Migrancy, Markets and Survival: 
Transnational Lives in South African Space

By

John T. Oakes

Submitted to the graduate degree program in Geography and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Chris Brown (Chair)

Garth Myers (Co-Chair)

Terry Slocum

Steve Egbert

Ebenezer Obadare

Peter Ojiambo

DATE DEFENDED: August 18, 2014
The dissertation committee for John T. Oakes certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation.

Migrancy, Markets and Survival: Transnational Lives in South African Space

------------------------------------------

Chris Brown, Chairman

Date Approved: August 21, 2014
ABSTRACT: When Apartheid ended in South Africa, so did many barriers to entry for other Africans who wished to migrate there. They came with business skills that locals lacked, having previously been barred from much of civic life, and quickly dominated in street trading. Two decades later, the lure of opportunity is still drawing millions of Africans to South Africa. The purpose of this study is to examine the obstacles and threats to livelihood that migrants encounter in South Africa, to understand the survival strategies they employ to combat these, along with the pressures from home, and to analyze the effects these strategies have on space at differing scales. This study utilized qualitative research methods and focused on migrant street traders in Greenmarket Square in the heart of Cape Town, South Africa. Migrants conveyed that they struggled with locals who exhibited high levels of xenophobia. They also struggled to understand and negotiate the South African Immigration bureaucracy, which is notoriously inefficient and sometimes corrupt. Lastly, migrants portrayed their relationships to home in complex terms, outlining both the benefits and costs, financial and emotional, of being linked transnationally to their home communities. Migrants are fond of home, but routinely feel negatively pressured to remit finances and struggle to maintain a place in the social order from afar. I conclude that migrants are exposed and at-risk, caught in between a context of poverty in the Global South and a tide of resentment, fear and stern migration policy in the Global North.
Acknowledgments

The greatest thanks must go to Professor Garth Myers for shepherding me on my journey through graduate school. His tutelage, mentorship and wisdom helped me at numerous turns. His instruction provided an excellent platform from which to launch my scholarly endeavors. I also must thank my formal committee Chair, Professor Chris Brown, for stepping in when Garth took a new position. Professor Ebenezer Obadare was the biggest thematic influence on this project. The idea for it came to fruition in his class on migration in 2009. His passion for academic research and teaching was infectious, and this combined with his keen mind helped propel me to success. I also must thank the remainder of my committee, Professors Terry Slocum, Steve Egbert and Peter Ojiambo for their participation. I thank the Geography Department at KU for providing me with the academic tools to complete this work. Hearty thanks go to the Kansas African Studies Center. The center played a truly massive role in molding me as a graduate student. KASC funded two of my years at KU via Foreign Language and Areas Studies fellowships (FLAS), and also financially supported the majority of my dissertation fieldwork in South Africa. Furthermore the learning environment created by bringing together Africanists from all corners of the University provided unparalleled instruction and collaboration. I wish to thank the Environmental Studies Department for offering me two years of graduate teaching assistantships, along with the wonderful teaching experience this provided. Lastly, I thank my fellow Geography students who provided superb peer critique, friendship and entertainment. In particular, I must thank Aaron Taveras for his help in designing the two maps in this dissertation. Thanks to my family who supported me from afar, and my wife, Kate who I met while studying at KU, and
who, in the words of Hank Hill, has provided me with four years of outstanding service. She was a constant encouragement in the completion of this project. Lastly, but most importantly, I thank the kind and willing migrants in Cape Town who shared their lives, stories and perspectives with me for this project.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction  
   - Historical Background  
   - Theory  
   - Research Questions  
   - Hypotheses

2. Methods

3. Market Dynamics in Place Context

4. Migrants and the State

5. Migrants and Local Government

6. Migrants and Society

7. Spatial Effects of Xenophobia

8. Migrants and Home

9. Cultures of Exile

10. Conclusion

Appendices A, B, C

Figures:  
1. Map of Cape Town Pg. 33  
2. Map of Cape Town Metro Area Pg. 35  
3. Photo of Greenmarket Square Pg. 36  
4. Photo of St. George’s Mall Pg. 40
Chapter 1. Introduction

I. Introduction

A. Migration to South Africa

Migrants are coming to South Africa in large numbers, from several African countries. This critical issue is the core of this research project. The majority of scholarship on migration to South Africa has focused on three topics. The first is the study of South Africa’s rich history of migration. The second is the study of contemporary South Africa’s high levels of xenophobia, which often has placed sole emphasis on the experiences and viewpoints of citizens. The third is research geared toward arguing the merits or demerits of migration and its corresponding state policies.

In these studies, migration in South Africa is largely taken as a given. Increasingly though, researchers have begun opening up the migration discussion to the understanding of how and why migrants act, rather than merely demographic information about them. These authors are largely anthropologists, but are increasingly joined by geographers. Many studies have also been largely quantitative in nature. The vast amounts of quantitative data are insufficient on their own to answer the multitude of questions that are still to be answered about migration in the South African context. The statistical and survey data that have dominated the tool kit of migration studies are now acting as a base from which scholars encourage one another to pursue research questions that are qualitative in nature and weighted on the perspectives and experiences of actual migrants.

Migration Studies hold certain assumptions about the strategies migrants employ to survive. The South African context often renders these assumptions problematic at
best. What motivates migrants to come specifically to South Africa and how they accomplish their unique goals once they arrive has not been sufficiently explored. This understanding is critical to answering questions about the state of contemporary South Africa, Africa, and global transaction.

B. Historical Research Context

To say that South Africa’s history has been shaped by migration is a major understatement. The movements of African and European peoples have had a great impact on the social make-up of South Africa for hundreds or thousands of years. The migration streams that most shaped contemporary migration to South Africa, however, began in 1870 when diamonds were discovered near Kimberley, and in 1886, when gold was found on the Witwatersrand (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006). Migrants were actively recruited from other parts of southern Africa and their labor became a central feature of the industrialization of South Africa (Modi 2003). The operation of these mines demanded huge numbers of cheap, unskilled, and, most importantly, disposable laborers (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Modi 2003; Crush and Tshitereke 2001). Mining served to economically integrate Southern Africa, albeit in a very skewed manner where South Africa controlled the flow of labor, enabling it to externalize the costs of the health and social welfare of its workers (Oucho 2006; Solomon 2005; Wentzel and Thlabela 2006). Labor migration remained a dominant feature of the South African economy under Apartheid (Adepoju 2003). However, as other countries in Africa emerged from their own independence struggles, most took issue with South Africa’s Apartheid-era policies. Countries like Zambia and Tanzania enforced a sort of labor embargo, not allowing their
citizens to seek work in South Africa (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Adepoju 2003). Many African countries also supported, armed and harbored freedom fighters and rebels driven from South Africa (Adepoju 2003; Modi 2003). In response, South Africa actively sought to destabilize its neighbors by supporting or aiding their own rebel elements and fracturing the already precarious post-colonial political and economic conditions (Modi 2003). This destabilization campaign left many countries functionally dependent to a further extent on South Africa (Modi 2003).

C. Post-Apartheid Migration Issues

When Apartheid ended, so did its fortification of South African borders. Before 1994, migrants did not perceive South Africa as a desirable migration destination (Shea 2008). The advent of majority rule ended many African countries’ labor embargoes on South Africa (Adepoju 2003). Contractual migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, and Malawi were joined by Africans from a plethora of countries (Adepoju 2003). The democratization encouraged an increase in all types of migration: skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal (Wentzel and Thlabela 2006; Adepoju 2003). However, most new migrants came illegally (Adepoju 2003).

The post-Apartheid African influx to South Africa has been multifaceted (Crush & McDonald 2002). Not only was there an influx of urban-bound foreign migrants in South Africa, there was now increasing internal migration amongst South Africans, especially blacks (Western 2001). Due to Apartheid, few blacks grew up in the cities. Apartheid fell and so did the barrier to the city centers (Ballard & Popke 2004; Landau 2006). South Africa’s cities are now growing rapidly, putting increasing pressure on an
increasingly diverse set of migrants, settled inhabitants, and the public officials tasked with providing service, safety and support (Western 2001).

D. Policy response

Post-1994 policy was ambiguous at best. Many policy makers chose to delay the complex issue and many chose to simply ignore it. A lack of any apparent policies or their translation to a confused civil service resulted in ad hoc procedure (Solomon 2005). This indecision or preference to ignore immigration permeated all levels of government. According to Sinclair (2001, 208), the local authorities in Johannesburg and Cape Town also refused to adapt to the changing urban social environment of the 1990s, preferring to “turn a blind eye to the level of conflict between urban groups, believing, no doubt, that this is beyond both their responsibility and their reach.”

Nelson Mandela, the first post-apartheid president, did not care to address immigration legislation, favoring to regard immigrants as brothers and sisters whose countries had aided in the struggle against Apartheid (Western 2001). Many other ANC members shared the same filial feelings with African countries that had harbored them under Apartheid. This sentiment was increasingly countered by more conservative policy-makers concerned with securing South Africa’s fragile peace and prosperity for those only within its borders. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the first government’s minister for Home Affairs, argued that migrants would threaten the resources of the government’s new economic program for Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Modi 2003). Thus, ironically to meet progressive goals in South Africa, policy makers have
chosen increasingly to take a hard stance on migration. Deportations began in 1995 and quickly rose to hundreds of thousands per year.

Draconian measures in South Africa have done little to halt immigration violations. Sinclair claims that South Africa’s control measures are built on realist fictions that the State dominates society and that immigration is fundamentally a security risk (Sinclair 1998). It is an impossible task to police the 4973 kilometers of land border, 65 check points on land, 9 harbors, 35 international airports and the 400 secondary airports (Solomon 2005). South Africa does not have the capacity to stop furtive migration, which is only increasing (Solomon 2005; Sinclair 1998; Sinclair 1999). South Africa, despite its challenges for migrants, is a very welcoming target. Its porous borders, relative economic advancement, and long history as a source of labor for migrants combine to overwhelm South Africa’s poorly funded and managed control regime.

Additionally, many South African businesses have a vested interest in helping immigrants come to South Africa for work. Immigrants play a key role for the many businesses that prefer to hire them. The South African labor market craves skilled workers and cheap exploitable labor (Crush & McDonald 2002; Maharaj & Rajkumar 1997). South Africa is experiencing a large outmigration of skilled workers, and their educational system is not producing anywhere near fast enough to meet the demand (Stern & Szalontai 2006; Solomon 2005). Immigration control laws, while potentially making it more dangerous for businesses to hire immigrants, ironically decrease the labor costs for businesses by making immigrants more desperate. South Africa’s economy has a one hundred and fifty year history of relying on disposable labor. Migration has been a
fundamental feature of the South African social landscape since before the state was formed, and it is unlikely that the state will now stop it (Sinclair 1998).

There are many contradictions within South Africa’s immigration stance. The first and most technically vexing contradiction is how South Africa seeks integration with world politics and economy, but is becoming more exclusive with its immigration policy (Maharaj 2001). Second, many public figures, especially Thabo Mbeki, “chose to promote South Africa as a site of a new African Renaissance and perhaps also a home for all Africans, at least symbolically” (Hansen et al. 2009, 189). This type of rhetoric was also being advanced in the lead up to “Africa’s World Cup,” hosted by South Africa in 2010 (Landau 2009). Third, South Africa’s constitution preserves freedom of movement as a civil right (Western 2001) and promises constitutional protections to all who live within South Africa’s borders, not to citizens per se (Sinclair 2001).

Sinclair believes that a new Apartheid has been created where people are denied their constitutional, civil and human rights due to being made illegal residents (Sinclair 2001). Fourth, there is the issue of the incalculable debt owed to African countries that played vital roles in the support, harboring and supplying of the ANC and other resistance groups. Some claim there is at least a moral debt to repay in kind the past help of countries that allowed South Africans to come and go at will (Anderson 2006).

Moreover, many other Africans of neighboring countries hold the Republic of South Africa criminally responsible for the “Total Strategy” destabilization campaigns that contributed to the great economic and political instability Southern Africa experiences today (Adepoju 2003). With a free and prosperous yet intransigent South Africa, many
countries that took in South African refugees now feel their openhandedness was misplaced (Oucho 2006).

Contrasts and contradictions like these are simply conditions of life in modern South Africa. By the numbers, the average per capita income of a South African is 36 times that of a Mozambican (Solomon 2005), but the average South African does not receive an equitable share of South Africa’s wealth. In fact, South Africa experiences one of the greatest income disparities in the world (Adepoju 2003; Oucho 2006; Steenkamp 2009). Thabo Mbeki accurately described South Africa as “two nations,” one in the first world and another in the third (Adepoju 2003). An estimated 18-21 million of its inhabitants live in abject poverty (Solomon 2005). In this context of crushing poverty, upwards of 40% unemployment, and vast social inequity, the social and political integrity of the country is precarious (Adepoju 2003). That millions of Africans have been compelled to immigrate, despite the difficulty that even South African citizens face in South Africa, speaks to the sadder disparity between South Africa and its African neighbors (Adepoju 2003). This research is aimed at answering some of the plethora of questions raised by such a vast movement of people under such circumstances. The first task is to ask what is known or suspected of the make-up of contemporary migrants to South Africa.

E. South Africa’s “New” Migrants

Obtaining demographic data on migrants is incredibly difficult. Much of the data collected through large-scale survey projects has been problematic (Crush & McDonald 2002). But small and medium scale studies organized largely through the South African
Migration Programme, using mixed methods, have accumulated data and yielded some insight into the makeup of African migration to South Africa.

Immigration to South Africa is overwhelmingly young, male and unattached (De Jong & Steinmetz 2006; Oucho 2006; Pendleton 2006). However, numbers of women are increasing, especially in non-economic migration, and informal trading in the urban setting (Crush & McDonald 2002; Oucho 2006; Pendleton 2006). Immigrants are now increasingly older with many more middle-aged migrants and heads of household (Pendleton 2006). Though average migrants in South Africa have long been better educated than locals, this level of education is rising (Pendleton 2006). The more educated migrants often find employment in the highest skilled jobs that locals are not able to do (Adepoju 2003).

Most often, however, migrants find employment in menial, unskilled occupations where there is less competition from local populations (Adepoju 2003). As mentioned before, employers value immigrants for their willingness to work harder, for less pay, under harsh circumstances and especially for their aversion to unionization for fear of visibility (Adepoju 2003; Modi 2003). Historically, mining has dominated migrant employment. Though mine employment has declined precipitously, mine work is still the most reported occupation (Pendleton 2006).

A large number of immigrants choose to self-employ due to state restrictions and the lack of employment protections (Maharaj & Rajkumar 1997). These small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) can take a variety of forms, such as auto repair, hairdressing, construction and street trading (Modi 2003). Street trading has seen particular growth, with more participation by West or Central Africans from further
Somalis in particular are known for a high capacity for entrepreneurship and a proactive approach towards survival (Sadouni 2009).

Street trading often involves working illegally and on the informal side of the economy. Many street traders maintain legal status, but many do not (Western 2001). The vast majority of immigrants enter legally through border posts (Crush & McDonald 2002). Thus, being “illegal” mainly occurs through clandestine entry and overstay (Maharaj 2001), but also can happen though amnesty defaulting, or losing a claim for refugee status (Oucho 2006). The majority of specifically illegal migrants are men (Oucho 2006). Illegal immigration figures vary widely and are inaccurate, many coming from some famously flawed studies (Crush & McDonald 2002), but they are still quoted by politicians, government and media (Maharaj 2001).

Migrants to South Africa rarely express a desire to remain indefinitely (Adepoju 2003; Crush 1997; Hansen et al. 2009; Modi 2003; Oucho 2006). Migrants report a strong preference for life in their home country and desire to return from South Africa (Crush & McDonald 2002; Modi 2003). Families rarely join migrants in South Africa, instead remaining at home (Adepoju 2003). Researchers agree on this note without exception. However, regarding the subject of migrant’s drives and motivations that may explain these patterns (or the lack thereof), large rifts divide researchers’ conclusions. Most commonly the topic of motivation and strategy is neatly avoided. My research seeks to fill these voids with a nuanced understanding of what drives and motivates the act of immigration to South Africa and the behaviors exhibited there by immigrants. I have summarized the historical and spatial conditions of contemporary migrant spaces in
South Africa and the relatively little that is known of the make-up of the actors in these spaces. I now introduce the theoretical deliberations on the causes and unfolding nature of contemporary migration as they impact this project.

II. Theoretical and Research Themes

A. Migration Studies in Context

The study of migration is an interdisciplinary field (Horevitz 2009), relying heavily on anthropology, political science, sociology, history, geography, economics, psychology and demography (Castles and Miller 2009). This broad base is useful for gaining a variety of perspectives, but also signifies a great deal of theoretical approaches. Quite a bit of debate exists over what factors drive migration. Is migration a family survival strategy (Cliggett 2003)? Is migration an individual strategy (De Jong & Steinmetz 2006)? Theorizing the factors that primarily drive migration is a bed of contention.

Most modern migration studies have operated from the Neoclassical theory of migration, which claims that wage differentials are the chief determinant of migration (Stern & Szalontai 2006; Todaro 1981). Such theories utilize a “push-pull” model whereby factors create undesirable conditions in the home country and create other desirable conditions in the destination country (Lee 1966). They focus heavily on human maximization of economic utility (Castles and Miller 2009). Many researchers of Africa view the migration dynamic as a push from home countries due to political and economic instability, with South Africa simply being the most readily available source of employment, or infrastructure to support small business (Maharaj 2001, Modi 2003;
Sadouni 2009; Solomon 2005; Western 2001). The increasing number of critics of Neoclassical theory, however, point out that it is too individualistic and is ahistorical. Its market focus dismissively categorizes factors such as state intervention as free-market distortions (Gray 2009). Finally, economic utility alone does not account for where people decide to migrate, as people do not always move to the places of highest wages, say when an Algerian migrates to France, as opposed to Germany (Castles and Miller 2009).

Researchers have historically focused on migration as an aggregate phenomenon but most now recognize the importance of family and individual strategies to explaining the aggregate (De Jong and Steinmetz 2006; Gray 2009). Commonly referred to as the New Economic Migration Theory, it stresses that households and not only individuals maximize utility (De Jong & Steinmetz 2006). These strategies are not solely focused on gaining higher wages, but can be aimed at diversifying streams of income and gaining capital for investment in cottage industry and farming.

Then come a collection of theories that address linkages on a global scale, such as the demand for cheap labor by owning classes, the historical linkages between colonial powers and former colonies and how these linkages play a factor in migration strategy (Schinkel 2009). They often utilize structural concepts to help explain the factors at work, i.e. the relationship between the spatial accumulation of capital and the labor that moves internationally to support it (Castles and Miller 2009). These theories see international labor systems as keeping third world dependent on the first world (Castles and Miller 2009).
Because many theories focus on economics, they fail to consider the diverse motivations for movement (Kothari 2008). There are multiple explanations for what moves people to migrate, and the most common theories often paint too simple a picture (Castles and Miller 2009). I fully appreciate the economic context around most migration decisions, and I find the push-pull dialectic very helpful and appealing. However I also recognize that motivation is layered. We must “let the complex texture of human practices call into question traditional academic divisions between “moves” motivated by, on the one hand, financial interest or survival and, on the other, emotional attachments” (Burman 2002, 49). I hope to take this idea a step further and explore how emotional attachments also play into survival strategies of migrant informal street traders.

B. Case Studies

I have pulled from a diverse group of authors to build this foundation of literature, as migration studies are by their nature interdisciplinary (Horevitz 2009). This base includes a number of geographers. Belinda Dodson and Catherine Oelofse (2002) did a study of Mizamoyethu in the Hout Bay area near Cape Town that displays well the strengths that geographers can bring to migration studies. Their study was historically grounded, and spatially sensitive. Instead of retrenching discourses of difference, they offer an interpretation of contemporary xenophobia as niche competition for resources. They contend that it is not the differences that drive citizens and foreigners apart, but their similarities (Dodson & Oelofse 2002). I appreciated that they were among the few researchers who discussed migrants’ motivations for coming to South Africa, as I plan to focus heavily upon these. They assessed migration motivations mainly in light of survey
data, whereas I hope to do so with ethnographic methods. Also, where this study rightly focuses on migrant connections to home and other migrants, I hope to continue along these lines, seeking to understand migrants’ experiences and perceptions of connections in the light of larger strategies. Most of all, I find it helpful that their study dealt specifically with theories of transnationalism in the context of their rich treatment of African migration to South Africa.

In recent years, more geographers have called for more place-based and ethnographic research on migration in South Africa (Crush 2001; Crush & McDonald 2002; Maharaj 2001; Oucho 2006). I hope to build on the rich geographic analyses of migrant space epitomized by Dodson and Oelofse with more of a focus on ethnographic investigation. Dodson and Oelofse themselves called for studies that display “…a sensitivity to the particularity of place” (2002, 127). “This is not to argue against generalization,” they continue, “nor against structuralist explanation, but to call for detailed micro-level case studies of the diverse experiences of foreign migrants living in different places in South Africa” (Dodson and Oelofse 2002, 127). By focusing my project on a small subset of the African migrant population, and seeking to connect it to larger questions of migrant perspectives and transnationalism, I will am helping to accomplish this vision.

Another study from which I would specifically like to build, Shea (2008), is an anthropology dissertation that gave one of the most textured and place-sensitive analyses of African migrancy in South Africa that I have yet come across. Shea’s use of qualitative methods was a confirmation that in-depth interviews have the ability to reveal rich narratives of migration. Her narrative analyses added a great deal to the discussion of the
roles of xenophobia, migrant networks and identity in the South African and transnational context. She was also quite concerned with how or if senses of identity and belonging transcend boundaries and/or are linked to specific places (Shea 2008). I hope to run with these questions and add to them a focus on the spatiality of migrant relationships with the state, the citizenry, home, other migrants and tourists/tourism. My study will differ further in two major ways. Her qualitative interview sample was only a dozen or so, and I extended this to 36 formal interviewees, along with the dozens of others I encountered with participant observation. Also, where her study participants were professionals, my participants were artists and street traders. Dodson & Oelofse (2002) and Shea (2008) combine nicely to summarize the theoretical outlook I took into my study, the theoretical ramifications involved and the themes I expected to encounter.

C. Theoretical Outlook

There is no single grand explanatory theoretical concept that is being tested in this project. Rather there are a number of meso-level theoretical concepts, policy positions and research findings with which my findings either conflict and question or support and defend. These fall generally into three categories, as does the analytical body of this dissertation: Migrants’ Relationships with the State, Xenophobia, and Home Relations and Remittance. I will reserve these theoretical discussions for the chapters in which they are applicable.

The greatest theoretical influence on this project, as expected, was transnational theory. In hindsight however, calling transnational thoughts a “theory” is quite a misnomer, as the closer one comes to them, the more one finds that it is a mélange of
ideas ranging from activist’s desires for a future outcome that subverts the nation-state to an assemblage of pragmatic, research-focused ideas regarding how we as migration researchers might want to think about contemporary migration. There are a multitude of facets in between, as well. If transnationalism has one tenet that can be called prescriptive to research (and that has heavily impacted this project) it is that scholars must identify the immaterial and unseen linkages that humans create and maintain, not only across national borders, but across any distance in space. This element of transnational thought does stand behind all three main analytical themes of this project, and is thus important to state here. I discuss the more nuanced ways that transnationalism has influenced this project, and the ways in which my research results speak back to transnationalism and migration studies in the last analytical section, the chapters “Migrants and Home” and “Cultures of Exile.”

### III. Summary of Research Goals

I set out to focus my inquiry on the population of migrants who operate in the informal street trade economy. However, upon starting fieldwork, I found it most interesting to focus on the semi-formal trading taking place in Cape Town’s central tourist markets. What makes this space “semi-formal” I explain in the chapter on “Market Dynamics.” This focus allowed me access to a wider cross section of socio-economic conditions, nationalities and livelihood strategies.

These migrants’ methods of survival drew several large question marks on the South African landscape and within the understanding of prevailing migration theories. My primary research goal was to investigate the strategies African migrant peddlers
develop to cope with the circumstances of life and work in a foreign country. To attain this goal I set out to ask the following questions:

How are African migrants able to maintain livelihood in South Africa despite prolific xenophobia, state control regimes and responsibilities to home?

a) What sorts of long term and short term goals are formed by migrants?

1) What part do these goals play in the formation of strategies of economic, cultural, or emotional/identity survival?

b) How do state control and xenophobia (specifically exclusion from formal banking) shape remittance and communication forms in South Africa?

c) What are the impacts (benefits and costs) of remittances in the short term on migrants’ livelihoods?

d) In what ways do migrant networks contribute to strategies of survival and self-advancement?

e) What role do market activities play in migrant strategies?

IV. Hypotheses

I encountered and befriended a number of African immigrants during my travels and studies in South Africa, May to August of 2009. These experiences caused me to ask a number of questions about their lives. I decided to pursue a few of them as a formal research project. My personal experiences, combined with a comprehensive literature review, compelled me to hypothesize the following before fieldwork:

1. Migrants will maintain strong financial, social, emotional and identity linkages to home.
a. these linkages will be experienced as obstacles at times, but most often as resources.
b. these linkages will help shape strategies of self-advancement and survival.

2. Migrants will participate in networks based on countries of origin, despite risks
   a. these networks may not always be expressed as such by migrants.
   b. these networks may serve diverse purposes.
   c. migrants will be largely self-sufficient and utilize these networks sparingly.

3. Migrant strategies may not be conscious or particularly well thought out. They may range from being more makeshift and ad hoc to being multi-phase strategies developed years in advance of anticipated situations. Migrants will express frustration with the South African state and civil society. I expect that these frustrations will be reflected in migrant’s strategies of survival.

4. Transnational theory will be useful in interpreting migrant narratives
   a. simultaneous embeddedness in more than one space will be a factor.

These hypotheses were tested via the use of largely qualitative methods to be discussed in the next section.
Chapter 2. Research Methods

I. Qualitative Methods

Migration studies, especially in South Africa, have most often been quantitative. This approach, though very appropriate for the study of migration, lacks the ability to gain nuanced understanding of migrant experiences relating to strategies of survival and self-advancement. “[L]arge sample sizes and structured questionnaire instruments necessarily sacrifice the more nuanced information that can be gleaned only from local case studies of an ethnographic, participatory and place-based nature” (Crush & McDonald 2002, 3). Crush and McDonald could not offer a clearer call for ethnographic inquiry to balance the relatively high amount of existing quantitative data on South African immigration (Crush 2001; Maharaj 2001; Oucho 2006). This nuanced research can be accomplished specifically through the use of interviews, participant observation and focus groups. My research was carried out in Cape Town, South Africa, a city that literature and personal, pre-dissertation experience showed to host very high numbers of African immigrants working as informal traders, selling artwork, hand crafts and curios (Peberdy 2000).

I primarily used interviews to gather my data, as it was vital to my study to understand migration phenomena with the migrants’ perspective in mind. Much like Eileen Moyer’s dissertation research in Dar-es-Salaam with at-risk youth, my methods were highly dialectic (2003). The interviews of my primary sample of African artist migrants took an open-ended and semi-structured form. Starting the interview process with open-ended questions allowed respondents to help set the agenda for the discussion and helped me, the researcher, formulate more specific questions (Sinclair 1999). I
valued the opportunity to access respondents’ viewpoints “in their own words” and with as little leading as possible (Sadouni 2009, 239). I also utilized open-ended responses to formulate more pointed and specific questions to probe deeper into topics of interest, along with reformulating and improving my existing open-ended questions. Topics discussed in interviews were the migrant’s reasons for migrating, their experiences of travelling to South Africa, entering the country, arriving and establishing themselves in their trade, their future plans and aspirations, their experiences with the State, civil society, home linkages, migrant networks, market activities, and relationships with tourists/their customer base.

I set out to take a sample from 30 interviewees one-on-one, and finished with 32 from 10 different countries: Swaziland (1), Zimbabwe (8), Malawi (8), Angola (1), DRC (4), Congo (1), Kenya (3), Sudan (1), Senegal (4), Uganda (1). I audio recorded each interview, save one because the participant asked not to be recorded. I transcribed all interview and focus group recordings myself. Originally, I had hoped to do more than one recorded interview with each participant, hopefully gaining deeper insights as levels of comfort and trust increased. However, apart from focus groups, it proved to be most advantageous to conduct further interviews in a conversational manner, without the aid of a recording device. This allowed participants to pause easily and conduct their business in the market when necessary, while the informal tone of the conversations also encouraged deeper insights.

Focus groups have been especially useful in studies such as this that seek better understanding of the interplay between meaning and theoretical concepts, in this case migrant livelihood and transnationalism (Cameron 2000; Lint and Livingstone 1996). I
facilitated three such focus groups at intervals toward the end of my fieldwork to help reformulate interview and research questions, to draw out a wider range or depth of topics discussed (Myers 1998), and to witness elements of social dynamics between participants (Arksey & Knight 1999). In other applicable studies, focus groups have proven especially helpful in creating synergistic effects in qualitative research resulting from increased collaboration and communication amongst research participants (Wang & Burris 1994). This was certainly the outcome with my focus groups.

I decided to organize focus groups around some of the principle social groups I found in the market: one for assistants, one for stall owners and one specifically for Senegalese migrants (for reasons discussed later). I wanted to have 4-6 participants in each group. I achieved this for the assistants and the Senegalese groups, but last minute cancellations turned my owner focus group into a dual interview. Regardless it was very instructive.

Once the participants were assembled, I moderated the group, asking a variety of closed and open-ended questions. Sessions were audio recorded and I took notes as well, to record the aspects of the session not fully captured by the audio recording and to identify the order of those speaking on the tape. Focus groups lasted one to two hours.

I arrived in the field somewhat concerned that migrants might have been reluctant to gather in public, due to the perceived or real danger of public or police harassment. This was not the case, as the market, being such a highly foreign space, was a relative safe haven (to be discussed more in “Market Dynamics”). However it was helpful to remove the assistants from the market so they could speak freely without fear of being
overheard by their bosses. Otherwise, simply finding a time when multiple participants could be assembled was the most difficult task.

For both focus groups and individual interviews, I had hoped to be able to compensate my respondents financially for their time, however I did not receive grant money to cover that expense. I was fortunate to arrive in the Southern Hemisphere Winter, which causes a noticeable downturn in tourism and therefore market activity. Participants were largely quite happy to share their experiences and stories. Receiving anything in return was not expected or obligatory in the social context. Still, I found ways to repay kindness with kindness during our interviews by providing refreshment.

Participant observation is the final research method I employed. This ethnographic tool is useful to researchers as a way of piecing together relationships that are not explicitly mentioned or fully explained through interviews and focus groups. I spent hours each day with migrants in the markets, socializing, learning about their trades, and observing them and other actors living and working in real time, within the context of South African space. Indeed, this time was highly effective in building rapport and relationship with numerous respondents. This increased comfort yielded better, deeper interviews and conversations. As previously mentioned, I used participant observation to engage participants in casual conversation about topics of thematic interest to my study and any other topic participants wished to discuss. Participant observation was a great aid in understanding the elements of South African space that shape migrant strategies: the State (most often in the form of police and the migration bureaucracy), xenophobia, the condition of migrant networks, and market exchange with tourists. Additionally, participant observation allowed me to informally interview many market
workers, easily doubling the number of individuals from which I was able to glean insights, large and small.

Note* When referencing and citing respondents, I utilize only the first name, followed by the year the interview was conducted.

Overall, the principle obstacles I foresaw in my research methods were trust building and communication. I feared that the issue of visibility that I have already discussed in the focus groups section would impact migrants’ willingness to participate. However, as I have mentioned, this was largely not the case. My regular presence in the market was the single largest trust builder. After a short while, everyone had seen me, and word had spread that I was doing research. While in any group, some individuals will be more reticent to open up about their lives, few in the market showed resistance to participating when asked. The only person I had to give up on including was a man from Kenya who always was available “later.” The rest were willing. Some were even excited that I finally had come around to talk to them more in depth. When I made my goodbyes and thank-yous at the end of fieldwork, I was surprised at the number of participants who not only wished me well on my project, but who actually thanked me for hearing their stories and learning about their lives.

As a final note, this project rested on my ability to communicate with Africans from a variety of cultures, languages and backgrounds. Loren Landau, also concerned about the obstacles language could present was surprised to find that “almost everyone living in the inner city [Johannesburg] (close to 90% of both South Africans and foreigners) reported that English was required for participation in the city’s economic and social life” (Landau 2006, 130). English is widely spoken in most of the countries
neighboring South Africa, the origin of the majority of South Africa’s immigrants. Additionally, English is widely used as a lingua franca in South Africa. Indeed, my target sample had to have high rates of English speaking facility in order to staff and run businesses that sold art and curios to tourists. Thus, while English fluency was variable, it did not present a problem. As I mentioned regarding organizing focus groups, finding times when workers and owners felt comfortable taking the time to sit down with me was the greatest encumbrance. Much participant observation was carried out in these long interstices.

Immigrants in South Africa, especially those with precarious legal status, have developed strategies to survive in the face of state surveillance and control. One of these myriad strategies is a level of opaqueness and of suspicion to inquiry that many researchers attest to (McDonald 2002; Shea 2008; Sinclair 1999). “As could be expected, one of the most critical aspects of doing research on cross-border migration is gaining the confidence of the migrants to be interviewed” (McDonald 2002, 119). However, McDonald, who did an ethnographic study of immigrants in Cape Town, maintains that if positive rapport and trust can be built with only one individual, this can open doors to other individuals in their social circle. William Foote Whyte demonstrates that if a particularly influential member of a community can be won over, then the entire community becomes more easily accessible (1943). For this reason, my sampling came primarily by way of the snowball or chain sampling method. For some researchers this can create the risk of having too homogenous a sample (Mazzucato 2009). However, for my purposes this aspect of snowball sampling actually helped me locate and gain access to the rather specific types of migrants I wished to study (McDonald 2002; Sinclair...
Early on I began to see distinct social groups emerging in the market, some regarding class, some nationality, religion or language. Gaining trust with one member of these groups led to more enthusiastic interaction with other members.

As mentioned before, the method of the inquiry can increase the chances of making immigrants in South Africa comfortable with the idea of talking to a stranger and letting them record their answers (McDonald 2002; Sinclair 1999). For instance, open-ended questions are more helpful in establishing comfort than pointed, or closed-ended questions (Sinclair 1999). In this vein, I like Sinclair, avoided meeting in homes, and did not ask for last names or addresses (Sinclair 1999). This was wise planning, but means that the methods used to attain narratives prevent me from being able to disseminate my research easily. For this reason, I utilized the focus group process and casual conversation during participant observation toward the end of fieldwork to discuss and disseminate findings verbally.

II. Post-Colonialism and Methodology

I believe my project in certain respects takes a post-colonial approach. This has been defined as research that “is a reaction to and rejection of colonial research” that “reflects and reinforces domination and exploitation through the attitudes and differential power embodied in its research relationships with ‘others’” (Howitt & Stevens 2000, 32). Postcolonial research conversely values participants’ “rights, knowledge, perspectives, concerns, and desires and [is] based on open and more egalitarian relationships” (Howitt & Stevens 2000, 32). Invariably, researchers bring elements of subjectivity and “positionality” to their pursuit of data and the analysis of its significance (Mullings
Nevertheless, I have the opportunity as a researcher to counterbalance this bias by infusing my study with the postcolonial values of respect, equality and honesty towards the groups and individuals I wish to study (Myers 2010). I have attempted to do this in the following ways: A) My project is focused on a literature that is largely sensitive to the historical inequities that help shape contemporary migrant spaces in South Africa. B). My project’s goal is to bring into focus the ways that migrants have negotiated the historically entrenched social, political obstacles that face them today. This will ideally bring forth immigrant discourses or meta-narratives that may form a measure of resistance to dominant discourses of a state control regime and a xenophobic civil society. C) I have taken precautions not to enlist state-centric discourse whenever possible. For instance, I faced a decision on whether or not to focus my study on illegal immigrants in South Africa, as the topic of illegality is rather fascinating to me and theoretically important. I was persuaded not to focus my study on “illegality” in order to avoid state centrism. Nicolas de Genova (2002) makes a distinction that “illegality” is a problematic term for a post-colonial researcher because its meaning is derived only from the state. I originally considered this in the light of other terms I employ, like the citizen/foreigner binary. However, I realized that the important distinction would be how migrants themselves perceive their situation. Migrants will not consider themselves to be citizens of South Africa, nor do they wish to be (Landau 2006; Sinclair 1999). They are often proud of their foreigner status (Sinclair 1999). However the status of “illegality” is met with harsh criticism by many migrants who feel, for a variety of reasons, that they are entitled to share in South African space, without having their very being made illegal (Landau 2006; Maharaj & Rajkumar 1997; Sinclair 1999). Another careful distinction is
that I refer to research “participants” rather than “subjects”. This was a conscious decision, not made to merely avoid criticism, but to genuinely shape the frame of my research.

Webster (2005, 57) says that one way researchers can avoid making research participants into colonial subjects is to understand the worlds they inhabit “from below” and to root studies in understandings of place in ways that allow participants to inhabit the “same moral or political universe as the researcher[s]”. I believe I have appropriately centered my inquiry on the issues of power in which immigrants find themselves. He also asks that researchers pay heed to their research participants’ agency, and not see them as passive and merely acted upon, simply byproducts of institutional, systemic or structural forces (Webster 2005). Webster advises the use of “intensive fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and non-participant observation” to achieve this perspective (Webster 2005, 57). I was compelled by this argument and tailored my theoretical framework and methods accordingly.

III. Ethics

The ironic ethical problem in this study was the small potential it had to act detrimentally to the very migrant survival strategies it investigated. By releasing information about how migrants negotiate state controls and xenophobia, in particular, I hope to inform the discourse surrounding migration in South Africa. However, I may also be putting knowledge and therefore power in the hands of those who may harm my study participants or people like them. In deciding how to negotiate this issue before conduction research, I went to the website of the Association of American Geographers
and read through the ethics statement. Regarding this issue, the AAG makes clear that the ethical responsibility of the researcher is to fully inform participants of the potential impacts of the research so that they may make an informed decision to participate or not. Thus, research that potentially endangers participants is not in itself unethical, but hiding that danger would be. I also discussed this matter with Ebenezer Obadare, on May 11th, 2010. He is a KU Sociology professor who researches many aspects of migration, even the illegal. He voiced the same ethical stance as the AAG. He added that social scientists often run into this issue, because it is central to the ethic of the Social Sciences to pursue understanding of all social strata, including the marginalized, the poor and even those operating outside of the law. Whenever such groups are researched, there always exists the possibility of the data somehow being used to harm the participants. However, Professor Obadare affirmed that the proper ethical stance was to fully disclose to informants the purpose of the research and the possible results. This is a solution I liked very much, as it allowed the study participant to weigh for themselves the costs and benefits of participation, and make a decision that they felt would empower their future. I do not think this absolves the researcher of all responsibility for impacts, but it does make the process ethically balanced. Additionally, I use pseudonyms for every migrant discussed, so as not to unnecessarily reveal specific identities.
Chapter 3. Market Dynamics and Place Context

Fig. 1: Cape Town
I. The physical geography of Cape Town is unique, dramatic and beautiful, hauntingly so at times. But its human geography is classically South African, admittedly with a local flair. Other major cities like Durban and Johannesburg have somewhat different ethnic make-ups, but residence is often demarcated by wealth, race, religion and nationality.

The city center rests in a u-shaped valley whose open end points northeast. This area is commonly referred to as the City Bowl. The City Bowl is separated roughly from the rest of the metro area by Table Mountain and its siblings. It is a well-managed city despite its struggles. But the tide of crime is only rising, and many in the Cape fear the danger of becoming as unsafe as Johannesburg.

I lived in a neighborhood called Bo Kaap on the northwestern edge of the City Bowl, where the ground climbs quickly upward. This area was settled by Cape Malays, people of Indonesian and Malay descent brought to South Africa as indentured servants or slaves. The Cape Malays brought their religion, Islam, to Cape Town and other cultural elements. This is reflected most immediately by the architecture in Bo Kaap. The swooping eves and lintels of the Dutch colonial designs give way to squat, geometric structures painted in pastels. Not all of Cape Town’s neighborhoods are so colorfully delineated, but the divisions are still stark. For instance, going into a shop at the rear end of the City Bowl, one might be hard-pressed to hear English, but Afrikaans instead, spoken by whites and coloureds alike. (Note: “Coloured” in the South African parlance has a historically different and less pejorative connotation that the term has in the United States and is widely used in scholarly works. While there are many variations of “coloureds,” it is the term that generally denotes racially mixed peoples in South Africa.)
The reverse is true if one walks even a mile north toward the oceanfront, where suddenly English-speaking blacks, whites and foreigners staff and frequent the shops. Furthermore, in the street along the way, you are more likely to hear French than English or Afrikaans, being spoken by the Congolese security guards hired in drove to protect Cape Town from itself.

Fig. 2: Cape Town Metro Area
The roads leading east out of the Bowl squeeze through the northern end of Table mountain and the shore of the Atlantic, then blossom outward onto the Cape Flats, a sprawling assortment of shanty towns and humbly functional neighborhoods. If one were to make a hard right and drive south along the eastern edge of Table mountain all the way to the sea, you would find largely white settlement. But from there, all the way to the R102 highway, is hemmed in an area of primarily black residence, including the homes of most of this study’s participants.

[Image: Greenmarket Square]

II. In the center of Cape Town’s City Bowl, a block-sized, cobble stone, open air market sits amidst a church, some office buildings, a café or two and traditional retail space. Greenmarket Square can no longer be accused of being very “green” but it is most
certainly a market. Over the three and a half centuries of European residence, the square has seen a variety of uses, some civic, including the location of the city hall for a time and location of a number of anti-apartheid protests, and some commercial, including the sales of slaves, vegetables and souvenirs. Today it is perhaps the most important hearth of tourism in the city, certainly in good company with staple sites such as Robben Island and Table Mountain. What the market may lack in historical or panoramic significance compared to the other two, it more than makes up for in accessibility and the ability for tourists to buy things that prove they went to Africa. I cannot be too skeptical, though - because what did I have to do on my last day of field work? You guessed it, collect little pieces of the action for those at home. The power of trinkets is indeed as powerful as the majesty of Table Mountain or the legacy of Nelson Mandela. After all, what good is it to have been to South Africa without a keychain proclaiming, “Amandla!”?

On any given day, Greenmarket Square is full of foreigners. But what may escape the attention of the British, German, Indian, or Canadian tourists browsing through the wooden spoons, stone sculptures and leather goods is that they are heavily outnumbered by the foreigners who own and staff the vast majority of the stalls. Greenmarket Square has been overrun at worst and boxed out at best by African business owners and salesmen ever since the country was opened more freely to foreigners at the end of Apartheid. Those who had been in the market since the beginning of this shift can recall to you the days when food and clothing dominated the market, which functioned not for tourists, but for locals. And as such, stalls were owned and run by locals. One of the only vestiges left of this arrangement is a spot a block or two south of the market where white locals can be found selling jewelry of the European style.
Eventually, a man named Badih Chaaban received a lease from the City of Cape Town to operate the market space more efficiently. He did not set out to make it into a foreign or tourist-focused space, only a most profitable one. Chaaban’s story is one worthy of another dissertation. But in broad strokes, the Lebanese man oversaw the changing of the guard to foreign traders who were more business savvy, and therefore more profitable to him than locals, specifically as souvenir sellers. He engaged in an epic struggle with the Cape Town City Council over control of the space after it became so profitable. Helen Zille, being a city councilor and then mayor of Cape Town, became his arch enemy, prompting Badih Chaaban to enter politics, first representing an Islamic political party and then the ANC, who could better support him in his Zille war. At the end of the struggle, Chaaban had been through numerous legal battles, accusations of corruption and a very controversial political life. He was given the mayorship of Paarl as a sort of consolation prize by the ANC, but even they couldn’t stem the tide of the Democratic Alliance’s advance in the Western Cape and Cape Town in particular, spearheaded by none other than Helen Zille. Chaaban may have won battles, but Zille most determinedly won the war.

In 2004 the market was taken back by the City Council. This had the effect of cementing the arrangement of ownership in the market. Where Chaaban had been able to lease space to whomever he pleased, for whatever sum he pleased, under the city council regime, spaces were set, along with their rent, roughly 400R per month. This paled in comparison to the rents Chaaban charged, which led many to think it would invigorate the businesses of the individual sellers and therefore the tourist economy. But in hindsight, the veteran stall owners see Chaaban’s departure as the day the market began
to die (Mamadou 2011). The willingness of tourists to come to the market by their own
devices had been grossly overestimated and Chaaban’s contributions to the market and
therefore the tourist economy were grossly underestimated. In the end, he was decried as
a glorified slumlord, when he was actually one of the best things to ever happen to the
Cape Town tourist economy. Badih Chaaban, very much because he loved money,
worked very hard to bring tourists to the market, especially those with money to spend.

Ibrahim claims to be the first foreigner ever granted a refugee status in post-
apartheid South Africa. He is one of the few who have seen the market change from even
before apartheid was fully over. Being a fellow Muslim, foreigner (Sudan) and
businessman, Ibrahim knew Chaaban. He was not a great fan of his ethics, but he
explained to me in great detail one afternoon, as we toured the square and its environs,
how Chaaban made links with local business partners. He brought busloads of tourists to
the square, not from backpacker hostels, but from the city’s hotels. The Cape Town City
Council, Ibrahim claimed, had taken no such measures. This was compounded by the fact
that now the market membership was frozen, where before it had been competitive. If a
trader did not show up by a certain time in the morning, alternates, literally lined up
waiting, were brought in to keep the market running at full capacity. In this way, Badih
was able to select only the most motivated traders. Many traders I spoke to recalled their
own time waiting on the sidelines for a chance at a spot. Others were more circumspect,
implying that there were more immediate ways into the market, often financial in nature.
But in 2004, the spaces were locked in, providing rent was paid regularly to the City
Council. The previously high and dogged levels of competition lessened considerably.
Tourists were not being brought into the square in as high number and the cost of doing
business was lessened. Over the intervening years, however, the lowered overhead became steadily eclipsed by the diminishing number of tourists, specifically those with much to spend.

One must also note the number of other souvenir stands and shops that have popped up in Cape Town as a possible contributor to the turndown. The establishment and growth of the Victoria and Albert Waterfront Mall has helped draw away the more monied tourists as well. This is part of a wider trend for migrant traders and other workers in public space attempting to contend with global advancement of neoliberalism and urban change, of which Cape Town is fully enmeshed (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2007).
Then of course the global economic crisis and resulting down turn had exactly the impact one would expect. Tourism diminished and the disposable income of tourists lessened. The 2010 World Cup was expected to be a reinvigoration of just about every service industry in South Africa, but apparently after receiving that figurative memo, opportunists came out of the woodwork to take advantage of this influx of cash, which spread out the profits. No participant in this study, when the topic arose, referenced the World Cup as a significant improvement in the generally declining sales.

It was especially helpful for me to have spent the whole of the South African winter in the market. There were fewer tourists to distract my participants from our interviews and socialization, which was helpful. More importantly, the southern hemisphere winter is also the worst time of year for sales. From the sound of it, sales closely followed the relative temperatures. That meant that while I saw a lot more depression, anxiety and sadness than in the fat times, I was offered a valuable insight into the marketplace’s dynamics. Only when the boat is raised out of the water can one see the rust and barnacles and shoddy patched spots holding the hulk together. Because of the steady decline in total market revenues, the market was running as of 2011 with the sort of tension is may have back in the days of Badih Chaaban - except that almost no one was profiting as much.

III. There were roughly 220 stalls in the market, of which, a handful usually went unused on any given day, something that would never be seen under Chaaban. The stalls were staffed with a mix of owners and assistants that some owners have hired to run their stalls. Competition is fierce in the market for a number of reasons. Stalls rarely sell
anything unseen somewhere else in the market. Because of the close proximity of vendors, it is impossible to create a niche for oneself. Antonio from Cabinda, Angola claims to have gone to great lengths to bring batik paintings (waxy images drawn on cloth) from Mozambique. They sold well, but then two weeks later, he said, he began seeing them in other stalls (2011). So it goes with any new item that draws the interest of tourists. Others get it and the niche becomes more standard fare.

Adele from DRC makes her own jewelry and has a secret contact in DRC that sends it to her. But their designs are plainly displayed. One while we were talking, she began shouting at a European woman trying to take a picture of some of her necklaces. I asked Adele if it was smart to be mean to the tourists. Adele explained that as an innovator in the market, she had to be vigilant against anyone other than her customers, especially other stall owners or assistants, taking even a lingering glance at her wares. This vigilance is held in contrast to her otherwise cheerful, kind and welcoming nature.

It is easy to see why the Adeles, the innovators in the market, are few. Most have given up on the largely useless race to novelty, and have settled into a détente whereby market workers can only compete by outselling other stalls that are selling the same things. This often means settling for lower selling prices.

This is a large reason that nationality does not affect market strategies, by and large. The stakes are simply too high to sacrifice one’s own profit for that of a countryman. With the possible exception of the Senegalese, and then only in some cases, sellers and workers in the market operate as individuals. They may prefer to eat lunch at times with people who speak their native language, but camaraderie ends there. In this way information is sometimes exchanged more along ethnic or national lines. But this is
rarely the sort of information that might help someone in business, and more practical issues like where to find the cheapest phone or rent or how to send money home safely.

In this way, the owners who hire assistants do not seem to prefer hiring from their own nationality, but rather by personality and talent. Pardon from Zimbabwe hired Thomas from Malawi. Erik from Senegal hired Emmanuel from Zimbabwe. Florence from DRC hired Robert from Malawi. Most owners preferred not to hire locals, though. I heard a number of reasons for this, but it generally came down to perceptions of unreliability and theft.

“You can’t trust these people,” Issa said of everyone in the market. He expected others from his native Senegal to be of some help to him in a time of trouble. No other nationalities seemed to have this level of culturally inspired intra-benevolence. Yet, Issa still did not trust other Senegalese. Life in the market is an individual affair, which means that, even though the market holds dozens or hundreds of people at any given time, working there is often a lonely affair. In Paul Stoller’s book *Money Has No Smell*, one of the central premises is that from many West African viewpoints, money is inert, exerting little influence on social bonds outside the family and visa versa (2002).

There is very little possibility for self-advancement within the market. An assistant will likely never be able to work their way up to owning a spot in the market as it is controlled bureaucratically, not by “market forces”. The waiting list to receive a spot in the market is reportedly of obscene length, and largely unaltered since the City Council takeover. The only possibility for advancement would be for a porter to become an assistant. Porters are hired to help breakdown the stalls at the end of the day and put them up the next morning. The stalls are usually cube-shaped frames of 1-1.5” thick metal
bars, 6-9’ in length. They are attached at the corners by cotter pins and sockets. Canvas sheeting is lashed to the sides and/or roof to protect goods and sellers from the elements when necessary. Still, in the winter months, both sellers and souvenirs take a good amount of punishment, especially from the rain and winds that come seemingly from all angles at the same time. Porters most importantly are paid to move stall owners’ goods from the market to whichever nearby storage space they lease, anywhere from a block to four or five blocks away.

While Cape Town has struggled to find a peaceful and prosperous balance in post-Apartheid South Africa, and while the world economy has tumbled, little has changed outwardly in Greenmarket Square. But there are tensions in the market, increasing by the day. Some of these are particular to the trading life or to Greenmarket. But most are remarkably global. This group of migrant traders had much to teach me about the contemporary state of migration and the global south. A new class is arising in the world. Though migration has always existed in human history, there are new ways that it is coming to characterize the livelihoods and life ways of large swathes of the human race, of which the occupants of Greenmarket Square are useful examples. This project now turns to the peripheries of the migrant class, where Government, Society, and Family have and are converging with glacial pressure to force people into the role of migrants’ indelible mark on their lives, their psyches and their collective futures.
Chapter 4. Migrants and the State

I. This chapter deals with the relationship between African migrants and the South African state. My pre-dissertation research and literature review clearly indicated that, for African immigrants to South Africa, the South African state would be a major actor influencing the quality of their life and the manner in which they live it. That is to say, the decisions made by policy executives at the highest levels and by bureaucrats at the lowest levels have the capacity to drastically alter the conditions of an immigrant’s life. It is key to the successful state enterprise to effectively control its territory and maintain control over who is given the access and benefits of residing within that space (Landau and Monson 2008). For this reason, I focus specifically on the relationship between African immigrants and the Department of Home Affairs, which administers access to South Africa and its services. For many immigrants, the only contact with a government representative will be through the Department of Home Affairs (Gebre et al. 2011). For many immigrants to South Africa, the Department of Home Affairs is perceived as the single biggest obstacle to realizing self-actualization (Palmary 2002). I anticipated, therefore, that this relationship with the state, and the Department of Home Affairs in particular, would need to be addressed if I wanted to understand the circumstances of life and work for immigrants to South Africa, especially that of highly visible workers in tourist markets. This examination illuminates key features of both the nature of the South African state and the quotidian experience of immigrant life there.

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) holds enormous sway over the eligibility of migrants to hold legal status in South Africa and to access the most basic services (Kihato 2009). The DHA is also notoriously inefficient, disorganized and
difficult for migrants to fully understand or predict. As a key component of the erstwhile Apartheid enterprise, the DHA maintains a sad legacy of using its immense power to actively disenfranchise and spatially control millions of South Africans (Breckenridge 2005). After Apartheid, many of its most experienced functionaries were encouraged to take early retirement to make way for black South Africans. The post-Apartheid DHA was given a complicated array of tasks with a severely diminished institutional knowledge (Breckenridge 2005). In addition, the leadership of the department was conceded by the ANC to the ultra-conservative Inkatha Freedom Party chief, Mongosuthu Buthelezi. His notorious anti-immigrant stance halted progressive legislation on migration for a decade and infused the DHA’s institutions with a severe protectionist and xenophobic bent (Crush 1999; Crush and McDonald 2001; Landau and Freemantle 2010).

Before collecting data, I thus hypothesized that the state would be an obstacle to immigrants’ survival in South Africa. I hypothesized further that the mechanisms for this hindrance would be A) vacillation on the part of bureaucrats and civil servants due to their ineptitude or anti-foreigner sentiment, B) Control mechanisms designed at policy levels to reduce immigrant numbers and/or their freedom of movement, and C) prolific corruption.

The qualitative data I retrieved largely supported these hypotheses, yet also added nuances for which the literature review had not prepared me, and which may contribute to existing literature. The South African state does indeed act as a hindrance to migrant livelihood in South Africa for all the hypothesized reasons. However, migrant experiences conveyed additional key themes including the ways immigrants can turn
unwanted and perhaps unjust state interference in their lives to their own benefit and the
effects that negative personal interactions with Home Affairs have vs. the effects of
related stories of abuse. Other themes also arose that informed my analyses. These
include A) The unique position of Cape Town in South Africa’s spectrum of governance
approaches and the effect this has on state-migrant interactions and B) The changing
local government relationship to tourist markets and the effects this has on geographic
distribution of documented vs. undocumented workers. These themes will be discussed in
more detail in the next chapter regarding migrant interactions with local forms of
government and state power.

II. “Papers”

I usually began semi-structured interviews by talking with participants about how
and why they came to South Africa. These stories related the participants’ background
and reasons for coming to South Africa, as well as other insights into their lives and
personalities. This opening was also an easy segue into my first question set regarding
interactions with the South African state. I never used the word “state” even once to my
recollection. We instead discussed terms like “papers”, “status”, and “city council.” I
found discussions about these relatable terms provided me more than a sufficient window
into the line migrants try to walk regarding the state, both at key times in their lives and
in their everyday experience.

Inevitably upon arrival in South Africa, each migrant interviewed was bound to
deal with the Department of Home Affairs. This government body is tasked with a
variety of bureaucratic tasks: issuing or denying everything from resident’s driving
permits to refugee asylum papers (Hoag 2010). These experiences with Home Affairs are important for me because they are, by far, the most common form of direct contact that participants have with the South African State. It is at once a tangible institution and a more ethereal body, shrouded in confusion, myth and the apocryphal. To know the real impact of the relationship between migrants and the Department of Home Affairs, I attend to the combination of tangible and intangible elements that create a body with immense power and reach to affect daily life for many African migrants.

The power of the DHA in administering immigration status lies in the various benefits bestowed by legal status. Landau sums the situation up nicely: “Documentation cannot prevent discrimination or ensure social inclusion, but official identity papers are invaluable in finding work, accessing social services and preventing arbitrary arrest and deportation. Conversely, without documentation, almost any act, from petty trade to walking in the street becomes illegal in the state’s eyes” (Landau 2005, 1121-22). For my participants who work in highly visible street trade in Cape Town’s busiest tourist markets, there is more pressure to attain legal status.

III. Asylum

The process of obtaining papers to live and work in South Africa was surprisingly consistent throughout my study group. The majority of migrants had papers qualifying them as having status as refugees or asylum seekers. I found this quite shocking at first. It took me a week or two of interviews to piece together the reason why migrants so often referred to their visas as a “status,” which seemed an odd distinction to me. When asked about this, people from countries like Malawi were honest about the peaceful
circumstances of their country, but did also point out that poverty is a major push factor (Paul 2011; Azibo 2011; Bomani 2011). Thus, migrants from relatively peaceful places did not mind the distinction “refugee” as it fairly accurately described their difficult and somewhat desperate position. Also, the distinction legally allows them access to some basic services like being able to go to a health clinic (though as I discuss later this is not always true in practice). “It was a very, very difficult experience [not having a refugee paper], because wherever you are going, maybe you want to go for medical to hospital, they are going to ask for the paper. If you go for the passport they say no you are staying here illegally” (Matthew 2011).

Refugee papers allow one a measure of access in South Africa, but do not convey other basic rights. Handling money was a very difficult task for many as they lack the ability to get bank accounts. Matthew, who had a post office savings account, was even denied access to his savings after his papers expired (2011). I will describe the banking issue in much greater depth in chapters eight and nine. Migrants have creative ways of dealing with the lack of access to banking in South Africa, though they are often more costly and dangerous than official banking channels.

Refugee papers are also quite temporary compared to work or resident visas. The first refugee paper someone is awarded can be good for as little as a month (Simon 2011; Emmanuel 2011). Most often it must be renewed every three months (Simon 2011; Paul 2011; Gabriel 2011; Emmanuel 2011; Oliver 2011). After multiple shorter renewal periods (though possibly as few as just one or even none), the paper can be given for six months before renewal (Robert 2011; Paul 2011; Oliver 2011). Brenda, an older woman from Swaziland, said that she had a refugee permit that she had not been obliged to renew
for many years (2011). Participants were largely unable to see that there existed clear
guidelines for the different decisions in their own experiences, nor could I detect hardly
any discernable patterns explaining why, when and under what circumstances different
papers are awarded. For instance, being granted a six-month refugee paper does not mean
that you can’t be given three months at your next interview, or one month or nothing at
all (Edmund 2011; Matthew 2011).

One pattern was very clear though: In 2011 Malawians were in a very a
precarious situation. The rumor in the market was that South Africa was in the midst of
reevaluating Malawi’s economy as justification for asylum (Azibo 2011; Bomani 2011;
Robert 2011). At the time of my interviews, Edmund, Robert and Bomani had already
been denied renewal of their refugee status on their last visits (in Edmund’s case multiple
times) and were in South Africa without legal status to breathe South African air, let
alone work in the market. “…[they] say they don’t need anyone in Malawi to get the
papers now. Because they say there is no war. There’s no refugees from Malawi,
especially like Zimbabwe. So they can’t give the paper. [It’s] difficult now for Malawis
to get the paper” (Edmund 2011). Robert from Malawi had been denied three months
ago. His opinion was that having an elapsed paper might at least make the police more
lenient if he was caught, though he could not rely it. His lack of evident concern was
normal for the tranquil Robert, an open and dedicated marijuana aficionado. Matthew
also was having difficulty renewing his rapidly elapsing refugee paper. By the time I left
South Africa in August, 2011, he had also been unable to resolve the issue and had
become an illegal alien. In the final weeks before my departure I asked him if he would
be able to get “the paper” in time. He related to me that he felt powerless to do so and had given up on Home Affairs to solve his problem.

Malawi lacks the domestic violence that justifies the refugee status of Senegalese (though that even is rather isolated, low level violence that at the time of this writing has stopped) and especially Congolese immigrants who comprise the largest group of asylum seekers (Baruti and Ballard 2005). Malawi also lacks the large-scale economic collapse of Zimbabwe, which has caused South African officials to give special dispensations to Zimbabweans. They are able to work for up to ninety days per year in South Africa with nothing more than a passport (Rutherford 2011). My conjecture is that Malawi’s long-standing good relationship and cooperation with South Africa -- dating back from the days when Malawian workers supplied a substantial portion of mining labor in South Africa and up through Apartheid – may have softened the bureaucratic stance toward them. Either this policy is being reversed or it has been transmitted very inconsistently. Most likely, there is some combination of both.

**IV. Long-Term Visas**

The most cherished form of visa is the resident/work or permanent resident visa. Most immigrants to South Africa do not intend to stay for life, nor wish to. Citizenship does not convey benefits of much interest to migrants that a residency visa would not already give them. Only two participants out of nearly 40, Ibrahim from Sudan and Adele from a rural region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were South African citizens and neither had the ability to go back to their homes. All those who expressed a dim hope of ever returning home clung tightly to their resident permits, or their dreams of
attaining them, but never spoke of ambitions to become naturalized (for instance: Samba 2011; Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011; Thomas 2011; Blessing 2011; Simon 2011).

Resident/work permits are usually given for a period of 3-5 years, during which the migrant gets a blessed respite from dealing with Home Affairs. However, residency permits of any kind are rarer to see in the market, and as I will elaborate later, the market is not reflective of general migrant populations. One of the numerous ways the market skews is toward those who do have some level of legal status (Azibo 2011; Matthew 2011). Therefore, it stands to reason that, in the wider immigrant population of South Africa, residency permits are somewhat rarer. Making that statement definitively is impossible given that it would require a large scale demographic statistical study with easy access to all South African immigrants combined with accurate and well-kept government records. Sadly, that is certainly not possible in South Africa (Crush 2001).

According to participant accounts, a residency/work permit requires a large sum of money (around 5000R) and a favorable history in the country (Simon 2011; Blessing 2011). That means that one must most likely endure refugee status for many years, while also managing to save thousands of rand. This incredibly difficult task can be related to the section on self-advancement in chapter four. I will not elaborate here on the difficulty this presents to residency seekers, other than to say that it prevents most who want residency from ever attaining it. Marrying a South African is a quicker path to receiving resident status, at least mid-term, though it is arguably not any cheaper. Mamadou from Senegal, Pascal from the DRC and Ibrahim had all married South Africans. Mamadou was separated, but still supporting his wife. Ibrahim was divorced (but had already progressed to citizenship). Pascal’s wife had passed away. Mamadou expressed that he
would not wish a South African wife on an African migrant. “That South African woman is a lot of problem… Be careful for SA women… Some of us you see they got married here. But they buy house. You know, those house you give, those credit you take [for] them, like a TV, flat TV. The salon. Everything to make the house beautiful. South African women want all the stuff from the foreigners… They know the foreigner work more here” (Mamadou 2011). Despite his stern warning about the dangers of marrying South African women, he is still happy to have a three-year resident status.

V. The Department of Home Affairs

Visiting Home Affairs is a daunting task. Merely getting in the front door is a battle, with hundreds or thousands of petitioners vying for entrance most days. Shana, a stall owner from Kenya, affirms that many people avoid Home Affairs simply because of the agony of forming the queue (2011). The incredibly slow pace with which the DHA processes applications for asylum and residency causes massive backlogs which create incredibly long lines, but also leave applicants in a state of “limbo” where they are in the country illegally and cannot seek work or access basic services (Landau 2006; Palmary 2002). Additionally, “…DHA officials not only apply irrational standards but actively ‘make people illegal’ through refusal of access to building, endless lines, and failure to provide proper documentation” (Klaaren and Ramji 2001, 43). Amos from Kenya estimates that he has seen up to twenty thousand people trying to get in at one time (2011). He stood behind this large figure when I asked if he meant it. “…you go in there you can’t see number one or who is the last” (2011). At the very least, his approximation conveys the sense of hopelessness one feels when queuing for entrance to Home Affairs.
It is mandatory for petitioners to begin lining up in the wee hours of the morning (Oliver 2011; Paul 2011).

When you go there, it was a place that you feel that I don’t belong here. You felt like you outside of somewhere you know, cause just to get there you queue, you are fighting just to get there. Not even fighting to get it, just fighting to get there to be asked questions, you know. And now you get it again, they’ll give you like three months. You have to go that time again. And you know what go? We go like 4 o’clock in the morning. Some they sleep there…It’s a miserable life we’re living (Paul 2011).

Petitioners can return repeatedly to Home Affairs, waiting in line from before
dawn until closing time, only to be turned away time and again.

What I felt that it was difficult in the beginning to get, even to renew your permit. People had to wake up very early in the morning, some 4 o’clock in the morning. And queuing up. Queuing up so you can have space. So people coming from corners of Cape Town, to fight, to strive for that. I myself, I remember around 5 o’clock, I was there queuing myself with other people and it was very difficult. Could stay for two days and then third day you have the paper. Difficult. (Antonio 2011).

Many decide to merely stay the night outside to hold their hard-won position in line for
the next day. “Yeah sometimes you can sleep there five days” (Gilbert 2011). This may seem extreme, but truly can be a major time-saving maneuver. Mawadza reports that
some petitioners have slept outside DHA offices for as long as three months before being able to apply for asylum. While waiting in lines, migrants often lack access to toilets and food (Mawadza 2008). Because of these harsh conditions, it is not unheard of for tensions to boil over into riots. One day in Cape Town, a riot erupted that tore through the fences penning in the lines of petitioners. Migrants stormed the DHA offices and destroyed equipment in a fit of indignant rage. The incident was so frightening to the DHA that for a time it made an effort to improve efficiency (Baruti and Ballard 2005).
VI. Getting to the DHA Office

Merely getting in the front door of the DHA office can be the biggest challenge in dealing with the State. However, getting to the office and making time for it are two other seemingly mundane but very challenging complications. Seemingly less important than a successful interview at Home Affairs, merely finding the time to leave work during business hours is not only inconvenient but potentially disastrous. Owners in the market were far more likely to have been in South Africa for many years. This longer tenure afforded them the opportunity at some point to get either a resident visa or a long-term asylum status. Owners are not immune and must still interact with Home Affairs from time to time. “So if you have to go five six seven times it cost money because you can’t work!” said Amos, a stall owner from Kenya (2011).

However, it is the assistants who bear the brunt of the Home Affairs experience. As mentioned in chapter four, assistants work in a very precarious environment. They can be replaced in a heartbeat by someone equally or even more desperate for any kind of work, let alone a somewhat prized position in the tourist market.

Amos: Yeah the one who employ you he don’t like that [missing work for Home Affairs]. He tell you if you don’t work he don’t pay you.
Me: Or he’ll fire you
Amos: Yeah exactly. Mostly that’s what they do. (Amos 2011)

Most assistants work seven days a week from dawn until dusk. Some, like Robert (who works for Florence), get a Sunday off here and there. For most, however, a day off is unlikely. When free time comes, it certainly does not come on weekdays, which are the busiest days in the market.

The stress of losing one’s job or complicating one’s relationship to their boss only serves to magnify the stress of the Home Affairs experience. Not only can missing work
for a day cost you your job, but migrants most likely have to return at least two or three more times before a meeting with a functionary is secured. Matthew related to me how difficult it is to make time for visits to Home Affairs.

I dunno it’s like time. Maybe they get a job. You get a job, maybe they are working in a construction company. They say no, if I go to the boss and say ‘Boss, I want to go to Home Affairs to organize my papers’, definitely they will lose their job, because, ’I can’t wait for you to sort out all your affairs. So go to home affairs. I will hire somebody to do the job.’ (Matthew 2011).

To combat this problem, participants related to me that they or their boss are sometimes able to arrange a friend to cover the gap for a day, though finding experienced, trustworthy people is difficult on short notice. Most often the owners must simply do without help and try to run the stall themselves, as Dr. Nijem did when Paul went (unsuccessfully) to Home Affairs in June to renew his refugee paper. Meanwhile, the assistant is forced to pray they get to Home Affairs and all goes off well, preventing the need to return another day and endure the ire of their boss. It is no wonder that people sleep outside in winter in order to assure themselves of success, hopefully on the first day.

The location of the Home Affairs office that deals with immigration papers has moved around over the years. It was downtown, and then moved to Nyanga. Now it is located in Maitland, roughly five miles from Greenmarket Square. Most participants prefer Maitland to Nyanga, but not to downtown. For most petitioners, travelling to Maitland means not only money, but the precious time that is needed to travel both ways. As I will discuss more fully in the next chapter, it is dangerous to travel at night anywhere in Cape Town, but especially so in the neighborhoods where most migrants live. Yet, to join the queue after 5:00 am almost assures one a failed visit to Home Affairs, because of the long lines. Only two participants, Florence and Mamadou, own a
vehicle, so in order to reach Maitland by five, one must necessarily leave home before
dawn and travel in darkness by taxi van or train, risking harm to themselves or their
property. It is a mundane but important aspect of the overall struggle to relate to the
South African state.

Participants reported that getting their first refugee status was usually a daunting
task. Florence from DRC said about visiting Home Affairs, “Yeah is difficult because we
must wake up early in the morning and go make the queue. Sometimes they are fighting
there, but if you go inside, to get the paper, no problem. To go in, that is the problem”
(2011). Oliver relates, “‘Cause, in order for you to get just a stamp, you have to wake up
as early as 5 o’clock, sometimes sleep for the night there. Too much chaos” (2011).
Andrew from Kenya reported that they have had to go five times over the course of a
month to be seen by an official just once so he could interview for his refugee status
tough for everyone first time in the foreign land eh? It’s tough for everyone, but for me I
manage. But you see I came and I sleep there for two days. They give me but it was
already rejected!” (Robert 2011). “And I spend three months looking for the paper and
they say no, say no. It was difficult…It was like every Wednesday and Thursday of the
week, I was going there. It was like 32 times” (Emmanuel 2011). It is easy to surmise
from these accounts and their consistency that simply getting in the front door of the
Department of Home Affairs can be the hardest part about managing one’s relationship
with the South African state as an immigrant.
VII. Incompetence and Caprice

The Department of Home Affairs is, by most participants’ accounts, characterized by a climate of caprice or incompetence. This results in what Hoag calls a general “illegibility,” which sets the DHA amidst a fog of disorder unintelligible to migrants (Hoag 2010). If Home Affairs functionaries are purposefully enacting directed policy, then it may be a matter of incompetence and disorganized inconsistency (Baruti and Ballard 2005). Regardless, most patrons of Home Affairs, not just Malawians, find the inconsistency very troubling and confusing. Antonio came as a political refugee from Cabinda. “I came as a real refugee. Not just for economical survival. Took me two years to get status. I never understood why it took so long for me to have a status” (Antonio 2011). Legally, the DHA must settle a request for asylum within six months, but these decisions can go years unresolved, if ever. While these asylum requests are being processed, migrants are in danger of arrest and find it difficult to work (Palmary 2003). Oliver from Zimbabwe showed me an email he had received from Home Affairs that informed him his application had been received but that he needed to get fingerprinted. “I already did the fingerprints for this application. It is very confusing” (Oliver 2011). Because of problems like Oliver is experiencing, South Africa has failed to process more than half of its applications (Baruti and Ballard 2005).

Participants who had been in South Africa for a few years often expressed exasperation about the issuing of resident visas. “They told us originally that they would give residence IDs after five years as refugees. But still hasn’t happened” (Shana 2011). “But after five years in the country you are entitled to resident visa but it doesn’t happen” (Antonio 2011). Despite the glaring problems with Antonio’s situation vis-à-vis Home Affairs...
Affairs’ treatment of Cabindan refugees, Antonio’s wife, Helena, thinks that Home Affairs is already giving trouble and will try in the future to give her trouble as well because she did her application jointly with Antonio as Cabindan refugees, regardless of the fact that she is from DRC where they met and lived for many years. She sees people from Congo getting permanent residence after only three years of asylum and finds the arbitrary distinctions emplaced on her condition endlessly exasperating (Helena 2011).

When migrants are able to win refugee status, problems with the DHA do not end. Even getting quality documentation can be difficult. Literally the material the refugee status is printed on is often of cheap quality with hand-written content and addendums. This contributes further to the susceptibility of migrants in South Africa. The Section 22 refugee permit which fortunate refugees are awarded is routinely disregarded by many possible employers, health care officials, police and even DHA functionaries themselves (Landau 2005; Baruti and Ballard 2005).

I told Amos in a focus group that my tentative conclusion was that Home Affairs was a big problem for immigrants in South Africa. His response was that they were a big problem indeed. His biggest complaint was that if you have been in South Africa for fifteen years, no matter your level of status, you are treated as if you had just arrived yesterday. “So imagine the people who are here ten years or fifteen years ago. They are still going to Home Affairs. And the newcomers are also still going there. That way we have big big problem, big queue” (Amos 2011). Migrants’ lack of trust in Home Affairs for adequate procedural explanations, or lack of explanations offered, forces confused migrants to turn to one another and seek information from those more experienced. I have already discussed this flow of information in the previous chapter, but at the end of this
section I will discuss how this flow of information particularly impacts migrants’ experiences of the South African state.

VIII. Rights and Information

Apart from a lack of clarity for migrants about how to attain documents, confusion and misinformation persist about the rights refugee documents convey. According to South African laws, petitioners for asylum and documented refugees are to be granted access to child education and health services. These legal rights are often misunderstood by service providers or blatantly ignored (Groot 2004; Klotz 2000). Foreigners are often forced to wait longer for or barred access to services like health care or banking, arguably unconstitutionally (Crush 2000; Landau 2006). Palmary’s study reported that “Refugees cited continuous examples of how they had been denied access to schools, clinics, housing and many other services” (Palmary 2002, 7). For her participants and those of Landau (2005 and 2006), not only were services denied, but there was no system by which they felt they could find recourse. The DHA after all is seen by refugee groups as very unsympathetic and few South African groups are lining up to protest the delays that cause asylum seekers to live exposed to police harassment and unable to access work and basic services (Landau 2005). Thus, as Landau concludes, “refugees and asylum seekers are effectively unable to convert these legal entitlements into effective protection” (Landau 2006, 308).

The reasons for the chronic inability of the DHA to keep up with the number of petitions each day are explained by some participants as originating mainly from the crush of people petitioning for papers. Others point to corruption or poor management.
Gilbert from Malawi maintained that he had been turned away many times because of computer crashes and other malfunctions in the Home Affairs office. “They say ‘come tomorrow.’ Then you go there again, same problem. ‘Yeah today the machines they are not working properly, so you need to come back again tomorrow.’ For days you are still going, going, going” (Gilbert 2011). Landau reports that in Port Elizabeth dozens of legally recognized refugees “went weeks without valid documents in mid-2004 because the office failed to procure the printer cartridge needed to produce identity documents” (Landau 2005, 1123). Other migrants have conveyed to researchers that they feel DHA staff were simply not properly trained to deal with refugees (Palmary 2003). Hoag related the following from his research into the DHA.

The Inspectorate office where I conducted fieldwork, for example, had not a single functioning printer, photocopier, or fax machine – and only one of the few functioning computers was connected to the Movement Control System (the primary database with which officials interact in their day-to-day activities). At the time of my research, the office was staffed by only 28 immigration officers, later augmented by 6 trainees. With these new trainees, the office was still 23 short of the 57 total approved posts. The Temporary Residence Permitting office, as well, was 28 short of the total 45 approved positions (Hoag 2010).

Hoag’s research unveils some of the enigmatic inner-workings of the DHA. Amongst his findings is an assertion that DHA functionaries are indeed confused by contradictory directives brought by political changes in upper echelons of the administration. Likewise, upper management is ineffective in effectively communicating policy and implementation strategies to its lower-lever bureaucrats. One such clerk accidentally came across a circular in a pile of papers that informed her that, due to a policy change, she had been improperly denying refugee status to a number of applicants for weeks or months (Hoag 2010).

Sadly, though, institutional capacity and bureaucratic incompetence may not be the largest factor limiting the proper treatment of migrants by the South African state via
the DHA. Baruti and Ballard claim that corruption and laziness of DHA officials are the primary causes of inefficiencies and are brought on by anti-foreigner sentiment (2005).

The racial and ethnic tone of South Africa’s active xenophobia extends to all levels of society. I explore this topic fully in a later chapter, but suffice it to say that South Africa’s centuries-long history of racialized policies has bitterly infected its struggle to come to grips with migration. This struggle not only transforms commonplace fears related to immigration into some of the most vehement anti-foreigner sentiment on earth, but also allows these sentiments to infect wide segments of society. The result is motivation for bureaucrats err on the side of conservativism in order to protect their jobs in their own climate of policy confusion (Hoag 2010).

**IX. Harassment**

Many participants related feeling harassed and belittled by Home Affairs officials. This harassment is one of the more consistent elements of what an African migrant petitioner can expect from a visit to Home Affairs.

"Some are very helpful. But some are very rude. Like in Nyanga, we had to be treated badly. Sometimes we are beaten...But they are not Home Affairs officials who do that. Security guards who are conducted by the Home Affairs, [a] private company hired by them” (Oliver 2011).

"Like before we used to go there to Nyanga. There was too much police. When you go there early in the morning they gonna grab you, take your phone what what. Now it’s in Maitland there…Maitland is better” (Edmund 2011).

Amos referenced a more institutional kind of abuse.

…when you stay three days, go back, go back, go back again, you have to pay 2500 fine. Because now you are late. So where you gonna get all this fuckin money? No way you can get that...Yeah they charge you 2500 [rand]. If you don’t pay the 2500 they lock you in the jail, maybe two years, or they send you back. After two years they send you back. It’s harassment! (Amos 2011).

Most participants simply accept the struggle with the DHA as a given component of migrant existence in South Africa. For most migrants, the best advice can be boiled
down to persistence and disregard for the intentions or ability of Home Affairs functionaries. My focus group with the Malawian assistants agreed unanimously that persistence alone largely determines one’s outcome, which is never guaranteed, for better or worse.

“By that time I struggled. I go there and I spend three times there without getting it. I go there and I didn’t get it, you see? Then, after, I get it. But I get it in an honest way. Because I struggle, always on the line. I be there maybe 4am. Struggle for a paper you see. They don’t wanna give it” (Thomas 2011).

“You can go and get it the first day or you can go for months and not get it” (Matthew-b 2011). Matthew tried for eight years and eventually enlisted a pro bono legal service run by University of Cape Town School of Law which took the matter to the High Court. The case finally won him recognition as a refugee by Home Affairs, at least until recently when he was denied again (2011).

No matter the reason, it is a grueling process, dreaded by all. It is no small wonder that many people elect to forgo legal status and live in the shadow of deportation in exchange for a reprieve from interactions with South African bureaucracy.

Bomani: You have to go. But if you can, if you don’t want to go you stay here now, but illegally.
Me: Could you still work in the market?
Bomani: Yes we can still work here, but the problem, if you have a problem, if they catch you, then you be in shit because they send you home.

However, not every one of my participants had a bad experience with the visa process. “It wasn’t really difficult. I queued for Home Affairs and got a refugee permit. Then interviewed later and got full asylum status after 1 year and 2 months” said Patrice (2011). Patrice, like some other migrants from the DRC, received asylum without much ado. Pascal, also from DRC, originally came to South Africa in the early 1990s because his brother was working in the Zaire embassy in South Africa at the time. His brother helped him get a visa sorted, but he maintains that he still could have come if his brother...
had not been working at the embassy. “There were already Congolese here. Relations were fine between Mobutu and South Africa” (Pascal 2011). Samba from Senegal also said he did not mind the experience but tried, as was usual for him, to convey his position above the fray.

No for me is actually nothing. Is the same like the moment I use my refugee papers. I use my Senegalese papers. For me is nothing. Is a papers like all papers. Because I have my Senegalese passport. I have my bank account in Senegal. Somewhere else is the same sure. South Africa is the same. But you know just follow the rules. What you want. And what you do you get. You know? (Samba 2011).

It is not uncommon for Senegalese to have an easier time working with Home affairs. However, Samba has a seemingly unshakable confidence in himself and is often making comments that reveal his extremely self-aware, but also self-gratifying thought processes. Samba’s personal philosophy reflects a stoicism even more pronounced than that of his compatriots and fellow Murids in the market. By appearing unaffected by the normal worries of the hoi polloi, Bas elevates himself above the fray, but also the unwashed masses. He best embodies this aloof personality trait that is common to the Senegalese in the market, but so much to an extreme that others in the market find him comical more than intimidating.

One day in my first month in the market, I was hanging out with Simon and Blessing at their stall, and Samba came up in conversation. I asked if they knew him and after we agreed we were talking about the same person Simon said unceremoniously “Yes. This one is full of shit.” Blessing looked in the direction of Samba’s stall and said “Yes. Full of shit.” It is not uncommon for non-Senegalese migrants to criticize the Senegalese in the market, but it was rare to hear any criticisms, especially such resolute ones, from the usually kind Zimbabweans, Simon and Blessing. Personality traits that set Senegalese vendors apart were most often reflected in their clothing and outward
confidence. These traits are connected to deeper cultural elements that have contributed greatly to Senegalese success in the marketplace, from Cape Town to Paris to New York. Perhaps this success is the Senegalese’s ultimate sin in the market.

X. Corruption

Corruption is an inevitable topic in a discussion of South African bureaucracy, specifically the DHA. Bureaucracy relating to immigration and naturalization in South Africa is notoriously inefficient and corrupt (Klaaren and Ramji 2001). Customs officials are also known to wield power over migrant activity by inconsistently and arbitrarily extracting high tariffs and additional fees or by eliciting outright bribes for documents (Maharaj 2001; Peberdy 2000; Klotz 2000; Landau 2005). Baruti and Ballard show that, amongst their participants, bribes solicited by DHA officials ranged from R100 to R1000 (2005). The United Nations High Commission on Refugees reports that a fifth of refugees have given bribes to DHA officials (Groot 2004). Accordingly, few participants in my study related to me any marked experiences with corrupt officials at Home Affairs. As was the case with police corruption, most of the stories shared with me were about a third party and not from my participant’s personal experience. When personal experience was referenced, allusions were made more than straight explanation.

Me: Can you describe your process for getting a work permit?
Pardon: I don’t want to go into the process because it will be like I am denouncing corruption. So it’s better to just say it was hard.
Me: So you don’t want to talk about the corruption?
Pardon: Ah no. I don’t want to be the victim of that thing.
Me: My project specifically focuses on that so I do want to hear about it.
Pardon: What I can say, it is there. How it is and…it’s up to how you find out about it. But it is there. You fork a lot of thousands to get a work permit by that time. But how I get it, it was according to me. But I don’t think it’s right to discuss about it. Because it was the hard way. And I don’t want to think about it. Because it was hard for me by that time. It was a bad time of my life. But I had to do it but it was very bad.
(Pardon 2011)
Pardón clearly had some sort of very troubling experience with the visa process when he attempted to get his residency permit. The topic was clearly off-limits so I did not press the issue. It would have been fascinating to know more details of his experience, but his words convey the point that corruption does happen, even in Cape Town.

Andrew: Obviously there is the corruption and everything you see. It is difficult to get it. It is not easy.
Me: How is there corruption?
Andrew: Most of the time, to make it work out for you, you have to pay money you see.
Me: To an official?
Andrew: Maybe, it depends. Cause me, I just went and queued for me. If you are lucky, like me I was lucky one day and I got it. (Andrew 2011)

Bomani referenced the possibility of Malawians going “back door” in order to escape the noose tightening around their necks.

Bomani: Will be harder now to get it from Malawi. There was no problem before, but when we came to find greener pastures, there was no hunger or war, just lack of opportunity. But now the government is figuring out that nothing is wrong in Malawi…But you know there is some other ways. There is still people you know. You know.
Me: What other ways?
Bomani: You go back door. You can go there. You can talk to people you know. Then maybe like you can pay. Like the corruption. When the law is too tight there are some other ways also. People, they get what they want. And they pay something. That’s why you can see people, they have, the new ones. But if you go there and you want to get it it’s not easy for you to get a paper (Bomani 2011)

Utilizing “back door” channels or paying “unofficial fees” are strategies for obtaining papers that many participants have considered if not enacted. The market inhabitants who must work most often with Home Affairs are the assistants, i.e. those with the least resources. This makes “back door” channels less appealing to them. If paying some sort of “unofficial” fee to a clerk could get them a more desirable legal status, they would likely never be able to afford it (see also Gebre et al. 2011). There were a few times where I saw assistants like Paul and Thomas trying to borrow ten rand from others just to get transport home. To go malnourished for lack of money is not an
uncommon phenomenon amongst assistants either. Amassing a large savings that could open doors for a better future, legally or otherwise, is extremely difficult for even owners to do, and more so for assistants (Matthew-b 2011).

Corruption is, by and large, a well-known and widely accepted phenomenon for my study group. African migrants in South Africa, like my participants, come from countries where corruption in bureaucracy is not unheard of or just as often is business-as-usual. Thus, the corruption present in The Department of Home Affairs, if it exists in a significant way, might not be eliciting an affective response in my participants, at least partially, because it is an anticipated element of the landscape for them. Additionally, for some, corruption seems relatively light in South Africa in comparison to their home countries. Some migrants and DHA officials place the responsibility for the presence of corruption on the migrants who foster the process by giving into bribery to make dealings with the DHA go smoothly (Hoag 2010; Gebre et al. 2011). Perhaps, this helps explains Pardon’s reticence to discuss his experience. He may feel victimized, yet also partly responsible and ashamed. Neocosmos would respond to Pardon’s shame with the assertion that the onus for corruption falls on South Africa’s migration legislation which assumes that migrants produce a net loss to society. Thus in presenting migrants as inimical to the State, the state encourages and justifies the defense of ‘Fortress South Africa’ using illiberal means. “To do this, police officers and officials from the Department of Home Affairs are given such excessive powers over extremely vulnerable people that the bribery, extortion and corruption become not only possible but regular practices” (Neocosmos 2008, 590). Those who give bribes do participate in the proliferation of the abuse. However, they do so in a context of power relations which
have been historically and institutionally shaped by illiberal ideals deployed in unjust manners.

XI. “Numinocity”

Myth shrouds much of the experience of migrant life in South Africa, and the interaction with the state is no exception. The Department of Home Affairs retains an ominous and numinous quality to many migrants for reasons that go beyond the great power the institution has over a migrant’s future well-being and freedom. Rumor and discussion about how to move from asylum seeker, to refugee, to resident status are commonplace amongst migrants in Cape Town’s public markets. The other major topic is how to navigate the DHA process for those seeking to attain or renew their refugee papers. The stories circulated amongst migrants about the DHA have much to do with the shaping of the contact between migrants and the state. The looming future interactions with the DHA make it a common topic of conversation amongst migrants in the market, as I have already mentioned. The impetus for much of this conversation is that so little is known amongst migrants in the market. At the same time, stakes are high, thus compelling people to seek information.

The Department of Home Affairs does not go to great lengths to adequately inform migrants of their rights and responsibilities. Great confusion abounds amongst my participants on issues like health care or housing assistance. The visa-granting mechanism of Home Affairs may be organized and consistent, but from the outside perspective of petitioners it appears erratic and capricious. With no clear path to obtaining a refugee status, or to advancing that status to a long-term asylum visa or a
resident visa, migrants are left to glean what they can from the experiences related to them by others who have gone before. This is extremely problematic for a number of reasons. First, the experiences of individuals from different countries should differ based on the South African government’s recognition or lack thereof of a substantive push factor at home justifying the granting of asylum. Thus, information passed through the grapevine may lack critical contextual details. Second, in the same way, verbal exchanges of subjective experience can lack context or be misunderstood by the hearer, especially when there is no corroborating information. Third, not only is there often a lack of corroboration, the opposite is often present. Differing opinions abound on the regulations and rules pertaining to migrant life in South Africa, including the appropriate or optimal way to petition Home Affairs for legal status.

A lack of consensus on institutional bureaucratic knowledge amongst migrants in Cape Town’s central markets leads to misinformation caused by conversing in climates of anxiety. This of course limits a migrant’s ability to negotiate their relationship to the South African state in a satisfactory or optimal way. Thus, a sense of despondency suffuses the relationship between migrants and the state. It is one thing to feel weak and alone in the throng of thousands hoping to be admitted to the visa office. It is quite another to feel powerless to advance your interests effectively and reliably once you have gained entrance to the building. The Department of Home Affairs is the migrant’s sole vehicle to the most basic approbation of the South African state: legal status. This pivotal role combines with its exclusivity, abject power and perceived caprice to hold a numinous place in the everyday life and imagination of African migrants to South Africa.
XII. Conclusion

The state is clearly an obstacle to migrant survival in South Africa by means of vacillation, control mechanisms and prolific corruption. The DHA lacks the funding, manpower and the will to process refugee and residency applications efficiently and ethically (Mawadza 2008). Migrants who came legally, but became illegal, or were even arguably “made illegal” live under a constant threat of deportation. This “ever-present vulnerability” shapes migrant experience by making immigrants more easily exploitable and reducing their access to basic services. Some scholars have pointed out that state controls are not always aimed at eliminating immigration. “It is deportability and not deportation per se that has historically rendered undocumented migrant labor a distinctly disposable commodity” (De Genova 2002, 438). This critical view lands squarely on South Africa with its combined histories of labor abuses and racial prejudice.

Illegality is a very important concept to this study because it “is a spatialized social condition that is frequently central to the particular ways that migrants are racialized as “illegal aliens” within nation-state spaces” (De Genova 2002, 439). I conclude that the poor functioning of the DHA (and therefore the bad relationship between migrants and the state) presents an inherently spatial obstacle to the survival of my study group. Shea, who studied professional African migrants in Cape Town, explains that “[T]he real power of such a culture [of exclusion] is contained in the unique blend of state sanctioned rules of belonging (citizenship) and the interpretation of these rules based on history and culture, by legitimate citizens” (2008, 127). The state’s ability to act as an obstacle to migrant aspirations is related directly to the will and assent of its citizenry (Modi 2003). South Africa’s citizenry happens to display unbelievably high
levels of racist disdain for foreigners, an inexhaustible hatred most often referred to in literature as “xenophobia.”

For those who work from dawn until dusk, seven days a week, the only thing worse than the work life is to be told by the government that they are no longer legally allowed to do that work. Migrants see the state as an institution that disregards their well-being, or directly seeks to harm them. This unfortunate relationship is often structural, being based off of the shape and style, policy and format of the institutions of permitting and police control that South Africa has enacted and that the City of Cape Town has enacted at the local level. When migrants interact with these institutional embodiments of South African political will, they do not do so impersonally. There is always a clerk, a functionary, a police officer -- human beings all. These living, breathing entities make up the facade of the state enterprise and have personal experiences as well as social, cultural and political outlooks that inform how they interpret institutional directives. Perhaps more importantly, their humanity informs how they choose to act in the spaces of discretion where no clear rule or regulation exists for them to follow, or where ignorance of rules persist. For this reason, in the following chapters, I continue this exploration with a focus on migrants’ relationship to police and local government in South Africa and then I will examine the relationship between migrants and larger society in South Africa.
Chapter 5. Migrants and Local Government

I. The relationship of migrants to the state via The Department of Home Affairs is a keystone to understanding the lived experience of migrancy in South Africa. In addition to national institutions, the migrant relationship to the state must be examined at the local level. The influential role that local executive institutions, like the police forces and city councils, play in daily migrant life has only increased since Apartheid as more city and municipal governments in South Africa take increased control of policing. Particularly important for my study group, local policing has largely taken responsibility for overseeing urban informal trade (Palmary 2002).

Local branches of executive power in South Africa, like the police, have been reported to be a large-scale nuisance to both law-abiding and undocumented foreigners in South Africa. South African police forces of all stripes often take advantage of the “spatialized social condition” created by State policies and apparatuses like The Department of Home Affairs (Klaaren and Ramji 2001; Landau 2006a; Maharaj 2001; Peberdy 2000; Samara 2011; Sinclair 1998; Western 2001). The police are well-known to be corrupt, violent and antagonistic (Peberdy 2000; Sadouni 2009; Western 2001). Levine defines corruption as the “unsanctioned or unscheduled use of public resources for private ends” (1975). Corruption can also be viewed as the “misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal” (Brooks 1970). By both of these normative definitions, police in South Africa operate in a corrupt manner. A 2002 Immigration Act promised to humanely reform immigration controls, but only a couple of reports were produced with no substantial changes made (Crush 2008). Since then,
South African policy has instead moved increasingly towards strategies of control. Wherever legislation leaves gaps, ad hoc local governance in South Africa usually amounts to anti-migrant stances. Moreover, the South African State emboldens extra-legal corruption by providing a larger governmental template of civil and human rights abuses that defy South Africa’s laws and foundational principles.

Before coming to South Africa to do field work, I hypothesized based on a review of literature, that police interaction would be a negative impact on the everyday life of African migrants. My data collection indicated that this was certainly the case. Many participants had been extorted personally, and many more had been harassed or abused in some form or another. Participants related a severe lack of trust in the police to treat them fairly and to protect them from harm by others, especially South Africans. It seems also that feelings toward the police are heavily shaped by what migrants witness first hand in interactions between the police and other migrants. Sentiments and strategies of negotiation are furthermore shaped by hearsay accounts related about negative migrant encounters with police. Lastly, I found that many migrants’ views and experiences of police in Cape Town have been heavily affected by previous experiences in other major South African cities.

II. Extortion

I asked each of my participants to relate to me what the police were like in South Africa and to tell me about any interactions they had with them. Numerous participants related that they had indeed been extorted of cash or valuables. For instance:

Paul: They [the police] are too much corrupt
Me: To you specifically?
Paul: Yes, a number of times.
Me: Do they ever try to get money from you?
Paul: Yeah, Yeah that’s their game! Yeah. (Paul 2011)

Most participants, like Paul, did not hesitate in their affirmation that police in South Africa and Cape Town, in particular, had extorted money from migrants. Pascal, for instance said, “They stealing! They just coming to disturb the people, to look at the papers, and talk. But they can see at that time you are selling, that you are busy. The customer can go because the customer don’t want to see police” (2011). When asked if he had personally been harassed, Pascal responded,

Yes! You see maybe you are three standing there. They come to you. Once it was us three, here on the corner. The police they come and arrest us. For what? They must search. Ok search. We go inside, they are searching us. Nothing. But we must go to the police. For what? Asking for what!? ‘You talk too much. You must just go’. We go in the police station, we go there inside. They say they must take us a picture, charting and check us. The time we go inside there, the woman was there she said ‘No, you are just wasting your time. Just go’. 2010 that happens. Those new police that are here now [since World Cup], they are just disturbing the people. They are not doing their job. They just looking for money. If they come, they see a new face on the town, they go to you. Maybe you leave your permit at home. They take you. You give them 50 [rand]. They let you go (Pascal 2011).

My literature review clearly indicated that harassment, extortion and theft are common in interactions with police (Peberdy 2000). Various discussions like the above with Paul and Pascal confirmed that police corruption is an obstacle to daily life for migrants in South Africa and in Cape Town’s public markets. South Africa has a sad history of police corruption that goes back long before the post-Apartheid influx of African migrants. “In the 1970s, black policemen were commonly believed to refrain from charging pass offenders in exchange for bribes” (Lodge 1998). As I later conclude, the repeal of Apartheid era laws like those restricting spirits and free movement created a vacuum of targets for historically entrenched police corruption (Lodge 1998).
III. Harassment

Participants also related that they had been harassed by police without necessarily being extorted for cash or valuables. When asked if he had ever been verbally harassed by police, Paul said that friends of his had been. “Even during that xenophobia time. They will come and they tell you ‘Why don’t you just go home!’” (Paul 2011). Asked about harassment and extortion, Mamadou responded, “Yeah you gonna have problem for that. Because sometime they think like you sell drugs” (Mamadou 2011). Gabriel from Uganda responded, “Yes yes. I hear so many stories. I always hear they have attacked some other people whereby they have gotten on cases, they have beaten, they have attacked. That’s what I am hearing. Because I’m always reading the newspapers. So all the people complain, ‘oh the police they are beating us!’” (Gabriel 2011). Targets for police harassment are commonly profiled by looks or speech, allowing even citizens to be harassed based on phenotype (Landau 2009). Mamadou agreed that the police do target black Africans, though he blames that more on Nigerian criminality than on the police racism. Adele made an interesting point that when she came to Cape Town from DRC, all of her clothes were stolen. She credits dressing in the South African fashion for helping her avoid being profiled as a foreigner and a target for harassment (Adele 2011).

Participants painted a picture of what services the police had rendered them, if any, in their time in South Africa. Largely this amounted to being told to “get lost” in some form or another when participants had requested police aid (Bomani-b 2011; Matthew-b 2011; Edmund-b 2011; Robert-b 2011).

Paul: The police, sometimes they become a problem.
Me: How so?
Paul: You know why? Police, over here, they favor too much South Africans. Like for example, if a South African does wrong to you, they cannot go for him. They leave him
sometimes. I’ve seen that. But if you just do wrong to a South African, they force you.
Me: What do they do?
Paul: If you are arguing with a South African, they come. They are not fair-minded you
know. They are not fair. I’ll be straight on that. (Paul 2011)

Oliver said “There is another guy. He is in Khayelitsha. He is from
Cameroon…He has this container that he use as store. Some people broke into his
container and stole some items. So he went to the Kayelitsha police station to report to
the police. So they told him you must go back to your country” (Oliver 2011). Emmanuel
related, “Me I can say, it’s not the same like their people in South Africa. They do treat
you differently. They don’t handle you nicely. You know, someone from far away, they
just say ‘Ah, I don’t care about you’. It’s only like they don’t do their job when they are
treating someone from far” (Emmanuel 2011). The feeling amongst participants was
nearly unanimous that when the police were not actively preying upon migrants, they
were disregarding their duty to protect them from harm to their person or property.

Gaining police assistance is especially hopeless for undocumented immigrants
who already have a hard enough time avoiding suspicion, harassment and brutality from
police (Klotz 2000). Azibo maintained, in a focus group, that interactions with police
tend to go even worse if you have no documentation. If you lack a paper from Home
Affairs, he said, the police will not advocate for you or protect you (2011). Thus, for
migrants who lack legal status, the police present even more difficulty.

Me: Any experiences with police?
Emmanuel: I just thank God that I am not meeting those guys.
Me: Why do you thank God? Are they difficult?
Emmanuel: Yeah, they are difficult. They like the papers. If you don’t have them they
will put you in holding cell and then send you back home.

Having legal status in South Africa, however, does not exempt migrants from
police harassment, as in Pascal’s account above. Migrants’ legitimizing documents are
often disregarded or destroyed, which aids in extortion or helps to boost arrest numbers
(Klaaren and Ramji 2001; Landau 2005; Landau 2006b; Peberdy 2000). “I have a friend. He was arrested here. Just for papers. He had the paper. But he just forget it home. They just took him up the corner. My friend, he’s just working right here (points down St. George’s Mall). [The police said] “You have a hundred rand. Just gimme money then we let it go” (Paul 2011). Klotz claims that “Securing proper status and paperwork does not protect foreign Africans from harassment, imprisonment and/or deportation” (2000) and that these infractions relate directly to the role police play in enforcing migration regulations.

Robert related a personal experience to me where he was extorted by police even though he had a refugee paper. When I asked him why that would happen if he had documents, he responded, “It’s their life there in Jo’burg [Johannesburg]. When there is foreigner, you must just take something. Yeah even if you have a paper, they just want something. Just want to get something from you.” Matthew said in his interview, “The thing is even if you do have papers they do harass you. They just want to take advantage because they know you are a foreign immigrant” (Matthew 2011). Even the South African Human Resources Commission wrote:

In the majority of cases there were no reasonable grounds for an apprehending officer to suspect that a person was a non-national. A significant number of persons interviewed had identification documents which were either destroyed or ignored or which they were prevented from fetching from home. Apprehended persons were often not told or did not understand the reason for their arrest. Extortion and bribery are practices extremely widespread among apprehending officers (SAHRC 1999, quoted in Landau 2005).

IV. Survival Strategies

Even if migrants have never experienced this sort of treatment personally, the vast majority still regard police as dangerous (Sinclair 1998). Given that participants’ lives seem deeply impacted by their negative experiences with or their fears of police, I asked
them to describe their strategies of negotiation and avoidance. Paul said, “You just have to play on your luck and try to plead with them, you know. You just have to plead with them and not try to be smart over them” (Paul 2011). Mamadou extolled the importance of having nothing to hide so that one can be confident and still respectful. “When you are honest you never have problem for yourself” (Mamadou 2011). Some police have dealt with him respectfully. When they are nice, he goes along with searches and road blocks, but they never are able to extort money from him. “From me you can’t get nothing! For Sure! Haha!” He is certain that if one has nothing to hide, they have less to fear from the police. When people look scared, he said, the police think you have a reason to be scared and then try to take advantage. Also, Mamadou prefers for friends to come to his house. “But me anyway I don’t like to go out…I go home watch TV, stay there inside. If I get invited, I can drive somewhere. I don’t even take a taxi” (2011). Adele echoed Mamadou’s sentiment about seeming afraid. She always tries to keep quiet around police and always avoids looking afraid. “I think police can sense fear” (2011). Adele probably also avoids police attention by dressing in South African clothing, as mentioned earlier (Adele 2011).

Samba, with his characteristic bravado (more even than his Senegalese compatriot, Mamadou, who himself is considerably self-aggrandizing), insists that when it comes to the police, the best policy is to demand respect.

Samba: No. Actually it’s not about lucky. I’m a person. I use my mind about everything. Sometimes I get stopped from the police and [we] talk and they let me go.
Me: What do you say to them?
Samba: Yeah actually some time you get stopped. They say they want to check you. I say no you don’t check me about…you must let me know the reason why you check me. You know because I’m a person, I’m working and you see me. What respect you have for me to check me? You know what I mean? I want to know the reason first. I can allow policeman to check me no problem, cause I don’t have anything to hide.
Me: So you actually stand up for yourself?
Samba: Yeah I actually want to know the reason. Before you check me you must let me know the reason why you check me. You know what I mean. So you tell me respect about something, ok, I say no problem. Then check me. If you wanna bring me somewhere I say no. I’m free. You check me where I am. Check me and let me go, cause you not gonna find anything wrong with me (2011).

Samba’s approach was very interesting to me because so many other participants told me that their strategy was to just avoid the police and be as amenable as possible. Samba, however, chooses to fight fire with fire. In a sense, his strategy relies on the playground principle of standing one’s ground and punching the bully instead of cowering and curling up into a ball. I would wager that his calm, righteous defiance often psychologically deflates the police’s potential interest in abusing their power.

The diffident Oliver, who is more the curl-into-a-ball type, adds that apart from merely being innocent, migrants should travel in groups and not draw attention. “Don’t imitate what the locals do. Like partying overnight, like…don’t play music loudly. If I can see these locals [doing this], there is no problem. If they are a foreigner, they will get trouble” (2011). Azibo also claims to have avoided many problems with police by not getting side tracked in to the night life, avoiding people who do, and focusing only on his work. Oliver said also that “being in the right place at the right time” is very important, I think from the context referring to avoiding townships at night. Andrew claims that there is another side to that wisdom. “I walk at night, but in specific locations.” He too avoids townships, but also avoids predominantly white neighborhoods and the city center. “Yeah, because…they see a tall guy, a black guy…you see?” (2011). Andrew fears getting profiled as a black criminal as much as an immigrant target. Antonio recommends keeping one’s refugee identification at home in order to protect it from loss or wear and tear. Sometimes he keeps a photocopy, just in case, but either way, he says, it is far more
desirable to avoid police (Antonio 2011). He best summarized all the survival strategies: One has to stay alert at all times to avoid police interaction at all costs.

These avoidance strategies show tangible examples of how participants have altered their behavior, their dress, and their daily patterns of travel, work and recreation in order to continue their lives in South Africa unmolested. The illegitimate behavior of the police and the power they wield are a fixture in the migrant psyche and the countless decisions made each day about how to negotiate the human and material landscape of the city. Avoidance is the most desirable policy because of the abject powerlessness the majority feel when they either imagine or encounter the police arm of the State. This sentiment is similar to participants’ wish to avoid the Department of Home Affairs at all costs as well. These strategies of avoidance imply that the state acts a mobile, unpredictable and omnipresent push factor in everyday migrant life.

This context of powerlessness helps explain why so many participants related that the only reason they have not been confronted or are not harassed more often is due to luck or spiritual protection (Bakary 2011; Helena 2011). “That is why I say I just thank God I am not meeting those ones yet. Because God is the only one who protect you. It’s like if you pray every day you don’t want to meet these kinds of things. Sometimes it can happen” (Emmanuel 2011). Adele and Oliver feel “lucky” that they have had few interactions with Police. “…to be quite honest I met some police officers a number of times, searching people, checking IDs, they just let me pass…maybe I’m lucky” (Oliver 2011).

The police are perceived by migrants as threatening almost unanimously. Exceptions like Thomas and Samba have avoided bad interactions with the police in
Cape Town and do not view them as a threat. As for Thomas, I have seen many inconsistencies in Thomas’ statements over key issues during the time I spent in the market talking with him. I also noticed that he was once or twice vehemently contradicted and rebuffed by all the other Malawians during our focus group. Thomas may be at the very least eccentric and sometimes plainly untruthful in his statements. Despite my suspicions as to his reliability, however, he actually illuminates an important pattern in my findings. Thomas is in a miniscule minority probably because he has not lived in South Africa more than a year or so, nor ever lived in Johannesburg.

Migrants are far more likely to run into these issues the longer they reside in Cape Town or other cities in South Africa. Participant accounts clearly indicate that Cape Town has unacceptable issues with police preying upon migrants. However, they also indicate that Cape Town does not seem to have the same degree of police harassment and corruption that exists in other major urban centers of South Africa. This could be for a variety of reasons. Western Cape Province has a healthy tax base and relatively high per capita income for South Africa. Cape Town city managers are lauded as some of the best in the world, let alone in South Africa. For these reasons, at least in part, the management of police is somewhat more effective and direct in Cape Town, thus decreasing police officers’ ability or desire to abuse their power, though clearly not removing it. Nonetheless, it is important to note how much regional differences in South Africa can affect the daily lived experiences of African migrants to South Africa.
V. Impacts of Local Governance

While the Department of Home Affairs represents the countrywide keystone of migrant interaction with the national government of South Africa, some migrants must also interact with local government bodies. In the case of souvenir sellers in Greenmarket Square and St. George’s Mall, this is especially the case. As mentioned in “Market Dynamics,” the Cape Town City Council has taken increased control of these two markets in recent years. Now instead of paying rent to a businessperson, stall owners must pay their rent to the city. The change of governance over these public spaces of private enterprise has had profound impacts on the relationship between migrant souvenir vendors and the South African state.

As discussed in the “Market Dynamics” chapter, the removal of Badih Chaaban from the market and the implementation of City Council control led to the retrenchment of stall ownership. For the most part, the market stall ownership has remained constant since the change in 2008-2009. Under Badih, the market had much more fluid turn-over. Badih’s management allowed some people with questionable migration status to own stalls in the market providing they could avoid intermittent police patrols. However, in order to secure a vending location from the City Council, one must now prove legal status (Pardon 2011; Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011). Thus, in one fell swoop, the market ownership was restricted by local government only to those with legal status. This increased the migrant vendors’ need for the approbation of the national body which administers legal status: the Department of Home Affairs.

Only the owners of the stalls must interact with local government offices in any significant way. This interaction is most often the simple act of paying the R400 per
month lease fee to the City Council (Antonio 2011; Mamadou 2011; Bakary 2011; Shana 2011). Almost no owners have given up their places in the markets since the departure of Badih Chaaban (Bakary 2011; Mamadou 2011; Pardon 2011). This is due partially to the lack of better options, but also to the increased fear that if one leaves the market, there is no way of returning (Pardon 2011). Under Chaaban, ownership was at his pleasure. He was never known to evict anyone for anything other than non-payment of rent. He was known, however, to play favorites with awarding market space (Shana 2011; Antonio 2011). An owner could leave the market on good terms with Chaaban and conceivably return sometime later and jump the line of “casual” workers waiting for an open spot. Also, vendors with capital could purchase a market space directly from another owner, as long as Chaaban approved the sale. For new owners to enter the market now, they must register on a very long waiting list at city hall and await an opening (Antonio 2011; Bakary 2011). Ownership in the market has remained almost exactly the same since the city council takeover and will likely remain unchanged for the foreseeable future (Pardon 2011). Competition for vending space is now so high in Cape Town that casual vendors regularly try to sell art and souvenirs at busy intersections, while walking amongst idling cars.

As also mentioned in the “Market Dynamics” chapter, the rents in the markets have dropped dramatically, but profits have dropped even more (Antonio 2011; Mamadou 2011; Simon 2011). This means that the small portion of profits that went to assistants has dropped both in amount and proportion of net profits. Because the city reduced the number of stalls in Greenmarket Square by as much as a third, many souvenir vendors and assistants lost their jobs, flooding the market with available and desperate
laborers willing to work for less. Additionally, because the ownership cannot be changed by a Chaaban or any private entity, there is no longer any profit in leaving the market by selling one’s stall. That combined with the ironclad necessity of having fixed, documented legal status to own a stall now means that assistants find it impossible to find upward mobility in the market. It is at once a salvation and a dead end: Pardon’s “Refugee Camp” (see: Chapter 9).

One possibly unintended consequence of this action has been a reduced police presence in the market (Edmund 2011; Antonio 2011). Police may understand somewhat mistakenly that there is less ability for undocumented workers to be in the market. Thus, those in my sample group have less interaction with police now, reducing one of the major types of interactions migrants have with state bodies. Shop assistants make up the majority of the population of the market and are less likely to have documents. Those assistants who have questionable status or knowingly are without proper documentation are able to work and breathe a little easier in the market because of the reduced police presence. However, that does not mean that the governance changes have lessened the need for assistance to gain legal status, nor has it really improved the quality of their lives (Matthew 2011; Thomas 2011). It remains only a matter of time before one gets caught by police without documentation.

Me: Not everybody I talked to has a paper. Is it extremely dangerous? Just a matter of time? Matthew: Yeah I can say it’s a matter of time. Because you never know what time they [police] will come there. Azibo: Because sometimes other guys they get caught maybe not there in the market, sometimes in the street. Edmund: Coming home. Matthew: Maybe just in the road somewhere. (Focus group 1 2011)
VI. Going “Back Door”

That is not to say, though, that there are not ways to prolong the inevitable. Life in Cape Town, even “illegal” life, finds a way. One could argue that the delays and inefficiencies of the DHA create a market for identity theft crimes, forgery and other fraud (Mawadza 2008). For instance, Edmund explained to me how friends will sometimes borrow each others’ papers to get started in jobs that require them. Edmund has never paid anyone at Home Affairs for help with papers, but as he put it “You can buy them from someone else. Other guy just has to be careful” (2011).

Adele shared with me the story of how she originally got space in Greenmarket Square in the early 1990s when there were very few immigrants in the market. “I did not have work permit before. We had a lady from South Africa working for us. She came to our house looking for a job. So we say ‘no we can’t help you here, but we have a proposition for you” (2011). Adele hired her as an assistant and put the South African assistant down as the titular owner of the stall and used her identification papers. Adele and Edmund demonstrate just two of the many ways that a little creativity can go a long way in advancing one’s interests in South Africa, despite having no legal status to live or work there. This is often a key skill in negotiating life as a foreigner in South Africa, where, as mentioned in the previous chapter, wait times for Department of Home Affairs decisions and the receipt of proper documentation on refugee status can last for years.

VII. Regional Differences in Corruption

Relationships with police are better in Cape Town than in places like Johannesburg (Bomani-b 2011; Robert-b 2011; Matthew-b 2011; Edmund-b 2011;
Gilbert 2011; Amos 2011). Once I began addressing this difference between Cape Town and other South African cities, I received a wealth of consistent explanations. Paul said, “It’s better here in Cape Town. Life is better here in Cape Town. But in Jo’burg, if you walk and you have no money, you have problem. When you go out you must have money. It was a slight mistake you make, when the police come they not let you go until you give them like a 50 rand or whatever” (Paul 2011). Referring to police extortion, Gabriel said, “In Cape Town, it is not all that much. But what I’m hearing, it is in Jo’burg. But Cape Town, it is a little bit different” (Gabriel 2011). Simon related that he had problems with police at least once in Cape Town, but couched that in the following:

As I see here in Cape Town, police are good. Because they can’t stop you when you are not doing anything wrong. If they suspect, they can search you. When I’m going home, we pass through Jo’burg. In Jo’burg, even when you are walking, the policewoman they see that one is a foreigner. They stop you. Then they search. Even when you have your valid passport, everything, they search again. Especially when they see money in the pocket. Like 1000, 2000, they say ‘where did you get that money?’ Even when you tell them, ‘I work. I’m working.’ They say ‘Ah no no. You are lying. You are a drug dealer.’ No matter how much you protest they keep accusing you being a drug dealer. So some they are starting small problem. When they see the phone, you show them the phone, they say, ‘Where is the receipt?’ You say, ‘that phone, I got it long time. How can I give the receipt?’ So they end up, they need money. All the time. But here it’s like convenient in Cape Town. I can leave my paper at home. They catch me without a paper. They ask me, they going with me, there by Home Affairs and you put a finger [in the fingerprint scanner] (Simon 2011)

Simon’s account displays, only partly, the difficulties caused by carrying large amounts of currency, because normal banking tools are not easily accessible for refugees and other migrants. As Landau puts it, “some police officers have come to see foreigners as mobile ATMs” (Landau 2005, 1127). Robert related the following about police taking his property.

Robert: Ah but here in Cape Town, no one ask me for the paper. But there in Jo’burg, they took me after my paper was just expired like a week. Then they take me. To release me I give them my phone. My own phone, the one I was using…Here in Cape Town, the police they don’t fight against papers…like there in Jo’burg, the way we are sitting here, maybe if they could pass maybe three or four of them, you give them twenty bucks…The police in Johannesburg is just about money.

Me: How many times did you give money to the police?
Robert: Ah you can’t count. The only one I count is my phone because is not just a phone. It was a nice phone. But also one thing I complain, because she was a lady. Maybe if it was a man, it wouldn’t have been too much. Like for where I’m sitting. 
Me: It hurt more because a lady took your phone? 
Robert: Yeah (2011)

Matthew also claimed that he was stopped five times in Johannesburg and was extorted money on at least one occasion. He affirmed that the police there made life very hard for him. He is glad to be in Cape Town with its relatively less blatantly corrupt police force, and in his own words he echoed the following apt sentiment from Amos. “Here if you find a corrupt police he gonna ask you for money. If you find a nice one even if you don’t have paper, he ain’t gonna ask you nothing.” Participants expressed great relief at no longer living in Johannesburg, if they had in fact spent time there. The police in Cape Town may not be as abusive as those in Johannesburg, but comparisons to Johannesburg’s levels of police corruption leave much to be desired. Migrants in Cape Town still know the power police have, the danger they can present, and that being approached by a police officer is a terrifying game of chance. One never knows if they are meeting a police officer with scruples or not. Thus, the specter of police harassment is always present.

VIII. Conclusion

Police interaction has proven to be a negative experience for immigrants in Cape Town’s public tourist markets. This finding is consistent with previous research into migrant experience, despite Cape Town’s somewhat improved situation. The overarching problem amongst South African police forces seems to be a combination of historical precedent and contemporary pressures. The police today are descended from the most effective and brutal state apparatus used by the Apartheid government to enforce its...
policies of separation and repression (Borer 2003). Police under apartheid were despised by much of South Africa’s population. The many black police officers complicit in the Apartheid abuses found themselves derided and ostracized by local black populations (Borer 2003; Kynoch 2003).

Police in the post-Apartheid era have tried to heal some of these social rifts and win back public support, ironically, by continuing to take advantage of their power (Borer 2003; Landau 2005; Samara 2011). Police have taken advantage of migrants’ unpopularity to boost their reputation and make money (Crush 2008; Landau 2005; Landau 2009). The post-Apartheid influx of immigrants to South Africa has contributed to an outpouring of public sentiment directed at removing immigrants from South African urban spaces. The xenophobic populace sees the police as a key mechanism in expelling the surplus of foreigners. Police can capitalize on the spatialized social condition of migrants, much like the spatialized conditions of blacks under Apartheid, and raise citizen support by doing it. Thus, little incentive has been created since Apartheid for police members to reform in a meaningful way, even in a relatively well-managed city like Cape Town.

Despite the tacit public and governmental support for police harassment of migrants, police have not managed to ingratiate themselves to the South African citizenry. The days when police took advantage of citizens utilizing pass laws and liquor restrictions have long gone, but the police’s reputation for dishonesty lives on (Lodge 1998, Kynoch 2005). Police have also been known to harass locals, especially the poor or homeless who have little legal recourse (Saff 1996). Corruption and mismanagement (outside of migrant interactions) have caused citizens to react with dismay at the
predation, excess and immorality of South African police (Cock 2005; Moller 2005). Police may be despised even more now than under apartheid (Kynoch 2005). Regardless, South Africans across the board find the police inept or insufficient to the task of meeting the local levels of crime (Landau 2005; Cock 2005).

The response of the citizenry has been to hire private security firms *en masse* (Cock 2005; Samara 2011). Ironically, these security firms usually look no further than the legions of cheap, hard-working foreigners afoot to staff their enterprise. As anyone can see walking down busier streets in Cape Town, the day-to-day security needs of the city are being met largely by francophone Congolese migrants. A few of the friends I made who occupied such positions had combat experience in the eastern Congo, Uganda and Rwanda. Some of these friendly men smilingly told me of the blood they had shed and the atrocities they had participated in during the wars of Central Africa. Yet, ironically, their services seem to add value by keeping Cape Town residents safer than the police do alone. Despite the expense, security guards in South Africa now far outnumber police officers. South Africans now also resort more often to gun ownership and vigilantism (Cock 2005), especially amongst those groups that are too poor to afford commoditized security.

Loren Landau points out that in attempting to meet its popular anti-foreigner mandate, South African government apparatuses often knowingly exceed their legal powers with impunity. After a string of corruption charges in the years just after democratization, the penalties for corrupt and abusive behavior toward immigrants have abated. An eighth of all policemen were charged with a crime in 1996, but from this purge, no sort of political will emerged to stop police corruption regarding migrants
(Adepoju 2003). This clearly contributes to the police force’s attitude toward personal enrichment via corrupt practice. South Africa’s creation of what Landau calls “zones of legal exception” conform to a larger global pattern whereby liberal governments compromise their foundational principles in order to combat unwanted immigration (Landau 2005). The trouble with this exception to the rule of law is that it also allows police to abuse its citizenry on the suspicion of conducting “anti-immigration” raids, much like authorities in the West increasingly step on civil liberties in the name of preventing terrorism. South Africa’s suspension of its “own laws with regard to non-nationals has, in turn, generated a set of officially and socially sanctioned practices that are undermining all urban residents’ ability to exercise their civil and political rights” (Landau 2005, 1119).

Tacit acceptance of immigrant harassment allows police resources to be expended that cannot then be utilized to lessen crime. Policies of extra-legality drive migrants into shadow economies, lessening the state’s ability to extract tax revenue and also lessening migrants’ ability to hire local employees and boost employment. The extra-legal police treatment of foreigners poses a threat to the liberties of the citizenry. Yet, African migrants continue to be persecuted by the South African state, indeed “acting on behalf of its citizens” (Landau 2005, 1116). The social and political underpinnings of this “extra-legal exception” by which the State actually limits its prosperity and the reach of its sovereignty, can only be fully understood by understanding the larger scope of the relationship between migrants and South African society. In the next chapter I examine this issue in greater depth and examine the larger role of South African society in the lived daily experiences of African migrants in South Africa.
Chapter 6. Migrants and Society

…That’s the thing about xenophobia my friend, it will never end.
It’s a very complicated thing -- Paul

I. Xenophobia in South Africa

The circumstances of migrant life in South Africa shape not only quotidian experience but collect themselves into numinous and intangible barriers that corral the accessibility and livability of South African space. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relationships migrants have with South African society. Many South Africans harbor a severe dislike of foreigners, particularly Africans (Modi 2003; Crush & Pendleton 2004). Scholars have found common stereotypes justifying this dislike. Immigrants, for instance, are purported to be violent, arrogant, and criminally bent (Adepoju 2003; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; McDonald 2002; Sinclair 1999). Immigrants are accused of taking precious few jobs in a country with near forty percent unemployment and dragging down service delivery and development (Crush 2000; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; Hansen et al. 2009; Landau 2006; Maharaj 2001; McDonald 2002; Solomon 2005; Steenkamp 2009). The largely male immigrant populations are also accused of “stealing” South African women (Dodson and Oelofse 2002). On a related note, many South Africans believe African migrants to be responsible for bringing diseases like HIV/AIDS to South Africa (Anderson 2006; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; McDonald 2002). In the opinion of most South Africans, immigrants number far too many and should all be deported (Anderson 2006; Crush 2008). Little distinction is made between legal and illegal resident foreigners (Anderson 2006; Dodson and Oelofse 2002; Shea 2008). Draconian
measures like pass laws that restrict geographic movement based on identity factors, eerily reminiscent of Apartheid, are also strongly favored (Crush 2000; Crush 2008).

Anti-migrant sentiment, often referred to as “xenophobia”, routinely becomes violent. In one example, in May 2008, a notable series of xenophobic attacks left over 60 migrants dead and many more displaced. Many homes and stores were looted and burned. The most alarming aspect of these attacks was their rapid spread nationwide (Steenkamp 2009). Anti-foreigner sentiment has steadily grown in government and civil society since 1994, as have violent attacks (Crush 2008; Murray 2003). Unless vast measures are taken, which is extremely doubtful, large-scale xenophobic violence is likely to occur repeatedly in the future (Crush 2008). In fact, this hostility “towards foreigners has become one of the most significant features of post-apartheid South African society” (Sinclair 1999, 466). In sum, South Africans are one of the most prejudiced and antagonistic populations towards foreigners (Adepoju 2003; Crush 2008; Steenkamp 2009).

All migrants are aware of and must deal with the deep-seated hostility of South Africans (Shea 2008; Sinclair 1999). Migrants’ opportunities, unlike those of South Africans, are heavily affected by their diminished ability to interact safely with locals on a daily basis (McDonald 2002). In Shea’s dissertation’s findings (as in Warner & Finchilescu 2003 and this study), most respondents reported commonly experiencing verbal abuse (Shea 2008). Legal, illegal and refugee migrants all express similar treatment, as assailants make little or no distinction between them (Sinclair 1999). Before field work, I hypothesized that poor treatment, verbal and physical attacks, and all of the resulting fears and insecurities would likely play a large role in the development of
migrants’ survival strategies in South Africa. As understanding these survival strategies is a main focus of my study, I sought to address this issue in interviews, focus groups and casual conversation with African migrants.

Scholarly attention has usually been paid to South African xenophobia via South African perceptions and their contribution to the phenomenon. As Warner and Finchilescu aptly point out, “[T]here is comparatively little research on how foreigners, particularly refugees, experience this prejudice. The traditional lack of emphasis on the targets’ perspective has resulted in a bias towards understanding the perpetrators rather than the targets of prejudice” (2003, 36). I believe that the traditional bent toward perpetrators ignores the relational and iterative processes that contribute to social phenomena. A focus on migrant perspectives and agency displays how targets of prejudicial abuse “manage aspects of their social world rather than how they are only manipulated by the prejudice of others” (Swim et al, 1998:38, quoted in Warner and Finchilescu 2003). In this project, therefore, I shift the discussion of xenophobia to incorporate the lived experiences of migrants negotiating this obstacle to their survival. In doing so, I am better able to locate where and how migrants’ strategies shape social and material space within dialectical processes shaping South African (primarily urban) space.

II. Migrants’ Experiences of Society

Participants conveyed a dizzying array of negative experiences with South African society. These experiences result largely from the considerable anti-foreigner sentiment present in South Africa. Migrants are certainly aware of this xenophobic
sentiment and shared a surprising number of reasoned arguments for why they thought it existed. Many participants had been in South Africa during the large-scale xenophobic manifestation of May, 2008. Their stories informed and confirmed my hypotheses. Yet, to a person, participants conveyed a sense of how the menacing presence of xenophobia remains deeply entrenched in their everyday lives as both fearful memory and continuing violence. For many participants, there is no real divide between the curses thrown at them on the train and the way they feel treated by the police or DHA (Department of Home Affairs) bureaucrats (Amos 2011). Many migrants experience these interactions as social interactions, even if they are largely based on state policies. This stems from a recognition that policy is inevitably based on similar social/historical foundations. I wish to clarify that though I have split the discussion of state and society into separate chapters for the sake of organization, I conclude, as do my participants, that the obstacles to survival of daily migrant life in South Africa are more connected and overlapping than not. Seemingly disparate obstacles of state and society are really interwoven threads stemming from the same sad tapestry of South African social and political culture.

When asked about relationships with South Africans, participants began by expressing that South Africans simply did not like foreigners (Amos 2011; Shana 2011; Andrew 2011; Ibrahim 2011). “I think they are bad if you jump their borders. Especially if you want to go out with their ladies. But they hate some foreigners, people from here. They hate some foreigners” (Blessing 2011). “People in South Africa don’t like you. They think you have lots of money or something” (Bakary 2011). “I tell you something, till now, because they’ve got legacy against the foreigners. Especially of the Apartheid. Then they treat us in a xenophobic way” (Ibrahim 2011). For many immigrants, like
Blessing and Ibrahim, xenophobia is actually the largest problem for foreigners trying to make a living in South Africa.

When asked to compare Malawi to South Africa, Azibo said, “Yeah it’s more dangerous here. Because these people, they don’t like foreigners especially. The people from South Africa, they don’t like foreigners” (2011). Participants felt discriminated against at many levels of society (Gabriel 2011; Ibrahim 2011; Issa 2011). Warner and Finchilescu noted that “Participants felt that their efforts to make a life for themselves in South Africa were blocked. They attributed their difficulties to the fact that they are foreign, rather than to any other factor. Participants felt that being foreign was often an instant barrier to employment” (2003, 38). Many of my participants expressed such ideas, telling stories of their job searches and working experiences, from before working in the market (Adele 2011; Willie 2011; Paul 2011; Robert 2011). Canaan and Ibrahim for example were journalists in their home countries of Zimbabwe and Sudan respectively. Both felt that they would have had no problem finding work in journalism in South Africa if it were not for xenophobic discrimination (2011).

Migrants also encounter harassment and abuse from a variety of societal actors. Matthew, in explaining why he did not think that South Africa was a good place for foreigners, said,

Because it’s like intimidation. Even like when it comes to the landlord. Like wherever I was staying, I was having problems with the landlords. It’s like the month is finished. You are paying like 500 rand plus electricity. Come month end, you make the rent. They are still giving you problems. After two days they say, ‘No electricity is finished, you have to give us extra money for electricity!’ Maybe they see you coming from work, you are carrying something. They are like ‘Why are you buying your own? You are supposed to buy something for us.’ These things. Yeah it’s hectic (2011).

In the working world of the market, street vendors experience even higher visibility than the average foreigner (Klotz 2000). This was one reason I originally chose
to study street vendors, as it stands to reason then that public vendors have valuable insights into the public manifestations of xenophobia, not only the interpersonal. Participants largely reported experiencing verbal attacks in the market on at least one or often many occasions. Canaan, perhaps because he is new to the market, felt safer in the market because of being around so many other foreigners. However, Antonio, a Greenmarket Square veteran, told it differently. “Even here in the market. Even those who we have working here, pushing the stuff. These people come to you and say, ‘Listen, these stuff will be only for us. You are stealing our jobs! But this is our stuff for money!’ Antonio would respond to them, “Nobody gave us money to start our business here!” which would do nothing to dissuade aggressors. “They say no, these one are ours!” (Antonio 2011). Thus, Antonio explains, they are targeted for theft because angry locals feel entitled to the goods in the market. Antonio said that, after foreigners stopped hiring locals, and began hiring only foreigners as pushers and assistants, and began renting storage space only from foreigners, the thefts diminished greatly. Though, sadly, theft from the stalls in the market still happens. Adele also mentioned how very few migrants in the market hire South African assistants anymore because they are known to pocket profits and merchandise while owners are away. “When you come ask about it, they are aggressive!” (Adele 2011).

Antonio’s wife Helena, like many others, gave examples of the public insults and unkind words that are thrown at migrants. “Some they call you names, ‘Go back to your country!’ she laughed. “Yes, one day we gonna go back!” (2011). “Each and every day you can face it,” said Issa from Senegal. “You can be walking in the street, and sometimes you can see it – evil eyes. That can talk. Instead of like telling you straight
that like ‘I don’t like you. Go back to your country!’ you see like evil eyes that do that to you” (2011). Adele said that her first job in South Africa was cashiering at a SPAR supermarket. Despite how much she needed the employment, she left after two days because of the abuse she received from co-workers (2011). Blessing says that he has felt especially insulted and abused in restaurants and shops in Cape Town (2011). It seems not to have mattered to attackers that Issa, Adele, Helena and Blessing are all legal entrants and residents of South Africa. This supports the hypothesis that “Popular reactions rarely take into account the migrant's legal status. Even legal residents, including asylum seekers who have obtained the right to work, remain subject to attack” (Klotz 2000, 839).

III. Naming as Norming

Amakwerekwere is one of the insults of choice that locals throw at foreigners. It is a Xhosa word technically meaning “foreigner.” It is a sort of onomatopoeia mimicking the sound of foreign speech. It is thus similar in etymology to the English word “barbarian,” and it carries the same highly pejorative connotations. As Warner and Finchilesescu described it and its role in their study, “Many participants mentioned that speaking their own language, or being unable to speak a South African language, made it easy for South Africans to identify them as being foreign” (2003,38). “If they see you are foreigner,” one of their participants said, “you are “kwerekwere.” [They] give the name for all foreigners, "kwerekwere” (2003, 38). Paul, from my study, said, “They call us Kwerekwere. Just the name itself, it insults you. It’s like you are not one of them” (Paul 2011). “I never saw this in my country when I was there,” Adele assured me. “We don’t
have the time. But here they will ask you even by the taxi. You can sit with someone. ‘Are you amakwerekere?’ You can feel only bad, because they treat you like you are not from here (Adele 2011). To understand the power that a word like amakwerekwere can have, I turn to Murray’s argument that naming is a kind of norming. “Names are an integral part of both a symbolic and material order that confers legitimacy on those with the power to affix labels to others, and, conversely, de-legitimates those burdened with bearing the stigma of “otherness” (2003, 447). Thus, those who harbor xenophobic fears utilize such appellations to designate and exclude foreigners from enjoying membership benefits of community and social services in South Africa, while simultaneously buttressing their own sense of entitlement. This style of norming also functions at a more violent level that derogatorily categorizes those seen as being at fault in bringing about an imminent destruction of South Africa. To the majority of migrants like Adele, the constant reminders of being a foreigner are incredibly shaming, hurtful and disenchancing. Hurtful insults, though very important to recognize, are clearly less frightening than the deeper ramifications of more intense forms of norming.

Migrants primarily fear the more violent expressions of these insults and thefts. Helena shared her horror at seeing on the news that three Zimbabweans were killed in their houses in Polokwane the night before I interviewed her. “They are violent,” Andrew said referring to South Africans. “Yeah that they are violent. They don’t have a second thought you see. They just do what comes up in their mind. Everybody says that. I am not the only one you have interviewed!” (2011). Robert related that he had been stabbed in Johannesburg, which prompted him to move to Cape Town. He showed me a long, jagged scar near his jugular. Robert was visiting his brother at a residence inhabited by
many foreigners. As he went to open the front door a man jumped out of the shadows and slashed at Robert’s neck with a broken beer bottle. As he lay on the ground bleeding profusely from the neck, the assailant left without taking anything from him. Crime in Johannesburg is nothing novel, and had the assailant taken Robert’s watch, cell phone or wallet, it would be easier to suspect it may have been simple robbery, perhaps unrelated to the fact that Robert was apparently a foreigner.

Robert’s tale resonated with those of many other participants. “They [South Africans] come and steal and rob and kill you!” Bomani said. “Many many people. Not like myself, but many many people. Many people…They come, they beat them [foreigners], even they kill them.” Two of Bomani’s Malawian friends had been killed in the last year alone (2011). “Yeah,” Matthew echoed in his interview, “maybe if you are walking on the streets, like youngsters, like guys on the streets, they ask you maybe ‘Buy me cigarettes. Buy me beer,’ you see. If you say, ‘No. I don’t have money,’ maybe they will come. They will close on you. They will search you. Then they get the money. Whatever amount they get in your pocket they will take it.” Matthew had been robbed on the street but had also seen his house broken into and all his clothes and valuables stolen (2011). “Our brother in law, they kill him for one rand. They ask him one rand and he refuse. They say ‘We know you. You are selling the stuff, always passing here with the stuff. Give us one rand.’ And he says, ‘I don’t have.’ And they kill him. They take it out, all the money he was with. And we buried him here” (Adele 2011).

Simon: One of our friends, some they cut him. They knife him. They stab him with the knife.
Me: They killed him?
Simon: Yeah he passed away there. He was going to buy like beef. He had R100 then the time he buy a beef, so he put it back, the change. So they didn’t ask him even the change. They stab him. Then they take it. So they kill him because of R47. And the other one, he used to do those paintings of animals (points to Bakary’s stand) He passed away. He’s from Zimbabwe. He passed away in 2005. I’m sure he was talking to the girls. So the
other guys, those Xhosa guys, they just say, ‘Ah, now he’s going to take our girls.’ Then they stab him. Fungai was his name (2011).

IV. Locating the Source of Xenophobia

Jonathan Crush argues the importance of recognizing scale and local difference in any study, but in the particular case of xenophobia, there is strong evidence that xenophobia is a similar factor over space and a variety of social characteristics (2000). Thus, xenophobia is not the condition of a “lunatic fringe,” but the majority (Crush 2008, 7). Specifically, he found the highest levels of xenophobia amongst the richest and poorest classes, Afrikaans, Xhosa, and Zulu speakers by language, and Cape Coloureds by race, with high levels also in blacks and whites (Crush 2008). This might surprise my participants who felt most at ease with Cape Coloureds. Studying this contradiction in findings might be a fruitful enterprise in the future. In the meantime, and more importantly, many scholars and my participants agree that the most violent acts have unanimously been attributed to poor blacks who appear to hold their views more vehemently than any other group (Steenkamp 2009; Warner and Finchilescu 2003; Crush 2000, 2008; McDonald 2002), though perhaps not as popularly if Crush is correct.

Participants indeed related that not all South Africans treated them the same. Of these, coloureds were mentioned as being the easiest to be around, and blacks the hardest, with whites somewhere in the middle (Shana 2011; Gilbert 2011; Simon 2011). Warner and Finchilescu’s (2003) study revealed this same assertion amongst their study group. In the focus group I facilitated with Malawian assistants, they unanimously asserted that the most dangerous form of xenophobia comes from black people. They clarified further that it comes from blacks all across South Africa, in their experience, not merely the Xhosas.
who happen to be the largest African ethnic group in Cape Town. “Me I can tell you the
nicest people I know are coloured people. They never talk of racist, saying ‘you are a
foreigner and that’. Few of them, they are bad” (Amos 2011). Bakary from Senegal said
that he thought all South African racial groups equally troublesome, yet he admitted
preference for living near coloureds or whites rather than blacks (2011). “Really,
sometimes it is very bad, because South African people they don’t like other people.
Most especially the black people” Pascal told me. “It’s a difficult to live with them”
(2011). “Ah, to my side,” Simon said, “the nice people are the coloureds…Some, they are
good.” However, as Simon clarified, only educated coloureds are relatively kind to
foreigners, and even more educated Xhosas can be too (2011). In their analyses of the
phenomenon of xenophobia, many participants referenced the issue of education, as I
discuss later.

As an anecdotal, yet instructive, aside, one day I was approached by a coloured,
middle-aged security guard who had seen me in the market consistently for some time.
He cheerfully introduced himself as Kramer, and asked a bit about me and what I was
doing in the market. I told him that I was from the United States and was working on a
research project about migration in South Africa. I had seen this security guard around
the market for weeks, and would continue to see him until I left. He could often be seen
talking, laughing and animatedly joking with market workers. So when he opened his
mouth I expected some sort of incisive social commentary on the ills of the South African
penschant for xenophobia. “Ahh, there is a real big problem with the refugees,” he said,
and I nodded expectantly. “They all need to go! Too many of them. They are swarming in
this county and not being stopped.”
I noticed the tone of his voice, the frustration, the use of words like “swarm” as if migrants were locusts eating up fields.

“Do you mean refugees or all migrants?”

“All of them. They are all refugees!” He swept his arm in a wide arc over the market.

“So, what do you think should be done?” I asked.

“They are criminals! We should get rid of the lot of them. They take up jobs. They bring drugs into the country. We must stop them. But the government isn’t doing enough about it.”

This conversation struck me, because it was directly in line with what Crush had reported about coloured communities actually harboring a great deal of xenophobic sentiment, though they do not often express it violently, or in Kramer’s case, even directly to migrants. Kramer makes his wage protecting migrants, yet deeply holds xenophobic sentiment, which in the aggregate builds structural cultural barriers to migrant advancement and self-fulfillment. At the same time, migrants may never know it, because he jokes with them every day under a shade tree. If a jovial and kind man like Kramer who actually knows migrants personally could hold such beliefs, I wondered to myself, then how much more vehemently could they be held by the large number of South Africans, primarily blacks, with less experience of foreigners, few or no friends outside of their ethnic group or social circle -- people living in poverty with little to lose and no prospects for their own future? How dangerous could such people unwittingly be to migrants and to peace and justice in South Africa?
When asked where anti-foreigner sentiment was felt or experienced most strongly, I received a number of responses. Foremost in the minds of migrants I talked with, were the “locations” or former townships, which are hotbeds of xenophobia. I devote the next chapter to this issue, so I will be brief here. Apart from townships, migrants referenced feeling relatively safe in the City Bowl, though many told of negative experiences there too. The testimony of those like Ibrahim, Antonio and Issa, veterans who had perceived numerous dirty looks and been harassed or abused in the city, showed that the urban center of Cape Town was certainly not free of xenophobic expressions. “[E]ven if it is the town, they can do the same things here” (Issa 2011). “You feel it in any public place” (Ibrahim 2011). However, I noticed a clear pattern that most urban or peri-urban expression of anti-foreigner sentiment (excluding that in predominantly black townships) had been encountered while using public transport. “If I am on the train going from Khayelitsha to Cape Town, if you speak and you are a foreigner, they just look at you. Maybe they start speaking bad about you” (Oliver 2011). “But the moment you go there in the train, you speak your mother tongue, they gonna say “Hey amakwerekwere!” (Shana 2011).

“In a taxi…they try to treat you in a rude way, you got me? They don’t know you are educated. Bus driver always used to, because we don’t talk their language. Our accent also, when we talk, is different. You see? Because the English, they talk it in their own way. And also our features also a little bit different” (Ibrahim 2011).

Ibrahim is a case study all by himself. Of all participants, he has been in South Africa the longest, is one of two to have received citizenship, claims to have been the first migrant to be awarded a post-apartheid refugee status (somewhat convincingly I might
add), and he has had, by far, the most interaction with the South African government apparatus, through a number of different offices. These interactions have left him certain that xenophobia infects South African society so thickly that it causes him to be mistreated both systemically and by individual bureaucrats. “I am a citizen, but there I go…for example I got to apply for a house. Now is 14 years. They didn’t give me a house. But some people they come from Transkei 5 years, 3 years, they give them. They didn’t give me a house. You feel the segregation.” Ibrahim here is referencing the South African government programs that ostensibly have endeavored to give every South African a house (see Ibrahim’s original application for housing dated from 1997 in the appendices).

I tell you, they don’t care about us, completely! I tell you, whenever I go to the government, when I want something normal, because you must have relationship with the government if you are a citizen, They will ask, ‘Where you from?’ Because your accent. I say ‘Why you ask me where I’m from? I come to you, this is my I.D. You see I am citizen!’ They ask you ‘Where you from?’ and ‘How long you are here?’ You see this all. I tell you here in this country they never ever respect foreigner! (Ibrahim 2011).

Many participants, if not all, were familiar with the term xenophobia, which is far more common parlance in South Africa than many other English-speaking countries. Yet, Ibrahim was one of the few who used it to reference the phenomenon of generally pervasive anti-foreigner sentiment. For most participants however, the word “xenophobia” elicits memories of the violent, large-scale anti-foreigner uprisings in mid-2008.

V. The “Big” Xenophobia

In May 2008, a riot erupted amongst poor black South Africans in Alexandra, a township just outside of Johannesburg. The riot rapidly turned into a bloody bout of anti-
immigrant mob violence. Dozens of migrants were left dead or wounded. If this were not bad enough, these mob attacks and riots spread like wildfire through Gauteng Province and then throughout the entire country in the coming days and weeks (Steenkamp 2009). In the end, dozens of African migrants, and South Africans thought to be migrants, had been stabbed, burned or beaten to death, with hundreds more wounded. Untold numbers saw possessions stolen or otherwise harmed. Cape Town’s migrant population was not spared. Most participants in my study were directly impacted at some level by the violence. Even for the few who escaped relatively unscathed, the event’s terrifyingly rapid spread and violent nature remain fixed in their imaginations of the landscape in which they live.

When riots erupted, Edmund ran from his home in Khayelitsha and slept outside of the police station in Milnerton for many days until it was somewhat safer to return. Edmund went back once to pick up his things and immediately moved to Delft, a township similar in poverty (and affordability) to Khayelitsha, but with more foreign population (2011). Pardon lives in a safer part of town, but he housed a group of friends during the crisis after a foreigner was killed in front of their shack. Bomani and Alex had all their possessions stolen from their homes. Theft was the most common abuse participants experienced (Paul 2011).

On the second day of the “big” xenophobia in May 2008, Ibrahim said that the home he lived in, in Woodstock, with his two children was robbed by many blacks. “They target me because I am a foreigner. Nobody can protect me, even the police. I went to the police. The police don’t care about me.” He showed me the doctor’s report from after the attack which shows where he suffered physical damage from the beating he
took during the robbery. He lost everything he owned, including clothes, bedding, appliances, food, and his kids’ possessions. “When I asked the neighbors they said ‘Oh, we thought you were moving and some people they come here and take the stuff.’” Ibrahim had a hard time buying his South African neighbor’s excuses for watching the attack and doing nothing. “You see? It’s just a conspiracy!” Ibrahim had to spend his little remaining money to buy clothes and food for his children. He was not able to pay his rent that month and was evicted. He received help from a government social worker who found a government facility to temporarily house and feed his children. Much to Ibrahim’s consternation, however, after he got back on his feet, the government refused to give his children back. Having been a mayor in Sudan, Ibrahim luckily had the bureaucratic savvy to parlay the situation to his advantage. He eventually got his children moved, at government expense, to Scalabrini House, an international NGO devoted to assisting immigrants. Ibrahim freely admits that they receive a better life there than he could provide them. “I take bad situation, xenophobia situation, you see? I am clever you see? I make South African government to pay for my children’s upbringing after they take them from me. Now I see them once or twice a week and take them for ice cream and help with their homework or something” (Ibrahim 2011b).

Participants’ usage of the word xenophobia to refer mostly to the events of May-June 2008 does not meant that they do not recognize the wider phenomenon nor consider it contained in a distinct time period. Bomani tried to express it this way:

[T]hat one was like, eh, what can I say, you know to like come out to the public to show people. But before, people had been killed. They had been robbed. They had been….that one was like for people to know now. Yeah this is the reality, before, and even now. Have you heard about the Somalians? In Milnerton? They robbed them about 200 houses. It was two weeks ago. They beat them. So yeah, it still happens. But that one was general, like for the whole country. But now it’s still happening. It often don’t make it to the news (2011).
To paraphrase Azibo’s words, the xenophobia is there, just dormant, like a volcano that grumbles and spurts each day, but is preparing to erupt once again. “But they just hide. They hide” (Azibo 2011). Emmanuel is still worried about such an eruption, “Because they can anytime do it again. See these people, I don’t know what’s wrong with them upstairs.” Emmanuel believes that the lead-up to the World Cup relieved some of the economic pressures on local South Africans involved in the vast array of construction projects. Those projects are gone now and Emmanuel is rightly concerned that the post-World Cup employment situation for South Africans will be as bleak as before, possibly giving rise to new tensions over old resource struggles. He understands some isiXhosa and is troubled by the things he hears on the train to and from town. “So, ahhh you can just think that they can maybe do it again. So here is maybe not stable, because anytime can be happening” (Emmanuel 2011).

Scholars widely agree with Bomani’s assessment that the outbursts of 2008 were only a small demonstration of widely held anger, which still seethes below the surface. Part of the reason, as Landau and Segatti point out, is that the xenophobic attacks of 2008 failed to illicit a strong governmental response or to unseat many policy makers from their denial of xenophobia (2008). They cite then-president Thabo Mbeki’s claim that the events of May, 2008 were merely an isolated bout of criminal violence. Even the South African Human Rights Commission, the branch of government one could assume would be the first to take interest in xenophobia, was hesitant to make any sort of investigation into the 2008 riots. “There is no equality here. There is no equality. There is no human rights,” Ibrahim told me. “Even if you go to the Human Rights [Commission] -- I go more than four times -- you find Xhosa peoples. They don’t care about you or your case.
Even the Human Rights here, they got a office here. I go there four or five times. They don’t care! I tell you because is the reality” (2011). Despite the wide body of scholarly evidence showing that xenophobia not only exists at a wide scale, but is also deeply entrenched in South African society, politicians and media outlets continue to ignore the issue, or worse, many continue to propagate factually baseless and inflammatory xenophobic ideas (Murray 2003; Danso & McDonald 2001).

I now turn to discuss the various strands of South African socio-political history that help to explain xenophobia. I pay particular attention to migrant perspectives, because they are widely underrepresented in scholarly work, especially those attempting to understand xenophobia and anti-immigrant political struggle. However helpful this is to building upon the literature regarding xenophobia, my main reason for doing so is to locate the primary factors that migrants perceive to be acting upon them through time and space. Understanding how migrants perceive the causal factors of such a daily obstacle to survival in South Africa is a necessary foundation to understanding the tactics migrants create and employ to manage their daily survival.

VI. Migrant Explanations of Xenophobia

It was fascinating to me to see the array of explanations participants gave for the general phenomenon and specific eruptions of xenophobia. Proximal explanations included the classic accusations made by locals that foreigners take jobs, bring crime and steal South African women. Theories regarding the ultimate causes of xenophobia offered by participants were often profound critiques, and revolved around ideas of culturally ingrained violence, a lack of education for blacks and the resulting smaller world views,
and Apartheid abuses to black South Africans. In general, I found, as Warner and Finchilescu did, that “Participants felt bewildered by the hostility they experienced from black South Africans. They expected them to be empathetic as they had also experienced persecution and oppression” (2008). In a 2010 interview regarding African perceptions of South Africa, Makame Muhajir, a fellow PhD student at the University of Kansas hailing from Tanzania, related to me that many Africans feel not only bewildered but deeply hurt by South African xenophobia. “We gave refuge to their ANC leaders during the Apartheid. If it were not for our help, South Africa would not exist as a free and democratic society as it does today. We are brothers and sisters. And then they treat our people like this!”

Sadly, despite this history of remarkable African contribution to the Apartheid struggle, South Africans seem more absorbed with the notion that immigrants are now taking their jobs (Azibo 2011; Blessing 2011; Abdou 2011; Touba 2011; Bakary 2011; Paul 2011; Andrew 2011). Bomani explained, “If you are from home and you start job here, they can see how you change and prosper…[T]o them, they feel bad inside. Because it’s their country, but you can overtake them. You can have things which they don’t have. Then they feel jealous inside” (2011). Andrew said, “So they get jealous and they say mean things and look for a way to fight with you…[T]hey cry foul that foreigners are coming too much in their country. They’re taking their jobs. But us we put it in this perspective: If foreigners, they come here, they take your job, ‘Why?’ you should ask yourself. ‘Why are they taking our jobs? Yeah I think they should ask themselves” (2011). Foreigners often answer questions like Andrew’s with accusations that South African blacks, in particular, are lazy. “Then they hate you for maybe for
success. Maybe they hate you for that. But look my brother, I am working in the rain.”
Paul waved at the torrential downpour from which we were (rather unsuccessfully) taking shelter under a rickety café umbrella in Saint George’s Mall. “You know they are there sleeping…They do not like to work like us. Because foreigners, they like to work. So, because us we like to work, that’s why they hate us” (Paul 2011).

Numerous participants referenced that South Africans who are willing to take a job are supposedly notorious for working only a couple of days before quitting (Gilbert 2011; Amos 2011; Paul 2011; Andrew 2011; Simon 2011). “So maybe you give him job today. He can work today, and tomorrow he don’t want to come” (Amos 2011). This affects hiring by foreign business owners, but also by local employers. “[Locals] get a little money and then drop off. So the white people here, if they need someone to work for them they use only foreigners. They know he needs to work. He needs money. South Africans they work only three days and then take their money” (Amos 2011). The well-documented South African entrepreneurial preference for migrant workers is an ironic contributor to the widespread xenophobia.

Adele witnessed many South Africans being given preferential treatment in stall assignment in the old Greenmarket Square of the early 90’s. “The problem is they are lazy. They got a spot when they were giving them away. They don’t like to pay. Too much things for mahala. Even house” (Adele 2011). I asked Adele what mahala meant. She responded with the following critique:

*Mahala is for nothing. They like house for mahala, for nothing. They must build for them house by government. Which, that thing, we didn’t know in our country. Government must give you house? No!. You must work! You must sweat to get money for buy your house. But for them they want something free, free, free, free, free! Which is not good for them, but is good for us because they are lazy (Adele 2011).*
Adele’s message of hard work and personal responsibility resonate with numerous other accounts from participants.

Another common complaint is that foreigners take South African wives (Paul 2011; Ibrahim; Touba 2011; Warner and Finchilescu 2003). “Then the women, they go to these foreigners, because they offer for them beers, money. Because they got children from [foreigners], they live nicely. But you see, [South Africans] are not working. Most of them they are dependent on women. In this country you see it a lot, even coloured and black, they depend on the woman” (Ibrahim 2011). Warner and Finchilescu’s participants added that South African women often find foreigners to be more kind and relationally faithful, as opposed to their view that South African husbands are adulterous and abusive (2003). This attention to “stealing women” is likely closely related to the notion that immigrants can be blamed for South Africa’s AIDS epidemic (Paul 2011).

South Africans are seen by migrants as problematically violent by nature (Andrew 2011; Paul 2011). “Yeah that they are violent. They don’t have a second thought you see. They just do what comes up in their mind. Everybody says that. I am not the only one you have interviewed. Maybe you have interviewed many people” (Andrew 2011). The ultimate causes of these character defects, to which migrants pin South African social problems, revolves around the idea that locals are a problem because that they have been confined into small areas their whole lives without the ability to travel, not even domestically. Additionally, their worldview is supposedly small because of government propaganda and lacks in education (Andrew 2011; Samba 2011; Issa 2011; Paul 2011; Antonio 2011). “Maybe it is the way they teach them from when they was young. Like other people from other place, they are animals, or things like this” (Pascal 2011).
As many participants noted, xenophobia of this magnitude is not produced only by the political need for a scapegoat, but is historically rooted. Lenri Shea hypothesizes that “The myth [of xenophobia] is born out of the struggle against Apartheid and the fact that the majority of South Africans were disenfranchised. Again, it is interesting that this also forms part of the culture of exclusion and the criteria of who belongs where” (2008, 120). Crush (2001, 7) adds that “Apartheid systematically entrenched racial discrimination in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life,” and that, because of this history, “South Africa is still one of the most race-conscious countries in the world.” Steenkamp offers that “South Africans still see themselves as apart from the rest of Africa, as exceptional, and therefore struggle to identify with other Africans” (2009, 443). Indeed, one of the saddest legacies of Apartheid is that it did not just separate white from black for decades, it separated South Africa from Africa (Schroeder 2012). It is not uncommon to hear South Africans refer to a trip north as “Going up to ‘Africa’”. This historical disjuncture is helpful in understanding the entrenched divisions that exist between peoples that are rather alike in many ways, ethnically, culturally or otherwise.

I think the reason for it, the government they didn’t deliver for them. The ANC, after they come for 1994, they didn’t deliver for the people. They didn’t change their life. They just promised them housing, jobs and this. But then the people, the foreigners who come here, most of them they’ve got a business mind…Here people, especially the Xhosas and this, they don’t have experience. The time of apartheid, they don’t work, by the law. You can’t do any business. You can work as a laborer but you can’t do any business. The second thing is they think to sell in this [market] sometimes it is shameful. The white people, most of them, they have nice cars and houses. They want to be like them. They think, 1994-95, most of them, they [blacks would] become very rich. They got a nice car, a nice house…But whatever. You can’t get it unless you have experience, the capital, unless you inherit money, all over the world…you can’t just government give you like that. Then they come and see the people who give them places here, most of them, they are foreigners. Then they think these are the peoples who are control the economy (Ibrahim 2011).
Ibrahim intelligently notes the spatial segregation of Apartheid planning. Through the creation and maintenance of townships and bantustans, the South African state successfully kept millions of blacks from meaningful participation in urban life, especially entrepreneurship (Ferguson 2008). Thus, when Apartheid spatial bans were lifted, immigrants filled the urban entrepreneurial vacuum with their social capital by way of small business savvy and networks of distribution (Dodson & Oelofse 2002). Participants like Ibrahim related a scaled, historical and systematic perspective of the plight of South African blacks that often put a sympathetic tone behind their plain criticisms. “Because the poverty predicament of South Africa, the plight of poverty in South Africa, it don’t resolved today. It can take years and years. And this animosity against foreigners will continue. It will continue” (Antonio 2011).

The system is to blame. The problem here is that the system made it hard to go up. They live in the township and they see a foreigner driving a nice car. What would you think? It’s also the suffering. This thing is socio-economic also. So people have nothing to eat. Going to sleep hungry and they have to blame someone. So, it’s easy to blame foreigners…That’s the thing about xenophobia my friend, it will never end. It’s a very complicated thing (Paul 2011).

Paul’s apt diagnosis contextualizes xenophobia primarily as a historically and economically enmeshed resource struggle. Antonio shares Paul’s dire predictions for the future.

It all depends on the policies of the leaders of the country. If they are for humanity, in terms of considering that other people from Africa also their brothers and sisters, if they understand this, hopefully there might be in the future change in view. But then if it continues in status quo, as I see there is no improvement now. ‘Cause everything that I see, the laws against immigrants is getting tougher and tougher. So I don’t believe that in the future the situation will be better (Antonio 2011).

Migrant perspectives represented in this study rest fundamentally on the notion that South African’s perspectives of African migrants, especially those of poor blacks, have been wrought by decades of unfortunate, and morally deplorable, imposed circumstances. Migrants see that the historical injustices of colonialism and Apartheid
persist to affect them today, ironically via the formerly oppressed. “Racial victims frequently internalize the dominant definitions of themselves,” Moodley and Adams argue. “The more powerless and threatened group members feel, the greater their need to denigrate others below them…In this way, new identities of superiority are manufactured” (2000, 63). Moodley and Adams’ social psychological perspective is a distillation of migrant understandings of the deep-seated needs that black South Africans are attempting to fill by denigrating migrants. As I discuss below, my participants understand xenophobia as just such an identity of superiority manufactured in response to racist and paternalistic social and spatial engineering.

VII. Creating the “Other African”

The Apartheid regime sought to control and reshape South Africa’s social, racial and ethnic identities. A democratizing South Africa has found itself in a vacuum of nationalism that has required new identities to fill in the considerable gaps that the Apartheid state interposed between ethnic and racial categories (Cornelissen & Horstmeier 2002). In the pursuit of South African unity, popular appeals to South African identity have played on Apartheid-era memes of racial superiority, South African exceptionalism and racial categorization. “Particularly striking in this growing xenophobia is the extent to which Africa remains the mental location of the threat. What apartheid defined as the 'black' threat, South Africans now generally apply to the continent as a whole, the amakwerekwere. 'Africa' remains a place outside its territorial boundaries, an area rife with crime and political instability” (Klotz 2000).

The only point is that they are not used to being in touch with foreigners…[B]ecause in those apartheid times, the white people, they were travelling to other countries. They were telling them [blacks] ‘You aren’t in Africa.’ That’s why they are calling us
‘African’ here. They say ‘I’m going to Africa,’ as if South Africa is not part of Africa. You understand, to rule them, to separate them from their own brothers and sisters...They are calling [us] ‘African’ men. They are calling ‘African’ to mean the same as foreigner...Now you know they closed to outside. They don’t talk. They don’t know what’s happening in other countries (Issa 2011).

Scholars have argued Issa’s point for many years now. Harris (2002) points to isolation hypotheses, like Klotz’s or Issa’s, as a key way of understanding the shock that international migration has caused South African society. Thus, generally speaking, “African” was presented by Apartheid leader as not just an “unknown”, but as the nearest, most chaotic, most unstable, and thus most dangerous form of outsider. This historic isolation, combined with the ways that the Apartheid state taught South Africans to view the “other African”, created a large ideological space in which resentment could ferment (Morris 1998; Harris 2002). As Harris (2002) aptly points out, the internal isolation that ethnic groups were subjected to under Apartheid fostered intolerance by eliminating many sites of rudimentary cultural contact. Not only does this help explain the intolerance South Africans of all stripes show to foreigners, it helps to explain a key aspect of the failure of South African nationalism to prevent ethnic fracture and sectionalism amongst South Africans. In fact, this fractured nationalism only increases the need South Africans have to unite over hatred of the “other African”.

Some participants conveyed the particularly racial tone of the abuse they suffered. As in Warner and Finchilescu’s study (2003), participants related the racist abuse they received to the racial divides and tensions that still plague contemporary South Africa.

Ibrahim: I tell you whatever, and in the future, if there is a naziist party, a new naziist party, anywhere in the world, it will be created in South Africa, not in Germany. The second, they will be here. This is what I predict. Because I know politics. I know Sociology. I know politics. You see, I predict the naziist they will start here.
Me: Why here?
Ibrahim: It happen here, because they are racist peoples. It has just become upside down.
Me: How is it upside down?
Ibrahim A: From the White they are racist against the black. From the black they are racist against the other [African] people.
Me: Meaning…
Ibrahim: Racist against us because anything they want they just translate it in a xenophobic way (2011).

Paul from Malawi and Issa from Senegal both remarked in detail on the ironies of African nationalism and South African exceptionalism, yet from very different experiences. “Like South Africa and Zimbabwe. They are cousins. You find Shona here you find Shona there. You find Ndebele here you find Ndebele there” Issa stated (2011). “And also, this Africa. The way South Africa is with Malawi and what, it’s like the same country,” Paul also argued. “You know why? You go to Zimbabwe, you find the people from South Africa there. You go to Malawi, you find the people from South Africa. What I mean is that the chief there is also a chief here. It’s the same people. They just migrated.” Indeed, Paul and Issa accurately depict the human geography of Southern Africa and the complexities caused, not only by European drawn borders, but by the resulting ironic and meaningless divisions of culture groups based on Colonial desires or South African Nationalist Party “exceptionalist” propaganda. Paul claims, as many scholars have, that during the “big” xenophobia, dozens of South Africans were killed and many more wounded or robbed, due to the difficulties in differentiating foreigner from citizen when judging only by appearance or language. Despite his assertion that xenophobia is not likely to go away because of engrained social contexts of resource struggle, Paul stated firmly, “Xenophobia will never work. It can’t work. That’s why it failed.”

Issa made a very interesting point about the position of Senegalese in the xenophobic landscape of South Africa. Despite the anti-foreigner animosity directed against the far more numerous immigrant populations like Zimbabweans, Issa argues that because of the cultural similarities with many South Africans, Zimbabweans have an
easier opportunity adjusting to South Africa and avoiding problems. For example, Issa argued, South African Members of Parliament can be seen spending time with a street kid, because it signals being of the common people. “They don’t show off.” On the other hand, Senegalese take the exact opposite approach culturally. In order to prevent others from pitying them, Senegalese refuse to hang their heads from hunger or worry, are scrupulously clean and usually wear bold colors and shiny accessories, no matter their financial situation. “And I tell you they can be like good looking but nothing in their pockets. But [South Africans] think these guys are very rich so they will start targeting them to take their money. So their lives gonna be in danger.” As Issa and many others cautioned, the key in avoiding xenophobic violence or abuse is to avoid letting locals feel “undermined.” More importantly however, as Issa points out, Senegalese are engaged in a small segment of trade, one which, as mentioned previously, local South Africans show little interest in. “The ones who are not educated are always thinking that other people are taking their jobs. But there is those who are not educated. But even those people don’t have a problem with the Senegalese people, you see? Because what they do and what the Senegalese people do are different” (Abdou 2011), as opposed to other nationalities that gravitate to the same sort of work South Africans want to do (Abdou 2011; Ahmadu 2011; Touba 2011). Thus, despite their vast phenotypical and cultural differences from South Africans, they actually receive less negative attention as the “African Other”. These perspectives of the Senegalese participants, that they avoid problems because of the sectors of trade in which they involve themselves, add even more weight to the argument that xenophobia, though complex, may be easiest to predict when regarded fundamentally as a resource conflict.
VIII. Conclusion: “Through the Social, for the Social”

Xenophobia is an enduring pattern within the mosaic of migrancy in South Africa, during Apartheid and since. It is a window into understanding the present resource struggles afflicting the largely impoverished populace. It is a window that reflects the decades of Apartheid injustices perpetrated upon black South Africans who were systematically grouped and constrained within tightly controlled landscapes of ignorance, poverty and insult. Lastly, it is a window that looks out upon a troubling future landscape for the South African experiment. Xenophobia, like bureaucratic corruption and zones of extra-legal exception, not only actively corrodes the principles of liberality upon which a “new” South Africa must be founded, but more frighteningly gives view to the fact that these foundations may have been papier mâché from the start.

Constantly reminded that they are amakwerekwere, and thus unwelcome in South Africa, migrants are hesitant to identify with South Africans, let alone feel sorry for their plight. Yet, many migrants still take sympathy intellectually on South Africans, especially poor blacks, because they see the larger scope of historical disenfranchisement that has left them destitute. Migrants have also witnessed the false promises, corruption and mismanagement of political leaders in South Africa that have left the South African dream largely unfulfilled. Immigrants recognize that they provide an easy scapegoat for politicians, unemployed poor, and a number of other groups. “[T]he massive rate of unemployment, the unsympathetic nature of the authorities and the mass media, and the general lack of education combined with the years of isolation perhaps preclude the possibility of a more generous response to African foreigners at this stage in South
Africa's history” (Morris 1998, 1133). African migrants, though hurt, angry and longing for improvement, nevertheless realize this to be true.

At the end of Apartheid, South Africans were not only allowed to interact more between cultures and ethnicities, but in some ways were obliged to for the sake of democracy. South Africa had been possessed since its inception by a small, powerful elite. The vast majority of its citizens had never before been confronted with the need to cooperate politically and overcome difference. “In searching for the Holy Grail of commonality, South Africans [were] seeking ways to define themselves as national beings, de-emphasizing the predominant ethnic classifications devised by the apartheid system” (Sinclair 1999, 469). Thus, xenophobia is partially the sad byproduct of a rather effective means of building nationality (Crush 2000). “South Africans have often appealed to nativist discourses in efforts to resolve these disputes in ways that deny rights of residence to those who cannot claim or demonstrate their South African origins” (Landau 2005, 3). Xenophobia, in fact, “provides substance to a national identity (Schinkel 2009, 791). At the same time, however, South Africa has experienced increasing ethnic identification in the wake of Apartheid, largely due to resource scarcity of one sort or another (Shea 2008). The continuing need to shape national identity in the face of powerful ethnic identities will only aid the continuation of xenophobia.

The foundational and ultimate causes of xenophobia have much to do with historical isolation and complex place specifics. However, without the fierce contemporary competition over South Africa’s incredibly scarce resources, it is difficult to argue that xenophobia would be so commonplace or vociferous (Shea 2008; Landau 2005). Because of the many ethnic, political, and religious fault lines, nationality was the
easiest rallying point to decide who should access resources (Landau 2006; Modi 2003). This would explain why “It is among the poorest groups that the question of loyalty and belonging are asked most vehemently, and where the reprisals are likely to be the most violent” (Hansen et al. 2009, 194). The relationship between citizens and foreigners is most highly pressured by the common context of poverty (McDonald 2002). Dodson and Oelofse have argued that an important aspect of the context surrounding poverty conflict is that South Africans are usually migrants themselves to the urban areas that are the locus of conflict (Maharaj 2001; Sadouni 2009; Sinclair 2001), where each group of migrants is “competing to establish themselves in a new social, economic, and physical environment” (2002, 137).

Lastly, xenophobia is a large factor in the creation of the identities that migrants fashion for themselves. More than anything, Harris argues, it is xenophobia, rather than distance from home, that makes Africans feel most foreign, resulting in alienation from South African society (2002).

This understanding of the impact of xenophobia on identity, together with the culture of violence that pervades ordinary South African life, suggests that xenophobia is not the pathology it is represented to be. Rather, it is a key component of the 'New South African' nation. To read xenophobia as a pathology is to contest traditional, normal understandings of psychopathology. It is not individually located and is not counter-normative, but rather operates through the social, for the social, serving to disguise relations of power and discursive contradictions (Harris 2002).

My participants, along with most foreigners in South Africa, did not wish to assimilate to or even live in South Africa at all if they could help it.

In this chapter, I have explored the distance migrants feel from the South African society surrounding them, largely due to xenophobia. In the next chapter, I examine the ramifications of this distance. I conclude that xenophobia in South Africa (and globally) will be an increasingly common feature of the migrant experience. It is then beneficial to
ask and ascertain how much increasing xenophobia might cause migrants to behave and think in new ways, perhaps in their decisions about how to operate in time and space. In this vein, I will complete my analysis of migrant relationships to South African society, by examining the strategies most commonly employed to avoid any negative impacts of South African xenophobia, and by examining the socio-spatial effects these strategies have.
Chapter 7. The Social and Spatial Effects of Xenophobia:
Perceived Boundaries Made Material

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I surmised that South African xenophobia impacts migrant perceptions of the accessibility and danger of South African space. Xenophobia significantly affects the lived daily experience of African migrancy in South Africa via universal experiences of “abusive treatment by police, exclusion from healthcare and education, xenophobic treatment by the South African public, and exclusion from livelihood opportunities” (Amisi and Ballard 2005, 3). In the last chapter, I examined the numinous, intangible boundaries that xenophobia places on migrants’ psyches and their perceptions of accessibility and safety. Moving ahead in this chapter, using the same migrant perspectives, I display how the numinous becomes tangible, i.e. how xenophobic sentiment, translated through migrants’ experiences and perceptions of it, is rendered by migrants into concrete and tangible social and spatial patterns. These patterns cast light upon migrants’ survival strategies and how these strategies impact South African space. Equally important, they actually reflect a reiteration of South Africans’ responses to their own matters of survival in the face of dynamic national change after years of marginalization and racial abuse.

Xenophobia, as I have argued, is often best understood as a resource conflict, but it cannot be considered so independent of context. It is not simply a sum of locals and foreigners fighting for a piece of the pie. South African xenophobia is the methods of disenfranchisement crystallized and distilled by centuries of colonial control mechanisms that have now been reinterpreted by contemporary voices and remobilized to specific
contemporary political issues. Xenophobia is not the result of resource struggle alone. It is the combination of political, societal, economic and, not least of all, psychological stresses, which target an at-risk foreign group. Xenophobia is the socio-geographic cousin of territorial cleansing, genocide and domestic political sectionalism. Thus, it must be seen as a discursive strategy that is physically violent psychologically, politically and economically. In this way, migrants’ responses to xenophobia must also be seen as strategies of survival: psychological, political and economic. The purpose of this chapter is to examine, in the particular context of South African xenophobia, the tangible ways in which migrants defend themselves psychologically, politically and economically by mobilizing the resources and human capital at their disposal, in order to live another day and earn another dollar.

One could argue that the South African state and local government have created more direct obstacles to entrance into the country and its economy and thus migrant livelihood. Yet the dangers presented by xenophobia have inspired a larger host of survival strategies that migrants mobilize to prevent harm. For this reason, xenophobia seems to me to impact the day-to-day experience of migrancy in South Africa far more than the DHA or the police. In particular, it creates more distinctly spatial patterns in the human geography of mobility, recreation and habitation in Cape Town.

In order to parse out migrants’ strategies for avoiding negative experiences with South African society, I asked my participants how they would advise a classroom full of new African migrants to South Africa, if they were the teacher. They responded consistently with ideas about transport, recreation, social proximity and residence location. Transport is a troublesome requirement for those migrants working in central
Cape Town. Only a few of my participants lived within walking distance and only two owned cars. The limited means of public transport leave people with two choices: minivan taxis and trains. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, transport is one of the most common settings for displays of xenophobia. “But there on train sometimes people they talk. Because me I don’t keep quiet” (Robert 2011). The need for traveling between home and work makes public transport an unavoidable risk.

Most participants also live some walking distance from their taxi van stop or their nearest train station. The greatest difficulty in taking public transport, participants warned, is the walk between stops and home. “Avoid the night” (Edmund 2011). Edmund’s three-word summary of his strategy for avoidance, though it sounds like the title of a bad horror movie, was unanimously voiced to be the wisest course. “You must really know your time to walk. Not just anytime. You can’t be free like [locals]. No. To walk in Khayelitsha at night is not safe” (Pascal 2011). Oliver echoed, “Yeah like in the location, the worst thing that can happen with a foreigner…don’t walk at night. Standard. You can be robbed. Even there in Khayelitsha, even daylight, if you are not like enough [in a large enough group], you can be robbed. Especially phones or money, at knife point. I have witnessed this many times! Even in front of my place” (Oliver 2011). If one must walk, safety is more likely in numbers. On this topic, Adele warned, “If they [hypothetical students] don’t know nothing about [South Africa]…to be safe, you must know where you are going and which place you are going and what for. Don’t go any place just because you want to go” (2011).

Social recreation was another problematic issue commonly addressed by participants. Not surprisingly, the two favorite pastimes of the largely young and male
group in the market revolve around young women and partying. However, this lifestyle is simply not an option for most African migrants in South Africa who truly want a chance at success (Matthew 2011; Bomani 2011; Edmund 2011; Simon 2011; Andrew 2011). My Malawian focus group agreed unanimously that the key was to not get into partying and city life in the first place. On that note, one Malawian said, “And with women, there is never enough money!” This was very similar to a comment Mamadou had made to me in his interview about the expense of dating South African women. Undoubtedly, a large reason that participants avoid drinking and dating is the expense. Another is that the grueling hours that are expected of a market worker do not leave room for hangovers or fatigue. “The advice I can give them,” Matthew cautioned in our interview, “If they are living in the townships, they must stay away from the shebeens. You know those small taverns.” The reason he claimed, was not based primarily on cost or incompatibility with work life. “They must be home on time. If they knock off from work, they are going to townships, they must reach home earlier because the earlier you are home the safer you are. Going home late you are asking for trouble.” The problem with public drinking, for Matthew, is primarily the darkness after work hours, relating to the necessity of carefully timing one’s travel. Add alcohol onto the danger that inspired Edmund’s maxim above—“avoid the night”—and it is even easier to understand the dangers at play. “Most of the youths who indulge in like too much booze. Booze is where you can get a problem. Maybe too much booze and I’m stumbling in the streets, people can attack me” (Matthew 2011). Not only that, any migrant would agree, but great danger is presented by the inevitable group of locals, usually poor, who are also drinking at a bar or shebeen. The
only course then, regarding safety, work ethic and finances, is to avoid social recreation, alcohol, travel before dark and walking alone.

II. Housing location

These preventative measures can do much to help, but still do not assure one’s safety. The best strategy, participants unanimously concluded, is to remove oneself from troublesome locales and situations whenever possible. The best way to do this is to avoid living in the “locations” all together (as former townships are often popularly called), or even passing time there. In the previous chapter, I explained the experiences migrants have had with xenophobic sentiment and its manifestation into insult and abuse. In this section, I examine the socio-spatial effects of xenophobia relating primarily to geographic decisions migrants make regarding housing location.

Migrants to Cape Town endure a great deal of hardship in their daily lives. Living conditions are often impoverished or spare at best. Migrants come to South Africa with the intention of making a better life for themselves and to help support their families back home. These goals necessitate great thrift. All participants displayed a staggering work ethic and show admirable durability under daily strain in pursuit of these goals. Indeed, if they did not, they could not work or compete in the souvenir trade to begin with. Likewise, participants showed a great willingness to endure hardship and substandard living conditions for many years if it meant a better life in the long run. Given these motivations, it follows that the long travel times, low-quality housing and even relatively high crime in townships would not stop most participants from living in the cheapest areas of greater Cape Town. However, despite the much greater expense
incurred by living closer to town in more affluent neighborhoods, nearly every participant displayed a frank aversion to this money-saving measure, running in direct contravention of the ostensible purpose of their life in South Africa. In this section, I hope to explain the reasons for this conundrum.

When I became aware of such spatial irregularities in the patterns of African migrant life in Cape Town, I inquired of participants which factors were the primary influences in their decisions regarding housing location. Themes of safety, housing cost, travel cost and travel time to the CBD were the deciding elements. In the course of probing this issue, it became abundantly clear to me from interview responses that safety was the driving factor, trumping even cost and convenience. Respondents felt certain that living in “locations” (term synonymous with impoverished former “townships” and their environs) put them at grave risk (Shana 2011; Bakary 2011; Issa 2011; Edmund 2011; Robert 2011). They identified the high criminality of the locations as a problem (Blessing 2011; Edmund 2011; Adele 2011; Samba 2011). Additionally, participants related that it was their foreignness, specifically, that magnified the threat of abuse and made living in the locations untenable.

There are no guarantees of safety even outside of townships. “You can’t avoid [xenophobia] if it comes, but it’s better if you are in the city. In town it’s better,” Blessing said (2011). Florence believed that “[Living in a location] is cheap, but there is no security for foreigners” (2011). “[F]or their security, they must avoid being in the locations. If they want to live longer, they have to be out of that area. It’s best to live closer to town,” Antonio cautioned (2011). Being fierce adherents to Antonio’s brand of advice, nearly every participant lived outside of the townships or aspired to do so. “All
the locations I do not go,” Bakary said flatly. Matthew, who lives in Nyanga, said the he would do anything to get out of the locations to a safer place like the City Bowl, but would happily settle for Maitland. Either way, his financial prospects do not bode well for such a move. He will continue to live in Nyanga with his wife and son for the foreseeable future.

I hate that there, in the locations, the crime is too much. Here [in town] it is very safe. You can move any time. Even 1:00 am you can move...It’s better to live in town. I know it is expensive but it is the safest place to stay...Is it an option to stay in location? That one I wouldn’t advise. Because I have some friends, they who are working there, two of them, only two months I am working here, but two Zimbabweans they get stabbed you see (Canaan 2011).

Blessing, Simon and Simon’s father all live in a neighborhood within Cape Town’s city bowl called Tamboerskloof. I knew it to be an attractive neighborhood. It was next to Bo Kaap where I stayed, paying R3100 (roughly $350-400/mo) for a modest bedroom in a house. Thus, I was surprised to learn of their living in Tamboerskloof. Apart from Canaan, they were the only migrants who lived within the City Bowl. I asked Simon why they would go to the expense of living in a nice neighborhood like Tamboerskloof. He responded, “Yeah it’s better to pay more and I’m saving my life, than to go [to a location] and I pay cheap but it’s dangerous. It’s better to spend when you are safe” (2011). I then asked him if he thought that the xenophobia issue was the biggest reason that immigrants live in or nearer town, despite it being more expensive. Blessing, who was not even being interviewed, chimed in with an emphatic “Yeah!” Simon followed “I live in the city because, ahhh, I can’t stay in location.” When asked to expound on that, he groaned and said “I…there is…it is very hard to stay there. In location there is too much locals. So some they just suspect everyday the foreigner there is money. So they can come any time and they rob” (Simon 2011).
Robert made very little money as an assistant to Florence, about R1400/month, of which he spent about R200/month on marijuana, leaving only R1200 for other necessities. Thus, I was surprised when Robert told me that he lived in Goodwood, which as he put it with a laugh, “That one is only for the whites!” He pays more for the one room shack he lives in (which is attached behind a bigger building) than for a comparable place in Nyanga or Khayelitsha. “I get a good life there so can’t say it’s expensive comparably.” After rent, and essentials like ganja, Robert barely has money for food. Robert is one of the few assistants to be able to live outside of a location, Bomani, Thomas and Canaan being the other three. Thomas is somewhat subsidized by his boss, Pardon, because Pardon’s mother is also a surrogate mother to Thomas. Canaan was only able to stay near the Parliament building because he was staying with a friend while he got settled in Cape Town. Bomani is a younger man, but a grizzled veteran of South Africa all the same. He stated the following:

Goodwood is better than Khayelitsha, because Khayelitsha is a location where there is a mixture of the local people. It’s a lot of people, like their home. It’s their home. In Goodwood there is a mixture of people, the coloureds, the Xhosa, and like us also. So like everyone is busy doing their own things. Because in location there, they look what you are doing you see. How do you change? How you change? They look at you. You see? At the end, they come and rob you. They see how you come here. They look at you. They see the stage you change, then they come and get you (Bomani 2011).

Bomani makes a clear case here for why he cannot tolerate living in the locations and thus chooses to pay higher rents. He feels that the minute he earns any money, it will become apparent to potential attackers. He is already, after all, going to be watched like a hawk by local gangsters because he is a foreigner, speaking a foreign tongue. Most dangerously, he comes and goes from home just before and after business hours, clearly implying that he has a job. It is seemingly at cross purposes with migrants’ stated goals of financial improvement to spend more on housing, but here Bomani explains clearly how
saving money by living in a location can cost one a great deal more in the long run, either through common robbery, or even violence or death. Likewise, when you look at Robert’s personal history, his seemingly unsound decision (when viewed purely financially) also makes more sense. Recall that he had suffered the most violent attack of any of the participants in the market, when an assailant slashed his throat open with a broken bottle in Johannesburg. Despite the fact that Robert is an extreme example, he is in good company with the many other participants who live very close to the edge of their means in order to live in relative safety, even if it means reducing their ability to have basic comforts, save money or remit it home.

In a focus group with stall owners, I had the following exchange with Amos and Gilbert about some of the conclusions I was developing as I neared the end of my field work.

Me: One of my other conclusions is that if there was no xenophobia, more foreigners would live in Khayelitsha and cheap places
Gilbert: Yeah! Yeah! Yeah!
Amos: Yeah. Yeah.
Me: But they can’t live there because they get targeted.
Amos: Yeah you get targeted all the time. They kill.
Me: It seems like nobody is safe in Khayelitsha.
Amos: Yeah even locals
Me: But the foreigners are…
Amos: Are the most!
Me: …are in much more danger?
Amos: Yeah! Yeah!
Me: Because if I’m a Skolie [a tough, thug or gangster], I think I should go for the foreigner because they have money and fewer friends?
Amos: Yeah. Yeah. And when he don’t get money from you he just kill you. Search you, then he stab you.
Me: I think that the conclusion I’ve made is that the danger of xenophobia pushes foreigners toward the city so they end up paying more for rent. So it takes more of their money.
Amos: And the owner of the houses, of the building, they take advantage. They increase the rent, because they know you can’t go to location. You gonna stay in town. (Focus Group 2, 2011)
Gilbert lives in Maitland and Amos in Woodstock. Amos used to stay in town, in the city bowl, but flats there were too expensive. The cheapest he found was R2400/mo and had only one room. He has a wife and two children, which would make that arrangement too difficult, he said. As I mentioned before, I myself had to pay R3100 just for a room in a house in Bo Kaap and had a similarly difficult housing search. Amos now pays R3000 for a two-bedroom place in Woodstock.

Thomas pointed out another reason that migrants like to live nearer to town, which in fairness has less to do with xenophobia. “Me, I’m in Woodstock. I’m around town, because I can’t stay in the location. With the business, I like to stay in town, because with my business you see. I must be here maybe around five or six [AM], or half five to do everything ok. So to stay in location is tough for me” (Thomas 2011). The cost in money and time of traveling between the more dangerous “locations” and the center of Cape Town is higher than the cost of traveling from closer neighborhoods like Goodwood. Robert, Bomani and Thomas, all living in safer neighborhoods, closer to the City Center, all save a few rand each day in travel costs. This certainly helps financially, even if it does not come close to making up for the higher rent they pay in Goodwood.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the inevitable use of public transportation is a primary risk factor for experiencing South African xenophobia. Thus, migrants also like to live closer to town for reasons of transport that are indeed linked to xenophobia. “You get the problem at night in the locations” Edmund said. “You see, most South African boys like me, they don’t work. They just wait for someone when he’s coming from work. So to avoid that, keep safe, don’t walk at night. In town there is security, police. But in location…” (Edmund 2011). Edmund’s words echo a common theme in
participant responses relating to the dangers of the night, especially walking at night. If a migrant returns to a location at night and has to walk home from a taxi or train stop, they puts themselves in great danger. Consequently, as I witnessed every day in the market, all migrants, especially those who lived farther away in more dangerous neighborhoods, were eager to pack up and leave as soon as possible. I was very aware of this phenomenon, because it made it almost impossible to get an interview after closing time.

III. Those Left Behind

Migrants fear townships so much that they move to safer places where they must spend a larger portion of their meager resources in rent. Here again, in another ironic stitch in the larger ironic patchwork of migrancy in South Africa, migrants fear xenophobic violence so much that they are willing to exchange the surplus money that is the very reason for their struggle in South Africa for safer living conditions. For most, it is not a choice. One merely pays the extra money as a cost of living in what is seen as the hateful human landscape of South Africa. However, for many migrants, their resources are so slim that they simply cannot pay to live anywhere but the locations. For my participants these included locations like Crossroads, Delft, Nyanga and Khayelitsha. The markets from which I drew my participants contrasted with the migrant population as a whole, which is relatively less employed than my study group. Therefore, in examining the poorest of my study group, we get a window into the larger experience of migrants in Cape Town and South Africa.

“Soldiers Survive...” –Robert
For migrants who are stuck in the townships and wish to survive unmolested, they must follow all the rules discussed above. They must keep a low profile, avoid overt displays of wealth, travel only during the day, and not get involved with social drinking or crime. Yet for migrants in the townships, pressures exist that forge additional survival strategies in the midst of harsh circumstances. As I found, these strategies can be divergent, though often based on similar principles.

Me, I don’t like Khayelitsha...[T]here are other people also they are surviving there, but you must know how. It’s very hard. You see like Oliver there (pointing to him a few yards away), he is living there. He is always telling me the stories. One day there was other guys. They were living in a room of five person. The skolies come in the house and take everything. The shoes, the clothes, everything in the house. Because why? The area where they are going to stay, the place where they are going to live (Adele 2011).

This is especially true for foreigners, Adele warns. No other provocation is needed.

Emmanuel lived in Crossroads, which borders Nyanga to the east, because rent and food are affordable for him there. He lives with a mix of Zimbabweans and South Africans. His landlord is a South African Xhosa. His neighborhood is predominantly South African. “Definitely not a good place to live as a foreigner,” he said. “Because dangerous!” he said when asked for more detail. “Because of the people that live there. You see those young guys, they can even rob you, you know. Yeah all of those things is what you are facing there. Skolies, gangsters. Some call it ‘skolies’ here...And only like where we live, like the buildings is not right. They build with those sheet metals. And you see now it’s cold! Yo!” (2011). He severely dislikes living in Crossroads and hopes to leave as soon as he can afford it. “It’s like maybe if I get near the town here. From Mutual [a train stop between Pinelands and Maitland], that is where the Central Business District (CBD) begins. From there it is the location. So if I can just get a place near to the CBD.” Emmanuel thought that would be a better location because he would not be at risk
of running into so many gangsters, he would be closer to town and would be able to get home more easily before dark (2011).

Oliver was indeed a fascinating case study, as Adele had indicated to me he would be. He had become so adept at navigating Khayelitsha and its dangers that he saw no benefit anymore in paying higher rents to be closer to the city. He would save on transport costs of time and money, but lose money overall. Oliver’s story intrigued me because he was the first participant to say that he voluntarily lives in a location. Yet, Oliver did not for one second act as if he were not terribly afraid of the dangers present for foreigners in the locations. I am certain he would agree that his fears are not mere emotional responses to stories or a few bad interactions with locals, but carefully crafted assessments of the social landscape in which he lives and breathes. Actually, his cultivation of such awareness is the foundation of the survival strategy that has left him not only unharmed, but a pillar of his largely Xhosa community.

Oliver said that he tries hard to keep a very low profile. He also advises other foreigners to avoid partying or playing loud music in their homes, so as not to draw attention from neighbors in locations (2011). He recommends innocence as best policy, in keeping with a common strategy amongst participants for avoiding all sorts of trouble in South Africa, including xenophobia (Mamadou 2011; Samba 2011; Bakary 2011; Antonio 2011). “The advice I can give is that don’t involve yourself in illegal activities. No crime. If I’m staying in the locations, these locals, if they are fighting amongst themselves, they turn to me for advice.” He said. “Even if they are under attack, they shout my name. Oliver! Oliver!” Oliver tried to show that moral and legal living does not only serve to deflect attention from you, thus diminishing the chances of being targeted
for crime. He went a step further to claim that this “innocent” lifestyle helps to build positive relationships, not simply to prevent the negative. Indeed, what I term “social proximity” is the bedrock of the safest strategies for migrants in the locations. Paul, Brenda, and Oliver represent such social proximity, though in unique ways.

It’s difficult, as I said before, because if you are a foreigner, you have to learn the culture. The people whom you are visiting. Know what they want. Know what they don’t want. Cause for example, I’m a foreigner. Number of occasions, some South Africans have asked me to look after their houses, sleeping in those houses (Oliver 2011).

Oliver seems to be fundamentally assimilationist in his strategy. His pattern was to ingratiate himself to South Africans around him using deep humility, respect, kindness and linguistic skill. The diminutive Oliver stands not more than five feet and four inches tall. He has a kind face and sweet smile. The Zimbabwean father of two teenaged kids seems very young at heart for his age and level of responsibility. His survival strategy reflects his personality and comportment. “Lower yourself and they will respect you” he advises.

Oliver is in some senses on the extreme end of this strategy. “Yeah if you are a foreigner, first of all must study how the locals live, what they like, what they don’t like. Then you can see where you can fit. It will make your life a bit easier. That’s what helped me.” Oliver felt that migrants must conform to a South African society in order to be safe. “Don’t try to be ahead of them or be clever of them.” Oliver also lives in poverty, along with his neighbors in Khayelitsha. I suspected that his fear of standing out through success inhibits his drive to make money for his family as it is at odds with the high competition in the tourist trade.
As an instructive side note, compare the assimilationist tendency of Oliver with Issa’s outlook. Issa, a relatively successful Senegalese, takes a different tack regarding “fitting in.” He advises African migrants,

To know their own identity. Like if you know your own identity, amongst the people you are, you are gonna be like fortunate. Know your identity is like, never to paint yourself like a South African. You understand? Even if you are married and you have South African papers, stay in your mind like you are Senegalese. You are in other peoples’ country. And if you are in other peoples’ country, they having their own culture. The first part is to respect the culture of the people. You can live your own culture, but respect the other peoples’ culture (Issa 2011).

Issa’s comments may seem reflective of the same ideal, but I see Issa’s outlook (so common to the Senegalese I spoke with) to be in many ways opposed to Oliver’s. Issa was a proponent of cultural respect but a fierce opponent of assimilation. He recommends actively holding to one’s roots and culture, the very thing that ostensibly makes migrants stand out and puts them at risk. “In South Africa these are marginal identities which function as ‘a source of empowerment and resistance’” (Hetherington 1998, 22).

Senegalese migrants like Issa are well known to be standouts among African foreigners, proudly displaying marginal identities, yet report having little to no violent interactions with South Africans (Focus Group 3; Issa 2011; Mamadou 2011; Samba 2011). As Touba added “We don’t have a problem with [South Africans]. That’s true. Unless you go take them lady [or] you stay by them. Then you cause your own problem yourself” (2011). Senegalese work very hard to live comfortably, far away from black townships and therefore any real danger, Issa assured me. Indeed, every Senegalese I interviewed lived in Maitland. Perhaps the bold clothing decision and fearlessness to stand out, though in some ways creating a target, also convey a confidence that makes up for their visibility and actually dissuades trouble makers. Referring to Congolese migrants in Paris, MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga argue that
In the face of xenophobic hostility, Congolese refugees respond with defiant pride in their culture – something they believe is not only valid but is actually better than their new cultural environment. Rather than accepting the denigration heaped on them, they reverse the hierarchy of inferiority, placing themselves at the apex. In effect, they create a ‘society outside society, a world of their own’ which rejects ‘both the activities and the value system of mainstream society’ (2000: 7).

Brenda and Paul, like Oliver, also use social proximity to their benefit. Brenda is a stall owner from Swaziland. She might make enough money to live elsewhere but lives in Nyanga because she feels more comfortable there with South Africans. Brenda is a unique case also, because she is the only participant who shares an ethnicity that is officially recognized in South Africa. She speaks Swazi and Xhosa, easing her life in the township. People generally have no idea she is a foreigner. “People just think I am from Mpumalanga” she said with a grin (2011).

“When they see you as part of themselves, they begin to understand” – Paul

Paul lives in Nyanga, because he cannot afford to live elsewhere. Yet, like Oliver, he has carved out a niche for himself there. He lives in a room attached to the house of a Xhosa family. He likes them very much. He credits them for keeping him safe during the “big” xenophobia in 2008. “That’s how I survive here. Everyone knows me there. If I just arrive there, even a small child will know me. ‘Paul! Paul!’” In response to my question about how to manage xenophobia in the locations, he responded,

It’s hard. It’s hard. This is very hard. You can manage it. You can stay away from those kind of people. That’s what a lot of people do, you know. They stay in town, whatever…For me, the way, I see it, is to get close to them, you know. To understand them, you know. To understand their suffering. To make them understand, you know…I make friends with them. And when they see you as part of themselves, they begin to understand, ‘No, These people are just the same as us’ (Paul 2011).
Still, Paul has to navigate a landscape that may present danger around any corner. He, as much or more than any other participant, could convey to me the finer points of dealing with potential trouble from young township gangsters. Traveling in numbers is preferable, Paul says in agreement with Oliver and others. But that simply is not possible for Paul, who does not live with friends his age. He must travel alone to work each day, as well as go out alone to buy food and other necessities. Some of his more creative techniques were not elicited by me, but by a charismatic Rasta from Malawi who came by Paul’s work place for a chat one day. During this conversation, they joked with me about the multiple times they had been robbed or attacked. Paul and the Rasta agreed on numerous finer points of strategy. For instance, Paul said, it may seem counter-intuitive, but when you see a group of five or six young toughs walking toward you, the worst possible thing you can do is move out of their path, or God forbid, cross the street. Then, he said, potential criminals’ predatory instincts get excited. They will suspect you have something to protect that they probably ought to take off of your hands. One time, on a pay day, Paul was walking to the store to buy food with a good sum of money in his pocket. This very situation occurred, and without flinching or showing his fear, he barged seemingly without thought through the group of troublesome-looking potential assailants.

The stories that got Paul and the Rasta laughing the hardest were about playing off of the weaknesses of bully psychology -- that which preys on those perceived to be unable to fight back. They thought this mentality underlay much of the xenophobic violence in the locations. Paul’s favorite story of any robbery attempt happened when a skolie pulled a knife on him in a dark street in Nyanga. Without hesitation, Paul reached dramatically into the breast of his winter coat to pull out his gun. Of course, Paul did not
have a gun, but before that became apparent, the assailant was running headlong down the street for safety. Making friends with South Africans and building cultural understanding, either by choice or by necessity, has undoubtedly aided those who live in locations. No number of friends, however, is sufficient to protect someone if they do not share such street smarts or Paul’s knack for staying alive in difficult circumstances.

IV. Language

Participants conveyed that lacking facility with a local South African language or publicly using one of their own languages is the most effective way of drawing attention to oneself as being a foreigner (see also Warner and Finchilescu 2003). “For foreigners, if [locals] see that you don’t speak their language…you know that xenophobia you see. People they just hate the other people, the others coming here” said Canaan drawing this conclusion after only two months of experience. Those participants who lived in locations expressed that knowledge of Xhosa was crucial (Paul 2011; Pascal 2011; Brenda 2011; Pardon 2011; Oliver 2011). Pardon and Brenda had the easiest time adjusting linguistically to Cape Town. Brenda is fortunate to speak Swati as a mother tongue, which belongs to the Nguni branch of the Bantu language family along with Ndebele, Zulu and most importantly for Cape Town, Xhosa. “It is dangerous [to live in a township as a foreigner], especially when you don’t talk their language. They’ll know you are a foreigner” (Brenda 2011).

Pardon’s mother has been cross-border trading between Cape Town and Zimbabwe for thirty years, even during Apartheid, he claims. She got him into Pinelands High School where he studied for years. When he came to Cape Town to work for his
mother full time running their stall, he already had a group of South African friends, along with a command of English and Xhosa. For him, interactions with South Africans feel rather normal. He doubts his language skills make much difference in the cosmopolitan city center, but is certain they would be invaluable in the locations, where he feels fortunate not to live.

Thomas, in one of his many surprising statements, told me that he would like to live in Khayelitsha because he hears life is good there. But for the moment he would not move there, even if it was closer to town and his work. “You know, me, I can’t say it feel right. Because you know me I’ve got a problem of language. I cannot communicate one another with the citizens people. So to me, thinking that maybe it’s right to stay around the town and to learn their language. Then I’ll go to stay there” (2011). I doubt the sage Oliver would advise Thomas to make that move, but he would certainly agree with him about the importance of language skills in the locations. “If I am on the train going from Khayelitsha to Cape Town, if you speak and you are a foreigner, they just look at you, maybe they start speaking bad about you” (Oliver 2011). Oliver tries to only speak Xhosa on trains and in Khayelitsha.

V. Exceptions to the rule?

Perhaps because of his social proximity to locals, Oliver may be exposed to a fuller spectrum of South African personalities, and thus, has more hope than most that xenophobia can wane in the years and decades to come. Oliver told me two stories about South Africans actually protecting foreigners from attacks.

I’ve said, there are some people who are very good. South Africans. Very helpful. And they don’t like to see foreigners being segregated. I see on the train, when people turned against their own…What happened was the foreigner got in the train, stood inside the
door. [A South African] guy started talking bad things about him, insulting. [The foreigner] didn’t answer, just keeping quiet. So when [the South African] started up, trying to manhandle him, that’s when all the people stood and said ‘You started a thing. This guy didn’t say anything bad to you! Why are you going to beat him?’ So they said, ‘We are going to teach you a lesson. You must learn to respect other people!’ (Oliver 2011).

These South Africans threatened to beat the man up if he persisted, and he quickly backed down. Oliver also told me about a similar event, on the train from Khayelitsha, when a man had started to shout insults and threaten a Sudanese friend of his. The Sudanese man kept quiet, but the South African persisted. He walked up to Oliver’s friend and began to unzip his trousers, about to urinate on him. Just then a South African school girl stepped in between them and shouted at the assailant. She kept shouting until she was shoved in to a wall. Then other passengers intervened to stop the altercation.

A few migrants spoke in a way about xenophobia that showed their appreciation that not all black South Africans were dangerous, or their hope that one day things might change. “People [in Nyanga] also marched to stop the xenophobia,” said Paul. Blessing said, “I think they say if they find that person who started that [xenophobia in May 2008], they sentence life in prison. Because all the old people who stay in the location, they are against that. If they catch you, they will beat you” (2011). Andrew, Edmund and Issa were among those who voiced the importance of the individual “hearts” of black South Africans in the dynamic of xenophobia. Issa was grabbed by a Xhosa man during the big xenophobia. Instead of being attacked he was hugged repeatedly as the man told Issa how stupid the attackers were and how much good he thought that foreigners brought to South Africa. “You are not going anywhere. You are my brother,” the man said. “Many people don’t want us to leave because we bring a lot” (Issa 2011). Edmund, no stranger to xenophobia himself, still thinks a portion of South Africans still like foreigners, some blacks included, because foreigners like to work. Migrants work, make money and are
able to pay rent and take up rooms. Generally, Edmund says, “foreigners are good for business” (2011), and some South Africans recognize and appreciate that.

One of the stories that I found the most remarkable came again from Issa. He told me about a time when two Xhosa teenagers came into the market carrying a drum. He recognized them as local street musicians, who played and danced in the streets around Saint George’s Mall. They approached the stall across from Issa’s, owned by another Senegalese man named Mansour, where there were a number of drums for sale. They asked with trepidation if there was anyone who could fix their drum, the head of which had split. Mansour offered to fix the drum for them for free. As they waited, one of the boys sat next to Issa.

He was young but intelligent. So he was asking himself a question out loud, telling himself, ‘I don’t know what we gonna do if these people were not around, because we do not know how even to fix a drum. We don’t know what a drum is.’ You know the djembe is something coming from West Africa. But though he was like thinking out loud, ‘Ok so my question is like what we gonna do if you guys leave? Because you are clever. You are intelligent. What you can do, we cannot do’ (Issa 2011).

Tales like those above give the impression that there are seeds of hope within the South African populace, even amongst poor black South Africans. Some migrants may harbor a secret hope for a new day when anti-foreigner sentiment will be held by a perhaps only a small minority and will no longer be a daily threat. In the meantime, however, almost no participants take a very sunny view of township life, despite the survival strategies available. Pascal, for instance, was married to a South African woman who passed away many years ago. He has lived in the locations longer than any other participant. I find his perspective to be noteworthy. He does not deny that having Xhosa friends is important for living in the locations. However, despite the fact that he has Xhosa friends, half Xhosa children, and he speaks Xhosa fluently, “[T]he others they don’t like you,” he said. “Because if they just see you, just maybe your accent, or the way
you’re talking or you know, they say ‘ah that is a foreigner!’ It’s really bad… You will find maybe they rob you all the time, rob your things. You can’t just walk free” (2011). No amount of friends or language skills has made Khayelitsha a nice place to live for Pascal.

**VI. Conclusion: “You can’t just walk free”**

I conclude that the greatest material spatial impact of xenophobia on African immigrants to Cape Town is the incredibly high cost differential between living in the locations, like Khayelitsha and Nyanga, versus the city bowl of Cape Town or the relatively safer suburbs, like Maitland, Woodstock or Goodwood. The irony of this spatial impact is palpable. Africans migrate to South Africa primarily to make money. Most have few or no other career prospects in their home country. The sole hope they have for a secure future is to earn and save money in South Africa. Additionally, nearly every migrant is contributing, sometimes vitally, to the financial support of family at home. Such is the psycho-social impact of xenophobia, that despite these immense pressures to husband hard-won resources, migrants do not hesitate to pay much higher rents in order to increase their security, or at least their sense of it.

Security is a large concern for South Africans of all stripes, let alone for foreigners. Truly, no amount of money spent on improved living conditions can ever fully prevent attacks. Nor can even the most strict and austere survival strategies fully prevent attacks. The impact of xenophobia on African immigrants and on their lived daily experiences of life and work in South Africa is clearly immense.
The xenophobic dangers associated with mobility in Cape Town present the second largest spatial impact on daily life for African migrants. The pressure to return home before dark causes anxiety for workers who are not allowed to close down shop when they desire, but only when owners allow. For owners without assistants who can close for them, the pressure to travel before dark necessitates shutting down operations earlier in the day, limiting profitability. Owners also have to pay higher pushing rates if they are in a hurry, because pushers usually service a number of stalls who compete financially for priority.

Though most migrants have developed and utilized effective strategies to avoid bodily harm, theft and insult, they still endure daily stresses and fears for their safety. Doubtless, many of these survival strategies compromise the quality of life, exchanging the pleasures of freedom for the safety of living small and quiet lives. “The pathos and real-life tragedies of the ‘immigrant experience’ go beyond any Foucauldian symbolic violence associated with social dislocation and economic hardship. Tens of thousands of foreigners are constantly on the lookout against real threats that range from petty harassment and intimidation to unprovoked beatings, rape, and even murder” (Murray 2003, 459). Murray’s statement accurately portrays the physical dangers ever-present in daily life of African migrants to South Africa. The related anxiety of constantly being on the lookout, in and of itself, must leave an indelible mark on daily experience and a strain on the human psyche. Who can quantify such daily a threat and its effects on human wellbeing? The threat of isolated xenophobic manifestations of violence is omnipresent in the African migrant’s experience of South African place and space. On top of this,
there lurks the more unsettling and very reasonable fear of more large-scale xenophobic manifestations in the future.

It would be an entirely fair question for a sensible person to ask why on earth migrants, such as my participants, would put themselves through such anguish. In the following chapters I aim to address this issue, and hopefully answer this question. I attempt to do so by enlarging the scale of my analysis to the regional and global forces at work that provide the context for the perceived necessity of migrancy in such miserable conditions.
Chapter 8. Migrants and Home

I. Locating the Migrant Life

Simon still owed $1200 USD in *labola* (bride-price) to his father-in-law. He had gotten a reduced rate because he had gotten his wife pregnant before they were ever betrothed, but it was still a considerable sum for Simon to pay back on top of his other responsibilities at home in Zimbabwe. You would not know, though, that such a large set of responsibilities hung over the sarcastically jovial young man.

There was something that buoyed Simon’s spirits each day. It is beyond my abilities to psycho-analyze Simon, but I have a suspicion it revolved around his phone. No one in the market was glued into technology more than Simon. He didn’t have what we would call a “smart phone” in America, but it had more capabilities than any other phone in the market save that of Bakary, which was comparable. When not attending to his stall, Simon was constantly perched against a traffic pylon at the edge of the square listening to Zimbabwean music or texting Zimbabwean friends.

While there are many ways of “doing migrancy,” Simon’s was indicative of what is seen by many as a new way, a “transnational” way. Transnationality has many definitions, but the definition that underlies them all is a simultaneous embeddedness of people or processes in more than one national space at a given time. It is an incredibly helpful tool for locating the physical movement but also the nature and significance of migration in our current era.

The “transnational” turn in the study of migration began with attention to networks, and then extrapolated network theory to a macro-level (Castles and Miller 2009). It is also partially a response to a trend whereby migrants find it increasingly hard
or unappealing to assimilate and must seek out new strategies of self-advancement
(MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Schiller et al 1995). Transnational theory,
being the cutting edge of migration theory, especially in Geography, is useful to my study
as it situates it in the primary and patently spatial discourse currently utilized by South
African migration researchers. More importantly, however, the daily reliance on and
responsibility to “home” in both the material and ephemeral sense for the migrant
livelihoods I studied is powerfully supportive of the most difficult notion within
transnationality: differentiating it from the international.

One of the main dilemmas within transnationalism has been finding the dividing
line between the Transnational and the merely international. For most researchers, this
division is clear when migrants function in a way that is simultaneously embedded in two
spaces. According to Nina Glick-Schiller et al., “Transmigrants are immigrants whose
daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders
and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one state” (1995,
48). Clearly, for these authors, identity plays a large part in separating human agency
from macro-level push pull factors.

Transnationalism also allows for migrant identities to be reconsidered apart from
the assimilation theory. Crush and McDonald see identity in migrants as a hybrid: several
identities that combine home and destination (Crush &McDonald 2002). Transnational
linkages also connect migrants strongly to their families or home societies, and thus
connect specific localities to specific localities (Horevitz 2009; MacGaffey &
Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Additionally, linkages that are more simultaneously “multi-
stranded” have a better claim to being transnational (Schiller et al 1995, 48). For Crush
and McDonald, “The occasional trip home, or the sporadic sending of remittances to family and friends, are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to justify the labeling of a new migration phenomenon” (Crush & McDonald 2002, 9). These stricter definitions make transnationalism more analytically useful as an explanatory theory.

Therefore, for transnationality and this project to be iteratively supportive in any meaningful way, migrants in Cape Town would have to be connected firmly in two places, simultaneously. These places need to be specific locations or sets of locations. And the connections ought to be consistent and active presences in migrants’ lives, both acting upon them and allowing them to act through them.

II. Transnational Modalities

I argue that transnationality is best understood not on a single spectrum, with the international on one end and the ultimate form of simultaneous embeddedness on the other. Rather I think migrants’ lives in Cape Town ought to be understood in terms of transnational modalities that often overlap or feed into one another. For some researchers, Simon’s life was arguably the most transnational, at least in the physical sense. It was very interesting that a man could live materially so much in Zimbabwe. His actions were physically sending the electronic signals to that other place. And he was listening to songs written, recorded and downloaded in that place. It would have been easy to conclude once again that technology has forever altered migration. Yet, in some ways, though it is new and therefore remarkable, the technology itself seems the least interesting part.
Technology and its innate appeal has without a doubt played a part in the popularity of the theory. Technology has indeed played a role in the shifting nature and complexities of migration. The role of technology is vital to understanding migration networks today (Sadouni 2009). While this is a worthy and useful field of study, our cultural obsession with gadgetry often diverts a weight of attention to it that is in some ways unjustified in light of the larger project of mapping human experience. Put another way, our geography cannot become an Apple commercial.

Transnational theory’s usefulness is not limited to helping scholars to understand how migration is new. In fact, it helps us understand more profoundly how migration has always been and always will be. For this reason, while it is a very important factor, technology cannot be the sole or even the principle vantage point from which to understand migration now in South Africa or elsewhere. Put another way, though Simon’s shiny phone was extremely important to him and therefore important to me as researcher, it was his connection to home that glued him to it.

III. Is Transnationalism New?

Some criticize that the new phenomenon of transnational migration is only “new” because of technology. If it is really an age-old practice, does it merit a new term? Researchers like Crush and McDonald also question if technology is the deciding factor in the high intensity of exchanges and embeddedness that marks transnationalism (2002). Other geographers note what they perceive as redirections of transnational theory for its cultural or rhetorical potential (Koser 2003; Mercer et al. 2009), meaning that the issue is moot for those who seek to use the theory as a form of activism. “The idea of global civil
society has become emblematic of a progressive politics in global times” (Mercer et al. 2009 145). This bent in much of the theory’s proponents presents a problem for the usage of the theory. “The insistence that transnational connections are inherently more progressive than local ones leads us to wonder if they are being fetishized” (Mercer et al. 2009, 145). Mercer et al. present a valid concern that the ways that migrant networks are imagined often do not take into account the varied, historical and contextual nature of the relationships between home and diasporas, including the agency and power relations involved (Mercer et al. 2009).

I take Mercer’s et al. direction to heart as the cosmopolitanist trend in transnational literature is evident to me as well. While new forms of migrancy do interact in subversive way with nation-states, many authors treat transnationalism as a process of bypassing or even effectively dissolving the Nation-State. Authors sometimes note how transnational behaviors transcend the nation-state or render borders obsolete. In even the most extreme cases of transnationalism, we cannot say that it transcends the project of the nation state. As Lenri Shea put it, “Globalization does not mean a collapse of borders or geopolitical entities and therefore cannot separate the influence of…‘governmentality’ on mobile individuals” (2008, 106-107).

Though migrants may not always be conforming to the nation-state’s will, or may feel somewhat “deterioralized” (Burman 2002), we must recognize that the nation-state is a major part of the migration context (Willis et al. 2004; see also chapters 7 and 8 in this dissertation). It is also a character in the migration story, with a collective will as important as that of the individual migrants. Lenri Shea’s work has been especially
helpful to me as it gives credence to issues of identity, but also respects the role of space and place.

Thus, transnationalism may not be all that new, both in the more material and ephemeral senses. It does not render the nation-state null and it exists independent of the tools and technologies migrants use to perpetuate it. However, the theoretical principles have been newly bundled, and this assemblage has proven very fruitful despite its problematical usages. Transnationalism has encouraged scholars to ask better questions and form more nuanced understandings. The transnational outlook is invaluable to this study, especially regarding migrant’s relationships to home.

IV. Centrality of “Home”

In my discussions with migrants in Cape Town, home was the primary factor in their imagination of their lives. Home was the beginning, the middle and the end, even though the middle consisted of them living abroad. In this middle, this second act, migrants did talk to me about communication, about culture, about art and music. They spoke of politics and many other kinds of embeddedness. But the particular sort of embeddedness that was primary in their speaking about their lives was financial, and those financial concerns were driven by family.

Transnational theory encourages scholars to engage in the intangible elements of daily life. As geographers, this is at first a daunting task, to map the physical is hard enough. But to map desire? Want? This is not easy. But by following the thread of these unseen aspects of daily experience, I found a remarkably succinct pattern, in which migrants live in cycles relating to their home. This pattern not only helps to understand
some of the enduring puzzles of contemporary migration (like why do migrants routinely put themselves in the position to struggle under the state and xenophobia?) but gives us some glimpse into the future of migrancy in a global context of widening inequality combined with increasing regional mobility.

In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss in broad strokes how home affects migrants and how migrants affect home. In the next chapter, to conclude the analytical body of this project, I will dig deeper into this dichotomy to reveal cycles of contemporary migration in Africa which show home and “away” not as separate polarities, but more like wickets on a cricket pitch, that is to say, intimately linked and co-dependent, with both healthy and unhealthy connotations of the term.

V. Home is the Best

An important context for the dislocation of migrants from their home has been covered in the historical background. However, it bears repeating that global migration is widely related to poverty and wage differentials. Admitting the role that real economics plays in daily life for migrants in no way diminishes the importance of the less tangible aspects. The specific expressions of migration tend to differ considerably based on the cultural, linguistic and historical connections between nations. For my participants, however, the decision to move to South Africa ultimately rested in a combination of these contexts, but the perceived financial opportunity was the only consistent factor amongst migrants.

Even for those who left their homes due to political strife or the threat of assassination, the context of greater perceived financial opportunity in South Africa
played a strong role. In fact, all but a very few African migrants who participated in this study felt compelled to leave their homes solely for financial reasons (Paul 2011; Gilbert 2011).

Issa claimed that his goal was to earn R100,000 and that he hoped to accomplish this goal in 2012. He was not close to the goal but as he says, “Everyday I wake up in my bed, I’m saying today is the right day to make like a lot of money” (2011). His hope is not only representative of the characteristically positive nature that so many Senegalese possess but of the expectant nature that participants generally displayed.

Usually the expectations were far lower than Issa’s. Robert said, “I come here to get something and go back. I came here to survive” (2011). Emmanuel and Edmund, despite being only in their twenties, suddenly found themselves their head of their families with the death of their parents. Their siblings are somewhat dependent on them for small influxes of cash. Most often Edmund can be only a little help. It gives him a sense of success though to at least not be a burden on them. Emmanuel has a larger vision to someday buy and sell properties in Zimbabwe, though for the moment he is no better off than Edmund and he showed no illusions as to the practicality of his goal. Daily life for him, as for Edmund, consisted of survival.

Bomani expressed a practical view of the pressures to stay in South Africa, despite and because of the largely dire circumstances.

You know like we have to find somewhere to start. The problem with we African people, I can say we black people, that are different. Sometimes, you know, like your parents they can make a way for you. While you are still growing they can keep money in a little bank, you can go to school, after that you can have a job you see? You see there? But we, they only raise us up, then you have to find your own start. You have to dig to find your own things. That’s why you see like many people here, when they find their own things maybe after 40 years, maybe 50 years…maybe white people they can have when they are 20 years. But for us that is why we come here, to find our start (2011).
This curious connection to home seems to drive so much of the migrant experience. As Bomani indicated, it is for their future at home that most of the migrants had come to South Africa and the market. To understand this complex and somewhat ironic separation, I asked each participant to discuss their relationship to home. Despite the personal nature of some of the questions, thoughts and musing about home and migrants relationship to it were offered up liberally.

Put simply to begin with, ‘home is the best’. This comment came verbatim in at least half of my interviews, and in some form or another in the others. Not one participant indicated that they came to South Africa because they disliked their home. Instead, mitigating factors like famine, economic collapse, war or dictatorship had changed their home to make it less hospitable. A few seemed able to deal with the estrangement from home with equanimity, the self-styled “cosmopolitan” Samba being the best example. In general, even the Senegalese like Issa, Mamadou and Bakary were also less emotive about the separation from home and familiar surroundings. When the recorder was off, however, I found that those feelings were to some extent masks. There is undoubtedly a bravado and confidence that the Senegalese I spoke with utilized to cover feelings of heartache, or any other negative emotion for that matter. Many like Samba enjoy travel, but even the stalwart Senegalese hurt and yearn for home. They also feel that ‘home is best’ not only because it is where they personally feel most comfortable, but because of a cultural pride displayed more than any other group in the market (Mamadou 2011; Issa 2011; Bakary 2011; Samba 2011).

Most participants, however, were openly heartbroken over their distance from home. Migrants are in South Africa physically, but a key component of their psyche is
rooted in a different space. Participants routinely used the metaphor of a vital part of their anatomy being missing from their body (Pardon 2011; Robert 2011; Pascal 2011). “My body is here, but my heart is at home. My mind is in Kenya” (Amos 2011). “Home is the best. My heart is in Kenya” (Shana 2011). “You know where your family is, that’s where your heart will be. They are my primary concern” (Canaan 2011).

Ibrahim’s home, Khartoum, Sudan, has been so irrevocably changed and he has been in South Africa for so long. He admits that for him South Africa is more his home. Yet he states that the reason for this, despite all the fundamentalist policies restricting life in Sudan, is mostly that his loved ones are no longer in Sudan. Ibrahim’s unique situation helps to point out the role family plays in the conceptions of home and their significance.

“But you can’t say, that. Wherever you go, the place you were born, it is the best place for you” (2011). This is especially important to note when many popular theories attempt to explain migration in pure rational terms relating to wage differentials and other economic indicators.

When asked if they would go home if they had a choice, participants responded overwhelmingly, yes indeed. This begged the obvious question of why they were not home, then. What was preventing them from making that choice? As Bomani put it, he had to come to South Africa if he ever wanted to have a prosperous life in Malawi. Participants responded similarly, in matter-of-fact terms that like Bomani, they simply felt they did not have a choice. No matter if participants came to South Africa to escape persecution or improve their finances, they unanimously felt that, now in South Africa, they were to acquire something that could not be gotten at home. Were they to go back,
they would have less than they imagined they would need to sustain them (Mamadou 2011).

Most also have dependents and responsibilities at home. Robert regrets missing big family events, yet, as he explains “I missed the money first, before I miss the family. Like me if I go like this, they can just maybe be happy like two three days. Then be like we miss you whatever whatever. But if I stay there like four days then maybe they start to see the finance. I have nothing also you see” (2011).

VI. Home as Emotional Strength

Though thoughts of home can cause heartache and feelings of estrangement, the maintenance of a connection to home can actually help migrants achieve their goals. This manifests in a few ways, the most common of which are words of affirmation of home, the knowledge that home is well, the assurance of social integration back home and the mental and psychological anchor it provides.

The favored method of contacting home is the telephone and most migrants call home regularly. The younger migrants tended to call more frequently than older migrants. Age may not be the mitigating factor per se, but the fact that most of the migrants over 40 came from Congo, Angola and Sudan, where their families were without phones, have fled home themselves or are more self-sufficient financially. In addition, most of the migrants from those countries had brought their spouses and children with them, as opposed to other African migrants, fleeing from economic troubles alone. Pascal from Kinshasa, for example, only calls home if there is a pressing concern or problem. Some of his family is in South Africa, and they have incomes. The others back home in the
DRC are sisters who are married, removing much of the feeling of responsibility for him to provide for and watch over them.

Isabelle can rarely reach her family, because they live so far away from telephone service. Last she heard, six months before we spoke, two of her nephews had died of malnutrition. This is incredibly sad news, but Isabelle does not regret finding out. Being engaged with tragedy or sadness at home can serve to maintain social and familial bonds as much as great happiness. Oliver and his family, for instance, share a constant state of despair at his absence, and yet they still maintain close ties, talking often. “Ah they are missing me a lot. Missing me a lot…Ah it pains me a lot”.

“Having that connection hurts?” I asked.

“Yeah it hurts ‘cause they are always asking, “when are you coming?”

Communication is a double edged sword for Oliver and family: the pain of distance mingled with the joy of connection. Despite the stress placed on the family because of this sadness, they remain closer than ever Oliver assured me. Going further, he mentioned “Sometimes I’m always on Facebook what’s happening there. People being killed, some being abducted. Some sick. Every night I always open my Facebook” (2011). One of the only participants to mention social media, or even email for that matter, Oliver displays that being in touch with the tragedies experienced at home causes him great pain. Yet, his deeper desire for connection causes him to sign on to Facebook knowing what often lays in store. In the end, because Oliver gets on Facebook knowing the sadness he may encounter, he is purposefully using it as a tool to keep in touch with the tragedies of home as well as the joys. “I just like to know. It feels good to have information about home” (2011).
In a less macabre sense, home does act as the active source of emotional support. Gabriel was the first to point out that home can be a source of emotional strength. He remains close to Uganda in his mind because it helps him to stay happy in South Africa. “My life is there, in Uganda. Here I can look for some money…Because you can’t put all your mind here…so we work very hard here, so we can go back there.” Referencing the power of communication, Gabriel said, “Whenever I call them I feel just as if I’m home. They can tell you this and this. You can make it [emotionally] like this” (2011). Simon seconded this notion of comfort provided by communication with home. “Yeah you know I remember when they ask me, how are you there? I say fine. And also when they say, fine, I’m happy” (2011).

Andrew said that he also takes encouragement from calling home, “to work hard and to simply take life as it comes” (2011). Robert said, “Maybe there is some issue there with family matters. I must ask, how is life and what goes on? Whatever.”

“Do you ever get any help from home?” I asked.

“Yeah I need to get the help there. Even some advice it help” (2011).

These simple comforts related to calling home were obviously important to the participants in this project.

Mamadou referenced the financial safety he feels having large network of communicative family members, both in Senegal and abroad in other countries. Even though there are the inevitable freeloaders, he said, it was still better to have his financial life intermeshed with that of a larger pool of extended family because of the safety net created by having multiple income streams. Blessing also referenced how keeping in contact with home helped him financially. He uses contacts in Zimbabwe to arrange
cheaper business supplies, particularly stones for carving that are harder to find in South Africa.

“I’m lucky because we are a Christian family,” Oliver said. “So whatever I tell them about what I encounter in South Africa, they tell me they will pray for me. They say don’t worry. Things will be ok. Praying fasting for me that maybe God will help you.” After I asked him what this support mean to him, he responded, “That encourages me, makes me even stronger. When by the time that I think I’m giving up, that makes me gain my strength.”

Shana calls home primarily to check on the health of ailing mother, but also “Just to ask how they feel. Because I miss them. Home is the Best” (2011). Issa calls home every couple of days. He says its not expensive, maybe 5 rand for 20 minutes. Issa, like many I spoke with, just needs to hear that all are well and there is peace in the home. “‘Cause you know, if you are far away from your family and you cut the connections, you are nothing. It can be like a very bad influence on you. Each and every day if you remember where you are coming from, and where you have to go, you are gonna be courageous to work hard and fill those gaps let at home.” Issa’s comment points to the way that responsibilities at home can motivate one to work harder for their family, but also point to a deeper logic he expressed later.

The cost of calling home, surprisingly to me, did not seem to be a problematic factor for even the poorest market workers who liked to call home frequently. In fact, younger migrants, despite having fewer dependents at home, tend to call home more often. I found that this was due to the fact that they are more often alone in South Africa. Robert calls home and talks to his sister every day. Asked why, he responded “Ah home
is the best. I have my own mother. She is still alive. My family is there. Sometimes I feel just to talk with them.” He especially likes to check in on his littlest sister who was a newborn when he left home. He is amazed when his mom tells him that she is running and talking and playing with friends. Canaan calls home twice a week to check on his family in Zimbabwe, “Just to find out how they are faring there…You know where your family is, that’s where your heart will be. You have to. Have to hear how they are feeling” (2011).

Edmund echoed this rationale in his interview when asked about the importance of calling home. “Yes exactly! You must know if something wrong there. You must know each and every time.” When I asked why, he explained “You know maybe there is a funeral there you must know. If someone is sick you must know. So that you can make things like to organize the money to send if someone is sick. Something like that. Must know what is happening there. See, home is home” (2011). In short, for Edmund, it was important to be a part of life at home as much as possible, because his family is there. Emmanuel said, “Me I just want to know if they are fine. Is there anything wrong? See to just know how is home, how is everything at home…”Cause I can say I’m the only big guy in my family. So I must be the one who must know everything you know. Like the big guy in the family must stand strong.”

Despite his absence and his small ability to remit finances, Emmanuel feels a need to lead his family from South Africa. For those like him, such as Edmund, Amos and Shana, Abdou and Mamadou and many more, their great sense of responsibility or longing, though a burden, causes them to find great comfort and or satisfaction when all is well at home. Even when there are problems, having communication allows them to
take a proactive and self-affirming stance in resolving any situation. The combination of the ability to act across large distances combined with the emotional burden of that distance, though somewhat paradoxical, lies near the very heart of the migrant experience.

The comfort that comes with having information about home, as I said above, is proportionate to the sense of responsibility one feels at home. However, in another sense, it is not. This is one example where we must distinguish between two modalities of transnationality: in this case, that of responsibility and simple longing for home, and that of social power and positionality via knowledge. To be a part of things at home, to maintain an active role in home community, migrants must remain tied in to the happenings, large and small. Furthermore, if they are to maintain their stake and wield their social power, they need information regarding the changing landscape in order to recognize when and where it is appropriate and profitable to act.

Even for those without dependents at home, the same desire to be a part of things at home was always present in our interviews and conversations. In one of these interviews, things were going along much the way others had. Azibo said, “Yeah. I’m used to hear[ing] some stories back home. Even I heard ‘Your friend is get married.’ Find out who passed away.” I probed the issue further with Azibo, as with others. “Why is it important to have that information?” I asked. “You have to know. You have to know. You have to understand. I’m not there but I have to know what’s going on there. You have to be like a part of there” (2011).

His words, more than any others up to this point led me to understand another facet of this connection to home. His words impacted me. You have to be like a part of
there, he had said, with a desperate urgency. I began to think back to all the conversations and interviews I had completed. I began to wonder whether or not there was a different aspect to this connection to home that I was not fully appreciating. When examining the older migrants who have children and dependents at home, I realized, it is easy to see their urgency to be a part of there primarily as the urgency to provide for those dependents. However, I began to wonder if, from the outside, this more obvious connection might mask other, perhaps deeper anxieties about staying connected to home.

Thus it was the younger migrants, those with few or no dependents at home, who showed me that migrants feel a great, almost desperate need to be a part of life at home that is separate from a) direct financial or familial responsibility; b) the emotional desire for information that all is well at home; and c) the desire to connect for emotional support. In the following section I examine the burdens that home represent, taking care to pay attention to the urgency to be a part of there.

VII. Home as a Burden

Much scholarly attention is paid to the role of remittance in the home connection, and for ample, well-founded reasons. I went to South Africa expecting this and was not disappointed. Indeed, remittance is a huge factor in the migrant relationship to home that I encountered. Yet, what migrants referenced most often regarding home was actually the emotional boon derived by simply being informed and being in the loop on matters at home. This plays an important part in the psychological and emotional health and strength of African migrants in South Africa.
This is also driven from a need to maintain a secure social and family position in the future inevitable homecoming. For the majority of migrants I spoke with, the connection to home was not only a source of strength and connectedness, but was also a burden. As discussed previously, the mere dislocation from home is a burden in and of itself. Home is a burden, by its very nature when we are separated. However home also burdens the migrant in a more active sense. The array of family and friends who count on migration remittances for their advancement or survival can place staggering pressure on migrants. The cultural expectation on migrants to give is both a product of traits common to African cultures and influenced by how migrants portray themselves to family at home. This burden has far-reaching impacts on the migrants’ relationships to home and the overall migration cycle. The first issue to note is that financial responsibilities to home have a deep impact on the financial well-being of migrants in South Africa.

No if you send money there it’s just, the money gonna help them there to buy what they want. That is the way only to help. Like to give. Because you cant like keep keep keep. Even the Bible say, give and you will receive (Bomani 2011).

Later Bomani added,

Bomani: If you don’t send money home, you know the problem is like if you go back there, you know like eh we African people like the parents they rely they depend on the kids because most of the things are tough on them. So if you yourself don’t send home to them, you can feel it, you can feel guilty. My parents they raised me up, they send me to school, I can speak, I can think, I can know how to do things. So you, you can feel it yourself.
Me: Social consequences?
Bomani: If you go home its …you can feel it. Its not good. You can find many people they are suffering there. That’s bad (2011).

Clearly, there were associations with guilt regarding remittance, a guilt that often intermingled with sympathy.

“Yeah, you know. Back home we are struggling there. That’s why we use…most of the time you have to do. It’s a must. It’s like a must. Me and my brother [are] like the man there. So all the people there [are] depending on us. It’s like a must to do that” (Azibo 2011).
Robert is explicit that he came to South Africa for himself, to improve his own fortunes. “But I can’t not help my mom,” he states resignedly. Emmanuel and Azibo are relatively young in the market, only in their early-mid twenties, yet due to the tragically low life expectancies in their homes of Zimbabwe and Malawi, they find themselves at least partial breadwinners for not only for their own siblings, but also cousins. As the younger generation in the market, they arrived after the post-Apartheid influx of migrants, and also after the solidification of market stall ownership. Thus, they, and other assistants like them, are among the most financially burdened by the relationship to home and the least able to make money in the market. Despite this difficult position, most migrants view the market as a much better place to work on average than the other jobs available to migrants in South Africa. Thus, where Emmanuel and Azibo may represent the poorest element of the market, they most likely represent a relatively more financially viable class than the majority of African migrants in South Africa.

Because the Malawian assistants in the market represented that young, poor, male demographic of migrants in South Africa, I thought it would be beneficial to do a group interview focused on their struggles. When the topic of connection to home came around, it brought out much more emotion and group dynamism than any other topic by far.

A principal theme that emerged from our conversation was that of the unending needs at home and the ways this stresses migrant life (Kihato 2009). As my questions moved to the struggle to remit, Edmund explained, “It’s like I’m thinking if I have five thousand, I can go to Malawi. The time is coming. Then there is a funeral. I can take two thousand and send. It’s not five thousand now, it’s three thousand. You start again. After that you get another problem again” (2011). That this was a common struggle, all the
participants strongly agreed. Bomani added, “Yeah because here you can see, we are many. We are six guys here. Even if you ask them, individually, one by one by one, this week, even yesterday, they had phone calls from home, people they are asking for money, for help. So I don’t think you can... you ask Thomas, he say my mom just phoned me yesterday ask me for money for food or whatever. Ask Edmund, he say, ah they ask for school fees. Ask Azibo, Ask Robert here, same story. Some of us here have got wives also” (2011).

In a separate interview, Mamadou from Senegal had this to say on the subject:

Me: …So you have two country problems?
Mamadou: Two country problems, yes.
Me: You are dealing with the problems of Senegal and SA
Mamadou: Yes Double work….I didn’t plan to have…You know when you go out of your country. All the time, you go the state to work, you have all the time two problem. Like problem South Africa, problem home. Like when you go to Senegal now, you want to work that side, you just have one problem. Like you work the metal, you sell for your family. But like for example now if I have 500 Rand. Make sure that 500 you don’t have to send something. Because even your foot sometimes a problem for you. Because when you wake up any time, your mama can call you, your brother can call you, your sister can call you. “Problem happen here.” You have to send home, money. They don’t care you work or not.

I understood Mamadou’s reference to his foot to mean than even a part of your body that you love and need can cause problems.

Me: So people at home ever help you?
Mamadou: no. No more help. One direction all the time.

As the conversation progressed with the Malawian focus group began discussing frustrations they had with remittance, beyond the immediate financial strain. When I asked if some of their friends and family at home had become dependent on them financially, laughter circled the table. Yes, they replied unanimously. Some able-bodied folks at home did not work or work as hard as they could because of remittances.
In another group interview, Amos from Kenya spoke about the struggles he faced trying to manage how his remittances were utilized in this context of dependence. “You find your father is dependent on you, your sister, your brother, maybe your cousin, maybe your sister’s son, their daughter, they are dependent on you. So you have to keep on looking. “Did you go to school? Did you do this?” (2011).

He neatly reflected the Malawian group’s feelings about the frustration of knowing that some of your hard-earned money was going to people who did not fully appreciate their sacrifices. These frustrations are in addition to the responsibility migrants like Amos and Edmund feel to know what is needed at home. “So if you don’t ask, they can’t do it the way you want it to be done. And they need money from you. So you have to confirm, the money is ok or is not ok” (Amos 2011).

The pressures to remit not only take a toll on the finances of African migrants, but also on their energies since many of them must also oversee the money’s transmission, distribution and management. From hundreds of miles away, even with the benefit of technology, it is easy to sympathize with the trouble this must present. This all begged an interesting question to me. This line of questioning resulted in by far the most interesting aspect of this research project. Why, in the context of their own struggle with poverty, knowing that some of their remittance will be wasted due to ill use, kids playing hookey from school despite the fees, lazy relatives becoming dependent and entitled, why do they continue to give when reasonable sacrifice is met with plain irresponsibility that frustrates remitters?

When I asked the Malawian group what would happen if they stopped giving as much as they did, due to their own frustrations, Bomani cut me off. “It’s negative! ‘Why
I asked, trying to clarify his point, if people at home would just think that they were holding out and being selfish. Again heads bobbed excitedly and loud assents were given.

I probed further, asking if they would be welcomed home if they did not remit to the satisfaction of key people at home. “No,” Boman i clarified. “The first time they welcome you to see what you’ve got. But the ship is sinking now. Now they start to remind you. ‘Do you remember when we were suffering and you didn’t help us? Do you remember that time?’ You see? After that, they try to reject you” (2011). The sentiment around the table was that this was a valid point. Their families would welcome them home at first, even if they did not remit much, but then would begin shaming them to extract the wealth they had supposedly accrued. Not only would this limit a returning migrant’s options at home, but limits their own justification for receiving future remittances from other family members abroad when they are in need.

The Malawi group’s appraisal of family dynamics still seemed bleaker than I’d expected, so I continued probing to better understand. What spurred the next exchange was when I asked if part of the issue was that family at home had not seen their suffering.

Bomani: You see. They don’t see our suffering.
Matthew: Same like you know like black people have got such a mentality like you know we are all happy here, we are doing better. But maybe one of us got sick. He is in hospital. Most of the people stay away from him you see?
(Lots of Ahs and Yeahs!)
Matthew: Because they know now you are useless you see?
Robert: Let him suffer!
Matthew: It’s like that you see. They do that in families.
Robert: That’s big in Africa. That’s Africa.

They all laughed and nodded at Roberts comment. I expressed my surprise at this apparently widespread feeling that their families and friends would retreat from a
member in need. “When I think of Africa I think of communities helping each other. Is that wrong?” I asked.

Thomas: In Africa we are helping one another.
Azibo: When there is like a wedding, do like
Bomani: Something to beauty!
Azibo: When there is something like you are together
Me: So people like to get together to contribute to something?
Bomani: When there is like small problems, like you are together.
Azibo: It’s like weddings, funerals….you can say, like, Africans they are together….
Bomani: Funerals, you know
Azibo: That problem you see, is the way he says it. He says when they meet you home the first time they say ah you work for the family now. Not talking about for the community. Just for the family. The family now start to reject. By the time they see you have don’t have money…
Bomani Chimes in and vociferously agrees. All murmur agreement.
Azibo: …So when something happens, (Matthew and Bomani start joking about the issue)
Azibo: Maybe someone passed away, they can think like, ah, they can see, they can come in a huge number, coming together, condolences, but they can say, ‘Ah, we are Africans together.’ But for the families, ah there is…God no (2011).

The Malawian assistants felt that their families and communities shared a spirit of community only when there was something like a funeral or a wedding. In daily happenstance, however, families are the active unit, and if someone were even to get sick within a family, these young men expressed frustration that their own families might reject them for simply being sick and losing their financial value to the family. They explained a variety of ways in which their ilk can become ostracized by choice or by bad fortune. I found this shocking, yet, the more these young men explained about the role financial contribution plays in social standing, a grim logic began to appear. Either one contributes financially, or one has no or diminished status.

Whether you are sick, or are struggling with life in South Africa, you are expected to either contribute or suffer the consequences when going home. These Malawian men did not argue with the sentiment shared by many that there is a spiritual blessing derived from contributing to family needs at home. When they give, it is not always out of
frustration. Many even give in a spirit of thankfulness to and care for their families (Bomani; Matthew; Edmund 2011). However, in this group interview, these young men displayed the stick lurking behind the carrot in the relationship to home. Despite the myriad challenges migrants face in South Africa, in the end, despite amassing little if any wealth, they run the risk of alienating family at home if they cannot keep up with the financial demands. Fear of social and familial ostracization was the driving force of remittance, even in the context of lacking a stake in how the money was spent.

Yet, few people I interviewed felt assured that they would be able to return home with much if any wealth. The Malawians agreed that only one or two migrants out of ten would be able to return home with enough money to buy a vehicle, let alone start a business or buy a home. Why would young men and increasing numbers of women put themselves in this position? Why come to South Africa to risk life or health, endure so much suffering at the hands of the political establishment and the populace? Why come to earn so little, give so much, and still run the risk of losing ones position in their community and even their family?

VIII. Conclusion: Home is the Future

Despite the fact that perceived financial opportunity is what drew migrants to South Africa, the pursuit of money takes on cultural connotations all its own. Even in cases where basic needs of food and shelter are met, such as in Malawi or Senegal, pressure is put on migrants to provide a better life for their families, including shelter, education, medical care, or expensive religious and cultural rites. Despite the differing levels of distress in participants’ home countries, all conveyed a sadness that they must
leave home in order to have a better future. Home is quite simply the best place to be for my participants and the place to which they are trying to return.

I choose to reiterate this, the same point from which I began this exploration, to make clear that migration is a cycle, whether or not that cycle is achieved physically (Potts 2011). Home is the best. Home is the past. Home is also present. Now I restate that home is the future. Migrants in South Africa have shown that they harbor a deep longing to return home. The pressures of life in South Africa significantly help migrants feel a constant desire to repatriate. No matter how long they may wish to hold on and hold out for that last (or first) windfall, the vast majority of migrants inevitably return from their time in South Africa, and most often with little to show for it.

Even the more situated migrants (I am thinking of Congolese (DRC) like Adele, Theresa, Helene, Patrice and Pascal and the Kenyan Amos, who all have multiple children in school in South Africa) still intend to return home when their children have achieved South African educations. This means that repatriation is perhaps fifteen years off in some cases, but for these migrants it is not any less desirous. South African citizens like Pascal and Adele, do not wish to stay any longer than necessary, even though they have achieved what so many other immigrants have dreamt of: an immunity from the systemic harassment by South African immigration bureaucracy.

For many migrants, the Senegalese in particular, remembering home was a willful act of focus and determination. Remembering home was a spiritual state cloaking one in protection from the ills of spiritual decay, but also from laziness and personal or financial mismanagement. “Each and every day if you remember where you are coming from. And where you have to go, you are gonna be courageous to work hard and fill those gaps let at
home” Issa explained, and expanded upon later; “Yes we coming with our culture and our positive behavior. That’s what we are doing. We are traveling with the culture. Not travelling only with a suitcase but we are going with the culture. It’s what we are doing. Like, never get yourself influenced in another country, especially in a negative way. Like, sometime you can see other people from other countries following just their heart and mind blindly and find them partying outside, drinking. Sometime they can find themselves in the police station” (Issa 2011).

But the most fundamental purpose of the connection to home, is for migrants to maintain a place for themselves in the fabric of home society and, more importantly, family. Migrants who are hard-pressed for money might otherwise shy away from picking up the phone to call home, knowing that communication opened up the opportunity for family and friends to ask for help financially. Many migrants, as the Malawian focus group exclaimed clearly, are afraid to express the difficulties they are having in South Africa and to ask family and friends for emotional support, as it would undermine their status. Yet, despite the one-sided burden the migrants feel in their thankless relationship to home, not only do they continue to pick up the phone, they often drive the communication.

In this chapter, I have attempted to show that this conundrum is easily understood in the context of the very rational need to be a part of there. Greater than the fear of financial burden, or even the discomfort and feelings of loneliness that would come from missing the news of home, is the fear of social displacement. This fear creates urgency, which in many can develop into anxiety. Because migrants’ successes in South Africa create social currency as much or more powerful than actual money, migrants begin to
interact with home in specific ways that create specific patterns of expectation, fantasy
and social movement. In the next chapter I use the above understanding as a foundation
to explore cycles of migration in which participants in this project find themselves: from
scales as small as the family and the community to scales as large as regions and the
globe.
Chapter 9. Cultures of Exile

I. Introduction

Little has been inquired of migrants about how remittance represents an obstacle to migrants’ achievement of significant personal goals. Burman states that “Money and goods sent to sites and people left behind are inextricable from a sense of responsibility, attachment, guilt, and reparations” (Burman 2002). Altruism and responsibility are listed amongst commonly held theories of remittance (Addison 2005), yet, little of the remittance literature is focused on this issue of responsibility and duty, or viewing remittances as a personal obstacle. The focus is usually put on their long-term utility for the migrant or the short term utility of the receiver. This begs the question, “When migrants suffer from low wages and difficult living conditions in their host communities, why do they remit resources that could improve their own quality of life at that moment” (Cliggett 2005, 35)? Even if we view remittance as a long term social or economic investment strategy, there is still an obstacle being created in the short term for the remitter.

II. Stuck

Pardon waved a hand toward the market and declared, “This market is a refugee camp.” I thought at the time that he might have been being a bit dramatic. As I look back on those words, however, I begin to see the true significance of what he was saying. It was not strictly a market space to which he was referring. When he waved his hand toward the market, he knew that it was not a camp. It was decidedly a commercial space, yet it also represented a sort of way station. He also waved his hands toward the
enterprise in the bigger picture. The market, for Pardon, meant the migrants in the market and the struggles that had brought them there. Most importantly, though, Pardon was describing the struggles that kept them there in the light of the widespread understanding that everyone in the market would rather be somewhere else.

Migration is changing, and not only in South Africa. Perhaps it is always in flux, but Pardon identified a way in which migration is currently changing, as witnessed within a single generation. His mother had been doing cross-border trade between Cape Town and Zimbabwe since the 1980s. Eventually, she began bringing Pardon along to help with her trade, and in the late 1990s, got him enrolled in a Cape Town high school. Pardon has many Xhosa friends, speaks the language fluently and felt more at home in Cape Town than any migrant I met, except perhaps Brenda from Swaziland. Yet, Pardon is also the first to tell you that something about the situation of migrants in Cape Town is rotten.

Pardon’s words have rung truer the more this project has evolved. In previous chapters I have discussed the roles of the state and xenophobia as barriers to migrant livelihood, and I have discussed some of the micro-economic reasons that market life is stratified, inert, cyclical, and rooted in processes of history and geography at various scales of time and space. These understandings help one see how respondents could refer to the market as a “trap”. There is another process at work that is firmly connected to “home” as family, as an imagined place, and as a point both of provenance and future return.

As I have already described, this other axis is the migrants’ relationship to home, a particularly burdensome one at that. This relationship is as stratified, cyclical, and rooted in processes of history and geography as the market itself (Kihato 2009; Potts
Migrants’ relationships to home alienate them from and bind them to home at the same time. These cycles rely on a complex of migrants, family, friends and historically rooted patterns. As I aim to point out in this chapter, the new aspects of the transnational nature of contemporary migration has created not only a new class of migrant, but a new culture in communities that send them. And all involved, it seems, are trapped.

“I was thinking I would come here for two, three, four months working, but I see not. It’s different. I’m stuck now.”

How was he stuck? I inquired of Robert.

“Money. Maybe I get nice money, I go in time.” Robert sincerely wanted to go home and stay there, but how can he when, as he put it, he “can’t even buy a tomato there”? He didn’t have a specific figure in mind that would compel him to go home.

“Then how will you know it’s time to go home?” I inquired.

“Ah, you know. It’s just life. Like the way I leave Jo’burg.” If you recall from the chapter on xenophobia, Robert left Johannesburg because someone slashed his neck open with a broken beer bottle. Robert lives pretty much day by day, his stoicism and resign perhaps aided by a regimen of THC.

Robert is not alone, however, not in his predicament or his attitude toward life. He took part in the Malawian focus group, but was largely silent there. The others were more vocal about the struggles they faced as migrants. For these migrants, it is nearly impossible to go home with a car or a business that could make life better back home, and as one participant aptly noted, even then “a car is not a future.”

Odds are that Robert and the rest will go home some day. Will members of his family welcome him? Will they celebrate him and his sacrifice? Will they be willing to
help him out financially when he gets sick or needs help with school fees for his future children? He doesn’t know what figure would support his future at home, what would maintain his dignity or the respect of others. But he does know that he can’t go home now, not if he cannot even buy a tomato. Perhaps his only hope is that after a certain period of time, the length of his term in South Africa becomes a sort of currency that he can use to leverage acceptance and support out of his family upon his return.

African migrants in South Africa commonly send remittances to family and home community members. Many sources estimate that official remittances (sent through official channels like banks and wire services) now exceed development assistance to the developing world (Addison 2005; Mercer et al. 2009; Pendleton 2006; Tall 2005; Tilly 2007). When unofficial remittances are included, these estimates more than double (Addison 2005). Unofficial remittances include the carriage of cash, goods and gifts (Landau 2006), or the sending of money via unofficial courier agents, trusted friends or family members (Addison 2005; Adepoju 2003; Tilly 2007). For remittance recipients, remittances secure food levels, finance children’s education and support the elderly and impoverished (Mercer et al. 2009; Schreider 2000).

Migrants are more likely to remit cash or gifts when they plan on returning home sometime in their future (Cliggett 2003; Schreider 2000). The high number of migrants in South Africa who plan on returning home indicates that this can be expected to play a part in long term migrant strategy. “[T]he exchange of ‘things’ creates, represents and reinforces social relationships” (Cliggett 2005, 38). Remittances can socially acknowledge friends and family at home, help keep one’s stake in their future inheritance, or simply accumulate to build the one’s wealth in their home country.
Also educating children, if not seen as a duty, can translate into a long term strategy where children can get higher paying jobs to support the parent in old age (Schreider 2000). No matter why immigrants choose to remit, it is clear that state control regimes affect how they choose to do so. “Denied access to almost all formal banking services, poor immigrants must either stash cash in their residences or carry it on their bodies” (Landau 2009, 203). Transferring money outside of official channels reduces transfer costs, but is inherently risky, though not necessarily riskier (Addison 2005).

However, as Pardon notes, leaving the market to pursue bigger things or cash in on his goodwill at home is tricky. “But now here I feel like if I don’t pull up my mind and say I will come out of here, then I wont come out of there. It will be like some like for you; you wont be surprised if you come in 5 or 6 years and it’s the same people you meet here. They’ll be still here” (2011). He later went on to say, “There are some people who are coming from war like the Congolese. They don’t have a choice. They have kids here and they stay. But for most people this place is temporary. It’s supposed to be temporary.”

Indeed, Pardon saw as I did that the Congolese had a tendency to put down roots, primarily because their children were in South Africa. “But if I calculate from 2005, when I start ‘til now, that is six years I’ve been here. I feel like I stay more here than the more I go home. Because if I go home, maybe I go once or twice a year. And I won’t go long because of finances. Because there, maybe the small money I have, it can finish so quickly. I have to bring also stock to here. So most life I’m here. So it’s like for me, I’m not happy here.”
When asked if he had accrued anything for himself in his time in the market, he responded, “Like for the past time I’ve been here, you know, what I can only say is I’ve managed to help my mother to build a house. That’s the only thing I can say I’ve done. Which it doesn’t bring income to me. It just brings shelter to me and my other siblings.”

Certainly this is a great accomplishment, even if he only played a part in the building of the home. “I wish I could get that income,” he continued. “This was the big idea when I come here. Maybe if I came here, if I work hard, I get income, I go see what I can do at home. But the way its going, its like if I don’t pull out from here, Ill end up stuck here and not even going back.”

Pardon went on to explain, however, that if he left the market, someone who was more desperate than him to be in the market would swoop in and his spot. Then he went on, if a plan to start out in Durban, for example, did not pan out, he would have to come back to the market as an assistant. If he lost his market spot, he said, he might have a white beard before he got it back.

Pardon’s example is extremely useful as an exclamation mark on my argument that South Africa’s migrant spaces are incredibly restrictive, via the state, society, the legal framework imposed by the city council, the context of poverty and even by the new migration cycles driven by expectation at home. Pardon has no dependents, an energetic and largely self-sufficient mother at home, ownership of a successful market stall with an ideal location, a command of local customs and language and even a social circle that consist as much of South Africans as Zimbabweans. So, if he feels trapped in the cycle of contemporary migration, then it affirms the validity of the feelings of thousands of others with or without his advantages (Kihato 2009).
III. Remittance Dependence

Andrew had been in South Africa only a year, but you would not believe it from the amount of space he managed. Andrew was 21 and new entrant into a large-scale family operation. We met for his interview in a large retail space on Long Street devoted to African souvenir crafts. His uncle owned or leased the whole building and sublet space to the dozens of other operations. Andrew provided an interesting vantage point as he, like Pardon, came to South Africa on someone else’s coat tails with subsequent privileges. In this regard, he voiced a great sense of responsibility to home.

I asked him what the best way to help home was.

“They best way to help is not giving them money you see.”

I never heard it put so succinctly during my time in South Africa, yet, the statement summed up so much of what had been expressed by other participants. I asked him if he could elaborate.

“If my father is old enough, he can run his own business you see. You can go home, open him a shop, something like that. Because if you giving money you gonna give him money today, tomorrow it’s finished. He still needing money, you see. So the best thing I think is opening something he can do.”

When I asked if he had any immediate plans to do that, he replied no. But he was remitting periodically to his family. He saw the trap, saw that he was in it with both feet, but maintained a dream of opening a business some day for his family back home, the “income” Pardon spoke of.

That the trap existed was clear from talking to participants. That this sort of cognitive dissonance was so remarkably common, however, indicated that the trap may
be far larger than a market space, or an economic role, but may have engulfed an entire mode of thinking, an entire lifeway.

As Andrew said and scholars have noted, this whole mess might be improved if migrants were not pressured one way or another to remit so much of their finances. That way they could accrue capital for further investment that would largely end up developing their home countries in meaningful ways. The best way in the long term to actually help those at home, Andrew said, would be to not give them money.

Yet, this is not possible in the social context of contemporary transnational migration. Put another way, Andrew knows it is not really his choice. It is not possible because the social forces that drive the entire process are largely at home. These forces have decided that no, thank you very much, we will take the school fees or the food or the convenience of a microwave oven over the possible payoff of a functioning business at some undetermined point in the future. And when one day, the young people who have benefited from Andrew’s remittances have no place to work as adults. The process then will repeat itself for another generation.

Later in my group interviews, as themes began to take shape, I took the opportunity to test my hypotheses with the groups. After weeks of listening and trying not to lead the witness, I now took the opportunity to get their reactions to my perceptions. Regarding this issue, they all agreed that there was an irony at work in their existence. They had ultimately come to South Africa to build something back home, but their connection to home was actively preventing that.

Me: So its like in the game of being an immigrant, Home Affairs wants some money, xenophobia pushes you into higher rent, so you lose more. Your mom is like “ah I have to go to the doctor,” or “oh there was a funeral, oh school fees yadda yadda yadda”
Gilbert: Yeah yeah yeah!
Amos: All they way you get a problem.
Me: And then you--
Amos: You have small money
Gilbert: and you see the problem, maybe…you can get sick also.
Amos: And you can’t work.
Me: Or you get robbed also. Or it’s winter
Gilbert: Yeah you see.
Amos: Winter is making and losing. That’s what we do.

To the group of Malawian assistants, I made the bold assertion, “I think that if you came here, even with all the challenges, you could actually make enough money to go home.”

This was greeted with “Yeahs” and hoots and “Ahhs” of assent.

“Quick Quick!” Bomani said.

“And if the six of you did that and went home to build a business in Malawi, you could improve the actual economy –

“Of the country!” Thomas interjected. This received the same chorus of assent.

“But that problem doesn’t get solved,” I went on, “because the money goes to rice, beans, t-shirts –

“School fees!” Bomani interrupted, along with other shouts of, “Yeah, School fees!”

When I asked about the idea of exile, the first time I had mentioned it to any participants, they agreed without reservation. Put simply, no one wanted to be in South Africa, but felt they could not return home. I picked up the idea again in another group interview.
IV. The Fantasy Cycle

A cycle of expectations is created when young children are repeatedly taught that when a person grows up, especially men, but increasingly women too, they move away to another country. They become relatively wealthy and provide for the family. One day that child grows up to become the migrant provider themselves (Kihato 2009). As mentioned earlier, because of the consumer use of remittance, the dire economic circumstances have gone unimproved. Once abroad, they find that the life of a migrant is incredibly taxing, in some ways more than life at home (Kihato 2009). They feel boxed in by the anti-immigrant sentiment of the country they are in, by linguistic difficulties sometimes, by hostile government apparatus, by the pull of easy money via crime, by the pull of attractive yet costly socialization, but perhaps most of all, by the constant volume of need and expectation at home.

Few migrants, if any, enjoy this position. Almost all would prefer to have never come, or to at least return home as soon as possible. Yet they stay, and more than that, they portray a façade to home when they enjoy the mantle of the wealthy paternal or avuncular figure, leader of the family. Yes they call home to simply connect with their loved ones, but also to make sure that monies remitted are allotted to their satisfaction, that they are apprised of developments in family and community politics and that they maintain a position of seniority for their eventual return. There is little room in this for a conversation about meaningful development, about saying no to sending money for a microwave or a funeral so that the next generation can have opportunity for careers at home.
That is not to say that meaningful development has not or cannot happen. The vehicle for this is often a “Home Association” whereby communities or migrant groups gather to reassess their priorities and build a community consensus to be stakeholders in a better future, at the cost of forgoing immediate use of remittances for consumables. But the fact that Home Associations like this have proven necessary, not just in Africa, but in Latin America and Asia too, points to the validity of the notion that without them, communities that routinely send migrants will only perpetuate the cycles of inequality that caused them to send migrants in the first place.

The fantasy loop begins, perhaps directly, via a parent telling a child that one day they will grow up and go away to help provide for their family and make something of themselves. The loop begins more powerfully, however, when the child is not simply commanded, but intrinsically motivated to become a migrant. How is this possible, when the reality of migrant life can be so incredibly grim, as described in this and previous chapters?

Interviews portrayed to me that migrants rarely are able to return home with any meaningful capital to invest in a home, a business or even in something as simple as a car. During focus group 1 with the Malawian assistants, I began to ask more pointed questions about the likelihood of success in South Africa. The previous excerpt showed many of the reasons why migrants find it incredibly difficult to make financial gains in South Africa. Put simply, family pressure to remit depletes resources.

These more pointed questions revealed that these migrants felt that perhaps only 2 in 10 migrants go home with anything substantial, with 8 returning home as destitute as the day they left. Pardon said that he thinks the number is more like 1 in 100, and I
believe that is much closer to the mark. Because of the obvious shame that can accompany this inglorious return that the vast majority of migrants are destined for, migrants often find ways to communicate to their families back home that they were successful. This can be as simple as having nicer clothes than when they left, a nice watch, a nice phone, i.e. tangible items that require little financial upkeep yet communicate to other social actors the hallmarks of success that so many in their country can never hope to attain. And yet this pressure to “look the part” is a way that migrants divert their own resources into material goods. If, as Edmund said, a car is not a future, then what sort of future is a watch or a Manchester United jersey in regards to meaningful self-advancement or development? If migrants feel doomed to fail in their dream of bringing back a better life via wealth, they can at least transport home a social standing.

You know, what we do as people, if I came here, I tend to call home, I lie to someone. ‘Hey I’m here in South Africa, it’s a nice place. I have a nice job. I have a lot of money.’ You see? There’s no one who likes to tolerate failure. So if you go home and you don’t want to be a failure. Like me if I say I want to go to America right now, I don’t want to go then I call home and say, ‘Hey I’m stuck here.’ Already there’s a bunch of people who are waiting for me! When I go, they are like, ‘Hey, here at least there is hope in the family. The family will bloom into a better life’ (Pardon 2011).

Like the way we were sitting right now. They just say ‘I got big brother in South Africa. He’s working there.’ They think you always you have money. They think like that. In Africa it’s always like that. When you move from home, all the people they just think, when you come you arrive and you are the king. You are the king. They see you come, and they think anything you have in the world you can do (Mamadou 2011).

Even migrants who know how hard the life is can fall into imagining that a different migration destination might still be the answer to their dreams.

Like for me I stay here for three years. Maybe I go home. I bring something. When they see ‘Ah! Its easy! I can go there. I can get something easy.’ For us here in South Africa we see someone [return] from America, he bring something, he bring money, we think ‘Ah! It’s better to go maybe to America!” But when you go there and reach there you see and you realize, “Oh it’s not.” (Azibo 2011).
Though destitute, migrants return home with as much of a façade of success as they can possibly muster. The small minority that return with the façade, the merit badge, and the trappings of success (that can manifest as gifts for family and friends, a car, a home or even a business) give enough substance to the culture-wide fantasy that many pretenders are able to draft in their wake by showing even less overt evidence of success.

Bomani: Like if for example, Edmund, he can be the first one to leave. By the time he go back he can have a car, he can have money. And me I can see what he have. I can think ‘Ah maybe there is something there.’ I can follow him. The time I come back, maybe
Matthew: Oh oh oh! (in agreement)
Bomani: These guys are doing better now! It’s like a competition back at home.
Azibo: We copy one another.
Matthew: You see in our country we have fewer opportunities. You see to have a better life you must get a good solid concrete education.

In addition, all throughout the migrant’s tenure in South Africa (and any other destination to be sure), they are remitting, perhaps paying a child’s school fees, for a grandfather’s funeral, for a wedding, a labola, a doctor’s visit or even gifts of appliances, clothing or other luxuries. Thus, children grow up seeing the migration veterans receive higher social standing in their communities for their years of service and their real or perceived wealth. They see that the migrant far from home (whom they may never have actually met yet) is a blessed guardian angel. And perhaps they think they might like to have a car or a phone or shoes like him. No one else has a car, only him, because he went to Italy, or Saudi Arabia, or France or South Africa.

At a very young age, then, children can resolve that getting away from homes like Malawi will be worth any cost due to the high potential reward.

Me: So people call home and tell that things are better than they are?
Pardon: Yeah that is why they have to come here and visit me from time to time. But they don’t know what I’m going through mentally, how hard it is for me.
Me: So you sometimes exaggerate your success to give your family hope?
Pardon: For people, for most people, you tend to do that. But sometimes you do it, not knowing you are doing it. Like not let’s say I can talk to my friend. “What are you doing
in South Africa?” I have a business. His mental will be like something big. ‘He is driving Mercedes, he has flock of workers.’ He’s like ‘Ah can I come there!’ (2011).

The fantasy loop becomes readily apparent for most migrants after some time in South Africa. The first time one must suffer a robbery, racial insult or the pain of hunger, the fantasy fades until the hard truth is revealed. “You have to get trapped! You come, you don’t have money to go back. So what can you do, you have to work” (Amos 2011). Yet migrants, once aware of it, find it difficult to shake it completely. It is such an ingrained portion of their worldview regarding financial opportunity that it tends to live on in different forms. Though tempered by the reality, migrant hopes and dreams manage to thrive.

Once in Cape Town, in the market, migrants feel doubly trapped. In a sense the blessing of a small income becomes a nuisance. It amplifies the fear of risk, as all know how easily they could lose out on having any income if they were to take the risk of changing career tracks (Pardon 2011). Yet, the pay for assistants and increasing numbers of owners is too low as to allow them to actually build something of substance for their future, such as property at home or a business. And even if they did make enough to possibly acquire the capital over years of work to go home and develop something of lasting permanence, bringing income and commerce to their entire community, this dream is most often nickel and dimed away by the needs of those at home, funds given at great personal cost by migrants for fear of social ostracization if they do not give what is requested. It is a trap and, increasingly, a firmly entrenched cycle.

It is exactly as Mamadou pointed out: migrants leave home to become links in a chain, equally drawn in by the fantasy portrayed by previous migrants and pushed by the absurdly high expectations of immediate reward for their families. For the individual
migrant, it is a doomed enterprise from the start. For the communities they serve, it is a means of getting quick infusions of cash for special occasions, school fees, small luxuries like appliances and sometimes to maintain food security. Yet, the remittance trap rarely lets individuals build a truly better future for themselves, nor lets sending communities make lasting commercial developments.

V. Conclusion: Cultures of Exile

The fantasy loop, the pressures families and decision makers place on children as future migrants and the context of domestic poverty all combine to create a culture of exile. I saw this theme emerge bit by bit as I engaged my participants in discussion about their relationships to their respective homes. As I neared the end of field work, I began to distinctly sense that my participants had been groomed, from childhood, for a life of migrancy, for exclusion from the comforts of home at the benefit of the community or the family.

I saw these attitudes in statements like the following.

Thomas: To my point its unfair. Because as usually as a citizen…you learn and you educated by your country. As a citizen you’re supposed not to have to go to another country. Because even you country, is country is crying for you to apply your knowledge so your country can be going somewhere. It’s better to stay in your home.
Bomani: But if there is nothing in your home, …
Azibo and Matthew: How can you stay.
Bomani: How can you stay? --goes on about how white peoples parents invest for them and start a base for them, as he does, but black peoples parents don’t do that. SO you have to make your own way and start your own foundation.
Azibo: And then if you get some peanuts, you have to share.
Bomani: And if you get some small peanuts, you have to share (2011).

Me: Is the image of a leader, a man who takes care of his family? Is that image now slowly becoming the man who goes to another country? Matthew: Yeah exactly. It’s the man who goes to another country. The one who takes care of the family at home.
Azibo: than even the one who is there.
Matthew: Because even if I’ve got some body who’s got money, who’s working there, but the family’s got a problem, maybe approaches him and he say ok you know what I’m gonna tell them to ..why can’t you call your brother in South Africa. He’s got a lot more money than me. You see? Ok I will help you with the phone. Call him and he will send you money.

Bomani: Even when they are earning the same amount in a month
Matthew: They don’t know that we are suffering here.
Bomani: The same amount! But if there is a problem, they will call here.
Matthew: Yeah yeah. What is going on. That is because you out of the country.
Thomas: And they expect that maybe you are getting something.
Matthew: Yeah yeah.
Bomani: That’s the situation (2011).

The Malawian group felt strongly that they were to some extent forced to come to South Africa, forced to remit and were being taken advantage of because of the image of the wealthy migrant. For them and almost every one else I spoke with about this idea of exile, when parted from the connotation of exile as punishment per se, felt that it accurately described their situation. They were being brought up in societies that value the work of the migrant over that of the homebound businessperson or otherwise hard worker. Then those migrants are taken advantage of once abroad.

One of my very first interviews was with Paul, a Malawian also, who considered himself a refugee, yet found this interesting considering that he came from a peaceful country, with plentiful food. However, as he put it, “You can’t choose to be a refugee.” This comment stuck with me. Despite how he saw himself as lacking the hallmarks of the stereotypical refugee, war, famine etc., he knew he was one, simply because he felt powerless, that he lacked choice in the matter of leaving his home.

Whereas many refugees, such as Ibrahim or Antonio, fled for fear of political persecution, or like Theresa or Adele, for fear of living in a war ravaged community, Paul saw plainly that he was a refugee too for fear of living with no social standing at home and with no hope of anything better than what his parents had. Unlike other types of
refugees, migrants are exiled not by dictators, roving militias or by famine, but by their owned loved ones.

**The Senegalese “Problem”**

Just as I became certain that the concept of exile was the pinnacle of what I had come to understand of migrant life, both in the Market but in South Africa, and possibly larger scales, I had a very problematic lunchtime focus group with some Senegalese gentlemen. There were new faces, some who had been hesitant before to be interviewed individually. Issa, Mamadou and Bakary were there. Abdou came for a bit and ate with the same speed he talked. I knew Abdou from two years previously. On a pre-dissertation research trip in 2009, I bought a drum from him at the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown, off in Eastern Cape. It was my interactions with migrants like him in that market that spawned the central questions of my dissertation. How fitting that he showed up for one of my final interviews. “First thing before you eat here, you have to make sure that the people behind eat already. Whatever happens to them will happen to you here. You have to think about them first. First thing is them. Second thing is us. This is the reason we are all here” (Abdou, 2011).

All affirmed that this was the case. I nodded inwardly, as this lined up with the pattern for the rest of the migrants. Next they shared a consensus that they came here primarily to make money to provide for their family. Still, despite their family-first focus, which was no new theme in my interviews, Abdou mentioned that he had earned enough to buy a functional bakery back home. He had done what few others in the market ever would: brought tangible development to his home.
“But not only,” Touba chimed in for the first time. “Others, no, they don’t have nothing. They are like me. I haven’t got cents there. If I don’t make money here, [my family] are not eating. Different story. Maybe [Abdou] have idea before he come. But some of us, more of us come with no idea. Come here make money and send home. Nothing else.” So, Abdou was still a bit of an anomaly, even for the generally more successful Senegalese.

I asked then, if they would rather live in Senegal, to which Abdou answered,

People leave Senegal to go to countries where they have hope. Where they have hope, there is money. Today if he goes to Malawi, Swaziland, you won’t see Senegalese there. That is why many are in South Africa, because there is money here. You can make the money, send it back home and make the family to be stable. Senegal is a country of 12 million now, but we can say we have 6 million outside. 85% of the people form Senegal their income comes from outside (2011).

All agreed that, like the emerging migrant cultures in other Sub-Saharan African countries, manliness was measured in provision, and migrant provision most of all. When I asked if families expect their sons to go overseas, Bakary answered that not all children in Senegal get groomed the same way. Those who show no aptitude for commerce do not get the same educational and capital investment in them as those who do. As Bakary told it, the weak are weeded out of the ranks and only the most intelligent and ambitious are selected. It was another piece in the puzzle of why the Senegalese seemed more successful in the market. The style of dress and the bravado were part of a cultural display, but they were also the results and partial causes of real success.

Intellectual Issa remained behind when the others left. He had thus far failed to get more than a word or two in edgewise with Abdou. When I asked him about the success Senegalese seemed to have in the market, he responded, “The Senegalese come with more capital.”
This I had heard also from Bakary and Mamadou. Senegalese families send their young men to countries like South Africa, France and the United States, they had explained. There is no place near Senegal geographically that holds hope for strong commercial success, so they must travel by plane which costs much more. The entry costs to migrant life in Cape Town for the Senegalese are simply higher. Thus, by elimination, those who arrive in New York, Paris or Cape Town are amongst the best supported migrants to be found, with families at home that are financially more stable than average. This capital allows them to start business with bigger-ticket items like masks, drums, silver and leather goods.

In addition to the capital, it is clear that they exhibit superior salesmanship over others in the market. Most sales pitches amount to something close to begging or, conversely, sitting idly by their stand. I had myself witnessed a German couple purchase a wooden mask from Issa in my first interview with him. They showed interest. Then he excused himself from our conversation and calmly began asking them what sort of mask interested them. He respectfully answered their questions with as much information as he could, sometimes referencing pictures for comparison in a large “coffee table” style reference book. He presented his products knowledgably, but without desperation or even a hard sell. It was very similar to Abdou’s style I encountered first in Grahamstown. He showed me some beats on the djembe and helped me find a drum with the pitch I liked the best.

In the end, the Germans handed over the equivalent of $150 US. Issa pocketed the money and sat back down with me, as if he had not just made in five minutes what many in the market made in a week. This sales style seems to emanate in part from a
confidence in the quality of their products, but more so from a lack of anxiety over the outcome. While the psychology behind this confidence is beyond my expertise, its comparative efficacy is immediately apparent to the lay person. As Issa explained, it was partly a result of a history of success and a kind of relaxed fatalism linked to spiritual faith.

Surely, the honest, erudite and outwardly humble Issa would help translate their confident demeanors and feelings in a way that would display that the Senegalese people felt exiled deep down. He did not. Amongst other things, I asked him if exile described the Senegalese experience. He replied, “I don’t like the word for myself, because I am coming here not because I have to, but because I want to find opportunity.”

I asked him if that didn’t make him awfully sad that he could not live at home and have opportunity. He agreed that, yes, it was very sad. Still, he resisted the idea of exile. Leaving was his choice. Given the more successful nature of the Senegalese market trade, it should not have come as such a shock to me that Issa resisted the idea of exile. At the time however, it did. I thought Issa would see the larger-scale injustices that drive migration and cause such heartache in African communities. When I had hinted at it before, the rest of the group had affirmed that they did leave their country for opportunity, and that yes they would prefer to be home, but they also had failed to display to me the depth of sadness and powerlessness that I was sure would tie up my thesis with a neat little bow. Issa’s people, the Murids, are a sect of Sufi Islam practiced primarily in Senegal. He and many of the other Senegalese in the market are from Touba, an inland city that is actually the hearth of Muridism. This sect particularly drew artisans and agriculturalists into its fold, upon its ascension in the mid 19th century, who utilized their
place as producers for the French Colonial hegemony and thereby long ago locating themselves in a global economy (Diouf 2000).

Despite his assertion that the idea of exile did not describe his personal feelings, Issa was not opposed to idea of exile regarding other Africans. For Issa, being a migrant involved a special ambition. Then again, he realized, that was a very common trait for Senegalese people and not necessarily for other cultures. In the end, Issa’s point was that for Senegalese people, migration was more about the going rather than the leaving. Senegalese leave home with far more assurance that they can work hard and achieve their goals, so the exercise feels more determined. The fact remains, however, that for a young man to pursue his future, he has to leave home, and the entrapping cycles of remittance affect the Senegalese too, perhaps, though, to a lesser extent due to the heavy community organization.

The Senegalese “problem” turned out not to be a problem at all. In the time since these conversations, I have come to think that the Senegalese have accepted the cycle of migrancy at a deep cultural level. It has no more the connotation of exile than a Roman Legionnaire felt going off to war to seek plunder and fortune. Stoller in fact points to the centuries-long history of West African people’s leveraging a willingness to be mobile as a capitalist ploy (2009). The Senegalese state uses its domestic policy and foreign diplomacy to foster these migration linkages and cycles (2003). The Senegalese have internalized the need to leave home for financial wellbeing to the point that it is no longer questioned. For reasons whose full depths would be a wonderful topic of study for another project, the Senegalese have accepted the lifeway of cyclical migration and instead of fighting it or decrying it, merely endeavored to be the best at it. Instead of
contradicting the notion that contemporary migration depends on cultures of exile, the
Senegalese migration project may actually provide a template for how to predict the
future of the impact of migration and remittance on African societies, culture and
families. It all begs the question: Are the Senegalese only the beginning?
Chapter 10. Conclusion

I. Mobility Is Not Success

The historical and contemporary cycles of migrancy in Africa intersect with cycles of xenophobia and racism in South Africa to make the migrant life there untenable, and the dream of self-advancement elusive. These cycles are firmly entrenched in their own historical backgrounds but also in their relation to one another. This relationship between migration cycles and anti-immigration sentiment is remarkably strong elsewhere in the world too. Few migration contexts lack a historically-rooted racism or xenophobia. Though these stories differ around the globe in places like Russia, Canada and Italy, human mobility is indeed being leveraged far-and-wide by the global South.

The theme of mobility is one of the core modes of understanding basic human adaptation strategies from prehistory to today and will continue to be so. Technology has increased the possibilities for markets and other institutions to move faster and farther, for people to travel, for cross-pollination of ideas. These are all good things, generally speaking, and when we use terms like mobility, we can get an exciting sense of improvement and collective empowerment. However, what we must keep in mind is that the lack of need for mobility was hailed for generations as a sign of working institutions, stability, the fruit of healthy civilization. Likewise, having to move elsewhere, having to rely on a high degree of mobility ought to signal that a very large element of global society plainly is not functioning.

Today who has this ability? As labor suffers in nations affected by neoliberal reforms, economically attractive locations tend to seal their borders to outsiders or bar
their participation within them. Those with capital and political connections are able to cross borders nearly effortlessly. Those in the labor class, as Africans in South Africa have found, are seldom able to reach their destinations easily, or maintain a presence there long enough to benefit from entry into the target job market.

The Senegalese problem, as I first saw it, is no problem for the notion that young men and increasing numbers of women are functionally exiled from their homes by lack of opportunity, but also by social pressures and reshaping cultural imaginations of rites of passage and markers of status. The Senegalese I encountered in the market did vary in personality and worldview in some respects. They also were remarkably unified in the worldview that refused to see migration as an unfortunate event. The exile has become so deeply rooted in the Senegalese men I interviewed and spent time with, they have finally accepted this necessity of migration unquestioningly. Issa was aware of regional inequality, has read Franz Fanon and certainly misses home, but when asked if it wouldn’t be a better life for Senegal to be a place where young men didn’t have to leave for their income and social standing, Issa responded the same way as if I had asked if it would not be a better world if we just didn’t have earthquakes or wild fires or mosquitoes.

Home is best. Migrants would by and large much prefer to be home rather than being in the role of migrant. Inequality and historical injustice, whose consequences are not soon to improve, are the principle culprits in creating the schism between home and migrant. A culture of exile does exist, but the Senegalese case asks how long this rubric for understanding will be eclipsed by the notion that the culture of exile has simply become “culture.” Exile’s eerie connotations of injustice and punishment may fade into
the background as newer, more pressing challenges come to exert discomfort on migrants.

After returning from fieldwork, I had the opportunity to participate in a symposium entitled “Cultures of Exile” relating to issues of African migrancy. This was my last confirmation that this idea, though novel to me at the time of field work, fitted well both into the scholarly conversation in which I am involved, and as a rubric for understanding the human experience of migrancy in Africa. The concept of cultures of exile serves as a helpful theoretical frame for understanding the contemporary changing nature of migration in Africa, as long as the motive for the exile is seen in its proper historical and place context. However, after cultures of exile become the norm, what does this mean for the migrant identity and the collective migrant future?

II. The Tides that Bind

Roughly a year after I conducted this fieldwork, I visited the mouth of the Klamath River in northern California. The mountain water flows in a wide band directly into the crashing and tumultuous Pacific. The contest between fresh and salt water halts river particles that are then deposited right along the front line of the battle. Over centuries or millennia perhaps, this created a sand bar. The directionally alternating winds continue today to drive more silt and detritus from the shorelines up onto a fifty-foot high berm. This berm is a hundred to two hundred yards wide and chokes the half-mile wide mouth of the mighty Klamath down to a small channel, maybe 80 feet wide.

I think back to that sand berm and I see on the one side in the pounding waves the constant global campaign for capitalist expansion. I see neoliberal policies and
neoconservative anti-immigrant sentiment. When I look to the Klamath, being drawn down by invisible yet unfaltering forces, to crash headlong into the Pacific, I see ten thousand small communities in the Global South, so destitute that local industry cannot support the imagined futures of its sons and daughters. I see families willing to fracture in order to find a better future, and I see young people enamored with the fantasy of emigration. And on this windswept sand bar I see Edmund and Bomani. I see Mamadou and Adele, I see Ibrahim, and whether he would like it or not, I see Issa. But when I pull back my gaze, I see a whole variety of people, all over the world, from every religion and race and nation. I see Africans, Europeans, even increasing numbers of Europeans and North Americans.

One thing that always drew me to understanding migration was the impact it has had on the events of history – and what a foundational effect! – but as I see this berm gathering before my eyes, I am beginning to feel that transnational migration in 2011 was not and is not only a finite event nor an age that will come and pass. Migration has attained a sort of collective critical mass that will cause it to be more than a trend or a phase that we describe in temporal terms. It is a hallmark of the human condition for a wide swath of the globe. The condition of the nation-state and neoliberal economics and the vast need of the Global South are at war. Yes, this is an event and a fair one for study, but this war is leaving orphans at the periphery.

What I have come to conclude in this analysis is not what I expected: to simply sum up the ways that migration is a process that is changing and fascinating. What I have come to conclude as the main thrust of my findings, is that migrants’ particular lifeways are incredibly unique and are accruing into a social class distinct from the poverty of the
global south that sent them and the wealth and power of the north that drew them. The tides that bind them are surging more every day.

III. The Migrant Class

This group we call migrants are not just people on the move. In fact, one of the chief struggles of the migrant class is that they live with some of the strictest bonds and barriers on their life regarding space and society. Though we think of them as travellers, they are actually some of the most immobile people on earth today. Their lack of citizenship and familiarity with locals denies them even non-spatial, social mobility. Migrants are actively barred from political and social life in their country of work and residence, yet they often perform key economic functions as part of their subaltern status. When we see that the migrant class, apart from having a unique identity, has a unique function, both for the countries that send and receive, we can argue that the Migrant class is also a Migrant caste.

Most people have heard of the untouchable dalits of India and the highly regarded Brahmins, but there are dozens of social castes in India and the majority of them have not only a connotation of ranking, but of position or industry. Migrants are very similar in this way. While I haven’t seen research pointing this caste/class framework toward migration elsewhere such as Africa, I do see scholars of Chinese labor using the terms to help define and understand the great dependence China has on its domestic labor migration.

As China makes neoliberal reforms under the umbrella of authoritarianism, it uses its directive ability to point the market where it wills. One way it has done this is by
adhering to decades old administrative delineations between urban workers (zhigong) and rural-to-urban migrant workers (nongmin gong) (Chunguang 2006; Tang and Yang 2008). Though these migrants spend most of their lives living and working in eastern cities, they are still branded by society and government as rural peasants, forever barring them from many benefits and protections that zhigong maintain and denying full participation in urban life (Davies and Ramia 2008). Occasionally migrants can become zhigong, but usually only by marriage or the possession of specialized skills (Tang and Yang 2008). The divide is about as hard to cross as gaining citizenship in a new country. Nongmin gong children, when they accompany migrant workers, are even segregated into migrant schools (Lu and Zhou 2013).

This hukou system, as it is called, goes back to the 50s and 60s, when a Stalinist model of rural/urban segregation was imposed in China (Tang and Yang 2008). The full history and description of hukou is complex and beyond the scope of my comments here. What is important to note now, however, is that the nature of migration places pressure on elites, bureaucracies, and receiving communities, even in some cases of domestic migration. These bodies often respond in the tradition of authoritarian regimes, like apartheid South Africa, to bureaucratically reify extant or perceived social boundaries in order (ostensibly) to better manipulate the economy and society as a whole (Cooke 2007; Tang and Yang 2008). Furthermore, migrant lifeways throughout the world impact sending families and home communities in ways that alter their behavior and interactions as well (Qin 2010). What my study’s participants must struggle with daily is highly reflective of the experiences of hundreds of millions of international and even some domestic migrants today. As I stated at the beginning of this conclusion, the specific
circumstances of these struggles are varied and complex, but the relationship between migration cycles and cycles of xenophobia is firmly entrenched, leaving migrants to pile up in the interstices.

The term “caste” often brings with it a racial connotation. A caste as we have come to know it in the Indian example, certainly does, and it also comes with the notion of exclusion. One is limited to his or her caste station, but others are also prevented from gaining inclusion into that caste. I must admit, the same cannot be said for the sort of economic caste that migrants represent worldwide. Though, one could argue that many migrants are pressured to migrate because of the residual effects of colonial regimes that were often unjust regarding matters of race and ethnicity. Regardless, as scholars around the world have noted, even though the primary force upon the migrant identity is the search for prosperity, all along they way they find resistance and obstacles regarding their race and outsider status as perceived by the social “host” environment. So while one is not limited from becoming a migrant on racial terms, they will find that much of their opportunity is lessened because of their “race”. This xenophobic bent is one of the forces of resistance that actively reject the migrant and prevent identities from seeping into one another via assimilation. This forces migrants to operate as an economic caste, one that is neither able nor willing in most cases to take on any other identity.

Transnational theory I predict will have to accommodate this change in viewpoint. As a model, it often is used to link the migrant to home in a symbiotic relationship whereby one agent of a family or community seeks out the collective will in another country. But as we can see, this model is insufficient for understanding the migrant identity in light of the ways they are actively barred from participation in family and
home community. Transnational theory has answered conclusively that, yes, actors can act across any amount of distance, and by paying attention to these linkages we can better understand the migrant life and its role in society at large today. But what transnational theory must balance that with now is the vast gulf that families and home communities intentionally or otherwise erect in order to make the cost of remitting poorly or returning home empty-handed quite high. Home communities use a number of economic and social means to threaten the future of a migrant: guilt, spiritual judgment, shame, and rejection from emotional and financial security pools just to name a few.

Again, this raises new questions for transnational theories of migration and their ability to work as a framework for understanding the migrant class, questions that could be policy-focused, theoretical, ethnographic, or institutional. There is still much to learn about the migrant identity and the full impact of the emerging class both on its constituents and the realms of power it borders. Understanding the nature of the migrant class may enable scholars to make predictive models based on comparisons with other emerging classes and castes or with migration contexts in distinct places, South Africa and China for instance. These predictive models could help activists and scholars both put forward concrete solutions to issues of social justice and policy.

The Migrant class cuts across a variety of ethnic, economic and cultural groups and divisions. The pressures to migrate have been shaped both by structure and injustice, but have also been accepted, reinterpreted and mobilized with intent by the members of the class themselves. It is both imposed and expressed. The social boundaries to migrancy are thick. If migrants constitute a class or even a caste, this raises numerous new questions, theoretical and practical, even perhaps activist and policy-driven. I leave
these questions for other projects or other scholars. I end my discussion here with the claim that the migrant class exists and that its boundaries will, for the present time, only be refined and enlarged as it tumbles in the interstices of global poverty and global capitalism.
## Appendix A

### Demographic Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Est. Age</th>
<th>Interview?</th>
<th>Foc. Group?</th>
<th>Stall Owner?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakary</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamadou</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samba</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issa</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdou</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touba</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenshirt</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y – 3</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Co w/ wife Helene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helene</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adele</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrice</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therese</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenda</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Rented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y – 2</td>
<td>Co w/ Wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shana</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y – 2</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomani</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azibo</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y – 1</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardon</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Co w/ Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessing</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Co w/ Simon’s father, his uncle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canaan</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisa</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Y*</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Y*</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*participant elected not to be voice recorded
Appendix B

Regarding Hypotheses and Research Questions

I wish to note here that I chose not to answer my original hypotheses in their bulleted format. To do so would have forced participant voices into neat compartments, whereas I set out to collect a more nuanced understanding of migrant life in South Africa. I leave the questions and hypotheses section “as is”, because these hypotheses and research questions were the best paths of inquiry I had formed before fieldwork. I feel it is important to transparently state the intentions I had upon arrival in Cape Town.

For instance, as my research progressed, I began to see that my respondents felt far more compelled to talk about the social order around remittance than the mechanisms of transporting it. My methods were designed to let this sort of shift to happen, with the use of open-ended questions and focus groups to allow and encourage migrants to direct the conversation along with me. In short, this is why the final dissertation organized around the themes that emerged from migrant voices rather than the hypotheses.
Appendix C

Interview Questions

It may be useful for other scholars to know how I organized my interviews. The following is the list of questions I asked of my participants. I allowed the conversation to flow to their interests, to see what I could glean without directing it. This often allowed me to gain the answers to these questions without having to ask them, as participants talked about their lives. While every interview was unique and followed a different order, I made sure to get the migrant’s perspectives on the following.

1. Why/under what circumstances did you come to South Africa? (Encouraged them to talk about their personal history, family, career.)

2. Can you tell me about your experience obtaining a “status”?
   2b. Asked about their interactions with DHA
   2c. Asked about their experience with police.

3. Can you tell me about your experiences with South Africans?
   3b. Encouraged them to elaborate on their experiences (pos or neg) with examples.
   3c. Asked them about how their experiences affected their decisions and behavior

4. Can you tell me about your relationship to home?
   4b. Asked how often and by what means they communicated with home and for what reasons
   4c. Asked what they received, if anything, from home
   4d. Asked about what they sent to their friends and relations at home.
   4e. Elicited as much detail as participants seemed comfortable giving about what or how much money they sent to whom and how often.
5. If you were teaching a class of new migrants how to survive and succeed in South Africa, what are the three things you would tell them?

Other questions that became more common after the first few interviews

How do you feel about your future in South Africa?

Would you recommend migrating to South Africa to people back home?

If you went home right now, would you be well received by friends and family? What would life be like?
Works Cited


McDonald, David A. “We Have Contact: Foreign Migration and Civic Participation in Marconi Beam, Cape Town.” In *Transnationalism and New African Immigration*


