Freedom of Mind

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by Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy
Princeton University
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Stuart Hampshire
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University of Kansas
I shall first state what I shall be trying to maintain in this lecture in respect principally to belief, but also in respect of a man’s aims and sentiments and intentional states generally. My thesis will be that, no matter what experimental knowledge of the previously unknown causes that determine a man’s beliefs is accumulated, that which a man believes, and also that which he aims at and sets himself to achieve, will remain up to him to decide in the light of argument. I want to suggest some grounds for the compatibility of the law of causality and the freedom of the subject to form his own beliefs, aims, and intentions by reasoning. Secondly, I want to point to a generally unrecognized consequence of taking the doctrine that the physical states of the organism determine uniquely corresponding states of mind. This is of course not the only, or even the usual, sense of “materialism”; but it is one possible sense. I shall argue that when this causal dependence of states of mind upon physical states of the organism is known to hold, then the dependent states of mind become, in virtue of the knowledge of the dependence, a form of perception. This was a consequence of the materialist hypothesis, and one which Spinoza saw; but most of those contemporary philosophers who have argued for some form of materialism have not perceived, or have not stressed, this consequence.

I shall not be trying to disprove, or to contradict, anything that could properly be called a thesis of determinism: e.g. the proposition “every event has a cause,” or “every event is an instance of some natural law, which explains its occurrence by reference to some set of initial conditions.” About these propositions I would only say that they seem to me to be illegitimately general, and for that reason vacuous. Because nothing would count as finding a negative instance to them, nothing would count as finding a good reason to believe that they are true or that they are false. Therefore they, and their negations, will play no part in my argument. But I am ready to agree that, given that we have any true statement of fact about a state of
mind, e.g. that Jones believes that there is a lectern in the next room, then we can always look for, and may expect ultimately to find, an explanation of this fact by reference to some set of initial conditions, which will, in normal circumstances, constitute sufficient conditions of Jones having this belief. I am also ready to agree that this request for an explanation of psychological fact, if pressed far enough, and pressed successfully, will always include, as one element in the whole explanation, an experimentally confirmed covering law. That is, I am ready to agree that there is no a priori reason why, given that a psychological fact is specified by a description, and given that we hold this description of the explicandum constant, we should not find an explanation under a covering law, experimentally confirmed.

Suppose my name to be Jones and I speak. I say “It is a fact that I believe that there is a lectern in the next room.” I can give you my reasons for believing, which, in the normal case, I believe to be good reasons, or at least not altogether bad ones. I give you my reasons, and then say “Now you know why I believe that there is a lectern in the next room; you have the explanation of my belief.” I have not told you all that you might conceivably have wanted to know when you inquired why Jones had this belief. I have not claimed to give you an explanation that amounts to specifying a sufficient condition of the belief. I have only claimed to mention one interesting condition which I take to have been a necessary condition for the consequence, or at least a cause, on this occasion. I have committed myself to the assertion that, had I not recently been in the room and seen something that looked like a lectern there (this being my reason), and if everything else in my situation had remained the same, I would have been more doubtful of the existence of a lectern in the next room than I in fact am, at least for some interval of time. When I give my reason for believing something, and claim to be accurate in this piece of autobiography, I state another belief, and a sketch of an argument which was in some sense present to my mind, or which would have come to mind, if I had been challenged; and I am committed to the hypothetical statement that, if this belief, and/or sketch of an argument, had been shown to be erroneous, I would in fact have reconsidered, or weakened, the belief which was their consequence. I am committed to no more than
this by offering you the reason for my belief. But also I am committed to no less. I am therefore implicitly denying that sufficient conditions of my holding the belief at that time about the lectern in the next room can be found in states of the organism, or of the environment, which do not include the belief, and/or sketch of an argument, that constitute my reason. I am not committed to denying that there existed in the state of the organism, and of the environment, conditions that were necessary to explain my holding the supporting belief or my following the supporting argument to its conclusion. If, for example, you were interested in the causal explanation of an error of Jones' about the objects in the next room, you might find an adequate explanation in some state of his organism. Equally if you were interested in Jones' surprising ability to form true beliefs about objects in the next room, you might find some adequate explanation in the state of his organism and of the environment. By manipulating and changing the relevant states of the organism and of the environment, you might thereby change his true beliefs into erroneous ones and his erroneous beliefs into true ones. But if Jones' account of the reason for his belief was a true one, then the states of the organism and of the environment were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for his belief.

How does Jones know what the reason for his belief that there is a lectern in the next room is or was? Sometimes of course he does not know, and particularly in these perceptual cases; but sometimes he does know. In one simple type of case he knows the reason for his belief, just because he gives his assent to a proposition, under a certain condition or proviso, and this condition is that which he gives as his reason when he is asked. When asked whether there was a lectern in the next room, he might have answered “Yes, there is, if the room which I have just visited is the next room to this one, as I believe it to be, and if that tall thing which I saw in the corner is a lectern, as I believe it to be.” Here he has spelt out in conditional form his belief together with its ground. In general we form beliefs which we are ready to revise if other beliefs that we hold are shown to be false. One belief is conditional upon another and upon a reasoning process of some kind, which at each step involves a belief. I could for some purposes present my beliefs as a chain of beliefs connected by reasoning, and therefore in con-
ditional form, and without detachment. When I am forming my beliefs in conditions of uncertainty, they present themselves to me with some of their conditions attached. When I am asked to give my reason for a belief that I hold, and that I have detached, I am asked to reconstruct some of the chain of conditions upon which it depends. In this reconstruction I do not need to appeal to a general covering law in order to assure myself that I have found a necessary condition of my detached belief. For I know that this belief was formed conditional upon others. Exactly the same may be true when I form an intention or adopt an aim. I may form it or adopt it subject to certain conditions, which I could either specify in conditional form, or produce as my reasons for forming that intention or having that aim. In cases where I have the conditional intention of leaving early if it rains, the rain can be given as my reason for leaving early, if this is what I finally do. Similarly in cases where I will only believe something if certain observations were actually made, then these observations can be given as my reasons for believing. These are the simple cases, which illustrate the possibility of knowing the implied singular hypothetical proposition to be true without appeal to a covering law.

I am not arguing that a man cannot be mistaken in giving his reasons for a belief or for having a certain aim. He can, and often he is mistaken. An argument from parallel cases may lead to the conclusion that his alleged reasons ought to be regarded as rationalisations, which do not at all explain his belief or his intention. The argument from parallel cases might be sufficient to convince us that the supporting belief, and/or reasoning, was not a necessary condition of the ensuing belief: that he would not in this case for a moment have suspended or weakened his ensuing belief, if the supporting belief and/or reasoning had been shown to be erroneous. I am only arguing that we do not need inductive, experimental argument in order to be assured justifiably that so-and-so is the reason for a belief or an intention.

This rough outline of an account of “being my reason for believing $p$” can be generalized, and applies equally to my reasons for wanting, my reasons for doing, and my reasons for having a certain attitude towards an object, or for feeling a certain emotion about it. Whenever I state “This is my reason, and it is my only reason,” there is a singular hypothetical prop-
osition entailed. Suppose that the reason for an action specifies a belief about some features of the action, e.g. its consequences: "I am doing it because it would help my friend." Then the entailed hypothetical is "If I did not believe that it would help my friend, I would become, at least for a time, more uncertain about doing it; I would reconsider." If this is given as my reason in the past ("My reason for doing it was . . ."), then the implied proposition is the hypothetical "If I had not believed that it would help Jones, I would have reconsidered doing it; that is, I would have been more uncertain, at least for a time, whether I was going to do it." This hypothetical proposition can be relevantly challenged by an appeal to inductive evidence; but the subject may be justified in claiming to know that it is true merely in virtue of his memory of his calculations at the time. So "x is his reason for φ-ing" entails the hypothetical "If he was shown that x includes a false belief, he would become more doubtful whether to φ or not," or "he would reconsider whether he would φ or not." My becoming doubtful whether I would φ or not, during deliberation, and when reasons are in place, amounts to the same as reconsidering. For my becoming sure that I will do so-and-so, that I believe so-and-so, that I am frightened of so-and-so, amounts to deciding; deciding, in the sense that, if I have first been uncertain whether I will do so-and-so, believe so-and-so, want so-and-so, fear so-and-so, and then consider the matter, my becoming sure, for some reason, brings it about that I intend to do so-and-so, want so-and-so, fear so-and-so, believe so-and-so. So we get the sequence of hypotheticals: if I lose some confidence in the validity of the reasons that explain my belief, intention, desire, attitude, or emotion, I lose some confidence that this is my intention, desire, attitude, or emotion. While I lose confidence, I cease to intend, want, believe, fear, etc. The two suggestions here are (1) that being sure of the object believed, intended, wanted, feared, makes that the object, (2) that the reasons for intending, wanting, fearing, believing, can be entered, in these cases of deliberation, into the full characterization of the intention, the desire, the fear, or the belief. The reason is in this sense internal to the state of mind, although it may also be a partial explanation of the state of mind. To classify my state as fear about so-and-so, or anger with so-and-so about so-and-so, is already to imply a partial explanation of the perturbed state of mind.
The allegation that explanation of states of mind by reasons is a distinct kind of explanation from explanation by causes, is unclear, and, insofar as it is clear, undemonstrated. But there is a distinction between two kinds of hypothetical proposition which may be involved in explanation; the first kind does not require the support of a covering law whenever someone claims to know that there is a true explanation, although it may be challenged by an appeal to a well-confirmed covering law. The second kind of explanation does require the appeal to a covering law, or at least to the evidence of parallel cases, if a claim to knowledge is to be justified at all. Consider the following:

1. "I would not like that person, if he did not have that particular quality."
2. "I would not want to go there, if they took the casino away."
3. "I would not have gone to the opera last night, if Callas had not been singing."
4. "I would not have believed that, if I had not had his eye-witness account."
5. "I would not be frightened of going up in the elevator, if it were larger."

In each case the condition stated in the if-clause gives a reason which will serve as a partial explanation. At the same time the condition stated can be viewed as specifying more fully the intention, the desire, the fear, the belief, the state of mind. I may simply recall that my intention to go to the opera was in this way conditional. But the reason and the partial explanation may be shown to be a mere rationalisation. Inductive arguments from parallel cases may lead me to doubt whether the statement of my reason is acceptable, that is, whether the implied hypothetical is true; just as inductive argument from parallel cases may lead me to doubt whether an unconditional statement of intention is true, even though I do not need to support a statement of intention with inductive evidence that I will in fact try to perform the action when the time comes. The question "How do you know that this was your reason?," and even more, the question "How do you know that this is your reason?," are odd and require a special context; but the questions "Are you sure that this was your reason?," and "Are you sure that this is your reason?" are normal. It is worth noticing that in this context I may give what would be my
reason for doing something in advance, and before I had decided whether to do it or not; and similarly for belief. Balancing the several reasons for believing or disbelieving the story that I have been told, I may say that these would be my only reasons for believing the story, even when I am not sure whether I do believe it or not. In cases of this kind the reasons for believing, or for acting, or for feeling, are incomplete explanations; we can always ask why did those reasons actuate you at that particular time, while they did not influence others relevantly like you, or why they did not influence you on relevantly similar occasions.

Let us turn back to the situation of someone who has a belief when there is evidence that sufficient conditions (with the ordinary reservations that must always be attached to this phrase) exist in the state of the physical organism for his holding this belief. There are two possibilities: first, that he does not know that his belief can be adequately explained by the physical state of the organism: secondly, that he comes to know that his belief can be adequately explained by the physical state of the organism. Of the first case, a belief explicable by hypnosis would be an example, if we knew of a physical mechanism upon which the success of hypnotic suggestion depends. Let us suppose that we acquire this knowledge. Any reasons that the victim offers in partial explanation of his belief under hypnosis will be rationalisations. The reasons will be no part of the explanation of his belief, and it will not be true that, if his reasons are shown to contain error, he will for a moment reconsider, and be for a moment more doubtful about his belief. He will simply substitute another reason, clinging all the time to the suggested belief. I will leave aside the suggestion that all our beliefs, and all our intentions, might rest on rationalisations in this way, without asking whether this is a coherent suggestion. At least we know of some clear cases of rationalisation.

Turn to the case where the subject comes to know the adequate explanation of his belief. Then the question is unavoidably raised for him of whether there is a correlation between the physical state of the organism and his belief in the specific proposition in question being true; that is, he must ask himself whether there is a rational connection between his organism being in a certain state and there being in fact a lectern in the
next room. In other words, he has to evaluate the discovered causes of his already formed belief as evidence of the truth of the belief. While he is evaluating the causes of his former belief as evidences of truth, his belief is suspended, and becomes only an inclination to believe. For if he says (to himself or to another), "I now know why I have believed this, but I don't yet know whether the causes are reasons for believing or not," he is not expressing a present belief. Suppose that he finds that there is indeed a correlation between the operation of these causes and his holding a true belief; then he has learnt how he knows, or why he believes, that there is a lectern in the next room, in the sense that he has learnt the mechanism which is at work. So a man might all his life have been able to judge the distances and sizes of objects seen from a great height, without knowing the mechanism that was at work, and in this sense without knowing how he knew, or why he believed, that one object was further away than another on a particular occasion. He previously was unable to give his reason for believing that the tower was further away than the bridge, and, because he was unable to give the reason, there is a sense in which he had no reason for the belief; namely, that there was no true hypothetical proposition present to his mind, or specifiable by him on request, of the form "I would have reconsidered whether the tower was further away from the bridge, if I had not believed so-and-so." We have a choice here: the language allows us to say both that he just had the belief without a reason, and also allows us to say that there was a reason which he did not know and which he has now learnt. So the connoisseur who can tell on sight the date of certain works of art, but cannot say how he tells, may be said to have a reason, which might be disclosed by interfering with clues. By suppressing some information which he was receiving, without his being distinctly aware of it and of its efficacy, we may discover the clues which he is "using," without his knowing that he was "using" them. Or he may be said to tell without having any reason at all.

But the interesting difference is the difference that is made by his coming to know how he forms his beliefs, or whence he derives his knowledge. Then he again has the evaluative question, like the man who has discovered that there exists a physical state of the organism which is a sufficient condition of his belief. Now knowing the mechanism, he must raise the question of
whether there is a reliable correlation between the physical state of the organism and the truth of the relevant belief. If he discovers there is such a correlation, then he has acquired a reason for now, and henceforth, endorsing the inclinations to believe which occur when the physical state of the organism is present. If there is, as far as he can discover, no such reliable correlation, then his inclination to believe, which will now be his state of mind, will no longer be for him a reason for actually believing. The hypnotist's victim, who could be made to believe false or true propositions indifferently, was ignorant, while hypnotized, of the adequate explanation of his belief. If he had known, while under the influence of the hypnotist, that his beliefs were adequately explained by the hypnotist's suggestions, as sufficient conditions in themselves, and that these suggestions were not sufficient evidences of truth, then his beliefs would have been only inclinations to believe. For a man distinguishes "I believe p" from "I am inclined to believe p," as reports of his state of mind, precisely by the implication (not entailment) which is attached to the first-person and not to the second- and third-person uses of the verb—namely, "p is to be believed."

Consider the following design of an experiment. An advertiser wishes to have some scientific foundation for his attempts to influence the beliefs of a certain class of consumers. He wants to know what are the sufficient, or under normal conditions, nearly sufficient, conditions of their believing that they are suffering from a certain physical weakness and need a certain kind of tonic. He therefore arranges an elaborate experiment, to assess the efficacy of his techniques of brain-washing. He is allowed to vary the stimuli from the environment and to vary the state of the organisms, only provided that he does not bring about the state of affairs which he wishes his subjects to believe exists. My suggestion is that if he asks the brain-washed group to report changes in their beliefs, as he changes the state of their organisms and the stimuli from the environment, he must refrain from telling them what he is doing; for if he tells them what he is doing, then they can only report changes in their "beliefs," in an inverted-comma sense, and their changing states of mind are more properly described as their inclinations to believe. The experiment otherwise cannot be carried through. The subjects are bound, by the sense of the concept of belief, to regard their
belief reports as reports of inclinations to believe, if they do not believe that the changes in their organisms and in the environment can be shown to be means of sharpening their powers of discovery.

The presence of the clues by the use of which I unknowingly form my veridical beliefs about physical objects, will be a sufficient condition, taken together with the normal state of organization, of my forming these beliefs. When I have learnt the mechanism from the scientific study of perception, I may use this knowledge to protect myself against error, and thus employ a method of inference which was not available to me before. My beliefs, even in the normal cases, will then have a different explanation from before, merely in virtue of this new precaution against error: another factor has been added. Unless I believed that the mechanism was working normally and along the standard path towards discovery of truth, I would not now endorse the inclination to believe which is its outcome; and this hypothetical proposition I may know to be true directly. When my belief is based on inference, and has been reached after precautions against error, there is always a hypothetical proposition that could be quoted to specify one of the necessary conditions of my belief.

One sees therefore why the phrase "the causes of the belief" sounds odd, if "causes" is interpreted as sufficient conditions (with the necessary reservations). For sufficient conditions of belief are immediately converted into sufficient conditions for an inclination to believe, when the conditions become known to the subject and are believed by him not to be reliable indices of truth; or the sufficient conditions of belief, hitherto, become reasons for belief, when the conditions become known to the subject and are taken by him to be reliable indices of truth. But this is not to say that the phrase "the causes of the belief" is improper, or that there cannot be sufficient conditions of particular beliefs, both of true beliefs and of false beliefs: looking back to beliefs that have been held by me, or that are now held by others, I can indeed seek to explain them adequately, as I can seek to explain any other phenomenon. But one must always allow for the fact that an increment to the subject's knowledge of the factors that are determining, and that explain, his current beliefs will by itself change the account that will have to be given of why he believes.
A similar complexity attends the explanation of a man's intentional actions. Given that we have the specification of a man's intention at a particular time to act in a particular way, and provided that we hold this description constant, we can seek an adequate explanation of the fact in some covering law, which will correlate such an intention with some initial conditions, normally including those desires and beliefs which the subject would give as his reasons. But we have to allow for the fact that an increment to the subject's knowledge of the factors, other than his own specifiable reasons, which explain his intentions must complicate his intentions in one way or another. Suppose that he learns that, in addition to the reasons that he would give to explain his intention, there are certain other necessary conditions to be observed in the state of his organism and in the inputs that explain this state of the organism. He has learnt that he would not have acted in the way that he is acting, if these conditions had not existed. In virtue of this knowledge, there is at least one account of his intention that becomes applicable, even when his original intention is not otherwise altered: namely, that he intends to allow his conduct to be determined by these factors rather than, e.g., to test their effects on him or to try to escape their effects on him.

If one accepts, as I do, that no limits can be set a priori on the scope of scientific explanation, one must still observe that scientific explanation requires that the description of the phenomenon to be explained must be held constant from the beginning of the inquiry to its conclusion. If a man comes to believe that his state of confidence in the excellence of his performance is wholly explained by a confidence-engendering pill which he has taken, he will no longer be so confident of the excellence of his performance. From the standpoint of the doctor, there is an identifiable and isolable state of mind, a state of confidence, which might have been produced by the pill, provided that the subject is ignorant of the cause, and which might have been produced by an excellent performance. From the standpoint of the subject, there is a state of tranquillity, which will only be a state of confidence while it is believed by him to have a certain explanation. The peculiarity of the explanation of intentional states—beliefs, intentions, attitudes of mind, desires—is that the subject's acquisition of knowledge about the explanation, or a change in his beliefs about the
explanation, modifies the descriptions applicable to the phenomenon explained, and also modifies the explanation itself. This is not a ground for suspending, or despairing of, the search for scientific understanding of mental states of any kind. On the contrary: the more I learn of mechanisms that may explain the past occurrences of these states, the more I am in a position to anticipate, and either to modify or to reinforce them, as I choose.

We see this complexity in the explanation of intentional states most clearly if we trace the full implications of the traditional, 19th-century materialist hypothesis. Suppose that we assume that for every distinct state of mind, and particularly for every distinct emotion, marked in the common vocabulary, there exists a distinct physical state of the organism which is invariably correlated with it. It would be surprising if this hypothesis turned out to be true, or even approximately true, if only because the distinctions among emotions marked in the common vocabulary have been made, and made gradually, to serve a variety of quite different, non-theoretical purposes. But let us disregard the implausibility of the hypothesis, so crudely formulated. For it is enough to consider a single possible case falling under the general hypothesis: for example, that with the emotion of anger there is an invariably correlated state of the organism, which can be stimulated by some physical inputs, and removed by other physical inputs, with immediate corresponding effects on the emotion: these correlations are to be supposed to hold in spite of variations in the objects, and the specifiable reasons, for the subject's anger. In all cases we find that subjects cease to be angry with x, and to be angry with x because of y, if the appropriate physical change is made; they only consider y as a reason for being angry when they are in the appropriate physical state; and when they are in the appropriate physical state, they always find some reason for being angry with someone. If the facts were discovered to be exactly as supposed—which is of course extremely improbable—we should have to say that the reasons which men had given in explanation of their being angry were really rationalisations: for we should have discovered that all the implied hypothetical propositions—"If such-and-such an injury, as I considered it to be, had not occurred, I would not, at least for a time, have been so angry"—were false; I would have been just as angry, if, and only if, the
appropriate physical state existed, and I would have immediately found some other reason for being angry. We will implausibly suppose, for the sake of the hypothesis, that being angry consists merely in having certain feelings and being disposed to behave in certain ways, and does not entail a certain belief of the subject in a specific reason for the disposition. So it has been discovered that the state of anger, whenever it occurs, does not in fact co-vary with any variation in the subject's independently established beliefs about the situation, but is varied only by a change in his physical state.

Neglect, if you will, the vast accumulation of evidence from experience which we have and which tells against this hypothesis: the evidence from experience that our anger does sometimes change as a result of an argument that convinces us that there is nothing to be angry about, and change in such a way that we have good grounds for believing that a belief was a necessary condition of the anger occurring. If the implausible hypothesis were verified, we should say that the state, which we had been calling anger, was a perception of a certain physical state; when we are angry, we are really perceiving a modification of our body in its interaction with the environment. We are perceiving, or feeling, this state, in the same sense that we feel a bruise or that we feel the heavy object on our back; and a feeling of this kind counts as a perception, in so far as we are able immediately and reliably to infer the change in the state of the body from the experience. We could speak of perceiving an external object, in so far as there was a physical cause of the change in the bodily state, the presence of which was immediately and reliably inferred from an inner feeling. In so far as smelling the flowers in the room counts as perceiving that the flowers are there, any similar immediate and reliable inference from a sensation to the external physical cause, which affects the body by an understood, regular process, will count as a perception of the cause. If we found that a certain feeling, which we had previously associated with certain beliefs and had distinguished as one of the emotions, was in fact reliably correlated with a certain physical stimulus from a certain kind of physical object, we should say that we are perceiving that kind of object, when the feeling occurs: perceiving it, in the extended sense in which smelling it is perceiving it. When we understand the physical mechanism by which the effect is produced, we have a
reliable method of immediate inference to the presence of the cause; and the inference in time becomes a habit to such a degree that it is no longer thought of as an inference.

I dwell on this Spinozistic consequence of taking one version of the materialist hypothesis seriously because it brings out the consequences of learning, and of coming to know, the mechanisms upon which the occurrence of the state of mind depends. One is liable to be persuaded that the consequence of such discoveries would be a helplessness, or a sense of helplessness: as if men would have depressingly discovered that their ability to modify and control their own beliefs, desires and sentiments, as they think fit on reflection, was in fact zero, or near to zero. This is a mistake. The coming to know about the mechanism, about the cause of a certain distinguishable type of state of mind, opens the way to a method of inference which can proceed from the state of mind to the external cause. Knowledge of a causal mechanism is converted into knowledge of a reality external to the mind. A person is an instrument which records the effects of stimuli, and the consequent changes of bodily states, in the experience of psychical states; but a person is an instrument which also reads, and interprets, its own recorded results, and, in reading and interpreting them, in a sense changes the result. For the recorded result in a psychical state, as interpreted by the subject in the light of new knowledge of the explanation of the state, has for the subject a different significance, and therefore constitutes, by a relevant criterion, a different state; just this is the intentional component in psychical states. The state which began as anger with Jones for something he had done, has now become an awareness of a changed physical state, in relation to which Jones' action was merely an inessential occasion. Since the subject no longer believes Jones' action to be a necessary element in the explanation of his state, there is a good sense in which he is no longer angry with Jones for what he has done; in this sense the knowledge of the explanation has changed the state of mind. But a scientist may regard the state of mind simply as an experience, abstracting from the subject's own beliefs about the explanation of it; and he may have shown by experiment that this experience, so identified as the experience that the man had when he ignorantly took himself to be angry, is to be explained by a clearly identifiable physical state. The subject, once convinced of the truth
of the scientist's explanation, will determine his attitude to Jones' action all over again.

There is for this reason an unclarity, or even an ambiguity, in the otherwise acceptable statement that the occurrence of any state of mind can in principle be explained like any other natural phenomenon, by reference to an experimentally confirmed covering law, which correlates such an occurrence with some set of initial conditions. This statement is true, when a proviso is added that is uniquely applicable to intentional states: that the subject's knowledge of the explanation by covering law will by itself change the state explained, even though the lawful connection does continue to hold between the initial conditions and the same state of mind, as identified under a description used in the relevant science, but not as identified under the description which the subject himself will apply. The discovered physical causes of anger are the causes of that independently identifiable state which the subject previously classified as anger, thereby explaining the state in a way which he now knows to have been erroneous. The causes of that state which he has previously classified as anger will no longer be causes of anger. This is the reason why the causal explanation of intentional states and processes is not a simple matter. In Spinoza's terminology, the reflexive knowledge of the causal mechanism constitutes a change in the effect. And this is the complexity which makes a place, as Spinoza suggested, for freedom of mind.
The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 1911 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the *Graduate Magazine* that

the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to speak on “Values of Living”—just as the late Chancellor proposed to do in his courses “The Human Situation” and “Plan for Living.”

In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that

The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form.

The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor Richard McKeon lectured on “Human Rights and International Relations.” The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas School of Law as part of his book *Students' Culture and Perspectives: Lectures on Medical and General Education*. The selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated to the Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been published, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of fifty cents each.


By José Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr College.


By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester.


By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College.


By Roderick M. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University.


By Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University.

1966. “Some Beliefs about Justice.”

By William K. Frankena, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.