

MORAL RATIONALITY

by

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The question whether a moral principle can be rationally justified has long had a central place in philosophical ethics. On its answer depends the possibility of construing the difference between what is morally right and what is morally wrong as objective and universal and hence as knowable by moral judgments on which all persons who use rational methods must agree. Although the question has been given an affirmative answer by many thinkers since the ancient Greeks, no version of the answer has received general assent among philosophers, for its opponents have been able to point out serious flaws.

In this lecture, I want to do three main things. First, I shall show that the claims which have been made for a widely accepted contemporary version of the affirmative answer are without adequate foundation, and I shall present some of the more basic difficulties which confront any attempt to justify a moral principle. Second, I shall briefly sketch a rational justification of a moral principle, and I shall try to indicate, with what I hope is due caution, how it surmounts the aforementioned difficulties. Third, I shall examine how this justification of the principle can cope with other traditional objections.

I

1. The contemporary version to which I have referred rests on a doctrine about the illocutionary force of moral judgments, that is, a doctrine about what persons do or regard themselves as doing in making such judgments. According to this doctrine, a person who makes a moral judgment is not solely or primarily expressing some emotion or giving some command about men's actions; he is also claiming correctness or validity for what he says. This claim derives from the consideration that the judgment rests on sound reasons, consisting usually in relevant facts which can be set forth in true propositions. Although the emotivists had also recognized that reasons, even factual propositional ones, are given for moral judgments, they had insisted that these reasons have only an incitive or rhetorical function: to move one's hearers to accept the judgment. The contemporary rationalists, as I shall call them, rightly deny that reasons for moral judgments function or are in-

tended to function solely or primarily in this way; they point out that the reasons are held to validate or justify the judgments, to give them rational and not merely emotional or conative support. And while the rationalists agree with the emotivists that the reasons taken by themselves provide neither deductive nor inductive grounds for the moral judgments they support, the rationalists add the significant further point that when these reasons are given from, and conform to, "the moral point of view," they do provide logical, indeed deductive, support for moral judgments. For example, the moral point of view contains as one of its main emphases the requirement that for an action to be morally right it must be acceptable to its agent when he is the recipient as well as the performer of such an action. Hence, a judgment that doing x is not morally right can be logically justified by showing that doing x is not in this way acceptable to its agent. For from the major premise that all actions which are morally right are acceptable to their agents when they are the recipients of such actions, and the factual minor premise that doing x is not acceptable to its agent when he is the recipient of x , the conclusion logically follows that doing x is not morally right. Thus, by assuming the moral point of view, reasons can be given which provide logically conclusive justifications for moral judgments.

Despite its claim to have defended the rationality of morals, this approach marks no significant advance over the position of the emotivists and other anti-rationalists with respect to the problem of moral reasoning or justification. For these latter philosophers also held that when a moral principle is assumed, moral judgments can be logically supported by citing relevant facts, so that purely factual considerations or reasons can serve to resolve moral disagreements among men whenever the men in question agree on their moral principles, or agree "in attitude." What the emotivists denied was that the principles themselves, or the "system of values" which particular moral judgments presuppose, can receive any rational justification or argument. "Given that a man has certain moral principles, we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react morally to certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot argue about is the validity of these moral principles."¹

¹ A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, V. Gollancz Ltd., 1948), pp. 111-112. A similar view, that moral principles are ultimately matters of "decision" rather than of argument, is found in the "prescriptivist" doctrine of R. M. Hare. See *The Language of Morals* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952), ch. 4, esp. p. 69.

Now the conception of "the moral point of view" has the same logical status in the rationalists' doctrine as the conception of "moral principles" has in that of the emotivists: once the conception is assumed, moral judgments can be given a rational justification. But the rationalists have not succeeded in giving a rational justification of "the moral point of view" itself. Either they make no attempt at such justification—and here they are at one with the emotivists—or if they do make the attempt, they are quite unsuccessful. It is important to go into the difficulties which explain this lack of success; for they bear crucially on the whole question of the possibility of a rational justification of morality.

2. Before examining these difficulties, we must consider the possibility that the moral point of view requires no justification at all. The main argument for this is that the moral point of view, or at least each of the main specific rules of which it is composed, is self-evidently true and is hence knowable by intuition. Some contemporary philosophers, reviving with greater sophistication the older intuitionism, have held it to be self-evident that, for example, the wanton infliction of pain on another person is always *prima facie* morally wrong, so that the fact that an action causes pain to another is at least an important even if not conclusive reason for not doing it.² Similar self-evidence has been held to attach to the obligations to keep one's promises and to tell the truth. The moral point of view might then be thought of as a generalization from such self-evidences.

In reply to this argument, it must be noted that if self-evidence attaches to certain moral rules like those referred to by intuitionists, it does so only when the specific principle which contemporaries call "the moral point of view" is assumed. The idea that such rules are independently self-evident runs into the familiar difficulty that their alternatives are and have been upheld; and the accusation that these upholders are morally blind simply stops argument when further argument is both needed and possible. What is referred to in the contemporary rationalist doctrine as "the moral point of view" is indeed definitive of a certain normative moral position, which is especially marked by its egalitarian uni-

² See William H. Gass, "The Case of the Obliging Stranger," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 66 (1957), pp. 193-204; J. R. Lucas, "Ethical Intuitionism II," *Philosophy*, vol. 46 (1971), pp. 9-10; Renford Bambrough, "A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals," *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, vol. 14 (1969), pp. 37 ff.; G. J. Warnock, *The Object of Morality* (London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1971), pp. 122-125.

versalism. Thus, one of its main principles is that "moral rules must be for the good of everyone alike."³ But this is only the morality among many; it is opposed to other, inegalitarian-particularist moralities, such as those of Callicles, Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Hitler, which restrict in various ways and on various grounds the range of persons whose good must be furthered by moral rules. Such inegalitarian doctrines are moralities in the sense of being regarded by their respective upholders as supremely authoritative guides to action or ways of life, furthering important social as well as individual interests and propounding various criteria for the distribution of goods and evils.⁴ Hence, even if the guidance of life requires that one have some morality or other, this of itself does not justify the egalitarian-universalist moral point of view as over against any other specific morality.

My conclusion, then, is that the moral point of view itself requires justificatory argument: neither it nor its subordinate rules are self-evident, and both have alternatives which, in terms of a non-question-begging definition of morality, are themselves moral ones. Particular moral judgments and general moral rules may have many different contents, each of which can be justified once the appropriate more general and higher-order principles are assumed. Hence, the crucial question concerns the justification of the principles themselves: Which, if any, principle or set of principles can itself be rationally justified?

In what follows I shall be concerned primarily with the justification of the principle of an egalitarian-universalist morality. By such a morality I mean a body of rules and criteria for individual action and social policy which accord to all men certain basic equal rights. While the precise application of these rights involves many sorts of circumstantial problems, the basic rights in question consist primarily in freedom from coercion by other persons and in certain essential aspects of well-being. My restriction to the principle of such a morality, as I envisage it, derives primarily not from a desire to reflect a parochial attachment to the ideals of our own culture

³ See Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 200-204. Although Baier's book bears the title to which my remarks are addressed, the doctrines in question are also upheld by many other contemporary American and British moral philosophers. Baier's book contains some of the best discussions of these doctrines.

⁴ For discussions of this point, see the various papers collected in G. Wallace and A. D. M. Walker, eds., *The Definition of Morality* (London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1970).

but rather from the conviction that this morality is alone inherently right or valid. The question then is, Can this conviction, and the principle of the morality in question, be justified?

3. Since the justification in question is to be a rational one, a helpful preliminary step will be to look at the concept of reason itself. In English, "reason" is used in three different although related senses, in two of them as a noun, and in one as a verb. As a noun, it is used in one sense to signify a certain power of the mind. This power may have several different aspects. One is the ability correctly to infer conclusions from premises or data. Thus we say, for example, "He used reason (and not mere guesswork) to arrive at the solution to the problem." Another aspect of this sense of "reason" as signifying a mental power refers to a certain quality of mind which is exhibited by persons who use reason in its first aspect: a quality of calm, judicious weighing of evidence as a means of arriving at justified conclusions or beliefs, as against holding the beliefs capriciously or arbitrarily. In this aspect, for example, one may say of someone that he appealed to reason rather than emotion in his discussion of some problem. In a second sense, "reason" is used as a verb to signify the act of reasoning, that is, the activation or exercise of the power of reason in the first sense. Thus we say, "He reasons that because heat is applied, the gas will rise in the tube." In a third sense, "reason" is used as a noun to signify the ground of some conclusion or event, either as the explanation of some fact or as the justification of some act or policy. In this sense we refer to the reason why gas rose in a tube or to the reason why an action was done or ought to be done. I shall refer to these three senses of "reason" by the subscripts P, A, and G, signifying, respectively, reason as power, as act, and as ground.⁵

The most direct way of relating these three uses of "reason" might seem to be as follows: "Reason_P reasons_A reasons_G;" that is, when one's power of reason_P is activated or exercised, one is said to reason_A, and the product of this exercise is a reason_G of some kind. This formula, however, blurs an important distinction. On the one hand, the connection between reason_P and reason_A is very close and indeed necessary, in that reason_A is simply the act of using reason_P, although, of course, one may have reason_P without always using it.

⁵ Other languages share this feature of using the same word, or a closely related one, for the three senses of "reason." See, in French, *raison* for "reason"_P and *α* and *raisonner* for "reason"_A; in Latin, *ratio* and *ratiocinari*; in Greek, *λόγος* and *λογίζεσθαι*.

On the other hand, it must be noted that in one direction there is a much more serious lack of necessary connection between reason_G and reason_P or A. Even if, whenever reason_P reasons_A or infers, it necessarily does so from a reason_G, the converse necessity does not hold: one may have and act on a reason_G without having used reason_P to obtain it. For example, Smith's reason_G for shooting Jones may be that he hated him and wanted him to die; but this reason_G was probably not gotten by the use of reason_P. To be sure, given this reason_G, Smith may well have used his reason_P to infer that shooting Jones would lead to the end or effect he wanted to attain, which was his reason_G for his action. In other words, Smith's hatred for Jones and his wish to see him die set a certain end or purpose for Smith, to attain which he used causal reasoning to infer the means. But this shows only that having a reason_G for an action may lead someone to use his reason_P to infer which action will serve as a means to carry out or effectuate that reason_G; it does not show that the reason_G is itself attained by reason_P. In my above example, Smith's reason_G was his end or purpose in shooting Jones; but although Smith reasoned_A from this end to the means of achieving it, he did not reason_A to this end. He may have seized on this end from powerful emotional impulses. Hence, if an end or purpose which one comes to in this way is irrational, or if more generally we say that a belief or goal which one acquires other than by the use of reason_P is, if not irrational, at least non-rational, then there may be many reasons_G which are either irrational or non-rational.

This distinction between reason_P and reason_G has a direct application to the moral rationalist doctrine discussed above. For even if the moral point of view functions as an ultimate reason_G or principle for the moral justification of actions or judgments, such that one reasons_A from this reason_G to infer conclusions about what one ought to do in particular cases, this does not at all entail that the moral point of view itself rests on reason_P. It need not have been established or ascertained by the use of reason_P at all. And since to be rational requires the use of reason_P, it follows that the whole appeal to reasons_G for moral judgments does not entail that those judgments are rational, for the principle on which they rest need not have been ascertained by the use of reason_P. Consequently, despite all the talk about moral reasons_G as deriving from the moral point of view, there still remains the problem of the rational justi-

fication of one specific moral principle as against its various competitors.

As was suggested above by the distinction between "reason_P" and "reason_A," what I have here referred to as "the use of reason_P" does not necessarily consist in some episodic or occurrent act of reasoning. It may instead be dispositional, in that for such use to exist in relation to some judgment or action it is sufficient that some essential part of the structure of reasoning could have been used to arrive at that judgment or action, and could be recognized by the person concerned as having this relation. The important question hence concerns the general nature or features of the structure of reasoning, which we must now consider with respect to morality.

4. How, then, is reason_P to be used to justify a moral principle? Philosophers have distinguished many different sorts of "reason_P" besides deduction and induction.⁹ Aristotle added reduction, reasoning by example, and the practical syllogism; Peirce added abduction; philosophers going back to Hegel if not to Plato have added various sorts of dialectical reasoning; moreover, some philosophers have held that there is a specifically moral kind of reasoning. This last, however, is often question-begging, in that it involves the use of the very moral principle one is trying to justify. According to this conception, reason_P in its morally relevant sense consists in evaluating proposed actions according to such criteria as whether they promote or harmonize the well-being of all the persons affected by them, or whether the agent is willing to accept such actions when he becomes their recipient. To reason about actions in this way is indeed to apply an egalitarian-universalist moral principle; but it begs the question, which is how to give a rational justification of that very principle. To say that moral reasoning just *is* this sort of thing is also open to the objections indicated earlier, in connection with the claim that the "moral point of view" requires no justification at all.

In discussing the problem of whether a moral principle can be

⁹ See C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London, Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 105-6, 265; William R. Dennes, "The Appeal to Reason," in *Reason*, University of California Publications in Philosophy, vol. 21 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939), pp. 3-42; H. J. Paton, "Can Reason be Practical?," in *In Defence of Reason* (London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1951), pp. 117-156; Kai Nielsen, "Appealing to Reason," *Inquiry*, vol. 5 (1962), pp. 65-84. See also the essays collected in Bryan R. Wilson, ed., *Rationality* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970) and in R. F. Dearden *et al.*, eds., *Education and the Development of Reason* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), Part 2.

justified by reason_p, and in giving my own presentation of such a justification, I shall restrict myself to deduction and induction as the two relevant kinds of reason_p. While recognizing that questions may be raised about both the exclusiveness and the exhaustiveness of this dichotomy of deduction and induction, I think these questions can be satisfactorily answered.⁷ In addition, this restriction is supported by a basic feature traditionally attributed to reason_p: its avoidance of, and opposition to, arbitrariness. The arbitrary is that which depends on and varies with one's inclinations or prejudices. The rational, on the other hand, is guided and restricted by norms or criteria which obtain and are valid quite independently of one's inclinations or prejudices; it is hence that which sets standards to which one must conform if one is to attain correct beliefs or conclusions, as against having one's beliefs reflect one's own whims or predilections. In this respect, inductive logic is rational because its beginning-point, sense perception, reflects what is coercive in experience as against what may be varied according to arbitrary whim, and because it seeks to regulate men's probable inferences on the basis of these coercive sense-experiences rather than hopes or desires. (For present purposes I shall ignore the objections raised on this point by philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz). In a broader sense, induction includes any attempt to establish general conclusions on the basis of particular data. In a parallel way, deductive inference is rational because it restricts valid conclusions to what necessarily follows from premises in virtue of antecedently admitted meanings of symbols, as against what one might like to have follow from the premises. In short, the rational is opposed to the arbitrary insofar as it takes account of what is cognitively necessary or coercive either logically or empirically. Hence, Descartes knew what he was up to when, in order to subject the claims of reason_p to the severest possible test, he hypothesized that all the logical and empirical necessities and coercivenesses of reason might be varied according to the arbitrary whim of an omnipotent evil demon. Whether there are other bases of such cognitive necessity or coerciveness besides those grounded in sense-perception and logical consistency is a point into which we need not now enter. It will be sufficient for present purposes if deductive and inductive reasoning in their various aspects can be

⁷ See, for example, S. F. Barker, "Must Every Inference Be Either Deductive or Inductive?", in Max Black, ed., *Philosophy in America* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 58-73.

shown to be sufficient for the justification of a moral principle. And in restricting ourselves to deduction and induction we shall not be open to the accusation that we have used either an idiosyncratic or a question-begging sense of "reason_P" to obtain our conclusion.

In the remainder of this section I shall indicate some of the chief difficulties which must be overcome by any attempt to give a rational justification of any moral principle, and especially an egalitarian-universalist one, by the use of inductive or deductive reason. In the next section I shall try to show how these difficulties can be overcome.

5. First, then, inductive reasoning: can it be used to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle? I shall here include each of the following under inductive reasoning: (a) the appeal to empirical facts either to refute or to confirm the empirical assumptions on which a moral principle rests; (b) means-end calculation, including "rational choice;" (c) generalizing from men's particular moral judgments to the general principle which systematizes them or which is implicit in them; (d) arguing from the validity or cogency of some specific choice-procedure to the validity or cogency of the moral principle which would be chosen by the use of that procedure.

(a) It has sometimes been held that all inegalitarian moral principles depend crucially on empirically false assumptions or correlations, such as that persons belonging to certain empirically discriminable groups—races, religions, nations, and so forth—have more of some desirable quality, such as intelligence or industriousness, than persons belonging to other such groups. Hence, all inegalitarian principles can be refuted by showing the falsity of the empirical correlations on which they depend, so that an egalitarian principle is left unchallenged and is hence justified, at least by default.

This sort of argument would not work, however, against inegalitarian moral principles which do not rest on empirical correlations. Such principles directly assert that persons who have in superior degree certain unequally distributed qualities, such as intelligence, industriousness, or political ability, should have superior rights. These assertions are justified by an appeal to elitist ideals as to maximal human development, with no attempt to correlate the persons who have these qualities with the members of other empirically discriminable groups.

This consideration also shows the inadequacy of another sort of attempted empirical justification of an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. It is sometimes argued that because all men equally have certain needs or desires, it follows that all men ought equally to have the means of satisfying these needs or desires. Entirely apart from the gap here between "is" and "ought", there is the further difficulty that the second type of elitist just mentioned can always deny, in the light of his inegalitarian ideal, that the men in question are all of equal value, since they are unequal with respect to the quality which is crucially relevant for the allocation of rights.

(b) Some philosophers have tried to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle by an appeal to means-end calculation or "rational choice" concerned with choosing the most efficient means to one's desired ends, where the chooser is an individual whose end is to maximize his own happiness or well-being. The general point, which goes back to Hobbes if not to Plato, is that the only way to be sure of attaining one's own happiness or of successfully pursuing one's interests is by giving equal consideration to the happiness or interests of all other persons who are affected by one's actions. On this view, prudence or self-interest and egalitarian morality coincide, at least so far as concerns the actions which each of them requires, so that an egalitarian-universalist moral principle is justified by being shown to be in accord with rational self-interest.⁸

This argument is unsuccessful, however, because an individual whose sole concern is to pursue his own interests will at least sometimes, and perhaps often, be able to achieve his ends by violating either the legitimate interests of other persons or rules which aim impartially at the good of everyone else.

An important attempt to avoid this result has been made by John Rawls in his much more sophisticated version of the use of rational choice to justify an egalitarian moral principle. Rawls' salient addition consists in the double stipulation that men who are choosing a basic moral principle for the constitution of their society are in an "original position" of equality with respect to power and

⁸ See Baier, *op. cit.*, ch. 12; Kai Nielsen, "Why Should I Be Moral?", *Methodos*, vol. 15 (1963), pp. 275-306; D. A. Lloyd-Thomas, "Why Should I Be Moral?", *Philosophy*, vol. 45 (1970), pp. 128-139. For a quite different approach to this question, see my "Must One Play the Moral Language Game?", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 7 (1970), pp. 107-118.

freedom, and that each is equally encumbered by a "veil of ignorance" about his own particular qualities. Given these equalizing stipulations together with primarily self-centered motives, the men in question will choose an egalitarian moral principle, which is therefore justified by rational choice.⁹

While endorsing many of Rawls' results as well as the careful way in which he works them out, I think that he attains his egalitarian conclusion only by a seriously circular argument. For the veil of ignorance, in addition to its obvious non-rational (because non-cognitive) features, is, like the assumption of original equality, a way of removing from the rational choosers' consideration certain factors, consisting in the actual empirical inequalities and dissimilarities which obtain among men, which, together with their self-interest, would strongly influence them to make inequalitarian choices. Neither of the stipulations by which Rawls avoids this inequalitarian result has any independent rational justification: men are not in fact equal in power and ability, nor are they so lacking in empirical reason as to be ignorant of all their particular qualities. This latter stipulation, that of ignorance of particulars, goes far beyond the limited assumption of ignorance which actual rational men make when they choose under conditions of uncertainty. Hence, Rawls' egalitarian conclusion is achieved only by putting into his premises an equality which cannot itself be justified either by empirical facts or by consideration of cognitive adequacy (as opposed to ignorance).

(c) Many moral philosophers have held that the only way in which any moral principle can be justified is by generalizing from men's particular moral judgments to the general principle which is implied or presupposed by the judgments. The particular judgments are hence the independent variables, so to speak, and the general principle is accepted as correct or valid insofar as it reflects in a general way what is judged to be right or wrong in those particular cases.

A more complex version of such an inductive justification has been upheld by Nelson Goodman in respect of the principles of deductive and inductive inference, and this in turn has been applied by Rawls to the justification of a moral principle. The pattern of the justification is that general rules or principles of logical inference or of morality are justified by being shown to be in

⁹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971), chs. 1-4. See especially pages 14, 143, 293, 401 ff., 413 ff.

accordance with the particular logical inferences or moral judgments which we actually make and accept, and the particular inferences or judgments are in turn justified by being shown to be in accordance with general rules or principles of inference or of morality. The circularity which is present here is held to be virtuous rather than vicious, because the justification of both the general principles and the particular inferences or judgments consists in their being brought into agreement or "reflective equilibrium" with one another.¹⁰

Whatever be the merits of such an inductive justification with regard to the principles of logical inference, it suffers from a serious difficulty when applied to morality—a difficulty already encountered earlier in my discussion of the possible self-evidence of a moral principle. The inductive justification assumes that we can quite unambiguously differentiate the morally right from the morally wrong in men's particular moral judgments, and can hence infer what is the morally right general principle by generalizing from the morally right particular judgments. This would work well enough so long as there is no serious dispute over the particular judgments which are taken as the sources. But what if there is such dispute; what if the judgments are challenged by a Callicles or an Aristotle, a Nietzsche or a Hitler? In this case, to appeal to the principles to settle the dispute would beg the question, since the principles rest exclusively on the particular judgments which the opponents are disputing. A principle which shows that alternatives like those just mentioned are morally wrong must do so not simply because it is itself a generalization from the opposed alternatives—for this is question-begging—but because it has an independent rational justification of its own.

(d) Some philosophers have tried to justify a moral principle by using what I shall call a *reflexive* method. By this method, one infers that a moral principle is valid or cogent from the fact that it would be chosen by a mental procedure which is itself valid or cogent, in that the procedure embodies such valuable mental characteristics as being fully informed, free, imaginative, sympathetic, calm, impartial, willing to universalize, acting on principle, considering the good of everyone alike, and so forth. The most famous version of this reflexive method is the "ideal observer" theory

¹⁰ See Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Indianapolis and New York, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pp. 63-64; Rawls, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21, 48-51, 120, 579.

stemming from Adam Smith. Other versions of the method attempt to justify a moral principle or principles through a certain "qualified attitude" or through the "considered judgment of a competent person" or through a "rational choice among ways of life" or through "the moral point of view."¹¹

These reflexive methods of justification all suffer, however, from a fatal dilemma. The mental characteristics or procedures which they regard as decisive in justifying one moral principle as against another are themselves either morally neutral or morally non-neutral, i.e., normatively moral. If the characteristics are normatively moral, then the argument is obviously circular. For in this case a moral principle will have been justified by assumptions which are themselves normatively moral ones, as to which mental characteristics or procedures are morally right as against morally wrong. But it is precisely these assumptions which had to be justified. Such characteristics as being impartial and sympathetic are among the obvious instances of this; for a man who is partial to himself (or to some favored group) in certain contingencies by making exceptions in his own favor, or who is lacking in sympathy for others who are suffering, is rightly condemned on moral grounds. If, on the other hand, the mental characteristics or procedures in question are morally neutral, as is the case with being fully informed, imaginative, and calm, then there is no guarantee that such non-moral traits will lead to the selection of one moral principle as against another, nor in particular to an egalitarian-universalist principle. A man may have such traits and still choose a moral principle which assigns superior rights in respect of well-being and freedom to persons of superior intelligence, political ability, and so forth.

I conclude, then, that while each of the varieties of inductive reasoning considered above makes a suggestive contribution, none is sufficient to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle.

6. Let us now turn to deductive reasoning: is it any better off in this respect? If we envisage a moral principle as the conclusion of a deductive inference in some sort of unilinear sequence, the

¹¹ For these, see respectively, Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 12 (1952), pp. 317-345; Richard B. Brandt, *Ethical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1959), ch. 10; John Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 60 (1951), pp. 177-197; Paul W. Taylor, *Normative Discourse* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961), ch. 6; Baier, *op. cit.*, chs. 7-8.

following difficulty arises. To justify something is to show its rightness or correctness as dependent on or following from something else. What is to be justified, the *justificandum*, is hence, in the justificatory sequence, logically posterior to that which justifies it, the *justificans*. A principle, however, is what is logically prior or first in some field, in that everything else in the field depends for its justification more or less directly on the principle while the principle in turn is not dependent on or justified by anything else. Consequently, the very idea of justifying a principle seems contradictory for it requires showing the dependence of what is independent, the logical posteriority of what is logically prior, giving the justification of that whose justification cannot be given.

Even if this difficulty is overlooked, the attempt to justify a principle by deductive reasoning appears to involve either an inevitable circularity or a certain superfluity. For the only things left to justify the principle are the very *justificanda* or consequents which it is the function of the principle itself to justify; hence, the *justificanda* can justify the principle only if it has already been assumed that the *justificanda* have themselves been justified by the principle. But if this assumption is made, then there is no need to justify the principle, for the latter could not have justified the *justificanda* unless it were already understood at that point to be itself in no need of justification. And if the principle is justified by the *justificanda* only because the latter have been justified by the principle, then the question of the principle's justification is obviously begged. Hence, the justification of the principle is either circular or superfluous.

The difficulties so far considered apply to the attempt to justify a principle in any field, including logic and empirical science. There are further difficulties when the principle one is trying to justify is a moral one. For insofar as a morality consists in rules of action which are regarded as supremely authoritative by the persons who accept them, there seems to be no possibility of deriving the principle of such rules from some superior source, since this principle is itself held to be supreme in the practical order.

Even if this difficulty is waived, the attempt to justify a moral principle by deducing it from some superior principle incurs the following dilemma. The superior principle in question must itself be either moral or non-moral. If it is a moral one, so that the justification which is given is also moral, then this obviously begs the question. For a moral justification of a moral principle already

assumes, in its criterion of justification, the very principle which is to be justified: the *justificans* is the same as the *justificandum*. If, on the other hand, the superior principle from which the moral principle is deduced is a non-moral one, then it is doubtful on many grounds whether the moral principle can be justified at all. In particular, there is the logical question of just how a moral principle containing an "ought" can be justified by premises which are theological, or biological, or psychological, or sociological, and the like, which do not themselves contain any "oughts". The familiar problems of naturalism and heteronomy arise here.

The principle of universalizability is sometimes held to surmount these difficulties of deductive inference. To begin with, the principle has the feature of logical necessity which is characteristic of deductive inference in general. Just as in a deductive inference one cannot affirm the premisses and deny the conclusion, on pain of self-contradiction, so in universalization one cannot, without self-contradiction, affirm that a predicate P belongs to a subject S because S has some quality Q—where the "because" means sufficient reason or sufficient condition—and deny that P belongs to all other subjects S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n which have quality Q. In other words, the principle of universalizability says that if a predicate belongs to one subject for a certain sufficient reason, then it logically must belong to every other subject which fulfills that sufficient reason. If this inference is denied, then one contradicts the original statement or assumption that one has given a sufficient reason for the predicate's belonging to the first subject.

The principle of universalizability has a direct moral application in such a form as: What it is right for one person to do, it must be right for any similar person in similar circumstances to do. Here, as before, it is explicitly assumed that the attribution of right to the first person's acting is based on a certain sufficient reason, and this rightness logically must characterize the same kinds of actions of all other persons who fulfill that sufficient reason. It is this fulfillment which supplies the criterion of relevant similarity in the principle's statement that all the other persons in question must be similar to the first. Thus, if it is right for S to do x (for example, to make a lying promise) because S has Q (where "Q" signifies, for example, wanting to avoid mild inconvenience, and where the "because" is, as before, that of sufficient reason or sufficient justifying condition), then it logically must be right for any other person who wants to avoid mild inconvenience to make a

lying promise. The moral bite of the principle of universalizability in its moral application consists in this logical requirement that a person who claims some right for himself must acknowledge that all other persons who are relevantly similar to him also have that right. For the principle thereby rules out the kind of special pleading by which persons or groups make exceptions in their own favor; it requires instead that persons be impartial toward one another and accord one another equal rights. And since the principle is a purely logical one based on the concept of a sufficient reason, it would follow that deductive reasoning alone is able to disjustify all particularistic moralities and hence, at least implicitly, to justify an egalitarian-universalist morality.

Nevertheless, the principle of universalizability does not provide a sufficient ground for such a morality. The reason for this is that the principle allows two important kinds of variability with respect to content. First, as to the actions which it is right to perform, the principle sets no limits on these other than the variable desires or opinions of the agents or other protagonists. Thus, since the principle says that what it is right for one person to do it must be right for any relevantly similar person to do, *A* may without inconsistency claim the right to do anything he likes to *B* so long as *A* would be willing to undergo that same kind of action should he come to have the qualities which he adduces as his justification for so acting on *B*. Second, as to the criteria of relevant similarity or the sufficient reasons for having the right to perform various actions, the principle of universalizability likewise sets no limits on these, so that agents or other protagonists can tailor these criteria or reasons to suit their own variable desires or prejudices. Thus, so far as the principle is concerned, *A* may without inconsistency claim the right to inflict various harms on other persons on the ground of his possession of qualities which are had only by himself or by some group he favors; or, alternatively, on the ground of his recipient's possession of qualities quite different from his own. Hence, the agent will not have to worry, so far as the argument from universalization is concerned, about situations where he might become the recipient of the sort of harms he inflicts on others, since the sufficient reasons for having the right to inflict these harms pertain only to himself or his own group. And even if it is insisted that the agent, in order to apply the principle, must imagine himself as being in the position of the recipient, this still leaves it open that fanatical agents may be willing to be recipients of such harm-

ful actions. It is these variabilities as to the actions one might be willing to undergo and as to the criteria of relevant similarities that remove whatever egalitarianism might otherwise be thought to characterize the principle of universalizability. Since the content provided for the principle is contingent on these variable features of men's desires and prejudices, it admits of many outcomes other than egalitarian-universalist ones.

So far as the above considerations have shown, then, reason_p as applied both in deductive and in inductive reasoning is unable to justify an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. This inability has had several sides. Formally, some of the attempted justifications have been circular, including in the premisses the very egalitarian-universalist principle they have purported to justify. Materially, others of the attempted justifications have left the door open to moralities which are opposed to egalitarian universalism. Various other logical difficulties have also been noted.

Despite these negative results, I think it is possible to give a rational justification of an egalitarian moral principle which avoids the above shortcomings. Since I have presented this justification in various other places,¹² I shall here confine myself to sketching the main argument and shall then consider how it fares with respect both to the difficulties indicated above and to other sorts of objections.

II

It must be stressed at the outset that in the rational justification to be presented here I aim to use reason_p only in the senses to which I restricted myself above, those of inductive and deductive inference. One salient aspect of my procedure concerns the logical status of various assertions I shall make about human action and its relation to morality. While recognizing that this question involves many complex issues, I shall interpret these assertions as conceptual or logical analyses of the concept of action, rather than as statements of the criteria of action or as inductive generalizations. I shall interpret the conceptual analyses, moreover, on the model of deductive inference, such that the various components into which a complex concept is analyzed belong to it with logical

¹² See my "Categorial Consistency in Ethics," *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 289-299; "Obligation: Political, Legal, Moral," *Nomos*, vol. 12 (1970), pp. 55-88; "The Justification of Egalitarian Justice," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 8 (1971), pp. 331-341. In my forthcoming book, *Reason and Morality*, I present a detailed development of the argument.

necessity, so that it is contradictory to affirm that the complex concept applies and to deny that one of its component concepts applies.

It will be helpful to give a brief summary of my argument presenting a rational justification of an egalitarian-universalist moral principle before spelling it out in somewhat greater detail. The main point is that the voluntariness and purposiveness which every agent necessarily has in acting, and which he necessarily claims as rights for himself on the ground that he is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, he must also, on pain of self-contradiction, admit to be rights of his recipients. For they are similar to him in being prospective agents who want to fulfill their purposes. Therefore, every agent logically must admit that his recipients have certain basic rights equal to his own rights of voluntary and purposive participation in transactions, which are equivalent, respectively, to rights of freedom and of well-being. The statement of these rights constitutes an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. My argument hence largely takes the form of what I shall call dialectical necessities: dialectical, in that it proceeds through certain claims made by agents; necessities, in that these claims logically must be made by the agents and they also logically must accept the corresponding obligations.

Now for a somewhat more detailed statement of the argument:

1. All moral rules and judgments about what is right or obligatory deal, directly or indirectly, with human actions. Moral rules, regardless of their highly variable contents in different moral systems, are intended for the most part to direct or guide the performance of actions by persons who know what they are doing and who can initiate and control their movements or behavior in the light either of the rules in question or of other purposes which the agents have in view. Moral judgments are intended, at least in part, to evaluate the agent's performance of actions insofar as he is accountable for them.

2. Hence, actions as delimited by moral rules and judgments, in the general sense of "moral," must have two main features. First, they are voluntary, in that the agent who performs them knows what he is doing and initiates or chooses and controls his behavior, without his choice being forced. (The choice and control, even if lacking at the time of the immediate act, must have been present at an earlier stage, as in cases of culpable negligence). Second, they are purposive, in that the agent intends to do what he does, envisaging some purpose or goal which may consist either in the perfor-

mance of the action itself (whether or not it conforms to some rule) or in some outcome of that performance; in either case, insofar as it is the purpose of his action the agent regards it as some sort of good. (The kind of goodness here in question need not, of course, be moral).

I shall henceforth call voluntariness and purposiveness the *categorical features* of action, since they characterize the whole category of morally relevant action, as against the features of more particular kinds of action within this category.

Since agents are persons who perform actions in the sense just specified, it is necessarily true of every agent that he acts voluntarily and purposively.

By a "transaction" I shall mean an action in which an agent acts on at least one other person, whom I shall call the recipient. It is necessarily true of every agent, then, that *qua* agent he participates voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved.

3. Since, in acting, the agent acts for some purpose which seems to him to be good, this good constitutes for him his justification for performing the action, so that he regards his action as justified. Hence, he regards himself as having a right to perform the action, and he makes a corresponding right-claim. It must be emphasized, however, that the justifications and rights here in question, like the goods, need not be moral ones; they vary according to whatever criteria the agent invokes explicitly or implicitly in the purposes for which he acts.¹³

As we saw earlier, it is necessarily true of every agent that *qua* agent he participates voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved. Hence, the point just made can be put in similar terms: every agent necessarily claims, at least implicitly, that he has a right to participate voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved. It may be objected that one cannot rationally claim to have a right to do what one cannot help doing; and since the agent cannot help participating voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved *qua* agent, he cannot rationally claim to have the right to participate in transactions in these ways. My answer to this objection is that what the agent claims to have a right to do is not merely to participate voluntarily and purposively but to participate in these ways in

¹³ I have dealt with this point in some detail in "The Normative Structure of Action," *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 25 (1971), pp. 238-261.

particular transactions. He can avoid participating as an agent in particular transactions, and it is to these participations that he claims to have the right in virtue of what seems to him to be the goodness of the purpose for which he acts. I shall give a further answer to this objection below, after some additional necessary steps have been sketched.

4. Every right-claim is made on behalf of some person, at least implicitly, under a certain description or for a certain sufficient reason. Although the descriptions or sufficient reasons adduced by agents may vary widely, the only description or reason for his action which the agent is rationally justified in giving is that he is a prospective agent who has some purpose which he wants to fulfill. For it is this description which is necessarily and universally, hence invariably, connected with the category of action which, as we have seen, is the general subject-matter of morality and practice.

Another way to see this point is as follows. In order to be rationally justified, a procedure must be non-arbitrary. But any agent's procedure in making his right-claim is arbitrary so long as he is permitted to pick and choose according to his own predilections from among the varying descriptions or sufficient reasons which may enter into his right-claim. The only way to halt this arbitrariness, and hence to establish his claim on a rationally justified basis, is to restrict its content to what is necessarily and universally connected with its subject-matter, as against what is optional or left to the agent's discretion. Hence, insofar as the agent's necessary right-claim is restricted to what he is rationally justified in claiming, his claim that he has a right to participate in the transaction in which he is involved must refer to himself *qua* prospective agent who wants to realize some purpose of his.

This point, bearing as it does on the criterion of relevant similarities, is so crucial with respect to egalitarianism that it requires some further consideration. Its crucial character can be seen from the fact that the description under which or the sufficient reason for which an agent claims the right to do something constitutes for him the criterion of relevant similarities, that is, the criterion as to the respect in which other persons must be similar to him in order for them logically to have the same right as he claims for himself. Hence, in the kind of argument which is being developed here, an egalitarian-universalist conclusion that all men have an equal right to something can be logically justified only if the quality in respect of which men must be similar, in order to have the right in ques-

tion, is a quality which is had equally by all men. We must, then, subject any such proposed criterion of relevant similarity to the closest possible scrutiny in order to test whether the criterion is itself rationally justifiable or whether the only basis for introducing it is to support the egalitarian principle we are trying to establish.

While I cannot here present the full scope of such a scrutiny, I can at least indicate some of its main aspects. I have been discussing the description under which or the sufficient reason for which the agent claims the right to participate voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved; and I have asserted that the only way in which he can avoid arbitrariness with respect to this description or sufficient reason is by holding that it consists in being a prospective agent who has some purpose he wants to fulfill. Now this description is obviously a very general one, and it will lead to an egalitarian result since all men equally satisfy the description. It may be objected, however, that the agent may fulfill the rational requirement of avoiding arbitrariness by holding that the description under which or the sufficient reason for which he claims the right to perform his action is something much less general, namely, the specific purpose for which he acts. It is obviously this specific purpose, whatever it may be, that constitutes his reason for acting; for example, to obtain some money, to win a political victory, and so forth. Hence, in citing this specific purpose the agent would be telling the truth about the ground of his right-claim, and at the same time he would be giving a *specific* characterization of his action. The characterization I have proposed, on the other hand, is excessively general, since it says that the agent claims the right to perform his action merely in virtue of being a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes: a characterization which pertains equally to all persons whatsoever.

There are at least two interrelated replies to this objection. One is that the agent's specific purposes may themselves be arbitrary in that they reflect desires on his part for which there is no, or insufficient, rational justification. Specific purposes are themselves in need of rational justification; at least, much of the point of a rational moral principle is to evaluate men's contingent purposes by reference to non-arbitrary, rational criteria. My contention is that the rationality in question is to be achieved by removing from the ground of the agent's right-claim those of its aspects which do or may reflect his own particular desires or predilections, and

recurring instead to that aspect of it which, being necessary and universal, is impervious to such contingent influences.

A second reply to the objection is that the agent, after all, claims the right to participate voluntarily and purposively not only in his present action with its particular purpose but in all his actions. To restrict to his present purpose his reason for claiming an action-right is to overlook the fact that he regards his voluntary and purposive participation as a good in respect of all his actions and purposes, not merely his present one. It would, therefore, be arbitrary of him to single out just one purpose—his present one—or just one description of himself—that of an agent who is now acting—as the sufficient reason for which or the description under which he claims the right to act. For this attachment to the present would ignore its pervasive similarities to his other purposes and states in respect of his reasons for acting. Hence, when the agent's right-claim is restricted to what he is rationally justified in claiming, from within his own standpoint in purposive action, he must claim this right insofar as he is a prospective, not merely a present, agent who wants to fulfill his purposes in general, whatever they may be, not just his present, particular purpose.¹⁴

This conclusion also bears on the objection considered above, that it is anomalous if not contradictory for the agent to claim a right to do what he cannot avoid doing, namely, to participate voluntarily and purposively as an agent in transactions. My earlier answer to this objection stressed that the agent claims the right to participate voluntarily and purposively as an agent in his particular transactions, and he can avoid participating in this, since whether or not he initiates the transaction is under his control. From the discussion just concluded, however, we can derive a further answer to the objection. For the agent rationally claims the right to participate voluntarily and purposively not only *qua* present agent but also *qua* prospective agent; and in the latter capacity it is not the case that he cannot avoid participating voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which he is involved. For although

¹⁴ I have previously discussed the criterion of relevant similarities in "The Justification of Egalitarian Justice" (cited above, n. 12). See also my analyses of this question in "Some Comments on Categorical Consistency," *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 20 (1970), pp. 380-384; "The Non-Trivializability of Universalizability," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 47 (1969), pp. 123-131; "The Generalization Principle," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 73 (1964), pp. 229-242, at pp. 237-240. I also discuss other problems of universalizability and the criterion of relevant similarities in a monograph, "Ethics," to be published in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

it is necessarily true that insofar as he is an agent he participates voluntarily and purposively in the transactions he initiates, it is by no means necessarily true that his participation in all his future transactions will be voluntary and purposive, since his participation in them may not be as an agent at all. His relation to these future transactions is at most only that of prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, not that of present agent. Hence, since his voluntary and purposive participation in future transactions is not inevitable insofar as he is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, there is no contradiction or conflict in his claiming the right so to participate. This right-claim, however, is itself necessary, given that the agent acts or wants to act for purposes that seem to him to be good.

5. It follows from this that every rational agent logically must accept the generalization that all prospective agents who want to fulfill their purposes have an equal right to participate voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which they are involved. This generalization is a direct application of the principle of universalizability; and if the agent denies the generalization he contradicts himself. For he then denies what he has implicitly affirmed insofar as he is rational: that he has the right so to participate because he is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes. For in this affirmation he has held that possession of the categorial feature of being a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes is a sufficient reason or justifying condition for having the right in question.

Now the recipients of the agent's action are themselves prospective agents. Hence, the agent logically must acknowledge that they have rights, equal to his own, to participate voluntarily and purposively in transactions in which they are involved with him. Their right to participate voluntarily entails a correlative obligation on the agent's part not to coerce them; their right to participate purposively entails a correlative obligation on the agent's part not to frustrate their purposes and hence not, especially in basic respects, to harm them. The general principle of these obligations and rights may be expressed as the following precept addressed to every agent: *Apply to your recipient the same categorial features of action that you apply to yourself.* I shall call this the *Principle of Categorial Consistency (PCC)*, since it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the

categorial features of action, including the right-claims which the agent necessarily makes.

The *PCC* is an egalitarian-universalist moral principle, because it requires of every agent that he be impartial as between himself and his recipients when the latter's freedom and welfare are at stake, so that the agent must respect his recipients' freedom and welfare as well as his own. To violate the *PCC* is to establish an inequality or disparity between oneself and one's recipients with respect to the categorial features of action and hence with respect to whatever purposes or goods are attainable by action.

This, then, concludes my brief sketch of the rational justification of an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. The main point, put succinctly, is that what for any agent are necessarily goods of action, namely freedom and well-being, or at least the absence of harm, are equally goods to his recipients, and he logically must admit that they have as much right to these goods as he does, since the ground or reason for which he rationally claims them for himself also pertains to his recipients. The many further complexities of this doctrine, including the various ways in which the principle is able to account for justified departures from equality of rights, must be left for another occasion.

My justification of the *PCC* has been rational in that it has argued from what is necessarily involved in the concepts of action and reason. The argument, then, has been primarily deductive, including the use of the principle of universalizability to bring out the inconsistency which results from denying a certain entailment based on the idea of a sufficient reason.

How does my justificatory argument cope with the difficulties I set forth in my first section? To begin with, there is no vicious circularity in the argument; my premisses, bearing as they do on the necessary, categorial features of action, do not include in any direct or explicit way the egalitarian-universalist moral principle which is to be justified. Since, however, the argument is intended as a necessary deductive one, it must be admitted that the moral principle is in some sense implicitly present in the premisses. But this is implicit only. The conclusion arrived at is genuinely informative, in that it has not been recognized that implied in the concept of being an agent is the further concept of making right-claims on the ground of having purposes and envisaging goods, and that this ground logically requires an extension of the rights in question to the recipients of the agent's action. Hence, this logical

containment of the *PCC* in the premisses does not constitute the sort of obvious, vicious circularity which characterized the kinds of arguments I examined in my first section.

In addition, the principle which my argument justifies is an egalitarian-universalist one, although the full specification of this would require many further details into which I cannot enter here.

Since my justificatory argument has been deductive, how does it cope with the above-indicated difficulties of the deductive justification of a moral principle? My answer comprises three main points. The first is that my justificatory argument has appealed to general principles of reason, including especially the requirement of consistency. Second, my argument has proceeded by an analysis of the concepts of action and reason. Since action is the primary genus of morality, in that moral rules are precepts as to how men should act, the first two points amount to saying that a moral principle is deduced from rational considerations about the features which necessarily pertain to all action. Since these considerations are logically prior to specifically moral considerations, because the moral is subsumed under the rational and the practical, the difficulties of deriving a moral principle from some superior principle are to this extent resolved. A moral principle is indeed logically first in the field of morality, but this field belongs to the wider fields of rationality and action, and a moral principle can be deduced from principles of these wider fields without losing its logical primacy within the field of morality itself.

Third, this deduction also resolves the problem of how a moral principle with its "ought" can be derived from a superior principle which does not contain any "ought". For I have argued that right-claims, with their correlative obligations or "oughts", are logically implied in all purposive action, in that, as indicated above, every agent claims the right to perform his action on the ground of what he regards as the goodness of its purpose, so that he also holds that no one ought to interfere with his action. Hence, the sequence from action to morality is not merely from an "is" to an "ought" but rather from a context which implicitly contains an "ought" to another context in which this "ought" is made explicit. This "ought", moreover, is a moral one not only because, pertaining to all action, it is unescapable in the practical order, but also because it entails requirements as to how agents are to treat their recipients where their freedom and welfare are mutually involved.

These considerations also bear on the ways in which my use of

the principle of universalizability surmounts the difficulties characteristic of most moral applications of it. These difficulties, to which I called attention above, arise from the variabilities as to content which the principle admits: variabilities as to the actions which it is right to perform and as to the criteria of relevant similarities. My argument avoids these difficulties because it substitutes rational necessities for these contingent contents.

First, as to the actions which it is right to perform, whereas the usual applications of the principle allow agents to choose and describe these actions according to their own inclinations or ideals, regardless of how their recipients might react to them, my application of the principle restricts the agent's action-descriptions to necessary contents, that is, to the categorial features of action, voluntariness and purposiveness. It is these features that the agent must apply to his recipients. Unlike the actions permitted by the usual applications of universalizability, these features are necessarily acceptable to the recipients because they embody what is directly involved in freely acting for one's purposes.

Second, as to the criteria of relevant similarities, whereas the usual applications of universalizability allow agents to choose and describe these according to their own desires, my application restricts these criteria to descriptions which are necessarily and universally connected with the category of action, namely, the description of being a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes. Because this description pertains equally to all agents and recipients, my application of universalizability necessarily entails an egalitarian-universalist moral principle, as against the inegalitarian and particularist moralities permitted by the usual applications of universalizability. Both of these shifts in respect of content, from variable to necessary features of action and criteria of relevance, result from applications of reason in that basic respect in which it is opposed to what is arbitrary. In this respect, reason requires that the features of action and criteria of relevance which give content to the logical form of universalizability not be permitted to vary according to the agent's contingent predilections, but that they reflect necessary and universal aspects of their subject-matter.

If my above arguments have been successful, then, it is possible to give a rational justification of an egalitarian-universalist moral principle. Or, to put it otherwise, reason_P, in a non-question-begging sense, is on the side of egalitarian universalism; it is neither

morally neutral, as Hume held, nor does it, as Plato and Aristotle thought, justify an inegalitarian morality.

III

According to my above argument, every rational agent must accept the *PCC* on pain of self-contradiction. This, I have held, is a consequence of the concept of a rational agent. My argument, then, has proceeded by conceptual analysis, and, as I indicated earlier, I shall interpret this as meaning that the *PCC* and the moral rules and judgments which follow from it are all analytic.

Now there are many traditional objections to regarding moral principles and judgments as analytic. Before considering some of the main ones, I wish to point out that the way of construing moral judgments which I have sketched above provides an answer to the vexed question of whether, and how, moral judgments are susceptible of truth and falsity. My answer does not involve an intuitionist appeal to the meaning of normative moral expressions, nor does it make the truth of moral judgments relative to their being acceptable from "the moral point of view" in the sense discussed earlier.¹⁵ According to my account, moral judgments are primarily concerned to attribute duties or obligations to rational agents and correlative rights to their recipients; and these attributions are true if they follow from the concept of what it is to be a rational agent in the ways indicated above. Unless an agent admits that his action is unjustified—in which case he admits defeat so far as concerns his right to perform his action—it follows from the concept of being an agent that he claims certain rights for himself, and it follows from the concept of being rational that his right-claim is made under a certain description. Hence, it follows from the concept of being a rational agent that every such agent must admit both that his recipients, all of whom fulfill that description, also have the rights he claims for himself, and that he has correlative obligations toward his recipients. It is in this way that all correct moral judgments

¹⁵ See Warnock, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-125; Baier, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-186; Kai Nielsen, "On Moral Truth," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Monograph Series No. 1 (1968), pp. 9-25; Alan R. White, *Truth* (London, Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1970), esp. pp. 57-65. A quite different approach to the truth of moral judgments can be found in the important "ontological" alternative set forth by Henry B. Veatch, *For an Ontology of Morals* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1971); see esp. Ch. VI. Unlike the other references given in this note, Veatch's doctrine focuses on goodness as an objective property of things; this provides a direct basis for attributing truth to moral judgments.

are analytically true: it is logically necessary, by virtue of the concept of being a rational agent, that such moral judgments be accepted by every rational agent.

The logical structure of a moral judgment, according to the above account, hence conforms to the pattern of dialectical necessity which I said would characterize my arguments. Strictly speaking, a moral judgment is not simply of the form: "*A* ought to do *x*;" rather it has the more complex form: "If *A* is to be a rational agent, then he must admit (or accept) that he ought to do *x*." For the reasons mentioned earlier in connection both with the non-arbitrary character of reason and with the necessity of the categorical features of action, this "if-then" structure does not make moral judgments hypothetical or contingent on men's variable inclinations or ideals. Moral judgments are addressed to rational agents in the sense of agents who are capable of attending to and being influenced by rational considerations (although, of course, this capacity may often not be exercised, or be exercised incorrectly, in relevant circumstances). Hence, the structure of a moral judgment may also be expressed as follows: "*A*, *qua* rational agent, ought to do *x*." The *PCC* and the moral judgments which follow from it are analytically true, then, in that they indicate what actions ought to be performed by rational agents, as following from what must be logically admitted by such agents. Every rational agent logically must admit that he ought to apply to his recipients the same categorical features of action that he applies to himself; hence, he ought to refrain from coercing or inflicting basic harm on his recipients, and also, by virtue of this requirement, he ought if possible to give certain basic kinds of assistance to other persons.

Without taking up here the further elucidations which the various applications of the *PCC* require, I want now to examine some of the main objections against regarding moral judgments as analytic and logically necessary.

1. *Objection.* What is analytic is purely linguistic, in that the predicate of an analytic statement pertains to its subject simply in virtue of the meaning of the subject-term. Hence, an analytic statement reflects only linguistic usage. But this yields no substantive conclusions either about the nature of things or about the contents of valid moral norms. From the fact that a word has a certain meaning nothing follows about what one ought to do, even if the word in question is "good," "ought," "action," or "reason." To put it otherwise, an analysis of meanings yields only indicatives

about language, not imperatives or guides to action. Hence, there is no basis for presenting the *PCC* in the imperative mood, as I have done.

Reply. The analytic statements presented in my above argument for the *PCC* reflect not merely idiosyncratic or even conventional meanings of words but rather concepts which signify objective properties. This is also the case with many other analytic statements. For example, it is an analytic truth that if X is longer than Y and Y is longer than Z, then X is longer than Z; but the transitive meaning of "longer" on which this truth is based derives not merely from linguistic usage but rather from factual characteristics of this relational property itself.¹⁰ It is because the relation of one thing's being longer than another is transitive and because men are aware of this transitivity that in their linguistic usage "longer than" signifies a transitive relation. Similarly, even if my statements are analytic that all actions delimited by moral and other practical rules are voluntary and purposive, that agents make implicit claims that they have the right to perform their actions, and so forth, this analyticity depends not on my idiosyncratic decisions or even on conventional linguistic usage alone, but rather on the properties of the relevant actions and agents, as signified by the respective concepts. Some analytic truths arise because men can conceptually understand extra-linguistic properties and make linguistic classifications based on that understanding. More generally, to characterize some statement as analytic is by no means necessarily to hold that it is "purely linguistic" or that there are not good extra-linguistic reasons for the classifications of the meanings of the terms comprising the statements.

As for the objection that the analysis of meanings yields only indicatives, not imperatives or moral norms, it is important in this respect to distinguish the position of the agent from that of the philosopher who analyzes what is involved in being an agent. The philosopher's analysis does, indeed, yield only indicatives; but among these indicatives are statements which point out that agents logically must make right-claims, which can be reformulated as imperatives. The fact that the philosopher presents right-claims only in indirect discourse—in such a statement as, "An agent claims that he has the right to do x"—does not militate against the further

¹⁰ I have previously argued for this in "The Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Truths," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 50 (1953), pp. 397-425, at pp. 419-424.

fact that right-claims logically must, at least implicitly, be made in direct discourse by agents, as in "I have the right to do x ." Hence, from the standpoint of the agent the conceptual analysis of his action shows that he logically must accept, as being made by himself, certain right-claims and hence certain ought-judgments and imperatives (summed up in the *PCC*), even though, from the standpoint of the philosopher, the results of such analysis consist only in indicatives or in "cognitive propositions."

The agent cannot reject these right-claims and the consequent ought-judgments on the ground that their attribution to him reflects merely the philosopher's linguistic usage or conventional meanings of words. Rationally to reject these attributions, the agent would have either to admit that what he is doing is wrong or to deny that he acts for purposes which he regards as good. The former alternative would constitute an admission of defeat so far as concerns the justification of what he does, so that the agent would at least implicitly accept a negative ought-judgment concerning his action. The latter alternative would fly in the face of the purposiveness which characterizes his action. Hence, unless the agent is willing to concede that his purpose in acting is a bad one overall—in which case he accepts a negative ought-judgment about his action—he must admit that he makes an affirmative, normative claim for his action. It is such normative claims or judgments on the part of agents which conceptual analysis shows to be necessarily involved in action. Hence, such analysis also shows that the *PCC* and the moral rules which follow from it are rationally justified, in that they must be accepted by a rational agent as logically implied by the right-claims which he necessarily makes under the only description which he is rationally justified in giving.

2. *Objection.* What is analytic is vacuous, i.e., it has no substantive content, since it is reducible to the form "What is A is A." Hence, it cannot serve to guide any actions. In order to guide action, a judgment must be informative in that it tells us that some independently identifiable action is to be done or not done. If this independent identification of the action cannot be made, i.e., if we cannot identify the action without already knowing that it has the moral predicate which the judgment attributes to it, then we don't know *what* action it is that we ought or ought not to do. For example, an analytic moral judgment, such as "Murder is wrong," requires that we already know that the action in question is wrong, since "murder" simply means wrongful killing. Hence, it amounts

to saying that killing which one ought not to do is something that one ought not to do. But it doesn't enable one to identify *which* is the sort of killing which one ought not to do. Hence, it cannot serve to guide our action.¹⁷

Reply. We must distinguish between explicitly and implicitly analytic statements and between logical and psychological vacuity. In an implicitly analytic statement, such as "Every (Euclidean) triangle has angles which are equal to two right angles," the predicate is deducible from the definition of the subject only through several intermediate steps, and this may be psychologically quite informative. In such statements one can identify the subject in terms, say, of concepts A and B without already being aware that the subject logically or implicitly also contains concepts X, Y, and Z. It follows from this that analytic moral judgments may give practical guidance if they are only implicitly analytic. For in such judgments the kind of action which the statement says is right or wrong can be identified independently of our being aware that the moral predicate applies to that kind of action. Thus, in specific reference to the *PCC*, we can know that a transaction is such that the recipient does not participate in it voluntarily and purposively, independently of knowing that such a transaction is wrong; and yet its necessary wrongness follows logically from the *PCC*, which is itself analytic by virtue of the concepts of "action", "agent", and "reason" as indicated above.

3. *Objection.* Any moral or other practical rule must be such that it is possible for the persons addressed by the rule both to obey it and to violate it. If both these alternatives are not available to the persons addressed, then there is no point in having or setting forth the rule. But it is logically impossible to violate an analytic moral rule. For a rule to be violated is for something (an action or a refraining from action) to occur which is the opposite of what the rule requires. But the opposite of what an analytic moral rule requires is self-contradictory, and what is self-contradictory cannot occur. Hence, violations of analytic moral rules cannot occur.

Reply. There is a crucial ambiguity in the statement, "the opposite of what an analytic moral rule requires is self-contradic-

¹⁷ For this objection, see especially George Nakhnikian, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy," in H. N. Castañeda and Nakhnikian, eds., *Morality and the Language of Conduct* (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1963), pp. 153-155. See also Hare, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42, and Jonathan Harrison, *Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1971), Ch. IV.

tory." This contention is correct if by the "what" in question is meant the *whole content* of the rule itself; for example, the opposite of "One ought to refrain from wrong killing" or "One ought to refrain from coercing one's recipient" is self-contradictory. But the contention is incorrect if by the "what" is meant the *action* referred to in the rule; the opposite of refraining from wrong killing or from coercing one's recipient is not itself self-contradictory. Hence, one can violate an analytic moral rule even though to deny the rule, or to affirm its opposite, is to contradict oneself.

It is important in this respect to be clear about the relation between a rule and its violation. In the case of a rule of the form "Doing x is wrong," its violation consists in doing x , not in bringing it about that doing x is not wrong. Hence, the violation of the rule is not affected by the relation between doing x and wrongness, since it consists only in doing x . But since what makes a moral rule analytic, on the view here under consideration, is the relation between an act and its deontic predicate—specifically, that the predicate is logically contained in the concept of the subject-act—their relation is not affected by whether or not the act is performed. Thus, even in the case of an explicitly analytic moral rule like "wrong killing is wrong," its violation consists in wrong killing, not in bringing it about that wrong killing is not wrong. What is self-contradictory or logically impossible is that an act which is wrong be not wrong, not that the act be performed. But when one performs a wrong act one does not thereby make the act not wrong. Hence, the performance of a wrong act or the violation of an analytic moral rule is not a case of doing what is contradictory or logically impossible.

These considerations apply directly to the *PCC*. A person who violates the *PCC* contradicts himself because he holds that a right which belongs to him insofar as he fulfills a certain description, and which hence belongs to all persons who fulfill that description, does not belong to another person who fulfills that description. But this contradiction pertains to the content of his beliefs, which is a logical matter; it does not affect the fact that his action occurs removing the right in question from the person to whom it rightfully belongs. His action does not make right what is wrong—this would indeed be self-contradictory. But in performing his violative action, even if he says that his action is right, his violation consists in removing from someone a right which rightfully belongs to the latter, not in bringing it about that that right does not rightfully

belong to him. To put it otherwise, the analyticity of a moral rule or judgment essentially involves its normative, not its empirical content, its rightness or wrongness, not the empirical facts which enter into it. To violate the rule or judgment consists in bringing or refraining from bringing certain empirical facts into existence—e.g., in assaulting or failing to rescue someone. But what is analytic about the rule or judgment turns not on the existence of the facts, but on a certain moral predicate's pertaining to the facts.

4. *Objection.* If the *PCC* is genuinely a moral principle, then it must be practical in the sense that it serves to guide action. In order to guide action it must give persons a reason for acting in one way rather than in another. But the only reason which the *PCC* gives for acting is that a person who violates it contradicts himself or is otherwise irrational in the sense of arbitrary. This, however, does not provide a genuine reason for acting in accordance with it. A genuine reason for acting must be practically efficacious in that it presents a motive for persons' acting in one way rather than in another. The consideration of self-contradiction, however, is rarely efficacious in this way, except for logicians and other persons engaged in theoretic pursuits. Hence, the *PCC*, so far as concerns the basic argument I have presented in its support, confuses the kind of reason which is appropriate to theoretic statements with the kind of reason which has practical bearings.

Reply. The traditional distinction between justifying and motivating reasons must be reiterated here. Reasons may be practical by setting forth justificatory criteria bearing on action even if men are not thereby moved to act in accordance with them. Since, as we have seen, actions implicitly involve right-claims on the part of rational agents, and since in transactions these claims may conflict with the rights of the recipients, the morally practical question is not: Which side can influence the other to move in the favored direction?, but rather: Which side is rationally justified? Now the most basic way of proving that a position is not rationally justified is to show that it involves a contradiction, for freedom from self-contradiction is the necessary condition of all rational justifiability. Hence, considerations of consistency and self-contradiction are directly relevant to practical reasoning.

5. *Objection.* Even if freedom from self-contradiction is the necessary and most basic condition of rational justification, this has no specific bearing on *moral* justification. To contradict oneself is to make an intellectual mistake, but this is different from making

a moral mistake in the sense of doing what is morally wrong. To base the rational justification of the *PCC* on the consideration that agents who violate it contradict themselves is to confuse the kind of justification which a person lacks when he says that 2 added to 3 equals 6 and the kind he lacks when he wantonly kills or assaults someone.

Reply. The *PCC*'s rational justification as a moral principle is based not on the formal consideration of consistency alone but also on the fact that its content is morally relevant, in that it is concerned with interpersonal relations in situations of potential conflict. The content to which the *PCC*'s formal consideration of consistency is applied is the agent's claim that he has the right to participate voluntarily and purposively in the transaction in which he is involved with his recipient insofar as he (the agent) is a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes; and the application of the *PCC* to this claim reflects the logical requirement that to avoid inconsistency the agent must admit that his recipient, who is also a prospective agent who wants to fulfill his purposes, also has the right to participate voluntarily and purposively in the transaction in which he is involved with the agent. What is thus admitted entails, by virtue of the conceptual relation between "right" and "ought", that no one (including the agent) ought to prevent the recipient from participating voluntarily and purposively in the transaction in which he is involved with the agent. Now this is a moral "ought"-judgment, because it bears on the purposes or interests of someone other than the agent. Hence, the logical requirement of consistency, when applied to the categorical features of interpersonal action, yields a moral requirement.

Categorical consistency in its very concept is a moral as well as a logical requirement, so that the extensional equivalence of the two requirements in the *PCC* is not merely coincidental. The reason for this is that the *PCC* bears not on consistency of beliefs or actions on the part of one person in isolation, but rather on consistency which is transactional and hence interpersonal. To be categorially inconsistent is to claim for oneself the most basic rights of action in a transaction with other persons, while denying these rights to the persons who are affected by one's action and who are relevantly similar to oneself. It is therefore to make exceptions in one's own favor and hence to be unfair to others. To violate the *PCC* is hence to do what is morally as well as logically wrong.

The distinction between "logical" or "intellectual" and

"moral" justification, while helpful in some respects, may lead one to ignore the fact that all morally relevant actions lay claim to rightness in the sense of rational justifiability. The rightness in question may not be directly moral in the sense of bearing on the interests of other persons; but it becomes moral once, through the universalization discussed above, the right-claim's predicate is necessarily extended to other similar persons. Now to show that such claims are not rationally justifiable is to subject them to the most basic kind of condemnation: a kind whose criteria cannot rationally be escaped or denied by anyone who engages in rational discourse or communication.

6. *Objection.* It is not the case that consistency is the necessary condition of all rational justification, for it may sometimes be rational to contradict oneself. A Machiavellian ruler, for example, may find it expedient to make mutually inconsistent statements when this advances his end of maximizing his power. Since a basic kind of rationality is the use of efficient means for achieving one's ends, such self-contradiction is rational. It may even be morally right to contradict oneself. For example, X says to Y's friend, "Y is in this house"; shortly thereafter, when an armed gangster Z comes looking for Y in order to murder him, X says to Z, "Y is not in this house." Since X's statement to Z prevents a murder and is intended to do so, X's self-contradiction is morally justified.

Reply. When it is said that consistency is the necessary condition of all rational justification, it is important to be clear about the kind of justification which is in question. What is primarily involved is not the efficient use of means for whatever ends one happens to have, nor is it even the intention to say what is true, although the latter is much closer to rational justification than the former. The crucial point is the opposition between the rational and the arbitrary. The arbitrary is what can be tailored to one's wishes or whims, regardless of what these may be; hence, it provides ultimately no objective or independent check or test of what one says or does. To be sure, the Machiavellian ruler's mutually inconsistent statements are tested for their adequacy by their effectiveness in advancing his end of self-aggrandizement. But this end is not in its turn similarly tested against any further criterion of adequacy or correctness in the Machiavellian context. Hence, the Machiavellian ruler's use of language in such contexts is ultimately arbitrary, in that it is dependent for its adequacy on ends not them-

selves subjected to scrutiny by criteria which are independent of his own predilections.

The rational, on the other hand, reflects criteria which are independent of one's whims or predilections. The use of language for the end of telling the truth is hence rational because, in order to conform to this end, one's statements must correspond to objective states of affairs. And consistency is basic to this rationality because two mutually inconsistent statements " p " and " $\neg p$ " cannot both be true; hence, one cannot be rationally justified in the attempt to fulfill the objective criterion of truth if one says both " p " and " $\neg p$."

These considerations also apply to the morally justified making of inconsistent statements, as in my above example of X 's helping to save Y 's life. When X says to Z , " Y is not in this house," X intentionally says what is false and intentionally contradicts himself; yet his saying this is rationally justified. For X is trying to prevent a murder. Murder is the most extreme case of an agent's applying to his recipient different categorial features of action from those he applies to himself and hence of incurring a transactional inconsistency. For the murderer, while participating purposively in the transaction, causes his recipient to lose all further possibility of fulfilling any of his own purposes. X 's factual self-contradiction, then, is rationally justified because it helps to prevent this extreme transactional inconsistency, so that it is incurred in the service of the *PCC*. To be sure, lying is itself a violation of the *PCC*, insofar as X 's lying to Z is fulfilling X 's purpose while frustrating Z 's. Nevertheless, in the situation as described, X 's contradicting himself by lying to Z is subordinate, in respect of rational justification, to X 's saving Y 's life by the action, and the reason for this is found in the categorial content of the *PCC*. For the purposes fulfilled by preventing a murder are more basic than those that would be fulfilled by telling the truth or being propositionally consistent in this situation. This example makes clear the points stressed above: that the formal consistency requirement must be considered together with its categorial content, and that the latter as well as the former is an application of reason.

7. *Objection.* To regard moral principles and judgments as necessarily true is to attribute to them a much more stringent modality than that found in natural science. But this is anomalous. As philosophers since Aristotle have emphasized, each discipline must seek only that degree of precision which its subject-matter

admits of. Since the subject-matter of ethics is human actions and institutions, which involve much more variation than the subject-matter of the natural sciences (let alone mathematics), the moral principles and judgments which ethics propounds must be correspondingly variable and contingent.

Reply. In addition to the tradition stemming from Aristotle, there is another tradition (to which belong philosophers as otherwise different as Locke and Kant) which regards moral judgments as necessarily true. In one respect there is no irreconcilable disagreement between the two traditions, since the contingency which Aristotle emphasizes pertains to the context where moral rules are applied to particular cases amid all the variable circumstances in which they are involved, while the necessity which the other tradition emphasizes pertains rather to the ultimate principles themselves from which the particular judgments derive. The applications of the *PCC* must, indeed, take account of such variabilities as arise in trying to determine just when coercion or basic harm is being inflicted on some recipient or just how specific rules justified by the *PCC* may mitigate its prohibitions against coercion and basic harm.

A justification can, however, be given for attributing to the *PCC* and its derivative moral rules a degree of stringency or necessity superior to that found in the laws of the natural sciences. There is a unity of subject and object in morality which is not found in any of the natural sciences, including psychology, insofar as it is an empirical discipline. This, it must be emphasized, is not the same as Locke's point that moral knowledge can be certain because its objects are mixed modes made by the mind itself, which do not represent anything beyond themselves and hence can be completely known by the mind which made them. This point is compatible with a view of the "objects" of morality as completely conventional and even arbitrary constructs. My point is rather that morality sets rational requirements for rational agents; hence, the whole enterprise is under the control of reason, in the ways traced above. In this respect, morality is unlike empirical psychology, where the independent variables are modes of behavior or of feeling which are not the same as the intellectual and empirical procedures which study them; and this non-identity is still more obvious in the relation between the knowing subject and the known objects in the other natural sciences. The rational agents for whom moral requirements are set are not in principle different from the

rational persons who ascertain what these requirements are, despite the greater degree of analytical precision which distinguishes the philosopher from the non-philosopher.

The *PCC*, as traced above, follows from the concept of what it is to be a rational agent. Hence, the independent variable which determines the content of the moral principle is the same as the persons for whom that principle sets requirements. And these are indeed *requirements*, not only because they logically follow from necessary antecedents but also because the persons to whom they apply are emotional and conative beings as well as rational ones, so that they do not automatically fulfill the requirements set by reason. Still, it is because of its central focus in reason_p that the principle of morality can attain the status of a necessary truth.

I have tried to indicate in this lecture how both the formal consistency requirement of the *PCC* and its categorial content are applications of reason_p, and hence how an egalitarian-universalist moral principle can be rationally justified.

The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the *Graduate Magazine* that

the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to speak on "Values of Living"—just as the late Chancellor proposed to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and "Plan for Living."

In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that

The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form.

The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas School of Law as part of his book *Students' Culture and Perspectives: Lectures on Medical and General Education*. The selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated to the Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been published, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of seventy-five cents each.

1961. "The Idea of Man—An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology."
By José Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College.
1962. "Changes in Events and Changes in Things."
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester.
1963. "Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language."
By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College.
1964. "Human Freedom and the Self."
By Roderick M. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University.
1965. "Freedom of Mind."
By Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University.
1966. "Some Beliefs about Justice."
By William K. Frankena, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
1967. "Form and Content in Ethical Theory."
By Wilfrid Sellars, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh.
1968. "The Systematic Unity of Value."
By J. N. Findlay, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
1969. "Buber and Buberism—A Critical Evaluation."
By Paul Edwards, Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.
1971. "What Actually Happened."
By P. H. Nowell-Smith, Professor of Philosophy, York University.