WHAT'S IN A NAME?

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE "GENOCIDE" LABEL

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Abstract

The present research examines the implications of the "genocide" label in historical representations for national identity, collective memory and reparative action. Study 1 exposed European American participants to different representations of the colonial encounter which construed historical violence as either "societal change" or "genocide". Results revealed that perception of harm and support for reparative action (indirectly via perception of harm) were greater among participants exposed to the "genocide" than "societal change" representation, even in a context (i.e. identity salience) that otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to reparative action. Moreover, participants in an identity salience condition or who scored high on national glorification tended to silence critical commemoration, despite the otherwise facilitating effect of the genocide representation. Study 2 exposed Costa Rican participants to different representations that construed the colonial encounter as either "societal change" or "genocide". Results revealed that the "genocide" representation led to a decrease in the centrality of Costa Rican identity, which in turn reduced support for Indigenous rights policy. Study 3 exposed European American participants to representations of either own-group or other-group wrong-doing which construed historical violence as either "calamity" or "genocide". Participants exposed to the "genocide" representation perceived historical violence as more relevant to present day reality, and reported somewhat greater support for reparative action, but only when the label referred to other group's wrongdoing. When "genocide" referred to own group's wrongdoing, participants perceived historical violence as less atrocious and reported less support for reparative action. Discussion focuses on the implications of the "genocide" label for national identity, collective memory and reparative action.

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Psychological Implications of the "Genocide" Label

Within popular imagination and scholarly discourse, genocide represents "the gravest form of crime against humanity" (Ternon, 1999, p. 238), "the most barbaric crime" (Scherrer, 1999, p. 14), and "the ultimate human rights violation" (Jonassohn & Bjornson, 1998, p. 98). While a depiction of genocide as the absolute crime appears self-evident, a consensual definition of genocide remains elusive. The multiplicity in conceptualizations and typologies of genocide (for reviews, see Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993) leads to substantial variation in its application to different atrocities such as mass killings, ethnic cleansings, political disappearances, forced removals, cultural exterminations, systematic programs of torture, or slavery. Moreover, the designation of genocide as the ultimate crime makes its identification and acknowledgment particularly challenging. Since the labeling of events as genocide or not determines who has committed or been the victim of the worst of all crimes, various actors—including perpetrators, victims, and bystanders—have strong incentive to apply or deny the label. The label not only carries different meanings for different parties involved, but also informs different types of action (e.g. reparation, retaliation, intervention).

One implication of these observations is that despite its seemingly undisputed status in the hierarchy of evil deeds, what qualifies as genocide is highly ambiguous. Another implication is that the application of the genocide label to different acts of violence is not neutral or objective, but rather reflects the conflicting identity-relevant interests and power struggles of different groups involved.

Taking these observations as a point of departure, the present research draws upon perspectives in social and cultural psychology to examine the implications of the genocide label for national identity, collective memory, and reparative action. More specifically, across three

studies I consider the extent to which different representations of historical violence as "genocide" serve as tools that both reflect and promote identity-relevant concerns and action.

Before I proceed to a discussion of the present research, I begin with an overview of definitional and political controversies surrounding the label "genocide" and its application to various historical events. I then focus the attention of the paper on theory and research in social and cultural psychology that examine the dynamics of national identity in construals of and responses to genocidal events and other acts of mass violence.

What's in a Name? Definitional Dilemmas

Since Raphael Lemkin first coined the term in 1944, scholars across disciplines have proposed various definitions and typologies of genocide, without reaching a consensus on the matter. This is not only because of the difficulties inherent in conceptually bounding genocide or categorically differentiating it from other atrocious acts (e.g. mass murders, state terror, displacement, etc) but also because definitions of genocide almost always reflect prescriptive agendas.

Lemkin (1944) proposed the term "genocide" as a neologism with both Greek and Latin roots: the Greek "genos" (race or tribe) and the Latin "cide" (killing). Lemkin's notion of genocide as an offense against international law became widely accepted and constituted a base for the Nuremberg trials in the aftermath of World War II. Due to Lemkin's active campaigning, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Article 2 of the United Nations Genocide Convention defines genocide as follows:

> "Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such:
> a. Killing members of the group;
> b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" (as cited in MacDonald, 2008).

Although the United Nations Genocide Convention is definitive for legal purposes, genocide scholars problematize this definition in numerous ways (for critiques and alternatives, see Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Charny, 1994; Churchill, 1997; Fein, 1993, Moshman, 2001; Totten, Parsons, & Hitchcock, 2002). Briefly, ongoing definitional debates revolve around issues of the identity of the perpetrator and target groups, the range of acts deemed genocidal, the distinction among different types of genocide and issues related to determining motives or intent for genocide. For instance, one major controversy involves conceptions of victim groups. Various scholars argue that the UN definition is too narrow with respect to victim groups and should be broadened to include other (e.g. political or economic) groups (e.g. Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993). Another controversy concerns the range of acts that fall under the rubric of genocide. While in lay imagination genocide connotes the killing and extermination of a large number of people, the legal definition does not require that anyone die. In Lemkin's terms:

> "Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killing of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions arrived at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity but as members of the national group" (quoted in LeBlanc, 1991, p. 18).

From this perspective, genocide does not necessarily require acts leading to the loss of physical existence, but rather involves acts leading to the loss of cultural identity. On the basis of such distinctions, scholars have proposed various linguistic subcategories such as "ethnocide", "cultural genocide", or "politicide" to qualify and distinguish between different acts of genocidal violence that various groups of people have experienced throughout history. Although potentially useful for purposes of conceptual clarity, scholars raise the possibility that these subcategories "confuse definition with degree" and propose a risky hierarchy whereby physical or biological forms of genocide appear as "the real thing" and non-physical or non-biological forms become "not real" (Wolfe, 2006).

Besides these and other concerns related to the legal definition of genocide, one of the most contentious issues within genocide studies involves the conceptualization of the Jewish Holocaust[1] as the defining exemplar of genocide. This is not to say that events associated with the Holocaust are considered typical. In fact, there is a substantial body of literature devoted to demonstrating the Holocaust's uniqueness and exceptionality in world history (e.g. Bauer, 1996; Katz, 1998). The exemplary status of the Holocaust instead refers to its depiction within scholarly and popular discourse as "the ultimate expression of genocide" (Strom & Parsons, 1982, p.1), "the most terrible event in modern history" (Weinberg, 1993, p. xiv), and an event that "stands alone in the history of the West and the history of genocide" (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 325).

The centrality of the Holocaust to understandings of genocide is further evident in the title of the first academic journal devoted to the study of genocide: *Holocaust and Genocide*

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[1] When scholars refer to the Holocaust (with a capital H), they often construe it in both narrow and broad terms. In the narrow sense, it refers to the Nazi killings of Jews during World War II. In the broader sense, the term also includes the Nazi killings of Poles, Romani people, homosexuals, and people with disabilities during the same era. While the term Holocaust extends to these different target groups, scholars often treat the Nazi Judeocide as central and defining (Johnson & Rittner, 1996).

Studies. Consistent with this title, the overwhelming focus on the Holocaust is further evident in the journal's content. Of the 53 articles published in this journal between the years 1997-2000, 48 of them focus exclusively on the Holocaust (Moshman, 2001). This pattern seems to reflect the general state of the field. While there is a wealth of research on numerous other genocides, the Holocaust appears to be the event that researchers have most extensively studied. Moreover, even in cases where scholars focus on other genocides in world history or study general processes of genocide rather than the specifics of a particular event, they tend to utilize the Holocaust as a central framework and treat it as the standard against which all other genocides are evaluated (e.g. Lerner, 1992; Staub, 1989).

Moshman (2001, p. 432) among others argues that a Holocaust-based conception of genocide may serve as "the primary conceptual constraint on thinking about genocide". To the extent that the Holocaust is viewed as the defining case of genocide, scholars and lay people alike may come to analyze other events of mass violence in terms of their similarities to and differences from the Holocaust. Similarly, to the extent that the Holocaust frames the understanding and study of genocide, people may further be reluctant to acknowledge the term's applicability to other violent events. To summarize, this review suggests that the term "genocide" is highly ambiguous and associated with conflicting definitions in legal, scholarly, and everyday discourse. Moreover, the study and understanding of genocide appear to focus on particular world events to a disproportionate extent. Together, these observations suggest that the application of the term "genocide"—particularly to events that are unrelated or dissimilar to the presumed exemplar—might entail various challenges. The tensions related to the selective application of the term become amplified when we consider the politics of genocide recognition and denial.

The Power of a Word: Politics of Genocide Recognition and Denial

Invoking the term genocide is not a mere "matter of vocabulary" (Camus, 1947/2001); it is an accusation of the most heinous crime and an urgent appeal for action. Genocide is a word with heavy moral weight and significant "ideational power" [2](Glanville, 2009). As such, partisan actors employ it or not as a strategic tool to trigger or resist particular forms of action.

"Genocide" is a word perpetrators seldom use, unless international authorities pressure them to do so. As Minow (1998) observes, in the 60 years since the United Nations Genocide Convention, no group has spontaneously declared themselves as perpetrators of genocide[3]. Even in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust– "the ultimate genocide" (Strom & Parsons, 1982) – Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany's first Chancellor, avoided the term and resorted to euphemisms: "In our name, unspeakable crimes have been committed and demand compensation and restitution, both moral and material, for the persons and properties of the Jews who have been so seriously harmed" (cited in Brooks 1999, pp. 61–67).

Perpetrator avoidance of *genocide* label. Among perpetrator groups, the stakes for invoking the term genocide are high and incur heavy moral, legal, and political charges. Acknowledging genocide involves admitting responsibility and liability for criminal actions punishable by international law. Aside from obligations to provide reparations and compensation to victims, acknowledging genocide also entails avowing one's shameful status as *hostis humani generis*, the enemy of humankind. In the face of such hefty material and moral losses, perpetrator groups have strong motivations to reject the label and deny genocide. While arguably the most

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[2] Glanville (2009) suggests that the "ideational power" of the term genocide includes not only the legal obligations that arise when the term is invoked, but also the social and political expectations to respond to extreme suffering.
[3] One exception was Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda who was the first and only head of state to confess to genocide, which he did only after being brought to the International Criminal Tribunal and which he later attempted to withdraw.

necessary party to invoke the term among all groups involved, the perpetrator group is also the least likely to utter the word.

Victim appropriation of *genocide* label. Employing the term "genocide" involves no such reservations for victim groups. In fact, there has been an unprecedented amount of focus on the crime of genocide by international courts in recent years due to the active lobbying of various victim groups. Victims of numerous atrocities have appropriated the language of genocide to draw attention to the extent of their suffering and to demand recognition and legal action. For instance, since 1968 the American Indian Movement has applied the term genocide to events associated with the devastation of Indigenous communities of the Americas. In 1997, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity commission released a report proposing that the Australian government's practice of removing Aboriginal children from their parents constitutes a form of genocide. More recently, scholars (e.g. Cooper, 2012) have noted that US policies against African Americans during the Jim Crow era constitute genocide as defined by the United Nations convention, and they have suggested that referring to events as such can make a stronger case for reparations than the current discourse which frames the issue as providing compensation for the labor of those subjected to slavery. Needless to say, in each of these and countless other cases, claims of genocide by victim groups meet strong resistance.

Aside from such cases of massive violence and human rights violations, scholars raise concern that various groups might have overused the term genocide to refer to any act of oppression. Perhaps more egregiously, numerous activist groups have misused and to some extent abused the term for purposes of condemning certain acts or eliciting support for their political causes. For instance, the term genocide has emerged in discussions of "race-mixing", medical treatment of Catholics, the closing of synagogues in the Soviet Union, as well as birth

control and abortion practices in the United States and the Third World (Porter, 1982). Such misappropriations of the term not only distort its actual meaning, but further diminish and trivialize the significance of acts that are truly genocidal.

Bystander perception of *genocide* label. Besides perpetrator and victim groups, invoking the term "genocide" has important implications for bystander groups. In the case of ongoing violence, recognition of events as "genocide" is a necessary— though not sufficient— condition for action, while failure to invoke the term serves as a basis for avoiding intervention. The prime example of this concerns the Clinton administration's reluctance to describe violence in Rwanda as "genocide" for fear that applying the term would trigger legal and political obligations to "do something" (Glanville, 2009). In the case of historical violence, bystander groups similarly apply or avoid the label in ways that serve their own political interests. For instance, in 2000, Speaker of the House Dennis Haster suspended consideration of the US House Resolution 596 (declaring the 1915-1923 Ottoman killings of Armenians as "genocide") minutes before it was scheduled for deliberation. Commentators have noted both how House Resolution 596 was a strategic ploy designed to help Representative James Rogan win a re-election campaign in California and also how Haster's controversial move was a response to concerns that the resolution would hinder US-Turkey relations (Mueller, 2004). Both examples suggest that, although bystanders' use of the term "genocide" may potentially serve to "prevent and punish" genocidal acts, whether they employ it or not depends on their particular political concerns.

Power and silence. On a final note, the politics of genocide recognition and denial are evident in the differential exercise of power that enables and reproduces memory of certain genocidal events, while silencing or repressing memory of many others. World history is replete

with examples of genocidal events. Among these countless cases, only particular events are consensually defined, documented, written into history textbooks, taught in schools, featured in films, and commemorated via museums, memorials, and days of remembrance as "genocide". Many other similarly atrocious events remain as "crime(s) without a name", ignored, unresolved or long forgotten.

As mentioned in the previous section, scholars have observed notable asymmetries in discussions and representations of genocide within the field of genocide studies. Moses (2002, p.9) links this asymmetry within the scholarly literature on genocide to hegemonic Eurocentricism:

> "The genocide of European peoples in the 20th century strikes many American, Anglo-European and Israeli scholars as a more urgent research question than the genocide of non-Europeans by Europeans in the preceding centuries or by postcolonial states of their indigenous populations today".

Mazover (1995) suggests two potential reasons for this asymmetry:

> "I think there have may have been…a widely-held unspoken assumption that the mass killing of African or American peoples was distant and in some senses an 'inevitable' part of progress while what was genuinely shocking was the attempt to exterminate an entire people in Europe. This assumption may rest upon an implicit racism, or simply upon a failure of historical imagination".

Along more radical lines, scholars further suggest that rather than a simple "failure of historical imagination", the reason for the given asymmetry might be because "genocide lies at the core of Western civilization" (Moses, 2002, p. 9; see also Churchill, 1997). From this perspective, the de-emphasis on genocides of non-Europeans by Europeans reflects and reproduces ongoing silence regarding the genocidal foundations of numerous Western nations. In other words, the study or recognition of particular genocides and the neglect or denial of others might constitute "two sides of the same debased coin" (Stannard, 1998).

In summary, the word "genocide" is a tool that various actors strategically use or refuse to serve their particular interests and to demand (or defuse) particular forms of action. Moreover, invoking and acknowledging the term are matters of identity positioning, not only within the so-called perpetrator-victim-bystander triangle of genocide[4] but also in the context of global power hierarchies.

A Crime of Identity: Psychological Perspectives on Genocide

The extreme forms of human violence and suffering during genocides, and particularly the Holocaust, have captivated the attention of numerous social psychologists and stimulated research on a wide range of psychological phenomena such as obedience (Milgram, 1974), intergroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), dehumanization (Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 1973); moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990) and role-based aggression (Zimbardo, 2007). Regardless of the wealth of psychological theories inspired by genocidal events, psychological research on actual cases of genocide remains relatively scarce.

Some of the seminal work within psychology has addressed the origins and dynamics of genocide (e.g. Staub, 1989; Newman & Erber, 2002). Within this literature, scholars have highlighted the role of identity concerns involved in genocidal campaigns and argued that rather than a crime of hate, genocide is more aptly described as a "crime of identity" (Moshman, 2007, p.118). For instance, in a series of case studies including the Rwandan genocide, Nazi death camps, disappearances in Argentina, the dirty war massacre in El Salvador, and the Wounded

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[4] While most of the literature on genocide utilizes a framework of the "genocide triangle" to distinguish between three major social roles or groups (i.e. perpetrators, victims, and bystanders), various scholars have noted how these categories may be misleading. For instance, some members of perpetrator groups may perceive themselves as victims (Cehajic & Brown, 2010), while many victims may have also perpetrated violent acts (Robins & Jones, 2009). Similarly, some bystanders were also victims (Steinlauf, 1997) while others were perpetrators (Gross, 2001). Moreover, there are cases in which people have occupied all three roles within the context of the same genocide (Bauman, 2000; Perechodnik, 1996). While recognizing the extent to which an entitative and monolithic conception of different social groups might be misrepresentative of the multiplicity of roles that people occupy in genocidal incidents, I use the framework of the genocide triangle here as a tool to make contact with and organize the existing literature.

Knee Massacre in South Dakota, Moshman (2005) has noted that identity-related motivations, rather than hatred, play a central role in these acts of destruction. This observation strongly resonates with work on genocide in different disciplines where scholars have suggested that genocides are perpetrated by ordinary individuals acting on behalf of a social group against those whom they perceive to be members of another group (Arendt, 1994; Ashmore, Jussim, Wilder, & Heppen, 2001; Osiel, 2001; Staub, 1989, 2001, 2003; Waller, 2002; Weitz, 2003; Woolf & Hulsizer, 2005). The overarching implication of this body of work in psychology as well as the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies is that identity concerns lie at the heart of genocide.

Identity concerns in the aftermath of genocide. In addition to examining processes leading to genocide, psychologists have increasingly directed their attention to the consequences of genocidal violence. Within this body of work, scholars have highlighted the ways in which being the target of genocidal violence threatens victims' positive identity needs (e.g. Staub, 2006) and leads to a variety of negative outcomes such as posttraumatic stress disorder, revenge, and intergenerational trauma (e.g. Barel, Van Ijzendoorn, Sagi-Schwartz, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2010; Field & Chhim, 2008; Volkan, 2001). Researchers have similarly emphasized the centrality of identity concerns in processes of forgiveness, apology, healing, and reconciliation among victim and perpetrator groups in the aftermath of genocidal violence (e.g. Albeck, Adwan, & Bar-On, 2012; Bilewicz & Jaworska, 2013; Brave Heart & Lemyra, 1998; Paluck, 2009; Shnabel, Nadler, Ulrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimama, 2005; Subasic & Reynolds, 2009). Of direct relevance to purposes of the present paper, researchers have examined the dynamics of identity in people's responses to and construals of historical events involving genocidal violence or other forms of illegitimate

wrongdoing (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).

Identity concerns in responses to genocidal violence. A significant body of social psychological research has shown that when confronted with accounts of genocidal violence or other forms of illegitimate wrongdoing committed in the name of collective identity, people may experience collective guilt, even in the absence of personal responsibility for the harm done (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). Feelings of guilt, arising from acknowledgment of in-group responsibility for past harm, can in turn enhance people's motivation for providing reparations to victimized groups (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al., 2005).

Research on identity dynamics in experiences of collective guilt has revealed mixed results. On the one hand, researchers have suggested that self-categorization as a member of the perpetrator group is a prerequisite for experiencing guilt and found that people who strongly identify with their group experience greater collective guilt in response to ingroup wrongdoing than do people low in identification (e.g. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004). On the other hand, researchers have also found that because reminders of historical wrongdoing threaten one's collective identity, people who strongly identify with the group engage in identity defensive strategies to maintain the group's positive image and avoid collective guilt (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998).

In response to this paradox, Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan (2004) have suggested that the relationship between identification and collective guilt depends on the type or meaning of identity. More specifically, they proposed a distinction between *ingroup glorification* (associated

with an emphasis on the superiority of the ingroup over other groups) and *ingroup attachment* (associated with connection to and a critical evaluation of the ingroup). They further argued that ingroup glorification might inhibit collective guilt and ingroup attachment might facilitate it. Numerous studies have indeed confirmed that ingroup glorification and ingroup attachment have opposing (negative for ingroup glorification, positive for ingroup attachment) relations to collective guilt and support for reparative action (e.g. Roccas et al., 2004, 2006; see also Leidner, Castano, Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2010).

Despite the wealth of studies on antecedents and consequences of collective guilt (see Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006 for a review), scholars have further noted that any form of self-critical sentiment regarding past generations' genocide or other mass violence is in fact a relatively rare occurrence (Leach, Zeineddine, & Cehajic-Clancy, 2013). Rather than accepting responsibility, feeling guilty for the harmful acts one's group has committed, and engaging in reparative action, the more typical response to reminders of genocidal or other forms of wrongdoing involves disengagement, denial, and inaction—a response that individuals achieve through alternative construals of events.

Identity concerns in construals of genocidal violence. Acknowledging genocidal violence and accepting responsibility for the harm go against the desire to maintain a positive group image. Hence, when reminded of their group's genocidal deeds, people experience a threat to their social identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and engage in a variety of defensive processes. One strategy involves minimizing the severity or consequences of harm inflicted by the ingroup (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) while emphasizing the harm inflicted on the ingroup (Pratto & Glasford, 2008; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). The identity relevance of this tendency is evident in the

observation that ingroup glorification is associated with less perceived severity of harm among perpetrator groups (Bilali, 2013; Roccas et al., 2006).

Researchers further find that people—particularly if they strongly identify with their group—construe genocidal or other forms of violent events in ways that legitimize or justify past harm. For instance, they make situational attributions (rather than ingroup attributions) to explain in-group's harmful actions (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003). They place responsibility for the harm done on victims (Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012) or dehumanize the victims of harm (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Kofta & Slawuta, 2013).

Construals of genocidal history in ways that minimize or legitimize past harm can in turn lead people to deny ingroup responsibility (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003), perceive victims as responsible for their fate (e.g. Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), avoid collective guilt, and reduce support for reparative action (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Wohl et al, 2006). Moreover, dehumanization of victims might not only justify past violence, but might even serve to glorify (see Ramet, 2007) and perpetuate it. The general implication of this body of work is that identity-defensive motivations might inhibit tendencies to acknowledge wrongdoing and undermine reparative action which scholars consider to be crucial factors in processes of recovery and reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide (Staub, 2006, 2013).

In summary, social psychological research suggests that exposing people to historical accounts depicting genocide or other violent events might trigger two opposing processes. On the one hand, exposure to genocidal accounts can promote various forms of acknowledgment and reparative action. On the other hand, confronting such information can elicit defensiveness, denial, or justification of past (perhaps even present) aggression. Moreover, identity concerns moderate these processes. In particular, people who show glorifying forms of identification

appear not only more immune to self-critical sentiment and action, but also more prone to self-defensive strategies and (in)action.

Congruent with disciplinary conventions, the majority of social psychological studies reviewed above employ experimental research methods. That is, they first expose people to particular varieties of historical accounts involving ingroup wrongdoing, and they then examine the effects of this "treatment" for psychological experience. However, one might rightfully contend that exposure to such critical accounts of history occurs rather infrequently outside of laboratory settings. Instead, as scholars of history note, most historical narratives emphasize collective triumphs and silence collective misdeeds (Loewen, 1995; Troulliot, 1995). This raises the possibility that ingroup glorification and identity-defensive strategies of disengagement and denial are not merely reflective of individual level processes. Instead, these identity concerns also reside in the cultural tools—such as mainstream representations of history— that people frequently encounter in their everyday worlds (see Adams, Salter, Pickett, Kurtiş, & Phillips, 2010). By reproducing or repressing memory in identity-relevant ways, mainstream representations of history serve as cultural tools that regulate identity concerns at the collective level.

A Cultural Psychological Approach to Collective Memory and Identity

Psychologists have long noted a bi-directional relationship between identity and memory (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Conway, 2005; Greenwald, 1980; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Most work on this topic has considered individual manifestations of self and the corresponding bidirectional relationship between personal identity and autobiographical memory. Increasingly, researchers have considered collective manifestations of self and examined the bidirectional relationship between social identity and social representations of history: repositories of collective memory embedded in history textbooks, memorials, museums, commemorative holidays, and other

structures of mind-in-society that people appropriate to reconstruct stories of the collective past (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

In one direction, people produce constructions of the past that bear the influence of present identity concerns. For instance, research (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010; Liu et al., 1999) suggests that collective memories of colonization vary as a function of identity positioning (e.g. former colonizer vs. colonized). Similarly, studies find that by manipulating the salience or intensity of social identity concerns, one can influence people to recall the collective past in more or less identity-enhancing ways (Sahdra & Ross, 2007).

In the other direction, people's experience of social identity depends on constructions of the collective past. Collective memories provide the content and trajectory for social identity (Billig, 1995; Liu & Hilton, 2005), serve as dimensions of intergroup comparison, and inform identity-relevant action (see the *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* focus section on collective memories, Volpato and Licata, 2010). Research suggests that by manipulating people's understandings of collective historical events, one can influence the course of individual action on behalf of social identity (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt & Khan, 2008).

On the basis of these observations, a cultural psychological perspective suggests that mainstream representations of history serve as "intentional worlds" (Shweder, 1990, p. 1; see Adams et al., 2010) that mediate the relationship between collective memory and identity. In one direction, mainstream representations of history are not natural or objective renderings of the past; instead they are social products that bear the particular identity concerns of the people who produced them. For example, research suggests that people with high investment in national glorification preferentially reproduce nation-glorifying representations of the past and tend to

deny or silence representations that pose a threat to national identity (Kurtiş, Adams, & Yellow Bird, 2010). In the other direction, social representations of history are not neutral; instead, they carry a psychological charge that directs experience towards particular ends. For example, research suggests that celebratory representations of national history often promote nation-glorifying forms of identification and action. In contrast, critical representations often promote less glorifying patterns of identification and action, even among people whose personal inclinations might lead them toward national glorification (Kurtiş et al., 2010). Together, these ideas suggest how mainstream representations of history serve as cultural tools for collective self-regulation (Wertsch, 2002; see also Vygotsky, 1978): the process by which people collaborate across time through cultural tools that bear traces of a person's identity-relevant motivation and mediate the influence of this motivation on identity-relevant actions of others.

Overview of Present Research

Drawing upon theory and research in social and cultural psychology, the present research examines the implications of the genocide label for national identity, collective memory, and reparative action. Across three studies, I utilize experimental research methods to expose people to either critical representations of history which label events associated with ingroup wrongdoing as "genocide" or to sanitized representations of history which avoid the label or construe events as something other than "genocide". I then examine the effects of this treatment for perceptions of (e.g. perceived severity and temporal distancing of harm) and responses to (e.g. support for reparative action and historical commemoration) historical events.

As the previous review of social psychological theory and research suggests, a critical representation of historical events as "genocide" is likely to trigger two opposing processes. One process involves acknowledgment of harm and increased support for reparative action. The other process involves denial of harm and reduced support for reparative action. Moreover,

acknowledgment or denial of harm and support for reparative action are likely to vary as a function of identity concerns. People are especially likely to engage in identity-defensive strategies (such as denial and silencing of past harm and opposition to reparative action) when identity concerns are high or salient.

On the basis of these observations, the studies address identity concerns involved in responses to the "genocide" label in three different ways. Besides measuring levels of identification, Study 1 experimentally manipulates the salience of identity concerns among a group of European American participants. It then observes the effects of this manipulation on perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the US colonial encounter. Study 2 examines perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the Spanish colonial encounter among participants in a Costa Rican context, where identity concerns differ in considerable ways from those routinely observed or reported in US settings. Study 3 experimentally manipulates the relevance of identity concerns by asking European American participants to respond to historical representations depicting either own group's or other group's wrongdoing as "genocide" (or not) and examines the effects of this treatment on participants' perceptions of and responses to historical events.

In addition to examining identity concerns at the individual level, the studies draw upon a cultural psychological perspective which suggests that mainstream representations of history serve as intentional worlds that regulate identity concerns at the collective level. In other words, mainstream representations of history not only reflect the identity concerns (e.g. national glorification) of the people who (re)produce them, but further direct the subsequent identity concerns of people engaging them towards particular ends (e.g. patriotic citizens ready to kill or die for nation).

Applied to the present research, this perspective suggests that exposure to sanitized (e.g. genocide-silent) representations of history might promote denial of harm and undermine support for reparative action or critical commemoration, while exposure to critical (e.g. genocide-mentioning) representations of history might promote acknowledgment of harm, support for reparative action, and critical commemoration—regardless of the individual intention or awareness of the people engaging them.

In order to examine these ideas, the present research exposes participants to either critical (i.e. genocide-mentioning) representations of history that afford acknowledgment or to sanitized (i.e. genocide-silent) representations that afford denial. I then examine the effects of this manipulation on perceptions of and responses to historical events involving genocidal violence. To "sanitize" representations of history or infuse them with affordances for denial, I draw upon a framework that comes from Cohen's (2001) work on denial of historical violence.

Cohen (2001) identifies three categories of collective denial mechanisms. *Literal denial* occurs when historical accounts deny that acts of violence happened (e.g. Sahdra & Ross, 2007). *Implicatory denial* occurs when historical accounts acknowledge acts of violence, but justify or legitimize them on ideological bases (e.g. Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Of particular relevance for the present research is a third category of collective denial mechanisms. *Interpretive denial* occurs when historical accounts acknowledge raw facts of historical violence but construct events in ways that make them appear less atrocious. In classic social psychological terms (Asch, 1948), interpretive denial does not merely result in differential judgment of an equally atrocious object (e.g., as in implicatory denial); instead, it results in different objects of judgment: representations of violence as something other than atrocity. In other words, interpretive denial is not simply about absence or failure to mention events related

to historical violence. Instead, it results from particular forms of presence or mention that transform potentially threatening events (e.g. "genocide") into transgression-denying objects (e.g. "calamity").

The framework of interpretive denial is particularly relevant to ongoing debates surrounding definitions and (selective) applications of the "genocide" label, and it is highly applicable to the set of historical events the present research considers. More specifically, all three studies focus on historical events associated with the American colonial encounter and the loss of Indigenous communities and lifestyles during massive, elaborate, and long-lasting acts of genocidal violence. As previously noted, numerous scholars and activists describe and condemn historical events starting with Columbus' 1492 voyage to the present day Americas as one of the most profound cases of "genocide" in world history (e.g. Churchill, 1997; Stannard, 1998). Yet, the use of the label "genocide" to describe colonial violence generates outrage and fierce debate within public as well as scholarly discourse. Various alternative accounts of the colonial encounter involve legitimization of violence (e. g. "frontier wars") or dehumanization of Indigenous Peoples (e.g. as "savages" and "half-civilized", see Fitzgerald, 1979). Accounts that acknowledge colonial violence reveal subtler instantiations of interpretive denial (e.g. loss of Indigenous populations by "disease", "cultural assimilation" or "biological absorption", see Ellinghaus, 2009).

Within the first two studies, I utilize a particularly pervasive case of interpretive denial evident in mainstream representations of history which construe Columbus' journey and events in its aftermath as "discovery" and "social change" and compare the effects of this representation with one that construes historical events as "genocide". In the third study, I employ the euphemistic discourse of "tragedy" or "calamity" as another tool for interpretive denial in

descriptions of historical violence and compare the effects of this sanitized representation to a critical one that construes the same set of events as "genocide".

As previously stated, a general hypothesis for these studies suggests that exposure to acknowledgment-infused (i.e. genocide-mentioning) representations of history will promote greater perception of harm, support for reparative action, and critical commemoration. Conversely, exposure to (interpretive) denial-infused (i.e. genocide-silent) representations will undermine perception of harm, support for reparative action, and critical commemoration. Moreover, to the extent that critical representations of history constitute a threat to identity, one can hypothesize an identity-defensive reaction such that the level, salience, or relevance of identity pressures will induce participants to deny harm, oppose reparative action, and abstain from critical commemoration.

Study 1

Various scholars have noted the extent to which mainstream representations of US history present sanitized and nation-glorifying depictions of the colonial encounter and related historical events (e.g. Fitzgerald, 1979; Loewen, 1995; Zinn, 1980). For instance, in an analysis of US history textbooks, Fitzgerald (1979) finds that books published between the years 1930-1960s omit any mention of Indigenous Peoples. Even in more recent cases where historical accounts mention Indigenous presence, they frequently employ the rhetoric of "vanishing" or "extinction" via natural causes such as disease and starvation to explain the "disappearance" of Indigenous communities (Barkan, 2003). In Cohen's (2001) typology, such explanations constitute discourses of interpretive denial. While acknowledging the tragic loss of Indigenous communities as a historical fact, they construe it as an inevitable or unintentional byproduct of processes leading to "development", "nation-building" or "progress" (see MacDonald, 2008).

Since the 1970s, historians in the US and elsewhere have been prompted by what Antoinette Burton (2003) has termed "the imperial turn" and begun assessing their nations' troubled myths of origin. Particularly in the early 1990s, there has been an outpouring of public discussion and scholarship surrounding the quincentennial of Columbus' arrival on the North American continent and its implications for the beginnings of the United States as a nation. For instance, in 1992, anticolonial activists staged protests challenging the myth of "discovery" and demanding the transformation of Columbus Day into a commemoration of genocide. As a result of such efforts, some US cities and states (e.g., Berkeley, California and South Dakota) have reconstructed the holiday as a celebration of Indigenous Peoples (Kubal, 2008).

Despite these controversies, Columbus remains a central figure of US origin myths and one of the two individuals (along with Martin Luther King) who warrant their own federal holidays. Generations of US schoolchildren continue to learn about Columbus' voyage as a defining moment of US national history and global progress. When asked to reflect on the origins of Columbus Day, US adults frequently note that "in 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue" and "discovered America" (Kurtiş & Adams, 2012, unpublished data).

Drawing upon these competing discourses surrounding Columbus Day, the first study examined the implications of different representations of Columbus' voyage and the American colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action. More specifically, I exposed participants to either a sanitized or critical representation of the US colonial encounter. The former portrayed Columbus' voyage and European settlement of the Americas as "one of the most profound cases of societal change" in recorded human history. The latter portrayed Columbus' voyage and European settlement of the Americas as "one of the most profound cases of genocide" in recorded human history. I then examined the effect of these different

representations on perceptions of past harm, support for reparative action, and tendency to reproduce a critical (versus sanitized) version of history. To the extent that critical representations inhibit (or sanitized representations promote) nation-glorifying action, one can hypothesize that perception of harm, support for reparative action, and tendencies to reproduce critical representations of history will be stronger in the "genocide" than "societal change" condition.

Besides the description of events, I also manipulated the salience of identity pressures. Prior research has documented the prevalence of silencing and denial (including processes of forgetting, justifying or legitimizing; e.g. Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) of historical wrongdoing among groups who have harmed other groups, particularly among people who report strong collective identification. To the extent that critical representations of history constitute a threat to national identity, one can hypothesize that the salience of identity pressures will induce participants to deny the severity of harm, temporally distance past harm, oppose reparative action, and reproduce sanitized forms of commemoration as an identity-defensive (re-) action.

Method

Participants

Participants were adults whom I recruited from public settings in the metropolitan area of a large city in the Midwestern USA. I report analyses of only the sixty-three participants (50.8% women, age range 18-83, median=23) who were US citizens and indicated *White or European-American* in response to an item about ethnic identification.

Procedure

Participants individually completed a set of paper and pencil measures. I assigned each participant at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In the *sanitized* condition, participants read a text entitled "Discovery and Settlement of America" that described Columbus' discovery and European settlement of the Americas. This text mentioned numerous acts of expansion (e.g. treaties, military raids, purchases) that Americans used to accomplish their "manifest destiny" and described the resulting demographic transformation of the American continent as "societal change". In the *genocide* condition, participants read a text entitled "History of the American Genocide" that described Columbus' arrival and European occupation of the Americas. This text mentioned numerous acts of violence (e.g. wars of conquest, forced removal, confinement of Indigenous Peoples to reservations) in Americans' westward expansion and construed the resulting demographic transformation in terms of "genocide" (see Appendix A).

I also assigned each participant at random to one of two identity salience conditions. Participants in the *identity salient* condition completed a national glorification measure before completing other materials. Participants in the *identity not salient* condition completed the measure of national glorification after completing other materials. Other than these differences, participants completed the same dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. After participants completed the measures, the experimenter debriefed and thanked them.

Measures

National glorification. I used the 8-item glorification subscale (α= .81) of a multidimensional measure of national identity (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). *Glorification* refers specifically to the identity-defensive tendency to view one's national ingroup as superior to

other groups (e.g. "The US is better than other nations in all respects"). In previous work, researchers observed negative associations between glorification scores and tendencies to acknowledge ingroup wrongdoing, experience collective guilt, and endorse reparative action (Kurtiş et al., 2010; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006). Participants used a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all* and 7 = *very much*) to indicate their agreement with each item.

Historical perception. After reading the historical text for either the genocide or sanitized condition, participants rated four items concerning the European conquest of North America. For three items—(1) "How violent or brutal was the European conquest of North America?", (2) "How many Indigenous people died as a direct result of European settlers' actions during the conquest of North America?", and (3) "To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous societies due to deliberate policies of violence by European settlers?"—participants indicated their response by placing an "X" on a line with endpoints of *not very violent/ brutal* and *extremely violent/ brutal*; *few* and *many*; and *accidental byproduct* and *deliberate policy*, respectively. I computed the mean of these three items to form a composite measure of perceived harm (α = .86). For the fourth item— "When did violence associated with the European conquest of North America occur?"—participants indicated their response by placing an "X" on a line with a right endpoint labeled *today* and a left-facing arrow at the left endpoint with the label *distant past*. I scored responses by measuring in centimeters the distance from the left endpoint of the line to the "X" participants placed.

Support for reparative action. Participants used a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*) to indicate their agreement with 3 items I created as an index of reparative action (α = .75). This index included two items—"The U.S. should officially apologize to Native American nations for all broken treaties, illegal appropriation of land, forced

displacement, and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans" and "The U.S. should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for suffering inflicted upon Native Americans"—that address positions on *national apology*. The index also included an item—"The U.S. should provide reparation and compensation for damages to Native Americans who were removed from their homes and forced to attend boarding schools"—that referred to issues of *reparation and compensation* to Indigenous Peoples for past harm.

Critical commemoration. To assess participants' tendency to reproduce critical or sanitized representations of history, I devised two tasks. Immediately after reading the historical text, participants responded in open-ended fashion to the following question: "In your opinion, what are the 5 most important events to commemorate during Native American History Month (November)"? I then created a "critical commemoration frequency" score by giving participants points for critical responses of Trail of Tears, Wounded Knee massacre, and Battle of Little Big Horn (e.g. responses which acknowledge genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous communities) , but subtracting points for celebratory responses of Thanksgiving, Columbus, and Custer's Last Stand (e.g. responses which sanitize genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous communities). Participants also ranked 10 Native American history items in terms of importance for future high school students. Four of these items—Wounded Knee, Trail of Tears, King Philip's War, Chief Joseph— described "critical" facts about European American wrongdoing against Indigenous Peoples. I created a "critical commemoration importance" score by computing the mean of participants' rankings for these four critical items and reverse coding it (so that higher numbers represent greater importance). I then created a "critical commemoration index" by taking the average of the standardized scores from the frequency and importance indices.

Results

To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted multiple regression analyses with glorification score, glorification salience (0 = not salient, 1 = glorification salient), historical representation (0 = sanitized, 1 = genocide), and their interaction terms as predictors of each outcome. I included participant gender and age as covariates in all analyses. Means and standard deviations as a function of condition appear in Table 1. Correlations between variables appear in Table 2.

Historical Perception

Perception of harm. Analyses revealed no effects of glorification score on perception of harm, b= -0.99, se= 0.95, p=0.30.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations

	Sanitized (n=35)		Genocide (n=28)	
	Glorification not Salient	Glorification Salient	Glorification not Salient	Glorification Salient
Glorification Score	3.12 (0.91)	3.92 (1.13)	3.73 (1.31)	3.60 (0.80)
Perception of Harm	38.59 (5.86)	32.48 (10.64)	39.64 (5.82)	39.81 (6.62)
Time of Harm	10.33 (3.12)	9.84 (3.54)	11.34 (3.07)	9.77 (5.36)
Reparative Action	3.96 (1.66)	3.08 (1.62)	2.64 (1.55)	3.59 (1.30)
Critical Commemoration	-0.12 (0.62)	0.03 (0.87)	0.58 (0.65)	-0.29 (0.74)

Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses).

Analyses for the index of perception of harm revealed hypothesized main effects of historical representation, b=4.41, se=1.90, p=.024, and glorification salience, b=-3.85, se=1.91, p=.049. Perception of harm was greater in the genocide condition than the sanitized condition and lower in the glorification salient condition than the not salient condition. A Historical

Representation X Glorification Salience interaction qualified these effects, $b=7.79$, $se=3.84$, $p=.048$. A series of simple and complex orthogonal contrasts revealed that participants in the glorification salient condition who read the sanitized text perceived less harm than did participants in other conditions, $b=2.20$, $se=0.74$, $p=.004$ (Figure 1). There were no statistically significant differences in perception of harm among participants in other conditions, $ps>.1$.

Figure 1: Effects of historical representation and identity salience on perception of harm

Bars with different letters differ at $p<.05$

One interpretation of this pattern is that representation of the colonial encounter as genocide was sufficiently powerful to promote perception of harm, despite the salience of glorification pressures that would otherwise promote denial of harm. A slightly different interpretation is that even the content of the sanitized condition was still sufficiently

consciousness-raising that it led to perception of harm in the absence of glorification salience, but not sufficiently so to overcome the denial-promoting effects of glorification salience. There were no additional main effects or interactions for this measure, ps>.1.

Time of harm. Analyses for the measure of perceived time of harm revealed no effects of historical representation, b=-0.02, se= 1.05, p= .98 or glorification salience, b= -1.26, se= 1.05, p= 0.25. The interaction of historical representation by glorification salience was further non-significant, b= -0.98, se= 2.30, p= .67. However, analyses for the measure of perceived time of harm did reveal a main effect of glorification score, b=1.17, se=0.52, p=.028. Consistent with the identity-relevance hypothesis and previous research on subjective temporal distancing (e.g., Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2003), higher scores on the glorification measure were associated with greater temporal distancing of past harm. There were no other significant effects, ps>.1.

Support for Reparative Action

Analyses for the measure of support for reparative action revealed no main effects or interactions, ps>.1. Thus, results of these analyses provided no support for the hypothesis that a critical representation of the US colonial encounter as genocide might have a direct effect of increasing support for reparative action. However, as previously noted, research on collective guilt suggests that the genocide representation of Columbus' voyage and subsequent European occupation triggers two responses with opposing implications for support of reparative action. On one hand, the genocide representation portrays European occupation in a bad light that is potentially threatening to European American identity. As a result, people may resist this representation and indicate less support for reparative action as an identity-defensive reaction (Doosje et al., 1998). On the other hand, the genocide representation leads to greater perception

of harm, which—in the absence of denial-promoting, identity-defensive motivations—may promote greater sense of need that motivates greater support for reparative action. To test this indirect effect of the genocide representation on support for reparative action through its effect on perceived harm, I computed bootstrapped confidence intervals (following the recommendations of Shrout & Bolger, 2002) using only the data from participants in the glorification salient condition (i.e., the condition for which I observed a significant effect of the historical representation manipulation). Results confirmed a significant indirect effect (see Figure 2). This provides some evidence that the genocide (but not the sanitized) text preserved perception of harm, and therefore support for reparative action, in a context (i.e., glorification salience) that otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to reparative action.

Table 2. Correlations Among Variables

	Variables	1	2	3	4	5
1	Glorification	-				
2	Severity	-0.16	-			
3	Time of Harm	0.31*	0.36**	-		
4	Reparative Action	-0.29*	0.58**	-0.28*	-	
5	Critical Commemoration	-0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.26*	-

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

Figure 2: Indirect effect of historical representation on support for reparative action in the glorification salient condition

*p<.05

95% Bootstrapped CI LL=0.06 UL=1.09

Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. c is the relationship between historical representation and reparative action. c' is the relationship between historical representation and reparative action controlling for perception of harm.

Critical Commemoration

Analyses of the critical commemoration index revealed significant interactions of historical representation with the glorification salience manipulation, b=-0.98, se=0.38, p=.013 and with glorification score, b=-0.39, se=0.19, p=.048. There were no other main effects or interactions, ps>.1. Regarding the former interaction, I examined the effects of the historical representation manipulation on critical commemoration in glorification salient and not salient conditions. The hypothesized effect of the genocide representation (i.e. eliciting more critical commemoration than the sanitized text) was absent in the glorification salient condition, b=-0.29, se=0.24, p= 0.24 but present in the not salient condition, b= .70, se=0.29, p=.02 (Figure 3). Results revealed a parallel pattern for the latter interaction. Simple slope analyses revealed that the hypothesized effect of the genocide representation was absent among participants who scored

high in glorification, $b=-.37$, $se=0.27$, $p= .17$, but strong among participants who scored low in glorification, $b= .60$, $se=0.28$, $p=.03$ (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Effects of historical representation and identity salience on critical commemoration

* $p<.05$

Figure 4: Effects of historical representation and glorification score on critical commemoration

* Slope is different from zero, $p<.05$

The consistent interpretation across these interactions concerns the moderating effect of identity concerns on the effectiveness of the genocide framing in fostering critical commemoration. In the absence of glorification pressures, the effect of the genocide framing is to promote greater commemoration of critical history than more sanitized framings promote. However, this effect of the genocide framing disappears under the pressure of high glorification concerns (whether as a dispositional difference or the result of experimental manipulation).

Discussion

To summarize, Study 1 examined the implications of different representations of the American colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action. Participants exposed to the "genocide" representation perceived greater severity of harm and indicated greater support for reparative action (indirectly via perceived severity of harm) than participants exposed to the "societal change" representation, even in a context (i.e. glorification salience) that otherwise promotes denial of harm and opposition to reparative action. The findings further suggest that participants reproduced critical versions of history as a function of exposure to the "genocide" representation, but only when identity concerns were not active. When identity concerns were active—whether via an identity salience manipulation or as an individual disposition (as measured by glorification score)—participants tended to reproduce sanitized versions of history that omitted instances of violence, presumably in service of the need to maintain a positive social identity. They did so even when they were exposed to a description of historical violence—in terms of "genocide"—that otherwise would promote more critical forms of commemoration.

In short, these findings suggest that, relative to sanitized representations of history, critical representations of history which invoke the label "genocide" to refer to the European conquest and occupation of Americas may overcome denial and opposition to reparative action.

Moreover, while the genocide framing of history may foster critical commemoration in the absence of identity concerns, this facilitating effect of the "genocide" label disappears due to identity-defensive pressures of glorification.

One of the limitations of the present study is that the texts I used as an experimental manipulation vary in ways other than the application of the label "genocide" and do not precisely instantiate the conceptual difference between literal and interpretive denial. Studies 2 and 3 address this limitation.

Another limitation is the restriction of focus to glorification aspects of national identification. I focused on this aspect of national identification because previous research has associated it with ego-defensive patterns of perception and experience (Kurtiş et al., 2010; Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006); however, other aspects of national identification—for example, attachment (Roccas et al., 2006) or patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989)—might be associated with more self-critical forms of perception and action. Beyond different dimensions of identification, a particularly important limitation from a cultural psychological perspective is the fact that the present study does not direct attention to more qualitative forms of variation in the meaning of national identity (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Vope, 2004; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As the majority of research on national identity takes place in North American or European settler societies, prevailing constructions of national identity within psychology reflect particular sociocultural, historical, and ideological processes and often obscure the multiplicity in the meaning or constructions of national identity (Hammack, 2008). In an attempt to address some of these limitations, Study 2 involves a conceptual replication of the present study in another national setting (Costa Rica) where different identity dynamics are at play.

Study 2

The quincentennial of Columbus' arrival to the Americas has similarly sparked much discussion within public and scholarly discourse across "Latin America"[5]. In more recent years, various activist groups within the region have staged protests and condemned events associated with the colonial encounter as "genocide". In part due to these controversies, October 12th— which officially marks "Columbus Day" across many parts of the United States—corresponds to a variety of commemorations among Latin American nations, including *Día de la Resistencia Indígena* ("Day of Indigenous Resistance") in Venezuela; *Día de las Américas* ("Day of the Americas") in Uruguay and Belize; *Día de la Raza* ("Day of the Race") in various countries such as Mexico, Chile, and Columbia; and *Día de las Culturas* ("Day of the Cultures") in Costa Rica. The multiplicity in commemorations of Columbus' voyage reveals the fact that constructions of the colonial encounter vary across time and space within Latin America as they do in North America. Moreover, these alternative commemorations suggest that the appropriation of Columbus' voyage in Latin American historical narratives differs in considerable ways from its treatment in North American, and in particular, US history.

As I previously noted, US historical accounts often frame Columbus' voyage as a myth of "discovery" and a defining moment of national history and global progress. In contrast, scholars suggest how historical representations of the colonial encounter in various Latin American settings construe events associated with Columbus' voyage as an "encounter between two worlds" (Carretero, Jacot, & López-Manjón, 2002; Zea, 1989) rather than a case of

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[5] While cognizant of the imperial-colonial invention of the idea of "Latin America" (e.g. see Mignolo, 2005), I use the phrase here to engage with scholarly literature on the region and in particular with discussions in decolonial theory which link the emergence of "Latin America" to the emergence of both "Europe" and the "United States of America".

discovery. Moreover, while Latin American national narratives keep memory of Columbus' voyage alive, they often treat it with ambivalence (Trouillot, 1990).

Trouillot (1990) suggests these observed differences in constructions of the colonial encounter and appropriations of Columbus may be due to two related processes. The first concerns differences in the nature of the colonial encounter across North and South America. Although the Spanish colonial encounter was brutal, it did not reduce the Indigenous populations as extensively as the Anglo colonial encounter did in North America. Second, the dominant ideologies of race and ethnicity within North America, in particular the US, exclude Indigenousness to a large extent and instead emphasize continuities with the Old World (see also "American=White?", Devos & Banaji, 2005). In contrast, reflecting the historical narrative of "encounter of worlds", ideologies of race and ethnicity across Latin American settings often include some form of *indigenismo* and employ metaphors of "blending" (Momer, 1967) to emphasize the formation of new identity categories (e.g. *criollos, mestizos*). Scholars have observed how notions of heterogeneity and plasticity similarly constitute recurring themes within Latin American constructions of national identity (Miller, 2006). Together, these processes suggest that the pressures to forget or deny genocidal wrongdoing against Indigenous communities may be less crucial to nation-making within Latin American settings (Renan, 1990). To the extent that national origin myths present less glorifying accounts of Columbus' journey and the colonial encounter, this further raises the possibility national identities within Latin American settings also take less glorifying forms in comparison to the US.

On the basis of these general observations, Study 2 turned its attention to a particular national setting in Latin America: Costa Rica. Columbus landed on the present-day Puerto Limón during his 4th voyage to the Americas in 1502. Historical accounts suggest that when he

encountered local Indigenous Peoples wearing gold necklaces and breastplates, Columbus falsely

assumed he arrived at a land of great wealth and named the place Costa Rica ("Rich Coast")[6].

Historical accounts further suggest that more than 90 percent of Indigenous populations in Costa

Rica had fallen by the end of the 16th century.

One of the most racially homogenous nations within Latin America, Costa Rica today

prides itself on its exceptionalism within Central America along various dimensions (e.g.

democracy, overall level of human development, nonviolent tradition). Cruz (2000) traces the

origins of the idea of Costa Rican exceptionalism to Costa Rica's colonial history. In particular,

Cruz (2000) notes the prevalence of interpretive denial (Cohen, 2001) in historical depictions of

Costa Rica's conquest as "peaceful", "nonviolent", "happy" and "conciliatory". He further

suggests that postcolonial elites have appropriated and reproduced these notions in order to claim

a national "tradition" of "civility" and to garner support for their political agendas such as

improving the prospects for national unity and a common developmental agenda.

Drawing upon these insights, Study 2 considered the implications of different

representations of Columbus' voyage and the American colonial encounter for Costa Rican

identity and identity relevant action. Similar to Study 1, this exploratory study exposed

participants to sanitized (e.g. genocide-silent) versus critical (e.g. genocide-mentioning)

representations of the colonial encounter. The sanitized representation construed Columbus'

voyage and European settlement of the Americas as "one of the most profound cases of societal

change" in recorded human history. The critical representation construed Columbus' voyage and

European settlement of the Americas as "one of the most profound cases of genocide" in

recorded human history. I then examined the effects for perceptions of harm, national

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[6] The irony is that Columbus, who erroneously assumed he had landed in India, was also misguided in his naming of the land. Spanish conquistadores and settlers who went to Costa Rica in hopes of attaining mineral wealth found very little of it during the colonial era.

identification, and support for Indigenous rights policy. As in Study 1, a guiding hypothesis is that the "genocide" representation will elicit greater support for Indigenous rights policy compared to the "societal change" condition (perhaps by affording greater perception of harm).

Besides effects on support for policy, previous research and the theoretical framework that I outlined earlier suggests that the "genocide" representation can also constitute a threat to national identity. However, I propose that the implications of this threat may vary across national settings. In national settings such as the US, relatively glorifying constructions of national identity may constitute a kind of cultural affordance for identity centrality that makes it relatively difficult to dis-identify in the face of threats to national identity. In the absence of affordances for dis-identification, people in US settings may be especially likely to react against the genocide label, deny harm, and report less support for Indigenous rights policy. However, discussions in settings such as Costa Rica suggest that constructions of national identity are less strongly glorifying and do not afford identity centrality to the same degree as in US settings. This implies that the decreased cultural-psychological emphasis on identity centrality in Costa Rican settings may afford dis-identification in the context of identity threat (see Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). Accordingly, one can anticipate that framing the colonial encounter as "genocide" (i.e., a threat to national identity) will be especially likely to lead to national dis-identification in Costa Rican settings.

Methods

Participants

Participants were 43 Costa Rican citizens (40% female, age range 18-44, mean=24) recruited from public settings in the metropolitan area in San Jose, the capital city of Costa Rica.

Procedure

Two research assistants (both of whom were native speakers of Spanish) approached participants in various public settings and invited them to participate in a study on perceptions of historical and current events. Participants who agreed to participate individually completed a set of paper and pencil measures in Spanish.

Participants were assigned at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In the *sanitized* condition, participants read a text entitled "The Spanish Discovery and Settlement of the Americas". This text described events associated with Columbus' arrival and European settlement as "conquest, settlement, and political rule over much of the Western hemisphere" and framed the resulting demographic transformation of the continent as "societal progress". In the *genocide* condition, participants read a text entitled "The Spanish Conquest and Genocide of the Americas" that described the exact same set of events as "conquest, destruction, and political rule over much of the Western hemisphere" and framed the resulting demographic transformation of the Americas as "genocide" (see Appendix B). Other than these differences, participants completed the same dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. After participants completed the measures, the experimenters debriefed and thanked them.

Measures

Historical perception. After reading the historical text for either the genocide or sanitized condition, participants rated the same four items assessing concerning the European conquest of the Americas as in Study 1. I computed the mean of the first three items to form a composite measure of *perceived severity of harm* ($\alpha = .72$). The fourth item assessed the *temporal distancing of harm*.

National identification. In order to assess identity concerns, Study 1 (and Study 3)

focused on national glorification which is a type of national identification emphasizing ingroup superiority. This is because previous theory and research have highlighted the prevalence of nationalism or national glorification within US contexts and linked it to various identity-relevant outcomes. However, scholars who have examined the experience of national identity across Latin American settings have suggested that the idea of "nationalism" or a conscious political commitment to nationalist action might not be a key experience within Latin America (Miller, 2006). Besides potential differences in the conceptualization or experience of national identity, the content of the national glorification scale is further not relevant to the Costa Rican context. As an example, one of the items of the national glorification scale (e.g. "The US Army is the best army in the world") is not applicable to the Costa Rican context, given that Costa Rica does not have a military force.

On the basis of these concerns, I opted for a relatively more etic measure of identity. I adapted two subscales of the Collective Self Esteem measure to assess participants' national identification (CSE; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). The CSE *private regard* subscale assesses positive assessment of national identity (e.g., In general, I'm glad to be a member of my national group; Cronbach's α = .75). The CSE *identity centrality* subscale measures importance of national identity to one's self-concept (e.g., The national group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am; α = .68). Participants used a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all* and 7 = *very much*) to indicate their agreement with each item.

Support for Indigenous rights. Participants indicated their support for Indigenous rights by responding to 5 items[7] ($\alpha = .75$) on topics related to providing Indigenous communities with reparations, job opportunities, health care facilities, agricultural credit, and land rights using a 7-point Likert scale (0=*strongly disagree* and 6= *strongly agree*).

Results

To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted independent samples t-tests. Means and standard deviations as a function of condition appear in Table 3. Correlations between variables appear in Table 4.

Historical Perception

I conducted an independent samples t-test to compare perceived severity of harm in sanitized and genocide conditions. Results revealed that there were no differences in perceived severity of harm among experimental conditions, $t(41) = .23$, p= .82. In other words, results failed to support the hypothesis that the "genocide" framing of the colonial encounter would elicit greater perception of harm. Moreover, there was no effect of the historical representation manipulation on participants' temporal distancing of harm, $t(41) = .39$, p=.70.

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[7] These items were part of a larger measure assessing support for various policies (see Appendix B). I retained and created an index of five items assessing support for Indigenous rights based on the results of a principal components analysis with varimax rotation.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations

Variables	Sanitized (n=20)		Genocide (n=23)	
Private Regard	6.51	(0.81)	6.51	(0.76)
Identity Centrality	5.29	(1.41)	4.08	(1.24)
Severity of Harm	13.96	(2.77)	14.16	(2.95)
Time of Harm	4.33	(5.49)	3.66	(5.68)
Indigenous Rights	5.12	(1.24)	5.60	(0.61)

Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses).

National Identification

Results of an independent samples t-test revealed no effect of the historical representation manipulation on the private regard dimension of the national identification scale, t (41) =.02, p= .98. However, there was an effect of historical representation on the centrality dimension of the national identification scale, t (41) = 2.987, p=0.01. Participants in the genocide condition (M=4.08, SD=1.24) condition scored lower on identity centrality than participants in the sanitized condition (M=5.29, SD=1.41). Although participants did not differ in their positive assessment of Costa Rican identity, the "genocide" representation of the colonial encounter reduced the importance of being Costa Rican to their self-concept. As anticipated, the framing of the colonial encounter as "genocide" led to national dis-identification.

Table 4. Correlations Among Variables, Study 2

Variables	1	2	3	4	5
1. Private Regard	-				
2. Identity Centrality	0.13	-			
3. Severity of Harm	0.04	-0.06	-		
4. Time of Harm	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04	-	
5. Indigenous Rights	0.07	0.30*	-0.07	-0.26	-

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

Support for Indigenous Rights

An independent sample t-test analysis revealed no significant effects of historical representation on support for Indigenous rights policy, $t(41) = 1.65$, p= .11. Thus, results of these analyses provided no support for the hypothesis that a critical representation of the colonial encounter as genocide has a direct effect of increasing support for reparative action.

Previous research and the theoretical framework I presented earlier suggest that the genocide representation of the colonial encounter may trigger two responses with opposing implications for support of reparative action. On one hand, the genocide representation affords greater support for reparative action. On the other hand, because the genocide representation threatens national identity, people may indicate less support for reparative action as an identity-defensive reaction (e.g. Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). To account for both of these responses, I examined the effects of historical representation and national identification (i.e. identity centrality) on support for Indigenous rights policy simultaneously.

Results of a multiple regression analysis with historical representation and identity centrality as simultaneous predictors of policy support revealed the hypothesized effect of

historical representation on support for Indigenous rights policy. In other words, the genocide representation facilitated greater support for reparative action, $b=0.884$, $se=0.289$, $p=0.004$. Analyses further suggested that identity centrality positively predicted support for Indigenous rights policy, $b=0.482$, $se=0.146$, $p=0.002$. This finding is remarkable for several reasons. First, it contradicts previous research which reports a negative relationship between national identification and support for reparative action in response to reminders of historical wrongdoing. Second, it is consistent with discussions regarding the multidimensionality of national identity. In particular, findings suggest that identity centrality may be akin to *national attachment* (Roccas et al., 2006) which emphasizes connection to and a critical evaluation of the nation. Besides differences in dimensions of national identification, results further point to potential differences in the meaning and dynamics of national identity across Costa Rican and US settings.

Apart from these interesting theoretical implications, the positive relationship between identity centrality and support for Indigenous rights policy suggests one reason for the failure to observe the hypothesized effect of the genocide representation on policy support. Namely, the effect of the genocide manipulation on identity centrality may exert an indirect effect of the manipulation on decreased policy support. This indirect effect may suppress the effect of the manipulation on increased policy support. To explore this possibility, I computed bootstrapped confidence intervals to test the indirect effect of the genocide representation on support for Indigenous rights policy through its effect on identity centrality. Results confirmed a significant indirect effect (see Figure 5), which indicates suppression rather than mediation. The genocide representation led to a decrease in identity centrality. Because identity centrality is positively associated with support for Indigenous rights policy, the decrease in identity centrality in turn

reduced support for Indigenous rights. In other words, the hypothesized, facilitating effect of the

genocide framing becomes apparent when one accounts for the simultaneous, suppressing effect

of the genocide framing (in this Costa Rican context) through its effects on identity centrality.

Figure 5. Indirect effect of historical representation on support for Indigenous rights policy

95% Bootsrapped CI LL=1.05 UL=0.10

Coefficients are unstandardizde regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. c is the relationship between historical representation and support for Indigenous rights. c′ is the relationship between histroical representation and support for Indigenous rights polcy controlling for identity centrality.

Discussion

In summary, Study 2 examined the implications of different representations of the

American colonial encounter for national identity and identity-relevant action in the Costa Rican

context. The results failed to support the hypothesis that the representation of the colonial

encounter as "genocide" might elicit greater perception of harm and support for Indigenous

rights. However, the "genocide" representation did lead to national dis-identification. Given the

positive association between national identification (i.e. identity centrality) and support for

Indigenous rights policy, the drop in national dis-identification in response to the "genocide"

label in turn reduced participants' support for Indigenous rights policy. Accounting for this indirect effect, findings did reveal the hypothesized, facilitating effect of genocide representation on policy support. However, since this pattern emerged only after controlling for the indirect effect, one should interpret with this finding with caution.

One interesting implication of these findings is that unlike high levels of national identification (i.e. ingroup glorification) which previous research has associated with reduced tendencies to support for reparative action, high levels of national identification (i.e. identity centrality) in the Costa Rican context promote support for reparative action. However, it is not possible to evaluate whether these different patterns might reflect differences in the particular types of identification (e.g. national glorification versus identity centrality) or the local experience of national identity in the Costa Rican context. A question for future research involves local constructions and dimensions of Costa Rican national identity and their implications for identity-relevant action.

Another limitation of the present study concerns the texts that I used as alternative representations of the colonial encounter. Unlike Study 1, I used identical descriptions of historical events in Study 2, but varied the framing of events for purposes of experimental control. Moreover, in order to keep two texts parallel, the description of events focused on the disappearance of Indigenous populations and did not mention specific acts of historical violence, even in the "genocide" condition. One can anticipate that different representations that explicitly mention violent events may produce stronger effects on perceptions of harm and reparative action than I observed in the present study. Study 3 addresses these concerns by incorporating mentions of historical violence in both ("genocide" and "sanitized") sets of historical representations.

Study 3

In the previous studies, I used different strategies to examine identity concerns in perceptions of and responses to different historical representations. In Study 1, I experimentally manipulated the salience of identity concerns and observed the effects of this manipulation on perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the American colonial encounter. In Study 2, I examined perceptions of and responses to historical events associated with the American colonial encounter in a different national context. In both of these studies, different historical representations referred to own group's history. Study 3 similarly addressed identity concerns involved in perceptions of and responses to different historical representations via yet another strategy. Rather than making identity concerns salient or measuring identity concerns in a different national context, Study 3 experimentally manipulated the relevance of identity concerns by exposing European American participants to different representations of either own-group or other-group wrongdoing which construed historical violence as either "social change" or "genocide".

Similar to Study 2, the historical representations in the present study attempted to instantiate interpretive denial via the use of euphemistic labeling. However, unlike Study 2 which omitted mention of violent events, Study 3 depicted numerous acts of violence (e.g. massacres, attacks, forced displacement). The sanitized text referred to historical events as the "calamity" and "catastrophe", while the critical text framed the same set of historical events as "holocaust" and "genocide". I then examined effects for perceptions of harm and reparative action.

A general hypothesis for this study suggests that perception of harm and support for reparative action will be stronger in the "genocide" than "calamity" condition. A second hypothesis suggests that participants might deny harm and oppose reparative action as an

identity-defensive reaction. Accordingly, one can predict that the identity relevance of historical wrongdoing will induce participants to deny harm and oppose reparative action. Finally, one can hypothesize that the "genocide" label will elicit greater perception of harm and support for reparative action when it refers to other group's wrongdoing than when it refers to own group's wrongdoing.

Method

Participants

Participants included undergraduate students who received partial course credit for participation in the study. I report analyses of only the sixty-nine participants (51% women, age range 18-26, mean=19.25) who indicated US citizenship and reported *White or European-American* ethnic identification.

Procedure

Participants individually completed a set of paper and pencil measures. Participants first completed a national glorification measure before completing other materials. I then assigned each participant at random to one of two historical representation conditions. In the *sanitized* condition, participants read a short text describing numerous acts of violence (e.g. massacres, attacks, forced displacement) and framed these acts as "calamity" and "catastrophe". In the *genocide* condition, participants read a text which framed the same violent acts as "genocide" and "holocaust".

I also assigned each participant at random to one of two identity relevance conditions. Participants in the *own group* condition read a version of the text describing aforementioned acts of violence committed by European settlers against Indigenous Peoples. Participants in the *other group* condition read a version of the text describing acts of violence against Armenians committed by the Ottoman State. Other than these differences, participants completed the same

dependent measures in the same order regardless of condition. After participants completed the measures, the experimenter debriefed and thanked them.

Measures

National glorification. Prior to reading the historical text, participants first completed the same 8-item measure of national glorification (α =.88) used in Study 1 (Roccas et al., 2006).

Historical perception. After reading the "sanitized" or "genocide" text describing own-group or other-group violence, participants rated seven items assessing their perception of harm. The participants completed the same four items used in the previous studies, where three items (α=.74) assessed participants' perception of harm and one item assessed participants' temporal distancing of harm. In addition to these four items, participants responded to three different items assessing denial of harm. One item assessed participants' perception of the extent to which the victim group constituted a threat ("To what extent did the Indigenous/Armenian communities pose a threat to the European settlers/ Ottoman State?"). Another item assessed participants' perceived bi-directionality of harm ("To what extent was the violence bi-directional?"). Finally, another item assessed participants' perception of the relevance of past harm to present day realities ("To what extent is the past treatment of Native Americans/ Armenians relevant to present day realities?")

Support for reparative action. Participants used a 7-point scale (0 = *strongly disagree* and 6 = *strongly agree*) to indicate their agreement with 3 items I created as an index of reparative action (α= .75) including two items on apology and one item on providing reparation and compensation for damages to Native Americans/Armenians for past harm.

Results

To evaluate hypotheses, I conducted the same set of analyses as in Study 1. More specifically, I used multiple regression analyses with glorification score, identity relevance (0 =

own group, 1 =other group), historical representation (0 = calamity, 1 = genocide), and their interaction terms as predictors of each outcome[8]. All interactions were probed and interpreted using simple slopes (Preacher, Curran, & Hayes, 2006). Means and standard deviations as a function of condition appear in Table 5. Correlations between variables appear in Table 6.

Historical Perception

   Perception of harm. Analyses for perception of harm revealed no main effects or interactions, *ps*>.1. Inconsistent with predictions, findings suggested that participants did not differ in their perception of harm, regardless of glorification score, the framing of violence and whether the perpetrator was own or other group.

   Time of harm. Analyses revealed a significant effect of glorification score on perceived time of harm, *b*=-0.76, *se*= 0.37, p= .05, suggesting that participants high in glorification engaged in greater temporal distancing of past harm. There no main effects of historical representation or identity relevance and none of the interactions was significant, *ps*>.1.

   Perceived threat. Analyses for perceived threat further revealed no main effects or interactions, *p*s>.1 (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). In other words, participants did not differ in their perception of the extent to which the victimized group posed a threat to the perpetrator group.

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[8] In a parallel set of analyses, I conducted a two-way ANCOVA with historical representation (calamity vs. genocide) and identity relevance (own group vs. other group) as the between-participants factors and glorification score as a co-variate. These analyses revealed similar results. I report results of the MLR analyses here for purposes of consistency with the previous studies. I indicate any differences that the ANCOVA test revealed in a footnote.

Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations

	Calamity (n=32)				Genocide (n=37)			
	Indigenous (n=15)		Armenian (n=17)		Indigenous (n=22)		Armenian (n=15)	
Glorification	4.03	(0.99)	4.12	(0.73)	3.94	(0.96)	4.13	(0.80)
Severity	11.49	(1.12)	10.62	(3.18)	11.58	(2.23)	11.92	(3.45)
Time	4.17	(3.40)	3.39	(2.80)	4.59	(2.89)	5.55	(3.56)
Threat	4.91	(2.89)	4.95	(2.96)	5.63	(3.19)	4.39	(3.36)
Bidirectionality	6.87	(2.28)	6.25	(3.57)	8.27	(2.35)	4.97	(3.05)
Relevance	8.80	(2.55)	7.51	(4.01)	7.94	(3.90)	10.24	(3.31)
Reparative Action	4.42	(1.03)	3.41	(1.29)	3.64	(1.15)	4.09	(0.86)

Note: Cells include means (with standard deviation in parentheses).

Table 6. Correlations Among Variables

|	Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Glorification	-						
2	Severity	0.03	-					
3	Time of Harm	-0.24*	0.03	-				
4	Threat	0.04	-0.10	0.19	-			
5	Bidirectionality of Harm	0.11	-0.03	0.09	0.32**	-		
6	Relevance of Harm	-0.27*	0.26*	0.19	0.08	-0.05	-	
7	Reparative Action	-0.24	0.03	0.25*	-0.03	-0.14	0.19	-

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$

Bidirectionality of harm. Analyses for bidirectionality of harm revealed no main effects of glorification score, $b=.43$, $se=.35$, $p=.23$ or historical representation, $b=.16$, $se=.70$, $p=.82$. However, analyses did reveal a main effect of identity relevance, $b=-2.10$, $se=0.71$, $p=.004$. Consistent with predictions, participants perceived own group's wrongdoing as more bidirectional (M=7.70, SD=2.40) than other group's wrongdoing (M=5.65, SD=3.35). A marginally significant Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction qualified this effect, $b=-2.52$, $se=1.36$, $p=.068$ (Figure 6)[9]. To probe this interaction, I conducted two parallel sets of analyses[10]. First, I examined the effects of the historical manipulation on perceived bidirectionality of harm separately within the own and other group conditions. Next I examined the effects of the identity relevance manipulation on perceived bidirectionality of harm separately within the calamity and genocide conditions. The first analysis did not reveal statistically significant effects of the Historical Representation manipulation on perceived bidirectionality of harm within own versus other group. The second analysis revealed that among those participants in the "calamity" condition, the Identity Relevance manipulation had no effect on perceived bidirectionality of harm, $b=-.76$, $se=0.98$, $p=.45$. Among those participants in the "genocide" condition, the identity relevance manipulation did have an effect, $b=-3.27$, $se=0.94$, $p=.001$. Participants perceived own group's genocide (M=8.27, SD=2.35) as more bi-directional than other group's genocide (M=4.97, SD=3.05). In Cohen's (2001) terminology, this finding suggests that when exposed to critical representations of own group's wrongdoing,

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[9] Results of the ANCOVA test similarly revealed a main effect of identity relevance on bidirectionality, F (1, 69) = 8.64, p= 0.005. Participants perceived own group's wrongdoing (M= 7.70, SD= 2.40) as more bidirectional than other group's wrongdoing (M= 5.65, SD-=3.35). In this analysis, the Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction was significant, F (1, 69) = 3.94, p= 0.05. Participants perceived own group's genocide as more bi-directional than other group's genocide, t (35) = 3.71, p= 0.02.

[10] I used Hayes & Matthes' (2009) MODPROBE macro to probe all interactions in Study 3 without adjusting the α level.

participants engaged in interpretive denial (i.e. construed wrongdoing as more bi-directional, hence as something potentially other or less atrocious than "genocide").

Figure 6: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on bidirectionality of harm


Relevance of harm. Analyses for perceived relevance of harm revealed reveal a significant main effect of glorification score, b= -1.00, se= 0.43, p= .02, suggesting that glorification score is negatively associated with perceived relevance of past harm to present day reality. There were no main effects of historical representation, b=.78, se=0.86, p=.36 or identity relevance, b=.77, se=0.86, p= .37, however analyses revealed a significant Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction, b=3.81, se= 1.69, p= .03 (Figure 7). To probe the interaction, I conducted the similar set of simple slopes analyses. The historical representation manipulation did not have an effect on perceived relevance of harm among participants in the own group condition, b=-1.02, se=1.16, p= .38. However, it did have an effect among participants in the other group condition, b= 2.79, se= 1.23, p= .03. Consistent with predictions,

participants in the other group condition perceived "genocide" (M=10.24, SD= 3.31) as more relevant to present day reality than "calamity" (M=7.51, SD= 4.01).

Moreover, I examined the effects of the identity relevance manipulation on perceived relevance of harm within calamity and genocide conditions. Simple slopes analyses revealed that the identity relevance manipulation did not have an effect on perceived relevance of harm among participants in the "calamity" condition, b= -1.24, se= 1.23, p= .32. However, it did have an effect among participants in the "genocide" condition, b= 2.58, se= 1.17, p= .03. Participants perceived other group's genocide (M=10.24, SD=3.31) as more relevant to present day reality than own group's genocide (M=7.94, SD=3.90).

As anticipated, these findings reflect the differential effects of the "genocide" label on perceptions of harm as a function of identity concerns. Participants perceive "genocide" as more relevant to present day reality than "calamity" only when the label refers to other group's wrongdoing but not when it refers to own group's wrongdoing. Moreover, participants deny the relevance of own group's "genocide" to present day reality to a greater extent than other group's "genocide".

Figure 7: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on relevance of harm


Reparative Action

Analyses revealed a marginally significant main effect of glorification, b=-.27 se=.14, p=.06 suggesting that participants high in glorification indicated less support for reparative action. Contrary to hypotheses, there were no main effects of identity relevance, b=-.19, se= 0.28, p= .49 or historical representation, b=-.11, se=0. 28, p=.70, however analyses revealed a significant Identity Relevance X Historical Representation interaction, b=-1.48, se=0.54, p=.008 (Figure 8). Once again, simple slopes analyses revealed that the historical representation manipulation had a significant effect on reparative action among participants in the own group condition, b= -.81, se= .37, p= .03. In contrast to predictions, the "calamity" representation elicited greater support for reparative action (M=4.42, SD=1.03) than did the "genocide" representation (M=3.64, SD= 1.15) among participants in the own group condition. Participants in the other group condition showed a trend in the opposite direction, b= .66, se=0.39, p= .09, such that the "genocide" representation elicited greater support for reparative action (M= 4.09, SD= 0.86) than did the "calamity" representation (M= 3.41, SD= 1.29).

Moreover, the identity relevance manipulation had no effect among participants in the "genocide" condition, $b= .49$, $se= 0.36$, $p= .18$, but it did have an effect among participants in the "calamity" condition, $b=-.98$, se=0. 38, p= .01. Participants reported greater support for reparative action in response to own group's calamity (M=4.42, SD= 1.03) than other group's calamity (M= 3.41, SD=1.29).

These findings provide some evidence for the idea that, while the framing of historical violence as "genocide" might be more effective in promoting reparative action among bystander groups, it might undermine support for reparative action among perpetrator groups[11].

Figure 8: Effects of historical representation and identity relevance on reparative action

Discussion

To summarize, results of Study 3 suggest the extent to which the implications of the "genocide" label vary as a function of the identity relevance of historical harm. Although the

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[11] I conducted a parallel set of analyses to examine whether there were indirect effects of historical representation on reparative action via historical perception measures (as in Study 1). Analyses revealed no significant indirect effects.

"genocide" framing does not lead to differences in perceived severity or time of harm, it triggers different responses when it applies to own versus other group. Participants perceive own group's "genocide" as more bidirectional and less relevant to present day reality than other group's "genocide". Moreover, when the "genocide" label refers to own group's wrongdoing, participants report support less support for reparative action than they do when historical violence is framed as "calamity". In contrast, when the "genocide" label refers to other group's wrongdoing, participants perceive historical violence as more relevant to present day reality and tend to report greater support for reparative action than they do when historical violence is framed as "calamity".

Results further provide some evidence regarding the implications of national glorification for perceptions of and responses to historical violence. Consistent with past research, participants high in glorification engage in greater temporal distancing of harm, perceive past harm as less relevant to present day reality, and indicate somewhat less support for reparative action.

General Discussion

The present research examined the implications of the genocide label for national identity, collective memory, and reparative action. Across three experiments, I exposed people to either critical representations of history which labeled events associated with ingroup wrongdoing as "genocide" or to sanitized representations of history which omitted the label and construed events as something other than "genocide". I then examined the effects of this treatment for participants' perceptions of and responses to historical events.

One general hypothesis for these studies concerned the impact of representations that mention genocide in the absence of identity concerns. More specifically, the hypothesis was that genocide- mentioning representations would facilitate greater perception of harm and support for

reparative action while genocide-silent representations would promote greater denial of harm and inhibit support for reparative action.

Another general hypothesis concerned the moderating impact of identity concerns on the impact of representations that mentioned genocide. To the extent that genocide-mentioning representations of history constitute a threat to national identity, the hypothesis was that the pressure of identity relevant concerns (whether as a dispositional individual difference or as the result of situational variation via experimental manipulation) would induce participants to deny harm and oppose reparative action as an identity-defensive reaction.

Effects of the Genocide Label

With regards to implications of the "genocide" label for perceptions of harm, results provided mixed support for the hypotheses. The genocide label enhanced perceived severity of harm, even despite the otherwise denial-promoting effects of national glorification, but this effect was only true in Study 1. In Studies 2 and 3, the "genocide" label did not impact participants' perceptions of the severity of harm. One potential reason for these different patterns of findings on perceived severity of harm might be the historical representations that I used as experimental manipulations. Studies 2 and 3 used the same text for both the sanitized and critical representations, but varied the framing of events. Moreover, Study 2 omitted any mention of historical acts of violence, while Study 3 mentioned violent acts in very brief terms. In contrast, the "genocide" representation in Study 1 not only varied the framing of historical events, but also involved a more elaborate description of numerous acts of violence, while the "sanitized" representation did not make references to the same violent events. Despite these important differences in the experimental manipulations, one possible interpretation of these studies is that merely labeling events as "genocide" without elaborate mentions of genocidal acts might not be sufficient to promote greater perception of harm. An alternative explanation is that genocide-

silent texts that involve both literal and interpretive forms of denial (Cohen, 2001) might

promote greater denial of harm than texts that utilize euphemistic interpretive denial alone.

The "genocide" label did not impact participants' temporal distancing of harm in any of

the studies. Study 3 assessed historical perception along three additional dimensions (perceived

threat, bi-directionality of harm and relevance of harm) and found effects on two of these (e.g.

bi-directionality and relevance). Briefly, findings suggested that an interaction between historical

representation and identity relevance of harm, such that participants perceived own group's

"genocide" as more bidirectional than other group's "genocide". Moreover, participants

perceived own group's "genocide" as less relevant to present day reality than other group's

"genocide".

The studies further yielded mixed results regarding the implications of the "genocide"

label for reparative action. In Study 1, there was no direct effect of the "genocide" label on

reparative action. However, the genocide representation had an indirect effect on reparative

action via perception of harm. In a condition of identity salience which promotes

identity-defensive motivations to deny harm, the genocide representation text still preserved

perception of harm, which in turn led to greater support for action. In Study 2, the genocide

representation did not have a direct effect on reparative action. However, the genocide label led

participants to dis-identify with the nation. Given the positive relationship between national

identification and support for Indigenous rights, the drop in identification in turn reduced

participants' support for Indigenous rights (including reparative action). Accounting for this

indirect effect, the genocide label facilitated support for reparative action. In Study 3, there was

an interaction between historical representation and identity relevance of past harm. When the

"genocide" label applied to own group's wrongdoing, it undermined support for reparative

action. When the "genocide" label applied to other group's wrongdoing, there was a reverse trend such that the genocide representation elicited somewhat greater support for reparative action. This finding contradicts the results of Study 1, which suggested the opposite pattern.

One potential explanation for this might concern the different pattern of results for perceived severity of harm. In Study 1, the "genocide" representation of own group wrongdoing elicited greater support for reparative action indirectly via perception of harm. However, in Study 3, there were no differences in perceived severity of harm. In the absence of acknowledgment of harm, the "genocide" label was not sufficient to elicit support for reparative action (see Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010). This finding resonates with previous research which suggests that acknowledgment of harm is necessary for reparative action (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005).

In addition to perceptions of harm and support for reparative action, Study 1 further examined the effects of the "genocide" label on participants' tendencies to reproduce critical (versus) sanitized forms of commemoration. Findings of this study revealed that the "genocide" representation led participants to reproduce more critical versions of history, but only when identity concerns were not high or salient.

Effects of Identity Concerns

In support of the hypothesis that perceptions of and responses to historical events reflect identity concerns, Study 1 found that identity salience reduced perceived severity of harm. In contrast Studies 2 and 3 did not observe any associations between identity concerns and perceived severity of harm. One possible explanation for this difference across the studies might be the different measures of national identification that were used (i.e. national glorification in Studies 1 and 3; private regard and identity centrality in Study 2). Another possible explanation

might concern differences in identity concerns across the different national settings in which these studies were conducted (i.e. USA in Studies 1 and 3, Costa Rica in Study 2).

Identity concerns further impacted participants' temporal distancing of harm differently across the three studies. Identity concerns were not associated with temporal distancing of harm in Study 2. However, in both Studies 1 and 3, higher levels of glorification were associated with greater temporal distancing of harm. Again, these differences might be due to the particular measure of national identification (i.e. national glorification) that was used in Studies 1 and 3. Alternatively, these differences might reflect differences in identity concerns across the national contexts in which I conducted these studies (i.e. USA and Costa Rica).

General Implications

Together, the studies suggest that the implications of the "genocide" label for perceptions of and responses to historical events vary as a function of identity concerns. Findings further reveal that invoking the term "genocide" in cases of ingroup wrongdoing might trigger opposing processes. First, the "genocide" label might enhance perceived severity of harm, and thus promote support for reparative action (Study 1). However, the "genocide" label might also trigger identity-defensive motivations to deny the genocidal character or relevance of harm and undermine support for reparative action (Study 3). In contrast, invoking the term "genocide" in cases of other group wrongdoing can lead to recognition of the relevance of past harm to present day reality and promote support for reparative action (Study 3).

More broadly, the studies suggest that identity-defensive motivations to deny harm are not merely reflective of individual level processes, but are further embedded in the denial-affording cultural tools (e.g. social representations of history) that inform people's experience of identity. From a cultural psychological perspective, mainstream representations of history serve as intentional worlds that regulate collective identity concerns. Mainstream representations of

history not only reflect the identity concerns of their (re) producers (e.g. nation-glorifying individuals who deny or silence ingroup wrong-doing) but further direct subsequent identity concerns of people towards particular ends (e.g. identity-defensive motivations to deny harm or oppose reparative action).

Limitations and Future Directions

One major limitation of the present studies concerns the relatively small sample sizes which resulted in low statistical power. Many of the patterns of results that I observed suggested differences in the hypothesized direction, but these did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests that low statistical power constrained my ability to observe significant relationships that might, in fact, exist (i.e., Type I error).

Another important limitation of the present studies is their exclusive focus on people of European descent (in USA and Costa Rica). While this emphasis reflects an interest in processes of denial, it reproduces silence about Indigenous experience in mainstream psychology. One important question for further research concerns implications of mainstream (i.e. genocide-silent) representations of history for Indigenous identification and action. Some scholars have linked ongoing problems of Indigenous Peoples to the "legacy of chronic trauma and unresolved grief" (Duran & Duran, 1995; p. 27) as an enduring result of European conquest. For instance, researchers have linked the high rates of depression and suicide among First Nations youth to these youths' limited abilities to construct a coherent narrative given their silenced history (Chandler & Lalone, 1998; Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Such research suggests a need to counteract silence regarding genocidal wrongdoing in order to achieve healing, reconciliation and restorative justice (Cole, 2004; Liem, 2007). More broadly, future research should examine

the implications of critical representations of history for healing, reconciliation, and restorative justice among victim as well as perpetrator and bystander groups.

Another limitation of the design that may explain relatively weak evidence for hypothesized effects of manipulations is that the textual accounts of the colonial encounter used in the present research are relatively impoverished forms of historical representation. One can anticipate that more involving (e.g. visual; see Berger, 1980) forms of representation may produce stronger effects on perceptions of and responses to historical events than the ones I observed in the present studies.

A fourth and related limitation concerns the absence of manipulation checks in the present research. Without manipulation checks, it is not possible to discern whether the failure to observe hypothesized effects of the manipulations reflect the actual absence of effects or the failure of experimental manipulations. The inclusion of manipulation checks would provide insight into this question by helping verify that the different manipulations used in these studies instantiated intended effects on participants.

Finally, the present research relies on the exclusive use of experimental research methods. Future studies would greatly benefit from the use of non-experimental methods (survey research, interview studies, and other qualitative methods) to examine lay perceptions of "genocide", historical knowledge of genocidal events, and the meaning of national identity. Future studies would further benefit from an examination of emotional responses (e.g. collective guilt, shame, anger) that the "genocide" label evokes among perpetrator, victim, and bystander groups.

Conclusion: Beyond Intentional Worlds of Denial

Decades of social scientific research have shown that unless effective measures are taken to rectify or remedy the past, historical injustice is likely to result in enduring injustice and harm.

In the case of nations with genocidal histories, acknowledging and accepting the different experiences of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders constitute the first steps to recovery and reconciliation (e.g. Kelman, 2008; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008; Vollhardt, 2013). Taking responsibility for the past, then, means taking responsibility for the present as well as the future (Spinner-Halev, 2007). As scholars suggest, coming to the terms with genocidal pasts is necessary not only for present purposes of collective healing and reconciliation, but also for the prevention of future genocides (Staub, 2004, 2006).The present studies hint at two related directions for coming to terms with genocidal pasts. One direction for coming to terms with the past among perpetrator groups concerns the need to promote less identity-defensive or more self-critical constructions of national identity, particularly among people who typically occupy positions of power and privilege. Consequently, an implication for future research and practice might involve interventions to induce changes in individual subjectivity (e.g. via processes of cognitive decategorization or recategorization) which has been the topic of much social psychological research (e.g. Brewer & Miller, 1988; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).

However, national identities are not reified natural entities, but instead get dynamically reproduced in everyday action via engagement with cultural models, discursive repertories, and social representations. Moreover, these structures of mind-in-society have a motivational force of their own, regardless of the self-consciously adopted identities or benign intentions of the people who engage them. Therefore, the second, and arguably more critical, direction suggests that efforts at coming to terms with the past should target the psychological structures of denial embedded in everyday sociocultural worlds. Without relieving individuals of their responsibility for their actions, this perspective shifts the focus of interventions from the task of changing

individual hearts and minds to changing the sociocultural worlds in which those hearts and minds are embedded.

The results of the present study suggest that a pressing task for coming to terms with genocidal pasts requires moving beyond intentional worlds of denial via the recovery of historical memory (Martin-Baro, 1994). Social representations of history that acknowledge past wrongdoing can not only counteract tendencies of denial and forgetting, but can further enable new "master narratives" (Hammack, 2009) or imaginations of national identity (Anderson, 1983) that affirm the common humanity of diverse peoples and mobilize action toward democratic innovation. As such, recovering historical memory can help reduce the risk of perpetuating past mistakes (Barkan, 2000; Pennebaker, Paez & Rime, 1997) and remind nations of their promise to "never again" repeat the horrors of genocidal acts.

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APPENDIX A- Study 1

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT OF AMERICA

In 1492, Columbus discovered America and provided the catalyst for a remarkable case of human migration and societal change. Prior to European contact, conservative figures estimate that the Indigenous population in the area defined by the borders of the present United States was greater than 12,000,000. Four centuries later, the Indigenous population was only 237, 000—a 98% reduction.

European settlement of the Americas began with Columbus, who returned on his second voyage with settlers and plans for European colonization. The pace of colonization increased after Columbus departed, and eventually there were Spanish, Portuguese, French, English /British, Dutch, and Swedish settlements in the area that has become the United States. Policies of expansion continued after the creation of the independent United States of America, where people claimed a "manifest destiny" to occupy the continent from Atlantic to Pacific coasts.

Americans used a number of means—some explicitly forceful/violent, others less so—to accomplish this manifest destiny. These methods include the following:

- treaties, purchases, agreements and other contractual means to acquire land from Indigenous Nations
- wars of conquest in which settlers forcibly acquired land from Indigenous Nations and displaced to less hospitable environments or to reservations;
- acquisition of French-controlled land after the "French and Indian" conflict (1754-1763);
- purchase of the Louisiana territory from France in 1803;
- gradual acquisition of Florida from Spain during early 1800s;
- treaty with Great Britain to set the northern border of the United States with Canada;
- annexation of the Republic of Texas (1845), which was itself a creation of American farmers and local Tejanos who fought a war of independence from Mexico in 1836;
- military conquest and acquisition of present-day Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado, Kansas, and Utah during the Mexican-American conflict (1848).

These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. Indigenous societies have become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years ago. Roughly 4,000,000 people in the USA today claim Indigenous ethnicities, compared to a non-Indigenous population of roughly 275,000,000. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants own the land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political systems, economic practices) have been replaced with English language and European-derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard European settlement of America to be one of the most profound cases of **societal change** in recorded human history.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE

In 1492, Columbus arrived in what we now call North America. For Indigenous Peoples, this event and its aftermath were a catastrophe. Prior to European contact, conservative figures estimate that the Indigenous population in the area defined by the borders of the present United States was greater than 12,000,000. Four centuries later, the Indigenous population was only 237, 000—a 98% reduction.

Large-scale killing began with Columbus, who returned on his second voyage and quickly implemented policies of slavery and mass extermination. However, mass killing did not stop after Columbus departed. Expansion of the European colonies led to similar genocides, which continued after the creation of the independent United States of America as successive administrations enacted policies to grab land for white settlers.

During American expansion into the western frontier, settlers and governments used a variety of methods—some explicitly violent, others more subtle—to destroy Indigenous societies and cultures. These methods include the following:

- wars of conquest;
- military raids and terrorist attacks on Indigenous villages;
- forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, disease, and exposure;
- confinement of Indigenous societies to "reservations", often located in undesirable areas far from the communities' place of origin, that almost insured poverty and subjugation.
- infection of Indigenous communities with smallpox and other diseases;
- destruction of flora and fauna (e.g., buffalo herds) that Indigenous Peoples used for food, clothing, housing material, tools, and medicine;
- imposition of farming and ranching lifestyles upon Indigenous Peoples; and
- forced removal of Indigenous children from home communities to attend boarding schools, where authorities not only stole their labor, but also poisoned their minds.

These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. Indigenous societies have become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years ago. Roughly 4,000,000 people in the USA today claim Indigenous ethnicities, compared to a non-Indigenous population of roughly 275,000,000. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants have occupied the land, taken its resources, and replaced Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political systems, economic practices) with English language and European-derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard the European conquest of America to be one of most profound cases of **genocide** in recorded human history.

National Glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006)

Instructions: We all belong to different social groups or social categories. We would like you to consider the nation to which you belong, and to respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about your nation. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions.

1. Other nations can learn a lot from us.

2. In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.

3. The US Army is the best army in the world.

4. One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.

5. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.

6. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the US.

7. The US is better than other nations in all respects.

8. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Historical Perception

1. How *violent or brutal* was the European conquest of North America?

2. How many Indigenous people died as a *direct result* of European settlers' actions during the conquest of North America?

3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous societies due to *deliberate policies of violence* by European settlers?

4. When did violence associated with the European conquest of North America occur?

Reparative Action

1. The U.S. should officially apologize to Native American nations for all broken treaties, illegal appropriation of land, forced displacement, and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans.

2. The U.S. should provide reparation and compensation for damages to Native Americans who were removed from their homes and forced to attend boarding schools.

3. The U.S. should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for suffering inflicted upon Native Americans

Critical Commemoration

In your opinion, what are the 5 most important events to commemorate during Native American History Month (November)? (Fill in blank)

What should future generations of high school students learn about American history? Please rank the following from 1 (most important) to 10 (least important) according to their importance for history education.

___ Sacajawea: The Shoshoni woman who assisted the Lewis and Clark expedition to explore the Louisiana Purchase

___ Trail of Tears: President Jackson ordered re-location of the Cherokee Nation from Southeast USA to Oklahoma. Thousands died on the subsequent "death march".

___Wounded Knee: USA soldiers massacre 128 Lakota men, women, and children at Wounded Knee, South Dakota.

___ Code Talkers: Members of the Navajo Nation who served with the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II for the purpose of transmitting secret messages.

___ Jim Thorpe: Native American football and track star who was voted Greatest Athlete of the first half of the 20th Century.

___ Inventions: Native Americans domesticated crops (e.g., maize, squash) and designed such products as moccasins, toboggans, snow shoes, and kayaks.

___ Iroquois Confederacy: Union of five Indigenous American Nations under a "Great Binding Law" that many scholars see as an influence on the U.S. Constitution.

___ King Philip's War: English colonists kill 88% of the Wampanoag, the people who had saved them from starvation in events commemorated in popular depictions of the Thanksgiving holiday. The war started with apparent poisoning of Wampanoag leader Wamsutta in English custody and ended with beheading of his brother (and successor) Metacom.

___ Chief Joseph: Leader of a group of Nez Perce Indians who resisted forced removal by the U.S. to a reservation in Idaho. The group fled across 1700 miles with 2000 U.S. Cavalry in pursuit in an attempt to reach refuge in Canada. The U.S. soldiers captured them only 40 miles from the border. Although Chief Joseph negotiated terms of surrender that provided for safe return to their home in Oregon, the U.S. forces broke their promise and marched the captured band of Nez Perce to Kansas.

___ Sequoyah: Cherokee man who invented a system of writing for the Cherokee language.

APPENDIX B- Study 2

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT OF THE AMERICAS

The **Spanish Discovery and Settlement** of the Americas was the conquest, settlement and political rule over much of the western hemisphere. It was initiated by the Spanish conquistadors and developed by the Monarchy of Spain through its administrators and missionaries. Beginning with the 1492 arrival of Christopher Columbus, over nearly four centuries the Spanish Empire expanded across: most of present day Central America, the Caribbean islands, and Mexico; much of the rest of North America including the Southwestern, Southern coastal, and California Pacific Coast regions of the United States and the western half of South America.

These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. Indigenous populations have declined by an estimated 95% and become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years ago. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants own the land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political systems, economic practices) have been replaced with Spanish language and Spanish-derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard Spanish settlement of America to be one of the most profound cases of **societal change** in recorded human history.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE

The **Spanish Conquest and Genocide** of the Americas was the conquest, destruction and political rule over much of the western hemisphere. It was initiated by the Spanish conquistadors and developed by the Monarchy of Spain through its administrators and missionaries. Beginning with the 1492 arrival of Christopher Columbus, over nearly four centuries the Spanish Empire expanded across: most of present day Central America, the Caribbean islands, and Mexico; much of the rest of North America including the Southwestern, Southern coastal, and California Pacific Coast regions of the United States and the western half of South America.

These processes caused a profound demographic transformation of the American continent. Indigenous populations have declined by an estimated 95% and become almost invisible in the space that they dominated 500 years ago. Non-Indigenous settlers and their descendants own the land and its resources, and Indigenous ways of life (e.g., religion, life kinship patterns, political systems, economic practices) have been replaced with Spanish language and Spanish-derived ways of life. As a result, many historians regard the Spanish conquest of America to be one of mostprofound cases of **genocide** in recorded human history.

Historical Perception

1. How *violent or brutal* was the European conquest of the Americas?

2. How many Indigenous people died as a *direct result* of European settlers' actions during the conquest of the Americas?

3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous societies due to *deliberate policies of violence* by European settlers?

4. When did violence associated with the European conquest of the Americas occur?

Identity Centrality

1. Overall, being Costa Rican has very little to do with how I feel about myself. *Reverse scored*

2. Being Costa Rican is an important reflection of who I am.

3. Being Costa Rican is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. *Reverse scored*

4. In general, being Costa Rican is an important part of my self image.

Private Regard

1. In general, I'm glad to be a citizen of Costa Rica.

2. I often regret that I am Costa Rican. *Reverse scored*

3. Overall, I feel that Costa Rica is not worthwhile. *Reverse scored*

4. I feel good about being Costa Rican.

Support for Indigenous Rights

1. Costa Rica should provide reparation and compensation for past damage to Indigenous Peoples.

2. Costa Rica should provide job opportunities for Indigenous communities living on or near reservations.

3. Costa Rica should provide health care facilities to Indigenous communities living on or near reservations.

4. Costa Rica should allow Indigenous farmers access to agricultural credit.

5. Costa Rica should protect Indigenous land rights.

Other Policy Items (not included in the analyses)

1. Costa Rica should have a military defense force.

2. Costa Rica should support CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement).

3. Costa Rica should strengthen its northern border security.

4. Costa Rica should provide bilingiual (Spanish and Indigenous language) education in elementary schools on Indigenous reservations.

5. Costa Rica should increase fines for employing undocumented immigrants.

6. Costa Rica should strive for greater regional integration with Central American countries.

7. Costa Rica should have the right to remove Indigenous Peoples from the lands they occupy.

8. Costa Rica should deport undocumented Nicaraguan immigrants and their families.

9. Costa Rica should align its policies with the USA.

10. Costa Rica should protect the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families.

11. Costa Rica should expand its economic cooperation with the US.

12. Costa Rica should have the right to extract energy resources from Indigenous reservations and lands.

13. Costa Rica should allow the US Navy access to Costa Rican waters and ports.

14. Costa Rica should have the right to allocate Indigenous lands to non-Indigenous Costa Rican ranchers and farmers.

15. Costa Rica should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize suffering inflicted upon Indigenous Peoples.

Demographic Information

Age

Gender

Nationality

Ethnicity

APPENDIX C- Study 3

For Indigenous case:

The **Indigenous Calamity**, also known as the **Big Calamity** and the **Great Catastrophe**, was the massive destruction of the Indigenous Peoples of the present day Americas. It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Indigenous villages, and forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of societal change in recorded human history.

The **Indigenous Genocide**, also known as the **American Holocaust** and the **American Indian Holocaust** was the massive destruction of the Indigenous Peoples of the present day Americas. It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Indigenous villages, and forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of genocide in recorded human history.

For Armenian case:

The **Armenian Calamity**, also known as the **Big Calamity** and the **Great Catastrophe**, was the massive destruction of the Armenian population of the former Ottoman Empire (present day Turkey). It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Armenian villages, and forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of societal change in recorded human history.

The **Armenian Genocide**, also known as the **Armenian Holocaust** and the **Armenian Massacres** was the massive destruction of the Armenian population of the former Ottoman Empire (present day Turkey). It involved the use of massacres, attacks on Armenian villages, and forced marches to relocate Indigenous communities, which killed thousands of people due to starvation, cold, and disease. Many historians regard these events as one of the most profound cases of genocide in recorded human history.

National Glorification (Roccas, Klar, Liviatan, 2006)

1. Other nations can learn a lot from us.

2. In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.

3. The US Army is the best army in the world.

4. One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.

5. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.

6. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the US.

7. The US is better than other nations in all respects.

8. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Historical Perception

1. How violent or brutal was the European settlers' [Ottoman Empire's] treatment of Indigenous Peoples [Armenians]?

2. How many Native Americans [Armenians] died as a direct result of European [Ottoman] attacks?

3. To what extent was the collapse of Indigenous [Armenian] communities due to deliberate policies of violence by the European settlers [Ottoman Empire]?

4. When did violence associated with the European [Ottoman] treatment of Native Americans [Armenians] occur?

5. To what extent did Indigenous [Armenian] communities pose a threat to European settlers [Ottoman Empire]?

6. To what extent was the violence bi-directional (e.g. including attacks and killing by both European settlers [Ottoman Empire] and Indigenous Peoples [Armenians])?

7. To what extent is the past treatment of Native Americans [Armenians] relevant to present day realities?

Reparative Action

1. The US [Turkey] should officially apologize to Native American nations [Armenians] for forced displacement and massacres perpetrated against Native Americans [Armenian communities].

2. The US [Turkey] should provide reparation and compensation for damage to Native Americans [Armenians].

3. The US [Turkey] should establish a National Day of Apology to memorialize and atone for suffering inflicted upon Native Americans [Armenians].

Demographic Information

Age

Gender

Nationality

Ethnicity