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Abstract / Résumé

Cet article suggère que les points essentiels quant aux "intentions" du Japon à l'égard du contrôle américain dans les Philippines, étaient déjà clairs avant l'incident Mandchou de 1931 et le passage de l'Acte Tydings-McDuffie de 1934. L'auteur maintient que dès le commencement de l'hégémonie américaine, les représentants américains aux Philippines n'ont pu ignorer l'attitude du Japon. L'auteur, fort de preuves, affirme que les autorités américaines ont alors tenté d'éveiller un sentiment anti-japonais dans le pays.

L'article met l'accent sur les opinions diverses que le passage de l'Acte Jones de 1916 et la promesse de l'indépendance éventuelle des Philippines ont provoquées parmi les Philippins et les Américains. Ces opinions spéculent sur différentes attitudes du Japon à l'égard de cette indépendance. En conséquence, l'auteur discute des points de vue prêtant à controverse tels que la probabilité d'une aide japonaise apportée aux groupes pro-indépendants du pays, l'interprétation politique de l'immigration japonaise aux Philippines, le développement d'une défense philippine en vue de l'importance grandissante de la flotte japonaise maîtresse de l'Ouest du Pacifique, et l'interprétation du développement croissant des liens commerciaux du Japon avec l'archipel.

La conclusion principale de l'auteur est que ces opinions représentent plutôt l'état d'esprit des Philippins et des Américains déjà commis à une politique d'anti ou pro indépendance. Après une étude minutieuse des archives japonaises, Goodman remarque que les Japonais, objet de ces discussions, s'en tirent à un silence et une discrétion officielle remarquables, bien que conscients et attentifs. Selon l'auteur, les autorités japonaises au Japon et aux Philippines firent ou dirent peu qui put être critiqué par les autorités américaines. En même temps, cependant, les représentants japonais-diplomates et hommes d'affaires gardèrent les relations les plus intimes avec les supérieurs de la bureaucratie philippine et des affaires locales aussi bien qu'avec leurs propres compatriotes aux îles. Ainsi, tout en respectant les autorités coloniales, les Japonais ont travaillé à affermir leur rôle dans les Philippines en vue d'une indépendance éventuelle du pays.

The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan: *The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule*

GRANT K. GOODMAN

BEFORE WORLD WAR II the major issue between the United States and its colonial ward in the Pacific, the Philippine Islands, was independence. From the time of the Treaty of Paris, which awarded the Philippines to the United States in 1898, to the passage in 1934 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which promised the Islands their full independence after an interim transition period of ten years, great amounts of personal energy, verbal bombast, and political skill were expended by both Filipinos and Americans on the question of independence. In much of this activity the role of Japan was seen as focal, though, as will be suggested below, each participant in the discussions about Japan and Philippine independence preferred to define that focus in his own way.

The Manchurian Incident in 1931 seemed suddenly to magnify the relationship between Japan and various aspects of the possibility of Philippine independence. However, as I hope to show in the paragraphs that follow, all of the "concerns" about Japan that were to be articulated by both proponents and opponents of Philippine independence had already been clearly delineated during the first three decades of American colonial rule. Thus, much of the intensified speculation about Japan that immediately preceded and also followed the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was either redundant or simply enlarged lines of argument already developed before 1931.

From the outset of the American occupation of the Philippines, the American governing authorities, supported in particular by both Americans and Filipinos writing in the local English-language press, consciously fostered the view that Japan represented a threatening menace to the Philippine Islands. Spy scares were reported with monotonous regularity. The dire effects of Japanese colonialism in Korea and Formosa were detailed over and over. The great benefits for the Philippines of the Western heritage of the Catholic religion and of European culture preserved under the aegis and guidance of the United States were continuously contrasted favorably with the "Oriental paganism" of Japan. The Filipinos were told that they really had, after all, nothing in common with other Asians, especially the Japanese, since Philippine religious, linguistic and political traditions were not only unique but superior to those of the "barbaric

Mongoloid hordes" to the north whose predatory desires included the ultimate conquest of the Philippines. So prevalent had these views become that by 1919 Carlos P. Romulo could write:

Filipinos who have not been in Japan look with disfavor, with misgivings, with fear at any mention made of Japan's desire to take possession of the Philippines. There should be no such feeling. Japan is not such a fearful ogre as some would believe. Japan is not so hateful, she is not so greedy, so tyrannical, so cruel as she has been painted to us. Japan is a great country and we have much to learn from her. Rather than hating her, rather than speaking against her, we should endeavor to know her more intimately. . . .¹

There were, of course, those Filipinos who did speak in more tempered tones about Japan, those who saw the Japanese as friendly neighbors, as potential allies or even as possible saviors. They saw the Japanese as fellow Orientals whose geographic proximity and ethnic ancestry made them far more logical helpmates in the achievement of an independent Philippine nationhood than the remote white colonialists.² Even by those articulate Filipinos who had been affected by American attitudes toward Japan, the Japanese were viewed as successful Asians whose successes were to be admired and, if at all possible, to be emulated. Wrote Romulo:

I admire the Japanese people, I admire their patriotism, the fountain-head from which springs their industry, their thrift, their great respect for Japanese traditions, their skill and their love for work.³

This particular theme was to be reiterated again and again by Philippine observers of Japan throughout the 1920's and 1930's and is still being heard.⁴ At base such views are little different from the admiration of and praise for the recently developed and still developing societies of Russia and/or China being voiced in many of the contemporary "underdeveloped" countries of Asia and Africa. For what was being admired or praised then and what is being admired and praised now is not really a specific country (Japan, Russia, China) or even a specific politico-economic organization (authoritarian Japan or communist Russia or China) but rather the "success," comparative of course, which these societies with what are ostensibly similar backgrounds and obstacles have enjoyed. For many thoughtful Filipinos in the early decades of the twentieth century, Japan was another Asian state which in a brief span of years had achieved the internationally recognized status of a Great Power and which therefore was the logical leader in the Far East. Distrust, fear, threat, invasion were, it was sometimes argued, all propagandistic concepts which the American colonialists had propagated in order to prevent

Asians like the Filipinos from joining hands with their natural ally Japan to throw off the imperialist yoke.

There were also those in the Islands who said that Japan alone could or would provide the economic resources needed for Philippine development. While economic conflicts between the United States and the Philippines were said to be inevitable since cane sugar competed with beet sugar and coconut oil with cottonseed oil, Japan was touted as the natural economic partner of the Philippines since Japan produced nothing which would compete with any Philippine product and therefore could provide a guaranteed market for all of them. There were also those who urged that, since Japan was then and would for the foreseeable future continue to be the dominant power in Asia, an anti-Japanese policy was national suicide while policies friendly to Japan would result in national salvation and a secure future for the nascent free Philippines under the protective wing of a militarily powerful but benign Japan.⁵ Some Filipinos who were perhaps less sanguine refused to romanticize about the "common destiny" of the two countries but said quite bluntly that when the United States left the islands, Japan would assume America's role and that therefore it would be wise for the Philippines to begin to prepare itself for that eventuality and make the transition that much easier.

One aspect of Japan, however, seemed to be universally appealing to Filipinos and to stand out boldly in all their writings on the subject. To a people whose aspirations for national independence had been so rudely crushed first by Spain and then by the United States, the national unity and the patriotism of the Japanese were most impressive.

Look . . . what we may learn by admiring the sublime abnegation, self-control, discipline, patience, resignation, and tenacity of purpose, shown by Japan, in the midst of the most terrible adversities and the most piercing disappointments of its existence.⁶

General Romulo was very much taken with the Emperor system. There is one bond that seems to be a connecting link which joins the Japanese into a living whole—their love and respect for their Emperor. Their emperor is sacred to them. Their love for him is such that they would willingly shed their last drop of blood for his sake.⁷

Again and again Romulo harked back to the theme of the nobility and grandeur of Japanese patriotism and the need for the Filipinos to follow Japan's example.

When our boat steamed out of Yokohama harbor—last port in

Japan—and we waved goodbye to the shrines and temples and geishas of the land of the cherry-blossoms and chrysanthemums, we inwardly felt the effects of the impression left on us by our stay in Japan—we were ‘infected’ by the Nippon patriotism and we left Japan loving our country, and cherishing its simple traditions as we never did before,—that piece of land given to us by God to love, to value, to adore.⁸

One must conclude, however, that in the overall picture of Philippine intellectual and political life in the first three decades of this century, Japan played albeit an extremely minor role, and there were only very occasional overt manifestations of pro-Japanese sentiment. Only relatively small groups of Filipinos seem to have been concerned in such activities. In Japan the tiny Filipino colony (students, traders, musicians, laborers) concentrated in Yokohama and Tokyo did have limited contact with certain extremist Japanese who were advocating an “Asia for the Asiatics” but who had no official support and whose efforts had little real import.⁹ In Manila the increasingly romanticized memory of Japan’s supposed aid in the Philippine Revolution affected some student groups and some of the disappointed revolutionaries who persisted in vain plots concocted to destroy the American colonial regime.¹⁰ However, despite both persistent pleas from Filipino radicals and persistent fears on the part of American authorities in the Philippines, the Japanese evidenced no interest whatsoever in any political involvement in the Islands.

The first really meaningful reaction to Japan came during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 following the destruction of the Russian fleet by Admiral Togo in the Battle of the Straits of Tsushima. Coming as it did only a brief few years after the Filipino bid for freedom in the Philippine-American War had failed, this Japanese triumph sent a wave of nationalistic feeling and Asian pride surging through the hearts of a number of young Filipinos. Eighty-eight law students of the Escuela de Derecho led by future Justice Antonio Horilleno, future Assemblyman Isidro Vamenta, and future Commissioner of Non-Christian Tribes Teopisto Guingona drew up and signed a congratulatory message which they presented to Japanese Consul Narita Goro. Justice Horilleno speaking some 39 years later recalled the feeling of those who had participated in that action:

Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Orient, as it seemed to us Filipinos, had no future, no prospects. It seemed as if there was no morning; that the sun which rose in the East was a sun not for Orientals, but peoples of other countries. Up to that time, there was no Oriental country, no Oriental people that could look the peoples of the West face to face.

Thus, when Japan defeated Russia, we Filipinos, the college students especially, received the news with great enthusiasm and rejoicing. We saw in that victory the dawn of a new day for us people of the east; and so much more so because Japan was forced to accept a war waged against her, at a time when nobody ever believed that she would dare to fight Russia. For very few knew and appreciated the spiritual strength of Japan; very few understood the spirit of the Japanese Army to die rather than to surrender.

We had been subjected to abuses and excesses by our foreign dominators. Other Oriental peoples suffered such abuses too, so that even the independent among them inwardly protested those excesses. But due to a lack of a truly vigorous spirit among them, nothing could be effectively done to correct those evils. Japan alone was the nation we had learned to look up to as one possessing that valiant spirit necessary to eject the dominators from the Orient.¹¹

The victory of Japan also seemed to encourage certain former revolutionaries in the Philippines to try once again to develop support in Japan for a revitalization of the fight for independence. Since these attempts coincided with a general worsening of relations between the United States and Japan, the American authorities in the Islands evidenced growing concern about Filipino-Japanese contacts and ordered increased surveillance of them. Moreover, Japanese-American tensions were, quite naturally, magnified in America's vulnerable Pacific "bastion." Local concerns extended even to the possibility of a direct Japanese attack. On February 10, 1908, for example, Governor-General Smith sent a confidential cable to Washington "For eye of Secretary of War or Chief Bureau of Insular Affairs Only."¹² Smith asked, "Is there any change in Japanese situation? If any change, have large deposits with three banking institutions trust funds and general funds; would like to deposit all gold coin with Hongkong bank in case of danger taking draft or telegraph transfer on London for all funds deposited. Have not spoken to Hongkong Bank about this. Do you approve my taking it up tentatively?"¹³ Washington's response to the Governor General was reassuring: ". . . nothing in the situation would warrant consideration of the arrangement suggested."¹⁴ Nevertheless, the possibility of Japanese support for subversive elements in the Islands as a kind of prelude to invasion continued to attract the attention of local American intelligence.

Of particular significance in this regard were unsigned reports collected by the Secret Service of the Philippine Constabulary. Much of this information was clearly hearsay, and most of it probably came from sources who either held grudges of one sort or another against

those about whom they reported or who sought to cultivate favoritism from the Americans by being informers. Nevertheless, in an atmosphere among American officials in the Islands of increasing uneasiness about Japanese intentions, these bits of information could not be ignored. Indeed, to some extent these reports had to be given greater attention than they might have under ordinary circumstances since there was never any evidence that the Japanese government was directly involved. Therefore, since no official protest to Japan was possible, in the American view local vigilance could not be relaxed, and all rumors, no matter how seemingly trivial, had to be investigated.

In the fall of 1909 it was reported that Bonifacio Arevalo¹⁵ and Vicente Sotto¹⁶ were en route to Japan ostensibly to buy machinery but "really . . . to purchase arms."¹⁷ At least two reportedly pro-Japanese societies of Filipinos were said to have been organized secretly and to include among their members certain leading ex-revolutionaries who had been involved in the Philippine-American War. These were supposed to include Emiliano Legaspi, who had spent six years in Japan, and Mariano Ponce, the one-time agent of the Malolos Republic in Japan and editor of the violently nationalistic journal *El Renacimiento*.¹⁸

In Tokyo a so-called "Oriental Society" was described as having as members a number of Filipinos as well as Siamese, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. Anti-Western speeches were regular fare at its meetings, and in the summer of 1908, at a meeting in honor of the Philippine national hero and martyr Jose Rizal, Okuma Shigenobu was said to have made a number of pointedly anti-American statements. Important members of the "Oriental Society" in the Philippines were supposed to be Ponce, who was of course well known to Okuma, a certain Amado Evangelista who had lived in Japan for many years, and Tomas Arejola.¹⁹ The American authorities also heard of contact between a Japanese general and the revolutionary hero Pio del Pilar, who was supposed to have told the general that the Philippine people would support Japan in a war between the United States and Japan because Japan promised independence and that they also supported Philippine participation in an "Oriental League" of Japan, China, Korea and the Philippines.²⁰

In the face of numerous reports like the foregoing, Governor General W. Cameron Forbes urged in communications to the Secretary of War that precautionary measures be taken in order to create a Philippine public opinion distrustful of Japan's motives and in order to counteract what Forbes believed was a systematic attempt by the

Japanese to undermine American prestige, to stir up racial animosity and to create dissatisfaction with the colonial government. To this end Forbes made a number of specific proposals: that special Filipino agents be sent to Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria to see for themselves the nature of the control exercised by Japan in those areas and that on their return they publish articles on their findings; that one of the Philippine political parties include in its platform a plank opposing aggression by any foreign power with the purpose of changing the sovereignty over the Philippines, especially any state having a monarchical form of government, i.e., Japan;²¹ that a society of Filipino school teachers be organized to instill in the minds of the youth a "rational distrust" of Japan; that the government purchase the control of some newspaper of wide circulation so that occasionally officially inspired articles, e.g., anti-Japanese materials, might be published; that the government undertake an educational campaign to instruct the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts in Japanese propaganda techniques and to warn them of the probable fate of the Philippines if it were to fall under Japanese domination; and that \$25,000 in United States currency be authorized from the secret funds of the President or the Secretary of War in order to carry out all of these schemes.²² In addition, Forbes recommended that prominent Filipinos be used to spread anti-Japanese propaganda. Specifically he suggested Jaime de Veyra whom he described as "a man I have means of controlling, through his wife, who is under obligation to me . . ."²³

Unverifiable reports continued to reach Forbes that men like the distinguished scholar Teodoro Kalaw ("He is one of the most decided Japanese sympathizers"),²⁴ Mariano Ponce, and many others were pro-Japanese. Forbes in passing this information on to Washington very wisely urged that, considering the sources, all such rumors be treated "with a grain of salt."²⁵ The Governor-General also analyzed whatever Japanese activities there were in the Islands as being the work of freebooting adventurers who were "spending money quite freely" and probably not government sponsored.²⁶ Nevertheless, he continued to press for a program of counteraction suggesting again the official fostering of anti-Japanese sentiment by emphasizing the fate of Korea and Formosa under Japanese occupation, the lowly social and economic status of Japanese women compared with the emancipated Filipina,²⁷ and the probable destruction of Christianity in the Philippines if the islands came under a "heathen" Japan.²⁸

One of the most important stimuli to potential pro-Japanese feeling

among the more radical "independentistas" came from the pen of the noted Austrian Rizalist and longtime friend of Filipino revolutionaries, Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt. Having been asked by one of his Filipino friends to give his views on the future of the Philippines, Blumentritt contended that since the United States, in his view, would never give the Philippines its independence, "the redemption of the Philippines" would only come by means of "a war of separation or of a conflict between Japan and the United States."²⁹ The former he dismissed as hopeless and surely resulting in "the ruin of the country."³⁰ The latter he viewed as a much more promising possibility.

According to Blumentritt, although the European powers despised the Japanese and resented their speedy industrial development, he believed that the Europeans were equally antagonistic to American sovereignty in the Philippines since the passage of the protectionist Payne Tariff Bill by the American Congress. Thus, probably as a European himself, he argued that it was in the best interest of European commerce to support Philippine independence. Blumentritt contended, however, that the European powers, specifically France, Germany, England, Russia and Holland, would not permit Japanese annexation of the Islands and therefore for the present saw American sovereignty as preferable to Japanese. Wrote Blumentritt:

... the aspect of the matter changes completely if the Japanese give a sure guarantee to give the Philippines true liberty, that is, to create an independent state with an "open door" for commerce. Then Japan would not only rid herself of a dangerous neighbor, but would render a good service to the European Powers.³¹

Blumentritt agreed that the likelihood of Japan undertaking a war for "ideal interests"³² was certainly limited. Nevertheless, he pointed out that by means of such a war Japanese trade and prestige would be greatly augmented and the United States would be eliminated as a potential threat to Japan.

Clearly, there were serious fallacies of logic in what Professor Blumentritt wrote, but the point is not what he said but rather that *he* said it, when he said it. For several years preceding, certain Filipinos had been suggesting that a war between the United States and Japan would bring freedom to the Philippines. For example, an article from *Muling-Pagsilang*, a Tagalog edition of *El Renacimiento*, published in December, 1909, had tried to prove that a war between Japan and the United States would occur very shortly and had argued that Japan which had vanquished both the greatest nation of Asia and the greatest nation of Europe would surely vanquish the greatest

nation of America. Therefore, since Japan would win, the article demanded to know from its readers whether the Filipinos would be on the winning side.³³ Now with the publication of the letter of the distinguished scholar Professor Blumentritt, what up to that time had seemed to be nothing more than wishful thinking and revolutionary propaganda was given a degree of seeming veracity and of prestige which it had heretofore lacked. An American intelligence estimate in late March, 1910, reported that the Blumentritt letter had done more to arouse pro-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines than anything that had happened in months.³⁴

Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the element in the islands that had been principally responsible for pro-Japanese activities or for the thesis that Japan was the real hope of Philippine "redemption" declined in importance. There were two primary reasons for this. One was the development of a grudging but realistic acceptance of American rule on the part of almost all Filipinos and a greater willingness on the part of Philippine politicians, at times even an eagerness, to play the American political game and to attain prestige, power, and even ultimately, perhaps, independence without resort to force or violence.³⁵ The other was the complete failure of the Japanese government to respond to the several overtures of such men as Mariano Ponce, Vicente Sotto or Artemio Ricarte or to occasional manifestations of pro-Japanese sentiment in the Philippine press.³⁶

Consistent with its previously demonstrated attitude, the Japanese government's position in such instances continued to be one of concern lest such isolated examples be thought either to have been instigated by or to have been encouraged by Tokyo and thus cast a pall over Japanese-American relations. That such concern was well founded had often been evidenced by the nervous reactions of the American administration in the Philippines to what were considered to be subversive statements or activities. For instance, a report reaching the Japanese Foreign Office in March of 1912 indicated that a spy scare had so infected the authorities in the Islands that arriving Japanese who were wearing boots were being arrested and returned to Japan on the grounds that they were military spies. And what was apparently even of greater perturbation to the Japanese government than the tightened surveillance of Japanese entering the Philippines was the fact that the whole situation had seemingly been precipitated by a reported remark attributed to an unnamed influential Filipino to the effect that rather than accept the imposition of the American legal system in the Islands the Filipinos had no alternative but to seek the assistance of Japan.³⁷

The election in 1912 of Woodrow Wilson and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 engendered new discussions in the United States as well as in the Philippines of the future status of the Islands. In the debates which followed, in statements by both Filipinos and Americans, almost inevitably there was reference to the role of Japan. Whether questions of principle or questions of practice were being argued, somehow the participants seemed to come back always to the topic of Japan. For the American colonial rulers the crux of the matter was whether the United States would profit most from a policy of fortification and retention of the Philippines or from a policy of non-fortification and independence. In effect, the problem was whether the threat to United States security would be greater if the Islands were set free so as not to irritate Japan or if they were retained and fortified with the probable irritant to Japanese power. In the former case, it was contended, the Japanese would inevitably overrun the Philippines economically and then politically thus ultimately dominating them. In the latter case, the United States would necessarily become further involved in the defense of an inherently (from the American point of view) indefensible area.³⁸

Since, despite the apparent generosity of the Jones Law of 1916, there did not seem to be any prospect of immediate independence for the Philippines, Filipino arguments dealt almost exclusively with the oft-heard contention that, whenever the Americans finally did withdraw, the Japanese would seize the Islands practically simultaneously. In fact, so prevalent did response by Filipinos to this hypothesis become that the very subject matter came to be known in pro-independence circles as "The Japanese Bugaboo." The classic Philippine refutation of "bugabooism" appeared in a publication of the Philippine Press Bureau in Washington in 1919.³⁹

To those who saw Japanese immigration to the Islands as a means of insidious infiltration leading to conquest, the answer was that the actual flow of immigrants was "negligible" as compared even with the numbers of Japanese entering Hawaii or California. Moreover, the repeated statements of Japanese political leaders that Japan had no intention of colonizing the Philippines were urged to be taken at face value relying on the high ethical standard of the spirit of Bushido. Further, it was pointed out that even if the Japanese had designs on the Islands, they would be utterly foolish to try to expand their hegemony over a people so totally different from themselves in customs, traditions, religion, language, and ideals. Strategically, too, it was stressed that the Japanese would be severely disadvantaged to have to protect some 3,000 additional islands in an area so far re-

moved from the Japanese home islands. Finally, it was asked whether the "Japanese bugaboo" were being raised by the Americans as a facade behind which to perpetuate their hold over the Philippines or whether the United States was, in fact, so frightened of Japan that it felt it necessary to its own security to retain the Philippines.

One of the effects of this kind of highly speculative discussion seemed to be to make both the Americans and the Japanese extremely sensitive to the activities of each other in relation to the Philippines. During World War I, for example, since to the Americans the role of Japan as an Allied power had always seemed somewhat ambiguous, there was particular concern about certain indications that Japanese-sponsored Pan-Orientalism was gaining currency among some Filipinos. Clearly such a development was a predictable dividend of both the growing commercial and financial interest of Japan in the Philippines and of the new power position of Japan in Asia as a result of the seizure of German holdings in China and in the Pacific islands and of the Twenty-One Demands on China.⁴⁰ In May of 1915 a so-called "Oriental Association" ("Sociedad Oriental") was founded in Manila with the following stated purposes: to make a thorough study of social, economic and political conditions in the Orient; to secure mutual understanding among Oriental countries and to do away with prejudice; to determine the best means of communication with similar associations elsewhere in the Orient.⁴¹ In order to achieve these aims, the Oriental Association intended to sponsor conferences with representatives of other Oriental countries, to send Filipinos to other Asian countries and to disseminate "correct" information about the Philippines.⁴² The leader of the Pan-Oriental movement was identified as General Jose Alejandrino, a veteran of the Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War. Other moving forces in the organization were Teodoro Kalaw, then Secretary of the Philippine Assembly, Dr. Alejandro Albert of the faculty of the University of the Philippines, and later Undersecretary of Public Instruction, Pedro Gil, editor of Gen. Aguinaldo's journal *Consolidacion Nacional*, Arsenio Luz, then editor of the official Nacionalista Party paper *El Ideal* and later editor of the *Herald* and Mauro Prieto, prominent banker and economist.

Like the Americans, the British were also highly attuned to seemingly pro-Japanese activities in the Philippines since they were fearful of a possible spread of such developments to Asian areas under their colonial control, especially India. Thus, in 1918 a letter from the British Consulate-General in Manila reported that a Filipino-Japanese Social Club was being established on land donated by K. S.

Ohta, founder of the most important single Japanese enterprise in the Islands, the Ohta Development Co.⁴³ Other interested Japanese were said to be two local officers of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and Inoue Naotaro, General Manager of the Ohta Development Co.⁴⁴ The same report identified two important Filipinos as pro-Japanese propagandists: Dr. C. B. Boncan who had been educated in Tokyo and his cousin A. H. Boncan who had been educated in Nagoya.⁴⁵ Certain Filipinos were also listed as having recently visited Japan: Mariano Ponce, his son Pedro Ponce, Pedro Gil (all members of "Sociedad Oriental") and Jose de los Reyes, a Philippine customs official who was married to a Japanese.⁴⁶

Although undoubtedly neither the Americans nor the British saw such activities as those described in the foregoing to be ominous *per se*, what was apparently disturbing to them was the possibility that a "Sociedad Oriental" or a "Filipino-Japanese Social Club" might be symbolic of something much larger in scope. In reality, however, these groups seemed to stress such innocuous themes as friendship, good will, more accurate knowledge of one another's country, increased trade, travel, educational exchange, and, of course, eternal peace. From the standpoint of the Japanese in particular, such organizations were viewed as economic associations designed to bolster and expand Japan's commercial and financial stake in countries like the Philippines. A report from the American Embassy in Tokyo in 1919, for example, stated that a group of Kobe shippers eager to foster economic ties with the Philippine Islands had inaugurated a "Japan and Philippine Society" of about 50 members of whom some 35 were leading business men interested in Philippine trade.⁴⁷ The association announced that it would give dinners and receptions for the many leading Filipinos who passed through Kobe en route to and from the United States. The formation of this new group followed immediately upon the most profitable year to date in Japan-Philippines trade with the total volume for 1918 reaching thirty million yen.⁴⁸

Obviously, the appearance of these various associations had no direct political implications, but with the Jones Law on the statute books, with Japan's power paramount in the Western Pacific, and with Japanese interests firmly entrenched at Davao,⁴⁹ contacts between the Philippines and Japan became more frequent and more intimate. In September of 1919, the Manila branch manager of C. Itoh & Co. reported that he had talked very confidentially with Sergio Osmena who had been en route to Japan. According to this report, it was neither true that Osmena was traveling to Japan to get married

nor to recover from an illness. For, it was said, that though Osmena, then Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, was supposed to be hostile to Japan, he was actually coming to Japan to find out whether independence could be hastened by cooperation with the Japanese. Moreover, the C. Itoh manager said that Osmena wanted to find out what the Japanese leaders' attitude toward Philippine independence was and what they would do if the Americans used force to put down the independence movement.⁵⁰

In 1920 there was held in Japan a meeting of the "Eastern Bar Association" which was founded by the Japanese and included among its members Philippine attorneys as well as Chinese, Siamese, and naturally Japanese attorneys. Fifteen Filipino delegates were present and were extensively entertained with funds provided by large Japanese corporations. The delegates heard an inordinate amount of anti-colonial propoganda about racial equality which was probably a sequel to the recent failure of the Japanese to gain acceptance of the racial equality clause at the Versailles Treaty Conference.⁵¹

A general appraisal of the Philippine view of Japan became available to the Foreign Office in Tokyo in mid-1921 through the statement of a member of the staff of the Mitsui branch office in Manila:

At present in Manila there is a good deal of discussion of a United States-Japan war, and we hear these views everywhere. Moreover, every newspaper published in Manila carries frequent rumors of such a possibility, and one newspaper in particular has reported that Japan is busily preparing for war and that Japanese males in the Philippines between the ages of 18 and 35 have been called home for military training. Probably knowing that there is pro-Japanese feeling among the Filipinos, one group of anti-Japanese Americans in order to cause trouble is saying that Japan has an anti-American, anti-Philippine attitude. This seems to be directed at diminishing pro-Japanese feelings among Filipinos and at the same time slowing down the pace of independence.

Though almost everybody wants independence, radicals are few. In short, they are thinking moderately and waiting for their chance. Though among the lower class there is a view that if a war between the United States and Japan occurred, the Philippines should support Japan, drive out the Americans and win its independence, responsible people do not take this view. They prefer to work and wait.⁵²

Support for this interpretation of Filipino attitudes vis-a-vis Japan was provided by the comments of a Filipino student who stopped briefly in Japan en route to the United States to study. He told his Japanese questioner that while Filipinos in general respected Japan they had lost much of their former antipathy toward the United States

having seen the good government which the Americans had brought to the Islands and their efforts to educate and enlighten the Filipinos. The Philippines must obtain independence, he said, but "hostile operations" against the United States were utterly impossible.⁵³

Clearly views like the above continued to weigh heavily in the considerations of the policy makers in Japan's Foreign Ministry. Japanese officialdom wanted no part of the unstable, erratic, and irresponsible radical element whose activities were anathema to both the American administration and to the emerging nationalist leadership in the Philippines. For it was evident that though these latter Filipino political leaders clamored for independence, they had become convinced that independence could ultimately be obtained from the United States through political pressure and constitutional processes, and they were willing to utilize the interim to secure their own political predominance in the Islands. There was no doubt, therefore, either in the Foreign Office or among the Japanese business community in the Islands that Japan's economic interest which was indeed Japan's primary interest in the Philippines could for the present best be assured by a politically "low posture" in so far as the Americans in the Islands were concerned and by a continuing effort to forge the closest personal ties with the Filipino leadership through expanding economic and cultural activities.

A secret report prepared within the Foreign Office in 1921 and entitled "The Philippine Independence Question" had a most insightful subsection headed "Japan and the Philippine Independence Question."⁵⁴ Its authors traced the development of anti-Japanese attitudes in the Philippines from the time of the Spanish-American War. The document began, quite accurately, with the statement that from the outbreak of the revolution of 1896, Filipino rebels had sent several missions to Japan to seek assistance, but Japan had not responded. It was then pointed out that, when the islands were acquired by the United States, many American politicians, financiers, and critics discussed ways of disposing of the Philippines because of the uprisings of the islanders, the miseries of the climate, and the financial losses encumbered in Philippine involvement. According to the analysts in the Foreign Office, however, those Americans who favored retention of the Islands countered most effectively with arguments either of a threat of Japanese invasion or of the possible plans of Filipinos to secure Japanese help to gain their independence.

From the Japanese point of view what the document did most tellingly was to list chronologically a series of straws in the wind, which, while minor in themselves, had by 1921 willy-nilly made Japan

a focus of pro- and anti-independence sentiment in both the United States and the Philippines. These included: the 1910 Blumentritt letter referred to above; a 1914 story in a Manila English language newspaper (*Cablenews American*) which suggested that Japan and the United States had worked out a deal whereby President Wilson had offered to make Japan the principal guarantor of Philippine neutrality in return for a lessening of Japanese pressure in regard to the California Alien Land Laws;⁵⁵ various statements by American figures, especially members of Congress, in 1915 and 1916, suggesting that America's Caribbean policy and Japan's Asian policy were the same ("Asian Monroe Doctrine"), that US-Japan relations would ease considerably once the United States left the Philippines, or that the United States should, in fact, withdraw from the Islands in favor of Japan since Filipinos would rather be governed by men of the "same race" to say nothing of the fact that Japanese immigrants would then go to the Philippines instead of to Hawaii or to the West Coast;⁵⁶ at the end of 1918, the establishment in Tokyo of a Philippine "Independence Movement Office" and visits to Japan shortly thereafter by both Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena seeking Japanese "understanding" of their position; in 1920 Quezon's refutation of anti-Japanese opponents of Philippine independence by arguing that there was no possibility of Japanese treachery in the Islands; and finally, in Feb., 1921, an article in the then pro-American *Manila Times* hinting at possible danger to the Philippines with the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and even going so far as to ruminate on whether the Philippines might be another Korea.

Thus, it was clear, to the Foreign Office at least, that whether the Japanese had any political position on the future of the Philippines or not, numerous positions were being attributed to them by Americans as well as by Filipinos. Of course Japan did have interest in the Philippines, trade and investment being the principal ones, but in the overall foreign policy planning of the Japanese government the Philippines played a very minor role. Nevertheless, since the "buga-boo" of Japan had loomed large in American thinking from the time of the acquisition of the Islands, in the United States both those who favored Philippine independence and those who opposed it had increasingly come to invoke assumed Japanese intentions in behalf of their respective views.

Filipino advocates of independence were quick to appreciate the importance of the American image of Japan's attitude toward the Islands. Accordingly, they devoted more of their attention to this phenomenon. A speech in New York City in January, 1921 by

Philippine Resident Commissioner Isauro Gabaldon may be seen as typical of the "line" that was to be followed through the 20's by his countrymen in seeking American support for Philippine freedom.⁵⁷ Gabaldon began by saying that what he, Senate President Quezon, and the other Resident Commissioner Jaime de Veyra wanted was nothing more complicated than "independence under the League of Nations, a protectorate by the United States, a neutralization treaty among the great powers, and complete independence!" Then, in order to emphasize the "logic" of these requests, Gabaldon turned his attention to Japan:

We do not fear Japan. Probably our independence can not be harmful to Japan. In spite of the Japanese being permitted freely to enter the Philippines, at present they do not reach 7,000 or $\frac{1}{12}$ the Japanese living in California. There are those who consider the American control of the Philippines a military threat to Japan. As we understand it, it is the presence of the American flag rather than the Philippine national flag which has drawn Japanese laborers. We want to have correct relations with Japan and every other neighboring country in the future, and we want to try to rely on the United States.

This last comment in part reflects the peculiar ambivalence so characteristic of the Filipino elite during their campaign for independence from the United States. However, in all fairness to Gabaldon, it must be recognized that he was talking to an American audience whose increasing concern in regard to the future of the Philippines was the role of Japan. Moreover, his arguments here—no Filipino fear of Japan, no Japanese fear of an independent Philippines, no significant influx into the Islands of Japanese immigrants—were all to be reiterated to Americans time and again by Filipino spokesmen for independence.

Curiously, at almost the same moment that Philippine spokesmen for independence were suggesting to Americans Japan's amenability to freedom for the Islands, Charles A. Dailey, special correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, was interviewing prominent Japanese in order to try to show that Japan really wanted American control to continue. While it is clear that these interviews were published to give support to the *Tribune's* retentionist anti-independence position, at the same time it is evident that most of the proponents of the opinions recorded by Dailey were themselves seeking to "defuse" the American nervousness about Japan's supposed preoccupation with the "fate" of the Philippines.⁵⁸

Hanihara Masanao, then Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, told Dailey that the American presence in the Philippines had never been

viewed in Japan as a menace but rather that the United States had always been welcomed as a friendly neighbor. He went on to say that Japan wanted only peaceful relations with the Philippines and had "absolutely no designs upon the islands whatsoever." According to Hanihara, "the majority of the thinking Japanese" preferred the United States to remain in the Philippines to insure Philippine good neighborliness toward Japan. "We do not want to be surrounded by people who cannot govern themselves," said Hanihara.

Another important figure who hoped that the Americans would stay in the Philippines was Viscount Kaneko Kentaro, Privy Councillor, Special Ambassador to the United States for the Portsmouth Treaty Conference, and President of the Japan-America Society. "Suppose you gave independence to the Filipinos," he told Dailey. "In five or ten years, I can say that the Filipinos will make a mess of it. History has not shown them capable of self-government." In addition, Kaneko scoffed at any idea of Japanese designs on the Philippines. He pointed out that Japan had its own troubles in Taiwan, Korea, and Sakhalin—"too many irons in the fire," as he put it. Commerce, not conquest, was Japan's lifeblood, said Kaneko, and therefore, feeling that Japanese commerce with the Philippines was safest under American protection, he concluded his remarks with the observation that "we would be genuinely sorry if the United States left."

Fujiyama Raita, then President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, minced no words in his chat with Dailey. Japan, he said, had no ambitions toward the Philippines. He further stated that the Islands should be left "as they now are." Fujiyama's culminating view was that the American presence in the Philippines was parallel to the Japanese presence in Korea and that in both places the people were much better off. Thus, no more than he could be expected to support independence for the Koreans could he be expected to support independence for the Filipinos.

The former Ambassador to England and one of the architects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Viscount Kato Komei, stressed to Dailey that, as long as the Philippines remained peaceful and unfortified, it made no difference to Japan who controlled the Islands. Kato, like so many of his fellows, pointed out once more that Japan had no territorial interest in the Philippines. He noted: "If she had, she could have realized them long before the United States went there. Aguinaldo had some idea of getting Japan interested, but we gave him no encouragement whatever."

As Marquis Okuma Shigenobu, then nearly 80, saw it, Japan's only

wish for the Philippines was that the Islands be "quiet and prosperous." He recalled that in earlier years many Filipinos had come to Japan seeking assistance against the "injustice" of Spain but that Japan had not interfered in any way. Okuma told the *Chicago Tribune* correspondent, "We have no dissatisfaction with American rule."

Two prominent men who favored the continuation of the American presence in the Islands but warned against any attempt by the United States to fortify the Philippines were Viscount Shibusawa Eiichi, financier and founder of the Chamber of Commerce of Japan, and Dr. Soeda Juichi, President of the Bank of Taiwan and President of the Japan League of Nations Society. Shibusawa said that if the United States fortified or increased its naval strength significantly in the Philippines, Japan would respond by a similar augmentation of its military forces in the area thus increasing tensions between the two countries. Soeda contended that, since Japan had no ambitions in the Islands, fortifications were unnecessary. Moreover, again according to Soeda, since Japan would come to the aid of the United States should any third power attack the Philippines, the entire question of fortification was a moot one.

Among the interviewees, only two, Baron Sakatani Yoshio, formerly Minister of Finance and a leader in the House of Peers, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, Diet member and former Minister of Education, spoke in even mildly encouraging terms about Philippine independence. Sakatani said that he had met and been impressed by Sergio Osmena and thought him the type of leader who could probably sustain independence once it was given. However, in Sakatani's opinion the real crux of the independence question was economic. If the Philippines could achieve financial independence, then Sakatani thought that the United States should withdraw. But, if not, then the Americans should remain 10 or 20 years more before granting the Islands their independence. In any event, according to Sakatani, even after independence, the United States should assume the lead in all important questions relating to the Philippines. Inukai, who spent most of his interview praising the correctness of the policies of Japan, simply said that he thought that, since the United States was the principal international standard bearer of "self-determination," it was logical for that policy to be followed in the case of the Philippines.

Interviewer Dailey's conclusions were logical in the light of the responses of his subjects. His most important presumption was that Japan represented no threat to the Philippines even if the United States retained the Islands. In fact, almost all of those interviewed seemed to prefer American retention to Philippine freedom. Thus, for a

representative of the anti-independence *Chicago Tribune* there was satisfaction in reporting that the Japanese had no interest in the Philippines, that they had their hands full elsewhere. Dailey went so far as to state that "If Japan must expand, the nearby continent of Asia offers her the greatest opportunity." For him the argument that the United States should withdraw from the Philippines in order not to frighten the Japanese was so much nonsense.

The publication of the interviews brought swift reaction from the Philippine press.⁵⁹ The *Herald* wrote in an editorial that the Japanese really knew almost nothing about the Philippines. It suggested further that what they did know came from third party publications, especially American books which were available in Japan. Therefore, the *Herald* criticized the Japanese for being so ill-informed and so dependent on American "propaganda." The Spanish language Nationalista Party organ *El Ideal* particularly criticized those Japanese who doubted the Filipinos' ability to govern themselves. The same paper attacked Japan's "imperialistic attitude" and contended that those interviewees who had approved of the American control of the Philippines were simply justifying Japan's role in Korea and China. *El Ideal* also assured the Japanese that an independent Philippines would be much less of a threat to Japan's security than the colonial situation which found the United States and Japan confronting each other across a common boundary between Taiwan and the Philippines.

The dispute, reflected in these interviews and their interpretations, between the anti-independence Republican administrations in Washington and their representatives in Manila on the one hand and pro-independence Filipino politicians and their spokesmen in Washington on the other continued throughout the 1920's. The retentionists and their opponents both expended considerable effort during the decade in attributing motives to Japan, motives which naturally rebounded to the advantage of their particular political position. Accordingly, the Japanese could not remain insensitive to such attributions, though they were extremely careful not to become directly involved in the independence question. The Foreign Office kept track of these discussions through reports from its consular staffs abroad, through meetings with Filipinos passing through Japan, and through reports from Japanese businessmen, merchant seamen, travelers and the like returning from visits to the Philippines.⁶⁰

In the fall of 1923, a so-called Philippine Independence Party passed through Japan en route to Washington.⁶¹ The group included then Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives Manuel Roxas

and his wife, accompanied by three advisers and three secretaries. Roxas told the Japanese that one of his aims in going to the United States was to try to counteract the idea, seemingly prevalent among the Republican administration in Washington and Manila, that, if the Philippines were given self-government, they would fall victim to Japan. There were three points, Roxas stated, which he intended to make in response to this claim. First, he would argue that Japan had abandoned a policy of advancing southward in favor of a policy of advancing northward. Therefore, there need be no anxiety over a possible Japanese seizure of the Philippines after independence.⁶² Second, Roxas would point out that Japan's first southward advance, the annexation of Taiwan, had been an experience filled with difficulties and losses for the Japanese thus making it even more unlikely that there would be any further desire to move to the south. Roxas's third point was to be that, even if for geographical and racial reasons a free Philippines were to cooperate with Japan, Filipinos would never brook any interference by Japan in their internal affairs.

Naturally Roxas was almost as eager to have the Japanese hear out his logic as he was to have the Americans accept it. For he understood well, even in 1923, that since there were obviously strong doubts in Japan about the viability of an independent Philippines, Japan's willingness to have confidence in and to cooperate with a future free Philippines was essential to that same viability. In fact, in order to provide concrete evidence of the desire of the Filipinos to have closer ties with Japan, Roxas turned his attention to a more immediate and more emotional matter: the Great Earthquake of 1923.

He complained that although the Philippines had contributed its doctors, its nurses, and its aid to Japan's earthquake sufferers, this assistance had been lumped with that of the United States. Accordingly, Roxas said that Philippine help had gone unnoticed and unknown in Japan. To overcome this disadvantage, the Filipinos had organized their own earthquake relief assistance program and had sent Roxas, as Chairman of that program, to present directly to the Japanese in the name of the Filipino people 70,000 pesos collected from all over the Islands. This money, Roxas stressed, was completely separate from the United States and had no connection whatsoever with it.⁶³

That Roxas was considered an important personage by the Japanese seems evident from the attention paid to him on his return from the United States the following summer. When passing through Japan en route back to the Philippines, he was given "every courtesy" including customs exemption.⁶⁴ However, again indicative of what

the real interest was of Japan in the Philippines, the Foreign Office records indicate that the "importance" attached to Roxas did not necessarily stem from his preoccupation with the independence problem. For the Consulate General in Manila in a coded message to Tokyo pointed out that on July 16 the Philippine Legislature would take up matters relating to cement and therefore recommended that Roxas, while in Japan, meet with such "interested parties" as representatives of Asano, Mitsui, and Suzuki.⁶⁵ Not independence, not bases, not neutrality—all matters which had seemed to preoccupy Roxas on his prior visit to Japan—but cement was what the Japanese really wanted to talk about. And, whenever in subsequent years Philippine independence was to be a subject of discussion between Filipino leaders and influential Japanese, although the Japanese made properly courteous noises about neutralization and fortification, their overriding concerns continued to be trade and investment with a secondary interest in immigration.

During the 1920's, party governments in Japan, postwar isolationism in the United States, the Nine-Power, Five-Power and Four-Power Washington Treaties, and economic prosperity in both countries had tended to contribute to a relaxation of tensions between Japan and the United States. But for the Philippines the independence question remained a burning one and the problem of Japan continued to affect discussion of it. A capsule of the typical arguments involved may be seen in these excerpts from a stenographic report of a luncheon discussion of "Philippine Independence" in New York before the Foreign Policy Association on January 31, 1925.⁶⁶

Statement of Mr. Marcial P. Lichauco, Harvard Law Student:

Mention is also made of the Japanese bugaboo. Our answer to this menace is that Japan has time and again promised us that she would be the first nation to guarantee our neutrality. And we have full faith and confidence in the word of the Japanese nation, even if your Congress hasn't. [Applause.]

Statement of Vicente Villamin, writer and economist:

The Filipinos have no official cognizance of the impressive international developments in which their country is involved. We have been told repeatedly of the so-called Japanese bugaboo which [does] not seem to have its terrors to Mr. Lichauco.

Statement of Dr. Henry Parker Willis, President, Philippine National Bank, Chairman, Phil-American Chamber of Commerce:

. . . That we have any reason to doubt that [the Japanese] would make a binding treaty to neutralize the Philippines, that they would show good faith toward us, I have no ground for supposing.

It should be noted that under our reduction of naval power, the naval authorities say that we could not hold the Philippines in case of war. The Philippines are within the cruising radius of the Japanese fleet, and they are not within ours. As things stand, we remain in the Philippines at the consent and under the general agreement of Japan. That Japan could drive us from the Philippines I suppose is obvious . . . I see no reason to doubt [it].

Statement of Lichauco in answer to a question as to whether the Filipinos have a racial and cultural affinity for the Japanese:

There is no doubt that we have no such feeling of relationship toward the Japanese. In fact, we believe that one of the strongest reasons why Japan would not want to come with us is because we are so totally different from them.

The crucial argument, in terms of its international implications, of the entire debate over Philippine independence seemed to be whether a powerful, armed, expanding, imperial Japan would permit a relatively defenseless independent Philippines to survive. As is evident from the statements quoted above, the points of view on this problem varied greatly, and what is even more apparent is that they were all in fact colored by other positions which frequently had little or nothing to do with Japan. That is, committed supporters of independence tended to minimize and even scoff at the potential threat of Japan and to use some rather extreme arguments to prove just how trustworthy Japan was and how utterly disinterested Japan was in the Philippines.⁶⁷ Similarly, committed opponents of independence obviously used the Japanese "bugaboo" with equal vigor in order to try to prove that the moment American sovereignty was withdrawn Japan would gobble up the islands. What both groups failed to recognize (or if they recognized it, failed to admit) was that Japan's policies were not predicated simply on the independence or lack of independence of the Islands but rather on what Japanese interests in the eyes of her policy makers demanded at any given moment. And as far as the defensibility of the Philippines was concerned, unfortunately vis-a-vis Japan, as the events of 1941-42 were so sadly to prove, the country could not be defended with or without American assistance.

Nevertheless, throughout the debates over Philippine independence the record is replete with statements on both sides of the Japanese question, some more fantastic than others. While on the one hand Japanese immigration was being described as a disguised invasion and all immigrants were reported to be military reservists, on the other hand Japan was being depicted as completely non-aggressive and the so-called Japanese menace was said to be "the product of mere

fantasies.”⁶⁸ “Fear-mongers” (or, more accurately, retentionists) proclaimed that the Philippines were being overrun by voracious Japanese colonists while advocates of immediate independence said that the Japanese were in fact repelled by the unfriendly tropical climes where they could never hope to survive.⁶⁹

Proponents of independence maintained that the only basis for Japan’s seeming threatening posture toward the Philippines was the fact that as long as American bases were present in the Islands, it was Japan which saw herself as threatened. Once American sovereignty was terminated, they said, clearly an independent Philippines could pose no danger for Japan, and, therefore, the supposed military interest of Japan in the islands would disappear and a truly peaceful attitude and a scrupulous respect for the rights of other nations on the part of the Japanese would prevail.⁷⁰ Retentionists, however, insisted that the only reason for Japan’s not having seized the Philippines to date was the presence of American forces in the Islands. As Japan grew stronger militarily and economically, it would be all the more necessary, they asserted, to sustain an American presence in the Philippines as a barrier to Japanese conquest.⁷¹

Interestingly, of course, this debate raged among Filipinos themselves or between Filipinos and Americans and through it all the subjects of these discussions, the Japanese, could be paragons of discretion only occasionally interjecting appropriately platitudinous statements. Japanese officials, whether in the Philippines or in Japan, did or said little which could be criticized by the American authorities who were responsible for Philippine foreign affairs. At the same time, however, representatives of Japan, both diplomats and businessmen, not only maintained the closest contacts with their countrymen in the Islands but assiduously developed intimate associations with the highest level of Filipino officialdom and with the local business community. Thus while carefully continuing to accord proper respect to the colonial rulers, the Japanese were at the same time paving the way toward a more influential role in the Philippines if and when independence might be granted.

1. C. P. Romulo, “From the Land of the Cherry-Blossoms and Chrysanthemums,” *The Citizen*, September 25, 1919.

2. “. . . the United States is only joined to us by an accidental tie, conquest, and Japan is tied to us by the natural ties of its geography, its birth and its permanence in this part of the world,” *La Democracia*, July 21, 1915.

3. Romulo, *op. cit.*, September 18, 1919.

4. “Can we as a people be able to retain much of what we hold as tradition, accept a technological order without losing our cultural identity? The Japanese have demonstrated the fact that this can be done. The Japanese have also shown to the whole world the strength of their native institutions.” *Sunday Times Magazine* (Manila), April 23, 1961, p. 11.

5. ". . . the Filipinos . . . desire to become acquainted with Japan in order to learn if that vigorous armed power are to some day serve as a guarantee of their nationality. . . ." *La Democracia*, July 20, 1915.

6. *La Democracia*, July 21, 1915.

7. Romulo, *op. cit.*, Sept. 25, 1919.

8. Romulo, *op. cit.*, Sept. 18, 1919.

9. It was reported that in 1908 about 180 Filipinos residing in Japan, China and Hong Kong had incorporated a "Liga Filipina Japonesa" and offered their services to the Japanese government. (Division of Natural Resources, National Archives, Washington, D.C., War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs [hereafter "BIA"]), 381/3. In 1909 a society called "Adhension Filipina" was founded by Tomas Arejola who was its president and by Martin Pobre, engineering student in Japan and brother of Deputy Baldomero Pobre, who was its secretary. BIA 381/2.

10. See, for example, G. K. Goodman, "General Artemio Ricarte and Japan," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* (Sept. 1966), Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 48-60.

11. Quoted in "1905 Nippon Victory Was Vindication of All Asians," *The Sunday Tribune Magazine* (Manila), March 26, 1944.

12. BIA after 381/1, Feb. 10, 1908.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Arevalo (1850-1920) was a dentist, a sculptor and a patron of the arts who had exhibited portraits of the Emperor and Empress of Japan in the Hanoi Exhibition of 1902. E. A. Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography* (Quezon City: Filipiniana Publications, 1955), Vol. 2, p. 62.

16. Sotto was a lawyer, a journalist, and a political radical whose affinity for Japan persisted to the eve of World War II. See G. K. Goodman, "Japan and Philippine Radicalism: The Case of Vicente Sotto," *Solidarity* (Manila, June, 1970).

17. BIA 381/2 Sept. 27, 1909. Actually Arevalo went to Japan to study the operation of a textile factory preparatory to the proposed acquisition of machinery for the establishment of a textile plant in the Philippines. The plan never materialized. Manuel, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

18. Governor General Forbes cabled the Secretary of War on September 21, 1909: "[I am] convinced that the hostility of the *Renacimiento* is inspired by Japanese influence with the object of prejudicing the Filipino people against the Government. . . ." BIA With 381/2. On October 21, 1909, *El Renacimiento* editorialized, "Colonies gain neither independence nor any right without long and bloody struggles." On October 29, 1909, the lead editorial was entitled: "Prince Ito Martyr to Duty."

19. BIA 381/3, Oct. 3-30, 1909.

20. *Ibid.*

21. In October, 1909, Forbes went to Romblon where he met Sergio Osmena and suggested that the Nacionalista Party platform include a subtle anti-Japanese plank. "He [Osmena] said it would be arranged very easily; that it was a natural corollary to the existing planks of their platform, which provide for a national program and could be expressed without any particular change. The addition of the words 'especially a monarchical form of government' will be sufficient to accomplish all of our purposes. . . . We have given him the arguments and will furnish him corroborative data as fast as it is turned out." BIA 381/15, Oct. 16, 1909.

22. BIA 381/8, Oct. 11, 1909 and BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909. In the Oct. 11 message Forbes noted opinions on a possible Japanese-American conflict expressed to him "over a year ago" by General Emilio Aguinaldo. "He told me that the majority of the Filipinos would be neutral; that a large minority—but not quite half would be in favor of the United States and willing to fight, and an extremely small minority would actively favor Japan. For his part, he was through with fighting and would be among the neutral."

23. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909. De Veyra was later to be head of the Executive Bureau of the Philippine Government and also served as a Resident Commissioner to the United States.

24. BIA 381/4, Nov. 8, 1909.

25. *Ibid.*

26. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909.

27. A Filipino visitor to Japan, Judge Simplicio del Rosario, was quoted in an interview on his return as follows: "Women carry on their backs all sorts of heavy loads and it is a common sight to see women drawing heavy carts loaded with large boxes of merchandise." Quoted from the issue of September 22, 1909, as reported in R. R. Ingles, "50 Years with the *Times*," *Manila Times*, September 22, 1959.

28. BIA 381/9, Nov. 26, 1909.

29. Letter dated Jan. 25, 1910 and published in *La Vanguardia*, Mar. 4, 1910.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. BIA With 381/4, Jan., 1910.
34. *Ibid.*, Mar., 1910. That the Japanese were completely taken by surprise by the Blumentritt letter and were concerned about its possible effect on Japanese-American relations is evident in a dispatch from the Consul General in Hong Kong to the Foreign Ministry. At first the Consul, who said the letter had been shown to him in English by a reporter for the *New York Herald*, referred to Blumentritt as a "certain Australian" though he later corrected himself. (Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter "JMFA"), I.6.2.1-6, Mar. 2, 1910.)
35. This trend was encouraged by the victory of the anti-imperialist Democrats in the American election of 1912 culminating in the passage in 1916 of the liberalizing Jones Law which gave the Filipinos full legislative powers. "By this time even the most intransigent Filipinos, with the exception of General Ricarte, who had exiled himself from the country, had become sincere friends and loyal supporters of the United States." Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1946), pp. 132-33.
36. A signed article in the Spanish language newspaper *La Vanguardia* for June 14, 1911, for example, stated that the help of Japan would be "expedient" in securing Philippine independence and that by so assisting the Filipinos the Japanese would, if they succeeded, force the withdrawal of their "most dreaded rival" and open up a new area for large-scale immigration. The author concluded: "With respect to the contingency of Japanese domination in the Philippines, it should be less antipathetic and perhaps more advantageous to the Filipinos than the domination of today. After all, Filipinos and Japanese are almost brothers and there exists an abyss between Tagalog and Yankees." Quoted in *The Cablenews American*, June 25, 1911.
37. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Mar. 28, 1912.
38. Roy Watson Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 132-36.
39. Jose P. Melencio, *Arguments Against Philippine Independence and Their Answers* (Washington: The Philippine Press Bureau, 1919).
40. In January, 1915, in Tokyo a Pan-Oriental type of organization, the "South Sea Association," was founded in order to strengthen the ties between Japan and her neighbors to the south including the Philippines. *Japan Advertiser*, January 29, 1915.
41. "Pan Orientalism in Philippines," *New York Evening Post*, August 14, 1915.
42. *Ibid.*
43. National Archives of India, Foreign & Political Department, Extl.-Oct.-12-Part (B) Secret 1918; letter from British Consulate General, Manila, Apr. 26, 1918.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. BIA 6144/48-A, April 28, 1919.
48. *Ibid.*
49. See G. K. Goodman, *Davao: A Case Study in Japanese-Philippine Relations* (Lawrence, Kansas: 1967).
50. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 1, Sept. 18, 1919.
51. BIA 6144/82-a, May 19, 1920.
52. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 4, June 3, 1921.
53. *Ibid.*
54. The full report is contained in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, May, 1921. Secret.
55. This seems to have stemmed from a visit to Japan by Gov. Gen. Harrison simultaneous with the debate over the California land problem.
56. In the debates over the Jones Act, the Democrats in favor of the legislation said that, in the event of an attack, the United States could not defend the Islands. In such discussions, there was no doubt that Japan was the potential "enemy country."
57. The full text of the speech is found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 3, Jan. 3, 1921.
58. The text of the interviews is found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, April, 1921.
59. The reactions are summarized in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 1, May 16, 1921.
60. The records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include a large number of pertinent newspaper clippings.
61. The conversation with Roxas is reported in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Nov. 28, 1923. Secret.
62. When Roxas did testify before the American Congress in behalf of Philippine independence, the Japanese press reported his statement that Japan was indifferent

to the Philippines and had no interest other than the possibility of the Philippines being used as a base for hostile forces. According to Roxas, once independence was granted, that problem would "evaporate." *Asahi Shimbun*, Feb. 18, 1924. Clipping found in JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2.

63. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, Nov. 28, 1923. Secret.

64. JMFA I.6.2.1-6, Vol. 2, June 24, 1924. In code.

65. *Ibid.*

66. BIA 364/556.

67. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs Manuel Roxas even credited the Philippine independence movement with bringing about democratic reforms in Japan. *New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1930.

68. Manuel Roxas quoted in the *Herald*, Oct. 2, 1927.

69. "Although the Empire of Japan and the Philippine Islands have been side by side for millions of years and there was no exclusion law to deprive the Japanese from going into the Philippine Islands, by the last official census there were only 7,800 Japanese there. I mention this fact because one of the most persistent points urged against the immediate granting of independence which was categorically promised is the Japanese bugaboo." Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias quoted in *Congressional Record*, March 25, 1930.

70. "Now if our brother Malayans of Siam can live happily and be increasingly prosperous without the sovereignty of an alien people, without tariff-free access to American markets, and also, if you please, without the slightest molestation from Japan or any other power on earth, why can not the Philippines look forward to equal contentment, peace and satisfaction under independence?" Former Resident Commissioner Isauro A. Gabaldon quoted in *Filipino Nation*, August, 1930.

71. "From an international standpoint withdrawal of America from the Philippines at this time, when Asia is charged with dynamite will unbalance the delicate international equilibrium. . . . America and Japan are powers around a body of water, having conflicting interests. Japan is militarily weaker than the United States because she does not have certain basic raw materials, especially iron ore. The Philippines has nearly 400 million tons of unexploited iron ore deposits. These deposits, under the control of Japan will strengthen that country's sinews and therefore its military power. That fact ought to have some meaning to the United States." Vicente Villamin quoted in the *Denver Post*, Sept. 14, 1930.

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