

DOES THE MARKET OR CLAN CONTROL CONFIGURATION BEST MOTIVATE
TEACHERS TO DEMONSTRATE ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR?

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine teacher motivating factors in urban settings that influence their ability to go above and beyond the normal call or duty without concern for reward or merit. The research defines these motivational factors within the context of the current school governance policy debate. One side of the debate argues that teachers are motivated to demonstrate behaviors beyond their contractual agreement through monetary rewards, where teachers are paid incentives for performing noncompulsory tasks. This practice is currently manifested in pay-for-performance practices. The counter governing argument believes teachers are motivated through normative control where teachers collaborate together to develop common goals and norms. These districts utilize professional learning communities as their normative model. These two governing practices are framed theoretically by the control theories of market and clan control, respectively. This study is significant because it closes the research gap between the debate of school governing practices and their effects on teacher altruistic behaviors. Specifically, the research answers the question: *Which control configuration best motivates teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)?*

This study assessed motivating factors through a survey that looked at teacher perception of their colleagues to demonstrate behaviors that extend beyond the normal call of duty. Two districts, one pay-for-performance and one professional learning community district, participated in this small sample study. Teachers in the pay-for-performance district could earn up to ten thousand dollars each in bonus pay. Unlike many other models of pay-for-performance programs, where teachers compete against each other and are rewarded for outperforming their colleagues, this district utilized a federal grant that removed the competition among coworkers. Each teacher could earn the same amount of reward by performing specifically defined tasks that extended beyond their contractual agreement. Conversely, the professional learning community district scheduled regular time each week for teachers to collaborate on student behavior, data, upcoming lessons and objectives, and school goals. Here, teachers were motivated through school norms and collegial accountability to collectively reach the school's desired outcomes.

A total of 223 teachers participated in the online survey, answering five-point Likert scale questions on the two constructs within the study, altruistic behaviors, or OCB, and teacher collaboration. Within the survey, participants responded to twenty-two OCB questions that stemmed from previously developed surveys that incorporated the five characteristics that define citizenship – altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy. All respondents also answered questions regarding teacher attitudes towards professional learning communities. These fifteen questions stemmed from previously developed surveys on the PLC concept. In essence, the survey assessed teacher motivation to perform the dependent variable of citizenship behavior, or altruistic acts.

The findings of this study confirmed its hypothesis. Teachers within the professional learning community district believed that their colleagues manifested altruistic behaviors at .370 units more than the average pay-for-performance teachers assessed the altruistic levels of their colleagues. In simple terms, this basically means that teachers in professional learning communities exhibit more altruistic behaviors than their counterparts in pay-for-performance communities. This concludes that teachers are motivated through normative controls to perform OCB more than merit pay practices within the context of the current governing policy debate.

DEDICATION

To my wife, Lisa, who has stood with me through this journey and with love and commitment, provided me the time, support, and encouragement needed to see this to the end. I love you. To my parents, Phil and Irene, for teaching me to dream past my ability time and time again. To my brother, Chad, for being a good role model of a brother, educator, husband, and father.

To my future children, let this serve as one example of the commitment I have to you and the support you will always receive from me.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem: Urban Schools' Need For Citizenship Behavior

Since the first draft of *A Nation at Risk* in 1983, school reform has been a continuous debate. The United States has identified itself educationally behind other leading countries in the world. Moreover, within our own country, urban education has received constant criticism of failing to meet academic standards and falling short of suburban counterparts. The urban school issues of student population and the innate obstacles of hiring qualified personnel lay the fundamental argument of the importance of this study.

Student populations in urban schools tend to be described in terms of two basic statistics: percentage minority and percentage low income (Bryk et al., 2010). Low income students are defined as those that qualify for the federal free and reduced lunch program. Crosby (1999) defines the urban school population as the following, [the urban] population consists largely of minorities: immigrants, African Americans, and the poor. Based on this student population, urban schools are much more than simple academic organizations. They have become social and welfare institutions that provide a safe environment for student and family recreation, and health care, food and employment services. These services define a greater need in urban settings than in other schools.

With the complex, and sometimes competing, ingredients that make up the urban settings, it is important to understand how to motivate teachers to perform behaviors for the good of their organizations. *It is puzzling to think that since urban schools are in need of teachers that will do more than officially expected of them, there is little known about the motivating factors of teachers to do so.* More difficult schools need higher commitment levels from teachers.

This study examines predictors of organizational citizenship behavior, defined as acts that benefit an organization without care for personal recognition or reward, and analyzes the level of teacher altruistic acts that benefit the good of a school organization. In simple terms, this study assesses the governing factor that motivates teachers to go above and beyond the normal call of duty or above their basic contractual agreement expectations. This need for teachers to go above their basic expectations is greater in urban settings because their students are academically behind and have greater social and emotional needs than their middle- and upper- class suburban counterparts.

1.2 Research Question

Urban schools are in high need of motivated teachers to take on challenges their suburban counterparts rarely experience. This effort is required to level the playing field to make urban settings as competitive and attractive as their higher socioeconomic counterparts, which could create equity among social groups. It is the teacher motivating factor behind the altruistic behaviors that will help catch urban students up academically to their suburban peers that this study examines.

This study adds to the current policy debate to find a school governance structure that encourages urban teachers to do more than officially expected. The school governance debate argues that teachers are either motivated through monetary rewards, currently manifested as pay-for-performance practices, or normative structures that are exhibited as professional learning communities. The research question is, *What motivates teachers to do more than officially expected?*

1.3 Significance

This study provides evidence using survey data from urban settings as to whether monetary or normative rewards best motivate teachers to go above their contractual agreement. The purpose of this study is to fill the research gap of relating altruistic acts, or organizational citizenship behavior, to reward structures that motivate teachers to extend beyond basic norms within the context of school governance. Particularly, this study is important as it adds to the current policy debate of how to govern urban schools. Some contend that teacher motivation is best governed through external monetary rewards (pay-for-performance practices), while others argue motivation stems from the development of a collaborative school climate (or, professional learning communities). More explicitly, the gap in research is defining the best *control mechanism*, finances, normative/team control, or a hierarchical structure of rules that encourage teachers to exhibit higher levels of citizenship behavior. In a classical study of organizational control, Ouchi (1980) broadly defined these mechanisms as markets, clans, and bureaucracies.

Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) puts a theoretical framework to the current school governance debate. Where much is written on OCB in mainstream businesses, context studies of motivating factors to perform citizenship behavior in schools, specifically urban settings, is rare. OCB research in education is either descriptive or focused on leadership traits. It is *not* related to alternative governing structures that motivate altruistic behaviors such as monetary rewards for performance and student achievement or normative based decision making in collaborative teacher teams.

Finding quality teachers and meeting the needs of their student demographics has been an ongoing challenge for urban schools in crises. Furthermore, the government has debated the solution to fix urban schools is to find mechanisms that foster teacher citizenship behavior. Currently, urban schools have become innovative in structuring teacher contracts that encourage

OCB. Teachers in merit pay settings are paid for student and school outcomes, as well as personal performance criteria such as taking more professional development than expected. Relatively, merit pay to schools is market control to mainstream organizations. Conversely, there is an argument that developing a culture rooted in collaboration will improve urban schools. Here, teachers are equally important to the collective process in identifying problems, finding solutions, and supporting each other. These professional learning communities broadly utilize the clan control theory found in businesses. The market and clan control theories that Ouchi defined in businesses came well before the current educational policy debate but provides the fundamental context to this study.

This study addresses the relationship between control mechanisms that motivate teachers (which policy debate has determined as the solution) and teachers' citizenship behavior. More specifically, it asks: which control configuration best motivates teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior?

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Organizational Configurations to Motivate Teachers

The research question inherently suggests that the control theory studied herein serve as the independent variable and citizenship behavior as the dependent variable. This study analyzes the effects of control on teacher citizenship behavior.

Prior to studying control mechanisms, we first must define an organization as a group of persons organized for some end of work. Ouchi (1980) supplies a more formal definition of an organization as a purposive aggregation of individuals who exert concerted effort toward a common and explicitly recognized goal. Corporations with economic goals, arise when conditions demand stability that extends beyond individuals. Ouchi (1980) further notes that individuals within organizations rarely have a common understanding goal. Workers that have uncoordinated efforts will pursue their own interest, which is not in the best interest of efficiency. Any collectivity which has an economic goal must then find a means to control diverse individuals efficiently (Ouchi, 1980). It is this efficiency factor that serves the need for control theory.

The principal element in defining an organization's purpose is efficiency, or transaction cost. This cost, interdependence between organization and individual calls for an exchange in which each individual gives something of value (labor) and receives something of value (money) in return (Ouchi, 1980). One can look for clarity within transaction costs when it is difficult to define a value of goods and services that stem from distrust or from an ambiguous definition of value over services. When competitive markets exist, the value and services requested are easily comparable to find a fair transaction cost. For example, individuals can shop for a fair price in

lawn mowing services and conversely mowing companies have to stay competitive in prices within their marketplace to gain business.

However, it becomes much more difficult to place value on services that are unique. In these situations, where competitive markets do not provide clear direction, each party relies on third party experts to estimate the value of services. The negotiating parties may also side with explicitly defining the services being purchased through a thorough and complete contract that outlines each job performance. In both situations, the transactions have costs and are necessary to create a perception of equity among all parties (Ouchi, 1980). This same argument applies to transactions in which a service, such as the labor or an individual, is the object of exchange (Ouchi, 1980). The true value of labor may be difficult to define when services are being sold. Furthermore, organizations exist because it can mediate economic transactions between its members at lower costs than a market mechanism can (Ouchi, 1980). The transaction cost mediates the relationship between the organization and employee, and is efficient when clear goals meet ambiguous job duties.

In essence, Ouchi contributed to the understanding of organizational efficiencies. This was done through the observation of transaction cost in organizations between two actors, the employee and employer. Ouchi defined three control mechanisms using the transaction cost between employee and organization; bureaucracies, markets, and clans. In some instances, markets have the most efficient transactional costs because the agreement between corporation and worker are mediated through contract done prior to the start of work, which outlines expectations of both fronts. However, markets can become burdensome and less efficient than bureaucracies and clans.

Market transactions, or exchanges, consist of contractual relationships (Ouchi, 1980). Market relations are efficient when there is little ambiguity over performance, so the parties can tolerate relatively high levels of opportunism or goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980). The transaction cost in markets is mediated through competition where the employee and organization view the exchange as reasonable. There are three types of contractual relationships within market control.

The first relationship is the “spot” or “sales” contract where transactions are fulfilled on the spot. For example, a student pays a tutor for a one hour session. The second market agreement is the “small numbers bargaining” contract where only one buyer and seller exist. This is more simply understood as a mutual monopoly. The final market contract is the “contingent claims” contract where a negotiated document indicates each party’s obligations. In order to obtain market efficiency, the contract must have little ambiguity in evaluating employee performance. This allows for tolerance in regards to each party’s high levels of opportunism and inconsistent goals. It is the contingent claims contract that this research assesses within its study. Market control is most efficient when job expectations are clear and high levels of discrepancies in goals exist between the organization and employee.

When two parties have common goals and can agree upon the desired results, the organization can institute clan control. Clans are efficient when goal incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high (Ouchi, 1980). In this control mechanism, there is a high degree of discipline displayed by employees, which is attained through an acute belief that the interest of the whole is served by complete immersion of each individual. These so-called clans forms of organization thus have little need for formal mechanisms to mediate the exchange between individual and organization, because the employee’s natural inclination is to behave in ways that

are consistent with the organization's objective (John R. Deckop, 1990). However, there are high levels of uncertainty in regards to performance evaluation as action cannot be translated into certifiable measures. [Clan success is] typically in technologically advanced or closely integrated industries, where teamwork is common, technologies change often, and therefore individual performance is highly ambiguous (Ouchi, 1980).

Although clans differ fundamentally from bureaucracies in that they do not require explicit auditing or evaluation, the professionalized bureaucracy may be understood as a response to the joint need for efficient transactions within profession (clan) and between professions (bureaucracy) (Ouchi, 1980). When subordinates perceive a trusting interpersonal relationship in which, for instance, agreements are diligently followed (promise fulfillment), subordinates are dealt with candidly (integrity), and supervisors listen (receptivity), subordinates seem willing to exceed formal job requirements (Deluga, 1995). Clan control is the comparison motivating factor that this study assesses.

The third and final control mechanism is bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are mediated by the concept of fairness and prove efficient when high levels of inconsistencies in goals and performance expectations exist. Equity is defined and mediated through a social agreement, or a contract, that authority is granted to the bureaucratic hierarchy. By and large, all organizations are bureaucracies. Similarly, schools are part of a hierarchical bureaucratic system. Schools report to their district, which again reports to a higher form of authority, the state who reports to the federal government. The bureaucracy control mechanism is used within the contractual agreement between teacher and school, which is mediating the concept of fairness from one teacher to the next. Within the negotiated agreement the teacher agrees to submit to the hierarchy leadership of the organization in return for compensation.

This study defines that all schools reside in a bureaucratic system within their district, state, and federal government. The current policy debate, however, encourages schools to become innovative within this bureaucratic governing system and experiment as to whether the market or the clan sub-control theory (in this system) best motivates teachers to go above their contractual agreement, or the normal call of duty. Schools, and largely urban schools, are experimenting with different forms of transactional cost. Does monetary incentives, markets, or normative goals, clans, motivate teachers to demonstrate more citizenship behavior?

2.2 Organizational Citizenship Behavior

Altruistic behaviors have a positive impact on organizations and can be encouraged as well as discouraged based on the treatment given to subordinates. In sum, it is predicted that there is a causal connection between prior overall satisfaction and subsequent display of a host of citizenship behaviors (Bateman and Organ, 1983). We first address these altruistic behaviors from their origin.

Most simply defined, organizational citizenship behavior, or OCB, is doing the right thing that benefits the greater good of an organization without receiving personal recognition or merit. By its definition, OCB analyzes one's individual and leadership traits that encourage acts that go above and beyond the normal call of duty and have a positive effect on an organization. Although a good deal of research has been conducted on organizational citizenship behavior, the development of OCB theory has progressed rather slowly (Konovsky and Pugh, 1994). It was in 1964 that Daniel Katz identified essential behaviors of employees that create an effective organization. One behavior is that employees must engage in innovative and spontaneous activity that goes beyond role prescriptions (Konovsky and Pugh, 1994). It was not until 1983 that a more formal name was given to this description. Every factory, office, or bureau depends

daily on a myriad of acts of cooperation, helpfulness, suggestions, gestures or goodwill, altruism, and other instances of what we might call citizenship behavior (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983).

More recently Michael DiPaola further defined citizenship behaviors within the educational setting. However, these studies are limited by their scope to individual and leadership traits. This study takes an important first step by going beyond current findings and exploring how OCB is influenced by school governance, or control theories. No current study examines the question: *Does developing a climate of collaboration (clan control) or paying teachers based on performance (market control) motivate teacher citizenship behaviors?*

Ouchi's typology is consistent with the current merit pay or collaborative governing debate. The theory is not specially about pay-for-performance or collaboration but bares upon it and is consistent and useful in addressing this research question in a theoretical framework. Within, we examine the connection between school governance, using control theory, and teacher tendencies to do more than expected.

Altruism and generalized compliance were the initial dimensions of organizational citizenship (DiPaola, 2007). Altruism is voluntarily helping others in need without concern to one's own benefit or wellbeing. Whereas doing the right thing to benefit an organization is the fundamental concept of generalized compliance. Examples of one's general compliance are being conscientious of attendance, use of work time, and adherence to various rules, but a conscientiousness that far surpasses any enforceable minimum standards (Organ, 1990). Since then, the basic definition of OCB has been expanded to include the following five components: altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy (DiPaola, 2007).

A prerequisite to defining an act as citizenship behavior is that it cannot be required or expected by the organization or one's superiors. Citizenship behavior surpasses any enforceable

minimum standards; workers willingly go beyond stated expectations in performing their roles (DiPaola, 2007). Moreover, OCBs are manifested voluntarily and discretionarily and are a matter of choice. OCB consists of informal contributions that participants can choose to proffer or withhold without regard to considerations of sanction or formal incentives (Organ, 1990). OCB actors individually define their own reward. Any rewards provided to actors for performing citizenship acts are uncertain and unforeseen. OCB also includes the quality of forbearance – the willingness to endure the occasional costs, inconveniences, and minor frustrations attendant to collective endeavors (Organ, 1990).

Individuals contribute to organizational effectiveness by doing things that are not main task functions but are important because they shape the organizational and social “context” that supports task activities (Organ & Ryan, 1995). Citizenship behaviors include the initiative to provide constructive criticism or suggestions for improvement, helping others, volunteer for additional jobs or committee work, express interest on others’ work, and uphold workplace norms regardless of personal agreement or disagreement. In respect of the quality of forbearance, employees refrain from faulting others, do not complain about inconsequential matters, and reject starting arguments with other employees.

Within the educational setting, teachers who voluntarily go out of their way to help their students, colleagues, and others as they engage in the work of teaching and learning exemplify organizational citizenship (DiPaola, 2007). DiPaola and Costa Neves (2009) continue, stating teachers in schools with high citizenship take it upon themselves to volunteer innovative suggestions, sponsor extra-curricular activities, and serve on new committees. These acts are the product of the teacher’s motivation to perform them, which this study contends are influenced by the school governance debate – money or climate.

2.2.1 Teacher OCB

To further define OCB within education, this study assesses Oplatka's (2006) four domains of teacher OCB; 1) individual pupil, 2) classroom, 3) staff, and 4) school organization. Teacher OCBs for individual students would be providing instructional assistance outside class time, assisting them when upset and proactively attending to pedagogical needs and difficulties. Inside the classroom, Oplatka (2006) defines OCB as teachers initiation and implementation of changes and innovations in teaching methods or curriculum, thorough and comprehensive grading of academic assignments, and involvement in social events of the class. In working with a staff, teachers provide materials, assist with administrative tasks, and provide emotional support to colleagues. Lastly, within the school organization, OCB is defined as teachers' participation in school events after the school day, participation in ad hoc school committees, and taking on unrewarded roles in school (Oplatka, 2006).

Citizenship behaviors, over extended periods of time, and when combined with additional contributions, may result in favorable outcomes for the actor such as a job promotion, raise or bonus, or special privilege. However, to be considered as OCB, the actor could not have foreseen or predicted these unknown benefits at the time of providing citizenship behaviors or receiving the benefit. The actor would also not perform the behavior in hopes of receiving a benefit but rather because they foresaw a benefit to the organization or a colleague. Organization governance susceptible to fairness judgments probably act more generally to reduce or constrain the spontaneous, naturally occurring OCB among persons rather than to facilitate it (Organ, 1990). There is no indication that tenure with organization or gender has any appreciable connection with altruism (Organ & Ryan, 1995). Organ and Ryan (1995) continue by stating only affective commitment is related to altruism. These are inherent obstacles within education

as governance within schools has typically been fostered through teacher fairness such as the payment step-ladders based on years of experience, level of education, and teacher tenure.

There are environmental cues and things subordinates seek that encourage acts of OCB. There is also a strong need for citizenship behaviors in formal structures; without creates a structure that would collapse as it is impossible to foresee all possible situations that will need flexible and self-initiated acts. Formal structure does not suffice to anticipate all needed contributions; willingness to cooperate is the essential condition without which formal structure is an empty shell (Organ, 1990). Organ (1990) continues, stating formal structure can only recognize what is already inherent in individual and collective willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, OCB is desirable from an organizational point of view because such behavior is thought to increase available resources and decrease the need for more formal and costly mechanisms of control (John R. Deckop, 1990).

Although not every single action contributes to organizational effectiveness, over time the accumulation of OCB improves the effectiveness of the organization (DiPaola, 2009). Teachers with good citizenship seek ways to make their school more effective, defined as flexible, adaptable, innovative, and efficient. The very nature of professional teacher behavior calls for action beyond that which is officially mandated (DiPaola, 2007). Here teachers efficiently use their time, are rarely gone from work, and work collaboratively.

This study defines teacher acts of citizenship as behavior that extends beyond their normal call of duty, or their contractual minimum expectations. Teachers that take it upon themselves to identify opportunities to perform tasks that are not enforced or expected are demonstrating citizenship behaviors as long as the acts benefit the greater good of the school. Citizenship is more than an altruistic behavior. Citizenship goes beyond an isolated act and

persist regularly within the individual to perform unrequired tasks that support the mission of the school. The principal factor in this study defining citizenship is that the exhibited behavior is unexpected and the actor is willingly going beyond their contractual agreement.

2.2.2 Teacher OCB Motivators

Deckop et al. (1990) analyzed motivating factors of employees to perform extrarole behaviors in industries. Within their study, they focused on motivating factors of the workforce employees, not CEOs, noting the lower-level employees do not have a lot of opportunity to affect key performance indicators. Many firms base pay increments, awarded as merit pay, on subjective assessments of employee behaviors (Deckop et al., 1990). This study takes a similar stance on analyzing OCB motivators of teachers, or the workforce employees. The principal finding in Deckop's et al. (1990) study is that pay-for-performance practices are effective with employees that are committed to the values of the organization. The contemporary manifestation of Ouchi's market control in school settings today is pay-for-performance programs.

Pay-for-performance had a negative impact on extrarole behaviors for employees low in value alignment but not for employees high in value alignment (John R. Deckop, 1990). Employees are less likely to perform OCBs when they perceive a strong link to performance pay, or market control. In fact, organizations can discourage citizenship behaviors by specifying the acts of which will be rewarded. Employees could be less likely to spontaneously perform citizenship behaviors as their focus would remain on tasks their employers recognize within its specified market contract. Furthermore, subjects given difficult goals and incentives for task completion exhibited relatively low levels of spontaneous helping behaviors (John R. Deckop,

1990). This inherently conflicts with the simplest definition of OCB of performing tasks for the greater good of the organization without receiving recognition.

Teachers may also be discouraged to perform OCBs if they feel it would have a negative effect on their wellbeing or benefits. As current policy debate continues to evaluate market control within merit pay models, it must also consider unintentional consequences. Teachers competing against each other for results may be less inclined to share information or help one another improve. Because most reward systems favor task performance, individuals may unintentionally hurt their careers by helping the organization (Bergeron, 2007). Bergeron (2007) continues by stating if individuals spend time on behaviors that benefit the organization, it may be at the expense of their task performance and, thus, may be costly in terms of rewards and career advancement. Teachers' market reward model would also need to fit into the current tenured practices. In 2004, Feather and Rauter studied the citizenship behaviors between tenured and non-tenured teachers in Australia. As predicted, non-tenured teachers reported more citizenship behaviors than tenured teachers. We would expect the [non-tenured] teachers to undertake extra-role behaviors and voluntary duties that would help their schools and improve their prospects of obtaining [tenured status] (Rauter, 2004).

Citizenship behavior in schools logically implies high levels of intrinsic motivation. Job satisfaction can affect citizenship behaviors. Zeinabadi (2010) analyzed Bagozzi 1992 study on attitude-intention-behavior, which suggests that behavior is a coping activity that results from an individual's appraisal of situation and subsequent emotional response. This study is congruent with Organ (1990) findings that motivating intrinsic job satisfaction internally motivates the employee to display [OCB] (Zeinabadi, 2010). Furthermore, teacher OCBs were found to be influenced by intrinsic teacher job satisfaction that also had an effect on teacher commitment.

One implication on principal-teacher relationship is that principals should afford intrinsic rewards (e.g. job meaningfulness, job responsibilities and job challenge) and endeavor to increase teacher's sense of intrinsic satisfaction, rather than offering extrinsic rewards (Zeinabadi, 2010). In a subsequent study it was found that procedural justice promoted teacher OCB (Salehi, 2011). Procedural justice is defined as a process resolution method based on fairness. Zeinabadi and Salehi (2011) found that procedural justice influenced teacher trust which in turn influenced job satisfaction and organizational commitment.

Research on effective teams outside the education sphere also indicates that effectiveness depends in part on unified commitment from members (Stoll et al., 2006). The contemporary manifestations of Ouchi's clan control within schools today are professional learning communities, or teams. Clans believe that the interest of an organization is served by complete individual entanglement into a common goal. Professional learning communities reaffirm this sentiment. In schools, PLCs share a common goal based on student achievement which is achieved through intense collaboration and data analysis. Stoll et al. (2006) continues defining effectiveness by the loyalty to and identification with the team, fostered through a balance between respecting individual differences and requiring unity. Developing clan communities contributes to a group's capacity for continuous improvement. Capacity is defined through skill, learning and the organization's support structure and culture. Put together, it gives individuals, groups, whole school communities and school systems the power to get involved in and sustain learning over time (Stoll et al., 2006). This supports Ouchi's clan control theory, which is fostered and sustained through a climate, or team.

As the idea and implementation of PLCs has spread, the result is that their original meaning is becoming diminished and their richness is being lost (Stoll & Louis, 2007). PLC

participation should be discretionary. However, in many cases, PLCs have become mandated or required of teachers. PLCs should be trusted groups of collaborators that make decisions based on evidence. PLCs are turning into add-on teams that are driven by data in cultures of fear that demand instant results (Stoll & Louis, 2007). This pushes discussion away from the goal of process improvement within the clan component. Rather, energy is focused on manipulating student test results, such as test-preparation lessons, which meet the demand of society. These quick-fix solutions do not improve the quality of instruction or teaching, which is a principal goal of collaborative learning communities. Demanding that PLCs be data driven ultimately leads most of them to concentrate only on mandated tests (Stoll & Louis, 2007). The experience of these communities should be inspiring and stimulate teacher innovation that works to improve schools rather than an additional student-learning intervention. Stoll & Louis (2007) continue by stating PLCs must move beyond mandated teams that generate instant gains in tested achievement, to something that is more educationally sound and professionally sustainable.

It is important to recognize that teachers enter the profession for multiple reasons and these motives may influence citizenship behaviors. However, no matter the reasoning behind becoming a teacher, finding teacher motivators to perform altruistic behaviors in urban schools is important to support its student demographics. This study seeks to find the solution of which governing practice, Ouchi's typology of clan or market, best encourages teacher citizenship behavior. Moreover, this study is timely as current policy debate is experimenting with this very question. *Does building an urban climate based on teacher community motivate teachers to perform citizenship behavior or are teachers motivated by monetary rewards?*

2.3 OCB Expectations Under Current Governing Policy Practices

The sustainability and success of effective urban schools demand organizational citizenship behaviors from its teachers. Without their willingness to perform citizenship behaviors, students would suffer and schools could become illegitimate in state or local certification requirements. Citizenship behaviors give purpose and originality to classroom and school structures that determine student success.

Therefore, with a need to perform OCB, it becomes logical that policy debate currently surrounds itself around governing practices that encourage this very behavior – merit pay or professional learning community practices. Since OCB cannot be required or expected, professional learning communities stand to predispose teachers to these behaviors more than pay-for-performance practices. A basic characteristic of OCB is altruism, which is consistent with the logic of Ouchi's (1980) clan control theory in developing a community grounded in common goals.

Clan control demands a high degree of obedience and compliance where the components of the efficient transaction cost are low goal incongruence and high performance ambiguity. Clans require little formal mediating mechanisms between subordinates and employer. The current governing debate, substantiated through Ouchi's clan control theory, is manifested in professional learning communities where teachers have common interest and goals that surround itself around the concept of student success. These goals are team-developed among each other and are equivocal and rather large. There is little need for mediating mechanisms with these goals as their tasks demand a sense of helpfulness, suggestions, cooperation, and goodwill, all qualities that have been defined in terms of OCB by Smith, Organ, & Near (1983).

Here, teacher motivation stems from their commitment to the school and community where individuals serve the best interest of the whole through collective effort. Cooperative

action necessarily involves interdependence between individuals (Ouchi, 1980). In essence, teachers work collaboratively over best practices, the future direction of lessons and the school, and hold one another accountable to results. This clan control mechanism, utilizing the governing practice of professional learning communities, is dependent on commitment to a greater purpose. Here, educators work together to achieve their collective purpose of learning for all (DuFour, 2004). DuFour (2004) continues, stating the powerful collaboration that characterizes professional learning communities is a systemic process in which teachers work together to analyze and improve their classroom practice. Since student success is an ambiguous goal, teachers innately welcome experimentation and innovation. Teachers put extra time into developing new teaching strategies, lessons, and practices that will increase student achievement. Teachers demonstrating this effort unexpectedly or noncompulsory are performing altruistic acts.

Furthermore, this union amongst teachers is founded on commitment, and is further explained through normative structures. The central element in most definitions of commitment [is] the acceptance of organizational expectations and values as guides to an individual's behavior where identification represents a form of normative control (Wiener, 1982). Normative requirements refer to the basic social agreements that all members of the transactional network must share if the network is to function efficiently (Ouchi, 1980). Individual actions in PLCs are motivated by their commitment to the overall school objective.

Teacher PLCs (clans) do not mandate extraordinary behaviors. Motivation to perform altruistic acts stem from the teacher's desire to serve the urban population that has already been identified behind and in a state of crisis. The organization benefits from altruistic acts performed by the teacher in their efforts of meeting student needs. This community climate can generate a sustainable cycle of teacher citizenship behavior. This is because the individual commitment is

to a common goal versus individual reward. Vigoda-Gadot et al. (2007) believes that OCB exist in a collective form rather than merely in an individual form. Teachers who do or do not display OCB do not do so in a vacuum, and the organizational context most likely serves to encourage or discourage them (Eran Vigoda-Gadot, 2007). Therefore, a cycle of OCB is developed as one altruistic act encourages another.

Manifesting citizenship behavior through professional learning communities is one side of the current policy debate. Normative control motivates individuals through group goal settings. This study puts the governing factor at the heart of its research question. Does normative control motivate teachers to go beyond their normal call of duty or does the other side of the policy debate, incentivizing teachers through monetary rewards, motivate citizenship behaviors more?

This other side of the policy debate contends that effort in motivating urban teachers is to utilize the contingent claims contract within the typology of Ouchi's market mechanism. This pay-for-performance control motivates teacher citizenship behavior through reward. The additional pay is based on meeting set requirements that extend beyond the basic expectations of the contractual agreement. These additional standards are not required or evaluative, rather determined by the individual teacher of whether they will perform extrarole duties. Examples of these extra duties are gaining additional teacher certifications, increasing parent communication, increasing personal attendance, and collective student academic growth. Many districts have become innovative in these efforts and identified district-specific reward areas.

It is logical that unrequired and unexpected acts cannot be predetermined and outlined for teachers to perform in order to receive reward. Pay-for-performance motivates teachers to non-compulsorily go above their contractual agreement through predetermined and assessed levels.

Teachers in this model set performance goals that reward them at the compensation level they feel is appropriately affixed to each action. These actions taken together can have a positive effect on student outcomes.

Teachers will stop extrarole behavior at the level of which they are rewarded. By clearly specifying behaviors and outputs that will be rewarded, organizations risk discouraging behaviors that will not be explicitly rewarded (Deckop, 1990). In fact, Deckop (1990) found that the stronger the link is between pay incentives to the desired behaviors, the less likely employees are to engage in OCB. Pay-for-performance by its delineation is antithetical to the logic of altruism. It is difficult to comprehend the motivation in this model for teachers to perform altruistic acts that have not been defined.

Another perspective is that these defined acts, although teachers could choose to withhold these acts, provide specific guidelines from supervisors to reach the compensation level of their satisfaction, and thus defining compensation expectations. This is contradictory to the definition of OCB and therefore, through logical reasoning, acts of altruism are likely to be higher under clan control than under market. It is reasonable to believe that teachers are motivated more to demonstrate citizenship behaviors through professional learning communities.

2.4 The Need of Urban OCB

It is inherently understood that OCB requires high levels of teacher motivation. There is a high need for these unselfish acts in urban schools as their population has more complex problems than other school settings. Urban districts deal with higher levels of crime rate, have consistently more severe types of crime within their neighborhoods, families may value education to the limit of a safe haven during the day, and students are often times grade levels behind where they ought to be.

Urban settings are further complicated by their lack of resources. Wealthier suburban districts have higher paying salaries, better recruiting methods and resources, and better working conditions. Furthermore, the differences in beliefs, values, and purpose of education has not only added to the differences in suburban and urban demographics but also divided communities by the ability of families to move to, and build, neighborhoods that meet their expectations. These qualities draw personnel away from urban settings and contribute to the discretion of where teachers choose to work. The teacher turnover rate in the urban schools is much higher than in the suburban schools and in more stable communities (Crosby, 1999). Urban schools are unable to compete with the resources their counterparts can offer their students and families. It is unfortunate that where the need is greatest, the supply is smallest (Crosby, 1999). Not only do urban schools need to retain good teachers. They also must call upon their teachers to demonstrate higher levels of altruistic behaviors that give the urban setting a fighting chance to serve their student population at the same level as suburban schools.

Urban settings require a different, higher energy level from teachers than their suburban counterparts. This is because student achievement and outcomes in urban settings are under heavy controversy and watch, whereas suburban schools need only to maintain a competitive edge in student achievement over their competition. In the current professional learning community and pay-for-performance policy debate, student achievement is achieved through the factors that motivate teacher citizenship behaviors. Moreover, the best control mechanism to motivate teachers is continuously contended because of the ambiguity in the purpose of schools.

It is heavily argued that the objective of schools is ambiguous and uncertain. Aldrich (2008) argues that the objective of schools, like industrial and business organizations, is to produce outputs from inputs. Urban schools have even a greater level of goal ambiguity. Urban

settings must prioritize their outputs – student achievement, school safety, student hunger and clothing. Suburban settings are fortunate to only need to focus on student achievement, which in itself is a highly ambiguous definition. Similarly teaching is highly equivocal. Teaching is characterized as an ambiguous, uncertain organizational technology with value boundaries and an unclear input-process-outcome connection (Oplatka, 2006). This is critical to understand as the control mechanism implemented in urban settings may transform based on the type of teacher recruited to work in these schools. It takes a particular individual to work in an urban setting. As noted above, urban schools work to meet the needs of the student population of minority and low income students as well as work to meet Maslow's hierarchy of needs and safety.

Since teachers enter the profession for many different reasons, and in some situations because of its ease of entry, it is important to find the best control theory to motivate teachers to go above the minimum requirements. Since their inception, districts and schools have experimented with all three control theories. School systems, like other organizations, do employ a variety of [control] mechanisms (Ouchi, 1980). Because of the local control districts have over education, they are able to experiment with the transactional costs (control mechanism) between teacher and organization. It has not been until late that districts and schools have stepped outside the norm with innovative techniques. Urban settings have been more aggressive in their efforts to find a control theory that motivates teachers to extend practices beyond their contractual agreement. It is this progressive professional learning community or merit pay policy debate that this study seeks answering. Are teachers motivated by pay-for-performance (market) or professional learning communities (clan)?

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

3.1 Methodology and Data

This small sample study compares two districts, each representing one of the current governing practices, pay-for-performance and professional learning communities, assessing within urban elementary settings the mechanism that better motivates teachers to go above their contractual agreement. Each school setting has an urban student demographic population, defined by high minority and low income, or free or reduced lunch, percentages. Bryk et al. (2010) described that student populations in urban schools tend to be described in terms of two basic statistics: percentage minority and percentage low income.

This section begins with comparing the two control theories that are established within their respective school settings. Market control is represented by pay-for-performance (PFP) schools and professional learning communities (PLC) utilize Ouchi's clan control theory. Next, the procedure of disseminating the teacher questionnaire within participating schools will be explained. Finally, this study will describe the data analysis structure and outcome expectations.

3.2 PFP vs. PLC

The PFP district has ten elementary schools that utilize their pay-for-performance structure. The PLC comparison group represents six elementary schools in three neighboring school districts. After a factor analysis, the study becomes a true comparison of one pay-for-performance district to a professional learning community district. The following chart provides an overview of the original participating settings.

Market Control	Clan Control
Pay-for-Performance	Professional Learning Communities
1 District	3 Districts
10 Elementary Schools	6 Elementary Schools
90% FRL	77% FRL
91% Minority	59% Minority

The following three tables further define the sites of the original participating schools that are included in this small scale study. Table 1 provides averages of all student demographic populations for each control theory group for the past three years (2011 – 2013). Both the PFP and PLC settings have high free and reduced lunch and minority populations as well as similar ELL and IEP proportional attendance rates. The PFP schools average more years of experience from their professional staff. This could provide an advantage over PLC schools as their employees seem to be committed to remaining in their current roles. However, PLC schools have higher attendance rates, which could be a result of students feeling more welcome and encouraged from their teachers demonstrating OCB acts.

Table 1
Averages of PFP and PLC Student Population Demographics

	Total Enrollment	Asian (%)	Black (%)	Hispanic (%)	Indian (%)	White (%)	Free / Reduced Lunch (%)	ELL ⁱ	IEP (% w/ serves) ⁱ	Attendance Rate	Students to Classroom Teacher	Students to Administrators	YRS of Exp of Prof. Staff
ALL PFP Schools and ALL Years - Average	346.8	2.6	67.1	20.6	0.3	9.1	90.0	83.0	74.5	75.2	17.0	244.2	14.5
ALL PLC Schools and ALL Years - Average	445.3	4.2	31.7	16.0	0.6	41.3	76.9	91.8	84.0	88.2	17.0	339.3	10.8

Note. ⁱProportional Attendance Rate

(Missouri Comprehensive Data System, n.d.)

Table 2 and Table 3 below show all specific data of each school within each control theory. These tables show specific school data between the years of 2011 to 2013. The PFP schools represented in Table 2 demonstrate their similarity in urban student population makeup as defined by Bryk et al. (2010) or high minority and low income students. The range of free

and reduced lunch between these schools is 79.6% to 94.5%, a difference of 14.9 points. At any given point within the three years of data among these schools, the largest white population was 26.3%. The average years of teaching experience in PFP schools was 14.5 years in comparison to PLC schools of 10.8 years of experience.

Table 3 below, representing professional learning communities shows their range of minority students from 37.2% to 89.3%. These schools had a more similar range of low income students to their comparison PFP schools of 26.6 points, with a maximum FRL percentage out of the three years of 87.2%.

Table 2
Pay-For-Performance Schools

	Year	Total Enrollment	Asian (%)	Black (%)	Hispanic (%)	Indian (%)	White (%)	Free / Reduced Lunch (%)	ELL ¹	IEP (% w/ no serves)	IEP (% w/ serves)	Attendance Rate	Students to Classroom Teacher	Students to Administrators	YRS of Exp of Prof. Staff	Performance at or below the 10th percentile
PFP School 1	2013	261	1.1	75.9	13.4	0	8.4	93.1	*		57	65.9	22	261	16.2	FRL:
	2012	231	3.5	71.9	18.6	0	6.1	*	86		58	73.6	13	231	13.2	ELA;
	2011	218	1.4	74.3	17.4	0.5	6.4	94.5	46		50	40.7	14	145	16.2	Total:
PFP School 2	2013	309	0	96.1	0.6	1.3	1.6	94.2	*		79	81.4	20	309	11.9	Black:
	2012	332	0	96.7	0.3	0.3	2.7	89.5	*		70	74.8	18	332	13.3	ELA;
	2011	324	0.3	95.1	1.5	0.3	2.8	88.9	*		74	74.6	17	216	21.1	FRL:
PFP School 3	2013	217	3.2	76	16.1	0	4.1	*	86		65	69.7	13	217	15.7	Not reported
	2012	175	0	87.4	9.7	0	2.9	*	*		*	60.0	13	175	15.9	
	2011	178	0	97.2	1.1	0.6	1.1	94.5	*		*	47.7	13	89	18.4	
PFP School 4	2013	707	0.6	42.7	44.1	0.3	12.3	81	93		93	89.2	17	236	14.8	N/A
	2012	721	0.7	45.6	41.7	0.1	11.8	81.3	92		85	90.4	17	240	14.0	
	2011	796	0.6	51.5	37.1	0.1	10.7	79.6	86		97	82.5	20	265	15.8	
PFP School 5	2013	571	8.6	17	60.2	0.2	13.7	*	95		86	89.2	18	286	14.1	Hispanic:
	2012	530	9.2	14.9	61.9	0	14	*	94		89	92.4	17	353	15.5	ELA;
	2011	514	9.1	13.4	62.6	0.2	14.4	*	89		78	82.2	18	257	17.8	White:
PFP School 6	2013	223	0	64.1	19.3	0.4	13	92.8	89		83	79.4	16	223	11.5	Black:
	2012	255	18	52.9	16.9	0	12.2	*	96		87	91.7	17	255	9.8	Math;
	2011	187	8	55.6	24.6	1.6	10.2	92.2	82		73	79.2	14	187	11.4	FRL:
PFP School 7	2013	442	1.8	51.8	30.5	0.2	14	*	81		66	72.4	19	295	12.0	Total:
	2012	382	1.3	58.4	30.1	0.3	9.9	*	97		88	90.6	16	255	10.8	ELA
	2011	376	1.3	58.8	28.7	0.8	10.4	*	69		50	49.5	23	188	11.5	
PFP School 8	2013	349	0.6	50.7	21.8	0.3	25.5	*	89		73	80.0	18	349	14.5	FRL:
	2012	320	0.3	53.1	20.3	0	26.3	*	77		75	77.1	17	320	14.9	ELA;
	2011	289	1.4	52.9	22.1	0	23.5	*	53		52	58.6	18	289	17.6	Total:
PFP School 9	2013	271	0	96.3	1.8	0	1.1	*	*		74	69.3	17	271	11.0	FRL:
	2012	282	0	96.8	1.1	0	2.1	91.6	*		87	83.6	15	282	6.9	ELA and
	2011	293	0	95.6	1.7	0	2.7	93.1	*		72	74.9	20	147	17.3	MA;
PFP School 10	2013	225	0.4	94.2	2.2	0	2.7	93.8	*		84	84.4	16	225	13.9	N/A
	2012	187	2.7	89.8	3.7	0	3.7	*	*		*	87.6	16	187	19.4	
	2011	240	2.9	85.8	7.5	0	3.8	*	78		67	63.6	17	240	18.2	
ALL PFP Schools	2013	357.5	1.6	66.5	21.0	0.3	9.6	91.0	88.7	#DIV/0!	75.9	78.1	17.6	267.2	13.6	
	2012	341.5	3.6	66.8	20.4	0.1	9.2	87.5	90.3	#DIV/0!	80.1	82.2	15.9	263.0	13.4	
	2011	341.5	2.5	68.0	20.4	0.4	8.6	90.5	71.8	#DIV/0!	68.0	65.4	17.4	202.3	16.5	

Note: * Indicates field has been suppressed. ¹Proportional Attendance Rate

Table 3
Professional Learning Community Schools

	Year	Total Enrollment	Asian (%)	Black (%)	Hispanic (%)	Indian (%)	White (%)	Free / Reduced Lunch (%)	ELL ¹	IEP (% w/ no serves)	IEP (% w/ serves)	Attendance Rate	Students to Classroom Teacher	Students to Administrators	YRS of Exp of Prof. Stat	Performance at or below the 10th percentile
PLC School 1	2013	355	2.8	17.2	14.4	2.5	51.5	75.6	91.8	86.8%	73.6	83.5	19	355	12.7	White:
	2012	322	3.4	15.2	15.5	1.2	53.7	77.9	98.0	86.3%	87.7	90.2	15	435	14.1	ELA &
	2011	323	3.4	21.1	14.9	0.9	52	71.1	91.8	83.3%	83.8	84.1	15	323	13.3	Math;
PLC School 2	2013	588	10	18.2	16	0.7	47.4	80.4	93.5	92.5%	82.1	91.3	21	294	9.6	Asian:
	2012	570	13.5	15.1	17.4	0.5	46.1	80.6	94.6	93.7%	89.3	89.3	17	285	11.9	ELA;
	2011	523	14.3	11.5	17.2	0.2	53.2	75	92.3	91.4%	85.5	90.4	16	349	11	White:
PLC School 3	2013	752	1.6	14	13.3	0.7	62.8	65.3	97.3	88.8%	88.5	94.2	19	376	9	White:
	2012	761	1.4	15.9	13.7	0.8	61.2	67.1	95.1	90.0%	86.0	92.8	18	381	9.8	Math;
	2011	751	2.1	14.1	14.2	0.5	55.8	60.6	89.6	86.4%	87.9	91.6	18	376	11.1	IEP:
PLC School 4	2013	347	2	13.3	17.6	0.3	55	79.9	87.7	85.3%	83.5	87.1	17	347	8.4	White:
	2012	348	3.7	10.3	18.4	0.3	59.5	75.9	89.0	85.1%	90.7	89.2	15	348	9	Elk;
	2011	322	4.3	9.9	17.4	0.3	62.4	78.4	87.8	86.6%	80.8	85.6	16	322	9	FRL:
PLC School 5	2013	290	3.4	65.5	13.4	0.3	13.4	81.2	88.4	92.1%	*	86.7	16	290	13.4	N/A
	2012	281	4.6	64.4	17.1	0	10.7	79.3	92.3	*	*	90.4	16	281	14.3	
	2011	281	4.3	64.4	14.9	0	16.4	81.7	91.3	88.3%	*	90.2	16	281	13.7	
PLC School 6	2013	414	0	73.9	11.1	0.2	12.6	81.9	90.7	92.3%	75.6	80.7	20	414	8.1	FRL:
	2012	378	0	64	20.4	0.3	14.6	85.9	95.5	93.1%	86.1	85.8	17	378	8.1	ELA &
	2011	409	0.5	62.3	21	0.2	15.9	87.2	85.6	87.8%	78.2	84.5	15	273	7.8	MA;
ALL PLC Schools	2013	457.7	3.3	33.7	14.3	0.8	40.5	77.4	91.6	0.9	80.7	87.3	18.7	346.0	10.2	
	2012	443.3	4.4	30.8	17.1	0.5	41.0	77.8	94.1	0.9	88.0	89.6	16.3	351.3	11.2	
	2011	434.8	4.8	30.6	16.6	0.4	42.6	75.7	89.7	0.9	83.2	87.7	16.0	320.7	11.0	

Note: ¹Proportional Attendance Rate

3.2.1 PFP Schools

The PFP district implemented their monetary incentive program in ten of their elementary schools, chosen by a formula defined below. This urban district resides in the state of Missouri and has experienced a declining enrollment since 2004. Today, the district has an enrollment of 15,625 students. In 2010 the district sought alternative teacher motivation structures and received a grant from the federal government titled PIONEER Program. The PIONEER program allowed the district to experiment with monetary incentives for teachers that performed tasks above their contractual agreement or changed behavior that is not assessed on evaluation cycles. The grant was written in 2010 and expires in 2015. The district received grant money in the 2010-11 school year, which served as their planning year. Here the district finalized implementation strategies, officially beginning the incentive base payout to teachers in the 2011-12 school year.

Elementary schools with the highest ranked needs were asked to participate in the program. In order to participate, 75% of the faculty had to agree to the program's criteria. If less than 75% of the faculty agreed, the district went to the next highest ranked school until ten schools agreed to participate. The district identified at-risk factors that would rank schools in the highest to lowest comparable needs. Although race is a significant factor, it was not considered in the districts highest at-risk formula because all the schools were 90% or greater student minority.

The district used a category weight (based on 1.00) assigned formula based on the degree of at-risk. Schools are ranked in order of the greatest need receiving the greatest rank in four areas. The four weighted categories are percent of student poverty, composite MAP scores, school size, and percent of ELL. Their weight into the overall formula is:

$$\text{At-Risk (1.00)} = \text{Poverty (.35)} + \text{MAP scores (.15 reading / .15 mathematics)} + \text{Size (.20)} + \text{ELL (.15)}$$

Poverty is defined by students that qualify for the federal free and reduced lunch price program. The Missouri Assessment Program, or MAP, is the Missouri's state standardized assessment. After schools were ranked, a district group approached the faculty to gage their interest in the PIONEER Program. The program began in each of the participating elementary schools in the 2011-12 school year. Incentive payouts are for certified staff only.

Participants in the program can make additional money but cannot lose money. Each participant is eligible to earn a ten thousand dollar (\$10,000) bonus, dependent on their job performance. The four areas teachers can earn monetary rewards are professional growth, wrap around, building growth, and performance assessment. The below table further outlines the incentive rewards within each category.

	Description	Dollars Rewarded
Professional Growth		
National Board Certification	Participants who gained certification from the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards in any subject area.	\$200
Extra PD Hours	Participation in 20 hours of optional professional development and documentation of how it impacted their classroom practices.	\$2,800
Wrap Around		
Attendance	Participants that missed fewer than 22.5 hours of the school year (3 days).	\$500
	Participants that missed fewer than 37.5 hours of the school year (5 days).	\$275
Discipline	Participants that reduced the number of discipline referrals they wrote by 25%.*	\$500
	Participants that reduced the number of discipline referrals they wrote by 15%	\$275
Parent Engagement	Participants who had 95% of their parents come to the building for a conference during the week of parent-teacher conferences in both the spring and fall and also had 10	\$500

	communications with parents of every student they served.	
	Participants who had 90% of their parents attend in-person conferences (regardless of 10 communications with parents of their students).	\$200
Building Growth		
Growth	Participants in buildings whose average value-added was higher than the district's average value-added.	\$2,500
Performance Assessment		
	Participants who earned a final summary rating of "Distinguished."	\$2,000
	Participants who earned a final summary rating of "Proficient."	\$1,000
	Participants whose classroom average value-added was greater than the district's average value-added in math.	\$500
	Participants whose classroom average value-added was greater than the district's average value-added in communication arts.	\$500

*In 2013-14, the criteria changed to assess the percent of discipline notices decreased building-wide versus individual teacher.

It is critical to understand that for this study the structure of this pay-for-performance program differs from other merit pay structures. This study used teacher perception data to examine the better motivating factor to get teachers to go above their normal call of duty, paying them more or building a climate grounded in common beliefs and goals. In order to use perception survey data, the study first needed to define that this pay-for-performance reward structure does not compare teachers against each other, which would ultimately create teacher competition. Unlike many other PFP programs where teachers can be pitted against each other in order to make more money, this setting provides a large enough pot of money that all participants can receive the same maximum reward of ten thousand dollars. In essence, teachers are rewarded on evaluative criteria of their own performances, such as attendance and parent engagement, and not data to outperform neighboring colleagues.

The program’s incentive payouts began in 2012. There are currently two years of data collected on the percent of certified staff receiving incentives. This is reported out from the district and included in Table 4 below. The district is in their third year of implementation.

The district changed the incentive criteria for parent engagement in the 2012-13 school year. Rather than combining the parent-teacher conferences with the number of parent contacts, it separated it into two categories. The table also shows a decline in the number of teachers given the rating of “Distinguished,” going from 30 teachers in 2012 to 14 distinguished teachers in 2013. It is believed the decline is due to the release of five elementary principals, who provided higher evaluation ratings to teachers than they deserved.

A limitation to this program was the method of which the program was introduced to the faculty. Schools were approached to participate in the PIONEER Program very shortly after many faculty members received written notice they were being laid off at the end of the school year due to a reduction in force. Therefore, at the time of the faculty vote, there was a lack of trust between employees and the district. This hindered the ability for faculty to see the full potential benefits of an incentive-based program.

Table 4
Comparison Summary of Incentives Earned by TEACHERS in 2012 and 2013

Category	Dollar Amount	Eligible 2012	Achieved 2012	Percent 2012	Eligible 2013	Achieved 2013	Percent 2013
National Board Certification	\$200	270	0	0%	280	0	0%
Extra 20 PD Hours	\$2,800	270	162	60%	280	218	78%
Attendance - fewer than 22.5 hours missed	\$500	270	135	50%	280	71	26%
Attendance - fewer than 37.5 hours missed, but more than 22.5 hours	\$275	135	36	27%	209	44	21%
Discipline - 25% reduction from previous year	\$500	260	183	70%	280	200	72%
Discipline - 15% reduction from previous year	\$275	77	4	5%	77	6	8%
Parent Engagement - 95% and 10 Contacts with parents	\$500	260	24	9%	-	-	-
Parent Engagement - 90% or 10 contacts with parents	\$200	236	18	8%	-	-	-
Parent Engagement - 95% P/T conference attendance	\$250	-	-	-	280	39	14%
10 Contacts with parents of all students served	\$250	-	-	-	280	141	51%
Building Growth	\$2,500	270	169	63%	280	250	90%
Performance Assessment - Distinguished	\$2,000	263	30	11%	280	14	5%
Performance Assessment - Proficient	\$1,200	233	189	81%	263	151	57%
Student Growth Math	\$500	173	66	38%	128	62	49%
Student Growth English Language Arts	\$500	179	67	37%	149	68	46%

3.2.2 PLC Urban Schools

The participating six PLC elementary schools are part of three separate districts, all adjacent to the PFP district. Four of the six elementary schools come from one district that has just under 19,000 students. This district has 73.98% of their student population that receives free or reduced lunch and a student white population of 55.05%, with a large Hispanic population of 16%. The majority of their students, 74%, receive benefits from the federal free and reduced lunch program. These schools represent four of the twenty-one elementary schools in the district and were selected because they had the most diverse and urban demographic student populations, defined by Bryk et al. (2010). These schools had the highest percentages of minority and low socioeconomic student populations of the other elementary settings in their district.

The other two elementary settings come from smaller districts, with student populations of 6,300 and 2,300 students. These schools are the only elementary settings that agreed to participate in the study from their respective districts. They have 86.4% and 74.1% of students receiving free or reduced lunch with 11.4% and 19.6% white populations, respectively. Due to the PFP district's lack of accreditation by the state of Missouri, these two schools have adopted many students that chose to move out of the PFP schools. These two schools are eventually omitted from the study due to their small response rates after a factor analysis, leaving a comparison of a merit pay district to one pay-for-performance district.

All PLC administrations implemented professional learning communities on their own accord, as it was not mandated from their district offices. Although one school is still in their first few years of implementation, they all set specific time aside for staff members to collaborate together. Having collaborative time built into the school day is a major quality of professional learning communities. There are no district level accountability measures for the individual

school implementation of PLCs. Rather, the PLCs are monitored by the building level administrations. Here, administrators actively participate in collaborative meetings with staff and hold teachers accountable to using their allotted group time each week. Each week fifty minutes is set aside for vertical collaboration, or collaboration among grade levels. Four days a week teachers are expected to collaborate horizontally with their grade level specific teachers.

During collaborative sessions, teachers use previous data to set goals, discuss student behavior concerns, upcoming lessons and objectives, have group meetings with parents and students, and reflect on their behavior. Each PLC reports to building administrators on a weekly basis of their progress towards goals and the how they used the collaborative time.

Administrators and counselors also use PLC time to share and receive critical student information. The PLCs have become an integral part of how the schools operate, dictating the master calendar, plan periods, and elective offerings.

3.3 Questionnaire

After the general information portion of the survey regarding income, gender, and years of experience, the survey is broken down into two main parts, an OCB and PLC section. The OCB questions for this study are based on previous OCB scales in existing literature. It includes questions within categories of the five discretionary citizenship - altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy. Using OCB scales within both the business and educational setting as examples, the survey questions were slightly modified to gain insight into teacher OCB practices in the merit pay and PLC models.

There are twenty-two OCB questions that are on a five-point Likert scale from Never (1) to Sometimes (3) to Always (5). These questions are analyzing the perception of teachers that

their colleagues go above the normal call of duty such as making home visits and volunteering for subcommittees. The other section of the survey focuses its attention on PLC practices.

There are fifteen questions regarding collaboration practices on a five-point Likert scale of Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). These questions stem from previously developed professional learning community surveys and analyze the perception of teachers of their colleagues to participate fully in collaborative efforts. The main purpose of these questions are to provide a second comparison data set to determine if pay-for-performance schools create a sense of competition among colleagues, which would foster an environment that teachers work in isolated silos. Recall that this study first identified a merit pay setting that was consciously structured to eliminate teacher competition amongst colleagues, where competition could have created biases in teacher responses to the OCB questions and ultimately create reliability and validity programs in the data collection. However, since this study used districts, that in both settings, teachers could work together to achieve their individual or collective rewards, the perception data is dependable.

The voluntary survey was disseminated via SurveyMonkey and sent electronically to participating schools. The survey took participants less than ten minutes to complete. Two follow-up emails were sent to participating schools; first, two weeks after the initial dissemination and the second 12 days after the original email was sent to teachers. Below is the survey that was given to teachers.

Teacher Survey

General Information:

1. What grade level do you teach?
2. How many years of teaching experience do you have?
3. What is your gender?
4. What is the highest degree you have received?
5. What is your ethnicity?
6. What is your annual income in your current position?
7. How many years have you been in your current teaching position?
8. (PLC – Questions): The following questions are on a five-point Likert scale. Please respond to each question on the scale of Strongly Disagree (1), Neutral (3), to Strongly Agree (5).

Each statement begins with Teachers In My School...

- a. Are always excited to share ideas and teaching practices with one another.
 - b. Are always willing to offer advice to help improve their colleagues' performance.
 - c. Always help each other out.
 - d. Are always willing to share student data when interacting with colleagues.
 - e. Are always motivated to share effective instructional methods and teaching philosophies with colleagues.
 - f. Get chances to benefit from one another only when it is reciprocated.
 - g. Never put themselves before the wellbeing of the entire school.
 - h. Always feel competitive when observed by other teachers.
 - i. Always enjoy opportunities to observe one another teach.
 - j. Always feel competitive when colleagues ask for advice or support.
 - k. Agree to collaborate with colleagues to develop teaching materials and activities only when it benefits them personally.
 - l. Always measure their own success relative to others.
 - m. Are always willing to volunteer their time to assist one another.
 - n. Consider extra compensation as the most important reason to do more.
 - o. Tend to view their own success as more important than that of their colleagues.
9. (OCB – Questions): The following questions are on a five-point Likert scale. Please respond to each question on the scale of Never (1), Sometimes (3), to Always (5).

Each statement begins with Teachers In My School...

- a. Volunteer free assistance to students on their own time.
- b. Offer innovative solutions to identify problems.
- c. Volunteer to mentor new teachers.
- d. Arrive and depart to work and meetings on time.
- e. View committees in this school as effective.
- f. Volunteer to help colleagues in their absence or when they fall behind.
- g. Volunteer assistance to substitutes and guests regularly.
- h. Volunteer for ad hoc committees (subcommittees).
- i. Use their entire instructional time throughout each day.
- j. Remain current on instructional and curriculum practices.
- k. Make phone calls home about positive behaviors.
- l. Make home visits.
- m. Use all their allotted vacation days.

- n. Differentiate instruction regularly to meet individual student needs.
- o. Seek professional development above the basic requirements.
- p. Communicate foreseeable absences in a timely manner.
- q. Use all their allotted sick leaves.
- r. Complete work at home.
- s. Greet students at the door each class period.
- t. Attend student activities outside the school setting.
- u. Enjoy coming to work on a daily basis.
- v. Have time provided to them for teacher collaboration.

3.4 Data Analysis

This study assessed the level of teacher motivation to go above normal expectations given to them through school control mechanisms. The independent variable is the control theory utilized within the contemporary governing practice, pay-for-performance (market) or professional learning communities (clan). The dependent variable is teacher citizenship behavior.



The two policies tested are the pay-for-performance and professional learning community practices. It is logical to believe that PLCs will encourage greater percentages of OCB as citizenship behavior cannot be expected or required. Groups of teachers in the PLC model surround each other around common purposes and goals. Whereas, the merit pay model is expected to encourage behaviors that are specifically outlined for individual rewards but not believed to encourage behavior that extends beyond reward recognition. The null hypothesis, there is no difference in teacher motivation to go above their contractual agreement, was expected to be rejected. The expected outcome was that PLC schools will demonstrate higher levels of organizational citizenship behaviors.

The steps outlined below were followed in analyzing the data:

1. Demographic data tables were gathered and assessed, comparing the two control practices.
2. A two-sample t-test was performed, comparing mean scores of the control practices.
3. Descriptive data was ran assessing controls, and mean scores of OCB and PLC questions.

(All non-teachers were omitted from the study)
4. A factor analysis of the districts was performed.

(The two districts representing one elementary each were omitted from this small scale study.)
5. A new demographic table was gathered and assessed.
6. A factor analysis of the OCB questions was done.

(Three questions were heavy outliers and were omitted from the study.)
7. A second two-sample t-test was performed comparing means of the control theories.
8. A regression model was performed, comparing governing practices of teacher perceptions of their colleagues to perform OCB.
9. A second regression model was performed, adding the control of PLC attitudes. This allowed the study to assess whether PLC sites utilized PLC best practices.
10. The PLC attitudes control was removed, and seven additional controls were added in a step-by-step fashion that assessed teacher perceptions of their colleagues to perform OCB.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

4.1 Review of Hypothesis

The purpose of this study is to examine teacher motivating factors that influence organizational citizenship behavior. Moreover, this study seeks to determine the relationship between school control factors, specifically market and clan control, and teacher motivation to perform acts above the normal call of duty. Are teachers motivated to perform these acts because they are rewarded monetarily or through normative practices? The research question is, *Which control configuration best motivates teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior?*

This study is significant because it closes the research gap between the school governance debate and citizenship behavior. Currently, in urban settings the policy debate over school governance argues teachers are motivated either through monetary or community rewards. The gap in research resides in defining the best governing control configuration that motivates teachers to give more of themselves in order to benefit the, already behind, students in urban schools.

This study test the null hypothesis between pay-for-performance and professional learning communities; $H_N: \mu_{\text{PFP}} = \mu_{\text{PLC}}$. The following chapter presents the statistical analyses completed in this study to answer the research question. After the online questionnaires were completed through SurveyMonkey, the data were imported into a Stata package. The descriptive statistics are found in Table 5, below.

4.2 Survey Participants and Descriptive Data

There were a total of four school districts and 265 educators that participated in the survey. Two of the four districts had large response rates of 148 (65%) and 80 (35%) participants and included multiple buildings within the school district. The other two districts represented one building each and had 21 or fewer respondents to the survey. After a factor analysis between districts, the two smaller districts were omitted from the study, leaving a true pay-for-performance district comparison to a professional learning community district. Table 5 below has the comparison population percentages of the two comparison groups with the omitted clan districts information removed. This table is updated from its original, Table 1.

Table 5
PFP versus PLC Student Enrollment

	Total Enrollment	Asian (%)	Black (%)	Hispanic (%)	Indian (%)	White (%)	Free / Reduced Lunch (%)	ELL ⁱ	IEP (% w/ serves) ⁱ	Attendance Rate	Students to Classroom Teacher	Students to Administrators	YRS of Exp of Prof. Staff
PFP District	346.8	2.60	67.10	20.60	0.30	9.10	90.00	83.00	74.50	75.20	17.00	244.20	14.50
PLC District	496.83	5.21	14.65	15.83	0.74	55.05	73.98	92.38	84.95	89.11	17.17	349.25	10.74

Note. ⁱProportional Attendance Rate. These numbers are three year averages from 2011-2013.

The large districts that remained in the study represented market, with 148 participants, and clan control with 80 responses. Four participants within these two districts were not teachers and were omitted along with one outlier in respect to salary was removed from the study, leaving a total of 223 teacher participants. Table 6 shows that of the remaining 146 (65%) teachers represented from the market district and 77 (35%) from the clan district, 200 (90%) were female. The control of teacher tenure was performed to assess whether OCB declined after teachers found security within their tenured status. Tenured status is defined by the state of Missouri when teachers start their sixth year of education. There were 165 (74%) participants that were tenured.

The majority of participants, 72.65 percent, had a master's degree or higher and were white or Caucasian at 68.16 percent. There are a total of 47 Black participants, 12 Hispanic, and

12 other races included in the study. This is interesting as the two districts had high minority student populations with only 9.1 (market district) and 55 (clan district) percentages of white populations. Although this study controls for teacher ethnicity, it is interesting to think that in both settings, students are benefiting from teachers that more than likely have different life experiences and upbringings. Study participants taught grades Kindergarten through Eighth grade.

Table 6 - Descriptive Data of Participants

	Number of Subpopulation	Percent of Subpopulation
Tenured	165	73.99
Female	200	89.69
Graduate Degree	162	72.65
Ethnic		
White	152	68.16
Black	47	21.08
Hispanic	12	5.38
Other	12	5.38
Highest Grade Taught		
Kindergarten	18	8.07
First	25	11.21
Second	28	12.56
Third	24	10.76
Fourth	25	11.21
Fifth	38	17.04
Sixth	55	24.66
Eighth	10	4.48

Note: Total participants = 223; Graduate Degree = master's degree or higher.

There were a total of twenty-two OCB questions that were classified into subgroups of the five discretionary behaviors that define citizenship - altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy. After a factor analysis of these OCB questions, three

(questions 12, 13, and 17) were found to be empirically different from the others and were omitted from the results. Furthermore, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to explore the sub-dimensions of the OCB construct. Unfortunately, the sub-dimensions in the questionnaire were not empirically verified and the researcher used all remaining OCB questions as one total construct.

Table 7 below includes the statistics of all 223 participants with their responses to the OCB and PLC constructs, as well as their level of income and experience. Three teachers did not answer the OCB construct. Of the remaining participants, the mean OCB score was 3.75 out of a 5 point scale (SD = .56). All 223 participants are represented in the PLC construct with a mean score of 3.37 out of 5 (SD = .48). There was an average teacher income of \$49,215.60 with a mean of 15.26 (SD = 11.10) years of experience.

Table 7 - Descriptive Data of Questionnaire

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
OCB	220	3.75	0.56	2.16	5
PLC	223	3.37	0.48	1.67	5
Income	210	49215.60	11618.46	24000	76000
Experience	223	15.26	11.10	0	47

Note: Total = 223; OCB = average of all OCB 5-point Likert scale questions in the survey, omitting questions 12, 13, and 17; PLC = average of all PLC 5-point Likert scale questions in the survey; Income = teacher salary; Experience = number of years of teaching experience.

4.3 PLC Effect on OCB

The district with 146 participants utilized the market configuration to motivate teachers whereas the district with 77 participants applied normative controls through their use of professional learning communities. To test the null hypothesis of this research study, a regression analysis was performed to examine the effects that control configurations had on citizenship behavior, depicted in Table 8, below.

H₀: There is no relationship between the control configuration and teacher citizenship behavior as measured by the OCB construct.

Table 8 - Regression Model 1

Dependent Variable: OCB		
	Beta	Stdzd Beta
PLCSite (0,1)	0.251 *** (0.077)	0.215
Constant	3.667 *** (0.045)	
R-squared	0.046	

Note. N=220. *** $p \leq .001$.

This regression analysis rejects the null hypothesis and shows clan control does in fact have a statistical significant effect ($p\text{-value} \leq .001$) on organizational citizenship behavior. The PLC control represents the control theory utilized within the two participating districts. The unadjusted mean difference between the market and clan configurations is .251 on a 5 point scale. This is a meaningful finding with a total sample size of 220 cases. The linear regression equation of $OCB = 3.667 + .251PLC$ means that the average respondent in the PLC site, their response to the question of whether their colleagues manifest OCB, is .251 units greater than the response of the average participants in the PFP site. This means specifically PLC respondents believe their colleagues manifest OCB behavior .251 units more than the average PFP participants. In simple terms this basically means that *teachers in the PLC context exhibit more OCB than their counterparts in the PFP context.*

This finding of teachers that work towards common beliefs and goals will present more altruistic behaviors was expected as their reward is measured in community outcomes. Contrary

to this finding, an increase in market control would predict that teachers would exhaust the amount of energy needed to receive their fixed desired reward or predetermined outcome reward levels.

Table 9, below, adds the control of the PLC attitudes, or the PLC mean survey responses. The PLC survey questions, or attitudes towards PLC practices, were given to both the PLC and PFP sites. This regression model accounts for how both sites implement collaborative efforts within the control theory practiced. This demonstrates that the measure of the PLC attitudes are congruent to the measure of the PLC district site control, which is tested throughout the additional regression models. When controlling for the perceptions of other teachers' collaborative behavior, the PLC effect on citizenship behavior is diminished to .148 units. This is a negative difference of .103 effect on citizenship behavior, which at 220 cases is substantial. The measure of the perception of others' collaboration efforts has a significant ($p \leq .001$) influence on the effect of the district clan control on teacher citizenship, meaning the measures are the same. The survey PLC questions are removed from the regression models that are found in Table 10.

Table 9 - Regression Model 2

Dependent Variable: OCB		
	Beta	Stdzd Beta
PLCSite (0,1)	0.148 ** (0.068)	0.127
PLCAttitudes	0.590 *** (0.070)	0.495
Constant	1.710 *** (0.234)	
R-squared	0.284	

Note. N=220. *** $p \leq .001$. ** $p < .05$.

To further explore the relationship between clan control and citizenship behavior, additional regression models with the dependent variable of organizational citizenship behavior were ran to introduce controls, after taking out the PLC attitudes, in a step-by-step fashion. Regression models 3 – 10 are depicted in Table 10, below.

Similar to the first regression finding, the subsequent analyses rejected the null hypothesis, depicting clan control had a significant ($p\text{-value} \leq .001$) impact on teacher perceptions of colleagues to demonstrate citizenship behavior. After all eight controls were added, the perception of the clan effect on OCB persisted throughout the models and to some degree, even grew irrespective of the additional controls. Model ten represents that respondents in the PLC site are on average demonstrating .370 units more of OCB than the average respondents in the PFP site, when controlling for all factors. The average difference in the perception of how one's colleagues demonstrate citizenship behavior between a PLC site and PFP site are in favor that PLC control encourages higher teacher motivation to perform acts above the normal call of duty. In essence, people in PLC settings believe that their colleagues exhibit more OCB than people in PFP settings think their colleagues demonstrate. Accounting for all the controls in model ten there is a positive .119 increase in OCB from its original model one regression. In simple terms when analyzing the teacher perception of OCB, this study demonstrates that teachers in the PLC site exhibit higher levels of citizenship behavior than their counterpart site of market control, or pay-for-performance.

A substantial finding is that the robust effect of clan control on OCB continued to grow with each additional control factor, with the largest increase occurring with the factor of experience. When controlling for teacher tenure, greater than five years of teacher experience, there is a small positive influence of .011 on citizenship behavior from the collaborative control

theory. However, model 5 demonstrates that clan control is interacting most with teacher experience, a positive effect of .032 on OCB, meaning that the influence of clan control on the citizenship behavior varies by teacher experience more than the status of a tenured teacher. This is interesting as many argue that once teachers become tenured, their efforts diminish due to their higher levels of job security. This study argues that the collaborative community can overcome the tenured security status. Teachers with higher levels of experience can offer more to the collaborative process than teachers with less experience. Furthermore, community goals motivate teachers to reach above their contractual agreement above years of experience.

In Model 3, the table shows that both income and clan control have a positive significant (p -value $\leq .001$) effect on teachers to perform OCB. Controlling for the gender factor has no influence to the overall linear regression model. Interestingly, the Hispanic race/ethnicity control factor shows a positive significant (p -value $\leq .100$) influence on the model. The market and clan districts are 20.6 and 15.83, respectively, percentage Hispanic. The Hispanic population in the clan district is larger than any other minority race percentage. Since the PFP site has a higher percentage of Hispanic students, the teacher Hispanic control is simply picking up the residual PLC effect on the overall model. It is worth noting that the population makeup of the districts is not hurting the PLC effect but positively influencing the overall effect on citizenship.

Again, these findings are consistent with the literature. As additional control factors are added to the model the larger the impact clan control has on OCB. The linear model is:

$$\text{OCB} = \text{Constant} + \beta_1\text{PLC} + \text{Controls}.$$

The literature would argue that the market and clan configurations adopt the controls that are added within this study. The control configurations act as the umbrella of the model, influencing, from a top-down initiative, how the additional controls interact with each other, and

ultimately impacting citizenship behavior. Relatively, females should be influenced the same to perform OCB as males in whichever control configuration they reside. Similarly, teacher salary, teacher tenure, years of experience, race, the grade they teach, degree status, and number of years in their current position would have minor influence on OCB. An agreed upon salary would not have a heavy impact on OCB. Rather, it is the reward that motivates teachers, which within a market control could be a bonus and would encourage the input of a teacher to match their desired reward output. However, since clan control reward is based on a common set of beliefs, the input of a teacher would match their commitment to the overall goals of the professional learning community, and not the controlled factors in this study of income, tenured status, etc.

Table 10

	Model 1		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta
PLCSite (0,1)	0.251 *** (0.077)	0.215	0.278 *** (0.078)	0.239	0.289 *** (0.078)	0.248	0.321 *** (0.085)	0.275	0.321 *** (0.085)	0.276
Income			0.000013 *** (0.000003)	0.269	0.000010 ** (0.000004)	0.213	0.000007 (0.000005)	0.154	0.000007 (0.000005)	0.153
Tenure					0.117 (0.105)	0.094	0.067 (0.117)	0.054	0.065 (0.117)	0.052
Experience							0.006 (0.006)	0.117	0.006 (0.006)	0.120
Female									-0.037 (0.128)	-0.019
Log(Current Position)										
Race/Ethnicity										
Black										
Hispanic										
Other										
Highest Grade Taught										
Graduate Degree										
Constant	3.667 *** (0.045)		3.022 *** (0.167)		3.066 *** (0.171)		3.143 *** (0.189)		3.179 *** (0.225)	
R-squared	0.046		0.112		0.118		0.122		0.122	

Note. * $p \leq .100$. ** $p < .050$. *** $p \leq .001$.

Table 10 - Continued

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta	Beta	Stdzd Beta
PLCSite (0,1)	0.328 *** (0.085)	0.280	0.355 *** (0.087)	0.303	0.368 *** (0.087)	0.314	0.370 *** (0.088)	0.316
Income	0.000007 (0.000005)	0.136	0.000008 (0.000005)	0.158	0.000007 (0.000005)	0.146	0.000007 (0.000005)	0.153
Tenure	0.051 (0.120)	0.041	0.050 (0.120)	0.040	0.049 (0.120)	0.039	0.054 (0.122)	0.044
Experience	0.005 (0.006)	0.095	0.003 (0.006)	0.058	0.002 (0.006)	0.044	0.002 (0.006)	0.042
Female	-0.031 (0.128)	-0.016	-0.042 (0.129)	-0.022	-0.018 (0.130)	-0.009	-0.019 (0.130)	-0.010
Log(Current Position)	0.044 (0.044)	0.083	0.034 (0.044)	0.066	0.027 (0.044)	0.051	0.025 (0.045)	0.048
Race/Ethnicity								
Black			0.123 (0.102)	0.088	0.122 (0.102)	0.087	0.121 (0.103)	0.086
Hispanic			0.280 * (0.169)	0.113	0.314 * (0.170)	0.127	0.318 * (0.171)	0.128
Other			-0.126 (0.176)	-0.048	-0.129 (0.176)	-0.050	-0.132 (0.177)	-0.051
Highest Grade Taught					0.026 (0.019)	0.100	0.027 (0.019)	0.103
Graduate Degree							-0.023 (0.093)	-0.019
Constant	3.180 *** (0.227)		3.137 *** (0.230)		3.061 *** (0.236)		3.058 *** (0.237)	
R-squared	0.131		0.15		0.159		0.159	

Note. * $p \leq .100$. ** $p < .050$. *** $p \leq .001$.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION

The following chapter provides a summary of the study, including the rationale and constructs used. Moreover, the following pages will review the research method, the results of the study and their implications, limitations of the study, and future directions to add onto this research.

5.1 Rationale for the Study

School reform for decades have sought innovate solutions to fix and improve America's urban schools. Large percentages of minority and low socioeconomic students in these settings are behind their suburban counterparts and often lack the same educational opportunity. It is believed that schools shall look at improving the source that has the largest impact on students, teachers. Recently, policy debate has played a large role in influencing teacher behavior.

Success of teachers in urban settings is defined through their organization's purpose of catching their already academically and socially behind students up to the success level of suburban students. This entails teachers finding motivation to go above and beyond their basic call of duty, the contractual agreement. However, to sustain teacher motivation it must be discretionary and voluntary. The simplest definition of this behavior is doing the right thing that benefits the greater good of an organization without receiving personal recognition or merit. Organ (1990), and later in education DiPaola (2007), defined this as organizational citizenship behavior.

Within the higher bureaucratic system, the policy debate has experimented using control theory in schools to motivate teachers to demonstrate OCB. This study expands the policy debate to determine whether monetary or community rewards, Ouchi's market and clan,

typology, better motivate teacher acts of citizenship behavior. Community motivation stems from individual commitment to the school's and community's goals. Conversely to this debate is that teachers are motivated through monetary rewards of predetermined requirements. The manifestation of community, or clan control, in schools are professional learning communities, whereas the manifestation of market control is merit pay. This study answers the research question, *Does the market or clan control configuration best motivate teachers to demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior?*

5.2 Review of Constructs

The researcher found four districts to participate in the study, two of which were eventually omitted. Each of the remaining districts in this small scale study represented one of the control configurations. The pay-for-performance district was rewarded a federal PIONEER grant that utilized a formula to rank their highest need schools. The formula defined at-risk schools as high percentage poverty, MAP scores, school size and percent of ELL students. This district had 146 teachers participate in the survey. The grant defined six areas teachers could make bonuses, totaling up to ten thousand dollars per teacher. This district's motivation technique was individualized per teacher and *not* structured in a manner that pitted teachers against each other competitively.

The professional learning community district implemented the collaboration tool voluntarily. This setting provided regularly scheduled times for staff members to collaborate over student behavior, data, upcoming lessons and objectives, hold group meetings with parents or guardians, and discuss school goals. Also included in collaboration are administrators and counselors. These PLCs now influence the school's operations, dictate the master calendar, teacher plan periods and professional development. Motivation in this district is collective.

5.3 Review of Research Methods

A short voluntary survey was disseminated electronically to all teachers within participating districts through SurveyMonkey. After the brief general information section, teachers responded to five-point Likert scale questions on the two constructs of OCB and PLC. The twenty-two OCB questions stemmed from previously used surveys that incorporated the five behaviors of OCB - altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, civic virtue, and courtesy. The fifteen PLC questions stemmed from previously developed surveys on the concept. All of the questions analyzed the perception of teachers on their colleagues to perform citizenship behavior and work collaboratively among colleagues. The survey assessed the independent variable, teacher motivation, to perform organizational citizenship behavior, the dependent variable.

5.4 Limitations and Future Direction

The limitations of this study surrounded the participation of districts. Two of the four surveyed districts were omitted because only one school within their system agreed to participate in the study. Furthermore, twenty-two or less participants in these omitted districts submitted responses. The professional learning community district consisted of four elementary schools, culminating in 77 submitted surveys. This sample size was my comparison group to the pay-for-performance district of 146 total participants from ten buildings. The study surveyed all of the participating PIONEER program schools within the market control district, which consisted mostly of elementary settings but had a few middle school teacher participants. It would be preferred to have a comparison of market versus clan of the same grade levels and a similar number of participants.

Another limitation was the minority population comparison between the two constructs. While both districts represented urban settings as defined by Bryk et al. (2010) of high

percentage minority and low income, there remained differences in the makeup of the student populations. The clan district was fifty-five percent white compared to nine percent of the market district. Moreover, fifteen versus sixty-seven percent, respectively, of the black population of the districts.

Participants of the study were identified through their district code and not by their specific school of employment. It would have been beneficial to breakdown the data by each school and analyze the sub-dimensions of each district in responses to citizenship behavior and PLC implementation. This study would also have liked to understand the background of participating teachers and reasoning behind their commitment to urban settings. Dan Lortie (2002) in his book *Schoolteacher*, discusses motivators of becoming a teacher and reasoning behind remaining in the profession. Connecting Lortie's (2002) theory to teacher citizenship behavior is a potential future direction.

A future study could explore Lortie's (2002) theory and understand how it influences teacher motivation to perform citizenship behavior. Furthermore, a study could assess the upbringing of current teacher participants to compare with their current student upbringings. This could be done through a qualitative study by interviewing participants of this current study. This study analyzed district level control configurations. A study could look whether building level control configurations have similar results as district controls as perhaps, teachers work for their direct report differently than the bureaucratic system they are employed under. Another future direction would be to explore the interaction that the clan construct is having with the other controls of this study, resulting in higher OCB levels. This study demonstrated a larger increase in teacher citizenship behavior when experience was added to the model than any other

control. This should be explored to understand this relationship better and the influence that experience has on OCB.

5.5 Findings and Implications

The findings of this study could have heavy future implications on how districts and schools operate. Ultimately, the findings herein are uniquely counterintuitive to mainstream business operations where monetary rewards are the fundamental motivational factor behind one's behavior. The argument presented here is that teachers are motivated to go above and beyond their contractual agreement through group norms and corporation, which are inherently tied back to their principal calling into the profession of improving student outcomes, whether that be individually defined as behavioral or academic results.

Currently there is a governing policy debate of how to motivate teachers. One argument is that schools operate similarly to mainstream businesses. Within this structure, teachers are rewarded through monetary incentives to reach performance criteria. Their motivation stems from the recognition of bonuses. For example, a car salesperson has an annual guaranteed base salary plus a financial reward each time they sell a vehicle. This salesperson would then define his or her motivation to sell the amount of cars needed to meet their individual financial goals, or their predetermined desired bonus amount. In the school monetary reward argument, teachers are motivated by their predetermined desired bonus amount as well. Here they would receive bonuses that are tied with their professional behavior, such as doing more professional development hours or having higher attendance rates. The essential finding of this study argues that teachers are not motivated similarly to mainstream business structures, like a car salesman.

Rather, teachers are motivated through the other side of the policy debate, which ultimately is the argument presented in this study. Teachers are motivated to do more than their

contractual agreement through collaborative settings that are grounded in collective goals and objectives. This is consistent with the reasoning teachers enter the profession in the first place. Teachers are inherently altruistic because often their motivation in becoming an educator is to make a difference in the lives of students. This study defined urban settings behind their suburban counterparts because of the complexity of the competing needs of their student makeup of low socioeconomic and minority populations. In order to catch these academically and behaviorally behind students up, the schools must operate as a cohesive system with common goals. These goals outline the roadmap of the normative control structures that become apparent in collaborative settings, where teachers are motivated through common fundamental beliefs and norms. Therefore, the principal finding of this study is that the typology Ouchi originally defined as clan control motivates teachers to go above their contractual agreement more than market control. More simply put, professional learning communities produce more altruism, or more dedication of their teachers, to go above and beyond the normal call of duty than pay-for-performance structures.

The results of this study confirmed its original hypothesis that teachers are motivated to perform OCB more through clan control. This rejects the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between control configurations and teacher OCB. Through a linear regression model, professional learning communities had a statistically significant impact on teacher OCB of .251, defined through teacher perceptions of their colleagues. As eight controls were added to the regression model, the impact PLCs had on citizenship behavior continued to increase. The only control that had a no impact of PLCs on OCB was gender. These findings could have the following implications on future policy and practice decisions.

As federal, state and local funding continue to decrease, which encourages districts to become innovative with revenue, these findings demonstrate the importance of where district monies should be spent. Rather than paying bonuses to teachers for summative evaluations and student outcomes, districts would see a greater impact on student performances through a commitment of building a collaborative community. This community practice would impact the policy debate of school and teacher evaluations. Currently, the federal government is pushing hard to incorporate student assessment data to be included in teacher evaluations. This study would argue that teachers should be evaluated on their level of collaboration in helping their community reach goals, which ultimately would impact student assessment scores as they would get a greater dedication from their teachers. Moreover, these implications could then effect school accreditation and teacher certification.

In terms of practical implications, this study could influence how districts allocate time and resources towards teacher professional development. These results suggests professional development should focus on developing common goals that the community of the school can support. Prior to effecting the development of teachers, districts should stress the importance of collaboration through their recruitment and hiring processes. Questions should determine the level of commitment to larger community goals versus individual rewards. These findings also suggest that the relationship between supervisor and subordinate would change. Perhaps supervisors would focus energy on facilitating the evaluation process, contrasting current practices of a top-down evaluation process that assess teacher objectives. The collaborative process during evaluations would take more time from both parties, which would need to be built into the master calendar and structure of teacher plan time. Furthermore, these findings would suggest districts need to assess their negotiated teacher agreement. At the core of this study, we

assessed the motivation of teachers to go beyond the contractual agreement. Understanding teacher motivation to exhibit citizenship behavior, districts could influence their negotiated agreement by providing more autonomy in community goal setting and evaluation processes.

Therefore, within this study's findings and potential future implications, it is concluded that urban districts desiring to motivate teachers to go above their contractual agreement should implement clan control by providing a sense of community and common goals. They should incorporate regular collaboration time amongst colleagues that focus on student behavior, data, a review of goals, and discussions of future directions.

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