CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

BY

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Abstract

Intrastate conflict plagues many countries within sub-Saharan Africa. A significant portion of research asserts that conflict in this region results from high levels of ethnic heterogeneity or weak national institutions that cannot quell violence. Another line of qualitative research highlights the role of political parties in inciting conflict. In this thesis, these two strands of research are merged by quantitatively testing classic theories on the stabilizing effect of highly institutionalized party systems.

In order to test this theory an original party system institutionalization index was created using extensive Afrobarometer survey data. This index served as the independent variable in a series of negative binomial statistical models that tested its correlations with various levels of social conflict, all of which fall short of war. I found that in a sample of thirty sub-Saharan states from 1990-2013 increases in party system institutionalization are statistically correlated with a lower incidence of intrastate conflict. Small sample size and missing data restrict the fully generalizability of these findings and thus leave room for future research to test the theory more robustly.

The statistical results are then tested through two case studies. I focused upon two nations with the highest and lowest institutional score: Botswana and Nigeria, respectively. Each case study supports the proposed theory that the level of party system institutionalization is a predictor for intrastate conflict. Botswana has high levels of institutionalization and its incidence of conflict is the lowest in the sample while Nigeria has the second highest incidence of intrastate conflict and the lowest institutionalization score. The colonial legacy and early experiences with democracy and political parties highlight the impact of party systems on political stability.
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I. Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is often characterized as conflict ridden. In fact, according to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict, half of all of the world’s current wars are waged within Africa (2012). The Heidelberg Institute’s 2012 Conflict Barometer reports that highly violent conflict in Africa is at its highest rates since 1945. The Conflict Barometer report is bolstered by the annual Failed States Index. Sub-Saharan Africa holds 40 of the top 100 most failed states in the 2013 Failed States Index. To be sure, the causes of sub-Saharan African conflict have long intrigued researchers.

Researchers have often cited ethnic diversity (Huntington, 1996), religious or ethnic polarization (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005), or even weak institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) as the primary causes of conflict. Unfortunately, these theories fail to incorporate important case study research that highlights the impact of African political parties and the ensuing party systems. Often political parties are denoted as mere facades for Africa’s “big men” or “godfathers” and in many ways their impact on society has been ignored.

Overwhelmingly, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa have tawdry reputations and are characterized as either ethnic or clientelistic parties (Carbone, 2007). Rachel Beatty Riedl (2013, p.2) notes that African political parties are pervasively known as “extremely weak, non-ideological, or reflective of ethnic cleavages”. These views allowed researchers to largely ignore the influence and significance of political parties. This is unfortunate because many countries have fully functioning political party structures and institutions (Beatty Riedl, 2013). Furthermore, even in those countries whose party systems are characterized as weak and underdeveloped, parties still impart significant affects upon national events (Pitcher, 2012;
Basedau, 2007). While African parties and party systems do not mirror Western European or American political parties, their significance should not be ignored.

There has been little quantitative work conducted on sub-Saharan African political party systems, but there is a plethora of case study work that examines the causes of conflict in these states (Mehler, 2007; Reno, 2011). Overwhelmingly, in-depth case studies indicate that political parties, through elite mobilization and manipulation, play important roles in instigating, sustaining, and resolving violent domestic level conflict. However, not all African states are besieged by violence nor are they all failed states with non-functional political parties.

These observations raise several important questions. Why are some states more susceptible to political conflict choreographed by political parties? What happens when the repeated interactions among these parties coalesce and party systems are created: is there more political violence? As party systems become increasingly institutionalized, do they act to temper the propensity for African sub-state conflict? I posit that the level of party system institutionalization has a direct effect upon the level of intrastate conflict that a developing nation experiences.

Before testing this theory, I highlight why political parties and party systems are a key force in either stabilizing or destabilizing society. Thereafter, I review important sub-Saharan conflict literature and identify the failure of current conflict research to fully incorporate the significance of party system theory. I quantitatively test my theory wherein I find support for the argument that nations with higher levels of institutionalized party systems experience less intrastate conflict. Finally, I subject my statistical findings to case study analysis in Botswana and Nigeria. Both cases buttress the party system conflict theory.
II. Theoretical Considerations

Why do political parties matter?

The importance of political parties cannot be overstated. In fact, they are often inextricably linked to successful democracy (Schattschneider, 1942; Sartori, 1976). To be sure, theorists and researchers alike deem parties as an essential instrument for an “accountable responsible government” (Reilly, 2008). They serve as a link between citizens and government by “organizing voters, aggregating and articulating interests, crafting policy alternatives, and providing the basis for coordinated electoral and legislative activity” (Reilly, 2008). These characterizations of parties are often used when describing the European and American democratic experience. When examining newly democratizing nations, the ability of political parties to fulfill these vital roles is more attenuated. Despite the importation of the Western party system model into newly democratizing nations, many of these countries do not have party systems that link governments and its citizens. In fact, it has been argued that the cause of this phenomenon in many democratizing states is due to elites constructing political parties merely to serve their own self-interests, rather than parties manifesting from underlying societal organizations or interests (Manning, 2005; Lindberg, 2007).

Many African countries attempted to create viable democratic systems during the third wave of democracy, in the 1980s and 1990s. One mechanism utilized to achieve representative government during this time was the creation of political parties, a decidedly western institution. In contrast to political parties in Western Europe, which emerged and evolved over long periods of time, African political parties were quickly created after colonial rule ended. This difference means that while Western European parties were able to emerge and forge strong bonds with civil society, many African parties did not (Randall, 2007; Manning, 2005). In fact, it is often argued that, African parties are merely copy and paste shells of Western parties, with little
ideological underpinnings and few linkages to civil society (van de Walle & Butler, 1999; Manning, 2005).

This is not to suggest that there are no sub-Saharan political parties linked with civil society. While parties are often merely elite constructions with few connections to civil societies, there are states where political parties did emerge from civil society coalitions (Randall, 2007). Specifically, Randall (2007) notes that opposition parties in Zambia (the Movement for Multiparty Democracy), Mali (Adema), and Zimbabwe (the Movement for Democratic Change) are directly derived from civil society organizations.\(^1\) It should be noted that what is at issue is not the existence of African civil society per se but rather that political parties are largely not believed to be rooted in civil society or associational groups. The fact that parties are often elite constructions (Lindberg, 2007; Erdmann, 2007) with few connections to civil society (Randall, 2007) facilitates the perpetuation of pervasive clientelistic party systems. The danger of systemic clientelistic systems is that they can effectively deny representation to those that are outside of the patronage network (Randall, 2007).

Clientelistic-based politics or patrimonialism is a practice whereby political leaders utilize individual and personal favors in return for political support (Roessler, 2011, p. 304). To be sure, most nations are characterized by patronage politics; the difference in Africa rests upon its pervasiveness. The power of patronage in some African states is so ubiquitous that it has undermined state institutions and bureaucracy, even creating unofficial political and authoritative structures that are even more powerful than official state institutions (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, p. 62).

\(^1\) Interestingly, within three years of assuming power the MMD began to splinter and instituted repressive measures against opposition groups (Larmer & Fraser, 2007).
The systemic use of patronage produced widespread corruption, which effectively sidelined political parties’ ability to engage in effective representation. In fact, some sub-Saharan African nations have patronage so deeply engrained within its governance structures that specific subsections of the electorate are excluded from the political process, as they are not recipients of patronage rewards. The results of this pervasive patronage network means that the interests of certain ethnic groups, women, and civil society organizations are not represented. (Randall, 2007). Arguably, this phenomenon means that parties and party systems are not fulfilling their primary functions of representation and accountability to the people, which renders the utility of party systems relatively nonexistent.

While the literature on African political party systems largely discounts the impact of parties, a mere woeful lament of the dysfunction does not offer any insight into the implications of such systems. Political parties do exist within all sub-Saharan African states, and a wholesale disregard of their impact neglects the opportunity to gain true insight into the consequences of the party systems they create.

One of the more interesting and nuanced relationships is between political parties and violence. Case studies and conflict reports overwhelming implicate official government incitement of violent conflict. For example, Andreas Mehler notes that in 1999 Cote d’Ivoire’s main parties, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and Rassemblement Democratique Republicain (RDR), freely used violence during a coup attempt (2007, pp. 201-202). Mehler also highlights Cameroon party leader, John Ni Fru Ndi, actively inciting his supporters to engage in violence:

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2 Bratton and van de Walle hold that these patrimonial systems often retard economic growth and national development because key public resources are usurped to bribe supporters instead of being directed at development projects (p. 67).

3 This is not to suggest that there is not any significant research on African political parties. Since the 1990s there has been increased investigation into parties (Giovanni M. Carbonne, 2007; M.A. Mohamed Salih, 2003); however, much more theoretical and empirical work needs to be conducted that extends beyond the clientelistic characterization.
“Let the Biya regime know that we are ready to fight to the last man to ensure that our victory is not stolen” (Mehler, p. 203). Even the oft touted democratic success story of Mali has a history of opposition leaders urging supporters to undertake violent action as a means to protest patronage (Mehler, 2007). In short, there is an undeniable link between violence and political parties. Unfortunately, this link is not merely the result of extremist parties or their members but also the work of party leaders.

African party elites do not merely urge election violence, but also actively utilize political parties as a means to wage ethnic conflict in order to pursue or maintain power (Mehler, 2007, p. 200). The late Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Wangari Maathai described Kenya’s “ethnic violence” in 1993 as widely the work of the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). She stated the following:

Ethnicity is one of the major strategies that politicians have used to divide Africans. The ethnic violence that erupted in early 1993 in the Rift Valley, Nyana, and Western provinces was widely believed to have been kindled by senior members of the government and ruling party, KANU. Because the government appointed the chiefs and sub-chiefs in towns and villages, it used them to maintain its control at local levels and to organize attacks on communities that the regime wanted “cleansed.” (Maathai, 2006, p. 237)

Maathai went on to describe the Rwandan genocide:

I do not believe that people who have lived as neighbors for hundreds of years start attacking and killing one another with no provocation or support from those in power. What happens is that politicians stir people up and given them reasons to blame their own predicaments on people from other ethnic groups. This terrible tragedy has cost Africa many lives and many years that could have been used to promote development (Maathai, 2006, p. 236).

These examples illustrate political parties’ active role in urging, initiating, and participating in violent conflict. Fortunately, not all sub-Saharan African states are stagnated in conflict nor are all African parties the root causes of conflict. The question is why? Why do some African political parties utilize violence and conflict while others do not?
This paper theorizes that when party systems are weakly institutionalized they fail to perform key functions of political parties such as representing interests, recruiting representative leaders, or organizing the electorate. When these situations occur, societal grievances are manifested in radical and often violent ways. In short, weakly institutionalized party systems facilitate instability and conflict in developing and democratizing states.

**Conflict**

Research that attempts to understand the cause of violent conflict in Africa is abundant, and the suppositions for its roots causes are numerous. In reviewing the literature on this subject, this section of the paper will focus upon those African conflict theories that are most prevalent in the literature. Specifically, this section examines literature that focuses upon ethnicity, poverty, exclusion and marginalization, and weak institutions as the causal factors for sub-Saharan African conflict. This review illustrates that despite the plethora of research on the African conflict, there is systemic failure to systematically integrate and consider the political aspects that have fueled much of the regional conflict.

**Ethnic Heterogeneity**

High levels of ethnic heterogeneity are often touted as the cause of African conflict. The general premise and popular perception is that conflict is the result of large numbers of different ethnicities fighting against one another because they were forcibly coopted into artificial nation states. While high levels of ethnic diversity have been touted as a cause of conflict and instability (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Moynihan, 1993; Ignatieff, 1993), quantitative research has largely discounted these assertions (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005).
The theoretical suppositions for ethnicity as a cause of conflict can be distinguished between two primary camps: primordialists, who view the causes of conflict to be rooted in biological or historically entrenched characteristics of ethnicity, and modernist who view ethnicity as a construct created by the modernization process (Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003, Lindemann, 2008). The difference between the two camps essentially rests upon the conceptualization of ethnicity.

Primordialists essentially view ethnicity as inherently divisive to society. For example, Samuel P. Huntington states that “[A]s people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are more likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relationship between themselves and people of different ethnicities or religions” (Huntington, 1993, p. 29). Thus, Huntington (1993) argues that rather than economic or ideological differences being the primary causes of social conflict it is the primeval differences between civilizations\(^4\) that are the root cause.,

While Huntington (1993) (1996) is perhaps the most well-known for the theory of ethnic and religious diversity causing conflict, he is not alone in this belief. For example, Daniel Moynihan (1993) also argues that the power of ethnicity can undermine state stability because it has an innate saliency which will perpetually undercut class cleavages. Michael Ignatieff (1993) argues that ethnically divided nations will eventually devolve into conflict, not because of ethnicity per se, but rather because of historically perceived oppression. Ignatieff (1993) asserts that only through strong state institutions that demand national allegiance rather than allegiance to the ethnic group is conflict avoidable.

\(^4\) Differences in civilization include language, religion, region, ethnicity, and nationality. Huntington argues that these differences “generate the most prolonged and violent conflicts” (1993, p. 25).
In contrast, modernists urge that the cause of ethnic conflict rests in the modernization process (Fearon & Latin, 2000; Lindemann, 2008).\textsuperscript{5} This strand of the literature essentially asserts that the modernization process made linguistic, regional, racial differences salient as people strived for jobs which were largely distributed based upon whether one could read, write, or communicate in the same language as the dominant class (Fearon & Latin, 2000, p. 851).

Fearon and Laitin (2000) acknowledge the difficulty that these broad theoretical approaches of identity formation have to explaining ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, this line of literature recognizes that social construction rather than primordially identity are potentially the cause of ethnic conflict.

While highly ethnically fractionalized states may be seemingly more susceptible to social conflict, it is not a truism that heterogeneity necessarily translates into ethnic strife. Lake and Rothchild (1996) fully dispute the notion of ethnicity as a cause of conflict. Bowen (1996) also argues that African conflict is not the result of deep-seated ancient hatreds. Daly (2006) also cautions against attributing social conflict and violence to ethnicity. Resistance to ethnicity-conflict theories is bolstered by quantitative literature that has largely determined these theories to be unfounded.

Quantitative research has found little statistically significant positive correlations between high levels of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. Both Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) as well as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that high levels of ethnic diversity in Africa are actually correlated with decreased incidences of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) quantitatively confirm these research results and find that both religious and ethnic diversity are not significantly and positively correlated with civil war. These authors find that any correlation

\textsuperscript{5} Fearon and Laitin refer to Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983) for this modernist/constructivist division within the literature.
between religious and ethnic diversity and conflict is nothing more than a spurious relationship with violence. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005)\(^6\) also find that ethnic heterogeneity is not statistically correlated with the incidence of civil war in Africa.

**Politization**

Another line of research suggests that ethnicity is used as a political tool by elites in order to secure political power and the material resources that accompany governmental positions (Lake & Rothchild\(^7\), 1996; Bowen, 1996; Daly, 2006; Mehler, 2007; Reno, 2011). At the root of these theories is the notion that ethnicity is a mechanism that can be easily and inexpensively used to divide the electorate and help to solidify one’s political power. This division is used by political elites to create an “us vs. them” mentality that can be manipulated by leaders in order to protect their own positions. This line of research illustrates that while ethnicity may be salient it is not ethnicity per se that causes conflict, but rather it is a confluence of factors that influence the occurrence of ethnic conflict\(^8\).

While theoretical propositions suggest that political elites have a distinct hand in instigating violence, Horowitz (1998, p.19) finds it unlikely that people will be so willingly manipulated by elites. Horowitz is justified in questioning the plausibility of these theories of elite conflict orchestration; however, his rebuttal fails to fully incorporate substantial qualitative case study analysis that directly implicates elites inciting conflict.

\(^6\) Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) statistically find that the ethnic and religious polarization are statistically significant predictors of civil war.

\(^7\) Lake and Rothchild (1996, p.41) argue that intragroup and intergroup competition are at the root cause of ethnic conflict. They argue that information failures, problems with credible commitment, security dilemmas are compounded by weak states which fosters the conditions that makes conflict more likely to occur. They argue that “[e]thnic activities and political entrepreneurs build on these fears of insecurity and polarize society.”

\(^8\) Patricia Daly (2006, p.312) stated the following: “The significance of ethnicity is overplayed. While ethnicity is a factor in the manifestation of violence, it is often used instrumentally by political elites which are driven more by personal politics than group identity or cause.”
Case study research provides in-depth accounts of the relationship between African political parties, political elites, and what are seemingly ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts (Daly, 2006; Mehler, 2007; Reno, 2011; Adekunle, 2012). Intensive qualitative research into African conflict suggests that many of these conflicts are often merely political constructs instigated by elites (Daly, 2006; Reno, 2011). These findings are found across multiple countries throughout history (Reno, 2011; Mehler, 2007). Thus, African political actors pervasively use violence for political means (Reno, 2011; Mehler, 2007; Maliyamkono & Kanyongolo, 2003). For example, in his study of Nigerian politics Julis Adekunle found that Nigerian politicians hire “area boys”, who he describes as political thugs, to commit violence against opponents and intimidate citizens in order to maintain their have relied upon armed youth groups in order to preserve their own power. He states the following: “Youth militias can be used to conduct irregular warfare against a country’s own citizens whenever organized oppositions appear” (p. 213). These are important findings that must be considered when examining African conflict. Increasingly, researchers have attempted to incorporate the political behavior of parties and elites into conflict theory but thus far do not fully consider the historical interaction of parties that creates patterns of conflict.

Philip Roessler (2011) theorized that political leaders fear the demise of their power and thus attempt to protect their own interests by dividing people into groups in a process that Roessler describes as “ethnic stacking.” In short, this is a process whereby elites divide the population between those that they believe are not threatening to their continued power and those that they believe could unseat them. The elites will then provide important patronage benefits including positions in the military, police force, or military to co-ethnics. In other words, elites engage in the wholesale exclusion of ethnic groups that leaders deemed treacherous to their
continued power but granted nonthreatening ethnic groups coveted government positions. These types of practices result in large-scale exclusions of ethnic groups from government representation that thereafter allows discontent to brew and make a nation more prone to civil war.

Stefan Lindemann (2008) notes that African conflict theories often produce contradictory analysis and fail to fully explain why some sub-Saharan states experience civil war while others remain stable and conflict free. Similarly to this paper, Lindemann theorizes that the crux of the answer rests with the impact of the understudied impact of political parties. In contrast to this paper, Lindemann argues that African conflict results from the degree of patronage that individual political parties provide to different segments of the population, in order to “buy off” potential competitors (2008, p. 22). In other words, Lindemann theorizes that the causes of sub-Saharan conflict are the result of the degree of exclusive vs. inclusive practices of the governing party. Lindemann states that exclusionary governments “fail to accommodate existing social cleavages and provide excluded leaders with an incentive to mobilize protest and violent rebellion” (Lindemann, 2008, p. 2).

This line of research illustrates that there is increased recognition that primordial differences are not the cause of sub-Saharan conflict. Increasingly, in-depth case study research highlights the influence of parties and their elites; however, even Roessler (2011) and Lindemann (2008) fail to consider the broader implication of party systems on conflict. Both authors consider the importance of exclusion as a key mechanism in civil war, but they fail to consider why some sub-Saharan parties and party systems function through exclusion while others do not. They fail to consider why large scale exclusion would result in civil war. It is not merely that people are angry that they do not receive patronage benefits, as Lindemann suggests,
but rather that countries that practice elite exclusion also do not offer institutionalized party systems that offer a vehicle for the electorate to peacefully air their grievances.

Weak Institutions
In the African context, political exclusion and ethnic fractionalization are intimately linked with one another but are arguably subsumed under the impact of weak political institutions. Fearon and Laitin (2003) empirically find that weak institutions facilitate the necessary preconditions to conflict. They note that weak states are characterized by poverty and instability and thereby lay the road for the growth of guerilla rebel groups. Similarly, Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2007) also finds that weak and/or failed states are the cause of conflict. She finds that weak states leave a power vacuum enabling non-state actors to organize and step into this unfilled gap. Unlike Fearon and Laitin, however, she does not discount ethnic and religious differences but rather holds them to be aggravating forces rather than principal causes.

This line of research essentially recognizes that weak states are also likely impoverished and thus unable to fully police their borders and quell militant actions by sub-state actors. It is apparent that the weakness of the state and its institutions is also linked to its economic level.

Poverty and Inequality
A significant portion of African conflict literature examines economic growth, poverty, and, and inequality a as causal mechanisms of political violence.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that a $1,000 reduction in per capita income is associated with a 41% increase in the chances of civil war occurring. While this finding highlights the relationship between poverty and conflict these authors largely discount income levels as a

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9 Fearon and Laitin (2003) offer a variant of the weak institutions theory by suggesting that natural resource rich nations are not fully integrated with the electorate and thus are more prone to civil war. These authors found that oil rich nations are statistical significantly correlated with civil war, thus supporting their theory. In contrast, Lindemann (2008) largely discounts these findings. He notes that empirical results that examine the resource curse-conflict nexus are overwhelmingly inconsistent and that case study research does not support the theory.
causal mechanism of violence, and, instead, the authors find that income levels are merely proxies for weak governments that are inept at solving poverty problems (Fearon & Laitin, p. 88). Collier and Hoefler (2002) also find that increases in individual income correlate to lower levels of state conflict.

Nicholas Sambanis (2004) also examined the relationship between poverty and conflict. He found that there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between violence and income. Interestingly, Sambanis recognizes that much of Africa’s reputation for a culture of conflict cannot be attributed to a single cause of ethnicity or income. He pointedly notes that these results cannot be used to give practical policy guidance because it is not clear how income levels interact with ethnicity. In contrast to Sambanis, Stefan Lindemann (2008) wholly rejects the conflict literature that examines income level and economic growth. He finds these arguments and resulting conclusions to be contradictory and failing to account for important variables that influence the occurrence of violence in Africa.

Researchers have also long theorized about the relationship between conflict and inequality (Davies, 1962; Russett, 1964; Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 2002; Ostby, 2013), but similarly to those conflict theories that emphasize poverty as the causal mechanism, quantitative research has largely found these theories to be statistically unsubstantiated (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefler, 2004). Increasingly, this research strand has distinguished between vertical and horizontal inequality\(^\text{10}\). Case study results as well as early quantitative work suggest that horizontal inequality is likely correlated to social conflict but these results must be refined further with more comprehensive datasets and larger samples (Ostby, 2013).

\(^{10}\) Vertical inequality is inequality measured between different individuals within a society while horizontal equalities are political inequalities between different groups of people (Ostby, 2013, p.208).
The aforementioned theories on African conflict have produced conflicting, unsatisfactory, and intertwined reasons for sub-Saharan conflict. For example, the research notes that nations with weak institutions will experience conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; van Wyk, 2007) but so will poor nations or those that suffer from inequality (Sambanis, 2004; Gurr, 1970; Ostby, 2013). Unfortunately, all of these theories are confronted with contrasting causal mechanisms and contradictory empirical evidence. In fact, these theories fail to fully consider the impact of parties or ethnicity as a mobilization tool. Party systems theory and cleavage theory also attempt to provide insight into the causes of conflict.

**Party System**

Classic party system theory that examines political cleavages has indirectly addressed this issue. Similarly to Huntington (1995), Donald Horowitz asserts that countries with large ethnic diversity will experience more numerous and severe conflicts than more homogenous nations (Horowitz D., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 1985). In contrast to Huntington, however, Horowitz roots his theory in the dynamics of party systems. He argues that countries that are divided upon ethnic lines often create political party systems that are also divided along ethnic lines, which in turn can perpetuate or exacerbate ethnic conflict. The general theory is that parties will pander to their ethnic base by attempting to influence government policies based upon ethnic lines (1985, p. 291).

Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) also argue that political entrepreneurs in plural societies use ethnic or communal issues as a means to obtain power. In short, Rabushka and Shepsle argue that plural societies will create ethnic party systems because of the power grab by political entrepreneurs who use communal concerns as a way to seek electoral support. This eventually results in parties engaging in “outbidding” one another by adopting increasingly extreme
communal issues, which eventually causes conflict and instability. Thus, it is often assumed that high ethnic heterogeneity creates political parties and party systems that are ethnic in nature and thus prone to conflict.

Horowitz’s (1985) and Rabushka’s and Shepsle’s (1972) theories on ethnic party systems essentially affirm Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal work on cross-cutting cleavages. Lipset (1960) theorized that countries whose populations are characterized with competing interests, loyalties, and political affiliations are less prone to radicalization. Competing cross-cutting cleavages render a society less prone to severe conflict (Dahl, 1982). The rationale is that people that have internally competing interests are less inclined to promote a single interest above all of their other interests.

African party systems are often described as ethnic, which suggests that they are characterized by reinforcing cleavages that facilitates radicalization and conflict. In short, while the party systems in Western European countries are generally perceived to be based upon structural cleavages, African party systems are perceived as being based solely upon ethnicity (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). If this perception were actually true, then explaining the link between party systems and intrastate conflict would be complete; unfortunately, African party systems have not been shown to be ethnic party systems. This is not to say that ethnicity is not important within African politics, but rather it is to point out that party systems are not organized solely upon ethnicity (Erdmann, 2007). Erdmann (2007) points out that ethnic parties are a rarity in Africa and that multi-ethnic coalitions are the norm.

Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes (2003) also provide preliminary evidence that challenges the popular contention that all African politics is based around ethnicity. In their quantitative study of twelve sub-Saharan countries, they suggest that ethnolinguistic cleavages are a
significant predictor of support for the governing political party; however, they also found that the strength of this association is tempered by voter perceptions of how well parties provide public goods. In short, while survey respondents that share the same language also seem to share support for the ruling party, voter support is also based upon how well the public perceives the government is at delivering public services.

While Norris and Mattes (2003) provide important insight into the saliency of ethnicity of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa, their work does not address political party systems, does not examine more than one year of data, and does not provide conclusive evidence that ethnicity is the determinative force in African politics. In fact, Matthias Basedeau and Alexander Stroh (2011) find the region is a more salient cleavage than ethnicity, but the degree of support for governing parties is contingent upon service delivery. These findings suggest that while ethnicity is an important factor in sub-Saharan parties there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the entire party system is properly characterized as ethnic. Research seems to confirm that there may be cross-cutting cleavages within many sub-Saharan nations.

The implications of these findings are tremendous, as Lipset’s theory on the impact of reinforcing cleavages is reaffirmed. Recent quantitative research shows strong evidence that the likelihood of civil wars is increased in societies where ethnic cleavages are reinforced by religion, income, or geographic cleavages (Gubler & Selway, 2012). Unfortunately, a dearth of information prevented the authors from including a representative sample of sub-Saharan African states and these findings cannot be extended to the region.

Certain political institutions have been linked to kinder and gentler democracies that experience less conflict (Lijphart, 2012) and even to societies that experience less civil war (Reynal-Querol, 2002), but there is little contemporary systematic and quantitative research that
directly examines the link between the institutionalized level of party systems and intrastate conflict despite evidence that the two are linked (Duvall & Welfling, 1973). This paper attempts to fill this gap by quantitatively examining how sub-Saharan African states with varying levels of party system institutionalization are affected by intrastate conflict.

**Institutionalization**

While scholars have increasingly examined the level of institutionalization of party systems in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been little research that examines the effect of differing levels of party system institutionalization. Most research that has examined the impact of party system institutionalization in Africa does so by examining its impact upon democracy; however, case study research in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates that party system institutionalization has an impact upon more than just democratic consolidation.

Party systems “are patterned interactions in the competition among parties” (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 4). More than just mere patterned interactions, party systems are also institutional avenues through which parties and their supporters are able to influence government and society at large. Thus, even states that have weak political parties, weak party systems and are weakly institutionalized are affected by these institutions (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995).

Developing and democratizing states are often characterized by patronage, corruption, and correspondingly weakly institutionalized party systems. Weak party systems generally do not have parties with political ideologies or party platforms. The result is that these systems are fueled by individual parties that lack legitimacy, that engage in corruptive practices in order to

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11 Mathias Basedeau lamented this fact before his 2007 party system institutionalization study. Basedeau constructed a limited institutionalization index in order to determine the relationship between sub-Saharan party systems and democracy. He found there is a strong statistical link between “party system characteristics” and democracy. M. Anne Pitch (2012) also constructed an original party system institutionalization index. She theorized that differing levels of party system institutionalization explain why nations in sub-Saharan African experience varying levels of private sector development.
shore up lucrative positions in government, and that mobilize the electorate through ethnic appeals. These types of party systems do not have parties that demand government accountability to its citizens, do not require government responsiveness to citizen needs, and do not mediate conflicts within society. In short, a weakly institutionalized party system does not perform essential democratic functions, but instead it is characterized by individual politicians who capitalize upon cleavages within the state and exploit simmering conflicts between the electorate (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995).

In contrast, highly institutionalized party systems are characterized by independent parties that operate with the consent of both elites and voters who respect electoral rules (Huntington, 1968). Highly institutionalized party systems facilitate and encourage compromise between parties, peaceful transitions of power, government accountability to the people, and adherence to the rule of law. Thus, the strength of the party systems is an important and causal factor that provides a means to either strengthen or disempower the state.

While Giovanni Sartori (1976) categorized party systems based upon the number of active parties and the ideological position of these parties, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) noted that in developing states this characterization was inappropriate because it does not account for the variation between the different kinds of systems that exist. That is, while many nations may have the same number of parties their functionality and impact by widely differ. Thus, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) contend that a classification scheme based upon the level of institutionalization is appropriate in developing states.

This paper adopts the now classic classification scheme for institutionalization as proffered by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). That is, party systems in developing states should be measured according to four criterions: regularity of party competition, the level of roots in
society of the parties, elites and citizens’ perception of the legitimacy of elections and parties, and the level of party organization.

Regularity of party competition refers to the Pedersen’s index of volatility, which attempts to determine the pattern of competition within the system. Pedersen’s index tries to evaluate the amount of volatility in the system by calculating the change in party preferences. A high index number reflects voters that widely swing from one party to another or repeated birth or death of parties. The ‘roots in society’ measure attempts to determine how much parties and voters are linked together such that voters will vote for candidates based upon party label. Citizens’ perception of legitimacy of the system attempts to measure the degree to which parties and elections are viewed as the only valid means through which a person or party assumes governing power within the state. Finally, party organization is a measure that attempts to determine the degree of professionalization of the level of party. That is, it measures the degree of organization of a party and in this way attempts to determine the level of party discipline and level of party control vs. elite control (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995).

This paper argues that countries with low levels of party system institutionalization are more prone to intrastate conflict because these systems are subject to elite control and manipulation. This essentially reduces parties to vehicles for individual gain rather than institutions which moderate conflict and thus ensures representation and accountability. In testing this theory, I attempt to reconcile recent work highlighting the importance of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa with theories on party systems by Huntington (1968), Horowitz (1985), and Mainwaring and Scully (1995).
Table 1 illustrates the theorized relationship between party system institutionalization and intrastate conflict. The left hand side of the table indicates the level of party system institutionalization while the right hand side of the table lists the corresponding conflict level. The theorized relationship is an inverse one wherein higher levels of system institutionalization are theorized to correspond to lower levels of institutionalization. It should be noted that the level of institutionalization will change depending upon the cases. While the level of institutionalization in this study is confined to sub-Saharan African democracies and semi-democracies, the theory is applicable in other developing states that experience multiparty elections.

**Table 1: Party System Institutionalization and Corresponding Intrastate Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intersection between Conflict and Party System Institutionalization</th>
<th>Intrastate Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Party System Institutionalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Institutionalization</td>
<td>High Incidence of Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Institutionalization</td>
<td>Low Incidence of Conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Institutionalization Index*

Increasingly researchers have begun examining the institutionalization level of African party systems (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Basedau, 2008; Pitcher, 2012). While each of these indexes provides important insight into the level of institutionalization of sub-Saharan party systems, there are marked deficiencies of each. For example, Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) wholly excluded survey data, did not utilize all four sub-indexes that make up party system institutionalization as theorized by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and limited their index to the
years of 1966-1999.\textsuperscript{12} In contrast, Basedau and Stroh (2008) conducted extensive fieldwork where they obtained original survey data but do not provide this data for replication and limited their inquiry to the years of 1990-2004. M. Anne Pitcher (2012) also constructed a party system institutionalization index where she included Afrobarometer survey data; however, her index relies upon only three indicators.

In contrast, this paper constructs an original institutionalization index that relies upon extensive survey data provided by the Afrobarometer. It includes all four sub-indexes originally theorized by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) as essential components of party system institutionalization in developing states. Furthermore, this index provides the starting point to examine the relationship between institutionalized party systems and conflicts.

III. Empirical Analysis: Measures, Data, and Methods

Data

I evaluate my theoretical argument with a statistical analysis of democracies and semi-democracies within sub-Saharan that have conducted at least two multiparty elections and have at least two political parties. The evolutionary nature of many sub-Saharan regimes is a shift back and forth between democratic and semi-democratic regimes. Thus, the sample was determined by excluding those regimes that were not coded as democracies or semi-democracies by Freedom House, a majority of the time during the years of 1990-2013. These temporal constraints highlight the post-Cold War time period as well as contemporary party systems in the third wave of the democracy. This results in a sample of thirty sub-Saharan states. The units of analysis are the thirty nation states.

\textsuperscript{12} Though Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) constructed a party system institutionalization index from the years of 1966-1996 the majority of their country data restricted their index to the early and mid990s.
Table 2: Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent Variables:**

While a large portion of conflict literature examines the causes of war, my theory recognizes that there are significant conflict events that result from weakly institutionalized party systems that do not meet the definition of war\textsuperscript{13}. In other words, weakly institutionalized party systems can effectuate social conflict that does not rise to the level of war but that nevertheless have a significant impact upon the developing state. Thus, three different dependent variables are utilized in order to determine the impact of weakly institutionalized party systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Count data for the dependent variables are violence against civilians, protests and riots, and battles.

Data for the dependent variables was obtained from the Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED defines violence against civilians as premeditated violent actions by some political organization against a non-combatant(s). ACLED defines protests and riots as separate entities. For the purposes of this paper, I compressed them into a single dimension that adheres to ACLED’s definition of a violent disturbance of the peace. Battles are defined as violent interactions between armed political groups. As these definitions highlight,

\textsuperscript{13} In order to be classified as a war there is a minimum of 1,000 battlefield deaths that must occur within a twelve month period (see the Correlates of War database available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW%20Data/WarData\_NEW/COW\%20Website\%20-%20Typology\%20of\%20war.pdf).

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the impact of weak party systems upon conflict is theorized to range from major armed conflict to mere rebellions and protests.

**Independent Variables and Controls:**

The independent variables are original indexes created to account for those aspects that are recognized as components of party system institutionalization: roots in society, autonomy, legitimacy, and the regularity of party competition. The indicators within each sub-index were averaged to provide a single score for each sub-index within the sample. The score for each sub-index is then added together to provide an overall institutionalization score for each state within the sample.

**Table 3: Political Party System Index with sub-indexes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-indices</th>
<th>Indicators:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regularity of Party Competition</strong></td>
<td>• Legislative volatility in the lower legislative chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roots in Society</strong></td>
<td>• Voters’ self-identification with a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Age of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>• Public’s perception of the legitimacy of elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loser accepts election results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomy</strong></td>
<td>• Level of country corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regularity of Party Competition**

Regularity of Party Competition was examined by calculating Pedersen’s index of volatility for each multiparty election since 1990 that occurred in the lower legislative chamber. Pedersen’s index attempts to account for volatility by examining the change in the percentage of votes that each party obtains in each election and then dividing by two. The general idea is that
the less volatility that a nation experiences, the more engrained the parties are as a source of democratic representation.

I calculated Pedersen’s index score by examining the change in the number of seats in the lower legislative chamber, for all multiparty elections held between the years of 1990-2013, for all nations in the sample. The individual volatility scores were averaged to provide an overall volatility score for each state in the sample. In keeping with Kuenzi and Lambright’s seminal institutionalization research, volatility score was coded as follows:

- 3.0=0-10%
- 2.5=11-20%
- 2.0=21-30%
- 1.5=31-40%
- 1.0=above 40%

*Hypothesis 1:* Higher volatility is commensurate with higher levels of intrastate conflict.

**Roots in Society**

Roots in society measures how deeply parties are rooted into society. In short, the stronger a party system’s roots in society are then the more institutionalized the system. This is because the citizens will have identified with a party based upon platform and ideology and less so upon personal appeals by party leaders. This is important because it illustrates the ability of parties to act as vehicles of representation for the electorate.

Consistently with previous research, I included an indicator that attempts to measure the longevity of parties within the system. The notion is that party systems that are strongly institutionalized will also have political parties that been organized for a substantial period of time or are “older”. Thus, I calculated the average age of the two parties who received the highest vote share in the country’s most recent lower chamber. The following coding score was applied:

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14 All election data was obtained from the African Elections database available at [http://africanelections.tripod.com/](http://africanelections.tripod.com/).
3.0 = 31+ years  
2.5 = 25-30 years  
2.0 = 19-24 years  
1.5 = 13-18 years  
1.0 = below 13 years

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) noted that survey results that examine whether voters have a predilection for a particular party are particularly useful for measuring roots in society. For this reason, I also utilize all five rounds of the Afrobarometer. These individual survey results indicate whether people identify with a party, regardless of the name, which provides a better means to determine the degree of party system entrenchment. I coded the “yes” responses as follows:

- 3.0 = 76 or higher
- 2.5 = 66.6 - 75
- 2.0 = 58.01 - 66.5
- 1.5 = 41 - 58
- 1.0 = 40 or below

_Hypothesis 2: High levels of roots in society are commensurate with lower levels of intrastate conflict._

**Legitimacy**

Legitimacy attempts to measure the degree to which elites view political parties and elections as necessary to the fundamental democratic system (Mainwaring, 1998). In an effort to fully capture the degree of legitimacy from both of these sources I measured legitimacy by combining both elites’ perceptions of the legitimacy elections and voters perceptions of legitimacy.

In order to measure elites’ perceptions of legitimacy, I relied upon Stefan Lindberg’s comprehensive dataset that indicates the degree of acceptance of election results in parliamentary elections. Lindberg’s dataset includes whether the losing parties to an election accepted the election results, did not accept the election results, or whether there was a delayed acceptance of the election results. The individual election results were coded as either a 2 if the main players
immediately accepted the election results, a 1 if there was a delayed but eventual acceptance by
the main players, and a 0 if the election results were not accepted. I then derived a country score
based upon the averages of all the individual election results.

In order to determine the degree of legitimacy by the electorate, I relied upon the
Afrobarometer. The Afrobarometer asks respondents two important questions regarding
legitimacy: 1) to what degree does the respondent believe that the last election was free and fair;
2) are elections the best manner in which to choose governing officials.

The survey allows participants to respond that they believed the election was fully free
and fair, mostly free and fair, free and fair with major problems, or not free and fair at all. I
combined the responses of fully free and fair and free and fair with minor problems into a single
category and averaged the results across all five rounds of the Afrobarometer. Thereafter, I
applied the following coding scheme:

- 3.0=76 or higher
- 2.5=70-75
- 2.0=64-69
- 1.5=59-64
- 1.0=below 58

Similarly, the Afrobarometer asks participants whether their country should choose
leaders through open and honest elections or other methods. Based upon the percentage of
responses in favor of elections as the method to choose leaders I applied the following coding
scheme:

- 3.0=95-100
- 2.5=89-94
- 2.0=85-89
- 1.5=79-84
- 1.0=anything below 79
In order to create a single sub-index score for legitimacy I combined the three numerical indicators into a country score.

_Hypothesis 3:_ Higher levels of legitimacy are commensurate with lower levels of intrastate conflict.

_Party Organization_

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) asserted that the level of party organization is a key component of institutionalization. The contention is that as party organizational coherence increases the ability of a leader to personally direct the operations of the party is limited. In short, the parties become independent and functional entities that are distinct and separate from their founders and leaders. Thus, institutionalized party systems with high levels of party organization are less likely to be personal vehicles of party leaders and elites, are not marked by substantial migrations in elite support, and are not characterized by substantial patrimonialism.

One of the main charges against African political parties is that they are merely a means for wealth accumulation for corrupt party leaders and elites. If this is true then party organization will be low and will lower the level of party system institutionalization accordingly.

_Hypothesis 4:_ High levels of party organization result in low levels of intrastate conflict.

In the African context, party organization is more properly conceptualized as autonomous party systems. Thus, due to practical constraints regarding the data availability of internal dynamics of political parties and in order to capture the degree of which there is political corruption, I have operationalized party organization by relying upon the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator of Corruption. This index relies upon fifteen measures of corruption for the years of 1996-2012 and thus provides comprehensive analysis of both perceptions of corruption as well as actual corruptive practices by government officials. I
averaged the annual percentile rankings for each nation in order to create a single overall score.

My coding scheme is as follows:

3.0=65-80  
2.5=64-50  
2.0=49-34  
1.5=33-18  
1.0=below 17

Table 4 provides the subindex scores as well as the final party system institutionalization score by each country within the sample.

**Control Variables:**

Ethnic heterogeneity is often cited as a cause of sub-Saharan conflict and therefore is included within the model as a control. I am utilizing Fearon and Laitin (2003) ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) measure for this model.

Increasingly, sub-Saharan Africa appears to be experiencing religiously-based conflicts thus suggesting that perhaps rather than ethnic fractionalization or polarization, religious polarization is a causal factor in sub-Saharan African conflict. Marta Reynal-Querol and Jose Montalvo (2005) theorized that religious polarization was an important contributing cause of civil war in Africa. While their statistical findings were inconclusive, I believe that it is an important variable, and I have therefore included it as a control into the model. I am relying upon Reynal-Querol’s and Montalvo’s (2005) measurement for this control variable.

It has been theorized that economic development and inequality drive sub-Saharan conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004); thus, I have included a measure the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). The IHDI measure not only provides insight into the level of national development, but also simultaneously takes national inequality
into account. In this way, IHDI is a better indicator of inequality and development than GDP per capita or the Gini coefficient.

I am also including World Bank population data for each nation. I took the average population for each nation for the years 1990-2012, and naturally logged them, in order to account for differences in population size.

**Methodology:**

A negative binomial statistical model is appropriate as the dependent variables are count data that are characterized by over-dispersion.

**Data Analysis and Findings:**

Table 4 provides the party system institutionalization level for all states considered. The total institutionalization level scores range from Nigeria’s low 4.75 to Botswana’s high ranking of 11.25. Most of the states receive institutionalization ranks that range between scores of 6-8 thereby indicating that most sub-Saharan democracies and semi-democracies have partially institutionalized party systems.

I analyzed the effects of individual attributes of party system strength against each dependent variable before examining the complete index. This method allows for an analysis of the strength of each subindex to predict likelihood of different types of political conflict.

Table 5 illustrates the relative impact of autonomy, legitimacy, roots in society, and volatility upon total conflicts, battles, violence against civilians, and protests and riots. Table 5 highlights that the relative impact of each component of institutionalization varies tremendously depending upon the type of conflict that is examined. For example, Model 1 utilizes a dependent variable that includes all conflict events in the model (minor conflict, major conflict, battles, protests and riots, and violence against civilians). We see that each institutionalization sub-
component indicates a decrease in total conflicts with an increase in party system institutionalization. A one unit increase in autonomy indicates an 8.5% reduction in the incidence of conflict, while increasing legitimacy results in a 21% reduction in conflict. Increasing roots in society decreases the incidence of conflict by 3.9%. Interestingly, a one unit increase in volatility is associated with a 52% reduction in conflict. This is a substantial reduction in conflict and seems to indicate that opening up the political system to different parties, combined with the increasing demise of single party systems, reduces overall violence in sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that as more parties and individuals have an increased ability for participation and representation in government, there is less incentive to participate in violent conflict, because party systems provide an institutional avenue through which one can have his grievance addressed.

Models 2-4 in Table 5 indicate that the relationship between each subindex component and conflict varies depending upon the severity of the conflict. For example, while increasing the level of party system autonomy reduces both the number of battles and the number of incidences of violence against civilians, it is also correlated with increases in the incidence of protests and riots. Interesting, as the legitimacy of party systems increases then the incidence of battles, violence against civilians, and protests and riots also increases. The subindex of roots in society indicates that as a party system increases its roots into society there is a corresponding increase in the occurrence of battles. Conversely, deeper roots into society are correlated with fewer occurrences of violence against civilians or the number of protests and riots. Clearly, these individual subindex findings do not provide insight into the relationship between institutionalization and conflict. In fact, these findings caution against the individual examination or attribution of party system sub-component attribution.
Table 6 presents the relationship between party system institutionalization and differing levels of conflict. Unlike Table 5, wherein the disparate impact of each sub-index is evident, Table 6 illustrates that as the level of party system institutionalization increases there is a decrease in every measured form of intrastate conflict.

Table 7 integrates the four sub-indexes into a full index that measures party system institutionalization. It utilizes a negative binomial model and uses the total number of intrastate conflicts as the dependent variable. Models 1 through 4 indicate that increasing rates of autonomy, roots in society, and volatility all correlate to decreases in intrastate conflict. Interestingly, increasing legitimacy does not correlate with a decrease in conflict. This is contrary to expectations as it was expected that as citizens and elites increasingly saw elections as free, fair, and legitimate there would be a corresponding decrease in conflict. Overall, model 5 reaffirms that as party system institutionalization increases the incidence of intrastate conflict decreases.

Model 6 introduces an interactive variable of rule of law and party system institutionalization. The theoretical reasoning behind the inclusion of the interactive term is that the relationship between high party system institutionalization and low levels of intrastate conflict is modified by respect for the rule of law. In short, if a state has a high level of institutionalization then the state, its apparatuses, its elites, and its citizenry will generally have high levels of respect for the rule of law. In other words, the effect and impact of party system institutionalization upon the level of intrastate conflict is theorized to be contingent upon the respect for the rule of law within a nation. Contrary to expectations the marginal effects graph indicates that the interactive effect does not significantly influence the incidence of intrastate conflict (see Appendix D).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
<th>Roots in Society</th>
<th>Index Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7.25</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>7.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>2.75</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5: Impact of Individual Institutionalization Factors on Intrastate Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>8.40 **</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>6.66 **</td>
<td>4.45 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
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<td>-3.27 ***</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>-0.19 **</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
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<td>(0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots in Society</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility</td>
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<td>-3.17 **</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Likelihood     | -179.93     | -54.42      | -148.57     | -157.34     |
Num. obs.          | 24          | 28          | 24          | 24          |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1. Statistical significance is included for interest only.

Note: Model 1 is Total Conflicts; Model 2 is Battles, Model 3 is Violence against Civilians, and Model 4 is Protests and Riots.

### Table 6: Party System Institutionalization and Differing Levels of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
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<td>-4.94</td>
<td>-4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.96)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
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<td>14.26</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(8.58)</td>
<td>(3.47)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Polarization</td>
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<td>-1.04</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
</tr>
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<td>(3.49)</td>
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<td>(0.79)</td>
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<td>-9.41 **</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(12.92)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
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<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.57 **</td>
<td>0.59 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Likelihood     | -126.47     | -41.96      | -99.54      | -92.41      |
Num. obs.          | 18          | 19          | 18          | 18          |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1. Statistical significance is included for interest only.

Note: Model 1 is Total Conflicts, Model 2 is Battles, Model 3 is Violence against Civilians, and Model 4 is Protests and Riots.
Table 7: Party System Institutionalization and Total Conflict

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>-5.97**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
<td>(3.04)</td>
<td>(2.96)</td>
<td>(2.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>IHDI</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Religious Polarization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>0.50***</td>
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<td>0.42**</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.25)</td>
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<td>Party System Institutionalization:</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
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<td>-115.71</td>
<td>-115.18</td>
<td>-115.10</td>
<td>-126.47</td>
<td>-117.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, p < 0.1. Statistical significance is included for interest only.
IV. Case Study Application

The institutionalization index highlights that Botswana’s party system is the most institutionalized system with a score of 11.25. Conversely, Nigeria is the weakest institutionalized party system with a score of 4.75. While the previous statistical models indicates that Botswana will experience fewer incidences of intrastate conflict than Nigeria, a closer examination of these two nations provides a more nuanced insight into the phenomenon that the institutionalization index alone cannot provide. These cases highlight how the sub-indexes of legitimacy, autonomy, volatility, and roots in society are reflected in descriptive analysis. Finally, these cases help to bridge the gap that seems to exist in much of the literature between quantitative research on party systems and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

Botswana

Botswana is a landlocked and arid country, making it a rather uninviting and undesirable colony. Its rather inhospitable environment ultimately resulted in little British control or interference in the country. This, combined with the fact that diamonds were not discovered until after independence, facilitated the country’s relative escape from the negative externalities generally associated with colonization. That is, the British exercised little control over the country, which allowed traditional authoritative institutions and structures to persist (von Soest, 2009). This is an important point because it ensured that Botswana was fairly protected from the major extractive practices that often plagued colonized states (Lewin, 2011). The British failure to completely coopt the state allowed traditional authoritative structures, such as the tribal chiefs and the kgotla from the Tswana ethnic groups, to maintain their political and administrative dominance over the populace (von Soest, 2009). This arguably helped to ensure the availability of adept political leaders in the post-independence period.
In its early experiments with party politics Botswana political elites forged political alliances between traditional authorities, cattle owners, scholars, and other elites in order to secure political power (von Soest, 2009; Tsie, 1996). These early alliances formed the political group that would eventually become the long ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). While the BDP may have emerged via elite concessions, compromise, and alliances, it also garnered the widespread support of non-elites (Tsie, 1996). Thus, the BDP ensured that it is supported by not only the land-holding elites but also non-landowners. This cross-sectional helped ensure the BDP’s long-standing dominance.

Botswana has held regular multiparty elections since its independence in 1966, but the BDP has consistently dominated these elections and thus has emerged as the ruling party since independence (Bothomilwe & Sebudubudu, 2011). Despite organized opposition parties, the Botswana National Front (BNF) and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), the BDP continues to dominate elections that are widely regarded as free, if not fair.\footnote{Gloria Somolekae notes that civil society groups and opposition parties concur that elections within Botswana are free but that they are not fair (Political Parties in Botswana, 2005, p. 6).} While a number of smaller opposition parties have emerged as splinter factions from the BNF and BCP, these new parties have been unable to garner major electoral success. In fact, these factions arguably undermined the ability of the opposition parties to wage successful electoral competitions against the BDP because they splinter the electoral voting support.

The BNF is argued to be historically left leaning with socialist routes, while the BCP is considered a more centrist party after having fragmented off from the BNF (Somolekae, 2005; IDEA Country Report, 2006). Despite these ideological slants the BNF and the BCP were formed as true opposition parties (IDEA, 2006). The BDP is said to rest upon ideals of free enterprise (IDEA, 2006) and multiracism (Somolekae, 2005). In fact, the BDP pursued a
development agenda that relied heavily upon satisficing the electorate in order to maintain its power base (Mokopakgosi & Molomo, 2000). However, it also should be noted that the BDP is widely recognized to have eschewed many of the poor governance practices that have plagued other sub-Saharan states. For example, the BDP sought to improve infrastructural programs, education, and healthcare within the country and has been generally effective in these endeavors (von Soest, 2009; Lewin, 2011).

Botswana is an interesting case study in many respects, not the least of which is its ability to avoid the spiral of resource curse politics, governance, development or conflict often associated natural resource dependency (Lewin, 2011; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). Botswana’s economy is arguably based solely upon diamonds, which has helped to vault Botswana into a middle-income nation. While natural resources are undeniably important in this respect it cannot be denied that BDP policies and governance have been a contributing factor.

Under BDP governance the country has emerged as one of the wealthiest nations in the region with a 2012 gross national income per capita (GNI per capita) of $7,650 and one of the least corrupt (World Bank, 2014). In other words, the BDP has ensured that economic development and wealth accumulation occur and are not siphoned off by the ruling elite. Unfortunately, Botswana’s economic wealth has not generated societal equality. In fact, with a 0.5 Gini coefficient, Botswana has significant inequality within its population. It also suffers from high unemployment. (International Monetary Fund, 2012). Thus, while Botswana has achieved remarkable economic and governmental success, its high levels of inequality suggest that there is discontent brewing within Botswana and with support for the BDP.
While the BDP’s hold on government is strong, the party is not without its critics. Increasingly there is dissatisfaction with the party (Thorpe, 2011). In fact, while the BDP’s hold over Botswana politics illustrates strong institutionalization it also illustrates that party system institutionalization that is too strong can result in stagnation and one party control. However, the BDP’s strength is being tested. As late as 2009, the BDP experienced an internal split as a young, urban faction split from the party and formed the Botswana Movement for Democracy (Thorpe, 2011). The BMD is a true, but rather insignificant, opposition party whose platform is dedicated to unseating the BDP. While the split illustrates increasing dissatisfaction with the ruling BDP, both internally and within the urban and youth populations, it is more significant that the split was peaceful and uncontested.16

This background helps to provide descriptive context to the statistical results from this research that shows Botswana to have the highest level of party system institutionalization in the sample as well as the least number of conflict events. While it is often argued that high levels of ethnic homogenization or welfare payments from the government to the citizens are the cause of this relative peace, I argue that the level of party system institutionalization is also an important factor in Botswana’s success in peace.

Botswana has high rankings in all subindexes of the party system institutionalization index. With respect to the roots in society subindex, the country received one of the highest scores, reflecting not only the longevity of the major political parties, but also how deeply entrenched political parties are in the national character. Unsurprisingly given the background

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16 In June 2013, the Botswana Gazette reported that BMD fundraising event was illegally and violently dispersed by police, available at http://www.gazettebw.com/?p=3327.
on the parties, all five rounds of the Afrobarometer reflected respondents overwhelmingly reported feeling “close” to a particular political party.\textsuperscript{17} 

This is likely because the BDP, the BNF, and the BCP, are arguably derived from pre-independence institutions that have a relatively long history of control and representation of the population. Notwithstanding this phenomenon, parties attempted to create broad based support for their agendas. These factors have enabled people to closely associate themselves with a political party. This has meant that these parties are grounded within the societal fabric of the country.

As reflected in my index, Botswana’s electoral volatility score indicates that it has the least amount of volatility in the sample. This is an unsurprising result because BDP continues to win elections and opposition parties fail to attract widespread support from the electorate. As previously discussed, the BDP is weakening and splinter parties are increasingly emerging, but the BDP is still dominating in the elections. Opposition parties have been unable to create sufficient alliances with each other that would allow them to garner significant electoral support. This means that there is relatively little volatility within the system.

As previously indicated, while the BDP holds a firm grasp of political power there is widespread criticism of the party. Nevertheless, there is overwhelming support and respect for elections, where the BDP has continued to win legislative seats time and time again. This indicates the respect that elites and the electorate have for election results. It also suggests that, while dissatisfied with the BDP, the electorate believe that elections and parties provide an institutional mechanism through which they can exercise their voices and air their grievances. It also provides some preliminary support for the quantitative assertions that inequality are

\textsuperscript{17} Round 5: 63\% responded feeling close to a party, Round 4 this number was 78\%, Round 3 this number was 79\%, in Round 2 this number was 61\%, and in Round 1 this number was 74\%. http://www.afrobarometer.org/.
unrelated to conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In short, widespread respect for the process of elections and their results illustrates why Botswana’s party system received high legitimacy scores.

Botswana’s major political parties are argued to be dominated by charismatic leaders, are poorly financed (if at all), and are often weakly operational in non-electoral periods (Somolekae, 2005). Nevertheless, the previous literature highlights that the BDP has a development agenda that is separate and distinct from its party leaders. This renders the party organization relatively strong. In my index, I examined the distinction between the individual elites and the party by examining corruption. Botswana ranks very low in political corruption, which is a result of the strong bureaucratic institutions that the BDP erected. Furthermore, the individual parties are fully organized from the national level to the cell level, although the number of full time workers devoted to party activities is widely divergent (Somolekae, 2005).

While Botswana is often argued to be free from intrastate conflict based upon ethnic homogeneity or because of welfare payments received from diamond rents (Selolwane, 2004), it cannot be disputed that the country’s high levels of party system institutionalization help to stabilize the country. The high levels of institutionalization ensure that political parties represent the interests of the citizens. This does not mean that the people of Botswana do not have grievances against the government or the ruling party; rather, it means that the party system is so entrenched within the country that the electorate looks to it to address its grievances in a peaceful manner.
Nigeria

While Nigeria and Botswana both have a British colonial legacy, achieved independence within five years from one another, and are natural resource based economies, in all other regards the two nations are the antithesis of another. Where Botswana is stable, Nigeria is not. Where Botswana has low levels of intrastate conflict, Nigeria has high levels of violent conflict. Finally, while Botswana has the highest institutionalization score, Nigeria has the lowest.

Nigeria has the largest population in Africa (Kamalu & Fonge, 2012) and the largest geographical area in West Africa (Political Handbook of the World, 2010). Unlike Botswana, where ethnicity is relatively homogenous, Nigeria’s large population is said to have between 250 groups (Kolo, 1996) to 350 different ethnic groups (Sklar, Onwudiue, & Kew, 2006). The three largest ethnic groups are geographically dispersed so that the Muslim dominated Hasau are concentrated in northern Nigeria; the Yoruba reside predominately in the southeast and are comprised of both Muslim and Christian religions, while the Christian Ibos chiefly reside in southeastern Nigeria (Anuglwom, 2000; Skylar, Onwudiue, & Kew, 2006). This is an important distinction because Nigerian politics has been largely divided upon these ethno-regional lines (Skylar, Onwudiue, & Kew, 2006; Salawu & Hassan, 2011).

While Botswana was left relatively unscathed by its colonial experience, Nigeria experienced intensive European influence. Nigeria has a wealth of natural resources including oil, gold, rubber, tin, and timber that made it attractive to Britain, France, and Germany. While the British colonized Nigeria in 1861, they officially assumed ownership of three different protectorates in 1884 (Badru, 1998). However, the British sought to make administration over

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18 Even within this regional distinction, the population may be further distinguished between emirates and non-emirates. Emirates are “Muslim polities over which emirs and their counselors presided directly in precolonial times—whose traditional institutions retain important political influence” (Skylar, Onwudiue, & Kew, 2006, p. 104).
the vast area more convenient and easier to manage and therefore merged these three protectorates into a single unit, the nation of Nigeria, in 1914 (Badru, 1998).

This creation essentially merged distinct, different, and unrelated ethnic groups together under the umbrella of a single nationality; however, as previously mentioned, Nigeria was purely a British construct. Thus, the new Nigeria did not have any singular national identity tying the vast region or its people together. Furthermore, in order to maintain control over the vast region and the multitude of ethnic groups, the British deliberately sought to undermine any attempt to create a united Nigeria. In fact, they consciously helped to promote ethnic divisiveness and ethnic tensions as a means to ensure their own rule (Adekunle, 2012; Ibeanu, 2000; Badru, 1998).

This colonial legacy thereby ensured that ethno-regional associations dominated the political landscape. Thus, when Nigeria finally achieved independence in 1960, non-ethnic civil societal organizations were sorely lacking. As political parties emerged their natural recruitment centers were thus ethnically based, which served to perpetuate ethnically based struggles for power. This illustrates that while Nigeria does have a historically based preoccupation with ethnicity, this preoccupation has been fostered by elites, political parties, and early meddling by Britain. Nevertheless, this preoccupation has largely undermined attempts to create political movements based upon non-ethnic concerns (Badru, 1998, p. 9).

British orchestrated institutional design ensured that the majority pro-British segment in northern Nigeria would stay in control of the country through a proportional representation parliamentary form of government (Badru, 1998). This combined with ethno-regional parties helped to fuel suspicions and fear of marginalization between and amongst different ethnic groups. The result was violent protests and deadly conflict during the First Republic (Salawu &
This violence in 1966 ushered in a coup d'état that effectively wrestled control from the civilian government and ended the First Republic. This began a cycle of military rule which would govern the country on and off for twenty-eight years of country’s forty-one years of independence (Dagne, 2002).

Adding fuel to the fire of instability in Nigeria are its rich expanses of petroleum. While Nigeria receives nearly all of its revenue from oil, there is little to show for it. That is, there is little infrastructural improvement, poverty is high and so is unemployment (Adekunle, 2012). The result has been increased militancy from the Ijaw youth, the main ethnic group in the Niger Delta. The Ijaw have engaged in significant violent actions including kidnapping oil workers and siphoning off oil from the pipelines and illegally smuggling it out of the country (Adekunle, 2012).

Facially, these acts appear merely criminal attempts to reap profits; however, these violent and illegal activities are undertaken because the government is unresponsive to the citizens’ needs (Adekunle, 2012). Residents of the Niger Delta are some of the poorest in Nigeria, and their demands for employment, infrastructural development and improvement, and environmental protection have been largely ignored. In fact, Adekunle (2012) notes that since civilian governance displaced military rule in the Fourth Republic there has been increased violence. This is an important point that illustrates the weakness of the parties and the party systems in Nigeria. That is, contrary to assertions that mere ethnic heterogeneity, resource curse governance, or colonial legacy has undermined Nigerian development and stability, we see a confluence of these factors ripping the country apart through corruption and violence. While parties and party systems should be giving proper voice to the aggrieved and marginalized
population, the reality is that they do not. The ultimate question thus asks why the Nigerian party system is inept.

Nigeria’s party system history is one rife with internal conflict. In fact, throughout most of its post-independence history, political parties have been out rightly banned, severely restricted by the national government, or have had party platforms virtually dictated to them by political elites (Agbu, 1998). As Nigeria has oscillated between military and civilian rule so has the existence of parties. For example, Nigeria first banned political parties in 1983 and thereafter allowed the formation of political parties for six months in 1989 only to reinstitute a ban again. The central government thereafter officially created two political parties that were allowed to exist for four years before the government once again instituted a ban against all political parties. Finally, although widely perceived as corrupt, the government did officially recognize five parties in 1995, but it refused to recognize ten other parties and thereafter ordered the dissolution of these remaining ten organizations. (Political Handbook of the World, 2010).

Nigeria’s post-independence experience with political parties, not to mention party systems, is negligible. In fact, independent parties have really existed since 1995 because prior parties were creations of the state rather than the citizens. Politics are used for the personal enrichment of elites and those within their patronage networks rather than vehicles for the representation of the public (Skylar, Onwudiue, & Kew, 2006; Agbu, 1998). The institutionalization index reflect this phenomenon with the legitimacy subindex only receiving a score of 1, roots in society receiving a 1.25, and autonomy receiving a 1. During the course of Nigeria’s political history political parties have been banned from becoming fully integrated into society because the Nigerian government has historically banned them from holding political rallies and from campaigning (Agbu, 1998). Thus, the fact that Nigeria has a low roots in society
score is unsurprising. As for the low legitimacy score, the military regimes’ persistent hold over Nigerian politics, including its unilateral annulment of presidential elections in 1993 and its unilateral creation of political parties (Agbu, 1998), undoubtedly contributed to its low legitimacy score.¹⁹

Nigeria’s political history helps to illustrate its party system institutionalization is low: parties have never had a full opportunity to develop. The result of this means that representation, accountability to the people, or mediation of conflicting interests is largely ineffective. Nigeria’s low levels of institutionalization render its party system a vehicle through which political elites foster, incite, and exacerbate ethnic and regional tensions which contributes to its high levels of intrastate conflict (Agbu, 1998).

This section attempted to contextualize the impact that differing levels of party system institutionalization have upon developing states. The history of both Nigeria and Botswana illustrate the importance of highly institutionalized party systems, and these case studies illustrate that higher levels of party system institutionalization means less incidence of political conflict, while low institutionalization levels also have a correspondingly high incidence of political conflict. In a state such as Nigeria, where there are a multitude of different ethnic groups and religious tensions are already high, weakly institutionalized party systems means that there are not the necessary institutions and leaders to moderate or relieve tensions but only to aggravate them (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, pp. 23-24).

¹⁹ Agbu (1998, p.251) reports that 14 million Nigerians voted in the 1993 Presidential elections but once the central government annulled these elections there was seemingly little interest by Nigerians to vote in elections. This is illustrated by the fact that in 1994 only 300,000 Nigerians voted at the Constitutional Conference despite 25 million people being eligible.
V. Conclusion

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced tremendous conflict. However, despite popular perception that the entire region is muddled in war, there are states that experience little intrastate conflict. This paper attempted to explain the reasons for this variation by relying upon classic party system literature that highlights the impact that varying levels of institutionalized party systems have upon intrastate conflict.

I theorized that those sub-Saharan states with lower levels of party system institutionalization experience a higher incidence intrastate conflict. In testing this theory, I have both departed from a significant portion of the previous literature, while simultaneously emphasizing important but largely untested institutional causes of social conflict.

First, while it has been widely theorized that the degree of institutionalization of party systems has an impact upon stability and peacefulness of a country there is no known contemporary quantitative work that has examined this relationship (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Thus, I have sought to determine whether the level of intrastate conflict that democracies and semi-democracies in sub-Saharan Africa experience can be explained by examining the level of party system institutionalization within each state.

Second, previous literature has chiefly sought to explain civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. I sought to examine the causes of conflict that are often the pre-cursors to civil war but which are likely more prevalent. Thus, I have limited my inquiry and analysis to wide ranging conflict events such as protests and riots, violence against civilians, as well as battles between the state and sub-national actors.

In order to test this theory I constructed an original party system institutionalization index as my independent variable. To my knowledge, this index is the only index that incorporates all
four sub-indices theorized by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) as important factors in the level of institutionalization. Further, while previous research only used limited survey data in the construction of party system institutionalization indexes, I have used all five rounds of Afrobarometer surveys. This provides an index that is more robust than previous research provided.

Using a negative binomial model, I statistically examined the impact of each sub-index, roots in society, legitimacy, volatility, and autonomy, against various intrastate conflict variables and found that each of these is statistically correlated with a reduce in intrastate conflict. Similarly, the full index is also correlated with reduced levels of intrastate conflict. These findings support the theory that differing levels of party system institutionalization have an impact upon intrastate conflict.

While the statistical results provide important insight into the impact of institutionalization, I also sought to examine the historical events within the nations that received the highest and lowest institutionalization scores: Botswana and Nigeria. It should be noted that each of these countries performed in the theoretically expected manner; that is, Botswana has the highest institutionalization score and the lowest incidence of conflict while Nigeria has the lowest institutionalization score and is second only to South Africa in the incidence of intrastate conflict events.

These cases provided important insight into the historical evolution of the political party systems in each nation and provided contextual evidence of the influence of party systems upon intrastate conflict. Notwithstanding the influence of its colonial legacy, Botswana illustrates that the historical strength of the party system served functions in recruiting highly legitimate party leaders. These leaders and their parties have strong roots in society which has enabled them to
perform essential tasks that ensure grievances and citizens’ interests are represented. In contrast, Nigeria illustrates how colonial legacy of ethnic divisiveness continues to plague its modern party system. Political parties are widely discounted by both the populace and political elites as mechanism to ensure representation and governance. Its party system is incredibly weak and thus parties perform few if any of their expected duties. The result is that individuals have taken matters into their own hands in order to force the Nigerian government to take action. Specifically, conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta can be traced back to an inability of the party system to allow for discord or grievances to be addressed.

While these findings provide important new insight into the sub-Saharan the statistical findings are limited. Country and party system data on sub-Saharan Africa is often lacking and thus as additional datasets on the region are collected future research should seek to validate the findings of this research. Further, while this research was limited to sub-Saharan Africa additional research should expand the regional interest to other developing regions. As additional survey research becomes available and states hold more elections this theory can be further tested.
**Bibliography**


Appendix A: Autonomy

Plot 1: Total Conflicts

Plot 2: Battles

Plot 3: Protests and Riots

Plot 4: Violence against Civilians
Appendix B: Legitimacy

Plot 1: Total Conflicts

Plot 2: Battles

Plot 4: Protests and Riots

Plot 3: Violence Against Civilians
Appendix C: Roots in Society

Plot 1: Total Conflicts

Plot 2: Battles

Plot 4: Protests and Riots

Plot 3: Violence Against Civilians
Appendix D: Volatility

Plot 1: Total Conflicts

Plot 2: Battles

Plot 4: Protests and Riots

Plot 3: Violence Against Civilians
Appendix E: Full Index

Plot 1: Total Conflicts

Plot 2: Battles

Plot 3: Violence Against Civilians

Plot 4: Protests and Riots
Appendix F: Marginal Effect of Party System Institutionalization