

sociology of the absurd. Hence I would side with Leach on the notion that there are different kinds of truth, and in a way which I think could eventually escalate into a major point of difference with Jarvie.

Another issue, separable from the first, is whether meanings or symbolisms are to be found beneath the surface of empirical behavior. Jarvie denies it; near the end of Part IV he goes so far as to claim that "the patterns or structures in ritual, doctrine, and myth are neither objectively there nor explanatory." This runs so fundamentally counter to anthropological praxis that it is difficult to find a middle course between a total review of the discipline and the dogmatic retort "Oh yes they are!" Jarvie presents two simple, "transcendental" arguments to support his position, and brief responses to them might be in order. The first argument rests on his contention that numerous incompatible systems of symbolic interpretation have been postulated (by Durkheim, Freud, Jung, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss, Leach, Turner, Douglas, Sperber, and others, to reproduce his list) and no agreement exists on which is the correct one. To Jarvie this points to the conclusion that there simply is no correct interpretation. In the first place, it is not correct to say that the various systems listed are all incompatible. They do not all ask the same questions, some being concerned with the nature of the mind and others with the structure of social and cultural institutions. Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss, and Leach all appear on Jarvie's list of "incompatibilities," but who would claim that Radcliffe-Brown's analytic approach is incompatible with Durkheim's? And in the very Myers Lecture that is the main target of Jarvie's essay, Leach said (1967:44): "the method which I advocate is the one which Lévi-Strauss calls 'structuralist.'" Nor can I accept Jarvie's idea that lack of agreement over which of several alternative systems is best (or even over the standards by which such judgment should be made) proves that none of them is more nearly correct than any other. If that were true, the history of science—any science—would be very different from what it is.

Jarvie's second argument is that determinate hidden meanings do not exist because we cannot say how they got there. But he himself indicates the answer to this when, immediately after stating his argument, he adds: "I am not saying that every social pattern or regularity is (consciously or unconsciously) intended. On the contrary, I follow the tradition from Mandeville and Smith to Hayek and Popper in thinking most of what we call society to be the product of human action, but not of human design." Such social patterns and regularities, I submit, *are* the meanings hidden behind empirical behavior. They are meaningful not in the intentional sense that someone designed them, but in the implicational sense that they presuppose and imply each other in patterned systems that we call social structure or culture. We understand and elucidate those meanings by explicitly formulating and delineating the workings of the systems or structures to which they belong; whether or not the actors are aware of them is immaterial to their objective reality. Elsewhere I have tried to work out these ideas in more detail (Hanson 1975, 1976). Jarvie's own ideal, Karl Popper, has developed a point of view similar to this under the rubrics of the "third world" of "objective mind" (Popper 1968, 1969)—a notion on which Jarvie himself has provided extended commentary (1972: chap. 6). To respond, then, to Jarvie's argument about how the hidden meanings got there, and in language familiar to him, we may say they stem from the unintended consequences of human action.

Finally, a note on scholarly procedure. Toward the end of Part II there appears the following sentence, including a quotation from Leach: "It is 'impossible on common-sense grounds' (p. 45) that what is well-known to most of mankind should not be known to all." Scrutiny of the Henry Myers Lecture reveals that the passage quoted from Leach does not appear on p. 45. Perhaps Jarvie has in mind Leach's statement on p. 41: "I find

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The fact that we may find a belief palpably untrue does not constitute sufficient reason to assume that those who profess it do not take it at face value. On this point I think Jarvie is entirely correct. One of the things he wants to do about palpably untrue beliefs, however, is to determine how they are shielded from disproof and why they persist. This task demands, as he says, "the sociology of dissembling and the absurd." Here I think Jarvie has left out a step. Beliefs which *we* judge to be palpably false may not be so by indigenous metaphysics and standards of meaning, evidence, and truth. Only after those standards have been articulated and a belief has been demonstrated to be untrue by *them* does it become fair game for the

it highly improbable on common-sense grounds that genuine 'ignorance' of the basic facts of physiological paternity should anywhere be a cultural fact." (Jarvie also quotes this passage, accurately this time, in Part IV.) But if that is the passage Jarvie is citing, it is puzzling why his quotation contains "impossible" instead of Leach's own "highly improbable" and why Jarvie's sentence and footnote 16 should imply that Leach was enunciating a general principle when his remarks were clearly directed specifically at ignorance of physiological paternity.