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FAULKNER'S RETURN TO THE FREUDIAN FATHER: SANCTUARY RECONSIDERED

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"Who is your father?" "I know not / surely. Who has known his own engendering?"

—Homer, *The Odyssey*

"the co-ordinates [of the Freudian myth of Oedipus] amount to the question . . . 'What is a Father?'

'It's the dead Father,' Freud replies, 'but no one listens.'"

—Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*

Faulkner's disclaimer that he was "not familiar with" Freud (*Faulkner in the University* 268) often has been regarded skeptically by scholars. John T. Irwin, for example, identifies Freudian allusions in *Mosquitoes* (1927) and wryly observes that "if the author of the novel was not familiar with Freud, his characters certainly were" (*Doubling* 5). Possibly Faulkner meant that he had not formally studied Freud since he readily admitted that he had been exposed to Freudian ideas: "Everybody talked about Freud when I lived in New Orleans, but I never read him" (*Lion* 251). Alternatively, we could interpret Faulkner's statement as a Bloomian denial of influence. Irwin theorizes that Faulkner may have actively resisted acknowledging Freud's work "to avoid the threat to his own creative energy and enterprise that might be posed by a sense of his own work having

been anticipated by Freud's" (*Doubling* 5). Of course, Faulkner himself subscribed to the view that all such speculation is irrelevant since the artist can intuit the psychic paradigms that the scientist analyzes: "a writer don't have to know Freud to have written things which anyone who does know Freud can divine and reduce into symbols. And so when the critic finds those symbols, they are of course there. But they were there as inevitably as the critic should stumble on his own knowledge of Freud to discern symbol" (*Faulkner in the University* 147). Faulkner's understanding of the creative process mirrors Freud's, who frequently stated that poets often "discover" what philosophers and scientists theorize about many years later. However we choose to read Faulkner's acquaintance with Freud—whether as a direct influence or as an independent, parallel investigation of similar psychic processes—as countless critics have demonstrated, the texts of his novels reveal a persistent, even obsessive, engagement with Freudian motifs. In particular, in *Sanctuary* he compulsively revisits and refashions a centerpiece of Freudian thought, an image out of the unconscious mind that Freud called the primal scene.

Freud came across the primal scene when he was seeking to discover a real, early event that was the origin of his patient's neurosis (Laplanche and Pontalis 331); however, at the origin, he found, not an actual event, but an imagined one. Beginning with a terrifying early childhood dream of white wolves sitting in a tree, then following one memory trace after another, Freud, together with his twenty-four-year-old patient, whom he termed the "Wolf Man" after the dream, pieced together a reconstruction of the child's own conception, a scene of parental intercourse allegedly witnessed by the child, which, in the later stages of analysis, Freud recognized to be a fantasy image.¹ Undaunted by the unreality of the primal scene, Freud insisted that his patient's fantasy is "absolutely equivalent to a recollection" because "the memories are replaced (as in the present case) by dreams the analysis of which invariably leads back to the same scene and which reproduce every portion of its content in an inexhaustible variety of new shapes" (17: 51). Citing Freud's alignment of fantasy and recollection, Ned Lukacher argues that the primal scene is a substitute formation for an unrememberable origin, which "comes to signify an ontologically undecidable intertextual event that is situated in the differential space between historical memory and imaginative construction, between archival verification and interpretive free play" (24); consequently, Lukacher claims, Freud's origin theory is comparable both to Derrida's deconstructive strategy and to Lacan's notion of the absent center.

Working from the premise that the primal scene is, in Lukacher's words, "a narrative reconstruction" (37), my project is to read this

narrative in conjunction with Faulkner's *Sanctuary* and with two other accounts of an original psychic trauma: Freud's essay "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924) and Lacan's theory of the rise of subjectivity in loss. I do *not* mean to use Freudian principles to analyze Faulkner's novel; rather I intend to read the narratives of Freud, Lacan, and Faulkner as analogous texts and to propose that Faulkner's representation of the origin story revises the phallogocentric biases of Freudian and Lacanian theory.

What does the primal scene signify? This fantasy image of the original constitutive event can be variously interpreted. As construed by Freud, it seems to become a dramatization of his theory of male identity-formation in castration anxiety. Following Freud, my outline of his theory traces male, not female, development, since, for reasons Freud finds "incomprehensible," his "insights into these developmental processes in girls is unsatisfactory, incomplete, and vague" (19: 178).² In "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex," Freud proposes that the key event in the development of male identity occurs when "the boy's Oedipus complex is destroyed by the fear of castration" (19: 179). The threat of castration is made real for the boy by the sight of female genitalia, which, Freud asserts disturbingly, occasions a "recognition that women were castrated" (19: 176). Out of a fear of suffering the mother's fate, the boy represses Oedipal desire and performs a symbolic self-castration; he "preserve[s] the genital organ," Freud writes, by "paralyz[ing] it—remov[ing] its function," and, "if [the repression] is ideally carried out," it accomplishes "an abolition of the Oedipal complex" (19: 177). Juliet Mitchell explains the importance of this development: "Together with . . . the Oedipal complex . . . the castration complex governs the position of each person in the triangle of father, mother and child; in the way it does this, it embodies the law that founds the human order itself" (14).³

For Freud, the primal scene seems to be the symbolic analogue for the developmental processes described in "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex"; that is, it poses the castration threat that drives the boy to turn away from the mother and to subordinate himself to the father. Ignoring narrative leads provided by the Wolf Man that suggest a fear of maternal incorporation—for example, the tale of "Little Red Riding-Hood," in which a wolf disguised as a *grandmother* threatens to eat a child, and the tale of "The Wolf and the Seven Little Goats," in which six goats are eaten by the wolf and later removed from his stomach—Freud focuses on a threat of castration from the father. For example, he deduces that the parental intercourse must have been performed *a tergo* (from behind), "the man upright, and the woman bent down *like an animal*" (17: 39; emphasis added). He insists on these postures because only these posi-

tions would afford the child the opportunity "to see his mother's genitals as well as his father's organ" and to make the same observation that precipitates the dissolution of the Oedipal complex, that is, to "discover the vagina and the *biological significance* of masculine and feminine." For Freud, this biological significance is evident: "He understood now that active was the same as masculine while passive was the same as feminine" (17: 47; emphasis added). Arguably, at this juncture, Freud is imposing on biology—the difference between male and female genitalia—cultural assumptions of male ascendancy.

To this interpretation of the witnessed scene of parental intercourse, Freud's patient, who would later assert that he could never recall having witnessed his parents engaged in intercourse (Obholzer 35), adds an observation that also fosters the notion of the father's total mastery of a "castrated" mother:

When the patient entered more deeply into the situation of the primal scene, he brought to light the following pieces of self-observation. He assumed to begin with, he said, that the event of which he was a witness was an act of violence, but the expression of enjoyment which he saw on his mother's face did not fit in with this; he was obliged to recognize that the experience was one of gratification. What was essentially new for him in his observation of his parents' intercourse was the conviction of the reality of castration—a possibility with which his thoughts had already been occupied previously. . . . For he now saw with his own eyes the wound of which his Nanya had spoken, and understood that its presence was a necessary condition of intercourse with his father. (17: 45–46)

In the patient's reading, the father is so powerful that, contrary to all reason, he is able to satisfy his desire and the mother's desire even as he castrates her. This self-observation appears to be a child's wish-fulfillment fantasy projected on the father: the child desires both to master the mother and also to gratify her sexually. This construction of the scene of witnessed parental intercourse as an image of paternal domination and maternal victimization has become the standard interpretation of the primal scene; and, because this reading is so widely accepted, feminist readers, like Maria Ramas, have denounced the primal scene as our culture's "dominant patriarchal sexual fantasy." In the primal scene, Ramas writes, "ultimately and always, a woman is being degraded" (157).

In *Sanctuary*, the primal scene is repeatedly depicted, and these successive depictions point to the fraudulence of the Freudian father. While Faulkner's initial representations of the scene seem to con-

form to the Freudian model, these versions are revised by later ones, which counter Freud's alignment of power with masculinity and inscribe an image of an unstable paternal prohibition threatened by a desire for maternal incorporation.⁴ I identify as a primal scene a witnessed sexual act, wherein the couple engaged in intercourse or its equivalent assume the roles of parents, and the observer, who is barred from participation in the scene enacted before him/her, represents the alienated, subordinated child. My reading reflects the Lacanian tenet that the mother, father, and child in the Oedipal triangle are roles or positions, which are variously occupied.

Temple Drake is placed at the center of an Oedipal drama when an inebriated Gowan Stevens wrecks their car and she is stranded at Frenchman's Bend, where lawless bootleggers grotesquely configure a family (Matthews 156). Temple is the Oedipal prize, whose sexual conquest denotes ascension to the father's position. Gowan, Temple's date, finds himself not "big enough" to occupy that position (66): when Van gropes Temple, a scuffle ensues, and Gowan is knocked unconscious and laid on a bed beside Temple. These events contextualize the first reprise of the primal scene. Hidden in the darkness, Ruby and Tommy observe as Popeye enters the room where Temple and Gowan lie and, as Temple later tells Horace, "fiddl[es] around" inside her knickers with his "nasty little cold hand" (218). Faulkner's narration focuses, not on the sexual act, which is withheld from the reader, but the observation of the act by the feeble-minded, "child"-like Tommy (42): "Tommy's pale eyes began to glow faintly, like those of a cat. The woman could see them in the darkness when he crept into the room after Popeye, and while Popeye stood over the bed where Temple lay. They glowed suddenly out of the darkness at her . . . with a quality furious and questioning and sad" (77). In this first reenactment, Temple is the daughter-substitute for the desired mother, and Popeye assumes the role of father, whom Tommy, along with Ruby, watches helplessly. This reprise appears to conform to the Freudian model: both Temple, who lies like a passive victim beneath Popeye's probing hand, and Ruby, who appears to be unable to prevent the violation of her daughter-double, seem to personify the notion of female castration. This scene serves as a prelude to Popeye's rape of Temple, which is also configured as a primal scene, with Popeye again positioned as father, Temple as the mother-figure, and Tommy as the murdered child-witness. Once again, the observation of the unrepresented sexual scene is critical, as Popeye kills Tommy, posted as Temple's look-out, for watching:

"Didn't I tell you about following me?"

"I wasn't following you," Tommy said. "I was watching him," jerking his head toward the house.

"Watch him, then" Popeye said. Tommy turned his head and looked toward the house and Popeye drew his hand from his coat pocket. (102)

Because the nature of the rape and Popeye's nature are withheld from us, at this point in the text, Popeye's violent sexual assault on Temple and his murder of Tommy seem to confer on him the dread aspect of the father in Freud and the Wolf Man's primal scene. Temple's wounded vagina, conspicuously marked by her flowing blood, figures the castration that the child-witness imagines he/she witnesses; and this sexual assault appears to induce castration anxiety in a distant witness to the scene, Lee Goodwin, who hears the shot that killed Tommy. Before the rape of Temple and the murder of Tommy, Goodwin, as the leader of the men and the father of Ruby's child, seemed to assume the father-position in the Oedipal triangle. But now he refuses to allow Horace to divulge Popeye's presence at the scene of the murder: "'let me just open my head about that fellow,' he says to Horace, 'and there's no chance to it. I know what I'll get'" (132). Like the Wolf Man, who imputes to the father unchallengeable power, Goodwin assumes that he has "no chance" against Popeye.

Subsequent inscriptions of the primal scene dismantle Freud's image of the invincible father-figure. Like the child outside his or her parents' locked bedroom door, like Clarence Snopes, who, on his knees, peeks through the keyhole of Temple's locked door at the brothel, we want to see and know the scene of desire enacted behind the barred door. Late in the novel, the scene we voyeuristically have anticipated is reported by Miss Reba: "Yes, sir, Minnie said the two of them would be nekkid as two snakes, and Popeye hanging over the foot of the bed without even his hat took off, making a kind of whinnying sound" (258). This configuration of the primal scene, which is withheld until nearly the novel's end, reveals that the positions of father and son are not fixed or natural as Freud implies. Here Red, who "look[s] like a college boy" (235), assumes the father's role. Popeye, fully dressed even to his hat, is marked as a spectator, not a participant, in the sexual drama enacted before him, and his "whinnying sound" suggests an infantile cry of frustrated desire. Miss Reba's image of Popeye "hanging over the foot of the bed" also identifies him as the child-observer by invoking a correspondence to another child-witness of another primal scene in the novel. Ruby expects to pay Horace for his lawyering by copulating with him, but her baby would have to accompany them, a witness to their sexual act. Appalled, Horace imagines the scene: "You mean with him at the foot of the bed, maybe? perhaps you holding him by the leg all the time so he wouldn't fall off?" (276). The verbal echoes pair Popeye with

Ruby's sick baby, and this coupling is further reinforced by another correspondence that is withheld until the novel's conclusion: Popeye, we learn in the novel's coda, is the product of a syphilitic union as presumably is Ruby's chronically ill child. This doubling invokes the scene of his engendering, when his father infected him and his mother with syphilis. In the context of the primal scene, syphilis functions as a trope of the father's fraudulence.

Sanctuary's successive representations of the primal scene anticipate a Lacanian perspective of the founding event and expose the myth of the omnipotent father, which Freud's reading codified. Freud interprets the primal scene literally and reads castration as an act and the father as a person. In Lacan's revision of Freud, castration is a function, and the father is a position or role, which can be variously occupied. According to Lacan, his substitution of the status of paternity for the biological father is a crucial distinction since to make of the father a referent, as Freud does, is to fall into an ideological trap: "the prejudice which falsifies the conception of the Oedipal complex from the start, by making it define as natural, rather than normative the predominance of the paternal figure" (*Feminine Sexuality* 69). The father in the primal scene stands for what Lacan calls the phallus, a difficult concept because the term suggests meanings that Lacan does not mean. While the male sexual organ is one of many figures for the phallus, the phallus is not the penis. Rather the phallus "is a signifier" that "forbids the child the satisfaction of his or her own desire, which is the desire to be the exclusive desire of the mother" ("Les formations" 14). The phallus is a way of naming the function of the father in the primal scene, the breaking of the imaginary mother-child dyadic relation. As James M. Mellard explains, for Lacan, "castration is the symbolic function within the Oedipal complex that establishes the position of father" (29). Various enacted, the father is the site of prohibition: he forbids access to the mother's body, and, because the father stands between us and our desire, the father or phallus seems to signify the fulfillment of all desire; but, according to Lacan, the actor in the primal scene who plays the father does not possess the satisfaction he forbids, and this is a crucial (and often overlooked) difference between Freud's father as referent and Lacan's father as symbolic role. In Lacan's narrative of identity, the fulfillment that we seek and that Freud imputes to the father in the primal scene is lacking as a condition of our induction into culture or what Lacan calls the symbolic order. While the function of alienation is real, the "father" in the primal scene, like a stop sign, represents the law, but is not the law. On this issue of figurization, Lacan, frequently obscure, is unambiguous: "when the legislator (he who claims to lay down the Law) presents himself to fill the gap, he

does so as an imposter. But there is nothing false about the Law itself" (*Écrits: A Selection* 311).

Lacan's notion of the phallus as a signifier that only masks lack seems to be personified in *Sanctuary's* Popeye. Initially, Popeye assumes the role of phallic father in the primal scene; subsequently, he is exposed as "an imposter." Disease-ridden, child-like, and impotent ("he will never be man, properly speaking," a doctor says of him [308]), he exemplifies the Lacanian notion that all subjects experience lack as the condition of subjectivity and that any subject can enact the role of "father," but they do so only as a signifier; that is, like the phallic symbols he relies on—the gun, the corn-cob, and even, eventually, Red—Popeye is only another in a long line of symbols that merely represent an always absent final authority.

Even as *Sanctuary* demythologizes the father as phallus, it also revises the role of the forbidden, "castrated" mother. *Sanctuary* reflects a poststructuralist understanding of the troubling notion of "female castration," which anchors Freud's reading of the primal scene. For Freud, a woman's lack of a penis is tantamount to castration, and the recognition that "women were castrated" drives the child to separate from the mother and to accept subordination. For Lacan, on the other hand, men and women alike experience privation (symbolic castration) as the price of human subjectivity, and the possession of a penis is not enabling: "what in reality [the male] may *have* that corresponds to the phallus . . . is worth no more than what he does not" (*Écrits: A Selection* 289). At the same time, however, Lacan observes that *within culture* gender roles are assigned on the basis of the presence or absence of a penis, and culture identifies the penis with phallic authority, a bias that Freud's reading of the primal scene reflects; that is to say, women are not castrated, but they are inscribed within culture as castrated to invent a phallic distinction. Woman, Jacqueline Rose writes, "is defined purely against the man (she is the negative of that definition—'man is not woman')" (49). Ultimately, according to Lacan, the logic of this binary supports the notion that on woman's denigration rests male ascendancy: "For the [male] soul to come into being, she, the woman, is differentiated from it . . . called woman and defamed" (*Écrits* 156). In a move that seems to intuit poststructuralist thought, *Sanctuary's* representation of gender identity also suggests that woman is not biologically inferior but rather that she is culturally subordinated. Popeye's horrific rape of Temple, for example, literalizes this cultural derogation: the violent rending of Temple's vagina enacts a desire to castrate her. Powerfully figured by rape, the novel's dominant trope, the impulse to designate gender difference and female subordination by "castrating" women is compulsively reenacted in Faulkner's novel. Popeye,

for example, in the aftermath of the rape, puts into words the objective of the sexual violation: "Aint you ashamed of yourself?" (139). Similarly, when Ruby defies her father and tries to run away with her lover, her father attempts to objectify the notion of female castration by killing the lover and then saying to her: "Get down there and sup your dirt, you whore" (58). And again when Ruby acts to prevent Lee from violating Temple, he signifies female subordination by slapping her until she falls to her knees and then saying: "That's what I do to them" (95). All such gestures perform a cultural inscription of the same meaning that Freud finds encoded in the primal scene: they inscribe women as the castrated coordinate in a male/female dialectic.⁵

The notion of female castration, which Freud embraced so readily, is, according to Lacan, an image out of the unconscious mind for the breaking of the mother-child dyad that introduces gender differentiation. The image of the castrated mother presupposes an earlier, phallic mother, whom the child imagines possesses all, including the child and the phallus, within herself. As Jane Gallop explains, the mythic phallic mother is a psychic representation for the inmixed existence prior to the mother's displacement, which Lacan calls the imaginary: "The imaginary might be characterized as the realm of non-assumption of the mother's castration. In the imaginary, the 'mother' is assumed to be still phallic, omnipotent and omniscient, she is unique" (147). Freud's primal scene configures the suppression of an early psychic identification with the mother in terms of the "castration" of the phallic mother;⁶ *Sanctuary's* final inscriptions of the primal scene, on the other hand, subliminally suggest that a desire for the mother of the imaginary stage is not so easily banished as the Freudian paradigm suggests.⁷

Both the original and revised texts of *Sanctuary* leak forbidden Oedipal desire.⁸ As John T. Matthews observes, both texts chart "Horace's regressive career" (257), an undoing of primary repression that is initiated by leaving his wife, Belle—who, in Lacanian terms, represents the *petit objet a*, that is, a substitute for the banished maternal body—and returning "home" to his elder sister, another substitute. The desire for a lost, prohibited mother-child relation is perhaps most strikingly evoked in a series of dreams that Faulkner deleted from the revised text. In one of these dreams Horace awakes "calling his mother's name" and feeling "that he had irrevocably lost something" (60). Faulkner removes this trace of a desire to return to an early, identificatory stage; however, disguised and displaced, this desire plays out in the revised novel as, in anticipation of Derridean theory, the text exposes the instability of the boundary-making process that generates identity. Derrida states that the prohibition on

which the cultural order rests is "a pure, fictive and unstable, ungraspable limit. One crosses it in attaining it . . . before the prohibition, it is not incest; forbidden, it cannot become incest except through the recognition of the prohibition" (267). The father's prohibition imaged in the primal scene marks a border, but, as Derrida directs us to see, borders are inherently porous; while they designate discrete identities, they are also the site where oppositions run together, where identity dissolves. *Sanctuary's* final inscriptions of the primal scene evoke it as the site where a desire for maternal incorporation meets paternal prohibition and where the father's prohibition is unveiled as mere cultural artifice charged with governing an inchoate material existence identified with the primal, or phallic, mother.

Disguised images of forbidden desire attend the representation of the novel's long deferred, central primal scene, the rape of Temple Drake, which the reader finally observes in the form of Horace's fantasy image of the event. Late in the novel, Horace visits Temple in Miss Reba's brothel, and she rehearses the story of her rape in a series of substitute formations (Petty 80). In effect, Horace witnesses the sexual scene, and, after leaving Temple, Horace imaginatively recasts the rape in a series of scrambled images that encode a desire for incorporation. This desire is initially signified as Horace studies a photograph of Little Belle, his stepdaughter, another displaced mother-figure, which, in a transgressive gesture, he has taken out of its frame. At this moment, the long-withheld scene of Temple's rape is represented in a series of fusal images.⁹ As Horace gazes at Little Belle's picture, he is overcome by nausea, and, as he vomits, he merges with Popeye as he sexually assaults Temple: "he gave over and plunged forward and struck the lavatory and leaned upon his braced arms while the shucks set up a terrific uproar beneath her thighs." Leaning on his braced arms, Horace assumes the position of a man engaged in intercourse: his spewing vomit simulates an ejaculation. Concomitantly, Horace identifies with Temple. As he fantasizes the rape, the pronoun "he" gives way to "she," and the "she" who "watched something black and furious go roaring out of her pale body" (223) refers not only to Temple, who sees the bloody cob withdrawn from her vagina, but also to Horace, who watches vomit gush from his mouth. These identifications invoke another, with Horace's dead mother, who, in a dream sequence deleted from the revised text, opens her mouth to reveal "a thick, black liquid welled in a bursting bubble that splayed out upon her fading chin" (60). More identifications follow as Temple's rape coalesces with Lee Goodwin's lynching. As Horace fantasizes the rape, the female victim is "bound naked on her back on a flat car," like Goodwin bound to

planks and boards in the center of the blaze; and Horace's image of "living fire" is identical with the "blazing mass" of fire that contains Goodwin's living flesh. Temple's rape merges as well with Popeye's hanging, as the female figure of Horace's fantasy "swing[s] faintly and lazily in nothingness." This breakdown of symbolization in an identificatory moment moves to an inexorable denouement, a scarcely disguised image for a return to the origin. Horace envisions a flat car speeding "through a black tunnel." The car's trajectory seems to trace the upward slanting path of the vagina through the birth canal to the womb/uterus: "The car shot bodily from the tunnel in a long upward slant, the darkness overhead now shredded with parallel attenuations of living fire, toward a crescendo like a held breath, an interval in which she would swing faintly and lazily in nothingness, filled with pale, myriad points of light" (223). The primal scene images the moment of prohibition, when identity, particularly gender identity, arises out of repression of a regressive instinct; and, for Freud, the paternal interdiction accomplishes not only a repression but "a destruction and an abolition of the complex" (19: 177). The latent content of *Sanctuary's* inscription suggests that the very image of phallic authority, the primal scene, is disrupted and challenged by the prohibited desire, which is both a desire for incest and a desire to return to an origin identified with the matrix or mother.

The instability of the father's prohibition is the disguised subtext of another configuration of the primal psychodrama, Lee Goodwin's lynching. While a lynching is not a scene of observed parental intercourse, in the manner of the unconscious, it imaginatively recasts these events. A lynching is an observed scene of always symbolic and often literal castration, performed before spectators, to enforce prohibition. In the post Civil War South, black men were lynched in appalling numbers either for allegedly raping or for being suspected of desiring a white woman. In these lynchings, the white lynch mob assumes the role of father or law, who forbids merging; the black community, who watch, terrified, in hiding, represent the observing child-witnesses; and the lynched black man performs the mother's role—like the female other, he is the racial other whose alienation and presumed castration function as the fictive grounds on which racial difference depends. In a racially segregated culture like Faulkner's South, race inflects the primal scene. For example, in the American South, with its history of racial slavery, the prohibition against miscegenation replaces the prohibition against incest; and a difference in skin pigmentation provides a token by which the members of the white mob distance themselves from the role of child-spectator; that is, their whiteness betokens an identification with the white lynchers, not with the lynched black man.¹⁰

Of course, Lee Goodwin is not black; however, in a novel replete with psychic displacements, the bootleggers and prostitutes in *Sanctuary* function as substitutes for a nearly invisible black community, who cannot play a pivotal role, because white identity hinges on black marginalization. Quite possibly without conscious awareness, Faulkner racializes the men and women of Frenchman's Bend. Popeye, for example, is himself a black figure. In his tight, black suits, he is repeatedly described as "black" (42, 49, 109; *Sanctuary: The Original Text* 9). Miss Reba's white brothel is shadowed by the black brothel that Clarence Snopes favors for its reasonable rates. And, in a scene that Faulkner positioned as the first chapter of the original text, Lee Goodwin, in his jail cell, nightly listens to the doomed black man in the next cell, his black double, who sings of a certain death that betokens Lee's own. Narcissa even anticipates a joint hanging: "Maybe they'll wait and hang them both together. . . . They do that sometimes, dont they?" (134). Most pointedly, the pressure to alienate this not-so-white underclass—Ruby cannot stay in Horace's house nor in the town hotel, and Narcissa is outraged that Horace would "mix [him]self up" with such people (117)—subliminally figures the racial segregation that historically characterizes Faulkner's South.

Given its structure as a primal scene, this racialized lynching—and by extension, all racial lynchings—are performed to impart a material form to the Freudian construction of the scene, that is, the indomitability of the phallic (white) father. Just as the presumed castration of the mother-figure in the primal scene appears to support the Freudian equation that "active was the same as masculine while passive was the same as feminine" (17: 47) so the castration, or its equivalent, of a black man is enacted to symbolize the supremacy of the white patriarch. *Sanctuary's* representation of this primal scene, however, leaks a forbidden meaning. Beneath the surface level, images of black-white merging suggest that the prohibition against miscegenation merely betokens white difference and supremacy and that this symbolization ineffectively opposes an assimilatory instinct.

The lynching is evoked like a dream, the place where repressed meanings and desires return disguised. Horace is trying to sleep and may be asleep when, as in a dream, "from nowhere," figures "emerge in midstride out of nothingness" (295). Defined by the flames they set, the lynchers appear to be shadows: "Against the flames black figures showed, antic" (296). Like Popeye, the white "black man" in the novel, these white "black figures" are imagos, symbolizations of the dark, repressed self as well as disguised signifiers for a breakdown of black-white difference. The fire, which is compared to "a voice in a dream," figures a forbidden desire for incorporation. Its engulfing flames consume all distinctions: what was once Goodwin is

now "indistinguishable, the flames whirling in long and thunderous plumes from a white-hot mass" (296). In this conflagration, the difference between white lynchers, themselves "black figures," and the racialized lynched man dissolves. Even as a man with a coal oil can sets fire to Goodwin, he himself is consumed in the fire: through "a fleeting gap" in the throng, Horace sees "a man turn and run, a mass of flames, still carrying a five-gallon coal oil can which exploded with a rocket-like glare while he carried it, running" (296). As well, in a scene of dissolving identity, the crime and its punishment elide, as the lynchers imply when they threaten Horace: "Do to the lawyer what we did to him. What he did to her. Only we never used a cob. We made him wish we had used a cob" (296). Goodwin, castrated or sodomized with a weapon, becomes a double for Temple, raped with a corncob, as the castration of the racialized Goodwin, performed to prohibit racial merging, becomes the site of an annihilation of all distinctions. Castration, the defining element of the primal scene, is performed to symbolize the "phallic," that is, omnipotent, father, who enforces culture's definitions; but *Sanctuary's* versions of the primal scene subliminally reveal that the violence performed to signify paternal interdiction is enacted by players who are themselves bodies in an ever-dissolving material world that eradicates the artificially constructed designations—like white-black difference—enjoined in the name of the mythic phallic father.

While a disguised subtext in *Sanctuary* undermines the notion of a phallic authority that secures the social order, Faulkner himself also spoke out publicly on behalf of that authority. On February 15, 1931, approximately a week after the publication date of *Sanctuary*, a letter written by Faulkner appeared in the Memphis *Commercial Appeal*; he writes in reply to W. H. James, a black man, whose letter, published a week earlier, had commended the ladies of Mississippi for uniting to prevent lynchings. Faulkner protests, "I hold no brief for lynching" (qtd. in McMillen and Polk 6); at the same time, however, he speaks approvingly of an instinct or drive for power:

the natural human desire which is in any man, black or white, to take advantage of what circumstance, not himself, has done for him. The strong (mentally or physically) black man takes advantage of the weak one; he is not only not censured, he is protected by law, since (and the white man the same) the law has found out that the many elemental material factors which compose a commonwealth are of value only when they are in the charge of some one, regardless of color and size and religion, who can protect them. (4)

While Faulkner's meaning is veiled by evasive language and convoluted constructions, he seems to be saying that the cultural order relies on a ritual of dominance, which puts "the elemental material factors which compose a commonwealth" in the hands of someone who can "protect" them and imbue them with "value." This "some one" seems to allude to a phallic father, a supreme and final authority, who guarantees the cultural (patriarchal) order. In effect, the letter expresses Faulkner's deep psychic investment in the dream of phallic power: it even can be read as itself an attempt to wield that power since, with words as his weapon, Faulkner is virtually unchallengeable—like the mythic phallic father—and the letter effectively defeats and silences his black correspondent. Troubling as this letter is on so many levels, it is not incompatible with *Sanctuary*. The letter rationalizes the same rites of dominance that are ceaselessly reenacted in the novel: as Pettey observes, "the novel works through series after series of symbolic castrations" (76). The defining and saving difference between public statement and fiction is the novel's textual unconscious; that is, fiction, like dreams, is the site of a ceaseless interplay of meanings, the place where refused, unacceptable meanings return disguised. Faulkner himself seems to acknowledge this difference between an author's text and a citizen's public statement by signing his letter "William Faulkner," the old family name, which he had not used for more than a decade. While Faulkner's novel, like his letter, stages gestures to claim the role of primal father, keeper of the law that orders material existence, the novel, unlike the letter, lets slip a forbidden meaning, the terrible transformative powers, identified with matter and the mother, that culture seeks to control with a symbol—the phallus.

We look to the father in the primal scene as the author of being, the original, stabilizing point of reference. In *Sanctuary's* central primal scene, the rape of Temple Drake, Faulkner positions Popeye as father, and, initially, Popeye fools us as he temporarily fooled Temple. With this move, by positioning as "phallic" representative a man who, as we eventually learn, relies on phallic substitutes—the corn cob, Red—to mask impotence, the text suggests that the father in the primal scene only symbolizes difference and that this act of symbolization is not the origin we seek, but another in a series of substitutions that point to an always absent referent. As the reader gradually discerns, Popeye's phallic pose disguises Oedipal desire. The novel's opening scene, which depicts a man (later identified as Horace) drinking from a spring, who sees Popeye in "the broken and myriad reflection of his own drinking" (4), alerts us to Popeye's role as Horace's double.¹¹ Wearing tight black suits that prompt Temple to call him "that black man" (42), Popeye is an expression, disguised

so as to elude censorship, of Horace's buried Oedipal desire, prohibited in the moment of identity-formation, which, variously transformed, has surfaced throughout the novel. Even as Popeye poses as the phallic father, his brutalization of Temple, a daughter-figure, who calls him "Daddy" (236), figures a scarcely veiled violation of the incest taboo. Information revealed only in the coda—each year he makes a trip "home" to his mother—marks him again as the son who has not renounced his identification with the mother. And when finally Popeye is exposed as a disguised exponent of regressive desire, that desire must be driven underground again, and the novel moves inexorably toward Popeye's expulsion, which arrives appropriately in the form of the primal scene.

Popeye's execution, like Goodwin's lynching, is yet another variation on a witnessed scene of symbolic castration performed to enforce prohibition. In this version, the sheriff who hangs Popeye assumes the role of father; the witnesses to the hanging are the child-spectators; and Popeye, as a racialized figure, represents the disallowed other, whose alienation signifies a token for the assertion of difference. Once again Faulkner's primal scene is marked by an outbreak of an unconscious drive toward fusion that the image of the primal scene purports to prohibit. As he is hanged, Popeye, bound and helpless, merges with Goodwin bound to a post in the middle of a roaring blaze and with Horace's nightmare image of a female victim bound on her back to a flat car. As Popeye falls through the trap to his death, his punishment seems to fuse with his crime, and death, sex, and birth appear to coalesce. At one level, the fall through the trap door is a repetition of the rape of Temple Drake: to gain access to Temple in the corn crib, Popeye lowered himself through a trap door. But the fall through the trap is identified with Temple's rape in another sense as well: it symbolically performs sexual intercourse, another entry through a narrow passageway. Popeye's fall through the trap also images birth, the infant's descent through the birth canal. And, as Popeye falls and hangs from a noose around his neck, he fuses with the victim of Horace's rape-fantasy, who "would swing faintly and lazily in nothingness filled with pale myriad points of light" (223). The conflation of this legal execution (for a crime Popeye did not commit) with Goodwin's lynching and with Temple's rape points to, as Matthews observes, "the institutionalized savagery of the law" (264). All three events reprise the primal scene; that is, they perform a figurative castration in an attempt to literalize phallic authority and guarantee the law; but—and herein lies the conundrum—castration, performed to symbolize the law, is an expression of the brutal instincts prohibited by the law, and these instincts open onto a breakdown of the social order, a return to a primal inmixed existence, identified with the phallic mother.

The primal scene is an origin story; and, for both Freud and Lacan, it is a male story: the father authorizes identity and social meanings. For Freud, for whom "Anatomy is destiny" (19: 178), the father's phallic authority derives from biological difference: a man is empowered simply by being the bearer of a penis. For Lacan, who rewrites Freud in terms of contemporary language theory, the father's authorizing power is not natural but cultural: culture assigns power to the penis. Despite this important qualification, Lacanian theory and applications are obsessively concerned with the figure of the father as the bedrock of the social order. Even while Lacan acknowledges that the phallus is a symbol, still, given its role "in the structuring and securing (never secure) of human subjectivity," it is the "transcendental signifier" (Rose 86), that is, "the symbol of the authority Lacan assigns to the concept of Law" (Mellard 31). By this kind of verbal equivocation, Lacanian theory seems to extend even as it rescinds the promise of a legitimization of identity and social meanings in the shadowy figure of the Symbolic or dead father.¹²

The primal scene poses an answer to the critical question—what makes a father? In Freud's reading, the father's role is defined by castration: the father appears to be castrating the mother and holds the son thrall by the threat of castration. This interpretation seems to inscribe primitive belief: by removing the sign of power, one is empowered. For Lacan, these functions always operate at the level of signification; nevertheless, an equivalent model of father/phallus obtains; that is, selfhood originates with repression, the psychic equivalent of castration, and the father or phallus represents the law that ordains castration. Castration, the cutting off of a part, makes possible difference and signification, since, as Saussure points out, one term is what it is by excluding another. Paradoxically, then, the father's constitutory power is contingent upon castration.

The problematics of this psychological definition of fatherhood are ceaselessly interrogated in Faulkner's novels. For example, in *Absalom, Absalom!* Thomas Sutpen compulsively reenacts this model of fatherhood: often by proxy, he symbolically castrates son-figures in accordance with an exclusionary model of identity-formation. As Carolyn Porter writes in her astute Lacanian analysis of fatherhood in the novel, the "son, of course, must die, must be sacrificed, so that the father's mastery is sealed once and for all, but at least this will have made a difference" (189). Porter's Lacanian application accepts as axiomatic that the death of the son (the symbolic analogue for castration) is regrettable, but essential: it invents the phallic distinction, the basis for difference and meaning. Faulkner's *Sanctuary*, however, subliminally suggests that the son's death/castration only figures a difference and does not seal "once and for all" the father's

mastery. The novel's reenactments of the primal scene, the image of primary repression, which register disguised formations of forbidden desire, point to another axiom of psychoanalytic thought, namely, that it is the nature of repression always to evoke the repressed material. In his essay, "Repression" (1915), Freud asserts that "repression itself . . . produces substitute formations and symptoms . . . indications of a return of the repressed" (14: 154); and Lacan, echoing Freud, writes: "repressed, it reappears" (*Écrits: A Selection* 297). In his landmark study, *Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge*, Irwin sees repression as an analogue for castration and death because repression "shatters once and for all the sense of bodily integrity, and as such is a partial foreshadowing of the ultimate dissolution of bodily and psychic integrity that is death" (89). Paradoxically, then, repression marks the boundaries of the self by a severance that invokes a sense of unboundedness.

Read for its latent content, *Sanctuary* discloses that a meaning-making system based in alienation, symbolized by the phallic, castrating father, is its own undoing. In later novels, particularly in the novels published in 1942 and after, Faulkner may be trying to revise the Freudian/Lacanian narrative of identity-formation in exclusion. In *Go Down, Moses*, for example, Ike McCaslin rejects the image of a castrating father, modeled by his grandfather, Old Carothers, who impregnated his own enslaved, unacknowledged daughter, and then made a slave of their son. Ike's subsequent dilemma, however, seems to confirm the Freudian paradigm; having refused a repressive model of fatherhood, Ike finds that he is "father to no one" (3) and that in "saving and freeing his son, lost him" (335). Faulkner revisits the Freudian definition of fatherhood in *A Fable* (1954), a *fabula* that he described as "the tragedy of a father who has to decide whether his son shall live or die" (*Faulkner at Nagano* 159). This novel, which he labored over for a decade and regarded as his "magnum o" (Cowley 91), has been largely ignored by readers and discounted by critics, apparently with justification, because its highly experimental form drains the text of any narrative power or excitement; however, the novel's stylized techniques may aim to oppose or attenuate language's exclusionary tactics. For example, the novel's tedious detailing of seemingly countless items in a series or ranks or levels in a hierarchy, as well as its sweeping focus, which favors archetypes and the human aggregate over the individual, may work to level distinctions defined by exclusion. These later novels also subversively recast black men, like Sam Fathers and Lucas Beauchamp, in the role of father. These men, who are both former slaves and father-figures, combine within themselves the polarities of the master-slave dialectic. Lucas Beauchamp, in

particular, seems to represent a new model of paternity, patterned after "Uncle" Ned Barnett, an elderly black man, widely respected for his dignity, who was both servant and father-figure to Faulkner.¹³ In *Intruder in the Dust* (1948), Lucas refuses to "be a nigger" (22); in Freudian terms, he is proof against the castration threat that defines the son's position in the father/son, white man/"nigger" coordinates, and, for threatening a (white) phallic distinction (and not, as the text discloses, for an alleged murder, which he did not commit), he is to be lynched. Like the lynching, the rape, and the execution in *Sanctuary*, this lynching would reenact a scene of castration to mark a difference, but in *Intruder* the lynching is prevented by a marginalized, alternative community, composed of a white boy, a black boy, and an elderly, white woman.

While Faulkner's later novels sometimes appear to be searching for an alternative to an authority generated by repression, these departures from a phallic script seem to be tempered by reassuring reaffirmations of the logic of difference. In *Intruder in the Dust*, for example, Gavin Stevens is Lucas's foil. On the one hand, Lucas seems to personify a new order of fatherhood, which is not contingent upon the castration threat; on the other, "Lawyer" Stevens is the garrulous spokesperson for a cultural order that locates (white) identity by (black) repression. The last third of the novel is dominated by Stevens, who argues the "Go slow" delay tactics of southern racism. Specifically, he contends that white Southerners must be allowed "the privilege of setting [Lucas] free ourselves. . . . But it wont be next Tuesday" (151–52). While Stevens never overtly advocates racism, his argument to delay integration in the name of southern "homogeneity," a code word for white difference, thinly veils a dread of egalitarianism as a loss of white identity and dominance.

In a thoughtful discussion of Faulkner's representation of racial difference, Wesley and Barbara Alverson Morris determine that he "could not think beyond difference as exclusive/inclusive, as the struggle of master and slave, but how many modernists can?" (235). The Morrises may be right, but Faulkner, like everyone who speaks, is trapped in language. We construct meanings in culture with language, a closed, artificial signifying system that works by erasure; that is, we assign one meaning to a word and exclude all others. This linguistic strategy for devising meaning is written as law in our origin narratives, which ordain dislocation, and psycholinguists theorize that language's method of displacement reflects psychic processes; hence, Lacan writes, "The unconscious is structured like language" (*Four* 20). As the Morrises observe, an authoritarian guarantee of difference appears to be elemental; it even may be what makes us human: "Difference is, therefore, grounded in the universal origins of

human society, giving us an order, a law without which we are subject to savage violence" (235). The case for difference based in exclusion is compelling; within the terms of its own logic, it appears to be incontestable, as psycholinguists teach that a difference created by repression—psychological and social—is our only defense against an omnipresence of meanings tantamount to meaninglessness. We embrace difference so as to invent a separate identity, but, as *Sanctuary's* successive expositions of the primal scene reveal, difference is itself a form of "savage violence." While Faulkner may not have found a solution to the dilemma of an identity carved out by repression, because his project is to search out first principles (to ask, "Who made me?") he does relentlessly challenge the logic of difference. If we are ever to find, in the words of the Morrises, "a different kind of difference, a difference that did not mythologize itself in exclusive/inclusive oppositions" (235) or if we are to find an alternative to difference, that is, a system of meanings not based in exclusion but perhaps, as feminist theorists suggest, in identification, we must to look to our writers—female, male, and of every race and ethnic group—who, like Faulkner, are profoundly aware of the difference words make.

Notes

For reading and commenting on an early draft of this essay, I would like to thank Marta Caminero-Santangelo, Deborah Clarke, and David Galef.

1. Freud writes that scenes of observing sexual intercourse between parents at a very early age "[p]ossibly . . . are part of the regular store in the—conscious or unconscious—treasury of memories" (17: 59). According to Laplanche and Pontalis, the primal scene is a regularly recurring, unconscious image that functions like a collective myth: through such imaginary scenarios "neurotics and perhaps all human beings seek an answer to the central enigmas of their existence" (332). For Lacan, as James Mellard lucidly explains, "[o]rigins can never be available to us (even if they exist); what is available, Lacan would say, is a capacity for symbolization expressed in language, that covers over the metaphysical or ontological gap where an origin might have been" (7).
2. Arguably, Freud is unable to explain satisfactorily these processes in girls because of the phallogocentric bias of his theory. He posits "a corresponding development" for females; however, because, in his view, castration anxiety motivates the boy to turn away from the mother and to identify with the father and because "the girl accepts castration as an accomplished fact," he acknowledges that "a powerful motive drops out for the setting up of a super-ego and for the breaking-off of the infantile genital organization" (19: 178).

3. To the castration complex, Freud attributes "the profoundest importance in the formation alike of character and of neurosis" (20: 37). Lacan maintains that Freud "designate[s] the very instigation of the subject by the name of castration" (*Feminine Sexuality* 116). In Lacan's revision of Freudian theory, the analogue for the castration complex is alienation, the rupture or division that gives rise to the fictive subject: "Alienation . . . condemns the subject to appearing only in that division which . . . if it appears on one side as meaning, produced by a signifier, it appears on the other as 'aphanasis' or fading" (*Four* 210).
4. My interpretation owes a debt to important, earlier studies by Polk and Matthews. In his seminal Freudian reading of *Sanctuary*, Polk locates two representations of the primal scene in the novel and observes that "the primal scene is indeed everywhere implied in the overwhelming emphasis throughout the novel on voyeurism" ("Dungeon" 74). Whereas I read these scenes as revising Freud and evoking the merely symbolic nature of the father's authority, Polk applies Freudian formulas to the novel and interprets these scenes as a manifestation of a repressed fear of the mother: *Sanctuary* "is at least in one sense, Horace's nightmare," the return of "*something* connected with sex and aggression and death and disgust and his mother; we may, then, legitimately wonder whether Horace's mother were not in fact much more akin to Caroline Compson than to the frail, helpless wraith of a woman he insists upon remembering" ("Dungeon" 73, 75). Citing Freud, Matthews examines the return in the novel of prohibited Oedipal desire, which, he finds, poses a threat to the social order. Unlike my essay, Matthews's interpretation does not identify the novel's unmasking of phallic authority, but his reading complements my own, particularly in his finding that *Sanctuary* reveals "the radical interpenetration of chaos and order, nature and the law, instinct and custom, innocence and evil" (247).
5. In an early, discerning discussion of the novel, Lawrence S. Kubie observes that rape functions as a substitute for castration, and men who rape or fantasize rape are driven by a sense of their own impotence.
6. Laplanche and Pontalis state that Freud never recognized "the full implications of the primal link to the mother" (285). The pre-Oedipal phase, or Lacan's imaginary stage, is difficult to describe because it is the very disruption of the imaginary that gives rise to language and conceptualization. The key point that emerges from Lacan's discussion of this early register of being is that there is no difference, no self and no other, and the child exists as one continuous totality of being. In the words of Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, the imaginary "is the domain of the imago and relationship interaction" (130–31).
7. This interpretation builds on thoughtful feminist readings of Faulkner by Mortimer, Jones, Gwin, Clarke, Dunleavy, and Eddy. In particular, my approach has been influenced by Jones, who, in an essay that interprets war as a boundary that closes out the feminine, calls for studies that critique the phallogocentric biases of Freudian and Lacanian theory so as to "find a way to the mother and the preoedipal" (51);

by Dunleavy, who demonstrates that the novel locates sexual difference not in biology but in social configurations of power; and by Eddy, who finds that rape functions as a policing of gender that leaks homoerotic desire. Finally, this study builds on my book, *Faulkner: The Return of the Repressed* (1997), a psychoanalytic reading of five of Faulkner's major novels (not including *Sanctuary*). In the course of writing this book, I discovered that just as Lacan rewrites Freudian principles so also writers, like Faulkner, interpret psychic processes in ways different from both Freud and Lacan.

8. In revising *Sanctuary*, Faulkner shifted the focus from Horace Benbow's Oedipal desires for his mother, sister, and stepdaughter to Temple Drake's rape and abduction; in the original text, the Oedipal complex is even directly named (16). See Millgate (121), Polk ("Afterword" 305), Irwin ("Horace Benbow" 546-47), and Clarke (60-62). On the revisions, see Massey (195-208), Meriwether (192-206), Millgate (113-23), Langford (3-33), Polk ("Afterword" 293-306), Bleikasten (*Ink* 213-20), and Cohen (54-66). Polk writes that Faulkner may have rewritten the novel to "get us outside of Horace Benbow's cloyingly introspective, narcissistic personality" ("Afterword" 300); in a subsequent essay, he analyzes the "nightmarish qualities" of the original text in Freudian terms and concludes that Faulkner rewrote the novel to obscure the self-revelation of the early draft ("Space" 18); Bleikasten contends that Faulkner refused to publish the early version for "aesthetic reasons" (*Ink* 216); Cohen agrees, but adds that Faulkner revised the book to make it more commercially saleable as well (56).
9. Some of this identificatory imagery, in particular, Horace's identification with both Temple and Popeye, has been recognized and variously interpreted by critics. For example, Polk reads Horace's dual identification as "fulfilling his own rape fantasy" ("Dungeon" 72-73): Temple is "his female self" ("Dungeon" 73), and Popeye "is much more Horace's double than has generally been allowed" ("Dungeon" 70). For Matthews, this scene is emblematic of the "fragility of the prohibition that protects culture from nature" (257). In an essay that interprets incest in Faulkner's novels in terms of primary narcissism, a self-love that manifests itself as a desire for the mother of the mirror-stage, Irwin argues that Horace's dual identification functions to double Popeye and Temple with Horace and Little Belle: "what the physically impotent Popeye does to Temple with a corncob is an image of what the spiritually impotent Horace would like to do to his stepdaughter" ("Horace Benbow" 558); according to Pettey, the merging of male and female in this scene reflects Horace's ambivalent sexual identity (81); in a Freudian reading that focuses on oral expulsion, Greg Forter argues that the novel stages "a drama of failed differentiation" from "a maternal being-in-the-world" and that "vomit is the ruin of masculinity that collapses the reader it imagines as male into the maternal object-to-be-mastered" (86, 92).
10. In his ground-breaking psychohistorical study of white racism, Kovel states that the lynchings of black men for the alleged rape of a white lady (with "rape" defined to include even imagined gestures or looks

of desire) "often included a castration of the black malefactor; and even when it didn't, the idea of castration was immanent in the entire procedure" (67). Reading these literal or symbolic castrations in terms of Freud's Oedipus complex, Kovel argues persuasively that white racists in the American South projected onto black men the roles of both father and son in the Oedipal triangle so as to satisfy conflicting infantile desires: by lynching the black man, the white racist "is castrating the father, as he once wished to do, and also identifying with the father by castrating the son, as he once feared for himself" (71-72).

11. On this doubling, see Polk ("Space" 23), Matthews (263), Bleikasten (*Ink* 261), Irwin ("Horace Benbow" 558). Adamowski traces Popeye's "pathetic lapse" from a figure "who is transcendent into a dependent creature of weakness" when "others know him" (47).
12. For example, Davis and Bleikasten apply a Lacanian formula to *Absalom, Absalom!* in an attempt to account for Sutpen's failure to represent a legitimate phallic authority, a project that leads them finally to invoke the shadowy figure of the dead father. Bleikasten writes that Sutpen is "dead, but not dead enough" to "act the role of the dead father" ("Fathers" 143), who guarantees the law. This conclusion raises the question: what does a father have to do to be "dead enough" to guarantee the law?
13. Blotner identifies Ned Barnett as a model for Lucas Beauchamp (1246); quite possibly, "Uncle Ned's" death may have moved Faulkner to write *Intruder in the Dust*. He died in December of 1947 and, in January of 1948, Faulkner put aside the manuscript of *A Fable* to write *Intruder*. Blotner's portrait of "Uncle Ned" suggests that he was both father-figure and servant to Faulkner (52, 998, 1006).

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