The Philippines

By
Carl H. Lande

East Asian Series, Reprint No. 8
CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES


8. The Philippines, by Carl H. Lande.
CHAPTER 10

THE PHILIPPINES

CARL H. LANDÉ

Introduction: The School System during the Spanish and American Colonial Periods

From the beginning of the Spanish occupation of the Philippines in 1565 until 1863, when a public school system was created, responsibility for education in the Islands was left entirely in the hands of the church. It continued to remain largely under the actual direction of the church until the end of the Spanish regime in 1898, though during its last years a number of private schools were established by some distinguished Filipinos.

Among the aims of the church-controlled educational system during the Spanish period were the Christianization of the Philippines as a whole, and the Hispanization of the Filipino upper class. These were fundamental cultural changes. As for political socialization, the schools in the Spanish Philippines sought to make the natives obedient subjects of the Spanish king. Preparation for more active political roles was an unintended by-product of Spanish education. The system produced a small but influential Filipino educated class which was steeped in European tradition, was familiar with European political ideas and institutions, including those of countries enjoying more liberal government than Spain, and aspired to a more active role in the government of the Islands while remaining loyal subjects of Spain. When such a role was denied them, they took arms to win a brief period of independence before losing it again to the United States. The Filipino leaders produced by the Spanish colonial educational system were men of outstanding ability who wrote a democratic constitution for their short-lived Republic, and gave the country outstanding leadership during the early years of American rule.

Educational policy beginning early during the American colonial period, which lasted from 1898 until the Japanese occupation of World War II, was heavily influenced by the knowledge of American officials that the colonial regime was to be a temporary one, and that the Islands were to be granted independence when their people had demonstrated their ability to govern themselves by means of the
largely democratic institutions of government which were established soon after the end of armed resistance to American forces.

Political socialization—in this case the deliberate inculcation of values appropriate for the citizens of a democracy—became a manifest aim of the educational system, and was pursued both by American colonial officials and by Filipino political and educational leaders.

Several other features came to characterize educational policy during the American regime, and largely continue to characterize it since the achievement of independence. These were: that large expenditures be incurred to establish a system of free public primary education which as many children as possible should attend; that publicly financed education be secular; that the language of instruction be English; that the curriculum follow that customary in the United States but that special emphasis be placed upon the extension of literacy, upon citizenship education, and upon vocational and physical training; that the entire educational system, both public and private, be subject to a high degree of centralized governmental control.

The effect of the mass education program upon the rate of literacy is of interest. The census of 1903 showed that of the population over ten years of age, 20.2 per cent could both read and write. At that time only 1.6 per cent had received the equivalent of a common school education.\(^1\) In 1938, literacy was estimated at 48.8 per cent of the population ten years of age or over, the basis being the ability to read and write in any language or dialect.\(^2\) The 1960 census showed the rate of literacy among those ten years and over to be 72.0 per cent.\(^3\)

The importance accorded to education was reflected in the fields of administration and of budgeting. During the period of American control, the Secretaryship of Public Instruction was held by the American Vice Governor. In 1937, shortly after the establishment of the Commonwealth, and for some time before that year, the Philippines appropriated a sum for education which constituted about 20 per cent of all national and local governmental expenditures.\(^4\)

From the beginning, stress was placed upon the training of teachers and upon the construction of schools. The resulting increase in the number of teachers in the public schools was as follows:\(^5\)

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 604.
\(^4\) Hayden, op.cit., p. 480.
Attendance at public schools increased as follows:⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School year</th>
<th>Public elementary schools</th>
<th>Public secondary schools</th>
<th>Public universities and colleges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902-1903</td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1935</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>between 1,000 and 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>4,598,097</td>
<td>226,890</td>
<td>27,604</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population during this period increased as follows:⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>7,635,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>14,731,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>30,241,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As these data indicate attendance at what until World War II were tuition-free elementary schools (since the war, outside Manila, only the four primary grades have been tuition-free) far exceeds attendance at secondary schools and colleges. In fact, a great many students leave school before the completion of the primary grades. The heavy and early drop-out rate, which is especially severe in the rural areas, has been a source of continual concern to Filipino and American educators, many of whom feel that less than four years of education is largely a waste of time and money. Efforts to lessen the drop-out rate have met with little success.

While a large number of students quit school after a few years of primary education, many continue on and graduate from high school. This in turn has created great pressure for admission to colleges and universities, with the result that the old church-controlled institutions, and a few new ones which were established during the American period, have been unable to accommodate the throng of applicants. The pressure has been absorbed in part by state institutions established during the American period, the most important of which is the University of the Philippines. But state institutions of higher learning are distinguished for quality rather than quantity. The pri-

⁶ Ibid., pp. 23–24, and unprinted records of the Department of Education. Figures for 1962-1963 do not include attendance at Zamboanga State College, for which no information could be obtained.
⁷ Ibid., p. 5, and unprinted records of the Bureau of the Census and Statistics. The figure for 1963 is an estimate.
mary commitment of the state to the provision of free elementary education for the masses has prevented it from offering facilities for college training to more than a small proportion of those who desire it.

The gap was filled by private venture colleges. Starting from small beginnings before the war, and organized initially largely as family undertakings, the number of such institutions and their enrollment have grown rapidly since the war and many of them have converted themselves into highly profitable joint stock companies. These private venture college-level institutions vary greatly in size and quality. The largest private venture university, and one of good reputation, is Far Eastern University, which in 1962-1963 had an enrollment of 47,777, and operated night and day. Another outstanding institution is Philippine Women's University. At the other extreme are innumerable large and small diploma mills which are engaged in a continual battle to maintain their accreditation with the Bureau of Private Schools.

For the year 1962-1963 the ratio of enrollment in private as compared with public collegiate institutions was roughly 15 to 1. (Private institutions include both private venture and church-affiliated ones. Figures published by the government fail to distinguish between the two.) Thus while the state has assumed the bulk of the burden of providing elementary education, higher education is left almost entirely to the private profit-making and religious sectors. Secondary education, which is offered both in public and in religious and private-venture high schools, falls roughly in between.

It should be pointed out, however, that collegiate education in the Philippines is not, and under present circumstances cannot be, the equivalent of collegiate education in the United States. Quite aside from the fact that instruction through the medium of a foreign language lessens the amount of substantive information which can be absorbed by a student, there is the added fact that since 1940 students have been admitted to college after but six years of elementary school and four years of high school (before 1940, there were seven years of elementary school). Thus two years less of pre-college education is required than in the United States. Finally, the data on Philippine college attendance signifies a broader and more shallow distribution of college education than would the same percentage figures in the United States, for a large proportion of those who enter college never graduate.

Nonetheless, the large number of Filipinos who "have been to
college” has political and economic consequences of considerable importance. The situation has produced a large number of individuals who think of themselves as persons of education and who attempt to take an educated approach to politics. It also has produced a large number of individuals whose education does not really prepare them for white-collar positions demanding a high degree of training, but who are unwilling to settle for non-white-collar employment and in particular for agricultural employment. While in the Philippines such people do not riot or join radical political parties, they do place a heavy economic burden upon hard-working parents and relatives who, as good Filipinos, feel it their duty to support them. Insofar as this reduces the working Filipino’s ability to save, it impedes economic development.

The lowering of the quality of a public elementary school education as a result of the cutbacks discussed above has brought increased pressure for admission to private elementary schools. The Ateneo de Manila currently has some 1,000 applicants yearly for entry into its first grade—of which only 200 can be accepted. This competition for placement in the best schools at all levels has enabled such institutions to make greater demands of their students in terms of scholastic performance and graduation requirements. While one cannot object to the efforts of schools favored by the wealthy to raise their standards, the simultaneous decline of standards in schools attended by the less privileged students, particularly the public elementary schools, places their graduates at a serious disadvantage in the job market and must tend to maintain the very gap between common people and gentry which the public school system was designed to lessen. Because of the difference in standards between public and private schools at the elementary and secondary levels, public school students find it increasingly hard to gain admission to the better colleges, both public and private. This in turn strengthens the hold of the diploma mills, which will accept almost any student who desires a college degree and can pay tuition.

On the whole, educational policy since the achievement of full Filipino control over that policy in 1935 has held fast to the principles established earlier, although certain changes of emphasis have resulted from the postwar self-examination which goes under the designation of nationalism. Thoughtful Filipinos have come to the conclusion that their intensive exposure to the admittedly impressive culture imposed upon them, largely with their consent, by the Ameri-
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cans has prevented the nation from concentrating upon the development of a distinct culture of its own. They realize that as a consequence of both Spanish and American rule, and of the failure of any of the great Asian civilizations to sink firm roots outside of the southern island of Mindanao, they are irrevocably a part of Christendom, and in large measure a part of the West. Their inability to be thoroughly "Asian," though tied to Asia by race and geography, makes them especially determined to preserve the distinctness of their syncretic culture and not to permit themselves to become another Hawaii, a little Malayan America outside the Union. Specifically, they wish a respite from the continual bombardment of American culture sufficient in duration to enable them to absorb what has been accepted, and to take control of their own cultural development.

The current mood has resulted in the hostility of much of the educated class to their government's decision to accept American Peace Corps volunteers. At the same time it has resulted in such positive measures as the establishment of an Institute of Philippine Culture at the Ateneo de Manila and an Institute of Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines. Finally, it has resulted in a tendency to look to countries other than the United States for some of the foreign contacts which no one denies are desirable. Significantly, until the early 1960's when admiration of Indonesia's anti-Western neutralism became pronounced among left-wing "ultra-nationalists" the countries looked to have been European and not Asian. Among them are not only England but also the earlier colonizing power, Spain. A result has been the institution, at the insistence of the "nationalists," and to the despair of most Filipino educators, of compulsory courses in Spanish in high schools and colleges.

Yet, as individuals, Filipinos remain determined to obtain American training. While on grounds of principle they may argue that Philippine education should be better adapted to the needs of a predominantly agricultural society and that Filipino merchants should study the methods of Chinese shopkeepers, Filipino industrialists, publishers, scholars, and politicians who really count among the country's leaders continue to send their sons to Harvard. And young Filipino nationalists of the elite, who object to the Peace Corps efforts to improve the English language skills of village children, know full well that their own professional success depends upon their mastery of that tongue, and they display that mastery by impressive contributions to their country's English language literature.
The growing interest in American social science and the execution of numerous empirical village studies by teams of Filipino social scientists will help educated Filipinos to obtain a better understanding of their own society. By achieving a greater understanding of what they are, and by keeping the myth-building and self-deception which seem to accompany surges of nationalism to a minimum, Filipinos will be better equipped to transform their society into what they want it to be.

Education and Nation Building

One of the most important changes which have taken place in the centuries since Spain first seized the islands has been the creation of a sense of Philippine nationhood. Education played a crucial role in this development.

The importance of the Spanish contribution is suggested by the state of affairs which existed in the mid-sixteenth century when Spain established itself in the Philippines. At the time the Islands constituted the least civilized fringe of the Malayan world. The population was probably under half a million as compared with the estimated 27.5 million of 1962. With few exceptions, communities were small and scattered. Archaeological evidence and anthropological inference from the institutions of surviving indigenous peoples of the region suggest that the political system of most of these communities were quite simple and did not extend beyond the confines of the community. There were no states of the sort found in Indonesia and mainland Southeast Asia. A few larger coastal settlements, which depended upon trade with Arab and Chinese merchants, contained sufficiently large clusters of population and wealth to support substantial local chieftainships. But these trading settlements and their political structures were of recent origin, only briefly antedating the Spanish conquest. Isolation permitted the development of large numbers of related but often mutually unintelligible languages throughout the Islands. Nothing that could remotely be called a Filipino nation existed when Spain began its rule in the archipelago. By the end of the Spanish period, a nation had come into being.

Among the major purposes of Spanish rule were the religious conversion of the natives and, in the framework of mercantilism, the economic exploitation of the country. Both ends were served by a policy of regrouping small scattered communities, some of them made up of wet rice agriculturists, many of them consisting of shift-
ing cultivators, into larger and more permanent towns and villages. As a result of this measure, the natives were made more susceptible to conversion and religious supervision by the clergy, whose numbers otherwise would have been insufficient for this purpose. Resettlement also facilitated the extraction of the surplus of the agricultural produce of the cultivators. It is probably no accident that the area under wet-rice cultivation, which yields a far greater surplus than does shifting dry-rice cultivation but which involves permanent settlement, greatly expanded during this period.

By these policies of settlement and indoctrination, Spain not only converted scattered agriculturists into a peasantry and facilitated the entry of that peasantry into Christendom—a process which profoundly affected though it did not basically alter the native folk culture of the common people throughout the archipelago—but also provided the economic preconditions for the gradual emergence of a Filipino and mestizo landed gentry. This landed gentry was subjected to a much heavier degree of Hispanization. While the peasantry received religious instruction in their own diverse languages, the children of the gentry throughout the Islands were taught to speak and read Spanish, the first *lingua franca* of the Islands. Those who sought higher education came to Manila and a few other centers of population where colleges established by the religious orders were to be found. A few who could afford it studied in Spain or in other European countries. Thus diverse local elites intermingled and intermarried, and over the course of time developed a sense of common nationhood which trickled down to the common people as well and which became sufficiently strong to culminate, at the close of the nineteenth century, first in a full-scale revolution against Spain and then in a war of resistance against the American effort to replace Spain as the ruling colonial power.

The educated class, particularly its literary members, played a major role in giving direction to the revolution against Spain. Propagandist activity for administrative reform had its center among Filipino students in Spain. Newspapers and novels critical of colonial policy and advocating reform were published by them in Madrid, and found their way back to the Philippines, where they aroused intense interest among members of the literate class who could not speak out openly in the Islands.

After the turn of the century, the process of nation building, an unwitting by-product of Spanish rule, continued now wittingly under
the American colonial regime. It took three forms: the dissemination of a new lingua franca, the systematic inculcation of patriotism and civic responsibility in the public schools, and regular practice in the actual operation of democratic institutions of government on a national scale. The first two of these processes involved formal instruction. The last was clearly intended by the colonial power to be a nationwide educational experience.

Religious instruction aside, formal education, including the learning of written and spoken Spanish, had been confined largely to the upper classes during the Spanish period. The introduction, with the approval of Filipino leaders, of mass primary education employing English as the medium of instruction from the first grade onwards, gave—as it was intended to give—a common language to a substantial proportion of the common people.

The availability of English as the language employed in virtually all public documents and as the language actually spoken among officials at the higher levels of government if not in local administration has helped to reduce the importance of regionalism in national politics. It permits candidates for national office to campaign and to win votes throughout the country despite their ignorance of local languages other than their own. It enables legislators from all parts of the archipelago to communicate with each other in a tongue which is understood not only by themselves but by petty politicians and other opinion leaders in their home provinces and by a large proportion of the interested electorate as well. It permits the Manila English language press to be the nation-wide press, entertaining a truly national point of view. It makes possible the assignment of civil servants to posts throughout the country, far from their home provinces.

After the establishment of self-government under the Commonwealth in 1935, Tagalog, the local tongue of central and southern Luzon, was made the national language. Though not the language used in government, which continued to be English, it was taught as a separate subject in the schools throughout the country. Tagalog and English are now the most widely known languages in the Philippines, being spoken by 44.4 per cent and 39.5 per cent of the population respectively, according to the census of 1960, and the knowledge of the former is increasing at a more rapid rate than the latter. Tagalog is the lingua franca of the Manila marketplace, and the growing number of non-Tagalogs who live in Manila soon learn to speak it. It seems probable that in time it will join or replace English
as the language of debate in the Congress. But that time would still seem to be far off.

While since 1957 the schools have employed the local vernacular of each region rather than English as the language of instruction in the first two grades, a proposal emanating from nationalist quarters that English be replaced as the language of instruction in elementary schools has met with little support. The reaction of the Secretary of Education was blunt and practical: "Take away English and we will be a nation of ignoramuses." No responsible leaders have suggested the replacement of English at the high school and college levels, nor has there been any move to replace it as the language employed in civil service examinations.

It may well be that the acceptance of English as a second language, if not as the language of ordinary conversation, has passed the point of no return. The almost exclusive reliance of newspaper readers upon the English language press assures that English skills acquired in school receive constant practice. Manila is dominated by six large English language dailies. Two Tagalog papers, subsidiaries of larger English language dailies, obtain their readers mainly among the urban proletariat. Neither is doing well, and one has changed recently from a daily to a weekly schedule of publication. Surviving Spanish language newspapers fare no better.

What is more, the same state of affairs prevails in the provinces, where one might expect a vernacular press to thrive. Much of the readership of the Manila English language press is in the provinces. Even the many small local papers published in various provinces favor English over the language of the locality. Of 38 such papers surveyed by a national digest of the provincial press, 24 are printed in English, 2 in the local vernacular, and 1 in Spanish. Eight print news both in English and the vernacular, and 2 employ English and Spanish. While several weekly family magazines published in the vernacular and English have a large readership, it is quite evident that English publications are the main medium of printed news.

This will affect the political socialization of Filipinos in the sphere of foreign relations. For some time to come, newspaper readers will continue to obtain most of their foreign news from American or Commonwealth press services. And college students will continue to be exposed to the ideas of American authors.

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The widespread demand for higher education in recent years has encouraged geographic mobility, thereby also furthering the growth of national feeling. The concentration of institutions of higher learning in Manila has filled that city with a flood of young men and women from all parts of the archipelago. Intermarriage among students in Manila and the acquisition of language and professional skills which can be employed anywhere have led to the settlement of graduates in provinces other than those of their birth. In the process narrow regional feelings have declined as sons and daughters have brought home spouses from other parts of the country.

Filipino school children not only acquired a common language during the American period. They were subjected as well to a common indoctrination in loyalty to the Philippine nation through textbooks and courses which stressed citizenship training and which imparted a knowledge of Philippine history and culture. The willingness of colonial authorities not merely to permit but to encourage the inculcation of Filipino patriotism helps to explain the weakness, until recently, of the anti-American ingredient in Filipino nationalism. While hostility to the continuance of American influence has become widespread among sectors of the Filipino intelligentsia in the course of the past decade, the mass of the electorate, especially in the rural areas, appear to be little affected, as was demonstrated at several elections in recent years when candidates who made anti-American appeals made rather poor showings at the polls.

Other aspects of American colonial policy contributed to nation building as well. Spain during her three and a half centuries in the Islands had failed to bring a number of important regional minorities under effective rule. In the southern island of Mindanao several Muslim groups, collectively known as “Moros,” had been fairly successful in resisting Spanish attempts to subjugate them. Since the periodic Spanish expeditions against the Moros were composed largely of Christian Filipino troops, and since Moro pirates and slave hunters made a practice of raiding the Christian Filipino coastal settlements of the Visayas for slaves and booty, the feelings between Christian Filipinos and Moros were, and to some extent still are, feelings of mutual fear and antipathy. Moro independence crumbled early during the American period when American troops, with superior armament, subjugated the area and imposed American colonial government. They also imposed an American educational system with the same rigor as elsewhere. Half a century later, most Moros
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under their Manila- and United States-educated English-speaking leaders had reconciled themselves to and now in large part welcome participation in the Filipino nation. Tradition-bound Moros still send their children to Muslim religious schools. But more progressive Moros consider these to be vastly inferior to the government’s public school system, and have used their political influence to secure the establishment of a branch of the state university in Mindanao. Participation in the mainstream of Philippine education has been the key to Muslim political effectiveness. When traditional leaders, lacking such education and the use of English which accompanies it, have been sent to Congress, they have not been taken seriously and as a result their constituents have suffered neglect. But when literate and articulate Muslims have been elected, they have been as effective as congressmen from other regions.

Much the same can be said for the Igorotes, a number of tribal groups who form much of the population of Mountain Province in Northern Luzon. Left to themselves in their impenetrable mountains by the Spaniards, the Igorotes were head-hunting pagans until the American colonial government began to build roads into the area. Provided with schools and taught to play baseball and politics in lieu of taking heads, these mountain people, like the Moros, have been brought into the Philippine body politic.

The cultural homogeneity and national feeling which developed during the Spanish and American periods, both as a result of and as a reaction against colonial rule, is reflected in the sphere of informal political organization. The country has two major political parties, the strength of both of which is evenly distributed throughout the Islands. Minor parties of a manifestly regional sort have been rare. Even the leaders of such distinctive regionally based minorities as the Moros and Igorotes have made no effort to create parties of their own but have divided themselves between the major parties in the same fashion as the Christian Filipinos. Politicians from diverse regions work together with a minimum of inter-regional misunderstanding.

Thus an area which at the beginning of the Western impact was among the most fragmented parts of Southeast Asia, a chain of islands inhabited mainly by a thin scattering of agriculturists and fishermen, with but a slight exposure to a common higher civilization and with no history of common subjection to any native empire, is now politically the most united country of Southeast Asia, Thailand
not excluded. It seems evident that this development was due in large part to the uniform system of education, both religious and secular, which came into being during the colonial period.

*Education, Culture Change, and Political Socialization*

A former American Vice Governor of the Philippines has noted that from the beginning of the American period, the Philippine school system was given a task different from that of the schools in the United States, where “the traditional function of the schools has been to supplement the home in imparting the more formal part of the established national culture to the coming generation . . . to preserve the traditional national institutions rather than to destroy or rapidly modify them.” Instead, “the Philippines under American guidance,” having “set out to modify profoundly its political, social and economic institutions . . . deliberately planned its educational system to hasten such changes in the national character as might seem necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes.”

This effort met with some success. The indigenous peoples of lowland Southeast Asia, with a few highly localized exceptions, share a common social structure, and their traditional patterns of culture and behavior, which underlie the diverse foreign cultures that have been superimposed upon them, are remarkably similar. Yet visitors from other countries of the region are struck by the “Americanized” ways of the present-day Filipinos, ways which go beyond fashion and manner and involve deep-going changes in their orientation towards action.

These changes affect various aspects of life. We shall confine ourselves here to those which bear upon economic activity and politics. The former is included because of the effect upon the Philippine political system of the recent emergence of a successful and aggressive Filipino business community.

While United States economic policy towards the Philippines, namely, the involuntary inclusion of the colony within the American tariff wall, discouraged the industrialization of the islands prior to independence, more farsighted educational policies adopted by American officialdom in the Islands prepared the way for rapid industrial growth at a later time by helping to create a labor force equipped by training and outlook to man modern industrial establishments.

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Next to the spread of literacy, the principal instrument for this development was a large-scale program of vocational education. The aim of this program was not merely to teach skills, but also to inculcate attitudes towards manual work of a sort likely to lead to the exercise of such skills. Spanish colonial society had looked upon manual labor as degrading, and Filipinos had shared, or come to share, this prejudice. American colonial officials and Filipino educators thought it desirable to inculcate a belief in the "dignity of labor," and to that end all school children were required to take at least some vocational courses which forced them to work with their hands.\textsuperscript{10}

While during prewar years the official stress upon vocational education encountered some criticism on the grounds that a predominantly agricultural economy was not yet ready to absorb a large number of persons trained in this fashion, such criticism is not heard today. The accumulation of a pool of skilled laborers and technicians has paid off in the rapid growth of Philippine industry which began shortly after the war as a result of the erection of obstacles to the duty-free and unlimited entry of American manufactured goods. The need for even more skilled workers and technicians is attested to by the numerous technical schools and colleges that have sprung up in the Philippines since the war, and now attract large numbers of fees-paying students.

In a broader sense, the schools and the government in and since American times sought to inculcate achievement values in a country where open-handed spending was more admired than frugality and saving, and where dependence, not to say sponging, was common and accepted. Under the new colonial regime the themes of self-reliance and industriousness were stressed in school textbooks. Thus a book written by the foremost Filipino educational official and writer of textbooks was "designed to aid in the tremendous undertaking of character education—nothing less than the reconstruction of the character of the citizens of a new nation—to lay the foundation for the formulation of a philosophy which centers on the serious business of life."\textsuperscript{11}

With the same objective in mind, the \textit{Commerce and Industry Journal}, a publication of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, quoted such aphorisms as "The man who never gets over difficulties

\textsuperscript{10} Hayden, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 519.

never gets very far,” and “High aims form great characters, and
great objects bring out great minds.”

The effort to inculcate an achievement orientation probably con­
tributed to the emergence of a Filipino entrepreneurial class. In the
past, commerce in the Philippines had been dominated by the Chi­
inese and other foreigners, in large part because the qualities which
make for success in business—hard work, frugality, reliability, and a
habit of thinking in long-run terms—were not highly esteemed in
Philippine society, which values leisure, conspicuous consumption, and
the right to change one’s mind.

During the American period, the values of much of the elite un­
derwent a transformation, drawing its members not only to the pro­
fessions but to non-agricultural enterprise as well. A current study of
Philippine entrepreneurship finds that: “While most of the creative,
daring and imaginative leaders were engaged in politics, the founda­
tions for entrepreneurial activities were being established. Marked
changes were made in the ‘latent’ factors influencing entrepreneurs:
... Reward for individual effort was exemplified; business pur­
suits and the profit motive were no longer ignominious; action was
given the same importance as ideas; and, access was provided to
accumulated scientific and technical knowledge. The prestigeful posi­
tion of entrepreneurship in American society was obviously impres­
sive to Filipinos. Also much was done to inculcate an understanding
of the behavioral pattern associated with entrepreneurial status. Fa­
miliarity with entrepreneurial behavior was being developed through
theory and folklore in the American-inspired school system.”

At the University of the Philippines, which attracts the children of
the respectable middle class and especially of civil servants, only 2.5
per cent of the students were enrolled in the school of business ad­
ministration in 1959-1960. But in the private colleges and universi­
ties, 29 per cent of the student body in 1957-1958 were enrolled in
the commerce course. It would appear that many of the commerce
students enrolled in private institutions, especially in the “diploma
mills,” appear to be men and women who aspire to minor jobs as
accountants, clerks, and secretaries, a fact which nonetheless gives an
indication of the growing importance of business in the life of the Phil­
ippines.

12 Quoted by Seidman, op.cit., from Commerce and Industry Journal, Vol. iv,
April 1928, p. 11.
13 Seidman, op.cit.
However, at the Ateneo de Manila, which more than any other college educates the sons of the social and economic elite, more than half of the undergraduates now major in economics. The Ateneo's role in training future captains of industry is of special interest because of that school's American connections. Originally a Spanish Jesuit institution, the college was taken over by the American branch of the order in 1921. While American educators have ceased to exert influence at the strongly nationalistic University of the Philippines or upon the public school system in general, American Jesuits at the several branches of the Ateneo now play a crucial role in inculcating in the sons of the Filipino elite the spirit of capitalism which Max Weber associated with the Protestant ethic.

Among those most strongly affected by their exposure to American values have been those members of the middle and upper classes who have spent some time in the United States. There they have discovered that the behavioral injunctions found in Philippine school books are not empty aphorisms but constitute the ground rules of a real society which many Filipinos—though by no means all of them—admire. Those who find it exhilarating to live in a society where the fruits of ambition are not siphoned off by sponging relatives, where people help total strangers as a matter of course, and where efficiency appears to prevail, often make major adjustments in their own behavior, remain under the influence of their stateside experience throughout their lives, and transmit that influence to their children. Some simply remain in the United States.

It is the returning Filipinos, a growing number of whom are graduates of American business schools, who have formed and who give aggressive leadership to civic organizations such as the Manila Jaycees. This group in particular has undertaken an impressive program of privately organized public service not only within the Philippines but—as in the case of "Operation Brotherhood's" medical teams in Vietnam—in other parts of Southeast Asia as well. Civic organizations of this sort are relatively new to the Philippines, where traditionally a wide range of obligations to one's kinsmen has left little time or money for philanthropy outside of one's kindred. The new civic organizations have played an aggressive role in organizing upper-class pressure upon Congress and various administrations in favor of good government and other public-interest objectives.

Let us turn to the role of education in political socialization. The schools since the beginning of the American period have sought to
foster a faith in and a desire for democracy, and to teach habits of citizenship appropriate to such a form of government. Classes in citizenship were introduced at the third grade level as early as 1904. Since then, more emphasis has been placed on instruction in citizenship than is customary in the United States. And as in the United States, such instruction has had an immediate practical purpose. For from 1907 onwards, young Filipinos found themselves called upon to exercise their citizenship skills in national elections at which substantial powers of government were placed in the hands of native leaders of their choice.

It would be erroneous, however, to assume that the considerable success of democracy and the high degree of public interest in elections and governmental affairs in general is to be attributed mainly to foreign-sponsored indoctrination. Much of the resemblance of the Philippine democratic process to that of the United States is due, rather, to certain traditional features of Philippine society and behavior.

For social structural reasons which are discussed elsewhere, social life in the Philippines may be described as a never-ending popularity contest in which victories depend to a large extent upon the ability to distribute material rewards. It is hardly surprising that a society of this sort should have adopted with enthusiasm a political system which embodies the principle of the popularity contest, particularly when the government’s coffers were so early put at the disposal of Filipino politicians by a cooperative colonial administration.

Again, Philippine society is somewhat anarchic. Clashes of interest or opinion are likely to have violent results. For this reason great care is usually taken to forestall open displays of aggressiveness, and to avoid pushing one’s opponents to the wall, and much effort is made to achieve compromises capable of saving the faces of everyone concerned, even at the risk of sacrificing matters of “principle.” This too facilitates the avoidance of the sort of open clashes of irreconcilable groups which in some countries make majoritarian democracy difficult to maintain.

On the other hand, when attitudes and behavior traditional to the Philippines are inconsistent with those suitable to the smooth working of a democratic system, serious problems arise. Thus American teach-

14 Hayden, op. cit., p. 485.
ers and officials tried to teach Filipinos to accept political defeat with grace and for this reason placed much emphasis upon the introduction of American sports in the schools. But in a society in which popularity is so important and in which substantive issues are of so little real significance, electoral defeat is far more hard to bear than in the United States, where a defeat can be shrugged off as the result of the public’s unwisdom in matters of public policy. In a Philippine election, a candidate’s prestige and self-esteem, and those of his relatives and friends as well, are at stake to an extraordinary degree—hence the unwillingness so often displayed by losing candidates, among them the losing candidate in the most recent presidential election, to admit that they were defeated by honest means.

Similarly, the effort of the schools to teach future civil servants to make decisions on an impersonal basis and to refuse to yield to pleas from friends and relatives for favored treatment has been but partially effective, to say the least. Yet the stress placed, in the citizenship classes of the American-sponsored school system, upon the necessity of accepting the outcome of elections and upon the undesirability of “anomalies” in government does seem to have left an impression upon those not directly affected, the educated public, as we shall see, and helps to account for the strength of democratic institutions in the Philippines today.

The general public’s refusal to tolerate a high incidence of anomalies in government and their readiness to vote against politicians whose anomalies are thought to be excessive appears to have been the main reason for the three postwar expulsions from power of a ruling party. The frequency and amplitude of the reversals in the electoral cycle are explained in part by a clash between traditional and foreign values. The urge to favor friends and relatives is exceedingly strong among Filipinos because of a deep-seated feeling that favoritism of this sort is “right.” Yet Filipinos also have come to believe that favoritism by public officials is bad for the country. As a result, politicians who upbraid the governing party for its anomalies when they are in opposition find it very hard to resist the pleas of their relatives when they themselves are in power. Yet the public will not tolerate such weakness and the politician soon finds himself ejected from office. This seems to be the principal reason for the rapid turnover of the membership of the Congress.
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*Education, Social Mobility, and Political Recruitment*

Social stratification and the means of social mobility have also undergone major changes during the periods of Spanish and American colonial rule. Education has helped to bring about these changes.

Social stratification was shallow in pre-Spanish times. A thinly scattered, frequently shifting population in an area of abundant land impeded the establishment of power over people. During Spanish times, the most important basis of status was that of race. Spaniards were on top. Pure Filipinos were at the bottom. Eurasian “mestizos” were in between. Chinese immigrants, as pariah capitalists, were in a special category of relatively low status.

Yet during Spanish times a Filipino gentry, largely mestizo in composition, began to take shape. The probable connection between the resettlement of the natives, the spread of wet rice agriculture, and the growing importance of land ownership has been suggested above. The emergence of a class of wealthy landed Filipinos was probably stimulated by the growth of an export trade for Philippine agricultural commodities during the last century and a half of Spanish rule.16

In Spanish times the Filipino gentry were set off from the purely vernacular speaking common people not only by their wealth but by their Spanish speech, culture, and education. During the American period mass education lessened the cultural if not the economic gap between landowners and the “common tao.” It also helped to greatly expand the professional middle class and in general opened new channels for the upward social mobility of individuals.

This does not mean that education per se became the major criterion of high social status, though certainly education did contribute to high status. Rather, education became a widely available means for the acquisition of those attributes which traditionally have been the main source of high status in Philippine society: wealth and popularity. Both of these attributes are of a sort that can be acquired rather quickly, as compared with descent, an ascriptive criterion, which has been less essential to status in the Philippines than in many other traditional societies.

Wealth and popularity are closely interconnected in the Philippines. Each helps to produce the other. Wealth enables a Filipino to gather about him a cluster of dependents who become his loyal followers, which in the Philippine sense of the word makes him a popular man. Conversely, the power obtained from the ability to mobilize followers facilitates the appropriation of wealth.\footnote{For survey data attesting to the close relationship between wealth and status, see Frank Lynch, S.J., \textit{Social Class in a Bikol Town}, Chicago, University of Chicago Philippine Studies Program, 1959.}

In late Spanish times the opportunities for the acquisition of land, the main basis of wealth, and thus of popularity and power were sharply restricted in the more densely settled portions of the Philippines. Share-cropping peasants, often perennially in debt, found it difficult enough to subsist, and few were able to accumulate a sufficient surplus to permit the purchase of land. The Filipino land-owning elite, once it had come into being, tended to be a closed group.

In American times, the establishment of electoral politics introduced a new and easier way to acquire popularity and wealth. By organizing a following among his fellow villagers or townsmen, an ordinary Filipino might win local public office or help someone else to win office. Having done so, he obtained access to spoils and patronage with which to reward his supporters and to increase his following. Then he might run for a higher office and obtain more spoils which he might use to finance his campaign for an even more exalted office and to enrich himself in the bargain. Thus by employing his skill as a manipulator of people, and public money as capital, the son of a peasant might—and not a few did—escape the poverty of his early surroundings and raise himself to a position of fame and fortune. In the course of his career he might marry into a wealthy family and consolidate his position within the social elite. Because of the relatively slight importance given to descent in the Philippines, this consolidation has usually been fairly complete.

The relative ease with which successful politicians of humble origin are absorbed into the upper class has had the effect of depriving the common people of leaders dedicated exclusively to the interests of the common man. It is notable how often Filipino politicians of humble origin adopt the conservative point of view of the gentry once they have made their political fortunes. Yet they retain their rapport with, and their ability to manipulate, the common people from whom they stem. This is one reason why Philippine political parties succeed
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in winning support from all social and economic strata simultaneously.

While the number of men who have climbed from nipa huts to the halls of Congress has been small in terms of absolute numbers, the belief that such ascent is possible has made a strong impression on young Filipinos of recent generations, and helps to account for their fascination with politics. This political Horatio Alger myth has also had the effect of diverting attention from the rigidity of the economic class system.

Education helps open the way to a political career and thus to higher social status. Filipino politicians agree that formal schooling, preferably in the fields of law or medicine, is a pre-condition to success at the polls. An uneducated man of wealth may deliver many votes to others. But he will win few votes for himself if the public knows him to be a man of little schooling.

Education also opens an indirect route into politics by way of a prior career in the civil service. In view of the availability of free public primary education, of the existence of a large number of inexpensive secondary schools and colleges which a working student can attend, many poor boys have been able to prepare themselves for the civil service examinations. Since English early became the language of administration and because candidates who took the civil service examinations in English had far better career opportunities than those who took them in Spanish, the linguistic inheritance of the sons of the old Spanish-speaking elite gave them no advantage, and the cards were not stacked heavily against linguistically talented village boys. In a sense this very fact lessened the prestige value of civil service positions, for the entry into such positions of large numbers of poor boys has made the public service in the Philippines a middle class rather than an elite profession. Nonetheless the fact that the civil servant is in a position to exert power over people and, sometimes, to extort tangible rewards for himself, lends great attraction to a civil service career, for as we have noted, power—which in the Philippines means popularity—and wealth are the main sources of prestige in Philippine society.

At the same time, in view of the even greater power and opportunities for income associated with elective office and of the great satisfaction which Filipinos seem to find in the public display of oratorical and combative skill and in the conspicuous distribution of largesse, it is a rare Philippine civil servant who would not exchange his bureau-
The Philippine bureaucracy has several characteristics. For an elective office. A great many poor but ambitious boys appear to have this in mind when they enter the public service. Their bureaucratic apprenticeship permits them to acquire inside knowledge of politics and to accumulate political capital: civil servants stationed in Manila generally make a point of doing favors for their townsmen and province-mates in preparation for the day when they plan to return to their respective home towns and throw their hats into the political ring.

An examination of the biographies of members of the House of Representatives confirms the contribution of mass education to a broadly based pattern of recruitment to positions of political leadership. Many congressmen appear to be of relatively humble origin. Most of them are the products of public primary, intermediate, and secondary schools and make a point of mentioning this fact in their published biographies. While a few attended the high-prestige colleges of the religious orders, two-fifths have studied at the University of the Philippines. The rest—with the exception of the handful who had no higher education—are products of the less distinguished commercially run colleges which cater to the working part-time students of lower or lower-middle-class parentage whose preparation of funds are insufficient to gain them admittance to the more prestige-worthy schools. The biographies of these congressmen reveal a passion for education. Many have attended several colleges and professional schools, perhaps because of the need to interrupt their studies to earn their tuition. Some have studied in the United States. As might be expected, a large proportion have law degrees, though this does not necessarily mean that they have practiced law. Many began their government careers at the bottom, holding minor clerical jobs and then rising in the civil service until an opportunity to enter politics presented itself.

Of those members of Congress who did not enter politics by way of the public service, all but a handful are professionals: lawyers, doctors, dentists, and civil engineers. That is to say, they are men who prior to entering politics obtained their living by the exercise of skills acquired through higher education, and only partly if at all from an independent income obtained through the ownership of land. Such men are part of the growing professional middle class whose contribution to Philippine politics will be touched upon below.

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We have suggested that the present pattern of education in the
Philippines promotes a good deal of social mobility. But it also has less felicitous social implications, which stem from its imbalance. We have dwelt on the high rate of college attendance. Yet we have noted that the drop-out rate in the elementary grades is also very high. The contrast between the two phenomena becomes evident when one compares the Philippines with other countries. A recent cross-national report on rates of enrollment in higher education showed the Philippines to rank second from the top in a list of 121 countries or territories. Its rate, per 100,000 population in 1957, was 909. Only the United States, with a rate of 1,816 in 1955, surpassed it. But in its rate of literacy among persons aged fifteen or over, the Philippines ranked 76 from the top of a list of 153 countries and territories, with a modest 60 per cent literacy among this age group.¹⁸

The rapid expansion of higher education among those who can afford to attend private colleges while a large proportion of the population remains virtually uneducated may produce serious frustration among those in the latter category as they find their social status and economic opportunities declining in relation to those of a mushrooming educated class. This suggests the need for a renewed stress upon public elementary education.

*Education and Democracy in the Philippines*

**A. LITERACY, ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY**

The high rate of Philippine literacy has made possible the employment of procedures for the conduct of elections which have the effect of maximizing the voter’s freedom of choice among candidates and parties. Such procedures help to account for the highly competitive character of Philippine democracy.

Elections in the Philippines are conducted by means of write-in ballots. Printed ballots contain nothing but a list of the offices to be filled. The voters must write in the names of the candidates for whom they wish to vote. Furthermore, no official list of candidates is posted in the polling booths. To find out the names of the candidates and their party affiliation, the voters are left to their own devices. To help them, parties, candidates, and individual political leaders arrange for the printing of “sample ballots” containing the names of

their favorite candidates which they distribute among the voters on or before election day. Each hopes that the voters will copy the names from his sample ballot when they cast their votes.

The write-in ballot system of conducting elections, together with the weakness of party cohesion which is a feature of Philippine politics, prevents party leaders, especially national party leaders, from restricting candidacy for a local and provincial office to that member of each party who is favored by its leadership. The national headquarters of each party can and does submit a list of “official party candidates” to the Commission on Elections. But anyone else who wishes to run may also submit his name to the Commission and may advertise himself as being a member of whichever party he wishes. As a result it is not unusual for a party’s “official candidate” to be beaten at the polls by a self-proclaimed member of the same party who has a larger personal following in the constituency. This makes the local party conventions, which nominate “official candidates,” and the national party leaders, who “proclaim” them, extremely wary of imposing unpopular choices as candidates for municipal and provincial officers and for the House of Representatives. The “sample ballot” system for making known the names of candidates brings the center of gravity of political power near the grass roots level. While national party headquarters, as well as individual candidates running for high national offices, arrange for the printing of large numbers of sample ballots containing the names of their party’s national candidates, and while they send batches of such ballots to political leaders in various provinces, the spaces for the listing of candidates for provincial and municipal offices are usually left blank, in the belief that local leaders will be more willing to distribute the ballots to their followers and to the voters at large if they are left free to insert the names of the local candidates whom they prefer. Even so, it often happens that the name of a national candidate—perhaps even the name of the senatorial candidate who paid for the printing—is scratched out and replaced by the name of another candidate who happens to have made an impression upon a local leader. Thus the petty leader at the grass roots level has the final say as to the names which will appear on the sample ballots which he distributes. Yet even he has but limited control over the outcome of the voting. For the voter receives many sample ballots from rival leaders in his locality. In the secrecy of the polling place he can copy down names from several of them or disregard all of them and fill in the
blanks of the official ballot with whatever names he prefers. As a result, disciplined straight-ticket voting is far harder to enforce than is the case in countries where an illiterate electorate permit the nation’s political elite to restrict the voters to a choice between symbols or colors representing the pre-selected slates of the political parties.

B. THE EDUCATED MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY

It has often been argued that the success of democracy depends upon the presence of a fairly large middle class. It is often assumed, further, that this must be an entrepreneurial middle class similar to that which came into being in recent centuries in the towns and cities of Western Europe.

In the Philippines, until a few years ago, the entrepreneurial skill of Chinese immigrants and of other foreign businessmen, as well as the absence of strong incentives for the development of domestic manufacturing, inhibited the growth of a large Filipino business community. This state of affairs is now undergoing change, due in part to the enactment of legislation designed to exclude the Chinese from retail trade, in part to the adoption of protectionist measures which have been administered in such a way as to favor native Filipino industrialists. As a result, the Filipino business community has grown markedly in recent years both in its numbers and in the wealth and aggressiveness of its leading members. Filipino businessmen have been among the most vocal critics of corruption in government, for such corruption has added to the cost of doing business. But they have not held democratic institutions of government to blame for corruption. Instead they have placed the blame upon an excess of governmental controls over the economy. The writer knows of no Filipino businessman who advocates the abandonment of the present system of government in favor of a more authoritarian one. Rather, Filipino businessmen and their organizations have thrown their support behind efforts to perfect Philippine democracy. At the same time, they have sought to play a greater political role themselves, both as members of organized pressure groups and, with increasing frequency, as candidates for elective and appointive public offices. There is good reason to believe that if Philippine democracy were to be threatened in the future, the business community would be among its staunchest defenders.

But during the crucial early years of Philippine independence, before the Filipino business community attained its present power and
Élan, the defence of democracy rested mainly in the hands of two other and somewhat older sectors of the middle class: the landed gentry and the professional and semi-professional people whose achievement of middle-class status is the result of their education.

The rural gentry appear to be quite satisfied with the present system. They have gained both pleasure and material satisfaction from the game of democratic politics as they have played it at the local level during the past half century. By and large, they have been hostile to, and refused to cooperate with what sometimes appeared to be centrally directed attempts to restrict or terminate the game.

Of the professional middle-class defenders of democracy, the public school teachers are of particular interest from the point of view of this study. Teachers seem to be especially influential as leaders of opinion in the more remote and backward villages where few other persons of education are to be found. On the other hand, in villages where the spread of education has led to the appearance of other educated persons—doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, educated farmers, and the like—the relative prestige and influence of the school teachers has, to some extent, declined.

The civic role played by school teachers has been affected by their status as public employees. Like other civil servants, public school teachers are supposed to eschew partisan politics. In practice they often find themselves under pressure from local and provincial politicians to use their influence with the parents of their pupils in favor of one or another candidate. But in view of the fact that most school teachers are not natives of the villages to which they are assigned, and as the factional and partisan divisions which largely determine voting in most communities have their roots in long-standing familial alignments and rivalries in these communities, it is doubtful whether many teachers exert much influence over the outcome of elections even when they wish to do so. Thus school teachers must leave the task of expelling unworthy politicians from office, and of replacing them with good ones, to local leaders—many of them self-employed or privately employed professionals—who were born in the villages where they reside and who are not barred from partisan activity by civil service rules.

In non-partisan matters, however, the school teachers' position as public servants invest them with special responsibilities with respect to the promotion of civic action and the guardianship of the democratic process. Thus various agencies of the central government

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charged with the task of teaching villagers to organize projects for community self-help—projects stimulated in part by the hope that they will inculcate democratic habits at the village level—draw heavily upon the off-duty labor of village school teachers for their local direction. And at election time school teachers, as ex-officio chairmen of the bipartisan boards of election inspectors, bear a major responsibility for the maintenance of honest elections at the precinct level.

From the point of view of their attitudes towards democracy, there appears to be far less difference between the entrepreneurial, landowning, and professional sectors of the middle class in the Philippines than is the case in some other developing nations. The great majority of the members of all three sectors are graduates of the American colonial educational system and have been subjected to heavy school-time doses of indoctrination by teachers who had few doubts about the superiority of democracy and about the applicability of that form of government to the Philippines. When the prospects for democracy seemed gloomy after the “dirty” elections of 1949, members of all three sectors joined or supported the National Movement for Free Elections. This organization and others like it, formed at a later time, established a most impressive network for the discovery and reporting of election anomalies. Together with a free and outspoken national press, such organizations have created an atmosphere of public vigilance sufficient to forestall any large-scale attempt to repeat the anomalies of 1949.

It is of some importance that most of the educated middle class and its leaders are not and do not regard themselves as being an “intelligentsia” in the Continental sense of that term, but rather as practical men: skilled professionals, technicians, and entrepreneurs. They display little interest in theory, but take much interest in practical politics as a means of achieving practical results. There is a small group of academicians and newspapermen, neither of whom constitute more than a minority in their professions—though a vocal minority—who lean in the direction of a Marxian point of view. But this group, and “intellectuals” in general, lack the influence among the educated class and the students which intellectuals enjoy in most other developing nations. As compared with practical men, Filipino intellectuals—the term is rarely used in the Philippines—occupy roughly the same role in the public life of their country as do intellectuals in that of the United States. One must conclude that it is the American direction of
the Philippine educational system, and the American training of most of those who studied abroad, which is in large part responsible for this state of affairs.

C. EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, AND GRASS-ROOTS PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT

Filipino politicians report that the readiness of rural voters to take advantage of the freedom of choice given them by the write-in ballot system has greatly increased in recent years. Before World War II, great national leaders such as Quezon and Osmeña rarely came to the villages at election time. Instead, they confined their campaigning to the important towns and relied upon provincial leaders to deliver the small town and village votes.

But since the end of the war, and especially since the time of President Magsaysay, who in 1953 set a new pattern of village-to-village campaigning, candidates for high offices have found it necessary to go from one village to another and to appeal directly to petty village leaders and to the village electorate at large. In doing so, they often by-pass the middle-level politicians who in the past delivered the villagers' votes.

Conversely, petty village leaders who in earlier years appealed to town and provincial leaders for help in securing nationally financed benefits for their villages, have learned to direct their requests straight to persons high in the national government, often traveling to the national capital to do so. This development has served to strengthen the village leaders at the expense of the leaders of municipalities and provinces.

In part this trend can be attributed to the increased competitiveness of politics at the higher levels which resulted from the re-establishment of a two-party system after a long pre-war period of one-party dominance. But in part the change may be seen to be a long-term consequence of mass education. For mass education has given villages access to reliable political news dispensed by the Manila press and by national periodicals, and has lessened their dependence upon verbal news and rumor, relayed and rationed by the middle-level leaders in the towns.

The improvement in the flow and accuracy of communication between Manila and the villages helps to account for the high degree of rapport that obtains between voters and politicians, a rapport which serves to distinguish Philippine politics from that of a good
many other developing nations and makes it more nearly resemble that of the United States. Travelers through the provinces in the Philippines during a pre-election period are struck by the intimate and accurate knowledge of political developments in Manila and elsewhere which is displayed not only by local politicians but by ordinary educated citizens. In forming judgments about the administration and the opposition, people in the outlying areas take their cues from the Manila press and from such colorful leaders of the city as the late Mayor of Manila. As a result, once an administration loses the confidence of such independent leaders of opinion in the capital, its support is likely to decline rather quickly throughout the country. This accounts for the frequency with which parties have been turned out of power since the end of the war.

In turn, national leaders in Manila have detailed and accurate information concerning political moods and trends in the provinces. The government, the political parties, and the newspapers have created diverse and elaborate networks to sound opinion among local leaders and the general public. This means that electoral tides usually are predicted with sufficient accuracy to permit well-directed last-minute efforts to influence the results, or to adjust to them. More generally, it accounts for the high degree of governmental responsiveness to the desires of diverse sectors of the public. This in turn may account for the rarity of explosions of “anomic” behavior in the Philippines. Politicians take great care to inform themselves of public opinion. With a number of notable exceptions, they have been able to discover surges of popular indignation and to appease or deflect them before they have reached the point of explosion.

D. Mass Education, a Plural Elite, and the Faith in Popular Government

The relatively slight political influence exerted by the “intelligentsia” has been noted. Furthermore the Philippines lacks a clearly recognizable “Establishment.” While there certainly is an upper class, there is no small cohesive, self-conscious elite group which sets itself off from the rest of the populace and regards itself, and is accepted as being, especially qualified to govern the nation. Some of the reasons for the absence of such an “establishment” are traceable to the educational system.

The first reason stems from the sheer number of people who have received a substantial amount of education. In a country where the
rate of college enrollment is almost as high as in the United States and where not to have had a few years of schooling is to be underprivileged, higher education does not give those who receive it a sense of being members of an elite.

Second, the Philippine educational system is not divided into two programs, one designed for the laboring class, one for those destined to work with their minds. While it is true that the parochial elementary and secondary schools are generally thought to be of higher quality than the corresponding public schools, and while a few special trade schools exist, the public school system on the whole is a uniform one, and it is common for students to pass entirely through that system and to graduate from the very prestige-worthy University of the Philippines. Furthermore, the large number of persons who have received one or two or three years of full- or part-time schooling at one of the numerous second-rate colleges obscure the boundary between the college-trained and the high-school-trained sectors of the population.

Third, the diversity of good universities—public, Catholic, Protestant, and private venture—has prevented the emergence of a corps of graduates from a single institution, united by the knowledge that they are destined to run the country.

As there is diversity among colleges, so there is diversity among the occupational groups which exert influence upon government. Power is shared by bureaucrats, lawyer-politicians, businessmen, planters, absentee landowners, the press, and various other occupational groups. There is no self-conscious elite administrative corps comparable to the Indian Civil Service. It was not the American intent to foster the development of such a corps. Politicians, who give orders to bureaucrats, must bow to pressures from interest groups. No single interest group is dominant, and all interests need the good will of powerful bureaucrats. All power holders are subject to harassment by the press. All are liable to have their power augmented or diminished as a result of what have been, in the case of the great majority of presidential elections, thoroughly intelligent and generally well-received popular judgments at the polls.

*Education and Political Integration*

One of the striking characteristics of Philippine political life is the great measure of agreement which exists among diverse sectors of the
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population as to the type of society and state in which they wish to
live, and as to the means of achieving these goals—in short, the high
degree of integration of political culture.

We have noted the effects of education in creating a nation out of
diverse and widely dispersed linguistic groups. We have also noted
its effects in lessening the danger of class conflict by facilitating social
climbing on the part of those who might otherwise become radical
political leaders of the poor. Education has furthered political inte­
gration in two additional ways.

First, the gap between the culture of the most tradition-bound
sectors of Christian Filipino society and of the most modern ones is
relatively slight as compared with similar gaps in other former colo­
nial societies. This accomplishment is largely the work of Spain,
which, during her three and a half centuries of colonial rule, intro­
duced not only the Filipino elite but also the Filipino peasantry into
Christendom. As a result all sectors of society, with the exception of
the small non-Christian minority, are sufficiently “Westernized,” if
not in their way of life, then certainly in their ideological commit­
ments, to ensure that the country is not troubled by serious political
conflict between “Westernized” leaders and a “traditional” counter­
elite and peasantry deeply committed to “Asian” ways, who balk at
being “Westernized.”

Second, the gap between the political cultures of the rural and
urban Philippines, though substantial, appears to be far less great
than is the case in many other developing societies. Here, too, educa­
tion deserves much of the credit. We have noted that a large number
of Filipinos who were born in the provinces come to Manila for their
studies. While many of them remain in Manila after graduation, a
good many others return to their home towns to practice their profes­
sions or manage their families’ farms. Many of those who remain in
Manila maintain close ties with their country cousins and make a
point of visiting their home towns from time to time.

As a result, the educated and professional urban middle class in the
Philippines does not consist merely of burghers of long standing, sepa­
rated from the rural folk, but to a large extent is made up of citified
countrymen. Because of their education, members of this group play
an important role in transmitting an urban and national point of view
to their rustic kinsmen and in bringing an awareness of rural needs to
the cities. This was reflected in the surprisingly close similarity of

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rural and urban opinion on a variety of political matters revealed in a
survey conducted by the writer. It is also to be seen in the lack of
much difference between rural and urban election-time preferences as
to candidates and parties.

The high degree of consensus which is found among Filipinos in
regard to the type of government which they desire for their country
is largely responsible for the successful functioning of democracy in
the Philippines. As constitutional democracy is the type of govern­
ment desired by the overwhelming majority of Filipinos, there are
grounds for concluding that politically the young Philippine nation
has come reasonably close to achieving its major objective. Hence­
forth, the task will be to perfect the system: to reduce the scale of
“anomalies,” to develop more severe criteria for the selection of offi­
cials, to produce party leaders who will devise more consistent and
effective policies and rely less on muddling through. But, despite the
current imperfections, the relative success of the nation in setting its
political house in order leaves it free to concentrate upon its economic
tasks. Here, too, the presence of a largely literate public, an educated
middle class, and a highly trained elite should contribute to a steady
rate of progress.

Conclusions

Philippine society has undergone great changes since the middle of
the sixteenth century when Spain established her rule. Had not cer­
tain of these changes occurred, it seems doubtful whether the country
would be capable of maintaining democratic institutions of govern­
ment on a national scale today. From a political point of view, the
most important changes were those which helped to make the Philip­
pines a nation and those which prepared the mass of its people to play
the role of intelligent voters in a democratic state. The first change
came about mainly during the Spanish period. The second took place
largely during the much shorter period of American rule and of Phil­
ippine independence which followed it.

The changes, especially the more recent ones, involved the acquisi­
tion of new skills: literacy and a common language in the case of a
large proportion of the common people; higher education in the
Western tradition in the case of a smaller sector of society which
comprises the propertied class and of a substantial number of up­

19 Carl H. Landé, “Political Attitudes and Behavior in the Philippines,” Philippine
wardly mobile children of more humble origin; administrative skills in the case of the large numbers of civil servants needed to staff a modern government; managerial, technical, and mechanical skills in the case of the entrepreneurs, technicians, and workers which were needed if rapid economic progress were to be made during the early decades of independence.

The changes involved an acceptance of new loyalties and beliefs: a common loyalty to a Filipino nation, and a strong belief in the desirability and feasibility of constitutional democracy in the Philippines.

Most important, the changes involved the learning through continual practice of new techniques for the achievement of political ends. Over the years these techniques became habits and finally the conventions of a relatively stable political system, which few would care to change. Among them are the habit of choosing and controlling public officials through free and competitive elections in the case of the people at large, and the habit of appealing for the votes of one's social inferiors and of accepting the outcome of the voting in the case of the political elite.

Finally, the changes involved major alterations in the structure and character of society: the growth of a substantial Filipino property class which, while to a large extent residing in the countryside and maintaining lines of communication with the peasantry, yet was sufficiently modern and Western in its experience and aspirations to educate its sons and daughters in the Western, and lately in the American, tradition and to accept modernization and Westernization as an appropriate goal for all classes. The development of a lower class which no less aspired towards modernity, and which now leavens the country’s governing elite by contributing to it the most capable of its educated and upwardly mobile youth.

These changes are the result of a combination of forces at work in the Philippines over several centuries. To what extent particular changes may be attributed specifically to education is impossible to say. But it is quite clear that both during the Spanish and American colonial periods, educational policies designed to bring about some of these changes were implemented with both enthusiasm and persistence. Some of these policies involved formal instruction: religious and secular instruction by the Spanish clergy, secular instruction alone by American-trained school teachers. Others involved training through practice: practice in the operation of democratic institutions of government. Some changes were intended by the colonial power:
the implantation of Christianity in Spanish times, the spread of linguistic skills and of literacy and the acquisition of new political habits during the American period. Other changes which laid the foundations for the modern Philippine state were not intended or desired by the colonial power, but were side effects of other changes which were intended: the growth of Philippine national consciousness which was stimulated by the reception of a common foreign culture and by the improvement of inter-island travel and communication during the late Spanish period.

The fact that two colonial regimes, each in its own way, were able to bring about fundamental changes in Philippine society and culture may be explained by a number of factors. First, many of the most fundamental changes were planned changes, not accidental ones. Unlike some other ventures in colonization which were launched with little more in mind than commercial or strategic advantage for the colonizing power, both Spanish and American colonial authorities sought not merely to exploit the Filipinos but also, for better or worse, to change them. For this purpose elaborate programs of religious and secular instruction were introduced. These programs had the benefit of being based upon prior experience: the Church's experience in the religious instruction of Europeans and American Indians, and United States experience in the mass education and citizenship training of American youth.

Second, these programs of planned change were carried out over extended periods of time. Spain began its effort to Christianize and Hispanize the Filipinos three and a half centuries before its rule came to an end. American colonial authorities began their program of formal and practical training of Filipinos for self-government nearly half a century before the country won final independence.

Third, both colonial regimes sought to change not only the Filipino elite but the great mass of people as well. Spanish priests wished to save the souls of all Filipinos, not merely those of the upper class. American education and political training were aimed at all sectors of the population.

Finally, Spanish and American efforts to transform Philippine culture met with the approval and, in many respects, with the enthusiastic collaboration of those whose culture was to be changed. As a result, even after former colonial rulers have lost their ability to force changes upon their colony, the latter, now an independent nation,
continues to strive to make itself more Christian and more modern and democratic in a specifically Western sense.

The reasons for Filipino collaboration with their colonial rulers' efforts to change them deserve some comment, for they stem from a combination of circumstances not found in many other Asian colonies of Western powers.

First, Spanish culture and to a slightly less extent American culture appeared to colonial Filipinos to offer something superior to the culture which they knew. Except for some small groups of Filipinos who had been converted to Islam—and these the Spaniards found harder to convert—the bulk of the Filipinos in the mid-sixteenth century were pagans with but a primitive technology and few if any supra-local social or political institutions. Having no great Asian civilization to look back upon and no great native states to command their loyalty, they sought—or at any rate put up but little resistance to—conversion and Hispanization. Later, when Americans replaced Spaniards in the Philippines, the culture which they brought with them was not a totally alien one, but merely a more progressive version of the European culture which Filipinos had imbibed in Spanish times. Filipinos appear to have been convinced that Western education, offered to them by the American-instituted public school system, was essential to the individual social and economic success of their sons and daughters. Furthermore, while Filipino ways of thought may appear to differ somewhat from those of Western Europeans, they differ from them considerably less than do, say, the ways of thought of various other peoples of what to many Westerners remains the inscrutable East. For this, too, the influence of Spain and of generations of Spanish priests in the Islands would seem to be responsible. Thus Filipinos were both eager for and capable of mass education in the Western tradition when this was offered to them in American times. As for the political institutions which Americans sought to impose on the Islands, these differed little from the liberal institutions of government which Filipino nationalists, educated in the West or in Spanish schools in the Islands, had sought to obtain from Spain for many years. Thus, in contrast to some other former colonies, there was not much foot-dragging by native traditionalists bent on protecting their culture against that of the West.

Second, both American colonial policy and the international climate of opinion of the early decades of the twentieth century, when the
aims and tactics of Filipino nationalists became fixed in a form which still persists, were such as to encourage Filipino nationalists to choose democratic practices and aspirations. The American regime, almost from the beginning, made it clear that independence would be granted when Filipino voters and leaders had demonstrated their ability to run their country in a democratic fashion. Further, the American regime, from 1907 onward, made it possible for Filipino leaders to achieve positions of great power and prestige by playing the game of Politics according to the American rules. Thus to learn the political lessons Americans wished to teach was both patriotic and profitable. To reject the lessons was unpatriotic and self-defeating, for there was at that time no anti-colonial bloc of nations to snap at the heels of the colonial powers, demanding that independence be given to subject peoples whether or not they were prepared for it.

Furthermore, Philippine democracy became a national goal and in large part a reality at a time when it was widely thought to be axiomatic that constitutional democracy was not only the best form of government but a form applicable to all peoples. European totalitarianism, of either the Marxist or nationalist variety, had not yet established claim to be the wave of the future, and its non-Western imitators were not to assert similar claims until after the dissolution of other European empires following the Second World War. By that time Philippine democracy was a successful going concern.

Third, Philippine democracy, as it evolved before World War II, served the needs and in general operated to the satisfaction of those sectors of the society that might have been in a position to sabotage it. During that period democratic politics in the Philippines took the form of an amiable, profitable, and socially undisruptive competition for office among the gentry. As the lower strata became more assertive, they too found it possible to obtain benefits for their class through the shrewd employment of the ballot and the exercise of pressure upon gentry or lower middle-class politicians. In short, the effective electorate was broadened gradually, somewhat as in England during the preceding century, with the difference that the presence of a benevolent colonial power reduced the effectiveness of rear-guard resistance on the part of the upper class. Today as in earlier years, most Filipinos feel that the maintenance of constitutional democracy serves their interests.

We have seen that, by and large, Filipinos welcomed the American effort to prepare the country for democratic self-government, and
sought to make that preparation a success. It remains to be asked whether the preparation was sufficient to ensure the survival of democratic institutions of government in the face of serious efforts to subvert them, once the restraining hand of the colonial power had been removed. Pessimism in this regard was widespread after the “dirty” elections of 1949, and many feared that the elections of 1951 or 1953 would be even dirtier, and might signal the end of Philippine democracy. Instead, these elections served as a challenge to which the champions of Philippine democracy responded with verve, organizational skill, and most important, with the general support of the educated public. Partly because of the anticipated effectiveness of measures designed to expose “anomalies,” partly because those in high places who may have considered committing anomalies had pangs of conscience about taking steps which they no less than their critics knew to be bad for the country, the elections of 1951 and 1953 turned out to be cleanly conducted. The same can be said for the elections held since that time. There has been a great deal of vote buying, much of it ineffective, it is true. But there has been little centrally directed violence, intimidation, or fraud at the polls. When such anomalies have occurred, they have usually been of local inspiration, uncoordinated, and designed mainly to assure the election of one or another candidate for local office.

This suggests some final observations concerning the relationship between education and Philippine democracy. One of these is that the indoctrination and practical training of the previous half-century helped to create a climate of opinion which would have subjected whoever might have tried to destroy democracy to the intense and sustained condemnation of their peers and of the public at large.

The other is that the most important political lesson which Filipinos have learned is one which they have taught themselves: that they can take effective steps to guard their democracy. Until the system was threatened and defended successfully, this question remained in doubt. Now, few thoughtful Filipinos have much fear that their system cannot be defended in the future, at least against internal threats. Nations as a whole learn in times of crisis. It seems unlikely that the Philippines, after the self-taught lessons of 1951 and 1953, will be quite the same again.