THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902
Causes Leading to Its Formation

by

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Causes Leading to Its Formation

I

THE BACKGROUND OF THE ALLIANCE

Introduction

The causes leading up to the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be sought within the circle of events immediately surrounding the Agreement of 1902. The roots of alliance reach far back into the nineteenth century. An understanding of this Treaty requires a brief inquiry into British and Japanese Foreign policies previous to the actual adoption of the Agreement.

After 1815, two fundamental factors entered into British foreign policy which were discernible throughout the remainder of the century. England had sought to maintain the Ottoman Empire against Russian Aggression in the East.¹ She was

hostile to France during the entire period,\(^1\) notwithstanding the apparent efforts of the two nations to create friendly relations by means of ententes and side-by-side fighting—as in the case of the Greek and Turkish questions.

After the fall of Napoleon, Great Britain entered upon a sort of isolation policy and endeavored to hold herself aloof from continental entanglements. Her fear of Russia in the Near East, however, prevented the success of this policy; neither was the period one of peace for Great Britain. Her fear of Russia had led to the Crimean War in 1854,\(^2\) the Trent Affair had strained Anglo-American relations almost to the breaking point in 1861,\(^3\) and the Fashoda Incident had almost


2. The Annual Register, 1858, pp. 241-251.

resulted in war with France in 1898. Yet "while differences of opinion divided the country in regard to particular steps the nation was at one in desiring to keep its hands unbound, to remain master of its fate, to pursue the even tenor of its way behind the rampart of the sea, to trust to its fleet for the security which continental powers sought in alliances and conscript armies." This statement may not be accurate in every particular but there seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that her attempted isolation attained a considerable measure of success in securing the interests of the British Empire. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, new dangers to the interests of Great Britain appeared upon the horizon and suggested the necessity of reconsidering her general line


of foreign policy with a view to adjusting it to meet the needs of rising emergencies.¹

The general principles of Japanese foreign policy since 1875 have been largely dominated by an imperialistic desire, which seems to be the result of economic necessity. Japan's policy of isolation is said to have begun in the year 1640. A Christian revolt in 1637 at Shimabara resulted in a great massacre at Hara, and by 1640 most all foreigners had been driven out of the country—except a few Chinese traders at Nagasaki and a few Dutch on the island of Deshima. Two ships were allowed to come annually to this island until 1790, when the number was reduced to one.² Except for the small influence of these few Dutch traders, Japan remained sealed to Western influences during

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² Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 105.
the period from 1640 to 1854. The circumstances that induced the United States to compel Japan to abandon this policy of isolation in 1854 represented the outgrowth of American commercial and industrial interests in the Pacific. The treaty with Great Britain in June 1846, and that with Mexico on 2 February 1848, had opened up the Pacific Coast, to the commerce of the United States, from the 49 parallel north latitude to the northern boundary of Lower California, a short distance south of the port of San Diego. The country had settled rapidly and commerce and industry developed in a comparatively short time. The Americans had developed the whal-


3. For this treaty, see "Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1887." pp. 438-39.

4. I bid. p.
ing industry in the Pacific and the wrecking of a ship now and then on the Japanese coast made it necessary for the government of this country to obtain guarantees for the safety of her sailors.¹

In 1853 Commodore M. C. Perry was sent to Japan with instructions to negotiate a treaty with the ruler of that country which would guarantee protection to shipwrecked American seamen, and permit American vessels to secure supplies in Japanese ports.² On 31 March 1854, the Shogun signed a treaty with Commodore Perry which provided for friendship and amity, the opening of two ports for the purchase of supplies, the protection of shipwrecked sailors and for the stationing of consuls at Shimoda, should the circumstances require.³ This treaty marks the end of Japan's two

2. See Ibid, pp. 1-195 for the details of this Expedition.
centuries of sullen seclusion. In June 1857, Townsend Harris, who had been sent to Shimoda as Consul-General, secured a commercial treaty, which was ratified one year later.\textsuperscript{1} This treaty threw open the port of Yokohama to American commerce,\textsuperscript{2} and its provisions remained the basis of Japan's commercial dealings with the outside world until 1899, when her commercial treaties were revised and she took her place as a great power among the nations.\textsuperscript{3}

Japan's policy of expansion may be said to have begun in 1874. Some inhabitants of the Luchu Islands were shipwrecked on the Formosa coast and murdered by savages of the latter island.

\textsuperscript{1} Senate Documents. 36th Cong., 1st Session., Vol. IX, No. 25, pp. 1-13.

\textsuperscript{2} For the treaty, see W. M. Malloy's "Treaties, and Conventions Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909, pp. 998-1000.

\textsuperscript{3} For first revised commercial treaty, see "The Directory for China, Japan, Korea," etc., pp. 173-178.
A dispute arose between China and Japan. The latter, claiming that the murdered Luchuans were her subjects, demanded an indemnity from the Chinese Government. The matter was finally adjusted when, in 1874, China honored the Japanese demand and admitted that the Luchuans were Japanese subjects.¹

Two years later, Japan took over the administration of the Islands and in 1879, she incorporated them in her empire. Thus by 1874, Japan had begun to acquire an imperialistic mind. In 1875, a dispute between Russia and Japan over the possession of the island of Sakhalin was terminated when Russia agreed to recognize the Japanese claim to the Kurile group in exchange for Japanese relinquishment of claim to the Sakhalin Island.² Great Britain had honored the claims of Japan in 1861 to the Bonin Islands and fifteen years later, Japan took

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them over as part of her empire. These acquisitions were small and somewhat insignificant but Japan was encouraged by these minor successes, and she began to look wistfully across the Strait toward Korea.

Japan's policy toward Korea and China grew out of economic necessity. Her trade and industry had greatly increased since the Harris Commercial treaty; her agriculture could not support her increased population and she lacked raw materials for manufacturing; she needed new sources of supply and new fields for colonizations. The conclusion would seem tenable that, should the markets of East Asia be closed, Japan's national life would be paralyzed, as her growing population would be largely deprived of its food and occupation. These markets, then, must be left as open as the circumstances permit, if Japan would exist as a growing nation.¹ A violent protest against Japa-

¹. Asakawa, pp. 8-11.
Chinese immigration into Korea appeared in the "Korea Daily News" in 1906, to which the editor of the Yorodzu Ohoho replied in the following words: "We humbly implore the Korea Daily News to teach us how to dispose of our surplus millions. Our little country can hardly find room within its narrow boundary to accommodate half a million people who increase year after year. We cannot fill up the Sea of Japan to create dry land and settle them thereon. We would like to go to Kansas or anywhere except the lower world where we could escape starvation. But, however hospitable America may be, she refuses to receive so many incomers all at once. We would very much like to cross over to Australia; but it is White Men's Australia, and although that continent is many times larger than Korea and is very thinly populated, no colored people are admitted there. We know Korea is densely populated, but there the least resistance is offered and so we go there, just as Englishmen went to America and Australia and elsewhere, forcing the natives
to make room for them in days of yore. But if the Korea Daily News will kindly use its powerful in-
fluence in our favor and persuade the Americans And Australians to receive any number of us, why, we should leave Korea alone and emigrate to those alnds of plenty with joy in our hearts."¹

"Commercially, too," says Mr. Brown, "The Japanese felt that they needed Korea. As in England, increasing population and inability to increase agriculture turned the national energies to manu-
facturing. Raw materials and markets, therefore, became questions of the first magnitude. Korea had both. Japan wanted the open door in Korea; Russia would close it. This was vital, for Japan depended largely on Korea for the additional food-
supplies that she needed."² All the necessities


² Ibid. p. 151.
mentioned in these quotations, however, constitute the elements that have combined to form the motives and forces behind the various policies of expansion during the nineteenth century; and they bear all the marks of imperialism. Thus as a result of such economic necessities, Japan had developed political interests in Korea.¹

Before 1834, the Korean Court had followed the custom of sending envoys to Japan upon the inauguration of a new Shogun; after that date, the practice was abandoned and Korea never acknowledged any political connection with Japan, while she did recognize China as her suzerain. After 1868, the Japanese tried several times to renew their former relations with Korea, but they failed in this effort.² As early as 1873, Japanese statesmen began

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to fear the southward movement of Russia and it became an important part of Japanese policy to prevent Russia from absorbing Korea. It was out of this fear of Russia that the idea of conquering the peninsula was born.¹ This fact marks a well defined Russo-Japanese policy in China and Korea and the beginning of that rivalry which had grown so intensively by the time the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was made.² But it is necessary to leave general principles at this point and consider the main lines of British and Japanese foreign policy which led finally to the formation of the Alliance.

The Foreign Policy of Great Britain

The international position of Great Britain at the outbreak of the Boer War was entirely unsatisfactory, for by this time she had...
powerful rivals in Africa and the East—both Far
and Near.¹ In Africa, the issue was between France
and England and an amicable adjustment seemed im­
possible at the beginning of the twentieth century.
During the entire period of the preceding century,
both nations had commercial and political interests
in Egypt.² This country was considered the "Key
to India" and Great Britain had secured the con­
trolling interest in the Suez Canal for this rea­
son.³ France had been offered the opportunity of
becoming the dominant stockholder in this valuable
commercial asset, but fear of Germany had prevented
her, for the moment, and England took advantage
of her delay and practically took over the Canal,
which had been built by French Capitalists.⁴

3. Barclay, pp. 37, 52.
France was jealous of the advantage thus gained by Great Britain and felt that the latter had intrigued to come into possession of what was by rights her very own. France had been the preponderant power in Egypt since the days of Napoleon I, and the whole territory had once almost belonged to her. Moreover, her protectorate over Algeria caused France to view any movement in Northern Africa, on the part of Great Britain, with deep concern. Finally, France was forced to recognize the peculiar interests of England in Egypt and the Sudan, but all through the process she was increasingly irritated by Great Britain and the rivalry continued to grow.¹

This mutual hostility between England and France was of long standing and the two countries had been on the verge of war many times. The entente of Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot, during the

¹ Murray, p. 53.
regain of Louis Philippe, had been smashed by the Spanish marriages;¹ the comradeship of Napoleon III, in the Crimean War was viewed with suspicion by the British as was his war policy against Germany in 1870;² the Jules Ferry program of colonial expansion in 1881, had opened new and boundless fields of controversy.³ In 1893, the Siamese incident almost brought the two nations to blows,⁴ and in 1898, when Major Marchand was forced to retire from Fashoda,⁵ was seemed inevitable. The problems were so many and so thorny between the two traditional enemies that the sword appeared to be the only means that could guarantee a success-

3. Barclay, pp. 82, 85, 89.
5. Barclay, pp. 144-56.
ful settlement. Sir Edmund Monson, in his Paris speech of 6 December 1898, protested against the policy of "pin-pricks" and insisted that it would be of vast importance to both nations to bring such a policy to a speedy termination;¹ but Franco-British colonial antagonism and national hatred was intensified on every hand, and not until 1903, when a treaty of arbitration—the work of Sir Thomas Barclay and Baron d'Estournelles—which provided for the adjustment of judicial disputes before the Hague Tribunal, was agreed upon, was there any sign of a cessation of these mutual hostilities.² Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century, the relations between England and France were strained to the limit and there was little apparent possibility of a reconciliation.³

1. Barclay, pp. 157-158.
3. Seymour's Diplomatic Background of the War, p. 122.
The relations between Great Britain and Russia—which occupy a significant place in the Background of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902—were as badly strained as those between England and France. This hostility, too, was a traditional one, dating even further back than the Congress of Vienna. England had prevented Russia from obtaining an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, she had opposed Russia in Persia and Afghanistan; and the interests of these two powers had again clashed in the Far East. Great Britain feared for the security of her possessions in India. Since the days of Catherine II and the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji,1 Russia had looked toward Constantinople with the hope that, some day, it would be a Russian port from which she would be able to move on to India and the Far East.2 Napoleon and Czar


Alexander, at Tilsit in 1807, had planned the partition of the Ottoman Empire, but the question as to which one should have Constantinople seems to have caused a rupture; and Napoleon's attempt to invade Russia five years later checked the latter power's advance in the Near East, for the moment; but after the overthrow of Napoleon, Russia's hands were loosed so that she could resume her aggressive policy. Russian desire in this direction was not only comprehensive but it was persistent throughout the nineteenth century; and that England feared for her Indian possessions is evident from the following statement, made by James MacGhan—a well informed writer of the period—in 1876: "The Russians are steadily advancing toward India, and they will, sooner or later, acquire a position in central Asia, which will enable them to threaten it. Should England

be engaged in a European War, then, indeed, Russia will probably strike a blow at England's Indian power."

The action taken by Great Britain in the War of Greek Independence in 1827, is among the notable events which mark the many attempts which she made to foil the imperialistic policy of Russia in the Near East. George Canning was quite willing to cooperate with Liberals if it meant anything to British economic interests. His policy of non-intervention, however, meant nothing, when he became convinced that Turkish perfidies must be checked. Fearing that Russia, if left to act alone, would exploit the defeated Turk, he seized the opportunity to bring about

1. A. Rambaud: The Case of Russia. p. 87.
2. Seymour, p. 123.
concerted action of the powers. This resulted in the treaty of London—signed 6 July 1827—by which England, France and Russia agreed to make a joint demand for a settlement of the Greek question.¹

In 1833, Russia had signed with Turkey a treaty of mutual alliance and assistance—the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi—by which it was stipulated, in a secret clause, that, if the need were that of Russia, the Sultan should close the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations²—but permitting free egress to the Russian Fleet. This treaty was abrogated in 1841—due largely to the efforts of Great Britain—and the new "Treaty of the Straits" was substituted, by which the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be closed

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to the warships of all nations so long as the port should remain at peace.¹ This was a great disappointment to Russia and it greatly intensified the hostilities of the two rivals.

The Crimean War of 1854 was another attempt on the part of Great Britain to check Russian aggression in the Near East.² It was for this same reason that Disraeli worked so hard to bring about the Treaty of Berlin,³ which forced upon Russia the revision of the San Stefano Treaty.⁴ Russia thus checked in this quarter, turned to the Central East with the hope of gaining control of Persia and through the Persian Gulf, an outlet to the Indian Ocean. This would give her an ice-free port and might enable her ultimately

⁴ Oakes and Mowat, pp. 877-90.
to seize India. She had already taken possession of Bokhara and established herself upon the borders of Afghanistan;¹ should she get control of this country, it would be possible to overrun India some day. But Great Britain again stepped in and called a halt by sending Lord Roberts with an army into Afghanistan.² And, although this campaign was not a success, it served to increase the hostilities between the two nations.

In the Far East, Russia had attempted a policy of expansion at the expense of China. In 1860, she had acquired the maritime province where Vladivostok was established, and she thought it possible to move on from this region to Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Korea.³ But by the trea-

1. Lord Roberts' Forty-one Years in India, p. 340.
ty of Nanking—signed with China in 1842—Great Britain, too, had acquired important interests in the Far East, and these commercial interests had grown very rapidly. After England's activities in this quarter, other powers followed, but Great Britain always remained predominant and she considered it necessary to hold this position of strength. British interests had continued to grow as may be seen by the following statement made by Lord Cranborne in 1902: "We own sixty per cent of all the shipping which trades with China; we own about one half of all the commerce which goes to and comes from China; so that our commercial position is one of very great importance."

Thus Russian aggression constituted a very grave source of danger to the commercial interests of Great Britain in the Far East; and by 1902, "the rivalry was such in this quarter as to

1. For the treaty, see "The Directory and Chronicle for China, Japan, Korea," etc., pp. 3-5.
make eminent the danger of open conflict."\(^1\)

England's relations with Germany at the time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was formed were considerably different from those with other powers, and yet there was to be found the roots of that rivalry which later developed into the World War. Germany was a young state and her statesmen had not been generally hostile to Great Britain. Bismarck, until his dismissal—8 March 1890—had maintained unquestionable official relations with England; and the cession of Heligoland to Germany in 1890\(^2\) indicates the confidence that Lord Salisbury had in the permanency of cordial relations between the two nations. Mr. Seymour credits Bismarck with the following statement: "As regards England, we are in the happy situation of having no conflict of interests, except commercial rivalry and passing differences such as


must always arise; but there is nothing that can bring about a war between two pacific and hard-working nations."¹ But the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation—3 January 1896—to President Kruger on his repulse of the "Jameson Raid"² was a source of considerable popular bitterness in England; but, as no further developments followed, the incident was considered to be merely a personal act of an excitable ruler; and, at the outbreak of the Boer War, Anglo-German relations appeared to be satisfactory.

In October 1901, the German tried to form an alliance of mutual defense with Great Britain that would guarantee the possessions of these two powers on every continent except Asia—this exception being made to avoid a Russo-German collision. Great Britain refused the proposal

¹. Seymour, p. 134, Note—A Citation from d'Avril: Negotiations relatives au Traites de Berlin. 325.
fearing a further estrangement of France—and the Anglo-German official intimacy began a rapid decline,\textsuperscript{1} so that by the end of the Boer War in 1902, the rivalry between these two nations was making good headway; and German activities in the Far East were coming to have a direct bearing upon the situation.\textsuperscript{2}

The Foreign Policy of Japan

In summing up the main lines of Japanese foreign policy, it is only necessary to touch upon the relations that existed between Japan on the one hand, and Korea, China, and Russia on the other, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In the general principles of Japan's foreign policy as indicated above, it was shown

\textsuperscript{1}V. Chirol in The Quarterly Review, October, 1914, pp. 415-449.

that her minor successes until 1876 had created a Japanese imperialistic mind, and that Japanese interests in Korea and China were not only economic but political as well. In 1875, a Japanese gunboat had been fired upon at the mouth of the Han River by a Korean fort; the Japanese warriors landed and practically annihilated the fort; and on 26 February 1876, the Korean Court was forced to sign a treaty which marks the beginning of Korea's subjection to Japan.\(^1\) This treaty provided for the opening of three Korean ports and the immediate establishment of commercial relations between the two countries.\(^2\) This treaty is called one of "peace and amity," but it would seem that the peace depended largely upon the development of Japan's economic interests in Korea. In 1880, Japanese traders went to the open ports provided by the treaty and a Japanese minister was sent to

\(^1\) Hornbeck, p. 199.

Representatives of the United States and Great Britain were sent there also within the next two years as if Japan had really made Korea an independent empire. But Japan's aggressive attitude toward Korea only continued the jealousy and suspicion of China, and Li Hung Chang persuaded Korea to open relations with the western powers, which resulted in the formation of a series of treaties from 1882 to 1886.

Both China and Japan desired to control Korea and two factions arose in the Korean Court—one progressive, the other conservative—and internal strife followed. The progressives appealed to Japan for assistance while the conservatives looked to China to settle their difficulties. Both the rival nations sent troops to Korea, but in 1885, a convention, signed at Tientsin, provided

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2. These treaties appear in Chung's "Korean Treaties," pp. 81-95; 107-21; 133-47; 165-75; 197-204.
for a joint withdrawal of their respective troops.\(^1\)

Strife, bloodshed and intrigue, however, continued for the next ten years and, in 1894, in consequence of another insurrection, Chinese and Japanese troops once more found themselves face to face in Korea.\(^2\) Japan determined to solve the Korean questions by introducing reforms into Korea, while China, reasserting her ancient claim to suzerainty over Korea, strongly protested against the Japanese plan. These peculiar activities constitute conclusive evidence that neither of the two nations meant to follow the provisions of the Tientsin Convention. Both China and Japan seem to have detected the treachery of each other in regard to this treaty and war soon followed, in which China was ignominiously defeated on both land and sea.

\(^1\) Curzon, p. 193. For the treaty, see the British and Foreign State papers. Vol. LXXVI, pp. 297-98.

The Japanese had actually invaded North China and were ready to advance upon Peking when the Chinese Government sued for peace. The treaty of Shimono-seki, signed 17 April 1895, closed this war. By this treaty China was forced to cede "the southern portion of the province of Feng-t'ien;" "The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining to the said island of Formosa;" "the Pescadores Group." In addition to the cession of these valuable territories China was forced to "agree to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of two hundred million Kuping taels." Other provisions were made which were far-reaching in their demoralizing effect upon China: 2 "The inhabitants of

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1. For the treaty, see the U. S. House Documents, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. I. pp. 200-203.

2. It is interesting to compare the Japanese demands in this treaty with the clause in the preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which says: "Being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea."
the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire.  

1. China was forced to open a number of towns, cities and ports to the Japanese on such terms as would give the latter the dominating influence in these towns and ports.  

2. One of the most striking demands of this treaty is to be found in the first part of Article VI, which reads as follows: "All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in consequence of war, China engages immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act—until the said treaty and conventions are brought into actual operation, to accord the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigations, frontier inter-

1. This clause must have been meant to clear the territories of the Chinese inhabitants so the Japanese moving in would "find room."

2. This part of Article VI. of the treaty seems familiar to the American, when compared with the Japanese demands on the California coast.
course, and trade, industries, ships, and subjects in every respect—most favoured-nation treatment."\(^1\) China was compelled also to withdraw and renounce her former claim to suzerainty over Korea and to recognize "definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea."

This treaty gave great offence to Russia and, together with France and Germany, she "counseled" Japan to withdraw from the mainland of China.\(^2\)

Japan was allowed to keep the remainder of the spoils with an additional indemnity of thirty million tael\(^3\) and, notwithstanding her losses sustained by the revision of the treaty, she had

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1. The demands of Japan upon China in this treaty constitute perhaps, the most sweeping and unreasonable price which the latter has ever paid for peace. This treaty is thus thoroughly significant of Japan's growing policy of imperialism and her determination to expand at the expense of neighbouring countries.

2. Hayashi, pp. 79-84.

added valuable territories to her Empire and had been placed in a position to carry out her designs on Korea.

But the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty marks the beginning of a well defined Russo-Japanese conflict, for, from this event, Japanese hatred of Russia became so intense that it promised important developments for the future.¹ It was this hatred for Russia—caused by her leadership in forcing Japan to surrender her gains from China—that led Japan to increase her military strength and prestige. "It became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained, and even her independence must be guarded, only by an armament powerful enough to give her a voice among the first powers of the world."² The feeling of the Japanese people after

1. Hayashi, pp. 77-79.
2. Asakawa, p. 79. See also, p. 80.
the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty, was well expressed by Count Hayashi when he said: "The treaty and its amendments by no means ends matters;"¹ and, since Russia was so bent on the revision of the treaty—"going even so far as to prepare the army contingents in the Amur region for quick mobilization"²—she brought upon herself all this hatred, which now entered into Japanese foreign policy to play an important part in bringing about the inevitable that followed in 1904—as well as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902.³ From the date of this treaty revision it became clear to Japan that her own existence depended upon her ability to compete with the great nations. "If she would not retire into herself, and finally cease to exist, she must compete with the greatest nations, not

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¹. Hayashi, p. 109. (Quoted from the Jiji Shimpo, a Japanese Magazine, for June and July, 1895).

². Asakawa, p. 75.

³. Hayashi, pp. 77-80.
only in the arts of peace, but also in those of war. Moreover a far vaster conflict than she had ever known in her history, excepting the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, was seen to be awaiting her. The only course to save her seemed to be—to go forward and become equal to the new, expanding situation."¹ Consequently the budgets of the Japanese government show a great increase in army and navy expenditures from this time on.²

The increased activities of Russia in China also constituted a source of great alarm to the Japanese Government. In 1891, Russia had begun her railway projects in Siberia, which—after squeezing many concessions from China³—she devel-

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¹ Asakawa, pp. 79-80.
² Ibid. See the table on p. 80.
oped into her Siberian System. She had granted China a great loan after the Chino-Japanese war; she had established the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1895; and by the end of the year 1896, Russia had gained many valuable concessions and privileges from China. On 30 September 1896, the famous Cassini Convention was ratified at Peking—the existence of which has been denied by the Russian Government. This treaty is reputed to have been concluded earlier in the same year for it was published in the "North China Daily News" on 27 March. Of this treaty, no Russian text has ever been published, but Dr. Asakawa has given an

5. Ibid., pp. 85 and 90.
6. Ibid., p. 85.
abstract from a Japanese source which coincides with the French and English texts which are now extant.¹ The provisions of the treaty gave Russia great advantages in regard to the use of Chinese ports. China also promised to assist Russia in case of war, and made great railway concessions—it would seem that such an alliance could have been aimed only at Japan. In September 1896, another agreement, which made important railroad concessions to Russia was signed between Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese bank.² The road to Vladivostok, through Manchuria, and the Chinese Eastern Railway was begun in August 1897, according to the above agreement.³


³ Asakawa, p. 99.
Russia, however, was still longing for an ice-free port, and following the example of Germany--the latter had secured a ninety-nine-year lease on the bay and port of Kiao-chow, together with important mining and railroad privileges in the Shan-tung province\(^1\)--she felt justified in making a similar seizure; and consequently, she demanded and obtained a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, as well as important railway concessions.\(^2\) The agreement by which Russia secured this lease was consummated on 27 March 1898, and on 3 April following. Great Britain secured a promise of the lease of Wei-hai-wei--but the agreement was not signed until 1 July.\(^3\) Japan approved this lease which was to remain in the hands of the


\(^{3}\) China, Treaty Series No. 14 (1898). China No. 1, (1899), pp. 80-81, 199.
British as long as Russia should retain Port Arthur—the latter had been leased for a term of twenty-five years—and "speedily evacuated the port in favor of England, leaving behind them every accommodation to the successor." Port Arthur and Dalny constituted a part of the spoils that Russia had been so energetic in forcing Japan to return to China in 1895; it was, therefore, of vital importance to Japan to have a friend near by, especially so, if that friend should be a foe to Russia. England's fear and enmity toward Russia are clearly shown by her activities against Russia's penetration into Persia, her arrival upon the borders of Afghanistan, her program of railroad extension toward the Afghan Frontier and her


3. Asakawa, p. 129.
intrigues in Tibet. All these events gave Great Britain just cause for alarm, and this fear of Russia was not allayed until the formation of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. When Sir Claude MacDonald reported to the British Government that M. Pavloff was pressing the Chinese Government for the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan and a railway concession that would connect Russia's railroad system with these ports, it "made a profound impression upon the British Government, which- - - - -was compelled to say that, if the Russian demands were granted, 'her influence over the Government of Peking would be so increased, to the detriment of that of Her Majesty's Government, that it seemed desirable for them to make some countermove. The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese- - - - to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to Germany.'"

1. See Asakawa, pp. 120-21. The enclosed quotation is from China, No. 1 (1898), No. 95--Salisbury to MacDonald.
That Japan expected war with Russia is very evident from the following quotation from the same author: "It was no matter of surprise to Japan that Russia now secured for herself the most strategic portion of the territory, the retention of which by Japan was, three years ago, declared by the same power to be imperiling the position of Peking, rendering Korean independence nominal, and interfering with the permanent peace of the Far East. When it was announced by Russia, in December last, that Port Arthur had been lent to her by China only temporarily as a winter anchorage, the Japanese Government merely 'credited this assurance, and accordingly took note of it.' When the negotiations for the lease were in progress, the Japanese Government made no protest, and when they were consummated, it manifested no appreciable sentiment. At the same time, it quietly approved of the British lease of Wei-hai-wei, which the Japanese troops had still held pending the final payment of the Chinese indemnity. Then they
speedily evacuated the port in favor of England, leaving behind them every accommodation to the successor."¹ This quotation, however, may be considered as putting the Japanese opinion in a mild form when placed beside the words of Count Tadasu Hayashi. He says:

"Our countrymen must be warned that the treaty of Shimonoseki and its amendments by no means ends matters. We must be prepared for many years to come to carry on both warlike and peaceful measures for the assertion of our rights. We must not shrink from attacking both to the North and the South with that object in view.

"As to the permanent occupation of Port Arthur, that part of Fengtien, which the second article of the treaty of Shimonoseki gave us, we have had to surrender it. The Russian, French and German Governments—-—-advised our Govern-

¹ Asakawa, pp. 128-29. The enclosed quotation is from the British parliamentary papers, China No. 1, (1898), No. 29.
ment to hand it back to China, and----we decided to accept that advice----.

"It is naturally very unpleasant to relinquish something which has once been in our possession, and though we did this as the result of the friendly advice of the powers, it seems an insupportable hardship that what we have once gained should be so lost.

"Opinions may differ in connexion with this matter, but----the ways of international intercourse amongst the so-called civilized nations are inconceivably intricate----.

"It must never be forgotten that discontent is the prime factor which incites men to greater activity and diligence. We should therefore retain our discontent to spur us on to greater diligence, with a view to one day dispersing the gloom around us. We must persistently suffer the insufferable and support the insupportable for the sake of what the future will have in store for us. In this way we shall truly promote the strength and prosperity of our nation."
"We should exert ourselves to develop our commerce and industries, for these are the principal factors of national expansion—-. We must also devote more attention than ever to building up on scientific principles our army and navy.

"We must continue to study according to Western methods, for the application of science is the most important item of warlike preparations that civilized nations regard. If new ships of war are considered necessary, we must build them at any cost. If the organization of our army is found to be wrong, it must at once be renovated. If advisable our whole military system must be entirely changed. We must build docks to be able to repair our ships. We must establish a steel factory to supply guns and ammunition. Our railways must be extended so that we can mobilize our troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping must be developed so that we can provide transports to carry our armies abroad."
"This is the programme that we have to keep always in view—Whilst our preparations are in the making things will not be easy—But if we always keep in view the great ends which I have indicated, then we shall endure all these things gladly.

"Peace has been restored but it cannot be a lasting peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, we must work for those who come after us—Many will be disappointed and discontented, but they must endure all their disappointment and discontent in silence and with a brave heart.

"It is not the first time in history that a power which has been strategically successful has been beaten in the Council Chamber. Russia beat Turkey, but England cancelled her victory and she returned home empty-handed, leaving behind the mountain of treasure for which she had fought—

"No modern war except the Franco-Prussian War has been concluded without interference from some outside power—No power is to be
blamed if it takes advantage of the weakness of another and can gain advantage for itself thereby.

"What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able to follow her own course, not only able to put meddling powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, meddling with the affairs of other powers. Then truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself."¹

Thus if Count Hayashi—to whose earnest efforts the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been credited—is to be taken as authority, there can be no doubt as to the deter-

¹ Hayashi, pp. 109-113--A reprint from the Jiji Shimpo, a Japanese Periodical, for June and July 1895.
mination of Japan to meet Russia on the field of battle at the earliest possible date. Nor can there be any doubt as to Japan's determined policy for "taking advantage of the weakness of another nation to gain advantage for herself thereby."

During the Boxer uprising, Russia had actually seized Chinese territory along the Amur, and had placed the treaty port of Niu-chwang under the civil administration of Russian authorities. To allay the apprehensions of the other powers, she informed them by circular notes that her action was only temporary, and that she would withdraw her troops as soon as she considered her interests secure.¹ She did not do this, however, but proceeded to formulate the "Alexieff-Tseng" Agreement,² by which she further stipulated the conditions upon which China should resume the civil

government of Sheng-king. The contents of the agreement caused considerable commotion among the other powers, and the United States, Germany, Japan and Great Britain made strong protests to China; but Russia again declared that she only meant to secure her interests in the occupied territory. In February 1901, however, Russia urged upon China another agreement—the "Lamsdorff-Yang-Yu" Convention—the terms of which appear to have been very unreasonable. But protests from Japan and Great Britain caused the abandonment of the negotiations. Russia was not yet satisfied and she made new demands upon China, which were disclosed to the American Ambassador at Peking, on 11 December 1901. She also proposed another

1. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 8, 12, 13, 14, 19.
2. Ibid., No. 2 (1901), pp. 1-3. No. 2 (1904), No. II.
3. Ibid., No. 2 (1904), Nos. 14, 25, 42.
4. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 28.
agreement in January 1902, which aimed to secure the industrial development of Manchuria for the Russo-Chinese bank.\(^1\) England, Japan and the United States protested against the Russian demands.\(^2\) Secretary Hay and Count Lamsdorff argued the question at issue, but the latter expressed himself as believing in the justice of the Russian attitude, and indicated that his government would maintain its right.\(^3\) A little later, however, Russia changed her mind and decided to accept the counter proposals of the Chinese Government--on 8 April 1902--which provided for the gradual evacuation of the whole of Manchuria within eighteen months from the date of the agreement. This change in Russian policy was doubtless due to the formation of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan.


This alliance, however, did not stop hostilities between Great Britain and Japan on the one side, and Russia on the other. It was merely a matter of fear on the part of Russia that induced her to accept the Chinese arrangement, and the traditional hatred between these powers was intensified rather than checked.

The facts and immediate circumstances which led to the formation of the agreement between Great Britain and Japan may, perhaps, be best expressed in the words of the negotiators themselves. Going back to the circumstances immediately following the revision of the Shimonoseki treaty in 1895, Count Hayashi sums up the situation as follows:

"If, however, the continental powers are going to continue the Alliance against her in order to curb our just aspirations, to fulfil which we have poured out life and money, then we too must endeavour to ourselves make an alliance which shall counteract their machinations."
"The recent change of Ministry in England seems likely to lead to a still further anti-Russian feeling in that country."

"Affairs in the Far East are now only in a preliminary stage. Russia certainly intends to obtain a predominating position, and in that case England's position in China might well become precarious. In this country all are agreed that the question must finally be settled by the sword, but England is not in a good strategical position for such a course, for the struggle would be settled on land and not on sea.

"If, however, England and Japan should make an alliance the problems of the Far East would be already settled. If the events of the late War have proved to the English statesmen that China is merely a big idol, then they may in time come to realize that Japan, though she is young and inexperienced, is earnest and energetic. China is no longer the power of the Far East, nor is Japan yet it. Russia is trying to be it. But
the real power in the Far East is England. If she casts her lot in with Russia she can no longer be it, for Russia can coerce China by land, which England cannot oppose. But if England casts in her lot with Japan, then she will more than ever be the power of the Far East, for she is the deciding factor at present. England and Japan together can control China and insure the maintenance of peace in the Orient.\textsuperscript{1}

In his Secret Memoirs, writing on the subject, "The Origin of An Opinion for an Anglo-Japanese Alliance," the Count says: "The origin of the desire for an alliance to be concluded between Great Britain and Japan is to be traced to the feeling existent in political circles in the latter country after the close of the Chino-Japanese war, when the intervention of the powers, Russia, France and Germany, Necessitated the retrocession of Fort Arthur—----。

\textsuperscript{1} Hayashi, pp. 113-114—From the Jiji Shimpo, June and July, 1895.
"Of course it was quite clear that intervention from the side of Russia would mean an excellent opportunity for that country to extend her influence in the Far East, and it was very natural that she was at the bottom of the whole affair—-—-—."

The letter of Lord Lansdowne, written on 30 January 1902, to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Tokio, is also of great value in setting forth the immediate circumstances surrounding the conclusion of this Alliance. And its importance in this respect justifies the incorporation of the entire letter at this point in this thesis. The letter is as follows:

"Foreign Office, January 30, 1902.

"Sir Claude MacDonald:

"I have signed to-day, with the Japanese Minister, an Agreement between Great Britain and

1. Hayashi, pp. 77, 80.
Japan, of which a copy is inclosed in this dispatch.

"This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome of the events which have taken place during the past two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.

"Throughout the troubles and complications which arose in China consequent upon the Boxer outbreak and the attack upon the Peking Legations, the two powers have been in close and uninterrupted communication, and have been actuated by similar views.

"We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the territorial status quo either in China or in the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the development of
their commerce and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained.

"From the frequent exchanges of view which have taken place between the two Governments, and from the discovery that their Far Eastern policy was identical, it has resulted that each side has expressed the desire that their common policy should find expression in an international contract of binding validity.

"We have thought it desirable to record in the preamble of that instrument the main objects of our common policy in the Far East to which I have already referred and in the first article we join in entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or Korea. We have, however, thought it necessary to place on record the view entertained by both the High Contracting Parties, that should their interests as above described be endangered, it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as
may be indispensable in order to safeguard their interests, and words have been added which will render it clear that such precautionary measures might become necessary and might be legitimately taken, not only in the case of aggressive action or of an actual attack of some other Power, but in the event of disturbances arising of a character to necessitate the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

"The principal obligations undertaken mutually by the High Contracting Parties are those of maintaining a strict neutrality in the event of either of them becoming involved in war, and of coming to one another's assistance in the event of either of them being confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile power. Under the remaining provisions of the Agreement, the High Contracting Parties undertake that neither of them will, without consultation with the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power.
to the prejudice of the interests described in the Agreement, and that whenever those interests are in jeopardy, they will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

"The concluding article has reference to the duration of the Agreement which, after five years, is terminable by either of the High Contracting Parties at one year's notice.

"His Majesty's Government had been largely influenced in their decision to enter into this important contract by the conviction that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence of important British interests. It in no way threatens the present position or the legitimate interests of other Powers. On the contrary, that part of it which renders either of the High Contracting Parties liable to be called upon by the
other for assistance can operate only when one of the allies has found himself obliged to go to war in defence of interests which are common to both, when the circumstances in which he has taken this step are such as to establish that the quarrel has not been of his own seeking, and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds himself threatened, not only by a single Power, but by a hostile coalition.

"His Majesty's Government trust that the Agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the two countries, that it will make for the preservation of peace, and that, should peace be unfortunately broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities.

"I am, etc.,

Lansdowne"

1. Parliamentary papers, Japan, No. 1 (1902).
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs very convincingly pointed out the vital facts and important circumstances which culminated finally in the making of this agreement, in a speech which he made in February 1902. He said:

"The Imperial Government in view of the actual situation in the Far East and the interests of the Empire involved therein, and recognizing the desirability of establishing close and confidential relations with friendly powers having interests common with them, has entered upon friendly negotiations with the British Government with a view to attaining the desired end. And the interests of the two Governments having happily been brought into complete accord as the result of extended negotiations, the Imperial Government obtained Imperial Sanction, and caused their Commissioner to sign with the British Commissioner an agreement in London on 30th January last. The text of the agreement I have the honor to read before the House. The effect of the present
agreement as you may have seen, is entirely pacific and is designed to safeguard our rights and interests in the two neighbouring Empires of China and Korea. Considering that the principle of territorial integrity of, and the open door in, are no other than what has been approved and voluntarily declared by all of the powers concerned, it is our belief the present agreement will not be regarded in an unfavorable light by any of the Powers."

These statesmen, in thus pointing out the recent policies of Great Britain and Japan, have given us a full and complete summary of the facts, conditions, circumstances and motives which clearly indicate the immediate causes that dictated the combination of these two powers in the Far East.

II

THE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

Coming now to the Treaty as it was signed on 30 January 1902, it is necessary to analyze it, the purpose of which is to ascertain the relation that the Document bears to the revelation of the causes which led to its formation. For the purpose of clarifying the stipulations of the Agreement in this respect, the Treaty is divided into two sections—the preamble and the articles of agreement—and an outline submitted with each section.

SECTION I

The Preamble

The Contracting Parties Propose:

1. To maintain the Status Quo and peace of the Far East

2. To maintain the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea

1. For the text of the Treaty, see Blue Book, Treaty Series, No. 3 (1902).
3. To secure equal commercial and industrial privileges in these countries for all nations

In this preamble, the Contracting Parties have aimed to set forth the motives that suggested the formation of the Alliance,¹ but these cannot be found here, for the roots of the Agreement reach much further back into the past.² The preamble merely points out the intentions of the two powers to attain certain ends. In connection with these objects, as indicated in the three clauses of the preamble, two important questions are at once apparent. In the first place, what is meant by the phrases "Status Quo" and "Territorial Integrity?" Secondly, why had Great Britain and Japan come to view the maintenance of the Status Quo of China and Korea and the peace of the Far East, the Territorial Integrity of China and

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1. Annual Register, 1902, p. 384.
Korea, the commercial and industrial security of all nations, with such profound consideration? It is unfortunate that the first of these questions is not answered by the terms of the Treaty itself. It would seem, however, that the accepted meaning of the first phrase should be plain enough and that, as it stands in the Treaty, it would refer to the situation on the date of signature,¹ but Japanese statesmen, it appears, have considered it as applying to the Status Quo Ante Bellum—that is, to the conditions as they existed before the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, in which case, it would have cancelled all Russia's aggressive activities in China since that time—otherwise, it would seem to sanction the abnormal conditions hitherto unrecognized by Japan.² The Japanese hold that all regularly arranged conventions between China and the Powers are included in the

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¹. The Contemporary Review, Vol. 81, pp. 443-44.
². Ibid.
phrase "Status Quo," and are, therefore, recognized under the Treaty. These include the Chinese leases as well as the commercial and industrial arrangements; but it appears that, by this interpretation, Japan was determined to refuse recognition of all secret and irregularly obtained conventions in regard to China, and this is especially true in the case of the Russo-Chinese convention of November 1900. This convention proposed to restore the civil government to China in the southern province of Manchuria provided the Chinese soldiers were disarmed and disbanded, all munitions of war handed over to Russia, all Chinese forts dismantled; and it proposed, moreover, that Russia would restore Niu-chwang and other places then occupied by the Russians, to the Chinese authorities, when the Russian government should be satisfied that pacification of the provinces was complete. It made further provisions for policing

1. Blue Book, China, No. 2 (1904), p. 3.
the country which should be under the influence of the Russian political resident stationed at Mukden. This was indeed an obnoxious instrument to the Japanese, and they had no idea of recognizing it or any other convention that would strengthen Russian political interests in any part of China or Korea. And the protest that was offered to China by Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the United States, marks clearly the attitude that was being assumed by the other great powers in regard to Russia's aggressive activities in the Far East. The two negotiating powers, nevertheless, proposed in the Treaty to protect the industrial and commercial interests of Russia as well as those of all other powers; and while it seemed that the Agreement was aimed directly at Russia, the latter expressed herself

1. The London Times, 3 January, 1901, p. 3.
2. Blue Book, China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 8, 12, 13, 19.
as being much obliged to any powers that were able to make any agreement which would grant a greater measure of security to her interests in the Far East—and in a joint note with France, she expressed her appreciation of the Agreement on 16 March 1902.¹ But if the negotiators did not mean the Status Quo, but the Status Quo Ante Bellum or the Status Quo minus secret conventions, it is much to be regretted that they did not say so, for in that case they would seem to stand convicted of having meant one thing, while saying another altogether different thing.

In seeking an answer to the second question, it must be remembered that Great Britain had long feared Russia's Far Eastern policy, which was primarily political and strategic.² Russia was chiefly interested in the expansion of her empire and this fact had led Great Britain to watch close-

¹. Blue Book, China, No. 2 (1904), No. 50.
². Asakawa, p. 48.
ly her movements in the extreme East. In the scramble of the powers for concessions and "spheres of influence" in China, England had seen her enormous trading interests threatened, and had considered it of vital importance to join in the scramble; she, therefore, took over a part of the spoils and began to restore her commercial influence.

England was hostile to France and, as Bismarck had admitted, Germany was her rival. Japan had received a great blow from England's three enemies through the revision of the Shimoneseki Treaty, and since that event, her diplomatic experience had been extremely humiliating. On this occasion, she had lost the most valuable

fruits of her victory over China. She had been elbowed out from the mainland; and, when she was forced to make the compromise of 8 November 1895, Japan realized more strongly than ever that her influence was waning in the Korean Peninsula. In the midst of such experiences and in the face of such facts, it became increasingly clear that Japan and Great Britain could neither uphold their policies nor safeguard their respective interests in the Far East without adopting some plan of cooperation and joint action. Japan was looking for a friend, an ally, a financial backer in her coming struggle with Russia—for Count Hayashi argued that, "in this country all are agreed that the question must finally be settled by the sword" --- --- "if England and Japan should make an alliance, the problems of the Far East would be already settled." And England was seeking some

some way by which she might retrieve her diminished influence in the Far East. Each nation needed the help of the other in view of their converging interests; and the very identity of these interests had led the contracting parties to realize more and more the importance of acting together. Count Hayashi considered their respective policies traditionally identical, as may be seen from the following statement: "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the established policy of Japan. It is the basis of the country's foreign policy. It was concluded owing to the common interests of the two countries demanding it, a demand supported by the traditional relations of the two countries. The Alliance may, therefore, be regarded as resting on the most solid foundation. Every effort and every mischievous trick having for its object the splitting of the tie cementing the two countries must end in failure."¹ Dr. Asakawa asserts that "each

¹. Hayashi, p. 207.
of the two nations found in the other something of a counterpart of its geographical position, its mutual needs and aspirations—-—-—This mutual sympathy was largely intensified by the common principles under which these interests could be best protected."¹ In other words, the alliance was necessary to both nations in order to protect these identical interests,² and this fact answers the question in regard to the anxiety of Great Britain and Japan for maintaining the Status Quo, the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, as well as the commercial and industrial interests of all nations.

SECTION II

The Articles of Agreement

The Contracting Parties Agree:

Article I.

1. That they recognize the independence of China and Korea.

¹ Asakawa, pp. 201-202.
2. That they are uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country.

3. That they have only their special interests in view--those of England relating to China; those of Japan to both China and Korea, with an additional political interest in the latter.

4. That they will protect these interests from both internal and external aggressions by whatever means may be necessary.

Article II.

1. That they will assist each other in case of war for the defence of these interests,

   (1) By a strict neutrality on the part of the power not at war.

   (2) By the efforts of the latter power to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

Article III.

1. That, if any other power or powers shall join in hostilities against either of the allies--at war for the defence of these interests--the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance.

2. That, in such event, the two allies will conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement.
Article IV.

1. That neither will enter separate arrangements with other powers, to the prejudice of these special interests, without first consulting the other contracting party.

Article V.

1. That, on considering these interests in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with each other fully and frankly.

Article VI.

1. That the alliance shall become effective immediately after the date of signature.

2. That it shall remain in force for a period of five years.

3. That one year's notice, before the expiration of the said five years, is required before either of the allies may terminate the agreement; otherwise, it shall remain in force for one year from the date on which either of the allies shall have denounced it.

4. That, if either party should be actually at war on the date of expiration, the Alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

The first clause in article I, specifies that the two allies have recognized the independence of China and Korea which, according to the preamble,
is one of the chief aims of the Alliance.¹² But in this connection, the attitude of nonest investigation leads to the inquiry as to just what the two powers meant by the term "independence" when applied to China and Korea. This word, as commonly understood, would seem perfectly clear and definite in its use, but in this particular case, its ambiguity is, nevertheless, apparent. The people of this country—during the Revolutionary period—construed the word to apply to the full control of all social, economic, commercial, industrial and governmental administration. It was largely the spirit of social, religious and political freedom that led the Pilgrim Fathers to settle in this country. And when Great Britain, in later years, tried to restrict the industrial development and commercial progress of these colonies, or when she

1. For each clause, direct reference is made to the text of the Treaty as found in the British parliamentary Blue Book, Treaty Series No. 3, (1902).

attempted to enforce laws that conflicted with their common idea of freedom and independence, these colonies rose in rebellion, and the mother country paid for her misdoing with the loss of the colonies—who protested that the principles of their independence had been violated. In the war of 1812, interference on the part of France and Great Britain with the shipping and commercial interests of the United States, was considered a violation of the principles of national independence and, therefore, a casus belli. It is a fact, moreover, that all the great Dominions of the British Empire possess absolute independence—so far as their local affairs are concerned; and the British Government, with all its traditional theory and constitutional right to legislate for all parts of the Empire, would not even think of making arrangements for special interests in one of these independent dominions—beyond the general interests of the Empire as a whole. If she did, it would result in another revolution, and another independent state added to the family of nations.
Thus, if the component parts of the British Empire itself, interpret the word "independence" to mean the full control of all matters within their respective territories, when applied to themselves and other great nations, what does it mean as used in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty with reference to China and Korea? If the two powers meant to construe the term in the light of the meaning indicated above, then it would become necessary in the outset for each to withdraw its claim to special interests in both China and Korea. Great Britain claims both commercial and industrial interests in China; Japan adds a political interest to her claim in Korea; and to withdraw such claims would, therefore, incur a great loss to each of the contracting powers; for this reason, they felt that such withdrawal could not be considered. Hence, the term "independence" as used in this Treaty, is a misnomer and cannot be applied in the fullness of its meaning; but, just as the framers of the Alliance misused the phrase "Status Quo" in the preamble, so have they misapplied the
Treaty on 12 August 1905, the two powers did not apply the phrase to Korea.¹

In the next clause of this article, the two negotiators express themselves as entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country.² In looking for the influence that did move them to action, it is at once clear that fear of Russian aggression in both China and Korea was one of the strongest that pointed to the necessity of such an alliance.³ But at this point, the most important question is: What did the contracting parties mean by the phrase "aggressive tendencies?" Lord Lansdowne undertakes to reinforce the provision of the clause when he says: "His Majesty's Government had been largely influenced in their decision to enter into the im-

3. Ibid., China, No. 1 (1898), No. 133.
portant contract by the conviction that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions to which it applies."¹ But the activities of Japan in Korea since the Treaty was made has caused this statement to appear somewhat contradictory, especially when the treaty with Korea on 22 August 1910, is given due consideration. It has been pointed out above that the special interests of Great Britain and Japan were in direct violation of the principles of independence according to the common acceptance of the term; and, at this point, consideration of the next clause, which sets forth Japan's claim to political interests in Korea, naturally enters. In this clause, both parties claim to have only their special interests in view; but it must be

¹ Blue Book, Japan, No. 1. (1902).

² For the proclamation and the treaty of annexation, see the London Times (Weekly) 2 September 1910, p. 667.
remembered that one of Japan's interests in Korea is political. And this fact gives rise to the question: What is meant by Japan's political interest in Korea? The answer to this question will also solve the problem connected with the meaning of the phrase "aggressive tendencies."

As applied to Russia's interests in Manchuria, the phrase "political interests" has been construed as conterminous with her acts of aggression for her own glory as a great expanding empire. Is it not natural that the same meaning should be applied in the case of Japan's political interests in Korea? Japan had her political interests in China at the close of the Chino-Japanese war in 1895, for she forced China to sign the treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded to her the Liao-tung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands. This fact, it would seem, demonstrates clearly the Japanese understanding of the phrase "political interests." And when Russia advised the

Japanese government "to renounce the definitive possession of the Liao-tung peninsula,"¹ she called down upon herself that hatred of the whole Japanese nation which was bound to result in war sooner or later. It was this feeling toward Russia that led Count Hayashi to warn his countrymen that they must be ready to carry on both warlike and peaceful measures at all times for the assertion of Japanese rights; he, therefore, urged them to prepare to face difficulties, and to make great sacrifices for Japanese honor and posterity.²

Thus would the Count avenge Japan of the wrong—as he considered it--done her by the act of taking over, as Russia actually did, what had been Japanese political interests in China; and following up the treaties made between Japan and Korea—which were, in reality forced upon the latter by

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¹ Hayashi, p. 85. Also see the London Times, 3 May 1895, p. 5.
² Hayashi, p. 109.
Japan—the intentions of Japan seem clear enough, especially, as indicated above, in consideration of what did actually come to pass on 22 August 1910.¹ This act of annexation, which was formally declared on 29 August, answers in full, the question as to what was meant by the "political interests" of Japan in Korea. In consideration of this explanation, it is also easy enough to place an accurate interpretation upon the term "aggressive tendencies" as used in the Treaty. Thus, if the latter phrase is construed in the light of its common use, the contradiction of meanings in the first and second clauses, of article I, is very apparent; for one of these clauses declares the contracting parties to be entirely uninfluenced by "aggressive tendencies," while the other admits Japan's Korean "political interests"—which are, according to the interpretation above, synonymous with the phrase "aggressive tendencies."

In the last clause of article I, the contracting parties declare that they will protect their special interests by any means that they may consider necessary; and adding to this declaration articles II and III, the agreement begins to take shape as a defensive alliance; for article II specifies that the allies will assist each other in case of war for the defence of these special interests, agreeing further that, if one should be drawn into war on account of the said special interests; the other would not only maintain a strict neutrality but would use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. Such an arrangement, however, would be of little material value to the negotiating powers if it stopped at this point. But article III adds, in the first clause that, if any other power or powers should join in hostilities against either of the allies, according to the arrangement of article II, the other ally would come to its assistance. Thus, considering the
last clause of article I, together with articles II and III, it becomes apparent that the negotiators intended to form an alliance that would comprehend the completeness of a defensive alliance; and when, in this way, the full significance of the Treaty is ascertained, it is going to appear as a sort of warning to those powers that have been engaged in the great scramble for the partition of China.¹

In the fourth article, the two powers agree not to make separate arrangements with other powers to the prejudice of their respective interests without first having consulted each other. The significance of this provision is simple and may be considered as consisting of a further mutual guarantee of the objects aimed at in the Treaty—that is, the cooperation of the two governments in the defence of the said special interests

¹ The London Times, 18 January 1898, p. 6. See also, Blue Book, China, No. 1 (1898) Nos. 53, 133.
within the regions over which the agreement assumes responsibility. The fifth article is also relatively unimportant. It provides for a full and frank communication between the governments of the contracting parties in case either should consider their special interests in jeopardy—with a view, of course, to taking the necessary measures of protection in accordance with the provision of the last clause of article I.

There are four clauses in the sixth and last article of the Treaty, and the first provides that the Alliance shall become effective immediately after the date of signature. The significance of this clause is to be found in the fact that it bears evidence of the readiness with which the treaty was accepted by both countries after the agreement had been reached. Count Hayashi records his extended efforts at negotiation, the anxiety which he felt for the cause and the patience with which he labored to bring about the agreement, in his Secret Memoirs. He says: "During the whole of my residence in Peking, and later in St.
Petersburg, having the object of creating the alliance always in view, I tried continuously to cultivate the society of the British representatives at those places—.

"In 1899 I returned to Tokio from St. Petersburg and visited Count Ito— Count Inouye was present at the interview, and asked me if I would like to go to London as minister. To this inquiry I replied that such was my most earnest desire.

"Count Inouye then continued by saying that M. Kato was always pressing on the Foreign Office the urgent necessity of an alliance with Great Britain, and he asked for my views on the matter. I replied that I considered the alliance to be most advisable and important, but pointed out that an alliance means something mutual, each side bringing something into the bargain. If Japan were not able to bring sufficient into the alliance as her contribution, then indeed it might suit Great Britain better to make an agreement with
Russia, which country could certainly offer more than Japan. And even if matters did not go so far as an Anglo-Russian Alliance, it might well be that the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be blocked. I said that my experience in Russia had been that England was very popular with certain sections, and therefore it would be very difficult to bring about an Anglo-Japanese Alliance.1

Count Hayashi took up his duties as Minister at London in 1900,2 and on 31 July, he had a conference with Lord Lansdowne during which the latter informed him that Great Britain considered it time to discuss seriously the question of making a permanent treaty with Japan.3 In this conversation, Lansdowne also informed the Count "that the situation between Japan and Korea was very similar

2. Ibid., p. 116.
3. Ibid., p. 129.
to that which had obtained between Great Britain and the Transvaal," and that the Count's "views were a suitable basis for discussion, and he would refer them to Lord Salisbury with a view to negotiations for a definite agreement being commenced."¹

Hayashi immediately telegraphed the substance of this conference to the Japanese Foreign Office, and on 8 August he received the following telegram in reply:

"Japanese Government acknowledges the purport of the propositions made by England regarding a definite agreement and accepts, in toto, your reports of your conversations with Lord Lansdowne. It desires you to proceed to obtain full particular of the British attitude in this matter. Success or failure of this convention depends on your carefulness. When our policy is fully decided upon the work will be easy."² On receipt of this

¹. Hayashi, p. 131.
². Hayashi, p. 131-132.
telegram, the Count says: "Of course I felt delighted when I received this telegram. Indeed, I had never felt happier in my life."¹

Thus the Count, now fearing, now hoping, yet faithfully, patiently and persistently pursued his course and urged his cause, at the British Court, with great anxiety, until his object was fully realized in the final consummation of the longed-for Treaty on 30 January 1902.²

But British statesmen were equally interested in the conclusion of this alliance as may be seen from various assertions made in the earlier stages of the negotiations, as well as after the treaty had been made. In conversation with Sir Claude MacDonald, Count Hayashi reports him as having said: "Whilst we are wasting time in discussing the terms of an agreement with Japan, the

¹. Hayashi, p. 132.

². Ibid., p. 167. A very splendid, detailed account of these negotiations is given in Hayashi's Memoirs, pp. 119-199.
Japanese Government might take up the idea of making an alliance with Russia. In fact, the German Ambassador (? Chargé) has been to the Foreign Office and said that there was a possibility of such action on the side of Japan.\textsuperscript{1} The Count also asserts that Lord Lansdowne expressed his views in the following statement: "We think that the time has come to discuss seriously the question of making a permanent treaty with Japan. I want therefore, to ask you what is the view of the Japanese Government with regard to the relationship of international interests in Manchuria, and secondly what sort of treaty you would want to make with us."\textsuperscript{2}

After learning the views of the Count, Lansdowne continues: "As regards Korea, England has very little interest in that country, but she does not wish to see Korea fall into the hands of Russia.\textsuperscript{3}

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1. Hayashi, p. 128.
2. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
3. Ibid.
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In the Lansdowne letter of 30 January 1902, after the Alliance had been made, the writer endeavoured to point out the purpose of the agreement and expressed himself as believing that it would bring great advantage to both contracting parties, and at the same time make for keeping the peace of the Far East. In this respect, he says: "His Majesty's Government trust that the agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the two countries, that it will make for the preservation of peace, and that, should peace be unfortunately broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of hostilities."¹ The opinions of these statesmen thus expressed, point certainly to the fact that both Japan and Great Britain were glad to accept this treaty-arrangement.

The second clause of this sixth article provides that the Agreement shall remain in force

¹ See the Lansdowne Letter, which is given in full on pages 54-59 of this thesis.
for a period of five years—and this has been called "the wisest clause in the Treaty."\(^1\) The third specifies that one year's notice will be required after the expiration of the said five years before either of the allies may terminate the Agreement. The fourth clause is merely an extension of the provision which aims to continue the Alliance in case either of the allies should be at war when the date of expiration arrives. Lord Lansdowne alludes to the last article as merely having reference to the duration of the Agreement which, after five years is terminable by either of the High Contracting Parties at one year's notice.\(^2\)

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2. Lansdowne's Letter, see Blue Book, Japan, No. 1 (1902) or preceding pages, 54-59, in this thesis. The letter is also given in the London Times, 12 February, 1902, p. 5.
CONCLUSION

In finally concluding this investigation, the facts ascertained may be summarized as follows: (1) Great Britain feared Russia, hated France, and considered Germany her commercial rival; (2) Japan hated both Russia and China, and wished to amalgamate Korea with herself; (3) The special interests of the two contracting parties were both traditional and identical; (4) The preamble of the Treaty sets forth the purpose and announces the aims of the Alliance; (5) The articles of agreement provide the arrangement by which the allies hoped to obtain their common objects; (6) The Agreement abounds in misapplied phrases, contradictory terms and grave inconsistencies; (7) These inconsistencies cast abundant light upon the real motives of the negotiating powers—pointing out that their special interests comprehended the intention to check the aggressive activities of other powers in the Far East, and to increase and extend their own imperialistic interests, as is most clearly shown by
Japan's annexation of Korea. And (8) out of these circumstances, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was born.

These facts represent the conditions which induced the motives that led finally to the conclusion of this Alliance, and point specifically to the policies that had dictated the terms of the Treaty. In conversation with Count Hayashi, before the Alliance was concluded, Lord Lansdowne said: "As regards China, our policy is identical with Japan's namely, the maintenance of territorial integrity and the open door—--.--."

After the Treaty was made this same diplomat said: "It may be regarded as the outcome of the events which have taken place during the last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them—--.--.--.--.

1. Hayashi, p. 130.
"From the frequent exchanges of view which have taken place between the two Governments, and from the discovery that their Far Eastern policy was identical, it has resulted that each side has expressed the desire that their common policy should find expression in an international contract of binding validity."¹

Count Hayashi says: "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the established policy of Japan, - - - - It was concluded owing to the common interests of the two countries demanding it, a demand supported by the traditional relations of the two countries, - - - - ."²

Mr. Kato, who was Foreign Minister at Tokio at the time of the Boxer uprising, spoke in unqualified terms of the Alliance. "He says that the two countries walked in such perfect step during the recent complications that they were

¹. See Lansdowne's Letter given above.
². Hayashi, p. 207.
suspected of being already in alliance, and there can be no doubt that the hearts of both have been long tending to union—-—-. The Japanese Weekly Mail adds also the opinion of Count Okuma. It says: "Count Okuma regards the Alliance as a natural outcome of the two Powers' community of interests and cooperation in action. They have been Allies in effect for some years, they are now allies in name—-—-—."  

Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi were the chief negotiators as well as the signers of the document; Mr. Kato and Count Okuma were prominent Japanese statesmen, who must have been in close touch with public sentiment and who were doubtless well informed on the subject of Japanese diplomatic history. Certainly the opinions of these statesmen can safely be taken as evidence of the traditionally convergent policies of the two negotiating powers.

2. Ibid., pp. 167-168.
The Japanese Weekly Mail has given what appears to be a very conclusive summary of Japanese public opinion through the Japanese press which indicates very clearly the attitude of Japan toward the conclusion of this covenant with England. Only such statements are given here, however, as tend to throw more light upon the idea of the traditionally convergent and finally identical policies of the two countries.

The Mail quotes the Kokumin Shimbun as follows: "The 12th of February is a day to be remembered in Japanese Annals, since it saw the announcement of an international event of the highest importance—-—-It may reasonably be said that ever since the Chinese trouble of 1900 England and Japan have been gradually drawing together—-—-.

"The result is due not only to the ability and tact of Mr. Komura but also to the foresight of Mr. Kato, and Baron Hayashi in London has contributed his share by his capacity and adroitness—-
- - by whatever statesman the end was achieved, how-
ever, the fact is equally great. Our long dream
has become a reality- - - - -"1

The Jiji Shimpo says: "As for the events
that have led up to this issue, it has long been
plain that Japan's policy was identical with that
set forth in the Agreement, and, at the same time,
Japan herself recognized that to carry out that
policy single-handed might be difficult- - - - -what
was wanted was an occasion to bring the two, (Japan
and England), together and to convince the latter
of the sincerity of Japan's purpose as well as of
her eligibility for an Union. The Chinese Complica-
tion furnished this opportunity."2

The Mail says: "The Nichi Nichi Shimbun
thinks that the world had already recognized the
practical reality and the sincerity of the Union
of England and Japan in Far Eastern affairs, and

1. The Japanese Weekly Mail, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 166-
167.

2. Ibid.
that the Japanese people themselves had recognized it, so that its consummation in the form of a written agreement may now be regarded as in the natural sequence of events.

"Our contemporary then analyzes the Agreement article by article with strong approval, and concludes by noting that England and Japan have been steadily drawing together for many years. It was England that set the example of revising the treaties, and after the war of 1894 to 1895 her attitude toward Japan has been uniformly friendly while the events of the Chinese crisis developed in practice and identity of interests, well known to exist in theory."\(^1\)

The Yomiuri Shimbun says: "No lengthy exposition is needed to set forth its lofty purpose and absolutely sincere spirit. Yet any one regarding it as a new political departure would be much mistaken. It is nothing more than a reduction to

documentary form of the facts that have asserted themselves in the practice of the two powers, each having abundantly proved by its actions during recent years that its sole aim is the preservation of peace and the open door."

The Japanese Mail concludes this summary with this statement: "The Hochi Shim bun, which heads its article with a picture of the two countries' crossed flags, says that the hearts of both nations have long inclined to this Alliance, and that their acts in recent years have plainly presaged it—- - - - Japan has long been in accord with England in her attitude toward Far Eastern problems."2

Thus, in addition to the opinions of the two statesmen who made and signed this Treaty, and those of other English and Japanese statesmen, we must add the opinion of the general public as expressed through the various newspapers and journals

2. Ibid.
quoted above, all of which must be taken as conclusive evidence that the treaty was, in reality, a consummate expression of the results of the respective foreign policies of Great Britain and Japan, which reach far back into the nineteenth century.

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