At the end of *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures*, Crusoe suggests that he may follow his story of the discovery, defense, and settlement of his island with an account of the struggles which his successors later endured as they endeavored to preserve peace in the new colony. The Caribbeans, he summarizes, returned to invade the settlers and ruin their plantations; the English villains he had left on the island were subjected to the Spaniards though used honestly and fairly by them; the island itself was further planted and improved; and Crusoe himself returned to give the colonists supplies and to divvy up property and administrative responsibility among them. Of all this, together with “some new adventures of my own for ten years more,” he tentatively promises to give an account. What he does not advertise in any detail are other episodes in *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, in which he travels on from the island around the Cape of Good Hope, past Madagascar, up toward the East Indies and the Pacific, overland through China and Tartar to Europe, and finally back to England. On this later voyage he continues to reflect, as he did in the first part of *Robinson Crusoe*, on the imprudence of an adventurer’s life. The difference here is that he interprets his misfortunes not so much as the just consequences of an original act of disobedience against his father, but as the result of his behaving like a reckless wanderer, journeying to places where he has “no business,” rather than like a responsible British merchant, who might secure, plant, and settle new territories “in the name of England” (216). A merchant, Defoe will elsewhere suggest, can, in the interests of trade, legitimately establish himself on foreign “uninhabited” soil. An adventurer who claims sovereignty over the territories he discovers, on the other hand, respects neither the interests of his own nation, nor the authority of those natural laws which regulate relations between different nations. As aimless explorer, as absolute ruler of the island, and as self-appointed prosecutor and judge of both his cannibal and his mutineer subjects, Crusoe is something more and less than a law-abiding citizen of his country and
of the ("civilized") world. *The Farther Adventures* begins where *Robinson Crusoe* left off, setting the relationship between patriarchal government and colonial plantation and settlement in the context of larger questions about sovereignty and the law of nations.

Crusoe’s journey beyond the colonial Caribbean and into the commercial Indian and Pacific Oceans, then, will be one in which he learns that absolute colonial rule is in conflict with national duty as well as with the "international law" which regulates colonial trade. In the course of his later adventures we discover that in the colonized world it is not cannibalism, as Crusoe had hitherto believed, but willful isolation that most offends the natural laws regulating contact between different peoples. Commercial relationships, on the other hand, whether between individuals, tribes, or states, are the civilized means to the material end of acquiring certain otherwise unobtainable goods and relieving oneself or one’s community of a surplus of others. In what follows I will situate Crusoe’s education out of the hubris of adventuring (and into the responsibilities of a British trader) in the context of a growing recognition that the accumulation of national wealth takes place in a global arena of exchange. This will be to argue that the *Farther Adventures* subscribes to a model of inter-state relations in which this accumulation can proceed "naturally," uninhibited, that is to say, by the protective jealousies of isolated peoples.

If, as Benedict Anderson has argued, political communities calling themselves "nations"—communities shaped by systems of horizontal comradeship rather than vertical relations of power—were first brought imaginatively into being in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, then these in turn must have enabled the imagining of a new, federative society of nations. To identify the most powerful influences on social and political life in Britain alone during this period—the changing relationship between King and subject, the growth of parliamentary authority, and the expansion of trade and empire—is to consider how questions of state practice were tied to those of national sovereignty as the modern institution of the nation-state freed itself from older, more centralized structures of power in Europe. In the wake of the Reformation, states began to see themselves as existing in free and equal relationship with other, equally independent states. This "comradeship" necessitated an articulation of the set of rights which one nation-state held against another, not least in order to settle the inter-European legal questions that arose in response to the colonization of and establishment of trading rights within newly discovered territories. The nation was brought imaginatively into being, that is to say, not only in the insubstantial connections which its members were able to establish with one another, nor even in the jealousies which they then developed.
against the members of other nations. It was also the product of a cosmopolitan spirit which enabled a whole people to see itself as both subject and beneficiary of laws, rights, and international peace.

Nationalism, Ernest Gellner has shown, is part of a web of political, social, and psychological responses to industrialization. Anderson, with rather more emphasis on the agency of the national subject, argues that the nation is apprehended, thought, or “imagined” in the wake of historical upheavals such as decline of dynastic government, the fragmenting of religious communities formerly bound together by sacred languages, and the emergence of a secular model of time. What it is also important to recognize is that, whether imposed by social and economic change or stimulated from below by those emancipated by such change, discourses of nationalism are historically intimate with those of liberalism and enlightenment cosmopolitanism. The nation, like the individual, is a subject of natural right and law. Rather than jealous and “tribal,” nations are expressions of Reason, Law, and Peace. Of course, as Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History demonstrate, this means that only certain peoples (Hegel is not alone in identifying these as being from the temperate zones of the northern hemisphere) can be identified as enlightened subjects of history belonging to nations. Nationalism in this sense could scarcely have less to do with ethnic rivalry. It belongs to that aspect of enlightenment history concerned with drawing careful distinctions between primitive and modern societies, and hence with determining who is or is not capable of membership in a “civil society” of nations.

This coincidence of nation with modern internationhood, then, has two important dimensions. The first is a theory of cosmopolitan right, which from Grotius’s The Rights of War to Kant’s Perpetual Peace involves the reconciliation of political prudence—the sovereign’s acting in the interests of the nation—with reason, to which the use of force by one nation which deprives another of its right is repugnant. The second dimension is an account of the evolution of government and culture in which some societies are seen as more entitled to be bearers of this cosmopolitan right than others. Since the nation is the primary unit of international law, the problem of how “pre” or “sub” national communities can be bearers of right in relation to greater powers necessarily haunts the law in the form of the Hobbesian state of nature: a primitive, disordered “society” ruled by passion rather than reason. Hobbes’s savage is drawn into civil community precisely because he is so destitute of reason, and only his subjection to absolute authority will guarantee his safety from the violence of others equally driven by their passions. Although as theorists of natural law both Grotius and Pufendorf deny that human beings are essentially and originally at war
with one another, each imagines a state of war where men are jealous and irrational as the state which predates both the well-ordered society and any organized federation of societies. For Grotius, “no beings except those that can form general maxims are capable of right.” 10 Although he argues with Hobbes that the natural state is one of peace, Pufendorf agrees that “those who are governed purely by appetite are incapable of right or law.” 11 That is to say, what comes to be identified after the civil war as the Hobbesian state of nature is figured at two levels in the discourse of cosmopolitan right. The first level is that of the improperly jealous and aggressive behavior of nations who illegally make war on others in order to advance their own interests (at the expense of those of their neighbors). The second is that of the pre-civil society whose ignorance of the fundamental principles of property and right disqualifies it from the protection of international law. While he doubts that any people so entirely uncivilized can be found anywhere, Grotius in principle denies such people could be the bearers of right:

> Neither moral nor religious virtue, not any intellectual excellence is required to form a good tide to property. Only where a race of men is so destitute of reason as to be incapable of exercising any act of ownership, they can hold no property, nor will the law of charity require that they should have more than the necessaries of life. For the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are capable of political or commercial intercourse, but not to a people destitute of reason. *(Rights of War, 3:39)*

Grotius’s defense of the dispossession of barbarous societies here seems at first inconsistent with his earlier claim for the political rights of first peoples in *The Freedom of the Seas* (1608). In this work he defends the right of the Dutch to make trading voyages to those parts of the East Indies where the Portuguese prohibited other European powers free passage. In the course of this defense he points out that islands which have always “had their own government, their own laws, and their own legal systems” cannot be subjected to the authority of a foreign sovereign, and that therefore their original inhabitants may allow the privilege of trade to any other nation they wish; the Portuguese, therefore, are not sovereigns but foreigners in those lands. 12 By the same token, he argues, a people cannot be deprived of their sovereignty for being ignorant of Christ, since “sovereignty is a matter of positive law and unbelief is a matter of divine law, which cannot annul positive law” *(Freedom, 20)* . Colonial powers, therefore, cannot base their claims to dominion either on discovery or on a supposed right of conquest of savage peoples unwilling to acknowledge the doctrine of the true faith. Discovery does not carry any automatic right of occupation, and heathen rulers are still legitimate rulers.
At the same time, however, the very basis upon which he argues that European powers have limited jurisdiction in foreign territories becomes tied up with a historicized account of the legal origins of political and commercial sovereignty. Grotius identifies two stages in the natural law as it is applied to the law of nations. The first is the primary or “primitive” law, under which everything is acquired in common and held as a community of goods, “fields [are] not delimited by boundary lines,” and “there [is] no commercial intercourse” (23). Here no man has any particular right. A “nation,” by this primitive law, is simply understood as a collection of individuals who collectively own both the land which they occupy as a group and the objects which they have for their common use. The secondary law of nations involves the modern distinction of ownership, both as private property—that which is individually owned—and public property, or that which belongs to a nation. The concept of property, then, must be contemporary with the emergence of states. This marking out of boundaries, Grotius tells us, “did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing the way” (23), as the consumable properties of a thing—that which could be eaten or drunk, worn or used in any other way—made it by nature the property of the person who used it. This notion of property as the object of bodily needs then necessitated a theory of ownership by occupation. Public property is that which satisfies the needs of a whole nation. In its modern, positive sense, the nation must be recognized as that which has marked out territory as its own, some of which remains public (the private property of a nation), and some of which is the property of individuals.

As the institutions of public and private property emerge, Grotius argues, the law of nations establishes a distinction between natural objects that are available for appropriation and those that are not. While rivers and inlets may be seen as part of the national territory, the sea can never belong to any particular nation since its natural properties prevent it from being seized or enclosed, and any boundary established in it can only ever be an “imaginary line” (39). This designation of ocean as the common property of all, coincides with another positive (secondary) law of nature, which recognizes that, although all things were originally given to all human beings in common, men living far apart from one another rely on commerce to provide them with many of the goods which they need or desire. He cites Aristotle in the assertion that “the art of exchange is a completion of the independence which nature requires” (61), and Seneca that “buying and selling is the law of nations” (63). This suggests that what remains under the jurisdiction of the primitive law of nations—that which is held in common by all men—is entirely encased in the secondary law which seeks above
all to protect commercial relations between both individuals and states. Only nations in the positive sense are fully respectful of natural law. It is at this point that we can return to the claim that a people who are “incapable of political or commercial intercourse” cannot be recognized as beneficiaries of cosmopolitan right. Those who subscribe to the primitive law of nations are not properly speaking nations at all. Hence it is not on the basis of belief or government, but on property and trade that a colonizing power might become the bearer of right where a subjected people cannot.

Like Grotius, Pufendorf argues the reverse of Hobbes, insisting that men are naturally peaceful, not hostile. Anticipating Locke, he also identifies natural man evolving into a man of property, appropriating moveable things for himself out of the store of common goods, and taking what land he needs into his possession. Land belongs to those who “manure . . . and improve” it, the rest, he concludes, “being left in its natural and negative communion to be possessed by any person that should afterwards think fit to use it” (Law of Nature, 367). While he suggests that the decision about whether the sea should be appropriated or remain in its primitive state is not made absolutely by nature, he does confirm that those who try to turn a thing into property which is peacefully used in common, like the ocean, should be seen as antagonists to the Peace of Mankind, and hence to the law of nature. “To sail the ocean in a peaceful manner ought to be the free privilege of all nations” (384). It is also conducive to the common peace, he suggests, that properties should be made of moveable things such as can be improved by the labor of men. Peace is promoted, Grotius and Pufendorf agree, by the productive enclosure of land and by the protection of open trade routes.

Natural law theory, then, identifies nationhood at two levels: in the exercising of sovereignty over a particular territory which can be appropriated either as public or as private property; and in communication and commercial interaction between peoples. These two aspects of nationhood are, of course, interdependent. Under the law of nature men appropriate land and moveables not only for their immediate use, but also in order that they can exchange these goods for others which they need. Just as individual right is realized in the appropriation of land and goods, and in commercial relationships with others based on a mutual respect for property, nations as bearers of right come into existence through their relation to other nations—and this relationship, although it may at times be aggressive, is by nature peaceful.\textsuperscript{13}

It is interesting in this context to look briefly at two pieces by Defoe that address the relationship between trade and national identity. The True Born Englishman turns the tables on William III's opponents by
arguing that indigeneity has not historically been the basis for Englishness; that "blood" cannot be the source of nationalism since it reveals both a heterogeneous as well as a sexually and politically dishonorable history:

Thus from a Mixture of all Kinds began
That het'rogeneous Thing, An Englishman:
In eager Rapes, and furious Lust begot,
Betwixt a Painted Britton and a Scot
Whose gend'ring Offspring quickly learnt to Plough:
And yoke their Heifers to the Roman Plough:
From whence a Mongrel half-bred Race there came
With neither Name nor Nation, Speech nor Fame. 14

If "Englishness" is xenophobically determined by blood then it is located not only in a history of defeat and subjection, but also, more ironically still, in one of miscegenation. If membership in the nation is based on race then the term "English" is a meaningless one. Although Defoe sets out to satirize James' supporters for being most un-English in precisely the terms in which they identify William—as racially impure—he ends up advocating a model of nationhood based rather closely on what is calculated to most embarrass his satirical targets. "England, modern to the last degree / Borrows or makes her own nobility" (404-5). Since claims to legitimacy based on blood, the "fame of families" (1214), are a sham, then "'Tis personal Virtue only makes us great" (1216). National identity and glory are both discovered in the process of self-invention which is associated with England's modernity.

Since it is of the order of the national, this greatness is tied to a sense of England's place in the larger community of nations. In defending William's right to the throne, Defoe suggests in the Preface, he may be wrongly taken for a Dutchman. He is, however, "one that would be glad to see Englishmen behave themselves better to strangers, and to governors also; that one might not be reproached in foreign countries for belonging to a nation that wants manners." Here Defoe is not a patriot of any particular nation but a cosmopolitan critic who corrects the incivility of the jealous or arrogant traveler. The English would do better abroad if they understood and respected the customs of other nations. It is in this "ambassadorial" role that his nationalism is located.

If the role of cosmopolitan critic is actively that of the satirist it is only incidentally that of the merchant. Defoe's glorifying of commerce and polite communication between nations over an arrogance and jealousy that is more strictly understood as patriotism is slightly differently expressed in *The Complete English Tradesman* (1738). Here he begins by describing the necessarily self-interested character of
commercial men. A tradesman cannot be a public figure; he who engages in party debate, joins clubs, and studies politics will end up a bankrupt; a “good patriot” is a “bad shopkeeper.” Yet although the tradesman must confine himself to his own sphere, he should be “capable of making a general judgment of things” in order to defend himself against projectors (16), and know all the inland trade of England so as to be able to turn his hand to any aspect of manufacture in his country. By pursuing his own interests honestly, thoroughly, and prudently, he contributes more than anyone else to England’s glory—a glory which is derived from its being “the greatest trading country in the world” (174), exporting, importing, and consuming more of the growth and product of its own and others’ land and manufacture than any other nation. Despite its private character, “trade is a public benefit” (304). Defoe’s anti-mercantilist, economically modern approach to trade is the descendant of Grotius’s natural law: foreign trade, he suggests, is a supplement to the invention of property—essential to the prosperity and security of nations: “no land is fully improved ‘till it is made to yield its utmost increase: but if our lands should be made to yield their utmost increase, and your people cannot consume it, or foreign trade take it off your hands . . . the lands must be laid down . . . and left to bear no corn, or feed no cattle, because your produce is too great for your consumption” (301).

Land is put to waste not only in the absence of a domestic market for what it yields, but also when foreign trade languishes. The tradesman, for Defoe, is a prototype of the merchant, since he ought to “understand all the languages of trade within the circumference of his own country . . . [just] as a merchant should understand at least the languages of those countries which he trades to, or corresponds with, and the customs and usages of those countries as to their commerce” (14). Furthermore, “by trade we must be understood to include navigation and foreign discoveries, because they are, generally speaking, all promoted and carried on by trade” (175). The cosmopolitan skills of this tradesman/merchant are more valuable in the end than martial ones, since England’s glory is not to be found in conquest and subjection, but in the achievements in commerce both at home and abroad.

Defoe’s pairing of peace and commerce requires that he describe the condition of war in which commercial relationships are threatened by greed, ambition and violence. War and savagery are figured not only in the cannibal practices of the New World, but also in the self-interest of financial men who feed off the national debt and in the gluttony of those European states who consume all the wealth of their American colonies in bullion rather than opening these colonies up to trade. In his account of the South Sea disaster, the national body
nourished by trade becomes the victim of stockjobbers and “man-eating discounters.”\textsuperscript{16} The Complete English Tradesman argues that countries which gobble up their colonial territories, absorbing the native peoples into the body of the parent nation, put their own resources under strain. By planting and settling colonies in “the uninhabited islands, and in the uncultivated continent of America” (180, my emphasis), England, on the other hand, ensures a market for the superfluities of British manufacture at the same time as it brings home a revenue in plantation goods like sugar, cotton, and tobacco. What is striking about Defoe’s description of this economy is the way that both “original” occupation and plantation labor seem to remain so innocent of the acts of colonial violence which frame them. They are able to appear so as long as Defoe opposes peace and industry to treachery and war:

\begin{quote}
We have not increased our power, or the number of our subjects, by subduing the nations which possess those countries, and incorporating them into our own; but have entirely planted our colonies, and peopled the countries with our own subjects, natives of this island; and excepting the Negroes, which we transport from Africa to America, as slaves to work in the sugar and tobacco plantations, all our colonies, as well in the islands as on the continent of America, are entirely peopled from Great Britain and Ireland, and chiefly the former; the natives having either removed farther up into the country, or, by their own folly and treachery raising war against us, been destroyed and cut off. (180)
\end{quote}

Unbloated by the incorporation of subdued foreign peoples, a lean Britain prides itself on the populating and cultivating of hitherto unproductive lands. Its treatment of the Indians whom it has either dispossessed or destroyed does not offend natural law since no unjust act of war has been committed—the offense has been that of the “aggressor” natives. The amicable trading partners here are Britain and its colony; slaves and savages diversify the population of the colony but do not in themselves constitute rival nations or, indeed, properly subject peoples.

I will now consider how The Farther Adventures explores this violent scene of contact where the law of nations has little or no jurisdiction. The colony in Crusoe’s story turns out to be a troubled site for the law, since his contact with pre-commercial peoples combined with his willed separation from his home country renders him in many ways as “nationless” as his savage subjects. His story before this has been a Hobbesian one. In the first part of Robinson Crusoe we saw him transformed from settler/planter into absolute sovereign, answerable neither to his subjects, nor to any higher power: even God’s authority here is finally identified with his own.\textsuperscript{17} In The Farther Adventures he discovers that this authority is determined in part by his weak sense of national identity—a discovery confirmed later in the novel when he is identi-
fied by Dutch merchants as an international outlaw. As he re-enters the commercial world and discovers his hitherto buried attachment to his home, he begins to think of “savages” less as his natural subjects than as isolated peoples whose failure to develop commercial relationships with others deprives them of the protection of natural law and cosmopolitan right.

At the beginning of *The Life and Adventures* we learn that Crusoe’s father was a foreigner from Bremen who settled at Hull where he made a good fortune “by Merchandise” (3). He then retired to York where he married into a good family (the Robinsons), so bringing foreign blood and the profits of trade (what both the *True Born Englishman* and *Complete English Tradesman* have argued constitute the substance and strength of the nation) to the landed classes. Crusoe’s own career is rather the reverse of this. He sets out from England each time, not as a merchant, but as an adventurer, and hence his return home (between parts I and II of *Robinson Crusoe*) is not the happy reward of a life of industry, but rather a “part” settlement (*Life*, 305), which is inevitably disturbed by a restless desire to travel abroad again. At the beginning of *The Farther Adventures* Crusoe confesses to a continuing “propensity to rambling” (1), despite his now having “no fortune to make” and “nothing to seek.” His obsessive desire to see his plantation and the colony he had left on the island is only moderated by his wife, whose distressed recognition of the way that this “impulse of Providence” (4) works upon him brings to his mind the absurdity of wanting to exchange, in his declining years, an easy and happy life for one of hardship and suffering. On his wife’s death, however, this comfortable life of retirement becomes suddenly so desolate that he feels “as much a stranger in the world . . . as I was in the Brasils” (8). Reversing the pattern of his father’s life and career, Crusoe leaves a comfortable retirement to go back to sea, though once again not as a merchant but as a solitary adventurer.

Once he returns to the island we are reminded of how, in the first part of his story, the trials and successes of his solitary life were complicated by his encounter with the cannibals and consequently by questions of law and government. Cannibalism, for the older Crusoe as well as for the younger, signifies the absence of law. While he has been gone hostilities have repeatedly broken out in the colony, both between the Spaniards and the English mutineers whom he settled there, and between all these and the neighboring savages who have reportedly visited the island on cannibal raids. Although they repelled these attacks and managed to take number of slaves, the Spaniards have not been able to educate these peoples out of their anthropophagic habi-
its, and while faithful as slaves, none are quite as dependable as Friday who, Crusoe recalls with a ghoulish reference to cannibalism, “was as true to me as the very flesh upon my bones” (69). These slaves cannot be trusted with knowing anything of the plantations, since they threaten to escape and bring their fellow invaders back to the island. This constant state of uncertainty is exacerbated by the lack of firm government on the island. Despite their having survived so many attacks, the Spaniards lack Crusoe’s economic and political initiative: where he enclosed land, built up a store of goods, and established sovereignty over all the other inhabitants of the island, they have remained hungry, dejected, and fearful for their lives. All that is to be found on this island, they complain, are “a few roots and herbs . . . which ha[ve] no substance in them, and which the inhabitants g[i]ve them sparingly enough, and who could treat them no better, unless they would turn cannibals and each mens flesh which was the great dainty of their country” (128). They are so dependent on the native peoples for their survival that they are not only unable to assert authority over them, but also haunted by the threat that they too might turn cannibal, going native in a manner that would finally and fully separate them from their civilized pasts.

This state of lawlessness is reversed with Crusoe’s return. Several striking descriptions of encounters with cannibals in _The Farther Adventures_ demonstrate how easily he once again assumes absolute authority, both as governor of the island and as narrator. He reports the first of these encounters second-hand. The three renegade Englishmen whose crimes included destroying the Spanish plantations, attacking one of the Indian slaves, and intending to murder all the Spaniards in their sleep, he tells us, were permitted by the Spaniards to leave the island with several firearms and travel to the mainland. On what turned out not to be the mainland at all but an adjacent island, they met with a “courteous and friendly” (83) people who supplied them with whatever they appeared to need, including sixteen of the two hundred prisoners taken in war who were being fattened for a coming feast. The third-hand narrator of this story (having been told it by the Spanish Governor who heard it from the Englishmen themselves), Crusoe remarks that “as brutish and barbarous as these fellows were at home, their stomachs turn’d at this sight . . . [but] to refuse the prisoners would have been the highest affront to the savage gentry” (84). They decided therefore to accept the prisoners and to return to the island before they were expected to kill and devour their “gift.” On the journey home they tried to communicate their good intentions to their captives, but every sign they made was interpreted as an indication that the Englishmen were about to murder them, and every offer
of food as an attempt to fatten them up for the kill. Finally, with the help of Friday’s father, they were brought to understand to their joy that they had fallen into the hands of Christians, who abhorred the eating of human flesh, and that they were to be made into servants, and, in the case of the women prisoners, wives to the English settlers. These proved to be “willing, quiet, passive, and subjected creatures, rather like slaves than wives” (90).

This incident is interesting both because the fear of cannibalism is expressed on both sides, and because its resolution takes the form of embracing of the new slaves into the “family” (126) of colonists which Crusoe has rejoined as head. Although the encounters with both the people of the cannibal island and their prisoners are only minimally comprehensible to the Englishmen, who interpret the meaning and feelings of the Indians through their gestures and expressions, their Christian disgust at the practices of this culture enables Crusoe to identify their civilized distance from the savages, and to represent them as fully aware of the nature of the miscomprehensions of the latter, even as the savages read every movement of the foreigners as if they were no different from themselves. This is in striking contrast to a later episode where Crusoe reveals his ignorance about Indian cultures, and informs Will Atkins, who from his wife knows better, that they have no incest taboo. Since the scene with the cannibals is presented retrospectively, however, the epistemological confusion which attended these earlier encounters with savages is repaired by informed cultural distance, and the Englishmen are brought back into the Christian family fold, which they had willfully left earlier by acting like savages and ruining the plantations of their more industrious countrymen (two mutineers who had fled Crusoe’s departing ship at the last minute and joined those whom he had already settled on the island). Crusoe’s description of the colony—Spaniards, English, and Indian slaves—is of the single family under his authority which the Spaniards in his absence were unable to establish. That is to say, the colonists are properly able to overcome their differences only when Crusoe returns as sovereign and finds of the subjects that meet him that “it was impossible to guess what nation they were of” (43). They greet him, he says, “one by one, not as if they had been sailors and ordinary fellows, and I the like, but really as if they had been ambassadors of noblemen, and I a monarch or a great conqueror; their behaviour was to the last degree obliging and courteous, and yet mix’d with a manly, majestick gravity” (43).

Although the colonists surrender their national differences, and together with their slaves once more become civilized subjects of Crusoe’s patriarchal rule, the figure of cannibalism is not quite erased on the side of the Europeans. On his journey to the island Crusoe res-
cues the company and passengers of a ship of Bristol that has lost its masts in a hurricane. Having used up all their provisions (and the passengers having none of their own to begin with) these have either starved, or nearly starved to death. The passengers join his ship, and later tell him in detail of the experience of extreme hunger which, Crusoe reflects, “knows no friend, no Justice, no Right, and therefore is remorseless, and capable of no compassion” (236). This observation is borne out when later in the novel he learns/reports the full story of the maid who faced starvation with her mistress. Where the latter had given her last piece of bread to her son, the maid is so “ravenous and furious with hunger” (201) that she imagines that had she had a child its life might not have been safe with her: “had my mistress been dead, as much as I lov’d her, I am certain, I should have eaten a piece of her flesh, with as much relish, and as unconcern’d, as ever I did the flesh of any creature appointed for food; and once or twice I was going to bite my own arm” (201-2). Crusoe rescues these people from their desperate isolation just as he did Friday and the Spaniard from the cannibals, and the captain from the mutineers. Had not his ship so providentially found them, he reflects, “a few days more would have ended all their lives, unless they had prevented it by eating one another” (204). This might simply be another parable about isolation and the state of war, except that it is told so differently from other accounts of European savagery in this novel. Here Crusoe presents the maid’s story not in his words, as he did with the Englishmen’s cannibal encounter, but in hers: “This was her own relation,” he comments, “and is such a distinct account of starving to death, as I confess I never met with, and was exceedingly entertaining to me; I am the rather apt to believe it to be a true account because the youth gave me an account of a good part of it” (203). His civilizing reordering and interpreting of events is replaced here by enthralled observation and an effort to verify the truth of such an extraordinary tale. Crusoe has no need to establish narrative authority here; he can simply record the story as it is told to him because in this case the cannibal figure presents no threat to his sovereignty. Although the maid’s story seems to nullify the civilized distance which Crusoe has been so careful to establish between the criminal English and the cannibals, in fact it points out how assertively and selectively Crusoe’s narrative makes civilized subjects of the occupants of the island, who need to be drawn into his “family” in order for the colony to survive. Both his interpretive and his sovereign authority at this point remain intact, compromised neither by a Providential narrative, as they were in his earlier adventures on the island, nor by any secular expression of natural law.
The Farther Adventures does not encounter narrative skepticism, then, in the distance between journal and Providential script as occurs in the first part of The Life and Adventures, nor even in the oddly contradictory way in which Crusoe is correcting of some “savage” forms of behavior, and detachedly “entertained” by others. For this reason, in the preface Defoe can dismiss “all the endeavours of envious people to reproach [the work] with being a romance, to search it for errors in geography, inconsistency in the relation, and contradictions in the fact” (A3). It is only after he leaves the island that his reflections on the nature of his experiences begins to diverge from his journalistic descriptions of them.

In The Life and Adventures, Crusoe’s refusal to accept the middle station of life, his willing himself into misfortune, is proven to be part of a larger providential plan when he returns at the end of the novel to England and family life with a sizable estate from the sale of his plantation. In The Farther Adventures he leaves the island not to return to his native land, but to wander on through the east, having rather improperly re-established, he now seems to reflect, his absolute/paternal authority where he should, like a good merchant, have taken out a patent in the name of England and shipped goods back from the colony. Reversing the pattern of the first adventures, Crusoe’s reflections become increasingly less authoritative, and his identity less secure. When, after assuming an authority on the ship that he does not have and exciting the hostility of both crew and captain, he is put ashore on the coast of Arabia, he reflects that he is “alone in the remotest part of the world . . . near three thousand leagues by sea farther off from England than I was at my island” (246). He must consider how to travel overland back to Britain, since, having no connection with the East India Company—either the captains of the ships or the company’s factors—he cannot get passage aboard an English ship. This sudden yearning for home almost turns him from explorer into merchant. An English merchant with whom he takes lodging suggests that they take a trading voyage to China together, and while Crusoe admits that trade is not his element, he confesses that after some debate with his companion he begins “to be a convert to the principles of merchandizing,” and to “conquer [his] backwardness” (252). Merchandizing, “a covetous desire of getting” in the world, rather than a “restless desire of seeing” it (250), a set of private ambitions which through the directions of nature contributes to the larger wealth of the nation, is not only a modern achievement which makes Crusoean sovereignty look economically outdated. It is also in keeping with the laws of Providence, which humble Crusoe’s narrative before the greater plan of God: “Let no wise
Isolation and homesickness are not to be so easily remedied, however. Crusoe and the merchant, having decided to take home a loading of cloves from the Manilas, have not long been at sea when they learn that the ship they have purchased from a Dutch captain was a pirate vessel, and that they are now thought to be international outlaws, the enemies both of Dutch and of English ships. Should they be caught, they will have no opportunity to give an account of themselves, but shall be “hang’d first and judged afterward” (263), for “merchants ships shew but little law to pirates, if they get them into their power” (257). Crusoe, who has been absolute ruler and judge of his subjects, and whose narrative authority has made clear the difference between warring savage and civilized subject, suddenly finds himself represented as the former without any right of self-defense. Much as his authority might have had the weight of Providence behind it on the island, once he leaves he discovers that it has no currency in an international arena, and that if he is no merchant, and if he is “nationless” in the sense that I have described above, then he will probably be taken for a pirate and a barbarian. He reflects, as he once did, shipwrecked and alone on the island, that “nothing makes mankind so compleatly miserable, as that of being in constant fear” (282), and then that he would rather be captured by cannibals than by his accusers, who will glut their rage upon him with “inhuman tortures and barbarities” (286). Now that he is thrust into a violent state of nature it becomes unclear who is the savage. The epistemological certainty of his account of the cannibal prisoners’ mistaken fear of the English has no place here. In the state of war each party mirrors the cruelty and barbarism of the other.

Perhaps the most striking change of heart in Crusoe’s narrative occurs towards the end of the novel when he is traveling back to Europe overland through Asia. Although this is primarily a journey home rather than a trading venture, Crusoe ends up traveling in the company of a great many merchants of several nations including Muscovites, Poles, and Scots, and himself in fact procures in Peking a cargo of silks, tea, calicoes, and “three camels loads of nutmegs and cloves” (308). His conversion to mercantilism is accompanied by a developing horror of what he calls “wilderness.” Apparently forgetting already how recently he himself was marked as a nationless outlaw, Crusoe identifies entirely with his merchant fellow travelers in his fear of this lawless wild over which no nation clearly has dominion. The Scots merchant warns him of the Tartars that they have no knowledge of letters or of any other language; that they live in a “wretched ignorance” (332). They are subjected to the Czar of Muscovy’s dominions—lacking both
sovereign identity and knowledge of other languages and customs, they are necessarily violent and brutish.

When Crusoe was abandoned by his nephew’s ship on the coast of Arabia his desire to return to England was combined with a righteous sense of how barbarically the crew had treated the native peoples whom they encountered at Madagascar. In revenge for the murder of one of their number who raped a native woman, the men of the ship set fire to the village and murdered as many of its inhabitants as they could find. Crusoe described this as a “rage altogether barbarous” and a “fury, something beyond what was human” (234). The Crusoe who acted in this episode, as he did on the island, as master, judge, civilizer, and protective father, has been replaced in the later half of the novel by a merchant figure whose attitude toward the Tartars is determined by his contempt for subjugated peoples who live in an isolated state of nature and who are incapable of communication or commerce with other nations. Horrified by idol worship and determined to “vindicate the honor of God” (*Farther Adventures*, 332), he proposes stealing an idol and leaving those who worship it an explanation of his reasons for doing so. Having reminded him that they cannot read or understand his language, the Scots merchant then tells him the story of a Russian who tried to interrupt them in their worship and was sacrificed to their idol for his pains. To this Crusoe responds with extraordinary violence: “Well, says I, I’ll tell you a story: so I related the story of our men at Madagascar, and how they burnt and sack’d the village there, and kill’d man, woman and child, for their murdering one of our men, just as it is related before; and when I had done, I added, that I thought we ought to do so to this village” (333).

Crusoe conspicuously offers no reflection on this change of attitude. Neither the final interpretive authority that he demonstrates on the island, nor the self-doubting narrative anxiety that he experiences on leaving it, are available to mediate this contradiction. His violent plan is simply presented as the logical one in a land where the people are isolated, ignorant and pagan, in a “wild uncultivated country” (347) where, we have already learnt, there are no safe routes for traders to follow. Tyrannical surveillance and barbarism are finally left behind when on the eastern border they are met by a merchant Hamburgher, and, since “the city of Hamburgh might happen to be as good a market for our goods as London” (372), they happily take freight with him.

Crusoe’s final reflection in *The Farther Adventures* is on his at last having learnt “the value of retirement and the blessing of ending our days in peace” (373). The peace of having finally abandoned the life of a wanderer, and returned home to a sober later life like that of his father, is, I have tried to argue here, tied also to a concept of peace in
the sense of the operation of cosmopolitan right. The law of nations into which Crusoe is educated in the course of the novel belongs to an enlightenment historicization of culture according to which those peoples capable of commercial intercourse are legitimate members of the community of nations, while those who are not are criminals against nature who cannot be bearers of right. To subjugate such peoples and to set oneself up as their absolute ruler and master is to become de-nationalized and dangerously removed from commercial culture. To make war on isolated savages and pagans in the name of cosmopolitan right and the freedom of trade, however, is to be at once profitable, lawful, and in the most strictly modern sense, English.

NOTES

I would like to thank Gil Harris and Martin Wechselblatt for their commentaries on an earlier draft of this essay.


2. Hereafter referred to as *The Life and Adventures*.

3. The very concept of "international law" is an anachronism here, since the term was coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1789, and the institutionalization of international relations dates only from the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century relationships between states are analyzed according to the prescriptions of natural, not positive law. Even Grotius’s tentative argument that a positive law of nations might be “proved by the perpetual practice of people” is interpreted in the eighteenth century as a challenge to the legislative authority of God. See J. J. Burlamaqui, *The Principles of Natural Law*, trans. Thomas Nugent (London, 1748), 197-98.

4. On mercantilism and the emergence of a global economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750* (New York, 1980). Critics of Wallerstein’s base-determined version of historical capitalism are too numerous to list here. However, a succinct rehearsal of the major debates around the relationship between culture and capital in world systems theory can be found in Antony King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World System* (Binghamton, 1991).


nationalism has attached itself to traditional cultural forms. His analysis invites a more flexible understanding of nationalism—one which can productively accommodate, say, indigenous and diasporic communities—but at the same time retains the emphasis on modernity so that nationalist violence can be understood in the contexts of the breakup of empires and the flow of capital rather than as something "tribal": "the dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life" (4).

13. Neither Grotius nor Pufendorf see war as opposed to nature per se. A just war, for both, is one in which a nation retaliates against another for depriving it of its right.