection are to be secured."

Generally speaking the best state is one in which the middle class is stronger than either or both extremes, and for its government, Aristotle recommends polity. But the same form of government is not best

2. Ibid, p. 137.
for every people and every set of conditions. Stability is the criterion of selection; a state should have the most permanent form of government possible. Democracy is the best government where the poor constitute a vast majority, while oligarchy is most suited to a state where the superiority of the rich in resources and power more than compensates for their inferiority in numbers. Aristotle saw the inadvisability of setting up philosophers as a ruling class and placed the rule in the hands of the citizens as a whole. But mechanics and laborers were not citizens, and below them were the slaves whose condition Aristotle justifies by a theory concerning their mental inferiority, which he admits does not correspond to actual conditions.

Thus while Aristotle makes a decided advance over Plato in recognizing popular rights, his thought is so hemmed in by Greek traditions that he accepts institutions whose character negates the fundamental idea of freedom. And the worst feature is his criterion of stability and permanence. He looks upon his system as perfect, at least to the extent that the criteria of utility and flexibility in order to meet changing conditions are to be sacrificed to perpetuity. By state constitutions he would place the real sovereignty in the hands of the class best able to keep it

intact; then he would aid that class in all possible entrenchment. He makes absolutely no provision for the possible rise of the masses; laborers and slaves are to be so perpetually. In spite of the advanced character of Aristotle's thought when considered in relation to his own time, it is nevertheless, when viewed in the light of Twentieth Century civilization, one of the most reactionary among systems of static imperialism.

Aristotle draws a clear distinction between the terms State and Government--- "the form of government," he says, "is the ordering and the regulating of the city, and all the offices of it, particularly those wherein the supreme power is lodged." The state, on the other hand, is "a collective body of citizens, sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life." In other words--- and this is a point that subsequent world development has not shaken--- the government is a means of achieving the purpose for which the state exists. But at the final analysis, the state exists in order to perpetuate itself.

Largely from Greece with her accomplishments in government, art, literature, and social life, arose the classic idea of liberty. The philosophies of

1. Politics, Bk III, Chapter 6.
2. Ibid, Book III, Chapter 1.
Plato and Aristotle had helped to formulate this idea in the minds of the people and to crystallize it in their manner of life. "Perhaps the deepest assumption of classic philosophy is that nature and the gods on the one hand and man on the other, both have a fixed character; that there is consequently a necessary piety, a true philosophy, a standard happiness, a normal art. The Greeks believed, not without reason, that they had grasped these permanent principles better than other peoples. They had largely dispelled superstition, experimented in government, and turned life into a rational art. Therefore when they defended their liberty what they defended was not merely freedom to live. It was freedom to live well, to live as other nations did not, in the public experimental study of the world and human nature. This liberty to discover and pursue a natural happiness, this liberty to grow wise and to live in friendship with the gods and with one another, was the liberty vindicated at Thermopylae by martyrdom and at Salamis by victory."

The Greek liberty then was "not freedom to wander at hazard or let things slip, but on the contrary freedom to legislate more precisely . . . and to discover and codify the means to true happiness. . . . The conservatives themselves were radical,

so intelligent were they, and Plato wrote the charter of the most extreme militarism and communism, for the sake of preserving the free state."

However much the Greeks disagreed and wrangled about just what, in detail, was the purpose of their state, we see in their very groping the same underlying absolute philosophy. They all felt sure that an ultimate natural wisdom could be found and that their own reason could find it. They were convinced of their ability, through reason, to put that wisdom into practice, once they had found it; and of course when they had once instituted this "single solid natural wisdom," there could be no deviation from it, for it was perfect. To them the true liberty was bound up in a static institution, the Grecian city-state, and all of the world was to be made to conform. The Greek liberty was naturally the very antithesis of the tendencies of the barbarians to run wild and to find in that wildness a seeming freedom. It was a forced or artificial liberty, a freedom of conformity to absolute wisdom.

II

Eventually the Christian Church superseded the Grecian political and social system, but in Christian-

2. Ibid.
izing the pagans, the Church became essentially paganized. Rome instead of Athens became the center of the new thought, but the underlying philosophy was not radically changed, for the Church absorbed the classic idea of liberty. There was a somewhat different conception of the field in which the Absolute was to work and the arguments put forth in its support were quite divergent. A Hebrew background had been inserted in the place of Greek polytheism, and God was held to be a pre-eminent Person, yet absolute and fixed in all his attributes and activities. Just as the Greeks had conceived the human soul, the Roman Church delineated Providence as having a fixed, discoverable scope within which lay the bounds of human freedom. The aim of life was salvation, and men were to be saved not for earthly life but from it. Hence arose asceticism and monasticism, and men dwelt in crypts and secluded castles and imagined they were free. A striking reproduction of Diogenes and his tub.

And if the static absolutism of Plato was to be administered by a selected school of philosophers, that of Christianity was monopolized by the Church personified in the Papacy. The mission of the Church was to set men free, and in order to accomplish it, she must be free from let or hindrance. Even political governments must be brought under the sway of the popes,
for if they disagreed in their laws or administration with the dictates of absolute truth, their subjects would inevitably live in bondage regardless of how much they might feel themselves to be free. On the other hand, however much certain malcontents might feel themselves oppressed by the authority and rule of the Pope, they were merely to be pitied for the darkness that so fettered their minds, rendering them incapable of recognizing truth and freedom when it was fashioned and placed upon them by the Church. Men were taught to distrust their senses and their reason and to rely only on an unchanging Providence represented by the Pope. The word of the Church was truth; therefore in knowing and obeying the truth, men were to be made free.

The temporal power of the Pope was the soil out of which sprung the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Kings were crowned at Rome and the Roman Pontiff was the Vice-Regent of God, therefore whoever spoke against a king was in effect blasphemying God. Moreover, there could be no freedom apart from the will of the king. Better to wear shackles in the court of a Rome-crowned king than to dwell with the deer in a forest.

Such was the mental slavery that passed for freedom throughout the Middle Ages. A king who ruled by divine right was well-nigh impregnably entrenched
against all hints of popular freedom. And against all popular uprisings he could deal with the utmost severity; feeling himself to be the representative of God, he was to all intents free from earthly restraint to do whatever his fancy chose. It is a psychological principle well established in history that men will, under the spell of religious frenzy, inflict upon those whom they feel to be blasphemers or heretics extremes of cruelty and brutality unheard of in other mental states. Kings were in a position then, to utilize all the religious superstitions of their time in forcibly maintaining their thrones and perpetuating the mental and physical bondage of the masses.

In describing European philosophy in the Middle Ages we are giving the setting of Machiavelli. The Florentine statesman was forced by an unfortunate conjunction of circumstances in the politics of Florence to retire from public life, whereupon he became a writer in the field of political philosophy. His experience as a statesman and diplomat having covered almost the whole of southern and central Europe, his writings display a remarkable insight into contemporaneous events and conditions of the social life around him. The secular power of the Holy Roman Empire had broken down and the aristocracies that had thrived under its protection were giving way to the era of the
strong man. Appropriately then, his fundamental principle is **power** rather than justice---power is the essence of the state.

He it was who first advocated the idea of the unification of Italy. Her divided condition he attributed to the fact that no one of the petty provincial rulers was strong enough to subordinate the others and bring the whole state under his dominion. But this was the very thing that must be accomplished if Italy was to stand among the nations of western Europe that had shown their ability to exist independent of papal authority. By his historical method he so accurately sensed the tendencies of his time as to see in nationality, expressed in power, the primal unifying principle in all politics. He adopted the Aristotelian classification of governments without change and agreed that the best government is a mixed form of monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional democracy. But in the development of his principle that all government rests ultimately on force, he invariably threw the emphasis upon monarchy as the most centralized and therefore the most powerful form of all, the one most calculated to endure.

A prince should have absolute authority in order to adjust and manipulate conditions and men for the perpetuation and extension of the state. He should sub-
ordinate all considerations to this one end. Machiavelli would have a prince utilize religious sentiment as an important instrument of state policy. "Where the safety of one's country is at stake there must be no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful; on the contrary, everything must be disregarded save that course which will save her life and maintain her independence." 1

"There are two ways of carrying on a contest; the one by law, and the other by force. The first is practiced by men and the other by animals. 2 A Prince then should know how to employ the nature of a man, and that of the beasts as well."

"A sagacious prince then cannot and should not fulfill his pledges when their observance is contrary to his interest, and when the causes that induced him to pledge his faith no longer exist. If men were all good, then indeed this precept would be bad; but as men are naturally bad, and will not observe their faith towards you, you must, in the same way, not observe yours to them; and no prince has ever yet lacked legitimate reasons with which to clear his want of good faith."

It is quite evident that Machiavelli completely

1. Discorsi, III, 41.
2. Prince, Chapter 18.
3. Ibid.
separated politics from morals and all religious or ethical considerations. A prince should choose to be feared rather than loved, "for love holds by a bond of obligation which, as mankind is bad, is broken on every occasion whenever it is for the interest of the obliged party to break it. But fear holds by the apprehension of punishment, which never leaves men." Machiavelli accounts for the military success of Hannibal only on the ground of his extreme cruelty, and concludes that a successful prince must be cruel to his subjects in order to hold their fear, but he must be sufficiently diplomatic about administering punishments to avoid incurring their hatred.

Much of the philosophy of the disgruntled Florentine office-seeker is revolting to men with modern standards, but we must not allow our aversion to prevent our discovery of the points of real importance in his system. From the standpoint of its influence upon subsequent European politics, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of his distinction between the standards of public and private morality. Many rulers of European nations, like Frederick the Great of Prussia, have repudiated the immoral teachings of Machiavellianism, but in times of national danger, have made use of its most fundamental maxims.

1. Prince, Chapter 17.
Machiavelli must receive credit for the reunion of theory and practice. He called to account the mediaeval tendency to philosophize "in the air" and to speculate entirely in the realm of abstractions. "His relentless empiricism gave an impulse to the method of observation and experience which was not exhausted until the last vestiges of mediaevalism in political theory had vanished."

"Machiavelli is sometimes called the first modern political philosopher. It is quite as accurate to say that he ends the mediaeval era as that he begins the modern. Great as was his influence in stimulating reflection, it was not by his radical rejection of all the characteristics of mediaeval political theory that the modern era was introduced. Western Europe could not be rationalized and paganized off hand. Before the death of Machiavelli, Luther gave the signal for the movement which was to keep the intellectual energy of Europe fully occupied for a hundred and fifty years in the fields of theology and morals. Machiavellian doctrine was influential during this time, though Machiavelli's name was execrated by all parties. Only after the Reformation had been succeeded by the Revolution was frank and open recognition given to Machiavelli's philosophical depth and practical and political sagacity."

1. Dunning: Political Theories, p. 323.
2. Ibid, pp. 324-5.
It is safe to say that Nineteenth Century Europe, that has bequeathed the present war and practically all the social and political problems now confronting civilization, is the legitimate off-spring of Machiavellian philosophy. The fundamental principles of his teachings have permeated practically the whole population of continental Europe, breeding passivity on the part of the masses and aggression by the rulers. To understand Machiavelli is to hold the master key to the political complexities of modern and contemporaneous Europe.

III

The German political system is distinctly Machiavellian. While a discussion of German philosophy can begin with no one but Kant---who marks the transition to modern thought in Germany as Machiavelli does in Italy---the national vissicitudes of the German states were destined to be such as to lead Fichte and Hegel to incorporate the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant with the power criterion of the Florentine statesman-philosopher.

It would be well to analyze the political philosophies of at least these three thought leaders in German history, but anything like a fair treatment of their writings would extend far beyond the space at our disposal. We can give but hints, therefore, of the real
structure of German national philosophy, the points only that stand out in the scattering references to German history called for by our purpose.

Prussia and the separate Germanic states were taught the value of unity by Napoleon. They were called upon to defend themselves against a nation whose criterion was power, and what more natural than to fight fire with fire? This was the real preparation for the permanent work of Bismark. After her unification, and through the ambitions of Napoleon III and the arrogant treachery of Bismark, Germany found herself in the Franco-Prussian War. Her success in this war and especially the terms of peace imposed upon France, show conclusively the temper and principles of the German rulers. They had the power to impose humiliating terms, therefore they did so.

But what at this time was the attitude of the German people? They were intensely loyal to their government. The military glory of their nation was their glory and naturally they rejoiced in it as such. But they had really deeper grounds for loyalty. They had seen England and France torn by internal strife as the people struggled to free themselves from feudalism. They had accomplished the painful economic transition from the feudal to the modern era in a far more satisfactory and orderly way. Their government had been wise enough
and beneficent enough to provide for them a modern
system even before they had demanded it. Educationally
and industrially their nation had been made second to
none; in all their social life they were happy and pros-
perous. And their government had been the instrument
of all these conditions that compared so favorably with
those of other nations. Why should they not be loyal
patriots?

Even from these considerations it is not surpris-
ing that the German people did not awake to the fact that
the gentlemen in authority at Potsdam had an ax to grind.
But an examination of German philosophy makes clear the
fact that the chains forged to hold the German people
in mental bondage were far more subtle than mere pecun-
iary benefits.

The Kantian principle of Duty is a fundamental
point in German philosophy, and Bernhardi has well ex-
pressed its meaning from the view-point of the aristoc-
racy:

"While the French people in savage revolt against
spiritual and secular despotism had broken their chains
and proclaimed their rights, another quite different rev-
olution was working in Prussia--- the revolution of duty.
The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ulti-
mately to individual irresponsibility and to repudiation
of the State. Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical
philosophy, taught, in opposition to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the idea of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis on which the claim of individual rights might rest. At the same time Stein laid the foundations of self-government in Prussia."

Such indeed has come to be the self-government of Germany, a self-government that was in reality enlightened despotism. By a high-sounding gospel of duty the German people were led to place themselves at the disposal of their government for the accomplishment of its aims. The Germans have repudiated the French doctrine of rights, which are at least reciprocal, and have adopted a conception of duty which is one-sided, expressing authority on one side and obedience on the other. Nietzsche contributes his disavowal of happiness as a criterion of human conduct: "Man does not desire happiness, only an Englishman does that." If happiness is nothing, then the German people can readily accept the criterion of duty interpreted for them by their government.

By their philosophers the German people have been taught that the State is a realization of Absolute spirit

in the realm of consciousness, literally a doctrine of the divine right of states. The State is God on earth. "The march of God in history is the cause of the existence of states; their foundation is the power of reason realizing itself as will. Every state, whatever it be, participates in the divine essence. The State is not the work of human art; only Reason could produce it." According to Hegel the World Spirit rests with but one nation at a time, victory being the final proof that it has passed from one nation to take up its residence in another.

It is not strange then, in view of the spirit of German philosophy and the paternal character of the German government, that the people should lend themselves whole-heartedly to the accomplishment of decidedly ambitious political aims. National aggression became a solemn duty in the light of Germany as the bearer of the one World Spirit to bring freedom to all men. It mattered little that this freedom was to be forced upon other nations. "Freedom is the consciousness of freedom. Liberty of action has little to do with it."

"While cosmopolitanism is the dominant will that the purpose of the existence of humanity be actually realized in humanity, patriotism is the will that this

end be first realized in the particular nation to which we ourselves belong, and that this achievement thence spread over the entire race."

The success of German efficiency at home naturally led to ambitions for expansion. Germany had become a world power too late to share in the division of unclaimed portions of the earth. It was her right therefore to make war if necessary to secure colonies for the purpose of building up markets for home products. "In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things."

In the Reichstag on November 10, 1912 the Imperial Chancellor said, "For months past we have been living, and we are living now, in an atmosphere of passion such as we have perhaps never before experienced in Germany. At the root of this feeling is the determination of Germany to make its strength and capability prevail in the world."

2. Bernhardi: Germany and the Next War, p. 23.
3. Quoted by Archibald Hurd in the Fortnightly Review XCI, New Series, 765. He says further: "To Germany a (fleet) is merely a means to an end, and that end—if the Pan-Germans may be believed—is the destruction of the British Empire, the disruption of the French Republic, and the domination of the world."
The German rulers found another excuse for aggressive militarism, if such were needed, in the central location of Germany. While her position was weak for defense, it was strong for offense, and as one of the best ways to defend against possible enemies is to strike before they are ready, the gentlemen at Potsdam were left free to call any campaign waged against their neighbors one of defense against plans those neighbors might be hatching for the destruction of Germany.

In summing up the political aims of Germany, the least that can be said is that her people are intensely loyal to their government, and that that government is, in spite of its semi-democratic form, to all intents and in its actual workings, a military, and therefore absolute bureaucracy. This admitted, we have the basis for the unlimited national aggression pictured by General Von Bernhardi in "Germany and the Next War," whose purpose is boldly and even baldly stated in the preface.

The national arrogance of Germany is almost beyond the conception of men of other nations. But to the Germans it is not arrogance, but Kultur, the spread of which is not only a right but a duty. They have found real freedom under the perfect organization of the Prussian monarchy; they who conform to it are
free; all who rebel are slaves and must be set free by the power and the ideals of Prussianism. "Kultur is transmitted by systematic education. It is not, like culture, a matter of miscellaneous private attainments and refined tastes, but, rather, participation in a national purpose and the means of executing it.

Kultur is a lay religion, which includes ecclesiastical religion and assigns it to its due place."

Kultur is similar to the classic liberty of the Grecian city-states and to the absolute liberty of the mediaeval church. It differs only in this respect: "At Sparta, in Plato's Republic, and in the Catholic Church the aims and constitution of society were expected to remain always the same. The German ideal, on the contrary, not only admits of evolution but insists upon it." It would seem that a doctrine of evolution could not be built on an absolute philosophy, but German Kultur is absolutism because the course the evolution is to take is predetermined by the absolute genius of Reason or the World Spirit to which it is ascribed.

Certain German writers have said that Kultur was not to be extended to other nations, but according to others, who have Fichte and Hegel on their side, the whole world is to be subjugated and purified by the

2. Ibid. (p. 95.)
German nation. Thus have the prophets of Germanism turned what is, in its primary elements, a blameless love of home, into a deliberate dogma of German superiority and right of aggression.

The purpose of the German State is therefore not radically different, although a distinct development, from the classic model of Plato. It is the negation of all empiricism. Trial and error is crude and subhuman, unworthy of a race divinely commissioned to have dominion over the earth.

IV

It will be remembered that Aristotle considered democracy one of the perverted forms of government, classing it with tyranny and oligarchy. The significance of this estimate for our purpose is not the fact that democracy was regarded as corrupt, but that it came in for consideration at all. For Aristotle based his discussion of governments upon the actual practices of the states of his time. Without pausing to explain why a philosopher who justified slavery would find a democratic government unsuitable for his purposes, we will turn our attention to the fact that popular governments did exist in the time of Aristotle.

Doubtless they were crude in form and practice, doubtless there is much reason for the execration of
philosophers; but the significant fact is that in spite of repeated and incessant condemnations of all thinkers who were the best schooled in politics and government, these crude forms of popular government have blundered persistently on. Apparently throttled completely in the days of the Caesars and Charlemagne, or presumably divinely outlawed under the doctrine of the divine right of kings, democracy has reappeared after each eclipse with vigor unabated and purpose undaunted.

In spite of all the attempts in that direction, the purpose of democracy has never been adequately defined. So say kings and aristocrats who claimed the right to rule on the ground that the people do not know what they want. There is a foundation of truth in their contention. The people do not know what they want, if their desires are measured by the standards of absolutism. The democratic ideal has but groped its way, and this groping is held by autocrats to be a conclusive argument against it. They want to know where they are going; they want to model their government and all its institutions by the criterion of a fixed and absolute standard. Democracy is to the minds of Kantians or Platonists but a crude doctrine of trial and error.

Let us examine the history of popular government. The citizens who voiced their desires and judgments in the assembly halls of Rome in the days of the Republic
were but doing their human best and that was all. They tried, and as a whole their blundering expedients failed. Take the French Revolution and the final establishment of the French Republic. The very crudest of blundering as we look back at it now. And what different plan do we find in the United States of America or the self-governing dominions of the British Empire? None whatever. Their histories are continuous chronicles of trials and failures or successes or mayhap only partial successes. And today all democratic nations are but marching along with the same possibility of failure ever present with them. No one can be sure that the United States or Australia or the French Republic may not at any moment commit some blunder that will ultimately destroy the nation. We cannot tell but what many of our actual practices, our contemporaneous social or political customs or machinery, may be so far from perfect as to do almost as much harm as good.

The absolutist sneers at such floundering and can find no excuse for it other than what he calls the inherent stupidity of the Anglo-Saxon race. It is ridiculous to have a machine that requires perpetual tinkering and repairing when a perfect system already established in the world is to be had by our mere submission to it. A wonderfully simple solution of human problems. It seems to be an ingrained characteristic of lazy humanity
that men long for the refuge of absolute philosophies. The numerical strength of the Roman Catholic Church, taken with the German political ideals, should establish the point beyond question. Men are so habitually indolent that they flee to absolutism to escape the responsibility and the exertion of thought.

When Huxley said, "I protest that if some great power would agree to make me always think what is true and do what is right, on condition of being turned into a clock and wound up every morning, I should instantly close with the offer," he struck a sympathetic chord in us all. We Americans and Englishmen have not rejected absolutism in government because we prefer to blunder. We are just as lazy as the absolutists and we would be glad to adopt their perfect system if we could see in it the perfection they profess to see. Looking at man as a rational machine, there could be no objection to absolutism if the Absolute were perfect and the machine-like mind of man could grasp it. But in the first place, man is not a machine but a free moral being with all that the term connotes. Even the most perfect and most divine of Absolutes, therefore, could not impose a system upon man without depriving him of his freedom and providing for his degeneracy by discouraging the use of his judgment and free choice.

In the second place, even if there were a perfect and
divine Absolute who would impose and absolutely enforce his will upon men, human minds are too limited to grasp that Absolute, and again we would be struggling with an impossibility.

But the German philosopher of absolutism would say, "What is the use of saying absolutism in industry and politics is impossible, when it has succeeded in Germany?"

The only trouble with his contention is that it is not true. We could grant all that the Germans claim for their system in the way of industrial, political and social efficiency, and yet we would meet the outstanding fact that that absolute efficiency has not sufficed to provide milk for the babies of Berlin when the British navy stood in the way. We could admit all that the Kaiser and Von Bethman-Hollweg have claimed for the success of German discipline and military

1. Lest I be misunderstood on this point, I must add that the underlying philosophy of this treatise is a belief in a divine and perfect Absolute, eternal, all-wise, all-powerful and free. But this God is not static, as an essentially scholastic theology has interpreted him, but functional, as Christ has interpreted; "My father worketh even until now and I work." (John 5:17) I accept also the teaching of Christ that God does not, will not and cannot impose his will upon men, in that he cannot do so without depriving men of the freedom that is theirs by virtue of their creation in the divine image. God is not a despotic ruler who would arbitrarily force men to conform, but a Father who would persuade and lead them to learn of him and in knowing his truth to be free. The Absolute then, so far as human relations are concerned, is a functional Educator whose perfection men will approach just as they learn and utilize the truth with which he is identical.
efficiency, and yet we could not deny that Paris was not captured and that Verdun has not yet fallen. We cannot escape the conclusion then, that German absolutism occasionally tries and fails, and that the very best that can be said about it is that it is trial and error in a large way, empiricism majestic and sublime, if you please, but empiricism nevertheless. The size of the matter is that human beings are human beings, and they can create neither gods nor philosophies one whit less fallible than themselves.

The big point in the rise of the masses is the fact that the masses rose. There is a tendency of our social machinery and all our social customs to "stay put." Folkways and traditions become established and all innovation is bitterly opposed. Whatever is is right, is indeed the maxim of social usage. In all times and situations the burden of proof has rested upon the one who seeks to change existing institutions or conditions. All experimentation in government has been obliged to fight every inch of its way. Democracy indeed has "come up out of the great tribulation," but that fact proves its inherent worth. It is without doubt the most vital factor in the politics of the world.

In showing the weakness of the German system, we do not intend to commit ourselves to an indiscriminate eulogy of all democratic practices. In spite of all
that can be said in favor of English and American empiricism in the social and political fields, there is yet a deal of truth in the caustic statements of German writers. The actual practices of English and American democracy are far from ideal; even our democratic institutions are in great need of improvement and radical change. Because the doctrine of laissez-faire appealed to our fancy, we swallowed it whole; and now it cannot be denied that the prevailing idea of liberty throughout the British Empire and the United States is a negative idea. It comes nearer being a rule of not doing to others what you would not have them do to you than one having the positive spirit of the Golden Rule.

We have used the term, equality, also, in a negative sense; it became a doctrine of leveling rather than a gospel of equal and unlimited opportunity for growth. Unrestricted competition in business was a result, with all the evils of monopoly and capitalism. Wealth increased much faster than our people learned to use it wisely, and the snobbishness of the rich in America is a rival to anything that Europe can boast among her strongholds of aristocracy.

It was but natural that a government based on the ballot in the hands of the people should develop the party system and lead men and groups of men to strive with one another to control the government and
to hold its offices for purely selfish reasons. Democracy has its curse of rings and bosses, its spoils system and its endless temptations and opportunities to graft. It is subject to the dangers of extremes in irresponsible individualism. In fact, there is an important element of truth in a great deal of what absolutists have said about democracy.

But democrats cannot be expected to renounce democracy because it does not move with military precision. If there are weaknesses in popular systems and constitutions, those weaknesses should be and can be corrected. "By what standard?" questions the absolutist.

And here is the value of empiricism: it can point to history and expound its plans in terms of precedents. Not being bound to an absolute ideal, it is free to experiment with plans and expedients, looking forward and backward at the same time.

"And it will fail nine times out of ten!" rejoins the critic.

Suppose democracy does fail in nine experiments and then succeeds in the tenth; the results of that tenth experiment are more valuable to men than all the pronunciamentos of absolute philosophy. They have been weighed in the balance of practical and actual human experience and have been found to answer to the
real needs of society. This sort of experimentation is just what democracy has been doing from the very beginning, and the vast structure of democratic institutions is but a composite of fortunate tenth experiments plus others that are yet in the process of trial.

English and American democracy has verified Aristotle's theory that the opinion of the whole population is sounder than that of any part, by demonstrating the practical value of public opinion as the dominant factor in government. In spite of our much deprecated extremes of individualism, individualism has taught us that there should be a reciprocity between the individual and society, and that no one should be forbidden to present his judgments and opinions to the minds of as large an audience as he can get. Then all men can choose between the opinions, the principles, and the personalities of prospective leaders, can follow their chosen leader as long as they desire and renounce him at will. Too crude for a systematic German aristocrat;-- but he has Socialists in his own country.

Democracy has rejected Machiavelli's criterion of power, but it has made practical use of his empiricism. It is well enough to theorize, but theory and practice must not be separated. There is in fact no other way to strive to attain the purpose of the state but to theorize diligently concerning it and test out
the theories in the laboratory of life. A democratic nation creates its own freedom. Even if this freedom were immeasurably inferior to the attainments of the Prussian monarchy, it is yet immeasurably preferable to all democratic minds; for freedom imposed is slavery.

To return to Newman: "The best state is a brotherhood of men of full stature, intellectual and moral, animated by a common aim—the aim of living and helping each other to live the noblest life, active and speculative, than men can live."

When our author speaks of "men of full stature," he shows that he is not free from the absolute thought tendencies of former times. Of course he does not offer a fixed and absolute system like Plato, but he is looking forward to a time when men—and presumably their institutions as well—will have grown to full stature. "The best state" is composed of this kind of men; therefore it cannot be until men have thus grown. And the logical conclusion for self-loving, struggling humanity would be that there is no use of trying to "help each other to live the noblest life" until we have all grown to full stature.

It would seem needless to explain that, as far as we can see, and as far as all practical purposes of life are concerned, men will never reach such a state of perfection and hence we will never achieve that 1. See note 1, page 20 above.
absolutely conceived "best state." We must amend Dr. Newman's really admirable definition to this extent:--- to define the best state possible to finite beings--- it is a brotherhood of men of ordinary stature, striving to realize and achieve their utmost, intellectually and morally--- and then we would finish the definition with the words of Newman and set these ordinary men to work immediately "living and helping each other to live the noblest life, active and speculative, that men can live."

It is evident then that our best state will not be best in any absolute sense, and will neither formulate nor realize its purpose in a perfect way. It will be merely a state that is constantly and consciously striving to be all that its citizens are capable of, and at the same time to teach those citizens consecutively all that can be learned in an endless progression of better and yet better methods, institutions and practical ideals.

Democracy is the only governmental ideal that places real emphasis on free education and the unlimited dissemination of all learning. With Germany it is a systematic education, an education calculated to teach the people to conform, in other words, an institution for the affecting of mental bondage. And if we lay aside, for argument's sake, the point of systematic
education, and emphasize the real scientific efficiency of German educational institutions, we would yet be obliged to note the fact that men do not learn what they have no incentive to learn, an incentive consisting of an opportunity to utilize in actual life the subject matter of the education.

The humblest citizen in a democracy, even such democracies as the United States or Canada or Australia have succeeded in building, has a real incentive to learn how to take an active and intelligent part in the social and political life of his country. His word does count; he can have something to say about the policies and methods of his government; he has an opportunity to exert real influence in national affairs. He is not a mere pawn, with however glorious opportunities to enjoy the thrills of some prince's chess game, free as long as he conforms to the wishes of that prince, but rather, a real citizen and freeman with the right to learn and to teach, to lead or to follow, subject only to the wills of a majority of his peers.

Democracy is not a denial of national sovereignty, but an insistence that it be conceived as a means and not as an end. Even national sovereignty is a responsible entity. The blind patriotism expressed in the fine phrase, "my country, right or wrong," is only a euphemistic way of making nationality superhuman and
irresponsible, all of which leads to the irrational conclusion that men are the unquestioning puppets and slaves to an artificial system of their own creation. National sovereignty has been called the final authority, the thing greater than the law, that indeed protects the law. Suffice it to say that national sovereignty is not the final authority, for, though it be behind the law and the protector of the law, still, behind national sovereignty is its creator, humanity, and reason cannot countenance a philosophy that enthrones the thing created and makes the creator its slave. Absolutism would bury men in a gilded mausoleum called national sovereignty; democracy would make national sovereignty into a ship of state of which ordinary men would command both bridge and wheel. Nations and national sovereignty are only means to an end. The end is humanity.

Chapter III.
DEMOCRACY.

Our comparative discussion of the different conceptions of the purpose of states leads us naturally to a further elaboration of that theory and form of government where humanity is sovereign. We have admitted the successes of absolutism and we have hinted at a few of its failures; but the one point necessary to our discussion is a clear understanding that political absolutism looks upon men only as the tools by which an absolutely conceived ideal may be attained. Democracy is the only theory of government that attempts to make men the goal and at the same time the self-conscious judges and engineers of all means and expedients for reaching that goal.

I

But what is democracy? There is a common notion that democracy means a form of government similar to that of Australia or the United States. To urge the advisability of democracy to a typical German audience would be to them a recommendation that they forsake their traditions and adopt our system in its entirety.
It is surprising to find how many citizens of democratic nations hold a similar view. Democracy is to them what it seems to the Germans, the workings of a government and no more, simply a system, a patented machine.

From this standpoint the absolutists assail democracy, point out its faults and speak with pride of the more efficient character of their system. This point of view also breeds malcontents within democratic nations who claim that because democratic practices are faulty and inefficient, democracy is not the true solution of the problem of human government. They would scuttle the boat because she does not sail to suit them.

The explanation for all such perplexity is a true definition of democracy. Democracy is not a system or merely a set of machinery. It is an ideal. It is not a form of government or even the government itself; it is the underlying principle or ideal that forms the basis of both government and form. Democracy is dependent on governmental forms and institutions just as a seed is dependent upon soil and rain and sunshine for its growth, yet like the seed, its inherent life is the element of primal importance.

Of course there is reason for this inadequate and negative connotation that the term, democracy, has acquired in its evolution from, and struggle with a priori systems. The Athenian democracy was a government
participated in by the whole population---theoretically, however---for slaves and women were excluded. The same discrepancy between practice and theory has continued to the present time. Chattel slavery has been abolished, but few even of the modern democratic states have extended the franchise to women. Terms acquire meaning for us only as we associate them with actual attitudes and experiences, and it is because our practices have lagged far behind the development of our theories that we continue to use the term, democracy, merely as a designation of form.

I do not recommend that we think of democracy divorced from forms and institutions. I urge merely that we look beneath the institutions to the underlying theory, principle or ideal. Without attempting to draw distinctions between these three terms, or to account for their shades of meaning when applied to a political philosophy, we shall merely suggest again our emphasis of the latter. Democracy is fundamentally an ideal.

But here again, we must carefully define our term. In its ordinary use, ideal signifies a standard of per-

1. "In its proper acceptation, theory means the completed result of philosophical induction from experience." J. S. Mill.
2. "A principle ascertained by experience is more than a mere summing up of what has been specifically observed in the individual cases which have been examined; it is a generalization grounded on those cases." J. S. Mill.
fection, a perfect type. So far so good; but not the absolute perfection of Hegel. Rather a functional perfection, a perfection that does not strip the ideal of reality, but makes it definite and concrete, capable of application to a world of men associating one with another. An ideal is a functional standard, none the less perfect, certainly, because it denies absolute perfection, but primarily and inherently usable. An ideal is essentially a guide to action.

Democracy, then, is a functional ideal, not absolute or fixed or static; an ideal that will grow in the minds of men as the minds of men continue to develop. Of course there will always be imperfections in democratic practices just as there are imperfections in the conduct of individuals. Human conceptions of the democratic ideal will always be imperfect, for human minds are finite and endlessly subject to error. But human minds are capable of detecting and correcting error when they have a standard by which to judge; thus, and in no other way, will democratic practices continue to approach the functional ideal of democracy.

The practices will never reach the ideal; and here would fall the condemnation of the absolutist. He would brand it a doctrine of despair. But we have shown that his philosophy is not different in the final analysis. Why delude ourselves with fantastic chimeras

1. See pages 48-49 above.
of absolutism and blind ourselves to reality? A man who sees in the intelligent striving of humanity toward a functional, and consequently a receding yet ever evolving ideal, a wilderness of despair from which he would flee to the refuge of absolutism, is simply admitting that he would rather be lulled to sleep by the siren of a phantom than to be captain of his fate.

Democracy, a functional ideal, is a gospel of hope. It faces conditions as they are and does not gloss them over with Utopian illusion. Surely a philosophy that admits of failure is not necessarily pessimistic, for as soon as faults are seen and understood there is a possibility of their correction---not before. That men will always see imperfections in democratic practices, is not a ground for discouragement, for the very remedying of discovered defects will teach men to see new imperfections, which in their turn must be dealt with in the interest of advancing civilization. The real grandeur of a functional political philosophy is that it lays the foundation for endless progress.

Then to recommend the democratic ideal and democratic institutions to a people yet under the sway of absolutism, Germany, for instance, is not to urge them to adopt the American or English system. No system can be efficient except as it dove-tails into and becomes the complement of historical and social conditions. To strive toward
the democratic ideal would mean for Germany just what it has meant for France or England. A basis of existing traditions, then an application of knowledge of society, politics and government, gained from observation and experience, to the lives and the social relations of its citizens. To the objection that Germany cannot be called deficient in the social sciences or in government, our reply is that all her institutions are based on an absolute philosophy, that however scientific and efficient it may be, is still not democratic. The conscious object of German civilization may be Man; but it is not men. Democracy is equally applicable to all nations and races because it can grow out of and can be applied to nothing but the actual relations of men. Its conscious object is not an abstraction, but the welfare and freedom of living men, interpreted and administered by themselves.

II

"The central fact of history, from a psychological point of view, may be said to be the gradual enlargement of social consciousness and rational cooperation. The mind constantly, though perhaps not regularly, extends the sphere within which it makes its higher powers valid. Human nature, possessed of ideals molded in the family and the commune, is ever striving, somewhat blindly for
the most part, with those difficulties of communication and organization which obstruct their realization on a larger scale.

"Throughout modern European history, at least, there has been an evident extension of the local areas within which communication and cooperation prevail, and on the whole, an advance in the quality of cooperation as judged by an ideal moral community. It has tended to become more free and human, more adequately expressive of communal feeling."

The psychological basis of democracy is the same group consciousness that has guided the evolution of human society from the beginning. It is reasonable to suppose that the social consciousness of men once extended little beyond their own families and that only as that social consciousness broadened was it possible for men to organize themselves into larger and then larger groups. The family was and is the primary group, a face-to-face group whose common experiences engender common ideals, where the emotions are trained by common experiences to react in similar ways to like stimuli, where the developing intelligence of each individual is molded by the store of meanings which he accepts ready-made from his elders, a group where a like understanding of oral and written symbols makes communication and

mutual understanding possible.

But families continued to grow until the original head of one family was a patriarch at the head of the families of his sons and grandsons. These new families, all being attached to a common father, were therefore bound to one another, and with a consciousness of their attachment and common interests came a consciousness of group, which was the primal, necessary element in the formation of a clan.

As men multiplied, necessity drove clans and sometimes isolated families into different localities where they came into contact with other clans. Here they discovered that clans totally strange to them still had had the same experiences as their own in face-to-face groups, and in these common experiences they found the basis of communication. This possibility of communication was true regardless of whether their coming together was that of friends or foes. It can even be seen that without common interests they could have been neither friends nor foes. The conquest of one group by another and the subsequent assimilation of the defeated group, was undoubtedly one means of the enlargement of groups. Their very striving for the best hunting or grazing grounds was inter-communication, and from it they learned the fruitlessness of unlimited strife. Often two or more clans were pressed by a foe
stronger than any one of them could face alone; then what more natural than that they should hit upon the expedient of an alliance for mutual protection and benefit? But temporary alliances for a certain campaign could not remain the limit of cooperation for sentient beings. Each new campaign brought them to a fuller understanding of the fact of their common experiences and common needs. Hence came the permanent organization of clans into tribal groups and the tribe became the largest social unit, the complement and reciprocating counterpart of smaller and more primal groups.

It would be but a repetition to continue this epitome of social evolution from the stage of tribes to that of nations. If we can judge by the actions of tribal chieftains as recorded in the historical narratives that have come down to us, we can say that they took it for granted that their tribes constituted the ultimate groups of men no less than political philosophers of the nationalistic era have based their philosophies on the same assumption with respect to nations. But the tribal chieftains were wrong; their day was but a step in the advance of humanity, only one stage in the process of realization by which man became aware of the possibilities for his own socialization.
This gradual growth into larger units was accompanied by an increasing difficulty in the matter of government. A clan or a tribe might attain to something like actual democratic control among the people of its own particular group. But when that group became a part only of a national group, the free institutions of the smaller group were usually sacrificed to the machinery necessary for the permanence of the nation.

"The growing states of the earlier world were confronted, whether they knew it or not, with an irreconcilable opposition between freedom and expansion. They might retain in small areas those simple and popular institutions which nearly all the great peoples started with, and to which they owed their vigor; or they could organize on a larger scale a more mechanical unit. In the first case their careers were brief, because they lacked the military force to ensure permanence in a hostile world. In the latter they incurred, by the suppression of human nature, that degeneracy which sooner or later overtook every great state of antiquity.

"In some such way as this we may, perhaps, dispose of the innumerable instances which history shows of the failure of free organization--- as in the decay of ancient mediaeval city republics. Not only was
their freedom of an imperfect nature at the best, but they were too small to hold their own in a world that was necessarily, for the most part, autocratic or customary. Freedom, though in itself a principle of strength, was on too little a scale to defend itself. 'If a republic be small,' said Montesquieu, 'it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large it is ruined by internal imperfection.'

But we have spoken of the difficulties overcome by the growing democratic ideal. It remains for us to demonstrate how democracy is the ideal of government naturally growing out of the developing group consciousness of men. Professor Cooley has truly said: "A right democracy is simply the application on a large scale of principles which are universally felt to be right as applied to a small group---principles of free cooperation motived by a common spirit which each serves according to his capacity."

It can not be successfully questioned that these principles universally felt to be right when applied to small groups are based on a sound social psychology. They are the principles that originated in the face-to-face groups of home and play ground and have extended

2. See above pages 44-45.
their sphere of influence as far as men have come to deal with other men face to face. They are the principles that have never failed of universal acceptation when applied to "we-groups;" and have, since pre-historic times, been limited in their scope only by the frontiers of "other-groups." And the boundary between the we-group and the other-group has been essentially one of intercommunication. Of course there are still lines of cleavage where intercommunication has become an established fact, but they are perpetuated by traditions, not yet outgrown, that have come down from times when the possibility of intercommunication did not exist. Such are race differences and hatreds, and to a great extent religious barriers as well.

Herein is the psychological basis of the democracy of small groups, and with equal verity, the basis of all democracy. Where men feel themselves to be members of a group about which they can speak as "we," there is a possibility of inherent free organization---not otherwise. To be sure there have been democratic or quasi-democratic governments over groups that had not this fellow feeling throughout, but to the extent that the "we" consciousness failed of universality, such democratic governments have been artificial and forced, and have just to that degree resulted in degeneracy and ruin. There is no graver danger to modern democracy than such barriers to uni-
versal fellow feeling as the distinct groups represented by labor and capital, rich and poor.

In many of the individual American colonies a highly developed democracy had become an established system. But when the time came to extend that democracy to the whole Thirteen States as a group, the difficulties occasioned by the lack of the necessary group consciousness became apparent. The colonies had fought together to gain their independence, but they feared each other so much that a system of checks and balances was the most prominent feature of the federal government they established. Their experiences with George III had made them distrust all government; therefore they placed just as little power in the hands of each department of government as necessity required. It was left for later generations to wrestle with the problem that responsibility cannot be fixed where power has not been given, and that distrust of democracy is inherently undemocratic.

It is reasonable to suppose that if means of communication had remained as they were, the American colonies would never have evolved into anything but a loose federation of quarrelsome states, and that they would have been limited in their western expansion by the Appalachian Mountains. But steam transportation, the electric telegraph and the printing press so multiplied
the possibilities of intercommunication that even the Rockies were surmounted and a multitude of nationalities and tongues have been welded into one democratic nation.

Capital and the unequal distribution of wealth are indeed serious barriers to the spread of group consciousness. They have grown into nothing less than class distinction and social castes inherently undemocratic in character. But even here there are hopeful signs of progress. Efforts are now being made toward strike conciliation where formerly the workers and employers were left to fight to a finish. Conciliation, conference and compromise have already borne fruit in developing a spirit of cooperation between laborers and operators that formerly thought of each other as enemies and legitimate prey. We can indeed look forward to a time when democratic partnership on a cooperative basis will become an established principle in the operations of labor and capital.

"Certainly there is, on the whole, a more lively and hopeful pursuit of the brotherhood of man in modern democracy than there ever was, on a large scale, before. One who is not deaf to the voices of literature, of social agitation, of ordinary intercourse, can hardly doubt this. The social settlement and similar movements 1. It lies without the bounds of this treatise to enter upon a discussion of the need for the further unification of the United States of America and the various means for achieving it.
express it, and so, more and more, does the whole feeling of our society regarding richer and poorer. Philanthropy is not only extending, but undergoing a revolution of principle from alms to justice and from condescension to fellowship. The wealthy and the educated classes feel, however vaguely, that they must justify their advantages to their fellow men and their own consciences by making some public use of them. Gifts—well meant if not always wise—to education, science and philanthropy are increasing, and there was never, perhaps, a more prevalent disposition to make unusual mental acquirements available toward general culture."

The changed attitude toward woman is another result of the growth of the democratic principle. Human fellowship has broadened, like the mustard seed that grew into a great tree, from men to men of distant communities; but at the same time, like the working of the leaven in the meal, it has been extended from men to their wives and sisters. In Germany there is the utmost contempt for women who dare to think or act independent of their husbands or of men in general; but with the spirit of the democratic ideal women are coming into a freedom that is indeed their own.

Consciousness of group is fast broadening to consciousness of kind, a "we" consciousness that admits

of no artificial distinctions on account of race, religion, or station, and that accords to every man, theoretically at least—which can but look toward actual accomplishment—the right to all the opportunities of his individual, inherent capacity. This is the fundamental meaning of the democratic ideal, an ideal based upon a true psychology of man as a social being.

III

Patriotism is generally understood to mean national allegiance or love of country. We use the term, local patriotism, now, to distinguish a man's loyalty to his town or community from his devotion to the largest group of which he is a part. We reserve the term, patriotism, in its simple form, for the designation of our loyalty to this largest group. But when we trace the word back to its origin we find that before there were any nations, men showed a similar sentiment on behalf of their clan or tribe. What is now local patriotism was then patriotism pure and simple.

It is evident then, that patriotism must be merely an exalted consciousness of group that has grown and will continue to grow as group consciousness extends beyond its former limits. As the "we" consciousness of man has broadened, he has not denied his tribe or
community; he has merely recognized its relation to and dependence on the larger group, and has learned that for the perpetuation and welfare of even his local group he must make the nation the first object of his loyalty. There are difficulties here, to be sure. Men will not all agree as to the relative importance of a specific social unit. To Robert E. Lee the unit was Virginia; to Lincoln the social unit of primal importance was the United States of America.

The leading factor in the strength of clan or tribal loyalty was the fact that its benefits were immediately present to every man. The face-to-face character of community life makes the development and fostering of local patriotism a comparatively simple matter. There is a public school supported by the taxes that I pay in partnership with my neighbors, and in this school my children receive free instruction. There is a park kept up by public money where I can take my family of summer evenings and enjoy the music furnished by a band whose members are paid out of the taxes of the whole community. On winter evenings I can read in the public library or bring books home to my own hearth. Why should I not be loyal to a group that showers its benefits upon me personally and individually?

In much the same way can national group consciousness be fostered and the advantages of national patriotism
be brought home to individual citizens; and this is an item of greatest importance in a democracy. A democratic government, to maintain its character, must be responsive to its citizens, and this requires that the citizens keep in personal touch and have personal dealings with their government. The postal system, rural credits, government ownership of railways and public utilities are practical ways in which all citizens may keep in personal touch with their national group. This does not mean the paternalism of Germany that virtually enslaves the minds of the people. Paternalism is impossible in a democracy, for the conscious object or symbol of group consciousness is not a king or a group of aristocrats, but the whole people. And man cannot receive as paternalism, any benefits that he himself establishes and pays for in cooperation with his peers. He cannot think of himself as the mere ward of his government when he is a responsible sharer in that government and his dealings with it are based on reciprocity.

In the time of Aristotle, men had not learned to express their patriotism or group consciousness successfully, except when the group was personified in a king or an assemblage of aristocrats. This fact alone would account for the failure of the Grecian city-republics. Democracy was made possible and became a legitimate ideal and form of government only when men had learned
the lesson of being patriotic on behalf of the people of their group without the necessity of an actual or fictitious governmental head as the object of their loyalty. It will be said that the citizens of the leading democracies of the world have not attained to this recognition of the whole group and the identification of themselves and their interests with it. Not in an absolute sense, certainly; but they have succeeded in that very thing exactly to the extent that they have progressed toward the accomplishment of the democratic ideal. There is much for them yet to learn and to do; but progress can take place in no other way.

Thus far we have carried our discussion no higher than national groups, but we have suggested that nations could no more remain the ultimate units of social organization than was possible for tribes. For the very same factors that worked for the extension of group consciousness beyond former tribal limits have been carrying men's interests beyond national frontiers as well. Men have made nations their ultimate units and have warred to bring about the destruction of other nations. But even in the midst of their fighting, commerce, labor and capital, as well as science, religion, literature and social uplift, have extended their influence across all international boundaries.
The intellectual interchange in all these fields is not limited by the frontiers of any nation. The problem for statesmen and philosophers is not so much a question of teaching men to think as it is one of being able to recognize the fact that they do actually think in world terms. All this cosmopolitan thinking has resulted in a decided growth of sentiment against war as a means of settling international disputes;--- and militarists are answering with the cry of race degeneration.

This is not the first time that the short-sightedness of man has read as social degeneracy the signs that have really portended social growth. The decline of indiscriminating nationalistic feeling accompanied by a diminution of ancient war spirit, does not indicate that man has forgotten his fellow citizens, but that he has remembered his fellowship with humanity as a whole. He has found that he can serve his country best by cooperating with the people of other nations. Patriotism is not dying out; it is pressing forward to keep abreast of the development of the group consciousness of men. When, through Twentieth Century intercommunication, men have learned to recognize their fellowship with men of other nations, it is psychologically inevitable that their sentiments should follow their knowledge; and it must be remembered that patriotism, in its real and highest sense, is an exalted consciousness of group.
and not a mere passion of mutual admiration among those who domicile within the political limits of nations. A casual observer in the habit of marking a river by its banks, might conclude, when a flood had obliterated the banks, that the river itself had disappeared; thus have militarists and nationalist philosophers drawn superficial conclusions in deciding that patriotism is lost because it is no longer hemmed in by national boundaries.

IV

It will be seen that this gradual development and broadening of group consciousness has resulted in the formation of what may be called a hierarchy of social groups. At the bottom of the structure is the primary and oldest of all groups, the family; then a group or clan of related families, which, under civilization, has been largely swallowed up in the rural or village community; then the state or province or dominion; and finally the nation or empire. Each one of this hierarchy of groups has grown up out of the failure of the group immediately below it, to meet the social requirements of the men of that day. There is consequently

1. It will be noted that we are considering here merely the social groups that are political in their nature, and do not take into account or attempt to classify business or religious groups, etc.
an interrelation of groups and a reciprocity of interests. The family depends on the community and also on the nation.

There has been a tendency among philosophers of the recent past as well as those of the present to emphasize the dependence of smaller groups upon those more extensive and powerful. The family, the community, and the state must be subordinate to the nation because the nation is the means of their preservation. Of course the dependence of the nation on the family was admitted, but it was held to be of minor importance, an opinion growing most naturally out of the group consciousness of a nationalistic age. Men have always emphasized the group which they conceived to be the social unit. At one time it was the tribe or state; but in our day it is the nation.

It was but a step then from the emphasis of nationality as a means of preservation for smaller groups and their institutions to the enthroning of nationality as the ultimate goal. This is just what has happened. States and communities, families and men, have come to be looked upon merely as means for the perpetuation of the nation. A man is not patriotic unless he unquestioningly places his property and his life at the disposal of his nation.

1. I have used the word, state, in this and the paragraph preceding to designate parts of a nation merely because it is so used in the political system of the United States. I use the term in its more general sense throughout this work.
Thus has nationalistic philosophy schooled our minds. But the culmination of nationalism is the European War.

Nationalism has come to be a deceptive viewpoint. It served well enough as a unifying and organizing principle in a world of warring tribes; in fact, it was the highest ideal possible to them when frequent and intensive inter-communication beyond their own immediate locality was practically impossible. It was indeed a beneficent principle when it worked for the extension of group consciousness from the one tribe to a federation of tribes.

But what can we say of that same principle when inter-communication, commerce, and thought in general, have become world wide in their character? Countless are the influences that in our day have broken over national boundaries, and men have come to see the necessity of thinking in world terms. There has been nothing greatly resembling personal hatred between Englishmen and Germans in their social and commercial relationship of recent years. Prior to the war they had been university classmates and side by side they had traded in the markets of the world. Social contact had engendered mutual respect, and they asked no higher privilege than to go on in unmolested intercourse and friendly competition. One thing prevented their realization of common ideals;
and that was the existing nationalistic philosophy and its fruits.

While nationality and national sovereignty worked for the unification of human society, it was indeed a constructive principle; but just as soon as it works to prevent their further unification, it becomes destructive and pernicious in the highest degree. Nationality was an ideal, a plan of action, worthy and helpful until men had accomplished the action; but as that accomplishment did not fulfill their destiny—-to borrow the phrase of the absolutist—-the responsibility is upon men to discover a new ideal that will lead forward from their present attainments.

"The 'state' is no longer a reality. It is an abstract idea which is over-ripe and ought to be thrown on the scrap-heap to be duly carried away by those modern scavengers that we call political leaders.

"In a measure, all the governments of the earth have already recognized this truism. They have long ago begun to disclaim any intention of attack and aggression. But as the ideas which have impregnated the atmosphere for many hundreds of generations must needs live on in their consequences long after they have lost their hold on our minds, the old conception of the state still pervades our whole life. . . . .

"Everywhere the toilers are beginning to see
that their common interests far surpass in importance those merely national ties which for so long have been supposed to bind them to the classes who waste away the hard-earned fruits of their patient labor in cruel competition with other parasites and sycophants."

Nationalism becomes a channel for social forces leading certainly to destruction when it is conceived as the final end to be attained. This is true even when the nation is viewed only as a temporary end, from which, at the proper time, men will proceed to cosmopolitanism. This view finds many supporters throughout the world today. It is urged that the United States increase her navy to the place of second in the world or to "incomparably the greatest navy in the world," in order that she might be a stronger influence for super-nationalism. Such views, such talk, and certainly the

2. These words are quoted from the speech of President Wilson at St. Louis during his trip to the middle west early in 1916 to sound public sentiment on the preparedness question. While the President in editing this speech changed the words to read, "incomparably the most adequate navy in the world," I have quoted them as they were first uttered because it was in that form that they struck the ears and the minds of the American people with the force of a first impression.
3. Personally I can but question the intellectual sincerity of a great majority of those who insist on extensive "preparedness for peace." As a class they do not know what super-nationalism is. But there are a few at least whose honesty of intention I cannot question; and it is to them I write.
acts that proceed from them are a most patent negation of all effective efforts in the direction of super-nationalism. While society has developed from primary to higher and broader groups, and while each individual "works up" in the same way in the development of his social life, there is a "working down" also, a reciprocity and a reciprocal interdependence between the very highest and the most primary of groups. Just as it would be suicidal for Kansas to seek her ends regardless of the welfare of the United States, so is it suicidal and mutually destructive for a nation to refuse to accept its true position subordinate to universal humanity.

This does not mean the obliteration of national political groups; but it does mean that nations shall be conceived merely as means toward the accomplishment of universal human welfare. Nationalism is a deceptive view-point; humanity is the true one.

And with the true view-point before it, democracy, which is at present fettered to the conception of national democratic institutions, may go forward toward self-realization, a realization that includes all men within its scope.
Chapter IV.

WORLD ORGANIZATION.

There is no surer ground for optimism in the present world outlook than the most evident tendency in all lines of social life toward universalization of ideals and efforts. It is safe to say that no field of human activity has escaped the prevalent trend. Certainly is it true in the field of politics and political organization. We have repeatedly suggested this fact in the development of preceding chapters.

I

We have now come to the point where a logical conclusion of our discussion cannot but lay stress upon the truth that for the evolution and working of the democratic ideal "the field is the world." It might seem, from a casual and decidedly local observation of the relative national liberty of Americans and Canadians, that the democratic ideal was nearing realization at least in the two great sister states of North America. From the standpoint of fifty years ago doubtless this is true. But now civilized men have awakened to the fact that the accepted views of yesterday can by no
means be depended on to interpret and cope with the achievements of a modern world. Intercommunication and commerce have become so universal that national isolation, even for a nation so large and with such widely diversified resources as the United States, is no longer possible. Indeed the time has come when the United States cannot insist upon its traditional policy of isolation without making of that very isolation a mast selfishly aggressive policy.

The problem of human governmental organization— a problem that is no longer remote, but of immediate interest to every civilized people on the face of the earth— is one of the establishment of justice and the promotion of general welfare throughout the world. This cannot be accomplished by a world sovereignty similar to that of Rome or by any world empire, whatever its government, that relies on the philosophy of power to extend its dominion. It is not inconceivable that a nation might become sufficiently strong to conquer a Twentieth Century world, but it is entirely beyond the conception of reason that this nation could long retain its rule over the world it had subjugated.

But if the possibility of permanent world organization on the basis of power were granted, it would not be organization according to the ideal that we

have shown to be the only one growing out of the actual and psychological nature and conditions of human society. According to the democratic ideal arbitrary might has no standing whatever; the only aristocracy shall be one of service and the first in society shall be the most effective servant of all. Democratic world organization must be based on the principles of social service and worked out by a system of government that will overlook the rights of none and jealously guard the welfare of all. It must be remembered that what men have called democracy may become so perverted as to be democracy no more; nevertheless the democracy that has not lost its vision, a government of men organized and administered by men and for men, has grown steadily in importance and power until now, with all its variations and in spite of its difficulties and occasional retrogressions, it is the form of government that has shown itself most ready to adopt measures for the restriction of national armaments and for international conciliation.

The responsibility for the present European war rests primarily upon the governments that, in holding to ideas of militarism, have failed to keep abreast in the growth of the world toward democracy. Churchill's proposal of a "naval holiday" was scorned by the German government because in Germany there were no untrammeled democratic ideals that could lead the people to veto
the vaulting ambitions of autocracy. Europe armed herself because neighboring military autocrats forced defensive measures upon each other and upon democracies; in such a situation it required but a spark of autocratic arrogance to enkindle popular dread, and the war came.

It is evident that the European was is not a clash of merely national ideals; no Englishman seriously objects to the collectivistic social habits of his Teuton neighbors, and few citizens of Berlin would do more than satirize the individualism of the people of the island democracy. The one really vital point in the radical difference between German and English popular ideals, is the fact that the German ideals have permitted a bureaucracy to exploit the wealth and the people of the nation, to the end of its own military aggrandizement.

But the European war is a clash of ideals. The ideals at issue are evident only when the various ideas of government held by the nations involved are analyzed in connection with the general trend of history. This analysis brings to light two inherently antagonistic factors: on the one hand, democracy, desiring and even proposing limitation of armament, and on the other, autocracy, preparing for war. The fact that autocratic Russia is fighting against Germany, is a seeming, but not a real complication in the problem, for autocrats have always feared each other no less than their aggressive
ambitions have been feared by democracies. The ideal of democracy is the one most at odds with the ideal of the absolute value of the state, and the issues are joined when we take cognizance of the fact that armies and navies, the bond-servants of autocrats, are struggling against the aggressive militarism of other autocrats and the defensive preparations of democracy.

This does not mean necessarily that the Entente Allies are consciously fighting for the rights of the common people of Germany or even of England, for in the British Empire with all her self-governing dominions, there are influential reactionaries, bureaucrats at heart, who are contending for the perpetuation of the monarchical elements in their own system, elements that furnish opportunities for the continued subjugation of the masses. But it does mean that if the war shall cease with autocrats still enthroned under the principles of supreme national sovereignty, it will be but a matter of time until their selfishness will again drive men at the throats of their fellows; while if the predominant factor in regenerated Europe is humanity organized nationally upon the basis of democracy, there will be every incentive and opportunity for world organization that will make international wars an impossibility.
In seeking to ascertain the responsibility for international wars, it is singularly striking and relevant to note that while democracies have not succeeded in avoiding war with autocratic neighbors, it is possible for them to keep peace among themselves. This is no longer a matter of speculation; it is an established fact. Common democratic ideals have enabled the United States and Canada to live side by side for a hundred years with an undefended border line four thousand miles long and with not a single war. No one faithfully conversant with history would think of considering such lack of preparedness and its consequent peace in the slightest degree possible, if either the United States or Canada had been an autocracy in practice. The leading nations of South America are fast attaining to this state of mutual trust. The time has assuredly come when it is reasonable for humanity to plan constructively for a similar mutual confidence and understanding to prevail among nations throughout the world; and to attain this, it is eminently fitting that democracy, the ideal that has brought peace to nations and states that formerly fought with each other, should be applied to the whole world.

Even a casual glance at the last two thousand years of the world's history shows the inevitable
tendency of nations to grow larger and larger. The motive behind this general evolution has been in some nations the power and ambitions of a ruling class or family, while others have grown because the democratic principles of their governments proved attractive to men who flocked from all parts of the earth to cast their lot with the growing democracy. Rome, a typical example of the former class, extended her boundaries until she became the undisputed ruler of the world; then her power passed more quickly than it had come. Her efforts and methods have been reproduced in all essential details by Charlemagne, Napoleon, and William II, each with less show of success than his predecessor.

On the other hand, the humanitarianism of the ideal of democracy has constantly led to an increased recognition of the rights of men and the formulation of principles of government to enforce those rights. Democratic ideals led the American people to throw off the autocratic yoke of George III, and inspired the French to endure the horrors of their own revolution to the end of an established republic. The very same principles of humanity deprived Spain of all her American colonies, and created the great self-governing dominions of the British Empire. German bureaucrats have contended that the British Empire would fall to pieces in the event
of a foreign war; but the part that Australia and Canada have played on the battle fields of Europe shows conclusively that the bond of human freedom is stronger than the iron rule of autocrats.

The common democratic ties of the far-extended British Empire is a beginning of world organization that the militarism of German bureaucracy has completely failed to shake. Is it contended that British democracy has not been left to cope single-handed with German militarism? Let us grant all that such contentions connote. The call that brought England and France to each other's aid when German absolutism was advancing on Paris, was the common danger to the democracy of both peoples. The objection that the entrance of England into the war was favored by her undemocratic classes, is little more than a quibble, for no one believes that Australians, Canadians, and the working classes of England would have fought on the side of bureaucracy regardless of what London aristocrats might have said. The very same reason accounts for the sympathies of practically all the people of the United States who are not directly or indirectly hyphenated with the Central Powers.

No one would think of the possibility of war between Australia or New Zealand and Canada. Since the overthrow of the Napoleons there has not been a

hint of possible war between the United States and France. American militarists never talk about a coming conflict with Great Britain; they say our common interests are too great. And it must be noted also that no one has deemed it worth while to mention the likelihood of war between the United States and Argentina, Brazil, or Chile.

Why all this past and anticipated future harmony among democratic nations, and why do American preparedness advocates always point out Germany or Japan as the possible enemies of the United States? The reason is obvious: democracy does not care to destroy; it is capable of defensive military preparation and it will fight a defensive war, but history proves that democracy is not, like autocracy or bureaucracy, inherently inclined toward aggressive military conquest. Give universal manhood a right to rule and it will be seen that civilized men are not man-killers at heart and that they do not desire to live by pillage and exploitation of their fellows. Herein is evident the extent to which the principles of democracy have already leavened the whole lump of human society.

All of the truly organic groups of every nation, such as labor, science, religion, finance, and capital—when not engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war—are unanimous in their desire for world peace. The rank
and file of humanity throughout the civilized world is agreed as to the futility as well as the pernicious character of war as a means of settling international disputes. Mankind agrees that war should be abolished; only a method is lacking.

The method should be the elimination of the cause.

It is true that the causes of the various wars of history have been as numberless as the sands of the sea, but it is not necessary to prove to men of a cosmopolitan age that nations no longer go to war on grounds that were once considered adequate. It is conceded that the factors involved in occasioning the present European war are intricate beyond all hope of accurate classification, but it is not illogical to look beneath the tangled maze of causes for the fundamental cause without which the others could reasonably be expected to have come to naught. We have attempted to show that the European war is primarily a clash between democratic and autocratic ideals, and that it would not and could not have assumed more than comparatively insignificant proportions but for the military preparations and ambitions of autocrats who rule under systems of government that do not hold them directly responsible and subject to the will of their people. If autocracy has been shown, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, to be the primary cause of modern warfare, it is legitimate to propose a plan
for its ultimate elimination and the substitution of democracy.

No one would deem it within the bounds of reason for the democratic nations, in urging democracy as a plan for world organization, to overthrow autocrats by force and compel their subjects to undertake the problems of self-government. Democracy is an ideal that must develop and exist in the hearts of a people before it can become an established principle in their government. Democratic states must proceed by methods consistent with their character if they would hope to lead a war-impoverished world in the fields of industry and prosperity that they are developing for themselves. Democratic methods are primarily methods of education, and it is now the problem and duty of all men who cherish democratic ideals to teach those ideals to their fellows throughout the world.

III

This brings us to a fuller consideration of the methods by which democracy has achieved its present state of development, and by which it must proceed toward the ultimate accomplishment of world organization. It is one thing to point out a practical ideal of human cooperation and brotherhood and it is quite another to state in practical terms a feasible means of attaining that
ideal. Men have conceived and have earnestly sought to utilize many agencies for social uplift, none of which have been more than partially successful. The futility of power as a means of human regeneration has grown increasingly apparent. History proves that men cannot be driven into anything better than a temporary and artificial civilization, the final break-down of which will be appalling and destructive in direct proportion to the length of time the inherent strength of the system has enabled it to stand. The degree to which any civilization, whether national or racial, has turned out to be permanent, is merely in so far as that civilization has been based on the general education of humanity. Men have found no other means of lifting the fellow who is down than by teaching him.

The development of social institutions has always been subject to the educational progress of mankind. It was a psychological prerequisite to the establishment of a nation that the tribes composing that nation should learn to think in national terms. Experience had taught them the futility and suicidal character of intertribal wars and they had come to see how their common interests could be conserved and promoted by a more comprehensive organization along lines of federation and national unity.

Had it not been for the continued advance of
learning, a world system based on separate national governments might have presented no insuperable difficulties. But hand in hand, or as a precursor to governmental evolution, science and invention has been shortening the distance and increasing the intercourse between nations, until now commercial and racial ties bind the whole world into one vast community. As a result of the wide dissemination of knowledge made possible by the development of printing, men of all nations have come to think the same thoughts and to be guided by kindred motives. Twentieth Century cosmopolitanism renders it impossible for any nation to preserve its institutions uninfluenced by those of neighboring states. The time has come when no nation is a Selkirk on an island by itself. A despot cannot rise and trample upon the rights of the most obscure people in all the world without menacing the free institutions of all peoples who hold those rights sacred.

If the present state of civilization and national organization is an achievement of education along the lines of practical, social psychology and the enlarged groups are the result of a growth of social consciousness, it follows that world organization is but another step in the progress of mankind. For the psychological reasons just stated, it would be useless for constructive pacifists to plan for a time when international wars
shall cease, if it were not true that men are learning and have learned to think in world terms. The international character of trade and commerce is unquestioned. The problem of the cost of living is faced by the Hindoo with his seven cents a day no less than by the skilled workman of America. Only in rare cases, among peoples who do not figure in the councils of civilized nations, do national boundaries continue to have any important relation to religious questions or race problems. The labor question is not confined to any nation; neither is the question of capital. The intellectual interchange in the fields of science, literature, and social uplift, is not limited by the frontiers of any nation.

The problem of world organization on the basis of the democratic ideal is an educational problem. This ideal would minimize class distinction by educating all men to a realization of their duty to participate in a world society where the leaders will be those who excel in social service. While such democratic principles of necessity leave no room for autocrats and even ignore national boundaries in the commonly accepted sense, they make more important than ever the hierarchy of social groups, each performing its particular function in human service, from family and village on up to nation and world. Having learned to think in world terms
in the fields of science, religion, and on many other topics of practical, every-day interest, the next rational step in human progress is for men to realize the world-wide character of all that is worthy in their national ideals. Democratic ideals have eliminated autocrats from the national affairs of democracies, and the citizens have learned that their government is merely a cooperative agency, created by themselves, for their individual and collective welfare. Democratic ideals applied to the world will lead men to see that in international relations men are dealing with men, and that the artificial conception of the state as a personified, irresponsible entity is as out-worn and mediaeval as the autocrat who persists in teaching such doctrines to his people in order to retain his throne. It is the problem of democracies to teach universal humanity that the key to a purposed civilization, when applied in the field of politics, is that nations exist for men and not men for nations.

In this program of world teaching is to be found the only consistent plan of defensive preparedness for democratic nations; just as in the ever growing principles of progressive democracy, lies the only hope of civilization. It has come to be a comparatively simple matter for one citizen of a democracy to teach democratic principles to his fellow citizens. It is not a simple
matter for democratic nations to teach the ideals of democracy to other peoples whose very minds are fettered by the methods of ruling autocrats. Even if it were possible for democratic propagandists to scatter their literature broadcast among autocratic peoples, their efforts would be interpreted as insincere and would be largely fruitless as long as their own democratic governments were building warships in "preparing to vindicate their rights to independent and unmolested action." A democratic state that arms herself beyond what is necessary to maintain internal order and to resist invasion, is testifying to the world that she has lost faith in her democracy; but a nation so favored geographically that she can safely refrain from endangering her democratic institutions by excessive armament, even amid the violence of a war-crazed world, is endowed with an unequaled opportunity to teach that world the ideals that must ultimately emancipate all men from the fetters of autocracy.

Excessive military preparation for the United States can never do more than neutralize the competitive preparations of other nations; but an ardently cultivated spirit of friendship and social intercommunication between our people and the people of all nations by means of commerce and the interchange of thought in the fields of education,

science, and religion— if the friendship should not be rendered suspicious by accompanying militarism— would not only protect our country from foreign invasion, but would lead other peoples to follow our example even to the ultimate extent of tearing down their false, autocratic foundations and building a superstructure of the common aspirations of humanity on the fundamental principles of democracy.

There will never be a better opportunity for the United States to inaugurate such a constructive plan of international friendship and world organization than the inevitable hour when European militarism has become exhausted by its own destructive efforts. If, at that time, our army and navy should still be small enough to keep other nations from suspecting our motives, the United States will be in a position to lead at least the democratic nations in the formation of a league of nations to enforce peace throughout the world. As a preliminary step toward the organization of an international league, is it reasonable to suggest that the United States seriously consider joining with England and France in a guarantee of Belgian neutrality and asking in return a pledge by those powers for the safety of Pan-America? A definite contract of mutual protection entered into by the five self-governing dominions

of the British Empire, the French Republic, the United States, and possibly several of the stronger South American Republics, would be a step toward world organization that no autocrat or combination of autocrats could afford to ignore.

When the world is fast approaching a longed-for opportunity to take a decisive, forward step in the cause of humanity, it is not the time for America to become self-centered or ultra-nationalistic. With all confidence in the good intentions of the patriots who have voiced the cry, "America first!" we must yet call attention to the fact that they are but echoing the spirit that led European nations in the military rivalry that has culminated in the present, mutually-suicidal conflict,--- and that if they would be true to their democratic ideal, they would cry rather, "America first in world service!" Just as the Thirteen Colonies developed by means of a preliminary federation to a peaceful, democratic union, it is possible and eminently reasonable and consistent for the nations of the world to evolve through a federation of nations, whose chief purpose is to enforce peace, to an ultimate world state where the principles of democracy will be world-wide in their application, insuring to all men the right of local self-government and providing a means of peaceful, judicial adjustment of all inter-group differences, regardless of the size or national character of the group.