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By

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1762  Elements of Criticism (Kames)

1776  Philosophy of Rhetoric (Campbell)

1783  Dissertations Moral and Critical (Beattie)

1790  Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (Alison)
INTRODUCTION

The following chapters attempt to trace the leading British aesthetic theories beginning with Shaftesbury through the work of Alison. The chief positions considered are those of Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Edmund Burke, Henry Home (Lord Kames), Thomas Reid, and Archibald Alison; with slight attention to some theories of George Campbell, William Hogarth and James Beattie. Some effort is made to follow the marked tendencies of the period toward psychologising beauty and to point out the growth of the rational and imaginative factors in aesthetic perception. A general summary of a number of points is given in the last chapter.
ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY (1671-1713).

Shaftesbury offers in many respects an excellent starting point for a study of British aesthetics in the eighteenth century. In him we find mirrored much of the easy-going, polished thought of the time, with its virtues of versatility and critical insight; its vices of superficialness and unoriginality. Though not to be taken as representative of the most original British philosophy of the early eighteenth century, he rather fairly exemplifies the position of aesthetic speculation—at that time still germinal with the Empiricists and among the Rationalists not free of Platonism. Shaftesbury stands, as it were with a foot in either camp representing in some ways both empiricism and rationalism. His empirical tendencies come out in his application of aesthetic theories to concrete examples, in his desire to make such theories practical rules of art, and in his lack of interest in metaphysics. His rationalistic side is shown in his Platonism, his abstraction and the way beauty is bound and permeated through and through by rationality.

Aesthetics, as Shaftesbury knew it, had no such clearly defined problems and province as it has today. It amounted to little more than gleanings from classic authors and a certain vague drift toward studious moralizing on the works
of art and nature. Doubtless for the beginning of aesthetic theory in Britain, such a critical, cosmopolitan age was the best possible. It was an epoch in which many turned with aversion from the intense application requisite in the sciences and metaphysics, and browsed instead in the easy pastures of art criticism. Shaftesbury was one of these. Of aristocratic birth, cosmopolitan through extensive travel steeped in the classics since his earliest days with a Greek and Latin speaking governess, it is the less to be wondered at that he forsook the thorny path to metaphysics proposed by his teacher, John Locke, and chose instead the more primrose way of polished art criticism and lofty moral soliloquies.

In Platonism, letting its metaphysical side slip into the background, Shaftesbury found the gratification of his classical, aesthetical and ethical tendencies. His aesthetics, like Plato, was so imbued with his ethical thought as to be impossible of clear definition and demarcation. Beauty and the good were for Shaftesbury one and the same. There was no clearly differentiated aesthetic experience as such.

But how are beauty and goodness identical? Shaftesbury would explain by saying that this world of sense is the creation and expression of God's mind which reveals itself to us under the various aspects of goodness, beauty and truth.

1. p. 399, 238 etc. The Moralists. Vol. 2.
"What is it you admire but mind, or the effect of mind? 'Tis mind alone which forms. All which is void of mind is horrid; and matter formless is deformity itself."

"I sing of Nature's order in created beings and celebrate the beauty which resolve in Thee, the source and principle of all beauty and perfection."

In such random passages, without any systematization of his metaphysics, Shaftesbury sets forth a kind of teleological, pantheistic monism. From an identification of Nature, God and mind, he passes quite naturally to an identification of beauty, goodness and truth. The only differentiation of these qualities is one of aspect, just as different colored facets are reflected from the white radiance of a crystal prism.

If we ask whence come these differences of aspect it would seem Shaftesbury must say from matter, the principle antagonistic to mind. For mind in his Platonic sense would seem the principle working to pure, undifferentiated unity, and matter the principle of division, gradation and individuality. In the foregoing quotations he even identified evil with formless matter and beauty with form, the intelligible principle.

2. p. 347. Ibid.
3. "For all beauty is truth" (p. 142 Freedom of Wit and Humor. Vol. 1); and beauty and the good are the same. (p. 299. Moralists, Vol. 2) and things equal to the same thing are equal to each other.
"The beautiful, the fair, the comely were never in the matter, but in the art and in the form or forming power." Beauty then is through and through intelligible; whatever is unintelligible and irrational is matter and deformity.

Elsewhere he takes the Platonic view that evil and ugliness only arise from limitation of outlook (here perhaps a connection with the idea that matter or evil is individuality); and have no real existence. But to say that evil does not really exist of course begs the question.

"All we can see either in Heaven or earth demonstrates order and perfection—all is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, except with relation to man only—Here the calamity and ill arises. The whole order of the universe, elsewhere so firm, intact and immovable, is here overthrown, and lost by this one view; in which we refer all things to ourselves: submitting the interest of the whole to the good and interest of so small a part." The point to be noted with regard to this passage is that true good is here identified with the good of the whole—not with the mere good of mankind, the utilitarian criterion later set up by his disciple, Hutcheson.

2. p. 274. The Moralists. Vol. 2. "This Order (i.e. of the world) is indeed perfect, excludes all real ill. And that it really does so, is what our author so earnestly maintains."
3. p. 291 Ibid.
But most worthy of remark in such a passage is Shaftesbury's complete failure in attacking the problem of evil. He can only echo the classical views, holding at one moment that evil exists only as a point of view in the mind, while again it is only a physical principle extramental.

Other such unbridged chasms appear in his metaphysics, if one presses his statements to their logical implications. An object has positive qualities just so far as it is present to some mind—not necessarily a human mind, but God's mind, says his Neo-Platonism. And as everything about the world is perfect, everything in the world must be perfectly beautiful (since beauty and the good are one) except the unknowable, deformed, pure matter. How then, if all things are perfectly beautiful, can he set up a criterion as to degrees of beauty?

Yet there are these degrees of beauty, three in number, Shaftesbury says. First, "The dead forms—which bear a fashion, and are formed whether by man, or nature; but have no forming power, no action or intelligence." This class would seem to cover all beauty in works of art and inorganic nature. Second, "The forms which form; that is, which have intelligence, action and operation." By this, he means

1. Quotation 1 on preceding page.
2. p. 406 Ibid.
beauty as a spiritual, creative principle in the world. Last, the "Third order of beauty, which forms not only such as we call mere forms but even the forms which form." This third beauty is God himself.

And what is the criterion of these orders of beauty? Shaftesbury would seem to say a faculty or instinct based on the organization of trained perceptions. One of Shaftesbury's chief contributions to aesthetic thought, it would seem, lay in pointing out that the criterion of beauty is no simple, ready formed, innate idea but the complex faculty that flowers only through the training and development of all the other faculties. Although he believes (in opposition to Locke) in certain innate faculties, senses etc., that arise in the mind of themselves and without other stimulus, the aesthetic or moral judgement is not one of these.

"Whatever good faculties, senses, or anticipating sensations or imaginations may be nature's growth, and arise properly, of themselves, without our art, promotion, or assistance, the general idea which is form'd of all this management, and the clear notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person be taken for innate." The sense of beauty requires for its exist-

1. p. 408 ibid.
2. p. 411 ibid.
ence, therefore, the stimulation from external objects through all the trained perceptions and faculties of the mind.

It is the mind and reason alone that has an immediate perception of beauty. Where alone it exists. There is no beauty in the pleasures of the senses unless they be rationalized through and through, and regarded as symbols by which to interpret the teleological ultimate beauty. Shaftesbury speaks of beauty as "belonging not to body, nor having any principle or existence except in mind and reason." It is thus an essentially intellectual and rational principle.

Bosauquet, in his History of Aesthetic, has made the following unjust comment on the rational content of beauty in Shaftesbury:

"So far as we can judge, the content of reason which beauty embodies for sense did not signify for Shaftesbury anything more than the formal principle of antiquity—the principle of unity in multiplicity." Shaftesbury seems to me to overstep this characterization in two points; namely, in the inclusion of teleology and an intellectual element in his content of beauty.

2. p. 426. ibid.
The principle of teleology, as to how far an object serves a natural function and has utility is brought out as a rational element in Shaftesbury's idea of beauty in such a passage as this:

"The same shape and proportions which make beauty, afford advantage, by adapting to activity and use. Even in the imitative or designing arts—the truth or beauty of every figure or statue is measured from the perfection of nature, in her just adapting of every limb and proportion to the activity, strength, dexterity, life and vigor of the particular species or animal design'd."

And again he says:

"Thus beauty and truth are plainly joined with the notion of utility and convenience even in the apprehension of every ingenious artist." From such passages it appears unquestionable that teleology in the sense of natural function and utility, is a rational element of beauty. Moreover, he is constantly referring to teleology in beauty in the sense of universal, final cause.

"For if we may trust to what our reasoning has taught us; whatever in nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint shadow of that first beauty.----how can the rational mind rest here, or be satisfy'd with the absurd enjoy-

ment which reaches the senses alone?" No, it will not rest; but will strive "never to admire the representative beauty, except for the sake of the original; nor aim at other enjoyment than of the rational kind." Hence we may conclude that Shaftesbury regards teleology, both in the sense of natural function and as universal final cause, as a necessary rational element in the content of beauty. Here Bosauquefs criticism is at fault.

Secondly, I think it can be shown that the rational content of beauty embodies for Shaftesbury an intellectual element beyond the mere formal principle of antiquity—unity in multiplicity. The evidence is necessarily inferential, for Shaftesbury is nowhere explicit as to the content of beauty. Perhaps he comes nearest being in The Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules where he most strongly emphasizes the classic principles of art. But even in this essay he seems to admit that additional beauty in the tablature may be attained by increasing the intellectual element. To this end he suggests that Virtue, a female figure, be clothed either with helmet, lance, robe of Pallas, crown without rays or magisterial sword. "But this beauty, says one, would

2. p. 395 ibid.
be discoverable only by the learned"--perhaps so. But then there would be no loss for the others; since no one would find this piece less intelligible on account of this regulation." The beauty of the robe of Pallas or of the magisterial sword is evidently an intellectual beauty here, and no mere principle of unity in multiplicity. Again we see emphasis on the intellectual element of beauty in such a passage as the following:

"For the accomplishment of breeding is to learn whatever is decent in company, or beautiful in arts; and the sum of philosophy is, to learn what is just in society and beautiful in nature, and the order of the world." It would seem as if "the sum of philosophy" and "the accomplishment of breeding" must teach men more than the one principle of unity in multiplicity; and if beauty were only this, Shaftesbury would have said so explicitly. Moreover the critic's art, which Shaftesbury lauds as the one art by which men "Are able to discover the true beauty and worth of every object" and to reveal hidden beauties to the world--certainly this art is not one of unity and multiplicity in the object, but a synthetic evaluation of new discovered elements.

3. p. 165 ibid.
ments in beauty created almost as much by the critic as by
the author himself. Wherefore we conclude that Bosauquet's
criticism is at fault in not recognising the teleological and
intellectual elements in the rational content of beauty for
Shaftesbury.

The appreciation of beauty Shaftesbury points out is
1 distinct from the idea of possession or desire of personal
ends; although utility in its broad sense of function is
2 joined with the idea of beauty always. This distinction
between the perception of utility and personal desire to
the exclusion of the latter from beauty is brought out more
emphatically by his follower, Hutcheson. Rarely Shaftesbury
speaks of an imaginative factor in the perception of beauty;
but it is only mentioned in passing, without explanation---
so it remains quite subsidiary to the rational element, the
true criterion. Besides an element of calmness in the aes-
thetic experience, due to its regulation by universal law
and reason, there is also an element of passion and a de-
mand for high passion in the object. At this point an in-
consistency comes in. God, according to Shaftesbury's Aris-
totlean conception is perfect and passionless, and unmoved

3. p. 197. ibid.
by anything outside himself. And the most perfect art (identical with the most perfect morality, since beauty and the good are the same) would therefore necessarily be passionless. Shaftesbury perceives the inevitableness of this logical conclusion. "The most perfect hero" he admits "would have to be without passion." But just here Shaftesbury's attempt to identify beauty and goodness breaks down. His true aesthetic taste cannot accept the logical consequence and proclaim the passionless hero as the most perfect artistic creation. No, he objects; "a compleat and perfect character is the greatest monster and of all poetick fictions not only the least engaging, but the least moral and improving." But how is it that the perfect and passionless hero is the least moral when he is most Godlike? Here the inconsistency of the identification of goodness and beauty yawns wide. Shaftesbury makes a pretense of bridging it by the explanation that the perfect hero is "far beyond the common stamp or known character of human kind. And thus the compleatly virtuous and perfect character is unpoetical and false." "The most delightful beauty in art is drawn from passion and reality." Could anything be more evident than that the ideals in artistic beauty and moral truth cannot be the same nor can goodness and beauty be one absolutely

4. p. 135 Freedom of Wit and Humor. Vol. 1. Here he seems to let the passions (erstwhile subjugated to reason)
Nor does Shaftesbury see his inconsistency in admitting two kinds of truth "poetical" and "historical", when truth, beauty and goodness he holds are all the same. By "poetical" or "plastick" truth, he means the "artful lying of the able poets" or "the probablility or seeming truth which is the real truth of art." For morals and the imitative arts there is the literal adherence to objective reality and its codes, which is "historical truth." Yet how can truth, beauty and goodness be one, if what is truth in a work of art is not truth in a work of nature? For example the face of a portrait is idealized to bring out the soul within, and this is poetic truth. But historic truth is violated, unless the face is presented with minute literality just as it appears to an analyst -- and even then historical truth can never be completely attained with the materials of art. For in painting "the historical truth must, of necessity, indded, give way to that which we call poetical." In the arts the genius is "unnatural, when he have some part in the aesthetic experience.

follows nature too close, and strictly copies life." For though the artist must keep in conformity with nature within limits he can discard objective truth and like the Creator resolve his own standards in truth of another kind. Illusion Shaftesbury felt was essential to his poetical truth, since art was of its very nature selective, blotting out the small things and training attention upon essentials. But while poetical truths might appear illusory and false from the standpoint of historical truth and vice versa, ultimately both kinds of truth conduce to a knowledge of the perfect truth, which includes both kinds. Now this union of poetical and historical truth in the last analysis is one more effort to bridge the inconsistency inherent in Shaftesbury's theory and indeed, it is a very different thing from holding that artistic and moral beauty are the same to say that they can be ultimately united in a transcendental universal kind of truth.

Still endeavoring to maintain his thesis that artistic and moral beauty are the same, Shaftesbury insists that no artist can portray beauty without having experienced moral feeling himself at some time or other; and he even goes so

3. p. 207 ibid.
far as to insist that the author who creates a work of art must of necessity be at the same time a truly worthy and moral character. These points find illustration in many passages such as the following:

"If he (the artist) was never struck with the beauty, the decorum of this inward kind, he can neither paint advantageously after the life, nor in a feigned subject, where he had full scope."

"'Tis impossible that true genius and ingenuity should reside where harmony and honesty have no being." And in a note, he quotes with approval these words from Strabo:

"'tis impossible he shou'd be a great and worthy poet who is not first a worthy and good man."

But this point of view Shaftesbury cannot stick to, hard as he tries. For example, in a curious passage in Advice to an Author he inadvertently betrays himself by advising the young poet that at any rate: "he must be speciously honest and in all appearance a friend to virtue thro' out his poem." Art, then, is really illusion; and here probably Shaftesbury is thinking that art must appear moral for the good of society and the state.

2. p. 208 ibid.
3. p. 208 Note. ibid.
The Arts (i.e. the arts of persuasion such as oratory, rhetoric and poetry) are regarded as the great welding powers for civilization by Shaftesbury. In reviewing the history of classic times, he says:

"The chief geniuses and sages of the nation betook themselves to the study of those arts by which the people were rendered more treatable in the way of reason—and be more subject to be led by men of science and erudition. By such a view the arts appeared first and the sciences later. Tragedy was brought to perfection before comedy because it was in the sublime manner, imitated nature more closely and hence was easier. Also comedy logically came later because comedy (to quote Strabo) was "introduced upon the neck of the sublime," as a criticism of tragedy. Thus in a democratic state (such as Greece in its classic age), "the healthy body has its own remedies." For criticising society and correcting the arts. On the contrary under a tyrannical government, the freedom of raillery is curbed and the arts grow deformed and decadent for want of criticism.

2. p. 244. ibid.
3. p. 252. ibid.
4. p. 248. ibid.
5. p. 239. ibid.
The critic's function is thus of the highest; his art the moulding of mankind's taste. Shaftesbury has made an important contribution to the thought of his time by so emphasizing the criterionship of the critic and his creative and synthesizing power. He points out that the critical faculty springs from the same source as the creative. Describing the origin of critics, or "sophists" as they were called in Greece, he says:

It would necessarily happen that many genius's of equal size and strength, tho less covetous of public applause, or of power, or of influence over mankind, would content themselves with the contemplation merely of these enchanting arts----being heard with satisfaction in their turn they were tempted to become authors and appear in public. These were honour'd with the name of Sophists---When such a race as this was once risen, 'twas no longer possible to impose on mankind, by what was specious and pretending. The true critic would thus possess the highest virtues of the Platonic-stoic ideals--indifference to fame, genius and the power of contemplation.

One good influence traceable from Shaftesbury's pantheism, in spite of its inconsistences, is that he draws no

1. p. 239-240 Advice to an Author.
sharp line of separation between art and nature. Art he regards as a divine natural principle in the vanguard of nature. (i.e. the sensible world), bringing to the mind new ideas and understanding of God's purpose by means of trained observation of sense perceptions. Nature, in an eighteenth century classical fashion, he regards as higher and more beautiful than art. Nature accordingly keeps a heavy thumb on art and keeps art from creating fantastic hybrids such as tragi-comedy, patchwork miscellanies and the grotesque. Of true art Shaftesbury says: "The natural and simple manner which conceals and covers art, is the most truly artful and of the genteel's, truest, and best study'd taste." In such a definition his classical tendency to keep art close to nature and as objective as possible, is quite evident. Though holding to the classic traditions of art as the highest, he is yet able to read in the signs of the times a growing subjectivity in art and to realize that the old objectivity has become impossible.

3.
4. p. 6. ibid.
5. p. 142. ibid.
Shaftesbury has practically nothing of value to say about the sublime. To him the term has a bad popular flavor, suggesting such elements as the miraculous, the pompous, the horrifying, joined in poetry with a variety of figures and multiplicity of metaphors. His classic view of art find little aesthetic value in it.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON (1694-1746)

Dr. Thomas Fowler in the Encyclopedia Brittanica says of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson:

"There are no two names, perhaps, in the history of any English moral philosophy which stand in a closer connection" And with equal truth he might have said the same thing of their aesthetic theories.

Hutcheson's method, however, is quite different from Shaftesbury's. Trained in hard scholasticism at an academy and by six years of philosophy and theology at the University of Glasgow, he acquired a systematic, scholarly method quite different from the light, cosmopolitan philosophy of Shaftesbury. Moreover Hutcheson was twenty-three years younger and felt the rising tide of Empiricism and the influence of such men as Descartes, Hobbes and Locke. It is curious to note how much greater Locke's influence on Hutcheson was than on his old pupil, Shaftesbury. Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were steeped in the classics and Platonism; both were interested predominantly in moral philosophy and ethics; and the aesthetic theories of both were a product and part of their moral philosophies.

1. Article on Hutcheson, Encyclopedia Brittanica. 11th ed.
As we should expect, Hutcheson undertook to define beauty more narrowly and (as Shaftesbury had foreseen) to make it more subjective. Beauty is no more self-existent, external and independent of mind as with Shaftesbury.

"Let it be observed" says Hutcheson "that in the following papers the word beauty is taken for the idea rais'd in us, and a sense of beauty for our power of receiving this idea." Beauty exists in the mind through the interaction of subject and object. This power of perceiving beauty Hutcheson terms a "sense". His reasons for so doing he states as follows:

3. By "sense" Hutcheson says he means "every determination of our mind to receive ideas independently on our wills and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain". (p 4 Nat. & Conduct of the Passions). Thus besides the five "external senses", Hutcheson enumerates such others as 1) the moral sense (p. 5. Nat. & Conduct of the Passions) p. 21 sec. X, ch. I, Bk. 1, Intro. Moral Philos.); 2) The sense of honor (p. 6. Nat. and Conduct of the Passions); p. 28, sect. 13, ch. I, bk. 1. Moral Phil.); 3) the sense of the ridiculous (p. 30 sec. 14, ch. I, bk. 1, Moral Phil.); 4) the public sense (p. 5, Nat. & Conduct of Passions); 5) consciousness (p. 115, Pars. 2. Cap. I. Synopsis Metaphysical Ontologiam et Pneumatologiam Complectens. "Qüera perciendi vis est sensus quidam interius, aut conscientia; cujus ope nota sunt ea omnia quae in mente geruntur." Hutcheson admits that there may be many more such senses.
"This superior power of perception is justly called a sense because of its affinity to the other senses in this that the pleasure is different from any knowledge of principles, proportions, causes, as the usefulness of the object; we are struck at the first with the beauty; nor does the most accurate knowledge increase this pleasure of beauty however it may superadd a distinct rational pleasure from prospects of advantage, or may bring along that peculiar kind of pleasure which attends the increase of knowledge. Beauty is here made analogous to sensation through being immediate, necessary and non-rational. Beauty differs from sensation in rousing "complex ideas of objects" whereas sensation rouses only simple ideas of pleasure. Further, the sense of beauty incurs no uneasiness of appetite beforehand, nor are we made miserable by its absence, whereas sensations do incur uneasiness of appetite. Moreover all the sensational senses seem to have their distinct physical organs, while beauty is a feeling diffused

2. op. cit.
3. p. 6, Sec. 1. Art. 8. ibid.
Lastly the idea of beauty is stimulated by some primary quality and has relation to figure and time; it probably closely represents the external object. Whereas sensations seem to be roused by secondary qualities and to have little or no correspondence to external objects. On this point, curiously enough Hutcheson is more of a Rationalist than Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury had been an Empiricist in so far that he never doubted that sensations, as far as they went, gave a true resemblance of external objects. Hutcheson, on the contrary, agrees with Locke that sensations very likely have no correspondence to external objects. He says:

"So cold, hot, sweet, bitter, denote the sensations in our minds, to which, perhaps, there is no resemblance in the objects, which excite these ideas in us, however, we generally imagine otherwise." According to Hutcheson

2. The idea of beauty and harmony being excited upon our perception of some primary quality, and having relation to figure and time, may indeed have a nearer resemblance to objects, than these sensations, which seem not so much pictures of objects as modifications of the perceiving mind." p. 14, Sec. 1. Art. 16. ibid.
3. P. 14, Sec. 1, Art. 16. ibid.
form alone (composed of the primary qualities) would correspond to external reality; and only in it would lie the perception of beauty; while to Shaftesbury the secondary qualities heightened, if only as symbols, the beauty of the object.

In his eagerness for close definition Hutcheson has ruled out from the sense of beauty any element of rationality or intellect. And in so doing he falls behind Shaftesbury in analysis of aesthetic feeling; for he fails to see that there is a rational principle involved in the very perception which distinguishes "uniformity amidst variety", the essence of beauty. He endeavors to account for the fact that beauty usually appears rational or in accordance with rationality through a kind of preestablished harmony, by which "as in our external senses so in our internal ones, the pleasant sensations generally arise from those objects which calm reason would have recommended."

1. p. 86. Sec. 6. Art. 10. ibid.
2. p. 36. Sec. 3. Art. 6. ibid.
Hutcheson does not believe in innate ideas, but like Shaftesbury, he is forced to admit some sort of an innate principle of beauty which, as Hutcheson says, "determines us to approve uniformity amidst variety wherever we observe it." This attempt to evade making beauty an innate idea appears to involve Hutcheson in a contradiction. For how can a sense of beauty which knowledge is powerless to develop, appear other than as an innate idea? If he should claim that the sense of beauty was developed by interaction with its object, one could combat him by citing an instance of his own in which there is produced a beautiful imitation of an original in which there is no beauty. Surely this beauty that arises in the imitation must be from the stamp of an innate idea; and Hutcheson seems forced to admit them.

Hutcheson denominates the sense of beauty as a reflex or subsequent sense, "because they (the perceptions of beauty) naturally ensue upon other ideas previously received." While Shaftesbury made beauty subsequent in log-

1. p. 39, Sec. 4. Art. 1. Ibid.  
2. p. 6. bk. 1, Art. 3. Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
ical development, he makes it temporally so. He further names it an "internal sense" and explains his reason for doing so as follows:

"There will appear another reason perhaps hereafter, for calling this power of perceiving the idea of beauty, an internal sense, from this, that in some other affairs, where our external senses are not much concerned we discern a sort of beauty, very like, in many respects to that observed in sensible objects and accompany'd with a like pleasure. Such is that beauty perceived in the theorems, or universal truths, in general causes, and in some extensive principles of action." A page or so back we quoted Hutcheson as saying that the pleasure of beauty is different from any knowledge of principles, proportions or causes in the object. At first sight the two passages look inconsistent. In reality they contain an original thought. Hutcheson has discovered clearly that while causes, principles and teleology remain as general mental abstractions they have beauty; but as soon as they become

2. For example the beauty of mathematical propositions containing a number of corollaries (p 33, sec. 3, Art. 5 ibid) or the beauty in Newton's law of gravitation (p. 34, sec. 3, Art. 5. ibid.)
concrete questions regarding some concrete object, they lessen the aesthetic charm. But if the beauty of general principles and causes can be kept abstract and universal even in contact with a concrete object, then there is a two-fold beauty. Such a beauty of causes and principles would be in the observation of the subordination and adaptation of parts in nature or the beauty of mechanism in an animal.

Beauty in corporeal objects Hutcheson would divide into two kinds: original and comparative, or otherwise termed absolute and relative.

"We therefore by absolute beauty understand only that beauty which we perceive in objects without comparison to anything external, of which the object is supposed an imitation, or picture; such as that beauty perceived from the works of nature, artificial forms, figures. Comparative or relative beauty is that which we perceive in objects commonly considered as imitations or resemblances of something else." Beauty is thus inherent, arising either with or without relations. Original beauty Hutcheson means to raise as a limit to the principle of association.

1. p. 45, Sec. 4, Art. 7. Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
3. p. 15, Sec. 1. Art. 16. ibid.
Comparative beauty is dependent upon imitation and association of ideas. This emphasis upon associational heightening the sense of beauty is a real contribution of Hutcheson's to British aesthetics. But he sets strict limits to it and warns us against "foolish conjunctions of ideas," such as we see among luxurious persons who "have got all the ideas of dignity, grandeur, excellence, and enjoyment of life joined to their table." Here the trouble arises first from associating ideas of personal desire with the non-egotistic senses of beauty and grandeur.

When Hutcheson goes so far as to say the mere association of ideas creates beauty, "that association of ideas makes objects pleasant, and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such pleasures," he is denying his assumption that beauty exists by interaction of subject and object. For the beauty of association appears to arise in the mind without any external stimulus of beauty. Moreover, there is always the inconsistency of his denial of

2. p. 46. ibid.
3. p. 74. Sec. 6, Art. 3. Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.


of rationality in beauty which forced him to refuse to admit it in all beauties of association and imitation. By beauty of imitation Hutcheson seems to mean a beauty arising from a unity or conformity between an original and copy. There is an interesting difference of view between Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as to the real beauty of imitation. Hutcheson holds that the deformities of old age if well represented may have beauty though there was no beauty at all in the original; and that this beauty in the copy rests entirely in the beauty of the imitation as such. On the other hand Shaftesbury would say that the genius is "unnatural when he shows nature too close, and strictly copies life." For the beauty of art lies in poetic truth, which presents truth on a higher level though it conforms with nature. Thus Shaftesbury would see no beauty in literally realistic art, whereas Hutcheson sees a beauty inherent in mere close imitation. On this point Shaftesbury shows a keener aesthetic sense than Hutcheson, who perhaps

2. p. 40. Sec. 4. Art. 2. ibid.
was led astray here by his early Scholastic training. Hutcheson’s emphasis on the association of ideas, however, is of importance in that it brings to the foreground the imaginative element in the aesthetic experience, later a factor of great prominence in aesthetics.

Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, declares that "a composition of this relative beauty, along with some degree of the original kind, may give more pleasure, than a more perfect original beauty separately." And like Shaftesbury, he deduces from this and from Aristotle the conclusion that the perfection of beauty in art lies in the presentation of imperfect, passionate heroes. Both are in consistent in making the beauty of art unlike the supreme original beauty of God.

In Hutcheson we have an early hint of psycho-physical parallelism. He says that: "probably certain motions in the body do accompany every passion by a fixed law of nature." Although he does not go so far as to say corporeal activity accompanies aesthetic feeling, he certainly tends in that direction.

1. p. 43. Sec. 4. Art. 5. Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
2. p. 40. Sec. 4. Art. 2. ibid.
That the sense of beauty is universal Hutcheson seeks to show by pointing out that all children love uniformity in variety, and so much the more as their faculties for observing it develop. It is a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity in variety. This is Hutcheson's analysis into component parts of the elements of beauty in the object. The stimulus of beauty is declared to be a "compound ratio of uniformity and variety"; so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. This principle is later adopted by Alison as an axiom for beauty in design; and it is only as a formal mathematical principle applied to inert matter that it can claim to be an adequate cause of beauty. Design, as purely formal, may attain its beauty through unity in variety in compound ratio, but certainly this principle will never account for the vital beauty in a work of art or nature. It may explain largely our aesthetic pleasure in geometrical propositions or the theoretical beauty a philosopher finds in...

2. p. 81, Sec. 6, Art. 10. ibid.
3. p. 17. Sec. 2. Art. 3. ibid.
arguing as to the design of the universe; but it will never account for the aesthetic beauty we experience in life and action or the aesthetic side of religious feeling. Hutcheson offers no proof for his assertion that it is uniformity in variety in the object gives us the perception of beauty, other than the assertion that "In every part of the world which we call beautiful, there is a surprising uniformity amidst an almost infinite variety." And there seems to be no necessary connection between the idea of beauty and uniformity amidst variety except as God framed us so that we might be led to the knowledge of a designing cause. Hutcheson argues that from our general idea of beauty we must be led to infer some first cause. Now if this first cause were a blind force it would seem that it must have produced an infinite number of irregularities; for "the irregular forms into which any system may be rang'd surpass in multitude the regular, as infinity does unity." And the more complex the system, the greater the chances against uniformity. Therefore since we have perceptions of uniformity, we may infer design in the cause. And

2. p. 47. Sec. 5. Art. 1. ibid.
3. p. 59. ibid.
4. p. 49. ibid.
universally the perception of beauty and harmony raises in mankind an opinion of mind; design and wisdom and leads them to the apprehension of a Deity. "No determination of our mind is more natural than this, no effect more universal." Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, holds that the beautiful excites veneration and leads to a knowledge of God. But while Shaftesbury's pantheism looks at God and the beautiful as in some sense one, Hutcheson regards beauty as existent only in human minds and placed there by God to lead to natural theology through a kind of pre-established harmony.

Besides the sense of beauty, Hutcheson gives man another faculty for perceiving the beautiful in the moral sense. He says: "What is approved by this sense we count right and beautiful, and call it virtue; what is condemned we count base and deformed and vicious." (But how and why evil and ugliness arise Hutcheson makes not attempt to say.)

4. Of absolute, universal evil he says "perhaps there is no real instance in the whole administration of nature." p. 36, Nat. & Conduct of Passions. Relative evil seems a privation of good, but as to how it arises, he has no notion.
It appears that the moral sense and the sense of beauty have a common ground in that both perceive unity in variety. Yet here they are by no means identical as in Shaftesbury. The moral sense perceives one kind of unity in variety, the sense of beauty another. The complete view of beauty is obtained by the two together. Usually they are in harmony, but sometimes they conflict, as in the following example:

"'Tis true, what chiefly pleases in the countenance are the indications of moral dispositions; and yet were we by the longest acquaintance fully convinced of the best moral dispositions in any person, with that countenance we now think deformed, this would never hinder our immediate dislike of the form, or our liking other forms more. In this passage we have the conjunction of moral beauty and aesthetic ugliness. Hutcheson points out that they arise from two distinct senses whose ideas can never become fused or one modify the other. Here, it appears to me, he has failed to use his principle of association at a point of vantage. Certainly the association of the idea of moral worth with an ugly face sooner or later will modify and soften our perception of its ugliness.

The moral sense like the sense of beauty is a universal innate principle and an immediate criterion. The involuntary immediacy with which we recognize moral goodness would seem to some to rob it partly of moral worth and hinder freedom. Hutcheson, moreover, goes so far as to hold that all passions arise from the moral sense. The proofs for such a position are: 1) "every passion --- in its moderate degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and morally good ". 2) The appeal of all the arts is to the moral sense. Many persons would refuse to admit this second point, and many more would refuse to consider the contention proved that all passions arise from the moral sense. In fact it seems a point arising out of Hutcheson's general philosophical position and hard to defend outside of it.

2. p. 266. Sec. 6. Art. 6. ibid.
5. p. 86. ibid.
6. This point he seeks to illustrate by such statements as the following. (a) "Upon this moral sense is founded all the power of the orator". p. 263. Sec. 6. Art. 6. Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil. (b) "Dramatic and epic poetry are entirely addressed to this sense." p. 266, Sec. 6. Art. 7. ibid. (c) Imagery in poetry is founded in the moral sense, p. 268. Sec. 6. Art. 7. ibid. (d) History and painting rouse the passions by the same method. p. 270 Sec. 6. ibid.
The criterion for moral beauty of action is sometimes, to Hutcheson, how far an action conduces to public good; and for this purpose he has invented a mathematical system "of computing the morality of actions. He has been called the first of utilitarians for saying: "That which produces more good than evil in the whole, is acknowledged good; and what does not, is counted evil." Dr. Fowler in the Encyclopedia Brittanica moreover criticises him for a double criterion of morality.

"It is curious that Hutcheson did not realize the inconsistency of this external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. Intuition has no possible connexion with an empirical calculus of results, and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his fundamental assumption." For this so-called inconsistency, it appears to me Hutcheson could perhaps defend himself on the ground of pre-established harmony between the intuition and the empirical calculus of morals, or holding that this latter was merely the gratification of the sense of beauty, expressing the intuition in the form of a mathematical design.

1. Sec. 3. Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
2. p. 171. Sec. 3. Art. 3. ibid.
The good of the whole as a criterion is even carried into Hutcheson's theory of art. He objects to having representations of tragedies in which the evil triumph and the virtuous are most miserable. "They can only lead the spectators into distrust of Providence," which would not conduce to the good of the whole. The individual's sense of beauty however, would react against this tragedy without any reflection as to its teleology. Thus we have both public and private criterions among the senses.

"But they all aim at good, either private or public: and by them each particular agent is made a great measure subservient to the good of the whole. Mankind are thus insensibly link'd together and made one great system, by this invisible union." Thus Hutcheson, as a protest against egoistic hedonistic psychology, set up an organic theory by which public and private senses are both criterions, equal and irreducible, and teleologically inseparable. Our sense of beauty then is our private egoistic (though not hedonistic) criterion of the beautiful, whereas our moral sense is the public nonegotistic criterion of it.

2. p. 178. ibid.
Hume's observations upon beauty, while they are few and fragmentary, yet deal with some of its chief problems and are noteworthy rather for their clearness and conciseness of statement than for actual new contributions. Like Hutcheson he marks a growing tendency to psychologise about beauty, also the widening gap between philosophical theories of beauty and actual aesthetic experience. McCosh reports of Hume: "That in the letters written during his travels, he never makes a single allusion to a fine statue or painting." There seems no doubt in Hume's case but that this is valid proof; yet curiously enough in Shaftesbury's letters we find an almost equal dearth of aesthetic topics, a fact far more striking when we consider how much he has written on the subject.

Hume defines beauty as follows: "beauty is such an order and construction of parts as either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul." Hume's scepticism is written broad on such a definition. He makes no distinction between objective and subjective beauty. Beauty is objective, since it inheres in "an order

1. p. 149. The Scottish Philosophy.
and construction of parts; at the same time it is subjective since it can only be experienced immediately and without analysis. Of it, subjectively, we can say nothing; whether it is voluntary or involuntary, innate or acquired, rational or non-rational. Yet even as he contends that we cannot define the emotion of beauty, Hume is defining it negatively. For if it is non-conceptual, it must reside somewhere either in the sensations or in impressions of them. Thus beauty is placed somewhere below the rational and yet not entirely in the sensation, for it can be discerned "by a taste or sensation". The perception of beauty seems rather to rouse an affection than a sensation, because it has "order and construction of parts." To some it would seem that this admission of "order and construction of parts implied an element of rationality in his definition.

According to Hume the only distinguishing character of subjective beauty is the pleasure which it gives the soul; and this pleasure constitutes its very essence. But this is not necessarily egotistic hedonism; for we often have a perception of beauty without its having any relation to our own advantage—as, for example, the beauty of a field of furze cited a little further on.

2. p. 96. ibid.
Yet Hume admits that the great part of our pleasure in beauty comes from the idea of its convenience and utility. However, this utility would not always be connected necessarily with our own desires. "The order and convenience of a palace are no less essential to its beauty than its mere figure and appearance," to the one who knows the function of a palace. But the beauty of the palace is not dependent upon whether it has a personal utility for us necessarily; and it is possible for the palace to appear beautiful without utility, provided we are ignorant of any function it could serve. Take this instance of a perception of beauty without utility:

"I know not but a plain, overgrown with furze and broom, may be, in itself, as beautiful as a hill covered with vines or olive-trees; tho' it will never appear so to one who is acquainted with the value of each. But this is a beauty merely of imagination, and has no foundation in what appears to the senses." So we may perceive beauty without any idea of utility or teleology, in beauties of the imagination. But imagination involves the association of ideas and how is this possible if beauty is non-conceptual?

2. p. 151. ibid.
The above quotation shows how the concept of utility alters the sense of beauty, even when the experiencing subject is not himself concerned with its utility. Thus the man who appreciates the fertile beauty of the olive grove does not necessarily own the grove or have any utilitarian connection with it whatever. "This is an advantage, that concerns only the owner, nor is there anything but sympathy, which can interest the spectator." The onlooker enters into his interest "by the force of imagination." and feels the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in him.

Bosanquet points out the importance of this distinction of Hume's between the beauty of imagination and beauty for the sense, and also the importance of his aesthetic generalization of pleasure and pain through sympathy. He says of Hume:

"We thus get an approximate anticipation of Kant's form of teleology without the idea of an end and also of his 'disinterested pleasure.'" This appears to me an example of an historical fallacy on Bosanquet's part. In the first place Hume did not admit a rational element in the perception of beauty, therefore Bosanquet has no right to

interpret it as teleological. Secondly, if the only distinguishing characteristic of beauty is pleasure to Hume, how is one to discriminate between beauty and any gratification of desire? How can Bosanquet speak of his beauty as being "without the idea of an end" any more than of any satisfied appetite? Thirdly, Bosanquet has no right to designate Hume's idea of beauty as an approximation of "disinterested pleasure." Hume makes no real distinction in his psychology between selfish and altruistic pleasures. All pleasures arise from the gratification of desires ultimately sensual—thought can originate nothing—and hence no such rational distinction between interested and disinterested pleasures can be made. Nor can one speak of Hume's "aesthetic generalizations of pleasure and pain;" this phrase also implies disinterestedness and rationality. Fourthly, teleology is not always an element in Hume's idea of beauty as with Kant.

No doubt Bosanquet perfectly recognized Hume's true conception of beauty, and in such statements only means to draw out the implications of his theory for a later time. Even so, it appears he has twisted Hume unwarrantably and read into him a more highly developed theory than he possessed. More justly, it appears, Bosanquet might have hit on Shaftesbury as a logical anticipator of Kant's idea of
beauty in many respects. For Shaftesbury held with Kant that beauty was essentially rational, disinterested and teleological. Teleological not only in that the idea of beauty was inseparably joined to that of utility, but in the Platonic sense of a ladder of beauties stimulating the soul to climb to a perception of absolute beauty. Yet the concept of an ultimate beauty is not present as a definite end in the perception to Shaftesbury; therefore he does not violate Kant's "teleology without the idea of end." In both appears the same principle; in Shaftesbury expanded objectively and Platonistically, in Kant highly subjectivized with its teleological implications left undeveloped.

Beauty, according to Hume is caused by pleasure derived from sensation. and exists entirely in the sentiments, though there are qualities in its objects fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. Yet in these feelings themselves he recognises a universal and normative principle.

"If, in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or considerable uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the perfect beauty."

2. p. 171 Standard of Taste
3. p. 170 ibid.
The principles of taste are universal "but feeling alone is not a criterion of beauty—for pure feeling can neither evaluate nor judge itself." The true standard of taste and beauty Hume describes as: "Strong sense united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice." All this is required to judge the quantity of pleasure to be had from a beautiful object. Hume is like Shaftesbury in that he makes the criterion of beauty dependent upon trained intellect and trained sense perceptions.

One of the most interesting fragments of Hume's views on aesthetics is to be found in his essay Of Tragedy, in which he criticises various theories as to why we experience pleasure from representations that excite painful feelings. It is worth noticing Hume's view in the light of the later criticism of George Campbell, a Scotch divine and professor at Marischal College. In 1776 Campbell published a "Philosophy of Rhetoric" which contained a criticism of Hume and other theorists on this point. The value of his book for aesthetics rests largely on his discussion "Of the cause of that pleasure which we receive from objects or representations that excite pity and other painful feelings."

2. p. 11. ibid.
Both Hume and Campbell agree in dismissing as only partially satisfactory the theory of the Abbé Dubos that nothing is so disagreeable to the mind as a state of indolence and indifference and that any passion, no matter how disagreeable is preferable to this languor. Such a theory may hold for the pleasure of gaming and hunting, but it will not account for the pleasure of a tragedy, which "were it really set before us, would give us the most unfeigned uneasiness, though it be then the most effectual cure of languor and indolence."

The next hypothesis is Fontenelle's and its solution Hume regarded as "just and convincing." It claims that pleasure and pain are alike in cause though different in themselves. Hence when one runs into the other we have a sorrow, soft and agreeable. This is the feeling that is aroused by tragedy, in the perception of which, at bottom we have always the idea of the illusion and falseness of what we see. Campbell objects to Fontenelle's theory as presented by Hume for two reasons: First, that the notion of falsity is not a necessary concomitant of the pleasure that results from pity and other such affections, but is merely

1. Reflections sur la Poetique p.36.
2. p. 159. Of Tragedy.
accidental. Hume also points out this weakness in the theory by his example of Cicero's description of the butchery of the Sicilian captains, an instance where the sorrow could not possibly be softened by fiction, for the audience were convinced of the reality of every circumstance. As his second objection Campbell asserts that it has not been shown that in any uncompounded passions the most remote degrees are productive of such contrary effects. Yet no doubt he would have had great difficulty in convincing Burke as to this reading of the evidence.

A third hypothesis criticised by Campbell is Hume's own, a modified mixture of the two preceding largely.

"The impulse or vehemence arising from sorrow, compassion, indignation, receives a new direction from the sentiments of beauty (found in the genius of judicious, vivid, selective representation). The latter being the predominant emotion, seize the whole mind and convert the former into themselves, at least tincture them so strongly as totally to alter their nature. And the soul being at the same time roused by passion and charmed by eloquence feels on the whole a strong movement, which is altogether delightful."

1. p. 117. Philosophy of Rhetoric.
2. p. 160 Of Tragedy.
In tragedy, too, there is the additional beauty of imitation which is always of itself delightful. Here we find Hume clinging to a curious bit of Aristoteleanism; like Hutcheson he seems to find a beauty in mere duplication.

Campbell professes to find difficulty in discovering Hume's meaning: that is, whether the art of eloquence is itself able to rouse the passions and diffuse them with pleasure; or whether it is the detection of the speaker's oratory and talents which is able to give pleasure and convert the passions into one strong delightful channel. He is equally scornful of each solution and the difficulty is one that readily presents itself on reading Hume. It seems, however, a difficulty more apparent than real. For Hume, it is the emotional power of eloquence and not the reasoned analysis of the speaker's art that gives the emotion of pleasure and the perception of beauty. If one only remembers how Hume is eager to exclude any rational element from pleasure, the problem of interpretation is easily solved.

Campbell also criticises him for proceeding on the supposition that there are two distinct effects produced by the eloquence on the hearers; "one the sentiment of beauty, or (as he explains it more particularly) of the harmony of oratorical numbers, of the exercise of the noble talents,

1. pp. 119-120. Philosophy of Rhetoric.
genius, art, and judgment; the other the passion which the speaker purpose'd to raise in their minds." When the first predominates, the mixture of the two is pleasant; when the second predominates, unpleasant. Campbell has just grounds for objecting to Hume's tendency to make the sentiment of beauty and the passion two "original, separate and independent effects," with no essential connection. But Hume would have said the passions were painful, the sentiment of beauty pleasurable—wherefore they were irreducibly different and independent in kind (for pleasure and pain are ultimates); and as for necessary connection between them, no such thing exists.

As a fourth hypothesis Campbell cites that of Hawkesworth, which holds that pity may be "resolved into that power of imagination by which we apply the misfortunes of others to ourselves;" so that we are able "to pity no longer than we fancy ourselves to suffer, and to be pleased only by reflecting that our sufferings are not real." It is enough to say that Campbell disposes of this theory with considerable ability.

1. p. 121 Philosophy of Rhetoric.
2. p. 122 ibid.
3. Adventurer. No. 110.
As a fifth and concluding hypothesis Campbell presents his own theory. Simple passions he says divide into the pleasant and the painful. But it is rare that we experience simple passion; for passions like ideas have the power of attraction and association. And these associated or mixed passions furnish a greater and more durable pleasure to the mind than the simple could. Thus pure joy in a work of genius cannot give greater enduring pleasure (Here it will be observed we have the old problem of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as to why the perfect character is not high art, recurring under a more psychological form.) Pure joy can not give the greatest pleasure for three reasons. First, sympathetic joy is much fainter than sympathetic grief. Second "joy is the least attractive of all the affections." Third, everything in nature is set off by comparison. Perhaps every one of these reasons may be questioned, but they are interesting as psychological interpretation of an old problem.

Pity, Campbell resolves into the combination of three emotions: commiseration (painful), benevolence (intermediate) and love (pleasureable). In the observation of art, the sentiment of beauty does not seize the whole mind and convert it into its own likeness, as Hume would hold. Rather

1. p. 131 Philosophy of Rhetoric.
2. p. 133 ibid.
the combination of the passions "resembles a mixture of
tastes, when you are quite sensible of the different sav-
ours of the ingredient." This point appears well brought
out and an indication of the growing sense of the complexity
of the aesthetic emotion.

The principal pleasure of pity ariseth from its own
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nature according to Campbell, which is his final explana-
tion of the question. The value of his theory is chiefly
that it throws emphasis on the psychological complexity of
beauty as an experience.

1. p. 135 ibid.
2. p. 134 ibid.
Burke may be interpreted either as a progressive or as a reactionary. Progressive we may say—so far as he marks a healthy tendency to widen the aesthetic field by turning attention to the sublime and bringing in psychological and physiological considerations. Yet a reactionary he is, in his emphasis on psychology and physiology as the whole of aesthetics, setting up a rude materialism and ignoring the fact that physiology and psychology are only the scaffoldings of aesthetics, in a sense, to insure that she builds firmly. The subjectivity of Hume and Hutcheson, the rationalism of Shaftesbury he counts for naught. He says:

"Beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies acting mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses." By this view beauty, while it reacts upon the mind, does so mechanically, being no creature of our reason. It appears in the mind in response to sense stimulation and is involuntary and uncontrolled by the mind. No additional knowledge or mental training is

1. He might as well have said "for the whole, as far as our knowledge goes."
3. "Beauty demands no assistance from our reasoning; even the will is unconcerned." p. 114. Sec. 2., Pt. 3. ibid
able to change one’s taste in beauty, which is hence quite apart from teleology “since it (beauty) strikes us without any reference to use, and even where no use at all can be discerned.”

Now it is only with regard to immediate sensible qualities that we can hope to have true knowledge.

“The great claim of causes, which links one to another, even to the throne of God himself, can never be unravelled by any industry of ours. When we go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth.” Beauty then, as far as we can have a certain knowledge about it, must have only sensations as its causes. And all we can discover as to the efficient cause of beauty is: “What affections of the mind produce certain emotions of the body, and what distinct feelings and qualities of body shall produce certain determinate passions in the mind, and no others.” Thus the physical and psychical sequence seem linked by some psycho-physical connection, but we can only interpret the psychical in their concomitant physical terms as to the efficient cause of beauty.

"By beauty" Burke says "I mean that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it." Desire is sharply distinguished from

2. P 113. Sec. 1, Pt. 3. ibid.
beauty, although it sometimes operates along with it. Beauty for the first time among these authors, we find emphasized as a social quality, a fact of some importance. Beauty, as will readily be seen, he takes in a very broad sense, applying it to all such qualities as inspire benevolent, altruistic emotions. This would cover moral beauty, which, however, one would perceive only through sensations and without any rational element involved. In contrast with Hume and worthy of remark in a materialist, these altruistic qualities having moral beauty are irreducible factors in sensations. In making love or some similar passion the distinguishing mark of beauty psychologically Burke falls into the old mistake of ignoring the element of reason in it. An animal may love a person merely from habit, association or instinct. But the human lover universalizes and passes judgment on the beloved object, thus gaining the perception of beauty. Judgment is always implicit in the aesthetic perception; for by the very consciousness "it is beautiful" an object is judged and evaluated.

Before starting to enumerate the constituents of beauty in objects, Burke on a hint from Plotinus, proceeds to exclude proportion as an element. Proportion had been

the prime essential of beauty to all classicists from the Greeks down through Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. To a degree this charge marks a healthy reaction against rationalism, but unfortunately it loses weight through being grounded in a crude sensationalism; so that only those who can accept his sensationalism will find his arguments against proportion satisfactory. Here are his reasons: first, proportion relates almost wholly to convenience and must therefore be a creature of the understanding and hence not an element of beauty; second, "proportion is the measure of relative quantity" but certainly beauty is no idea belonging to calculation or geometry; third, proportioned bodies are not always beautiful; fourth, no constant proportions can be found which are always attended with beauty in either plants or animals.

Nor is fitness or utility an element; for the effect of beauty is previous to any knowledge of the use. For to judge fitness and proportion one must know the end for which the work was designed. This statement is, of course, open to sharp attack. So is the remark that perfection cannot be a cause of beauty, since beauty almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and imperfection. And perfect virtue, if unadorned by any weakness, cannot be the cause of beauty—but rather of the sublime.  

2. p. 130. Sec. 10. Pt. 3.
tempered by weakness is the only sort that arouses the idea of beauty; and Burke has some stern criticism for those writers who, by their loose and inaccurate confusion of beauty and virtue, "have---misled us both in the theory of taste and of morals." One more we find an interesting interpretation of Shaftesbury's problem as to why the most perfect character is not the most beautiful in art, in Burke's comment that virtue tempered by weakness is the most beautiful.

Turning to the positive qualities of beauty, Burke enumerates seven. First, beautiful objects are comparatively small. Here as elsewhere Burke has abundant examples to illustrate, but when he comes to showing how smallness as a principle, is one of the causes of beauty, he is quite plainly out of his depth. The smallness of the humming bird merely as such has nothing contrary to the idea of beauty; and on the contrary "perhaps his beauty is enhanced by his smallness." The uncertainty expressed in the "perhaps" shows how unwilling Burke is to develop his statement to its logical conclusion. For, if smallness is an element of beauty, the smaller the object the more beautiful it

1. p. 131. Sec. 11. Pt. 3.
will be—a contention which Burke refuses to be drawn into. When an object has the qualities of beauty united to great dimensions, Burke denominated it as "fine". This category he originates to fit between beauty and the sublime.

The second quality of beauty mentioned is smoothness. Since smoothness appears to be a cause of pleasure in taste, smell and hearing, Burke holds that it will therefore be admitted as a constituent of visual beauty. Here Burke virtually admits that, in the last analysis pleasure is his criterion of beauty. Thus, his so-called efficient causes of beauty: smallness, smoothness, etc. are not real causes, but rather phenomena observed to accompany pleasure and not in themselves necessary qualities of pleasure; for pleasure is an ultimate, simple idea incapable of definition as to its qualities. So by the admission that qualities causing pleasure to the senses must be elements of beauty, Burke discloses his true purpose to be in no sense ontological or metaphysical, but merely the collection of data from experience as to phenomenal accompaniments of beauty.

A third element of beauty is a gradual variation of

direction in easy curves. To the question why is this an element of beauty, Burke answers: because easy variation does not strain the nerves and because it is everywhere observable that beautiful objects are composed of lines varying in gentle curves. This answer is, of course, no complete answer. To the establishment of the metaphysical thesis that the object of the beautiful must have in itself certain necessary elements, he brings as proof only physiological and empirical observation. As to why his seven elements and no others should be the essential qualities of beauty, he has no proof. A narrow materialism forbidding him to seek any justification beyond sense perception forces his head into the noose of his own theory.

A fourth essential of beauty is to have its parts un-angular and melting into each other. A fifth element is delicacy, or even appearance of fragility. As proof he cites many ingeniously chosen examples. The sixth is to have clear and bright colors, but not too strong or glowing. The seventh and last element of beauty is that if there should be a glaring color, it must be diversified with others.

1. p. 133. Sec. 15. Pt. 3 and p. 165. Sec. 23. Pt. 4. ibid
Burke appears to have received considerable influence, chiefly negative, from William Hogarth's "Analysis of Beauty" published in 1753. It is barely possible that Burke got his notion of dividing beauty into elements from Hogarth; and certainly Burke's selection of his seven elements was largely determined in critical opposition to him. Hogarth had enumerated the qualities of beauty as: 1) fitness, 2) symmetry, 3) variety, 4) simplicity, 5) intricacy, 6) magnitude. Burke devotes several paragraphs of his best critical skill to showing why fitness and symmetry cannot be essentials of beauty. And in direct contrast to Hogarth's "magnitude" he sets up "smallness" as one of his elements. Burke took directly from Hogarth his third element of beauty, that is, the gradual variation of direction in easy curves. Yet he could not accept Hogarth's "line of beauty" without qualification; and this qualification he set down in his fourth element of beauty, which is, that the parts of the object must be angular and melting into each other. Hogarth had marked angular figures as beautiful on account of their variety. Burke opposes this position on the ground that he does not find "any natural object which is angular, and at the same time beautiful."  

p. 134. Sec. 15. Pt. 3. ibid.
In Burke's last two elements concerning the softness and diversity of colors, there is probably another trace of the painters influence, which directed Burke's attention to the importance of color in beauty. Lastly it appears not impossible that Burke may have started to develop his theory of the sublime through his strong opposition to Hogarth's emphasis on magnitude as an element of the beautiful.

"When forms of beauty are presented to the eye in large quantities, the pleasure increases on the mind, and horror is softened into reverence." Passages such as this in Hogarth very likely produced an effect in clarifying and stimulating Burke's theory. On reading it, Burke must have been confronted by such questions as the following: does the pleasure in beauty increase with the quantity of the object? does horror ever decrease with increasing quantity? is reverence the feeling aroused by beauty? All these questions he answered negatively, in opposition to Hogarth.

It will be noted that all the elements enumerated by Burke were of visual beauty. But he holds there are the

same qualities in the beauty of sounds, such as clear, soft tones, easy gradations, etc. The lower senses also can appreciate aesthetic elements, but these remain often obscure unless translated by the analogous terminology of a higher sense, or else are explained physiologically. But the important thing is Burke's emphasis that all the senses have this power of aesthetic perception. Even the sense of touch distinguished the elements of beauty. Burke says in this regard:

"Whoever compares his state of mind on feeling soft, smooth, variegated, unangular bodies, with that in which he finds himself on the view of a beautiful object, will perceive a very striking analogy in the effects of both; and which may go a good way towards discovering their common cause." Burke's physiological and psychological treatment of beauty would be worth while if for this one point alone—a clear realization that all the senses furnish aesthetic experience.

As to the old problem of why painful feelings are

1. p. 140. Sec. 25. Pt. 3.
pleasant and why we enjoy a tragedy, Burke has a clear
drastic theory. The sight of pain and suffering is in it-
self delightful to us; for "terror is a passion which al-
ways produces delight where it does not press too closely;
and pity is a passion accompanied by pleasure. The sight
of a tragedy is also delightful as an imitation. Burke
holds the old idea that imitation is itself beautiful, but
it is interesting to note that he limits and depreciates
its effect. Moreover, pain and terror furnish a third
delight in tragedy by "clearing the parts, whether fine or
gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance." As
Bosanquet points out this is a revival of Aristotle's pur-
gation theory. Thus, according to Burke, tragedy is de-
ligntful for three reasons: 1) pity and terror are them-
selves delightful, 2) imitation is pleasurable; 3) the
purgation of the finer organs gives delight. But our sat-
isfaction in tragedy and imitation is weak beside our int-
rest in real suffering, as Burke would point out by the
illustration of how a theatre would be emptied in a moment

lime and Beautiful.
2. p. 81. Sec. 15. " ibid.
3. p. 82. Sec. 16. Pt. 1.
4. p. 149. Sec. 7. Pt. 4.
5. p. 203. B. Bosanquet. History of Aesthetic. Lon-
don, 1896.
if there were news of a hanging in the next square.

Burke is willing to grant a fair amount of associationism, but he is far from going such lengths as Alison later. "Some things" he says, "must have been originally and naturally agreeable or disagreeable, from which the others derive their associated powers; and it would be, I fancy, to little purpose to look for the cause of our passions in association, until we fail of it in the natural properties of things." So always he comes back to sensation.

Burke's treatment of the sublime is historically important as giving it a place beside, outside and equally important with the beautiful. Yet in many ways his treatment is loose and crude and may be disposed of shortly. As pleasure was the source of the beautiful, so pain and terror are the source of the sublime, which is the strongest emotion the mind is capable of. Curiously enough, he makes it a self-preserving passion, because it is based on the ideas of pain and danger. The emotion attending the sublime he designated "delight" because it turns on pain

2. p. 144. Sec. 21 Pt. 4.
4. p. 84 Sec. 18. Pt. 1.
and is thus distinct from positive pleasure. The other emotion is astonishment, "that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror." In its inferior degrees, astonishment reduces to admiration reverence and respect.

The elements of the sublime form an almost perfect contrast to those of beauty; they are: vastness, ruggedness, privation, power, infinity, magnitude, difficulty, magnificence, obscurity, intense darkness or light, suddenness and vividness of contrast. Another curious point in Burke is that ugliness is quite consistent with the sublime, although he adds: "I would by no means insinuate that ugliness, of itself is a sublime idea, unless united with such qualities as excite a strong terror." Terror is always for Burke the chief emotion excited by the sublime. If pushed far enough the sublime would seem to degenerate into mere horror and pain. The overemphasis on terror in the sublime and the complete severance between it and beauty as directly opposite and contradictory, are the points that most vitiate the worth of Burke's theory.

1. p. 86. Sec. 1. Pt. 2.
3. p. 142. Sec. 27. Pt. 3.
HENRY HOME (Lord Kames) 1696-1782.

Henry Home, Lord Kames, like Burke, represents a critical theory based on innumerable examples drawn from wide knowledge of the facts, yet without much development of underlying principles or the metaphysical side. Yet whereas Burke represents a more scientific approach to the question, through his physiological and psychological observations, Kames approaches it rather from the side of literary criticism and the resources of his wide classical reading.  

Both men, as Bosanquet points out, are critics not philosophers. One approaches aesthetics from a strongly empirical side, the other from a more rationalistic position, although in Kames, too, the influence of the empiricists is very strong, indeed.

Kames states no distinguishing characters of beauty, beyond calling it an "agreeableness" Beauty for him is simply the pleasant to the sense of sight. The emotions aroused by this pleasure have one common character, that of "sweetness and gaiety." Beauty in its proper meaning belongs only to objects of sight. But by a figure of speech

2. P. 103 Ch. 3. Elements of Criticism.
3. P. 103. Ch. 3. ibid.
we can come to transfer it to the invisible, such as: "A
beautiful thought, a beautiful discovery in science and even
1
to another sense, as "a beautiful sound." Though we exper-
ience pleasure (metaphorically termed beauty) from all the
senses, it is only the pleasures of hearing and sight that
2
are perceived in the mind. Those of the other senses are
purely corporeal. This is an interesting view as tending
to harmonize the empirical view and rational conceptions of
beauty. Whereas Hume and Burke had held all beauty non-rat-
2
ional and Shaftesbury just the contrary, Kames takes a med-
iatory position much like that of Hutcheson and holds that
all soo-called beauty of the lower senses is corporeal, but
that only in the higher senses guided by reason is there
true appreciation of beauty. While Hutcheson has admitted
beauty of sound as well as of sight, Kames limits beauty to
sight only, the reason for which does not well appear, as
the differences of pleasure and appreciation between the
two senses are apparently only of degree.

The influence of Hutcheson upon Kames is very striking.
Kames preserves the distinction between the external and
internal senses, the distinction between absolute and rel-
ative beauty and many other points. This distinction be-

1. P. 103, Ch. 3. Elements of Criticism.
tween intrinsic and relative beauty is a very important one to Kames. Intrinsic beauty, that observed in a single object "viewed apart without relation to any other", is an end in itself and an object of sense merely. The perception of relative beauty has with it an act of reflection and understanding and is viewed as a means relating to some "good" end. ("Good" seems here to mean "useful."). It is difficult for one to see, of course, how an intrinsic beauty could be purely sensual and without rational elements when perceived in a "single" object and one viewed "apart" from others.

For the perception of an object as unity and as distinguished from another object implies rational principles at work. One wonders too, why the lower senses cannot perceive intrinsic beauty since it is purely sensual.

"These different beauties agree" says Kames" in one capital circumstance, that both are equally perceived as belonging to the object." This is easily understood in regard to intrinsic beauty, though hardly if we exclude a rational element; but in the case of relative beauty it means utilitarianism. What makes a plough beautiful is its utility. This conception comes about through a natural tendency to transfer the idea of beauty in the effect to

1. P. 103. Ch. 3. Elements of Criticism.
the cause as one of its qualities. Association with an idea of beauty or utility can render an object beautiful. Hutchesson, it will be remembered, excluded utility from any part in the conception of beauty. To many it would seem that while utility may be an element heightening one's appreciation of beauty, Kames is wrong in assuming that utility by itself is enough to arouse it.

Intrinsic and relative beauty often coincide in the object and when they do, give the greatest delight. The beauty arising from utility is easily distinguished, but intrinsic beauty is so complex as to require analysis into its constituents parts. Intrinsic beauty of an object viewed as a whole arises from its regularity and simplicity. Viewing the parts with relation to each other, the qualities of beauty are: uniformity, proportion and order. The distinctions between relative beauty and intrinsic beauty, which he calls "ultimate" and "unrelated," seem somewhat blurred. All Kames seems to mean is that one is utilitarian, whereas the other is not. Yet when he assumes that each part of a complex beauty by its own beauty helps to make up the beauty of the whole, he confuses and contradicts his own distinction.

1. P. 104. Ch. 3. Elements of Criticism.
Kames next brings up the question formerly raised by Hutcheson, as to whether beauty is a primary or secondary quality of objects. His answer is, that since beauty depends on the percipient as much as on the object perceived, it cannot be exclusively either a quality of the subject or object.

Other points at which Kames shows the influence of Hutcheson and agreement with him are: that passions and actions are governed by the moral sense and are right in moderation; a belief that sensual aesthetic and intellectual pursuits lead in an ascending scale to virtue and a recognition of the divine order of the universe, the view that instinctive actions are neither selfish nor social; a strong feeling of the divine order in the world and a refusal to recognize evil as ultimate. Although Kames has followed Hutcheson in many other points, he does object to Hutcheson's main contention that beauty consists in uniformity amid variety. Variety, Kames holds, contributes nothing to the beauty of a moral action, a mathematical theorem, a globe and many other objects. Only objects beautiful in themselves can be blended into beautiful pro-

1. P. 108. Ch. 3. Elements of Criticism.
2. p. 60, ch. 2. Pt. 2. ibid.
portions of uniformity and variety.

Kames has an interesting theory with regard to our pleasure in tragedy. He thinks that what we chiefly enjoy is the working out of Providence through the laws of Nature. Thus the drama for him, as for Hutcheson, is founded on the moral sense and belief in a divine order. When the gloomy notion of chance creeps into a tragedy, it loses its power and our pleasure dies away. A noteworthy point is Kame's contention that a perfect character may be introduced into tragedy, provided it be kept in an under part, so as to leave room for drawing a moral lesson from the imperfections of the main character. A moral tragedy not only pleasantly affirms our belief in Providence, but unpleasantly also through pity and pain. Kames, like Burke in some respects, believes that painful emotions are sometimes agreeable. He says: "Thus the painful emotion raised by a monstrous birth or brutal action, is no less agreeable upon reflection, than the pleasant emotion raised by a flowing river or a lofty dome; and the painful passions of grief and pity are agreeable, and applauded by all the world."

1. 160. Ch. 9. Pt. 7 Elements of Criticism.
2. 416. Ch. 22. Pt. 7. ibid.
3. P. 60, Ch. 2. Pt. 2. ibid.
There is really a wide difference from Burke, however, in this view which appears so similar to his. Whereas pity and pain to Burke, are immediately organically pleasant, to Kames they are only pleasant "on reflection." That means that ultimately the pleasure of grief arises from our consciousness of teleology, the realization that sorrow is as natural as pleasure and that all things are in connection.

An interesting fore-runner of Kant's teleology without an end is to be found in Kame's discussion of "a vague feeling of gratitude without an object." and the emotions raised by music without any object or outlet. This feeling which Kames terms "The sympathetic emotion of virtue" is really the aesthetic passion.

Very little is found in Kames about the Sublime. He does not distinguish it definitely from grandeur. Both are used sometimes to designate a quality in the object and again of the emotion itself. Sublime and grand objects seem to be characterized by magnitude and elevation. The emotion aroused is serious, in contrast to the sweetness and gaiety of beauty, yet it is highly pleasant. Magnitude seems to be the mark which distinguishes grandeur and hence the sublime

from beauty. *Agreeableness* is the genus of which beauty on the one hand, and grandeur and the sublime are species.

1. p. 110 Ch. 4. pt. 7. *Elements of Criticism*. 
THOMAS REID (1710-1796)

Though seldom referred to as a writer on aesthetics, there is perhaps no other of the Scottish school who furnishes so fair and clear, though brief, discussion of its problems as Reid. Hutcheson, though more original and credited with greater development of the subject, lacks Reid's clearness and unity of thought; Alison's narrow thesis lacks the correction of Reid's broad common sense; while such men as Gerard and Beattie are almost wholly lacking in his analytic and metaphysical power.

Reid defines the sense of beauty thus:

"The sense of beauty may be analysed in a manner very similar to the sense of sweetness. It is an agreeable feeling or emotion accompanied by an opinion or judgment of some excellence in the object which is fitted by Nature to produce that feeling." The first noteworthy point here is that beauty exists in the external object as well as in the mind. In a passage just preceding Reid criticises Hutcheson and "other modern philosophers" for holding with Descartes and Locke that secondary qualities exist only in mind. Locke is right only in so far as he shows that there

1. p. 499 (741) Of Taste.
2. p. 499 (740) ibid
can be no similitude between our sensation and the object which stimulated it. His view that there is reality no beauty in the object in which it appears to be, would attribute to men fallacious senses. And to doubt our senses would be to accuse God of deception, says Reid, voicing the Cartesian argument. Reid's own argument is: that to say there is no beauty in the object contradicts the common sense of all men and common sense is very rarely wrong. He adds two less impressive proofs: first, that if our judgment of beauty be a true judgment, there must be some real foundation for it in the object. and second, since the most perfect works of art and nature strike even the most ignorant men as beautiful, they must have a beauty in themselves apart from the trained perception of it.

The second noteworthy point in his definition is the presence of judgment joined to the emotional factor in the perception of beauty. Like Kames, Reid here marks a tendency to fuse the rationalist and empiricist positions. Yet he advances far beyond Kames, who held the appreciation of

1. p. 499 (740) Of taste.
2. p. 500 (741) ibid.
4. p. 499 (741) ibid
5. p. 500 (742) ibid.
of beauty to be merely the emotional pleasures of hearing and sight perceived in the mind. Reid makes the sense of beauty not only mental, but to consist primarily in judgment. These aesthetic judgments, unlike those of mathematics, or metaphysics, are always accompanied by an agreeable emotion. Thus the sense of beauty is to Reid a kind of bridge connecting the intellect and the senses, joining the elements of both. His position on this point, to some degree anticipates Kant, it would seem. Reid has amplified the suggestion of Hutcheson, who had put beauty between the intellectual and the sensual, for whereas Hutcheson excluded rationality, Reid makes it always an essential element. A further anticipation of Kant has to do with the so-called "teleology without an idea of end." Reid says that the sense of beauty, like the other senses (evidently meaning internal senses), implies an opinion of some quality in the object which occasions the feeling. In perceiving beauty our belief holds to some excellence in the object. "It gives a value to the object, abstracted from its utility." This evaluation apart from utility seems an attempt...
to express the same sort of idea as Kant's teleology without end.

There are, according to Reid, innumerable kinds of beauty agreeing only in their common relation tone expressed by our emotional evaluation of some excellence in the object. These determinations of ours with regard to beauty he distinguishes into two kinds: instinctive and rational. The instinctive perception of beauty arises on first sight, without reflection and without our being able to specify any perfection that justifies our judgment of it. Reid means that while the instinctive perception of beauty involves no reflective judgment, there is always the form or valuation present in the very perception that an object is beautiful. This instinctive perception appears to brute animals and to very young children, yet it continues to appear throughout life. The instinctive perception of beauty may be called an "occult quality" since what it is in itself we do not know, nor have we any standard by which to measure or criticise it. Rational judgments of beauty are "grounded on some agreeable quality of the object which is distinctly conceived and may be specified."

1. p. 500 (743) Of Taste.
2. op. cit.
3. p. 501 (745) ibid.
4. op. cit.
5. p. 5101. (746) ibid.
The emotion experienced is the same as that of instinctive beauty, but the judgment in this case is reasoned and based on analyzed perceptions of the object. Reid's distinction between instinctive and rational perceptions of beauty appears of real methodological value and he is careful not to make the distinction absolute. Even in instinctive perceptions, there is concomitant reason involved; and what would seem a rudimentary apriori form of judgment fastens on the content the instant it is presented. This is what distinguishes any perception of beauty from sensation and constitutes the difference between the internal and external senses says Reid. "To perceive the beauty, therefore, we must perceive the nature or structure from which it results." The classification into instinctive and rational is then primarily for speculative and philosophical purposes, as in particular judgments the two beauties are so mixed as hardly to be distinguished.

Having classified the perceptions of beauty Reid next divides beauty itself into two kinds: original and derived. Let us consider the latter first. By derived or transferred beauty, Reid seems to mean that perception of beauty

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1. p. 501 (746) ibid.
3. p. 501 (746) ibid.
which we gain by associating the idea of the original beauty of the cause with the effect; that is, we transfer the beauty in the thing signified to the sign and call it derived beauty. For example we metaphorically may attribute qualities of mind to an inanimate object. This second kind of beauty comes about because only the signs of objective qualities are immediately perceived by our senses; these signs themselves become beautiful from the process of reflecting beautiful qualities to our understanding. All this acquired beauty of the signs reduces to mere association of ideas; for objects without intrinsic beauty only become beautiful through association with intrinsically beautiful objects. Reid therefore has no right to talk about beauty as "beauty itself existing external to mind. His so-called derived beauty is only, after all, another aspect of original beauty.

The fountain of original beauty, says Reid, lies in the moral and intellectual perfection of the mind and from it is derived all the beautiful of the visible world. He declares himself here in agreement with Shaftesbury and Aikenside. The business of our minds is to impress our own mental qualities upon material objects and from these mater-

2. p. 503. (750) ibid.
erial objects we receive sensations and all our knowledge. Just so the Creator in the visible world has stamped upon all his works signatures of his divine wisdom, power and benignity, which are visible to all men." Thus we come to know God only through natural theology by means of our sensations of objects stamped with his signature, it would seem.

"In every form, unorganized, vegetable, or animal, it (matter) derives its beauty from the purposes to which it is subservient, or from the signs of wisdom or of other mental qualities which it exhibits." His teleological conception of beauty is much like Shaftesbury's Platonism, somewhat further developed. The beauty of a sound, he says, lies in the perfection of the cause, (and perfection seem to mean intelligence and purpose) Brute animals derive their beauty from their active motions and looks, which express a certain thinking principle. While the human species derives its beauty from its color, form, expression and grace. He criticises Hutcheson's principle of uniformity in variety, saying that while that principle does express design very strongly, still its beauty must always

1. p. 503 (752) Of Taste.
2. p. 503 (753) ibid.
3. p. 505 (758) ibid.
4. p. 506 (760) ibid.
5. p. 505 (756) ibid.
yield to that rising from adaptation to end. "Everything in the form that suits the end is a beauty" Teleology is the highest beauty.

Moral beauty then, would just be teleological beauty of another sort. Virtue and beauty, as in Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, are aspects of the same principle. As virtues they draw the approbation of the moral faculty; being becoming and amiable they affect our sense of beauty.

The grand and sublime are originally in qualities of mind, though they are discerned through the senses. The emotion raised by grand objects (a lesser degree of the sublime) is awful, solemn and serious. Burke was in error when he made everything terrible sublime. Reid finds it hard to distinguish between grandeur and beauty in particular cases. From which one may infer that the qualities of the sublime are much the same sort as those of beauty and not the directly opposite as Burke would have one believe.

1. p. 505 (756) ibid.
2. p. 502 (750) ibid.
3. p. 498 (736)
4. p. 494 (725)
5. p. 498 (736)
6. p. 502 (748)
ARCHIBALD ALISON (1757-1825)

Allison makes in several ways a favorable figure with which to close this discussion. He marks the growing tendency to subjectivize beauty and turn it into a rational train of ideas, also a feeling of the complexity of the aesthetic emotion and the necessity for intense analytic investigation of some limited and defined problem. The "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste" while it leaves unexamined some of the most important metaphysical questions regarding beauty, yet concentrates powerful and ingenious analysis on the thesis it defends. The book is planned in a logical scholarly fashion, working from effects back to causes. His first discussion is of the effects of the emotions of beauty and sublimity upon the mind. The mind, he says, is peculiarly favorable to these emotions when it is idle and sensitive to impressions. An early familiarity with poetry or even painting will increase the mind's sensitiveness to emotions from the beauties of nature. The effect of the emotion of beauty upon the mind Alison describes as follows:

2. p. 44. ibid.
3. p. 327. ibid.
"When the object either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe every man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find is insufficient to excite these emotions unless, according to common expression, our imagination is seized, and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought, which are allied to this character or expression." The outstanding point in this definition of course is the statement that the emotion of beauty consists chiefly in a train of thought seizing our imagination. This fact of the exercise of the imagination in beauty is what distinguishes beauty and sublimity from ordinary simple emotions. Moreover, there is always a train of thought accompanying a perception of beauty or sublimity; yet not all trains of thought are accompanied by aesthetic emotions. What then is peculiar to the train of thought aroused by the emotion of beauty? Alison gives two distinguishing marks. First, trains of thought suggested by beauty or sublimity objects are in all cases composed of ideas cap-

1. p. 2. ibid.
2. p. 114. ibid.
able of exciting some affection or emotion; and that not only the whole succession is accompanied with that peculiar emotion, which we call the emotion of beauty or sublimity, but that every individual idea of such a succession is in itself productive of some simple emotion or other." Second, the succession of these ideas is distinguished by some general principle of connection which subsists through the whole extent of the train. By this Alison seems to mean that a certain unity of character is necessary in all ideas aroused by beauty. Tragi-comedy he holds indefensible as a form of art for violating this principle. As to what it is in the object that stimulates a train of thought as to what there is in the train of thought to stimulate certain emotions and as to what causes the connection of trains of ideas—all these are questions overlooked by Alison.

At the first, Alison shows that association particularly by resemblances increases the emotion of beauty. This idea, though it had been present in the chief writers of

1. p. 52. ibid.
2. p. 55. ibid.
3. p. 110 ibid.
5. p. 9 ibid.
of the Scottish School, such as Hutcheson, Kames and Reid—had been chiefly emphasized by James Beattie, a professor in Moral Philosophy at Marischal College. Beattie held that beauty was increased through association of ideas by the principles of resemblance, contrariety, contiguity, the relation of cause and effect and custom, and moreover, he had emphasized resemblance as the chief associative principle. But his work is popular discursive and without much force of thought; so that, although he seems inclined to account for all ideas of beauty on principles of association, he lacks a clear grasp of the question and the necessary logical power. As an example of the slight considerations which he allows to balk his train of reasoning, let us quote the following:

"In all cases, it seems possible to account for them (our ideas of beauty) upon the principles of association, except perhaps, in that single one, of colors giving pleasure, and being called beautiful, merely because they are bright, or because they are delicate." But Alison followed and set up Beattie's thesis backed by well chosen examples and strong analysis. Alison carried Beattie's position to

1. p. 88-96 Dissertations Moral and Critical
2. p. 142. ibid.
its logical conclusion and reduced all subjective beauty to the principle of association.

According to Alison, the emotion of beauty is always accompanied by pleasure. Yet, whereas this pleasure is simple usually, in the emotions of taste it is complex because it arises from a union of the pleasures of simple emotions with "That which is annexed, by the constitution of the human mind, to the exercise of imagination."

His next question is with regard to the sources of sublimity and beauty in the material world. "Matter is in itself is unfitted to produce any kind of emotion" he says. However, material objects may, through the power of association, become signs of spiritual qualities and so give rise to the emotion of beauty and sublimity.

Beauty and sublimity we perceive chiefly through the senses of sight and hearing, although we may perceive them through all the senses. Here Alison is in agreement with Burke. Sight, Alison explains, has pre-eminence in the perception of beauty because whereas the other senses

2. p. 120 ibid
3. p. 125 ibid
4. p. 126 ibid
5. p. 129 ibid
6. p. 136 ibid
7. p. 204 ibid.
discover single qualities, sight perceives an assemblage of them. Thus visible qualities become the signs for those of the other senses. He discusses the emotions of beauty aroused by sound, color, form, the human countenance and motion. The beauty of all these he undertakes to show arises in the association. For example the ticking of a clock at noon is probably a matter of indifference, whereas at midnight the sound strikes us only sublime. The blush of the rose, Alison says elsewhere is only beautiful when it is new and unfamiliar. What he seems to mean by such an example of beauty is that there is an element of beauty in the rose itself, in the experience of novelty and probably another such element in the environment of the rose, such as a garden. The association of all these elements of beauty constitutes the aesthetic experience. No object has beauty when perceived by itself yet each has an element of it, which when combined in a unified succession with others, gives the emotion of beauty.

On the metaphysical questions Alison has almost nothing to say. All he has to remark of the relation of beauty to virtue or to episomology is in this one sentence: "Art—

1. p. 205 ibid.
2. p. 149 ibid
3. p. 213 ibid.
has the capacity, at least of becoming one of the most powerful means we know, both of strengthening virtue and of communicating knowledge." Nor does Alison perceive his inconsistency in assuming an external world independent of mind, after he has reduced everything to association. Such a statement, for example as that emotion is very little dependent upon the object which excites it puts a limit upon the association, which he has elsewhere assumed to be an unlimited, universal principle. Also at the last he admits a principle more or less implied throughout his work, but left unconsidered and never put to use—namely, that all the beauty of the material as well as of the spiritual world is to be found in mind and its qualities.

1. p. 298 ibid
2. p. 14 ibid
3. p. 412 ibid.
The British aesthetic thought of the eighteenth century, though it leaves many problems unsettled and cannot claim a close linked logical development, yet exhibits certain distinct tendencies. First there is the movement to subjectivise beauty. Shaftesbury at the opening of the century maintains the old position that beauty is external and independent of the finite mind. Yet even he foresees the coming era of subjectivity in aesthetics, an era opened by his successor, Hutcheson, who extended Locke's principles to that field. "Beauty is taken for the idea rais'd in us" says Hutcheson and this idea is raised through the stimulus of the forms of external objects. Secondary qualities or sensations exist only in the mind and have no resemblance to the beauty in the object; in so far Hutcheson may be called a "formalist". Hume and Burke ignore distinctions between subjective and objective beauty; yet subjective beauty always appears to them in some way related to qualities in the external object. Kames is explicit in declaring that beauty exists in the mind although it depends on the external object quite as much as upon the percipient. Unlike Hutcheson, he would consider beauty

both a primary and secondary quality of objects. Reid likewise would take exception to Hutcheson's position that secondary qualities exist only in mind. He holds that Locke was only right in maintaining that there can be no similitude between a sensation and its object; yet there is beauty in the secondary qualities of the object—even though we perceive no likeness of it. All these men, while they tend to a common sense position, yet show a consciousness of the problem of subjective and objective beauty; and moreover throw all the emphasis on the subjective side leaving the objective vague and sometimes shorn of its qualities. Alison, the last of the group, apparently marks the triumph of subjective beauty when he reduces all beauty to the association of ideas. Yet he, too, recants so far as to assume an external world which excites these emotions and associations. So we may say the period marks a tendency toward, rather than an achievement of subjectivity.

Another trend of their thought may be noted that toward recognizing a rational element in beauty. Shaftesbury in classical and rationalistic fashion had rationalized beauty completely, at the expense of imaginative and sensational elements. Hutcheson marks the Empiricist re-
action against this position by a sweeping denial of any reflective or intellectual thought process in the perception of beauty. Hume and Burke agree with him in this position. Kames takes the first step back from Empiricism toward mediation with Rationalism, by making beauty the pleasures of sight and hearing that are perceived in the mind. What is the mind's activity in this perception, he does not explain. Reid takes the next step, holding that the perception of beauty involves an integral, concomitant rational process. To perceive beauty one must perceive the nature or structure from which it results; and a comprehension of structure of course involves reasoning. Alison marks its complete integration with the other elements of beauty. Beauty, he holds, is dependent on a train of thought awakened in the imagination and made up of emotional ideas associated by some principle of connection. Here at last, reason is made an immanent, suffusing element in subjective beauty. The Neo-Platonic view that objective beauty consists in the intelligibility and rationality of the object to some infinite mind to which it is present, is a further position held by Shaftesbury and Alison.
Utility and teleology are by most of these authors connected closely with beauty. Shaftesbury holds that the ideas of beauty and utility are always joined; and that through teleology we arrive at the perception of beauty. Empiricists such as Hutcheson and Burke hold the effect of beauty to be previous to any knowledge of its use; hence utility is not connected with beauty. Teleology Hutcheson holds to be somehow joined to beauty, though only discoverable subsequently after reflection. For example the perception of beauty leads to natural theology. Hume, Kames and Alison maintain that utility, though not an essential of beauty, contribute largely to our aesthetic pleasure. Kames even goes so far as to hold that utility alone may make an object beautiful. The most highly developed conception of utility to be found among these men is that of Reid. Reid holds that utility when it becomes abstracted from particularity and becomes teleology is an immanent, necessary element in the perception of beauty. Beauty gives a value to the object, abstracted from its utility, says Reid; and there is a strong anticipation here of Kant's teleology without end.

Along with an increased emphasis on the rational side of beauty in this period, goes a strong rising interest in the element of imagination. Shaftesbury makes only vag-
mention of it, and with him it is negligible. Hutcheson is the first to treat imagination as important, which he does indirectly by his emphasis on the association of ideas. An object without beauty may become beautiful to our imagination through being in close relation with some object possessing intrinsic beauty. Hume goes farther and distinguishes between beauty of the imagination and the senses. He contends that the mere sympathetic imagination can raise a perception of beauty where there is no practical and rational or great sensory stimulus. Burke in his absorption with the physiological sensational side of beauty neglects almost any mention of imagination. Kames and Reid agree with Hutcheson that an object or an idea may become beautiful to our imagination through close association with some idea or object possessing intrinsic beauty. Whereas Alison, the last of the group, holds that no object has intrinsic beauty; and therefore all beauty of association arises from a succession of ideas each containing an element of beauty, which when joined together, raise the complex aesthetic emotion. Alison gives a thoroughly analytic study of the laws regulating the association of ideas in beauty, basing them on Locke and Beattie.
Turning to the chief contributions of individuals, we must credit Shaftesbury with greatly stimulating the interest in aesthetic thought of his time; and for the potential harmonization of Rationalism and Empiricism implicit in his theory. His most important specific contributions lay in pointing out that the aesthetic faculty matures only through the training and development of all the other faculties; also in championing the criteria of the critic—the creative and synthesizing power of the critic, which Shaftesbury points out, springs from the same source as the creative; lastly in his emphasis on teleology and rationality in beauty. The analogy of beauty and virtue while it had some echoes after Shaftesbury—for example in Hutcheson and Kames—cannot be called an important contribution.

Hutcheson is primarily worthy of note for having carried the principles of Locke into the field of aesthetics. He marks the beginning of psychological theory in British aesthetics; and with it the advent of more analytic, scientific treatment of its problems. He is one of the first to employ Locke's classifications into internal and external senses, likewise of original and comparative beauty. And he discovered the truth that causes, principles and laws have beauty as long as they remain mental abstractions.
but as soon as they become concrete questions regarding particular objects, their aesthetic charm is gone. As we have seen, he is the first of these men to point out that the association of ideas creates beauty in objects. Also he is the first to hint at psycho-physical parallelism, and the first to incline to an utilitarian position in morals. His definition of beauty as the perception of unity in variety had an influence on such successors as Kames and Alison, but was recognized as an insufficient principle to account for more than beauty of design.

Hume did little for aesthetics except to strengthen its empirical, psychological bent. He did point out, however, the distinction between beauties of the imagination and of sense—but his distinction he derived from Berkeley. He agreed with Shaftesbury in holding out that any criticism of beauty must be dependent upon trained intellect and trained sense perceptions.

Burke further emphasized the physiological and psychological basis of aesthetics. His work furnishes an interesting collection of the phenomenal accompaniments of beauty, but is of almost no metaphysical value. He does point out that beauty is a social quality which may be a point worthy of mention; and that all the senses contain
elements of aesthetic experience. His most important contribution perhaps is his treatment of the sublime which he assigns to a place distinct from beauty, yet having equal importance with it.

Kames like Burke, brings a wealth of phenomenal data relating to beauty, yet is equally lacking in any metaphysical power. His examples are drawn from literature and analysed critically without much exposition of the principles behind them. He strongly reflects the influence of Hutcheson, though whereas Hutcheson limited aesthetic appreciation to sight and hearing, Kames further narrows it to sight only. His "Elements of Criticism" was translated into German by Reinhart and exerted some influence but as it stands the book has little original thought or philosophical value.

Reid carries on the work begun by Shaftesbury of synthesizing the Rationalist and Empiricist conceptions of beauty. The perception of beauty involves both sensation, emotion and reason. What distinguishes it from mere sensation is the rationality immanent in the perception; thus, we always have a rational consciousness of the nature and structure of the beautiful object. What distinguishes the aesthetic perception from mere logical reasoning is the agreeable emotion which always accompanies it. Thus he

makes emotion and judgment equally important factors in the perception of beauty. Another important contribution to aesthetic theory is his statement that beauty gives a value to the object abstracted from its utility. This comes quite nearly anticipating Kant's teleology without an end, as has been remarked before.

Alison, the last of these authors is important as exemplifying one of the first intense, analytic treatments of a clearly defined aesthetic problem. He treats it moreover from the psychological point of view and endeavors to trace the source of all beauty to the association of ideas. His efforts to maintain this thesis bring out clearly some of the most important characteristics of this whole period, namely: the subjectivity of beauty, the immanence of both reason and emotion in all aesthetic perception, the recognition of aesthetic elements in all the senses and a tendency to treat beauty psychologically and analytically rather than metaphysically.

A few of the most obvious weaknesses of this period are: a complete failure to attack the problem of ugliness and evil; a tendency to draw too close an analogy between beauty and virtue; a belief in the beauty of mere imitation as such; little appreciation for the beauties of nature; and last a lack of original abstract thought, the place of which is taken by classification and analysis.