THE 1968 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OF SENATOR EUGENE J. MCCARTHY: A STUDY OF RHETORICAL CHOICE

by

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United States Senator Eugene J. McCarthy acted to accomplish what he took to be his duty to his country and has thereby earned the author's permanent gratitude and admiration.

Others who were nearer contributed to the present work and created it with the author on a day to day basis. Professor Wil A. Linkugel sacrificed potential sabbatical tranquility in order to provide supervision and coordination for this dissertation and by his choice made the present work possible. Professor William A. Conboy—mentor and friend—gave massive doses of time, effort and encouragement to the author and made her one thereby. Professor Calvin W. Downs contributed consultation time, editorial skill and early encouragement for the project.

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The work in its entirety is dedicated to Bobby R. Patton in gratitude for years of unfailing cooperation, professional respect and love.

B.R.P.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The year 1968 found some Americans talking of a revolution in process. Andrew Kopkind, Washington Correspondent of the New Statesman, however, disagreed, countering that America was not in a revolution, for "if it were, Tom Hayden wouldn't be on television. . . .and Eldridge Cleaver would be shot."¹ Instead of reacting as an Establishment threatened by revolution, the response of many groups within the Establishment to Tom Hayden, co-founder of the Students for a Democratic Society, was to hire him at large fees to tell of his plans for destruction of the Establishment. Eldridge Cleaver co-founder of the Black Panther movement was transformed into a best selling author even though he was sought by police.

David English of the London Daily Express maintained that America did not experience revolution in 1968 but

. . . a bewildered anxiety. Something had gone wrong with America. Deep divisions, always visible but not always of prime urgency, had by some imperative chosen simultaneously to demand attention: the black against the white, the rich against the poor, the established against the innovating, the war makers against the peace lovers. The result was a confusion of priorities and a paralysis of will, bringing the decade to an end in total contrast to its beginning. ²

¹Andrew Kopkind, "Are We In the Middle of A Revolution?" New York Times Magazine, November 10, 1968, p. 59

English saw only one sort of unity in this country, and that a melancholy one:

In 1968 Americans of all races and classes were united in one emotion, an emotion totally foreign to the American thinking, at least to white American thinking. Americans were almost without exception gripped by frustration, a frustration so powerful that many people feared that the nation was heading for a nervous breakdown.3

That Americans were to elect a new president in such a national climate was a situation calculated to produce unparalleled surprises and tragedies. Nineteen hundred and sixty eight was a year in which reasonable men sought to find new answers to problems and irrational men sought to impose their answers on their countrymen. When the campaign had ended, Theodore H. White, author of books on the presidential elections of 1960 and 1964, said of his efforts to analyze the 1968 presidential election:

The new book is like a Shakespearean chronicle. Shakespeare finished his chronicles by dragging a body off the stage. What I'm trying to do is write a history, find a theme, compose a narrative, but the months explode from episodes and the stage is heaped with corpses.4

In such a year, a man's choices--personal, political, rhetorical--are likely to be unpredictable and perhaps in some ways unfathomable. Writing in a time of such tumult of the techniques of change is not a

3Ibid., p. 3.
task for the wary; an analysis of the 1968 political effort of Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, particularly of his rhetoric or persuasive choices, is virtually an act of faith.

The Minnesota Senator, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and persistent critic of the involvement of this country in Vietnam, arose on November 30, 1967, to announce that he would enter four presidential primaries and indicated that he might later decide to enter more. His unique role in the campaign was described by David English:

A more unlikely folk hero it was difficult to imagine. Yet that is what he became. McCarthy did not know it when he sat down after his Berkeley speech /October 26, 1967/, but from that moment the mysterious political forces that combine to make vintage election years were already beginning to gravitate toward him. He was engulfed and propelled into a series of events that future historians may well regard as a turning point in American politics. For Eugene McCarthy gave meaning to a phrase that was being used yet not widely understood. He was the spearhead of "the New Politics."5

**Purpose and Plan of the Study**

This work constitutes an effort to order, systematize and analyze significant elements of the 1968 political campaign of Senator Eugene McCarthy. With the ultimate goal of understanding the communication behavior of the Senator and of his supporters, his campaign will be

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5 English, p. 53.
viewed from the following four perspectives:

In Part I, The Senator, two central characteristics of the Senator himself will be identified and likely resultant behavior suggested. This section of the work is to serve as an analytical backdrop against which to view the following three sections.

Part II, The Act, will present a chronological ordering of the events of the McCarthy campaign. His strategic choices—political, personal, and rhetorical—will be reported here.

Part III, The Agency, will analyze the persuasive techniques in the McCarthy campaign. His style, his selection of issues for his speeches, and the effects of these factors are all matters for consideration in the first half of Part III. The latter half of Part III will examine the style and rhetorical choices of other major participants in his campaign—McCarthy's family, his staff, and his army of volunteers.

Whether his rhetorical choices and those of his supporters were effective can be answered only in the context of his—and their—intentions as they faced the American voting public. Accordingly, the final section of this study, "After the Fact: McCarthy's Intent and Effect," will explore the following questions: Why did McCarthy choose to campaign? What groups did he hope to reach and, consequently, what effect did he hope to produce. Why did McCarthy continue in the race even though circumstances changed during its course? What were the results of either his decision to campaign or some of his campaign efforts? And finally, in light of his intent and of existing political realities, were his
rhetorical choices wise ones? Could he have acted differently? Should he have acted differently?

**Source Materials**

In addition to daily perusal of the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Kansas City Star*, the *Kansas City Times* and the *Lawrence Daily Journal World*, all major available journals were examined regularly as data sources. Senator McCarthy's Washington office provided all speech materials requested.

The writer spent the week preceding the Nebraska primary in that state observing and participating in various aspects of campaign organization and interviewing volunteers, staff members and campaign coordinators. I interviewed local, state and national campaign organizers, and Frank McCarthy, the Senator's cousin.

**Limitations of this Study**

My analysis of Eugene McCarthy's political rhetoric was limited to the persuasive choices made by the Senator and his supporters during the period between November 30, 1967, and August 30, 1968. McCarthy engaged in hundreds of speaking situations, and I considered his general effectiveness and persuasive techniques. In Chapter 6, for purposes of analysis of content, however, his choices in eleven major addresses are considered. Transcripts were not available for many of his speeches; however, the eleven chosen were available in the form of transcripts of
speeches as delivered. In two cases, I possessed tape recordings of
the addresses and careful collation proved that in those cases the
transcripts were accurate. These addresses were delivered to widely
divergent audiences: farmers, students, Americans for Democratic Action,
major campaign rallies and to demoralized and defeated supporters. The
speeches chosen offer diversity not only in audience but also in event
and mood.

An imposed and significant limitation of this study is that of
immediate participation. To write of current rhetorical events, even
in quiet times, is to lose some detachment which time offers. A critical
analysis of rhetorical events in time of change by one experiencing the
changes--being buffeted by them--must be partially a report of the
effect of that rhetoric on the writer; to write of political rhetoric
in a time when political reality seems so to depend on which national
leaders are left alive on a given day is to write as one trying to cope
with political events--political rhetoric--as well as to order and
analyze them.
Part I

EUGENE J. McCARTHY:
WHEN A THOUGHTFUL MAN COMMUNICATES
But Senator McCarthy? For two weeks this gentle philosopher roamed the hills of New Hampshire. He looks like a birdwatcher, intent on observing the nuthatch, but he was not after titmice. He was seeking, of all things, votes.


McCarthy compares his political success to "the dews of the night coming on soft and gentle--but in the morning, I was there."

Two words—paradox and irony—have been applied consistently and appropriately to Senator Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota; defined by Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, applicable meanings include:

Paradox: 1. . .seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense but that may be true in fact.

Irony: 2b. A usually humorous or sardonic style, 3a. incongruity between the actual result of a sequence of events and the normal or expected result, 4. an attitude of detached awareness of incongruity typical of the depicter or observer of an ironic situation.¹

McCarthy chose to enter a race he could not win and probably did not wish to win. Entering political primaries in order to provide a participatory avenue for the politically dispossessed, he refused to make ritualistic political addresses which could have widened that avenue. Consideration of the nature and background of Eugene McCarthy may increase understanding of the candidate's rhetorical choices in 1968.

A two year study of this man and his campaign persuade the writer that the word paradox (that which may seem contradictory but that may yet be true in fact) is among the most fitting to describe this man and his effort. Rather consistent traces of preferences for order co-mingle in his background with evidence of the expectation of inevitable anarchy; such paradoxical tendencies may be seen in his professional choices ranging chronologically from baseball player to priest, to professor, and then to politician.

The first and second chapters of this work are written to provide some conceptual framework in which to view the political activities of Eugene McCarthy in 1968. His behavioral choices, particularly rhetorical choices, become easier to understand and evaluate with some idea of major personal tendencies of the man. Accordingly, the thrust of Part I is to explore two significant characteristics of Senator McCarthy. Chapter One summarizes his history of preference for change within preserved order and Chapter Two projects this preference against McCarthy's protective cynicism.
Chapter 1

McCARTHY'S PREFERENCE FOR CHANGE
WITHIN PRESERVED ORDER

Much in McCarthy's background suggests a major attempt at some time in his life to provide an avenue of order where none exists. His upbringing in the small Minnesota farm community of Watkins has been cited as directing him toward the feeling that orderly life has much to commend it.¹

As a Roman Catholic, he might be expected to respect institutional imposition of order unless he found the institution to be directed toward repression of all internal reform. His experience with the liberal wing of his church reinforced rather than weakened respect for church order.² Nick Thimmesch provided valuable insights into the effect of McCarthy's religious tendencies in directing his later political choices. Thimmesch postulates that the influence of liberal Benedictine approaches to social reality were particularly important to an understanding of McCarthy. St. John's College, located thirty miles from Watkins, played a significant role in developing McCarthy's philosophical standards. The


largest Benedictine monastery in the world, St. John's was the college from which the Senator graduated cum laude in 1935 after three years of study.\(^4\) St. Johns, long known as a place of ferment for the social order, was founded by the oldest order of teachers in western civilization. Thimmesch recalls, "The Benedictines are remarkably open to new thinking and the social and economic ferment of the thirties when McCarthy was a student kept faculty members up long past bedtimes for monks."\(^5\) The faculty and students at St. John's were not programmatic liberals; their liberation was a rational matter and they were encouraged to feel they could accomplish beneficial change within the established order. Thimmesch reviews behavioral evidence of Benedictine liberality:

The social thinking at St. John's is like that of the Christian Democrats of Europe, the parties which produced Adenauer, DeGasperie and Schuman in the postwar period. St. John's pioneered in pastoral psychiatry, gives summer courses to Protestant, Catholic and Jewish clergy and has an Institute of Ecumenical Research with 12 scholars from various denominations in residence.\(^6\)

McCarthy's undergraduate experience at St. John's thus was with an institution that explicitly provided for value testing, for questioning, for receptivity to the possibility of error. Avenues were provided for change if change was proved vital.

\(^4\)Ibid.

\(^5\)Ibid.

McCarthy received his master's degree from the University of Minnesota in 1938 and taught thereafter at several public schools, including one in Mandan, North Dakota, where he met Abigail Quigley, his future bride. Before that marriage, however, two other institutions, the United States Army and St. John's University, contributed to the development of McCarthy's fundamental concepts of order. He returned to St. John's as a novitiate in 1941 for a one year stay. While there, he taught under the name of Frater Novice Conan. The next year McCarthy left the monastery and served for the duration of World War II in the War Department Intelligence Service as a civilian technical assistant in military intelligence.

In 1945, McCarthy married Abigail Quigley and began a college teaching career at the College of St. Thomas. He went to the College as acting head of the Sociology Department, a position that might have provided lifetime security.

Two years later, however, in 1947, McCarthy took the step that would lead ultimately to November 30, 1967; He successfully opposed the "Marxist element in his Democratic-Farmer-Labor party in Ramsey County

7Thimmesch, p. G3.
8Thimmesch, p. Gl.
10Ibid.
and was elected county chairman. Though three years later, he fought for and won his seat in the U. S. House of Representatives. His political efforts from the beginning gave him reason to regard the established order as both malleable and responsible for preserving conditions of orderly growth. He had defeated what he took to be harmful tendencies in his party and had been chosen as U. S. Representative by citizens of both parties. He won each of his four elections to the House by larger majorities:

- 1950 (59,930 to 39,307)
- 1952 (98,015 to 60,827)
- 1954 (81,651 to 47,933)
- 1956 (103,320 to 57,947)

During these terms of service, Senator McCarthy again found the American political system subject to reform with the rise and fall of his namesake, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. In 1950, the Wisconsin Senator had begun establishing his reputation as a militant anti-Communist with his February speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. In 1954 he would be censured by the Senate; in 1957 he would die; and, by 1965, McCarthyism would be defined as "a mid-twentieth-century political attitude characterized chiefly by opposition to elements held to be subversive and by use of tactics involving personal attacks on individuals by means

11Thimmesch, p. Gl.
12"Eugene J. McCarthy. . .Member of Congress Since 1949," from Headquarters, McCarthy for President.
of widely publicized indiscriminate allegations especially on the basis of unsubstantiated charges."\(^{1}\) The scene in 1952, however, was not so safe for one who would oppose the originator of McCarthyism; that year, for instance, Senator Joseph McCarthy presented a major address at the Republican National Convention.\(^ {15}\) Eugene McCarthy was one of only a few people then willing to do public battle with the Wisconsin demagogue. They met in debate on the *American Forum of the Air*, of which Eugene McCarthy later recalled, "the moderator told me quite frankly that the only reason he asked me to oppose McCarthy was that he could not get anybody else."\(^ {16}\) One excerpt from that encounter of which Eugene McCarthy was particularly proud demonstrated respect for institutional order and democratic procedures:

Senator /\text{Joseph} /\text{McCarthy}: I think the great overriding evil which encloses all lesser evils which beset the nation today, such as high taxes, the absence of so many young men in the service, is the extent to which the Kremlin has shaped and directed our foreign policy.

We know we have lost an average of 100 million people a year to Communism since the shooting part of World War II ended. Not 100 thousand, 100 million. Since the shooting part of World War II ended, the total lost has been about 700 million people. ...Right, Gene?

Congressman Eugene McCarthy: Senator, I don't think you can say that we have lost them. We never had them. Of course, it is not our policy to have people. I think we can say that we have saved much of the world from Communism

\(^{1}\) *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*, p. 506.

\(^{15}\) *Wragge*, p. 294.

through the sound foreign policy which the Democratic administration did initiate, and which was given bi-partisan support by the Republicans as long as it seemed to be going along very well.

Moderator: Congressman McCarthy, do you believe that it is healthy for personalities to outweigh policies in a national election.

Congressman McCarthy: I think not. We speak of ours as a government of laws rather than of men. I think we ought to try to have our campaigns of program and policy rather than of personalities.

Moderator: Do you want to comment on that, Senator?

Senator McCarthy: I think Gene did right well. 17

Although warned time and again not to do public battle with the Wisconsin demagogue, 18 Eugene McCarthy trusted the American political system and thus the American voter. Haynes Johnson recalled, "Gene took the same stand then as now—that if you have a reasonable position and discuss it intelligently, the people will make the right decisions." 19 Two years later, the nation had come to recognize Joseph McCarthy as a dangerous man, and the American political institution acted against him.

Eugene McCarthy continued to succeed within the established system and was called by commentators, including Nicholas Thimmesch, a first rate Congressman. 20 The German and Irish Americans of St. Paul re-elected

17 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
19 Ibid.
20 Thimmesch, p. Gl.
him three more times before he decided to run for the Senate in 1958, Thimmesch recalls, "His liberal voting record was of the highest octane and it didn't bother his constituents because as he puts it, 'They don't panic much in St. Paul.'"

When McCarthy did decide to run for the Senate, he found it necessary to run without the support of Hubert Humphrey in the primary; nevertheless, he was successful in the primary and defeated a twelve-year Senate veteran, Edward Thye handily (608,847 to 539,629). In 1964, McCarthy was re-elected by the largest popular majority of any Democratic candidate in the history of Minnesota. Clearly he had for most of his life found political institutions responsive.

The other institution that most affected McCarthy was the Catholic Church and his experience with the liberal wing of the Church at St. John's had strengthened his belief that change within order was possible. Furthermore, the reign of Pope John XXIII occurred during the manhood of the Senator. This liberal Pope's great and seemingly successful efforts toward ecumenism and change encouraged trust in institutional reform. Mrs. McCarthy recalled the affect that Pope John had had on the McCarthy family philosophy, "His life was such evidence

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21 Eugene McCarthy. . .Member of Congress Since 1949.

22 Ibid.
that one man can change the times. The currents for change are there, if you can sense them and know how to move with them."²³ McCarthy's experiences with his church, as well as in his political career, thus produced in him the belief that man could be an effective agent for change without rejecting the institution to be altered.

²³ Johnson, p. 196.
Chapter 2

McCARTHY AS IRONIST

A new President /Richard Nixon/ took office Monday. For Eugene Joseph McCarthy and his followers, the ceremony merely confirmed the triumph of orthodoxy over political heresy, the impregnability of the system's windmills to one man's quixotic lance.¹

The institutional man described in Chapter 1 was thus described by more than one knowledgable commentator. Did McCarthy expect to find all institutions impregnable? And if he did, why then would he attempt to affect them? Perhaps a hint of an answer may be derived from further consideration of his brand of Catholicism—"Benedictine cynicism" with which hoped for ideals were blended. Wilfrid Sheed in the New American Review, used the phrase, "Commonweal Catholics" to describe members of the generation of U. S. Catholics, now aged thirty-five to sixty, who combine "old-fashioned religious training" with progressive politics shaped by unionism and papal encyclicals on the worth of labor.² Jeremy Larner who for a time served as a McCarthy speech writer, explained:

It should be clear that when a man as loyal to this system as McCarthy would challenge authority, he may do so only after he has restrained his will and arrived at a reasoned judgment. The proper pace for progress, in the words of Pope John, is "little by little."³

¹"His Battle Lost, McCarthy Hauls Down His Colors," Associated Press Release, Kansas City Star, January 22, 1969, p. 9A.
³Jeremy Larner, "Reflections on the McCarthy Campaign," Harper's, April, 1969, p. 64.
So McCarthy challenged his party and President within established political avenues, fully expecting that his trust in the flexibility of the system would not be misplaced. In an act to be described and analyzed as the rest of the body of this work, he challenged the American political system as represented by all voters to change political alternatives in that system. Nicholas Thimmesch draws the conflict in terms of "a remarkable event taking place in American politics because of a man whose vision of life includes plenty of room for paradox": 4

... Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, 51, whose name was Frater Novice Conan in a Minnesota monastery a generation ago, strongly believes in obedience; yet he has risen, as no member of his party has, to oppose his leader and President. ...

McCarthy is a quiet, witty man of grey presence; yet his crusade to change U. S. policy on Vietnam... will attract the wildest kind of dissent. He has been tagged as a laconic fellow who lacks proper political ambition; yet the Johnson Administration now considers his audacity as fearfully dangerous to the 1968 Democratic ticket... 

He talks about Vietnam in abstract terms, reminiscent of the faculty lounge, yet Vietnam has become the bloody battleground of our decade, and its tragic realism is conveyed daily to American next-of-kin. No senator votes more liberal than McCarthy; yet he claims his effort is conservative in that it will provide a healthy political outlet for alienated protestors who have occasionally become street mobs. ...


5Ibid.
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenback implied on August 17, 1967, that because of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, no further congressional sanction was needed to pursue the war; such statements were cited by McCarthy as a turning point leading to his decision to oppose the Democratic Administration.  

He opposed the formation of a third or fourth party and gave as one reason for his primary efforts the possibility that dissenters might otherwise form another party. Seeking to remain within the party and the system even during the campaign, McCarthy argued that the Democratic Party had left him not he the party. Senator McCarthy clearly is a man who felt betrayed by institutional intransigence after he had spent a lifetime in defense of institutional approaches.

When he chose to enter the political primaries in 1968, McCarthy acted as a man aware of the irony of the situation. Only a certain sort of politician could appeal to enough people to win the presidency, and to become that sort of politician would require that he overstate and emote as he was not prepared to do. National columnist, James J. Kilpatrick, commented admiringly, "McCarthy paid no heed to the rules...", and then reviewed traditional rhetorical rules:

Now the rules for such occasions are clear. A candidate is expected to speak for 45 minutes and to wave his arms 128 times; McCarthy spoke for 22 minutes and gestured not at all.

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7 McCarthy Announcement of Candidacy, November 30, 1967.
A candidate is expected to get 'em laughing with a few timely jokes. You know how McCarthy began? "I have a limited measure of courage," he said. That was his lead. He did not even say he was glad to be back in New Jersey.

The rules require that a candidate must never appeal to the intelligence of his audience. He may appeal to their party loyalty, perhaps, to patriotism, or to their pugilistic instinct. The regulation as to poetry is that a candidate may quote four lines of Shakespeare or two from Edgar Guest; no other poets are approved. The one permitted reference to history is to the Founding Fathers; nothing else is allowed.8

While McCarthy's rhetorical choices are discussed at length in Part III of this work, the irony or paradox inherent in the approach cited above exemplifies the conflicting tendencies exhibited throughout the campaign and throughout the life of the candidate.

He did enter the Presidential primaries, but he did so as an "anti-hero." "Gene is an anti-hero. I think he has to be. This country can't afford any more heroes,"9 was his wife's description of McCarthy's image. An anti-hero may be expected to view institutions he has revered with the ironic view expressed by McCarthy when he later reflected, "It might have been better to let things run wild--to have a peasants' revolt."10 After the campaign, McCarthy analyzed the deficiencies of a very different sort of "institution," the game of

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8 James J. Kilpatrick, "This Candidate Ignores the Rules," Kansas City Star, March 13, 1968, p. 13B.


baseball, with the same sense of reluctant rejection of the unchanging institution:

It really isn't the national pastime any more. We start kids out in the Little Leagues and right away the whole thing is very serious. They get too much too soon. The whole thing is over-engineered and the only place people want to go is to the top. There's no room in the middle for fun. Perhaps we should abolish organized baseball—the Little Leagues as well as the majors. Then we could just leave a few balls and bats lying around and see if people picked them up.  

His ultimate development of fundamental questions about institutional ability to respond to reform tendencies may have contributed, as did his ironic view to the "McCarthy style." Ward Just of the Washington Post observed:

Eugene McCarthy is an ironist, an almost unique quality among American politicians. Thus when a Black Power leader would lean over the microphone and in a slow, deliberate, nasty voice advise the white kids that it is "not relevant to feel guilty or ashamed...it is only relevant to repent," McCarthy could lean his head back and laugh.

But when the time came for counterthrust, he did not have it.  

McCarthy apparently could understand the irony in such statements from a Black student who was wealthier, better fed and better clothed than most people in the world, whether black or white; and simultaneously could understand Black impatience in a country where many still live as


a "colonial people." Effective "political" counterthrust would seem to be difficult under such conditions. E. W. Kenworthy observed early in the campaign, "Some observers found it paradoxical...that a man so morally committed should impress his listeners as being so emotionally disengaged."13

The conflicting impulses in Eugene McCarthy were clearly reflected in the campaign and will be analyzed in succeeding chapters. Much that was to follow his decision to campaign, however, can be better understood when one realizes his relationship to, and regard for, orderly processes of change, his identification with institutions that he took to allow orderly change, and finally, his anger and dismay at an institution he could not change until he challenged it directly.

Eugene McCarthy defined the ideal political process and the ideal politician as:

The fundamental objective of politics is to bring about progressive change in keeping with the demands of social justice and its concern is with ways and means and with prudential judgments.

Political decisions cannot be based purely upon the determinations of science or of philosophy, but must take into account the whole history of mankind and particular conditions at the time of decision.

Despite the protestation that ours is a government of laws and not of men, the fact is that laws and executive decisions reflect the views and attitudes of men. The

majority of Americans, the majority of men holding public office in the United States, are sustained and fortified in their political judgments by ethical precepts strengthened by religious faith.

It is absurd, therefore, to hold that ethics and politics can be kept wholly apart when they meet in the conscience of one man. One discipline will relate to the other, if he is indeed a whole man. 14

The McCarthy campaign of 1968 may be best understood as an effort by the Minnesota Senator to unify ethics and politics in one man and in so doing to contribute to the unification or reconciliation of the country. He tried to provide the opportunity for American political institutions as constituted to fulfill their "fundamental objective," as he saw it, of bringing about "progressive change in keeping with the demands of social justice."

His campaign choices as well as his post campaign actions may become understandable as one contemplates his definition of the "ideal politician":

The ideal politician is a good man, an informed man, and a man skilled in the art of politics. Such a combination is hard to find. A man may be good indeed, and thoroughly informed, but failure and inadequacy in the art of politics should disqualify him as a politician.

. . . . . . .

He should shun the devices of the demagogue at all times, but especially in a time when anxiety is great, when tension is high, when uncertainty prevails, and emotion tends to be in the ascendancy.

. . . . . . .

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He should be judged by the standard of whether through his decisions and actions he has advanced the cause of justice, and helped, at least, to achieve the highest degree of perfection possible in the temporal order.\textsuperscript{15}

Shortly after the campaign in which McCarthy had been, by some definitions, the "poorer politician," since he had lost the election, he decided, at least temporarily, to contest no more. He sent his followers one of his poems that considered "the private soul in the public place." Its last stanza follows:

\begin{quote}
Now I lie on a west facing hill in October.
The dragging string having circled the World, the universe, crosses my hand in the grass. I do not grasp it.
It brushes my closed eyes, I do not open.
That world is no longer mine, but for remembrance.
Space ended then and time began.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

For a time, then, Senator McCarthy hauled down his colors. By March, 1968, however, he was again teaching by illustration. As one studies the campaign of 1968, the experience of Joseph Roddy, \textit{Look} Editor, has particular relevance:

When I got near the spot where McCarthy had parked, I could see the Senator himself in the middle of the street looking nonplussed. Closer up, I could see that his car was trapped by a long blue and white Pepsi Cola truck double-parked... The driver may have been seeing his broker or calling on a lover or having a late lunch at

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

Sans Souci, but he was in no place that sold Pepsi on that block. "Can you drive that thing?" McCarthy asked. I assured him I could not. "Not very resourceful, are you?" he said, and then climbed up behind the wheel and drove off with about 500 gallons of Pepsi. I hoped he was hijacking it for the Senate Dining Room. But he stopped at the end of the block. "Did you notice that I looked around for someone else to make that run before I made it?" he said not quite solemnly. "I may not have been the best man to make it, but I was the only one willing to try. . . ."17

PART II

THE ACT: A CHRONOLOGICAL ORDERING OF THE EVENTS OF THE MCCARTHY CAMPAIGN
Chapter 3

THE DECISION AND EARLY CAMPAIGN

The Decision: November 30, 1967

I intend to enter the Democratic primaries in Wisconsin, Oregon, California and Nebraska. The decision with reference to Massachusetts and New Hampshire will be made within two weeks. Insofar as Massachusetts is concerned, it will depend principally upon the outcome of the meeting of the Democratic State Committee this weekend.¹

With characteristic lack of drama, Eugene J. McCarthy, on November 30, 1967, announced his entrance into the race which would culminate in the election of a President of the United States. His stated reason for contesting President Johnson's renomination was to raise the issue of Vietnam and other related issues in the primaries.² An additional reason for his entry as a presidential candidate was his hope "that a challenge may alleviate the sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics and of American government."³

The November announcement came after two years of opposition to the Johnson Administration policies in Vietnam and to Administration treatment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee advice. In

²Ibid.
³Ibid.
January of 1966, Senator McCarthy had signed with sixteen other Senators, all Democratic, a letter to the President urging a continuation of the current bombing halt in Vietnam. On this day in the Senate he argued that the bombing was militarily ineffective and called for a "much more extensive discussion not only of Vietnam, but also of the whole function of America in history during this second half of the 20th century." He concluded this address, delivered two years before his entry into the presidential race, with a call for "... a national debate, a national discussion, and a real searching of the mind and soul of America." May 1, 1966, McCarthy more directly attacked Administration handling of peace negotiations with the statement, "We should have shown a greater willingness along the way to talk to the National Liberation Front—or the Viet Cong—and also to use the United Nations." By February 1, 1967, Senator McCarthy had determined that our presence in Vietnam was unjustifiable and maintained:

The final measurement which must be applied to this as to any war is that of proportion. There are three points which must be raised:

One, assuming that we understand what we mean by victory, is there a possibility of victory?

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7 Transcript of *Face the Nation* television broadcast. Columbia Broadcasting Company, May 1, 1966.
Two, what would be the cost of that victory?
Three, what assurance do we have that a better world or a better society will emerge in Vietnam following that victory?
The answers should be positive on each of these three counts.
I do not believe that the answers are positive and since they are not, we must be prepared to pass a hard and harsh moral judgment on our actions on Vietnam.8

Ten months, then, before he announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency, Senator McCarthy had decided that the United States had erred in the kind and extent of commitment to South Vietnam. During this interval McCarthy viewed Administration response to his cautionary view as arrogant to an intolerable degree.

This is also surely the interval to which he referred when questioned after his announcement of candidacy. He recalled his wish that Robert Kennedy had entered the race to oppose Johnson's Vietnam policy and continued, "It was nothing like St. Paul being knocked off his horse...I waited a decent period for someone else to do it."9

Throughout the month of November, 1967, indications had been that Senator McCarthy was considering his announcement of candidacy. November 13 had found McCarthy in California to "sound out dissenting elements on what kind of support he or some other dove might get in Democratic primaries against the President."10 The California Democratic Council

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suggested probable support for McCarthy, or for Senator Robert Kennedy should he decide to make the race. Also, on November 13, the Conference of Concerned Democrats, in Boston for its national convention, announced unofficially that they would back Senator McCarthy for the presidency in 1968. This organization of students, primarily organized by Allard K. Lowenstein, was constitutionally prohibited from official support for any presidential candidate. Zolton A. Ferency resigned his post as Democratic Party leader in Michigan after five years at his post on November 29, one day before the announcement of candidacy. He urged Senator McCarthy to run and promised to "do what I can to help him."

Finally, major pressure to become a candidate for the presidency came from the Senator's family. He referred during the campaign to the pressure exerted by his daughter Mary and by his wife Abigail throughout this time of decision. Abigail McCarthy at first did not want her husband to be the one to make the challenge which she, too, felt must be made by someone. To her statement one night in the McCarthy home, "Why shouldn't it be someone else?", Mary's response was, "Mother! That's the most immoral thing you have ever said. That's the exact opposite


12Andrew J. Glass, p. 1C.

13Ibid.

of everything you've taught us to believe."^{15}

So, on November 30, 1967, in the Senate Caucus Room, Senator Eugene McCarthy contracted to enter at least four primary campaigns: Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and Nebraska. Further, he indicated that he would perhaps enter the primary campaigns in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

December was a month of organizing the rudiments of campaign strategy. The decision whether to enter the March 12 New Hampshire primary was considered intensively; backers to Senator Kennedy urged McCarthy to shun it;^{16} Democratic leaders in New Hampshire strongly supported President Johnson and saw unity of support in the electorate.^{17} David Broder of the Washington Post quoted an "Administration Source" as saying that if McCarthy ran in New Hampshire "...his only allies would be 'two or three guys who haven't made it with the party.'"^{18}

Effort was also begun in December to broaden the issue base of the campaign. To be sure, the announcement of candidacy had included references to "the bearing of the war on other areas of United States responsibility" which included poverty program funds, foreign aid...


^{18}David S. Broder, "McCarthy's Bid Sparks Opposition," Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1967, p. 17B.
reductions, inflation threats and appropriate governmental response to protest.\textsuperscript{19} His major dispute with the Administration, however, had concerned Vietnam; and the other issues, as indicated immediately above, were seen to depend upon resolution of that conflict. After he presented his first major address as candidate to the Conference of Concerned Democrats on December 3, an address dealing primarily with the war and secondarily with domestic effects of the war, work was begun on the development of domestic programs. December 15 marked the first major domestic issue presentation of the campaign. In Manchester, New Hampshire, Senator McCarthy addressed himself solely to the questions of governmental responsibility for the housing of its citizens and of minority unemployment as a source of civil disorder.\textsuperscript{20}

The search for a broadly based constituency, then, had begun.

\textbf{New Hampshire Primary: March 12, 1968}

On January 4, 1968, David C. Hoeh, chairman of the New Hampshire McCarthy for President Committee, made public a telegram from Senator McCarthy which began, "I have decided to carry my campaign for the Presidency of the United States into New Hampshire. I will enter the

\textsuperscript{19}Announcement of Candidacy.

\textsuperscript{20}"McCarthy Proposes 'Massive Program' of 'Decent Housing,'" \textit{New York Times}, December 15, 1967, p. 33A.
New Hampshire primary."\(^{21}\) Although he had said earlier that he did not regard that primary as particularly significant,\(^ {22}\) and although he had received reports that Democratic voters in that state were not particularly opposed to Administration policy in Vietnam,\(^ {23}\) McCarthy had decided to contest the President, or his stand-in, with a direct challenge in New Hampshire on March 12.\(^ {24}\)

With that decision made, an initial problem to be faced was the issue of Senator Robert Kennedy's position on the Vietnam war and on the McCarthy candidacy. Eugene S. Daniell, leader of the Kennedy effort in Massachusetts, declined to support McCarthy and worried at the loss of funds for Kennedy that McCarthy's candidacy would cause.\(^ {25}\) McCarthy's first major address after his decision to enter New Hampshire's primary contained several references to those who "evade tests," to "some Americans, including some at the highest levels of government and politics, who have not yet spoken as their minds and consciences dictate." "In some cases," he continued, "they have not done so for reasons of personal or political convenience." Finally came the most pointed of his references, "There are a few, I


\(^{22}\)Ibid.

\(^{23}\)Ibid.

\(^{24}\)Ibid.

\(^{25}\)Ibid.
suspect, who are waiting for a kind of latter day salvation. Four years is too long to wait."26

Robert Kennedy responded on January 9, "I have to analyze how I can accomplish more good and be the most useful. . . my judgment is at the moment that I don't further the cause" of peace by supporting McCarthy.27 A portion of his explanation follows:

I give this answer with a great deal of effort. I don't think it is completely satisfactory. But I must examine the issue in relation to my concern about my own future, to my own conscience, and my judgment about what can be most useful.

My feeling at the moment is what I'm doing is the most useful, but perhaps not accomplishing a great deal.28

January 30, Kennedy declared again that he would not be a candidate for the nomination.29 On February 8, however, he launched his "bitterest broadside to date"30 at the President's conduct of the Vietnam war. At this time, his major charge leveled at the Administration was:

Our nation must be told the truth about this war, in all its terrible reality, both because it is right—and because only in this way can any Administration rally the public


27 "Kennedy Will Stay Neutral in Primaries," Los Angeles Times, p. 10A.


confidence and unity for the shadowed days which lie ahead. . . . Reality is grim and painful. But it is only a remote echo of the anguish toward which a policy founded on illusion is surely taking us. 31

This series of charges followed mounting evidence that the January Tet offensive in Vietnam had achieved unexpected success in waging effective attacks in over thirty cities in Vietnam. 32

March 4, Kennedy received results of a private poll which predicted a Kennedy win over the President and McCarthy in California. 33 March 9, Four Mid-West Democratic governors met with Kennedy in Des Moines and assessed the impact of President Johnson's nomination on the states which they represented. 34 Jack Newfield, political analyst for Life, summarizes the chronology of the next events:

On March 10, two days before the New Hampshire primary, Kennedy sent a personal emissary to tell McCarthy he probably would run. At 5 p.m. on March 14 /two days after the primary/, when Defense Secretary Clifford called to say the President had rejected the idea of a commission to study the war, the decision to announce on March 16 became irrevocable. 35

Throughout McCarthy's New Hampshire Campaign, however, Senator Kennedy held publicly to his course of opposition to Administration policy in

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Newfield, p. 29.
35 Newfield, p. 29. Material in brackets added.
Vietnam and concurrent refusal to support the McCarthy political challenge to that Administration.

On January 9, at the time of his first refusal to support the McCarthy challenge, Senator Kennedy said that only a minority of perhaps twenty-five percent of the population supported the McCarthy-Kennedy view of the Vietnam conflict. In light of some analyses of significance of the eventual vote in New Hampshire, a look at several audience factors is relevant. Louis Harris reported on February 12, 1968, that public support for U.S. participation in Vietnam was at the highest level since July, 1967 (74%). Support level had been only 61 per cent in December 1967, before the Tet offensive when thirty-eight Vietnamese cities were attacked and the American Embassy was penetrated by the Viet Cong. Harris found with regard to the military offensive that 66 per cent of those questioned held the view that "the latest Communist stepup of the fighting justifies the policy of not halting bombings of North Vietnam." Again, after the Tet offensive, 48 per cent of those questioned felt the stepped-up fighting "is to our advantage, since it has brought Communist forces out into the open where they can be met

36 Witkin, p. 25C.


38 Ibid.
head-on." Finally, 74 per cent of those questioned supported the war effort in spite of the fact that 71 per cent of them felt that the war will go on "a long time, perhaps for several more years." Results of a private poll taken for the Democratic party in December, 1967, led Senator Tom McIntyre (D.N.H.) to say of his constituents, "...people are frustrated and want some change but more of them want to step up the military pressure than back out." McCarthy said people needed at least three weeks to let the Tet offensive "sink in." "By then, he conjectured, "it could make the difference." His own position on Vietnam, however, was not universally known, at least by the second week in January. When asked whether McCarthy was a "hawk" or a "dove" about Vietnam, 37 per cent of a national cross section surveyed by George Gallup reported "no opinion." Comparable "no opinion" totals were Johnson, 16 per cent; Kennedy, 21 per cent; Rockefeller, 42 per cent.

Given the assumptions that a majority of voters in New Hampshire did not oppose United States involvement in Vietnam and that a large

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.


number of them might not know that Eugene McCarthy did oppose United States involvement, Senator McIntyre and Governor John King worked diligently on Johnson's behalf to establish the McCarthy "dove" image. \textsuperscript{44} Governor King's effort extended to a point of possible backfire as he used the phrases "an advocate of appeasement and surrender" \textsuperscript{45} to refer to McCarthy and stated that a vote for McCarthy would be "unpatriotic." \textsuperscript{46} Finally, King asserted that any significant vote for McCarthy would be "greeted with cheers in Hanoi." \textsuperscript{47} Simultaneously, supporters of the Administration presented a series of radio advertisements which charged, "The Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire primary. Don't vote for fuzzy thinking and surrender." \textsuperscript{48} Of these tactics of his colleague in the campaign, Senator McIntyre said, "It's a little unfair to say of our opponent that any votes he obtains would be cheered in Hanoi," and then concluded:

> His patriotism, his loyalty to this country is as good as yours or mine any day of the week. But I assure you, in politics this stuff does come in, but I don't want to be guilty of saying too much along this line myself. \textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{47}"Kennedy Raps Attacks on McCarthy's Loyalty," \textit{Los Angeles Times}, March 10, 1968, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
McCarthy used the charges as an example of the kind of opposition he faced, calling the remarks, "an affront to the democratic process of free debate." He continued, "What is important is not the falseness of the charge, but the fact that they are being made in 1968 and by Democrats." The manner as well as the substance of the attack were also rejected by Robert Kennedy who recalled the same sort of charges against his brother, John Kennedy, in 1960 and maintained that both times the charges were without foundation. Kennedy likened the sincerity of McCarthy and Johnson with the comment that McCarthy "is setting forth his honest views of what is best for our nation just as President Johnson is carrying out policies which he believes are best for our nation. The motive of neither should be impugned."

McCarthy garnered his essential local issue of the campaign when McIntyre and Governor King decided to use three part pledge cards in their write-in campaign for President Johnson. The cards, each of which carried a serial number, were distributed to all registered Democrats and to any independent voter who wanted to commit himself.

One section of the series, to be signed by the voter, pledged to write

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52 Ibid.

in the President's name on March 12; a second section asked whether transportation or a sitter would be needed on primary day and a third section was labeled, "White House Copy" and noted, "As an expression of your support, this card will be forwarded to President Johnson at the White House in Washington, D. C."54

McCarthy chose to make political capital of the pledge card technique and likened the card to other persuasive techniques of the President, "These cards come close to denying the right of a free ballot."55 Often the cards were treated more humorously but still presented a significant issue:

I don't know who devised the idea of numbered pledge cards, but it's not altogether inconsistent with Administration policy to kind of put a brand on people. It's something they do in Texas. I would hope the voters will react against it. It's a test of the independent spirit of New Hampshire.56

The serious personal attacks questioning McCarthy's patriotism, or loyalty, combined with the campaign pledge card gimmick to add many votes to the challenger's total. E. W. Kenworthy, correspondent for the New York Times, quoted several "long time observers of politics" as saying many voters who disagree with the Senator on Vietnam will


56Ibid.
take out their resentment over the pledge cards by staying home.\textsuperscript{57} The probable effect of the cards then was to contribute to a neutralization of the Vietnam war issue as reflected in vote totals as it increased McCarthy's percentage of the Democratic and Independent vote cast.

March 12, 1968, New Hampshire Primary day, Senator Eugene McCarthy scored the "minority victory" which would at least contribute indirectly to President Johnson's March 31 announcement that he would not seek to be re-elected. McCarthy far surpassed his forecasts as well as those of his opponents by winning 42 per cent of the Democratic ballots and twenty nominating votes at the party's national convention.\textsuperscript{58} Supporters of the President had earlier predicted a ten-to-one victory for the President, a prediction which had altered as primary time approached to a three-to-one victory prediction. With the vote counted, these vote totals emerged:

\begin{align*}
\text{President Johnson (not on ballot)} & : 29,021 \\
\text{Eugene McCarthy} & : 28,791 \\
\text{Robert Kennedy (not on ballot)} & : \text{less than 1} \% \quad \text{600} \quad \frac{58,412}{59}
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{"Bobby Kennedy Reassessing Plans on Possible Effort," Lawrence Daily Journal World, March 13, 1968.}

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Joe Lastelic, "Bobby is Officially In," Kansas City Star, March 16, 1968, p. 1.}
Richard Nixon 79% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83,071
Nelson Rockefeller (not on ballot) 11% . . . . . . 11,517
George Romney (withdrawn as candidate) 1.5% . . . 1,674
96,262 60

It should be noted that George Romney who withdrew from the race after stating that he had been misled about the United States effectiveness in Vietnam and thus represented a Vietnam view similar in some respects to that of Senator McCarthy received less than 2 per cent of the Republican vote. 61

Primary voting in New Hampshire also allocated twenty of the twenty-four convention delegates to McCarthy. 62 Surely a factor which contributed to this result was McCarthy's ability, because he was on the ballot, to choose his own slate of electors, a slate which he limited to twenty-four. On the other hand, the forty-five persons competing as loyalists split the vote of Johnson supporters. 63 McCarthy then captured 42 per cent of the Democratic vote and 82 per cent of the electors from an incumbent Democratic president in whose behalf a major write-in campaign was waged.

61 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
As the ballots were being counted and the magnitude of McCarthy's accomplishment was becoming clear, President Johnson referred to New Hampshire as probably "the only place where a candidate can claim 20 per cent is a landslide and 40 per cent is a mandate and 60 per cent is unanimous."\textsuperscript{64} He continued, "The New Hampshire primaries are unique in politics. They're the only races where anybody can run--and everybody can win."\textsuperscript{65} As a matter of fact, however, only Eugene McCarthy had chosen to contest President Johnson's right to the Democratic nomination. In the face of this challenge, the President had allowed a major write-in campaign on his behalf and had been unable to receive the support of even one half of his own party members.

As a result of the brutal charges against the person and patriotism of McCarthy, Johnson probably gained votes in Manchester, "conditioned to Red-baiting by the notorious editorials of the Manchester Union Leader,"\textsuperscript{66} which may have allowed him a "victory" in New Hampshire. It is also probable, however, that some potential support for the Administration was negated by the personal attacks and the signed, numbered, cards. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Regular Democrats Across Nation Are Jolted," \textit{Kansas City Times}, March 15, 1968, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
speculate, "but what saved New Hampshire may help lose the country. Democratic politicals who bear the scars of soft-on-communism smears from the right deeply resented the King-McIntyre line."67

The New Hampshire primary results were widely interpreted as a rejection of President Johnson's strong support of United States participation in Vietnam. McCarthy was asked election night whether the result was a repudiation of the war in Vietnam. "I think that's at least half of it,"68 he replied. David Broder predicted that an upset in New Hampshire would be "more than an embarrassment to the front-runner; it would be a clear signal of public demand for a change in direction in U. S. military and diplomatic policy."69 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak recalled two days after the election two interviews of March 2 which disclosed two citizens of New Hampshire who had planned to vote for the President but had changed their minds. Both referred to the Tet offensive as one basis for their decision to change:

In the ten days remaining in the New Hampshire campaign following that day in Nashua, similar encounters with voters plus polling information confirmed that the success of the Viet Cong had transformed domestic politics in 1968. McCarthy's support


had suddenly swollen from a corporal's guard of intellectuals and students who view the war as immoral to a war-weary host of voters who oppose the war only because it is not being won. 70

Two days after the election, then, Evans and Novak analyzed the results to mean that New Hampshire Democrats (42 per cent of them) wanted the war effort changed in the direction of increased chance of military victory. Their analysis took a startling turn on the very next day when they analyzed the results as not only representing a rejection of the President's war policy but, further, demanding a decrease in United States military action rather than an increase:

Many L.B.J. loyalists are now convinced he must soften his war policy—-at the least, drop his long planned tactic of campaigning as patriot president; at most, shift somewhat his war policy—to keep down McCarthy and stave off Kennedy. 71

The view of New Hampshire primary results which equates them with a demand for withdrawal from Vietnam, whether in the party or the entire electorate, is too simple an answer. On the one hand, if the results are considered simply in terms of strategy for securing the nomination of the Democratic party, then the President's chances for securing the nomination after the primary can be examined. In the first place, President Johnson did secure 48 per cent of the Democratic vote with an error filled write-in campaign, with no personal


appearances and in the face of severe military setbacks in Vietnam. Secondly, in light of a hard fought campaign by Senator McCarthy on what was considered by most of his supporters to be primarily an anti-Vietnam platform chances are that a larger percentage of "doves" elected to vote than the actual percentage of voters holding an anti-Vietnam sentiment.72 Recall voter anger at the pledge cards. President Johnson's chances for re-nomination after the New Hampshire primary were summarized in the following question-answer format by Godfrey Sperling Jr., Staff Correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor:

Q. So the President is the favorite to succeed himself for the Democratic nomination?

A. Beyond a doubt. Not since 1884 has a challenger defeated an incumbent president seeking re-nomination at the convention. Blaine did this against President Arthur. Arthur had moved up to the presidency from the vice-presidency. But he had never been elected to the presidency—as was Mr. Johnson in 1964.

Q. Anything else in Mr. Johnson's favor?

A. Yes. His power of patronage will tend to keep his party people in line. Also mayors are often key men in determining the direction a state delegation goes at a Democratic convention. These mayors are not likely to be unmindful of the big amounts of money coming from Washington—money that Mr. Johnson might reduce or shut off if angered.

Finally, the Democratic National Committee is President Johnson. He runs the party. President Eisenhower left this role to others. Democratic chairman John Bailey had some power under President Kennedy. But President Johnson runs the Democratic Party today.73

Only an inadequate analysis would suppose that the essential meaning of the New Hampshire Primary results was that, because of his acceleration of the Vietnamese conflict, President Johnson had lost his chance to be re-nominated by the Democratic party. Most Democratic dissent in New Hampshire, whatever its source, found its home with Eugene McCarthy. George Wallace did not conduct an active campaign and secured under three hundred votes. Robert Kennedy was given only 1 per cent of the vote and the remaining 8 per cent were divided among all other write-ins.

Analysis of the primary results equating them with a national bi-partisan request for decreased military pressure in Vietnam is even more questionable; while Nixon, Johnson and Rockefeller received more than 123,600 votes, the "dovish" vote total was only 31,065. Further, of the total of votes (154,674) cast for either Johnson, Nixon, Rockefeller, Romney, Kennedy or McCarthy, only 21 per cent (31,065) were cast for Eugene McCarthy, George Romney or Robert Kennedy. Roscoe Drummond concluded his analysis of the New Hampshire results, "Thus there is no evidence in the voting thus far that the get-out-of-Vietnam stance of McCarthy and Kennedy reflects anything near to dominant public sentiment."


Richard L. Strout, Washington correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, analyzed the significance of the New Hampshire primary so as to take account of some factors in the voting in addition to Vietnam:

New Hampshire has 0.3 per cent of the nation's population and its political influence is equally minimal. There is some danger of over interpreting the results.

The fact remains, however, that a relatively obscure challenger, Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D) of Minnesota, who was originally dismissed as unlikely to get more than 10 or 20 per cent of the Democratic ballots, has got something closer to 42 per cent.

This is a sign of weakness of President Johnson's part. It is true that his name was not on the ballot as contrasted to Senator McCarthy's but he had a strong write-in organization that included the Governor and a senator. Yet he got only 49 per cent.

Mr. Johnson is in trouble.

His difficulty in the New Hampshire primary is only a reflection of the agonizing problems which face him on the domestic and world scene. None of them seems to get solved and they all seem to get heavier: the restive Senate, the gold crisis and, above all, Vietnam.76

New Hampshire thus demonstrated that while the President could surely gain the nomination of his party for a second full term, he would deal with a party divided in its support of a broad spectrum of his policies. If he attempted to unite his party by assuming a more "dovish" stance on Vietnam (a stance rejected by 79 per cent of New Hampshire voters of both parties), then what of his support among

non-Democratic voters who did not necessarily believe that a change in this direction was the best possible course to follow and who rebelled at the Administration on different grounds: tax levels, urban turmoil, the balance of trade and other divisive issues?

NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSEQUENCES. If one moves from the question, "What caused the results in New Hampshire?" to the question, "What events were caused by the results in New Hampshire?" the problem is simpler. While it was said earlier that the President was absolutely unbeatable should he choose to seek re-nomination, after New Hampshire he was considered almost absolutely unbeatable, again given the same single contender, Senator McCarthy. Secondly, as events then stood, if a Democrat were to wrest the nomination from President Johnson, Senator McCarthy would be the one. Accordingly, a surge of volunteers as well as increased contributions were reported by his supporters as early as March 14.77 A third consequence of the New Hampshire primary results was McCarthy's entry into the May 7 Indiana and the June 4 South Dakota primaries. With the certainty that money and extensive support awaited a credible challenger to the Johnson Administration, whether McCarthy or someone else, other major events followed.

Enter Senator Kennedy. Three days after the New Hampshire results, Robert Kennedy, a long time opponent of United States Policy in Vietnam but a consistent supporter of the Administration otherwise, made a significant announcement. He was "reassessing" the possibility of entering competition for the Democratic nomination and said that in any event, "Obviously, I can't support the President."\textsuperscript{78}

With the words, "I am announcing today my candidacy for President of the United States," Robert Kennedy radically changed the context of American politics—1968. His statement of March 16 promised his entry into the Nebraska, Oregon and California primaries. Further, he urged voters in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts to support McCarthy in the presidential primaries in those states.\textsuperscript{79} Kennedy himself said that the New Hampshire results were responsible for his decision. In an explanation of his timing which was cynically received by McCarthy and many of his supporters, Kennedy said that the relationship of New Hampshire to the Kennedy candidacy was that it proved "how deep are the present divisions in our country and in our party." Had he entered the race before that primary, his candidacy would have been seen as one of personal animosity toward the President,

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
but "My decision today reflects no personal animosity or disrespect for President Johnson. . . The issue is not personal." 80 In sum, Kennedy's announcement of candidacy reflected his view of March 16 that the only way that "disastrous, divisive policies" can be changed is by changing the men in office who are making them. 81

Since Kennedy had earlier argued that "disastrous policies" could be changed by strenous objection to the policies coupled with support for the policy makers, his announcement of candidacy and subsequent explanations of timing were met with anger and resentment from McCarthy and many of his followers. McCarthy's initial statement on the Kennedy candidacy was that he had made no deals with Senator Kennedy and that he would "run as hard as I can" to defeat Kennedy and President Johnson. 82 He referred to the Kennedy offer to help in some primaries where the two men would not meet as sounding "kind of like fattening me up for the kill." 83 McCarthy specifically asked Kennedy supporters not to schedule any Kennedy appearances in Wisconsin on McCarthy's behalf; "If this is the test he [Kennedy] wants—which is the best candidate—I think it would be better if he didn't crowd the

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
field in Wisconsin."84 Of a Kennedy offer to President Johnson to refrain from entry into the race in connection with the formation of a panel on which he would serve to revise the government's Vietnam policy, McCarthy said it was a "strange exchange: which needed additional clarification," but that it would "be untenable from any point of view and an insult to the Foreign Relations Committee."85

A character change. The entire character of the McCarthy campaign changed on the day of Kennedy's announcement of candidacy. For one thing, it turned from a battle solely against the Administration into a battle for leadership of the attack on the Administration. Moreover, it assumed the nature of a personal conflict that it had heretofore lacked; as Newsweek reported:

"The coolness between McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy dates back well beyond Bobby's declaration. At the 1960 Democratic convention, McCarthy gave an eloquent nominating speech for Adlai Stevenson, which furious Kennedy strategists interpreted as part of a last-minute effort to stop JFK and throw the nomination to Lyndon Johnson."86

Whatever the history of personal animosity, Kennedy's timing constituted almost a character flaw to McCarthy. Occasionally a humorous side comment assumed significant personal proportions, as when McCarthy

85Ibid.
86Ibid.
made the first of many comparisons of his character and tastes with those of Kennedy: "He plays touch football; I play football. He plays softball; I play baseball. He skates in Rockefeller Center; I play hockey." More seriously, the angered McCarthy reminded various audiences that while he had risked all by entering the New Hampshire primary certain to face defeat, Kennedy had "stood on the mountain lighting signal fires, lighting bonfires and dancing to the light of the moon," but had risked nothing. However, at this point, McCarthy said that he would support Kennedy at the convention if Kennedy were the only alternative to Johnson. Kennedy, in contrast, said that he would have to decide at the time of the convention whether to support Johnson and refused to pledge support for McCarthy.

An issue found. An extremely important result of the New Hampshire Primary was the emergence of the issue of "widespread opposition to United States Military presence in Vietnam." As this analysis has indicated, the actual causes for McCarthy's New Hampshire showing are difficult to assess: the pledge cards had probably kept many Johnson supporters home; "doves" were perhaps more likely to vote;

87Ibid.
89"Serious New Hampshire Madness," Life, 64 (March 22, 1968) p. 56A.
Governor King's offensive personal attacks on McCarthy's character and patriotism may have increased his vote; finally, the Tet offensive was not universally interpreted as a setback of important enough nature to withdraw support by those who had either defended Presidential policy in Vietnam or wanted stronger military response. Whatever the actual causes of McCarthy's vote total, the only cause later attributed to the event was his having shown "how deep the frustration over the President's war policy ran within his own party." More complete presentation of this particular thesis appeared in the July 29 Convention Issue of the Christian Science Monitor:

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, the handsome, 6-foot 3-inch former economics and sociology professor from Minnesota gets most of the credit for rousing the country on the Vietnam issue and launching the Democrats on one of the most topsy-turvy primary seasons ever.

The Senator rode a rising wave of dissent on Vietnam—a wave which broke over the President with a roar following the Communist's terrifying February military offensive that shook every major city in South Vietnam. The offensive came just in time to make people listen to the Senator's message before the first primary March 12 in New Hampshire. John Dillin, quoted immediately above, accurately reflects the view of New Hampshire significance held by many supporters of Johnson, by McCarthy, by many reporters, and by virtually all who were actively

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
opposed to United States participation in the Vietnamese war. Thus the ascribed cause of McCarthy's New Hampshire became exceedingly potent—whether or not it was accurate.

In sum, the March 12 New Hampshire Democratic primary established Eugene McCarthy as an image of respectable dissent and, for a time, increased money available to him as well as campaigners who volunteered to help. The vote demonstrated a significant potential anti-Administration vote within the Democratic party as represented by New Hampshire Democrats. The McCarthy achievement in New Hampshire provided sufficient impetus to Robert Kennedy to feel he must enter the 1968 Presidential Race. Finally, whatever the actual motivation for those New Hampshire citizens who voted for McCarthy, the results of the primary provided the issue which would be called "widespread grass-roots opposition to United States military presence in Vietnam."

THE EFFECT OF KENNEDY ON THE PRESIDENT. Robert Kennedy's entrance into the race posed a very different threat to President Johnson than had McCarthy's:

The airport scenes at Kansas City and Topeka were straight out of 1960: the jumpers jumping, the squealers squealing, the fans clawing for buttons or cuff links or hanks of hair. Some 15,000 students turned out to hear him render, of all things, the annual Alfred M. Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, 20,000 more to cheer a speech at the University of Kansas. They stomped and whooped and chanted,"Bobby! Bobby! Bobby!" And suddenly, it was intoxicatingly possible for Robert F. Kennedy and his promoters
to believe in anything—even his improbably apostate candidacy for Presidency.93

If Senator McCarthy "scared Bobby in"94 the race for the presidency, then the one who eventually "scared" President Johnson out of the race was Robert F. Kennedy of New York.95 McCarthy contrasted his style with that of Kennedy by saying, "I don't want them to scream, I want them to listen. Bobby's campaign is like a grass fire—it will just burn off the surface. Mine is like a fire in a peat bog. It will hold on for six months."96 Staying power could easily be attributed to Senator McCarthy, but one must at the same time attribute more drawing power over larger constituencies to Senator Kennedy and the larger constituencies—blacks, labor, dispossed whites—held the key to President Johnson's success. As is clear throughout the campaign, Senator McCarthy's campaign became stronger and deeper, as a "fire in a peat bog," but it was the immediate impact of Senator Kennedy and evidence of support for him which threatened the President. Senator Kennedy's blanket condemnation of "the way things are" encouraged

95Ibid.
96Ibid., p. 37.
audiences to overlook the dearth of specific proposals. According to *Time* magazine:

To the crowd, however, the words seem not to matter. Just as Bobby draws the same kind of abuse from skeptics that his brother did—charges of arrogance, ruthlessness, opportunism, a lackluster Senate record—he also elicits unstinted adulation from sympathetic audiences. Frequently he hears the war cry, "Sock it to 'em, Bobby!"...and he does.97

Kennedy began his campaign with visits to several college campuses, Alabama, University of Kansas, Kansas State University and Vanderbilt. In terms of his tour goals, to "persuade his party that he is a winner, that LBJ is a loser and McCarthy a gallant irrelevancy,"98 he accomplished what he went to the colleges to do.99 His strategists hoped in the early stages of the race, "to so display Bobby's vote-catching talents that key Democrats around the nation will come out for him—or failing that, at least hold off committing themselves to LBJ."100

Although Senator McCarthy's New Hampshire vote had seriously embarrassed the President, no major pundits were suggesting that the President might not win renomination as long as the candidates were limited to these two. If, however, Senator Kennedy could draw wide

97"Sock It To 'Em," *Time*, April 5, 1968, p. 22.
99Ibid.
100Ibid.
popular personal support, then President Johnson was severely threatened. The President's first direct involvement of major proportions came with his speech to the National Farmers Union convention in Minneapolis March 19. In an attack which had some overtones of earlier argumentation in New Hampshire he concluded his address:

So long as he feels that he can win something by propaganda in the country, that he can undermine its leadership, that he can bring down the government, that he can get something in the capital that he can't get from our men out there, he is going to keep on trying.

But I point out to you that the time has come when we ought to unite. When we ought to stand up and be counted, when we ought to support our leaders, our government, our men, and our allies, until aggression is stopped wherever it has occurred. . .

We don't ask anybody else to surrender. . .but we don't plan to surrender either. We don't plan to pull out either. And we don't plan to let people influence us, pressure us, and force us to divide our nation in a time of national peril. 101

Although the President did not refer to McCarthy or Kennedy by name, his comments surely were relevant to their candidacies, at least to what the writers called, "the momentum of the peace vote in the New Hampshire primary and the candidacy of Senator Kennedy." 102 The particular wording just cited gives good indication of the interpretation placed on the effect of McCarthy's having provided a protest avenue and the more direct challenge posed by Senator Kennedy's continuing candidacy.


102 Ibid.
Further, the intensity of such Presidential appeals concerned some Presidential advisors who considered them to be rhetorical "overkill." The reason for such concern was that, as earlier suggested, most analyses of the New Hampshire primary agreed with Newsweek analysts that the vote there reflected "more of a loss of confidence in the President himself than in his Vietnam policy." Consequently, such attacks could recall for the listener personal attacks on McCarthy's dissent in New Hampshire and risk loss of ethos in defense of a cause which did not need such strenuous defense for the majority of voters.

Although the President did not campaign personally in Wisconsin, his emissaries did appear, occasionally with unfortunate results. Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman was forced to cut short his address of March 21 at the University of Wisconsin in Madison because of continued hissing from the audience. At the same time, Senator McCarthy was receiving a standing ovation at Marquette University in Milwaukee; and although the ecstatic screams of Kennedy crowds were missing, support for McCarthy's dissent was clear.

Unlike New Hampshire, Wisconsin allows crossover voting in Presidential primaries. Each voter is given both Democratic and


Republican ballots as he enters the voting booth, and, of course, there is no way to enforce party loyalty. Voters have one more alternative: under Wisconsin's new primary law, there is also the provision for electors to register a protest by voting for "none of the above." Since Romney had withdrawn from the race on February 28, Nixon's win was assured and a large number of Wisconsin Republican voters were expected to cross over to embarrass President Johnson. Even with the major-name campaigning of Orville Freeman, Vice-President Humphrey (to a crowd of 350), Lawrence O'Brien, and Ramsey Clark, President Johnson had no reason to expect to win the Wisconsin Primary even as he had "won" the New Hampshire primary. More than one analyst suggested that President Johnson might come in second or even third on April 2. Polls reported the week before Wisconsin voting suggested a "smashing victory" for McCarthy. A California poll reported the week before April 1 gave Kennedy 42 per cent of the Democratic vote to 32 per cent for President Johnson and 18 per cent for McCarthy. March 24, the


106Ibid.


Gallup Poll survey indicated that President Johnson had fallen behind Robert Kennedy in the struggle for the support of Democratic voters.\textsuperscript{111} On the same day, however, the \textit{New York Times} survey of Democratic leaders in all fifty states was released. According to this survey, "As Democratic power is now divided, President Johnson can win more than 65 per cent of the votes at his party's national convention, easily turning back the combined forces of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Senator Eugene J. McCarthy."\textsuperscript{112} The President was judged at that time to control 1,725 convention votes to a combined total of 790 for Kennedy and McCarthy.\textsuperscript{113} Two other surveys taken during this time predicted that Johnson would win the Democratic presidential nomination. The Associated Press survey showed only 400 votes as probably anti-Johnson, and further that, while delegate support was sometimes more questionable, a virtual solid front of delegation chairman supported Johnson.\textsuperscript{114} A poll conducted by the Democratic National Committee predicted (under a system of analysis which gave the benefit of every doubtful delegate to Kennedy and McCarthy) that Johnson would receive about 1,500 votes.\textsuperscript{115}


\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.


Since only 1,312 votes were needed to win the nomination, chances were good that whatever the choice of Democratic voters might be, the choice of the Democratic Convention would be President Johnson. The possibility surely existed that convention delegates and chairmen could change their minds about support for the President if Wisconsin proved too embarrassing for him. James Reston reported, "Even many of the potential delegates to the Democratic convention are saying to the Kennedy and McCarthy people: 'We are going along with Johnson for the time being, but we're waiting for Wisconsin and the late polls and then we'll decide.'"\(^{116}\)

Political commentator, Peter Lisagor, provided yet another description of the importance of Wisconsin:

More important than the 50 delegates at stake is the prestige of the President in his renomination bid in Wisconsin. A second display of anti-Johnson sentiment is a real possibility with Republican cross-over votes following McCarthy's near-win in New Hampshire, might create a damaging bandwagon psychology, L.B.J. managers fear.\(^{117}\) Emphasis added.

With steadily increasing division in the Democratic Party and the country and simultaneous increased attention to Wisconsin, the Gallup poll released on the last week in March must have been particularly dispiriting to the President. "Only 36 per cent of those questioned

\(^{116}\) James Reston, "Old Political Pros May Get Hit by a Haymaker, Kansas City Star, p. 27.

\(^{117}\) Peter Lisagor, "L.B.J. May Appear in Person in the Wisconsin Campaign," Kansas City Times, March 20, 1968, p. 28.
approved of his conduct of the presidency (v. 48 per cent in January); only 26 per cent approved of his conduct of the war (v. 39 per cent in January).\textsuperscript{118}

President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 that he would not be a candidate for renomination to the office of President, speaking nineteen days after New Hampshire and two days before the Wisconsin primary. He had announced a major address to the nation for that day and not one major writer predicted the renunciation. Most of his address had been predicted: the decision to halt United States bombing of an area of Vietnam which held 90 per cent of the population of North Vietnam,\textsuperscript{119} a unilateral step toward de-escalation,\textsuperscript{118} an increase in 13,500 men from the United States, major efforts toward re-equipping the South Vietnamese--these decisions may have surprised some writers but had been predicted by several others.\textsuperscript{119} After speaking for thirty-five minutes, however, President Johnson said to those who were still listening:

\ldots There is divisiveness among us all tonight. What we won when all of our people united just must not be lost in suspicion and distrust and selfishness and politics among any of our people. And believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year. With American sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{118}"The Bombing Pause," \textit{Time}, April 5, 1968, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{119}"Bowing Out," \textit{Time}, April 5, 1968, p. 19
\end{flushright}
peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes. Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President. . . .

Thus was changed the entire meaning of Politics—1968. Senator McCarthy had entered the race in order, he said, to move the Administration closer to the McCarthy position on Vietnam. In this, McCarthy had failed: no basic Administration policy or premise change had occurred. President Johnson, unwilling to change a policy in which he profoundly believed, faced a constituency part of which is best described by Mike Royoko one week after the withdrawal:

The white racists, those profoundly ignorant broads who toss eggs at school busses, blamed him for the very existence of the Negro. To them, he was a nigger lover.

The black separatist could find no insult too vile to be used on him. To them he is a white racist. That he launched some of the most ambitious civil rights legislation in the nation's history means nothing in a time when black scholars say Abe Lincoln was the worst kind of bigot.

The Doves portrayed him as engaging in war almost for the fun of it.

And the young... Their collective conscience rebelled against the "unjust" war. So they portrayed him as the eager murderer of babies.

This combined constituency created the possibility that he would be humiliated and rejected even as he sought to reunite them; and this

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121 Mike Royoko, "Maybe He Wasn't the Best, But Were We?" *Los Angeles Times*, April 7, 1968, p. Gl.
possibility ultimately made four more years as President of the United States a goal not worth the seeking to the man who had won the largest landslide in history four years before.

**Wisconsin Primary: April 2, 1968, and Beyond**

April 2 voting in the Wisconsin primary yielded the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATS</th>
<th>REPUBLICANS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarthy</td>
<td>412,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>253,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>46,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>733,002</td>
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George Wallace received a total of 4,616 votes under both Democratic and Republican labels. 123

Whether the President's vote total was higher than it would have been had he remained in the race, we cannot know; surely there was no longer any reason for Republicans to cross-over to humiliate him. It was estimated, however, that 25 per cent of all Republican voters in Wisconsin crossed party lines to vote for McCarthy. 124 Nixon won in all

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congressional districts by wide margins, but his percentage of the total vote cast in both primaries was only 31 per cent—about 2 per cent more than his total vote in 1960.\textsuperscript{125}

McCarthy's ability to draw a significant number of Republican votes was surely noted by Democratic politicians, particularly since Kennedy had not yet demonstrated such ability; in fact a May Nationwide Gallup Poll of 1,033 college students would demonstrate the opposite tendency. Of the total vote, Senator McCarthy won 46 per cent in a three man race, with Kennedy winning 33 per cent, and Vice-President Humphrey gaining 15 per cent. These ratios shifted in a two man vote to 56 per cent for McCarthy and 39 per cent for Kennedy. The second interesting element, relating to Wisconsin results, is that when just the votes of students who described themselves as Democrats were tabulated, Kennedy led with 47 per cent to McCarthy's 36 per cent and Humphrey's 13 per cent.\textsuperscript{126} If then, these students reflected the predictions of their elders, McCarthy would be more effective with the total population than within his own party.

As the Wisconsin vote demonstrated McCarthy's ability to do well with Republican voters, it also demonstrated his inability to capture votes of significant minority blocks. President Johnson won

\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}

his eight delegates by running ahead in the two Milwaukee districts which contained large Polish, Slavic and Negro majorities.\footnote{127}{McCarthy Climbs," Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1968, p. 2.}

Opposition to President Johnson's course in Vietnam had been the focus of the McCarthy campaign and the question arises whether his strong showing can be attributed to the fact that he was the only announced Democratic candidate on the ballot or to support for his position on Vietnam. The Associated Press provided this answer:

That issue was pinpointed in Madison, the university city which was a center of opposition to the war and support for McCarthy. There, a referendum question calling for a cease fire and a U. S. withdrawal was defeated by a margin of 58 per cent to 42 per cent.\footnote{128}{McCarthy, Nixon Primary Winners," Lawrence Daily Journal World, April 3, 1968, p. 1.}

While Kennedy congratulated McCarthy and said that his victory had demonstrated that "there is a good deal of opposition" to the administration position in Vietnam,\footnote{129}{Ibid.} no concrete proof exists of his analysis.

One effect of the President's withdrawal was to diminish the effect of McCarthy's victory. Had McCarthy defeated a fighting president, he would have gone as a much stronger candidate into his Indiana confrontation with Robert Kennedy. McCarthy commented on the effect of Johnson's withdrawal, "I feel as if I'm in a horse race and have
made the turn for home and the other horse has jumped the rail and started eating grass. It makes it a little embarrassing running for the wire alone. "130 Of his coming confrontations with Kennedy, McCarthy told newsmen, "Until Lyndon got out of it, it was like three-cushion billiards. Bobby could hit me only if he banked it off Lyndon. It was a case of who could hit Lyndon most and he seemed to be winning. Now he will have to hit me directly."131 Few other commentators, however, agreed with McCarthy's assessment that he was much stronger for Johnson's having left the race. Carl Rowan suggested:

> It will not be easy for Kennedy to avoid damage from Johnson's implied charge that Kennedy is an overambitious young man who has put his lust for power above his country's future. And it will be virtually impossible for either Kennedy or McCarthy to go on arguing that he wants peace more than Johnson when the latter has made the ultimate political sacrifice in an effort to end the war.132

While Kennedy could suffer if the charge of over-zealous self interest could be made credible--the charge emphasized by Johnson and McCarthy and his supporters--by the same token, Kennedy could not fail to benefit in a two man intra-party struggle in which not Vietnam but rather a wide range of social issues, mass constituencies and party

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funding would determine the victor. Within the week, two events would transpire to broaden the campaign in just this manner. Even before these events though, of the commentators researched, only Carl Rowan and Roscoe Drummond saw Kennedy as weaker because of Johnson's withdrawal. Drummond opined, "With his name, money, and organization Kennedy will make a formidable bid for the nomination. But if Vietnam becomes a muted issue--as it well may--it wouldn't be surprising to see McCarthy delegates turn to Humphrey rather than Bobby." More commentators, however, agreed with Richard Strout, "The race between them now intensifies with considerable advantages thought to be with Senator Kennedy because of his better organization, longer purse, and family name." Jack Bell, even before the Wisconsin results, predicted:

McCarthy will get a satisfying boost by winning Wisconsin's presidential primary tomorrow after the President's default. But once the balloting is over, some Wisconsin leaders of the Johnson and McCarthy organizations may swing quickly to Kennedy.

The Minnesota senator is spending all that comes in on winning primaries while Kennedy's unlimited financial resources are pointed at the selection of delegates at state conventions, where the nomination demonstratedly is won or lost.


The United Press International temporized, saying,

In any conventional reading of the political outlook, Kennedy would be favored over McCarthy in future primaries because of his access to greater resources in money and organization. But McCarthy so far this year has torn apart the conventional rules of politics with his ragtag army of amateurs and student volunteers.¹³⁶

Early predictions had been that if McCarthy secured a miniscule vote in New Hampshire and Wisconsin, funds would begin to diminish as would volunteer help and any further race would be one of futile principle.¹³⁷ In addition, as McCarthy was required by Johnson's withdrawal to turn and face a powerful Robert Kennedy, fear was felt "that the pull-out would prompt a mad dash for the Kennedy camp."¹³⁸ Neither event occurred. Senator McCarthy had secured a large vote that might have been just as large if the President had remained in competition. He had secured significant support among Republican party members and felt no immediate loss of funds or volunteer help to Kennedy. In a year as surprising as 1968 had already become, who could blame the reluctance of Democrats to move in any direction? "There should be no headlong rush to anyone's bandwagon," advised New Jersey's Governor Richard Hughes—and most politicians heeded him.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Ibid.
THREE EVENTS WHICH CHANGED THE ENTIRE CAMPAIGN. Three events occurred that transported the McCarthy campaign to a much different perspective than it had held before within one week.

The President's withdrawal. First President Johnson had announced that he would not be a candidate for renomination for reasons outlined above. This announcement had confirmed the transformation of "Politics--1968" into "the old politics, pretty much" which McCarthy saw as having begun with the entrance of Kennedy into the campaign. McCarthy recalled the transformation, "It wasn't really the challenge to the Johnson position. It got into the question of 'what's your record on civil rights, ... and all these other side issues that Bobby introduced.'"

Hanoi's announcement. On April 3, four days after the President's decision to limit air and naval attacks on North Vietnam, Hanoi broadcasted its willingness to meet with United States representatives for the first time in the lengthy conflict. While the major portion of the monitored broadcast was devoted to attacking United States' imperialism, and a restatement of previous North Vietnamese demands, major emphasis was given in the United States to the willingness of


141Ibid.

North Vietnam to negotiate. Ensuing events would show that this announced willingness to talk did not by any means indicate that the battle would soon be over. As an issue in the minds of voters who were comparing presently announced candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination, however, Vietnam was probably less a consideration even than it had been before.

The murder of Dr. Martin Luther King: April 4, 1968. A man who registered at his rooming house as John Willard shot and killed Dr. Martin Luther King on April 4, 1968. Dr. King had participated in the strike of Memphis, Tennessee, garbage collectors for several weeks previously. Two weeks before his murder, a march in which he had participated had become a riot of minor proportions and he had wanted to leave the conflict as the men had left his principles. He had been persuaded to stay, however, and was murdered by a white man. Martin Luther King had himself described the manner of moral leadership which alone could lead to a peaceful land:

We will match your capacity to inflict suffering with our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. We will not hate you, but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws. We will soon wear you down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our freedom, we will so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win you in the process.

143 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
As he described the course of protest for his followers, he provided some insight into the level of appeal needed for one who would bring peace—no legalistic concept of just distribution of powers and rights but rather one seen to have "soul force," one who could appeal to "heart and conscience." Candidate response to the rending loss of Dr. King is illuminating. Vice-President Humphrey, who would announce his candidacy on April 27, issued a statement expressing profound sorrow and the feeling that the assassination "brings shame to our country. An apostle of nonviolence has been the victim of violence." President Johnson addressed a nationwide television audience:

America is shocked and saddened by the brutal slaying tonight of Dr. Martin Luther King.

I ask every citizen to reject the blind violence that has struck Dr. King who lived by nonviolence.

I pray that his family can find comfort in the memory of all he tried to do for the land he loved so well. I have just conveyed the sympathy of Mrs. Johnson and myself to his wife, Mrs. King.

I know that every American of good will joins me in mourning the death of this outstanding leader and in praying for peace and understanding throughout the land.

We can achieve nothing by lawlessness and divisiveness among the American people. It is only by joining together and working together that we can continue to move toward equality and fulfillment for all of our people.

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I hope that all Americans tonight will search their hearts as they ponder this most tragic incident.

I have canceled my plans for the evening. I am postponing my trip to Hawaii until Friday.

Thank you.\textsuperscript{148}

The above statement is quoted in full because it epitomizes the well meant, honestly felt expression of grief expressed by white men throughout the country. A relevant question arises however as to whether the statement indicates the quality referred to above by Dr. King when he spoke of "soul force."

Senator McCarthy heard of the death of Dr. King as he was meeting with labor leaders in San Francisco. The Associated Press commented: "He immediately asked for a moment of silence, then went to his room where he drafted a statement saying that 'all people, especially Americans, have lost a man of peace,'"\textsuperscript{149} His reaction was one of intensely felt internalized grief. An aide said McCarthy was emotionally distraught when he visited Head Start and day-care centers in the Compton area the day after the King murder.\textsuperscript{150}

Representative portions of his address at one such center follow:

\begin{quote}
Thank you for the introduction and let me thank you also for having invited the people of this area to come to meet
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{149}"Shot Kills Martin Luther King," \textit{Kansas City Times}, April 5, 1968, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{150}Nicholas Thimmesch, "Clean Gene," \textit{West} magazine of the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, May 12, 1968, p. 12.
with me and listen to me here today. Let me say that I was particularly pleased to have visited this Head Start Project for a number of reasons. One, because of the great work it is doing, but also because as members of the Congress we know that the Head Start Program is the one program which is universally approved. It is not very often that you find a government program which is approved by everyone.

I want to speak to you this afternoon particularly with reference to Martin Luther King and what he has meant to America, and what he must continue to mean to America as we make new resolutions following his assassination.

I first met Martin Luther King when he led the great march in Washington before we passed the first Civil Rights Bill. . . At that time we were talking about a set of civil rights which were clearly guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. . .

But he realized after that was over. . . that we had to develop . . . a whole new set of civil rights. . . And this, in his mind led to the development of a new set of civil rights, including the right to a decent job becoming the dignity of a man, a job which returned him an income with which he could support his family with decency and with dignity.

He said that all Americans have the right to health. . .

. . . he said that every American has the right. . . to the kind of education which is needed by that person to develop his full potential. . .

The fourth and final one, and most important, is the right to a . . . house in a neighborhood which is part of a community which is part of the United States of America.

This was the second dream of Martin Luther King. . . His assassination does not in any way weaken or lessen the importance of his goals. But what it does is to force all of us who have participated in some degree—not with the same understanding that he had, and not with the same dedication that he had, and not with the same total commitment and the same courage, perhaps, but at least in some measure we can take heart from his leadership.

Now that he has been assassinated in the pursuit of this cause, we can resolve even more strongly to dedicate ourselves to the end that equality may become something more than just a word that we use in America, but that it may become a genuine
reality. The good life and the promise of happiness for all Americans may be brought much closer to realization because of his service, because of his life, and also, now, because of his death.151

The address quoted above is a well constructed, closely reasoned, practical attempt to utilize the occasion of the death of a great leader to draw attention to the needs of the people left bereft by that leader's death. Nicholas Thimmesch reported that McCarthy was quite private about the King death. "Men grieve in different ways." Thimmesch said.152 Mrs. McCarthy, a long time friend of Mrs. King, flew immediately to Atlanta to be with her and help her in any way she could.153 Initially, Senator McCarthy did not plan to attend the funeral because he "felt he just didn't know King that well. When it was evident that the King funeral became a 'must' for politicians, McCarthy agreed to go."154 In order for the effect of Dr. King's assassination on the campaign to become more clear, the honest, apolitical response that was "quite private" and quietly articulated by Senator McCarthy needs to be contrasted with the instinctive response of Senator Kennedy. Told of the assassination of Dr. King as he reached Indianapolis, Kennedy went immediately to a

151 Transcript of Remarks from Senator McCarthy's office.

152 Nicholas Thimmesch, p. 12.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.
rally scheduled earlier. He gave first word of the tragedy to most of the predominantly Negro crowd. He spoke instinctively and honestly to a sad and bewildered group of people who had come to celebrate the opening of his new headquarters:

... For those of you who are black considering the evidence that they were white people who were responsible, you can be filled with bitterness, with hatred, and a desire for revenge. We can move in that direction as a country, in a great polarization—black people amongst black, white people amongst white, filled with hatred toward one another.

Or we can make an effort, as Martin Luther King did, to understand and to comprehend, and to replace that violence—that stain of bloodshed—that has spread across our land, with an effort to understand, with compassion, and love.

For those of you who are black and are tempted to be filled with hatred and distrust at the injustice of such an act, against all white people, I can only say that I feel in my own heart, the same kind of feeling.

I had a member of my family killed, but he was killed by a white man. But we have to make an effort in the United States—we have to make an effort to understand, to go beyond these rather difficult times.

He quoted from Aeschylus,

Even in our sleep pain which cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the heart until, in our despair, against our will, comes wisdom through the awful grace of God.

So I shall ask you tonight to return home and say a prayer for the family of Martin Luther King, that's true—but more

importantly to say a prayer for our country, which all of us love—a prayer for understanding and that compassion of which I spoke.

... ... ... ... ...

Let us dedicate ourselves to what the Greeks wrote so many years ago: "to tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of this world."

Let us dedicate ourselves to that and say a prayer for our country, for our people.156

After speaking with the crowd, Senator Kennedy cancelled all speeches for the weekend except one in Cleveland that was to deal with the crisis of violence in America.157 He telephoned Mrs. King and arranged for an airplane to take her from Atlanta to Memphis and then to return to Atlanta with her husband's body just as his brother had telephoned Mrs. King in 1960 when Dr. King had been jailed in Birmingham.158

Perhaps these comparative responses are questions of style; they nevertheless become crucial to events if leadership style developed as it then did into the major campaign issue between Senator Kennedy and Senator McCarthy. Given a decreased emphasis on the issue of Vietnam after the President's withdrawal and the increase in importance of race relations as emphasized by the murder of Dr. King and the ensuing riots and deaths, demonstrated leadership style could become the all

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
important determinant. Surely both men responded honestly and instinctively—Senator McCarthy into private grief, withdrawal from activity, then into reasoned discourse, and Senator Kennedy to visible leadership, active participation in the events to come, and impassioned discourse with diverse elements of a troubled populace. The death of Dr. King provided the opportunity for both men to demonstrate their leadership tendencies and by so doing provided perhaps the strongest comparison of the two men afforded by the entire campaign.

PRELIMINARY TO INDIANA; PENNSYLVANIA, HUMPHREY, POLITICAL SHUFFLING, MASSACHUSETTS. Before the May 7 Indiana primary, two victories occurred that could, it was hoped, provide a psychological advantage in the coming major contest. Pennsylvania might almost be called a no-primary primary. The vote is not binding on any delegate and the delegates are not designated by candidate affiliation. In 1960, all votes in the Pennsylvania primary were written in and President Johnson won 209,606 of the total 253,223 Democratic votes cast. McCarthy was the only nominee named on the 1968 ballot so his victory was not surprising. His total, however, was over 350,000—more than

161 Ibid.
the total of Democratic votes cast four years earlier.\textsuperscript{162} Robert Kennedy did campaign actively for write-in votes but was defeated by a margin of seven to one. Vice-President Humphrey who had not yet announced his candidacy garnered only one vote for every ten given McCarthy.\textsuperscript{164} While the winner was no surprise in Pennsylvania, his margin was worthy of note, as was his total number of votes.

Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey announced himself a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination April 27.\textsuperscript{165} Since the President's withdrawal, Humphrey's announcement had been expected, and on April 12 United Democrats for Humphrey had been formed with former president Harry S. Truman as honorary chairman.\textsuperscript{166} Humphrey's announcement of candidacy included a refusal to repudiate past actions of the Johnson administration and a promise to make unity in the country his fundamental goal.\textsuperscript{167} During the campaign, McCarthy's response to a possible Humphrey candidacy was to call it irrelevant, "It might give some people like labor leaders a place to hide for a while, but it won't

\begin{footnotes}
\item[163] Ibid.
\item[164] Ibid.
\item[165] "Unity is Hubert Theme," \textit{Kansas City Star}, April 27, 1968, p. 1.
\item[166] "Truman is Honorary Chairman of Democrats for Humphrey, Lawrence Daily Journal World, April 12, 1968.
\item[167] "Unity is Hubert Theme," p. 1.
\end{footnotes}
make much difference one way or the other." Later though, Senator McCarthy told a different story; on December 15, 1968, Senator McCarthy said in an interview for the Boston Globe, "I thought the minute Bobby came into the primaries that it was going to be Humphrey." Perhaps his statement is exaggerated because at the time Senator Kennedy became a candidate the President had not withdrawn and McCarthy had said he was surprised at the withdrawal when it did occur. At any rate, Humphrey's entrance was no surprise. Of ninety-one key Democrats queried the week of April 23, 70 per cent supported the Vice President and only 10 per cent said they supported Senator Kennedy. Significantly only 2 per cent of the leaders asked said they supported Senator McCarthy. Of the same sample, another 2 per cent supported George Wallace.

Nelson Rockefeller entered the contest for the Republican presidential nomination on April 30, forty days after he had surprised his backers with the announcement that he would not be a candidate this time. Since Romney's withdrawal, Richard Nixon had been unopposed and Rockefeller said that he had been profoundly disturbed by the events

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169 "Party Nomination Was Never Within Reach, Says McCarthy," p. 16A.


171 Ibid.

of the four weeks before his announcement, including, of course, the assassination of Dr. King. Edward Brooke joined Senator Thruston Morton, Senator Hugh Scott, Representative William E. Miller, Leonard W. Hall and Meade Alcorn in a demonstration of support for the Rockefeller bid.173

The Massachusetts primary of April 30 provided McCarthy with seventy-two first ballot votes at the Democratic National Convention. Long before his withdrawal from the race, President Johnson had given the McCarthy campaign a publicity boost by waiting until seventeen minutes before the filing deadline to announce that he would not allow his name to be placed on the ballot in Massachusetts.174 For a time, supporters of Senator Kennedy, led by Kenneth O'Donnel, considered mounting a write-in campaign in order that Massachusetts delegates would be in a position to vote for Senator Kennedy on the first ballot if, as they then supposed, the "battle will be over on the first ballot, if the tide runs strongly in the Kennedy direction."175 Since over thirty Massachusetts communities, including Boston and several other large cities, used voting machines and a write-in campaign was therefore particularly difficult, the Kennedy supporters ultimately decided to forgo the effort.176 As a

173 Ibid.


result of this Kennedy decision, McCarthy won the Massachusetts primary by gaining 49 per cent of the vote to Kennedy's 28 per cent and Humphrey's 18 per cent. The President was given 3 per cent, an amount which becomes significant only if one adds Humphrey's vote and sees Administration support of just over 50,000 votes or only 21 per cent. Senators Kennedy and McCarthy polled over 190,000 votes or 77 per cent of the total. 177

Indiana Primary: May 7, 1968

As the candidates entered the month of May and approached the crucial Indiana primary, their first direct confrontation, they faced a different race than they had before the formal entrance of Vice-President Humphrey. The effect of Rockefeller's entrance was still to be determined—what would his effect be on independent voting? That question, however, did not affect Indiana; no write-ins were allowed and Nixon would be the Republican winner. The outcome of interest was in the three way race between Senators McCarthy, Kennedy, and Indiana's governor, Roger D. Branigin.

One of several poems by Senator McCarthy described Indiana as a "place of good and bad signs." "This is a kind of crazy state, you know. The people don't like to tell you what they think and it's a place with no form, no borders. To reach Indianans on TV, you have to buy time in Chicago or Louisville."¹ The confrontation between Kennedy and McCarthy, which had been hoped for earlier, was changed in character by the decision of Governor Roger Branigin to remain in the primary race. Originally a

stand-in for President Johnson, the governor decided not to bow out when the President did and to run instead as a bona fide favorite son in order, he said, to derive the bargaining power a state such as Indiana deserved.² Branigan had won his 1964 election by the largest vote margin in Indiana history; and since under Indiana law he could not succeed himself, he had nothing to lose by vying for the position of favorite son.³ Branigin, indeed, provided a view of all Indiana, "an instrutable and frustrating place for all of the out of state candidates. Hoosiers are closemouthed, provincial and suspicious of outsiders."⁴ According to Lucia Mouat of the Christian Science Monitor, until Humphrey's entrance, Branigin's candidacy served as a place for Democrats to go "when they don't want Kennedy or don't want to decide just yet. Things have happened so fast that this is an effort to 'Save your powder, boys, until you see the whites of their eyes.'"⁵ After Humphrey entered, it was assumed that Branigin, should he win, would give his votes to the Vice President, but Branigin argued that he was a stand-in for no man. He chose to run a deliberately provincial, Indiana-for-the-Hoosiers campaign with the basic thesis that the primary should

³Ibid.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Alexander, p. 77.
not decide whom Indiana Democrats want for President but whom they want to do their presidential bargaining for them.\textsuperscript{6} Below are typical Branigin statements of the issue in Indiana as he saw it:

I personally think Indiana is a great state, but the state is so great we don't dare let an outsider represent us at the convention. I believe that only a Hoosier can express a Hoosier's view at the Democratic national convention. \textsuperscript{7}

Hell, yes, I'm serious, I want to make Indiana more effective. We have not been as effective a force in National politics as 63 convention votes and a 5,000,000 population should dictate.\textsuperscript{8}

They (Kennedy and McCarthy) are tourists in Indiana, and should be treated as such. We don't mind them having a fight here, but we don't want them to carry away the arena.\textsuperscript{9}

I really don't think they (Kennedys) can buy Indiana, but they're going to try. I've heard that the Kennedys paid $2,000,000 more for West Virginia than Thomas Jefferson paid for the entire Louisiana purchase ($15,000,000).\textsuperscript{10}

His essential argument against the two candidates who contested him were that they were the "outlanders" of the "foreign invaders."\textsuperscript{11}

Kennedy was urged to refrain from entering the Indiana race by all leading Indiana advisors. Indiana men felt that Branigin's organization, one of the "most disciplined, tightly knit state party


\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{8}"The Hoosier Plank," \textit{Time}, April 26, 1968, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{9}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{11}Alexander, p. 77.
organizations in the country," could dispose of Senator McCarthy without any trouble,\textsuperscript{12} and Kennedy could then move to Oregon and California having avoided possible embarrassment from Branigin.\textsuperscript{13} The state had not been good to John Kennedy in 1960 when he netted only nine of the state's ninety-two counties as support.\textsuperscript{14} Even as Branigin compared Indiana, 1968, to the Kennedy effort in West Virginia in 1960, advisors to Bobby Kennedy accepted some similarities:

\ldots the Indiana gamble typifies the audacity with which the Kennedys have always played politics and exactly duplicates the gamble taken by John F. Kennedy in West Virginia in 1960. By running in a state where the cards seem all stacked against him, Bobby Kennedy risks disaster in search of a win that might start the bandwagon moving.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as John Kennedy had faced a theoretically antagonistic voting population in West Virginia, Robert Kennedy would face this constituency:

The majority of the million Democrats in Indiana tend to fit in one or more of these categories: Organization-oriented, Conservative, Hawkish on Vietnam, Southern in outlook, Rural or resentful of Negro social and political advances.

None of these groups would appear to offer much encouragement to either Kennedy or McCarthy. \ldots \textsuperscript{16}

Kennedy's hopes depended on his ability to build from his solid backing among Negro voters, less than 10 per cent of the population total, and

\textsuperscript{12}Mouat, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{14}Mouat, p. 1.


organized labor. To be successful, he would have to attract the votes of those who were by no means his "philosophical kinfolk," and he would have to do so by getting concrete proof of his stature as a national celebrity with "star quality." As the campaign developed, it appeared that Kennedy did have this "star quality." His crowds continued large and enthusiastic up until the very end of the campaign. Kokomo provided one comparison of the drawing abilities of Kennedy and McCarthy because McCarthy appeared only two days after Kennedy. In his outdoor appearance in Kokomo, Kennedy drew between three and four thousand people while McCarthy was able to attract only "a couple of hundred, mainly youngsters."  

Both McCarthy and Kennedy were critized for handling issues in too cavalier a fashion. Kennedy, according to Time magazine, failed to:

- . . win any points for statesmanship when he carped that the Administration's delay over settling on a peace negotiation site was "unforgivable." Bobby repeated the simplistic notion that an end to the war would overnight redirect billions from military expenditures into urban programs.

Furthermore, Kennedy was forced to admit that twenty Senate employees working for himself and his brother on the United States payroll were engaged in campaign activities.

McCarthy probably did not win any new support with his statements that seemed to be casual and "off-the-cuff," that the

18 "Quicken'ng Passions," Time, April 26, 1968, p. 22.
19 Ibid.
United States as a "number one power" ought to "expect once in a while to pay ransom," with reference to the captured ship Pueblo. 20 Again, new support was probably not won with statements that Dean Rusk should be fired as Secretary of State and replaced with Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. 21 McCarthy was also quite adamant that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover should be retired because "a police agency in a democracy ought not be kept under the control largely of one man to a point where it develops to a kind of fief really, which is somewhat beyond criticism and outside judgment." 22 If his wish was to strengthen the dedication of already won followers, McCarthy, perhaps, did not err in making such statements. If he planned to increase his vote in Indiana among the population elements described above, his strategy would be found lacking.

McCarthy support among the students continued strong, with a nationwide survey of over one million college students awarding him 285,988 votes to 213,832 votes for Kennedy in April 24 balloting in 1,207 colleges. 23 Significantly, computer analysis of the ballots that had included several policy questions showed students voting in opposition to present U. S. war policy made up 85 per cent of McCarthy's


22 Ibid.

23 "Campus Votes to M'Carthy," Kansas City Times, April 4, 1968, p. 3.
strength and only two-thirds of Kennedy's. If his goal was to win the primaries, McCarthy would clearly have to "look at the world through a wider-angle lens" than his original anti-Administration position had dictated. He would have to include an ever more diverse population in his plans just as Kennedy was doing in Indiana. Kennedy drew "vast crowds"—"tidal waves" of enthusiastic people while Philip Kunhardt reported in Life that McCarthy was:

... often late for scheduled appearances—simply because he takes his time about things. Two days before the Indiana primary, even though he was running very late, he stopped his cavalcade to share sandwiches with those in a little country park and bat a few baseballs. Later he skipped an appearance at a South Bend supermarket where advance men had rounded up the largest crowd of the day.

On a stop in South Bend's Negro district, McCarthy stepped out of his car, was pushed around for a few minutes in the crowd, didn't like it much and got out of there as soon as possible.

So much for an enlarged constituency.

Two other factors affected the Indiana race. One was the concerted effort by Branigin and all other Kennedy opponents to lure a large crossover vote. The Indianapolis Star was one leader in such a campaign with directives to vote for either Branigin or McCarthy, and substantial numbers of Republicans were expected to cast Democratic

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24 Ibid.


ballots in order to harm a man they perceived to be their toughest opponent.28

Secondly, McCarthy had depended for most of his workers on the same group of young college students whose efforts had paid such dividends in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. As the Indiana primary approached, many of his student volunteers who had been engaged in door-to-door canvassing had to return home to study for final examinations.29

Branigin had initially been expected to win the primary race without too much difficulty as he concentrated his efforts on small towns throughout the state, depending on his tight party structure to deliver enough votes from the major cities.30 As the primary neared, however, predictions changed as it became clear that Kennedy was achieving success even in the small towns and rural areas.31

The later predictions proved correct on May 7. Robert Kennedy won 42 per cent of the total vote which when combined with McCarthy's 27 per cent constituted 530,000 votes. Branigin polled 234,000 votes for a personal showing of 31 per cent. McCarthy did place third


30Mouat, p. 1.

as predicted, but claimed to be satisfied with his total, because it was more than any poll had predicted and 7 per cent more than he had said would satisfy him before the primary.  

Newsweek reported one typical poll of the two weeks before the primary that gave Kennedy 45 per cent of the vote to Branigin's 28 per cent and McCarthy's 19 per cent. Further cause for McCarthy calm lay in the reports that he would have received a large percentage of the votes that went to Branigan, had it been a straight two-man race. According to Tom Wicker's analysis:

... both were considered strong in rural areas and among more conservative Democrats.

By running almost as well as Branigin, a popular governor who had been at one point regarded as a possible winner here, and by staying reasonably close to Kennedy, McCarthy showed that he was more than a one-issue candidate or the beneficiary of an anti-Johnson, anti-Vietnam war sentiment.

Kennedy ran well, although his 42 per cent of the vote was not big enough to smash McCarthy's candidacy...

The combined McCarthy-Branigin vote, 57 per cent of the total, added up to a considerable anti-Kennedy vote. Moreover, the size of Nixon's total indicated that there had been little Republican "cross-over." Thus the Democratic primary was fought mainly among Democrats.

In other words, the results in Indiana could be considered a 42 per cent victory for Senator Kennedy or a 27 per cent victory for Senator McCarthy depending on the predilections of the analyst.

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33 "Kennedy and Mac Enter Last Week of Indiana Bout," Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1968, p. 16.
34 Wicker, p. 24.
Nebraska Primary: May 14, 1968

The first primary limited to Kennedy and McCarty came exactly one week after Indiana in Nebraska. Both candidates spent almost all of the week between primaries in Nebraska crisscrossing the state by car and plane.

Few issues had developed as matters of contest between them, the chief ones being the timing of Kennedy's entrance into the race--"you ought to pass a judgment on candidates who won't run in cold weather primaries"--and Kennedy's refusal to debate McCarty, "I sought one in Indiana and offered to meet him at high noon in Scottsbluff. I said I was prepared to come alone." McCarty, argued McCarty, "should be questioned about his refusal to debate since public debate is in the tradition of his family." A third issue that disturbed McCarty considerably was the rumored use of McCarty's attendance record in the Senate as a reason to vote against him. On one occasion, McCarty called a news conference specifically to attack the rumored practice of Kennedy supporters and to compare his own attendance record with that of Robert Kennedy and John Kennedy during their Senate terms (John's 60 per cent, Robert's 80 per cent and McCarthy's 79 per cent). Further, on Election day, McCarthy supporters paid for a full page ad in the


36Ibid.

37Ibid.
Omaha World Herald, "A MESSAGE TO THE CITIZENS OF NEBRASKA" which began, "Some Voters in Omaha have been told that Senator McCarthy has a poor attendance record in the Senate."38 One-half of the entire page was devoted to the charge. Such emphasis was justified by McCarthy aids because, they said, approximately 20 per cent of those who told canvassers they would not vote for McCarthy expressed concern about his attendance record.39 This particular issue still concerned McCarthy seven months later in December, when he referred again to "the old politics," "it wasn't really the challenge to the Johnson position. It got into the question of 'what's your record on civil rights,' and 'why is your attendance record bad' and all those other side issues that Bobby introduced."40 Two other issues were raised by McCarthy as he battled Kennedy. One was McCarthy's "rumored" support of the guaranteed annual income--not a popular position among Nebraska voters. The rumor drew angry denials: "This concept is completely inconsistent with the Senator's position. . ."41 The second issue was the comparative ability of the two men to deal with farm problems. McCarthy argued that Kennedy did not deserve support of the people of Nebraska since he "supported


40 "Party Nomination Never Within Reach," p. 16A.

41 "A MESSAGE TO THE CITIZENS OF NEBRASKA."
quotas for textiles, which affect the eastern part of the nation, but opposes quotas on meat imports, an issue vital to Nebraska."42

Among those who campaigned for Senator McCarthy in Nebraska was television personality, Garry Moore, who characterized Senator Kennedy as "gutless," with "borrowed courage to satisfy a family yen," attempting to "perpetuate the sad misjudgment" of recent administrations.43 Moore contrasted the previously characterized Kennedy with a McCarthy who "tried to get someone else to do it," "went because he thought he ought to," and found he had "people power." Finally, he spoke of McCarthy's contribution to Moore personally as he described McCarthy's ability to bridge the gap between generations, "I feel very grateful to him for giving me my sons back. He gives us the chance for a decent future—and decency is something we've been short of."44

Frank McCarthy, the Senator's cousin, was one of several family members who spent several days in Nebraska, driving from small town to small town. At each stop, he walked from store to store, introducing himself and emphasizing his cousin's "close identification with farmers, having been reared in the rural community of Watkins, Minnesota."45 Occasionally these storekeepers had become incredibly jaded, making


43Speech at Pershing College, Beatrice, Nebraska, May 8, 1968, from personal notes.

44Ibid.

statements such as, "I don't mind shaking your hand. So far this week, Patricia Lawford, John Glenn and Robert Kennedy have been right here in this store and I shook all of their hands, too!" Surely these rural storekeepers had never before been subjected to so many visitors asking how they would have voted had they not been Republicans.

As in each primary, student volunteers came from all over the country to assist in the McCarthy campaign and they gained considerable publicity for their candidate. He had predicted in April that some 5,000 students would be assisting his campaign.46 Dan Schlitt, recruiting canvassers at the University of Kansas in April, predicted that students would contribute a total of 4,000 weekends on McCarthy's behalf in Nebraska.47 The recruitment speeches again stressed personality differences between Kennedy and McCarthy, with the Minnesota challenger described as ideologically committed and a political-social theorist, and Kennedy described as uncommitted, with a "lawyer mentality" that would probably move "quickly to the right" if McCarthy could be disposed of before the Convention.48 The work and style of these students who did work so devotedly for McCarthy will be detailed in another segment of this paper; the salient factor to present considerations is that


47Address by Dan Schlitt at the University of Kansas, April 17, 1968, from personal notes.

48Address by Dr. Louis Douglas at University of Kansas, April 17, 1968, from personal notes.
fewer students came than had been expected. David Evans, the twenty-six year old state McCarthy campaign director, admitted, "the student turnout of some 3,000 canvassers in the last four weeks was only half the number sought."49

Crowd size constitutes another factor worthy of note. Kennedy consistently drew crowds that were much larger and heterogeneous than McCarthy's crowds:

Everywhere he has gone the crowds with a beautifully organized and efficient network of advance men paving the way, have been large. In the rural areas as well as in the cities the turnouts have been good...  

McCarthy, conversely, with poor advance work and quixotic scheduling has spoken to comparatively small crowds almost everywhere he has been on his four trips to the state.50

Some specific comparisons are possible when candidates visited the same or similar towns within a few days of each other and selected instances include:51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Reported McCarthy Crowd Size</th>
<th>Reported Kennedy Crowd Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beatrice</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creighton University</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCook</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Omaha (ghetto included)</td>
<td>&quot;several dozen&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;several thousand&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilbur (pop. 1,360)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crete (unscheduled)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings</td>
<td>under 2,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska City</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>&quot;Considerably larger&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 Michael J. Kelley, "Looking to Nebraska," Kansas City Star, April 12, 1968, p. 18A.

50 Ibid.

Their final addresses of the campaign dealt with two issues of central importance to them. McCarthy's final speech centered almost entirely on the war in Vietnam and United States foreign policy. Kennedy's last speeches and major advertisements stressed his interest in and ability to facilitate better relationships among men, particularly among races. 52

Both men approached May 14 with face-saving predictions. Kennedy said that he could not possibly win 50 per cent of the vote and McCarthy said that he would be happy with anything over his 27 per cent accumulation in Indiana. McCarthy further maintained that any Humphrey write-in votes or any votes for President Johnson would come from his, rather than Kennedy's sources of strength. 53 He did not explain this judgment.

Nebraska's May 14 primary proved to be perhaps the most disappointing for McCarthy of all the primaries. Considered a fair indication of 1968 farm belt sentiment, 54 the Nebraska race could have provided support for McCarthy's argument that Kennedy could not unite many segments of the national constituency and that he himself could more effectively enhance reconciliation of population sub-groups. The election results presented a different story. Kennedy won the primary handily with 52 per cent of the vote. McCarthy did exceed his Indiana percentage with

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54 Ibid.
31 per cent of the vote but the distribution of Kennedy's vote told an entirely dispiriting story to McCarthy strategists. Kennedy, as expected, had achieved great success in blue-collar, low income districts and in Omaha's Negro precincts, which he carried by a 10-to-1 margin. Notably, however, Kennedy also achieved major success in rural areas where he had campaigned. He won eighty-eight of the state's ninety-three counties and carried Cedar County, wholly rural, by a 6-to-1 majority.55 McCarthy, as expected, made his strongest showing in Lincoln, location of the state university.56

The strongest indication of Kennedy strength in Nebraska came with delegate election. On the elaborate ballot presented to Nebraska voters, was the direction to select twenty-eight delegates, the other two of Nebraska's allotted thirty being allotted by law to the Democratic National Committeeman and Committeewoman. One hundred and two delegates filed for election and, of these, forty-two were pledged to President Johnson, twenty-nine ran as uncommitted, and McCarthy had a slate of thirty-one.57 Even though 1) almost no cancelling out was done with votes for McCarthy delegates, since only thirty-one people were contesting for the twenty-eight seats, and even though 2) voters who wished to vote

56 Ibid.
for Kennedy delegates had to cut a list from the newspaper ads and take them to the polls or take their chances with uncommitted candidates, only three McCarthy delegates were chosen. Kennedy far surpassed that record under considerably more difficult conditions. In short, nothing at all about the Nebraska primary could have given any comfort to Senator McCarthy.

When Kennedy said after the results were in that he wanted the McCarthy forces to join with him for the balance of the pre-convention campaign, McCarthy suggested that Kennedy was not clear about his intention—presumably whether Kennedy wished to campaign for the first or second position on a Democratic ticket. Further, McCarthy sharply denied any intention to withdraw and said, "We'll go on to Oregon as we've planned and also to California."59

Oregon Primary: May 28, 1968

With most writers now assuming the major Democratic combatants to be Humphrey and Kennedy, the focus of attention shifted to the West Coast for the Oregon Primary on May 28 and the California primary on June 4. By this time, supporters of Vice President Humphrey claimed that their candidate had won seven state convention victories in a row and now controlled approximately eleven hundred convention


59 "Kennedy Triumph," Los Angeles Times, p. 3.
delegates of the 1,312 needed. Convention pledged delegates included 169 delegates from Arizona, Alaska, Maryland, Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming and Hawaii. The importance of Oregon and California becomes clear if note is taken of the fact that Humphrey continued to rise in the public opinion polls even in light of the continuing Kennedy primary victories. The May 12 Gallup Poll indicated that, against Nixon, Humphrey would win 36 per cent of the vote; Kennedy, 32 per cent; and McCarthy, 31 per cent. Against Rockefeller, Humphrey would win 33 per cent; McCarthy, 31 per cent; and Kennedy 28 per cent. Clearly, Humphrey's popularity was not decreasing as the primaries that he had not entered continued to provide his opponents with the opportunity to attack and weaken each other. Just as clearly, McCarthy was continuing to rise in the opinion polls even as he continued to lose to Senator Kennedy in the primaries. Both Kennedy and McCarthy, then recognized the cruciality of California, and from the start had maintained that it was the most important of the primaries. Since Oregon results could very well influence California voters, the earlier primary assumed considerable importance.

Oregon, an overwhelmingly white, middle-class state with no


substantial minority blocs, gave Eugene McCarthy his sole primary victory. After the Nebraska primary, Kennedy had been confident of victory in Oregon and told one correspondent that he considered McCarthy merely a foil for his own continued success, "I'd be in real trouble if he got out." One week before the Oregon primary Kennedy was "so sure of himself that he said publicly: 'If I get beaten in a primary, then I'm not a very viable candidate." The National Broadcasting Company released a poll taken by Oliver Quvale the week before Oregon voting that showed Kennedy beating McCarthy by 34 per cent to 32 per cent; Hubert Humphrey received a predicted 10 per cent, even though his votes would have to be written in, and President Johnson was given 9 per cent of the total. The 11 per cent of voters called "undecided" by the pollsters, however, would finally create the surprising outcome.

Kennedy and McCarthy depended enormously on television during their last week of campaigning. Eighty per cent of Kennedy's budget was said to be used for television campaigning in California and Oregon, with one station in Oregon, KGW, reporting that Kennedy bought

62 "In the 'New' Politics," Time, June 7, 1968, p. 23.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
fifty-eight one minute spot announcements while McCarthy bought forty-six. 66

As the campaign drew to its climax, the two major campaigners showed differences in mood and style. Kennedy "inflated his overdog standing" in a state which some called "haven to the maverick" by continuing to refuse McCarthy's challenge to debate, refusing to answer McCarthy charges about Kennedy participation in Vietnam planning and, in general, giving the clear appearance that he considered his only major opponent for the Democratic nomination to be Vice President Humphrey. 67 One week before the primary, for instance, Kennedy campaigned "past McCarthy" in the following manner, "My opponent--the vice president--calls this the politics of joy and the politics of happiness. I'd like to see it the politics of reality and the politics of hope." He seldom mentioned McCarthy at all. 68

McCarthy now was suggesting for the first time that significant differences existed between his positions and some positions espoused by Kennedy. He repeated earlier taunts at his opponent who had refused to enter any "cold weather primaries," but, much more importantly, McCarthy charged Kennedy with exploiting for his own benefit the

67 "In the 'New' Politics," Time, p. 23.
minority groups whose champion Kennedy professed to be. In a state with only 7,000 Negro voters, such charges entailed little risk for McCarthy and, coupled with other major attacks on Kennedy's ultimate dependence on the techniques of "old politics", won much support for McCarthy.

To large and generally congenial crowds, McCarthy repeated often his major charge that Kennedy was often guilty of misconceptions rather than merely mistakes. This general charge was specified in two topic areas, Vietnam and individual right to privacy. Previous charges that Robert Kennedy had participated in decisions that turned out to be mistaken changed to direct charges that Kennedy was closely associated with "disastrous" policies that led to the war because he erred philosophically, "Those policies were not merely the product of specific misjudgments. Rather they grew from a systematic misconception of America and its role in the world. I am not convinced that Senator Kennedy has entirely renounced that misconception."

Later, in reference to the charge that Kennedy, as Attorney General, had authorized a wiretap on the phone of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, McCarthy continued his theme, "Senator Kennedy has said he has made mistakes. Much more serious than a mistake is a misconception.


70Jack Bell, "Doubt in Oregon Vote," Kansas City Times, May 27, 1968, p. 17.

You can say, 'I'm sorry about that particular wiretap.' But what about the idea of wiretap?"72

In the last days of the campaign, McCarthy faced extremely large enthusiastic crowds in Willamette Valley. He picnicked and engaged in sightseeing in Portland.73 Kennedy meanwhile was putting in fifteen and more hours daily, trying by numerous public appearances to "allay fears about himself which he considers unfounded--and which he feels will yield to exposure and to the public." Godfrey Sperling, Jr. continued:

The object seems to be for him to get as close as he can to audiences and crowds along the streets--in order that they may see and feel his warmth.


And so it went in city after city. This, too, underscores Senator Kennedy as a warm human being in the face of the anti-Kennedy feeling that would not see him in such warm, human terms.

The Senator also seeks to allay fears of those who are anxious about what he might do as president.

He is making a real and obvious effort to let white voters know that he is not the Negro candidate--that he is the candidate for all the people.74

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73 "Easy McCarthy Day," Kansas City Times, May 27, 1968, p. 3.

In Oregon the state McCarthy organization continued to spark the "traditional volunteer energy with a higher-octane professionalism than in previous primaries" up to the last moment. Simultaneously, Kennedy was realizing that he had not won a large enough share of the 11 per cent of the electorate that had been undecided the week before the primary. Hours before the polls opened in Oregon, Kennedy said of the campaign, "Sometimes I wished they'd booed me or kicked me or done something. I just couldn't get much response." Within twenty-four hours, Kennedy found he had been right in his pessimistic predictions; "I'm not the candidate that I was before Oregon."

"We'll take down the fence around the White House and have a picnic on the lawn," was the initial response of Eugene McCarthy to his strong victory in Oregon where he garnered 45 per cent of the vote as contrasted with 39 per cent for Kennedy, Johnson's 12 per cent and Humphrey's 4 per cent.

Recalling the earlier Kennedy offer to join forces, which had so offended McCarthy, the victor commented after his Oregon win, "I think we've demonstrated who has the real staying power, the real strength, the real commitment." "Best of all," he added, for once no one was asking him, "who I'm going to yield to." 

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75"In The 'New' Politics," Time, p. 23.
76Ibid.
78Ibid.
79Ibid.
California Primary: June 4, 1968

Although Senator McCarthy was content, even jubilant, with the results of Oregon's primary voting because it meant that he could maintain his protest up until the convention, his chances at the Democratic nomination were not generally thought to have been strengthened. Rather, since McCarthy had given Senator Kennedy what might be a fatal setback, majority estimates agreed with Warren Weaver, Jr., that "about 575,000 Oregon voters have moved the nation perceptibly closer to a choice between Richard M. Nixon and Hubert H. Humphrey for President in 1968,"80 Weaver explained:

The results of the primary here gave a major assist to the vice-president's prospects of winning the Democratic nomination by seriously damaging, if not derailing, the campaign of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's decisive victory over Kennedy did not eliminate the New Yorker from the presidential race, but it made it much more difficult for him to continue advancing the theory that his popularity is broad enough to win for the party in November.81

The California primary had from the very first been considered as ultimately the most important single primary because of its timing and size. The campaigns of both candidates had stretched back at least as far as January with information right from the first that Eugene McCarthy faced an almost insurmountable struggle if, again, his goal was to win the primary in order that he could win the nomination.


81Ibid.
Senator McCarthy had made his first major exploratory trip to California on January 10, his purpose being to seek needed funds estimated to be between $200,000 and $500,000.\textsuperscript{82} At that time, he designated Gerald Hill of the California Democratic Council—a group of Democrats advocating withdrawal from Vietnam—as his campaign chairman.\textsuperscript{83} The magnitude of Hill's task is suggested by the results of several state polls released at the beginning of the campaign:

In the June 4, 1968, primary election you will be asked to vote for a slate of delegates to represent California at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The Democratic nominee for President of the United States will be chosen at this convention. If the following delegations appear on the ballot, for which one would you vote?

- Eugene McCarthy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18%  
  (A slate of delegates pledged to support McCarthy)
- Thomas Lynch Delegation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63%  
  (An uncommitted slate of delegates favoring President Johnson)\textsuperscript{84}

On the other hand, given the opportunity to vote for the then unannounced Robert Kennedy, 43 per cent of the voters questioned would have done so as compared with 49 per cent support for President Johnson.\textsuperscript{85}

Finally, a California State poll showed the relatively low percentage of Democrats who opposed the Administration Vietnam policy


\textsuperscript{83}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84}Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1968, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid.
(30 per cent) to be widely spread between those who desired acceleration (40 per cent), those who desired a decrease of military activity (32 per cent), and those who voted in the "don't know" category (28 per cent). Whatever else these numbers indicate, it seems clear that Senator Kennedy, who would not announce his candidacy for almost three months, did not have his strong support because of his Vietnam position, and, equally clear, that a McCarthy candidacy based on dissent to that war would have even a more difficult time than on grounds which pitted him against Kennedy on a personal basis.

One and a half months after he had announced his candidacy, Eugene McCarthy could expect to lose handily to Johnson in California, and worse, to lose to Robert Kennedy. McCarthy was no better known in California than he had been in his other primary battles, with his position on Vietnam assessed in January as a "dove" by 52 per cent of those asked, a "hawk" by 11 per cent, and "not known" by 37 per cent. He faced in California the same situation he had initially faced in New Hampshire; even had he been known and his position clear to the voters, more California voters wanted to intensify the war effort than decrease it.

The pattern that had begun emerging as early as New Hampshire recurred in California and indicated that his major workers and manpower

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87 Ibid.
came to him via the route of opposition to the United States involvement in Vietnam. On the other hand votes were usually won or lost on other bases, usually social issues on which Kennedy had ordinarily had the support of more voters. One good example of the intensity of these workers who came via the anti-Vietnam route was provided in March when "the massive and well-organized drive by volunteer workers for the Democratic presidential peace candidate...got enough signatures in a matter of hours to qualify McCarthy for the top spot on the Democratic ballot." The technique used to win this spot was the staging of five hundred petition-signing, fund-raising house parties throughout California, virtually all of them hosted by relative political novices who according to Jack Bell, agreed only on "the immediate necessity of extricating the United States from Vietnam. This was the cement that held this rather disparate group together in support of the Senator from Minnesota." These people showed remarkable diversity in other matters, with one party described by Bell below:

It was a remarkably varied crowd, ranging in dress from conservative business suits to sweat shirts and jeans, in age from obvious first voters to a handful of senior citizens, and in occupation from beachcombing to corporate executive and college professor. There was a surprising number of small-businessmen present, a local labor leader, the wife of a judge, and a large contingent from the nearby campus of the University of California.

90 Ibid.
Under California law, only 13,475 valid signatures were needed to secure the top spot on the ballot and more than 30,000 signatures were secured in the one evening of parties described above. It was assumed, of course, that this ballot position would secure more votes than any other position. 91

Nor did Senator Kennedy lack for well planned campaign tactics energetically pursued. From the first, Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh, probably the most powerful Democrat in California, had remained uncommitted to either President Johnson or to Senator McCarthy. He directed the campaign to secure Senator Kennedy's place on the ballot and was responsible for most of the pre-planning and early direction of the Kennedy campaign in California. 92

Polls throughout the time of contest showed a highly volatile situation in California. Kennedy and Johnson alternated for the lead in public opinion polls through the month of March with a stalemate reported in March. 93 Results of a statewide poll reported by the Los Angeles Times showed another surprise for a state in which registered Democrats outnumber Republican by five to four. The April poll indicated that Governor Rockefeller would have carried California had the election been held then. He would have secured 53 per cent of

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91 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
Johnson's 38 per cent, 57 per cent to Kennedy's 36 per cent, 62 per cent to Humphrey's 30 per cent, and finally 53 per cent to McCarthy's 38 per cent. If McCarthy faced a severe challenge to secure the allegiance of Democrats, clearly any Democratic contender was likely to be in trouble if ultimately forced to face Rockefeller in the general election.

From the beginning then, both Democratic candidates felt that they must win the California primary if either were to defeat Vice President Humphrey for the nomination. While both faced tremendous difficulties, until the Oregon primary Kennedy was considered likely to win the primary handily. For it was, after all, a state which "groans with urban problems. It is laden with minorities." These were major contributing elements to each previous Kennedy success.

Eugene McCarthy campaigned vigorously in California and his campaign there resembled others:

I think I can feel comfortable with most of California. Last time I was out there, they were quite content with my style. I don't have a campaign management firm working for me, but I think the California Committee has somebody doing something. I don't know who it is or what they're doing.

I expect we'll have varied audiences. The schools all want me.

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I don't know if money is going to be a serious problem. You never have it so you can plan in advance. 96

McCarthy seems to have correctly assayed the importance of the issue of Vietnam to the contest between himself and Senator Kennedy:

On issues, Vietnam hasn't diminished, but you don't have to talk about it as long. People are measuring the men (McCarthy, Kennedy, Humphrey) now. I figure I will have to have other people make the speeches about me. I don't know if I will confront Kennedy or not. It gets to be like a horse show now instead of a race. Show your five-gaited step and do a little jumping. 97

McCarthy continued to press for the debate with Kennedy who continued virtually to guarantee that it would not occur by saying he would participate in a debate only if all candidates were involved. 98 Kennedy's loss in Oregon, however, changed his mind. He had said that a loss in Oregon would mean he no longer was a very viable candidate and had then been dealt a stunning loss. At this point, he had little to lose by trying to diffuse one of Senator McCarthy's most emphasized arguments: Kennedy was violating the tradition of his own family and was afraid to meet his challenger. Three days after Oregon, Kennedy announced that he would meet McCarthy in a "debate" and Vice President Humphrey declined the ABC Network offer to join McCarthy and Kennedy. 99

96Thimmesch, pp. 9, 10.
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
Under the proposed format Kennedy and McCarthy were not to engage each other in direct exchanges, but whenever one answered a newsman's question, the other was given the opportunity to comment and criticize his opponents' answer. The exchange which was called a "non-debate" by Time magazine and other publications did not disclose major policy differences between the two candidates, although they did try to make it seem that they differed on detail. The Moderator, Frank Reynolds declared approximately two/thirds through the event, "Well, there don't seem to be very many differences between (you) on anything, really." The two men engaged in some personal carping as reported in Time magazine:

They were not being exactly "nice." One-upping and putting-down one another to the best of their ability, both candidates did their determined best to denigrate the other's qualifications for the presidency: McCarthy, 52, came across as casual, languidly professorial, mature and even a little sleepy—an impression that was enhanced by the pouches beneath his eyes. Kennedy, 42, appeared tense, brittle, and, by visual and verbal comparison, considerably younger.

Time concluded:

After it was over, it was clear that Kennedy and McCarthy differed only in minor detail on the major issues. What was clear, however, was that the Minnesotan came across on television as a formidable opponent, relaxed in manner, with an articulate command of the issues.

100 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 "Perils of the Primary," Time, June 10, 1968, p. 25.
After the primary, Kennedy staff members said they felt the standoff debate had "stemmed the McCarthy tide set in motion out of Oregon."104 Top Kennedy advisor, Lawrence F. O'Brien, said of the debate, "it broke the pattern of Oregon. We got feedback that people 3-to-2 thought Kennedy won the confrontation. Doubtless it helped us in California."105 Is it possible that four days before the California Primary, Eugene McCarthy lost even the ever so slim opportunity he had so carefully planned to beat Robert Kennedy in California? If so, recalling the four month effort to force Kennedy to debate, irony abounds.

Senator Robert Kennedy won both the California and the South Dakota primaries on the last active day of his life. South Dakota had been largely ignored in pursuit of the larger delegate count in other states but came to stand as a further example of Kennedy ability to pull rural non-minority votes.106 Kennedy had carried the ghettos and barrios of California as expected. In several, his margin was as high as 80 per cent because Negroes and Mexican-Americans identified with him as they could not with McCarthy. "To us, McCarthy sounds too academic and uncommitted to our needs," was the way one California Negro phrased it.107

104 Waugh, "California Shows..." p. 3.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
John C. Waugh of the Christian Science Monitor, continued his analysis of the evidence supplied by the California and South Dakota primaries:

But the Kennedy victory margin had more than just the minority edge. He also held his own in suburban and rural regions.

His backers here twinned the California outcome with the primary vote the same day in South Dakota. They say the two together show that their man is the complete candidate.108

SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY: VICTIM OF ASSASSINATION. Sirhan Bishara Sirhan shot and killed Robert Kennedy moments after a victory address to his supporters at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California.109 Although he lived for eighteen hours after the shooting, it was clear from the first that Senator Robert Kennedy would not recover.110 During the course of a three month campaign he had aroused the lasting enmity of Eugene McCarthy, the hope of people in minority groups throughout the country, and the respect of millions of voters who saw in him the possibility for reconciliation of Americans. His death devastated McCarthy and the minority group members and saddened millions of others.

McCarthy, had, from the first, bitterly resented what he took to be Kennedy's attempted theft of the peace-student momentum in the


country. McCarthy had taken the risks when he challenged President Johnson in New Hampshire and now, almost as if he were engaging in a ball game and someone cheated, he saw Kennedy become the likely player to take credit for a ball McCarthy had caught. When Senator Kennedy was killed, however, perhaps McCarthy recognized that the race had not been a game but realized instead that a strong man had been killed in pursuit of a goal both had sought. His reaction was quite similar to what it had been when Martin Luther King was murdered—withdrawal and desolation. Of course, he immediately suspended campaigning and announced that he would consult with the President and Vice-President and others before deciding what he would do.\(^\text{111}\) One aide said that Senator McCarthy was going through "a very difficult personal period" because of Kennedy's death. McCarthy's first formal statement included the request for a re-examination of the national "soul":

> It is not enough, in my judgment to say that this was the act of one deranged man, if that is the case. The nation, I think, bears too great a burden of guilt, really, for the kind of neglect which has allowed disposition of violence to grow here in our land.\(^\text{112}\)

He called this violence "a reflection of violence we have visited upon the rest of the world."\(^\text{113}\) If his public remarks concerned national


\(^\text{113}\) Ibid.
guilt, however, his private remarks concerned private, individual guilt. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak report being told by those in McCarthy's "inner circle" that he had seen the campaign to oppose President Johnson's leadership change from a valiant, issue-centered one to an instance of the "politics of personality" which had become foremost when Senator Kennedy announced his candidacy:

Since then, in McCarthy's view, there has been endless talk among press and politicians of delegate counts, media spending, and organizational structure. What is worse to McCarthy is that, after losing to Kennedy in Indiana and Nebraska, he also joined the game.

Though still amorphous by conventional standards, McCarthy's campaign took on a more professional gloss. . . . McCarthy dealt far more in personality using his stinging wit freely against Kennedy. Thus, in McCarthy's mind, he now shared in the general culpability for the insane state of American politics.

The effort succeeded brilliantly with a win in Oregon and a close second in California, more than 15 percentage points higher than his showing in mid-May polls, but to McCarthy, the result was escalation of the super-heated, irrational atmosphere conducive to a mad young man in Los Angeles firing point-blank at Robert Kennedy.

Thus, although McCarthy's closest political associates are sure he will continue his campaign, they have been informed unequivocally that things will be different. The cotton-candy atmosphere of Oregon and California where McCarthy, the poet-philosopher, gibed at Bobby Kennedy's dog, Freckles, will not reappear.114

Once again, then, Eugene McCarthy faced a candidacy different in character from anything he had imagined or desired when he had announced less than a year earlier, "I intend to enter the Democratic primaries in Wisconsin, Oregon, California and Nebraska." He had scored a totally unexpected victory in New Hampshire; had seen his victory serve as encouragement to Robert F. Kennedy to enter the race; lost as opponent the man he entered to oppose when President Johnson refused to seek re-nomination; allowed his campaign to assume a character entirely foreign to McCarthy's philosophy; lost the opponent he had come to view as an unprincipled interloper; felt a share of guilt at the death of Senator Kennedy; and now he faced the man he had least expected to face, Vice-President Humphrey, for the position he surely had not seriously expected to contend for—the Democratic nomination for the Presidency of the United States.
From California to Chicago: Developing Trends

In the two and one half months between California's primary and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, three trends developed:


2. Growing disenchantment of some of his first passionate young backers with his person and leadership.

3. Growing certainty that neither of the above would affect delegate behavior in Chicago--Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey would be the candidate.

INCREASED PUBLIC AFFECTION FOR McCARTHY. As more people had come to know Senator McCarthy they had felt increased affection for him. After all, he had come to represent the one effective way to express disenchantment with the Administration--never mind if the voter did not happen to agree with Senator McCarthy on the specifically proposed alternatives. Of a total of 5.4 million votes cast in eight major Democratic primaries, Johnson-Humphrey forces had picked up only about 1 million votes, compared to about 4.4 million for the anti-establishment forces. Democratic voters obviously were demanding a change. Since not considered as a policy

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maker but rather as a symbol of protest, McCarthy continued to win majority public support. July 13, 1968, saw release of a Gallup poll which indicated that with a population cross section, McCarthy would then have defeated both Rockefeller and Richard Nixon, while Humphrey could beat Nixon but only tie Rockefeller. When the answers of only Democrats were tabulated, however, Humphrey was favored over McCarthy.² Within two days of the above poll, Gallup released more data which reported that most Americans had a less favorable image of the Vice-President than of McCarthy. "Most people regard the Senator as more sincere, stronger, more straightforward, cool-headed, decisive, confident, independent, up-to-date, exciting, and good-looking than the Vice-President."³

Less than one month after the preceding polls were reported, George Gallup released another poll that showed data with interesting implications: By August 4, 1968, 52 per cent of the persons questioned viewed Vietnam as the major problem facing the nation and only 27 per cent of those questioned viewed the Democrats as the best party to deal with the crisis as opposed to 27 per cent who favored the Republicans and 42 per cent who felt there was no difference between the parties. At the same time, 53 per cent of the Democrats questioned preferred Humphrey to McCarthy, while 53 per cent of the Independents questioned favored McCarthy.


as opposed to 32 per cent who favored Humphrey. Of those who approved of Johnson's performance as President, 26 per cent favored McCarthy, while of those who disapproved of Johnson's performance, 57 per cent favored McCarthy. Finally, Lou Harris released figures on August 22 which brought the foregoing figures into a meaningful configuration. As the earlier Gallup polls showed, 52 per cent of those questioned felt Vietnam to be the major issue at this time. Harris reported that when asked, "Who would do a better job in handling the war in Vietnam," the American people preferred Vice President Humphrey to McCarthy by 47 to 29 per cent. As late as August 22, only 50 per cent of the sample questioned believed McCarthy favored a halt in all bombing in North Vietnam. The other 50 per cent either thought the opposite or just "didn't know." Only 26 per cent of the public knew that McCarthy had called for a coalition South Vietnamese government that would include the Viet Cong.

So it was now in August, that, just as they had in March, the American people respected McCarthy's courage in challenging the Administration (75 per cent), but failed to discern his position on Vietnam (50 per cent), opposed McCarthy on the issue of Vietnam even when they supported his

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6Ibid.
candidacy (55 per cent), felt the war was the most important issue (52 per cent), and felt that Humphrey could best handle the issue (47 to 29 per cent).

DISAFFECTION OF THE RADICALS. By now, the second aforementioned trend was becoming obvious, that of the growing disenchantment of some of McCarthy's most fervently anti-Vietnam supporters. These young people, had been most opposed to the Johnson administration in a focused way and had been McCarthy's first supporters. Before Robert Kennedy's assassination, one of the editors of Dissent, Arnold S. Kaufman, severely criticized McCarthy for becoming too ego-involved in what Kaufman argued should be a purely issue oriented race—the issue being deposition of the Administration. The crux of this particular attack came against the kind of campaigning by McCarthy forces that linked Kennedy with present foreign policy difficulties—the specific stimulus being an advertisement which included this paragraph:

Both Humphrey and Kennedy (and Nixon, Reagan and Rockefeller, too) are part and parcel of the kind of thinking about America's role in the world that is leading us on to catastrophe.7

Kaufman's reaction included the following remarks:

This made me mad. Why the hell did the McCarthy people have to lie, just like all the others? Oh, not a bald-faced lie; just one of those subtle lies of implication.

After recalling that Kennedy had opposed the United States policy in Vietnam and had taken responsibility for participating in early decisions, as well as the responsibility to protest that policy long before McCarthy had spoken out, Kaufman continued:

I remembered the meeting Zolton Ferency, Al Lowenstein, and I had in my home in Ann Arbor just before Al went off to Washington to ask McCarthy to run. I remembered our discussion of what we called "The Kennedy Problem." We decided it would not be a bad thing to have that problem on our hands. Our aim was to stop the war and to re-order national priorities. And of course we never supposed that Johnson would drop out.

I looked at the photo of the first airport demonstration for McCarthy that we organized in Detroit's Metropolitan airport in early November. There was my wife holding a McCarthy for President sign. We were a lonely band. We had a devil of a time rounding up all of a hundred people. And I thought, Dammit, she had never asked him to continue to run no matter what. Nor had Zolton or Al. Nor had any of the 50 state Democratic leaders who met and formed the first McCarthy organization on November 11. . . . We had never requested that he pursue the Presidency regardless of consequences, regardless of contingencies. Rather we hoped and expected that he would pursue it as long as it was useful to do so in behalf of the aims and values we shared.8

Kaufman's major complaint was that McCarthy now wanted to win the office rather than introduce the issue and be willing to support whoever else might more effectively damage the political empire supported by what they called the "old politics." By the last week in June the "new politics" movement as represented by Allard K. Lowenstein and others had not only pretty much given up on McCarthy's chances and refused to

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8Ibid.
coalesce behind him after Kennedy's death, but met in Chicago to plan new strategies. One stated purpose was to continue the "American Revolution of 1968" as they referred to their efforts. A purpose of some who attended, however, was described as the determination to "insure that the weekend didn't become just a great big pledge-in for Eugene McCarthy." Only 400 had been expected on the four day notice, but 1,500 delegates appeared from thirty-nine states including more than 100 who would actually go to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago as delegates. William A. McWhirter reported, "The Politics of Unhappiness, where villains had replaced candidates and, for the moment, grievances had overcome causes, was enjoying a boundless constituency." McWhirter provided provocative insights into the vortex of McCarthy's core "supporters," the most idealistic of those whom he had assumed belonged to this "constituency of conscience":

Whatever the hang-ups of the dispossessed outside the camp of Eugene McCarthy, the problems within that candidacy were nearly as depressing. The weekend before, in Chicago, a strategy session of McCarthy staff members had collapsed in a bitter name-calling shambles. Now there were the rumblings of fatal rumors: McCarthy was ready to release his delegates; McCarthy's campaign was so broke it had recalled all air travel charge cards from its members; this coalition meeting—sharply disavowed by the senior McCarthy staff—was being held at the Sherman House because of a McCarthy bill outstanding at the Hilton.

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9 William A. McWhirter, "Coalition Against the Humphrey Steamroller," Life, July 12, 1968, p. 30A.
The frictions among the youthful and sensitive McCarthy people were many and severe; for them American politics had become a love-substitute somehow betrayed; Eugene McCarthy had, of many mistakes, not loved back. He had been distant, remote and inconsiderate. "Do you know," asked one McCarthy girl in her scandalized way, "that he has not got one single friend in the whole world?" "I guess the closer you get the harder it is to believe in him," said another of the faithful, as if somehow this was never supposed to happen in politics, going steady, or anything else.

All of them, the McCarthy and the non-McCarthy people (known for reference in Chicago as the Outs and the Out-Outs), were dedicated to the proposition that almost nothing in this election year would work; and they seemed to want to confirm it all, turn around and go home.10

As the Democratic National Convention drew nearer, attacks on McCarthy grew from some segments of the "New Left." Some attacked him for "never having been a real standard-bearer for revolution."11 Carl Oglesby, a major leader in the "New Left" movement, argued, "Almost every champion among our youth of McCarthy we talk with is well to the left of his candidate."12 Bill Epston, editor of the revolutionary paper, Challenge, carried a full page cartoon on its front page with a "devastating sneer" at McCarthy by showing him about ready to take a shower, but with the caption: "Ay, here's the smell of blood still. All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little ham." Epston charged:

"The role of McCarthy is to build a loyal opposition, which is a sham opposition, and capture the peace movement and

10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
insure its loyalty. Such a man is necessary to the ruling class. As Voltaire said about God. If he didn't exist, they'd have to invent him."13

Insight can accrue if this segment of early McCarthy support can be understood. Kaufman said of them: "Out of the debacle of the Johnson Administration is rising a new breed of indefatigable radical-liberals--people who'd rather be right than winners but who have the will, energy, and savvy to be both."14 Epston and Tom Hayden who organized the National Mobilization Committee for protest at Chicago described the winning of political office as irrelevant and considered that they had already won a major victory before the Democratic Convention because they had "forced the rulers to hold their convention behind a wall of guns and quite obviously the war makers would, if necessary, use the same violence against us as they use in Vietnam."15 The winning of office might even deter effective revolution because, "the people are best served if we build an opposition which cannot be appeased by any shuffling of politicians, by any change of lines, even by any pretense by the ruling class that the peace movement has won."16

McCarthy's reaction to Russia's August 20 invasion of Czechoslovakian territory that the invasion was "not very serious" and that President Johnson "went overboard" in calling an emergency meeting of the National

13 Ibid.
14 Kaufman, p. 296.
15 Morgan, p. 8A.
16 Ibid.
Security Council earned him more approbation from even his less radical supporters. One opposition paper, the *Los Angeles Times*, charged, "If an empty head is ill-becoming in a Presidential aspirant, an empty heart is even more so. McCarthy didn't bother to criticize the Soviet action or to express sympathy for the Czechs, even when pressed by reporters."17

Without question, McCarthy went into the Convention with thousands upon thousands of supporters, but those young people who viewed him only as symbol of all that opposed the "Establishment" became dismayed and almost vengeful when it occurred to them that McCarthy was a man of the "Establishment" who wished to see it changed in some meaningful ways and then retained to the extent practical.

**AWARENESS OF IMPOTENCE: 1968.** As the time of the Democratic National Convention approached, the final trend of the campaign was the growing awareness that regardless of measured public sentiment for McCarthy, regardless of the issue of total primary repudiation of the Administration, and regardless of the issues raised by Eugene McCarthy and his followers, the delegates to the National Convention would choose Hubert Humphrey to lead them.

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New York provided the one bit of good news for McCarthy people as they sought delegates after the death of Robert Kennedy. Hubert Humphrey had been expected to win virtually all of the delegates but of the 123 delegates at stake, McCarthy won 61, Kennedy forces remaining uncommitted won 61, and Hubert Humphrey won only 12.18 Again McCarthy was effective in areas containing relatively affluent, well-educated voters who cared enough about their candidates to learn which delegates to elect since they were not designated by candidate support on the ballot. McCarthy's campaign was thought to receive a major boost in New York—but only 25 per cent of the registered Democrats had voted. Given the desires reported above of some of his early supporters, the description of what McCarthy himself saw as his goal at that time is relevant: "There's no special alchemy. I try to put things in some kind of historical context, and these people respond to this kind of approach." This constituency (the affluent, intelligent supporters in New York), said McCarthy, is "what America is becoming. The more people are educated, the more they will want this kind of politics."19

One major state by state survey reported June 28 that Humphrey had the probable support of 1,336 delegates, with 1,312 delegates needed to nominate.20 McCarthy was given a probable 427 votes, with the remaining

18"Hubert's Problem and Gene's Progress," Time, p. 15.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
857 votes as uncommitted. James Reston said during the first week of July, "Nobody talks about McCarthy as if he had a chance. In fact even McCarthy's most enthusiastic supporters seldom discuss what kind of President he would be. They think of him as a symbol of protest and talk about him as if he had no real power."21

McCarthy received much press coverage with charges of unfair treatment by Convention planners, and the battle of "how many phones" for each candidate raged in August newspapers. He continued to press Humphrey for joint television appearances but the one finally scheduled was never held.22 George McGovern's August entry into the race angered McCarthy with its implication that anti-Administration forces wanted an alternative candidate, but McGovern was unable to rally major delegate support and probably did not affect McCarthy's race.23 Much discussion of the relative strengths of a Humphrey-McCarthy or a Humphrey-Edward Kennedy ticket was ended when both men refused to accept such an offer should it be tendered.24

McCarthy said on August 18, on the program, Issues and Answers, that the only contingency that would allow his nomination would be if


24"McCarthy 'No' as H.H.H. Mate," Kansas City Times, August 26, 1968, p. 16A.
the "party people" were forced to say, "We may not like him particularly; we don't like what he has done but this is the way it is. In order to win the election, we have got to go with him." McCarthy said a few sentences later, "I don't know whether that is quite clear to them." Of course, the situation described by McCarthy was not clear to the delegates; and while several youth groups planned the destruction of the Democratic Convention, a majority of convention delegates proceeded with their plans to nominate Hubert Humphrey as their candidate.

The major Convention concerns, then, were not over candidate selection but with three issues that had seemed to be more negotiable. First, administration supporters defeated a determined effort to have what was referred to as a "peace plank" for the platform. The second major area of controversy dealt with the seating of 1,000 contested delegates--compromise was reached in this area on Administration terms; and finally the battle to eliminate the unit rule in future nominating primaries was won by the anti-Administration coalition.

Chicago: Democratic National Convention August, 1968

Senator McCarthy arrived in Chicago August 25 to greet an excited cheering crowd of 10,000 supporters who were already angered at security

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precautions taken by the city in the face of earlier threats by other groups to disrupt the Convention. The Associated Press reported "They seemed to accept with a melancholy stoicism the fact that his chances of winning the nomination are poor."27

Several threats had been made to embarrass the Convention and a few groups had vowed to disrupt or destroy the convention. Since members of all these segments unfortunately seemed to become one in the eyes of Chicago and much of the country, a mention of the several groups would seem to be in order. Blame for the actions and excesses of all these groups would ultimately be laid at McCarthy's door.

The major groups seeking confrontation were three in number beginning with the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, whose officer, Tom Hayden, was quoted above as he disavowed McCarthy as an Establishment pawn. His group had sought a permit to march from downtown Chicago to the International Amphitheater on August 28 and said that whether the permit was granted or not they would have their desired "confrontation" with the Party.28 This committee had acted as sponsor for the October, 1967, demonstration at the Pentagon.

Secondly, 10,000 members of the Youth International Party, called Yippies, were expected for a week long satiric convention to nominate

27"Demos Seen As Tired, Worried," Des Moines Register, August 26, 1968, p. 9.

what they referred to as a "pig of their own," for president. This was the group which had sought the Soldiers Field permit and whose request had been denied. Yippie "leader" Paul Krassner, explained the goals of his group as being to embarrass rather than to affect the behavior of the convention.29

Finally, Allard Lowenstein's Coalition for an Open Convention, the group responsible for the early August convention, planned to affect the convention in any legitimate way possible to stop the nomination of Hubert Humphrey, or at least to make the representatives of the "Old Politics" appear publicly as manipulators and as dedicated to the maintenance of a rigid unresponsive political structure. Many of these members were dedicated to the McCarthy campaign, had been supporters of Robert Kennedy, and could be described essentially with the same description E. W. Kenworthy later applied to the young men who directed the McCarthy campaign:

...True, they were opposed to the war and they wanted to give priority to urban problems. But they also wanted political power and had decided they could get it only within the established political structure behind a Democrat who would challenge the President's renomination...They used him (McCarthy) and he used them.30

In this group could be found the one hundred Democratic delegates who had attended the earlier Lowenstein convention and most of McCarthy's staff

29 Ibid.
and workers, many of McGovern's friends and, in general, those who wished to work within the established framework to bring change to the Establishment which they considered irrelevant or unresponsive to the Vietnamese war, participatory democracy, or urban problems. Most of those dedicated volunteers who had been responsible for the significant McCarthy showing in primary after primary belonged to this group.31

The rationale for this lengthy description of all three groups was that they were all treated as one by many commentators and this treatment embittered McCarthy perhaps as much as anything since Kennedy's entrance into the race. After continued nights of provoked response, the constituted authorities of Chicago seemed to finally begin to feel that any gathering of young people probably intended to destroy the "order" they meant to maintain. Consequently, by the night of Humphrey's nomination, police were reportedly approaching gatherings of people, using sometimes violent means to disperse them and retaliating to shouted obsentities and occasional peltings with what was universally determined to be over-zealousness in some instances. One group of students was standing in front of the hotel occupied by McCarthy headquarters and contained many students and young McCarthy workers. Police attacked and injured many youngsters who had only been observing events. Some of them

were then taken to a make-shift first aid station set up in McCarthy's quarters at the Conrad Hilton.32

While Hubert Humphrey breathed tear gas escaping from the street below his hotel, he watched his expected first ballot nomination. McCarthy, simultaneously watching the defeat he had always expected, saw youngsters drawn to Chicago by support for him whom they had made their symbol of hope and protest--beaten and bleeding.

Grant Park and the Night Before: Which is Forecast?

By the next day he was able to say to a cheering group of his supporters who had gathered in Grant Park to him:

...I am happy to be here to address the government of the people in exile:

. . . . . . . .

We are going to continue to carry the issues to popular judgment, and hope that that will come to bear upon the nominee of the two parties. . .

...I will not compromise. All the way, I say, I have not departed from my commitments to you. Nor have you departed from your commitments to me--those of you who have been with me since New Hampshire. So we will go on in this same spirit.33

No matter--the actual ending of this campaign which had begun with such high idealism less than a year earlier had come the night before,

32Ibid.

33Transcript of Grant Park Remarks by Eugene McCarthy, August, 1968.
the night of Hubert Humphrey's nomination, the night of beatings and bloodshed as recorded below by the Associated Press:

As he (McCarthy) emerged from another temporary first aid room, where a young man with a mustache and a blue shirt covered with blood was sitting on a bed, a nurse in civilian clothes approached him.

The nurse tried to speak but burst into tears. McCarthy put his hand on her shoulder and kept saying, "It'll be all right. I'm upstairs if you need me."

When photographers clustered around, McCarthy looked up and said, "Get out of the way fellows, get out. You don't have to see everything."

Then his voice rose to an angry shout, "Get the hell out of the way!"34

Part III

AGENCY: THE MEANS TO THE ENDS
The Senator and the Matter of Style

Style has traditionally been discussed as an element in many ways apart from content; questions of style have often been defined as questions of word choice, of structural and rhythmic composition, and of embellishment.¹ Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird in Speech Criticism, published in 1948, referred still to stylistic analysis as consideration of the three speech elements listed above based upon the qualities of grammatical correctness; perspicuity; appropriateness of each element to audience, event, and subject; and ornateness.² Classical writers did analyze style as a separate entity from content; Aristotle commented, "We have next to treat of diction (i.e., style, and the like); since it is not enough to know what to say--one must also know how to say it."³ Even though he did separate style from content he recognized that effectiveness of style could be evaluated only with some regard for audience predispositions:

The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits; for we demand the language we are accustomed to, and that which is different from this seems not in keeping but somehow


²Ibid.

unintelligible and foreign because of its unwontedness. . . Thus some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically, others unless he gives instances, while others expect him to cite a poet as a witness. And some want to have everything done accurately, while others are annoyed with accuracy either because they cannot follow the connexion of thoughts or because they regard it as pettifoggery. 4

Although modern rhetoricians may speak of style and content as separate entities, they recognize, as did earlier writers, that the two are separated only for purposes of convenience. Stylistic effectiveness was seen by Aristotle to depend in part on audience taste and mood. 5

Marie Hochmuth draws this conceptual relationship between style, matter, and effect:

Both ancient and contemporary thought might question the dichotomy between "the sense and the expression" as indicated by Campbell. From Aristotle to modern times competent critics have recognized that "there can be no distinction drawn, save in reflection, between form and substance. The work itself is matter formed. . ." The contemporary philosopher, Jordan, notes that "At the point of the abstract ultimate what is said. . . and the way it is said. . . may be the same thing. . . ." Experience of course reveals that so united are matter and form that when a speaker struggles to make his thoughts clear but fails, he in fact says something else. 6

The McCarthy campaign style was only partly composed of word choice, arrangement, and embellishment; the message he communicated was composed


6Thonnsen and Baird, p. 410.
of other elements too, and these elements are to be considered as well to be elements of style. William A. McWhirter described some of these unique qualities:

Much of what has happened throughout the campaign has been as fast and imperceptible as a form of extrasensory perception, sympathies swiftly transmitted in an almost underground shorthand of gestures and symbols. It is almost, in fact, nonverbal; the dissenters neither have or want a Sorenson. . . .

As the analyst seeks clear categories of devices and techniques in McCarthy's campaign style, he finds that problems there are met with a "staggeringly McLuhanesque array of physical and emotional probings."

McWhirter says, "The ambiguity has provided space and breathing room for a unique coalition. . ." and concludes:

Lowenstein himself calls it "the politics of intangibles."

It is seen in the near litany of the beautiful ambiguities: "Where it's at," "something's happening" and "your own thing."

Along with the new adjective Beautiful itself, they are the mainstays of the new lexicon.8

To describe such a campaign in terms only of language usage or intended effect would obviously be to overlook much that is essential to an understanding of the effort. Accordingly, the style of this campaign will be discussed in terms which emphasize effect in the rhetorical situation. To the extent that McCarthy's words create the effect, they


8 Ibid.
will be considered; his projected image in various media and its effect will be analyzed. In short, those central aspects of McCarthy communicating which determined his rhetorical effectiveness will be discussed here as matters of his campaign style.

CHARISMA. "The trouble with Eugene McCarthy is that he is trying to spark an uprising without raising his voice," wrote Mary McGory of the Washington Evening Star. Ward Just of the Washington Post agreed, commenting that the Senator seemed so "gently contemplative that he might well have been running for the Presidency of Plato's Republic."9 James Kilpatrick added this impression of the Senator:

One observes him at a campaign rally, an island of reserve in a sea of animation. The puzzled question forms on the Senator's face: "What in the name of heaven am I doing here?" It is as though a poet had wandered, quite by chance, into a Legionnaires' convention.10

This man, McCarthy, whose idea of an interesting revolution was the peasant uprising of 1381, provided the basis for a journalistic controversy that overshadowed almost all other areas of his campaign—the question of whether he had or ought to have "style," "charisma," or the power to evoke cries of "sock it to 'em!" as Robert Kennedy had. As one considers the matter, it ought to be recalled that most of these

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10Ibid.
writers were assuming that his goal was election to the presidency and were making their analyses of his effectiveness in those terms.

While puzzled and perhaps offended by those who made an issue of his presumed lack of "charisma," McCarthy did not seem to take the issue to be a very serious one. Surely his campaign was not based on the attempt to arrange crowds for the maximum excitement quotient provided by Kennedy planners; and while the example cited below was not an example of daily occurrences, neither was it very unusual.

The crack of dawn found Senator McCarthy heading for Whitlow Community Center, where he talked to precisely 12 persons. During the afternoon he visited Kokomo, Peru, Wabash, Marion and Gas City. It was snowing at Peru. Most of his partisans were under the age of 15. At one point, his audience consisted of three farmers in a tool shed.11

On at least two occasions, McCarthy, seemingly not unhappy to depart from planned schedules, participated in widely reported sporting efforts. In February, he played a creditable game of hockey in New Hampshire; later, Time reported his baseball prowess along with the general tenor of his campaign style:

...McCarthy's campaign seemed to be suffering from what he likes to call "acedia"--spiritual torpor. He displayed perhaps his best form of the week when he joined the pepper game with reporters outside a Muncie Westinghouse plant and poled three line drives practically out of the factory grounds. More than normally disorganized, McCarthy appeared late for speeches, found his audience sparse and unresponsive.12

12Ibid.
If this lackadasical campaign style irritated some of his top campaign strategists, McCarthy seemed at a loss to understand their feelings or to know what to do about it. "I keep asking Al [Lowenstein], 'what do you want me to do?' and he won't exactly tell me," McCarthy stated. Perhaps James Reston penned the best description of the McCarthy campaign style:

Yet his campaign goes on more like a seminar in political science than a battle for the presidency. He is showered with speeches, which sometimes he reads, and with advice, which occasionally he takes. His aides brawl with one another over whether he should talk to the country or pander to the delegates, but he just goes his own way from city to city, stuffing his pocket with poems, most of them bad, written by his followers and brought to him as tokens of affection.

Hugh Downs, on his August 16 Today show, interviewed the Senator. When Downs asked McCarthy whether he "flew in the face of...political protocol--as far as rhetoric and what they call charisma," the following exchange ensued:

McCarthy. I don't know about the charisma line. That's one of those interesting things you know. And I felt a little hurt by the first observation of that kind--when I was running against Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. And all of these things are relative, you know. It's a question of--not what you have but whom you are being compared to.

Downs. Do you feel it's necessarily a slam? Is that charisma something that you think... .

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McCarthy. Well, you're supposed to have it. I don't really know. When they say it, they say it as though it showed a great defect of character, somehow. So we've been working on it. And the crowds have been increasing; something is coming on, I think. I wear striped ties now; that may have made the difference.

Downs. You hadn't worn striped ties?

McCarthy. No. They said that was very bad--not to wear striped ties. I've been getting striped ties from people all around. "This is one of the weaker ones. So if you have a problem of charisma; try a striped tie; and you'll pick up fast, I think."

This exchange, in addition to indicating a relatively unconcerned view of the "charisma game," provided an example of another element which contributed to the projected style of McCarthy, his use of humor. McCarthy contrasted his use of humor with that of Adlai Stevenson with whom he was often compared:

I never felt I used humor the way Stevenson did. His was often an insertion into his train of thought. I try to use it to sharpen a thought.

For example, what I had to say when I was asked what I would do about Vietnam if I became president.

I said, "I will go to the Pentagon."

This, of course was a reference to Eisenhower and his promise of going to Korea if elected.

It was also a reference to the influence the Pentagon has had on advising the President on Vietnam.

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15 Transcript of McCarthy interview on Today show. McCarthy for President.
But finally, it was an expression of my feeling about the concentration of power in the Pentagon and the difficulty of dealing with such a concentration. 16

Although the reporter who had asked for McCarthy's Vietnam policy might have felt the question not fully answered, McCarthy saw the answer as having all of the meaning a longer or more pedantic answer might have had.

Surely other examples of humor contributed to the charisma which McCarthy did develop for some segments of the public. His staff exhibited some of the same sense of fun McCarthy conveyed when they chose to answer a literary allusion to the Vice-President released by Humphrey's staff. From Shakespeare's Henry VI, Part II, the Vice-President's staff cited the words, "Humphrey is no little man. . . And listen after Humphrey how he proceeds." Shortly thereafter, McCarthy supporters cited this passage from the same act which referred to the same character:

Seem he a dove? His feathers are but borrowed. For he's disposed as the hateful raven. Is he a lamb? His skin is surely lent him. For he's inclined as is the ravenous wolf. Who cannot steal a shape that means deceit? Take heed, my Lord. The welfare of us all hangs on the cutting short of this fraudulent man. 17

In April, McCarthy referred humorously to prevailing aviary terminology used to represent military posture concerning Vietnam.


17 "Literary Level of Campaign Up," (AP) Kansas City Times, August 1, 1968, p. 3.
Rather than being called either a hawk or a dove, McCarthy said he preferred to be called a crane since the crane was a bird of peace in ancient mythology. Further, he said his position was analogous to that of the crane which required nine steps before it could fly. The candidate stated that he had eight primary battles and the Democratic National Convention before he could "fly" as the presidential nominee.\textsuperscript{18}

Other aspects of McCarthy's projected personality were particularly well communicated by television. His effectiveness was considered by some to be enormous in this medium which provides instant contact with vast audiences:

There also is at least one technological reason for his electability--television. Marshall McLuhan's "cool" medium seems just right for Eugene McCarthy, who can be cool enough to freeze a live audience. Understated, handsome, controlled, McCarthy usually comes across with considerable impact on the home screen--not least because there is very little that is contrived about his appearances. He has almost no television drawbacks--no distracting gestures or dark jowls, no off-key or irritating voice sounds--and a way of looking frankly and directly into the camera.\textsuperscript{19} [Emphasis added]

McLuhan saw two further reasons for McCarthy's effectiveness on television. He thought that McCarthy conveyed there the "yokel quality" of a "small town philosopher" and that he appeared to be "indifferent to political power. Anyone who looks as if he wants to be elected had best stay off TV."\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} "McCarthy Forsakes Doves for Cranes," (AP) Kansas City Times, April 24, 1968, p. 2A.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
McCarthy was never able to reach some segments of the population; for others, however, he did come to symbolize a kind of leader they felt they had lacked. The answer to the question of whether McCarthy did or did not have charisma, then, varied according to the audience. Tom Wicker described the charismatic qualities seen and admired by the age and population groups to whom McCarthy appealed:

McCarthy's eloquence, his wit, his restrained style, his willingness to buck the president when no one else would, his defiance of the might of the Kennedys--these intimations of individuality, as much as his stand against the war, have made him a romantic symbol in a time of power and propaganda.21

STYLE IN PERSONAL CONTACT. Although McCarthy's scheduling was often abysmally planned and his addresses too low-key to be widely effective, he was extremely capable in personal campaigning. His performance on interview shows allowed him to banter freely with questioners and he usually appeared to enjoy experiences like the Today show interview cited above.

His approach to campaigning unquestionably appealed to people tired of traditional pomposity and manipulation. The remarks below of one excited McCarthy fan provide insight into the flavor of much of his campaign and enlighten us as to the nature and character of much of his support--people for whom he did have "charisma."

McCarthy had almost a movie star appeal to his young miniskirted, modish supporters.

A young mother hugged her baby and squealed, "Oh I felt like I should have just thrust my child into his arms."

"But I guess that would have been going a little too far." /Emphasis added/22.

In Nebraska, a group of approximately sixty people, most of them well under forty years of age, waited for the Senator to arrive at the Lincoln airport.23 When his plane arrived, it stopped perhaps two hundred yards from the fence behind which his fans stood. It was obvious that they held him in high esteem. They raised placards in the hope that the Senator might be encouraged by them. Applause and cheering were subdued as if to avoid offending his sensibilities (as he said his farewells much later to Chicago supporters, he commented on the fear he felt of losing his "cool"). The people most attracted to him seemed to be ever considering whether motion toward him would "be going too far" or would signify the loss of "cool." At any rate, in Nebraska, he walked to the fence, shook hands and chatted with every person there. The attachment between him and those who responded instinctively to his personal style grew throughout the campaign. Always the reserve of the candidate and of his followers seemed to be an issue of importance and a quality demanding reciprocal respect.

22Kathi Clough, "Ralph, Crowd Cheer McCarthy as Choice," Fort Worth Star Telegram, August 10, 1968, p. 2.
23The writer attended this rally.
STYLE IN FORMAL ADDRESS: TECHNIQUE AND IMPACT. Few times in the campaign did McCarthy gain an extremely enthusiastic response from his listeners if the audience was not made up of already committed supporters. The first sign of this came in December of 1967 at McCarthy's debut before Allard Lowenstein's Conference of Concerned Democrats:

Lowenstein found the 500 Chicago delegates restless, bored and a little disappointed even in anticipation of McCarthy's appearance; whereupon he proceeded to deliver an enormously exciting speech to the convention to the accompaniment of a brass band's rendition of "Hello, Dolly," McCarthy waited in the wings, "Kicking paper cups," someone said. Lowenstein soared higher and higher. "He didn't just warm up the crowd," a McCarthy campaigner said later, "He overheated it."

It was more than a letdown when McCarthy finally gained control of the rostrum. His own speech was dry and dull, and the audience response was in the same vein. It was there that the image of McCarthy as a cool fish was born, and it haunts the campaign to this day.24

The New York Times said of this initial effort:

...He wandered through a well-written speech last night in an off-hand fashion, declining opportunities to signal for the release of audience enthusiasm and just barely touching off the traditional demonstration at the end.

"He was flat," one delegate observed. "This is the fourth time I've heard him and he's been flat every time. When is he going to take off?"25

In January, eight thousand students at UCLA gathered to hear McCarthy, "but the Minnesota Democrat's speech was low key and witty, not

24 Kopkind, p. 52.

stirring much applause from an audience that obviously had come prepared to be enthusiastic."

When he spoke to the San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, in January, he was described as:

... apologetic and gentle in advancing his alternatives to the Administration's economic policies. McCarthy told his listeners he is not "broadening my attack on the Administration as the headlines may state."

The Jaycees gave him only polite applause and asked only two questions in a question and answer period.

He flew back to Washington after the talk, leaving some of his supporters puzzled by his lack of aggressiveness.

Richard Bergholz, the Los Angeles Times Political Writer, provided this useful early analysis of the McCarthy campaign style in formal speaking situations:

Sen. Eugene McCarthy has his own style. And the truth is, it's disturbing some of the senator's own backers.

The Minnesota senator... is a calm, unemotional speaker. He is not a Fourth-of-July orator because it's not his nature to be one. Thus his campaign speeches thus far haven't been the kind that would send his listeners charging the barricades.

A case in point:

More than 1,000 women, above-average in political sophistication made up his audience at the Beverly Hilton during his recent campaign tour. Mostly, they were his friends. They were


ready to cheer him at the drop of a bon mot. They were sorely
troubled by conditions in the world, deeply disenchanted with
President Johnson.

Speaking to his palpitating, eager-to-cheer audience,
McCarty gave them virtually nothing. No call for action, no
attack on Mr. Johnson. In his quiet, professorial tones, he
gave them a studied attack on present Vietnam war policy and
his reasons why it should be changed.

Some said later McCarthy really bombed out. He and his
advisors shrugged it off, said that is the McCarthy style and
people shouldn't expect a flag-waving speech from a man whose
style is something else.

The same thing happened, in various degrees, in some of
McCarty's other appearances in California.\(^28\)

While not agreeing with Mr. Bergholz that to give an audience "a
studied attack on present Vietnam war policy and his reasons why it
should be changed" is to give that audience "virtually nothing," one
can see quite clearly that Senator McCarthy often failed to make
converts of adult audiences. He did not deliver "flag-waving speeches"
with "attacks on Mr. Johnson" or "calls for action" and consequently,
audiences which expected them were disappointed.

The reason that McCarthy was so often unsuccessful in his public
addresses to adult audiences and so much more successful in his
television addresses may be essentially situational. It may well be
that when one dresses up, finds transportation to some location in a
downtown area or university auditorium, finds a parking place, sees

\(^{28}\) Richard Bergholz, "McCarty and a Matter of Style, Los Angeles
Times, January 17, 1968, p. 3.
enthusiastic supporters waving posters, fights a crowd, finally finds a seat and hears a rousing introduction, he expects a different effect than if he turns on his television set and settles back to hear a man who interests him. Perhaps the audience member demands intense excitement and arousal as payment for his trouble.

McCarthy was much more successful when he spoke to young audiences or those composed primarily of students. He did not usually engender the tumultuous response of, say, a Robert Kennedy; his fans treated him more as a Pied Piper who would lead them in discussions after his speaking. He was, nonetheless, quite successful with college audiences:

McCarthy turns them on with his quotations of poetry, his questioning of administration policies, his dry wit and his professorial manner. Bored daily by professors, they sit enraptured through a long and dull McCarthy dissertation of a problem, such as the forces of change in Europe.29

Two characteristics mentioned above were particularly appealing to college audiences--McCarthy's lack of cliches in literary allusions and the wit which was so successfully used to illuminate philosophical issues.

Himself a poet of widely recognized talent, McCarthy utilized literature comfortably. He did not seem to strain when he quoted and expanded from the words of Cadoc the Wise:

An ancient Irish poet, called Cadoc the Wise, in one of his writings said that no man can love his country unless

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he loves justice, and no one can love justice unless he also
has a love of learning, and no one can love learning unless
he has a love of poetry and song. You can reverse the order
and say that no one who is insensitive to poetry and song
can have respect for learning, and no one who has no respect
for learning can have real respect for justice and that no
one who does not respect for justice can, in fact, manifest
a true love for his country. We are called upon in this,
our effort, to be mindful of all of these considerations. 30

In an address at the Pfister Hotel to an audience made up
primarily of young people who had campaigned for him, McCarthy employed
the same conclusion he used for a major television address. He again
demonstrated the ability to use literary allusions rather than appear
to be including them at the behest of a speechwriter who thought each
address should have them:

This need not be a nation in anxiety and distress. This
need not be a nation of mistrust and fear; we can return to
what we have promised to be. And I would conclude with lines
from Walt Whitman which I think can describe the American of
the very near future if we are prepared to do what it has
indicated we must do; stop the war, and proceed to deal with
the problems of America and make our contribution to the needs
of the world. He said:

"I hear America singing, the varied carols I hear:
Those of mechanics--each one singing his, as it should be,
blithe and strong;
The carpenter singing his, as he measures his plank
or beam,
The mason singing his, as he makes ready for work, or leaves
off work;
The boatman singing what belongs to him in his boat--the
deck-hand singing on the steamboat deck;
The shoemaker singing as he sits on his bench--the hatter
singing as he stands;

The wood-cutter's song--the ploughboy's, on his way in the morning, or at the noon intermission, or at sundown; The delicious singing of the more--or of the young wife at work--or of the girl sewing or washing; Each singing what belongs to him or her, and to none else;"

And then he writes, speaking of the future, and speaking of all of us when he wrote this; and we speak now to the youngest among us and to those who will come after us when he said:

"Poets to come! orators, singers, musicians to come! Not to-day is to justify me, and answer what I am for;"

He said:

"But you, a new brood, native, athletic, continental, greater than before known."

He was speaking of us. And then he said--and this must be our theme:

"Arouse! Arouse--for you must justify me--you must answer."31

The second characteristic of McCarthy's formal speaking which especially appealed to students was his use of humor. Although occasionally biting or ironic, his humor in formal address was more often gentle or whimsical with only a touch of irony. Just as he used literary allusions to develop points of view, he often used humor to provide new perspectives to problems. Two examples may illustrate:

I was a little bit distressed in reading the list of committees that Senator Kennedy is supposedly setting up. In his varieties of voters, he includes the Irish. I had really thought we had made it--I did not know we were still considered a special class in America. We are setting up

31Ibid.
a subcommittee on retired left-handed pitchers from the
Three-I league. We are really working ours down. 32

In an address at Creighton University, a Jesuit school, McCarthy
developed this theme and received an extremely enthusiastic response:

I have been somewhat disturbed to note that almost
everything that the Church tried either to give up or at least
to water down at the Vatican Council has been picked up by the
Defense Department in several ways: the idea of the grace of
office; in the president a little bit of the hint of infallibility;
the idea of holy wars (I could make a whole speech on this);
the question of heresy, which the Church has said they are not
so sure of—but there is no uncertainty downtown in Washington,
they can tell you what heresy is right away; they have got a
little bit of Inquisition going; and they have developed a kind
of Index which they call "sanitizing the records" (that is better
language than the Church ever used). And I said when I began
to see these signs that I thought the real danger point would
come when they began to speak Latin. I didn't realize how soon
it would come. Because about six weeks ago, there was a story
that the Department of the Army had entered into a contract with
Douglas Aircraft to do a study for them under the title of
"Pax Americana." I think it was later than we thought. The
time had come for all of us to be concerned about this develop-
ment. /the Senator moved in the next paragraph to a serious
discussion of foreign policy decision making criteria. 33

Occasionally, McCarthy used humor merely as a means of achieving
audience rapport, as he did at the beginning of a major civil rights
address in Milwaukee:

We agreed the other night to hire or appoint three
stewardesses. One of them wants to be on the Civil Aeronautics
Board. She thinks she should be. One of them is going to take
over consumer protection from Betty Furness. She made a special

32 Ibid.
33 Address, May 13, 1968, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska.
ruling about whether you could have another drink when you pass the time zone. That is real wisdom and real insight. That is the kind of consumer protection this country needs—not the kind that you get by opening a refrigerator door. The third one, we thought we could assign her to general purposes. She was a very nice girl. 34

To be a member of a college audience attending a McCarthy speech was to be a member of a select group able to appreciate literary allusions and to understand subtle humor. McCarthy, as a public speaker recognized and challenged the intelligence of his audience.

While one unconvinced of the correctness of McCarthy's position did not find himself lifted "out of himself" as Longinus argued he should be, 35 such was not McCarthy's goal. Time and again he passed up the chance to lift the audience "out of themselves." Philip Kunhardt, reporter for Life magazine describes one such incident and provides a partial analysis:

McCarthy's campaign is cool, Bobby's is hot. That's what it comes to over and over in many different guises. And each candidate wants it just that way.

McCarthy, for example, recently elicited a wild response among young people by calling for General Hershey's removal as director of Selective Service. Afterward, he decided he would not go that route again. "It's just too easy," he said. "It's a cheap way to stir all those young people up."


Instead of firing voters up emotionally, McCarthy wants to appeal to their minds, their knowledge of the American past, their collective will. This tall, gray-haired man, clear-eyed, slightly stooped, this casual, benign-looking man with a fedora in his hand, almost strolls through his campaign. [Emphasis added]

Not until the August Madison Square Garden Rally did he allow himself to excite and truly arouse an audience. McCarthy defended his approach to political campaigning as being beneficial to the national interest. "And I think my approach is not only right," he said, "but it's good politics." McCarthy could have moved his audiences to great excitement had he chosen to do so, as one example clearly demonstrates.

In 1960, McCarthy delivered on behalf of Adlai Stevenson, what Nick Thimmesch called, "the finest nominating speech of our times," Thimmesch reports:

He spoke only from a few notes, with fervor and beauty (Do not leave this prophet without honor in his own party. Do not reject this man.) and when he finished, the convention, already locked in on John Kennedy, responded with an enormous, emotional demonstration.

"I knew it was risky to give that Stevenson speech," McCarthy recalls. "It was the wrong time and the wrong audience and it could have been badly received. But it had to be given on principle."38

One may question the nature of the principle to which McCarthy referred above. Theodore Sorensen, for example, referred to the address

37Ken Reich, "McCarthy Still High on Low Key Campaign," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1968, p. 2B
as "the cynically brilliant speech nominating Stevenson... delivered by... Senator Eugene McCarthy who was actually for Johnson."39 One may not, however, reasonably question the excellence of the speech or its demonstration that Eugene McCarthy was capable of bringing an audience to a high pitch of emotional arousal. Theodore H. White attacked the logic of McCarthy's position, arguing that John Kennedy had earned the delegate votes while Stevenson had not, but called it a superb speech:

Certainly the high point of drama in the Los Angeles Convention was the placing in nomination of Adlai E. Stevenson by Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. In magnificent voice, holding the crowd with the rhythm of his cry, toying with the crowd, letting it respond when he asked questions, McCarthy pleaded for Adlai Stevenson. "Do not reject this man," he pleaded. "Do not reject this man who has made us all proud to be Democrats. Do not leave this prophet without honor in his own party."

It was a superb speech, flawed only by the logic that held it together... .

... . . . . . . . .

... And as Eugene McCarthy concluded, the floor erupted. In from all the gates poured the demonstrators, snake-dancing, chanting, wriggling, yelling. Gold balloons burst from the ceiling and drifted over the mob, and the mob yelled: WE WANT STEVENSON... Now the chant became a drumbeat and the hall echoed rhythmically; WE WANT STEVENSON, WE WANT STEVENSON... The chairman pleaded for order; McCarthy pleaded for order; the Convention band attempted to blare above their shouting, the lights were turned out; and still the chant went on: WE WANT STEVENSON.40


Alden Whitman, biographer of Adlai Stevenson, recalls:

With the convention packed and tense, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy stepped up to the podium Wednesday night and, in a quavering voice, began the most emotional, dramatic speech of the convention.

\[ ... \]

The speech's effect was electric. The convention erupted in a screaming roar. Chanting, placard-waving demonstrators jammed the aisles while the galleries suddenly came alive with Stevenson supporters going round and round in a deafening din.

For twenty-five minutes, the bobbing, weaving demonstrators shook the convention in a wild, emotional outburst... The convention chairman pleaded for order. Senator McCarthy pleaded for order. But the pandemonium continued.\[41\]

Clearly, then, McCarthy demonstrated in 1960 and early in 1968 that, had he chosen to do so, he could have elicited emotional, frenzied responses from his audiences. Instead, McCarthy chose the rhetorical route described below by Tom Wicker:

He was unemotional, undramatic and nothing about his speech or his manner was hoked up for cheap applause or enthusiasm. He even treated his audience as if it would understand his points and allusions and respond sensibly to his ideas. He said that which he had to say, with some eloquence but no particular flourish, and then he sat down.\[42\]

What, finally, shall be the evaluation of Eugene McCarthy's speaking style? He did not habitually draw the masses of voters to him. McCarthy did not "master" new audiences as Robert Kennedy was so

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able to do. He never significantly enlarged his potential constituency from the white, middle class, intelligent, sensitive "constituency of conscience" to include the varied types of people who must support a successful national leader. If, then, his goal was to achieve a position of leadership which only he could be thought to fill competently, then some of his rhetorical choices cannot be considered as successful or wisely chosen. If, however, his goal was quite different, as the next section of this work argues, then had he chosen a different style of delivery he would have made achievement of his goal impossible and would have violated the premises that had initially catapulted him into the candidate's role. Was his goal to master listeners so that they should be forced to vote for him? Or was it partly, as will be argued, to change the expectations of the citizen concerning what a political campaign and a political campaigner ought to resemble and the role he ought to fill? The man who attempts to change values is foolhardy if he imagines that he will be the likely leader of those whom he has dared to change--that would be likely only if change were instantaneous and people were not concerned with maintaining for as long as possible their currently held value system. If the listener has not been mastered, but instead has been well taught, he will more likely be a different sort of citizen with different expectations of the politicians whom he later will choose.
The Choice of Content in Selected Speeches

An analysis of the content of several major speeches in the campaign should show whether the kind of political campaign McCarthy waged did not, in fact, become a major concern to him as he conducted his campaign. His office, when asked for transcripts of twenty-two addresses that had been reported in the news media and for seven major interviews quickly responded by sending eleven transcripts of speeches "delivered," one complete address "to be delivered," all requested interviews, including the meeting with Senator Kennedy, and thirteen "news releases" of extensive excerpts.

The speech manuscripts as "delivered" and the one "prepared for delivery" include:

1. The November 30, 1967, announcement of intent to enter the primaries.

2. March 23, 1968, A major address preceding the Wisconsin primary which was delivered at the Pfister Hotel in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.


5. April 5, 1968. Remarks at the Compton Head Start Day Center shortly after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King.

6. April 11, 1968. Two manuscripts; one of remarks "prepared" and one of remarks "delivered" for the audience at Boston University. He was introduced by Professor John Kenneth Galbraith.

7. May 13, 1968. Address at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. Address delivered the night before primary voting May 14.

8. May 18, 1968. Speech before the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the Americans for Democratic Action, a group which had been the first and major group to endorse the McCarthy candidacy.


10. July 25, 1968. Address delivered to an audience estimated at 40,000 in Fenway Park, Boston, Massachusetts. The rally was organized by Leonard Bernstein and included Pete Seeger and other entertainers.

11. August 29, 1968. Remarks at Grant Park in Chicago after the Democratic Convention to an audience that included supporters and demonstrators who had been involved in earlier confrontations. The speeches listed above were studied carefully and categories of recurring issues were set up. Jeremy Larner, one of McCarthy's
speech writers, described the way that campaign addresses may be formed:

Depending on the candidate and the occasion, texts can be important. What he stands and falls on every day, however, are the interchangeable parts of his stump speech, which he develops much as a stand-up comedian develops his "bits." Each "bit" is a piece of comment centered around fixed phrases suggested by an adviser or thought up by the candidate himself. The candidate tries out the "bit"; if it goes over, he expands it. He is constantly adding, dropping and recombining "bits" to suit the changing circumstances of the campaign.

McCarthy's bits are worth some reconstruction here, partly because, with occasional exceptions, he did not consistently use texts until he go to Oregon and even then he usually surrounded them with bits and often embellished them as he read. . . In McCarthy's case the bits are doubly significant. . . What he repeated each day was the expression of his personality and the essence of what he was offering. . .

McCarthy developed and utilized these "bits" which occasionally appeared in only slightly different form from speech to speech. Because of his literary background and skills, perhaps his delivered speeches were structured and embellished in virtually perfect paragraph form. Occasionally a "bit" could be equated with a paragraph on a one-to-one basis as in the parallel drawn between church terminology and military terminology and habit. Often, however, a "bit" would appear in a more extended form, consuming several paragraphs. The writer chose to make the paragraph the unit of consideration whether the central focus of a paragraph could be considered a complete "bit" or whether the paragraph

formed one portion of a "bit." The assumption was made that the amount of time or paragraphs spent on each "bit" could give some indication of the issues which McCarthy took to be central to communicating with the audience he faced at that time.

Each speech was read carefully several more times after the issue categories were established and a count made of the paragraphs in each speech devoted to the development of each issue or "bit." Major issues are described below, beginning with the one mentioned most often, and listed in order of the number of their appearances. A total of two hundred and twenty-two paragraphs in the eleven speeches were devoted to these issues, with thirty more paragraphs devoted to other miscellany and not tabulated as issue development.

1. The Nature and Accomplishments of the McCarthy Campaign: This issue appeared in only slightly different forms in eighty-seven of the two hundred and twenty-two paragraphs. One appropriate example occurred in Boston, April 11:

This has been in many ways—I hesitate to call it a campaign because it is just beginning to take on that character—a most unusual experiment in American politics. It was said in the beginning that we could not accomplish what we set out to do because there was no precedent

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against what we were doing, and that left the way open to all of us, particularly students, the academic profession, the more venturesome citizens of this country, and at least one politician who was prepared to take some chances. You have to be most careful of a politician who has no further ambitions because he might run for president.45

In May, at Creighton University, he described the nature of his goals as:

...there were some who said, "This is a time for a rational judgment on American policy, a judgment within the context of history and also one which attempts to apply at least what we have said for some centuries to be certain standards for moral judgment with reference to war." And we have proceeded to attempt to do that, and to call upon the country to make the same kind of judgment. Not really to present any very new facts with reference to either our domestic problems or our international problems, but simply to give the people of the country a chance within the political process to make some kind of judgment.46

McCarthy's May address to the Americans for Democratic Action provided another example of this category:

Much of the significance of what has happened, will be determined by what happens in the future, although as one commentator said early, this effort would be nothing but a footnote of history. I think it is perhaps part of the main text already, but we want to be sure that it is a part of the main text, and this means we have to commit ourselves to go all the way.47

45Address, April 11, 1968, Boston University.

46Address, May 13, 1968, at Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska.

47Address, May 18, 1968, Convention of Americans for Democratic Action.
2. Civil Rights: This issue was developed in sixty-two paragraphs and often appeared as a discussion of the four new basic rights of all people, whether black or white, to education, a home, a job, and health. His philosophy with regard to the nature of society's responsibility was perhaps most clearly presented in his Milwaukee address on March 30, 1968:

> For the very harsh fact of the matter is that the Administration is refusing to take measures which almost every informed expert has said are essential to prevent, not just future riots—because the riots are the manifestations of the great distress and the anxiety of the people—but those actions which are necessary and those steps and the progress which are necessary if the anxiety is to be relieved. One of the ancient rules of moral theology is that anyone who is in power has at least this responsibility: you cannot eliminate all conditions which may drive men to viciousness or to evil. But you at least have an obligation to try to establish such conditions that a person need not be expected to exercise a kind of heroic virtue in order to stay out of crime, or to avoid dishonesty, or antisocial behavior. Certainly we in this country have the power to establish such conditions.48

3. Domestic Issues: Domestic issues other than civil rights were categorized separately and included farm problems, the problem of stifled or irresponsible dissent, and some aspects of poverty programming. Twenty-four paragraphs were devoted to these

48Address, March 30, 1968, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
issues with fifteen of them occurring in the Wausau, Wisconsin, farm policy address:

We proposed along the way a new program having to do with setting up a feed reserve program, which would isolate from the market a certain percentage of feed grains for time of emergency or for difficult times. It was only within the last month or two of the last session of Congress that the Administration showed any real interest in that program. And this year, it has not showed any continuing interest in it.49

4. The Nature of the Ideal Political System: This category received the fourth largest number of mentions (twenty-two). The Civil Rights Speech delivered at Milwaukee on March 30 provided two useful examples:

Chesterton, the English essayist, visited this country some 40 years ago, and returned to England to write an essay in which he said that America was the only country in the world which was founded upon a creed. He said this creed is expressed with great literary clarity and also with theological and philosophical clarity, in the Declaration of Independence. That was the declaration of our belief, that all men were created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

We are involved in, I think, the first great test of the United States in history—we are called upon to prove whether we have been a kind of accident, a kind of sport, a kind of chance occurrence, without the strength or the resolution to stand the difficult test of mature nationhood; or whether, on the other hand, we will respond to this test of history by demonstrating that the good life which we claim, and which in some measure

49 Address, March 26, 1968, Wausau, Wisconsin.
we have achieved, is good not just for us, not just for white Americans or white Europeans, but that it offers the best way and the best hope for all people in all times and in all places.\(^{50}\)

5. Vietnam: The war in Vietnam was the major content in only fifteen paragraphs. In his initial announcement of candidacy, six of ten paragraphs concerned the cost of Vietnam; one of them follows:

Let me summarize the cost of the war up to this point:

--the physical destruction of much of a small, weak, nation by the military operations of the most powerful nation on this earth;

--the uprooting and fracturing of the social structure of South Vietnam, where one-fourth to one-third of the population are now refugees;

--for the United States, 15,058 combat dead and 94,469 wounded through November 25, 1967.\(^{51}\)

McCarthy's May speech to the Americans for Democratic Action dealt with the war again:

Of course we cannot say that the tide of events has been completely reversed today, but surely we can say that the drift towards escalation has been halted, or at least we hoped so until this week; that reason was given another reprieve; although we have the statements again of the Secretary of State with reference to a possible coalition government, the reports of casualties, the new announcements of increased drafts and the calling of reserves, and most recently the kind of public reprimand of the Vice-President because he dared to suggest that the National Liberation Front's views might somehow be considered in the settlement of the war in Vietnam.\(^{52}\)

\(^{50}\)Address, March 30, 1968, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

\(^{51}\)Announcement of intent to enter primaries, November 30, 1967, Washington, D.C.

\(^{52}\)Address, May 18, 1968, Convention of Americans for Democratic Action.
6. Foreign-Policy / Military Decision Making: This category, emphasized in seven paragraphs, includes references to policy making not explicitly tied to the issue of Vietnam. A fine example occurred in the McCarthy address at Creighton University on May 13:

I think that we have been developing in the Defense Department has a great influence on foreign policy. Because I think with the power there and especially with Secretary McNamara any policy question to the Defense Department, "Well, we have a policy which we might want to carry out. What do you say about contingency planning for it?" And they would say, "All right, we will do some contingency planning for it. What do you want us to plan for?" "Well," they would say, "we would like Cuba, say on Easter morning. Could you program that for us?" And, of course, very soon they would come back and say, "We have programmed it for you." So that at that point you didn't have to worry very much as to whether the policy was right or whether you really ought to carry it out because you were assured that it was going to succeed. At least, you had military assurance. And this was true with reference to Vietnam. It was programmed any number of times for success and for conclusion. I don't know whether they set a particular date. But this was more or less the way it was done: A programming for success without a sufficient analysis of whether or not the effort should even be undertaken. And I think that in a way this was—I don't say it was a fault—it was a consequence of having Secretary McNamara with the reputation he had. And I think this comes out of any one of the major automobile companies, that they are always programmed for success. You can take a bad idea like the Edsel and program it. And it is supposed to succeed. But altogether, no one of the big three companies can fail. And if you take the President of General Motors, as they took Charlie Wilson, he is programmed for success. And you take McNamara from Ford, and he is programmed for success. And when you put this on top of what you have in the Defense Department, then the consequences by way of mistakes can really be compounded. And you move into a situation in which the purpose becomes
something which develops from the process itself. Or the objective a projection of our power. Or the end which we seek something which depends upon whether or not someone says we can program the military aspect or the military factor for the achievement of this particular purpose. This whole process must be subject to a most careful, reasoned and, within historical context, more severe careful, reasoned and, within historical context, most severe re-examination in 1968 and beyond. [Emphasis added] 53

7. The Domestic Effects of Vietnam: Five times, the Senator spoke specifically of what could be accomplished domestically were it not for Vietnam, as exemplified by the following excerpt from his March 23 address in Milwaukee:

It is after all the poor and the sick and the distressed who are being called upon to pay the price of the war in Vietnam, providing most of the manpower for that war. The poor of this nation, bearing most of the manpower for that war. The poor of this nation, bearing the principal cost of it in inflation and higher interest rates, are being asked to submit to an across-the-board surtax, which gives no recognition to the progressive character of our taxes in the tradition that those who are best able to pay are called upon to pay for wars, are again denied the promise which has been held out to them year after year for at least fifteen years since the end of World War II. 54

An analysis was made of the eleven speeches briefly described above in order to determine which campaign issues were developed in them. The number of paragraphs in which each issue was emphasized was tabulated: the following totals emerged for each speech:

53 Address, May 13, 1968, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Nature of McCarthy Rights Issues</th>
<th>Civil Rights</th>
<th>Domestic Issues</th>
<th>Political Theory</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Effects of Vietnam</th>
<th>Foreign Policy Decisions</th>
<th>Total Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-30 Announc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-23 Milwaukee</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-26 Wausau, Wisc, Farm</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-30 Milwaukee Civil Rights</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-5 Compton Head Start</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>4-11 Boston-Prepared</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>4-12 Boston-Delivered</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>5-13 Creighton U.</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>5-18 ADA</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-26 Waldorf Ast.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-25 Fenway Park Boston</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-29 Grant Park</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total in Speech</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of this tabulation reveals that certain observations may be made about the Senator's choices as he spoke to widely divergent groups throughout the timespan of the campaign.

Vietnam. The first and most interesting observation to be made is that McCarthy apparently did not feel compelled to persuade the electorate that United States participation in Vietnam was unjustified. Being a candidate thought to be running out of anger at United States involvement in Vietnam, McCarthy apparently assumed that the issue needed no proof. In the three years before his candidacy, Senator McCarthy had spoken often and eloquently of misgivings concerning United States involvement in Vietnam. His record of opposition was outlined in Part II of this work. Furthermore, in his announcement of intent to enter the primaries, he detailed his analysis of what he took to be the unacceptable cost of United States involvement in Vietnam. Six of ten paragraphs of his announcement were devoted to this issue. How important he felt this issue to be to his candidacy is clarified by his concluding paragraph:

I am not for peace at any price but for an honorable, rational and political solution to this war; a solution which I believe will enhance our world position, encourage the respect of our allies and potential adversaries, which will permit us to give the necessary attention to our other commitments abroad--both military and non-military--and leave us with both resources and moral energy to deal effectively with the pressing domestic problems of the United States itself. In this total effort, I believe we can restore to this nation a clearer sense of purpose and of dedication to the achievement of that purpose.55

55Announcement to intent to enter primaries, November 30, 1967, Washington D. C.
Early in the campaign, the Senator spoke often and emphatically of the war in Vietnam. Examples are his January 11 luncheon address in Los Angeles, his January 14 address to the California Democratic State Committee, and his February 21 address to the Dane County Bar Association in Madison, Wisconsin.

Throughout the campaign his interviews concentrated on the issue of Vietnam for one obvious reason: most reporters continued to see him as primarily an anti-war candidate. For instance, as late as August 18, on ABC's Issues and Answers, twenty-six of thirty-six questions concerned McCarthy's position on Vietnam with the other ten being related to the Democratic Convention.56

As the campaign progressed, however, press releases and transcripts indicate that he came to assume that the matter of whether United States losses in Vietnam had reached an intolerable level was proved and it remained only for him to encourage the electorate to act on facts which they already accepted. In his Wausau, Wisconsin, farm policy address delivered March 26, for instance, Senator McCarthy devoted fifteen paragraphs to the question of farm policy, five paragraphs to the nature of his campaign, one to humorous jibes at Ezra Taft Benson, one to the domestic effects of Vietnam and one to the issue of the war

56ABC's Issues and Answers, August 18, 1968. Transcript provided by American Broadcasting Company.
itself. His statement in this address that did directly concern Vietnam is important and is repeated here in full:

I ask you as you approach the time to vote on next Tuesday to take into account, as did the people of New Hampshire the fact that in this campaign of mine, you are being given a chance in a kind of referendum to pass a judgment on the war itself. And I am not going to review for you what the realities are there. Because everyone here reads the reports every day. I would say that I was not an early critic of the war. I stood by the Administration. I accepted what they said and what they projected to us until late 1966, when I concluded that it had become our war; and that we could not win it; and that from that point on, we were wasting the lives of Americans, we were wasting our resources. And the prospects of achieving anything good or worthwhile, in my judgment, tended to become less and less every day. /Emphasis added/57

The underlined portion of the quotation above gives clear indication that the Senator saw little need to add his persuasive powers to what he took to be the persuasive powers of the "reports" readily available to "everyone here." His campaign was presented as an opportunity to "pass a judgment on the war itself" and he seemed to feel certain that it remained only for the audiences he faced to act on the only possible judgment that could be made about the war he had come to loathe. Throughout the campaign he assumed little responsibility for creating or directing a public judgment about Vietnam, but rather devoted his energies to providing an effective channel for the dissent he was sure would follow the "reading of reports."

57Address, March 26, 1968, Wausau, Wisconsin.
Further analysis of the Vietnam issue provides more interesting insights. Of the fifteen Vietnam paragraphs, six had occurred in his initial announcement and four more occurred in an address before the Americans for Democratic Action in May. This group probably had less need to be persuaded of the correctness of his position than any other group he addressed, except Lowenstein's Conference of Concerned Democrats. The ADA had been the first, major, and only group of like size to endorse McCarthy's candidacy, and had done so as early as February. When he discussed Vietnam in this address, he spoke of what "those of us" making the stand for peace had accomplished. He spoke to an audience he knew to be in sympathy with his Vietnam position and shared with them the pleasure at what he felt their combined efforts had accomplished.

In an address to a crowd of 40,000 at Fenway Park in Boston on July 25, the Senator devoted three paragraphs to the issue of Vietnam. In each case, however, he treated the question of the "error" of Administration policy in Vietnam as a proved fact:

And in somewhat that same spirit, we are called upon to pass judgment upon our military position, and particularly upon our involvement in the war in Vietnam. For the first time in our history, we are called upon to pass judgment not before we undertake a policy of this kind, when we might say, "We should not do it"; and not after we have carried it out and could say, "well, perhaps that was a mistake"; but to undertake to pass judgment upon it in mid-course. No other great modern democratic nation has done quite the same. But we are called upon to say in the middle of the course that we think that what we are doing is unwise, and even that it is wrong. I think that we can make this judgment. The test now is whether those who hold public office or who influence public office or who aspire to it, are prepared to show the
same measure of commitment and of courage as I think the people themselves have already rather clearly shown. . .

In other words, Senator McCarthy spoke eloquently of courses of action appropriate to those already convinced of the error of American involvement: he said that he thought "that we can make this judgment," Only seldom during the campaign and never during these selected speeches did McCarthy attempt to create the judgment where it did not already exist.

Civil Rights--McCarthy's campaign included several major "civil rights" addresses. In those speeches chosen for analysis, references to civil rights occurred in sixty-two paragraphs. Worthy of note, however, is the fact that thirty of the sixty-two references were found in one address, his March address in Milwaukee. Although his aides urged him to speak more on the issue of civil rights and to enlarge thereby his constituency, his references did not materially increase. Two factors, in addition to his refusal to compartmentalize the American people, seem relevant. It is likely that his speeches may have been intended on occasion to concern themselves explicitly with civil rights and then, in their delivery, the focus was changed. A comparison of one speech "delivered" with the speech "prepared for delivery" would bear out this observation. The speech McCarthy "prepared" for delivery in Sargent Gymnasium at Boston University April 11, contained thirty-two paragraphs.

58 Address, July 25, 1968, Fenway Park, Boston.
thirty-one of which were devoted exclusively to the issue of civil rights. As "delivered," however, the character of the speech changed remarkably, with only sixteen of thirty paragraphs devoted to the issue of civil rights, and twelve paragraphs devoted to "The nature and accomplishments of the McCarthy campaign":

In any case, the campaign has moved along, mobilizing the general concern that was abroad in this country only four or five months ago that somehow the country had come apart, that it was unravelling, that instead of rather clear lines and threads we had become a nation of pulp or felt in which no clear or positive decision would be made. And in fact a general feeling existed that no decision would be made even though it could have been made. A loss of sense of purpose and a loss of any sense of priorities for this country, and a general feeling that the history of this nation [was] beyond any clear, rational or reasonable control.

I think that it is quite clear now, by virtue of what has happened in two primaries and other indications, that changes have taken place in this country that this nation has made a decision with reference to the war in Vietnam. A public judgment has been passed.59

When McCarthy faced audiences, particularly college audiences, he frequently was tempted to depart from his planned address, which might advance his goals as determined by his planners but which would not meet his needs of the moment. He preferred to speak of the accomplishments of his campaign, and it may be assumed that college audiences who had participated in that campaign preferred that subject as well.

Another contrast appears between the speech "prepared" and the speech "delivered." In length and form the addresses differ remarkably.

59 Address, April 11, 1968, Boston University.
One "prepared" address consisted of thirty-two brief paragraphs and contained approximately 1,650 words. As delivered, however, the thirty paragraphs averaged 165 words or were approximately three times the length of those in his manuscript. The length of the entire address approached 5,000 words. Thus when the Senator faced this audience, his emphasis changed, probably because of the excitement of his listeners and his corresponding exuberance. His address trebled in length and his paragraphs were considerably more complex and developed than in his planned address.

Nature of the Campaign—If the distinction between intent and event at Sargent Gymnasium occurred as well in other McCarthy addresses, the effect of the audience on the orator is effectively demonstrated. This phenomenon may account for the fact that approximately one-third of the paragraphs in the major speeches analyzed above (eighty-seven of two hundred and fifty-one) emphasized primarily the nature of the accomplishments or intents of the McCarthy campaign. Of course these paragraphs related the nature of his campaign to other national issues, but more than one-third of his speaking time was spent recalling the hardships of this campaign and describing the accomplishments of it. This rhetorical choice had three consequences:

In the first place, it must have been pleasing to savor the knowledge that perhaps the campaign had made a difference in American political life, had been more than "a footnote" as the Senator said. He could not win, and probably did not wish to win, the office he ostensibly sought. The opportunity remained, nevertheless to savor the effort.
itself and to divide the enjoyment with any who had shared in the campaign. If the nature of the present campaign were made clear and the pleasure in participation shared, then the style of this campaign would likely affect the style of future campaigns.

Secondly, by emphasizing the nature of the campaign, McCarthy worked toward the accomplishment of a clear goal: the creation of faith in institutionalized dissent on the part of the previously alienated young. Nine of eleven paragraphs of his final address in Grant Park were devoted to the nature and accomplishments of the campaign and when asked whether he had gone there to prevent the kids from becoming exiles, McCarthy responded, "Maybe they are exiles. I went there to prevent them from becoming outcasts."60 In that address he repeated his goals and described future efforts which needed to be made:

I was prepared to stay with these issues as long as I had any constituency. And I see I still have a constituency. We will press forward to get a change of policy on the war, to demilitarize the American foreign policy, to demand selective conscientious objection for this country. We will push forward on poverty, and against racism, in this nation.

......

So this is where we are, the last of August in 1968 (I don't want to say that this is necessarily the most critical year in the history of the country; but I think it is) to determine the course of this country as best we can. I will not recommend to you, because you make your own judgment. But I tell you what I am going to do. My effort will be to elect as many members of the United States

Senate as I can find who subscribe to my position; to re-elect people like Wayne Morse; and to elect candidates like Paul O'Dwyer from New York and Harold Hughes from Iowa, who stood up for me last night. And I know that Julian Bond, if he were a candidate, we could run him for the Senate all the way. . . I hesitate to ask you to rely upon the United States Senate to save the Republic, because you might have some reservations about that. And I have doubts; I have some. But the fact is that we have come in the last two years in that body, with people like Senator Fulbright and others, to begin to assert the Constitutional role of the United States Senate. And if you can help us elect ten more Senators of our point of view, we will determine the foreign policy with reference to the war in Vietnam for either Richard Nixon or Hubert Humphrey. It will be a policy which you support and which I support.61

In the emotional turmoil of the day of this speech, one senses perhaps more clearly than at any other time in the campaign the strong fear that the institution might not be moveable; one also senses the desperate desire to persuade his young supporters to give the existing institutions one last try before choosing anarchy.

Finally, the consequence of devoting this amount of speaking time to the nature and past accomplishments of his campaign may have limited its future accomplishments. New listeners and potential supporters may have wanted more analysis of issues relevant to them. Surely they cared less about what the candidate had accomplished philosophically, than what he would accomplish concretely. How would he raise money to be funneled into poverty programs? How would he respond to some of the more threatening forms of dissent? How would he secure peace in and for South Vietnam?

61 Address, August 29, 1968, Grant Park, Chicago.
Since he did not project the energetic activist image of a Robert Kennedy, skeptics seemed more in need of specific program plans from McCarthy than from other candidates.

To have been elected on his own terms, Senator McCarthy would necessarily have been required to secure the trust of alienated young people by demonstrating that change could be accomplished by orderly processes within the established political system. The time he spent describing the nature and accomplishments of his campaign contributed to that end.

To have been elected, however, his potential constituency had to grow to include satisfied white adults and totally disillusioned members of minority races. These groups were not likely to be reached on the basis of lengthy and subtle references to the nature and accomplishments of the McCarthy campaign.

The Senator had no time, and probably no inclination, to function fully in both capacities. Consequently, he spent his largest single effort in communicating with those who already looked to him for leadership—those testing the American political system.
Chapter 7

OTHER RHETORICAL ELEMENTS IN THE CAMPAIGN

Senator McCarthy's Family in the Campaign

The smallest group of McCarthy campaigners, his family, added much to the campaign. His wife, Abigail Quigley McCarthy, herself an author and teacher, assisted her husband throughout the campaign even though she was ill most of the year.

One technique designed to make the most of the various talents of the Senator and his wife included arrangements to attend numerous social functions in one evening. The Senator normally arrived first at each function, socialized and made a brief speech; as he finished speaking, his wife would be scheduled to arrive and together they would socialize with those attending. After a brief period, the Senator could leave for the next reception and his wife would remain at the reception for a time doing what she called, "cleaning up after him." She said she felt that people would often ask her questions they felt shy about asking her husband. Referred to as possessing a quality of "dynamic calm," Mrs. McCarthy campaigned with a restrained passion which made the phrase meaningful. When she felt physically able, she


2Ibid.

engaged in strenuous campaigning, including major speaking engagements, interviews with media representatives, question-answer periods with audiences in which most answers began with, "Gene feels we should..."\(^4\) and conferences with community leaders. Mrs. McCarthy's April 18 visit to Kansas City, Missouri, for example, included each of these activities.\(^5\) Before her husband's announcement of candidacy, Mrs. McCarthy had accepted a speaking engagement in Kansas City to discuss the background of the United States involvement in Vietnam. After his announcement of candidacy however, her schedule was expanded so greatly that activities lasted until late in the evening. The day began with a major address at the Kansas City War Memorial Building. Although her speech was restrained and her voice soft, her passionate commitment to oppose further United States involvement in Vietnam was apparent. She spent little time on the McCarthy campaign except to declare that support for the anti-war effort, which she saw as the base of her husband's campaign, was widespread. She repeated comments made to her by the young people who came to help with the campaign and of adults who were as dedicated as she to reversing present American foreign policy tendencies. Her low-keyed approach to this speaking effort of approximately forty minutes reinforced her image as a poised, utterly committed campaigner for an end to the war in Vietnam via the campaign of her husband.

\(^4\) Miller, p. 16.

\(^5\) The writer spent April 18, 1968, attending each of the events described except the luncheon.
The next major event of the day was a luncheon at the Wishbone Restaurant to which leaders of minority factions from greater Kansas City had been invited. This meeting was not advertised in any way and was held to generate interest among minority ethnic groups for McCarthy with the hope that these leaders would make useful suggestions. The meeting was closed to press coverage and admission was by special invitation only. The luncheon seems to prove that many who were involved in the McCarthy campaign were deeply concerned about the lack of minority support given their candidate—whether or not the Senator himself felt it wise to campaign exclusively to the minority groups.

Throughout the day, her two aides, Mrs. Susan Perry and Mr. Terry Trahan, worked diligently to conserve Mrs. McCarthy's energy as she proceeded through the incredibly tight schedule. Afternoon plans included a news conference at which she performed with grace and confidence. Without hesitation she answered all questions in the name of her husband. She admitted that she had hesitated each time her husband had chosen to seek political position and that each time she had been wrong.

Her evening schedule provided for an address to the Greater Kansas City McCarthy for President club. This time, in a strictly political speech, Mrs. McCarthy spoke after several young men who had worked as canvassers in earlier McCarthy primaries. She appealed for more young people to join the effort and spoke primarily of the successful effort at national reconciliation now being made by her
husband. Again, her presentation was soft and barely audible but compelling because of her obvious total commitment.

If her husband often seemed to doubt that any real improvement was possible in the American political system until it had deteriorated completely, if he seemed occasionally cynical and detached about the efficacy of persuasion, Mrs. McCarthy seemed never to share these philosophical tendencies. Nor could she find refuge in his appreciation of humorous aspects of what she took to be the horror of Chicago. During their September vacation in France, reporters questioned both McCarthys, and at one point in the exchange:

Mrs. McCarthy, her face puckered in distress, spoke of how the police had entered the rooms of the McCarthy volunteer workers in the Conrad Hilton on the morning of August 30 and clashed with the youths.

"It's too bad they didn't get a picture—all the kids in the lobby," the Senator said. His voice was very low and he shut his eyes for a while.

Then, maybe in an attempt to take Mrs. McCarthy's mind off that morning, he tried to joke.

"A lot of the kids were awake and playing bridge before it happened," he said. "One girl told me later that she held a 21 point hand when the police burst in. That is like shooting up the saloon when you have a straight flush."

Mrs. McCarthy didn't laugh.

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Two McCarthy daughters, Ellen and Mary, campaigned extensively for their father but in very different ways. Ellen, 20, a Foreign Service major at Georgetown University, appeared at various "Eugene" discotheques—nightspots usually rented for a night, with the "cover charge" going to the campaign and food or drink money going to the management. She danced, sold campaign buttons, and visited. This campaign style contrasted sharply with the considerably more direct campaign techniques used by her sister Mary.

Mary McCarthy, 19, dropped out of Radcliffe for a year to help with her father's campaign. She often traveled with her mother, but later in the campaign traveled alone and proved herself to be an able speaker. Her special interest was in securing invitations to appear on interviews so that she might explain the issues.

The poised young woman performed routine tasks such as speaking at receptions and has generally not generated any major political news. But she has received much attention, especially on radio and TV talk shows.

"It's free time, after all," she noted happily after several broadcasts with moderators who always appear slightly dazed when talking with a pretty girl who grew up with a knowledge of little-known congressional procedures and discusses her father's record in detail, right down to the last rider on an amendment.


Exceedingly outspoken and direct, Mary presented an entirely different image from that presented by her mother or sister Ellen. She did not hesitate to criticize, directly and strongly, the press, President Johnson, Senator Kennedy, "political hacks," Ronald Reagan and various other institutions. Of Ronald Reagan, Governor of California, Mary said in a California interview, "A joke. Another Goldwater. That would be a disaster, and besides, I don't think Reagan will be heard from this year."\(^9\) Mary spent much of her time working with the volunteers and because of her preference for direct language was especially able to communicate with them.

By April, she was saying that she had forgotten whether she had been largely responsible for her father's decision to compete.\(^10\) She worked diligently at a variety of tasks, but by June she said, in a philosophical echo of her father, "If I had known things were going to get this serious, I never would have gone in."\(^11\) Other McCarthy relatives acted as campaign assistants, including his cousin, Frank McCarthy, and niece, Mary Beth, who took walking tours, attended parties in the Senator's place and helped in any way they could. The primary familial campaigning, however, was done by Mrs. McCarthy, Mary and Ellen.

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\(^9\)Ibid.
\(^10\)Ibid.
Staff Structure and Change

On January 7, 1968, Joseph C. Harsch asked Senator McCarthy on ABC's Issues and Answers:

MR. HARSCH: Senator you have spoken about your campaign. I am intrigued by the mechanics of how a man can possibly get a campaign going when the entire vast machinery of the Democratic party belongs to someone else.

What have you got so far? What is your organization? Is it anything more than Blair Clark and a telephone?

SENATOR McCARTHY: Oh, we have got more than Blair Clark and a telephone. We have got five or six assistants.

MR. HARSCH: Five or six assistants here in Washington?

SENATOR McCARTHY: Here in Washington, and I suppose we have 20 or 30 volunteers who are helping us answer mail every day here in Washington. We have got a formal organization in Massachusetts which has a director and is set up. We have one in Wisconsin with headquarters in at least two cities. We will have one in California at least six months before there is any primary in California.

MR. HARSCH: What sort of machinery do you have in New Hampshire?

SENATOR McCARTHY: We have only announced there, you know, about four days ago, but we have a corps of about 100 people who we have been talking to for about a month who are now organizing and it has good balance. It has party people; it has some academic people; it has some labor people.

Three months after these remarks about organizational structure of the McCarthy campaign, the Senator said in Wisconsin:

We may not be well organized at the top, as I have said, but we are the best organized at the bottom that this country has ever seen. From now on at the top we are not going to appoint anyone except as acting officer. We can lose an acting
person and it makes no trouble. I may be an acting
candidate until next November.12

At the close of the campaign McCarthy was more succinct: "The organization
was not much good but the people in it were great."13 The situation
described by all three statements above has some humorous aspects and
may have solidified the non-professional image many people involved in
the campaign desired. Top organization positions were held by dedicated
and sometimes effective men. Howard Stein, president of the Dreyfus Fund,
was the finance manager;14 Parker Donham, Press Secretary and top aide
at twenty-two, had dropped out of Harvard and shaved his beard in order
to assist McCarthy;15 Blair Clark, McCarthy's Campaign Chairman, was a
former CBS News Director whose only campaign experience was being Press
Director of the Harriman for President Committee in 1952;16 and Curtis
Gans, thirty-one years old, directed the entire volunteer organization
until he left the campaign in June.17

Below these top aides and directors, the next level of campaign
organizations consisted of the numerous "Coalitions for. . ." and

12 ABC's Issues and Answers, Television interview show. Transcript
provided by ABC, January, 1968.

13 McCarthy speech at Sheraton Schroeder Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
March 30, 1968. Transcript provided by McCarthy for President.

14 Emerson, p. 37.

15 Ibid.

16 Saul Pett, "Cool Words on Hot Issues," Kansas City Star,
April 7, 1968, p. 10G.

17 Andrew Kopkind, "The McCarthy Campaign," Ramparts, March, 1968,
p. 52.
"McCarthy for President Clubs" which formed throughout the country, usually in University towns. The organization of this campaign until June was described perhaps romantically by Rafe Conte, a Loyola student: "The disorganization is the beauty of this kind of campaign. There's a lot of creativity. Techniques are adapted to the area involved." Conte's view does make sense in terms of the early stages of the campaign when funds were short and it was necessary to place primary emphasis on exposure of the McCarthy name and image.

Curt Gans organized the volunteer effort and during the first crucial months his planning achieved the goals of establishing McCarthy's image, making his candidate recognizable to the public, and attracting funds. His plan for the latter part of the campaign, however, was "to continue building his volunteer organization as a weapon of massive public pressure on the Democratic convention through petitions and public outcry culminating in huge demonstrations both inside and outside the Chicago convention." Such tactics could not be depended on to influence the delegates, however, and might as easily have repelled as attracted them. When the time had come to change tactics, McCarthy chose Thomas Finney, a forty-three year old Washington lawyer, to direct the latter

19Ibid.
part of the campaign. Hired two weeks before the California primary, Finney began immediately to attempt to project a more sophisticated image of the McCarthy campaign. To achieve this effect, he summarily pulled a virulently anti-Kennedy full-page advertisement after it had run for only one edition in the Los Angeles Times. He hired several expert copywriters from the Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach advertising agency in New York and brought them to San Francisco to whip his lagging and confused media campaign into shape.

After Kennedy's murder, Finney rejected the Gans strategy in favor of virtually total concentration on direct pursuit of Convention delegates, particularly those previously committed to the late Senator. Although several workers had left during the campaign, Clark and Donham remained with McCarthy to the end. Donham's remarks long after the convention provide insight into the fervor of several of the people who gave the campaign what direction it had:

"We haven't won yet, said Donham, "but they lost."

"What you saw this year was the dying gasp of a bunch of bosses, hacks and bums. Four years from now we'll be running that party," He repeated the prediction for emphasis, "We'll be running that party."


22Ibid.


STAFF RESPONSE TO THE ISSUE OF CAMPAIGNING FINANCING. At the close of the campaign, Blair Clark recalled collecting the first $20,000 and handing it out to the young workers in New Hampshire. "I thought then that would be the McCarthy budget for the year," he said.\(^{25}\) The magnitude of the shock he must have felt must have been staggering as the campaign continued and cost became one of the primary limiting issues. The estimated cost of a single statewide mailing in California, for instance, was $700,000.\(^{26}\) Fund raising ultimately became one controlling factor in the choice of persuasive techniques in the campaign and, as such, warrant some consideration.

Senator McCarthy began working to raise money as early as January when he spent six days in California attempting to raise between $80,000 and $100,000. E. W. Kenworthy reported that primarily because of the "passion gap" he supposedly presented, however, McCarthy was able to raise only about half of the goal.\(^{27}\) Blair Clark later complained that even the pledges which were secured usually did not arrive in cash. As a result, ten days before New Hampshire, the campaign "had insufficient funds to pay a printer; there wasn't even postage money in the house."\(^{28}\)


After the New Hampshire primary, donations increased considerably, however, and roughly $400,000 was the sum allotted to the Wisconsin primary. A single day's mail in McCarthy's New York office occasionally netted as much as $30,000 in the first excitement over New Hampshire.  

The Indiana confrontation with Senator Kennedy was more costly than Wisconsin with McCarthy's finance chairman, Howard Stein, admitting that the final cost of their Indiana campaign would approximate $500,000. If the word "admitted" sounds too dramatic, it is well to remember that during the campaign the question of who was trying to "buy" each primary and the ultimate nomination became an issue in virtually each race. In Indiana, for instance, Kennedy's advertising agency said that Kennedy would probably spend between $15 million and $18 million in his nationwide campaign, including $3 million in Indiana. Although Kennedy quickly denied this figure, both he and McCarthy were charged by the state Democratic chairman, Gordon St. Angelo, with spending $2 million each in order to "buy" Indiana.

In May, Rose Kennedy, the Senator's mother was more candid when she said, "It's our own money and we're free to spend it any way we

29 Ibid.


32 Ibid.
please," and continued, "It's part of this campaign business. If you have money, you spend it to win. And the more you can afford, the more you'll spend."34 In striking contrast to the affluence felt by Kennedy staffers, McCarthy assistants were by this time occasionally going without paychecks and sometimes existing on $5 per day for expenses.35

During April and May, "Eugene" cabarets brightened the fund picture considerably, some weeks bringing $11,500 into the campaign treasury. By now, major centers had opened in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and St. Paul.36 Besides engaging in lively inter-table political repartee themselves, nightclubbers were able to watch performances by entertainers such as Eartha Kitt, Tony Randall, Larry Blyden, Robert Vaughan, Theodore Bikel, Woody Allen, Diahann Carroll, Simon and Garfunkel, Walter Matthau, the Paul Newmans and Dustin Hoffman for an admission fee ranging from $3 to $5 plus drinks.37

Other original techniques were used to raise money and to get attention for the campaign. One such event was the "cook in for McCarthy" held at Arthur's discotheque in New York City where three hundred people

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
paid $25 each to watch Michael Field teach actresses to make omelets and to dance to an all-girl rock band. Joanne Woodward expressed her preference for this sort of event to fund raising efforts which included "the inevitable speeches and then the thing at the end where everyone asks for money. Ugh."  

By early May, in spite of these efforts, the McCarthy campaign was reportedly $100,000 in debt which might have been no major cause for alarm had the candidate been backed by the Democratic party. McCarthy creditors were impatient and hesitated to extend credit to what still appeared to many of them an uncoordinated, undependable, volunteer effort. 

The first of two major McCarthy rallies in Madison Square Garden was held in May. With the help of "a mass of other entertainers," it raised $300,000. Although this sum sounds large, it assumes more realistic proportions when it is measured in terms of the phenomenal cost of campaigning. Gerald Hill, McCarthy's California campaign manager, estimated that the California campaign alone would require $100,000 for administrative expenses and "up to a million to cover television, radio, and newspaper advertising costs." 

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38Maxine Cheshire, "Eggheads Try Omelet Art at Senator McCarthy 'Cook-in,'" Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1968, p. 8E.


By July, the McCarthy staff sought to cut costs by "furloughing" seventy-five workers, most of them younger campaigners. Most of them insisted on staying with the campaign, however, even without the food allowance.\(^{43}\)

Two rallies held in August represent the high points of McCarthy fund raising. The St. Louis Rally was attended by 12,500 people and an additional 2,000 people listened outside.\(^{44}\) The emotional and financial peak of the campaign occurred August 15. Called, "M Night" this night saw 20,000 people gathered at Madison Square Garden and 160,000 more people at rallies throughout the country who were reached by closed circuit television. They cheered the McCarthy effort and contributed emotional and financial support. Campaign funds were increased that night by pledges and gifts of $2 million.\(^{45}\) Admission to the Garden was by ticket, ranging in price from $3 to $100.\(^{46}\)

Two weeks before the Democratic Convention, McCarthy seemed to come alive in his Madison Square Garden speech, again demonstrating passion and enthusiasm in his return to the issue of Vietnam. "This is my real campaign style," he said. "I've just been giving lectures for

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\(^{45}\)Ibid.

the last six months."47 This comment about his campaign style must have proved ironic to those workers who had been begging for a more aggressive style in order to mobilize emotional and financial support during the past arduous months.

The Children's Crusade: Coming of Age in the Sixties

The thousands of young volunteers who flocked to the McCarthy campaign became prime contributors to the effort to advance his candidacy. These volunteers became simultaneously a major motivating force behind his candidacy: the Senator said of them in a May 11 interview with Garry Moore, "My one honest fear--if it appeared that I had abandoned the cause, the embitterment would be something I do not plan to let happen."48

"Do you realize what this means?" one excited college senior asked his parents the day after Senator McCarthy announced his candidacy. "I can cut my hair and shave my beard. I can go straight."49 His enthusiasm was shared by thousands and thousands of students who came for a weekend, a week, a semester or a year in order to do what they could for the McCarthy campaign. Their contribution was recognized and articulated by Richard Nixon in May just after the Indiana primary. He

47 Ibid.
48 Television interview with Garry Moore on the Nebraska Television Network. Shown throughout the week of May 11, 1968.
said that McCarthy might have been knocked out of the race in Indiana
"except for one thing McCarthy has going for him. . .that neither Kennedy
or Humphrey has and that is a very sincere volunteer effort." 50

They came from varied backgrounds with one fairly common
denominator: most had at least at one time been college students.
Many of the volunteers were the sons or daughters of leaders in various
phases of American life, and represented both political parties. Among
these were:

Edmond Brown, Jr., son of the former Governor of California;
Jim and Ann Hart, son and daughter of Senator Philip Hart of
Michigan; Jessica Tuchman, daughter of author Barbara Tuchman;
Katy Koyle, daughter of a Wisconsin federal judge; Tom Saltonstall,
son of a Boston city councilman; Mark Frankena, son of a professor
at the University of Michigan and a member of the National
Humanities Foundation; David Flatley, son of a retired Vice-Admiral;
James Roosevelt, grandson of the late President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt; Paul Moore, III, son of the Right Reverend Paul Moore,
Jr., Suffragan Bishop, Episcopal Diocese of Washington; Hal
Wilde, grandson of the late Wisconsin Senator, Alexander Wilde;
Eleanor Vliet Lindsay, daughter of the Mayor of New York City;
and Greg Craig, son of an Assistant Secretary of H.E.W. 51

James Reston wrote of these young people, "The Humphrey managers
can deal with the Nixon managers, they can deal with the Kennedy delegates,
and even convince Johnson that they should state their own independent

50 Don Walton, "Nixon Predicts R.F.K. Win here," The Lincoln Star,
May 9, 1968, p. 22.

51 "Mrs. McCarthy Praises Woman And Defends Young People," Press
release from Women for McCarthy, March 26, 1968.
views; but many of them have trouble dealing with their own children, who prefer McCarthy's speeches to Humphrey's."52

These students were joined by others from all over the country of varied interests, which caused commentator Saul Pett to ask:

In which other campaign headquarters can you find vote canvassers being organized by a young Ph.D. from Columbia whose specialty is Chinese theology? Or an Iowa mathematician stuffing envelopes and wondering aloud if there isn't a more efficient way?53

They worked in various capacities, chief among them being individual canvassing. The operations came to be organized almost along military lines, becoming more and more effective as they gained experience. Godfrey Sperling recalled:

I sat in the youth—run McCarthy headquarters in the Wisconsin hotel and marveled over the way these students have put together an effective political operation.

Without much advice from professionals, they are having to improvise. But, in a most orderly way, the incoming volunteers were being dispatched into various parts of the city for door-to-door campaigning.

The plan called for a visit to be made at every residence in Milwaukee. And by the end of the weekend this "saturation" undertaking was well under way.54

Since most student volunteers were willing to "come clean for Gene," the canvassing technique was the chief avenue by which the


53Pett, "Cool Words," p. 10G.

youngsters came into contact with the public. McCarthy planners realized that his campaign must not project an image of being composed of "irresponsible hippies." Some "Directions for Canvassers" excerpts indicate steps taken to avoid this image:

**Dress**

Boys wear semi-formal dress (i.e. at least a tie) and have their hair neatly cut and combed and be clean shaven. Girls wear skirts.

The object here is to **look straight** and therefore impressive to the voting public.

If you have McCarthy buttons wear them, but wear only McCarthy buttons.

If it's cold, dress warmly.

Bring a clipboard, or its equivalent and a pen. \(^{55}\)

Frank Wagner of the Kansas City McCarthy-for-President Club was more demanding of his canvassers, "The word is clean up for Gene. If you're a boy, wear a white shirt, coat and tie when you go door-to-door. If you're a girl, keep your skirt reasonably long--and wear shoes." \(^{56}\)

Complete directions for canvassers included a form of a programmed interview with alternative courses of action depending upon each response. Until President Johnson's withdrawal, more specific questions were recommended, "Which would you prefer as the Democratic nominee for

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\(^{55}\)Mimeographed instructions provided early McCarthy canvassers,

president, Eugene McCarthy or Lyndon Johnson?" By the time of the Nebraska primary, however, emphasis was placed on indirect analysis, as the instructions for Nebraska canvassers demonstrate:

... Use a soft sell and be very polite. Tell the voter how important he and his vote are—especially if you are from a state where there is no primary. You must be alert and sensitive to the interests of the home: draft age sons? unemployment? education?

During the course of the conversation try to determine indirectly the voter's attitude toward McCarthy. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD YOU ASK HIM WHO HE WILL VOTE FOR.57

After canvassers turned in their analyses, a voter was classified for further "treatment" if it was thought that his vote might be won for McCarthy. If he asked questions that the volunteer was unable to answer, the voter received a call from headquarters with the answer. He was also reminded of the primary voting date and was offered a ride. An attempt was made to reach every registered voter. The McCarthy organization claimed that in Indiana they nearly reached that goal.

Although canvassing was the major responsibility delegated to the young volunteers, numerous other service opportunities were opened to those unwilling to gamble their beards or sartorial image on the chance that they could affect their elders. These volunteers were relegated to the "back rooms" and given tasks that included running mimeograph machines, addressing envelopes, drawing precinct maps for canvassers,
typing answers, calling voters who had questions, calling voters who
leaned toward McCarthy's candidacy and organizing sleeping quarters
with local people for out-of-town volunteers. Staffers made extensive
efforts to utilize in some capacity everyone who offered to help,
including "a shy, 16-year-old high school dropout, a boy who had been
diagnosed by his collegiate boss as very nonverbal. He was given a
job appropriate to his personality--running a mimeograph machine in a
hotel bathroom."58

These volunteers, heterogeneous in ability and background,
provided an astounding amount of assistance in the campaign. Some of
these students may have been involved simply as a "lark," but most of
them worked prodigiously. A sign posted at four p.m. one morning in
Nebraska provides an indication of the extent of their efforts:

If you've just been working 24 hours, keep it up.
If you've not slept for four days, go sleep.
In between, do what you want to.

Toothose who did not choose to contribute to the organized
effort on behalf of McCarthy, several other options were open and
utilized. Two young Indiana volunteers, Dinah Yessne and Bobbie Kramer,
originated the idea of a "travelling storefront." They covered over
5000 miles in Indiana's 8th Congressional District in an Econoline

58 Pett, "Cool Words," p. 10G.
Van christened, "Gene's Machine," loaded with campaign literature. Later the technique was expanded; ten mini-buses were used in Nebraska. Buses were used especially to reach towns which were not reached by any other aspect of the campaign.59

In small towns throughout the country, volunteers demonstrated perhaps more dedication than anywhere else as they manned the loneliest vigils of all, the headquarters in such places as Nebraska City and Auburn, Nebraska. Two young workers had been with the campaign since the Wisconsin primary and manned one office in Nebraska City. They had great difficulty getting materials, but then they had little need of them, since they said that only on rare days did they have more than two visitors. They did what they could to coordinate volunteer canvassers who arrived on weekends and carried the cause as they saw fit.60

McCarthy "headquarters" in Auburn, Nebraska, was located in an abandoned service station. The young girl who lived there temporarily and slept inside on a bedroll had been with the campaign in like capacity through the Wisconsin and Indiana primaries. She had never met the Senator and was quite excited at the prospect that she might have the chance to see him in Nebraska before the primary. She worked alone in a town with virtually no McCarthy sentiment and seemed proud to be found

59 "Mini-Busing for Gene," publicity release provided by McCarthy for President, Lincoln, Nebraska.

60 Interviews with campaign workers in their various "offices," May 11, 1968.
capable to serve in this capacity. This girl epitomized the faith placed in McCarthy by his volunteers. Such dedication compelled him to continue the campaign with whatever means he had although he had no chance of winning the presidency. 61

From the beginning, student efforts had contributed much to the McCarthy campaign. Thousands of students had come to New Hampshire to draw attention to the campaign and to sway the voters of that state to McCarthy. Many continued to come for weekend work, with 3,500 reporting from all over the country two weekends before the Wisconsin voting 62 and over 7,000 coming the last weekend before the primary—theese in addition to those simultaneously at work in Indiana. 63 As the May 7 Indiana primary approached, students became fewer as they began to concentrate on preparing for final examinations—some in order to stay exempt from the draft and the war in Vietnam which they so deplored. After Indiana, when campaign technique no longer depended entirely on student canvassing, they continued to contribute to the development of the McCarthy campaign image. Saul Pett described their contribution as "the infantry and the excitement, the legwork and the flavor of this campaign." 64 Their contribution of excitement, flavor and image was as important to the

61 Ibid.
63 Sperling, p. 4.
64 Pett, "Cool Words," p. 10G.
campaign in some ways as their legwork, because it made dissent respectable for many who otherwise would have opposed the campaign simply because they viewed dissent as not respectable. Most found it difficult to see only subversion and threat in a campaign characterized by the work of some of these young people. Oregonians responded especially well to the campaign, and the following description of McCarthy Headquarters in Portland provides some insights into the reason. Subversion would be hard to conceptualize in a headquarters where "downstairs there is a nursery where young coeds are watching over young children while equally young mothers work upstairs. . . And a reporter pushing in for the first time is brushed aside by three barefoot girls trilling out a song as they head for the elevator that doesn't work."65

Young volunteers provided the spirit, the focus, the image and the daily labor of Senator McCarthy's campaign. That they placed such a burden on him thereby was a price he was willing to pay for as long as he was able.

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PART IV

AFTER THE FACT:

McCARTHY'S INTENT AND EFFECT
INTRODUCTION

Does a man enter the race for the presidency in order to become the president? The answer may be "No" and Eugene McCarthy may be an example of such a man. The goal of this section, therefore, will be to explore alternative justifications for Senator McCarthy's announcement of intent to "enter the primaries," his continuance of the race through the primaries, repeated reference to techniques he chose to accomplish his goals, and the effects of these choices.

In his statement of November 30, 1967, the Senator nowhere said, even for the sake of form, that he intended to "seek the presidency"; rather he announced that he would "enter the Democratic primaries in Wisconsin, Oregon, California and Nebraska." The only other reference to his plan was the announcement of "my decision to challenge the President's position," which clearly could be a reference to the President's position on Vietnam rather than a commitment to seek the position of President of the United States. While the Senator said much later in the campaign that he was a serious candidate for the Office of the Presidency, it is the feeling of this writer that the momentum of his followers and the intensity of their commitment required these statements and that his contest was initially waged for the benefit of the Establishment rather than against the Establishment.

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His decision to continue the race will thus be examined later in this section. To what ends, then, did Senator McCarthy begin a campaign on November 30, 1967? He presented a generalized answer in various speeches throughout the campaign as he talked of the "best kind of unity." McCarthy said he sought to draw a response that would not:

...be in terms of membership in a special bloc or in a defined group within America; it must be intensely and particularly a personal one in which we call upon everyone...to be as fully responsible, and that means as fully political, as he possibly can be. And in so doing we can achieve a genuine unity, first of all a unity of purpose as we seek to accomplish what we judge must be done.2

This section of the work thus will develop the thesis that the McCarthy goal was the achievement of "the right kind of unity" in this country. It will be further contended that McCarthy recognized this unity could occur if two simultaneous movements occurred: dissent must be brought into legitimate channels and the established political order must be made responsive to this appropriately channeled dissent.

Senator McCarthy referred to his goal of a less angry and divided population in his initial statement of willingness to enter four primaries:

There is growing evidence of a deepening moral crisis in America: discontent, frustration, and a growing disposition to extra-legal—if not illegal—manifestations of protest.

I am hopeful that a challenge may alleviate the sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics and of American government. On college campuses especially, but also among other thoughtful adult Americans, it may counter the growing sense of alienation from politics which is currently reflected in a tendency to withdraw in either frustration or cynicism, to talk of non-participation and to make threats of support for a third party or fourth party or other irregular political movements.

However one refers to this goal, whether to provide a respectable channel for dissent, to institutionalize dissent, or to protect established political two-party traditions, the accomplishment of this goal should increase institutional attention to the unsatisfied constituency and strengthen the American political system. The unifying issue chosen was the one McCarthy identified as having caused the alienation as well as one about which he had long cared deeply—United States participation in the Vietnamese conflict. In the sense

3 Announcement of Candidacy.
that many people first became aware of their political helplessness only when they disagreed with the government over this issue, McCarthy chose his vehicle well; one fundamentally important voting segment, minority populations, had recognized the helplessness earlier in their battles to achieve their civil rights. To the extent that McCarthy was identified as the Vietnam candidate by these voters, he would be seen as useless in their own battles to be heard by America's political establishment. McCarthy's success in achieving his goal of unifying the population within the traditional two-party system will be analyzed by observing his effect on three groups of people whom he attempted to reach: the Lowenstein coalition, the group to be referred to as the Hayden group, and the racial minority groups.

The Lowenstein Coalition

The Lowenstein group was composed of two wings, the first of which received the most publicity as the "Children's Crusaders." The accomplishments of the younger student wing of this coalition were detailed in Part III. Their dedication to McCarthy does not seem to have been based primarily on his Vietnam position (or more of them surely would have left him for Robert Kennedy who had what most thought to be a better chance for success), but on the sort of "non-political" politician they thought McCarthy to be. The fact of McCarthy's decision to "challenge the Establishment"—the possibility that the Establishment could be forced to attend drew thousands of students to his banner. His attraction for them was best summed up by one quite popular poster of
his campaign showing McCarthy on a deserted plaza and proclaiming, "He Stood Up Alone and Something Happened." The first portion of this slogan was the most important aspect of the campaign to many of these students—the same students who were flocking to see the movie "Cool Hand Luke" which depicted challenge to the Establishment and whose hero was played by Paul Newman, who became, significantly, McCarthy's leading celebrity campaigner. To these youngsters, McCarthy's courage in undertaking a hopeless cause was worth more respect than any assault on the system which had a better chance of success. James Reston said of this branch of the Lowenstein coalition:

...McCarthy didn't organize them or at the start, even inspire them. They inspired him and in some odd way...they really demonstrated, consciously or unconsciously, probably the latter, what is meant by "the flexible and courageous use of cooperative intelligence."4

Although these students ultimately wanted to join the democratic process, not all were primarily concerned with success in this particular effort. One student-for-McCarthy put her view this way, "I would really be amazed if we could beat the system. But it really doesn't matter whether we win or lose now."5 Tom Wicker referred to that aspect of the McCarthy campaign which drew the support of these youngsters and drew them into "the mainstream":


In an age of overwhelming and impersonal institutions—the government, the corporation, the union, Selective Service, the city, the eight-lane highway, the beehive apartment building, Lyndon Johnson's presidency—Gene McCarthy began to look like one man against the juggernaut, like the inner-directed and indomitable free spirit that all men wish themselves to be, at least in their romantic dreams.  

Eugene McCarthy as Don Quixote, as Cool Hand Luke, as anti-hero, accomplished much of his purpose with these students. His campaign did provide an institutional outlet for their aspirations. Those who had "dropped out" were given a cause for which students came "Clean for Gene" and dropped back in. 

The other segment of Allard Lowenstein's coalition was composed of tougher material. It was Lowenstein who had instigated a "Dump Johnson Movement" in July of 1967 and had been responsible for persuading McCarthy to stand in challenge to President Johnson that November. Lowenstein and the relatively tougher liberals at the center of his coalition are described below by E. W. Kenworthy:

Many, if not most, of the young men at the center of the McCarthy campaign were not starry-eyed idealists. True, they were opposed to the war and they wanted to give priority to urban problems. But they also wanted political power and had decided they could get it only within the established political structure behind a Democrat who would challenge the President's renomination. After much casting about and several refusals, they finally persuaded McCarthy to take on the task. They used him and he used them.

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One member of the group said of their goals, "We had never requested that he pursue the Presidency regardless of consequences, regardless of contingencies. Rather we hoped and expected that he would pursue it as long as it was useful to do so in behalf of the aims and values we shared." Included in this group were Jeremy Larner, who attacked McCarthy bitterly in lengthy articles appearing in Harper's magazine in the spring of 1969, and Lowenstein himself, who left the campaign for a time and worked on the common causes of Kennedy and McCarthy while launching a successful campaign for his own seat in the United States House of Representatives.

The two wings of the Lowenstein coalition differed on the relative importance they attributed to the image of the man who challenged the Establishment and to the effectiveness of his stand. They held a common desire to work within the established boundaries of the American political system. McCarthy achieved his purposes with them when he gave them even fleeting hope: "He spread throughout the land a new belief that housewives, clerks and college kids—thousands and thousands of college kids—could find themselves a niche and play a role in shaping the nation's future." The Senator from Minnesota

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11 Ibid.

achieved his purpose to the extent that these thousands of citizens had learned that they could effect change without the destruction of the "system."

The Hayden Group

The second major segment of citizens in whom McCarthy hoped to encourage productive political participation abruptly repudiated him when they perceived that to be his aim; these were the people whose group survival depended on their remaining outside of the established political processes—the New Left Radicals. These citizens, perhaps best represented by Tom Hayden's National Mobilization Committee, desired confrontation with the established order rather than consultation with it. In Hayden's words, the ideal social situation is one in which, "Options will be closed. Our people will be pushed to the wall. They will have to choose their preferred walls and decide whether to back down or break through when they have their backs against them."\(^{13}\)

Leaders who wish their people to be pushed to the wall surely must fear the success of one who intends to include the radicals and increase their participatory alternatives.

The Radicals could never have been enticed to join the mainstream by a man who described his own position as "the essence of conservatism," since, he said, he was only asking his audience to "clear

your vision and clear your mind" and decide what ought to be done "so that the best interests and the best purposes of this country can be served." The radical choice was to use McCarthy's attacks on Johnson to support their own, and then later to turn on McCarthy, for they argued, "The people are best served if we build an opposition which cannot be appeased by any shuffling of politicians." Bill Epston correctly identified part of what may be assumed to have been one of McCarthy's goals, "to build a loyal opposition," but McCarthy would surely have stressed the word "opposition" while Epston felt betrayed by the word "loyal."

Martin Peretz, a contributing editor for Dissent, predicted that the Radicals, "demanding an ideological posture from McCarthy which they know he does not hold...will perversely prefer the ugly lucidity of the present incumbent." Peretz further maintained:

Then at last, the worst predilections of their theories may come to pass. Denying the campaign their support is not, however, the kind of "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency" of which Veblen spoke. Rather it is self-defeating—at least for those nondogmatic radicals who are embarrassed into a hands-off attitude by the sneers of the doctrinaires.

15 Morgan, p. 8A.
16 Ibid.
A staff member of the AFL-CIO Union spoke of the relationship as "The New Left kids, all aflame for a 'revolution' they can't really imagine (let alone make), find McCarthy square, dull, liberal." He continued:

At least if the New Left kids were willing to work for McCarthy, there'd be some troops—even if irregulars. But they're not. They prefer confrontations with the Far Right. Well, bless 'em; while praying they don't live to see their fantasies made actual. 18

McCarthy's dilemma as he sought two goals seemingly in conflict with one another was described by Joseph Clark, an ex-communist who had served in 1950 as foreign correspondent for the Daily Worker:

...Those who shape Johnson's Vietnam policies would enjoy nothing so much as identification of the McCarthy campaign with the political hippies and adherents of the Viet Cong. McCarthy has to exert heroic efforts to remain in the mainstream of politics, the only place where he can be effective against Johnson's war. 19

McCarthy's difficulty in attempting to achieve an aura of respectability for his Vietnam position was responsible for his difficulty in reaching the radicals. Andrew Kopkind explained that "the liberals can only talk to the white radicals but there is no guarantee that they will listen. Most of all McCarthy could not hope to deliver the necessary pay-off—an end to the war—from the Democratic Administration." 20

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Two of Senator McCarthy's rhetorical choices, outlined at length in Part III of this work, contributed further to the estrangement between the candidate and this particular constituency. As his discussion of the Vietnamese conflict decreased, radical disaffection increased. While McCarthy assumed the people opposed the war, the radicals assumed that McCarthy no longer cared sufficiently about the conflict. Secondly, McCarthy spoke at ever increasing length of the "Nature and Achievements of the Campaign." The more he described the "loyalist" nature of the campaign, the more irreconcilable became the breach between the radicals, the candidate and the Lowenstein coalition.\(^{21}\)

The three would meet again--in Grant Park the day after McCarthy's loss had been made a matter of record. The radicals no longer had to fear him and they had taken many liberals with them "to the wall" in Chicago.

**Racial Minorities**

In order for Eugene McCarthy to succeed in contributing to a reconciliation of the citizenry and the inclusion of alienated segments of society into the normal political channels, a third group would have to be included: racial minority groups, especially the Blacks.

On the face of it, there would seem to have been no issue-based impediment to minority support of McCarthy. He had consistently voted

\(^{21}\)Ibid., pp. 50-55
"correctly" on every civil rights bill of any magnitude, had supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and voted for cloture on debate of the 1966 Civil Rights act which included provisions for open housing. In 1965, McCarthy voted against an amendment that would have banned poll taxes, although he strongly opposed them. He explained at the time and again later when this vote was criticized by political opponents that he had voted this way because the 1965 Civil Rights Act thus amended would probably have had no chance of passage and because suits had already been accepted by the Supreme Court that would in all probability have the same effect as the amendment.22

One reason he gave for his willingness to enter the primaries was that because of the United States participation in Vietnam less money was available for the poverty programs and housing legislation. Time and again throughout his campaign he spoke to the problems of racial discrimination, of the need for a new set of "Civil Rights" that included the right to a good job, the right to education, the right to medical care and the right to a decent house in a community. This series of "rights" was promulgated by McCarthy as early as August, 1967, and formed the basis for major speeches throughout the campaign.23 His actual position on civil rights then was one that should have appealed to most members of minority groups, but he never got Black support.

22Dorothy Dunbar Bromley and Ruth Gage-Colby, Eugene McCarthy on the Record, excerpted from McCarthy speeches and writings. Published and distributed by the McCarthy for President Committee, N. Y. 1968, p. 24.

23McCarthy Address to the Senate, August 8, 1967.
Signs were clear from the first that McCarthy had little chance
to accomplish his announced purpose of reconciliation of this particular alienated segment of society. At the initial meeting of the Conference of Concerned Democrats, which opened the McCarthy campaign on December 3, there were five Negroes in an audience of nearly 500. Asked if he planned to involve Black civil rights militants in his campaign, Senator McCarthy replied, "This group looks militant enough to me, a pretty bold group."24 In April, James Kilpatrick, reporting on a series of McCarthy campaign stops which included a major address to an audience of 1,300 paying guests, wrote:

A reporter, counting the house, was struck by a thought of passing political significance: McCarthy's liberal record on "civil rights" is unexcelled in the Senate, but the crowd this night in Newark was 98 per cent white. Not more than thirty or forty Negro faces could be seen.25

In late June, McCarthy tried to address a convention of the NAACP. When no invitation was forthcoming, McCarthy went to Atlantic City, site of the convention, and rented rooms at Howard Johnson Motor Lodge (29 Varieties) for a reception and address. He was accused by NAACP leaders of "meddling" in their affairs and was forced to continue on the defensive in his pursuit of Black votes. Late in July, McCarthy

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had an extremely successful rally in Boston's Fenway Park. In an audience of 40,000, however, only a scattering of Blacks could be seen. One published picture of the audience showed not one Black face of those discernible.\textsuperscript{26} McCarthy's spectacular lack of success in securing Black support in the primary elections was examined in Section II. Several factors which contributed to McCarthy's inability to accomplish his purposes as they involved minority group votes and support are discernible and worthy of note.

In the first place, McCarthy was still identified as the Vietnam peace candidate who interest was primarily foreign policy. Just as Martin Luther King's decision to broaden the base of his civil rights campaign to oppose injustice wherever it occurred had caused some Blacks to feel his interest had shifted from them, they never believed McCarthy could have real room for their interests. \textit{Time} magazine's report of a late July campaign stop helps to illuminate the point:

Last week he was even ready for his first major swing through the South. He managed to draw some friendly crowds while evoking no visible hostility. Yet his stop in a black neighborhood in Atlanta, like an earlier visit to Pittsburgh's Negro Hill district, displayed again his failure to stir black enthusiasm. Asked why black Democrats should support him instead of Humphrey, McCarthy replied: "I haven't really made much of an argument that they should, except that if we pursue the war, there's not enough money to take care of poverty programs in this country."\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{27}"In Search of Political Miracles," \textit{Time}, July 26, 1968, p. 21.
Furthermore, McCarthy said time and again that he would not "compartmentalize" the American people:

I have not really become a candidate because a combination was put together in support of me. I saw a story today where one potential candidate has twenty-six separate committees of various kinds of Americans. I knew that Howard Johnson had twenty-nine varieties of ice cream, but didn't know that there were twenty-six varieties of Americans who could be combined for political purposes. I have but one variety: a constituency of hope and trust in the future. And the only defectors who have come over to me are those who have defected from fear, and from disillusionment, and from defeatism and a kind of near despair in America; and those are most welcome defectors.28

The man who sought to bring these alienated peoples into the mainstream of American life gave no indication of knowing that they would not have been alienated if they had already "defected from fear and from disillusionment." If Blacks and representatives of other minority groups had felt themselves to be members of a "constituency of hope and trust in the future," they could have supported him but they might not then have needed him. At the same time, the Senator did talk to "the farmers." In Nebraska, it will be recalled, much of his argumentation was directed to this one population group, this one economic group or this one "variety" of American. So while McCarthy talked to farmers of farm problems, he spoke to Blacks of a "constituency of conscience." His civil rights addresses were delivered to the total population where they might have accomplished the most ultimate good, but McCarthy would not

28 Address broadcast on national television presented at the Pfister Hotel, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, March 23, 1968. /Emphasis added/
direct his rhetoric to the Blacks in such a way as to give them hope or free them from despair.

Finally, McCarthy failed in his attempt to provide the avenue by which Blacks could regain faith in the American political system because he was unable to appear to them to care about them. The same cool detached projection which drew white liberals tired of Johnsonian rhetoric, to McCarthy caused ghetto blacks to reject him: "A Negro offered an explanation of why McCarthy is not more popular in ghettos: 'He ain't got soul.'"29 His approach to volatile audience interests was a matter for extended analysis in Section III: the effect of that approach is seen in his failure with minority audiences. This intent—to avoid "firing voters up emotionally...to appeal to their minds, their knowledge of the American past, their collective will."30 could have succeeded with those whose "collective will" was not of necessity totally committed to secure rapid change and to support those who inspire belief that change is possible and near. McCarthy's encounters with ghetto Blacks, however, were usually characterized by the feeling of mismatch

29"In Search of Political Miracles," p. 21.

hinted at below. Philip Kunhardt, Life magazine reporter, provides the following examples:

McCarthy refuses to play up to the Negro vote or to any other specific vote on grounds perhaps unrealistic, that all people should be campaigned to equally. On a stop in South Bend's Negro district, McCarthy stepped out of his car, was pushed around for a few minutes in the crowd, didn't like it much and got out of there as soon as possible.31

Again, compare the effect McCarthy had on crowds, and they on him with that of Kennedy:

It was an amazing sight as, hour upon hour upon hour, the candidate, looking small, almost flimsy, with sunburned face and windblown hair, stood on the trunk of a convertible, a security man's arm lock around his waist to keep him from falling or being torn off the car, the car edging through twisting rivers of humanity, screaming, running kids, girls in hysterics, boys on bicycles, excited adults, all pressing toward the car and reaching out for a touch of the magic hand that was thrust toward them like a scepter.32

To articulate all that is meant by contemporary Blacks when they use the word "soul" would be futile. If McCarthy was thought to lack "soul," then the word probably could not have meant integrity, or devotion to just causes, or a view of life which respected the dignity of each person. It may merely have meant that to desperate people he seemed to lack the necessary identification with them to inspire faith and create devotion that could sustain them through the days until their needs were met. David Riesman, in a slightly different context, described what may

31Ibid.

32Ibid.
have been this final reason for McCarthy's lack of success with minority
groups, "Eugene McCarthy's unhysterical campaign... won him followers
among some conservatives and liberals while failing to attract many who
believed that grave national problems needed to be attacked by charisma
as well as by competence." 33

Through McCarthy, some Americans who had felt themselves to be
politically impotent found a participatory avenue. To these people,
"defectors from fear and disillusionment," McCarthy had "charisma," as
he came to represent them in pursuit of their shared liberal ideals.

The same image of success and faith in intellectual application
of liberal principles that drew part of his constituency to him alienated
other groups. Hayden's people responded best to the image of failure and
demanded to be "driven to the wall": rather than included; ghetto Blacks
did not know success and could no longer trust "intellectual application
of liberal principles."

McCarthy succeeded with those whose approval was his for the
asking—those who had defected from fear and disillusionment; he failed
with the radicals whose success required the destruction of orderly
political processes and with the Blacks who had been driven to demand that
their physical survival be guaranteed and their faith restored before
they could be interested in the survival of any other "process."

33 David Riesman, America Moves to the Right, "New York Times
Magazine, October 27, 1968, p. 84.
Chapter 9

TO REFORM THE ESTABLISHMENT

If the unity sought by Senator McCarthy were to be accomplished and if the people were to attend to the established political order, then clearly much change would be required in the nature of the operation of the Establishment. Accordingly, McCarthy sought to provide impetus for this reform and the changes he sought to make are considered below.

To Move the Administration Concerning Vietnam

If Administration response to given issues had indicated responsiveness to what McCarthy took to be the will of the people, his candidacy would not have occurred. For several years American policy in Vietnam had been under wide attack reaching into the Senate and across the country. The fact that the Administration did not change its direction was cause enough for anger to these people; what ultimately spurred action, however, was the recognition that the Administration was not only refusing to agree with the dissidents but was refusing to listen to them or consult with them.1 This behavior, regarded by McCarthy, Fulbright and others as evidence of "the arrogance of power," had been exemplified by one statement of Nicholas Katzenback, then the Undersecretary of State. His position was that further Senate action would not be


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required for continued or increased action in Vietnam since "Congressional declarations of war" could have their "functional equivalent" in Presidential interpretations of other Congressional acts."2

In March, 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk engaged in an exchange with Senator Fulbright, Head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which provides a clear example of what McCarthy argued was a kind of imperviousness to restraint of power of the Executive Branch of the American Government:

Fulbright said the conflict had arrived "at a crucial turning point." He demanded consultation before the President makes a final decision.

"What I want to talk about is the exact precise plans you have on escalation," Fulbright said. ..

Rusk declared President Johnson has not made a final decision. Fulbright said he took that to mean the committee would not be informed until a decision was reached and then it would merely be informed.

Rusk replied he thought there had been considerable consultation and "there is no mystery about the views of this committee" on Vietnam policy.

But Fulbright insisted that consultation now is "justified. .. I believe we could make a contribution if we were given a chance to do so." He said the war has reached a point when decisions will determine whether we go either down the road to all-out war or to a negotiated solution."


2Ibid.
Fulbright asked Rusk at one point: "Do I understand you have no intention of consulting with this committee?"

"I told you the President has not reached his conclusions," Rusk replied. "There is therefore no knowledge of what actions may be required by the Congress."

Fulbright said he understood this to mean "you have no intention of consulting with us prior to reaching that decision."

Rusk insisted that "senior members of this committee" have been consulted: and that the hearings of the past two days have made their views "pretty well apparent."

In other words, Fulbright retorted, "your position is that you already know our views."

"We know a great deal," Rusk said. 3

The Committee had attempted to question Rusk for many months before this appearance and by the time he did appear McCarthy had already entered the race. The exchange, however, had been repeated in substance earlier by other Administration representatives such as Katzenback.

So McCarthy, in his determination to increase the responsiveness of the Administration, determined to change some aspects of it. He later reported that he had hoped virtually anyone else would challenge, if not the entire decision making apparatus of the Administration, at least the specific decision which was responsible for so many other choices—the decision of whether to engage, and in what capacity to engage, in battle in Vietnam. Ultimately, he decided to press the attack himself.

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To Win the Office?

Nine days before his announcement of candidacy, Senator McCarthy told Godfrey Sperling, Jr., of the *Christian Science Monitor* in an interview that should he run he would do so for two reasons: he sought first of all to give the Democrats a "clear alternative on the war," presumably by doing so to

...help persuade the administration to accept or move in the direction of the McCarthy alternative. The Senator is convinced that there would be nothing like a few primary victories over the President (or those running who backed the President on Vietnam) to get the administration to take a fresh look at the war.4

In his announcement of intent to enter four primaries, McCarthy gave as his reason, "...I thought the issue of Vietnam and other related issues should be raised in the primaries. ..."5 His "challenge to the President's position" was determined and strengthened by:

...recent announcements from the Administration of plans for continued escalation and intensification of the war in Vietnam and, on the other hand, by the absence of any positive indications or suggestions for a compromise or negotiated political settlement. I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no limits on the price that it will pay for military victory.6

McCarthy then summarized the "cost of the war up to this point" in terms of its cost to the country of Vietnam—physically and socially, its cost

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5Announcement of Candidacy, November 30, 1967.
6Ibid.
in human lives, its economic cost and "the bearing of the war on other areas of United States responsibility."\(^7\)

In two interviews during January and February, McCarthy, faced with the problem of securing commitments of support and money, finally phrased his intent, at least formally, as including the willingness to seek the presidency if that should be required. On January 7, in answer to Joseph C. Harsch's question, "Is your purpose still solely to change policy?", Senator McCarthy answered:

Well, my immediate purpose would be to change policy but since I recognize that the only way in which this policy might be changed is by a change in administration, I have never set any limitation upon how far I might go in order to do that.\(^8\)

By February, the momentum of the campaign had caused a slightly different sort of statement. On the NBC program, Meet the Press, the following exchange occurred between David Broder and Senator McCarthy:

**MR. BRODER:** Senator, despite your many statements on the subject, and perhaps because of bad reporting of those of us in the press, people are still confused as to your basic purpose. Do you wish to take the nomination away from President Johnson, or is your candidacy simply a vehicle for allowing people to express disagreement with his policies on Vietnam and other issues?

**SENATOR MCCARTHY:** I don't see it as having that limited purpose. My objective is to bring about a change of national policy, both with reference to the war and also with reference

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\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Transcript of ABC's Issues and Answers, January 7, 1968.
to national priorities. As I see it, in order to accomplish that, as things are going, it would be necessary to take the nomination for the Democratic Party from President Johnson, so that is my objective.9 /Emphasis added/

By the end of March, McCarthy, fresh from a successful New Hampshire primary and in the first full flush of anger at Robert Kennedy's entry into the race, was saying:

No longer are we raising an issue. No longer are we conducting an educational campaign on Vietnam or leading a children's crusade. We are seeking the presidency of the United States.

. . . . . .

It was not my boyhood dream to be President.

. . . . . .

I do not lay claim to the White House on the basis of succession.

. . . . . .

A constituency in this country needed a person around whom it could rally, a constituency of conscience, hope, of trust in the future role of this country.10

Over a period of several months then, McCarthy's stated goal changed slightly; the stated distance he was willing to contest expanded as he had realized that it must in order to submit the question of the war to the American people and to provide an avenue of involvement for the apathetic or alienated.

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Throughout the campaign, however—and his honesty here was never seriously questioned—McCarthy did not admit to "wanting" the presidency. Shana Alexander analyzed the phenomenal situation in this manner:

McCarthy's ultimate weapon in this campaign, more potent even than the force of his ideas, the patent sincerity of his commitment, his courage, or even the pull of his strange, cool personality, may be his utter detachment about the prize he seeks. The office of the Presidency interests him; the job does not. Back in Indiana he had said, "Nothing is more dangerous than a man with no ambition. Especially if he happens to be running for President under rather, ah, peculiar circumstances."

For another analysis of McCarthy's ambition to be president, consider Time's summary of July 26:

"... basically McCarthy's approach to the electorate remains the same. He got into the campaign last Nov. 30 almost as his own second choice, implying that he would have stood aside for Kennedy. He still manages to sound strangely devoid of the lust for power. "I don't think you ought to want it in terms of personal desire or aspiration," he said on a recent television show, "but I'm quite willing to be President.""

It appears then that the Senator wanted an issue (Vietnam) raised along orderly political channels in such a way that the Administration would be forced to attend to the dissent. He found that he could gain money and support enough to raise the issue effectively if he were willing to phrase his intent in terms used by presidential aspirants, and so the decision was made to contest questions he took to be relevant all the way to the convention. This decision was strengthened by the entrance of Robert


Kennedy into the race and cemented by the possibility of engaging in other reform activity McCarthy felt necessary.

To Oppose Robert Kennedy

Senator McCarthy might have stepped aside if a candidate other than Robert Kennedy had chosen to enter the race after New Hampshire. If, for instance, Senator George McGovern had chosen to enter the race in March rather than in August and entered supporting the same policies McCarthy supported, McCarthy might have felt no wish personally to engage in the combat he never seemed to relish. The extent of his animosity for the Kennedy men, however, could have been counted on to insure that he would be no "stalking horse" for Senator Robert Kennedy. The conflict had two aspects, historical conflicts and McCarthy's repugnance at Kennedy tactics.

In 1960, McCarthy delivered what is generally believed to have been his finest public address, his nomination speech for Adlai Stevenson. He revered Stevenson mightily and has remarked that his own goals in foreign policy are essentially those that Stevenson might have made his as President.13 The Kennedy defeat of Stevenson in 1960 and the abrasiveness of Robert in that battle surely must have left a well of irritation in McCarthy. In 1962, for instance, McCarthy is reported to have voted against a proposal of the John Kennedy Administration to close the

loophole on expense account deductions. Andrew Kopkind reports, "In reply to criticism on that one, he said scornfully that the Kennedys never gave him the time of day, and he felt no obligation to vote for their little reforms."\(^\text{14}\)

One contrary act with regard to the Kennedys occurred when, on August 27, during the Democratic Convention, McCarthy offered to withdraw from the campaign and give his support to Edward Kennedy in order to keep the nomination from Hubert Humphrey. Edward Kennedy again refused to enter the conflict however, and McCarthy stayed until the first ballot saw the nomination go to Humphrey.\(^\text{15}\) Within five months of this move, McCarthy voted against Edward Kennedy and for Russell Long in the battle for position of Democratic Whip of the Senate.\(^\text{16}\) The McCarthy argument that Kennedy's election would give the appearance of reform while denying its substance may have been accurate but may have been influenced strongly by the fact that it was a Kennedy who was "giving the appearance" of reform. McCarthy's dislike for Kennedy had roots in political history and familial tradition.

McCarthy also strongly disapproved of various tactics used by Senator Robert Kennedy (whom McCarthy always called "Bobby"). The man


\(^\text{15}\) "Made An Offer To Stop HHH," (AP) \textit{Kansas City Times}, August 29, 1968, p. 8A.

who obviously wanted to be President should have been willing to take risks to achieve it rather than being "content to stand on the hill and light bonfires and dance by the light of the moon." Kennedy, who presumably felt as strongly as McCarthy did about the Vietnamese struggle was willing to let someone else test the water while Kennedy "just threw messages over the fence." Representative Charles O. Porter of Eugene, Oregon, said in this same context, "We like Senator McCarthy but basically we consider him a stand-in for Senator Kennedy."  

The March 13 meeting between Kennedy and McCarthy was a bitter one, consisting mostly of "embarrassing pauses during which neither spoke. Kennedy bluntly informed McCarthy that he could win the nomination from President Johnson (implying that McCarthy could not) but never proposed a plan whereby the two might work together."  

March 18 saw McCarthy saying of Kennedy, "I don't altogether approve of what he's done in the past three or four days." Of becoming Kennedy's running mate, McCarthy said, "I think that's beyond imagination." McCarthy's anger grew at Kennedy tactics utilized in Nebraska (reported in Section II) "That's not the kind of politics to which I would lend my name."  

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McCarthy accused Kennedy of approaching "a kind of arrogance" because of Kennedy's repeated invitations to join the Kennedy camp. Another practice referred to earlier was Kennedy's tendency to divide the electorate into "kinds of Americans" in order that their vote could be sought more effectively. Ultimately, McCarthy felt, the man who wanted power was the kind of man most to be feared: he felt that Kennedy did want power (regardless of what he wanted to do with it once attained). Furthermore, Kennedy's effort in 1968 to gain power had come at the expense of Senator McCarthy who himself had been thrust into a battle he had hoped to avoid because Kennedy would not risk defeat to advance a cause. The entry of Robert Kennedy, then, was in part responsible for McCarthy's remaining in the contest from March to June: it provided one more purpose for the contest.

To Reform Institutional Policy Making Procedures

By the time that Senator Kennedy was killed and of course long after President Johnson had decided to retire from the Presidency, yet another major purpose had developed for McCarthy's continued contest—a desire to reform the establishment by affecting concepts of the Executive Branch and by creating a reform mechanism for the election of the man to head that branch.

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McCarthy himself provided the clearest and most concise reference to the kind of reform he wished to accomplish with regard to the "concept of the Executive Branch":

If I am elected I will never regard the presidency as a personal office. A President should not speak of "my country" but always of "our country," not of "my Cabinet" but of "the Cabinet." For once the Cabinet has been appointed it becomes something apart from the man who nominated its members and something apart even from the Senate which confirms them in office.

In this conception the office belongs not to the man who holds it but to the people of the nation. It is an office which must be exercised by the will of the majority but not in the sole interest of the majority.

The role of the President must be to unite the nation. But he must unite it by inspiring it, not unite it by just adding it up or by piecing it together like some kind of jigsaw puzzle. Rather than trying to organize the nation he must try to encourage the common purpose of creating an order of justice in America.

I believe that a man who is presented to the presidency must know the limitations of power, and know the limitations that must be placed on the exercise of the office of the President. He should understand that this country cannot be governed by coercion, and that it needs a special kind of leadership, which itself recognizes that the potential for leadership exists in every man and woman.

America has great reserves of energy and high purpose, but at present our energy is being diverted and our idealism is being sapped by a war that seems to transgress our cherished tradition of prudence and decency. Much of our energy has been turned toward destruction and the more generous and noble impulses of our people have been given little room to manifest themselves.

The next President must liberate these generous impulses by reordering our national priorities. He must give direction to the movement of the nation by setting people free.23

Traces appear here of McCarthy's memory of Administration refusal to consult with the Senate about proposed military policy as well as McCarthy's feeling that the Administration did not listen adequately to dissenting elements of American citizens.

Particularly after the death of Kennedy, McCarthy's goal expanded to include, in addition to executive reform, concentration on reform of nominating procedures, although the fight had begun long before June.

Use of the mass media by an incumbent President had become one of the earliest issues of the campaign with McCarthy's outrage at remarks made by President Johnson in an hour long prime time interview which "linked the McCarthy candidacy to the political maneuvering of Robert F. Kennedy, and suggested that both senators were motivated by outsized personal ambition."\(^{24}\) McCarthy sought equal time under provisions of the Federal Communications Commission Act to "answer" the "personal attacks" and to grant him time to answer "Mr. Johnson's views on the war." The Commission denied the request whereupon McCarthy's attorneys offered to prove to the F.C.C. that Johnson was a candidate since he was personally involved in the establishment of his primary campaign in New Hampshire.\(^{25}\) The matter ultimately was dropped but gave forecast of the intensity with which Establishment activities would be watched and attacked.


The second element of reform in McCarthy’s campaign came to light in battles waged as various states sought to select the delegates who would choose the Democratic candidate in August at the National Convention. In caucuses across the nation, his supporters engaged in what they referred to as real "grassrootsy things to do" and battled old line Democratic leaders for the right to participate in the state and local decision making apparatus. In state after state, they either won delegates that the "loyalists" had never considered losing, or through publicity brought such pressure on the meetings that they won the philosophical issue.

In Kansas City, for instance, when McCarthy’s Democratic supporters attempted to attend meetings at which delegates would be chosen, they found that they had been given wrong addresses and times for the meetings; furthermore when they found the meetings, they were occasionally subjected to physical threat. Reporting such as that below obviously harmed the entrenched politicians now under such severe attack:

Actually the violence included reported incidents among workers for the old-line factions, some of which are remnants of the corrupt Pendergast years and members of the McCarthy-for-President club here. Arthur Wortman, 53 Janssen place, treasurer of the McCarthy organization, was hit in the nose and Janet Andrews, 4030 Oak Street, was shoved out of a meeting by a man.26

Perhaps because of such publicity, the Democratic Party in Kansas City compromised:

The old-line factions will get half. ... The other half will go to an unlikely coalition composed of members of the McCarthy-for-President club here, members of Judge Charles E. Curry's Committee for County Progress and members of Freedom, Inc. ... The compromise amounted to a victory for the McCarthy-C.C.P.-Freedom combination, and to a major retreat by the old line factions.27

In New York, the McCarthy people captured a stunning 62 of 123 district delegates to the National Convention. At-large delegates were then chosen by the Democratic Committee. While the McCarthy people argued that the party should choose delegates in roughly the same proportion as the voters had chosen them, the Committee ultimately decided to award only 15 1/2 of the 67 at-large delegate votes to people not dedicated to Humphrey and of these 15 1/2, only 7 1/2 votes were allotted to McCarthy people.28 The local party rationale?

The county leaders protested. ... that they could not turn delegate chairs over to McCarthy insurgents seeking to destroy them. Trips to national conventions belonged, they insisted, to regulars who had opened their bank account. Without such patronage, the county leaders protested, the clubhouse system was finished.29

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29 Ibid.
Such decisions and the publicity given them were duplicated across the country and resulted in bitterness which led to a concentration on reform of these procedures at the National Convention. According to E. W. Kenworthy, "...McCarthy has made such an issue of the haphazard, antiquated, nonrepresentative manner of selecting national convention delegates in many states that the Democratic party will almost certainly have to reform its procedure for nominating a President." 30

One important practice under attack was the use of the "unit rule" still allowed by the Party in the selection of delegates to the National Convention although its use had been prohibited at the Convention. Because of the difficulty McCarthy people had had getting to State conventions, if their minority vote could be ignored or wiped off of the books once there, no real reform was likely to occur. Consequently, a major battle was waged and won at the National Convention to prohibit use of the unit rule at State Conventions in the selection of National Delegates. 31

In Sum

Any rhetorical perspective of the McCarthy campaign must depend at least partially on an understanding of the goals of the rhetorician;


had his major goal been election to the presidency, certain of his strategies would have to be judged as unwise. One Kennedy delegate who could not endorse McCarthy after Kennedy was assassinated said, "From what he [McCarthy] says, he'd turn the conduct of the office over to a committee and go off and read books. That scares the hell out of me."32 A more aggressive style, a less contemplative approach could have won more votes for McCarthy. If, on the other hand, he wished to teach—to develop a constituency itself more unified and contemplative—then his stylistic choices are somewhat more defensible.

Eugene McCarthy sought to serve his vision of what America ought to be by providing a rallying point for dissenting and alienated citizens. He sought to channel their frustrations into avenues which could lead to the elimination of policies which had initially frustrated them. He was brought into the battle by Allard Lowenstein who never ceased to organize and legitimize effective, constructive protest against a system he felt to be in error. In other words, those who wanted to learn to wage effective protest within the existing form of American government, learned it. John Cogley, former religion editor of The New York Times, was only one of several commentators who credited McCarthy with "getting the protest into a political channel."33 David English of the London

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Daily Express was with the campaign from New Hampshire to Chicago and commented, "When Senator McCarthy finally comes to weigh his achievements in 1968, this one must count heavily among them. McCarthy called for—and worked toward—the bridging of the generation gap." The young McCarthy supporters wrung changes in party structure from the party in Chicago and by "Coming Clean for Gene," increased respect of the satisfied for orderly, institutionalized dissent from existing policies. McCarthy's willingness to "stand up alone" would provide an image conducive to hope for many thousands of people, and he would continue to provide that image until the hopeful had found they could accomplish change themselves. Shana Alexander suggested that "simply by becoming a candidate, by stimulating people to think, to question and to doubt, by reasserting the dominion of idea over personality and of mind over charisma, McCarthy has in his own terms begun to win. . . " Tom Wicker detailed McCarthy's contribution:

...McCarthy has given Americans opportunity to free themselves of all sorts of intellectual bondage—to jettison assumptions, prejudices and taboos that have been shaping political life for decades. He showed, as few others have, that an intelligent politician can talk intelligently about serious affairs and still find a constituency. And he demonstrated that a certain faith in the good instincts of the American voter is not altogether misplaced. . .

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Senator McCarthy never reached the Blacks, nor did he perhaps realize that the goal of the desperate ghetto citizens was not "genuine unity of understanding" but the more immediate goal of physical survival and the survival of the spirit which required a man able to respond to them in a way that McCarthy either would not do as contrary to his political philosophy or could not do as contrary to his nature.

Senator McCarthy's hopes of unity required that the established order be forced to respond to the legitimate protest of those whom he agreed to lead. He sought to change American policy in Vietnam and assumed erroneously that most Americans already believed the United States to be in error. Most Americans had not at that time come to evaluate the facts of Vietnam in the same light as McCarthy did. The preceding analysis of McCarthy's major speeches indicate that McCarthy misanalyzed his larger audience on the issue of Vietnam as he failed to attempt to create opposition to Vietnam policy and concentrated instead on challenging his audiences to register their presumed protest by voting for him. He had not sufficiently developed their protest to make that assumption.

McCarthy's other efforts to affect the Establishment were more successful. His view of the value of a somewhat depersonalized candidacy and executive branch seem to this writer to be the image
projected by President Nixon. Tom Wicker rightfully credits McCarthy with contributing to the change:

So the old strident know-nothingism, the safe insistence on the obvious, the appeals to the cheapest emotions and the most sensitive interests of the voters--Eugene McCarthy put these ancient tools of the trade aside, and neither the Democratic party nor American politics is like to be quite the same, ever again.36

Efforts to consult with opposition and to allow for the place of dissent are now at least a part of the stated decision making mechanism of all present leading politicians.

The country without McCarthy's effort would be a different country; review of this work will suggest several consequences of the McCarthy campaign. Some consequences reflect his successes and some his failures.

Without McCarthy, no rallying point for *legitimized* dissent would have been likely within the Democratic party. Several other potential candidates had been asked to make the effort and had refused. Existing dissent could have affected the Democratic party only from without, then, and might have taken a considerably more obstructionist turn than it took with McCarthy.

If Senator McCarthy had not demonstrated the chance of winning for the "right" candidate by his showing in New Hampshire, Robert Kennedy would not have entered the race. As McCarthy polls in New Hampshire

36Ibid.
began to indicate possible McCarthy success, Kennedy "reassessed" his position. McCarthy said much later, "It is enigmatic to reflect how one decision can alter so many things. Had Bobby Kennedy stuck to his word, /not to seek the Presidency in 1968/ not only would he almost certainly be alive today but most probably he would have emerged as President of the United States in 1972."\(^{37}\)

In all probability, without the McCarthy challenge and the resulting Kennedy challenge, President Johnson would have sought another term. He had considered not seeking re-election but had started plans for the campaign in several states. The vicious and occasionally obscene attacks being leveled at him would probably have been insufficient to disuade him had they not been coupled with the chance of humiliation at the hands of his own party. Life for Vice President Humphrey would have surely been greatly different without the McCarthy challenge. The two men from Minnesota had come together in a far field in a curious way less than four years after McCarthy had hoped to be asked to serve in the role President Johnson gave to Humphrey.

The Democratic party probably would not have changed in structure without the McCarthy candidacy. Local, state, and national nominating procedures would not have been changed had Establishment opponents

lacked candidates and consequently reason to attend the convention or reason to hope for change.

More speculatively, had the issue of Vietnam not been raised within the Democratic party, all existing dissent might have rallied behind a Republican candidate who opposed the war. Between Vice-President Humphrey and Richard Nixon the war was virtually undiscussed because of Nixon's moratorium on such discussion. A campaign for the presidency between President Johnson, and, say, Mark Hatfield who opposed participation in Vietnam would have been a vastly different rhetorical situation and one in which both candidates would have engaged in persuasive efforts to win public decisions about Vietnam.

Robert Kennedy was not able to mobilize quite the same spirit among young people that McCarthy was able to do. Kennedy received the cheers of larger crowds, but he usually had to pay rather good wages to his "volunteers." McCarthy's achievement of significant involvement of young people in the political decision-making process of this country is surely an accomplishment great enough in itself to have warranted all that he gave.

Clearly, when one considers what McCarthy sought to do and what the political year of 1968 would have been like had he not chosen to contest as he did, the slogan used for the nine months of his campaign has a poignant relevance:

He stood up alone and something happened.
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