Questioning Precision: Discourse Ethics and the Recognition of Noncombatants in Drone Warfare

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Abstract

The study of discourse assists scholars in understanding and explaining the ways in which words, utterances, and dialogue impact occurrences within international relations. Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics situates communicative processes within a context of equitable discourse that, upon reaching consensus between parties, can arrive at just conclusions. Critics believe that power constructs within societies, however, abridge the occurrence of equitable communication, representative of minority and marginalized populations. Thus, on a theoretical level, this thesis seeks to account for the short-comings of Habermasian discourse ethics by placing it into conversation with Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and Judith Butler’s theory of grievable life. This theoretical conglomeration allows for the discourses of minority groups to be accounted for within the public sphere of discourse, especially in regard to issues of contemporary military engagement and security.

Technological advancements in warfare have produced weapons that are designed to protect soldiers through speed, precision, and the ultimate removal of humans from the battlefield. This focus on casualty aversion has redistributed the risk from soldiers to noncombatants through impersonal delivery systems like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), prioritizing the lives of soldiers over the lives of noncombatants. Understanding the importance of discourse ethics, this dominant discourse of casualty aversion should be placed into deliberate conversation with subversive discourses that would allow for the voices of noncombatants who have been victimized by drone warfare to be included within the public sphere. Thus, this thesis questions the prevalent utilization of precision-based weaponry that fails to recognize the voices and lives of noncombatants in warfare.
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Introduction

In a field outside of a village in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region in northwest Pakistan a 90 by 60 foot portrait of a small child stares into the sky. Created by a collective of Western and Pakistani artists who are interested in “[sharing] the untold stories and images of people in their communities,”1 the art installation, entitled #NotABugSplat, can be seen by American drones conducting surveillance and combat missions.2 The artists claim that this picture of a child who lost members of her family to a drone strike “target[s] predator drone operators sitting thousands of miles away who refer to kills as BugSplats. Now they’ll see a child’s face instead.”3 The artists behind #NotABugSplat do not intend to stop with one installation, but want “to continue to put up more posters of children to instigate further dialogue and awareness.”4 Whether or not this campaign will influence change in American military practices, this art installation articulates a shift in the public drone narrative from wonderment about the precision and technological advancement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to the impact that they have upon people.

Discourse Ethics: Analyzing Discourse

Dialectic philosophers in the Frankfort School tradition, such as Jürgen Habermas, concentrate upon the importance of communication as the foundational, constitutive attribute of society. Agents operate in the world through speech acts, which establish meaning not only to the words that one speaks, but looks to the intention underpinning the words. As J. L. Austin

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4 Sifi, “Not a ‘Bug Splat:’ Artists Give Drone Victims a Face in Pakistan.”
notes, communication is “to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in saying something we are doing something.”

Using Aristotelean language, Habermas presents four types of “linguistically mediated interaction” each with its own teleology or purpose-driven-ness. His concentration on teleology, in the tradition of Austin’s speech-act theory, suggests an emphasis on the result or goal of the communicative act, rather than mere concentration on the words uttered. The first type of interaction delineated by Habermas is strategic. The goal of strategic interaction is for one party to influence the behavior of a second party, precipitating a desired action or outcome. Second, Habermas describes a conversational type of communication. The goal of this interaction is to convey information from one party to another that describes an event or situational environment (i.e. “The dog is outside.”) Third, Habermas outlines dramaturgical action, the goal of which is to expressively convey a particular, intentional re-presentation of a social narrative to an audience by “purposefully disclosing his subjectivity.”

Fourth, and most important for this analysis, Habermas presents the process of speech action or discourse as communicative action, noting that it is a collaborative endeavor of mutuality designed to resolve conflicting viewpoints. In order for discourse to be effective,

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5 J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 12. Emphasis is in the original.
7 Habermas includes a chart describing his understanding of “Aspects of the Rationality of Action” on page 334 of The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1.
10 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communication, Vol. 1, 86.
participants must presuppose a stance of equity and “universal solidarity with all others.” Thus, through the practice of discourse “actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement.” It is at the point of agreement that the ethical consensus is achieved.

While critiques of Habermas’ assumption of discourse as being fundamentally egalitarian and democratic will be discussed in the following chapter, it is important to mention Habermas’ belief that within the bounds of political liberalism, dominant, institutionalized discourses should be questioned. Habermas chides liberal democracies for their dialectic complacency and encourages critical political discourse. “Claims to validity involving practical questions and political decisions were intended to be continually questioned and tested.” Additionally, the dialectic process is central to the “cooperative search for truth.” Ultimately, the discursive telos, central also to political liberalism, is the realization of justice. “Justice,” according to Habermas, is “not a particular value but a dimension of validity.” Thus, dominant political discourses that appear to abridge another’s realization of justice should be challenged and altered.

In the Habermasian tradition of critical discourse, this analysis takes into consideration attempts in the international public sphere (such as the #NotABugSplat art installation) to challenge the dominant military discourse of casualty averse warfare in order to allow for renewed examination of the human cost of distance-fought, precision-based warfare.

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13 Ingram, 31.
16 Ibid., 96.
Precision and Casualty Averse Warfare: Establishing the Dominant Discourse

[We must] challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture for the defense of America…On land, our heavy forces will be lighter, our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain. In the air, we will be able to strike across the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems. On the oceans we will connect information and weapons in new ways, maximizing our ability to project power over land. In space, we’ll protect our network of satellites essential to the flow of our commerce and the defense of our comment interests.

President George W. Bush
February 13, 2001

American military engagement in the Post-Cold War world has taken on a markedly different tone. Lacking a monolithic adversary, American forces have taken on smaller-scale, shorter-term missions dominated by the use of strategic air-based strikes. This transition from modern, total warfare (evidenced in World Wars I and II) to a limited-engagement, precision and speed-focused model of warfare, has been widely regarded as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Latham acknowledges that this RMA “has been ‘triggered’ by technological changes” and is characterized by “a transformation of most (if not all) dimensions of the mode of warfare.” Prior to 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, Latham sagely suggested that threat had been redefined in the Western world. Instead of “the Soviet Other” providing the primary security threat, it is now characterized “by a range of actually or potentially hostile Third World

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18 The Economist comments that “Defense-industry folk sometimes get nostalgic about the cold war…[they miss] the sheer simplicity of life in those days. There was a clearly defined enemy” (“Survey: Military Revolutions,” The Economist, 20 July, 2002, 7).


20 Shimko notes that it is difficult to determine the beginning/end of this RMA because it is “the first to be so extensively analyzed as it is supposedly unfolding” (Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21).

states.” The change in security threat not only changes the type of war to be waged, but the adversary that it is to be waged against.

Revolutions in Military Affairs are certainly not a new or unique development to the contemporary military world. Volumes by Parker, Keegan, and Boot chronicle the emergence of technological innovations that so altered the battlefield that they required radical changes in military strategy and training. Focused on the mechanization of the battlefield, Martin van Creveld suggests that the trajectory of the RMA finds its roots in the ashes of World War II. “The most significant post-1945 technological developments took place in the field of electronics and space.” The consequent arms races of the Cold War produced expensive, virtually unusable stockpiles of nuclear weapons. As new challenges and conflicts developed, “big bomb” strategies were no longer viable. New technologies, applications of technological developments, and warfare strategies integrating precision were desirable.

In his study, War Made New, Max Boot is clear that changes on the battlefield are reflective of factors inclusive of and beyond the military (social, economic, political, etc.). He notes that at a fundamental level the focus of RMA analysis should rest on “the soldier struggling to kill or avoid being killed, and [on] his commander struggling to master the remorseless logic of carnage.” The deliberate inclusion of the human into the RMA equation is also endorsed by

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22 Ibid., 222.
27 Whether or not the proliferation of nuclear weapons create a more or less stable world is the subject of Sagan and Waltz’s book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, but both scholar agree that the use of nuclear weaponry in warfare would be so horrible that containment and monitoring regimes to control these weapons are more likely than the utilization of these weapons (Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, (New York: Norton, 2003).
28 Ibid., 11.
military historian, Adrian Lewis. Critiquing the wholesale acceptance of a defense development and deployment strategy characterized as technology-first, Lewis states: “Technology, operational doctrine, and new adaptive organization were to come together in ways that created synergies that made possible the RMA. The problem with this thinking was that it left out the human beings.”

At the heart of this RMA has been the development of casualty-averse technology such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. According to P.W. Singer, the present RMA is unique as “the introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn’t change simply how we fight, but for the first time changes who fights…It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its capabilities.” This change in agent has additional implications for the role of the soldier and the Western understanding of war because, as Singer quips, “Drones don’t die.” Weapons like UAVs are designed to feed a casualty averse American public, “destroy[ing] [the enemy combatant] at long range, [and] accelerating a long-standing trend: the battlefield has been emptying for centuries.”

Half a year before the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks and the United States’ incursion into Afghanistan, the nascent Bush Administration committed itself to development of a technologically-driven military that would reduce risk to soldiers through technologic advancements. In an address given to troops and personnel at Norfolk Naval Air Station on February 13, 2001, President George W. Bush noted: “We’re witnessing a revolution in the technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness…Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided

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weapons. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”33 It is this sentiment that cements the continuation of the RMA and the American-preferred “Casualty Averse” philosophy of military engagement.

In order to properly understand what is meant by “casualty averse warfare,” it must be defined. Conceptually, casualty aversion is not complex. Robert Mandel describes casualty averse warfare as: “During warfare one has a low tolerance for losing many lives or suffering many injuries.”34 The very definition of casualty aversion is, however, laden with ambiguity as the nature of “many lives lost” is perceptual.35 Mandel notes that “the quest for bloodless war represents as aspiration embodying a set of sometimes unspoken or confusingly stated motivations, intentions, and values, rather than a pattern of unambiguous empirically observable behavior.”36 This defines the ideal of precise death in warfare of precise combatant targets without risk to soldiers or noncombatants not identified as targets, thus establishing a righteous justification for conflict. If assailants can attack enemy combatants with pinpoint accuracy, then the risk of collateral damage is decreased significantly.

Casualty averse military strategies become attractive in a world of twenty-four hour news cycles and competition between cable news stations to break the latest news. American public support of military actions is directly tied to what is shown on their television screens. Ignatieff describes the Kosovo Conflict as “a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way

33 Bush, “Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel.”
35 Coker suggests a deeply ingrained Western cultural norm that considers “a life lost [to be] a waste.” He links this cultural phenomenon to a collective inability to accept the risk and sacrifice associated with war and conflict. “One of the principle reasons we cannot justify casualties any longer is that we can no longer make sense of the waste of life in the complex situations that demand the use of force” (Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 65). Essentially the Western culture is characterized by an impossible demand for peace without conflict.
36 Mandel, 8.
that sports do.” American citizens become “armchair soldiers,” watching exploding bombs as spectators. Thus, Americans require images of victory to lend support to war. Fewer casualties translate to greater support by Americans for the military. This feeds an American culture with expectations for images of easy victories and few flag-draped coffins. Mandel explains, “So casualty aversion seems to be a virtually inevitable consequence because people would be upset if many of their fellow citizens were being slaughtered in battle.”

The relationship between media and public support can clearly be observed through the media’s “ability to dramatize the costs of war.” What would become known as “the CNN Effect,” accounts for the ability of CNN (and all news media outlets) “to focus an audience’s attention,” thus “increas[ing] public pressure on political leaders.” The classic case for the CNN effect is the Vietnam War. It is largely believed that “the reason Vietnam casualties are still remembered today is because of their unprecedented visibility during the conflict.” The visualization of loss causes a conflict and the strategy by which it is being fought to face delegitimization in eyes of the public.

Directly influencing change in American military strategy, the media’s portrayal of the United States’ Battle of Mogadishu in October of 1993 caused not only the swift abandonment of a ten month United Nations mission in Somalia, but also impacted the strategies utilized by NATO forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. After two Black Hawk transport helicopters were shot down by Somali militants, with initial reports of five dead American soldiers and bringing

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37 Ignatieff, 3.
39 Mandel, 13.
40 Ibid., 18.
42 Mandel, 18.
43 John H. Cushman Jr., “5 G.I.’s are Killed As Solis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters,” *The New York Times*, 4 October 1993, sec. 1A, p. 1. This figure was later increased to 18 American soldiers killed.
the combat death toll in Somalia to sixteen.\textsuperscript{44} While the soldiers’ deaths were tragic in their own right, the reports and images of the Somali’s grisly treatment of the soldiers’ corpses and soldiers taken hostage caused the loss to be intolerable by the American people.

News reports from Mogadishu…said the bodies of dead American soldiers littered the scene of the fighting, with the bloodied corpse of one U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets by ropes tied to his feet, and another dead serviceman stripped naked and surrounded by a gleeful Somali mob chanting “Victory!”…In another case, the corpse of an American soldier was said to have been tied up and trundled through the streets on a wheelbarrow by about 200 cheering Somalis.\textsuperscript{45}

This intolerance was characterized rhetorically by the United States Congress, who were quick to link the operation in Somalia to controversial loss of soldiers in Vietnam\textsuperscript{46} and evidenced in a public opinion poll, which revealed that “43% [of those polled] say that they’re less willing to commit U.S. troops after the escalating violence in Somalia” and the same percentage believed that the United States should remove troops immediately. \textsuperscript{59%} of those polled had seen ‘news photos of the corpse of a U.S. solider being dragged through the streets by Aidid followers.”\textsuperscript{47} This incident marked the beginning of the end of the American military’s mission in Somalia, with formal withdrawal completed on March 25, 1994.\textsuperscript{48}

The October 1993 battle in Mogadishu served as a backdrop for the spring 1999

United States-led, NATO air war against Yugoslavia. The impetus for the strikes was “an effort to halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of its Kosovo province by Yugoslavia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic.”

Using the recent history of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans and measurable success with targeted air strikes during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, President Clinton stressed the aerial (casualty averse) nature of the campaign in Kosovo, while affirming its potential risks.

Like any other military action—there are risks in it…There are risks every time our young people get up and fly jet airplanes at very high speeds…But the dangers of acting must be weighed against the dangers of inaction. If we don’t do anything after all the to-and-fro that’s been said here, it will be interpreted by Mr. Milosevic as a license to continue to kill. There will be more massacres, more refugees, more victims, more people crying out for revenge.

Commentators speculate that a contributing factor for Milosevic’s eventual surrender was the threat of ground troop deployment, but the images of the Somalia tragedy, stamped on the minds of the American public, would only permit a perceptually low-risk engagement for American troops in defense of Kosovo. Like other conflicts of the 1990s, the Kosovo Conflict was widely televised, but the lack of US troops on the ground prevented “battlefield reports”

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49 Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), xiii.
52 Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, 72. In an interview with James der Derian, General Wesley Clark discussed plans for escalation to ground troops had the air strikes been ineffective. “Well, we had a basic strategy: discuss an air threat, make an air threat; discuss a ground threat, make a ground threat, then invade. Each one built up to a greater coercive pressure” (*Virtuous War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 189-190).
53 James der Derian explores the expansion of the Bosnian campaign’s coverage to the internet. He notes that he “dipped in and out of the virtual Bosnia represented on the Web, moving through bulletin boards, booklists, home pages, electronic archives and even a ‘Bosnian Virtual Fieldtrip’ on the Internet” (52). The impact of the internet on warfare and information dissemination from the battlefield is a topic for another paper, but it should be acknowledged that media reporting extends beyond to what is read in print and seen on television screens into cyberspace.
from reporters. Thus, the US government was able to control the interpretation of the bombings, primarily through the portrayal of Milosevic’s war crimes as the problem.\(^{54}\)

A public resistant to the idea of combat deaths of their troops has aided in propelling the evolution of Western military strategy. Thus, this strategy is reliant upon air power in order to prevent heavy casualty conflict.\(^{55}\) In the end, Kosovo “did indeed represent the first time in which air power coerced an enemy leader to yield with no friendly land combat action whatsoever.”\(^{56}\) The NATO victory in Kosovo set a precedent for technology and air-power-focused twenty-first century warfare.

A progressively casualty-averse strategy of warfare is propelled by technological developments that allow for soldiers to step back from the danger of battlefield, with the goal of increasing the strength and precision of weaponry.\(^{57}\) The ultimate intention is to “give the United States a battlefield edge against region powers, [and] will also bolster efforts to deal with such dangers as international crime, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental damage.”\(^{58}\) In part, the edge that technology provides a military is speed of response.\(^{59}\) A vital technological advancement in today’s battlefield has been the development and use of UAVs for the purposes of surveillance and combat.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, such as the USAF’s TQ-1A Predator and US Army’s Hunter, were first used for intelligence collection during the Kosovo Conflict.\(^{60}\) The tactical advantage of


\(^{56}\) Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, 224.

\(^{57}\) Latham, 223.


\(^{60}\) See Singer’s “Drones Don’t Die” for an historical overview of UAV development from World War I to the Global War on Terror.
UAVs was quickly acknowledged as “UAVs offered commanders and planners the frequent advantage of real-time video imagery without any accompanying danger of aircrew losses.”

General Wesley Clark confirmed the utility of UAVs in combat in an interview with James der Derian, and advocated for continued development of the technology.

> What you needed was integration, of the digitized images from the unmanned aerial vehicle flying overhead, your map coordinates, and the geolocations of the enemy from the GPS, and to project it all on the thermal viewer, to use it as a computer, so the driver and the gunner know when they get to the top of the hill, they’ll know that the son-of-a-bitch is going to be right there.

While not fool-proof, the USAF was able to use three Predators with 24 hours of flight time, to simultaneously to map and identify targets for attack. Additionally, General Clark and his staff were able to locate two of Milosevic’s Serbian colleagues (Mladic and Karadijic), though both eluded capture.

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the remote, rough terrain of Tora Bora of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the United States Department of Defense articulated an intention to further develop UAV capabilities. The *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* expressed the efficacy of UAVs for “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” (ISR). The value of UAVs for surveillance missions is undeniable. Unlike the Cold War surveillance standard, the U2 spy plane, the unmanned Global Hawk, slated to replace the U2 in 2015, can monitor targets for about 35 hours at an altitude of 65,000 feet without endangering a pilot. To put this in perspective, the “Global Hawk can fly from San Francisco, Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, 94.

Der Derian, 188-189.

Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, 95-96.

Ignatieff, 96.


spend a day hunting for any terrorists in the entire state of Maine, and then fly back to the West Coast.”

The surveillance provided by UAVs is remarkably crisp and, provided in real time, it eliminates the delay of photo and information transfer previously experienced through intelligence gathering methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT). In her seminal *New Yorker* article, journalist Jane Mayer described her experience watching as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team surveyed and executed a strike on wanted Pakistani terrorist, Baituallah Mesud, through the assistance of a Predator Drone. “It was a hot summer night, and he [Mesud] was joined outside by his wife and his uncle, a medic; at one point, the remarkably crisp images showed the Mehsud, who suffered from diabetes and a kidney ailment, was receiving an intravenous drip.”

While Predator Drones had been utilized to track the movements of al Qaeda terrorist, Osama bin Laden in October of 2000, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Drones had not been weaponized and the CIA was forced to watch, frustrated, as bin Laden went about his daily tasks unhindered. “Here was the clean shot they had been seeking for more than two years: positive identification of their target, no questionable human agents, no delay.” Money to arm the Drones, however, was not immediately forthcoming. The 9/11 terrorist attacks propelled this technology forward.

For the purposes of warfare, the ability to equip UAVs with strike capabilities in order to access targets in remote or hidden areas has been an integral component of casualty averse strategies. The *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* expresses the necessity of weapons capabilities to be developed for UAVs in combat: “Emphasis must be placed on…unmanned

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long-range precision strike assets, related initiatives for new small munitions, and the ability to defeat hard and deeply buried targets." Shortly after the Global War on Terror had begun, President Bush praised the efficacy of armed UAVs and the necessity to further pursue unmanned technology.

This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special forces, and precision air power -- has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums. The Predator is a good example. This unmanned aerial vehicle is able to circle over enemy forces, gather intelligence, transmit information instantly back to commanders, then fire on targets with extreme accuracy. Before the war, the Predator had skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways. Now it is clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We're entering an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater importance -- in space, on land, in the air, and at sea.

While concentration has clearly been upon casualty aversion for American service men and women, how does this military strategy account for the deaths of and injuries to civilians? At the time of writing, 2,319 U.S. service members have died in Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001. While the deaths of these US service men and women are an indisputably tragic loss to the United States, the loss of life has been more substantial for Afghan civilians. The United Nations reports that from January 01, 2007 to December 31, 2012, 14,728 Afghan civilians have died.

70 Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 44.
73 Exact numbers of noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan is difficult to confirm, but the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) does provide official numbers in its annual reports. Reports are available online at http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13941&language=en-US. The annual reports provide the figures for noncombatant deaths in Afghanistan from 2007-2012.
lost their lives. 3,219 of these deaths are attributed to pro-government forces as “collateral damage.”

The numbers of combatant and noncombatant casualties attributed to UAVs are also extremely lopsided. This is because the pilots of UAVs are not located within the physical geography of the battlefield, and, thus, combatants and noncombatants almost entirely absorb the casualties sustained through UAV attacks. Because casualty numbers resulting from UAV attacks are classified, reports vary wildly. While some sources report that 50 noncombatants are killed for every one militant, The New America Foundation claims that the rate between noncombatants and militants has never been that high and currently claim a civilian death toll of single digits in 2013 and zero in 2014. These numbers have come under scrutiny because they are limited by the numbers that are reported in the media, not by the real numbers that are collected by the US military and/or the Central Intelligence Agency.

Martin Shaw refers to the preservation of soldier safety while sacrificing noncombatant safety as “risk-transfer war.” This is “because it centers on minimizing life-risks to the military…at the expense not only of ‘enemies’ but also of those whom the West agrees are ‘innocent’.” The ambiguity of casualty aversion is apparent: what is casualty averse for one group may not be casualty averse for another, but may, instead, be the transfer of risk from one

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78 Shaw, 1.
group onto another. The consequence of risk transfer warfare is the prioritization of the soldier protection over the protection of the other, inclusive of noncombatants.

**Recognition: Facilitating An Alternate Discourse**

The dominant discourse of casualty averse warfare is not only strong, but has informed American military structure and research and development through the RMA. The emergence of alternative discourses is not driven by an alternative view of military structure, but, rather, access deep-set norms or expectations for the behavior of states in the international community. The goal of a critical theory such as discourse ethics is to expose the inadequacies and injustices present within the status quo in favor of an approach that better adheres to socially-established norms. While Habermas contends that this can be accomplished through the availability of discursive opportunities and the praxis of discourse, Habermas’ protégé, Axel Honneth, contends that discourse alone is insufficient in facilitating resolution in the face of conflict. This is because conflict between two parties is often a result of power inequalities between them. Thus, discourse is reliant upon the precondition of recognition.

Honneth describes the *a priori* necessity of mutual recognition between parties in order for an individual or group’s humanity to be respected.

> Every human subject is dependent in an elementary way, on a context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by normative principles of mutual recognition; and the absence of such recognition relations will be followed by experience of disrespect or humiliation that cannot be without damaging consequences for the single individual’s identity formation.79

In the case of clear power differentiations, such as those observed between noncombatants and military powers in conflict, discourse is not possible without the deliberate recognition of personhood, rights, and the existence of perceived grievance by all discursive

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parties. “The politics of recognition,” according to Shapcott are ultimately ontological. Recognition “refers not only to people’s relationships to the things of the world but to their fundamental modes of being-in-the-world.”\textsuperscript{80} The process of recognition, followed by the practice of discourse, is fundamentally the practice of empathy, or as some feminist theorists have put it, of care.\textsuperscript{81} Recognition-driven discourse, thus, “requires participants to put themselves in the place of all others potentially affected by a candidate norm, in order to see whether or not it can be welcomed from their perspective too.”\textsuperscript{82}

In a culture that values precision and expediency of weapons in conflict under the umbrella of “casualty averse” warfare, Habermasian discourse ethics, augmented by Honneth’s theory of recognition and Judith Butler’s grievable life, provides helpful insight into the plight of noncombatants who find themselves unjustly in a UAV pilot’s cross-hairs. Chapter One of this project looks at Jürgen Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics, how it fits into constructivist International Relations scholarship, evaluates its shortcomings, and suggests ways to build upon its discursive foundations for easier applicability. Chapter Two considers the voicelessness of noncombatants in UAV warfare and suggests that through recognition and transnational discourses that challenge the dominant narrative, noncombatants can move beyond the dehumanizing label of “bug splat” and towards recognition as humans deserving justice.

\textsuperscript{80} Richard Shapcott, \textit{Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11.


\textsuperscript{82} Finlayson, \textit{Habermas}, 85.
Chapter 1: Justice, Discourse, and Recognition: Habermas and International Relations

Richard Shapcott begins his book *Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations* with the assertion that understanding justice in the international system is essentially “an impossible task.” This sentiment is echoed by David Campbell. “Justice is like the pre-original, anarchic relation to the other, and to the undecidable. It represents the domain of the impossible and the unrepresentable that lies outside and beyond the limit of the possible and representable.” From these perspectives, it seems that the study of justice in International Relations might be fruitless. That does not seem to deter us, however, from exploring theoretical venues through which justice might be more holistically realized for more of humanity, especially those who are marginalized and/or oppressed.

Some political philosophers and political documents suggest that justice can best be realized through a top-down mandate from the state or through a legal code. Alternatively, and relevant for this analysis, others have concluded that justice is best achieved through a grassroots, bottom-up approach. For example, Rawls’ contention that the practice of justice begins at the theoretical first position and from behind a Veil of Ignorance so “that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or contingency of social circumstances.” Walzer suggests that justice within warfare is determined by the consensus, not of the war-wagers, but of humanity. Concepts of justice, thus, are understood as constituted through human intersubjectivity and inclusivity. This process is facilitated most...

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83 Shapcott, 1.
84 David Campbell, “The Deterritorialisation of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics After the End of Philosophy,” *Alternatives* Vol. 19, No. 4, 472
obviously through communication. “Dialogue may result in the expansion and/or reconfiguration of moral boundaries...because the principle of communication is universally inclusive: no agent capable of communication can be ruled out in principle.”

International relationships are fundamentally driven by meaning-laden communication or speech acts. Utterances are performative actions, wrought with meaning, that evoke response, after interpretation, from the receiver of the speech. Risse notes the “triviality” of this assertion, noting that “communicative behavior is all-pervasive in international relations as in any other social setting.” But, he continues, there is a difference between instrumental “cheap talk” and deliberative argumentation or “rhetorical action.” The difference is rooted in the purpose underpinning the communication. Habermas refers to the purpose of these speech acts as establishing “validity claims” or mutually-agreed-upon understandings of reality and norms. Finlayson explains: “Human actions are always primarily coordinated by speech or language use...Validity claims have a practical function, since they guide the actions of social agents.”

Additionally, the practice of discourse in search of understanding is a process through which validity claims can be established and altered. This occurs on the international level both through formal discourse such as diplomatic negotiation and through less formal public discourse, which informs the international public sphere. The public square provides an intentional check upon the actions of political actors. “The existence of a public sphere ensures that actors have to regularly and routinely explain and justify their behavior."

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88 Shapcott, 26.
89 Austin, 8-9. It should be noted that Habermas is intentional to move beyond Austin’s assertion that propositions (or locutionary) are foundational to meaning, as “Habermas endorses the view that the illocutionary, or performative force of speech action, no less than the locutionary content, constitutes a bona fide category of meaning” (Ingram, 39). See also Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application, xiii.
90 Risse, 8.
91 Ibid., 8.
92 Finlayson, Habermas, 26-27.
93 Risse, 21.
The relevance of a discursive approach to International Relations theory seems apparent. Even the (essentialized) realist International Relations theorist who argues that it is exclusively the acquisition and execution of material power that establishes activity within the international system, might find some promise in discursive theoretical traditions as the actions and words that states undertake are symbolic of power-laden discourse. Considering, for example, the quintessentially realist Melian dialogue transcribed by Thucydides, it is apparent that Athenian power ultimately triumphed over Melian desire for neutrality. The anecdote itself is encased in discourse, action, and reaction.

This chapter will, first, explain the ontology and discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. Second, it will review the International Relations literature in order to establish the utility of discourse ethics for the study of international politics. Finally, it will evaluate a selection of critiques of Habermas’ work and explore ways that discourse ethics can be augmented in order to be most useful for this study.

**Habermas’ Ontology: Lifeworld and System**

A chief concern of International Relations theory is an articulation of the ontological presuppositions both of the utilized theoretical approach and of the researcher. Jackson notes that “what is at stake in the contrast between ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ is not the character of the world, but rather how we observers are hooked up to it.”

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94 For example, E.H. Carr (*The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (New York: Palgrave 1981/2001)) states, concerning material coercion, “Economic power is impotent if the military weapon is not held in readiness to support it. Power is indivisible; and the military and economic weapons are merely different instruments of power” (109).

95 For an intriguing, alternative interpretation of Thucydides identifying the importance of speech acts to the Athenian narrative, see Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides the Constructivist,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3: 547-560.


97 Lebow 554-557.

ontology is important not only because it situates the scholar within Habermas’ theoretical presuppositions, but also because it provides context for the transformative significance of communication within his vision of the world.\textsuperscript{99}

In his seminal two-volume work \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Jürgen Habermas takes great care to explain and develop his understanding of the composition of the world. Articulating opposition to Popperian positivism and belief in an objective, discoverable truth “out there,” Habermas describes three worlds within which “the actor takes up relations with his utterance.”\textsuperscript{100} These three “worlds” consisting of the objective world (possible truth statements), the social world (interpersonal relationships), and the subjective world (a speaker’s unique experiences) inform Habermas’ ontological presuppositions.\textsuperscript{101}

Habermas breaks down his representation of the social world further into two spheres that simultaneously constitute society: the lifeworld and the system.\textsuperscript{102} Despite the differentiations between these social levels, Habermas is clear that they are both presupposed by “normatively regulated action.”\textsuperscript{103} It is through this ontological envisioning of the world that communication transpires. “Communicative action presupposes language as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested.”\textsuperscript{104} Thus, it is the people within the world that compose, sustain, and change it through discursive praxis.

\textsuperscript{99} Jackson does warn that prioritizing ontology does box one into a “particular (if revisable) account of what the world is made up of: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you” (\textit{The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations}, 27). For the purposes of this paper, an ontological concentration of the composition of the world and the human actions that contribute to that contribution seems appropriate. That said, the researcher should be prepared to consider epistemic and other philosophic underpinnings of utilized theorists.

\textsuperscript{100} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 1, 100.
\textsuperscript{101} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 1, 100.
\textsuperscript{102} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 2, 120.
\textsuperscript{103} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 1, 88.
\textsuperscript{104} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 1, 99.
The first part of Habermas’ division of the world is the system.\textsuperscript{105} The system itself is a fairly regimented, sedimentary structure that Habermas designates as being driven by two material mechanisms exchange (or money) and power.\textsuperscript{106} These mechanisms provide the basis for social stratification such as “state organization in forms of political domination and…relations between private legal persons.”\textsuperscript{107} Because the rigidity of the institutions at the system level become so pervasive for the functionality of everyday life, these structures can actually “colonize” the socially-driven lifeworld causing “agents [to] fall naturally into pre-established patterns of instrumental behavior.”\textsuperscript{108} These patterns actually restrict the potential for communicative action “instead of making it possible in the first place.”\textsuperscript{109}

The process of reintegrating colonized portions of the lifeworld can be lengthy and difficult, forcing reconfiguration of the system’s institutions through concerted discursive efforts.\textsuperscript{110} One need only think about the generations-long fight to abolish the slave trade in eighteen and nineteenth century Great Britain and the United States to see a clear illustration of the difficulty in changing system-level legal and economic structures and converting them into social, ethical discussions.\textsuperscript{111} Crawford refers to this process of systemic change as overcoming extrinsic barriers and notes: “An argument may overcome extrinsic barriers when the culture and the institution where the arguments occur are open to challenge.” She goes on to explain that the

\textsuperscript{105} Because the lifeworld portion of Habermas’ world division is more pertinent to the discussion in this paper, I have chosen to dispense with a description of the system first in order to show how the lifeworld better speaks to the constructivist approach to International Relations.

\textsuperscript{106} See Figure 24 in Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 2, 166.

\textsuperscript{107} Habermas, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Vol. 2, 166.

\textsuperscript{108} Finlayson, \textit{Habermas}, 54.

\textsuperscript{109} Brent Steele, \textit{DeFacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics} (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 87.

\textsuperscript{110} Brent Steele contends that reflexive discourse can expedite this process as actors move to reconcile their self-conceived identities with an understanding (genuine or not) of others’ perceptions of their identities. See: “Making Words Matter: The Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and the ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in International Politics,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} (51), 908-912.

“Domestic and international institutions designed to facilitate democratic deliberation may lower the extrinsic barrier to argument, by increasing the ability of different actors to participate.”

Such inclusive participation occurs, Habermas contends, at the level of the lifeworld.

The second part of the Habermasian ontological world is the lifeworld (or social world), which exists prior to the system. Central to the lifeworld is a “normative context that lays down which interactions belong to the totality of legitimate interpersonal relations.” These relationships include “the informal and unmarketized domains of social life” such as the family and culture. Central to the existence of the lifeworld are language and culture, which are re-presented through a “culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns.”

Resulting from these existing linguistic patterns, Habermas considers the lifeworld to be a universal commonality to the point that it cannot be transcended or exited by communicative actors. The lifeworld provides the context within which situations that require discursive mediation occur. Habermas explains: “The lifeworld forms the setting which situational horizons shift, expand, or contract. It forms a context that, itself boundless, draws boundaries.” This presupposition of boundedness and commonality provides actors with a referential linguistic system permitting mutual understanding between discursive parties. Habermas asserts that “speakers and hearers come to an understanding from out of the common lifeworld about something in the objective, social or subjective worlds.” Habermas does provide space for differing definitions of terms and concepts and suggests that part of the initial discursive process

112 Neta Crawford, 118.
114 Finlayson, Habermas, 51.
is dependent upon determining accepted definitions. Without consensus on terms and definitions between parties, discourse cannot continue and will not be efficacious.

Embedded within the commonality of the lifeworld are established, universalized norms. Habermas suggests that it is out of these established norms that cultural values are realized. “Members can then expect of one another that in corresponding situations each of them will orient his action to values normatively prescribed for all concerned.”118 The contention that norms are dialogically constituted and impact human behavior aligns itself nicely with the ontological and theoretical premises of constructivist international relations theory. It is now to this body of literature that we turn.

**Constructivism and Habermasian Discourse**

One of the core goals of the constructivist approach to International Relations seeks to understand how societal norms are established and sustained, while simultaneously establishing and sustaining the identities of individuals and collectives. Wendt explains that “particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and that constitute the structure of the social world.”119 Thus, when identity formation and sustenance is a key theoretical consideration, understanding the creation of relational meaning becomes important. Kloz characterizes shared meanings and norms as intersubjective. “Particular meanings become stable over time, creating social orders that constructivists call structures or institutions. Rules

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and norms set expectations about how the world works, what types of behavior are legitimate, and which interests or identities are possible.”

While the formation of identity is a complicated topic and ultimately beyond the bounds of this project, it is important to tie it in to the social processes that humans continuously engage in. Aristotle famously categorized humans as political animals and linked their humanity to their engagement with and in the polis. “Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city-state—he is either a beast or a god.” Thus, it follows that identity can be envisioned as a political process.

A key social and political practice vital in both norm and identity production is communication. Kratochwil links communication with the development of meaning and practice directing norms in society. He notes that a central part of constructivist International Relations research requires the scholar to “understand how the social world is intrinsically linked to language and how language, because it is a rule-governed activity, can provide us with a point of departure for our inquiry into the function of norms in social life.” Habermas speaks similarly to the mutually constitutive nature of norms as discursively produced and behaviorally maintained. “Norms express an agreement that obtains in a social group…The central concept of complying with a norm means fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior.” Habermas, as discussed above, contends that norms become entrenched into the fabric of a society’s lifeworld, thus becoming universalized and establishing a common foundation for discourse to occur.

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Habermas, International Relations, and the Insufficiencies of Discourse Ethics

In its January 2005 issue, the Review of International Studies asked whether or not the engagement of international relations scholars with Habermas is “a useful dialogue” and advances the development of critical theory. While the consensus of the contributing scholars to this specific forum and a number of theorists published since, see the benefit of applying Habermas’ theories to International Relations, they are cautious about the extent to which “pure” Habermas can be utilized, acknowledging a number of insufficiencies in his theoretical framework when applied to specific cases.

First, however, we should address the scholars of International Relations who have found Habermas to be helpful and have found some success in applying his principles to cases. Habermas has been used to explore the utility of rhetoric in International Relations and to support universal norm commonalities concurring with the lifeworld concept. Speaking to critics of Habermas, Risse suggests: “The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a ‘common lifeworld’ and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed.” Deitelhoff and Müller find that the “lifeworld” is already present, at least in a “thin” form, in the international system. “There is more of a lifeworld in international politics

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128 Risse, 33.
than conventionally assumed: there exist frames of reference in international law, diplomatic customs, and shared history in which speakers anchor their arguments."\(^{129}\)

Andrew Linklater produces a compelling case for the use of Habermasian discourse ethics within International Relations. Acknowledging the potential for an international dialogical community, he concedes that powerful states engaging in dialogue with less powerful states must be cognizant and tolerant of cultural and moral differences. He asserts, however, that “only through dialogue with other cultures can progress be made in separating merely local truth from those with wider acclaim.”\(^{130}\) He goes on to argue that Habermas’ project is ultimately one that provides emancipation for those engaged in discourse.\(^{131}\) Linklater goes on to defend the use of Habermas in International Relations literature stating that, “it opposes totalizing projects that ride roughshod over cultural differences and expose individuals and groups to forms subjection and humiliation.”\(^{132}\)

The criticism of Habermas within political theory and the international relations literature is, however, pervasive. A primary criticism of Habermasian discourse ethics is its situation within the definite structures of the lifeworld and system. Despite his criticism of positivist epistemologies, which establish objective truth as something that can be discovered though human reason, Habermas seems to unintentionally perpetuate a positivist understanding of the world in a “softer” sense.\(^{133}\) He accomplishes this through his inclusion both of the objective world and the system portion of the social world. Both are almost set sedimentary structures that are difficult to alter. Additionally, Habermas’ contention that norms are universalizable in the

\(^{129}\) Deitelhoff and Müller, 172.
\(^{130}\) Andrew Linklater, *The Transforming of Political Community* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 79.
\(^{131}\) Ibid., 90.
\(^{133}\) See part I of Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol 1, especially pages 75-88.
lifeworld (permitting discourse), is premised on the presupposition of interests that can and should be held by all participating agents. Positivists suggest that truth can be uncovered through scientific discovery, and, likewise, Habermas suggests that validity claims can be discovered through discursive efforts. A markable difference between social scientific positivism and Habermasian discourse ethics is a concentration on creation (through language and dialogue) underpinned by universally recognized norms, rather than scientific discovery underpinned by objective truth.

Habermas’ “soft” structuralism is further complicated by its reliance upon Western, liberal assumptions and language. Habermas is unapologetically dependent on his German intellectual forefather, Immanuel Kant, desiring for his analysis to continue and complete “the (unfinished) philosophical project of the Enlightenment…a project that, represented by Kant among others, aims to locate, and so benefit from the ideal ethical potential in rational human beings, while significantly remaining faithful to the sovereign state.” This is especially evident in Habermas’ publications on supranational and global governance discussing “political action on the scale of the planet” and institutionalized cosmopolitanism through the “constitutionalization of international law.”

Maintaining his structural presuppositions, Habermas couches his concept of public sphere discourse, maintaining a classic Westphalian conception of the state. Political theorist Nancy Fraser “problematizes” this liberal-Western assumption: “In this model, democracy

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134 For an overview of development of the philosophy of science within International Relations theory, see Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, chapter 1.
137 Jürgen Habermas, “Crossing Globalization’s Valley of Tears,” New Perspectives Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 4, 57.
requires the generation, through territorially bounded processes of public communication...[requiring] the mobilization of public opinion as a political force.”

The problem with a state-focused understanding of the world is further explained by poststructuralist David Campbell who observes that “our political imagination has been impoverished by the practices associated with the paradigm of sovereignty...In terms of the political field, this has meant that the idea of ‘the political’ has been subsumed by and made synonymous with ‘the state.”

The implications of a presupposed Westphalian-state-oriented international system include an abridgement of transnational communication and social mobilization’s impact on domestic and global political movements, which is characteristic of globalization. “Where such structures transgress the borders of states, the corresponding public spheres must be transnational. Failing that, the opinion that they generate cannot be considered legitimate.”

The problem of legitimacy in a Westphalian international system is further explained by Steele and Armoureux who suggest that the exclusionary nature of this system is “isolating...the influence that non-state actors, since they are not legitimate members, can and have had upon the content of those principles.”

Additionally, the presupposition of a Westphalian international system perpetuates an ethnocentric, liberal-concept-laden use of language. This ultimately entrenches power differentiations between discourse partners that Habermas neglects to acknowledge, maintaining

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139 Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World,” Theory, Culture, Society Vol. 24, No. 4, 11.
142 Fraser, 22.
that lifeworld norms are universal in nature.\(^\text{144}\) The extension of liberal language into discourse ethics also extends meanings and practices representing inequality. Notably, Habermas’ understanding of democracy does not “adequately address issues of particular significance to Third World politics: the legacies of colonialism, the West’s hegemony in current global politics…and the impact of material conditions and socioeconomic (in)equality on democratic politics.”\(^\text{145}\) Additionally, we see the perpetuation of “political modalities—such as strength, resolution, boldness, will, and vigilance—associated with the regime of Masculine/feminine.”\(^\text{146}\) These inequalities are especially problematic for the alleged egalitarian preconditions of Habermasian discourse ethics.

One of the staunchest critiques of Habermas comes from feminist scholars who are concerned about the perpetuation of discriminatory social and cultural practices that restrict the participation of women and other minority groups in public discourse. Fraser is intentional to note the continued presence of inequalities today. “Socioeconomic injustice and cultural injustice are pervasive in contemporary societies. Both are rooted in processes and practices that systematically disadvantage some groups vis-à-vis others.”\(^\text{147}\) Robinson articulates the difficulty of uprooting and/or transforming these inequalities because they “reflect structures and institutions that are enduring (although not timeless) as well as persistent values and beliefs.”\(^\text{148}\)

Consequently, it seems that these values are established norms within particular lifeworlds and would only be replicated within the practice of Habermasian discourse. In fact, Hutchings argues that “the lifeworld/system distinction and the role of the public sphere in

\(^{144}\) See Brent Steele’s critique of communicative action in *DeFacing Power*, especially pages 84-90.


\(^{146}\) Campell, *Writing Security*, 199.


\(^{148}\) Robinson, 852-853.
modernity does little to challenge the liberal private/public distinction.” Kapoor affirms that the perpetuation of private/public sphere gender roles remains an important consideration in nonwestern cultures as well. “Transcendence of the ethical/personal can end up legitimizing women’s oppression in the home and prevent the problem from being addressed and resolved in the political/public sphere.” In gender-oppressive cultures in which women are expected to be seen and not heard, even the presence of women at the table does not guarantee their participation. “This is all the more the case when sensitive issues such as rape, violence, or sex are discussed publically.”

Despite the shortcomings of Habermas’ discourse ethics from a feminist perspective, some feminist theorists consider Habermas to possess analytical promise. Benhabib suggests that despite the strong language of Habermas’ requirement for unanimous consensus following discourse, “This requirement is still useful for understanding how the logic of universalizing justice claims differs from the logic of strategic as well as ethically specific claims. Discourses are moral and political learning processes.” Additionally, Benhabib acknowledges the importance of balancing the universality of human rights with the particularity of culture, which she believes to have been developed in international politics through discourse. While Hutchings is ultimately critical of Habermas, she does concede the role of his theories in the “broadening of the canvas of International Relations to include social and normative theory.”

149 Hutchings, 156.  
150 Kapoor, 470.  
151 Ibid., 469.  
152 Benhabib, 145.  
153 Ibid., 40.  
154 Hutchings, 165.
Recognition and War: Building Upon Habermas

While the critiques against Habermas’ discursive ethics are serious, Benhabib’s above assertion that the platform of discourse, given a proper framework, can lead to greater understanding between discursive partners is promising. It is clear that Habermas’ theory alone is insufficient in facilitating egalitarian communication especially between agents with clear power differentiations and that involved, transnational non-state actors must be intentionally included within the discursive practice if resolution to injustice and narrative discord are to be reached. As Rustin concludes regarding Habermas, “One must look elsewhere in order to locate an ‘inclusive’ ethical theory that might motivate individuals toward greater respect for ‘others’ as fellow human beings.” Rustin’s analysis could also be elevated to the group level, asserting that states and their representatives must be motivated to recognize the humanity of the other.

A potential solution to the feminist and poststructuralist critiques of Habermas is to use additional theorists, in the vein of Habermas, to build upon the theoretical foundation formed by his discourse ethics. I propose that this can be accomplished by taking a step back from the public sphere and establishing an *a priori* inclusionary practice of recognition. Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition gives us a theoretical path towards the intentional inclusion of the other. Additionally, Judith Butler’s theory of grievable life provides us with unique insight into the power that humans possess to provide or deny recognition of the other in conflict zones. Using Honneth and Butler to build upon Habermas gives us a richer picture of how a dominant, power-driven discourse might be altered through recognition and justice-driven sub-discourses.

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155 Rustin, 187.
156 The engagement with Honneth following Habermas is not an especially novel approach. As Jürgen Haake quips, “Given the perceived difficulties in ‘applying’ Habermas, there appears to be an emerging trend to end the honeymoon with Habermas in favor of a reorientation with Honneth” (“The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition,” *Review of International Studies* Vol. 31, No. 1, 181).
This is especially beneficial as we turn to the relevance of recognition to casualty averse warfare and the tactical use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in contemporary warfare.
Chapter Two:
Casualty Averse For Whom? Noncombatant Casualties, Ambiguous Justice, and Recognition in Drone Warfare

Fire leaped from the dragon’s jaws. He circled for a while high in the air above them lighting all the lake; the trees by the shores shone like copper and like blood with leaping shadows of dense black at their feet. Then down he swooped straight through the arrow storm, reckless in his rage, taking no heed to turn his scaly sides towards his foes, seeking only to set their town ablaze. Fire leaped from thatched roofs and wooden beam-ends as he hurtled down and past and round again…Flames unquenchable sprang high into the night.
J.R.R. Tolkein\textsuperscript{157}

“Everyone is scared and they can’t get out of their house without any tension and fear of drone attacks. People are mentally disturbed as a result of the drone flights. We can’t sleep because of the planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the fear of attack on our mind.”
A Resident of Esso Khel, North Waziristan\textsuperscript{158}

Flying quietly through the air, often unseen, dragons, the mythical creatures of the fantasy genre, stalk their prey with destructive intent. Striking without warning, like Tolkein’s Smaug, they breathe fire and possess nearly impenetrable scaly shields. They are characterized by stealth and precision, often lacking discernment between combatant and innocent. In many ways, weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are modern, mechanized dragons. They are armed with hellfire missiles, quietly collecting surveillance, striking with precise, fiery explosions, without warning, when “signature” targets emerge. Their distance from their targets makes them difficult to neutralize by combatants. While every attempt is made by military personnel for discernment between combatant and noncombatant targets, mistakes are made and noncombatants become collateral damage. UAVs are perceived on the ground as omnipresent,

producing anxiety that everyone in the besieged community could be at risk of a swift, fiery death.\textsuperscript{159}

The utilization of UAVs in armed combat is designed to prevent risk to American and NATO troops, while targeting combatants with greater precision and efficacy than previous air-based attack methods.\textsuperscript{160} The result, however, is a tactic of warfare that can seem indiscriminate and increases physical insecurities and psychological pressures of noncombatants living under the perpetual threat of death from the skies.\textsuperscript{161} If we understand this conflict and the utilization of UAVs to be situated within the transnational community, then the emergent critical discourses aiming to challenge dominant discourses should be engaged. At root, these subversive discourses are concerned with the un-administration of global justice to noncombatants targeted (with intent or inadvertently) and reduced to the status of “collateral damage.”\textsuperscript{162} In this environment of insecurity, the pursuit of global justice has taken a backseat to battlefield efficacy and casualty aversion as wartime risk is deliberately shifted from soldiers and placed upon noncombatants.

\textit{The Public Sphere, Discourse, and the Internet}

The transnational nature of warfare causes it to be a contentious topic within the international community. International dependence at economic and political levels results in mutual dependence for international security. Within the context of what Habermas refers to as “the decline in the state’s capacities for control,”\textsuperscript{163} he also argues for the “transformation of the state power”\textsuperscript{164} that deepens international relations through “the constitutionalization of

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 31-32.
\textsuperscript{162} See Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World.”
\textsuperscript{163} Habermas, “Crossing Globalization’s Valley of Tears,” 52.
\textsuperscript{164} Habermas, “Plea for a Constitutionalization of International Law,” 5.
international law...bound up with a supplementation of powers of national governments by a growing web of international organizations that make governance beyond the nation-state possible. But, this also requires that states in the international community understand themselves within the context of the international community. “States,” according to Habermas, “can no longer regard themselves exclusively as sovereign, contracting subjects.” They must consider themselves to be full members of the international community, adhering to the precepts of international law and norms, especially within the context of conflict.

While the difficulties of this position from a critical perspective are discussed above, the premises of the transnational and interconnected nature of international relations is readily applicable to transnational dominant and subversive discourses on security issues, such as the use of weaponized UAVs in combat, occurring within a global public sphere.

Habermas’ understanding of the public sphere has its roots deep in the Western tradition, going back to the Greek polis. Habermas defines the public sphere as the symbolic and physical place where “private people come together as a public” in order to debate and challenge “the general rules governing relations” in society. In short, this becomes “people’s public use of their reason.” The public sphere, thus, facilitates practice of ethical discourse “for disputing parties in the lifeworld.” At the domestic level, Putnam has referred to the public sphere as “civil society,” which sustains and further develops democratization through public participation in formal and informal civic organizations. Globally, this concept has been referred to as the “international society” held together by a set of commonly adhered to rules and characterized by

165 Ibid., 6.
166 Ibid., 7.
“a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”¹⁷⁰ For the international society to be successful, it is reliant upon a presupposition that the sovereign rights of states are protected simultaneously with the rights of individual citizens.¹⁷¹

While Putnam bemoans the perceived decline of domestic civil society and of democratic participation in the United States,¹⁷² the public sphere has been digitized and expanded transnationally. “The public sphere, according to some, has been purified and reborn in the virtual realm. Citizens publically connect to networks of other citizens via the Internet and participate in rational debate and exchange.”¹⁷³ The digitization of the public sphere has allowed for the emergence of transnational advocacy networks that are generally informal “sets of actors linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and service, and common discourses.”¹⁷⁴

The digital public sphere, especially characterized by social media websites and applications, provides a forum for pervasive, inclusive informative and dialogical exchange that can be utilized for social mobilization. The prominence of mobile devices with data capabilities makes communication even more prolific. “Already more than half of mobile phone users access the Internet from their [mobile] device” and this number will only increase.¹⁷⁵ The prevalence and availability of social media has led to a trend of “tech activism” through which participants

¹⁷² Putnam, Bowling Alone.
possess “an impulse towards the creation of alternatives in reaction to structural injustice.”

Social media applications such as Twitter facilitate the creation of succinct statements that can be rapidly disseminated through “retweeting” posts to one’s page followers, thus quickly mobilizing invested parties.

The internet and its communicative possibilities presents a brave, new (life)world for Habermasian discourse ethics. This lifeworld is open to those with shared communication platforms, shared language (though visual representation of ideas can mitigate language barriers), and traversing traditional international boundaries. The internet provides “Habermas’ theory of communication” with deliberate “access to an emancipatory sphere of action.” In this way, Habermasian discourse ethics seem to align with the goals and processes of social media-based activism as “subjects encounter each other within the horizons of normative expectations whose disappointment becomes a constant source of moral demands.”

The exchange of ideas through internet platforms is a way by which subversive discourses can be introduced into the public sphere in order to challenge popular adherence to dominant discourses.

**Recognition and Discourse Ethics**

The dominant discourse of casualty averse, thus risk transfer, warfare establishes a space between the justice that is normatively expected by the international community, and the justice that is received by the noncombatant affected by this strategy of warfare. How can this gap between expected and experienced justice for the noncombatant be filled? We can discover some

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177 A 2010 survey found that more than 60 percent of respondents “said that they retweet political leaders’ tweets at least sometimes. That number is even higher for those people who follow a mix of elected, nonelected, and organizational leaders on Twitter” (John H. Parmalee and Shannon L. Bchard, *Politics and the Twitter Revolution* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 209).
179 Ibid., 69.
helpful insight from the critical theories of Axel Honneth\textsuperscript{180} and Judith Butler,\textsuperscript{181} whose theoretical perspectives acknowledge the importance of recognition and grievable life (respectively). Taken in tandem, within the context of Habermas’ discourse ethics, these theories suggest a framework through which the justice of noncombatants in contemporary warfare might be holistically articulated.

Responding to what he views as the applicability insufficiencies of Habermas’ theory of communication, Axel Honneth suggests that “the presupposition of all communicative action is to be seen in the acquisition of social recognition.”\textsuperscript{182} Thus, Honneth’s theory of recognition and justice seeks to confront previous trends in political philosophy to either concede the pursuit of global justice as unattainable, thus forcing the theorist to “muddle through” tough examples of injustice, often tacitly excusing them, or to link justice to citizenship (local and/or global), which alienates those disenfranchised by the global community.\textsuperscript{183}

Honneth, heavily influenced by the phenomenological work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, understands recognition to be a mutually-constitutive process through which individuals share existential validation. Honneth characterizes Hegel’s view of recognition as being fundamental to the actualization of the self. “A subject can only arrive at a ‘consciousness’ of its own ‘self’ if it enters into a relationship of ‘recognition’ with another subject.”\textsuperscript{184} Once recognition is achieved, it is protected through intentional praxis of social order and law.\textsuperscript{185}

Thus, it is through participation in community that an individual is able to realize the full extent of his/her humanity “by being gradually assured of the specific abilities and needs

\textsuperscript{180} Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice.”
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{183} Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice,” 352.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 21.
constituting his or her personality through the approving patterns of reaction by generalized interaction partners.” This experience is global in the reality that “every human being is dependent in an elementary way, on a context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by normative principles of mutual recognition.” Lack of mutual recognition generates patterns of “disrespect or humiliation that cannot be without damaging consequences for the single individual’s identity formation.”186 Thus, injustice occurs when “human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve,” experiencing “feelings of social disrespect.”187

Honneth’s theory develops three principles of recognition (love, equality, and merit)188 which correspond with practical “spheres” that can measure justice: “responsiveness to need, legal equality or justice to achievements.”189 Injustice can be realized in society when these spheres are not adequately recognized within an individual’s context.

Similarly, Judith Butler suggests that it is through human interaction that one’s humanity is socially understood. This causes one’s life to be precarious, which suggests the vulnerability of one’s life in relation to others. “One’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other…Grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters.”190 Humans, especially within the context of war are situated within physical and psychological spaces of insecurity, causing them to experience fundamental levels of vulnerability. “Loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.”191 Thus, for Butler, the fully realized life is the life that we mourn individually and corporately.

186 Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” 354.
187 Honneth, Disrespect, 71.
188 Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” 355.
189 Ibid., 361.
190 Butler, Frames of War, 14.
In the face of warfare, this is difficult, however, as public narratives are constructed to dehumanize and delegitimize the lives of combatants and noncombatants alike. According to Butler “such populations are ‘lose-able,’ or can be forfeited, precisely because they are framed as being already lost or forfeited; they are cast as threats to human life as we know it rather than as living populations in need of protection from illegitimate state violence.”\(^{192}\) Butler also seems to understand this within the language of risk transfer warfare, concluding that through the incorporation of otherizing frames that present the stories of those within war-contexts to be fundamentally different than one’s own,\(^{193}\) “the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of ‘the living.’”\(^{194}\)

The Stanford/NYU and Amnesty International reports present the lives of those impacted by drone-based warfare to be difficult and infiltrated with insecurity and fear that they might be the next victims of a drone strike. The Amnesty International report quotes a resident of a North Waziristan village that has been under threat not only by the Taliban and al Qaeda forces, but, consequently, also by American drone activity. “‘Everyone is scared and they can’t get out of their house without any tension and from the fear of drone attacks...We can’t sleep because of the planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the fear of attack in our mind.’”\(^{195}\)

The NGO drone reports seem to elucidate an abridgement of the justice expected by Honneth’s first sphere of recognition, basic human need. People possess an intrinsic need to feel safe so that they are able to go about their lives’ pursuits without fear of imminent death. The frequent tactical use of drones makes it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals living in areas heavily impacted by drone strikes. This is further complicated by the violent, unexpected deaths.

\(^{192}\) Butler, \textit{Frames of War}, 31.
\(^{193}\) Butler, \textit{Precarious Life}, 38.
\(^{194}\) Butler, \textit{Frames of War}, 31.
of noncombatants in these locations. For example, the Amnesty International report details the death of a grandmother who was killed by a drone strike in October of 2012 while harvesting okra in a field with four of her grandchildren nearby. “Before her family’s eyes, Mamana Bibi was blown into pieces by at least two Hellfire missiles fired concurrently from a US drone aircraft.”196

Additionally, drone strikes reportedly prevent their victims from pursuing economic and academic advancement, causing Honneth’s third sphere of recognition, achievement, to be unrecognized. A student who became disabled by a drone strike that hit his house, killing his father—the breadwinner for the family, tells the Living Under Drones researcher that he is no longer able to continue his studies because of his injuries. Additionally, he laments the fact that his disability (a lost leg) prevents him from working. Thus, his younger brothers are unable to attend school “because I can’t afford to support them, buying their books, and paying their fees.”197

There is a cultural component to drone warfare as well. Reports show how drone warfare has entrenched itself within the cultural discourse of drone-targeted cultures. “The mothers used...to tell their kids: Go to sleep or I will call your father. Now, instead, they say: Go [to] sleep or I will call the plane.”198 Living Under Drones researcher Jennifer Gibson argues that drone warfare is systematically destroying communities in areas targeted by, especially, weaponized UAVs. “Parents are afraid to send their children to school. Women are afraid to meet in markets. Families are afraid to gather at funerals for people wrongly killed in earlier

196 Amnesty International, 19.
197 Living Under Drones, “Victim Stories.”
strikes. Drivers are afraid to deliver food from other parts of the country. The routines of daily life have been ripped to shreds.”¹⁹⁹

Habermas considers justice experienced by individuals to be not “something material, not a determinate ‘value,’ but a dimension of validity.”²⁰⁰ Honneth explains this validity to be underpinned by recognition of the other, while Butler suggests that this sort of recognition is informed by the grievability that one attributes to the other. In case of noncombatants affected physically and/or psychologically by the omnipresence of UAVs in their contexts, their validity is in question through the seemingly indiscriminate and abrupt nature of attacks, which challenge perceptions of security and validation as (using Butler’s term) grievable persons by the American military.

*Justice and the Presuppositions for Discourse in the Lifeworld*

Before the interplay of dominant and subversive discourses is entertained, the Western presuppositions of Habermasian discourse ethics and Honneth’s theory of recognition should be acknowledged. Both Habermas and Honneth openly concede their liberal philosophic assumptions throughout their writings, assuming universality of human rights, international law, and an implicit expectation for just conduct by states during war. This assumption of universality, however, applies equally to powerful and less powerful states, cultures, and individuals. Thus, Honneth attempts to account for these presuppositions by acknowledging recognition to occur at the individual and collective dimensions allowing for recognition of culture. The acquisition of discursive power by collectives allows movement towards justice and


²⁰⁰ Habermas, *Justification and Application*, 152.
is realized through “a transformation of collective self-understanding…that could lead to the claim for recognition of one’s own culture.”

Because the subversive discourses are directed toward a dominant Western discourse, they are underpinned by Western, liberal assumptions of universal human rights, international, and just war.

First, the universality of human rights establishes a fundamental expectation for the recognized dignity of humanity. In a literal sense, human rights are “the rights that one has because one is human.” Due to the tautological nature of this definition, Donnelly goes on to explain that human rights are equal in the sense that “one is or is not a human being, and, therefore has the same human rights as everyone else.” Human rights are also inalienable based on one’s biological classification as a *homo sapiens* and cannot be lost or abandoned. “One cannot stop being human no matter how badly one behaves nor how barbarously one is treated.” Beetham adds that human rights “seek to guarantee to individuals the minimum necessary conditions for pursuing a distinctively human life.” This sentiment is echoed by Honneth who contends that collective recognition is necessary for the preservation of both individual and collective.

Traditionally the provisions of human rights have been divided into three categories or “generations.” One might think of each generation as forming the levels of a pyramid. The most

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203 Ibid., 7.
204 Ibid., 10.
foundational rights can be found at the base of the pyramid\textsuperscript{207} with less essential or debated
generations as making up the middle and pinnacle of the pyramid. These levels do not replace
one another, but are “interrelated...[suggesting] that the protection of the first generation
political rights and the provision of second generation economic rights will contribute to third
generation solidarity rights.”\textsuperscript{208} Despite claims of universality, Donnelly is careful to note that the
concept \textit{human} must be understood as a concrete notion that takes into account, where
appropriate, cultural and religious practices. Thus, despite its Western origins, the preservation of
dignity for all humans and their respective cultures should be prioritized.\textsuperscript{209}

Second, is a Western valuing of the viability and accountability of states to the precepts
of international law. This assumption forms expectations for legal warfare become what
Habermas refers to as the “constitutionalization of international law,”\textsuperscript{210} which allows for the
“taming of brute political power.”\textsuperscript{211} This view of the international system requires the
submission of a global power’s “right to war” to a “continually expanding [international]
federation that prevents war [and] can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the
law.”\textsuperscript{212} Adherence to the precepts of international law also suggests an acknowledgment and
acceptance of international underpinning norms that “tie [the international community] together
because we share them as humans.”\textsuperscript{213}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{DeLaet} DeLaet defines first generation rights as: “the right to life, liberty, and security of person, the right to
property, the right to freedom of speech and thought, the right to a fair trial, and the right to vote” (Debra DeLaet, \textit{The Global Struggle for Human Rights: Universal Principles in World Politics} (Belmont, CA: Thompson/Wadsworth, 2006), 19).
\bibitem{DeLaet2} DeLaet, 20.
\bibitem{Habermas} Habermas, “Plea for a Constitutionalization of International Law,” 5.
\bibitem{Habermas2} Ibid., 6.
\bibitem{Addis} Adeno Addis, “Imagining the International Community: The Constitutive Dimension of Universal
\end{thebibliography}
The importance of international law to wartime conduct is vital to the protection of all parties within the legal practice of war. As Addis’ norm analysis suggests, international law produces the expectations that exist for justice within warfare. The proximity of noncombatants to the battlefield has become a key consideration when looking at the legality of UAV-centric warfare. While the purpose of this analysis is not to determine the legality of American use of UAVs in warfare (especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen), the perspectives that have been articulated by international lawyers can be helpful in establishing a benchmark for understanding the administration of global justice to noncombatants within the international community. As Habermas contends, problems that are as complex as eradicating terrorism (especially al Qaeda and its affiliates) “can be solved only through joint political action”\textsuperscript{214} with international law as its basis for action.

There are two areas of \textit{Jus in Bello} that should be considered when determining the justice of military engagement. First, proportionality attempts to determine the balance between the military advantage achieved by attacking a target and the amount of potential and/or realized collateral damage associated with it. This principle, however, should not be viewed as an empirical calculus of weighing numbers of civilian to combatant casualties.\textsuperscript{215} Judge Advocate General for the Army, Chris Jenks, suggests that determining proportionality can be difficult because it is a “subjective determination the military commander makes…As a general rule, proportionality does not limit the amount or type of force used; it considers the expected results.”\textsuperscript{216}

\textsuperscript{214} Habermas, “Plea for the Constitutionalization of International Law,” 7.
\textsuperscript{215} This legal interpretive nuance may contribute to the difficulty encountered when attempting to interpret the above casualty numbers from Kicullen & Exum, The New America Foundation, and analysis from the Amnesty International and \textit{Living Under Drones} reports.
The difficulty with proportionality in the case of UAVs, articulated by Vogel, is the case-by-case nature of each strike. “Thus, the number of civilians killed, or of terrorists killed, is only the first part of the analysis—whether the target was of sufficient value and whether the strike offered a real military advantage and was conducted with all due caution and concern for civilians establishes the operation’s proportionality.”\textsuperscript{217} Additionally, Brunstetter and Braun suggest that the use of UAVs may actually increase adherence to the principle of proportionality because of a UAV's precision-guided missiles. “The localized application of drone strikes limits the destruction because it target the actual individual threat, thus minimizing the force necessary to remove it.”\textsuperscript{218}

This, however, leads to the second principle of \textit{Jus in Bello} in international law, discrimination. The legality of UAV strikes within warfare is difficult to determine because the definition of those who are defined as combatants and noncombatants can be fluid. Under the \textit{Jus in Bello} expectation of distinction, International law is clear that noncombatants cannot be deliberately targeted in warfare. “Only members of a state’s armed forces during armed conflict or persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted.”\textsuperscript{219} A person’s role in the conflict may not be immediately clear to a UAV pilot who is surveying the scene from above. An additional complication for the principle of discrimination is the fact that “suspected militant leaders wear civilian clothes. Even the sophisticated cameras of a drone cannot real with certainty that a suspect being targeted is not a civilian.”\textsuperscript{220} Though Vogel adds that this is not a

\textsuperscript{217} Vogel, 127.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 23.
problem unique to drone warfare, and that the ability to conduct careful, lengthy surveillance increases the potential for discrimination between combatants and noncombatants.\textsuperscript{221}

The third Western assumption underpinning discourse on drone warfare is an implicit reliance on Just War Theory (JWT). Emerging from Augustine’s writings in the fifth century CE, the premises of Just War Theory have guided ethical understanding and underpinned legal interpretation of just conduct of war-wagers. Its viability in technologically changing war environments persists as “a moral framework with evolving normative categories that helps us talk about the ethics of war.”\textsuperscript{222} This permits JWT an elastic quality that allows for its reinterpretation as it is applied to new scenarios and historical contexts. “So while it displays a potential for renovation and change, the theory also reflects a strong element of continuity…We can be relatively confident that when we tap into the language of just war, we are participating in a trans-historical dialogue with the great and the good of previous generations.”\textsuperscript{223}

The principles associated with Just War Theory\textsuperscript{224} present a framework by which we might better understand and thus talk about the ethical conduct of war. It also translates from the philosophical to the pragmatic, suggesting a standard of justice that is expected within war. Key to the discussion of \textit{Jus in Bello}, or justice during war, is the treatment of noncombatants. Traditionally, \textit{Jus in Bello} has been divided into two major areas of consideration that are mirrored in international law: Proportionality and Discrimination. “Proportionality attempts to balance the harm inflicted with the anticipated military advantage of an action, while discrimination entails making all efforts to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants,

\textsuperscript{221} Vogel, 123.
\textsuperscript{222} Brunstetter and Braun, 338.
\textsuperscript{224} These are commonly delineated as \textit{Jus ad Bello} categories of Just Cause, Legitimate Authority, Right Intention, Likelihood of Success, Proportionality, and Last Resort and \textit{Jus in Bello} categories of Proportionality and Discrimination. While \textit{Jus post Bellum} is gaining recognition within JWT, it lacks a standardized set of principles (see Brian Orend, \textit{The Morality of War} (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006) chapters six and seven).
and avoid harm to the latter while still fulfilling the military mission.” Walzer is clear to note that noncombatants “do not forfeit their rights when their states wrongly go to war.” Instead, they are to be considered “men and women with rights [who] cannot be used for some military purpose.”

While Walzer argues that within the Just War paradigm “noncombatants cannot be attacked at any time,” he concedes that there are times that noncombatants are placed into danger “because of their proximity to a battle that is being fought against someone else.” This is known as the principle of double effect, which “gets its start from the realization that actions often have more than one consequence.” Under the principle of double effect, both the positive and negative consequences of a particular act should be considered before the act is undertaken. For example, “Actions performed by a soldier can lead not only to the death of enemy soldiers but also the death of by-standers, trauma to other enemy soldier and by-standers, the destruction of buildings, damage to the environment, and so on.”

The turn towards casualty averse and technologically-driven modes of Western warfare characterized by the utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles suggests that contemporary wartime strategy is primarily concerned with precision and speed, coupled with an aversion to casualties that causes concern with Just War principles, such as double effect to slide in practice. Instead, the practice of risk transfer warfare becomes attractive because it protects the

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225 Brunstetter and Braun, 347.
226 Walzer, 137.
227 Ibid., 151.
228 Ibid., 152.
231 Ibid., 137.
232 Shaw, 87-88.
lives of American soldiers, through their spatial separation from the battlefield, at the expense of the ontological and physical security of noncombatants in the midst of the war.\textsuperscript{234}

Thus, we see a gap emerging between the expectation for justice as presented through human rights, international law, and the just war tradition and the willingness of Western (notably American) military strategy to develop and employ weapons that not only distances the soldier (in the case of drones, pilots) from the battlefield, but removes them from it, in a physical sense, altogether. Consequently, warriors are removed from physical harm, while noncombatants disproportionately shoulder the physical risk and threat of warfare. “The consistent overall pattern of greater losses of life among civilians than among Western militaries is intended.”\textsuperscript{235}

This tactical pattern has the potential to flirt with the line of illegality, wallowing in the grey spaces of morality between black and white. This might be more troubling and difficult for the international community to process and interpret than the clear, outright breaking of international law.

\textit{Discursive Ethics, Recognition, and Subversive Discourses}

The role of discourse ethics can be understood as the process through which injustice might be identified and analyzed discursively.\textsuperscript{236} This often difficult intellectual process is also the first step that might be taken to close in the gap between injustice and a clearer pursuit of justice for the voices of those who are underrepresented within the traditional discourse. The stories of noncombatants whose communities, families, and, sometimes, their very livelihoods are threatened through drone-centric warfare have been largely under-told both within public and academic discourses. Two recent publications\textsuperscript{237} and the #NotABugSplat art installation,

\textsuperscript{234} Shaw, 77-82.  
\textsuperscript{235} Shaw, 86.  
\textsuperscript{236} Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” \textit{Critical Inquiry}, Vol. 34(3), 400.  
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Living Under Drones} and Amnesty International.
however, possess the objective not only of exposing the “messiness” of the United States’ tactical use of drones, but also of telling the stories of those affected in order to bring clarity to an intentionally opaque practice. The power of these stories is important as the global and digital nature of this conflict has caused for “the claims for recognition of once-distant others [to] acquire a new proximity, destabilizing horizons of cultural value that were previously taken for granted.”

Habermas contends that an important aspect of discourse ethics is the application of the theoretical to the practical through the practice of dialogue “that draws people together in meaningful argument.” While we might wonder how we are to arrive and judge the arrival at truth or validity claims, Habermas provides us with a rather vague term of consensus, which he seems to believe is intuitive to human reason. “Moral theory engages in a task of rational reconstruction when it elicits from everyday moral intuitions the standpoint of the impartial judgment of interpersonal practical conflicts.” Habermas goes on to reiterate the importance of dialogue as a speech act, which means that intentions (as far as they can be determined) matter. “It cannot abandon the performative attitude of participants in interaction; only in this way can it maintain contact with intuitive knowledge acquired through socialization that makes moral judgments possible.”

The Living Under Drones and Amnesty International reports and the #NotABugSplat art installation present two examples of subversive discourses that have shown some success in contributing to, perhaps even sparking public debate on the impact of drone warfare on noncombatants. Each is a response to the dominant discourse of casualty averse warfare and

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238 Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” 396.
239 Finlayson, Habermas, 79.
240 Habermas, Justification and Application, 25.
241 Ibid., 25.
challenges the public sphere to consider the wider impact of casualty aversion upon noncombatants. This discourse seems to be predicated upon the question: For whom is casualty averse warfare actually casualty averse?

In September of 2012 the report *Living Under Drones*, a joint venture between scholars at Stanford and New York University was released. Its intent to provocatively challenge the dominant discourse of casualty aversion is presented in the first sentence of its executive summary. “In the United States, the dominant narrative about the use of drones in Pakistan is of a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the US safer by enabling ‘targeted killing’ of terrorists, with minimal downsides of collateral impacts. This narrative is false.”242 The report goes on to acknowledge the security threats apparent to American and Pakistani interests along the largely ungoverned Afghanistan/Pakistan border, but “in light of significant evidence of harmful impacts to Pakistani civilians and to US interests, current policies to address terrorism through targeted killings and drone strikes must be carefully re-evaluated.”243

The equally provocative Amnesty International report “*Will I Be Next?*” was published in October of 2013. It, too, seeks to engage the dominant discourse regarding American tactics of drone warfare, expressing the discrepancy of experiences by noncombatants and reported precision of UAV strikes.

The USA, which refuses to release detailed information about individual strikes, claims that its drone operations are based on reliable intelligence, are extremely accurate, and that the vast majority of people killed in such strikes are members of armed groups such as the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. Critics claim that drone strikes are much less discriminating, have resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths…and foster animosity the increases recruitment into the very groups the USA seeks to eliminate.”244

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242 *Living Under Drones.*
243 Ibid.
244 Amnesty International, 7.
Often utilizing more damning language, the Amnesty International report expresses concern that drone-based attacks “have resulted in unlawful killings that may constitute extrajudicial executions or war crimes…[and] may have also violated human rights.”

Given the above analysis asserting that the internet and social media applications can be understood as a new form of the public sphere, it is worth noting that www.livingunderones.org, where the report has been posted and maintained, is designed as a multimedia experience. In addition to the provision of data about drone strikes and written victim stories, the website has linked video interviews (also posted on YouTube) in which interviewees explain their experiences while living in an active drone war zone. This provides visitors to the site with the ability to disseminate information through their social media presence, thus perpetuating the discourse. The Amnesty International “Will I Be Next?” report possesses a similar, though not as flashy, web presence and includes an interactive story map and a Tumblr page entitled #GameOfDrones detailing a traveling protest movement, elucidating physical in addition to cyber forms of discourse.

The response to the subversive discourse elicited through these NGO reports is illustrated in President Barack Obama’s 2013 speech on drone policy in which he explains that the utilization of a drone-based strategy saves American lives, despite the threat, and in some cases, loss, of noncombatant lives. He is intentional to discredit the extent of noncombatant casualties described in reports such as Living Under Drones. “Much of the criticism about drone strikes—both here at home and abroad—understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between US assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports.”

245 Ibid., 8.
President Obama goes on to explain the necessary tragedy of civilian deaths in the course of America’s pursuit to eradicate terrorism.

As Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives... It is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.247

While President Obama acknowledges the loss of noncombatants in drone strikes, referring to them as “tragedies,” he also explains that the alternative to drone warfare would require greater risk to American troops. He even references one of the most horrifying U.S. military experiences in recent history, the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, enshrined in the book and movie entitled, *Black Hawk Down*.248 Ultimately, this speech serves as a re-entrenching of the dominant discourse, though collected data since the publication of these reports suggests that drone strikes in Pakistan have decreased to their lowest level since 2007.249 Correlation, of course, should not be considered to equal causation.

The critique of the dominant discourse has been perpetuated beyond NGOs and political speeches into the public sphere. For example, journalist Conor Friedersdorf recently questioned the political use of the term “militants” to describe all casualties of drone strikes. He concludes that the use of the words “‘human’ or ‘person’ instead.” He concludes, “Say how many people died, that they haven’t been identified, and that we don’t know if they’re among the hundreds of

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247 Ibid.
248 Keith Richburg reported in an October 5, 1993 *Washington Post* article: “News reports from Mogadishu...said the bodies of dead American soldiers littered the scene of the fighting, with the bloodied corpse of one U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets by ropes tied to his feet, and another dead serviceman stripped naked and surrounded by a gleeful Somali mob chanting “Victory!... In another case, the corpse of an American soldier was said to have been tied up and trundled through the streets on a wheelbarrow by about 200 cheering Somalis.”
innocent humans killed by drones or not.”250 This hints at Honneth’s call for recognition of the other to be established as a precursor to discourse. Using nondescript terms (a practice that this paper is guilty of) such as “noncombatant” and “militant” is an attempt to sanitize the reality that casualties of warfare are, in fact, people.

This humanizing process of populations targeted by UAV warfare is a central component of the subversive discourses challenging the dominant discourse. Humanization through creative visualization is also what makes the Pakistani art installation, #NotABugSplat such an impactful contribution to the subversive discourse. Influenced by the building-sized portraits envisioned and installed around the world by “semi-anonymous” artist, JR,251 the #NotABugSplat art installation tries “to reach the people pulling the trigger in America’s drone wars—the drone operators themselves.”252 While the aim of revealing the innocent, thoughtful face of a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa child to American drone pilots through their cameras, the installation has a wider audience. Meyer notes that the poster is “also designed to be captured by satellites in order to make it a permanent part of the landscape on online mapping sites” and that “it challenges all those who have access to images photographed from the sky to use their power to make a more just world.”253

The artwork’s title is a visual, discursive challenge to the military terminology popularized by a 2012 Rolling Stone article which uses the term bug splat. “The military slang for a man killed by a drone strike…since viewing the body through a grainy-green video image

251 See: http://www.jr-art.net/.
253 Ibid.
gives the sense of an insect being crushed.”254 It’s presence within the digital public sphere has been pervasive as its title, which includes a hashtag (#) indicates an intention for aerial photographs of the artwork to be widely disseminated through social media like Twitter and Instagram, both of which use hashtags as an organizational device for searching and grouping tweets or photos with the same hashtags.

In addition to its proliferation on social media and presence in mainstream news, the #NotABugSplat art installation received additional publicity when artist J.R. was interviewed on the August 28, 2014 episode of Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report giving the project and the subversive discourse popular culture exposure. Regarding #NotABugSplat, host Stephen Colbert sarcastically (and in all seriousness) quipped: “So what you’re saying is that I have to consider every person as human. That I can’t just think of people as part of a population or a statistic…Anybody who accidentally dies in a war that’s otherwise justified, I have to grieve over?”255 While, it seems that Colbert is prompting an answer in the affirmative, these questions support the assertions of Butler and Honneth: as Butler argues, life is valuable if grieved and, as Honneth suggests the foundation of discourse should be humanizing recognition.

The discursive exchange between the dominant public discourse, supporting drone warfare and subversive discourses designed to challenge these commonly held beliefs has clearly not reached a level of consensus or validity. However, the discursive pursuit of justice for noncombatants caught within the context of drone warfare seems to have rooted itself within the public sphere, especially present on the internet and on social media applications. At the core of the subversive discourses presented here is an intentional focus on granting noncombatants faces, voices, and humanity. Not only is this an attempt to provide recognition to the innocent civilian,

but the telling of people’s stories allows for their history to be acknowledged, making their stories *known*, resonate, and the lives of the story teller and the receiver to be connected in such a way that grievability can be attributed not to a foreign, distant noncombatant, but to a human.
Conclusion

The Revolution in Military Affairs has produced tactical weapons, such as weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, that seek to elevate strategies of casualty aversion through precision and speed while transferring risk to noncombatants. This creates a gap between justice expected by the international community—characterized by expectations of universal human rights, adherence to international law, and implicit dependence on the Just War Theory tradition—and the justice experienced by noncombatants affected by the presence of UAVs in their immediate contexts. Habermasian discourse ethics, augmented by Honneth’s precondition of recognition and informed by Butler’s concept of grievable life, presents a useful analytical framework through which the interaction of dominant and subversive discourses can be explained in the lifeworld. Subversive discourses ultimately contribute to critical evaluation of commonly held values and can promote the narrowing of perceived gaps between justice expected and justice experienced within the context of war.

The intrinsic value of noncombatants caught within the crosshairs of UAV cameras cannot be realized until they are recognized or discriminated (as is defined under the international law of Jus in Bello) as possessing grievable lives and the holistic impact that a lack of recognition can have upon a family’s livelihood when a noncombatant is maimed or killed erroneously in a UAV strike. This recognition cannot happen on an international level until the United States is willing to recognize the real number of deaths of combatants and noncombatants in UAV strikes. Amnesty International recommends: “At a minimum the USA must disclose basic factual and legal information about its drone program in Pakistan”256 because “Secrecy is a barrier to accountability.”257

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256 Amnesty International, 49.
257 Ibid., 50.
Transparency would give the United States government and the Obama Administration, specifically, the ability to explain and account for its UAV tactics to the international community, showing itself willing to be a fully functioning member within the international community, fully responsible to international law. But, perhaps more importantly for the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, it would allow for the stories of UAV victims to be fully welcomed into the international discourse and for their injustice to be recognized on a global scale. It is through this exchange that an “inspiring vision of a discourse of justice…could reveal contemporary injustices for the moral outrages they surely are”\(^\text{258}\) and move towards closing the validity gap.

The peril of precision and technologically-based warfare, however, is a trade-off between the human and the mechanized. This creates greater safety for some, while placing others at greater risk. Thus, the function of public discourse becomes a valuable platform through which critique can be articulated. From the ancient Greek polis to the Romantic-era salon to the social media applications of the Information Age, discourse has shaped public opinion through dissemination and debate within the public sphere. As communication becomes increasingly swift and succinct, discursive contributions to the public sphere will increase. While some social media-based protest movements will move public opinion, others will gather a small following before fizzling. The difference between the two is prolonged engagement.

Thus, if the prominence of drone warfare is to be questioned and scaled back, those concerned with the recognition and grievability of noncombatant lives must continue to raise questions about the ethical ramifications of casualty averse warfare within the public sphere. It is through this increased discourse that noncombatants will transition from “collateral damage” to #NotABugSplat.

\(^{258}\) Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” 422.
Bibliography


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