Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution
A Personal Account

Yueh Sheng

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Foreword

Little is known about institutions in the Soviet Union that Chinese radicals attended in the 1920s and 1930s, nor is much known about the activities within the Soviet Union of the ones among these radicals who subsequently played significant roles in political developments in China.

To be sure, one knows a bit about Wang Ming and the "28 Bolsheviks." One knows that they existed, that Wang Ming was prominent among them, and that, somehow, they apparently sought to gain control of the Chinese Communist Party. One knows of their loyalty to Stalin. But one does not know who they were, for the rare listings of them do not conform to one another. Nor does one know what sort of an entity the 28 Bolsheviks constituted, nor how that entity came into being. In fact, one really knows surprisingly little about these people, whose influence historians in Communist China invariably treat as the major force in the thirties and early forties that contested the policies of Mao Tse-tung.

Nor is the issue of Wang Ming and the 28 Bolsheviks a closed one historically. For Wang Ming continued to be flayed by the Chinese Communist press prior to and during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and many Chinese Communist leaders who were purged in that Party convulsion were accused of having collaborated with Wang Ming. One reader reports that one could verify that Wang Ming was living in Moscow, and that he had lived there since the late 1950s. And then, in April, 1969, the Canadian Tribune, published in Toronto, carried a long diatribe by Wang Ming against Mao Tse-tung, the most vitriolic attack against Mao I have read in any Communist source. A story based on the diatribe was promptly filed by Tass and carried by Izvestia. Wang Ming, one of the 28 Bolsheviks, for years the Chinese Communist representative to the Comintern, is again openly doing battle with Mao Tse-tung, again, apparently, with Soviet blessings.

The events of today, then, do seem a bit to be evoking shades of the past. That being the case, it becomes more important than ever, from a practical standpoint, to understand what happened in the past. Mr. Sheng Yueh’s study (it is both a study and a memoir) of Sun Yat-sen
University in Moscow and of the 28 Bolsheviks, who had their origins there, throws invaluable light on this aspect of the past. For he was one of the 28 Bolsheviks, he attended Sun Yat-sen University, and he lived, first as a member of the Chinese Communist Party and then of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the Soviet Union from 1926 through 1932. For a time in the mid-1930s, Mr. Sheng was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He left the Chinese Communist Party in 1935.

But, of course, Mr. Sheng's work is useful not solely as a source of information about a Russian institution for Chinese radicals or a Chinese Communist power faction. Mr. Sheng makes the point that Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow had an impact upon the Kuomin-tang as well as upon the Chinese Communist Party, although he concerns himself chiefly with its relationship to Communists. Nevertheless, one learns that Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of Chiang Kai-shek, was a Trotskyite at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, which places the younger Chiang in a rather different light from the one in which he is generally placed. The younger Chiang's denunciation of his father in 1927 also is translated in this book; it does not exist, I think, in any other English-language source. There are fascinating bits of information about a number of people.

In his introduction Mr. Sheng stresses the dearth of source material relevant to Sun Yat-sen University. As he points out, he has had to rely largely upon his own memory in writing this book. He does not regard it, I know, as a definitive study either of Sun Yat-sen University or of the 28 Bolsheviks, or of the other subjects he treats in passing, such as the Chinese Trotskyite movement. It is not, therefore, to be read as a definitive, scholarly work. It is to be read as the work of one man who was intimately caught up in many of the events he describes, who has unique knowledge of these events, and who writes about them as he wishes. In writing this book, Mr. Sheng has thrown a good deal of light on aspects of modern Chinese history which few others are in a position to provide.

R. A. Burton
May, 1969
Preface

Among the problems one confronts in writing a study of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow is the dearth of written source material. The archives of the university are, presumably, in Moscow. I was not in a position to consult them, nor do I know that they would be made available to scholars seeking to consult them. Fragmentary information about Sun Yat-sen University also exists in the Documents Division of the CC of the KMT in Taiwan. At the time of writing, however, this material was not available for scholarly examination. Furthermore, former students of Sun Yat-sen University, most of whom now live in Taiwan or in mainland China, have written few reminiscences of their experiences at that university, perhaps because circumstances in both places make it expedient for them to close that chapter of their lives.

Further complicating research on Sun Yat-sen University were the almost covert circumstances under which it was established. Soviet publications, such as Pravda, make few references to it from 1925 through 1930. So far as I can discover, moreover, there are no Russian-language treatments of Sun Yat-sen University.

The histories of the CCP published in mainland China that I have examined utterly ignore Sun Yat-sen University, although numerous Chinese Communists, many of them men of great Party influence at one time or another, attended the university.¹ Nor have works published under KMT aegis contributed much information on the subject, although they do provide bits and pieces of data.

Thus, in writing this study I was forced to rely principally upon my own memory of my years at the university and of the 28 Bolsheviks,

of whom I was one. My memory, as is that of any man, naturally is fallible. But it seemed useful to record to the best of my ability what I felt able to record, simply because of the dearth of other sources.

This is not to say that I had no assistance in refreshing my memory or no data other than my memory. I have been able to examine Russian-language publications of the period and Chinese-language publications. Much help was given to me in correspondence by friends who had studied at Sun Yat-sen University. I shall respect their wishes that they not be named, but I wish to stress my gratitude to them. Mr. David H. L. Tseng, especially, and Mrs. Xenia J. Eudin, and others at the Hoover Library were most gracious in helping me locate valuable material.

This book could not have been written without the encouragement and support given to me by the then Dean of International Programs at the University of Kansas, George M. Beckmann, and Dr. Thomas R. Smith, then Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at that university. I am greatly indebted, too, to Professor Robert A. Burton, of the University of Kansas, whose knowledge of modern China I much admire, for the many discussions we had on the material in this work and for technical assistance and advice in completing this manuscript. I shall long remember his assistance. Lastly, but by no means of least importance, I wish to thank a fellow student at Sun Yat-sen University, Ch’ing Man-yun, who is also my wife, for her tireless assistance. I don’t suppose one usually thanks a person for having an incredibly retentive mind, but it has been my good fortune that she has such a mind and that she made her recollections available to me and functioned both as a healthy stimulus and as a check to my own recollections. Her contributions to the chapter on the Sixth Congress of the CCP were especially notable, for she was in a position to furnish information about that Congress which few others could have furnished.

So far as I know, this is the first attempt in any language to write a substantial study of Sun Yat-sen University. The work naturally contains many flaws. It is my hope that scholars with knowledge of the subject and former students at the university will not hesitate to acquaint me with these flaws or to suggest things that I have overlooked so that, perhaps, I may some day write a more comprehensive
study of the subject. But if this work provides students of Chinese and Soviet affairs with a few blocks on which they can build a more perfect knowledge of what still is recent history, then it will have served its purpose.

Abbreviations

CC—Central Committee
CCP—Chinese Communist Party
CEC—Central Executive Committee
CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CYC—Communist Youth Corps
ECCI—Executive Committee of the Communist International
GPU—Государственное Политическое Управление—Government Political Department and formerly the secret police of the Soviet Union
KMT—Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party
KUTV—Communist University for the Toilers of the East
NEP—New Economic Policy

The following shortened forms are also used:
Comintern—Communist International
Komsomol—Communist Youth League
Kresintern—The Peasant International
Kuominchun—The People’s Army
Politburo—Political Bureau
Profintern—Red International of Labor Unions
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Introduction

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born November 12, 1866. On March 12, 1925, he died in Peking. Dr. Sun’s death presented the Russian Communists, who were eager to convince China of their good will, with an opportunity to demonstrate their friendship. In commemoration of Dr. Sun, they opened Sun Yat-sen University for the Toilers of China at Moscow in the autumn of 1925. The life span of this university was short, for it was closed in the autumn of 1930. Nevertheless, it had a significant influence upon events in China, both Nationalist and Communist, which lingers to this day. Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow is an integral part of the history of relations between China and Russia after 1917, just as it is an integral part of the history of relations between the KMT and the CCP in the 1920s. It is, furthermore, an integral part of the history of both the CCP and the KMT.

Chinese who studied in the Soviet Union at Sun Yat-sen University, Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV), Lenin Academy, and various Soviet military institutions, have occupied important posts in the CCP. Every one of the 28 Bolsheviks, for example, graduated from Sun Yat-sen University. More recently, of the ninety-five members of the CC elected by the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in 1956, for example, I can identify at least twenty-seven who studied in the USSR, and graduates of Sun Yat-sen University were prominent among them. Teng Hsiao-p’ing, who became the Party’s general secretary at that congress, was a graduate of Sun Yat-sen University. Ch’en Po-ta, another member of the CC elected at the Eighth Congress, who was closely identified with Mao Tse-tung in the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” also studied at Sun Yat-sen University. At least three members of provincial committees of the Party in the mid-1960s attended that university. At the same time, at least sixteen people who held notable positions in the Central government in mainland China, such as Liu Shao-ch’i, had studied in the USSR. Liu, of course, attended KUTV. I have mentioned only a few obvious examples; a great many more could be listed who are in the Party, the government, and the military.

Chinese who studied in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, moreover, have played, and still play, significant roles in the KMT, a party which
in 1924 was reorganized along lines similar to the Communist model
at the recommendation of Michael Borodin, its Soviet adviser. Here,
too, a great many names could be listed, although I shall mention only
a few. General Chiang Ching-kuo, a graduate of Sun Yat-sen Univer-
sity, became Minister of National Defense in the government of the
Republic of China in Taiwan in 1965 and is a member of the Standing
Committee of the CEC of the KMT. In 1969 he became Vice-Premier
of the Executive Yuan. His authority on Taiwan is reportedly second
only to that of his father, Chiang Kai-shek. The late General Cheng
Chieh-ming, a leading figure in the Nationalist intelligence service,
also attended Sun Yat-sen University. As an assistant to the late Gen-
eral Tai Li, who headed the Investigation Bureau of the Military Com-
mittee of the National Government, Cheng was for many years in
charge of Chiang Kai-shek's personal security. He was regarded as
one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted aides. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's
competent assistant, P'i I-shu, is a Sun Yat-sen University graduate, as
is her husband, Ku Cheng-ting, a prominent member of the Legislative
Yuan. Ku Cheng-ting's brother, Ku Cheng-kang, a member of the
Standing Committee of the CEC of the KMT, also attended that uni-
versity. Additional Sun Yat-sen University graduates in Taiwan in-
clude the Vice-Minister of the Interior, Teng Wen-i; General Liu Yun-
yao, who has held various important positions in the KMT and who
at one time was in charge of personnel work in the National Army;
Hsiao Tsan-yu and Wu Chia-yu, who are members of the Legislative
Yuan; and Chang Hsiu-lan, a member of the Control Yuan. Ho
Chung-han, former Minister of Communications, actually studied at
Moscow Military Academy, but he maintained intimate ties with Sun
Yat-sen University, which was nearby and at which he took his meals.
P'u Tao-ming, who died in 1964 in Taiwan, where he was director of
the Institute of International Relations and was widely recognized as
an authority on Soviet affairs, was a graduate of KUTV and later at-
tended Sun Yat-sen University. Wang Ch'ung-wu, another graduate,
who on the mainland was mayor of Tsinan, became deputy director of
the Institute of International Relations and is still one of its senior
staff members.

Without filling whole pages with the names of Chinese who studied
in the Soviet Union in the twenties, I trust that I have mentioned
enough names to indicate that these students who returned from Russia played major roles in both the CCP and the KMT. I trust, too, that such names will suggest that although Sun Yat-sen University has been closed for many years, its influence in mainland China and in Taiwan is probably still discernible.

Sun Yat-sen University also played a role in relations between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. For among the early factors that contributed to the conflict between Communist China and Russia one would have to include the first batch of Chinese whom the Russians trained, Chinese who pledged their allegiance to Soviet Russia and to the Comintern and who, when they returned to China, strove to gain leadership in the CCP. For some of them this power struggle continued for more than twenty years. In the end, Mao Tse-tung shunted aside cadres in whom the Russians, and especially Stalin, had taken a particular interest, such as Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, and, later on, Chang Wen-t'ien, Yang Shang-k'uen, and others. And their eclipse, no doubt, was an ingredient in, as well as a symptom of, the deterioration of relations between Soviet Russia and Communist China. Furthermore, at the time of writing, Ch'en Shao-yu, now presumably in Moscow, continues his struggle against Mao Tse-tung. Four days before the Ninth National Congress of the CCP convened on April 1, 1969, at Peking, *Izvestia* published some details of a lengthy attack that Ch'en had recently made against Mao.

Sun Yat-sen University also was the cradle of the Chinese Trotskyite movement, which initially was literally transplanted from Russia to China. The great majority of Chinese who initiated a Trotskyite movement in China were students at Sun Yat-sen University. These included Lu Yen, Liang Kan-ch'ao, Sung Feng-ch'un, Hsiao Pin-yang, and Li Mei-wu. Only a few of the early Chinese Trotskyites, such as Wang P'ing-i and Liu Jen-ching, came from other Soviet institutions. Trotsky himself was directly involved in the Trotskyite Opposition in Sun Yat-sen University and in the subsequent Chinese Trotskyite movement.

There were, of course, other areas of activity in China that were probably influenced by Sun Yat-sen University. Some of the pedagogical techniques used in some mainland Chinese educational institutions, for example, closely paralleled methods of teaching used at
Sun Yat-sen University. It might be pointed out, too, that an early effort to reform the Chinese language was undertaken at Sun Yat-sen University by a group of Chinese students whom the Russians recruited especially for the task. The late Wu Yu-chang was one of these students, as was I, and noticeable progress was made on the project. Wu Yu-chang was especially influential in developing a Latinized written form of Chinese. Later, after the Chinese Communists came to national power, it was Wu Yu-chang who headed the organization in mainland China that undertook the reform of the Chinese language.

The influence of Sun Yat-sen University upon the introduction of Marxist ideas into China is also notable. For the university undertook a rather monumental translation project, which rendered into Chinese classics by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and others. Many Marxist works were translated into Chinese for the first time as a result of this project, and an attempt was made to standardize the Chinese equivalents of Marxist terms. Furthermore, a number of Sun Yat-sen University students continued this important work of translating after they returned to China. Their undertakings contributed significantly to the thinking of a great many Chinese, especially Party cadres. Sun Yat-sen University, meanwhile, had an impact on many other subsequent events in China, which I shall mention in the body of this study.

Nor did Sun Yat-sen University have an impact upon China alone. The Russians obviously profited from experience gained in running both Sun Yat-sen University and KUTV, experience which doubtless was useful to them when they established the People’s Friendship University in Moscow in the autumn of 1960. While Sun Yat-sen University and KUTV differed from one another, and People’s Friendship University differs from both of them, the last-named obviously has inherited the traditions of its two predecessors. When KUTV and Sun Yat-sen University were formed in the twenties, they reflected a mounting Soviet interest in the national liberation movement in the East, especially in China. Somewhat similarly, by the 1960s, the focus of revolutionary undertakings had again settled upon the underdeveloped countries, not only in the East this time, but throughout the world. And People’s Friendship University was established to accommodate students from all parts of the world. KUTV had the word “Communist” in its name, of course, and it enrolled only Communists. But Sun
Yat-sen University enrolled non-Communists, and it did not become “Communist University for the Toilers of China in Memory of Sun Yat-sen” until 1928, following the Communist split with the KMT. Since People's Friendship University enrolls non-Communists, I suppose its lineage goes back most directly to the first three years of Sun Yat-sen University. Although the name of Patrice Lumumba, the late African revolutionary, has been added to the name of People's Friendship University, Lumumba's ideas are not taught at the university. Nor, indeed, were the works of Sun Yat-sen ever taught at Sun Yat-sen University. But there is a significant difference in the curricula of the two institutions, suggesting, no doubt, the changes that have taken place in the years that separate them and the experience that the Russians gained from their earlier institutions. Only what might be classed as social sciences were taught at Sun Yat-sen University, including, of course, "scientific socialism." At People's Friendship University in Memory of Patrice Lumumba, however, emphasis is placed upon the natural sciences. Yet, of course, KUTV, Sun Yat-sen University, and People's Friendship University do have something in common. In all three cases the Soviets obviously felt that their interests would be furthered by students who attended these institutions. I leave it to historians to assess the extent to which the Soviet position in this respect has been a valid one.
Chapter I
The Birth of Sun Yat-sen University

The Dawn of a New Era

The 1911 Revolution seemed to bring China, a nation weakened by foreign invasions and internal upheavals and often scorned as the "invalid of the Far East," into a new era. The empire having been overthrown, a republic was established, the first of its kind in Asia. More important, the revolution roused the national spirit and thus prepared the way for advancement and a bright future.

In November, 1912, Lenin, in a Pravda article entitled "Regenerated China," expressed his far-sighted evaluation of the Chinese Revolution and extended to this sleeping lion which possessed four hundred million people his warmest congratulations:

Progressive and civilised Europe shows no interest in the regeneration of China. Four hundred million backward Asians have attained freedom, and have awakened to political life. One quarter of the world's population has passed, so to say, from torpor to enlightenment, movement and struggle.¹

The deep-seated influence of the 1911 Revolution on China and the tremendous changes that stemmed from it were self-evident and not Lenin's discovery. But Lenin certainly should be credited with producing an accurate analysis of the international significance of the revolution, a fact unfortunately ignored by most historians. His interpretation of the 1911 Revolution strongly influenced the Bolshevik Party's policy toward China and other colonial countries after the Bolshevik Party seized power in Russia.

As far back as July, 1912, Lenin, after reading Dr. Sun Yat-sen's article "On the Social Significance of the Chinese Revolution," wrote an essay entitled "Democracy and Narodism in China," which contained a detailed evaluation of the 1911 Revolution and Dr. Sun's political theory:

In China, the Asiatic provisional President of the Republic is a revolutionary democrat, endowed with the nobility and heroism of a class that is rising, not declining, a class that does not dread the future, but believes in it and fights for it selflessly, a class that does not cling to maintenance and restoration of the past in order to safeguard its privileges, but hates the past and knows how to cast off its dead and stifling decay.²
To Lenin, Dr. Sun Yat-sen represented a rising progressive class. He also wrote:

What has decayed is the Western bourgeoisie . . . . But in Asia there is still a bourgeoisie capable of championing sincere, militant, consistent democracy . . . . The chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause, is the peasant.3

The opinion expressed here formed the basis for the “Theses on the National and Colonial Question” drafted by Lenin and adopted at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920. It also prepared the way for the future alliance of Dr. Sun with Soviet Russia. For the strategy of assisting the Chinese national revolution, on which this alliance was based, naturally followed from Lenin’s evaluation that the bourgeoisie and peasantry of Asia constituted a historically progressive force.

Even after the 1911 Revolution, China, which had been ravaged by internal upheavals and humiliated by foreign incursions since the Opium War, did not enjoy a single day of peace or prosperity. The revolutionary spirit did not die, however. It was constantly rekindled until it reached a climax in the May Fourth Movement of 1919. This movement opened a new frontier for the Chinese revolution and brought new vitality to it. It sprang from a happy blending of China’s awakening national consciousness and the impact of Russia’s October Revolution. Harold Isaacs, in his book The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, judiciously summed up the importance of the May Fourth Movement as follows:

The tide of May 4 engulfed the entire country. It ushered in the second Chinese revolution. It seemed to touch off waiting impulses of astonishing vigor. Traditional ideas and modes of conduct were crumbling and the echo of their fall sounded from one end of the country to the other. Young men and women in towns and villages began to break with the old authority of the family and the village elders. A fissure opened between the generations that was never again closed. The old ways of doing and thinking still governed much of Chinese life but they were now being mortally assailed. In the colleges and universities there was a great churning. The disillusionment with the West after the Versailles Conference turned popular attention among the students to the Russian revolution. This new current brought with it to China belated tributaries of all the main streams of European social thought, democracy, anarchism, syndicalism, and Marxism, opening up new horizons and stimulating a veritable revolu-
tion in thought, morals, and literature, and rapidly deepening the channels of political change and social conflict. All classes of society entered the political arena. Old political organizations took on fresh life. New organizations came into being.\textsuperscript{4}

The policies and slogans of the Russian Communists increasingly attracted the attention of people in China, who had long suffered from foreign insults and atrocities. And Sun Yat-sen apparently was the first Chinese of any prominence to openly express sympathetic enthusiasm for the Russian October Revolution and to seek ways of establishing contacts with Soviet Russia. Thus, in 1918, Dr. Sun sent a telegram from Shanghai addressed to Lenin and the Soviet government. In it he said that the Chinese and Russian revolutions had a common aim. He predicted that the Russian and Chinese revolutions would join forces to liberate all oppressed peoples.\textsuperscript{5} The telegram in effect expressed Dr. Sun's frustration in trying to deal with the West and his sympathy for the Russian Revolution.

On August 1, 1918, Chicherin, as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, replied warmly to Dr. Sun's telegram of "a few months ago," deferentially referring to Dr. Sun as "Respected Teacher" and stressing the interdependence of the Russian and Chinese revolutions and the important destiny that they shared.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, it may well be that these early communications between Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet Russian leadership influenced subsequent Bolshevik diplomatic moves in China. The famous Declaration of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, signed by Karakhan, which renounced special Tsarist rights in China, for example, was addressed to "the Chinese people and to the governments of South and North China."\textsuperscript{7} Sun Yat-sen, of course, led the revolutionary movement in South China at the time. Afterwards, contact between Dr. Sun and the Russian leadership continued and led to the joint statement of Dr. Sun and the Soviet official Adolf A. Joffe on January 27, 1923. In the same year Michael Borodin had arrived in Canton to serve as Dr. Sun's adviser in the reorganization of the KMT. The reorganization of the KMT in 1924 and the later cooperation between the KMT and the CCP were clear evidence that the influence of the Russian October Revolution on China was gradually gathering...
momentum. This influence reached its zenith in the great revolution of 1925–1927.

It took only five or six years to produce tremendous changes in the Chinese political situation, from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the revolution of 1925–1927. In the 1925–1927 period Sun Yat-sen’s three principal policies of alliance with Soviet Russia, cooperation with the Communists, and support of the workers and peasants became a dynamic revolutionary force. These policies were adopted because of frustrations from both within and without. The ignorance and selfishness of the Western powers, evidenced in their policies toward China and their indifference to Dr. Sun’s revolutionary movement, had forced him to turn to Soviet Russia for help. In a 1924 letter to Chiang Kai-shek, whom Sun had sent to the Soviet Union in 1923 for instruction, Sun wrote: “Our party’s future revolution cannot be achieved without taking the Russians as our teachers.”

Yet Chinese admiration for the October Revolution and the rejection of Sun’s revolutionary aspirations by the West were not the only factors in Sino-Soviet cooperation. Another aspect was the growing interest that the Russian Bolsheviks had in the East. At the end of World War I a revolutionary wave swept Europe. However, this revolutionary wave quickly receded after the failure of the revolutions in Hungary and Germany. It was at this time that the Russian Communists began to seriously look for allies in the East in order to break their isolation. China, with its revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, was a natural target. In 1921 the Comintern dispatched its special envoy Maring to China, and on November 23, 1921, he met with Dr. Sun at Kweilin. Upon his return to Russia, Maring gave a detailed report to the ECCI on the contemporary political situation in China. Maring contended that alliance with Dr. Sun was far better than alliance with either of the warlords Wu P’ei-fu or Ch’en Chiung-ming. Maring felt that Sun, due to his revolutionary record and thorough understanding of the theory of socialism, would be a most desirable ally for the Comintern. After the announcement of the joint statement of Sun and Joffe in 1923, the alliance of Dr. Sun and the Soviet Russians was officially established. Although founded after Dr. Sun’s death, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow was a product of this alliance between
Sun and the Soviet Russians and a logical result of the development of Sino-Soviet relations of the period.

In addition to being a product of the historical development of Sino-Soviet relations, the founding and closing of the university represented the high and low tides of the Chinese revolution. Moreover, it represented the contemporary Chinese political society in miniature. The Chinese students at the university were part of all of the violent political struggles that marked the era. At the university there were CCP members of many inclinations, including Stalinists and Trotskyites, and there were representatives of the KMT and all of the other groups and factions that made up the Chinese revolution.

But Sun Yat-sen University was more than a reflection of the Chinese political scene. It was also part of the struggle between the leaders of Soviet Russia. Upon the death of Lenin in January, 1924, there ensued a bitter struggle for power among the Russians. Stalin and Trotsky, like two gamecocks, fought each other; and the China question constituted one of the focal points of the struggle. Each of them considered himself to be an authority on Chinese matters, and they competed for the position of spokesman for the Chinese people. Thus, the Chinese students of the university, in addition to playing a part in the Chinese revolution, were also hurled into the whirlpool of Soviet Russian politics.

On a more individual level, the inauguration of Sun Yat-sen University in the fall of 1925 marked an important milestone for Chinese students studying abroad. Formerly, most Chinese students pursued their advanced studies in Europe, America, or Japan. Indeed, the first students sent abroad by a Chinese government had, thirty of them, gone to the United States in 1872. But never had a Chinese government sent students to China’s vast neighbor, Russia; nor had many Chinese gone to Russia to study, for it had been regarded as backward. Now, however, after fifty years, the situation sharply changed. With the establishment of an alliance between Sun Yat-sen’s KMT and Soviet Russia, the Soviet Union became a highly favored place for Chinese youth to study—an indication in itself that Russia no longer was regarded, by many at least, as the intellectually backward country of earlier days. While in the period 1921 to 1924 only a few Chinese Communists had
gone to Russia to study at KUTV, in 1925 hundreds of Chinese began to flock to Russia to study at Sun Yat-sen University.

However, the opening of Sun Yat-sen University brought more than a quantitative change for Chinese students. While students from Europe and the United States brought their class notes and books containing “science” and “democracy” home with them, and dreams, perhaps, those who studied in Russia brought back dreams of a new China plus political programs to realize them and party affiliations to support them.* And these students who had studied in Russia ultimately played a large part in shaping China’s destiny.

DR. SUN’S DEATH AND BORODIN’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FOUNDING OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY

On November 13, 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with a group of nineteen persons including Madame Sun and Wang Ching-wei, left Canton for Peking. The purpose of this northern trip was the realization of Sun’s lofty aspiration of “the regeneration of China.” This regeneration was to take place through consultation with Generals Tuan Ch’i-jui and Chang Tso-lin. Unfortunately, Dr. Sun and his mission did not reach Peking until December 31, as Dr. Sun was detained at Tientsin for almost a month with a recurrence of his liver trouble.

At that time I was a student at the National University of Law and Political Science (kuo-li fa chen ta-hsueh) in Peking, and I vividly remember Dr. Sun’s arrival. Two days before his arrival it snowed heavily in Peking, and all of the roads were frozen and quite treacherous. In addition, the temperature had fallen below zero. Yet, in spite of the unfavorable weather, some one hundred thousand persons gathered at Peking’s Front Gate Station to welcome Dr. Sun. A band from National Peking Institute of Arts started to play Chinese music as Dr. Sun stepped off his special train, and thousands of people shouted with excitement at the prospect of seeing and hearing him. But Dr. Sun was gravely ill; and he simply nodded to the welcoming crowd, stepped into his car, and went directly to the Hotel Peking.

On the evening of Dr. Sun’s arrival a lantern march was held. We

* For security reasons, when the Chinese students crossed the border between China and Russia, Russian intelligence personnel searched them and stripped them of their books and class notes.
gathered at the square in front of the Tien-an Men and set out like a flaming dragon for Dr. Sun’s temporary residence on Iron Lion Lane (t‘ieh shih-tze hu-t’ung), which Tuan Ch‘i-jui had made available to him. We were anxious to pay our respects to Dr. Sun and hoped that he would give a speech. But upon our arrival we found that Dr. Sun was still too ill to address us. Instead Wang Ching-wei, Sun’s handsome Cantonese assistant, appeared and, on behalf of Dr. Sun, expressed his thanks to us. We then dispersed in disappointment.

Sun Yat-sen’s illness became even more critical as the days passed. Six or seven foreign doctors in Peking were consulted, but there was no evidence of improvement in Dr. Sun’s condition. Finally, on January 4, 1925, a Russian liver specialist arrived from Moscow. However, every effort was in vain. At 9:30 A.M. on March 12 Dr. Sun died, leaving behind him a still struggling China with her suffering people.

When Dr. Sun’s illness had become extremely critical, a will was drawn up by Wang Ching-wei; and on February 24 Wang read it to Dr. Sun to get his approval. On March 11 Dr. Sun was finally asked by his comrades to sign this will, together with a message to the Soviet Union. The message was apparently composed in English by Eugene Ch‘en. This message, made public only after Sun’s death, became an important document in the history of Sino-Soviet relations. The full text of the message is as follows:

Dear Comrades,

Here on my deathbed my thoughts turn to you, as well as to the future destiny of my Party and of my country.

You are at the head of the Union of free Republics, that heritage which the immortal Lenin has left to all suppressed peoples of the world. By means of this heritage, the victims of imperialism will inevitably win their emancipation from that social order which has always been based upon slavery, war, and injustice.

I leave behind me a party which, as I always hoped, will be allied with you in its historical task of liberating China and other suppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism.

My charge to the Kuomintang party above all is that it shall continue to promote the cause of national revolutionary movement for the emancipation of China, which has been degraded by imperialism into a semi-colonial country. I therefore charge my party to maintain permanent contact with you.

I cherish the firm belief that your support of my country will remain unaltered.

In taking my last leave of you, dear comrades, I express the hope that the day
is approaching when the Soviet Union will greet a free and strong China as its friend and ally, and that the two states will proceed hand in hand as allies in the great fight for the emancipation of the oppressed of the whole world.

With brotherly greetings,
Sun Yat-sen

The day after the death of Sun Yat-sen, the CEC of the KMT sent an announcement of Sun’s death to the chairman of the Comintern, Gregory Zinoviev, and to Stalin. In this announcement the KMT expressed its wish that cooperation between the KMT and the Russians would continue:

The National revolutionary movement of China has today, with the death of Sun Yat-sen, lost its leader. The work of Sun Yat-sen, is not yet completed and will be continued by his party. We are still confronted with huge difficulties, for we are surrounded by counter-revolutionary forces which are allied with imperialism. We are convinced that you, as true disciples of Lenin, will fight along with us, the heirs of Sun Yat-sen.

The KMT’s announcement and Sun’s message were sent to Moscow simultaneously. The Soviet leaders joined the Chinese in mourning the loss of their revolutionary leader, who was also a great friend of the Soviet Union’s. Stalin sent his condolences in a reply to the death announcement by the CEC of the KMT, the text of which follows:

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party mourns with you over the loss of the leader of the Kuomintang Party and the organizer of the National Emancipatory struggle of the workers and peasants of China for the freedom and independence of the Chinese people and the unity and independence of the Chinese State.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party has not the least doubt that the great cause of Sun Yat-sen will not die with his death, but will live on in the hearts of the Chinese workers and peasants, in spite of their enemies, and that the Kuomintang Party will hold aloft the banner of Sun Yat-sen in the great fight for emancipation from imperialism and will carry it with honour up to the final victory over imperialism and its agents in China.

Sun Yat-sen is dead. Long live the work of Sun Yat-sen! Long live the cause he had bequeathed!

Zinoviev, in his reply on behalf of the Comintern, reiterated the Comintern’s stand to fully support the Chinese Revolution and the spirit of Sun Yat-sen:
The Executive Committee of the Communist International will do everything which lies in its power in order to make clear to the broad masses of all workers of all countries the great importance of the work of Sun Yat-sen.¹²

Moreover, the ECCI, in memory of Sun Yat-sen, made public its “Letter to the Chinese People” and its “Letter to the World’s Workers.”¹³ Special articles of condolence were written by Zinoviev, Karl Radek, G. N. Voitinsky, and others. These contained favorable appraisals of Sun Yat-sen and of the Chinese revolution. Of these, Radek’s article in Prawda was typical. In closing his article, which was entitled “The Heritage of Sun Yat-sen,” he stated: “The greatness of Sun Yat-sen lies in his eternal progressiveness. After every defeat he suffered, he stood up again, re-evaluating his experience and studying more.”¹⁴ Radek, who was to become the first rector of Sun Yat-sen University, had long been considered an expert on Chinese affairs. In this Prawda article he compared Sun Yat-sen to Hung Hsiu-ch’uan and the Chinese revolution to the Taiping Rebellion, and he also elaborated on some of Lenin’s thinking with regard to the Chinese masses from his personal experiences:

One day in 1916, at the time when the First World War was at its height, some Bolsheviks gathered together at Berne to discuss problems of self-determination of nations. Lenin, who was at the conference, suddenly made a proposal that the Bolsheviks unite with the Chinese Revolution in the future. His proposal at the time seemed to be an idiot’s impossible dream! Just imagine, the Russian proletariat will join with millions of Chinese to fight! Among those five or six Bolsheviks present at the meeting, who among them imagined that if they had lived long enough, they would see this dream materialize.

When Russia and China were separated by the Czechs, Socialist-revolutionaries, and Kolchak in 1918, Lenin once inquired if among those Chinese laborers who had immigrated to Russia men of resolution could be singled out who would contact Sun Yat-sen. Now we have established contact with the Chinese people. Our mission with the Chinese revolutionaries today is to enlarge our contact with millions of people.¹⁵

Apparently with Lenin’s thoughts in mind, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Comintern reached the conclusion that truly “the seeds sown by Sun Yat-sen are to blossom and bear fruit.” After reaching this conclusion, the Soviet leaders decided to invest more capital in the Chinese revolution. The establishment of Sun Yat-sen
University in Moscow in the same year was one of the most important investments that the Soviet Union made.

Soon after the death of Sun Yat-sen, the establishment of the Revolutionary Nationalist government at Canton on July 1, 1925, opened new horizons for the Chinese revolution. This Revolutionary Nationalist government attracted new blood, consolidated revolutionary strength, and appealed to the masses for further revolutionary activity. In this highly favorable revolutionary situation the Soviet Union speeded up plans to bring into being the proposed Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow.

Michael Borodin, Russia's special adviser to the KMT, formally announced the establishment of Sun Yat-sen University at the sixty-sixth meeting of the Central Political Committee of the KMT on October 7, 1925. At this meeting Borodin also proposed that the KMT select the students to study at Sun Yat-sen University. This proposal was adopted, and a screening committee composed of T' an Yen-k'ai, Kuo Ying-fen, and Wang Ching-wei was organized. Borodin acted as adviser to this committee, and soon after its establishment the work of selecting students began in Canton, Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin.

The news that students would be selected to study in Russia soon spread throughout the country. In Canton alone, more than one thousand youths registered to participate in the qualifying examination. As Canton was the chief revolutionary center in China at that time, a majority (180) of the 340 students selected by the screening committee were from that city. Ten students each were selected on the basis of their having some from Whampoa, Hsiang (Hunan), and T'ien (Yunan) military academies, all of which were located at Canton. Fifty students were selected from Shanghai and fifty from the Peking-Tientsin area. Furthermore, over thirty additional students were selected upon the special recommendation of Borodin. Those personally recommended by Borodin were, in the great majority of cases, sons and brothers of influential members of the KMT. These specially selected students were exempted from the competitive examinations. Of those selected in Canton, 90 percent were members of the KMT, whereas the majority of those from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin were Communists.

The specific method of selection was a series of three examinations.
One of my classmates at Sun Yat-sen University, who took the examinations at Canton, described the procedure in the following manner:

Public registration for selection of students was conducted in Canton in the fall of that year. The procedure was very simple. Just filling out a registration card at the Chinese Kuomintang Central Committee office (which was located at the former Provincial Assembly of Kwangtung) would complete the whole matter. One was not required to show one's diploma or any other kind of certificates. There was no age requirement either. Therefore those selected greatly differed in age and education; they were from fourteen or fifteen to forty or fifty years old and from almost illiterate to college graduates and returned students from abroad. They truly constituted a fantastic spectacle of "Three Generations in the Same Hall" and "The Learned and the Unlearned Are to Study the Same Subject!" The Nationalist Government gave special attention to this matter. After the candidates filled out their registration cards, the KMT Central Standing Committee appointed high-ranking officials (including T'an Yen-k'ai) to screen their qualifications and then to set a date for examinations. The examination took place at Kwangtung University. An essay on "What is National Revolution?" was the examination. No examination on other subjects or foreign language was required. It was truly very simple. After this written examination, the preliminary selected candidates were announced. Then after a considerable time, there was an oral examination over which high-ranking officials of the Kuomintang presided (Kan Nai-kwang, member of the Central Committee, was one of them). The oral examination emphasized the candidates' knowledge of current political events. So to be finally selected, one had to pass three examinations. It seemed easy, but in fact it was no simple matter. After the first screening, the written examination, and the oral test, nine-tenths of over a thousand original candidates were eliminated. The number selected was not very large.16

Although I was selected at Peking and did not participate in the examinations held at Canton, I am quite sure that of the three phases in the screening procedure, the first was the most difficult. That is to say, one had to be approved by the screening committee as a loyal KMT member. As for the other phases of the examination, all one had to do was to show the ability to write a composition containing current revolutionary slogans and possess a little common knowledge of world affairs.

An interesting point in regard to the selection of students was that Chiang Kai-shek, director of Whamhpoa Military Academy, officially prohibited graduates of the first and second classes from voluntarily
registering for the examinations. There are a number of possible explanations for this order. First of all, it is possible that this prohibition was simply to cut down on the large number participating in the examination and to thus facilitate the screening procedures. However, possibly the best explanation is that the cadets of the first and second graduating classes had already entered the war and were quickly becoming the backbone of the new army. To allow them to leave their posts would thus be militarily inadvisable.

In spite of the regulations a number of cadets from Whampoa Academy did go to Moscow to study. In fact, the CEC of the KMT actually set up a quota of ten students for each of the three military academies in Canton. Thus, Chiang’s order was not strictly enforced and was highly flexible. Teng Wen-i, who was a cadet at Whampoa Academy at the time, in his book *Yu-tsung wan-li* (Around the world), throws some light on Chiang’s motives and on how he himself was able to circumvent Chiang’s orders and go to Moscow to study.

The Kuomintang Central Committee took charge of screening students to study in Russia. I secretly registered for the examinations. First I went to see Wang Po-ling, Dean of Instruction at Whampoa, and reported to him that I had passed the examinations and told him of my aspirations. I explained to him although the Academy did not allow its students of the first and second classes to participate in the examination, I had passed. I asked him to give me special permission to go to Russia. His answer was: “No, you cannot go. You must obey the order of the Academy.” This deeply grieved me. But after all, he had reasons. Later, I heard that one reason he decided to forbid me to go to Russia might have been that I did not join the Sun Yat-sen Society. He might have thought I was a Communist, and therefore have deliberately put obstacles in my way. At this time the Director of the Academy (Chiang Kai-shek) was at the front line of battle (Shan-t’u), and I was almost at the end of my wits. Only after repeated requests and explanations did I finally get the approval of the Director to go to Russia’s Sun Yat-sen University to study as one specially selected by the Kuomintang Central Committee.\(^\text{17}\)

From what I have said above, some conclusions can be drawn. First, the initiative for the founding of Sun Yat-sen University came entirely from the Russians. Borodin, not the KMT, made the announcement about the creation of the university. Second, the committee for selection of students to study at Sun Yat-sen University was organized only after Borodin made his proposal. Third, the selection
of students was actually under the supervision of the Russians (Borodin and other Russian agents). Both the KMT and the CCP acted completely in accordance with the instructions of the "Russian advisers."

Notes

3. Ibid.
6. See ibid., p. 39, where Chicherin's letter is reproduced in its entirety.
7. See ibid., p. 43, where the entire document is reproduced.
8. Sun Chung-shan hsien-chu (Selected works of Sun Yat-sen; Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1962), II, 876.
10. Telegram from the CEC of the KMT to the CPSU, dated March 12, 1925, in Pravda, no. 60 (2991; March 14, 1925). The telegram was also carried in International Press Correspondence (London), vol. 5, no. 20 (March 19, 1925), p. 286.
11. Pravda, no. 60 (2991; March 14, 1925), p. 1.
13. Pravda, no. 60 (2991; March 14, 1925), p. 1.
14. Ibid., p. 3.
15. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
17. Teng Wen-i, Yu-tsung wan-li (Around the world; Taipei: published by the author and distributed by Pa ti shu-chu, Taipei, 1959), p. 24. Teng has held many important posts in the KMT and in the Nationalist government, the most recent one being Political Vice-Minister of the Interior.
Chapter II
The Pilgrimage to Red Mecca

The Road to Moscow

At the time that the first group of students was preparing to leave China for Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University, there were three main routes to the Soviet Union. First, one could go by way of Harbin. This route was not safe, however, because Manchuria was occupied by the warlord Chang Tso-lin, who was quite anxious to prevent Chinese radicals from studying in the Soviet Union. Second, one could go to the Soviet Union via Europe. This route was by far the safest but was quite expensive. As students taking this route would have had to pay their own expenses, it was almost out of the question. Probably the most practical route was the one used by the first group to leave Shanghai in 1925, which presumably arrived in Moscow in November of that year. This group assembled at Shanghai where it boarded a Russian ship and went straight to Vladivostok. This was also the route utilized by subsequent groups going to the Soviet Union from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin. Those of us from Peking and Tientsin boarded ships at Tientsin and proceeded to the embarkation point at Shanghai. Travel arrangements for the students from Canton were much simpler; they merely boarded Russian ships at Canton for Vladivostok.

While ship fare as well as train fare to the Soviet Union was provided to the students free, there was considerable variation in the amount of travel money available for students going to Sun Yat-sen University. Most of the wealthy KMT students from Canton had an average of 250 yuan to spend for clothes, food, and other incidentals. In addition, the CEC of the KMT gave them an allowance of 100 yuan. However, students from other parts of China had substantially less money at their disposal. The KMT and the CCP paid the fare to Shanghai for those students from Peking, Tientsin, and other cities in China. When I left for Russia in October, 1926, my travel expenses were paid by the CCP. I cannot recall the exact amount given to me for travel expenses, but it was substantially less than that given to KMT students from Canton.
Since northern China was at that time still dominated to a great extent by warlords, students leaving from Peking and Tientsin dared not make a show of their departure. Most of us secretly left our homes with only a few relatives and friends to see us off. As I was one of the leaders of the revolutionary student organization, I had long been wanted by the secret police of the Peking government. Therefore I disguised myself in order to evade the surveillance of the plain-clothes men. Fortunately, my disguise proved satisfactory, and I was able to depart for Shanghai without incident.

The situation was entirely different for those sailing from Canton. Here students leaving for Moscow proudly walked through the city as if they were going out to conquer a foreign land. One of my classmates recalls:

Before their [the students'] departure, the Kuomintang Central Committee held a farewell party and a meeting at the Party headquarters in Canton. Among the participants were Wang Ching-wei and Borodin. At the meeting, Wang urged that people from among the students be elected to maintain contact with the Kuomintang back in China. The departing students, however, came from different parts of the country and did not know one another, and so could not decide whom to elect. Finally, therefore, Wang Ching-wei appointed Lin Posheng (his close associate) and Ch'en Ch'un-p'u (the brother of his wife) to maintain liaison with the Kuomintang.¹

The first group of students from Canton left for the Soviet Union toward the end of 1925. A second group of about fifty left shortly thereafter. This still left some one hundred students in Canton, and these students were delayed for quite a long time. One student describes the delay and its consequences as follows:

There were about one hundred left in Canton waiting for further instruction. But who knew what date had been set for our departure? We were in extremely low spirits. When the authorities realized that it was bad to let these students idle away their time, they decided to rent two buildings at their own expense to serve as dormitories for students scheduled to go to Russia. We were furnished with free room and board. And several Russian ladies were employed to teach us the Russian language.²

These women teachers were dependents of the Russian advisers in Canton and were selected and appointed by Borodin. The classrooms were in Kwangtung Hospital. These Moscow-bound students studied
Russian for about four or five months, but the results were far from satisfactory. It was not until the summer of the following year, 1926, that these one hundred students, comprising the third Canton group, boarded their ship for the Soviet Union.

The first group from Canton arrived in Moscow in January or February of 1926. From one member of this group it is possible to gain some idea of when the first students arrived in Moscow. This student states:

As soon as we entered the gate of the Sun Yat-sen University, we were surrounded by a group of Chinese students, male and female. When they learned that we came from Canton, the headquarters of the Chinese Revolution, they were very enthusiastic. One question followed another, and we were almost unable to answer them all. Later we learned that they had arrived in Moscow from Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin only a month or two before we had.3

Thus it seems that among the three hundred and forty students selected to study at Sun Yat-sen University, the earliest arrivals probably reached Moscow in November, 1925. Chiang Ching-kuo in his *Wu-pai-ling-sze Hsiao-shih* (Five hundred and four hours)⁴ tends to substantiate this date. He writes: "October 15, 1945, today is the twentieth anniversary of my departure from my country to Russia to study." Calculating two or three weeks for the entire trip, Chiang should have arrived in Moscow by November at the latest. Other groups of students arrived in Moscow in December, 1925, and in January, February, and later in the following year.

Personally, when I learned that I had been selected by the Peking committee of the CCP to study in Moscow, I had many reservations. First, I had hoped to finish college in Peking before making any other plans. Second, in Peking I was engaged in revolutionary activities against the Tuan Ch'i-jui government, and I hated to give them up. I had taken part in the May Thirtieth (1925) Movement, the May Seventh National Shame March, the Capital Revolution, and the March Eighteenth Incident of 1926. I was deeply involved in all of these activities and had come close to death several times while participating in them. For I was one of the leaders of the student movement in Peking at that time. I was a member of the Executive Committee of the Student Association of the National University of Political Science and Law. At the same time, I was the secretary of the CCP
fraction in the All-China Student Association, the headquarters of which was in Peking. It was our secret fraction in that association which, behind the scenes, directed the activities of the huge national student organization, a device often used by Communist movements in the non-Communist world.

CCP members in Peking in late 1924 and early 1925 numbered only about 180, and there were only about 2,000 KMT members, exclusive of Communists. But membership in both parties increased dramatically after the arrival of Dr. Sun Yet-sen in Peking, and especially after his death.

The Chinese Communist committee for Peking and surrounding areas (Pei-ching ti-fang wei-yuan-hui) had as its secretary Liu Pochuang, a Szechwanese who had studied in France in the early twenties. He had worked in Peking for several years and later was to be a delegate to the Sixth Congress of the CCP in Moscow. The director of the Organization Department of this committee was Ch’en Wei-jen, a veteran Party member from Hunan whose wife subsequently became a student at Sun Yat-sen University. The committee’s Director of Propaganda was Li P’u-hai. I was the executive secretary of the latter department, and I worked with Li, who was the son of a large landholder in Shantung Province. In 1927, after I had left, he was arrested in Peking. Under threat of execution, Li P’u-hai revealed the details of the Party’s organization in and around Peking and the names of the Party’s cadres. More than sixty Party members were arrested and executed as a result of Li’s betrayal. But Li survived, and eventually he gravitated to the service of Chang Hsueh-liang, where, under the name Li T’ien-ts’ai, he became Chang’s chief aide. Later still, he was credited by the KMT with being one of the leading instigators of the Sian Incident in December, 1936, in which Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by Chang Hsueh-liang. After Chiang Kai-shek was released and had returned to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsueh-liang, a KMT organization summarily executed Li without trial. It is my understanding, however, that the KMT did not know at the time that Li T’ien-ts’ai was in fact Li P’u-hai. Yet I am sure in my own mind that the Chinese Communist leadership at the time of the Sian Incident did know who he was. K’ang Sheng, for example, had been a close friend of Li’s, both of them having come from Shantung
Province. But I shall suppress my inclination to speculate about the implications of this state of affairs with regard to the Sian Incident.

While Li P’u-hai was Director of Propaganda in the Communist Party committee in Peking, the two of us edited a magazine entitled something like *The Voice of Labor*, and I also went around to various Party cells lecturing on Marxism, using as my text the *A B C of Communism* by Bukharin and Preobraschensky, which was our standard text in those days. It was my impression that my work favorably impressed Li P’u-hai, and I would guess that it was he who recommended that I be sent to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University. However, it was not Li who informed me that the decision had been made to send me to Russia. One day, Ch’en Wei-jen, director of the Organization Department, who was a graduate of Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV), made an appointment to meet me in an unoccupied classroom of the National College of Arts and Sciences, where we met and where to anyone who might have noticed us, we probably looked like a couple of students chatting. There he notified me that the Peking committee had decided to send me to Moscow to study. The decision came as a surprise. I asked Ch’en to allow me to complete my studies in Peking and to continue with the revolutionary work I was doing there. His flat refusal to grant my request came as a great disappointment to me, and I pressed for a reconsideration of the decision. If I had to give up my activities in Peking, I suggested, wouldn’t it be possible to assign me to work in General Feng Yu-hsiang’s army? But Ch’en Wei-jen, his face stern and cold, replied, as I recall, “This is the final decision of the Party committee. If you do not obey, you will be severely punished. Don’t you know what ‘iron discipline’ means?”

Faced with the dilemma of choosing between being punished or going to Moscow, I decided that study, after all, was perhaps not such a bad idea, even though it meant leaving China; and so I accepted the committee’s decision.

A week or so later, Ch’en Wei-jen made another appointment with me. This time we met in the ramshackle house of a rickshaw puller who was a Party member. There he gave me a train ticket to Tientsin, an address to contact in Tientsin, a ship ticket from Tientsin to Shanghai, pocket money for the trip, instructions as to the Shanghai hotel at
which reservations would be made for me, and the address in Shanghai that I was supposed to contact after checking in at the hotel. Everything, as usual, was brilliantly organized. In parting, he told me that Liu Po-chuang wanted to talk to me, and he gave me the time and place of the meeting with Liu. When I met with Liu, he told me that the Party attached great importance to Sun Yat-sen University. He assured me of the Peking committee's faith in my potential and told me that I was being given an opportunity to learn from the Bolshevik experience of the CPSU.

On October 16, 1926, I left Peking alone. At Tientsin, I joined with a number of other students who were Communist Party members, with whom I went by ship to Shanghai. From Shanghai we went by ship to Vladivostok, and from Vladivostok we made our way to Moscow.

No Passport, No Visa

When I arrived in Shanghai on October 20, 1926, I was assigned to stay at the P'ing-an Hotel. Upon moving into the hotel I found that quite a number of students from different parts of the country had already arrived in Shanghai. Many lived in various hotels such as the P'ing-an, while others stayed in the Shanghai University hostel. Those who stayed in the hotels paid their own room and board, but those who lived in the hostel enjoyed free room and board, which was provided by the university.

Among those students who had already arrived in Shanghai, I was delighted to find a number of familiar faces, two of which belonged to friends from my own province—Wu Chia-yu and Ho Sheng-yang. Wu, who is now a member of the Legislative Yuan in the Republic of China and a very learned gentleman, was being sent to Moscow by the KMT to study at Sun Yat-sen University. Ho was a classmate of mine in high school and was graduated in the first class of the Whampoa Military Academy. After his graduation he had been promoted to the post of battalion commander. He was subsequently wounded during the Battle of Tung-kiang. Ho told me that he was being sent by the CCP to study at KUTV. At any rate, I was quite delighted that I would have company on the journey to the Soviet Union.
While the Soviet Union was generally quite cautious in granting visas, we had no difficulty at all. When we arrived in Shanghai, we were told that we were to go to the Pao-fa Photo Shop and have a few snapshots taken. At the same time we filled out a simple application form. These forms were collected by a fellow student who had some knowledge of Russian and were sent to the Consulate General of the USSR in Shanghai. Apparently filling out the forms and submitting photographs were mere formalities, as the consul had already received official notification from his government that we were to be allowed to enter the Soviet Union. Interestingly enough, we were also told not to bother about applying for passports from the Chinese government.

Some rather special circumstances applied to those of us who had come from North China, which might be sketched here, for we had been selected to go to Russia under trying conditions for both the KMT and the CCP in the North. On March 16, 1926, the diplomatic corps in Peking had issued an ultimatum to the Tuan Ch'i-jui government there, demanding that the closure of Taku—the port of Tientsin—be lifted within forty-eight hours or the Powers would take military action to open it. The next day, students and others in Peking, outraged by the ultimatum, had clashed with the Northeastern Army troops which protected Tuan Ch'i-jui. On March 18, Li Ta-chao, who was in charge of Communist affairs in the North, and Ting Wei-fen, who was Li Ta-chao's counterpart in the KMT, led a huge demonstration from the T'ien-an Men to Tuan Ch'i-jui's headquarters. I marched in that demonstration. The demonstrators confronted the Northeastern Army troops protecting Tuan's headquarters, who after a time fired into the air and then fired point-blank into the demonstrators. Forty students were killed, and a great many more were wounded or injured. I saw Li Ta-chao running before I was buried under an avalanche of fleeing students, which nearly resulted in my own death. On March 19, the turmoil increased. Thousands upon thousands of students, as though with one voice, demanded that Tuan Ch'i-jui and his government step down. But the upshot of these events was that Tuan Ch'i-jui outlawed the KMT, which had functioned more or less openly since Dr. Sun Yat-sen's arrival in Peking. The Communists, of course, had been outlawed all along. At the same
time, an order was issued for the arrest of Hsu Ch’ien, Li Ta-chao, Li Yu-yin, Yi Pei-chi, and Ku Meng-yu, all of whom promptly either fled Peking or went deep underground. Li Ta-chao moved into the Soviet Embassy compound, and he became the only leader either of the KMT or the CCP who was able to carry on his duties, although naturally he did so secretly. Li Ta-chao, then, took charge of all KMT and CCP activities in the area from his sanctuary in the Russian Embassy. It was while he was in this sanctuary that he had approved the list of students recommended for study at Sun Yat-sen University and had passed this list to the Russians. Under the circumstances, had any of us on the list applied for passports, we would promptly have been arrested. And, in any case, the Russians knew who we were.

Consequently, we did not have yellow books either, and the Russian authorities never asked for them. Of course, the Russian generosity toward us had political motives. It was part of the general plan of the CPSU and the Comintern to expand their influence to the Far East and to undermine the positions of the Western imperialist powers in China by inducing more Chinese youths to study in Moscow and thereby pouring more oil on the fire of the Chinese revolution.

While in Shanghai, we were disgusted by the decadent luxuries and seamy sights of this colonial city, and thus we were quite anxious to depart for the Soviet Union. The Russian ship (after so many years I, unfortunately, cannot remember the name of this ship) on which we would travel to Vladivostok was unloading cargo at the Huang-pu dock. Some of us could not resist taking a look at the ship that would take us away from Shanghai. The police who were stationed at the dock to watch the Russian crews did not pay any attention to us and allowed us to board the ship as we pleased.

A few days later, the KMT-CCP organization that was in charge of travel arrangements told us to board the Russian ship. When all were aboard, I was quite startled to see that there were some sixty male and female students going to Russia to study. The Russians, for purposes of security, ushered us to the stowage area before the customs officials came aboard for inspection. We were not allowed to leave that area until the ship left Wu-sung-k’ou. I can still recall the foul stench in this stowage area, which was to be our quarters until we arrived at Vladivostok. All the male students were assigned these quarters in
the stowage area because the very few passenger cabins were all occupied by the female students. Fortunately, there was a good deal of space in the stowage area because there was not much cargo. Therefore, we were able to spread out and choose an area for ourselves.

When we were finally released from the stowage area, we felt as if we had just been granted some sort of reprieve. We were quite excited and went to the lower deck of the ship, where we shouted and sang the “Song of National Revolution” and the “Internationale.” It was very moving. However, when the singing ended, a feeling of nostalgia engulfed us. Casting a last glance at our beautiful land, we could not help vowing: “Goodbye, dearly beloved country! We are determined to have you emancipated from semi-colonial status!”

As the ship entered the East China Sea and moved toward Korea Strait, the sea was calm and the sky was deep blue. But these wonderful weather conditions did not last for long. When the ship entered the Japan Sea, a wind came up and both the sky and the sea became dark. The ship was buffeted by the angry sea. Most of us became seasick, and I was no exception. I vomited many times, and for the moment, all my aspirations and ideals disappeared.

Rough weather brought us other problems besides seasickness. Some of the students, seeking solitude, had taken the space under the ladder in the stowage area for their temporary sanctuary. One night when the sea was especially violent, we were suddenly awakened by a terrible boom. We discovered that the ladder had fallen down, due to a loose lock. Naturally, we were quite worried about the safety of those who slept under it. Fortunately, as if directed by the warning of the gods or by instinct, the students who usually slept there had already moved elsewhere before the accident. After this accident, the stowage area became a place of constant fear for us. In the daytime we stayed on the deck or chatted and sang in the lounge of the ship. Only after midnight, when we were exhausted, did we go back to the stowage area to sleep. The days passed like years. Finally, after three days and nights of struggle against the rough seas, seasickness, and the horrible stench of the stowage area, we landed at Vladivostok.

Vladivostok had once belonged to China and was still quite Oriental at the time we were there. Its famous Millionka, or Chinese section, was somewhat like some old Chinatowns in the United States. Res-
taurants, tearooms, gaming houses, theaters, and opium dens could all be found there. But upon our arrival, we did not have a single penny left. Therefore, the representatives of the Comintern gave each of us an allowance of four rubles per day, which we spent eating Chinese food in Millionka.

About one hundred thousand Chinese lived in Vladivostok. Most of them were either merchants or laborers. And while we were in the city, the trade union for overseas Chinese laborers held a welcome party in our honor at their May First Club. The atmosphere was quite gay and cordial.

During our stay in Vladivostok we were also given physical examinations. Those students who had tuberculosis or other communicable diseases were detained in Vladivostok to await a boat bound for China. I have always thought it was strange that we were not given physical examinations in Shanghai before leaving China.

Leaving Vladivostok for Moscow early in December, 1926, we traveled on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. It was winter, and as the coaches were not heated, it was terribly cold. While it was almost nine years after the 1917 Revolution, coal was still in very short supply. The Siberian train on which we rode was still operated by burning wood. This wood was piled in heaps in every railway station. Coal was reserved exclusively for the International Express, which was the only train on this route that had a dining car. Though the train moved slowly and steadily along, it took a fortnight to travel the more than 7,400 kilometers from Vladivostok to Moscow.

The trip was by no means comfortable. As there was no dining car, we were forced to eat hurriedly when the train stopped at one of the larger stations. Once the queue was so long that some three or four of my fellow students did not get their meal before the train left the station. They were driven to despair when they saw the train already gone. They went to a GPU officer stationed in the station and asked him to help. The officer, who had probably been notified by Moscow authorities about our trip, made quick arrangements with the station administration to put them on the next train to Moscow. In addition, the train’s water tanks had frozen solid, and there was no water for the toilets or for drinking. To get a drink, one had to wait in long lines at the stations. Thus, we spent twelve miserable days and
nights on the train. We finally arrived in Moscow in the middle of December, 1926.

This was my first long trip to a foreign land where, while the old regime had been overthrown by revolution, the new order did not always work without difficulties. Its imperfections were to catch one's eye everywhere, as we witnessed on the way to Moscow. We had bitter experiences and suffered on this trip. Nevertheless, our revolutionary spirits did not sag an inch, and we still envisioned a glorious future for Soviet Russia, then the only ally of our country in its fight for independence and freedom.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 96.
3. Ibid., no. 98, p. 32.
4. A book privately published and distributed by Chiang Ching-kuo, the elder son of Chiang Kai-shek. The book was written when he served as the Foreign Ministry's special envoy in Northeast China in 1945. Unfortunately I have not been able to examine a copy of the book, and the quotation given was copied by a friend in Taipei and communicated to me in a letter. My friend, however, failed to supply the page on which the quotation appears.
5. In Chiang Kai-shek's *A Fortnight in Sian: Extracts from a Diary* (Shanghai: Walsh Ltd., 1937, p. 57) Li T'ien-ts'ai is identified at the time of the Sian Incident as "head of intelligence work under Chang Hsueh-liang." His formal title is listed (p. 118) as Assistant Director of the Northwestern Political Training Department of the Military Affairs Commission, under Chang Hsueh-liang.
6. Feng Yu-hsiang had recently returned to China from the trip he had made to Russia in May, 1926. Feng had asked the CCP to supply him with one hundred political workers for his army, and the CC of the CCP had given the Party committee for Peking and surrounding areas the task of recommending cadres to fill these posts. I already had made some recommendations of my own, and at this point I was merely recommending myself for one of the posts in Feng Yu-hsiang's army.
Chapter III
The Opening of Sun Yat-sen University
and Its Three Rectors

Trotzky Presides over the Opening Ceremony

Sun Yat-sen University, which was established in September, 1925, was located in a four-story building at 16 Volkhonka Street in Moscow. In front of this building, which constituted the campus of the university, were a number of trees. On the left side of the building there was a volleyball court, and in back a basketball court which could be converted into a skating rink in the winter. The entire building had one hundred rooms. The dining room was on the first floor; and the library, classrooms and study rooms, and administration offices were on the second, third, and fourth floors respectively. The library, which possessed thousands of volumes, was quite good. The first three hundred students at the University were housed in this building, but later these quarters were needed by the university for classrooms, and so other buildings were taken over to serve as dormitories.

Opposite the university was Moscow's Church of Christ the Savior, which was famed for its six gold domes. This church, which was dismantled in 1930 and replaced by Lenin Hall, had a beautiful square in which we did physical exercises every morning at eight. On each side of the church were beautiful gardens which we frequented in our leisure hours.

Although Sun Yat-sen University was not a completely secret institution, it was not open to the public either. Activities inside the university were rarely reported in the newspapers. The government of the USSR did not wish to furnish the imperialists with information concerning the university nor to provoke them by spreading any news as to the revolutionary nature of the university. Moreover, at that time, with the exception of Kwangtung Province, all of China was still under the domination of warlords. Thus, for the safety of students upon their return home, it seemed better for the Soviet government not to disclose the students' activities at Sun Yat-sen University.

From talks with students who attended it and from various other sources, I have learned that the opening ceremony was probably held at
the Trade Union Building in November of 1925. The official opening of Sun Yat-sen University was another mark in the “honeymoon” of close cooperation between Soviet Russia and the KMT. It was opened just a year and a half after Whampoa Military Academy, which was set up in May, 1924, in Canton with the assistance of the Russians. In any event, both the Russians who attended the opening ceremony of Sun Yat-sen University and the Chinese students were excited about the event. The hall was elegantly decorated. Portraits of Lenin and Sun Yat-sen hung on the right and left sides of the hall under their respective national flags. Many guests were present, including representatives of the CC of the CPSU and the ECCI. The renowned statesman and orator Leon Trotsky presided over the opening ceremony. That evening many guests made speeches, but only Trotsky’s speech won the students’ admiration. After pointing out the importance of the Chinese revolution, he urged his fellow Russians to reevaluate the importance of China and the Chinese people:

From now on, any Russian, be he a comrade or a citizen, who greets a Chinese student with an air of contempt, shrugging his shoulders, is not entitled to be either a Russian Communist or a Soviet citizen.

Trotsky’s appeal was not made without cause. The prejudice of the Russians against the Chinese had carried over from the days of Tsarist Russia. For example, we were often insulted on the streets when people asked us in Russian, “Friend, do you want salt?” At first we did not know what they meant. When we asked the instructors at the university, they looked rather embarrassed and did not answer our question. Only later did we find out that there was a legend to the effect that a Chinese was reported to have died in St. Petersburg in the summer. So that the body could be sent back to China for burial, a relative was supposed to have packed the body with salt to prevent it from decomposing. The customs officers who inspected the coffin at Vladivostok supposedly observed the salt-packed body and regarded it as a great joke. The story somehow spread all over Russia. Needless to say, whenever we were asked, “Do you want some salt,” we became angry. And we were asked this question by all kinds of Russian people—adults, teenagers, once-prominent figures, and “new Soviet citizens.”

Still another thing which often irritated and angered us was that
wherever we went, there were always people who contemptuously asked us where we got the money to study in Moscow. We usually answered their question calmly, telling them that we were supported by the revolutionary government in Kwangtung. However, sometimes we could not bear their offensive manner and told them bluntly that is was none of their business, but that they could be sure that it did not come from their pockets.

Trotsky made his appeal to the Russians because he was far-sighted and wanted us to have a pleasant environment during our stay in Russia. He also hoped, of course, that upon returning to our native land, we would not retain any bitter memories of Russian prejudice. Unfortunately, his appeal did not achieve very much, as racial discrimination and prejudice accumulated through the years are deep-rooted and cannot be eliminated by a formal appeal.

Perhaps some of Trotsky's sensitivity to the problem of discrimination was due to his Jewish origin and the fact that he had suffered as a result of Russia's anti-Semitism. Chiang Kai-shek's recollections of his trip to Russia in 1923 tend to substantiate this hypothesis:

Most of the Russian leaders holding responsible party and government positions who expressed regard for Dr. Sun and sincere desire to cooperate with China in her National Revolution were Jews, the only exceptions being Kamenev and Chicherin who were Russians. . . . This aroused my special interest. I found that men like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek and Joffe were, comparatively speaking, more concerned with the question of cooperation between Kuomintang and the Russian Communist Party.5

In addition he states:
I had more talks with Trotsky than with other Soviet leaders. I found him to be the most forthright of them all. . . . He said to me in all seriousness: "Except direct participation by Soviet troops, Soviet Russia will do her best to help China in her National Revolution by giving her positive assistance in the form of weapons and economic aid."6

It seems likely that Trotsky was invited to preside over the opening ceremony of Sun Yat-sen University because of his towering international reputation and popularity, for he still was far better known than Stalin. At any rate, the great impression that Trotsky made upon the Chinese students, together with the appointment of the pro-Trotsky Karl Radek as the first rector of the university and the presence of a
large number of Trotskyite professors on the faculty, provided fertile ground for the dissemination of Trotskyism at Sun Yat-sen University. And from Sun Yat-sen University Trotskyism was transplanted to China, where it exerted a definite influence on the Chinese political scene, the details of which I shall discuss in a later chapter.

THE THREE RECTORS OF SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY

Sun Yat-sen University, in the short span of a little over five years from its establishment in 1925 to its closing in 1930, had three rectors of varying accomplishments. The first of the three was the internationally famous Karl Radek, who served as rector from 1925 until 1927. He was born in Lwow (Lemberg), Poland, in 1885 and was educated at the University of Cracow and the University of Berne. In 1904 Radek joined the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. Shortly thereafter he was taken prisoner and jailed for twelve months. Upon being released from prison, he participated in revolutionary activities in Germany and Poland. During the Russian Revolution of February, 1917, Radek crossed Germany with Lenin and Zinoviev. He was then sent to Stockholm as a representative of the Bolshevik Party. After the October Revolution, he participated in the Brest Litovsk peace negotiations with the Germans.

When the German revolution broke out in 1918, Radek was smuggled into Germany, where as a representative of the CC of the CPSU, he played an active role in reorganizing the German Communist Party. He suffered a second imprisonment in February, 1919, and was released in December of the same year. Radek then returned to the Soviet Union and became a leading member of the Presidium of the Comintern. Finally, after being smuggled into Germany again, he was made a scapegoat for the failure of the German Communists to seize power in the autumn of 1923.

Due to his support of the rightist faction of the German Communist Party, he was relieved in 1923 of his positions on the ECCI and the CC of the CPSU. Thereafter, he devoted his time to propaganda and educational activities, and he retained his high prestige and his reputation as a dazzlingly brilliant scholar. When Sun Yat-sen University was founded in 1925, he was made its first rector. Because of his involvement in the power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, he was
suspended as rector in the early summer of 1927. And when he was dismissed from the CPSU in December, 1927, for siding with the Trotsky opposition, he was formally dismissed as rector of Sun Yat-sen University.\textsuperscript{7}

The students of the university considered Radek to be a good rector. One of the first students to attend the university wrote an interesting essay on Radek. Part of this essay, which gives an excellent picture of Radek’s personal manner and scholastic ability, follows:

Radek was the first rector of Sun Yat-sen University, but two years later he was convicted by Stalin as a Trotskyite and lost the rectorship. He was a rather strange character. He had all the traits of a bookworm, but was a man of responsibility. He was given only three or four months to establish Sun Yat-sen University, and everything was quite well organized in that short time. Even the first group of students to come to the university felt at home when they arrived. He kept regular office hours and was at work at nine each morning. Whenever he met the students on campus, he not only greeted them, but also inquired about their classwork and their fields of interest. I remember telling him that Russian was a very difficult language to learn and that it had given me much trouble. His answer was extremely interesting. He said that the only one who had no problems was God and that both he and I had problems. I do not know whether this was a Western proverb, but I have often meditated over it. He had a warm personality, like that of a common man. He did not have the air of the high-ranking official that he was. He was easy to get along with. Although he, as much as other Communist leaders, was guilty of plotting against China, every student at Sun Yat-sen University esteemed him highly.

He did not have a big build. His face was rather unusual. His large skull and small jaw resembled those of a monkey, and his bald forehead made him look like Lenin. His speech was eloquent and sometimes funny. Both his countenance and his speech made people roar with laughter. He was very near-sighted and if he did not wear his glasses, he could not even walk. His hair was often uncombed and his beard left untrimmed. He never seemed to change the dark gray suit which he wore every day. In all, his appearance was sloppy, and he did not look at all like a rector. He always clenched a pipe in his mouth, whether there was tobacco in it or not. It was said that he was a scholar, a philosopher, and an expert on China. Word of his achievements spread quickly among the students, and he became an idol to all. It was also said that he spoke seven or eight languages, but no one knew for sure whether this was true. We did know that he spoke Russian, German, and French. He was always calm and precise in his reasoning. He was a great speaker. His speech was free and smooth. When he reached the climax of a speech, he always put his two thumbs in the pockets of his vest and flapped the other fingers against his chest like the wings of a
butterfly. At times he hung his head down and strolled left and right across the stage, and he never failed to hold the attention of his listeners.

Radek taught a course entitled “History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement.” It was a popular course at Sun Yat-sen University and the only course that brought students of different classes into the same classroom. He lectured two or three times a week, his lectures usually lasting two or three hours. The auditorium was always packed on the days of his lectures. Students from Eastern University [KUTFV] and scholars and experts doing research on China came to attend his lectures. Still another group attended his lectures; they were not his bodyguards or intelligence agents, but his stenographer and people carrying reference books for him (he often used armloads of reference books). He walked surrounded by these people as the moon is surrounded by stars in the sky. He was a gifted person and had a good memory. Whenever he stated a fact, he knew which book to turn to for reference to prove his statement. His method of teaching and his approach in analyzing Chinese history was accurate and scientific (not necessarily using dialectics). Hence he shed new light on the facts and fascinated his audience. On the whole, his knowledge of the political system far exceeded that of an ordinary historian or sociologist, not to mention those who mechanically applied dialectical materialism.8

Radek began his course, mentioned above, on the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement in the spring of 1926. Its first part treated the latter years of the Manchu empire through the early years of the Chinese Republic. The second part of the course focused on revolutionary developments in China from the time of the Taiping Rebellion. Since I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1926, I was able to sit in only during the second part of this course. Fortunately, however, transcripts of his earlier lectures were available in the Sun Yat-sen University library, and I read them with fascination. For Radek had made extensive use of Tsarist archives, and it was my first encounter with the secret diplomatic activities that had transpired between China and Tsarist Russia. Like many other Chinese students who took Radek’s meticulously documented course, I felt that I was getting for the first time a tremendously revealing look at Tsarist imperialistic intentions toward China and at the shocking ineffectuality of the Manchu government. I could not help thinking about the immense benefits that would be derived by everybody if all governments made public the documents and plans regarding China which they so carefully kept secret.

Radek spent much time studying the problems of China. While his
viewpoint in general coincided with Trotsky's, he differed from Trotsky on many policies and tactics. For example, Radek opposed Trotsky's policy regarding the KMT. Trotsky himself provides sufficient evidence of this fact:

I personally was from the very beginning, that is, from 1923, resolutely opposed to the Communist party joining the Kuo Min Tang, as well as against the acceptance of the Kuo Min Tang into the "Kuomintern." Radek was always with Zinoviev against me.  

Stalin noted, however, that on basic problems concerning China, Radek and Trotsky held the same point of view. Stalin stated that on the crucial point of the survival of feudal remnants in Chinese society both Trotsky and Radek were of the opinion that there were no feudal survivals in China and that even if there were, they were of no great significance.

The differences of opinion between Radek and Stalin were one of the factors that cost Radek his rectorship and eventually his membership in the CPSU. Without explanation or any ceremony at all and without even bidding us farewell, Radek suddenly left the university in the summer of 1927. He left without finishing his course, and I think many students felt, as I certainly did, that we had been deprived of a brilliant lecturer. His contributions to Sun Yat-sen University as its founder were not erased from our minds. We still admired him and greatly missed his original and profound arguments in the auditorium.

The man who replaced Radek was the famed "nanny" of the "28 Bolsheviks," Pavel Mif.* In the early 1920s Mif was of little importance, and therefore there is little biographical data on him. He was born in 1901. In the early 1920s, soon after it was formed, he joined the Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, through which he apparently made his initial contact with the Chinese revolutionary movement. While Mif was hardly yet an old China hand, he became rather well known in the Far Eastern Secretariat. Thus, he was appointed vice-rector of Sun Yat-sen University when it was established in 1925. When Radek lost his job, Mif was the logical choice to fill the position vacated by Radek. His old position as vice-

* Although I have not personally investigated the possibility, many authorities, including Conrad Brandt, suspect that Mif, Russian for "myth," was a pseudonym. See Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924–1927, p. 103.
rector was filled by a very handsome and friendly man named Kuchumov. He came to the university more often than Mif and was well liked by the students. He was also known as an expert on China, but actually his specialty was Outer Mongolia. He was in charge of Mongolian affairs in the Comintern. During the 1920s, he also took various Sun Yat-sen University students on official tours of Outer Mongolia.

Mif was young, inexperienced, and generally unpopular. While he was vice-rector, most of the students did not like him, for he seldom mingled with them. He maintained contact only with a handful of students who spoke fluent Russian and who were among those who later became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. He did not even teach a course at the university and only occasionally delivered speeches to us. In addition, he always had a long face and never smiled. Perhaps his relative youth made him self-conscious and caused him to try to act older than his age. In any case, students at that time, at least, had no way of knowing what substance there was to the man. What was clear to all was that he compared to Karl Radek as a drop of water to an ocean.

The China Problems Research Institute, which will be discussed in chapter four, was Mif’s greatest contribution while serving as rector of the university. His only other achievement was to issue walking papers to some very learned Trotskyite professors and to replace them with instructors strong on Partyism but poor in scholarship. Of course, he was not to blame in this case, for he was doubtless only carrying out the orders of those higher up in the Party.

Despite being disliked by many students of the university, Mif was very successful in enhancing his position in the Party and the government. With the rapid development of the Chinese revolutionary movement after 1925, the situation in China naturally became more and more important to the Comintern. Consequently, Mif’s post as rector of Sun Yat-sen University became an enviable one. Moreover, the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky gave him the opportunity to improve his position even more. Mif supported Stalin and was in turn consulted by Stalin on the problems of the Chinese revolution.

However, Mif did not find himself above correction on the problems of the revolution. At the ECCI’s Seventh Plenum, held from
November 12 to December 16, 1926, Mif proposed "Theses on the Problems of China." The theses submitted by Mif contained more mistakes and errors than any of the other reports. Stalin considered Mif's suggestion that Soviets should be organized in the Chinese countryside to be especially inappropriate. But Mif did not fall into disfavor on account of his proposal.

Mif was not one to stay in the Comintern building. On the contrary, he made frequent trips to China. One trip that I know about was his trip to China prior to the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI in November, 1926. The apparent purpose of this trip was to assist the Chinese Communists in setting up Communist Party schools. Moreover, in March or April of 1927, Mif, accompanied by his favorite student, Ch'en Shao-yu, went to Hankow to take part in the Fifth National Congress of the CCP which was held on April 27, 1927. After taking part in the congress, he returned to the Soviet Union in August of the same year.

At that time all the students of Sun Yat-sen University were taking a summer vacation at Trasovka, a resort not far from Moscow. One day Mif and Ch'en Shao-yu came to the resort to report on their recent trip to China and the state of the Wuhan government. Mif despaired over the worsening situation of the Chinese revolution, and his never-smiling face seemed more serious than ever. What he told us made us quite uneasy. Everyone was quiet, yet deep in our hearts we were greatly perturbed. Finally Mif finished his speech and walked out amidst polite applause. It was a very depressing experience.

Even though the Chinese revolution was sliding into a period of decline, Mif's good fortune was in no way affected. Towards the end of 1927 he was promoted to the directorship of the Chinese Section of the Comintern and shortly after that, as I have already mentioned, he was promoted to the rectorship of Sun Yat-sen University. He was also entrusted with organizing the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, which was held in a suburb of Moscow in June, 1928.

However, trouble was brewing at Sun Yat-sen University, which was quite disturbing to Mif, for complaints were showered upon him from all sides. The Party dispute at the university put him on especially bad terms with the Chinese Communist representatives to the Comintern, Ch'u Ch'i-ku-pai in particular. Unwilling to bear the burdens of Sun Yat-sen University, he asked to be relieved of his job as rector.
of the university in the summer of 1929. He used the excuse that he needed to devote all of his time to the more important matters of the CCP. Probably in November or December of 1930 he was sent on a mission to Shanghai. There he secretly met with many leaders of the 28 Bolsheviks to plan an important coup in the CCP: the liquidation of the Li Li-san Line; the shattering of the united opposition of Lo Chang-lung, Ho Meng-hsiung, and Li Ch’iu-shih; and the establishment of the “Wang Ming Empire.”

While Mif was a man of little personal substance, one should not overlook the important historical role he played. His origins were humble, and it was sheer luck that fate sought him out. With the backing of Stalin and the Comintern, he played an important role in trying to shape the Chinese revolution and CCP affairs at a time when Russia had many men that were more able than he. He may have been a small man with a large backing, but he played a leading role in the orientation of the CCP through the early 1930s. The numerous articles he wrote, moreover, remain useful source materials for the period. From a source who strikes me as reliable, I learned that he was finally purged by Stalin as a Trotskyite, although I have not seen proof of this information. In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that works published by Chinese Communist historians never mention his name.

When Mif left the university in the summer of 1929, he was replaced by Veger, who was chiefly an educator and definitely not a politician. Although he was a veteran Bolshevik, he had devoted himself chiefly to cultural and educational work. Before he was appointed rector of Sun Yat-sen University, he taught in a number of Moscow universities. When Sun Yat-sen University, under the pressure of increasing numbers of worker and peasant students, was trying to make a radical shift in its educational program, Veger, an experienced educator, was assigned to do the job. He was very generous to the students, and students liked him much better than Mif. He was an excellent orator of the professorial type rather than in the style of a revolutionary agitator. While he was rector of the university, he was named to the Editorial Committee of The Problems of China, a quarterly journal which began publication in Moscow in 1929. After that, he was counted among the famous China experts in Russia.
Veger accepted the position as rector of Sun Yat-sen University at a time when the university was in great turmoil due to the intensive Party purge. Veger, whom I considered to be a highly likable man, was placed in a very unpleasant situation—one which had no solution. In the autumn of 1930 Veger walked dejectedly out through the gate of the university for the last time, and Sun Yat-sen University was officially closed.

Notes

1. I could not locate the exact date of the founding of the university in the 1925 issue of Pravda, nor could any of my former classmates recall it. Probably the best estimate as to the date of the establishment and opening of the university is given by Eudin and North in Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927. They state that Sun Yat-sen University "was established in Moscow during September of 1925 and opened its doors in November of the same year" (Eudin and North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927 [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957], p. 86). Moreover, Borodin in Canton announced the establishment of the university to the CEC of the KMT on October 7, 1925.

2. According to a personal letter to me from a friend in Taipei who kindly discussed the matter with one of my schoolmates, Chu Mao-tseng, Mr. Chu arrived at Moscow in November, 1925, with the first group of students. Immediately after their arrival, classes started, without waiting for the official opening of the university. The opening ceremony did not take place until two months later, when several other groups of students arrived from China. But Mr. Chu said that he did not remember the exact date of the ceremony.

3. I have not been able to locate the original text of Trotsky's speech. The library in Sun Yat-sen University, however, did have a Chinese translation of it, and a friend of mine, a Sun Yat-sen University student who attended the ceremony, took notes from the text in the library. It is from his notes, kindly made available to me, that I have taken this quotation.

4. During my more than six years' stay in Russia, I traveled to every corner within its domain. My impression was that the farther you went to the west or south—to the Ukraine and the Caucasus—the more friendly people were to us Chinese; the farther you went to the east, the less friendly. Particularly on the border areas between the two countries, contempt and prejudice deepened, perhaps because the two peoples had more frequent contact there than in Russia proper or in the west. Big-power chauvinism in Russia has not been rooted out despite half a century of Communist rule. Not only has the average Russian not been converted into a so-called internationalist, even the Communist leaders at all levels are not really proletarian internationalists. This is one of the reasons why Soviet Russia's reputation has gradually been tarnished and its influence has gradually declined even among other Communist countries. This is especially the case in Russia's relations with Asian and African countries.


6. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

7. Radek was readmitted to the Party in 1930. However, Radek not only continued to communicate with members of the opposition, but he became a prominent member of the Rightist-Trotskyite bloc. In January, 1937, he was tried, together with fifteen other anti-Stalinists, including Bukharin and Rykov, and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. However, he was released after serving only four years of his term, so that he might serve as a propagandist during his remaining years and thus contribute his "surplus value" to the Communist Party. However, many sources believe that he was executed about 1942 for allegedly being a German spy. Recently, I heard from someone who regarded his source as impeccable that Radek died in prison when, in an overcrowded cell, he quarreled with his cellmates, who beat him to death.


Chapter IV
The Internal Organization
of Sun Yat-sen University

The Financial and Legal Status of the University

Sun Yat-sen University differed from most public and private universities in that the source of the funds that supported the university was not disclosed to the public. In fact, the exact annual expenditures and their source still remain a secret. Sun Yat-sen University also differed from other universities in that it received no tuition from its students. Moreover, room and board were free to all students, and even clothes and pocket money were provided. Since the student body increased rapidly from 340 in the first class in 1925 to about 600 in 1928, a substantial sum of money obviously was required to maintain the university. It was a sum of money beyond the means, surely, of individuals or private organizations, and I doubt that funds from China ever contributed substantially, if at all, to its support. It seems more likely, as I assumed when I was a student there, that the full burden of financing Sun Yat-sen University fell to the Russians, who took the initiative in establishing and staffing the university in the first place. After I left the university, but while I was still in Russia, I was told, in any event, that the primary funding of Sun Yat-sen University came from the Profintern, whose chief source of income was the Central Council of Labor Unions of the Soviet Union.

It is my opinion that there may have been some symbolic contributions of some money by wealthy KMT members, but it would be erroneous to believe that these contributions were of great importance.¹ I hold to this belief for two reasons. First, I do not believe that the KMT had the financial resources to support the burden of maintaining Sun Yat-sen University. In 1924 the KMT did not even command enough capital to independently establish Whampoa Military Academy, whose importance far surpassed that of Sun Yat-sen University. In the end it was possible to establish that academy only because of material aid from the Soviet Union.² Second, and perhaps more obviously, if the KMT had been able to bear the burden of Sun Yat-sen University, why was it established in Moscow instead of Canton?
I once asked friends in Taipei to do some research on this subject, but they failed to obtain any results. The archives kept by the CEC of the KMT contained neither telegrams nor correspondence concerning financial aspects of Sun Yat-sen University. There seems to be absolutely no record of the KMT ever having provided any financial support to it.3

An interesting point is that the subject of management of the university was not brought up until it had already been established for six months. Sometime in early April of 1926, Hu Han-min4 sent a telegram from Moscow to Canton in regard to this point. The text of the telegram is as follows:

Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University proposes that the university be placed under the Soviet Communist Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang.5

This proposal was brought up at the 139th Session of the Central Political Committee of the KMT, which was held on May 5, 1926. At this session, it was decided to accept Radek’s proposal and to instruct the CEC of the KMT to cable the resolution to Radek. That same day the secretary of the Central Political Committee drafted an official letter to the CEC of the KMT instructing it to act in compliance with the resolution.

On May 11, 1926, the Twenty-seventh Plenary Session of the CEC of the KMT elected by the Second Congress recorded Radek’s proposal as the sixth article on the agenda:

The Central Political Committee passed the resolution to adopt Radek’s proposal that Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow be placed under joint administration of the Soviet Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and to notify Radek of our resolution.6

After discussion and debate of this proposal, the CEC decided to accept the proposal and to notify Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University.

The telegram of acceptance, which was sent to Radek on May 15, 1926, read as follows:

Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow: In conformity with the recommendation and accompanying letter of the Central Political Committee of our Executive Committee, which stated: “The 139th meeting of the Central Political Committee passed a resolution of acceptance of the proposal made by
Rector Radek of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow as reported to the Committee by Hu Han-min. The proposal that Sun Yat-sen University be placed under the joint administration of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Russian Communist Party and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang is accepted. We hereby urge that your Committee cable this resolution to Rector Radek.” In accordance our 27th session reached the following resolution: “Accept the proposition and cable reply to Rector Radek.” We are pleased to inform you of the acceptance of your proposition.

The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

This document seems to imply that Sun Yat-sen University had only two managers, the CPSU and the KMT, with the CCP and the Comintern being represented by the CPSU.

One of the individuals responsible for watching out for KMT interests at the university was Shao Li-tzu, who went to Moscow in the summer of 1926. Upon his arrival in Moscow, the university held a big reception in his honor and presented him with an honorary student identification card. Shao, who had come to Moscow as the permanent representative of the KMT to the Comintern, became a member of the Board of Trustees of Sun Yat-sen University. Soon, in addition to merely visiting the university, he began taking and auditing courses there.

By taking courses at the university, he became a classmate of his son, Shao Chih-kang, who was a member of the CYC. This quickly became a popular topic of conversation among the rest of us. Presently, Shao provided us with yet another topic of conversation; for another student at the university then, a member of its first class, was Miss Fu Hsueh-wen, who had studied at Shanghai University when Shao Li-tzu was its deputy director. Shao, who was a widower, wooed and won her in Moscow. Since male students were far more numerous than female ones, this took an attractive girl out of circulation, a state of affairs which was noted with dismay by the other males.

Perhaps here I might be allowed to digress a bit to discuss the relationship between Shao Li-tzu and his young bride, Fu Hsueh-wen, for it is relevant to the affairs of Sun Yat-sen University. Fu Hsueh-wen was a member of the CYC when she married Shao in Moscow, and she remained a member of the CYC. When the KMT conducted its purge of Communist members beginning in April, 1927, Shao Li-tzu, as the KMT representative to the Comintern and a man closely
identified with Chiang Kai-shek, naturally returned to China. His CYC wife returned to China with him, which those of us in the CCP who remained at Sun Yat-sen University could not help noticing. Most of us assumed that she retained her CYC membership and that she was under Party orders to remain with her KMT husband. After all, Shao was expected to take an influential position in Chiang Kai-shek’s organization back in China, which he did, and what better source of information about this organization could the Party have than Shao’s own wife. She never publicly renounced her membership in the CYC. Rightly or wrongly, then, I assume that she still retained her Party ties when, in 1949, both Shao Li-tzu and she abruptly deserted Chiang Kai-shek in favor of the Chinese Communists.

Be that as it may, the relationship of Shao Li-tzu and of the KMT to Sun Yat-sen University changed after the April 12, 1927, anti-Communist movement in Shanghai. Shortly after this incident, Shao silently packed his suitcase and left for home. His departure served not only as a prelude to the breaking off of relations between China and the Soviet Union, but it was also a prelude to Sun Yat-sen University becoming completely Communist controlled. After Shao’s departure there was no longer a KMT member on the Board of Trustees of the university.

On July 26, 1927, the CEC of the KMT made an official announcement of the KMT’s repudiation of Sun Yat-sen University and severed all ties with it:

Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow illegally used the name of the party leader of the Kuomintang as protection while engaged in plotting conspiracy against the party. It is only proper that the university be repudiated. No organization is to send any more students to Moscow.9

This strong resolution adopted by the CEC of the KMT was based on the proposal made by the Central Youth Department of the KMT, the text of which follows:

It was found that Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow was originally Sun Wen University before a name change was adopted. The said university attracted members of our party and promising young people throughout the country under the banner of Kuomintang. The university has repeatedly disparaged the principles and policies of the party. Borrowing the name of Kuomintang, the university engaged in activities betraying the party. We hereby make known to all the
world our denouncement of the conspiracy of the university and our repudiation of the university. Furthermore, no organization in the country is permitted to send any more students to Moscow, so that our youth will no longer be deceived by its imposture.

Chairman of the Central Youth Department of the Kuomintang
Ting Wei-fen July 8, 1927

Following this proposal a Plenary Session of the CEC and the 106th Meeting of All Department Chiefs passed a resolution which read:

Repudiate Sun Yat-sen University, and instruct the Political Bureau and the National government to issue a nationwide edict forbidding further dispatch of students to Moscow.11

This edict was officially posted on July 26, 1927. In accordance with the edict, all organizations under the KMT ceased to send students to Moscow. But Sun Yat-sen University’s name was not changed simply because of the KMT’s resolution. Not until the following year was the university renamed. However, Sun Yat-sen’s name was retained in the title, as it was far too valuable a propaganda tool to be given up so easily.

The Administration and the Budget of the University

The internal organizational structure of Sun Yat-sen University was rather simple, since although it was called a university, it had no separate colleges or disciplines. The head of the administration, the rector, was a Russian, and he was assisted by two vice-rectors, both of whom at first were also Russians. Later, after the university was re-organized in 1928, one of the vice-rectors was Chinese. This change was not brought about by any Russian desire to show Sino-Soviet equality. Quite the contrary, the Russian Communists at that time suffered from an acute superiority complex with regard to the Chinese, and nothing could have been farther from their minds than a Sino-Russian equal partnership. The move seems to have been dictated simply by necessity. There were two main advantages in having a Chinese vice-rector. In the first place, it eliminated the very considerable language barrier that existed between the administration and the student body and at the same time provided a buffer between ad-
ministration and students. Second, the Chinese vice-rector was able to function as a liaison officer between Sun Yat-sen University and the CCP representatives to the Comintern.

The first Chinese student to serve as vice-rector was a proletarian comrade named Wang Pao-li, who came from Nanking. While he was not well educated, he was of the working class and had served admirably as chairman of the Student's Commune. Unfortunately, proletarian though he was, Wang was found to be lacking in leadership ability, and so in 1929, upon the recommendation of Ch'en Shao-yu, Rector Mif appointed my good friend Li Chou-sheng to replace Wang. Li, who was a diligent student, an efficient worker, and good tempered, retained the post of vice-rector until the university closed in 1930. But as I have stated, the vice-rectorship was never intended as a gesture of equality or cooperation, and consequently Li possessed little actual authority. Some of the cynics among us commented disparagingly that the Chinese vice-rector amounted to no more than an interpreter in the area of administrative affairs of the university who received higher pay and a larger desk than the other interpreters.

Under the rector there were three departments: the Secretariat, the Business Office, and the Department of Academic Affairs. The Secretary General of the university was a man called Pogulyaev, who spoke only a little Chinese. He was a Machiavellian sort of person whom nobody liked. Pogulyaev's young assistant, Abramson, spoke excellent Mandarin, yet he was also intensely disliked by us because of his impudent attitude.

The Secretariat was roughly the equivalent of a chancellor's office, for it had charge of all important administrative matters. The Secretariat at Sun Yat-sen University, however, had yet another function, which derived from the unique status of Sun Yat-sen University itself. The university was not, after all, an "open door" institution, and the Secretariat was much preoccupied with affairs of security. It was responsible for transporting students from abroad, and for getting departing students to their destinations abroad, through secret channels. In this undertaking it worked closely with the relevant authorities in the Comintern and the GPU. The Secretariat also was responsible for conducting security checks on students at the university when instructed to do so by the Comintern or the GPU. The Secretariat also
arranged the secret nighttime arrests of "anti-Party" students. Some of these students were among those who had come to the university as KMT members but who had not returned to China following the rupture of KMT-Soviet relations late in 1927 and had drifted into supporting the Trotsky opposition. Others were members of a Trotskyite organization or elements of the "Second Line" group.

Confidential organizational matters that did not directly involve the university sometimes were entrusted to the Secretariat. For example, handling the secretarial affairs of the Sixth Congress of the CCP was one of its functions. It recruited secretaries and interpreters from among the students, arranged for translations of documents, and so forth.

In connection with its security functions, the Secretariat subjected all of us at the university to one altogether curious week, in the autumn of 1927 as I recall. The GPU was behind the move, I believe. For one whole week we were all physically measured in great detail, and the data was recorded in dossiers containing biographical and other information about us. They measured our height; the dimensions of our heads; the size, dimensions, and relative positions of our eyes, noses, and ears; the length of our necks; and the delineation of our hairlines. They also recorded any particular identifying physical marks we might have, such as scars, warts, and so forth. Since the university already had on file photographs of each of us, the taking of our measurements puzzled us and caused much resentment and suspicion among most of the students. A good many students wanted to refuse to be measured, but since such overt flaunting of authority would have singled them out for suspicion, they submitted to it. Non-Communist students were especially outraged, and read into the affair all sorts of possible sinister connotations. It was generally decided, I think, that photographs might eventually fade or get lost, and that from the measurements the Russians could reconstruct our appearances. The need for a permanent record of our physical appearances, though, was more alarming to some than to others. Would the Russians use this record to hound us for the rest of our lives, should they so desire, or was it merely a paternalistic gesture to better insure that in the case of mishap we could readily be identified? Jokingly, we said that we had now given ourselves body and soul to the Russians.
The Business Office was purely a service department. Its head was a Russian named Visotii. The Business Office handled what might be called the logistics for the students: it was responsible for clothing, feeding, housing, and transporting us. Despite the NEP, economic conditions still were rather grim in Russia then, and we at Sun Yat-sen University were looked after far better than Russian students. We, for example, had such luxuries as white bread, coffee, and cocoa, which were denied to our Russian counterparts. Nevertheless, complaints were endlessly directed at the beleaguered Business Office.

Yang Ming-chai, a Chinese immigrant to Russia who had gone to China with Voitinsky in 1920, worked in the Business Office. In 1925, when Sun Yat-sen University was still in the preparatory stages, Yang, then in Shanghai, was responsible for the reception and coordination of Chinese students bound for Moscow. In November of 1925 he personally headed the second group of students going to Sun Yat-sen University, and upon his arrival in Moscow, he began to work in the business section of the university. Then, in the summer of 1927, while we were all at Trasovka, a larger summer resort outside Moscow, Yang Ming-chai visited the resort to say goodbye to student friends there. He had, he said, received a letter from Voitinsky to the CC of the CCP recommending that he be given a responsible position in the CC, and thus he was about to depart for China. I heard that when he arrived at Shanghai, the CC scrutinized his record, evaluated his capabilities, and assigned him to some minor local post in Tientsin. That is the last information I have been able to find about him.

The work of the Department of Academic Affairs was the most complex. The selection of courses, professors, and instructors, the arrangement of classes, and the preparation of educational material for a highly heterogeneous group was no simple matter. At first the department’s work was divided into two parts: one dealt with the first graduating class—the groups of students arriving in Moscow in 1925 and the beginning of 1926; the other with the second graduating class—the groups of students who arrived in Moscow in the latter part of 1926 and the beginning of 1927.

In 1928, when the Chinese revolution was at low ebb, droves of peasant and worker cadres were sent to Sun Yat-sen University. This sudden jump in enrollment complicated the university’s academic
planning even more and forced an extensive revision of course and class arrangements which I will discuss in a later chapter.

When I arrived in Moscow late in 1926 the director of the Department of Academic Affairs was a Mr. Ignatov. He was an old Bolshevik of working-class origin, honest and responsible. Once he confessed to me with all candor that during the 1917 October Revolution and the long civil war that followed he had almost lost his faith in the cause upon seeing the complete destruction of industry, the famine, and the great human suffering. However, the end of "War Communism" and the introduction of the NEP saved his faith in the Bolshevik cause.

Ignatov was a man who was not embittered by the hardships and sorrows he had endured, but rather one who was sweetened and made more compassionate to the sorrows and aspirations of others. To us he was especially kind and warm. His relationship with the faculty was also quite cordial. Wherever he went with his small thatch of a beard and his kindly, chubby face, he was greeted by the students with warmth. He was truly an unforgettable person and the finest of gentlemen. He is long dead now, but I am sure that I and the other students cannot forget him.

Subordinate to the Academic Affairs Department was the Academic Affairs Conference, which was composed of the head professors of each course. This group met regularly to discuss teaching methods, student progress, and the improvement of courses. It functioned as a powerful advisory group to the Academic Affairs Department, and almost always the suggestions coming from this group were promptly executed by the department.

In 1928 the personnel structure of the Academic Affairs Department, as the vice-rectorship, was modified. Under the director of the department, who was a Russian, there was also a Chinese assistant director, who was chosen from the ranks of qualified students. The student selected to serve as assistant director of the Academic Affairs Department was Yin Chien, who was a native of Hupeh. He was a very modest and hard-working man. On returning to China, he first worked in the Shanghai Trade Unions. Later he was transferred to Tientsin and the coal mines at T'angshan, where he was arrested and executed.

Now I would like to discuss briefly the budget of the university.
As I mentioned above, the budget of the university was veiled in the greatest secrecy. Only the handful of people in charge of this matter knew how big the budget really was. Outsiders, including the students of the university, were kept in the dark. However, it was said that the annual budget of the university was around one million tchervonetz (or ten million rubles), but confirmation of this was not available.

The budget of the university was composed of three main items: (1) Administrative expenses of the university; (2) salaries of the staff and faculty members, and the allowances given to the students; and (3) expenditures for recruiting students from and repatriating them back to China or other countries.

The first big item of the budget was administrative expenses. This included room, board, clothing, transportation, and summer vacations for about five hundred students, maintenance of the campus and library, and other expenses.

The second item of the budget was salaries. A rather large staff of professors, instructors, administrative personnel, and maintenance staff (estimated at more than one hundred and fifty persons) created a big problem of payment. At that time the so-called salary-limit system for Party members was still in force in the Soviet Union. According to this system of maximum payments, the salary limit of Party members was set at 225 rubles a month. In other words, that was the highest salary for a Party member, no matter what qualifications he had or what position he held. A great many of the staff and faculty were Party members, thus a large amount of money was saved. But there were two exceptions to this policy. The professors or instructors who were not Party members were paid according to their qualifications, not being restricted by the above-mentioned maximum salary; and a few distinguished professors hired from abroad were paid still more.

The students of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow were recruited either from China or from among Chinese in other countries; and after the completion of their studies, they should be sent back to China or elsewhere to do revolutionary work. Their transportation expenses were provided by the university. It was a very complicated item in the budget, because the matter of foreign currency was involved. It was no secret that at that time the Soviet Union possessed very little
foreign currency. Therefore, the Russian authorities were not without pain in getting this job done.

Another factor that made the budget of the university rather burdensome was that the university had to support both financially and materially three supplementary institutions: the China Printing House, the China Problems Research Institute, and the Translation Bureau.

And finally, there was an unusual item in the budget—allowances given to poor students (mostly worker and peasant students) to support their families in China. The students in Sun Yat-sen University, as a demonstration of solidarity, organized a Mutual Assistance Fund. The university deducted a certain amount from the students' monthly allowances for the fund, which was used as a relief fund to support the families of poor students. But the money from this fund was not adequate, so the university had to contribute more than the students did. This was just one of the peculiarities of the budget of Sun Yat-sen University.

The budget was supposed to be examined and approved by the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern as well as the CPSU. Actually, however, the university's budget from the very beginning was exclusively decided upon and adjusted, if necessary, by the CPSU. The KMT never actually entered into partnership with the CPSU, because it was not able to provide any financial support to the university. The KMT had no say in budget matters of the university even in the first years of harmony between the KMT and Soviet Russia.

Three Supplementary Institutions of the University

Although Sun Yat-sen University survived for only five short years, three supplementary institutions of the university, with certain structural reorganizations, survived it. These three institutions were the China Problems Research Institute, the Translation Bureau, and the China Printing House.

I do not remember the exact date of the founding of the China Problems Research Institute. I only remember that preparations for this organization were begun in 1928, soon after the defeat of the December 11, 1927, Canton Uprising. While the events of December 11 at Canton constituted a "rear-guard action," the Comintern nevertheless lauded it as the harbinger of a new era—the Soviet phase of the
Chinese revolution—and felt that valuable lessons could be drawn from this revolutionary experience in order to prepare the next rising tide of revolution. It was with this thought in mind that the China Problems Research Institute was formed. The specific goals of this institute were to evaluate the experiences of the 1925–1927 Revolution, to set up guide lines for future action, and to study Chinese problems in depth. Thus, the China Problems Research Institute served to coordinate both scholarly and practical research.

The proposal for the establishment of the institute probably originated in the Chinese Section of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, and its formal establishment took place early in 1929. Volin, a professor at the university, was its director. Several “new generation” Chinese experts were also members of the institute. Among them were the famous Yollk and a gentleman named Oshanin. Yollk, apparently a Russian, was a student at the Leningrad School of Oriental Languages. He did advanced work in Chinese and spoke excellent Mandarin. In fact, he often gave speeches in Chinese to the university students.

Oshanin was born in Harbin, Manchuria, and was educated in Peking. Consequently, his command of the Chinese language was even better than Yollk’s was. Indeed, Oshanin’s ability to translate from Chinese into Russian, or the other way round, was absolutely amazing. He had no party affiliations and did not concern himself in his work, in any event, with political issues. He was a linguist, and it was as a linguist that he worked at the institute. Among his notable publications was *Kitaicko-Russkii Slovary* (Chinese-Russian dictionary), which he edited and which was published in Moscow in 1959. Besides these individuals, older Russian Sinologists such as Ivanov (his Chinese name was Yi Feng-ko) served the institute as consultants. Ivanov had been a professor at National Peking University in the early twenties, and possibly earlier, where he had taught Russian. His field, however, was Sinology, and he was an eminent man in that field. I remember that in 1923 Hu Shih held a symposium in Peking in commemoration of the great Ch’ing scholar Tai Cheng (Tai Tung-yuan). I was in the audience and heard Ivanov present his paper in impeccable Chinese. Back in Soviet Russia, he was a professor at the Leningrad School of Oriental Languages, which has produced a good many imposing
Sinologists. Another famed Russian Sinologist, Kolokolov, did research at the institute.

In addition to the Russian Sinologues and "China experts," over ten Sun Yat-sen University graduates were chosen as associate members of the institute. Most of the students chosen were members of what later became known as the 28 Bolsheviks. Among them were Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Yang Shang-k'uen, and Ho Tzu-shu. Ostensibly, the criterion for selection was academic, however political considerations were of the utmost importance. The emphasis upon political considerations stemmed from the fact that the Comintern was trying to train a group of future Chinese Communist leaders who would be loyal to the Comintern rather than striving for academic excellence in the institute.

The research work of the institute was divided into two sections: fundamental problems of China and current problems of China. The first section was, in the main, academic and technical. Most of the older Sinologists were in this section. They concentrated on the study of such fundamental problems as reform of the Chinese language (Latinization of Chinese), the land problem in different periods of Chinese history, the social structure of ancient China, and so forth. They were also responsible for the compilation of a Chinese-Russian dictionary. The second section studied the most pressing problems connected with the development of the revolutionary movement in China.

The institute's first contribution was publication of the first Russian-Chinese dictionary, Russko-Kitaiskii Slovary. This dictionary was a great boon to Chinese students of the Russian language, as the only dictionary previously available was the Russian-Japanese Dictionary published in Tokyo.* Russko-Kitaiskii Slovary was probably published in cooperation with Soviet Russia's National Foreign-Language Dictionary Press, which was under the general editorship of Kolokolov.

The institute was also responsible for the publication of a Russian-
language quarterly called Problemy Kitaia (Chinese problems), which first came out in 1929. The editorial committee was composed of Varga, Veger, Kuchumov, Madyayr, Mif, Strakhov, and Volin. Volin was head of the editorial committee. However, after the publication of his first article in the journal, “On the Role of the Chinese Bourgeoisie,” which was criticized for containing “right-opportunist mistakes,” he was stripped of his position. From the second issue of 1930, Pavel Mif served as chief editor of the journal.14

This journal was fairly representative of Russian Sinological studies in the thirties. It strikes me as useful not only for understanding the state of Russian Sinological studies but as a scholarly publication with merit in it own right. For example, in the second issue of 1930 there were such articles as “A Contribution to the Study of the Social Foundations of Ancient China” by Yollk, and what may have been the first discussion of a Latinized Chinese alphabet by someone who signed his name Chu Bai-to, who I suspect, with no real evidence to support the suspicion, may have been Ch’u Ch’iu-pai. In other issues the journal treated a wide spectrum of Chinese topics, some of which might be described as essentially political but many of which were essentially scholarly. There were theoretical discussions of peculiarly Chinese manifestations of social-historical development; analyses of the economic, philosophical, and sociological bases of Sun Yat-senism; reviews of works about China published both in Russia and abroad; and so forth.

Besides the publication of a Russian-Chinese dictionary and the academic journal Chinese Problems, the institute was also concerned with contemporary China. As I have mentioned above, attention was especially focused upon the many questions raised by the Chinese revolution, such as “the land question and peasant movement,” the path of Chinese economic development, the foreign domination of China, and so forth. By way of helping to provide materials for research, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern furnished the institute with a good many documents from and about China which had been received by the Comintern. In return, the institute committed itself to turn out periodic studies, which were confidential, for use by the Comintern. Most of the participants in political and economic research were young Chinese and Russian members of the institute. In
addition to employing most of the younger institute members, this section dealing with contemporary problems also had a much larger number of individuals doing research. Consequently, the contributions of this section were a good deal more extensive than those of the section of the institute dealing with academic problems.

From its foundation until 1930, the China Problems Research Institute was nominally subordinate to the Association for Research on National and Colonial Problems. However, in reality, it functioned as a branch of Sun Yat-sen University. After the university was closed in the autumn of 1930, the institute became a special branch of the Communist Academy of Science in Moscow, which stood right beside Sun Yat-sen University on Volkhonka Street.

Another institution connected with the university was the Translation Bureau. Translations from Russian to Chinese had always been important work at the university, but in the early years the translating work was geared primarily to the needs of the classroom. Initially, Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* was translated by P'u T'ao-ming, while translations were also made of Engels's *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* and of Karl Kautsky's *The Economic Doctrines of Marx*. At the same time, translations were made of the lectures delivered in every course. It might be noted parenthetically that the translations made of the lectures in our seminar on economic geography were somehow sent back to China by a student, Han Liang-hsien, who published them under his own name, with an introduction by Hu Han-min, when he returned to China. Other students did the same thing with the translated lectures of our courses in the History of Western Revolution and the History of Social Formations. Meanwhile the translation of important works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin was left undone due to a lack of time and resources. To remedy the situation the Soviet State Publishing House (Gosizdat) cooperated with Sun Yat-sen University in a project to translate and publish the "sacred works" of Marxism-Leninism. The State Publishing House financed the project, while the university provided the necessary talent; so the first works in the translation of the collected volumes of Lenin got under way. After the dismantling of the university, the translators stayed in Moscow and continued their work under the Soviet State Publishing House. There were about ten
translators in all.* Among them were Liu Ch'i-feng, Hsieh Chien-ming, and Sun Tsung-fan. Liu was originally from P'ing-hsiang, Kiangsi, and had studied at Peking Normal University. Liu's English was excellent, so he enrolled in the "English Class" at the university. Liu and I went to Moscow in the same group, and we worked together for a long time in the seminar on the History of the Evolution of Social Formations. I have heard that Liu died from some illness in Moscow.

Hsieh Chien-ming was a fellow provincial of mine from Tse-li County, Hunan. Although his oral interpreting skill was not very good, his ability to translate written material was of superior caliber. But all of the translators, despite their undeniable talents, were hampered by an insistence upon their producing a literal word-for-word translation between two such totally different languages as Russian and Chinese. The main reason for the choice of such an approach was the desire for accuracy. While the translation of the Marxist works was not completed by these translators and was finally taken over by Communist China's Bureau for the Translation and Editing of the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the translations done through the Translation Bureau were the standard ones used by the CCP for many years. On the whole, the influence of the Translation Bureau surpassed that of the corresponding American- and European-educated Chinese students' attempts to translate and introduce into China the elements of science and democracy. The American- and European-educated Chinese students were the first to begin the modernization of China, yet science is still undeveloped in China and democracy has never been implemented, but Johnny-come-lately communism is firmly entrenched in China.

The work of translating seems to be merely literary and technical in nature. Yet it contributed greatly to elevating the general level of

* I was among the translators while I was at the university. In addition to interpreting in some of the classes, I translated special lecture notes, reference works, and two works by Engels—From Monkey to Man and Dialectics of Nature. In the spring of 1930, when the struggle against Trotskyites in Sun Yat-sen University had reached a climax, the university authorities urged Yang Shang-k'uen and me to translate Stalin's large work On the Opposition in great haste. Working literally night and day, we managed to finish the job in a couple of weeks, for which we eventually were rewarded with a magnificent vacation at Yalta. During the Second World War, I saw copies of our translation on sale in Chungking in an edition published by the Hsin-hua Jih-pao under the Chinese title Lun Huan-tuei-p'ai. My name was not given as a translator. The translation was credited to a Chinese rendering of Yang Shang-k'uen's Russian name, which I have forgotten.

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theoretical thinking of the members of the CCP; so much so that the apprentice has now outstripped the master, and the Chinese Communists are capable of waging ideological battles with the Russians. It is perhaps ironic, and perhaps to the infinite regret of the Russians, that it was they who made this possible by initiating the first really sound translations of the works of the Communist masters at Sun Yat-sen University. The fact that Mao Tse-tung, who did not have access to Marxist and Leninist classics except in translation, is now heralded by some as the greatest contemporary Marxist-Leninist is evidence of the far-reaching influence of the works of the Translation Bureau.

Preparation for the China Printing House in Moscow began quite early, and it was officially opened in early 1928. It was responsible for printing the translated materials for the university proper, the translations of the Translation Bureau, and the Chinese edition of the Communist International. The Chinese director of the Printing House was Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s second brother, Ch’u Yun-pai, who used the Russian name Karakhan. He was also responsible for recruiting skilled printers from Shanghai and for purchasing Chinese printing equipment.

Some of the less academically inclined students were selected to work in the Printing House as proofreaders. Though they ceased to attend classes, they maintained their student status and, in addition, were paid very well. From the very beginning the Printing House was operated in cooperation with the Soviet State Publishing House and became directly affiliated with it after the closing of the university. Perhaps many of Russia’s Chinese propaganda materials are still printed by this Printing House of Sun Yat-sen University.

Notes

1. Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, in Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957, p. 86) stated that “Wealthy members of the Kuomintang and overseas Chinese provided the main material support for the university at first, but the Comintern and public organizations in the U.S.S.R. contributed money also. By the middle of 1927, when relations with the Kuomintang were severed, the institution was supported solely by Soviet Russia.”

2. The following excerpt from A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution sheds some light on this subject: “... at the time of the establishment of Whampoa Academy there were no funds, no ammunition, and no instructors. Guns and bullets were sent over by Soviet Russia. The main material support was provided by Soviet Russia .... The personnel assistance as well as material support from Soviet Russia made possible the establishment of Whampoa Military Academy” (Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution [Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957], p. 60). Shen Yun-loong also reported that “while the National Assembly [of the KMT] was in session [January, 1924], he [indicating Dr. Sun Yat-sen] assigned Chiang Kai-shek to undertake preparations for the establishment of
Whampoa Military Academy. In the beginning Chiang had no access to any available funds. Sometime later, Liao Chung-k'ai sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek stating: 'I am in possession of some money for the Academy. I will not ask for your expenditure report if you will not ask me the source of the money'" (Shen Yun-loong, *The Origin of the Chinese Communist Party* [Taipei: Free China Press, 1959], p. 40). Shen later said that the money came from the Russians as a result of their selling a large quantity of Russian kerosene on the Canton market.

3. It is beyond any doubt that Soviet Russia took it upon herself to bear the whole burden. But owing to the domestic as well as foreign circumstances of Soviet Russia at that time, it probably was imprudent to disclose the real source of the funds for the university. Thus, the Russian authority purposefully claimed that the university was not solely supported and established by Russia, that the Chinese people themselves provided the main material support, which was not actually the case.

4. Hu Han-min, an important figure in the CEC of the KMT and a long-time, close associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had left China for Russia in September, 1925. He had come under a cloud in China when his brother had been suspected of being involved in the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai, and it was thought that Hu Han-min himself may have been implicated. I understand that Michael Borodin had suggested that he visit Russia because of these circumstances. In Russia, among other things, he attended the Congress of the International of Peasants, to whose executive committee he was elected. He also attended the Sixth Plenum of the ECCI as the first KMT delegate to attend such a plenum, the KMT having been admitted to the Comintern. Hu Han-min arrived back in China on April 29, 1926. The solution of the legal status of Sun Yat-sen University came at the time when the KMT was granted a special membership in the Comintern. As early as June, 1924, when the Comintern held its Fifth Congress, the KMT reportedly submitted its application for membership in the Comintern: "The KMT also applied for membership in the Comintern, but it was not accepted, not being a Communist organization" (William Z. Foster, *History of the Three Internationals* [New York: International Publishers, 1955], p. 347). But the KMT was not the least discouraged when her application was politely denied. The KMT steadily worked toward this goal as may be seen by the following: "The sixth enlarged plenum of the ECCI met from February 17 to March 15, 1926... . . . Hu Han-min, a member of the Kuomintang attended for that party, which had been admitted to the Comintern as a sympathizing party. In the meeting of the CPSU political bureau in March 1926 the decision to admit the Kuomintang was carried out against the vote of Trotsky" (Jane Degras, *The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents* [London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1960], II, 245).

5. Original text in the collection of historical documents in the KMT archives, Taipei.

6. See note 5 of this chapter.

7. See note 5 of this chapter.

8. Shao Li-tzu, who at the time was closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek, attended the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI in November, 1926, as the representative of the KMT. On several occasions early in 1927 I heard him make speeches from the balcony of Comintern headquarters in Moscow.


10. See note 5 of this chapter.

11. See note 5 of this chapter.

12. Both Li Chou-sheng and Wang Pao-li were members of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. Li Chou-sheng, a favorite of Ch'en Shao-yu, returned to China during the summer of 1930, where he worked in Shanghai in the Organization Department of the CC of the CCP. According to the confession Hsiang Chung-fa made to his Nationalist captors before they executed him, Li was for a time in charge of the Organization Department. In 1932, when the Shanghai Bureau of the CC was created following the departure of the CC itself to Jui-chin, he became the first chairman of that bureau, in which I was in charge of propaganda. Because of his position in the Shanghai Bureau, the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CC elected him a member of the CC and an alternate member of the Politburo. He was arrested on June 26, 1934, in Shanghai—a day still vivid in my memory—for there were massive raids on Communist organizations in Shanghai that day, and I was nearly captured. As it turned out, though, I succeeded Li Chou-sheng as chairman of the Shanghai Bureau.

13. Yang Ming-chai and Voitinsky first visited Li Ta-chao in Peking, and through Li's introduction they met Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai. In Shanghai they founded the School of Foreign Languages whose function was to select students for Moscow's KUTV. In Shanghai and Canton they organized the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps and also did organizational work in the Shanghai trade unions.
14. I have had an opportunity to examine several early numbers of this journal at the University of Kansas Library.
15. There were, of course, other Chinese translations of some Marxist-Leninist works, mostly by Japanese. But these translations were, by and large, not well done.
Chapter V
The Educational Program and the Teaching Methods Used at Sun Yat-sen University

The Educational Program and Curriculum

The educational objectives and curriculum of Sun Yat-sen University took into consideration the following:

1. The goal of the university was the successful training of highly skilled political workers, and not primarily the education of academic scholars or scientists. In view of this consideration, natural science courses were completely absent from the curriculum.

2. In view of the rapid expansion of the Chinese revolutionary movement, with its accompanying increased demands for skilled political workers and leaders, the training of political workers had to be swift and efficacious. Because of this, the period of training was two years, half that of a regular university.

3. The emphasis was on both theory and practice. To be efficient political workers, the students had to be capable of wielding a pen to sway the masses and of wielding a sword to direct a campaign.

4. Academic endeavor had to be supplemented by actual on-the-spot observations of Russian governmental structure and Party organization.

In keeping with the above four considerations, the two-year curriculum of Sun Yat-sen University was as follows:

1. Language Instruction. There was intensive work in the Russian language, plus elective courses in a second language, such as English, French, or German. During the first semester, Russian was the most important and demanding course. It was also one of the most important factors in deciding whether a student passed or failed. This emphasis was carried through the second semester, but by this time some students simply dropped the study of Russian while others continued their struggle with Russian grammar.

2. History. The history curriculum included the following courses; History of the Evolution of Social Formations, History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement, History of the Russian Revolution, History of Eastern Revolutionary Movements, and History of Western Revolu-
tionary Movements. The reason for this emphasis on history is quite clear. To the Marxists, traditional history, as a product of bourgeois historiography, is unorganized chaos, showing little awareness of order or of the objective laws that govern the historical development of human societies.

The five history courses at the university were newly developed. The History of the Evolution of Social Formations was concerned with the processes and various stages of social evolution. This course was one of the most colorful and interesting at the university, and I was very much involved in it, for I was the senior assistant instructor in this course and did most of the interpreting for it, both from Russian to Chinese and from Chinese to Russian.

The History of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement was taught by Karl Radek, the first rector of the university. This course included discussions of Chinese history in general; the emphasis, however, was understandably on modern revolutionary movements. Radek's views were strikingly similar to the views of the Chinese Communist historian Fan Wen-lan, and it is not impossible that the latter's were borrowed from Radek. Fan contends that the whole history of China is a history of agrarian revolutions.² The two courses on the History of the Russian Revolution and the History of Western Revolutionary Movements, as can be noted from their titles, also focused upon revolutionary movements. The instructor of History of Eastern Revolutionary Movements was also a celebrity, and his course, like Radek's, was taught in the auditorium. Unfortunately, I am not absolutely sure of his name. However, it was probably B. F. Shumiansky, known also as Andrei Chervonnyi, an expert on Oriental affairs and, at that time, rector of KUTV in Moscow.

The above is a summary of the history curriculum in Sun Yat-sen University. The courses had one guiding principle—to inculcate in the student the principle of "historical materialism," and "the concept of world revolution." To achieve this end, I am sure that the university administration must have worked zealously.

3. Philosophy. Our philosophical education was supplied by a unique course entitled Materialism. The purpose of the course was to provide the student with a new world-view, and with a new methodology—dialectics. This course consisted of dialectical materialism and
historical materialism. Stalin, in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, gives a clear indication of the content of these two aspects of materialism. He states:

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is *dialectical*, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is *materialistic*.\(^3\)

On historical materialism Stalin writes:

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.\(^4\)

The above two definitions express the content of the course quite clearly. Most of the young Chinese intellectuals at Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, had only a weak background in traditional Chinese philosophy and very little knowledge of "bourgeois" or modern Western philosophy. We were instantly fascinated by the freshness of dialectical materialism. The novelty of dialectical philosophy, plus the fact that the course was taught in my class by a young and beautiful female instructor, made the course a very enthralling one indeed.

4. *Political Economy*. Basically, this course involved studying Marx's *Das Kapital*. Since *Das Kapital* itself was a highly technical and difficult work, we used Karl Kautsky's *The Economic Doctrine of Karl Marx* as a textbook. Kautsky's work is truly remarkable, presenting the thought of *Das Kapital* with a lucidity not found in other books. In the second year of the course we used Lapidus's and Ostrovityanov's *An Outline of Political Economy*, which was then a new book, as a text. In it they not only expounded Marx's economic theory, but applied it in analyzing actual Soviet experience in the construction of a Socialist economy. The above, then, formed the basic content for our study of political economy. Great importance was attached to this course in political economy at the university. It was always a difficult course in the two-year curriculum, and was usually taught by renowned, first-class economists from Russia or Germany.

5. *Economic Geography*. Although Marxists deny that geographical environment exerts a *determining* influence on social evolution, they
nevertheless cannot deny that “Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, influences the development of society, accelerates or retards its development.”

After the Russian Revolution much talent was used on research in economic geography—an especially well developed branch of geography then in the United States and the United Kingdom—and the results of this research made direct contributions to the Soviet national economy. Our years at the university coincided with this period of relatively intense research, and, consequently, such a course was taught at the university. Although the Russians did vast amounts of work in the field of economic geography during this period, the basic subject matter still followed the research and accomplishments of Western scholars, and many of the lectures were given in English.

6. Leninism. During the early part of April, 1924, after Lenin's death in January, Stalin delivered a series of lectures at Sverdlov University in Moscow, systematically expounding his interpretation of the doctrines of Lenin. From these lectures “Leninism” was born. When these lectures were published in book form under the title Foundations of Leninism, they took on even greater importance. As one can imagine, “Leninism” was a very important course at the university. The textbook used was Stalin's Foundations of Leninism mentioned above. The instructors in this course were invariably reputable Communist theoreticians. Of all the courses in Sun Yat-sen University, this course had the most impressive list of professors.

7. Military Science. The study of military strategy was undertaken both because of the theoretical importance of the subject and because it was a practical necessity. The course was perhaps one of Sun Yat-sen University's most distinguishing features, as one doesn't usually encounter military science of this variety in a university.

Lenin had said that important issues in history were all decided by force, and Stalin said in 1926, “In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. This is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. And therein lies the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.” He further urged:
In the first place, the Communists in China must in every way intensify political work in the army,...

In the second place, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, must undertake a thorough study of the art of war. They must not regard it as something secondary, because nowadays it is a cardinal factor in the Chinese revolution.7

The seriousness with which the courses in military science were conducted at the university was totally in keeping with Stalin's judgment. During my stay at the university, from December, 1926, on, the director of military-science education was a division commander with the Chinese name of K'ung Chieh-chih, whose Russian name I have forgotten. At that time he apparently was commander of the garrison forces of Moscow, and at one time he had been a military adviser in China. In addition, there were some officers with the rank of colonel. Among them was the director of the university’s military-research room, a wing commander called Akimov.8

In the military-research room were exhibited various common firearms such as cannons, rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and howitzers, in addition to assorted topographical sand models. As a supplement to regular classroom lectures, lectures were held in this room on the structure and use of the various weapons. In addition, we often toured the military academies near Moscow and visited nearby army garrisons to practice marksmanship. Starting in 1928, each summer the whole male student body of the university, with a few exceptions, put on military uniforms and were quartered in an army garrison near Moscow to receive field training. According to one of the students who participated in this training, most of the officers there had been officers at Whampoa Military Academy in China. At the end of the training session the students were told by one officer, “Your military training has been comparable to the military training received by Whampoa Academy cadets in classes one, two, and three; and you are now able to lead military campaigns.” He was not boasting, for many students later did become famous generals, attesting to the success of Sun Yat-sen University's combination of military and academic education.

The above passage has outlined the educational plan and curriculum of Sun Yat-sen University. Some courses, such as Economic
of a Russian-language work entitled *A Study Of Sun Yat-sen’s Teachings* were available free of charge. While no authorship was attributed to the book, it seemed obvious to us that it had been written by someone who knew a great deal about the subject. Its detailed analysis of Sun Yat-sen’s teachings was severely critical of them. The author chiefly developed ideas which Lenin propounded in 1912 in “Democracy and Narodnism in China.” For in that article Lenin praised Sun Yat-sen as a progressive bourgeois democrat, while at the same time warning that underlying Sun’s Socialist ideas was “petty-bourgeois ‘Socialist’ reactionary” theory. The ready availability of this volume at Sun Yat-sen University was ironic indeed. It demonstrated, of course, that the relationship between the Russian Communists and the KMT was not based upon any ideological affinity, but upon political considerations and tactical expediency.

From all that has been written above, one can draw some conclusions: First, the usual four-year course was completed in two years’ time. The work was so intensive that the students had to spend eight hours a day in the classroom. Second, from the nature of the courses one sees that the ambition of Sun Yat-sen University was no less than the complete molding of a student’s thinking, starting from the very fundamentals of philosophy and world view. The final goal was to enable him, in whatever circumstances, to grasp the essentials and arrive at ready-made answers through a ready-made methodology. And, finally, while Sun Yat-sen University nominally was supposed to train KMT cadres, in fact it was designed solely to turn out students oriented towards furthering the Communist movement in China.

**Some Class Arrangements and Special Facilities at the University**

Sun Yat-sen University was a veritable catchall of personalities different from each other in education and in status. About five hundred persons made up the first and second graduating classes of the university. My own student identification card was 527, which indicated that by the time I enrolled at Sun Yat-sen University at the end of 1926, 526 students had enrolled previously, and there were, of course, enrollments which followed mine at about the same time. However, students left the university from time to time without having graduated.
For example, following the Plenum of the ECCI in November, 1926, about thirty Sun Yat-sen University students were drafted to join M. N. Roy’s mission to China. Thus, allowing for such dropouts, an estimate of about five hundred students actually studying at the university at the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927 seems reasonable. A majority of these came directly from China; but some of them arrived from the United States, Germany, France, the Philippines, and other countries.

One alumnus of Sun Yat-sen University states:

The group from China was the most diverse. There were dudes and belles, housewives and mistresses, soldiers, laborers, and farmers, although students predominated. According to Marxist classifications, ninety percent of them were petty bourgeoisie. This great diversity of backgrounds thus also explains the tremendous differences in their levels of education, ranging from nearly illiterate to scholarly graduate students or even professors. After the Communist revolts at Nanchang and Canton in 1927, the number of students of the university increased rapidly, although there was also a corresponding decline in their quality. The above account is not exaggerated, for the academic plan and arrangement of classes had to take this great diversity into account.

The arrangement of classes was sometimes based on the linguistic qualifications of the students. For example, in the first and second graduating classes there were the so-called English Class, the Russian Class, and the Semi-Russian Class; and the students in these groups received most of their instruction in the foreign language that they already were able to understand. In the English Class, for example, lectures were delivered in English, and in it were people who either had studied in the United States or had otherwise acquired facility in English. Students in the Russian Class included people who had studied Russian in China or who had rapidly picked up the language in Russia. In the Semi-Russian Class an interpreter was used only part of the time. This procedure somewhat alleviated the chronic shortage of Russian-Chinese interpreters. It also facilitated communication between students and instructors, which the process of interpreting made burdensome and time-consuming.

On my arrival at the university in November of 1926, I was enrolled in the tenth class of the second graduating class, all meetings of which were addressed through Chinese-language interpreters. Later I moved
up to the seventh class, which also depended on interpreters. There I met two friends of mine, Wu Chia-yu and Wang Ch’ung-wu. Wu had studied Russian for a while at Peking University, but had later majored in Chinese literature. Therefore he had to take up Russian anew in Moscow. Wang sat next to me in class. He was a very large gentleman from Shantung, candid, forthright, and impatient with conventions. He was also a brilliant scholar. All in all, I must say that I benefited greatly from my close association with these two individuals. Unfortunately, however, I was soon transferred to the fourth class, the so-called Semi-Russian Class.

Aside from linguistic considerations, the length of time of Party membership (CCP, of course) also seemed to be a factor in class placement. The seventh group of the first graduating class was one that appeared to have been set up with this criterion in mind. We called it the “Theoretical Class.” Most students in this class had been Party members for a long time and had lengthy experience in the revolution. Some were also professors. Many were already famous, like Chou T’ien-lu, Shen Tse-min, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Hu Chung, Li Chun-tse, Yu Hsiu-sung, Ch’u Wu, Tso Ch’uan, and Wang Pien (a woman).

Yu Hsiu-sung had played an important part in the early history of the CCP. When the Comintern sent Voitinsky, who was accompanied by Yang Ming-chai, to China in March, 1920, Yu ably served for a time as Voitinsky’s assistant. Yu was also instrumental in the preparations that went into founding both the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps and the CCP. In addition he helped to found the Foreign Languages School in Shanghai. Wang Pien served as director of the Shantung CYC. Shen Tse-min, brother of the famous Communist author Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun), was also famous in Shanghai’s literary circles in his own right. In 1923 he, along with Wang Ch’iu-hsin and Chiang Kuang-chih, fellow students at Shanghai University, led the “Revolutionary Literature Movement.” At Sun Yat-sen University he was not only a student, but also an interpreter and assistant instructor. He was one of the 28 Bolsheviks in the university. Upon Shen’s return to China, he was sent later to the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base as one of the representatives of the CC, where he died after a long illness.

Teng Hsiao-p’ing, originally a “work and frugal study” student in France, went to Moscow from France. While a student at Sun Yat-sen
University he acquired the nickname “Little Cannon” because of his short stature and aggressive spirit. After his return to China he was stationed in Kwangsi Province, where he organized insurrections among KMT troops and was a founder of the Soviet district there. Subsequently, he did important political work in the Red Army and experienced a conspicuous and rapid rise in influence under Mao Tsetung. At the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1956 he became secretary general of the Party’s Secretariat. Among a great many other top-level undertakings, Teng headed the CCP delegation to Moscow in July, 1963, which held, and then broke off, talks with the CPSU’s leadership. Yet in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, he became a target of attack second only to Liu Shao-ch'i.

Chou T‘ien-lu broke with the CCP and subsequently became an important Trotskyite. He was very learned in Chinese history and literature and once served as an adviser to General Hu Tsung-nan. He was shot by an underground CCP agent in Shanghai in 1949 shortly before the CCP took the city.

Ch‘u Wu was the son-in-law of the deceased KMT hero Yü Yu-jen. At one time he left the CCP and was a member of the Nationalist government’s Control Yuan. Since 1949 he has worked in Peking.

Tso Ch‘uan originally attended Whampoa Military Academy, and after his graduation from Sun Yat-sen University, he continued his studies at Moscow Military Academy. In 1930 Tso returned to China and went to the Kiangsi Soviet Military District as commander of the Fifteenth Army.

One can easily see that this “Theoretical Class” was quite extraordinary. While there were other groups in the first and second graduating classes at Sun Yat-sen University, none contained such notable individuals.

A class called the Special Class was formed sometime in 1928. It included among its members not only long-time Communist Party members, but also such KMT “founding fathers” as Wu Yu-chang, who had been a member of the Tung-meng Hui and a member of the CEC of the KMT. During the revolution of 1925–1927 Wu represented the Communist Party in the Wuhan government. After the failure of that revolution, Wu was sent to Sun Yat-sen University. When the university was closed down in 1930, he was sent to Vladivostok as an
instructor in the Soviet Party School there which was operated jointly by the local Soviet Party and the local government for young Chinese workers living in the Russian Far East.* The rector and all the faculty members of the school were former students of Sun Yat-sen University. Upon his return to China, Wu was concerned with CCP cultural and educational affairs. He was at the time of his death on December 12, 1966, a member of the CC of the CCP and chairman of the State Council's Committee for the Simplification of the Chinese Language. Many of the measures for reforming the Chinese language have been due to his efforts. Even while he was still at Sun Yat-sen University, he had started to work on the Latinization of the language. While in Vladivostok, he was, along with myself, a member of the Soviet Russian Far East District Committee for the Promotion of the Latinization of the Chinese Language. Among his notable contributions were the writing of a Latinized textbook and a dictionary.

Another senior member in this Special Class was Lin Tsu-han, also called Lin Po-chu. He joined the revolutionary movement while still a student in Japan, and he was one of Sun Yat-sen's early comrades and a member of the Tung-meng Hui. During the period of KMT-CCP cooperation in the nineteen twenties he was a member of the CEC of the KMT and one of the Communist Party's important representatives in the KMT administration. Like Wu Yu-chang, he went to Moscow in 1928; and again like Wu, he went to Vladivostok to teach in the Soviet Party School for young Chinese workers. Upon his return to China, he first became the Finance Minister of the Central Soviet Government in Kiangsi, and later chairman of the Communist government of the Border Regions during the Yenan period. Prior to his death in 1960 Lin served as a member of the Politburo of the CCP.

A third senior member of the Special Class was Hsu T'e-li, whose nickname was "Ole Grandma." He was a famous educator in Hunan Province. Among his students was Mao Tse-tung. In 1968 he was deputy chief of the Department of Propaganda of the CC of the CCP and a long-time member of the CC.

Yeh Chien-ying, who became a marshal in the Red Army and a member of the CC of the CCP, was another member of the Special

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* At this time there were perhaps 100,000 Chinese in the Vladivostok area.
Class. At the time of writing, he holds a great many extremely important military and governmental posts in Peking.

In the Special Class, too, were Chiang Hao, who had been a member of the Peking military government's Parliament in the early twenties, and Fang Wei-hsia, who had served as Director of Education in the Hunan provincial government in the early twenties. Both were prominent Communists who had played leading roles in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927.

Yet another member was Hsia Hsi, who attended the Sixth National Congress of the CCP in Moscow in June, 1928, where he was elected a member of the CC of the CCP. When he returned to China he was assigned to the Hunghu–Hunan–Western Hupeh Base to direct Party affairs. And lastly there was Ho Shu-heng, who, along with Mao Tse-tung, represented the Hunan Communist group to the First National Congress of the CCP at Shanghai on July 1, 1921. He was also a delegate to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP. After his return from Moscow in 1930, he was assigned to work in the Kiangsi Soviet district. Ho attended the First National Congress of Chinese Soviets held at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, on November 7, 1931. At this congress he was elected inspector general of the Central Soviet government. Ho also participated in the Second National Congress of Chinese Soviets held in Kiangsi on January 22, 1934. At this congress Ho Shu-heng was elected a member of the CEC of the Central Soviet government.

After reviewing the records of these individuals, there can be no doubt that they were indeed a very "special class." All had extraordinary careers, all were highly educated, and all were experienced revolutionary warriors. Their special qualifications naturally presented difficulties for the university's administration. For one thing, most of them were past the age of fifty, and their ability to memorize had declined. Therefore, their foreign-language hours had to be reduced correspondingly. In the second place, most of them were learned scholars, so the class had to be conducted on a much more sophisticated level than ordinary classes. Their class was conducted more like a graduate seminar than an ordinary lecture course. Third, as they had been leaders and would continue their leadership upon their return to China, special emphasis had to be put on leadership training.
With this special attention these “old students” showed great spirit in applying themselves. One of the most enthusiastic students was Hsu T'e-li. At that time, he was well past the age of fifty, and some of his teeth had already fallen out, causing him considerable difficulty in pronouncing the troublesome Russian sounds. But he was undaunted. Every morning he would wake up very early and practice his pronunciation.

Ho Shu-heng was another student who never tired of learning. Although in appearance he was rather dull looking, he was actually quite quick-witted. In May of 1927, when General Hsü K'e-hsiang carried on the anti-Communist coup in Changsha, Hunan (this was the so-called Ma-jih Incident), Ho Shu-heng was one of the persons captured, and of course he had little chance of escaping the death sentence. Fortunately for him, however, the judge had no idea who he was and concluded from his appearance that Ho was certainly not a rebel, but probably an old country scholar. The judge scornfully asked Ho's name and profession. Ho answered that his name was Chang, and that he was a private tutor. Then feigning naivety, he went on to recite with gusto passages from the *Analects of Confucius*. The judge stopped him impatiently and continued with the questioning, “Do you know what the Kuomintang and the Communists are?” To this question Ho answered with dignity, “I am a scholar! What things do I not know?” “Then tell what you know. Speak up, speak up!” To this Ho replied with an obvious air of satisfaction, “I know perfectly well that the Kuomintang is the Three Principles of the People and that the Communist Party is the sponsor of a ‘Constitution of Five Rights.’” This marvelous theory was greeted with loud laughter, and even the judge could not keep from smiling. With a loud bang from the judge's gavel, Ho was dismissed from the courtroom. By the time that the authorities had found out who Ho really was, he had long since disappeared.

There are endless interesting anecdotes concerning the students of the Special Class. After two years of intense study, the achievements of the Special Class were understandably great, and those who were not later captured or executed made considerable contributions to the Communist revolution. However, I must not digress further.

The Preparatory Class, a special class for undereducated workers,
came into being in the following manner. In the 1920s the Comintern had complained that the composition of the membership of the CCP was faulty, that the majority of Party members were petty bourgeois in origin, and that the CCP hadn’t assimilated laborers into the Party or trained proletarian cadres. The Comintern asked how such a party could ever hope to bring about the hegemony of the proletariat. For this reason, at the Fourth Comintern Congress of November-December, 1922, Ch’en Tu-hsiu was chided by Karl Radek, who told him to get out of his Confucian ivory tower and start a labor movement. The Comintern was evidently quite dissatisfied with what it regarded as the overly academic character of the CCP’s leadership, regarding it as not sufficiently proletarian. And indeed, after that the CCP did try to recruit more workers and to train proletarian cadres.

In June, 1928, at the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, a former boatman from Hankow named Hsiang Chung-fa was elected secretary general of the CCP in keeping with the wishes of the Comintern, which inaugurated a “Proletarian Age” in the CCP. This step of electing a proletarian Party leader was unprecedented in the history of the CCP. In reality, however, the action was a mere formality, for from the time of his election to his capture and execution, Hsiang was never more than a puppet.

During this same period of time the “Proletarian Age” was also heralded in at Sun Yat-sen University. After the 1927–1928 failure of the revolution, the Communist organizations in Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton, and other industrial and commercial centers were for the most part destroyed. It was the proletarian members of the Party who suffered the most. In order to save as many of the proletarian elements as possible, a group of selected proletarian cadres was sent to Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow.

Most of these proletarian comrades were illiterate. Their training and education thus presented special difficulties, and they were all enrolled in a special Preparatory Class. The primary objective of this class was the elimination of illiteracy plus the absorption of a limited amount of general knowledge.

The main courses of this class were Chinese, history, geography, arithmetic, and “political common sense.” There was also Russian-language instruction.
I was honored to teach the political common sense course for this class, which made me quite apprehensive, because these were not ordinary students and because I knew that theoretically they would be the future leaders of the revolution. Many of the students had absolutely no educational background, and lecturing to them was very difficult. Progress was slow in this class, and their achievements were somewhat less than ideal. However, considering the almost complete lack of any educational foundation, one could not have expected any more of them. In the classroom the workers used Bukharin's *The A B C of Communism* as a text, while outside the classroom they learned the practical aspects of proletarian leadership by participating in Party and student organizations.

In spite of their generally low scholastic level the proletarians were a powerful faction within the university. One episode involving proletarian leadership, while it does not strictly fit into a description of the academic program, may illustrate the situation. A worker was elected chairman of the students' commune, and even the dining-room supervisor was of proletarian origin. This dining-room supervisor was an individual named Li Chien-ju, the hero of three Shanghai revolts (1926–1927). He had chronically bloodshot eyes and a very fearsome face. He was involved in one incident that I remember quite distinctly. A "bourgeois" student, Hsi-men Tsung-hua, was eating only the soft inner part of the bread and throwing away the crusts. This was obviously an act of wanton waste, and Supervisor Li would have none of it. At first Li tried to persuade Hsi-men that his action was wrong. Hsi-men, however, felt that his honor was challenged, and he turned a deaf ear to Li, continuing to eat only the soft part of the bread. Li was so enraged that his bloodshot eyes lit up even more fearsomely than usual. He picked up a knife and advanced toward Hsi-men Chung-hua as if he were about to kill him on the spot. Hsi-men, however, retreated very hastily. Li watched him flee with a chuckle, and nothing more came of the incident.

The seminars (Kafedra in Russian) were another important part of the academic setup at Sun Yat-sen University. These seminars were composed of the professors of a course, its assistant instructors, and its interpreters, who met regularly to discuss the daily progress of the course in question, and to prepare the lecture materials and translations.
The courses that had such seminars were Military Science, History of the Evolution of Social Formations, Political Economy, and Leninism. Each seminar had office space and special rooms allotted to it.

In the Military Science seminar room there were various weapons and sand models on display, while in the History of the Evolution of Social Formations seminar room there was a small museum with various charts on the evolution of human society and many historical artifacts. These seminars had a very stimulating effect on the students associated with them.

I was appointed to the seminar for the History of the Evolution of Social Formations and was head of the Chinese staff for it. The course was a very broad one, drawing upon different fields such as archaeology, anthropology, and paleontology, each of which had a difficult technical vocabulary. For this reason it was the most unpopular course among the interpreters. However, I liked the course and enjoyed interpreting for it.

Other members of this seminar were Li Chou-sheng, Yang Shang-k’uen, Wang Sheng-ti (Wang Hao), Hsiao T’e-fu, Liu Ch’i-feng, Fan Hui-chou, and a Mr. Hsu. Yang Shang-k’uen, as a member of the CC of the CCP and chief administrative official of the CC office, came under vitriolic attack in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. Wang Sheng-ti was a transfer student from the University of Paris. Wang, upon his return to China, was appointed propaganda chief of the Kiangsu provincial committee of the CCP. Later he was captured and left the Party. Upon his release he became a professor at the Land Research Institute in Nanking. Still later he turned to administrative affairs and became director of the Land Affairs Bureau of Hunan and Hupeh provinces. In 1949, when the Communists occupied the mainland, he had just completed his term as mayor of Changsha, Hunan. He was taken prisoner and died in jail. Hsiao T’e-fu was another transfer student from France. Upon his return to China he became a professor of economics at the University of Peking. Li, Yang, Wang, Hsiao, and myself were all members of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. About the fate of the other three students mentioned above I know little. After the university closed, Liu Ch’i-feng stayed in Moscow and translated Marxist classics. Lastly, the fates of Fan Hui-chou and Mr. Hsu are a complete mystery to me.
In all, there were four professors for the course. The head professor was a bearded man named Levkovsky who loved to drink. I interpreted for him. At that time I had only studied Russian for six or seven months; my fellow students frankly had no great faith in my ability, and I must say I had even less. Fortunately, Levkovsky was a very cooperative and understanding person, and he was a great help to me in the first few sessions.

While the hours that I spent in the seminar room preparing translation materials or asking one of the professors on duty about some obscure point in the lectures paid off handsomely, generally speaking, acting as an interpreter was more detrimental to me than helpful. This was due to the fact that preparation for the seminar took a great deal of time and delayed my own work. However, I was compensated for this loss of time by one hundred and seventy-five rubles a month—a considerable sum of money at that time. Among the students I was considered a “capitalist,” and requests for loans and donations were numerous. I became known as the “Little Meng Shang-chun,” Meng Shang-chun having been a prime minister in ancient times who was noted for his generosity.

The Russian Consultation Seminar was another special facility to aid the students who were studying Russian. The Russian instructors took turns on duty, answering any questions that students might have in regard to the Russian language. I was a frequent visitor to this consultation seminar, especially during my second semester at the university when I had already become an interpreter myself. At this time I found that many Russian textbooks were still quite difficult for me. Each day I would spend several hours in the consultation room with a Russian text and a dictionary by my side, looking up new words, asking the instructors questions, and jotting down notes. After a semester of hard work I began to make headway and progressed to more difficult readings such as Lenin’s *The State and Revolution*.

The rapid progress I was able to make I owed naturally to my instructors, but certainly the unique consultation room was also a great help. Most of the language instructors were ladies, and their patience, responsiveness, and sense of responsibility I cannot forget even to this day.
The unique teaching methods used at Sun Yat-sen University

The teaching methods employed at the university were quite singular and were praised by all of the students who attended, regardless of their affiliation. These methods were efficiently attuned to the intensive two-year curriculum.

First of all, the teaching methods were functionally dependent upon the different levels of education of the students in the regular, special, and preparatory classes. The methods employed in regular and special classes were more or less similar to one another, while differing radically from the methods employed in the preparatory classes for laborers and peasants, where the main task was to do away with their illiteracy. Naturally the specific method varied also with respect to the particular subject matter of the course. For instance, courses such as Dialectical and Historical Materialism placed great emphasis upon theoretical thinking and discussion, while courses such as Military Science naturally tended to emphasize practical application.

I shall first discuss the teaching method employed in the courses in Russian language. With the exception of a very few students who had studied some Russian before coming to the university, most of the students were completely ignorant of the complexities of the Russian tongue. However, due to the fact that the university operated on an intensive two-year curriculum, we students were immediately plunged into intensive courses in Russian newspaper reading, Russian prose, and Russian grammar. These three courses accounted for four hours of class time daily, six days a week. While this was the regular number of class hours devoted to courses, they were insufficient to permit the rapid absorption of language skills that was expected in the intensive two-year curriculum of Sun Yat-sen University. Consequently a method was employed which I shall refer to as the “speed-learning method.”

The first Russian class I attended was “Russian Newspaper Reading.” The newspaper we read was Pravda, and our introduction to it was abrupt and somewhat unorthodox. Identical copies of this newspaper were placed before us, while at the same time the woman instructor began to read her copy aloud. Judging from her facial expression, she was evidently enthusiastic about what she was reading.
However, we might as well have been deaf. This fact did not seem to bother her a bit, and she only kept pointing to the title page and saying, "Sevodinya V Nomere . . ." (Today in this number . . .). At the same time she gestured that we were to repeat after her. It was months before we finally acquired an "ear" for Russian. After this initial period, however, progress was surprisingly rapid. It was only then that we came to appreciate the effectiveness of this direct oral method.

The second Russian course was Russian Prose Reading. The selections in the text were chosen especially for us. The articles were usually theoretical and argumentative in nature rather than descriptive or expressive. Quite obviously the design of the course was not to provide us with an appreciation for Russian literature, but rather to provide us with the vocabulary in politics, philosophy, and economics that was necessary for revolutionary work. Student participation was required of all. Right or wrong, the student had to learn not to be embarrassed by his errors and to speak, speak, speak.

The last course was Russian Grammar. Russian grammar is, to say the least, a very complicated matter. Just the inflections of case are enough to drive one insane; however, these inflections must be memorized if one is to be proficient at either reading or writing. In this class we wrote very few compositions. Instead, we concentrated primarily on the syntax and grammar necessary for a competence in reading Russian. It was assumed that we would pick up composition and literature on our own.

In spite of the efficiency with which the Russian language was taught, however, there was just so much that could be accomplished in a two-year course. Of the more than one thousand students who I would estimate attended Sun Yat-sen University from its inception in 1925 through its closing in 1930, I would guess that perhaps about ten percent of them actually achieved a usable proficiency in the Russian language. For even if one had studied Russian and nothing else for two years, one would have been hard-pressed to become truly proficient in the language; whereas, one actually had a good many additional, non-language courses to cope with while studying Russian at Sun Yat-sen University. Furthermore, the concentration of study was on political, economic, and philosophic vocabularies to the exclusion of
the vocabulary of Russian literature. This meant that we were cut off from the culture of Mother Russia, which is an impossible state of affairs for someone who seeks to truly be at home in the Russian language. We read not a single piece of literary writing, not even Gorky, and none of us, except I suppose for a few rare individuals, could translate Russian literary works. I remember struggling through Gorky’s *Mother* on my own, but I found it a trying task, and my understanding of it most likely was superficial. Nor was the difficulty in reading Gorky one merely of not understanding the culture of Mother Russia, for Gorky wrote a fairly colloquial Russian, and the Russian we learned in class was bookish and stilted. Thus, when we mingled with ordinary Russians, we found communicating difficult, and we had to learn the language of the common man on our own—those of us who were motivated to learn it, that is. I suppose such problems are common to any intensive language-study program, however, and I would doubt that ours was less satisfactory than most.

In the social sciences the method of study could be divided into four distinct stages. In the first stage the professor lectured in Russian, giving an overall view on a particular problem, delimiting it, and pointing out important points the students should note. At this time the professor handed out a study outline and notes, along with the titles of reference works, with the minimum and maximum required readings indicated. In studying these notes and reference materials, the students came across many questions and confusing points. These questions and points were then raised during a period of class consultation in which the professor gave answers to the questions. This class consultation constituted the second stage of the method mentioned above. In the third stage the professor of the course asked individual students questions which they were required to answer extemporaneously. A conference constituted the final stage of the process. This conference was an attempt to sum up the material examined in the foregoing stages. The discussion was free, and violent debates often erupted. During this discussion of conclusions, the professor acted as moderator. At the conclusion of the conference he would point out which views were correct and which were incorrect, and he would summarize the correct position. Each stage of this teaching method
usually ran around two hours, and the grades were assigned almost completely on the basis of the student’s participation in class.

The students at the university were all greatly impressed by the above teaching method, which they felt was more stimulating and efficient than the usual lecture method. Personally, it seems to me that this method had several advantages. The most important of these being: One, it stimulated thinking rather than emphasizing rote memory. Two, the student had to be active rather than passive. He had to choose his own special topic and reference material from the outline; he also had to analyze and criticize the works he read and raise questions about them. Three, the student benefited immensely from the mutual discussions. He began to see problems where he had suspected none before and to see old solutions in a new light. Four, the stress upon daily work and oral testing in the class, with the accompanying elimination of formal examinations, gave a true measure of the student’s worth. Five, learning was like a battle. When one put forth his arguments it was like charging forward on a battlefield. If the student was defeated, he still learned perseverance in the face of adversity. He also learned grace in accepting defeat and complying with the will of the majority.

The weekly meetings of Communist Party cells, into which all of us who were Party or Youth League members were grouped, were conducted exactly as were the class conferences mentioned above. There usually were twenty or, at the most, twenty-five of us in each cell, over which a guide presided. After the abolition of the Moscow branch of the CCP, a Russian always acted as guide. At the cell meetings we could say anything we wished, or thought prudent, but each of us was required to say something about the topic under discussion. One could not remain silent, and anyone who sought to do so would be called upon by the guide to speak out. Of course, one facet of this approach to cell meetings and class conferences was an attempt to insure that everyone concerned adhered to acceptable views and to single out and deal with aberrant ideas. But another aspect of the approach was to develop in all of us the ability to express ourselves on our feet. The method was effective in both respects. Even semiliterate workers developed the ability, through repeated pressure to do so, to express themselves publicly. Thus, while one might not be able to write any-
thing at all, or even to read, one generally became adept at making
speeches, which was an important quality for a revolutionary agitator
to have. Hsiang Chung-fa, for example, who had been a semiliterate
boatman and who for several years was secretary general of the CCP,
could not write effectively; he was nevertheless an orator of some
ability. This pattern was the case more often than not.

Turning from classroom methods of teaching, I will now discuss
the more practical aspects of our educational experience. These prac­
tical aspects of our education consisted primarily of excursions, tours,
and practical training at industrial units. In the summer of 1927, after
my arrival in Russia, the university organized two touring parties—one
to the Crimean Peninsula and one to the Caucasus. The object of these
tours was to study the history and social structure of the various
minority groups in these regions.

I was with the group that went to the Caucasus. It was composed of
six or seven students and was headed by the dean of the university,
Ignatov. The professor of Western History, Wax, and a professor of
the History of the Evolution of Social Formations also accompanied
our group. We left Moscow in July, going south to Vladikavkaz by
train, and from there continuing our trip by bus along the famed
Voennno-Gruzinskaya Daroga (Military Gruzinskaya Highway). Mid­
way we stopped at Kasbek for two nights and a day, and saw the
perennially frozen glacier and a volcano. We also visited a nearby
tribal village. After leaving Kasbek, our bus climbed higher and higher
into the mountains.

Finally, we arrived at a place called Basanaur. On our second day
there we scaled a mountain in order to visit the Hefsur tribe. This
tribe numbered approximately five hundred. And, although these
people lived in the mountains, they were not considered backward. We
met the tribe’s hoary sage, a man of one hundred and twenty-five years.
Through the services of a young policeman of the tribe, we were able
to conduct a very interesting interview with the old sage. The Hefsur
people were very proud, brave, warlike, and exceptionally long-lived.

They had resisted Tsarist Russian oppression, and they also fought
against the Soviet regime. The Soviet government had tried to subdue
the tribe by armed force, but the Hefsurs used the mountainous terrain
to their advantage and fought off the Russians valiantly. The conflict
dragged on and on, and finally the Soviet Russians had to adopt a soft approach—exemption of the Hefsurs from taxation and the education of selected Hefsur youths. It was through this group of educated Hefsur youths that the tribe was eventually conquered.

Leaving the Hefsurs, we went to Tiflis (now renamed Tbilisi), the capital of the Georgian SSR, where we were given a very warm welcome by the native people. We stayed in Tiflis for two days and learned a great deal.

So far we had been traveling in the mountains. But then we arrived at a place called Chakow which was very near the Black Sea. Chakow was a tea plantation, at that time the only one in Russia. Bamboo was also grown there. There were Chinese tea farmers working on the plantation. They were training the Russians in the arts of tea-growing and processing. These Chinese were royally treated by the Russians.

After staying in Chakow for half a day, we went to an important port of the Georgian SSR on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, Batum. Giant oil pipelines linked Batum with the Baku oil fields. Batum was a thriving city, and the scenery in the vicinity of the city was quite beautiful. Our leader, Ignatov, saw fireflies, tea plants, and banana trees for the first time at Batum.

We boarded ship at Batum and visited resorts around the Black Sea such as Sukhumn, Sochi, Yalta, and Sevastopol. From Sevastopol we took a train back to Moscow. The entire tour lasted more than a month, and we traveled thousands of miles. We saw and heard a lot that interested us. It was like taking a course on the history of the minority races of southern Russia.

In April of 1928 the university organized a Leningrad tour, which was open to the entire student body. We visited many famous sites on this tour, including the Summer Palace and the Winter Palace. We also inspected many factories and docks. And naturally we visited the Smolny Institute, from which the October Revolution itself had been directed. On its third floor, we inspected the three offices which had been assigned to the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies which had been responsible for carrying out the uprising on October 24, 1917, by the old Russian calendar—November 6 by the new calendar. We also viewed office number 86 on the second floor, where Lenin worked and lived.
during the uprising. Thus, generally speaking, we became better acquainted with the history of Russia and especially with the history of the October Revolution. What left the deepest impression on me were the dank, pitch-dark dungeons in the Trubetzkoï Bastion of the Fortress of Peter and Paul. It was here that intractable revolutionaries had been imprisoned, we were told. We tested out some of these dungeons for ourselves. With their massive oak doors closed, one was left in total, soundless darkness, which, we were told and I believed it, rather quickly could drive a prisoner out of his mind. Those hideous dungeons symbolized for me the dark ages of Tsarism.

On touring the Winter Palace, we saw on display a vast quantity of Chinese antiques and treasures, many of which had been seized by Tsarist forces when they joined the foreign expedition that occupied Peking as a result of the Boxer Uprising. The students in our group demanded to know how these Chinese treasures came into Russian hands. Caught off guard, our guide was speechless. Finally, he told us that the items had been bought by various private and official collectors. This lie only served to enrage the students even more. It was indeed an embarrassing situation for the guide.

Besides these extended tours, there were various Moscow city tours and practical training at industrial installations. In Moscow we visited such points of interest as the Museum of History, the Darwin Museum, the Lenin Museum, the Museum of the Red Army, and a historically important underground printing press.¹⁵

Often we went to observe various factories in and around Moscow, especially to study the tripartite system of cooperation and leadership (that is, the management, the Party organization, and the trade union). Sometimes we were assigned to attend factory meetings, so that we could experience in person the basic workings of the industrial unit and come into closer touch with the proletarian spirit which was deemed necessary for us members of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. However, the language employed in the factories was radically different from that which we had learned in class, so for the most part we students could neither understand or make ourselves understood. We sat for hours on end at the conference table, deaf and dumb. As a consequence, the training in industrial units was of little value, and the desired results of this practical program were seldom achieved.
From the above, one can see that the main objective of the teaching methods at the university was the effective correlation of theory and practice. In fact, Stalin sums up the philosophical foundations of this teaching method when he states, “Theory is the experience of the working-class movement in all countries taken in its general aspect. Of course, theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illuminated by revolutionary theory. But theory can become a tremendous force in the working-class movement if it is built up in indissoluble connection with revolutionary practice.”

The authorities of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, in working out the above-described teaching methods, probably had this statement as a guide. These methods had far-reaching influence. The similarity of teaching methods subsequently employed in some colleges and universities in Communist China is not coincidental.

Notes

1. Nevertheless, many Sun Yat-sen University graduates were selected to undertake advanced study in such higher academic institutions as the Institute for Red Professors, the Political-Military Academy in Leningrad, the China Problems Research Institute, the Military Academy in Moscow, and the industrial academy. Those who studied at such institutions were, of course, being prepared to assume important political, educational, industrial, and military posts under the Party back in China.

2. Fan writes, “From the early years of Western Chou to modern times, Chinese history has spanned a period of over three thousand years. Phenomenally, this huge collection of data exhibits the multifarious rise and decline, the order and chaos, of dynasties, with more chaos than order. But essentially, the problem is but one, the problem of land ownership, i.e., the struggle of the peasants against the landlord class for the right of ownership of the land” (Fan Wen-lan, “Nien-ch’u chung-kuo san ch’ien nien li-shih te yueh-shih” [The key to the study of three thousand years of Chinese history], in Fan Wen-lan, ed., Chung-kuo t’ung-shih chien pien [History of China, short course; Shanghai: East China People’s Publishing Co., 1950], p. 5).

3. Chu Chen-chih, in his book Modern History, says that Radek wrote a book called The Taiping Rebellion, in which Radek asserts that the Taiping Rebellion was a peasant movement containing elements of bourgeois revolution (as referred to by Chien Yu-wen in Chien’s article “Ma-k’e-sze hsiuch-p’ai te T’ai-p’ing t’ien kuo shih-kuan” [Marxist historical view of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], in Wen-t’i yu nien-chu [Issues and studies; Taipei], vol. 2, no. 3 [Feb. 20, 1962]). This contention is similar to Fan’s idea that in the second stage the bourgeois rallied the peasants in their struggle for land. In fact, on March 14, 1925, Radek published an article in Pravda in commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in it he said that the leader of the Taiping Rebellion, Hun Hsiu-chuan, was the predecessor of Sun Yat-sen—an opinion which he was to repeat many times in his course, The History of the Chinese Revolution.


5. Ibid., p. 5.


7. Ibid., p. 380.

8. I had the pleasure of meeting him again ten years later (1937) at the Air Force station
in Lan-chow, Kansu. He was a commanding general of the Russian "Aid China Volunteer Air Force." His headquarters was located in Lan-chow, the capital of Kansu Province.

9. He was also known as Lin Po-chu. He came back to China in early 1933 and was sent to Jui-chin, Kiangsi, to take the post of Finance Minister of the Central Soviet government.


11. Chin-p'eh ta-lu (Mainland today; Taipei), no. 95 (July 15, 1959), p. 27.

12. On his way back to China, I believe in 1930, Chiang Hao became critically ill on the train and had to enter a hospital at Vladivostok, where he died. I was working in Vladivostok at the time, and it fell to me to organize his funeral and officiate at it. He was buried with full military honors on a hill in a suburb of the city, where a contingent of the Russian Red Army fired a final salute over his grave after I delivered the eulogy.

13. A member of the Chinese CYC while at Sun Yat-sen University, Hsi-men Tsung-hua subsequently left the Communist movement and joined the Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He left the Ministry to become a professor at Chinling University in Nanking. When the Communists came to national power, he remained on the mainland.

14. Each professor or instructor had a class roster, which was used not for roll call but for the professor or instructor to record the student's daily performance grades. The final grade for a course was the total accumulation of the daily grades, which was both fair and very accurate.

15. About the city tours, one fellow student of the university wrote, "Moscow has numerous and varied museums and famous buildings. These museums, numbering one hundred and sixteen in all, classify and display multifarious artifacts and charts. As to the historical landmarks preserved by the government, there were about eight hundred and seventy in all, most of them well preserved for the people to visit" (Chin-p'eh ta-lu [Mainland today; Taipei], no. 103 [Jan. 1, 1960], p. 13).

Chapter VI
Room, Board, and Recreation at Sun Yat-sen University

From a material and recreational standpoint, we were very well taken care of at the university, a state of affairs which had not always prevailed for Chinese who had stayed in Russia during the earlier years of the revolution. Perhaps the exceptional treatment we received could be traced back to the experience that began to accumulate at the First Congress of Toilers of the Far East in January, 1922, when Russia was ravaged by famine. There was scarcely enough to eat anywhere in Russia, and in large areas of the vast country people were dying of starvation. Many Chinese delegates to the Congress of Toilers of the Far East, of whom Chang Ch’iu-pai was a KMT delegate, were quite unhappy about the food and lodgings made available to them. Their dissatisfaction, moreover, apparently was reflected to a degree in political positions that they took as a result of having attended the congress.

A Russian, writing from China about this situation some years later, observed that the Chinese delegates to the congress had been better fed than Russian workers or the Russians in general. Nevertheless, he noted:

The devastation in Russia resulting from famine and war created a very bad impression on the delegates, particularly KMT members. . . .

Many members of the delegation, especially KMT members, returned to China and declared that on the basis of the actual conditions observed, the treatment they received in Russia, and the experience of traveling with the Communists, it was doubtful whether the KCT [Chinese Communist Party] could be of benefit to the country.

Perhaps the Russians learned a lesson from this congress. When the executive board of the university was aware that the majority of the students were KMT members, it took great pains in preparing the daily menu for the university. Of course, it was impossible to have rare delicacies on the menu, but we were never short of chicken, duck, fish, and meat, all of which were not easily obtainable even in 1926.

In fact, the administration of the university carried its fear of a repeat performance of the 1922 Congress to extremes. One student,
who was at the university in 1925, recalls, “We had five meals a day when we first arrived at the university. Sometime later we requested the university to cancel the afternoon tea and the night snack, since we were not accustomed to eating five times a day. Besides, we thought it wasteful to do so. Three meals a day were plenty.” Just imagine, five meals a day! The Russians must have taken us for gluttons. In any case, by the time I arrived in 1926, we received only three good meals a day.

Such generosity was indeed wasteful at a time when the Russians were getting by economically only by living frugally. Flour, meat, hide, butter, and other commodities were exported in order to acquire foreign exchange. Despite the economic difficulties, both the quality and quantity of each of our three meals were quite high. For example, for breakfast there were eggs, bread and butter, milk, sausages, black tea, and occasionally even caviar. I do not think rich people anywhere enjoyed a more abundant breakfast than we did.

In addition, the officials of the university were so anxious to create a favorable impression that when we students grew tired of Russian food, they hastened to accommodate us by employing a Chinese chef. From that time on, we had a choice of either Russian or Chinese food.

We students were also clothed quite well. I clearly remember that upon admission each student was given a suit, a coat, a pair of shoes, towels, washcloths, handkerchiefs, shirts, combs, shoe polish, soap, a toothbrush, toothpaste, and all else that one might need in everyday life. Our towels and shirts were laundered free, and about the only things we had to buy for ourselves were hats and ties.

It seemed that the only person in Soviet Russia in those days who wore a European-style felt hat was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All of the rest of the Russian leaders wore either civilian or military caps. Neckties were almost as rare as felt hats, and women dressed pretty much as the men did. By and large, we followed the prevailing fashions. We usually wore high-buttoned Lenin jackets or the popular violet Ukranian-style shirts that buttoned up the left side, although we also were issued European-style suits. In winter, which was terribly cold, we were supplied with quite adequate overcoats and warm hats. We were also given boots for snowy or rainy weather and sandals for summer wear.
Let us now turn to housing at Sun Yat-sen University. At the beginning, since there were not too many students, they were accommodated on the third floor of the main school building. After 1927, with the increase of students, all bedrooms were converted into classrooms. Dormitories were then scattered in three or four places. They were clean, neat, and comfortable.

Upon my arrival at the university I was assigned to live in a dormitory on Petrovka Street. The building had been the residence of a duke during the reign of the Tsars. To a young farm boy like me, it was no less than a royal palace. Beautiful chandeliers sparkled before my eyes. I was more than pleased with my lodgings. However, as this dwelling was soon converted into a women’s dormitory, I was forced to move into more conventional lodgings.

Housing for the married students created some problems in the beginning. At first the university ignored the marital status of the students and assigned each student to a dormitory according to sex. Husbands and wives were forced to live apart. The unhappiness of the young married couples caused a daring young man named Yu Kuo-chhen to suggest that the university set aside a “secret meeting room” for their use while the family dormitories were being constructed. At first his suggestion was severely criticized by moralists young and old. However, the university administration was extremely broad-minded, setting aside a “secret meeting room” and hastening to rent a family dormitory. This benevolent policy not only won the praise of the married students but also encouraged many unmarried students to have love affairs. Hence, both legitimate and illegitimate members of a second generation rapidly appeared. The married-students’ dormitory was constructed in the spring of 1928. However, the birth rate of “little revolutionaries” had been high since 1926. Someone had once asked the rector, Radek, what he planned to do with the newborn revolutionaries. Rector Radek laughed and answered, “That problem should not be hard to solve. We can set up nursery homes, and a few years from now we can even establish a kindergarten for them.”

A discussion of the housing problems at Sun Yat-sen University inevitably reminds me of the shortage of housing in Russia at that time. It was very hard to get a single house or even a single big room. Sometimes a large room was divided into smaller ones to accommodate
more families, which provided a home without privacy, for one could hear the snoring of one's neighbors! It left much to be desired in being called a home. The married-students' dormitory at Sun Yat-sen University was of precisely the same pattern.

The problem of transportation at the university was handled in a very simple manner. The university did not have school buses or cars. At that time trams were the means of transportation in Moscow. The university supplied those students who lived beyond walking distance of the campus with monthly tram tickets. The tickets were quite inexpensive and could be used only before eight o'clock in the morning. If we slept late, we had to buy a regular-fare ticket with our own money. Of course, those students who lived close to campus walked to classes.

Walking to and from the university, though, could have its drawbacks, which I will mention by way of giving a bit of the atmosphere of Moscow then. Students who lived in Ileinka dormitory, which was near the headquarters of the CC of the CPSU, had to go through Kremlin City Park, which was dense with trees. In the evening it was poorly lighted, and it was there that prostitutes plied their trade. Many of these prostitutes were great, hulking amazons compared to some of the more delicate male Chinese students, and many of them desperately needed money. Two of these muscular prostitutes literally kidnapped one Chinese student and robbed him before they freed him. After that, we avoided Kremlin City Park and, for good measure, walked in groups rather than singly to minimize the possibility of being robbed.

Having discussed the basic problems of daily living, I will now examine the recreational activities and student welfare at the university. There were actually a multitude of recreational activities, including movies, plays, and musicals sponsored by the university. At considerable expense, some of the greatest ballet troops in Russia were brought to our auditorium, as well as concert artists and prominent actors and actresses. We could and did see the best artistic offerings that the Soviet Union possessed without having to leave the university, and we enjoyed them immensely. The numerous motion pictures which were shown, however, were less enthusiastically received. These tended to beat to death the same limited number of political themes, and after you had seen one of them, the others grew progressively less entertaining.
When famous operas were staged in Moscow theaters, we were given tickets to attend the performances. The Student Commune had numerous clubs, including music, volleyball, basketball, horseback-riding, archery, swimming, photography, ice-skating, dancing, and sightseeing. Students were free to participate in any one or all of them with the opportunity of being instructed by experts in each field.

The university also had facilities to deal with the financial welfare of the students and their families in China. A student whose family was in need could apply through the university to have a certain amount of money remitted to his family in China. This service demonstrates the lengths to which the university went to insure the students' welfare, since at that time foreign currency was severely limited in Russia.

One cannot talk about student welfare at the university without mentioning the summer-vacation system. According to the Soviet Constitution and labor laws, all laborers who were engaged in heavy industry or whose work was in one way or another harmful to their health (for example, furnace workers and those in the chemical industry) were entitled to one month of vacation annually. Those in light industries got a two-weeks' vacation, and the intelligentsia (scientists, professors, students, and so forth) were entitled to a two-months' vacation. All travel costs and room and board during the vacation period were entirely free. The students of Sun Yat-sen University were no exception in this universal system of vacations.

During my stay of more than six years in Soviet Russia, I spent my summer vacations in various dom outdykha (rest houses) in different parts of Russia—from luxurious summer resorts on the coast of the Black Sea to those located along the shore of the Pacific. The food in all the rest houses was excellent. There were usually four meals a day—breakfast, lunch, afternoon tea, and dinner. It was also compulsory for everyone to take a nap for one hour after lunch. This hour was called meortvii chac (the dead hour). Anyone violating this regulation three times was ordered to check out of the rest house. The doctors inspected every dormitory after lunch to see whether there was anyone missing from his bed.

On the day that one checked into the rest house, he was weighed and his record was kept on file. It was considered a failure of the
administration if the weight of the vacationer had not increased by the
time that he checked out. A poor record in this respect for the whole
season was a matter of grave consequence for the director of the house
and could very easily cost him his position. As taking a nap was con-
sidered the surest way of putting on weight, the *meortvii chac* was
strictly enforced. However, there were also sports and amusements of
all kinds. A concert, movie, or special show was available every evening
in the open-air club. These events were usually very well attended.

We students had nothing to worry about, since the university took
care of everything related to summer vacations. We enjoyed every
summer both as foreign tourists and as members of the big “Soviet
family.” We always returned to the university happy and full of
energy. In addition to my own impression of these vacations, let me
give the recollection of Teng Wen-i, the prominent KMT member who
has described himself as the first Russian-educated person to turn
against Soviet Russia:

In the summer, the university set up a summer camp in the countryside with
woods and flowing rivers, close to the camps of Russian workers and students. It
was a rare opportunity for relaxation. Facilities were not luxurious, but they were
adequate and comfortable. No classes were held, and we were not allowed to read
too many books. Instead, we were encouraged to go swimming, canoeing, sun-
bathing, or to participate in the many other available recreational activities.
Thousands of young people mixed together to have fun, rest, and enjoyment, and
to experience the thrill of falling in love. Everybody gained weight after two
months of delightful experiences and happy times. I think the whole world should
attempt to have similar summer-vacation programs.4

The university provided health services to the students during the
academic year, and it had a health clinic and a small hospital. Upon
entering the university, each student was given a thorough medical
checkup, and files of his medical history were compiled and kept at the
health clinic for handy reference. The health clinic had two full-time
doctors, one of whom was a surgeon. There were also nurses and
maids. Sick students were generally treated by the health clinic.
Patients with severe illnesses were sent for treatment to a hospital
owned by the government.

In the Soviet Union all medicine and medical expenses were free
through an almost perfect insurance plan. Although as foreign students
staying temporarily in Russia we did not participate in this program, we enjoyed the same privileges that native Russians enjoyed.

I have described some aspects of student welfare and recreational activities at the university. I will now examine extracurricular education. The student organization at Sun Yat-sen University was the Student Commune. Its president and other officers were elected by popular vote. The duty of the Student Commune was to aid the university in carrying out administrative policies, to assist in disciplinary functions, to aid the students in all recreational activities, and to administer student welfare. (For example, funds for needy students were sponsored by the commune. Under the commune there was a Fund for Mutual Assistance.)

The commune also organized a publication committee, which was in charge of editing a weekly paper which was posted on the bulletin board. Special issues were posted whenever the occasion arose. This paper contained news reports, notes on university life, scholastic research, and literature. Articles in the literature column were supplied by the students. Since we were all young and enthusiastic about the publication, we contributed so many articles that the paper was often quite large. Every time a new paper was posted, students swarmed around it, and some even jotted down notes as they read it. The influence of the paper was great, and it was a major part of the extracurricular education at the University. It was highly regarded by the university administration as well as by the Party.

Another function of the Student Commune was the “comrades’ court,” which received and tried disciplinary complaints of all students and staff members. I remember two famous trials. The defendants were Chang Ch’ao and Li Hsieh-yuan, both of whom were CCP members. They were accused of wife-beating, which is not permissible in any society, much less in a society where men and women are equal. The trials were dramatic and exciting. In addition to the plaintiffs and defendants, there were public prosecutors (in Russia they are called _obschestvenni obvenichel_ or prosecutors for society) and three judges who constituted the jury. Both the prosecutors and judges were students at the university. The trial procedures were exactly like those of a real court, except that when the verdict was announced, a vote of the student body was taken, which either endorsed the verdict or rejected
It would have been quite exceptional, but had the student body failed to endorse the decision of the judges, the judges would have had to reconsider their verdict.

Everyone present in the court had the right to vote, making the verdict a true public judgment. While the verdict did not have the same effect as one handed down in a real court of law, it did represent a check by the student society. However, it also represented a good deal more than this, since both the school administration and the Party organization usually backed up the decisions of the "comrades' court." For example, the verdict in Chang Ch'ao's case was "expulsion from the university." The university administration promptly acted in accordance with the verdict of the court and sent Chang Ch'ao back to China.

Soviet assistance to the KMT and to Sun Yat-sen University was not, of course, devoid of a certain grim determination to further the "cause of world revolution." When Sun Yat-sen University opened in Moscow in 1925 Soviet Russia was still reeling from the earlier years of civil war, economic collapse, and social revolution. It had really just begun to show a few significant signs of recovering; and recovery, of course, continued throughout the years of Sun Yat-sen University's existence. In spite of its own terrible shortages and weaknesses, however, Soviet Russia had hastened to the assistance of the KMT in China as early as 1923. Students of the situation, both Chinese and Russian, found themselves wondering why it was that Soviet Russia, while facing huge unsolved problems of its own, should so readily give assistance to such an organization as the KMT, which was at best a dubious ally. I know that the situation troubled me. For those of us at Sun Yat-sen University enjoyed luxurious treatment; we were wonderfully well fed and clothed. At the same time, I could not help but see the long, pathetic queues of Russians, standing all night long in front of shops from which they hoped, often unrealistically, in the morning to be able to get a tiny bit of meat. Nor could I ignore the Russian student from Moscow University who worked part time at Sun Yat-sen University carting wood for the stoves that kept us comfortably warm. In temperatures far below zero he wore only a threadbare cotton jacket. I could see him shivering in the cold, and I knew that he probably had an unheated home to return to. Every day, moreover, while we ate our
excellent meals, I knew that our professors could not dream of eating so well. I was not the only Chinese student troubled by this situation, and some of us asked one or another of our professors to explain why the Soviet Union was helping others at the expense of its own people. One professor, I remember, gave a far-too-glib reply. He said that a revolutionary party should not be stingy and that no revolutionary should be a miser. My professor of Leninism, Miroshhevsky, gave a more realistic explanation. He said that any nation, large or small, just like an individual in society, needed friends. Nobody, he said, could afford to abandon the effort to establish friendly relations with someone with whom he could fight a common enemy today, even though that person might be his enemy tomorrow. Indeed, as our studies progressed, we recognized this position as one of Lenin’s teachings.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 58.
3. Chin-jhi ta-lu (Mainland today; Taipei), no. 98 (1959), pp. 32–33.
Chapter VII
The Relationship of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party at Sun Yat-sen University

Sun Yat-sen University was the product of the Chinese revolutionary movement's "united front" of the 1920s. This united front was, in fact, a synthesis of contradictions and not a resolution of conflicts. On the one hand, the KMT, after suffering setbacks both domestically and internationally, was forced to find some new path to keep the party from falling apart. On the other hand, the newly founded CCP was eager to form alliances to strengthen its position. Finally, Soviet Russia, anxious to break out of its isolation, turned eastward in search of friends. All of these developments hastened the formation of the united front.

When the united front was first formed, not only did the KMT and the CCP fail to resolve the differences between themselves, but also within each of the two parties diverse opinions persisted. Although these two parties were brought together temporarily by necessity, their goals were far apart. The KMT hoped to get more Soviet aid to strengthen itself, and the Chinese Communists used the KMT as a cover to expand their own Party. The KMT subscribed to the slogan of National revolution but had little intention of carrying it out, much less of carrying out a social revolution. The Communists also clutched the banner of National revolution, but they actually wanted to expand it into a Socialist revolution. From the above, it is evident that the united front rested upon very fragile foundations. As events developed, the inherent conflicts intensified under the new circumstances. Indeed, as Lenin and other Marxists have said, development was the struggle of opposites.

The motivation for this united front is to be found in the resolutions of the CCP's Third National Congress held at Canton in June of 1923. In accordance with a resolution adopted by the ECCI on January 12, 1923, and another directive from the ECCI to the CCP in May of the same year, this congress discussed policies toward the KMT and finally
passed a resolution to cooperate with the KMT. The main points of this resolution were:

1. To cooperate with the KMT while maintaining ideological political independence.
2. To absorb the progressive elements of the worker-peasant masses and to expand the Party organization.
3. To help reorganize the KMT and to criticize and overcome its compromising and reformist tendencies.

This resolution of the Third Congress of the CCP not only determined the relationship between the KMT and the Communist Party in China, but it also determined the relationship between the two party organizations at Sun Yat-sen University a few years later.

At the university there was a branch office of the CCP. The KMT also maintained a branch office there with the special permission of the Comintern. During the period 1925–1927 there were about five hundred students at the university, and KMT members accounted for a little over half of them, while the rest were CCP or CYC members. Through the united front the Communists belonged simultaneously to the KMT and the CCP. In fact the Communists controlled the KMT’s Moscow branch office, leaving the real KMT students very little room to maneuver.

Before differences were outwardly manifest within the Chinese revolutionary camp, KMT and Communist students got along harmoniously on the surface. However, this state of affairs did not last. As conflicts that had previously been hidden became more and more apparent in China, the relationship between KMT and CCP members at Sun Yat-sen University became strained. This was natural, because all developments in China were quickly reflected at the university.

The differences that developed within the KMT concerning that party’s policies made it possible for the Chinese Communists to accelerate the splitting process by seeking to divide the KMT into Right Wing, Left Wing, and fence-sitting Center. The Communists proliferated in the rising revolutionary tide in China and decided to ally with the Left to attack the Right, with as much help as possible from the Center. The Communist organization at Sun Yat-sen University dutifully adopted the same policy as the CCP in China. As a result, conservative KMT members, indignant over Communist control of their organiza-
tion and Communist intrigue, secretly formed an informal organization of their own.

The Communist students enjoyed the overwhelming advantage of being in a Communist country. But the KMT students, simply because they were in a sense besieged as a result of being in a Communist country, were more strongly united than would otherwise have been the case. There were many outstanding personalities among the KMT students, such as the brothers Ku Cheng-kang and Ku Cheng-ting, Cheng Chieh-ming, Teng Wen-i, Wu Chia-yu, Hsiao Tsan-yu, Liu Yun-yao, Wang Li-i, Ho Han-wen, Wang Shao-lun, Kang Tse, Chang Cheng, Tuan K’o-ch’ing, Wang Chi’-chiang, Shen Yuan-ming, Chiang Hsi-chung, Liu P’an-chu, and T’ang Chieh-fei. They were all well-educated men who had firm beliefs. Later, after returning to China, they all became key figures in the KMT.

While at the university, their firm stand under adverse conditions was truly remarkable. Mao I-heng, in his *Reminiscences of Russia and Mongolia*, spoke highly of their outstanding performance:

I noticed that those who came to see Feng were all Communist students, Kuomintang students never came to see us. Later I went to Sun Yat-sen University to look for them. One day I met Ho Chung-han at the gate; he said that he was a student at the Military Academy in Moscow and only came to Sun Yat-sen University to take his meals. I also got to know a transfer student from Germany, Chou Chi-hsiang, who was a Kuomintang revisionist and anti-Communist and was said to go back to Germany soon. Finally I learned that the Kuomintang members of that university were closely united, firm in their beliefs and thoroughly anti-Communist. Because they did not know our position they therefore were reluctant to associate with us. . . . The Kuomintang students dared to be anti-Communist in such an adverse environment at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. One could not but marvel at these young people’s courage!

A great deal of the KMT’s organizational unity was undoubtedly due to the reorganization of the KMT and the great care exercised in the selection of the KMT students who were sent to the university. Also, one must consider that the KMT students living in the red capital had to unite in order to survive. However, Mao I-heng cites an additional factor, which was of considerable importance. He notes that the main factor accounting for the high degree of KMT unity was Hu Han-min, who was spending a seven-month exile in Moscow for his alleged part in the assassination of Liao Chung-k’ai.
The actual theoretical struggle between KMT and Communist students at the university centered around a number of basic points. First of all, the Communist students maintained that Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People were merely three principles and not a complete theory. They also held that the three principles applied to a “bourgeois democratic revolution,” not to a proletarian revolution. KMT students argued that the Chinese revolution should progress through two stages, the first stage consisting of a revolution against foreign domination for national independence and the second stage consisting of a social revolution within China. The second stage, they insisted, had to be postponed until after the first stage had been achieved. Communist students argued that the social revolution was an indispensable part of the revolution for national independence. For unless social revolution were offered to the masses—such social reforms as reduced land rentals, salary increases, and better working conditions—they held that the masses could not be expected to join in the fight for national independence, and that the revolution against foreign domination would thereby be emasculated. KMT students responded by claiming that the Communists gave class struggle priority over the revolution for national independence and that they were destroying the united front against foreign domination in the process. To this argument the Communists replied that the KMT’s position was hypocritical, that the KMT merely wanted to ride to power on the backs of the people and that, once in power, the KMT would do nothing to improve the lot of the people. Around and around we went. And this argument precisely reflected the argument going on in China between the KMT and the Communists. It was an argument which, unresolved, led to the split between the KMT and the Communists in China and to severence of relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and Soviet Russia.

A second bone of contention between KMT and Communist students concerned Dr. Sun’s “Principle of Livelihood.” The dispute was both bookish and vehement, and both camps utilized passages from Sun Yat-sen’s writings in attacking and in defending themselves. Communist students kept harking back to Dr. Sun’s statement that “Livelihood is socialism, it is communism.” They neglected to complete Dr.
Sun's curious sentence, which added, "... it is Utopianism." Another favorite quotation which they used was:

I can put my distinction to-day between communism and the Min-sheng [People's] Principle in this way; communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the Min-sheng Principle is practical communism. There is no real difference between the two principles—Communism and Min-sheng—the difference lies in the methods by which they are applied.  

KMT students, forced to respond to such challenging quotations, countered in the university's wall newspaper with an article entitled "The Principle of Livelihood is not Communism," by a student named Hsiao. Hsiao produced a passage from Dr. Sun's second lecture on the subject: "They [CCP members] do not realize that our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism. It is not a form that originated with Marx but a form that was practiced when primitive man appeared upon the earth." To further strengthen his argument, Hsiao added this quote from Sun Yat-sen: "So in working out our Principle of Livelihood, we cannot use or apply in China the methods of Marx, although we have the deepest respect for his teaching. ... Even Marx's disciples say that we cannot use his methods for the solution of all social problems in China."

Communist students counterattacked by recalling that Dr. Sun had written: "This proposal that all future increment shall be given to the community is the 'equalization of land ownership' advocated by the Kuomintang; it is the Min-sheng Principle. This form of the Min-sheng Principle is communism, and since the members of the Kuomintang support the San Min Principles they should not oppose communism."

Indeed, there was an abundance of quotations in the writings of Sun Yat-sen to replenish the polemical arsenals of both Communist and KMT students, and the polemic went on and on. It was not surprising, of course, that both bodies of students could find what they sought in Dr. Sun's work on the "Principle of Livelihood." For Sun Yat-sen had written it at a time when he was striving to mobilize heterogeneous forces behind his movement. Disheartened by repeated lack of support from the West, he was seeking aid from the Soviet Union, while also seeking to make such use as he could of the fledgling CCP. At the same
time, he had to be careful not to alienate important elements within his own KMT. Thus there was a bit of something for everybody in his "Principle of Livelihood." Nevertheless, Dr. Sun's writing failed to appease either the anti-Communist-minded KMT members or the ambitious CCP. Certainly, Chinese Communist students at Sun Yat-sen University never dreamed of honoring Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a Marxist, which of course he was not. By quoting passages from Sun Yat-sen which described "communism as a good friend" and the CCP as "a very thoughtful group," they aimed merely to strengthen their own position while weakening that of the KMT, which was, after all, a cunning strategy.

A third dispute arose between KMT and Communist students at Sun Yat-sen University over the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie in China, in particular, and in colonial and semicolonial countries, in general. Communist students, quoting Engels, and KMT students, quoting Lenin, made the two eminent Marxists seem to be in disagreement on an issue about which they did not in fact disagree. Communist students, distorting Engels's meaning a bit, argued that Engels had long since pointed out that the further east one went, the more fragile the capitalist class became and the more limited became the progressive role of the bourgeoisie, which was doomed to be a stumbling block to revolution in the East. KMT students, distorting Lenin's meaning a bit, countered with Lenin's comments on the Chinese revolution of 1911 to the effect that the Western bourgeoisie was in a state of decay, while in Asia there still was to be found a militant, revolutionary bourgeoisie.

The Communist students, besides attacking the KMT students on theoretical grounds, also attempted to harass and divide the KMT students in a variety of ways. As I have mentioned above, they sought to split the KMT students into Right and Left. They then attacked the Right and tried to woo the Left with rumors, threats, and inducements. The KMT students were also placed under surveillance by the Communists. However, the KMT students did not give up. They held "committee meetings" whenever three or four of them could get together. These "committee meetings" were usually held on Sundays when they strolled in Lenin Hill Park, sat on the grass, and talked.

Further information on the nature of this struggle and its results have been supplied to me by Ku Cheng-ting, an important member of
the Legislative Yuan, who talked with a Sun Yat-sen University graduate in October, 1964, in Taipei. Apparently, a group of ten students including the Ku brothers, Li Yu-chu, Wang Ch'i-chiang, Tuan K'o-ch'ing, and Hsin Ping-chou left Germany on January 6, 1926, for Moscow. After arriving at the university, these students learned that the Communist Party members were surrounding KMT students and trying to force them to join the Communist Party. Hsin Ping-chou was a Communist at that time and did his utmost to convert the other students. There were quite a number of heated debates, but the KMT students maintained their position.

In addition, Ku went on to say, one day when he was at the university both Stalin and Trotsky came to a KMT party meeting at the university to debate the problem of cooperation between the KMT and the Communist Party. Trotsky insisted that the Chinese Communists withdraw from the KMT and develop separately. Stalin maintained that the banner of national liberation was of paramount importance and that the Communists should hold this banner tightly in their hands. Therefore, he opposed withdrawal from the KMT but advocated increased utilization of it. Loyal KMT members present at this meeting, apprehensive of Communist infiltration, all insisted on the withdrawal of the Communists from the KMT. Consequently, Ku Cheng-kang and some others were sent back to China in the fall of 1926.

Perhaps Ku Cheng-kang and those who returned to China with him reported the contentious relationship between KMT members and Communists at the university to the KMT authorities. Through one channel or another, in any event, the CEC of the KMT doubtless learned about it. For quite early in 1927, by which time I was studying at the university, a scholarly-looking man whom we knew only as Mr. Chang appeared in our midst and began popping up in one or another of our classes. At first we took him to be just another student. But his failure to attend classes regularly, and the way he frequently behaved in the classes that he did attend, suggested that he really was investigating the university. I still remember the embarrassment he caused the students when he stood up in two of my classes and argued with the professors. After about a month he vanished as abruptly as he had appeared. Later, I was told that this Mr. Chang was really Chang Ch'i-

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pai, who had attended the Congress of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow in 1922 as a KMT representative. Subsequent to the departure of Ku Cheng-kang’s group, a group of ten, including Wang Shao-lun, Shen Yuan-ming, Ho Han-wen, and Liu P’an-chu, was also sent back to China. Finally, a group that included Chiang Hsi-chung was sent back.

When Wu Chia-yu and his group arrived at Vladivostok, the Chinese Communists were staging the Canton Uprising (December 11, 1927), which caused the Chinese government to sever relations with Russia on December 15, 1927. All ships going to Shanghai were stopped. Wu and others hurriedly made arrangements with the Japanese consul to return to China via Japan. When Chiang Hsi-chung and his companions arrived at Vladivostok three days after Wu, they were promptly arrested by the GPU and sent back to Moscow. They were tried by a revolutionary court composed of Ch’in Pang-hsien and other Communist students at the university. They were found guilty of “being lackeys of the national capitalistic class” and of “destroying the proletarian revolution” and were sentenced to forced labor in Siberia—chopping wood and digging coal. In the summer of 1928 Chiang Hsi-chung was able to escape from his labor camp. After passing through many dangers, he made his way to Nanking and reported his experience to the KMT authorities.

The students mentioned above were not the only KMT students who suffered privations at the hands of the Russians and the Communist students of the university. After China severed relations with Russia, many of the sons and relatives of prominent members* of the KMT who did not return to China in time or who were not absorbed into the Communist organization were arrested and imprisoned for a year and then released. Some were apparently detained permanently, and their fate is unknown.

The remainder of the KMT Left Wing which remained at the university was finally absorbed into the CCP, and in 1928 the name of

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* The sons, daughters, and relatives of prominent members of the KMT who went to Sun Yat-sen University included: Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo; Shao Li-tzu’s son Shao Chih-kang; Feng Yu-hsiang’s son Feng Hung-kuo and daughter Feng Fu-lun; Li Tsung-jen’s brother-in-law Wei Yun-ch’eng, who later married Chiang Kai-shek’s niece; Li Tsung-jen’s wife, Wei Shu-ying; Chang Fa-kuei’s brother Chang Fa-ming; Teng Yen-ta’s brother Teng Ming-ch’iu; Ch’en Shu-chen’s son Ch’en Fu; Yeh Ts’u-ts’ang’s son Yeh Nan; and General Ku Cheng-lun’s two brothers Ku Cheng-kang and Ku Cheng-ting.
the university was changed from Sun Yat-sen University for the Toilers of China to Sun Yat-sen Communist University for the Toilers of China. In the summer of that year the Chinese class of KUTV was incorporated into Sun Yat-sen University.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that the relationship between KMT and Communist students at Sun Yat-sen University paralleled closely the relationship between the two parties in China. The relationship might be described as having passed through three stages. The first stage lasted from 1925 to the latter part of 1926. The early part of this period consisted of a brief, giddy honeymoon which was badly jolted by Chiang Kai-shek’s first overt anti-Soviet, anti-Communist coup, the Chung-shan gunboat incident of March 20, 1926. The increasingly vitriolic quarrel that followed reached a climax at Sun Yat-sen University with the visit of Trotsky and Stalin. Still, both the CPSU and the Comintern sought to minimize the significance of the Chung-shan incident in an effort to maintain a working relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. It was said, for example, that the incident was a fabrication of British intelligence. Some KMT hotheads were sent back to China. And presently a semblance of harmony, more or less, was restored between the two parties at Sun Yat-sen University. It was this period, during which efforts were made to patch up or, at any rate, play down the quarrel between the two parties, that constituted the second stage of the relationship between them. It lasted from the end of 1926 until the April 12, 1927, coup d’état in Shanghai. Even the semblance of harmony at the university, which had been maintained only with great effort, disintegrated with the April 12, 1927, incident, which gave rise to contention between the two groups of students that was infinitely more destructive than the quarrel that followed the Chung-shan incident of the previous year. “Lips became guns and tongues became swords,” as an old Chinese saying has it. Thus began the third stage in the relationship between Communist and KMT members at Sun Yat-sen University, which ended by December, 1927, in a total rupture between the two parties in the university and between the KMT and Soviet Russia. Perhaps the most notable event at the university in this period was Stalin’s visit on May 13, 1927, to answer questions raised by students there regarding the situation in China in general and the relationship between the KMT and the CCP in par-
ticular. At this crucial juncture in the Chinese revolution, Stalin at the
university still defended the KMT as “anti-imperialist, just as the revo-
lution in China is anti-imperialist.” Even more startling for most of
us was his characterization of Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin described him, to
be sure, as a KMT rightist who had intrigued against the KMT Left and
the Communists prior to the April, 1927, coup. Nevertheless, Stalin in-
sisted that Chiang was at the same time “warring—whether well or
badly—against the enslavement of China, and was thus helping to
weaken imperialism.” It was in this speech, too, that Stalin overesti-
mated the potential of the KMT Left and its “Revolutionary Govern-
ment” at Wuhan, which two months later turned against the Commu-
nists. This rupture of relations between the KMT Left and the Commu-
nists in July, 1927, in fact marked the end of a united front between the
KMT and the Communists. A circular of the CEC of the KMT dated
July 26, 1927, denounced Sun Yat-sen University for having named itself
after Dr. Sun in order to betray the principles of the KMT. The circu-
lar forbade KMT members to attend the university. Thus, any pretense
of KMT-Communist partnership in sponsoring the university officially
ended, and in 1928 the name of the university was modified.

Notes

1. G. S. Kara-Murza and P. Mif, eds., Strategiia i taktiki Kominterna v natsionalno-
kolonialnoi revoliutsii na primere Kitaia: Sbornik dokumentov (Strategy and tactics of the
Comintern in the national-colonial revolutionary movement, as exemplified in China: A
collection of documents; Moscow, 1934), p. 112. See also Jane Degras, The Communist

2. In May, 1923, the Comintern apparently issued a directive on relations with the KMT
to the Third Congress of the CCP. See Wang Shih, Wang Chiiao, Ma Chi- ping, and Chang
Ling, Chung-kuo kung-ch' an-tang li-i ihh chien-pien (A brief history of the CCP; Shanghai:
People's Publishing House, 1958), translated by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,
Washington, D.C., JPRS 8756, Aug. 16, 1961, p. 42. See also Jane Degras, The Communist

3. Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages

4. Mao I-heng, O-meng Huei-i- lu (Reminiscences of Russia and Mongolia; Hong Kong:
Ya-chou Ch' u-pan-she [Asia Press], 1954), p. 170. Mao, who was Fung Yu-hsiang's aide,
accompanied Fung to Russia in 1926 when Fung sought Russian aid. According to his own
account, he arrived in Moscow on May 10, 1926, and stayed for several months before he
returned to China. During his stay he frequently visited Sun Yat-sen University, and he
was not unfamiliar with the strife between KMT and Communist students at the university.

5. Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I (The three principles of the people), L. T. Chen, ed.,
364.

6. Ibid., p. 364.
7. Ibid., p. 416.
8. Ibid., p. 429.
10. Ibid., p. 434.
11. Ibid., p. 428.
12. Ibid., p. 423.
13. I have not been able to find any published reference to this visit of Stalin and Trotsky to Sun Yat-sen University, nor was I in Russia at the time of the visit that Ku Cheng-ting reported. Assuming that the two did in fact visit the university, they probably did so prior to the Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU, for Ku Cheng-ting and the others returned to China during the fall of 1926, by which time Trotsky and Stalin had already been to the university. The Fifteenth Conference of the CPSU took place in October and November, 1926. It was at this conference that Trotsky presented theses, dated September, 1926, that were bitterly critical of Comintern policy in China. Perhaps, then, Trotsky and Stalin visited Sun Yat-sen University in September, 1926, and perhaps Trotsky's theses at the Fifteenth Conference were the product of this visit.
15. Ibid., p. 249.
Chapter VIII
Rule of the Moscow Branch of the Chinese Communist Party: The Dark Ages of Sun Yat-Sen University

According to the principles of proletarian internationalism, a Communist, regardless of his nationality, was supposed to join the Communist Party of the country in which he resided. Nevertheless this principle was ignored at Sun Yat-sen University prior to 1926. Instead of being members of the CPSU, the Chinese Communist students at the university were members of the Moscow branch of the CCP. This situation was the result of the precedents set earlier in Japan and France, where branches of the CCP had been formed. Branches of the CCP had been formed in Japan because there was, at that time, no Japanese Communist Party, and in France because the French Party was only formed in December of 1920 and was relatively weak.

I went to Moscow toward the end of 1926 after the Moscow branch of the CCP had been dissolved, so I had no firsthand experience with it. However, quite some time after my arrival I learned a good deal about the affairs of the Moscow branch in conversations with Berman, who, at the time that we talked, was secretary of the bureau of the CPSU in Sun Yat-sen University, the second man to hold that post. He told me that the only reason for the Comintern permitting the organization of a Moscow branch of the CCP was the language problem; few Chinese at KUTV or at Sun Yat-sen University knew enough Russian to participate in Russian Party affairs or meetings. Nor were there enough interpreters, either Chinese or Russian, available when the Moscow branch was formed in 1921. Thus, he said, the Moscow branch was formed as a matter of technical expediency rather than as a matter of principle. It seemed to me then, as it does now, that Berman offered a perfectly credible explanation for the formation of the Moscow branch of the CCP.¹

In any event, the Moscow branch started what many regarded as a reign of terror at Sun Yat-sen University when the university was established in 1925. By the time of my arrival, many upper classmen who
were Communists still shuddered at the recollection of it. One student was subsequently to recall it this way:

Under the reins of the rule by the Moscow branch of the CCP, the students at Sun Yat-sen University were filled with repressed anger and deep hatred which was carefully restrained. . . . The administrators of the Moscow branch appeared before the students as authoritative patriarchs and all-powerful leaders. Irrationally abusing authority, they put the students under strict discipline and treated them as mechanized automatons instead of human beings. Everyday life as well as all matters, whether important or trivial, were all under their iron control. Consequently, everyone was in constant fear and terror, and suspicion abounded among the students. Everyone's life was in danger. . . . Many Communist students had nervous breakdowns and eventually joined the lines of mental patients, while in less serious cases many could not eat and still others suffered insomnia.

This kind of authoritarian control exerted by the Moscow branch was not unfamiliar to members of the CCP, as the Party was at that time under the authoritarian rule of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Everyone looked to him for instructions, and democracy was a mere fiction. The leaders of the Moscow branch were among those who had been trained and educated in this unhealthy atmosphere, and they applied their authoritarian training to Communist students at the university and to the Moscow branch of the CYC.

A leading figure of the Moscow branch of the CCP in Sun Yat-sen University was Jen Cho-hsuan, who later used the name Yeh Ch'ing. Active in Chinese Communist affairs in France, he had apparently gone to Moscow in 1925, where I would guess he was initially affiliated with KUTV before transferring to Sun Yat-sen University, perhaps at the time it was established. It is my recollection that students who were at Sun Yat-sen University at that time later told me that Jen was secretary of the Party branch there.

A useful insight into the nature of the rule of the Moscow branch under Jen Cho-hsuan and others may be gained from one of its publications, Hu*n-nien Kung-cho Chih-tao Kang-yao (A concrete guide to the work of training), which is not dated. Some of the more important points in this work are:

4. We should destroy family, local, and national concepts—the proletariat has no family, no local or national limitations.
5. Destroy unity based on sentiment—sentimental unity is petty bourgeois unity—we build our unity on Party interests.

8. We must employ in our work for the Party the same kind of interest we have in love and literature—love and literature are the foundation of romanticism.*

11. We must studiously avoid academic-type study—academic-type study denies that theory is born of practice.

13. We must pay attention to the Russian language aside from our studies—we absolutely must not maintain the erroneous idea that we should first study Russian before we study ideology.

16. We must strive to eliminate the [bad habits of the] intelligentsia—the bad habits of university students and the entire petty bourgeoisie.

17. We must at all times and everywhere mutually correct each other’s errors of thought and action.

18. When we have opinions, we must express them—if we hide our opinions and do not express them, we would be standing outside the organization and encouraging counterrevolutionary [tendencies].

22. Every comrade must develop close relations with at least two other comrades (exclusive of comrades belonging to the same small unit) in order to achieve solidarity among our comrades.

23. The organization’s interest is the individual’s interest. We must not obstruct the organization’s advance because of individual interest.

24. We must have the psychology of thoroughly trusting the organization—it is counterrevolutionary conduct not to trust the organization.

25. Our lives and our will must not be based on individual beliefs or the individual will. There is absolutely no such thing as individual life or individual free will.

26. We must strictly criticize our comrades’ errors and humbly accept our comrades’ criticism. Wherever he may be, every Communist must at all times criticize and supervise his comrades in accordance with the relations of mutual supervision (the mutual relations of Communists mean mutual supervision).

Articles four and five required that members of the CCP disown and denounce their parents, friends, and relatives, much as was the case in mainland China after the Communists came to power in 1949. The leaders of the Moscow branch stirred up a relentless struggle against all kinds of sentimentalism.

Article eight denied the Party members love and literature, because

* While this translation is impeccably accurate, the meaning of this article might be conveyed by the following paraphrase: “We must employ in our work for the Party the kind of enthusiasm that we are now wasting on love and literature; and we must abandon our enthusiasm for love and literature, for they are the foundations of romanticism, which can destroy Party organization.”
these were "the foundations of Romanticism" and they preached that "Romanticism is a condition which destroys organization."

Articles eleven and thirteen were quite critical of the students of Sun Yat-sen University. First, they expressed the opposition of the leaders of the Moscow branch to any genuine interest shown by those students who really wanted either to acquire useful knowledge from books or to master the Russian language. The students of the university held two main theories in regard to the study of the Russian language. One group held that since Russian was quite difficult, it could not possibly be mastered in two short years. Therefore, they advocated that students should concentrate on the more practical aspects of their revolutionary education, while spending as little time as possible on Russian-language study. The leaders of the Moscow branch, led by Jen Cho-hsuan, were prominent among those at the university who discouraged the study of the Russian language.

However, other students felt that since they had traveled thousands of miles to study the theories and experiences of the Russian Revolution, mastery of the Russian language was essential. While this stress upon Russian-language study made a good deal of sense to many students, it was eventually suppressed by the authorities of the Party branch. While the students dared not openly show their dissatisfaction with this policy of mass ignorance in regard to the study of the Russian language and academic study, they never hesitated to disobey it when the backs of the leaders of the Party branch were turned. In doing so they ran the risk of being caught and subjected to severe public criticism at the Party committee meetings.

The net result of the restrictive academic policy of the Moscow branch of the CCP was that learning for the majority of the students was greatly hindered, while a small minority chosen by the leaders of the branch were allowed to attend classes in the Russian language. This select group consisted mainly of members loyal to the leaders of the Moscow branch of the CCP and some popular girls such as Chuang Tung-hsiao and Li P’ei-tse. In this manner Jen and the other leaders were able to dominate the critical interpreting positions at the university.

Articles sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and twenty-six were also quite important. For example, what exactly are the "bad habits of university
students and the entire petty bourgeoisie" mentioned in article sixteen? Any action of a student might be included under this vague term since no examples or concrete explanations were offered. Articles seventeen and twenty-six were to insure conformity in the student body and to insure that all the students would supervise each other. Everyone supervised the actions of his comrades and was in turn supervised by all the other students. Many showed eagerness in reporting others so that they might put themselves on good terms with the authorities. In this way an atmosphere of everybody for himself was created. Under this rule of terror even the few silent students who minded their own business found it difficult to keep out of trouble. By means of article eighteen even those individuals who remained silent might be stigmatized for "conceiving treachery within themselves." This article denied even the right to silence. Under the above articles one might, on the one hand, get into trouble by making one petty remark, while on the other hand, anyone with a mouth was forced to open it and utter something, even though he had no desire to speak.

As one can see from the above articles, A Concrete Guide to the Work of Training was carefully conceived and precisely phrased in order to guarantee complete authoritarian control by the leaders of the Moscow branch of the CCP. However, in spite of these dictatorial rules, the Moscow branch at Sun Yat-sen University and its leaders did not endure. The Communist students at the university finally reached the limit of their tolerance and revolted. They held a series of meetings in which the policies of Jen and the Moscow branch were denounced. These meetings alerted the Russian administrators to the severe damage done by the Moscow branch of the CCP.

These meetings were held on four consecutive days in the summer of 1926, and Karl Radek attended every one of them. The issues apparently were dramatized for him for the first time at these meetings, and at the last one he delivered a four-hour speech which condemned the orientation and activities of the leaders of the Moscow branch. He concluded his speech by proclaiming the dissolution of the Moscow branch. All CCP members at the university attended this meeting, about which a classmate of mine later recalled:

Although Radek's proposal was not brought up for an official vote, yet it was still considered as adopted without opposition. Thereafter, the Communist stu-
dents of Sun Yat-sen University and Communist University of Toilers of the East were able to breathe the fresh air of freedom once again. Their joy was as great as that of prisoners released from jail; they felt so much at ease and no longer burdened that they imagined themselves floating in the clouds.5

When the Moscow branch of the CCP was dissolved, some of its leaders, such as Jen Cho-hsuan, returned to China. A good many others, however, remained at Sun Yat-sen University. In any event, the committee of the CPSU for the Moscow district in which Sun Yat-sen University was located placed Party organizers in Sun Yat-sen University who set about establishing a CPSU organization among students there. CCP and CYC members were screened for membership or as candidates for membership in the CPSU or the Komsomol. With this reorganization the acute dissatisfaction of Chinese Communists at the university began to subside. Nevertheless, they took every possible opportunity to continue to attack the leaders of the former Moscow branch who remained at the university. Wrangling over theoretical issues between the rival student groups continued intermittently even after I arrived.

Because of the continuing student struggle, the Party bureau at the university invited Krupskaya, Lenin’s widow, to speak at Sun Yat-sen University early in February, 1927. It was hoped that she would provide a Marxist-Leninist clarification of the issues which would end the quarreling. Krupskaya, of course, had a considerable reputation in the field of Soviet education, and if my memory serves me well, she was a member of the Collegium of the Commissariat of Education of the USSR when she came to the university that February. She was, at the same time, a member of the Control Commission and of the CC of the CPSU as well as a member of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The subject of her lecture, which I attended, was Communist education. During the course of it she managed to touch upon several of the points raised in A Concrete Guide to the Work of Training, which the former Moscow branch had produced, although she mentioned neither the work nor the branch. Everyone, I think, was tremendously impressed by her solicitous manner and by what she had to say.

Krupskaya began her lecture, as I recall, by talking about love. Love was a fundamental in human nature, she said, and Communists
were, after all, human beings and not supermen. Communists were unique in that they fought for communism, but they had all the universal human needs, including love. A good Communist, she said, did not need to be a puritan. What must be avoided was merely playing with love, which could be very dangerous.

It was my impression that she knew a good deal of the goings on at Sun Yat-sen University. Most of the student body were men, and they often contended with one another for the attentions of the few women students. Some of the women, on the other hand, encouraged the attentions of three or four men at the same time. This state of affairs gave rise to all sorts of problems usual in such situations. In one case that I know of, which happened a bit later, one male student wounded another male student with a knife as a result of a love affair.

It was against this background, I suspect, that Krupskaya went on to stress that the abuse of love led people astray. Yet love, properly understood, could produce miracles, she said. A Communist couple who truly loved one another would be reinforced by the love of each for the other, and they could produce miracles. This, she said, was love which had a sense of responsibility about it. Thus, she concluded, love itself was not a crime; what was needed was responsible love.

Then, I think, Krupskaya moved on to what connection there could possibly be between love and literature, on the one hand, and retrogressive human tendencies on the other. (Be it recalled that the authors of *A Concrete Guide to the Work of Training* had stated that love and literature were the foundations of Romanticism. But, clearly, they had not understood the term “Romanticism” as it was used by Western writers in tracing Western intellectual currents. The authors of the *Guide* treated Romanticism as the sort of thing that one reads about in what now are regarded as perfectly acceptable novels, such as *Dream of the Red Chamber*, but which then tended to be regarded by many Chinese as fiction of the yellow press, which dwelt upon the lascivious relations between men and women, the stock in trade of what used to be called “penny dreadfuls.”) She already had explained the constructive role of love. Now she said that there did not need to be anything contaminating about literature. Indeed, she insisted, far from being avoided, there was much to be learned from literature. She said that Russian Communists respected Pushkin and many other classical Rus-
sian writers, from whom one could learn about the old society, while at the same time they loved Maxim Gorky, from whom one could learn about contemporary society. Why, she then asked, should anyone say that Communists opposed literature in general or that all literature was a basis for lascivious thought.

Krupskaya next talked about the family. (The Guide had said that we must destroy the family, that the proletariat had no family.) For a Communist working underground, she said, it might be necessary to cut off all contact with his family, especially if his family were a reactionary one that might obstruct his revolutionary activities. That did not mean, though, she said, that Communists should destroy families in general. Nor could it be said that the proletariat had no family. For the family was a human being’s sanctuary, rather like the nest of a bird. Of course, she said, a Communist must not let his family occupy all of his attention; a Communist had great tasks to perform. Nevertheless, a healthy society was made up of many healthy families. She quoted Marx and Engels to the effect that capitalism destroyed the family. That was capitalism, she said, but why should Communists destroy the family?

The individual life and individual free will of a Communist, which the Guide had insisted did not exist, were Krupskaya’s next theme. Why, she asked, should a Communist be deprived of personal free will and a life of his own? A Communist was bound to work according to the instructions of the Party, she said. Beyond that, however, a Communist had his own life to live. Moreover, the fact that a Communist had to submit himself to the will of the Party did not mean that he had no free will of his own, she said. In fact, she said, it was by the exercise of his free will that a person joined the Communist Party—he could not be forced to join it—and if he so chose, a person was free to leave the Communist Party. Free will, she observed, was quite incorrectly regarded by some as a manifestation of lack of discipline. Then Krupskaya went on to talk about Party unity. Party unity could not be achieved by the terroristic imposition of ideas on Party members, she said; Party unity could be achieved only by the conscious agreement of Party members to the issue involved. Moreover, to create an atmosphere of suspicion in one Party member about another could seriously damage the individual as well as the Party as a whole, she said. Party unity,
she said, should be based on trust and understanding among Party members.

Krupskaya spoke for about two hours. I cannot, of course, recall all that she said. After her formal talk, in any event, the hall was cleared of all men, and she met with the women students of the university, who, we were given to understand, had problems peculiar to women which they might not feel free to raise if men were present. As we were filing out through the lobby I overheard a classmate jokingly observe, “After this I guess we won’t have to recruit Party members exclusively from the ranks of Buddhist monks and nuns.” With the abolition of the Party branch, the organizational problem had been solved. Krupskaya’s speech, however, provided a good many of us with an intellectual and emotional solution to the problem.

A woman who, while she was a student, attended that gathering of women students with Krupskaya has kindly given me a verbal account of her recollection of this meeting. One of the problems presented to Krupskaya was the question of how a woman Communist ought to regard bearing children. Every now and then a girl student at the university had become pregnant; some were married, others were not. All of them, however, had come under heavy fire from the Party branch. The Party branch had taken the position that Communist women must not bear children. To do so, the branch contended, turned them into mere housewives, petty bourgeois who gave a higher priority to raising a family than to carrying out the work of the revolution. Since abortions were legal in the Soviet Union then, some of the pregnant students, fearing the wrath of the Party branch, had had abortions performed. And now Krupskaya was asked whether or not a Communist woman ought to raise a child; was there a contradiction between being a Communist and being a mother? Krupskaya emphatically stated that there was absolutely no contradiction between being a Communist and being a mother. While abortions were legal, she added, they were not desirable either from the standpoint of the health of the girl concerned or from the standpoint of the long-range development of the community. Having a child, she conceded, could make working in the underground back in China difficult. But abortions were not the best solution to this problem. A girl could have her child, and while she was doing dangerous underground work, she could leave it in the care of a
nursery in the Soviet Union, Krupskaya said. In fact, the children of female students at Sun Yat-sen University already were cared for in a nursery located in suburban Moscow. Krupskaya's conversations with the women students at Sun Yat-sen University provided these students with a sense of intellectual and emotional relief similar to that which the men experienced. For, in a way, the women students had found the tyrannical behavior of the Moscow branch even more trying than had the men.

The Russians at the time, as I recall, invariably referred to the Moscow branch as “Raphaelschena”—which might be rendered “Raphael's regime.” I would guess that Raphael was the foreign name for a certain Chinese Communist who was prominent in the branch. In any case, it was only we Chinese who called it yu-mo chih-pu, or Moscow branch. With its dissolution, and with the ideological reorientation of students which was then undertaken, there began an organizational regrouping of CCP or CYC members at the university. Thereafter, of course, the secretary of the Communist Party organization was always a Russian. All members of the CCP were transferred to the CPSU and the Russian Komsomol. But there was a certain degree of discrimination in this action, because members of the CCP and the CYC were all demoted to candidates for membership in the Party and placed on a waiting list. The status of an official member and that of a candidate in the CPSU differed greatly. Official members of the Party enjoyed full voting rights at Party meetings, while candidates could only exercise a vote during discussions. Also, official members were permitted to pass freely into the Comintern building and the headquarters of the CC of CPSU, while candidates for membership had to fill out a form before being admitted.

Many of the Chinese students who transferred to the CPSU or the Russian Komsomol remained on the waiting list for full membership during the entire period of their stay in the Soviet Union. However, if one was a laborer, there was a good chance of gaining full membership. As for a petty bourgeois or even someone from a landowning family, he had to patiently wait for an opening in the very limited monthly membership quota for nonproletarians in the local Communist Party organization. All in all, the matter of full membership in the CPSU was rather academic for the Chinese students, as they were soon to
return to China. In addition, they were not the least bit bothered by being put on the waiting list as long as they were forever free from the bondage of the Moscow branch of the CCP.

Notes

1. Chiang K'ang-hu, leader of the Chinese Social Democratic Party, who participated in the Third Comintern Congress in 1921, looked into the situation of Chinese students at KUTV at the time, and his observations confirm Berman's recollection that, indeed, the Chinese students faced a language barrier: "... about 35 or 36 [students were] from China. ... Since the Russian language was difficult for them to learn, these thirty-odd students were assigned to a special class. Ch'u Chi'u-pai and Li Chung-wu acted as interpreters and assistants to the instructors, so that at times Communist doctrine was taught in Chinese" (Chiang K'ang-hu, *Hsin-o Yu-chi* [Journey to New Russia; Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923], p. 35).


3. *Su-lien yin-mu wen-chien wei-pien* (Collection of documents on the Soviet plot; Peking: Pei-ching chin-ch'a-t'in tang-an wen-chien pien-i-hui chi hui-chang Chang Kuo-ch'eng [Committee under the chairmanship of Chang Kuo-ch'eng for compiling and translating documents regarding the CCP under the Peking Police Department], 1928), pt. 3, pp. 25–27.


Chapter IX
The Shanghai Coup of April 12, 1927, and Sun Yat-sen University

On March 21, 1927, the workers of Shanghai launched their third armed revolt in support of the National Revolutionary Army, which was then advancing toward the suburbs of Shanghai. Bitter battles were fought in all sectors of Shanghai, and by the afternoon of the twenty-first the workers and the Revolutionary Army had defeated the warlords and gained a glorious victory in six out of seven sectors of Shanghai. Thus Shanghai—the largest economic and industrial center of China—fell into the hands of the National Revolutionary Army.

The news of the great victory of the Chinese Revolutionary Army spread like lightning to every corner of the world. At Sun Yat-sen University the news was like "a thunderbolt from a clear sky." We heartily congratulated ourselves, shook hands with one another, and embraced one another with joy and excitement. Our enthusiasm was such that sparkling tears ran down many happy faces.

The secretary of the CPSU organization at the university walked toward a huge map of China and bowed in deep reverence. He then took down the little black flag, which was a symbol of warlord occupation, from the part of the map where Shanghai was located. He tore the flag to shreds and threw it to the floor. We all rushed to stamp on it with our feet. Within seconds there was hardly anything left of the flag. In a mood of wild celebration we thronged into the auditorium and held a jubilant meeting. The big hall reverberated with uproarious talk and loud laughter. The speakers' repeated attempts to talk were drowned out by deafening applause. One of my classmates leapt to the podium, shrieked "Comrades," and then, literally, was so striken with emotion that he could not go on. He just stood there, his mouth frozen in an ecstatic grin. He looked rather like the beaming worker in the front-page cartoon in Pravda the next day, who proclaimed, "Shanghai is ours." Somehow, some order eventually descended on the meeting, and we voted to send two effusive congratulatory telegrams. One telegram was sent to the commander of the Northward Expeditionary Force, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek, and the other to the workers of Shanghai. After the meeting was adjourned we pushed through the gate of the university and quickly formed lines for a demonstration, which eventually included thousands of Moscow residents. Two stout northerners carrying huge banners led the march to the Comintern building. The students of Sun Yat-sen University marched in front of everyone else in the demonstration. *International Press Correspondence*, in what strikes me as a reasonably accurate account of what happened, described the demonstration in the following manner:

The news of the seizure of Shanghai by the insurrectionary workers spread this morning in Moscow and was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the population.

After the close of work, meetings took place in the factories where speakers explained the significance of the new victory of the nationalist troops.

At four p.m. a mass-meeting of many thousands of workers took place in the square before the Comintern building. The students of Sun Yat-sen University marched at the head of the demonstration. Comrades Murphy, Kolarov, Duncan, and a representative of the Communist Party of China spoke to the masses. The demonstrations lasted until late in the evening, workers streamed to them from the factories on the farthest outskirts of the town.¹

In the square in front of the Comintern building, people gathered by the thousands. Banners were flying high in the sky. After Murphy’s speech the president of the university, Radek, spoke to the massed demonstrators, among whom were five hundred young Chinese patriots:

Shanghai is now in the hands of the Chinese, but when the revolutionary army marched into Shanghai they could still see the barbed wire set up by the British soldiers! The revolution in China is still in its embryonic stage; the counterrevolutionary forces have not been driven out. The troops of Chang Tso-lin still threaten Wuhan. But the Chinese Revolutionary Movement is growing stronger every day, and no doubt it will be able to conquer all the obstacles and difficulties that lie in its future. The workers of Moscow received the news of the taking of Shanghai only this morning [March 21] at 10 a.m.; already they are streaming to you in celebrating this great victory. Moreover, they adopted resolutions extending greetings and brotherly love to the Shanghai revolutionary proletariat. Let the imperialists be aware that in case of necessity, the proletariat of Soviet Russia will not hesitate to support the Chinese Revolutionary Movement.²

His speech greatly moved us, and our spirits rose still higher.

The marchers continued on toward the headquarters of the CC of
the CPSU. As we passed through the Ileinka zone, someone in the Soviet Department of Finance building waved to us and shouted at the top of his voice, "Long live the youth of China!" We became more and more exuberant. Finally we made a turn and halted in the old square in front of the building of the CC. CC member Andreev appeared on the balcony of the building to welcome us and to deliver a speech of encouragement and praise. Here the demonstration dispersed, and each group made its own way back home. On our way we were stopped by the crowds. They cheered us and some even seized some of my fellow students, threw them in the air, and caught them as they fell. Many Russian girls innocently threw us kisses and flirted with us coquettishly.

After this memorable day our status increased rapidly. When we walked into theaters, Russian girls clustered around us. They seemed to know that these future revolutionary figures would soon return to China to hold high positions. They also paid us frequent visits at the university. Some of the more daring girls simply offered themselves as loving wives and asked to be taken back to China.

Nor was jubilation over the Shanghai victory limited to Moscow. A wave of joy seemed to sweep across Russia. There were meetings of celebration in Leningrad, Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev, and many other cities, some of the congratulatory messages of which were published in Pravda.

Leaders of the Comintern and the CPSU were all dazzled by the Shanghai victory. A Pravda editorial, "On the World-Historical Importance of the Victory of Shanghai," made a bold prophecy: "The taking of Shanghai is without doubt a factor driving the Chinese revolution toward the Left, strengthening the role of the Chinese proletariat, and increasing its hopes of attaining the hegemony of the revolutionary movement." The prophecy of Pravda seemed to be based upon sound ground, yet before the ink of that editorial had time to dry, the Shanghai anti-Communist coup of April 12 took place. The Chinese revolution not only failed to take a leftward turn, but, on the contrary, made a radical turn to the Right.

Many Russian Communist leaders and Comintern officials were utterly unprepared for the devastating turn of events in China. On April 5, 1927, one week before the anti-Communist coup at Shanghai,
for example, Stalin had insisted that there was no need to try to drive away the KMT rightists, that Chiang Kai-shek was submitting to discipline, and that the Communists needed the KMT rightists, among whom were capable military leaders. Through March, Pravda had drummed away at the theme that Chiang Kai-shek was forced to bow to the will of the revolutionary masses. Yet it is difficult to believe that Stalin and others did not have some prior information about the state of affairs in China, that they had not sniffed any of the odors of impending disaster which were wafting out of China. Maybe events moved more rapidly than they had expected. Perhaps, meanwhile, because of the struggle with Trotsky, who had for some time been forecasting disaster, Stalin chose to suppress any information, even that which might have been privately circulated, that would have substantiated Trotsky's position. Certainly Stalin took great pains not to alienate Chiang Kai-shek.

On April 12, 1927, in any case, the National Revolutionary Army began to massacre the Shanghai workers who had thrice supported the Revolutionary Army at the risk of their own lives. Like the news of the taking of Shanghai, this news quickly spread around the world. The events at Shanghai came as a sickening shock to Moscow and the students of Sun Yat-sen University. Neither the Comintern nor the university had any forewarning of the coup. On the evening of April 12 we held another meeting. Instead of the celebration of some twenty days before, cold anger reigned in the assembly hall. No trace of a smile was visible on any of our youthful faces. With great fury we adopted a resolution to send a telegram to the Nationalist government at Wuhan, demanding severe punishment for the traitors of the revolution. The cable read:

Present developments of the Chinese revolution have provoked counter-attacks from the Imperialists and their loyal lackeys. Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues, the pseudorevolutionaries, have violated the principles and discipline of the Party; they have betrayed our revolution, massacred the Shanghai revolutionary workers, and have thus become the lackeys of the Imperialists. Now they constitute an obstacle on our revolutionary path. But we feel confident that the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government will, with the support of our worker-masses and revolutionary army, bravely and steadfastly pursue the struggle against the counterrevolutionary Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues. We are sure that we shall attain the final victory. From
all the members of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party at Sun
Yat-sen University.4

Before the telegram was approved, many students gave speeches, including those members of the KMT who were sons of KMT dignitaries. They mounted the speakers' platform and severely criticized the Shanghai April 12 coup. Chiang Ching-kuo was one of them. He was then a member of the CYC. His eloquent speech won a thunderous ovation from all students. On April 16, 1927, Izvestia published an account of this speech in an article describing the reaction of Sun Yat-sen University students to the coup: “... son of Chiang Kai-shek urges the students to demonstrate in front of the Comintern building. Not long ago he said at a meeting of young Chinese: ‘I speak here not as the son of Chiang Kai-shek, but as the son of the Chinese Komsomol.’”5 A few days later, Chiang Ching-kuo made a public statement denouncing his father, Chiang Kai-shek, whom he declared to be his enemy. This announcement was translated into several languages and widely distributed by TASS. The English translation of the full text ran as follows:

The treason of Chiang Kai-shek is not unexpected. While he spoke eloquently about the revolution, he gradually began to betray the revolution, wishing to compromise with Chang Tso-lin and Sun Tsung-fan. Chiang Kai-shek has finished his revolutionary career. As a revolutionary, he is dead. He has gone over to the counterrevolution and is an enemy of the Chinese working masses. Chiang Kai-shek was my father and a friend of the revolution. He has gone over to the counterrevolutionary camp. Now he is my enemy.6

His speech at the meeting of university students and his written statement denouncing his father were probably products of his youthfulness and of the pressing circumstances.7 However, this rejection of his father won him the respect of the students of Sun Yat-sen University as well as of the Russian people. After this proclamation, wherever we went, we met people who asked us with great concern, “Where is the son of Chiang Kai-shek?” He became a famous and celebrated figure overnight. But woe to those of us without such a father as Chiang Kai-shek; after the April 12 anti-Communist coup our stock dropped greatly. Not only did the Russian girls no longer flirt with us, but we were received with contempt by Russians everywhere. In addition to pointing at us and shouting, “Chang Tso-lin,” the Russian people gave
us the new title, "Chiang Kai-shek," who had been praised not long
before as a Chinese national hero and a revolutionary fighter, but now
was downgraded as a counterrevolutionary warlord like Chang Tso-lin.
I still remember very well that the Moscow Preparatory Committee for
Celebration of May Day had planned to honor Chiang Kai-shek by
displaying a huge effigy of Chiang in the Labor Day demonstration in
Moscow. Sun Yat-sen University also made a full-length portrait of
Chiang Kai-shek in celebration of the occasion. But the sudden turn
of events drove the Russians and the students of Sun Yat-sen Univer­
sity really mad, and both Chiang's effigy and portrait were burned in­
stantly upon receipt of the information about the April 12 coup.

It might be pointed out that the resolution condemning Chiang
Kai-shek as a counterrevolutionary was unanimously adopted by formal
vote of both Communist and KMT students at Sun Yat-sen University.
Perhaps many of the KMT students did not in their hearts truly endorse
the resolution for which they voted, yet the atmosphere of that meeting
was so emotionally charged with outrage that they would have felt it
imprudent, to say the least, to vote against the resolution. After the
meeting, I know, a number of them spoke with indignation about the
attack that Communist students had carried out against Chiang Kai-
shek. The Shanghai coup, these students argued, was indeed anti-
Communist but not counterrevolutionary. Why, they asked, if the
coup was a counterrevolutionary one, had the Comintern representa­
tive in China, M. N. Roy, cabled Chiang Kai-shek on April 13, pleas­ing
with him not to break the unity of the revolutionary forces? After
all, they insisted, Chiang Kai-shek could not very well maintain the
unity of the revolutionary forces if he were counterrevolutionary.

That telegram of April 13 sent by Roy struck me then, and still
strikes me, as evidence that the Comintern, even after the April 12
coup, hoped to patch up the split with Chiang Kai-shek as Borodin
had done following Chiang Kai-shek's March 20, 1926, anti-Commu­
nist coup. Borodin may have thought, to use a Chinese expression,
that all of the birds were still in the same nest. But relieved of the total
dependence upon the Russians that had prevailed while he still was in
Canton, Chiang Kai-shek had flown the nest. When the Russians
finally accepted Chiang's defection, Bukharin and others, as I recall,
characterized the April 12 coup as a coup of the big bourgeoisie against
the KMT and its left wing, an eventuality which, they said, had rid
the KMT of its right-wing saboteurs and traitors. Now, they said,
the KMT would become a truly revolutionary mass organization. Their
position was similar to that of someone watching the death of a man
and shouting with joy instead of weeping. Leaders of the CPSU and
of the Comintern assured us that now the Wuhan government headed
by Wang Ching-wei was truly a revolutionary government. We must,
they said, place our hopes in Wang Ching-wei, General T'ang Sheng-
chih, and Feng Yu-hsiang. Recalling Stalin's talk at Sun Yat-sen Uni-
versity on May 13, 1927, indications were that Stalin placed a great
deal of faith in Feng Yu-hsiang. Yet the headlong sweep of events in
China once again contradicted all the assertions and predictions of
Stalin and others.

As developments in China undeniably moved from bad to worse,
a sense of being in a hopeless quandary enveloped Communist and
KMT Left students at Sun Yat-sen University. Many of us figuratively
dashed about trying to figure out what in heaven's name had happened,
and we spent a good deal of time in deep, gloomy thought. So many
pressing questions needed answering. Perhaps the most important one
concerned the disarming of armed workers in Shanghai—the workers'
pickets—on the order of the CCP, which was presumably responding
to Comintern instructions. If the workers' pickets had not surrendered
their arms, or buried them, in order to avoid an open clash with KMT
forces, was there any chance at all that they would have been able to
repel the attacks of Chiang Kai-shek and get control of Shanghai?
Various Russian leaders, some in the Comintern, others in the Party,
assured us that the Shanghai pickets were hopelessly outnumbered,
that the disciplined core of the armed pickets consisted of no more than
two or three thousand men. Moreover, these pickets were inadequately
armed. They had not had enough guns to go around in the first place;
many of the guns they did have had been lost in the fighting which
began on April twelfth; and of the guns which remained in their hands,
many were not in working order. Furthermore, we were told, the
Military Committee in Shanghai, which the CCP had organized to
carry out the uprising there, had not been psychologically, politically,
or organizationally prepared for the events that confronted it. The
committee simply had not expected the KMT's Revolutionary Army to become its most deadly enemy overnight.

Perhaps the next most compelling question that was on the minds of many of us was why the revolutionary Wuhan government did not divert its troops that were marching northwards against Chang Tso-lin to make an eastwards thrust against Chiang Kai-shek, who had, after all, openly betrayed the revolution. Stalin gave us a comprehensive answer to this question in his talk on May 13. The most important point he made was the need to avert a direct confrontation of the revolutionary forces with the forces of Western Imperialism. Let Chiang Kai-shek for the time being hobnob with the Imperialists at Shanghai, he said, while the Revolutionary Army moved north to unify the rest of China. For the Imperialists, he said, would not lightly relinquish their control of Shanghai, and the revolutionary forces were not strong enough to fight on all fronts at the same time.

It seems to me that one theme ran throughout Stalin's policies towards China in this period: The fear of crystalizing a direct confrontation between Imperialist forces and the forces with which the Soviet Union was unmistakably linked. On March 24, 1927, British, U.S., French, Italian, and Japanese warships had bombarded Nanking, causing a heavy loss of life. On April 6, 1927, the diplomatic corps at Peking had permitted forces of Chang Tso-lin to enter the extraterritorial Legation Quarter and to raid the Soviet Embassy there. And at Shanghai, in April, 1927, armed forces of the Powers in the Foreign Concessions had coordinated their activities with those of KMT troops to suppress the Communist-organized uprising. To Stalin and others in Russia, such actions must have appeared to be clear warnings that the Powers would, if pushed too far in China, take retaliatory action; and Stalin had to weigh the possibility, from his standpoint, that they might retaliate against the Soviet Union itself. Yet the Soviet Union then was still a weak nation, and there were limits to the commitments it could realistically make abroad and to the dangers it could risk to its own territory. Viewed in this light, Stalin's policies towards China in this period seemed to emerge not so much from "opportunism" as from the weakness of the Soviet Union.

Yet another question that haunted Communist and KMT Left students at Sun Yat-sen University was why we had not seized control
of Nanking when we had had a good chance of doing so, thereby making it impossible for KMT forces to carry out the kind of coup they carried out in Shanghai. Probably we lacked sufficient information to conclude that we could have controlled Nanking. But we did know that the Second and Sixth armies of the National Revolutionary Army, which had been the first to march into Nanking, had had Communist leanings. It was not until the next year that some of us were able to learn all about the circumstances surrounding the events at Nanking. For it was then that Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang, who had been personally involved in the Nanking developments, and Chiang Hao, Hsia Hsi, and others, who had detailed knowledge of these developments, arrived at Sun Yat-sen University. Lin Tsu-han had been political commissar of the Sixth Army. Wu Yu-chang had been one of the most important members of the Wuhan government and was at the time a member of the CEC of the KMT. These men gave students at Sun Yat-sen University their versions of what had happened at Nanking. Later, too, I worked closely at Vladivostok with both Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang for nearly two years, and we talked off and on about the Nanking Incident. But it was mostly from Lin Tsu-han that I learned about Nanking. We came from adjoining counties in Hunan Province, and we had an especially pleasant personal relationship.

As best I can recall, the following is Lin Tsu-han's version of what happened at Nanking. Li Fu-ch'un, a Communist, was political commissar of the Second Army, which was commanded by General Lu T'ı-p'in, a Hunanese who was loyal to the KMT. There were many Communists among the commanders at middle and lower levels of Lu's army, and, for all practical purposes, Communist influence prevailed among his troops. Lin Tsu-han himself was political commissar of the Sixth Army, which was commanded by General Ch'en Ch'ien, another Hunanese, whose KMT membership went back to the earliest years of that party. Considerably senior to Chiang Kai-shek in the KMT, Ch'en Ch'ien was at odds with Chiang, under whom he had no wish to serve. His uneasy relationship with Chiang caused him to lean towards the Communists, not as a matter of conviction but by way of strengthening his own position vis-à-vis Chiang. Lin Tsu-han utilized this state of affairs tirelessly in trying to induce Ch'en Ch'ien to
throw his lot in with the Communists. On many occasions, as a result, Ch'en Ch'ien did support the Communists, although he never wholeheartedly joined the Communist movement as a whole. Thus, when on March 24, 1927, the Second and then the Sixth Army marched into Nanking, Lin Tsu-han redoubled his efforts to influence Ch'en Ch'ien. Lin pleaded with him to assert his personal control over Nanking to counter the growing power of Chiang Kai-shek.

Just at this time the Central Political Committee of the KMT at Wuhan, of which Lin Tsu-han and Wu Yu-chang were members, was seeking to assert its own control over Nanking, and Lin Tsu-han went to Wuhan for a meeting of the committee. As a result of this meeting, at the suggestion of Lin and Wu, a Committee on Political Affairs in Kiangsu Province, of which Nanking was then the capital, was created. General Ch'en Ch'ien was named chairman of this committee. Of the ten additional committee members, six were Communists: Li Fu-ch'un, Hu Shao-ch'iu, Chang Shu-shih, Li Lung-chien, Chiang Tung-ch'in, and Ku Shun-chang. Ku Shun-chang was commander of the armed workers' pickets at Shanghai. His appointment to this Kiangsu committee obviously suggested the possibility of coordinating Nanking activities with the activities of the Shanghai workers' pickets. Another committee member, Liu Ya-tzu, was closely identified with the Communists. Lin Tsu-han then rushed back to Nanking towards the end of March, 1927, to facilitate control of that city by forces hostile to Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang Kai-shek, meanwhile, was not unaware of what was going on at Nanking and Wuhan. He hurried from Kiukiang in Kiangsi Province to Shanghai on March 26, 1927, and summoned General Ch'en Ch'ien to meet him there. After their meeting, Ch'en Ch'ien proceeded to Wuhan. On April 6, 1927, while Ch'en Ch'ien was still away from Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek wired the Sixth and Second armies an order to immediately evacuate the city, cross the Yangtze River, and march northwards. An army loyal to Chiang had by this time entered Nanking. Ch'en Ch'ien's subordinates at Nanking wired Ch'en asking whether or not they should obey Chiang Kai-shek's evacuation order, and Ch'en replied that they were not to obey it. But, somehow, agents of Chiang Kai-shek managed to prevent Ch'en's telegram from reaching his subordinates at Nanking. Thus, the Sixth
and Second armies marched out of Nanking. Chiang Kai-shek personally entered the city on April 9.

In Wuhan, as soon as Li Fu-ch’un notified Michael Borodin that Chiang Kai-shek had dashed off to Shanghai, Borodin apparently sniffed unfavorable developments in the wind. He called a meeting of Wuhan leaders at his residence on April 7, 1927. At this meeting the decision was made to move the CC of the KMT, which was at Wuhan, and the Nationalist government there, to Nanking. But, of course, the decision was not made in time.

As Lin Tsu-han described it to me, the entire plan of forces hostile to Chiang Kai-shek to gain control of Nanking turned into a fiasco. In summing up, he said that neither the Comintern nor the CCP had a well-prepared plan for dealing with KMT generals who might turn against them. Second, the Wuhan government at the time was not strong enough to assert its influence over the Nanking-Shanghai area. Lastly, General Ch’en Ch’ien, on whom everything depended, was not himself sufficiently committed to the Communists and the KMT Left to insure Communist control over the Second and Sixth armies, even though those armies were under Communist influence.

Back at Sun Yat-sen University during that spring of 1927, there often were no answers, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, to the questions that preyed upon our minds. And as we agonized over the adverse developments in China, those developments continued to move against the Communists. The Wuhan government, in which Russian leaders had urged us to have faith, switched over to the side of Chiang Kai-shek. Feng Yu-hsiang, the warlord who had seemed especially dependable to Stalin, threw his support to Chiang Kai-shek, too. Communists by the tens of thousands were slaughtered. Our feelings of being depressed and in a quandary, which had been oppressing us, turned increasingly to outrage. A Comintern representative came to the university to meet with Communist students there—the KMT Left students having by then lapsed into silence, since in China the KMT Left had turned against the Communists. We bombarded the Comintern representative, whose name I have forgotten, with angry questions. Why had the Comintern, for example, not learned from the lesson of the April 12 coup at Shanghai that measures should have been taken to prevent a similar coup at Wuhan just three months later?

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Surely it was on this point that the whole Stalin-Bukharin leadership was most vulnerable. It was, of course, difficult for the Comintern representative to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. He placed the entire blame for the debacle upon Chinese Communist leadership, and upon Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "opportunism" in particular. Chinese Communist leaders, he said, had not paid adequate attention to Comintern instructions, and they had sabotaged many Comintern instructions in the process of claiming that they were carrying them out. I think I can safely speak for most Communist students who were at this meeting when I say that we did not wish to minimize the responsibility of Chinese Communist leaders for the tragic events in China. Yet to place all the blame upon the Chinese leaders, while assigning no blame at all to the leadership of Stalin and Bukharin, stuck in our craws. We were not, I think, prepared, either, to believe that such men as Borodin and M. N. Roy were any less to blame than Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Yet when Borodin returned to Moscow in late August or in September, 1927, he was not publicly reprimanded, as Ch'en Tu-hsiu was publicly castigated, even though there had been a good deal of private criticism of his behavior. Indeed, he returned to Moscow a defeated man, and no one in Moscow, Russian or Chinese, seemed to have a good word to say for him. No doubt Stalin and Bukharin, not wishing to supply the Trotskyites with ammunition, spared Borodin from public condemnation. Nevertheless, to us at Sun Yat-sen University it seemed obvious that he had fallen into disgrace so far as Stalin was concerned. Stalin, I understood, refused even to see Borodin. In contrast, General Vassily Blucher, who had been the chief military adviser to the KMT and had worked intimately with Chiang Kai-shek, received the highest military award the Soviet Union gave to its military men. Eventually, Borodin was given the insignificant post of editing the English-language Moscow News, a post which he held for years.

When we at Sun Yat-sen University learned that Borodin had returned to Moscow, we insisted that he visit the university to report on the situation in China and upon the role he and the Comintern representatives had played in that situation. He flatly refused the invitation on the grounds that it was not the proper time for him to speak on this subject and that the university was not the proper place for
him to make such a report. So many students were highly outraged by Borodin's refusal that there was a real chance that there would be violent student demonstrations. Trying to head off such an eventuality, the vice-rector, Kuchumov, took the initiative in trying to persuade Borodin to somehow do something that would placate the students. In the end, Borodin agreed to address the students on condition that the meeting not take place at the university, but at some place less emotionally roiled up, and that only a select group of students and professors, no more than one hundred in all, attend the meeting. Reluctantly, Borodin's provisions were accepted. The Party bureau at the university selected the students and faculty members who would attend the meeting, and I was among those chosen.

As I recall, Borodin spoke to us for about one hour in the small hall of a one-story building not far from the university. His strategy seemed to be, as a Chinese expression has it, to avoid the heavy things while picking up the light ones. A Russian saying applied to another facet of his strategy—instead of hanging a dog around his own neck, he hung it around the necks of others. Thus, we learned nothing of any substance from his speech, which raised the tenor of our anger to a new pitch. To make matters worse, he concluded his speech by announcing that he had to leave to keep another engagement, whereupon he hurried out of the building. We had no opportunity to ask him any of the questions that we had collected beforehand from schoolmates who were not invited to the meeting.

Waiting eagerly for us at the university when we returned were a great many students who immediately jostled us into a hall, where several of us, myself among them, recounted what Borodin had said. They reacted to our report just as we had reacted to Borodin's report. Many unkind things were said about Borodin, to put it mildly. In retrospect, to be fair to Borodin, I suppose that he had been forbidden to make public utterances of any consequence on the subject of China. After all of these developments, few of the students at Sun Yat-sen University, I suspect, felt that the Comintern or the Soviet leaders could necessarily be relied upon to guide wisely the course of the revolution in China. The towering reputation that Stalin and Bukharin had acquired among many of us was badly shaken. This state of affairs, of course, created a favorable situation for students and faculty mem-
bers whose sympathies lay with Trotsky. They could present Trotsky's positions, while criticizing Stalin and the Comintern, and only a hard core of Comintern loyalists had the heart to argue against them. Thus it was at this point that Trotskyism at Sun Yat-sen University achieved its initial thrust, and among those who pushed Trotsky's cause at that time was Chiang Ching-kuo. He appeared frequently at speakers' lecterns, usually with a pile of books from which he quoted, supporting Trotsky's positions. Speakers at such meetings were limited to five-minute presentations. Young Chiang, functioning like a machine gun, would frantically leaf through his books while speaking at a great rate, discover and read off the appropriate quotation at precisely the right point, and then continue speaking and searching out the next quotation. He was a brilliantly organized speaker and made maximum use of the time allotted him. At the same time he was the author of a good many effectively written essays which were posted on the university's bulletin boards.

We shall discuss the fate of Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University in later chapters. Here let me anticipate a bit by saying that Chiang Ching-kuo was not punished for his outspoken support of Trotsky, although less outspoken Trotskyites were harshly treated. Instead, Chiang Ching-kuo was sent on from Sun Yat-sen University to attend a military-political academy in Leningrad. At the time, some of us assumed that the Soviet authorities chose to overlook his political indiscretions because of his youth. Subsequently, though, I entertained the thought that Stalin may well have been keeping Chiang Ching-kuo up his sleeve, as it were, as a bargaining piece in possible future negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Or perhaps Stalin merely hoped through Chiang Ching-kuo to have available some sort of a link with the boy's father in the event that such a link might prove useful in the future. During the years of the War of Resistance Against Japan and shortly afterwards, this latter consideration, in fact, did seem to be the case, although it is beyond the scope of this volume to go into the matter here.

In any event, many of the students at Sun Yat-sen University who in this trying period came to sympathize with Trotsky's positions eventually became formal members of the Trotsky opposition. But it was the hope of those of us who, though our trust had been sorely tried, remained loyal to Comintern leadership that Comintern and Russian
leaders would, indeed, profit from their mistakes and grow more adroit in their assessments of Chinese revolutionary needs and developments.

The anti-Communist coup of April 12, 1927, marked a turning point in modern Chinese history. From that day on, the policy of the KMT again reverted back to the state that prevailed before the reorganization of the KMT in January, 1924. Sun Yat-sen’s three major policies of uniting with Soviet Russia, uniting with the Chinese Communists, and supporting the workers and peasants were abruptly dropped. Also from this day on, events led the Chinese Communists to liquidate Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s soft-line leadership and to adopt the hard line of armed struggle. The failures suffered by the Communists in Shanghai and in other large cities after April 12, 1927, a series of failures that continued for years, became a decisive factor in shifting Chinese Communist policy from organizing city workers as its main task to sponsoring armed agrarian revolution in the villages. They developed the military strategy of absorbing the cities by occupying villages. Much later it was this same strategy which they insisted should be adopted on a world-wide scale to win the world revolution!

Notes

5. *Izvestia* (Moscow), Apr. 16, 1927.
7. Mao I-heng, in his recollections of his trip to Moscow with Feng Yu-hsiang in 1926, described Chiang Ching-kuo as a KMT member at heart (*O-meng Hui-i-lu*, p. 171).
Chapter X
Feng Yu-hsiang—Honorary Student
at Sun Yat-sen University

The initial efforts of Soviet Russia to establish a foothold in China can be traced back to the early days following the October Revolution of 1917. But it was not until 1923, when the Russians established firm relations with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in South China, that they made any substantial headway in China. Michael Borodin left Moscow for Canton in September, 1923. On the way, he stopped off in Peking, where he had long conversations with Leo Karakhan, the Soviet representative there. They discussed, among other things, the possibility of establishing a Soviet foothold in North China in addition to the one in the South. About the same time, Li Ta-chao and, later, Hsu Ch’ien, helped this undertaking by providing concrete suggestions as to how it might be implemented. Li and Hsu proposed to Karakhan that General Hu Ching-i, commander-in-chief of the Second Kuominchun, then based in Honan Province, was the most likely man in the North with whom the Russians might develop a useful working relationship. Hu Ching-i had long maintained close relations with the KMT and could almost be regarded as a KMT member. The Russians accepted this suggestion and began the lengthy negotiating and planning necessary to send a substantial military advisory group to work with Hu Ching-i. Before the advisory group actually was sent, however, Hu Ching-i died of an infection from an abscess in April, 1925. The Russians had no faith in his successor, Yueh Wei-chü. This time, Li Ta-chao, Hsu Ch’ien, and perhaps others suggested that the Russians work out a relationship with the commander-in-chief of the First Kuominchun, Feng Yu-hsiang, who was stationed at Chiang-chia-k’ou. Again, the Russians accepted the suggestion. At Li Ta-chao’s request, Mao I-heng, a professor in Peking, visited Feng Yu-hsiang and acquainted him with the Russians’ interest in providing him with military assistance. Feng promptly named three subordinates, Liu Chi, T’ang Yueh-liang, and Pao Shih-chieh, to directly negotiate in his behalf with Karakhan. Meanwhile, the KMT appointed Hsu Ch’ien as its representative to the First Kuominchun. Then, in behalf of the KMT, Wang Ching-wei,
Sun Fo, and K‘ung Hsiang-hsi, one after the other, visited Feng Yu-hsiang at the headquarters of the First Kuominchun to strengthen political ties. Eventually, Borodin visited Feng Yu-hsiang at Chiang-chia-k‘ou, and shortly after that a large Russian military advisory group arrived.¹

Indications are that Borodin, at Karakhan’s request, went to Peking in April, 1925, and that on April 21, 1925, he went to Chiang-chia-k‘ou, accompanied by the Russian military attaché at Peking, A. I. Gecker. Presumably, since the groundwork already had been laid by Mao I-heng and others, Borodin and Feng Yu-hsiang readily reached an agreement regarding Russian assistance to the First Kuominchun. The Russian advisory group, headed by a Russian whose Chinese name was Jen T‘e-chiang, probably reached Chiang-chia-k‘ou in about May, 1925. The group consisted of twenty-nine military specialists, two political workers, one medical doctor, and four interpreters.²

As I recall, Li Ta-chao at the time sent out a confidential communication to leading CCP organizations in North China informing them of these developments and suggesting that Feng Yu-hsiang might eventually turn completely to the side of the revolution. Li’s communication instructed Party organs to prepare to address themselves to this new situation. Peking at that time was the cultural and political center of China, and the Peking Communist organization was the largest in North China. Li Ta-chao’s communication instructed it to prepare capable, energetic young political workers for possible assignment to Feng Yu-hsiang’s army. Li’s communication, I recall, caused a good deal of excitement among the Communist leaders in Peking as well as the rank-and-file Party members. Many of them, of whom I was one, were eager to be recruited to work in Feng’s army.

In October of 1925 Feng sent a military mission to Soviet Russia to examine Russian military education and to explore the possibility of getting more Russian military aid. The head of this mission was Hsiung Pin.³ Hsiung Pin, however, had at least one additional task—to prepare the way for a visit to Moscow by Feng Yu-hsiang himself. Feng left for Russia in March, 1926. He left P’ing-ti-ch‘uan on March 20 and arrived at Ulan Bator on the twenty-second, where he and his wife, Li Te-ch‘uan, and the rest of his group stayed for more than a month. It was while they were still there that Borodin, leading a group
of thirty people, which included Yü Yu-jen, Eugene Ch’en, Ku Meng-yu, Hsu Ch’ien, and Ch’en Ch’i-hsiu, arrived at Ulan Bator on April 3, 1926. Borodin and his group discussed with Feng the details of cooperation between the KMT and the Kuominchun.

Feng finally arrived in Moscow on May 9, 1926. He was given a most cordial and enthusiastic welcome. The students of both Sun Yat-sen University and KUTV were at the station to greet him with huge banners and placards proclaiming “Greetings to the leader of the People’s Army—protector of the worker-peasant movement of China!” Besides the students, Pugachev, chief-of-staff of the headquarters of the Russian Red Army; Melnikov, Narkomindel’s Far East Director; and Yakovlev, commander of the Moscow garrison, were present.

Feng apparently was moved by the welcome accorded him. He held a press conference at the station, at which he stated:

I have come to Soviet Russia to strengthen the ties of friendship that bind our two countries and to study the reconstruction of Russia and the Red Army. On the way from Verkhne-Udinsk to Moscow, I have already seen the successes of the reconstruction in the many bridges, highways, and apartment houses now completed. I am happy that here, in Russia, I have found a model of what the future of China can be. . . . What particularly impressed me in your country is the Red Army, especially the Red cavalry. While in Verkhne-Udinsk I joined in the May Day celebrations and saw firsthand the close unity and cooperation between the Red Army and the people. Many of the military barracks I visited were as orderly and clean as an academic institution.

He then went among the ranks of the welcoming students and thanked them for their kindness. For this gesture he was again rewarded with thunderous cries of “Long live the leader of the Kuominchun!” “Long live the warrior against Imperialism!” As a further gesture of his sympathy for the Socialist cause, he personally donated one hundred rubles for the relief of the striking English workers and asked for further donations from his group. Naturally, this gesture received front-page treatment in Pravda. Feng truly possessed diplomatic and acting talents.

As Sun Yat-sen University students described it to me later, he made further use of his talents when, on May 10, he visited the tomb of Lenin and dramatically announced that he had decided to join the KMT and fight for the National revolution. While he made it appear
that his decision was based upon inspiration from the Communist saint, it was actually based upon the practical considerations entailed in the unfavorable military situation and the growing shortage of armaments which he faced in China.7

Everywhere he went in the Soviet Union he gave stirring speeches proclaiming his revolutionary ardor. He fooled everyone, including the students at Sun Yat-sen University, who invited him to a special meeting. Mao I-heng, who accompanied him on his trip to the university, wrote:

On the third day of our stay in Moscow, Sun Yat-sen University invited Feng Yu-hsiang to give a speech to the students. Both Hsu Ch’i-lung [Hsu Ch’ien] and I were also invited to attend. The time was set for eight o’clock that night, but we arrived around half past seven. A group of students chatted with Feng for a while, among them some fellow provincials of Feng Yu-hsiang’s from Anhwei Province. At the meeting eight students were chosen for the presidium. One of them was a girl named Chang Hsiu-lan, who is now a member of the Control Yuan in Taiwan. Rector Radek gave the welcoming and introductory speech in which he especially stressed the point that Feng came from landless farmers and that therefore he would be the best protector of the peasants’ interests. He also stressed that North China needed a man like Feng Yu-hsiang. Feng then stood up and gave his speech, of which the first sentence was, “I shall always be a turncoat of the bourgeoise! I have also chased the Manchu emperor away from his palace, thus destroying the very roots of several thousand years of the Chinese Imperial system!” His opening sentences were very well received, as evidenced by the thunderous ovation he received. Everyone appeared to be enthusiastic. Feng spoke for approximately an hour and fifteen minutes and held the interest of his audience very well. This speech left a very good impression on his listeners. Later I was told that after the speech, during the Party group discussions held at the university as to whether or not aid should be given Feng, the majority were in favor of aiding Feng.8

Another student who attended the meeting later told me that Feng started his speech by saying, “I am the son of a worker” and ended it by shouting, “Long live Leninism! Long live the proletariat! Long live the World Revolution!”

Apparently in response to Feng’s eloquent speech at the university, many students the next morning went to the Hotel Europa, where Feng Yu-hsiang was staying, to pay him a courtesy visit. It might be noted that, as Mao I-heng recalled it, students in this group included Ch’en Shao-yu, Wang T’ung-yung, and others who came from Anhwei
Province, as did Feng. It seems apparent from Mao I-heng's account of the episode that Ch'en Shao-yu made a highly favorable impression on him as a pleasant-faced, intelligent young man whose command of the Russian language was noteworthy and whose knowledge of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin was impressive. Of this courtesy visit Mao I-heng also noted that a majority of the students were Communists, a circumstance which led Mao to speculate that the Russian Communists encouraged Chinese Communist students to visit Feng by way of initiating a relationship which might lead to the young Chinese eventually working with Feng back in China. That may be the case, but after I got to Moscow I was told that Chinese Communists in the university had organized the visit to Feng's hotel with the intention of inclining Feng favorably toward the Communists while isolating him from the KMT. If this was their intention, it succeeded for a time. Most KMT students, I was told, treated Feng as though he already was a creature of the Communists; they only later made overtures towards him. In any event, where Communist interests were at stake, Communist organization was apparent, which could not always be said of the KMT.

According to Mao I-heng, on the way to Moscow, at Feng's request, a Russian accompanying the party had lectured Feng and his entourage on Leninism. During his stay in Moscow, Feng made much of his "proletarian" background. He even asked Karl Radek to explain Leninism to him, which Radek did. It was as Radek's student that he received an official Sun Yat-sen University student identification card and was made an honorary student of the university, although he did not attend classes. Apparently to further demonstrate his sincerity with regard to the revolutionary cause, Feng summoned his son Feng Hung-kuo from Germany, where young Feng had been studying, and enrolled him at Sun Yat-sen University. He also enrolled his eldest daughter, Feng Fu-lun, in the university. Feng placed his second daughter, Feng Wu-lun, as a worker in a Moscow aeronautical plant, presumably to cement his ties with the proletariat.

Before Feng Yu-hsiang left Moscow, he enrolled one member of his party, a close associate named Ch'en T'ien-ch'ih, as a student at Sun Yat-sen University. Somewhat later, on Feng's instructions, a good many of his officers who were studying in military institutes in Kiev.
and elsewhere, were transferred to study at Sun Yat-sen University. With one of these men, Yang Nien-hsi, who used the Russian name Ivanov, I formed a close personal friendship. At about the same time Feng somehow enrolled one of his more senior officers, Chang Cheng-ya, as a student at KUTV, which meant that Chang must have been a Communist Party member, perhaps a member of the CCP. While studying at KUTV, Chang seemed to spend much of his time at Sun Yat-sen University, where I got to know him. He always was a busy man. Rightly or wrongly, I assumed that he was a double agent whom Feng had planted in the Communist Party but of whose services the Communist Party made good use. He was not the only one of Feng’s men in Russia who joined the Communist Party, of course. But the others, it seemed to me, maintained an unquestionable loyalty to Feng.

Feng Yu-hsiang visited many important dignitaries in Moscow. Among them were Chicherin, Zinoviev, Kalinin, Radek, Voroshilov, Trotsky, and Madame Lenin. Feng did not meet Stalin, but Stalin was evidently quite impressed by him. According to Mao I-heng, Stalin originally promised Feng military equipment for fifty thousand troops, but later he decided to go all out and multiplied the amount of equipment promised by eight times. With such fruitful results Feng finally left Moscow on August 17, 1926. He was accompanied by Liu Po-chien, a graduate of KUTV who had been working with the Chinese Section of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat. Upon arriving in China, Feng appointed Liu director of the Political Section of the Kuominchun.

Feng Yu-hsiang got back to his headquarters at Wu-yuan in Suiyuan Province on September 15, 1926, where he was sworn in as commander of the united Kuominchun and where he formally proclaimed that he had become a KMT member. Now he had six armies under his command. On November 28, 1926, after considerable fighting, he occupied Sian, the capital of Shensi Province. Yü Yu-jen, a native of Shensi, was made governor of the province. Sian thus became a center of the revolution in China; at the time a saying went “Canton in the South, Sian in the North.”

At the same time, of course, Shensi Province became a felicitous place for Chinese Communist activities. In almost every field of activity
in the province, Chinese Communists quickly came to occupy significant posts—in government, the educational institutions, the mass organizations, and so forth. Interestingly, in Sian, doubtless with Feng Yu-hsiang’s consent, an organization comparable to the Russian GPU was created. It was called the Department of Political Defense (cheng-chih pao wei pu). Meanwhile, at Sian the Sun Yat-sen Military Academy was established. Both the Department of Political Defense and the Sun Yat-sen Military Academy were headed by a Communist named Shih K’o-hsuan. Liu Po-chien, a Communist, was made head of the Political Department of the united Kuominchun, and the CCP rapidly expanded its political work within the Kuominchun. In addition to Liu Po-chien, such Communists as Liu Chih-tan and Li Lin were active in the Kuominchun. Liu Chih-tan was subsequently to become a founder of the Shensi-Kansu Soviet area.13

The young Party activists recruited by the Peking Chinese Communist organization specifically for work in Feng Yu-hsiang’s army, about one hundred of them, were also by this time working in the Kuominchun. I might digress a bit to reminisce about one of them, a close, lifelong friend of mine named Wu Chung-lan. We came from the same village in Hunan, and we studied at the same university in Peking. It was I who convinced him that he should join the CCP and who sponsored his membership in the Party. It was I, too, who recommended to the Peking Communist organization that he be assigned to work in Feng Yu-hsiang’s army, and he left to undertake this work before I left Peking for Moscow. In 1927, when Feng Yu-hsiang turned against the Chinese Communists, most Communists working under him were dismissed, the others executed. Wu Chung-lan was executed.

With the rapid success of the Northward Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army, there was a swift growth of dissension in the revolutionary ranks. Starting with the anti-Communist coup in Shanghai, the conflict between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary elements in the Wuhan government area was intensified. Even in the upper echelons of the Wuhan government there were signs of discord.

Sensing danger for the Chinese revolution, the students of Sun Yat-sen University passed a resolution on June 9, 1927, urging Feng Yu-hsiang and T’ang Sheng-chih to hold the revolutionary line. The complete text of the resolution follows:
Through the CEC of the KMT in Wuhan and the Nationalist government we appeal to the commander-in-chief of the Wuhan Northward Expeditionary Forces, General Feng Yu-hsiang, the deputy commander, General T'ang Sheng-chih, and all officers and soldiers in the front: The recent victory of the Northward Expedition launched by the Wuhan government and the armed threats of the Imperialists have demonstrated that only those revolutionary troops that operate with the support of the workers and peasants can be the fearful enemy of the Imperialists. The treacherous and inhuman actions of the new tool of the Imperialists, Chiang Kai-shek, can but make the people more revolutionary, strengthen the solidarity of the workers and peasants with the Nationalist government, render the victory of the Chinese revolution more secure, and accelerate the fall of Imperialist domination in China.

The arming of the workers and peasants and the agrarian revolution in the villages are the only guarantees of the victory of the Chinese national revolution. The Northward Expedition is victorious, and we predict that the demoralization of Chang Tso-lin's army and his fall are inevitable. This news makes us very happy. The proletariat and oppressed peoples all over the world, especially the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union, sympathize deeply with our national revolution and offer us every possible assistance. This is proof of the correctness of the Three Principles of our illustrious President.

All members of the branch of the KMT in this university have vowed to work together with all of the comrades of our party and to fight to the end.

The Community of the members of the KMT in Sun Yat-sen University, Moscow.14

This resolution, full of high-sounding phrases, was, of course, incapable of changing Feng's mind. He did not reply to it, nor did General T'ang Sheng-chih. All Feng really cared about was the enlarging of his own domains; he could not have cared less about the revolution.

On June 10, 1927, Feng, Wang Ching-wei, T' an Yen-k'ai, Hsu Ch'ien, Sun Fo, Ku Meng-yu, T'ang Sheng-chih, Chang Fa-k'uei, Teng Yen-ta, and General Blucher met in Cheng-chou to discuss retaliatory measures against Chiang Kai-shek. However, on June 19, Feng had met with Chiang and Hu Han-min to discuss the Northward Expedition and measures that could be taken against the Wuhan government. Feng analyzed the situation in the following manner:

Chiang invited me to meet him in Hsu-chou. When I arrived in Hsu-chou we discussed the continuation of the Northward Expedition. So now the Wuhan government wants me to help them fight Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang wants me...
to help him fight the Wuhan government. But if we were to squabble among ourselves, how could we acquit ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese people?¹⁵

After his conference with Chiang Kai-shek, Feng's attitude toward the Wuhan government changed abruptly. On June 21, he sent the Wuhan government a telegram which indicated quite clearly that he had sided with Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, it was not surprising that on July 8, 1927, Feng officially started his "Party purge" against the Communists. All of the political workers in the Kuominchun who were stationed in Honan and Shensi were completely investigated, and all of those workers who had been sent by the Wuhan government or the Communist Party were discharged. The director of the Political Section of the Kuominchun, Liu Po-chien, who had returned to China with Feng, was among those discharged from their positions. Feng had no more need for Russian aid and was anxious to rid himself of Russian fetters.

However, in turning against the Communists, he seemed to have forgotten his wife and children in Moscow. Feng Hung-kuo's reaction to his father's treachery is especially interesting, because he was placed in a situation quite similar to that of Chiang Ching-kuo. He hastened to issue the following scathing denunciation of his father's treachery:¹⁶

Father: Now it is evident that by deserting the revolutionary front you have become a leader of the counterrevolution. To me, because I was aware of your opportunism and your pretentious and pig-headed character, this shift was not unexpected. During the negotiations between the KMT and the Northwestern Peoples' Army on the conditions of affiliation of the latter with the KMT, you rejected the conditions by which the KMT would be granted the authority to punish officers of the Kuominchun [Peoples' Army] if they violated the discipline of the KMT. You argued at that time that this condition would mean a capitulation of the Peoples' Army and was not a condition for mutual cooperation. Judging from these words, it is obvious that you had no intention of carrying on the revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the KMT, but that you only wished to make use of its flag and to seize more territory under the pretense of protecting the interests of the workers and peasants. Now, throwing down your mask, you have not only failed to defend the interest of the working class and the peasantry, but you have gone so far as to cooperate openly with Chiang Kai-shek, the butcherer of workers and peasants.

I have learned that you issued an insolent statement saying that in the territory under the control of the Wuhan government the merchants, the owners of industrial enterprises, and the landlords were oppressed by the workers and
peasants. This is ridiculous! The time has not yet come when the Chinese workers and peasants can oppress the capitalists, merchants, and landlords. But even if this were the case, you should stand on the side of the majority of the people and help the workers and the peasants overthrow the yoke of the exploiters.

You have become the enemy of the working class and the peasantry and a renegade of Sun Yat-senism. Formerly, when I was studying in an old-style school, I had no idea of revolutionary teachings. Now, after entering Sun Yat-sen University and studying the theory and practice of revolution, I know the line that the Chinese revolution should follow. While you have followed the counterrevolutionaries, I have become a revolutionary. And as a revolutionary I care only for the interests of the revolution and not in the least for the relationship between father and son. Therefore, I am breaking all ties with a counterrevolutionary father like you. Starting today I regard you as belonging to the pack of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Tso-lin, and other counterrevolutionaries.

Now you and I belong to hostile camps. You are in the camp of the counterrevolution. From now on I will carry on a resolute struggle against my own father who is an enemy of the working class and the peasantry. This is my last word to my father—a counterrevolutionary!

August 15, 1927, Feng Hung-kuo, Moscow

The ever-suspicious Russians had been on their guard against Feng. But when he sent his wife and children to Moscow, they were lulled into a state of overconfidence. Also, early in 1927, Feng sent a group of military men to Russia. They were headed by the veteran General Lu Chung-lin. Besides being an excellent soldier, Lu was an excellent speaker. I remember that on February 7, 1927, KUTV held a fourth anniversary service in remembrance of those who died in the tragic strike of the Peking-Hankow Railroad workers on February 7, 1923. The speakers at this meeting were Bukharin and Lu. Lu gave a very moving speech which was received with thunderous applause from the audience. In concluding his speech, Lu said, "I, Lu Chung-lin, upon my return to China, will do my utmost to liberate the workers and peasants. If I should ever turn counterrevolutionary, I ask all of you to strike me down."

This performance by Lu Chung-lin added further to Russian confidence in Feng Yu-hsiang. They had so much confidence in Feng that after dissension appeared within the Wuhan government, Borodin and the other Russian advisers had planned to evacuate revolutionary elements to the part of Northwest China that was controlled by Feng.
However, their plans were destined to fail, and Borodin found no haven in Feng Yu-hsiang’s territory.

Notes

2. Li-T'ai-fen, Kuominchun ke-ming-shih (Revolutionary history of the Kuominchun), p. 431.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. On Mar. 9, 1926, on the eve of the decision that he announced at Lenin’s tomb, Feng learned that the Kuominchun was suffering from an acute shortage of ammunition. With Tientsin in the hands of forces hostile to him, his only supply line was the Ulanude-Chiang-chia-k’ou Highway, which connected with the Trans-Siberian Railway. It was by this route that he already had received 6,000,000 rubles’ worth of weapons and ammunition from Soviet Russia, and the need to keep military supplies flowing to his forces by that route was obvious. (Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927, p. 333.)
10. Even had he not had Radek’s sponsorship, though, Feng doubtless would have been made an honorary student of the university, for most influential non-Communist Chinese who spent some time at the university were made honorary students. For some reason, Communists of comparable stature, however, were not made honorary students.
11. Feng Hung-kuo and I were classmates at Sun Yat-sen University. We both were in the seventh group of the second graduating class. A pleasant person, who lacked his father’s guile, he was more inclined towards athletics than towards academic matters, and he regularly missed our first morning class.
16. According to Mao I-heng’s reminiscences, Feng Hung-kuo’s relations with his father were none too good under the best of circumstances, because Feng Yu-hsiang had kicked Hung-kuo’s mother to death and Hung-kuo had always wanted to avenge his mother’s death. While we were together in Moscow, Feng Hung-kuo told me, and a great many others, that indeed his father had publicly kicked his mother to death. It preyed on his mind a good deal.
17. Pravda, Aug. 20, 1927.
Chapter XI
Madame Sun Yat-sen and Other Visitors to Moscow and Sun Yat-sen University

The years from 1925 to 1927 were eventful years in China, and the turbulence of the times was reflected in the number of KMT and Communist dignitaries who journeyed to Moscow from China. Among the never-ending procession of pilgrims to Moscow, members of the CCP were the most numerous. Sun Yat-sen University often invited these Chinese Communists to the university to report on the situation at home. Among those we had the pleasure of listening to were Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, Lu Ting-i, Teng Chung-hsia, Kuan Hsiang-ying, and others. Strangely, Sun Yat-sen University never held receptions for any of these Chinese Communist leaders, nor did it present them with honorary degrees. Receptions and honorary degrees seemed to be reserved for visiting KMT dignitaries.

However, not all visitors to Sun Yat-sen University were KMT or Communist leaders. Among the more important non-Communist visitors was the internationally known scholar, Dr. Hu Shih, although Dr. Hu did not visit the university while I was there, nor do I recall hearing about his visit during my stay in Russia. Mao I-heng in his Reminiscences, however, mentions that during his trip to Moscow with Feng Yu-hsiang in May, 1926, he heard that Dr. Hu had visited the university earlier. According to Mao:

Hu Shih paid a visit to Sun Yat-sen University while he was passing through Russia. Radek (rector of Sun Yat-sen University) asked Hu what impression he had formed of the Soviet Union. Hu answered with humor, “A group of people are working diligently according to their ideas!” As to the outcome of their efforts, Hu said that only the future would tell, and he was no prophet. This anecdote was told me by a student at Sun Yat-sen University, who denounced Hu as a product of capitalistic training. . . . Thereafter the Communists and their followers denounced Hu Shih on general principles . . . . The Communist attitude toward Hu Shih was not so hostile before his Moscow trip. Sun Yat-sen University’s gate was henceforth shut to all Chinese scholars who were not revolutionaries. Mr. Chang Chun-mai tried unsuccessfully to gain admittance while he was in Moscow.
Hu Han-min was an especially important visitor at the university. As I have already mentioned, Hu was sent to the Soviet Union as an envoy for the Nationalist government in Canton. This was a result of the Liao Chung-k’ai assassination. He left Canton on September 23, 1925, and arrived in Moscow on October 18, 1925. He was accompanied by his daughter and several others including Li Yuan-fan, secretary general of the Canton government; Chi Ho-chung, secretary of the Military Committee; and two cadets from Whampoa Military Academy. In spite of Hu’s connection with Liao Chung-k’ai’s assassination, Moscow accorded him a full reception. Apparently, whatever crime Hu Han-min was suspected of, his generalissimo’s uniform and repeated references to world revolution impressed the Russians. He was given a post in the Kresintern and awarded an honorary degree by Sun Yat-sen University.

However, the issue of Liao Chung-k’ai’s assassination acutely embarrassed Hu Han-min during one of his early visits to Sun Yat-sen University. At a meeting there, some of the students, who, of course, had no way of knowing the circumstance of Liao’s death, blandly asked Hu for a report on the particulars of Liao’s death. Hu apparently blushed and was unable to utter a word. Apparently only an impromptu speech by someone else smoothed over a difficult situation. Yet, as I have mentioned in a previous chapter, despite this embarrassing incident, Hu Han-min went on to render valuable support to the KMT organization in the university.

Another interesting guest at the university was Yii Yu-jen, a veteran KMT member. According to Mao I-heng, Feng Yu-hsiang probably initiated the idea of having Yii Yu-jen come to Moscow, as Feng believed that Yii could help him get Russian aid; but Li Ta-chao probably made the arrangements for Yii’s trip. Later, Yii Yu-jen’s son-in-law Ch’u Wu, who was studying at Sun Yat-sen University, told me essentially what Mao I-heng speculated above to be the case. Ch’u, however, added that Yii had an additional mission, which was to get Russian aid for the Second Kuominchun, with which Yii had close ties.

Yii arrived in Moscow in late July of 1926. The August 4 issue of Pravda contained an interview with Yii which included a detailed account of his life and work, with special emphasis on his part in
the founding of Shanghai University in 1922, an institution which, for all practical purposes, was a training school for leftist and Communist cadres. The Chinese Communists were very fond of Yü. In the Pravda article Yü was described as the organizer of the Second Kuomintchun. That he occupied an important position in the Kuomintchun and that he came to Moscow with a special mission are obvious from the text of his interview of August 4 in Pravda:

Q: What is the future of Chang Tso-lin’s alliance with Wu P’ei-fu?
A: Viewed from the entire experience of the Chinese civil war, this alliance is unstable; conflicts between them are inevitable. But it would be a grave mistake if we waited with folded hands for the situation to change; on the contrary, the Kuomintchun should take immediate action and launch an attack.

Q: What is the present strength of the Kuomintchun? Is it greatly weakened after the recent setback?
A: Naturally the Kuomintchun is weakened to some extent, yet its foundation has become stronger than ever. Those people who lived in the regions controlled by the Kuomintchun came to hate the warlords even more after being subjected to their brief rule, and they desired the return of the Kuomintchun. But the Kuomintchun realizes more than ever before the urgent need to cooperate closely with the KMT. I hope that General Feng Yu-hsiang will take back with him the revolutionary experience he learned in Russia, and I am sure it will be of great value in improving the Kuomintchun’s combat capability.

Q: Pravda, in its reports on the defeat of the Second Kuomintchun, maintained that the reason for this defeat was the Army’s failure to establish good relationships with the peasants. These reports also told of soldiers who robbed peasants of their property. How accurate are these reports?
A: These reports are correct. Due to the fluidity in the composition of the Kuomintchun and the war conditions, the commander of the Second Kuomintchun was not always able to exercise authority and control over the troops.

Yü Yu-jen was quite busy during his ten-day stay in Moscow. On July 31, he visited the Soviet Agricultural Department. He was entertained by the Kresintern on August 3 and was introduced to many
Russian scholars. He also received a warm welcome at Sun Yat-sen University. At a reception for him at the university, Yü, like Hu Han-min and Feng Yu-hsiang before him, was awarded an honorary degree by Rector Radek. Thus Yü’s name was added to the list of distinguished alumni.

Besides receiving an honorary degree, Yü Yu-jen had relatives at the university. His daughter Yü Lun and his son-in-law Ch’u Wu were both students there. After her graduation Yü Lun returned to China, but Ch’u Wu remained in Moscow and attended the Moscow Military Academy. When Ch’u was ordered back to China after the completion of his studies, he resisted. He got off the train at some Siberian station and secretly returned to Moscow, hoping to continue his relationship with his Russian mistress. However, he was soon arrested by the Russian secret police and sent to Siberia to be reformed by labor. Finally, after years of hardship, he was sent back to China; but instead of reporting to the Chinese Communist authorities for duty, he became a member of the Control Yuan of the Chinese Nationalist government. He secured this position with the help of his influential father-in-law.

Two other interesting personalities who visited Moscow during this period were Shao Li-tzu and Lu Chung-lin. Shao Li-tzu came to Moscow on an official mission soon after Hu Han-min, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yü Yu-jen. According to the Russians, he represented Chiang Kai-shek as the KMT delegate to the Comintern. I have already mentioned this fact in another chapter, but I have not been able to find out whether Shao’s mission was based on a resolution of the CEC of the KMT or on Chiang’s personal order. Also, I am not certain as to the exact date of Shao’s arrival in Moscow.

Some time around the end of 1926 or the beginning of 1927, Lu Chung-lin came to Moscow with the last group of Feng Yu-hsiang’s officers, most of whom held the rank of division commander. Among the members of Lu’s group were Li Hsiang-yung, Ch’en Hsi-hsien, Chang K’e-hsia, Ho Ch’ih-li, and P’u Hua-jen. All of these officers were young, inexperienced, and easily influenced by Communist propaganda. The only one of the group who might have been termed an intellectual was the Christian minister P’u Hua-jen, Feng Yu-hsiang’s personal chaplain, who was fascinated by communism.
Besides engaging in the usual sightseeing, Lu and his fellow travelers were enrolled in a short-term class set up especially for them at Sun Yat-sen University. In this course Rector Radek and others discussed Leninism and the principles of military affairs.

Some members of Lu's group later became Communists. P'u Hua-jen, for example, shifted his ardent faith from Christ to Marx and preached communism instead of Christianity.⁶

Another guest in Moscow with whom we students at Sun Yat-sen University had contact was with Teng Yen-ta. The year 1927 had been a turning point in the course of the Chinese revolution, and after the April 12 anti-Communist coup in Shanghai, the Wuhan government became more and more unstable. The situation took an abrupt turn for the worse after Feng Yu-hsiang telegraphed the Wuhan authorities his ultimatum of June 21, 1927.

Due to this unfavorable turn, a July 13 TASS dispatch from Hankow reported that Teng Yen-ta had issued a statement saying that the KMT and Feng Yu-hsiang had betrayed the Three Principles of the People and that he, therefore, no longer wanted to remain as chief of the National Revolutionary Army's political department. Shortly after issuing this statement, he left Wuhan via Northwest China and arrived in Moscow in August.

At the time of Teng's arrival in Moscow the entire student body of Sun Yat-sen University was vacationing at Tarasovka, a suburb of Moscow. As we were all anxious for news of China, the university authorities invited Teng to this resort to report on the revolutionary situation in China. Teng was a very learned man, and he impressed me most favorably. In a four-hour-long report, he discussed in detail the conflicting factions existing within the revolutionary camp. He severely denounced Chiang Kai-shek and the Wuhan leadership, but he also pointed an accusing finger at the Communists. Some of the Communist students in the audience were apparently angered by his denunciation of Communists and retaliated by snapping the lights off and on and by scuffing their feet on the floor.

When we returned to school in early September, 1927, Teng prepared a well-written, documented report for us. This report was printed by the university and distributed to various groups (each class was divided into groups) for discussion. The central problem of these
discussions was the relationship between national revolution and class struggle—a problem of life and death for the Chinese revolution at that time. Some maintained that all Chinese should form a united front to fight against Imperialism and that we should not indulge in class struggle. Others insisted that the anti-Imperialist, national revolution must have its foundation on the revolution of peasants and workers.

Two other individuals who visited Moscow during the late 1920s were Eugene Ch’en, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Wuhan government, and Soong Ch’ing-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. As I have stated, by July 20, 1927, an anti-Communist political storm was imminent at Wuhan, and the Communists and Nationalists were confronting each other with daggers drawn. Under these circumstances Borodin left Wuhan for Russia on July 27. Leaders of the KMT Left Wing, who were no longer secure in their positions, also made preparations to leave Wuhan. Among these Left Wing leaders were Ch’en and Madame Sun. At the end of July they left Wuhan separately for Moscow.

Previous to this time, however, it had been rumored at Sun Yat-sen University that Teng Yen-ta and Soong Ch’ing-ling were about to leave Wuhan, and we were quite disturbed. We gathered one day in late July to discuss the Wuhan situation and unanimously passed a resolution to telegraph Teng and Soong, asking them to remain at Wuhan. The text of this telegram was as follows:

Appeal to Comrades Soong Ch’ing-ling and Teng Yen-ta. Having been acquainted with the statement of Comrade Soong Ch’ing-ling and the circular of Comrade Teng Yen-ta on the treason and betrayal by the top leaders of the party of the three policies (cooperation with Soviet Russia, cooperation with the Communists, and support of the interests of the workers and peasants) laid down by our great leader, Sun Yat-sen, a general meeting of the student members of the KMT in Sun Yat-sen University wholly subscribe to the opinions of principle expressed in your statement and circular. We hold that the conciliation with the Nanking wing and the rupture of relations with the CCP are exact repetitions of the capitulationist policy of the Right during the revolution of 1911. This is a betrayal of the interests of the people in the present stage of the revolution.

While resolutely condemning the treacherous policy of the so-called Sun Yat-senist, the general meeting recognized that our party is experiencing an extremely grave crisis now. The only way out of this situation is to resolutely reverse the conciliatory, treacherous policies of the top leadership, to firmly pursue a course of
spreading the agrarian revolution as the main force of the democratic-liberation revolution in China, to resolutely broaden the worker-peasant movement, and to maintain unequivocally the cooperation with the CCP in order to guarantee a sound leadership for the revolution. In this grave moment, this general meeting is of the opinion that your departure from active duty is inadvisable, and we appeal to both of you and to members of the KMT who still remain loyal to the principles of our leader Sun Yat-sen. We urge you to be more active, energetic fighters than ever in the struggle against the treacherous leadership and the counterrevolution and to strive for the effective realization of the policies of our leader by rallying the workers and peasants around the Chinese national revolution.

Down with the traitors and betrayals!
Long live the genuinely revolutionary Kuomintang!

The Community of members
of the KMT in Sun Yat-sen
University, Moscow

Unfortunately, Soong and Ch'en had left Wuhan before this telegram reached them. While they left Wuhan separately, they entered the Soviet Union at the same time, arriving in Moscow on September 7, 1927. Soong Ch'ing-ling, on the strength of her late husband's name and her own revolutionary appeal, greatly impressed the students of Sun Yat-sen University. The day she arrived in Moscow, students from Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, and KUTV, and representatives from Moscow's various factories and the Chinese Community all went to Yaroslavskii station to welcome her. When her train pulled into the station, the band was playing the "International," and there was thunderous cheering.

After the train stopped, Karakhan, the representative of the Soviet central government, and Popov, the representative of the Moscow Soviet, entered her coach to welcome her personally. Then she got off the train and walked along the platform as those of us in the crowd applauded her wildly and shouted slogans. She responded with a broad smile, although it was easy to see that her face bore signs of strain. The scene reminded me of the previous time that I had seen her, which was when she and Dr. Sun Yat-sen had gotten off their train at Peking at the end of 1924 and I had been among the throngs that had shouted and clapped our welcome to them. On that occasion, too, she had obviously been delighted by the greeting of thousands of
youngsters who had stood for hours in the snow. But on that occasion, too, there had been evidence of strain in her face—strain because of the rapidly deteriorating state of Dr. Sun's health. She had smiled and waved to us as she had escorted Dr. Sun to the waiting car. Less than three months later she had lost her husband. In Moscow on the day of her arrival, a bit more than two years after Dr. Sun's death, the hint of sadness in her face no doubt reflected the loss of the Chinese revolution for which both she and her husband had worked.

I was to see Madame Sun a third time under quite different circumstances. In 1924 at Peking and in 1927 at Moscow, I was a spectator in the audience and she was the star on the stage. But in the summer of 1934 at Shanghai, when I saw her for the third time in my life, we met at my invitation. At that time I was chairman of the Shanghai Bureau of the CC of the CCP. We spent almost five hours together in an apartment building in the French Concession of Shanghai. The CC at Jui-chin had instructed me to arrange this meeting with Madame Sun to brief her in detail about the situation in the Kiangsi Soviet, which Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth Encirclement Campaign then held under attack. It was a critical time for the Red Army in Kiangsi, and I was instructed to seek Madame Sun's assistance in carrying out a campaign in the non-Communist areas which would relieve the pressure on the beleaguered Soviet. Madame Sun expressed her deep concern for the plight of the Soviet and promised to do everything in her power to assist us. That was the last time I was to see Madame Sun Yat-sen. All three encounters, however, etched themselves with equal clarity on my memory.

But on that day in 1927 at Moscow, of course, I had no way of anticipating our subsequent encounter. I stood worshipfully in the crowd and listened while Popov and a number of Moscow's women and then several members of the Moscow Chinese community delivered speeches of welcome to Madame Sun Yat-sen.

The following day Soong Ch'ing-ling made a statement to all of the newspapers through TASS, of which this was the third paragraph:

By taking this trip to Soviet Russia, I am carrying out another, a third mission. Death caught Dr. Sun Yat-sen before he could fulfill one of his ardent desires, namely to pay a visit to Moscow and to consult with you, the staunch revolutionary friends of China. His death was precipitated by the hardship of
forty years of revolutionary struggle and by the frequent violation of discipline on the part of those who betrayed him while pretending to speak in the name of Dr. Sun's principles. Before his death Dr. Sun asked me to visit Moscow on his behalf. Therefore, I have come here to fulfill his wish. In the name of the revolutionary masses of China, I assure the people of Soviet Russia that we have appreciated their cooperation with us in the past, and we are confident that this cooperation will be continued in the years of struggle to come.8

Stalin and other Soviet leaders warmly received Soong Ch'ing-ling during her stay in Moscow, and of them all she asked that Russia continue to support the revolution in China.

The students at Sun Yat-sen University, especially the women students, brimmed with pride at her outstanding performance. At a welcoming reception held for Soong Ch'ing-ling and Eugene Ch'en at the university, her poise, beauty, and charm evoked waves of love and respect from all of us. A native of Kwangtung, Madame Sun's Shanghai dialect was impeccable, and she spoke to us that day in the Shanghai dialect. She expressed deep gratification, as I recall it, at visiting the first Chinese university named after her late husband to be established abroad. She told us the thrill she experienced at seeing so many fervent young people who were devoting their energies to the realization of the Three Principles of the People. Never forget, she admonished us, that we were disciples of Sun Yat-sen and that we had been trained in a university that bore his name. She urged us never to forget that Sun Yat-sen's most precious behests were the Three Principles of the People and the three policies: unite with Soviet Russia, cooperate with the Chinese Communists, and work for the workers and peasants. It was only after Dr. Sun adopted his "three policies," she said, that momentum towards the realization of the Three Principles of the People increased and the KMT gained new strength. She stressed, however, as she had done in her TASS statement, that people who had betrayed Sun Yat-sen were pretending to speak in the name of his principles. She mentioned no names in this connection. In any event, she was an effective orator. Her crisp, clear voice was periodically drowned out by our applause. She made an indelibly warm impression upon her audience.

Immediately following Soong Ch'ing-ling that day at Sun Yat-sen University, Eugene Ch'en spoke to us. He enjoyed great popularity in
Russia as well as among us students. For he was accepted as the author of the sentimentally cordial letter that Sun Yat-sen had sent to Soviet Russia just before his death. He was celebrated, too, as a revolutionary diplomat, the foreign minister of the Wuhan government. An overseas Chinese who apparently spoke little Chinese, Eugene Ch’en addressed us in English. He spoke mostly about his negotiations with the foreign powers during the period of his foreign-ministership.

Soong and Ch’en were the last prominent members of the KMT to go to Moscow. The period of Sino-Soviet cooperation had ended. Antagonism now separated the two nations, and the campus of Sun Yat-sen University was no longer graced by the presence of visiting KMT dignitaries.

Notes

1. Chang Chun-mai was better known in the West as Carson Chang, a famous philosopher who founded the National Socialist Party in China in the 1930s.


3. Hsien-tai shih-liao (Materials on modern Chinese history; 3 vols., Shanghai: Hai-tien chu-pan-she, 1934 and 1935), III, 204. This source states that Yü Yu-jen was the speaker who stepped into the breach to smooth things over for Hu Han-min, which seems to be an error. For Hu Han-min and Yü Yu-jen were not in the Soviet Union at the same time. Yü Yu-jen reached Moscow about three months after Hu Han-min returned to China.


5. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Yun K’uan (husband of Wang Pien), Hsiao Ts’u-yu, Yun Tai-ying, Teng Chung-hsia, and Chang T’ai-lei were among the Communists who taught at Shanghai University. K’ang Sheng (who used the name Chao Yun in that period), Yang Chih-hua (the wife of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai), and many other important Chinese Communist cadres were graduated by this university.

6. In January, 1933, when I returned to Shanghai from Russia, a young American who represented the Communist Youth International conducted me from my hotel to a good-sized house on Yuyuan Road which P’u, who by then had joined the CCP, had rented. The house served as a Chinese Communist underground liaison center with Comintern representatives. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and his wife, who were old acquaintances of mine, lived there, and it was they whom I was taken to see. But I met P’u Hua-jen on this occasion for the first time and was impressed by his dedication to the Communist cause.

7. Pravda, July 31, 1927.


9. Eugene Ch’en (Ch’en Yu-jen) was indeed the author of Sun Yat-sen’s letter. According to Lo Chia-lun (Kuo-fu nien-p’u; Kuo-shih-kuan shih-liao pien-chuan wei-yuan-hui; and the Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang tang-shih shih-liao pien-chuan wei-yuan-hui [Taipei, 1958], p. 745) on Mar. 11, 1925, the day before Sun Yat-sen’s death, after Dr. Sun had signed his will, Eugene Ch’en, his English-language secretary, presented Dr. Sun with an English-language draft of a letter addressed to the Soviet Russian leaders. The letter, which was a long one, was read to Dr. Sun, who was terribly weak, by Sung Tzu-wen (T. V. Soong). After listening to it, Sun Yat-sen signed the letter.
Chapter XII
Stalin and Sun Yat-sen University

Joseph Stalin began to study the problem of nationalities early in his career. His first work on this subject was *Marxism and National Problems*, which was probably published early in 1913. Even now this work is considered a classic by most Marxists.

In April, 1917, Stalin made a report on nationalities problems to the Seventh All-Russian Conference of Bolsheviks. On November 8 of the same year his position as an authority on the nationalities problem was confirmed by his appointment as commissar of the Peoples’ Commissariat of Nationalities.

In his article in the magazine *Zhizn Natsionalnosti* of November 24, 1918, Stalin dwelt briefly upon the tasks of Communists working in the East: “It is the task of communism to break the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East, to infect the workers and peasants of these countries with the emancipatory spirit of revolution, to rouse them to fight imperialism, and thus deprive world imperialism of its ‘most reliable’ rear and ‘inexhaustible’ reserve.”

At the Tenth Congress of the CPSU in 1921, Stalin made another report, “On the Party’s Present Tasks Concerning Nationalities Problems.” Perhaps due to his report and influence, the Soviet government in April, 1921, established the University for the Toilers of the East under the auspices of the Commissariat of Nationalities. Stalin’s personal role is emphasized by the fact that the literal translation of the university’s name became the Communist University for the Toilers of the East Named after Stalin (KUTV).

With Lenin’s death in January of 1924 Stalin became increasingly involved in the running of the Comintern. Whereas KUTV had previously addressed itself chiefly to the nationalities within the Soviet Union, it now gave greater emphasis to the people of the colonial and dependent countries of the East. This was at just the time when the national-liberation movement, especially in India and China, was gaining momentum. Hence, Stalin was brought face to face with the problem of the Chinese revolution.

In 1925, the year of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s death, the Chinese revolu-
tionary movement developed rapidly. This rapid expansion resulted in a great demand for revolutionary cadres; and although KUTV had a Chinese class,* admission to it was restricted to members of the Communist Party or the CYC. Besides, this class was too small to meet rapidly expanding needs. Hence a university specializing in the training of revolutionary cadres for China was established. This was Sun Yat-sen University. History does not record who was the originator of this university, but since Stalin was a sponsor of KUTV and, after the Eleventh Congress of the CPSU in 1922, had risen to the powerful post of secretary general of the Party, he may well have played a role in the establishment of Sun Yat-sen University.

The power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky after Lenin's death was intensified by and involved in the problems of the Chinese revolution, and the newly formed Sun Yat-sen University was sucked into this struggle from the beginning. After the Chung-shan gunboat incident—Chiang Kai-shek's first anti-Communist coup on March 20, 1926—Stalin and Trotsky appeared at the university and held a heated debate on whether or not the Chinese Communists should withdraw from the KMT. It was evident that both Stalin and Trotsky were already seeking the support of the young Chinese revolutionaries.

From February 17 to March 15, 1926, and from November 22 to December 16, 1926, the ECCI held its Sixth and Seventh Enlarged plenums at which the problems of the Chinese revolution were thoroughly discussed. On November 30, 1926, at the session of the Chinese Commission of the ECCI, Stalin delivered his historic speech "The Prospects of the Revolution in China." The resolutions passed by this plenum concerning Chinese revolutionary problems were primarily based on Stalin's speech. At this time, the Stalin-Bukharin axis dominated the Comintern. Bukharin had succeeded Zinoviev as Chairman of the ECCI.

After the adjournment of the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, Stalin

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* According to Stalin's address of May 18, 1925, to students of KUTV (Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], VII, 153), the university included in addition to students from the Soviet East, about ten different groups of students from colonial or dependent countries. No doubt the Chinese class constituted one of these groups: "The Chinese class at Communist University for Toilers of the East was initially assembled in the autumn of 1921 with, probably, about 35 or 36 students. Of these, apparently more than half were from Hunan Province, and most of the rest from other areas of South China. Most of these students were members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, only a few being OCP members."
and Bukharin sent M. N. Roy, as chief representative of the Comintern in China, together with a large number of Party workers to strengthen the Comintern’s leadership of the Chinese revolution. At the end of 1926, upon the instruction of Stalin, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern also selected a large number of outstanding students from Sun Yat-sen University to go to China with Roy. One of my fellow students, Teng Wen-i, who was among those who went with Roy, remembers that

In the spring of 1927 it was rumored that the Third International wanted to send a delegation to China to direct the revolution and that Sun Yat-sen University was to select forty outstanding students to go back to China to work with the delegation. The director of this delegation was a member of the Executive Committee of the Third International, an Indian named Roy. The Chinese representatives included T’an P’ing-shan and others. Among the forty students there were thirty-seven Communist Party members and only three KMT members—Lo Fang-chun, Wen Chung, and myself.³

As the National Revolutionary Army was advancing rapidly and conflicts in the revolutionary movement were becoming increasingly evident, Roy and his followers hastened their departure. Teng recalls:

We started on our journey immediately after receiving notice. We were allowed to take all our personal luggage, books, and notes with us. This was a privilege granted to us counter to the regulation that forbade taking anything out of Russia. Aboard a chartered train, we left Moscow in great haste, and with unbelievable speed we hastened to our destination as soldiers speeding to the battlefield. Less than ten days later we arrived in Vladivostok. After a one-day stopover, we sailed for Canton aboard the S.S. Lenin. In less than seven days we were in Canton. About a week passed; then the delegation representing the Third International and the returning students from Moscow all went to Wuhan.⁴

However, the Roy Mission could not change the trend of events. The internal conflicts and the dangers of the Imperialists’ armed intervention became more grave. When the Northward Expeditionary Army had captured Shanghai and Nanking, British, American, Japanese, and French gunboats shelled Nanking on March 24, 1927, causing more than two thousand casualties among the military and civilian population. Stalin characterized this “Nanking massacre” as “a signal for a new demarcation of the contending forces in China. In bombarding Nanking and presenting an ultimatum, the imperialists desired
to make it known that they were seeking the support of the national bourgeoisie for a joint struggle against the Chinese revolution." This intervention of foreign powers, coupled with clashes within the united front, exerted all sorts of divisive pressures on the Chinese revolution. Shortly afterwards, on April 12, the anti-Communist coup broke out in Shanghai.

After the April 12, 1927, anti-Communist coup at Shanghai, Trotsky and his followers greatly increased their attacks on Stalin. At the same time, Trotskyite elements at Sun Yat-sen University also increased the tempo of their agitation. In order to alleviate the worsening situation and quiet the clamor of the opposition, Stalin published an article in the April 21, 1927, issue of Pravda, "Questions of the Chinese Revolution," which criticized the position of the opposition and especially that of Radek: "The fundamental mistake of the opposition (Radek and Co.) consists in not understanding the character of the revolution in China, in not understanding which stage the revolution is passing through at the present time, and in not understanding the present international situation."

At that time Radek still was nominally rector of Sun Yat-sen University, but he seldom visited his office. However, behind the scenes he tried to instigate activities among the Trotskyite professors and sympathizers in the student body. The rest of the students, taking note of the rapidly worsening situation in China, also had doubts as to the wisdom of Stalin's leadership. In order to allay our doubts about the Chinese revolution, we asked that Stalin be invited to come to the university to give us his analysis of the Chinese revolution and to answer questions. Our wishes, carried through the proper channels, met with Stalin's approval. He instructed the branch organization of the Party at the university to collect the students' questions and to present them to him in writing before his scheduled talk.

We wrote down questions on those facets of the Chinese situation which had been bothering us and turned them in to the Party's branch office. Because many of the questions were vague, repetitious, or incoherently stated, several students from the higher classes, in addition to translating them into Russian, sorted and corrected them.

After the questions were sent out, we anxiously awaited a reply. Finally, on the morning of May 13, 1927, a large bulletin appeared in
front of the library. It stated that an important member of the CC of the Party would address the student body at 2 P.M. that day. Who was the important member? The bulletin did not say, but we all guessed it must be Stalin. Our mood was one of anxiety mixed with excitement. We rushed to the auditorium long before the appointed hour. Several hundred pairs of young, shining eyes were fixed upon the stage. At last the stage curtains went up, and Stalin appeared smiling on the stage. The auditorium was packed. Besides the chiefs of various departments of both Soviet and Comintern organizations, a good many dignitaries from the Trotskyite opposition turned up, carefully taking note of Stalin's every word. While there were a great many Russians crowded into the auditorium, both Stalinists and Trotskyites, Rector Radek was not among them, and in his absence the secretary of the Party's branch office at the university served as host.

Stalin was no orator. From the standpoint of elocution he did not compare to Trotsky or Radek. But he excelled in using simple vocabulary and simple phraseology to express complex thoughts. Hence, while his speech did not possess great agitating power, it was quite convincing. He answered the questions one by one, pausing after each paragraph to permit the interpreter to translate. When the interpreter, Chou Ta-ming, told him that he could talk a little longer between pauses, Stalin smiled and said, as I recall, "I'd rather not talk too long in a stretch; then you will not forget so much in your interpretation." We all laughed on hearing this remark and were impressed by Stalin's thoughtfulness and thoroughness.

Unfortunately, Chou failed to make a good showing that day. Because of either nervousness or excitement, his interpretation was none too good. We unanimously demanded that Chou be replaced with P'u Shih-ch'i (P'u T'ao-ming), in spite of the fact that Chou would lose face. At first Stalin thought that the shouts and catcalls directed at Chou Ta-ming were meant for him; but later when he learned that the disturbance was over the interpreter instead of an unfavorable reaction to his speech, he smiled.

P'u Shih-ch'i was met with cheers when he appeared on the stage. His interpretation was much better, and we were able to grasp more fully the fine points of Stalin's important speech. His talk lasted three hours. Strangely enough, whether as a security precaution or simply
because of a desire to chat with his comrades, Stalin would disappear backstage while the interpreter was translating his answers. We really never knew the reason for this.

After he had answered our tenth question and the interpreter had finished translating, we waited quietly for Stalin to come out so that we might ask some additional questions. But it was the Party secretary who appeared on the stage to state that Comrade Stalin, having some important affairs to attend to, had already left. We applauded to show our respect for Stalin, yet at the same time we were a little disappointed. We were left puzzled by the abruptness of Stalin's visit and his mysterious departure.

A good many more questions than those Stalin chose to answer had been submitted to him, as Stalin had acknowledged at the start of his meeting with us, when he suggested that a second, perhaps longer, session at Sun Yat-sen University might be arranged. After the Wuhan government turned against the Communists, student tempers again flared up, and there was a general demand that Stalin make his promised second appearance at Sun Yat-sen University. But the Party bureau at the university refused to relay our invitation to Stalin, perhaps because events had demonstrated that a number of the prognostications he had made during his first appearance were tragically wrong. Thus, the second visit that Stalin had promised to make to Sun Yat-sen University never took place.

I remember being surprised at the minimal security arrangements that prevailed on the occasion of Stalin's visit to Sun Yat-sen University. There were some plainclothesmen here and there about the campus and in the buildings, but not nearly so many as I had assumed would appear. These rather relaxed security precautions contrasted dramatically with the suffocating security measures that I saw in 1932 in connection with the funeral procession for Stalin's wife. On the latter occasion, all activity along the street that the procession took was banned, all windows facing the route had to be kept closed, and the route was lined with uniformed men, their backs to the procession as they ceaselessly scanned the buildings along the way and held their rifles at the ready. But in 1927 such security precautions in connection with Soviet leaders were unheard of. In any event, the Soviet security peo-
ple clearly did not expect any violence at Sun Yat-sen University the day Stalin came.

Among the ten questions Stalin analyzed for us, he touched on theoretical matters as well as upon immediate tactical issues; but, naturally, everything he said had policy implications. For example, his answers to our first and second questions were direct replies to positions that Radek had taken. Radek had maintained that, for all practical purposes, there were no feudal remnants in the Chinese countryside. Of course, this touched upon a fundamental issue concerning the very nature of the Chinese revolution, and Stalin had to handle it with great care. Stalin maintained that "if there were no feudal survivals in China, or if they were not of very great importance for the Chinese countryside, there would be no soil for an agrarian revolution, and there would then be no point in speaking of the agrarian revolution as one of the chief tasks of the Communist Party at the present stage of the Chinese revolution." Whereas Radek had insisted that the KMT was a petty-bourgeois political party, moreover, Stalin said that the KMT was not an "ordinary" petty-bourgeois party.

The positions that Stalin took that day at Sun Yat-sen University have been widely discussed, and I have no intention of going into them in any detail here. But I would like to mention the reaction of the students at the university to Stalin's speech. It seems to me that Stalin created a generally favorable impression among the students. This did not mean, however, that his answers to our questions satisfied all the different student factions or that everybody accepted all of his answers. For example, those students who sympathized with Trotsky were quite unprepared to change their views on many issues no matter what Stalin said. Even students who supported the Comintern's leadership experienced doubts about some of the things Stalin had to say. I, for example, did not find his analysis of the April 12, 1927, coup in Shanghai very satisfying. It could be said, I suppose, that the sunlight of full clarity did not shine on Sun Yat-sen University after Stalin's appearance there; Stalin dispelled a good many clouds of misapprehension, but some clouds remained to darken the sky.

In order to give Stalin's speech greater effect than it might otherwise have had, however, the Party bureau at Sun Yat-sen University immediately named several Russian faculty members and Chinese
students to edit and translate it into Chinese. It was issued as a pamphlet in Chinese only two days after Stalin’s appearance. Copies of the pamphlet were made available to all students and faculty members of the university. Meanwhile, the Party bureau called a meeting of all the directors of Communist Party cells in the university—all of whom were Russians—and instructed them on ways of handling the discussions of Stalin’s speech in cell meetings. At this meeting, the cell directors were instructed to handle their cell discussions so as to criticize the positions of the Trotsky opposition and thus to point up the correctness of Stalin’s positions. In other words, in our cell meetings we did not, then, discuss the Chinese revolution from the standpoint of seeking valid answers to pressing issues. The Party bureau’s strategy was merely to support Stalin in the power struggle within the CPSU and the Comintern. This state of affairs did not sit well with most students at the university. It was a tragedy that the Chinese revolution, instead of being the object of the best thinking of Party leaders, became a mere political football which they used in contesting one another’s leadership. In such factional struggles, of course, each contestant explores only the weak points of his opponent, which he magnifies in an effort to discredit everything the opponent has to say; and in the process, whatever validity there might be in the opponent’s arguments is drowned in a sea of vitriol. Not everything Trotsky had to say was wrong, obviously. Nor was everything Stalin had to say correct.

In the meeting of the cell to which I belonged at the university, I was among those who expressed dissatisfaction with Stalin’s discussion of the April 12, 1927, coup; and perhaps my attitudes may serve as a sample of student reactions. Stalin had maintained that the coup should not be appraised as a “decline of the Chinese revolution” and that those who so appraised it were in fact “siding with Chiang Kai-shek” and were in fact in favor of receiving Chiang back into the Wuhan KMT. I remember asking our cell director whether the April 12 coup, if it did not represent a decline in the Chinese revolution, represented an upsurge in the Chinese revolution. He did not reply. So I pressed on. Stalin had said that the April 12 coup had resulted “in a partial defeat for the workers in a number of areas. But that is merely a partial and temporary defeat.”

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asked, that a “partial and temporary defeat” was not a decline? Eventually, our cell director replied with Stalin’s argument that the Chinese revolution had entered a higher stage of development with the April 12 coup, the phase of agrarian revolution. Yet Stalin had also said that “in a number of areas, such as Hunan, Hupeh, etc., the peasants are already seizing the land from below, and are setting up their own courts, their own penal organs and their own self-defence bodies.”11 If this agrarian movement had already gotten under way by the time of the April 12 coup, I wanted to know, why had Comrade Stalin linked this new, agrarian phase of the Chinese revolution to the April 12 coup? Again our cell director lapsed into embarrassed silence. So I poured oil on the flames. Could it be, I demanded, that the agrarian revolution had been overdone and that its excesses had caused the April 12 coup? I was, of course, not alone in pressing such questions. Nor was I the only one to question Stalin’s statement that “Chiang Kai-shek’s coup is one of those zigzags in the course of the Chinese revolution, one that was needed in order to cleanse the revolution of dross and to impel it forward towards a powerful agrarian movement.”12 Did Comrade Stalin contend, a number of us wanted to know, that the April 12 coup was a necessary prerequisite to the agrarian revolution and that Chiang Kai-shek was a contributor to this revolution? And so we wrangled in our cell meetings. In the end our cell director announced that the issues that Comrade Stalin had touched upon were so complicated that we would have to explore them in greater detail at a later time. With that he adjourned our meeting. Perhaps I should note here that, speaking strictly for myself, my doubts about some of the things Stalin said did not lessen my support for Comintern leadership of the Chinese revolution as a whole.

Five days after Stalin’s address at Sun Yat-sen University, on May 18, 1927, the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI was held. Trotsky’s address to the plenum, which included his theses on China, was not made available to the public. The Trotskyite opposition, nevertheless, again stepped up its bitter attacks on the Comintern’s China policy. And the students and faculty members at Sun Yat-sen University who sympathized with the opposition, after a brief period of restraint which followed Stalin’s May 13 address at the university, also increased the tenor of their opposition to Comintern policy in China. Indeed, so
many people at Sun Yat-sen University eventually turned out to be strongly influenced by Trotsky that this was one of the reasons why the CPSU and the Comintern closed the university in 1930 with Stalin's approval.

Notes

2. Stalin, in his letter "To the Students of the Communist University of The Toilers of the East," which appeared in *Pravda* on May 31, 1927, stated that the fourth graduating class included "representatives of 74 nationalities" (J. V. Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], IX, 319).
4. Ibid., p. 28.
6. The first question was: "Why is Radek wrong in asserting that the struggle of the peasantry in the Chinese countryside is directed not so much against feudal survivals as against the bourgeoisie? "Can it be affirmed that merchant capitalism predominates in China, or feudal survivals? "Why are the Chinese militarists, who are owners of big industrial enterprises, at the same time representatives of feudalism?" (See J. V. Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], IX, 243.)

The second question was: "Why is Radek wrong in asserting that, since Marxists do not admit the possibility of a party of several classes, the Kuomintang is a petty-bourgeois party?" (See J. V. Stalin, *Works* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954], IX, 246.)
7. Ibid., p. 244.
8. Ibid., p. 248.
9. Ibid., p. 264.
10. Ibid., p. 264.
11. Ibid., pp. 263–264.
12. Ibid., p. 265.
Chapter XIII
Sun Yat-sen University and the
Transplantation of Trotskyism to China

Leon Davidovich Trotsky (1879-1940) had been a dissenter from his early days. In the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, his position was somewhere in between the two. When the February, 1917, Revolution broke out in Russia, he managed to reach Petrograd from the United States shortly after Lenin reached Petrograd. At that time, he led a small party of Social Democrats who soon merged with the Bolsheviks. Thus it was not until July, 1917, that Trotsky became a member of the Bolshevik party.

He was a remarkable person, well versed in military as well as civil matters, equally at ease on horseback or in drafting a diplomatic memorandum. After the October Revolution of 1917, he became the first Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the new Soviet government. Later, he became the People's Commissar of War, and from that time on, frictions grew between him and other Party leaders, so that presently he lost the post. Indeed, although in the October Revolution his fame was equal to that of Lenin, with whom he had had many past disagreements, and although he held in check the discordant political views he retained, given a chance, he became his old tempestuous self again.

Trotsky became the central figure in the United Opposition as his differences with various other Soviet Communist leaders grew increasingly strident. The Trotskyites maintained dissenting positions towards many Soviet domestic and foreign policies, including the China policy. From 1923 onwards, for example, Trotsky consistently opposed allowing the KMT to join the Comintern. Whereas by 1925 Stalin was proposing Communist alliances with the petty bourgeoisie in such countries as Egypt and China, in which Communists and non-Communists would be organized in a single party, Trotsky from the start opposed the idea of having the Chinese Communists join the KMT. The Trotskyites began to make their presence felt at the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, which met from November 22 to December 16, 1926, at which Trotskyites savagely attacked the Com-
intern's China policy. In September of that year Trotsky had demanded that the Chinese Communists withdraw from the KMT and independently carry out a "proletarian" policy. At the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI, Stalin, Bukharin, and T'an P'ing-shan all attacked Trotsky's position, even though on March 20, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek had carried out an anti-Communist coup at Canton. One can understand why Trotsky was beside himself with rage. The struggle grew more tempestuous. At the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI, from May 18 to 30, 1927, Trotsky presented his views in two speeches, and he supported Zinoviev's position, which called for an end to alliances with the bourgeoisie. By this time, of course, the anti-Communist coup had taken place at Shanghai on April 12, 1927, and Trotsky attacked Stalin's position of maintaining an alliance with the bourgeoisie in China. He also castigated Stalin for rejecting the opposition's call for the establishment of Soviets in China. The month following the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI—June, 1927—saw the KMT Left organization at Wuhan turn publicly against the Communists. In view of the progressively deteriorating situation in China, the ECCI on July 14, 1927, passed a resolution instructing the Chinese Communists to withdraw from the Wuhan government but to remain within the KMT. This resolution condemned the Chinese Communist leadership for not properly carrying out Comintern instructions, thereby blaming the Chinese Communist leadership for the conspicuous Communist failures in China. Trotsky criticized both Stalin and Bukharin for saddling others with the blame for this state of affairs. The battle raged within the CPSU until its Fifteenth Congress in December, 1927, at which the Trotskyite opposition was made illegal and therefore subject to open suppression. The Ninth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, meeting from February 9 to 25, 1928, adopted a special resolution endorsing the action taken by the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU.

Thus, by the end of 1927, the Trotskyite opposition had reached the end of its rope in the Soviet Union. It was no longer a faction within the CPSU. It was labeled an anti-Party, anti-Soviet, antirevolutionary organization. Generally in Russia, Trotskyites literally faced the choice of life or death. The wavering ones confessed their waywardness and surrendered to the Party's power center. The determined ones went underground, carried out their activities secretly, and were, more often
than not, eventually liquidated by Stalin. At Sun Yat-sen University, the Trotskyites proved, on the whole, to be a loyal and dedicated group. In August, 1928, they established their own Trotskyite underground organization within the university. It was they who transplanted Trotskyism from the Soviet Union to China.

The members of this initial secret Trotskyite organization in Sun Yat-sen University, I know from having investigated it at the time, included, in addition to such well-known leaders as Lu Yen and Liang Kan-ch’ao, An Fu, Fan Ken-piao, Wang Wen-yuan, and Li P’in. An Fu, who was less conspicuously identified then with the Trotskyites than were Lu Yen and Liang Kan-ch’ao, ran the organization’s activities. This group received instructions from the Russian opposition, with which it had frequent contact, and it was responsible for translating the opposition’s documents into Chinese and for distributing them among students at Sun Yat-sen University.

By the time the secret Trotskyite organization at Sun Yat-sen University came into being in August, 1928, of course, the first class of students already had been graduated. A few of them had stayed on to serve as interpreters or teaching assistants, while others had entered Soviet military academies or other specialized institutions. But most of the first class had returned to China, and it seems likely that there were Trotskyites among them. For at that time the university made no effort to detain pro-Trotsky students, no matter how troublesome they were, preferring to send them home to find their own ways rather than keep them at the university, where they might contaminate others. It was this consideration which caused the university to send such well-known Trotskyites as Liang Kan-ch’ao, Lu Yen, and others back to China in 1928. Lu Yen, a native of Yuyao County, Chekiang Province, graduated in Sun Yat-sen University’s first class with an excellent scholastic record. Initially, he was kept on at the university as an interpreter. By inclination more a scholar than an agitator, Lu Yen may well have been the most adept theoretician among the Chinese Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University, although he was not especially active in practical matters. At the university Lu married a beautiful young Russian waitress named Anna, who worked in the university’s dining room. We used to speculate that they were not well matched, for Lu
occasionally turned up with deep scratches on his face, which we took as evidence of connubial incompatibility. Be that as it may, his lusty Russian bride stayed in Russia when he returned to China. Liang Kan-ch’ao, a Kwangtung native who had graduated in Whampoa Military Academy’s first class, went to Sun Yat-sen University in 1926. He had a stormy disposition and enjoyed controversy. He also had a resounding voice and a thick skin; and in meetings when statements rolled from his mouth in stentorian tones, there was the aura of a stereotype hero about him. The vice-rector of Sun Yat-sen University, Kuchumov, once good naturedly dubbed him “the leader of the oppressed peoples.” Lu, Liang, and others went back to China, as I recall it, in the summer of 1928, and they doubtless began sowing the seeds of Trotskyism in China. The secret Trotskyite organization at Sun Yat-sen University, I know, entrusted them with this mission.

The Trotskyite opposition’s activities in China were strengthened when in September, 1929, the following members of the secret Trotskyite organization returned to China from Moscow: Ou Fang, Chang Fang, Shih Shou-yun, Ch’en I-mou, Sung Feng-ch’un, Li Mei-wu, Hsu Chen-an, Fu Jen-lin, and others. About the same time, Liu Jen-ching returned to China from the Soviet Union, bringing with him a program for China drafted by Trotsky himself. By then, the Chinese Trotskyites who had returned to China ahead of Liu already had launched some organizational activities, however, and factions mushroomed in the Chinese Trotskyite movement in China proper.

Indications are that the first general meeting of Chinese Trotskyite oppositionists was held in Shanghai in January, 1930. The meeting apparently lasted for three days, during which it endorsed Trotsky’s political platform and adopted, as its main policy, opposition to Stalin and to the “opportunist” leadership of the CC of the CCP. Presumably, then, from an organizational standpoint, the transplantation of Trotskyism to China was completed by January, 1930. The undertakings of this group opened a Chinese front for the world-wide Trotskyite war against the Stalinists; yet another foreign Buddha’s shrine was thus erected in China.

At this initial Trotskyite meeting in Shanghai, the Chinese opposition apparently elected a General Committee of Executives (Tsung
The General Committee was made up wholly of people who had attended Sun Yat-sen University. Surely Stalin in his wildest dreams could not have imagined that Sun Yat-sen University, which he helped to establish, would generate so many disciples of his deadliest enemy—Trotsky. Yet these disciples of Trotsky were emperors in their own households only; they had no substantial popular following.

The official title of the organization formed at the January, 1930, meeting was Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang tso-p'ai huan-tuei-p'ai (Left opposition of the CCP). A participant in the Trotskyite events of the time told me many years later that the Chinese Left opposition responded to instructions from Trotsky in setting up this organization. Trotsky's instructions were to remain within the organizational framework of the established CCP, rather than to form a rival organization which would be isolated from the members of that Party. The Left opposition could, Trotsky reportedly said, operate more expeditiously within the established Party than from outside. This tactic failed, however, for the Trotskyites soon were expelled from the established Party.

Among the slogans that the Chinese Left opposition that was probably formed in January, 1930, used were the following:

1. To demand that the CC [of the established CCP] publicly discuss the issues raised by the Left opposition.

2. To demand that the CC convene a National Party Congress to elect a new CC.

3. To demand that the CC appeal to the Comintern to publicly discuss the China problem.

4. To demand that the CPSU restore Trotsky to his former position in that Party.

* The General Committee apparently included Liang Kan-ch'ao, Shih Shou-yun, Ch'en I-mou, Li Mei-wu, Sung Feng-ch'un, Chang T'e, and Lu Yen, who started using the name Lu I-yuan when he returned to China. The following people seem to have been elected alternate members of the General Committee: Hsiao Pin-yang, Ou Fang, Tang Yueh-po and Hsu Chen-an. Shih Shou-yun was secretary general of the General Committee; Lu Yen was director of propaganda; Chang T'e was director of organizational affairs; Hsu Chen-an was in charge of activities in the Kiangsu-Cheking area; Liang Kan-ch'ao was in charge of activities in southern China; Ou Fang was in charge of propaganda in southern China; Ch'en I-mou was in charge of organizational affairs in southern China; Sung Feng-ch'un was in charge of activities in northern China; Hsiao Pin-yang was in charge of propaganda in northern China; and Li Mei-wu was in charge of organizational affairs in northern China.
5. To demand that the CPSU reorganize its leadership and adopt Trotsky's platform.

The Russian Left opposition, of course, had been condemned as an illegal organization by the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU in 1927. The so-called CCP Left opposition, seeking to function within the established Chinese Communist organization, used the above slogans for inner-Party consumption in an attempt to restore Trotsky in Russia, to overthrow the established CC of the CCP, and to institute its own leadership in a new CC. Needless to say, these goals remained as impossible to achieve as is the grasping of reflections of flowers in a mirror or the reflection of the moon on water. Indeed, even though the Chinese Left opposition had been given new vitality when Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih formally joined the Left opposition, forming a “Trotsky-Ch’en United Front,” it did not remain vigorous for long.

Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his followers were formally expelled from the CCP on November 15, 1929. The charges against them in connection with their expulsion, as one might reconstruct these charges from Ch’en’s “Letter to Inform Comrades of the Whole Party,” apparently were that Ch’en and his followers not only disagreed with the policy of the CC of the CCP on the Chinese Eastern Railway incident of 1929, but that since the August 7, 1927, Conference they had stood in opposition to the CC and had throughout that period criticized and sought to discredit the leadership of both the CCP and the CPSU. At some point, moreover, they had apparently begun to praise Trotsky and his political position on China. The CC, in any event, forced Ch’en to openly take a position on Trotsky when, on October 6, 1929, it ordered him to write an article against the Trotskyite opposition. Ch’en refused to write the article, for, as he stated in his “Letter to Inform Comrades of the Whole Party”: “Now I have recognized fundamentally that Comrade Trotsky’s views are identical with Marxism and Leninism. How would I be able to write false words, contrary to my opinions?”

Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s “Letter” is dated December 10, 1929, two whole years after Trotsky was expelled from the CPSU and, in effect, labelled a counterrevolutionary. Yet Ch’en called him “comrade,” which indicated the depth of Ch’en’s agreement with him; and this was not
the first occasion on which Ch’en called him “comrade.” “Because we spoke of Trotsky as a comrade,” Ch’en wrote in the letter, “the CC accused us of ‘having already left the revolution, left the proletariat, and gone over to the counterrevolution’ and expelled us from the Party.”

Then early in February, 1930, the Comintern issued an instruction to the CC of the CCP. It urged the CC not to weaken its political struggle against Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s “opportunism,” on the one hand; but on the other hand the instruction asked the CC to transmit to Ch’en an invitation in its behalf to visit Moscow specifically to discuss all matters related to his expulsion from the Party. The Politburo of the CC of the CCP transmitted this Comintern invitation to Ch’en Tu-hsiu on February 8, 1930, and asked Ch’en to reply within one week. Ch’en replied directly to the Comintern on February 17. In this communication he restated his political views and repeatedly praised Trotsky. He flatly rejected the Comintern invitation, moreover. His open defiance of the Comintern and his firm refusal to conform to Comintern wishes greatly encouraged the Trotskyites in China as well as the Trotskyite students still at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. From that point on, Ch’en Tu-hsiu apparently cut all relations with the CCP and with the Comintern, and devoted himself wholly to the “Trotsky-Ch’en Opposition.”

But it seems most likely from the events described above that the CPSU and the Comintern regarded the decision of the CC of the CCP to expel Ch’en Tu-hsiu and his group from the Party as too drastic. For it sought to maintain negotiations with Ch’en months after the Chinese Party had already expelled him. Considering Ch’en’s imposing reputation as a political figure as well as a scholar, they may well have hoped to keep Ch’en within the Party so as not to give the Trotskyite movement in China a well-known leader. Without Ch’en, the spread of Trotskyite influence in China would undoubtedly have been hampered. For the Trotskyite students who returned to China from Sun Yat-sen University carried no political weight.

The leading figures around Ch’en Tu-hsiu had not attended Sun Yat-sen University, although some of them had studied in the Soviet Union. This was true, for example, of those people closest to Ch’en Tu-hsiu who signed the statement of the Chinese Left opposition dated, probably, some time in November, 1929: P’eng Shu-chih, Yun
K’uan, Cheng Ch’ao-lin, Kao Yu-han, Ch’en Pi-lan (the wife of P’eng Shu-chih), Ma Yu-fu, and others.

Whatever appearances may have seemed to indicate, however, the Chinese Trotskyite movement was far from united. Indeed, it was riven with conflicts. Its second general meeting seems to have convened at Shanghai in September, 1930, in an effort to iron out the differences. But the differences were so intense that the meeting adjourned without having resolved them. From 1929 onwards there emerged a proliferation of readily identifiable rival Chinese Trotskyite groups—as a Chinese saying has it, it took three people to make a group and five people to make a party. There were four especially conspicuous groups. One was the “Our Words” group, led by Ou Fang, Liang Kan-ch’ao, Ch’en I-mou, and others. Presently a group split off from this one to become the “October” group led by Liu Jen-ching, an important CCP veteran who had visited Trotsky in Turkey. A third, small group, which called itself “Struggle,” was formed by Wang P’ing-i,* Liu Yin, Huang Yuan-ming, and others. The fourth group, which was the most powerful one, called itself the “Proletarian” group. It was organized by Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih, and it included among its leading figures Yun K’uan, Cheng Ch’ao-lin, Ma Yu-fu, and Wang Tse-k’ai.

Of the four Trotskyite groups mentioned above, the first three were constituted chiefly of people who had studied at Sun Yat-sen University, KUTV, or Lenin Institute (Leninskya Shikola). The Proletarian group contained only a thin sprinkling of such people, one of whom was P’eng Shu-chih, who had studied at KUTV. While the four groups seemed to be unable to find sufficient common ground to unite, the first three groups did have one position in common—they were critical of the “Right Opportunism” of Ch’en Tu-hsiu and P’eng Shu-chih in the events of 1927. They held that Ch’en and P’eng had been discredited and were not fit to be followers of Trotsky.

Eventually, Trotsky apparently personally took a hand in the affairs

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*I knew Wang P’ing-i well. He was a graduate of the University of the Toilers of the Far East who returned to China from the Soviet Union in the late summer of 1928. Having arrived in Shanghai, he worked there in the Department of Economic Struggle of the CC of the CYC, a department headed at the time by the Party veteran Wen Yu-ch’en. Eventually he went into Party trade union work, an activity in which he was engaged when, for some reason, he joined the Chinese Left Opposition. At the time of writing, he is a member of the National Assembly in Taipei.
of his disputatious Chinese followers by urging that they unite. Each
group then named two delegates to form a committee, the purpose of
which was to work out a united Chinese Trotskyite organization that
would be acceptable to all. This committee's efforts achieved fruition
with a unity congress, held in May, 1931, which brought into being
"The Communist League of China." According to all accounts, the
CC of the League that was elected by the unity congress included Ch'en
Tu-hsiu, P'eng Shu-chih, Wang Wen-yuan, Sung Feng-ch'un, and
Cheng Ch'ao-lin. While this congress may have achieved unity of
sorts, it did not achieve stability, for within three months most of the
CC members had been arrested and most of the League's organizations
were shattered.

Indeed KMT intelligence agents raided units of the underground
Trotsky-Ch'en Tu-hsiu opposition relentlessly from 1931 through 1932.
The first raid took place in May, 1931, shortly after the unity congress
of the Communist League of China. Members of the organization's
CC who were seized in this raid seem to have included Cheng Ch'ao-
lin, Wang Wen-yuan, Ch'en I-mou, and Chiang Ch'ang-shih. A
second raid occurred in August, 1931, when another group of members
of the CC of the opposition was arrested, including Sung Chin-hsiu,
Yun K'uan, Chin Hung-t'u, and Sun Yu-chieh. A third series of
raids, which constituted the fatal blow to the opposition, began on Oc­
tober 15, 1932, and continued to October 17, 1932. Arrested in those
raids were, among others, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the opposition's leader, and
such CC members as P'eng Shu-chih, who initially sought to disguise
his identity by giving the name Chang Tze-nan to the police, Hsieh
Te-p'an, and Sung Feng-ch'un. Other important functionaries of the
opposition who were arrested at this time included P'eng Tao-chih,
who was P'eng Shu-chih's brother, Wang P'ing-i, and Liang Yu-kuang.
For all practical purposes, October, 1932, marks the end of Trotskyism
as an organized, independent force in Chinese politics. Only a few
individuals who managed to escape arrest carried out intermittent
activities thereafter.

Eventually, one after another, the arrested Trotskyites were re­
leased. Even Ch'en Tu-hsiu and P'eng Shu-chih, who on April 26,
1933, had been sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment, were released
after the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out. As for those
Trotskyites who had not been arrested, most of them eventually took the initiative by capitulating to the KMT, for had they not done so, they would have continued to be hunted. A good many of them gave up political activity altogether. But some once-dedicated Trotskyites, such as Liang Kan-ch’ao, Chou T’ien-lu, and others went to Sian and served under General Hu Tsung-nan, the general to whom Chiang Kai-shek gave the task of encircling and containing the Chinese Communists after the Sian Incident of December, 1936. Liang Kan-ch’ao, Chou T’ien-lu, and others were of great service in this task of containing the Chinese Communists. As a result, they established a firm place for themselves under the umbrella of Hu Tsung-nan, which encouraged a number of their former Trotskyite colleagues to join them. Apparently they attempted to rekindle dead ashes. Yet other former Trotskyites, either on the recommendation of Hu Tsung-nan or by some other route, joined the KMT intelligence service of General Tai Li, where they fought the CCP.

Chiang Ching-kuo, after his return to China from the USSR in 1938, became a district commissioner in southern Kiangsi Province, where he undertook numerous reforms, and many former Trotskyites gravitated to him. After Chiang Ching-kuo was summoned to Chungking in 1939, however, these former Trotskyites seem to have dispersed.

Over the years, as has been suggested, efforts of the Chinese Trotskyites to regroup failed. Some of the one-time Trotskyites died of illness or poverty. At least one of them, Chou T’ien-lu, was assassinated, presumably by underground Communist agents, in his Shanghai apartment in April or May of 1949, on the eve of the Communists’ capture of that city. Other former Trotskyites simply grew older and older and became increasingly passive politically the while, so that their backgrounds go unnoticed in China today. Some even today are employed in various KMT organizations; still others live abroad.

When the Trotsky opposition, with students who had returned from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow as its core, was first organizing itself in China, the golden age of what remained of Trotskyism back at Sun Yat-sen University was nearing its end. The Sixteenth Conference of the CPSU, which met in April, 1929, ordered a purge within the Russian Party. The resolution concerning the forthcoming purge appeared in the May 1, 1929, issue of Pravda, whereupon a certain
nervousness prevailed throughout the Party. Certainly tension was evident in the Party organization at Sun Yat-sen University, and the Trotskyites at the university grew especially jittery, naturally.

The Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University were knitted into an underground organization which had only vertical, but no lateral, organizational connections. That is to say, members of one cell did not know what other cells there were or who belonged to them; their organizational connection ran only up through the chain of command directly above them and not beyond. Thus, any cell member who wavered in his loyalty was in a position to betray only his own cell members and, possibly, one person at a higher level, but he could not betray members of other cells. They truly functioned underground, making use of assorted university outings to hold their secret meetings, passing communications in classrooms, dormitories, and elsewhere without outsiders realizing what they were doing. In short, the school was a cover for their activities; their operational methods blended in well with its routine; and their methods were successful.

But the heyday for the Trotskyites at Sun Yat-sen University did not last long. Starting with the fall semester of 1929, purge commissars sent by the Central Control Committee of the CPSU descended upon Sun Yat-sen University. These commissars were veteran revolutionaries who had been toughened in numerous struggles; many of them had served in China or had been involved in Chinese affairs through Soviet military intelligence or other Soviet intelligence undertakings. A series of meetings was scheduled at which these commissars presided and at which every Party member at the university had to confront other Party members who might or might not denounce him. The bureau of the Party branch at the university carefully singled out Party members on whose loyalty it could count, of whom I was one, and these members were given a special briefing before they scattered themselves among those attending the meetings. They defended the appropriate Party members against attacks by others and bombarded the Trotskyites and other "anti-Party" elements with telling accusations. These meetings were shattering experiences for the individuals being scrutinized, for the slightest possible blemish from the past was apt to be publicly questioned. Even one's family history going back to remote ancestors was thoroughly investigated. It was a cruel method
of inquiry. In the heavy crossfire of questions and charges, many of
the weak people simply broke down. Even the most robust and strong-
will among us were bathed in their own sweat at these inquisitions.

Before a battery of iron-faced inquisitors, the Trotskyites at Sun
Yat-sen University began to falter. One of them, who occupied a
high post in their underground organization, finally turned himself
in to the bureau of the Party branch and seemingly made a full con-
fession. I cannot recall his name, although I do remember that he
came from Honan Province, where he had been a teacher and then a
school principal. He was about thirty years of age, and he had an
honest face. Four days before he was scheduled to be questioned, he
suddenly came to see me. His face was shrouded in dark clouds; he
appeared to be suffering immensely. He seemed to want to say some-
thing, but dared not for fear of some dreadful consequence. After I
had consoled and encouraged him, he began to talk hesitantly, but still
withholding information concerning the secret organization and its
personnel. He told me frankly that his fellow Trotskyites already felt
the change in him, watched him closely, and hinted that his life would
be in danger if he dared to withdraw. After having said this, he stared
at me fixedly as if he hoped that my response would give him some
sort of guarantee of safety. I guessed his intention and told him smil-
ingly to have courage and not to surrender to threats. I further volun-
teed to accompany him to see Ignatov, secretary of the bureau of the
Party branch, the next morning to discuss the matter. He agreed, and
we parted. The next day we met at the appointed place and went to-
gether to Ignatov’s house. When Ignatov received him warmly, he
began to pep up and talked a lot; and Ignatov listened to his story with
wonderment, taking note of everything he said. But after our in-
formant had finished talking, his countenance began to darken, and
his spirits sagged. He said sadly that his position was both painful and
dangerous. His fellow comrades wanted to destroy him, and the
bureau of the Party branch did not necessarily believe him; being un-
able to please either side, his only solution was to commit suicide to
end all these entanglements. Ignatov and I, greatly surprised by this
suddenly expressed desire to die, tried our best to comfort him. Ignatov
reassured him that the Party trusted him completely, that as long as he
was willing to jump out of the fire, everything would be all right.
Upon hearing this, his sadness turned into joy and the clouds of doubt vanished from his face. We were all relieved. This took place on a Sunday. On Monday evening he came to see me again. He again looked pessimistic and wanted to have a chat with me in the garden of a church that faced the university. It was in the depths of winter, snow was piled over a foot high on the ground, but he was perspiring. He looked very agitated, and told me in a hoarse voice that he could not dispel his sufferings and was prepared to take his own life. I was stunned and asked him what was the matter. He shook his head and sighed, saying nothing. He looked as if he was experiencing great pressure from outside. I comforted him again and tried to explain things to him. My words began to cheer him up; he smiled, and quite naturally, at that. I thought everything was going to be all right. But the evening before his scheduled inquiry, before the students went back to their dormitories, he hanged himself in his room. His death brought me great sorrow and endless regret. Had I taken precautionary steps, the life of this friend, who trusted me and came to me for help in his distress, might have been saved. I reproached myself for being so stupid and naive.

His tragic death struck terror into the university. The entire student body, faculty, and staff members all felt sadly insecure. At the purge meetings, gloom hung low and thick; those who were being questioned and those who were not being questioned all seemed to be nervous. To relax taut nerves, to lessen the sufferings of those Trotskyites who were still wavering, and to avoid future tragedies, the bureau of the Party branch assigned me to report to a general conference of students the story of that Trotskyite student's suicide, and to hint that other Trotskyites need not hesitate any more, for everything had been exposed and it would be futile to try to hide. After my report, most students were pacified, but the hearts of the Trotskyite students, faced with a difficult choice, sank deeper. Whether to continue to struggle or to abandon the cause, this question caused great confusion in their ranks and no unanimous solution was found. Therefore, they began to act individually. The organ of highest command in the Trotskyite secret organization was first to split. A student by the name of Li P'in, who was responsible for secret organizational affairs, suddenly confessed publicly during a meeting and submitted a list of names of some
eighty to ninety Trotskyite students. With that, the Trotskyite organization at Sun Yat-sen University completely collapsed. Some students announced their withdrawal from the opposition, but there was no small number who fought to the end. Hence, the Russian GPU stretched out its hairy paws; it arrested all those suspected of being leaders of the opposition who had refused to confess, and put them in prison. The fate of many of them was not known.

In this ferocious struggle against Trotskyites in Sun Yat-sen University, I was deeply involved from start to finish. Throughout the purge, I was a member of the bureau of the CPSU branch in the university. Concurrently, I was the branch’s secretary in charge of all translating and interpreting from Chinese into Russian and from Russian into Chinese at all bureau meetings. At the same time, I was deputy Party guide (hu tang chih tao yuan) for one of the class cells in the university.3

There were more than twenty students in my cell. With the exception of two or three cell members who were more or less loyal to the bureau of the Party branch, all of them were either Trotskyites or some other kind of “anti-Party element.” It was the university’s worst cell. Since “oppositionists” were in the majority, they more than once adopted resolutions demanding that the Party branch dismiss me as deputy guide and replace me with someone else. The bureau of the Party branch naturally ignored these demands, while giving me pep talks about the importance of my being a good fighter. Thus, at every meeting I was besieged from all directions by “oppositionists.” With the stubborn determination of youth I fought off all of their charges, and in the process they not unnaturally came to hate me. Indeed, when the purge was reaching its climax and the oppositionists became frantic, a plot to assassinate me was uncovered.4

Meanwhile, as the purge progressed, the most obstreperous Chinese Trotskyite students were arrested and held in the underground jail in the headquarters of the GPU on Lubyanka Square in Moscow, and it became necessary to interrogate them. GPU headquarters asked the bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University to assign someone to help them with these interrogations. Unfortunately, the bureau assigned this odious job to me. I protested the assignment to Ignatov,
but he insisted that I accept it by announcing, “It is an order.” There 
was nothing for me to do but reluctantly accept that order.

As I recall, an official of the GPU presently came to the university 
one evening and visited me. He reminded me of the bureau’s recom-
mandation. He had me sign a document which bound me to refrain 
from revealing to anybody at all any information that I learned as an 
assistant interrogator for the GPU. A few days later, after the evening 
meal, a GPU car picked me up at the university and drove me to 
GPU headquarters.

We began an interrogation as soon as I arrived at GPU head-
quarters. The Russian interrogator whom I assisted was named, I 
think, Beremeny. He was the GPU official in charge of Chinese af-
airs at the time. As was the case with other GPU officials, he worked 
at night. I accompanied him to the basement jail to get the prisoner 
he wished to interrogate. On the way down, at the entrance to the 
prison block, I heard the sounds of leg chains and hand manacles. 
Coming from the bright lights upstairs, the jail was so dark that for 
a time I could not see anything. The prison block consisted of nu-
merous small cells with only one prisoner to a cell, and Beremeny led 
me to one of these cells. He ordered the guard to open the cell, and 
we entered it. The prisoner I confronted was a Sun Yat-sen University 
classmate with whom I had had a friendly relationship. Automatically 
we extended our arms to shake hands. As we did so, a powerful hand 
abruptly forced my arm down, while another hand struck the prisoner’s 
wrist. It was Beremeny, using both of his hands. As I looked up at 
him, shocked, he shouted at the prisoner, “You are a counterrevolution-
ary. You are a prisoner now. You have no right to shake hands with 
this comrade.” I don’t know which of us, the prisoner or I, felt the 
more crushed by Beremeny’s brutal crudity; we merely looked at 
each other silently. There was much that needed saying, but we 
could say nothing. After a few minutes, guards took the prisoner up-
stairs to Beremeny’s office. An armed guard stood by in the office, and 
the interrogation began, with me doing the interpreting.

Beremeny ordered the prisoner to brace rigidly with his heels and 
shoulders tightly against the wall, to look straight ahead, and not to 
move. Many questions were asked. Hours passed; it was midnight, 
and I felt exhausted. I glanced at Beremeny, who looked utterly fresh
and alert. The prisoner, still braced against the wall, looked, it seemed to me, like a cadaver. Alarme by his appearance and concerned about the fate of a fellow student, I asked Beremeny to halt the interrogation for the time being and to resume it at another time. Beremeny flatly rejected the idea. He told me, as I recall, "This method of incessant interrogation, giving the prisoner no rest, is the practice of the GPU. No one can stand up to it indefinitely; he will eventually tell you what you want to know. Desperate to get some rest, they will tell the truth." It was, he said, a method of torture; but he insisted that no other forms of torture were used or needed. We had, he assured me, just reached an important stage in the interrogation. The prisoner would deny everything during the first few hours. It was after that that he could be expected to begin talking truthfully. And so, Beremeny told me, we could not possibly adjourn the interrogation at the point at which I had urged adjournment.

Beremeny told me to pull myself together and to be alert. He gave me a cigarette and a cup of coffee, and we resumed the interrogation. To my astonishment, precisely what he had said would happen did happen. The prisoner capitulated at last. The sun was coming up when we finished the interrogation. Beremeny ordered guards to return the prisoner to his cell. Then he asked me to sign as a witness the transcript of the interrogation which he had typed in triplicate as I had translated it. I signed all three copies; and as I did so, I asked him why he needed three copies. One copy, he said, went to the CC of the CPSU; one went to the Comintern; and the third was for the GPU files.

I cannot now remember how long I continued to do this distasteful work. But I know that I spent a great many exhausting nights at GPU headquarters and that while the prisoners suffered terribly, the torment that this work caused me seemed scarcely less than that which the prisoners endured. I asked myself, "All this is being done for what?"

In addition to the Trotskyite students who were arrested and interrogated, some of the most active of the other "anti-Party elements" who allied themselves with the opposition to form the "Second Line" faction, which is described in some detail in chapter fifteen, were exiled to Siberia to undergo reform through labor at the Altai gold mines.
and other labor camps. A few of them, I know, died in those camps; but the majority of them, after surviving terrible hardships, were sent back to China. But when these potential new recruits to the Trotskyite opposition movement arrived back in China, the opposition in China itself already had spent itself and was no longer capable of functioning at all. Trotskyism was transplanted to China; but due to unsuitable soil and climatic conditions, it withered before taking root.

Various factors doubtless contributed to the failure of the Chinese Trotskyite movement. Among the more important factors surely was their assessment of the Chinese situation after 1927. Trotskyism, it will be recalled, was imported into China shortly after the defeat of the 1925–1927 revolution. The oppositionists recognized this defeat as an indisputable fact, which, of course, it was. But surely they erred in crediting too much significance to the military victory of the KMT, as one reads their position in Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "Letter to All Comrades." According to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the military victory of the KMT had so strengthened the position of the "Chinese bourgeoisie" that it had produced a stable regime which would prevail for many years to come. Thus, the Trotskyites urged the Chinese people to conduct their political activities within the framework of "bourgeois democracy" and to "struggle for the convocation of a National Assembly." While the Trotskyites paid lip service to the establishment of Soviets, actually they concentrated their efforts on the convocation of a National Assembly, which, had it ever convened, could have accomplished little under the domination of one party. There was little general interest in a National Assembly because no one had faith in the newly established government, which would have manipulated any National Assembly that might be convened. And, of course, there was widespread disappointment with the new government because it had not fulfilled the promises it had made prior to the Northward Expedition.

The oppositionists were, of course, fully aware of the desperation, fatigue, and frustration that prevailed in China after the revolution's defeat. Yet they did not, apparently, realize that these reactions were merely one side of the coin, the other side of which was a deep, popular feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo. This latter situation was so much the case that the Trotskyites' call for the convocation of a National Assembly struck many people as just one more political trap.
There was also, of course, a good deal of bewilderment as to how the revolution could reach a high tide solely by convening a National Assembly.

Surely another important ingredient in the failure of the Chinese Trotskyites was the fact that they came into being just in time to be caught in the crossfire of the two armed camps of the KMT and the Chinese Communists; they had no real power of their own with which to fire back. For the Chinese revolution of 1925–1927 was followed by bitter political struggles and open military clashes between the KMT and the Chinese Communists. Eventually, a full-scale civil war resulted in China. The two contending parties constituted two hostile regimes, each relying upon its own internal and external resources, each having its own military establishment. Under these circumstances, it was nearly impossible for any kind of a third force, which was neither Communist nor KMT, to emerge. For example, the once-prominent Communist T’an P’ing-shan, who was expelled from the CCP in October, 1927, organized, with Teng Yen-ta’s group, the Third Party (ti san tang). This new party quickly drew fire from both sides, from the Communists as well as from the KMT. Pinned down by barrages from both sides, its members encountered such great difficulties that they had trouble merely surviving physically, not to mention carrying out political activities. The Third Party soon collapsed.

Another unsuccessful independent movement involved Li Chi-sheng, Ch’en Min-ch’u, Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, and others, who instigated a rebellion and proclaimed the establishment of the “People’s Government of the Republic of China” in Fuchow, Fukien Province, on November 20, 1933. At the same time, they organized their own political party, named the Production party (sheng ch’an tang). The government and the party were short-lived. Faced with heavy pressure from KMT government forces, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the cold shoulder of the Chinese Communists, who treated the Fukien government with jealousy and suspicion, the “People’s Government” collapsed in January, 1934.

The Trotskyites who returned to China from Sun Yat-sen University, joined by Ch’en Tu-hsiu’s group, represented another effort to organize a third force, following upon the heels of T’an P’ing-shan’s attempt and preceding the effort by Li Chi-sheng and others. They
were no more successful than T’an P’ing-shan had been, and they were less successful than Li Chi-sheng and his colleagues. The Trotskyite opposition, of course, was acceptable neither to the KMT nor to the Communists. The Communists attacked them as renegades from Marxism-Leninism, while the KMT attacked them as followers of a branch of the Communist movement.

It is useful to dwell briefly upon the fact that neither the KMT nor the CCP was a political party of the conventional type. Each had its own party army. Conventional political parties attack one another with verbal criticisms; but these two parties attacked one another with guns in addition to verbal criticisms, using guns as their weapons of criticism. How, then, could a third party—the Trotskyite opposition or any other—survive, standing in between the two and searching for a middle course, unless it became more radical than the Communists or more conservative than the KMT?

In conclusion I would like to say a little about the impact of the Stalin-Trotsky struggle on the Chinese revolution. As the Chinese revolution developed into an issue in the Stalin-Trotsky struggle for power, neither side concerned itself with the best interests of the Chinese revolution, but used the success or failure of this dispute as a means to gain (for the Trotskyites) or to retain (for Stalin) power. In retrospect, the leadership of the Stalin-Bukharin axis and its direction with regard to the Chinese revolution were far from being perfect, even taken at their face value. When put into practice, Stalin’s and Bukharin’s mistakes were numerous and grave; this was undeniable. The Trotskyite opposition’s theories concerning the China problem contained many notable misconceptions; but the warnings that they gave during a particular period of the Chinese revolution and the policies that they suggested for some problems were not without merit. It was a pity that both sides were indulging in the power struggle; neither was willing to consider the other side’s proposals calmly and to discuss them frankly. They each held on to their convictions (or prejudices), but it was China and the Chinese people who were the real victims. Now, they have both passed away: Trotsky was assassinated on August 20, 1940, in Mexico; and in March, 1953, Stalin also reported for duty to Yen-Wang, the King of the other world.
The sages and idiots, after a thousand years, who knows for sure? They all ended in the graves where tall grasses grow.

As far as Stalin and Trotsky were concerned, their dispute about China was settled by death. But Trotsky was without an heir in China, and no one from China looked after his grave. Stalin can count on sacrifices offered by Mao Tse-tung and Company on such occasions as the New Year and other festivals, or a lonely wreath placed in front of his grave by visiting Chinese Communist dignitaries. From this viewpoint, Trotsky was really a loser to the end.

Notes

1. The Hoover Library has a copy of this document, a xeroxed copy of which it has kindly furnished me.

2. Ch'en Tu-hsiu ta-fu kung-ch' an kuo-chi hsieh (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Letter to the Comintern), a copy of which is in the Hoover Library. It is reproduced in Wang Chieh-min, Chung-kuo Kung-ch' an-tang shih kuo (A draft history of the CCP; Taipei, 1965), II, 116–118.

3. There were something like twenty classes in Sun Yat-sen University at the time. Communist and Komsomol members in each class were organized in a cell which met once each week. To each cell was assigned a Russian professor who was a Communist Party member; he was the guide during the cell's meetings. A Chinese who had knowledge of the Russian language and an acceptable political background was also assigned to each cell as the deputy guide. It was his function to assist the Russian guide in directing the meetings.

4. Some Trotskyite students held a secret meeting in the theater on the second floor of the university's student club. It was late afternoon and dark at the time, and they thought the theater was deserted. But old Ho Shu-heng, a delegate to the founding congress of the CCP, happened to be napping in a seat in one corner of the theater. Unbeknown to the Trotskyites, he heard them make their plans to assassinate me. When they left, he immediately reported what he had heard to Ignatov, the secretary of the bureau of the Party branch. Ignatov promptly contacted a Russian general, whose Russian name I have forgotten but who had been an adviser in Canton, where he used the Chinese name K'ung Chieh-chih.

At that time K'ung Chieh-chih was commander of the Moscow garrison and concurrently the chief professor of military affairs at Sun Yat-sen University. He acceded to Ignatov's request that Browning revolvers be supplied to me and to each of two bodyguards who were promptly assigned to guard me. These bodyguards were Chinese students at Sun Yat-sen University who were of working-class origin. They were trained gunmen who had worked in the Intelligence Department of the CC of the CCP in Shanghai.

5. See note 1 of this chapter.
Chapter XIV
Sun Yat-sen University and the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

Early in 1928 the Politburo of the CCP decided to convene the Sixth National Congress of the Party in March of that year. The congress was to appraise the lessons learned from the failure of the 1925–1927 Chinese revolution and to regroup Communist forces. But the Politburo did not designate a site for the congress. Indeed, finding a safe site for a congress then was a difficult task because of the KMT’s ruthless slaughter of Communists. Meanwhile, the Sixth Comintern Congress and the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist International were scheduled to convene in Moscow in the summer of 1928, and the Fourth Profintern Congress in the spring. To these congresses the CCP naturally would have to send delegates. And, as I was subsequently to learn in Moscow, the Chinese Politburo seized upon these three international congresses, for which its delegates would in any event be in Moscow, to propose to the Comintern that it hold its own Sixth National Congress in Moscow at about the same time. The Comintern, of course, agreed.

Holding the Sixth National Congress of the CCP in Moscow facilitated efforts by Russian Communists and the Comintern to function as advisers to the CCP, although it cost the Russians a sizable amount of foreign exchange to get the Chinese delegates to and from Moscow. Had the Comintern, however, not extended this timely helping hand in gathering up the badly battered forces of the CCP and getting them to Moscow, where they could have a bit of rest, revitalization, and encouragement, the Chinese Communists might not by themselves have been able to reassemble their forces. At the very least they would have experienced a long period of confusion and disorder within the Party, during which it would not have been possible to unify the will of its members or to build up the strength of the Party as a whole.

For it might be recalled that the CCP had suffered extremely serious setbacks. Especially after the Nanching Uprising of August 1,
In 1927, the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in Hunan and Hupeh, and the Canton Uprising at the end of 1927, the Party's organizational structure pretty much collapsed, as did the armed forces under its control. Party members were slaughtered in the KMT's "White terror," others simply defected, while still others were lost in the turmoil and never found their way back to the Party. In any event, the CCP had about 57,967 members at the time of its Fifth National Congress in April, 1927. In the summer of 1928, at the time of the Sixth National Congress, membership had slumped to something like 20,000 or perhaps 25,000 at the most.

A defeatist mood ruled the Party then. The August 7, 1927, Conference had removed Ch'en Tu-hsiu from Party leadership, although his influence within the Party naturally was not wiped out at one stroke. But if the "opportunism" identified with Ch'en Tu-hsiu had proved disastrous, the "putschism" that his successor, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, carried out was suicidal. Ch'u's policy seemed rather like that of a frantic man betting everything he had on one last, desperate gamble, which failed. What was called for, surely, was an organized, disciplined, and patient retreat in order to preserve such forces as remained and to sustain morale. But this minor scholar, whose chief claim to fame was his ability to read and write, through his leadership hastened and deepened the crisis of the CCP. Both structurally and psychologically, the Party showed alarming symptoms of deterioration by the summer of 1928.

The dismal state of Party affairs was reflected in the mood of the delegates at the Sixth National Congress of the CCP. Delegates from areas of China that had endured especially severe anti-Communist assaults were noticeably more melancholy than other delegates. In private as well as in public they complained about the shortcomings of the CC's leadership. They were pessimistic, too, about the prospects of the revolution. Of course, some other delegates demonstrated somewhat better morale. Perhaps the muddled thinking of the delegates is aptly illustrated by a controversy that arose early at the congress. Some delegates maintained that a rising tide still prevailed in the Chinese revolution. Others, who contended that the revolution was experiencing a low ebb, rebutted them. Still others, seeking a compromise between the conflicting positions, declared that while no rising wave
was in evidence, “a bit of foam” could be seen. The argument thus became a tiresome, cynical dispute over words which dragged on for several days. This dispute caused the already confused and dispirited delegates to become even more confused and dispirited. Later, when students at Sun Yat-sen University, myself among them, learned about the argument over whether China was experiencing a revolutionary wave or merely a bit of revolutionary foam, it became a stock joke among us. But because of such circumstances as that dispute, one person who attended the Congress concluded that had the congress not been held in Moscow, it probably would have turned into a disaster which would have led to an irreparable split in the Party. As things turned out, however, Bukharin eventually managed to pull things together and bring some sense of order into the proceedings of the congress.

Selection of Delegates to the Congress

Delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP were not selected through an election participated in by the entire Party membership. Some delegates were designated by the CC. Others were selected by Party organizations at various levels for approval by the CC. Members of the CC itself were automatically entitled to be delegates if they were able to get away from their duties long enough to attend the congress. In addition, a certain quota of delegates was reserved for Party functionaries in various Chinese Communist-front organizations, such as trade unions.

The number of delegates from particular geographic areas was directly proportional to the number of Party members and to the strength of the Party in those areas. Larger delegations were selected to represent provinces that had powerful Party organizations, whereas remote provinces in which Party influence was minimal received only a limited quota of delegates. The three largest provincial delegations at the congress came from Kwangtung, Kiangsu, and Shung-chih (Hopeh). Next to them in size was the delegation from Hunan Province. Many provinces were represented by delegations of three to five persons, while some provinces, such as Shensi, Shansi, Shantung, and Honan, had only one or two delegates. It might be noted that some delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP also were
delegates to the Fifth Congress of the Chinese CYC, which immediately followed the Party congress.9

Chinese Communist historians have yet to publish a comprehensive list of delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, nor is documentation as to the delegates available. Students of the subject have been forced to piece together as best they could lists of known and probable delegates.10 The following list, alphabetically arranged, while of course not comprehensive, consists of people that Ch’ing Man-yun, after most careful consideration, remembers to have been full delegates present at the Sixth Congress:11 Chang Chin-jen, Chang K’uen-ti, Chang Kuo-t’ao, Chiang Hui-fang, Chou En-lai, Chou Hsiu-chu, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, “Old” Chuang, Fang Wei-hsia, Ho Shu-heng, Hsia Hsi, Hsiang Chung-fa, Hsia Yang, Hsu Ch’in-lan, Hsu Hsi-ken, Hsu T’e-li, Hu Chun-ho, Hua Shao-feng, Huang Ping, Kuan Hsiang-ying, Li Li-san, Li Tzu-fen, Liu Po-chuang, Lo Teng-hsien, Meng Chien, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Teng Ying-ch’ao, Ting Chun-yang, Ts’ai Ch’ang, Ts’ai Ho-sen, Wang Chung-yi, Wang Jo-fei, Wen Yu-ch’en, Yang Chih-hua, Yang Ying, Yu Fei, Yuan Hsiao-hsien, and Yuan Ping-hui.

Of these delegates, none at the time was a student at Sun Yat-sen University. However, Ho Shu-heng, Hsu T’e-li, Fang Wei-hsia, and Hsia Hsi subsequently did enroll in the Special Class at Sun Yat-sen University.

Comintern requirements in those days, as we generally understood them, indicated that as many delegates as possible should have working-class or peasant backgrounds, and that as many delegates as possible should be veteran Party members who had good political records. Apparently, though, it was not possible to check the qualifications of all delegates to the Sixth National Congress against these standards. It is likely that people with questionable backgrounds, and perhaps even some Trotskyites, managed to slip into the delegations—fish eyes among pearls. Li Ang, for example, writes that he and other members of a provincial delegation appointed by the CC were taken off their Moscow-bound train at Irkutsk and sent back to China, presumably on orders from Moscow. Subsequently they learned, he states, that this was done because there were alleged to be “oppositionists” among them, a state of affairs which he says was not the case.12 I would agree with
Li Ang that his delegation did not include "oppositionists" from China, for it was only later that the "opposition" appeared in China. But I am not sure that there were no Trotskyite-inclined people in his delegation or at the Sixth National Congress.

**The Number of Delegates**

One KMT source states that 176 delegates attended the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, which undoubtedly is an inflated figure. Many Communist historians who treat the subject state that 84 voting delegates attended the Congress. One Communist historian states that 34 alternate delegates also attended the congress and that the various delegations represented more than 40,000 CCP members. This would bring the total number of delegates and alternate delegates given in the Chinese Communist sources I have consulted to 118. It is Ch'ing Man-yun's recollection that the number of people present at the congress at no time exceeded 100, including delegates, alternate delegates, and the secretaries and administrative assistants recruited from Sun Yat-sen University and from KUTV. A figure of 84 delegates and alternate delegates combined struck her as a likely one.

Subsequently I learned that the CC of the CCP and its provincial committees had selected a larger number of delegates than the number that actually attended the congress, for many designated delegates failed to reach Moscow. Delegates from the more remote provinces did not reach Shanghai in time to board the appropriate Russian ship. At that time there was no regular shipping service between Shanghai and Vladivostok, and it was not unusual to have to wait a month or two between sailings. So, naturally, delegates who missed their sailing were unable to reach Moscow in time for the congress. Then, too, some delegates, I understand, were arrested by KMT agents before they could depart for Russia. Also, some of the more important delegates to the congress could not get away at the last minute, because unforeseen developments required their presence in China.

Thus, the exact number of delegates who actually attended the congress remains to be determined. But it seems to me that Ch'ing Man-yun probably has recalled all of the important delegates who attended the congress. A number of delegates, of course, she has for-
gotten, but they probably were not well known and of only secondary importance at most.

Preparations for the Congress in Moscow and at Sun Yat-sen University

While the selection of delegates was taking place in China, preparations for the congress proceeded full speed ahead in Moscow. Sun Yat-sen University had a share in the activities that made the congress possible. Many resolutions later adopted by the congress were drafted by professors at Sun Yat-sen University at the direction of the Comintern, and secretarial work for the administrative services were mainly performed by students from Sun Yat-sen University. A few students from the Chinese Department at KUTV were also drafted to carry out these activities.

Ch'ing Man-yun was among the students at Sun Yat-sen University who were recruited to work for the congress. Indeed, the secretariat of the congress consisted mainly of students from this university. Ch'u Ch'ing-pai, the youngest brother of Ch'u Ch'i'iu-pai, headed the group of Sun Yat-sen University students who served the congress. The designation of these students was made secretly. The rest of us were aware that suddenly some familiar student faces had vanished from the university. We assumed that they had been sent back to China. No one that I know of looked into the matter. For there was a rule that one always felt it best to follow in a Communist organization—that it is not a question of what a person is able to find out, but a question of whether or not a person ought to find out something. If a person discovered something that he was not supposed to know, then he was headed for trouble.

Now let's return to the preparations for the congress. Ch'ing Man-yun recalled:

Toward the end of May and the beginning of June, 1928, a few students of Sun Yat-sen University and I were called to Secretary General Pogulyaev's office. He distributed some documents in Chinese and told us to copy them on stenographic paper for printing. He gave us severe warnings against letting other students know about the contents of the documents or even the fact that we were in his office. Before the documents were distributed to us to copy, they had already been broken up into segments or short paragraphs. Some of us copied the
introduction, others copied the conclusion, still others copied parts of the main text. This precaution was taken to prevent any of us from getting a complete picture or idea of the documents, for we were not allowed to exchange the documents that were distributed to us. . . . These mysterious documents could not have been the lecture notes of the university nor the outlines of our Party group discussions. At that time no one had the faintest idea that they were the documents of the Sixth National Congress of the CCP! This mysterious work continued for a whole week. Then one day Pogulyaev told us individually to pack our suitcases. He said to us, "Tomorrow you will leave the university to go to another place, the storage room of the university is open today for you to find your luggage with your name tags on them. You need not bother about them further, they will be sent to you. As to your belongings in your dormitories and classrooms, you must leave them as they are, do not move them. All you have to do is to indicate by some kind of marking the items that you wish to take along with you. . . ." When we asked him whether we were going back to China, he hesitated for a while and replied, "You need not ask now, you will find out in due time." Finally, he cautioned us not to show any signs of leaving the university.

Before these "drafted" students boarded the same train for the designated destination, no one knew who was "one of the selected group." At the moment when they walked out of the gate of Sun Yat-sen University, sadness dominated their mood, for they could not help feeling attached to the university and were sorry to leave, and their hearts were heavy, not knowing what the future had in store for them. They could not bid farewell to their friends, and of course no one could see them off. Ch'ing Man-yun continued:

Only after I boarded the tram to the railway station did I have a chance to see for the first time who the people were in the group. Among us was Li P'ei-tsé, who held the number one student identification card at Sun Yat-sen University. She was the wife of Wang Jo-fei, a member of the CC of the CCP. Also there were Meng Ch'ín-shu, the "sweetheart" of Ch'en Shao-yu, and Tu Tso-hsiang, the wife of Ch'en Ch'ang-hao. The male students included Hu Hsi-k'uei, Ch'u Ching-pai, a brother of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, and others.

After they got off the tram at the railway station, they were met by a Russian who gave each one of them a train ticket. They boarded a train which made seven or eight stops. But she could not recall the name of the station at which they got off. After all, it all took place almost forty years ago. However, she said:

Apparently, it was not the Siberia-bound train. . . . After we got off the train, we rode by car for about half an hour and pulled to a stop in front of a white
building. Upon our arrival there, we met many old-time acquaintances, such as Chuang Tung-hsiao, who was among the first batch of students who studied at Sun Yat-sen University; her husband Pan Chia-ch'ên, who was an interpreter at Sun Yat-sen University, was also there. I remembered that they had gone back to China in the spring of 1927. Both worked as interpreters in the CC of the CCP in Shanghai, since there was a need for interpreters due to the fact that both the Comintern and the Profintern and other Russian organizations had representatives stationed in Shanghai and there were always important documents in Russian coming from Moscow which needed to be translated.

Ch'ing Man-yun said that only after meeting them did her colleagues find out that they were to work for the Sixth National Congress of the CCP. As a student at Sun Yat-sen University at that time, I had some knowledge about what was going on. I recall, for example, that I helped to translate some of the documents that eventually appeared at the congress from Russian into Chinese, such as the Resolution on the Agrarian and Peasant Problem, which was written by Professor M. Volin of Sun Yat-sen University. Nevertheless, I did not know where or when the forthcoming congress would be held.

**The Arrival of Delegates in Moscow and the Strict Security Measures**

Although the Sixth Congress of the CCP did not begin until, probably, June 18, 1928, the first group of delegates arrived in Moscow at the end of May. They were followed by other groups. The important CCP leaders, such as Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Chou En-lai together with Hsiang Chung-fa, who already was in Moscow, stayed in Moscow to discuss with Comintern leaders matters that were related to the congress. All other delegates from China, however, went directly to the site of the congress, which was outside Moscow. When a train carrying delegates arrived in Moscow, the curtains on their compartment windows were kept down. They had to wait on the train until all other passengers had left it. Then automobiles drove onto the station platform and drove the delegates directly from the train to the site of the congress. Curtains in the cars were kept drawn en route. After they arrived at the site of the congress, the delegates promptly changed into Lenin- or European-style suits to minimize their conspicuousness. Most delegates were scheduled to return to China shortly. A few of them
planned to stay on for a while to attend the forthcoming congresses of the Comintern and the Young Communist International, while others were scheduled to return to China as soon as the Sixth CCP Congress closed. And, of course, all these precautions were taken to protect the delegates from being identified before they could return to China. No news of the congress was made public while it was in session. Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow was not far from the site of the congress, yet only a few of its students, not to mention the general public, knew anything about the congress. I went to watch the opening session of the Sixth Comintern Congress on July 17, 1928, and it was there that I first saw some of the Chinese delegates who had attended the Sixth CCP Congress. Some of them I recognized, while others I did not. They sat in the delegates’ section, whereas I sat in the audience. Only during intermissions did we speak to one another, and then we merely exchanged pleasantries. They kept their mouths shut about the Sixth CCP Congress. In his marathon report to this Comintern Congress Bukharin nowhere mentioned the convening of the Sixth CCP Congress. Obviously the silence on the subject was maintained because not all delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress had yet returned to China. As Ch’ing Man-yun recalled, the delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress at no time appeared in public while they were at the congress—they did not even go on a sightseeing tour of Moscow. Some important CCP delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress who stayed in Moscow were invited to speak at Sun Yat-sen University, but not until early September, when Sun Yat-sen University resumed classes after summer vacation, about two months after the Sixth CCP Congress had adjourned.

THE DATE OF THE CONGRESS

Communist historians have not given the specific date on which the Sixth CCP Congress convened, although they are generally agreed that it took place in June, 1928. Pavel Mif, who was in charge of organizing the congress, said only that “The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was convened in the Summer of 1928.” All files of the congress were presumably available to him, yet he did not choose to disclose its precise dates even nine years later, when the congress had become history. No wonder non-Communist his-
torians have experienced problems assigning exact dates to this congress.\textsuperscript{18}

The historian P'ei T'ung, who has shed more light on this subject than other historians in Communist China, however, states that the Sixth National CCP Congress opened on June 18 and closed on July 11, 1928.\textsuperscript{19} Ch'ing Man-yun agreed with the dates in P'ei T'ung's work. She recalled, in addition, that three days after the Sixth CCP Congress closed, the Fifth National Congress of the CYC opened on July 15, 1928, at the same site as the Party congress. Meanwhile, some delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress moved into Moscow for the Sixth Comintern Congress, which opened on July 17, 1928.

Sun Yat-sen University was closed for summer vacation when the Sixth CCP Congress met. Most of its students were sent to a summer camp in the suburbs of Moscow for military training. They learned about the CCP Congress only when they returned to the university early in September.

\textbf{The Site of the Congress}

One student of KUTV who was present at the Sixth CCP Congress recalls that its site was Serebroe, a dacha not far from the town of Zvenigorod, near Moscow.\textsuperscript{20} This dacha had belonged to a landlord in Tsarist days. Its name means "silvery villa" and came from its white walls, which shimmered in the sunlight. The dacha had lovely gardens and a gymnasium. The building faced a road, and the garden lay behind it. Beyond the garden was a hill, densely overgrown with greenery. And beyond that flowed a stream, whose clear water and green banks made it a favorite resting place for the delegates.\textsuperscript{21}

Nikolai Bukharin, the Comintern representative to the congress, sometimes stayed at a neighboring dacha and sometimes commuted from Moscow.

The "silvery villa" was a building of considerable size. Its first floor consisted of a dining room, a kitchen, and many other rooms. The offices of the secretariat of the congress, which transcribed and duplicated documents by hand and kept the records of the congress, were situated in these rooms. On the second floor of the villa was a splendidly decorated hall which could hold seventy to eighty people. The former owner of the villa presumably entertained his guests in this hall, and
it was there that the sessions of the congress took place. Other rooms on this floor housed delegates and other functionaries of the congress. High-ranking CCP leaders whose wives accompanied them, such as Chou En-lai and his wife, Teng Ying-ch’ao, and Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and his wife, Yang Chih-hua, were assigned separate rooms for each couple. Others were grouped several to a room. Rooms on the third, which was the top, floor were made into dormitories. The “silvery villa” became a Red headquarters. Who would have dreamed that a Russian landlord’s resort would have hosted the Chinese Communist movement?

I should like to say a few more words about Zvenigorod. It was a small town. Near it was a public rest resort. Most Sun Yat-sen University students, including myself, spent a pleasant month in this resort, which was an old feudal castle—a fortress, really—of Tsarist times, built on a hill. This was in August, 1928, just twenty days after the Sixth CCP Congress closed. We were, however, unaware that there was a “silvery villa” in the area.

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS**

When the congress convened on June 18, 1928, the CPSU, the Comintern, the Young Communist International and the Profintern all sent high-ranking representatives to the opening ceremony. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai officially opened the congress in the name of the CC of the CCP. After the speeches of greetings from representatives of the various organizations at the opening session, the congress elected a presidium of fifteen. The election was conducted so as to insure that the Party, the CYC, trade unions, and other Communist-led organizations each was represented on the presidium. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and Chou En-lai represented the CC of the CCP on the presidium. The CYC was represented by Kuan Hsiang-ying. Representatives of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions were Hsiang Chung-fa, Su Chao-cheng, and Hsiang Ying. Chou Hsiao-chu was the representative of Chinese women and women workers on the presidium. Miss Chou, the wife of Lo Teng-hsien, was of working-class origin. Both energetic and capable, she cut a striking figure at the congress.

After the presidium was elected, the congress elected a committee to evaluate the credentials of the delegates. Then Chou En-lai was
unanimously elected executive general secretary of the congress, a post which made him the chief administrator of the congress. The congress then named the various committees and those responsible for calling them into session (chao chu jen). There were, for example, the Committee for Drafting Political Resolutions, the Workers' Movement Committee, the Youth Movement Committee, the Soldiers' Movement Committee, and the Women's Movement Committee. Drafts of all resolutions, formally speaking, were prepared by these committees and then presented to full sessions of the congress for discussion and adoption. Membership on these various committees was based on the kind of work that the members pursued in China. For example, those who were active in the workers' movement were put on the Workers' Movement Committee. Thus all committee members were supposed to be experts in their fields and in a position to make valid recommendations.

Delegates from different parts of China often spoke dialects that were unintelligible to one another, which naturally hampered communication. When a Cantonese spoke in his native dialect, other delegates could not understand him, and so a good many interpreters had to be used. Huang P'ing, a Cantonese who also spoke Mandarin, and Teng Ying-ch'ao, a Honanese who had learned Cantonese when she worked in Canton, were interpreters for the Cantonese delegates. Because of high-ranking Comintern people at the congress, such as Bukharin and others, P'an Chia-ch'en and P'an Wen-yu were designated as the congress's Russian-language interpreters. Chuang Tung-hsiao, P'an Chia-ch'en's wife, and Li P'ei-tse, the wife of Wang Jo-fei, interpreted for the Women's Movement Committee. There were additional interpreters. All Chinese who acted as Russian-language interpreters either were Sun Yat-sen University students or had worked as interpreters at Sun Yat-sen University, such as P'an Chia-ch'en, who at the time of the congress was no longer associated with the university. In addition to the Chinese, there were several Russian interpreters whose Chinese was fluent. These Russians had worked in the Oriental Seminar at Sun Yat-sen University and then had transferred to the China Problems Research Institute. Interpreting work at the congress was strenuous, for in addition to oral interpreting, much translating
work had to be done. All documents of the congress were prepared both in Chinese and Russian. Some of these documents had to be translated before the congress convened, others had to be translated on the spot, and many documents had to be revised.

As mentioned above, the delegates were not unanimous in their assessments of the situation in China or in their ideas about who the Party leaders should be. Heated debates took place on a number of issues. Yet disparate as their views were, they were eventually unified under Bukharin’s leadership, or so it appeared on the surface. As Ch’ing Man-yun recalled, Bukharin made a nine-hour speech at the congress. In it he discussed at length the international situation, current conditions in China, and the mistakes committed by the CCP. He singled out Ch’en Tu-hsiu as the main target for criticism and blamed him for the failures of the Chinese revolution. He also criticized the “putschism” of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai after the August 7, 1927, Party conference. It was in this speech that he made his famous remark that “armed revolt is a refined art. It is neither as simple nor as easy as lighting a match.” Many other CCP leaders were not immune from Bukharin’s fire.  

After nearly four weeks (the congress lasted twenty-four days) of debates and discussions, the congress passed a number of resolutions and elected a new CC. For the first time in the history of the CCP a proletarian leadership was established—Ch’u Ch’iu-pai was replaced as secretary general of the Party by Hsiang Chung-fa, who had risen from the ranks of the workers. But this Comintern insistence upon proletarian leadership, based on the dogmatic commitment that the working class was superior in revolutionary spirit and determination to any other class, turned out to be yet another of its mistakes in dealing with the CCP. Hsiang Chung-fa ascended the throne solely because of his working-class origin. In deciding to turn the helm of a ship that was sailing in turbulent waters over to a person who had never experienced a voyage at sea, but who had only plied the Yangtze on river boats, the congress, under Comintern pressure, truly took a reckless chance. It was this decision that permitted Li Li-san to wrest the real power from Hsiang’s incompetent leadership and to sail off along the disastrous Li Li-san line.
At that time Bukharin was chairman of the Comintern. He enjoyed fame equal to that of Stalin. Lenin, while recording observations about both Stalin and Bukharin in his last years, had praised Bukharin as “a most valuable and major theorist” who was “rightly considered the favorite of the whole Party.” Indeed, he was as responsible as Stalin for the outcome of the 1925–1927 revolution in China. The fact that the CCP’s Sixth National Congress took place under his personal guidance demonstrated that the Comintern and the CPSU considered the congress to be of the utmost importance. During my stay in Moscow, I had on several occasions listened to Bukharin’s eloquence; on one occasion he spoke for six hours without notes. Physically, he did not resemble the average Russian. He was neither tall nor husky nor stout. His mustache gave him a pompous appearance, to my eyes, yet he was in no way aloof. Ch’ing Man-yun was much impressed by his oratorical ability. For, she recalled that while his nine-hour speech at the congress certainly was long, his eloquence riveted the total attention of the delegates to what he was saying; no one seemed bored or gave evidence of drowsiness. After each session of the congress he invariably addressed individual Chinese delegates with a smile and warm greetings. Often he carried a hunting rifle with him, while a falcon rested on his shoulder, and at the first free moment he would go out hunting accompanied by two bodyguards. Apparently hunting was his favorite recreation.

Another important Russian at the congress was Pavel Mif, who, as senior official in the Far Eastern secretariat of the Comintern, was then in charge of Chinese affairs. It will be recalled, too, that he was then the rector of Sun Yat-sen University. At the congress he was in charge of administrative affairs. These administrative affairs were not merely technical in nature, but also involved political and theoretical matters. For example, he was responsible for preparing notes for Bukharin’s political report to the congress and drafts of the resolutions of the congress in addition to supervising those who took care of the reception and transportation of delegates, security measures, and so forth, jobs that were handled by Russians for the most part. Midway in the congress, moreover, Ch’ing Man-yun recalls that an additional
batch of students from Sun Yat-sen University was brought to the congress to assist the overworked students already there, and all such students were Mif's responsibility.

Most of the time during the congress, Mif stayed in Moscow. He attended the congress only intermittently, apparently because he had to brief Stalin on the progress of the congress and carry out in Moscow such other undertakings as preparing the final drafts and amendments of the resolutions of the congress. Since he was able to come to the congress only infrequently, his assistant, Kuchumov, the vice-rector of Sun Yat-sen University, usually looked after the proceedings of the congress in his place.

In addition to these Russians, some Comintern and Young Communist International representatives in China returned to Moscow to participate in the CCP's Sixth National Congress and in the Fifth National Congress of the CYC. Ch'ing Man-yun recalls as being present a Young Communist International representative in China, whose name she has forgotten, and a Comintern representative, a woman, known as "Old Grandma" (lao tzu mo), who had helped the CCP in organizing its women's movements. Both of them had returned to Moscow, apparently to attend the congresses. In China, Old Grandma had spent a good deal of time with Yang Chih-hua, the wife of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, and Ts'ai Ch'ang, the wife of Li Fu-ch'un and sister of Ts'ai Ho-sen. Perhaps it was for security reasons that this woman Comintern representative was called Old Grandma, for she was a young lady in her thirties. The congress designated her a member of the Women's Movement Committee.

As has already been mentioned, some Russians, such as Yolllk, also worked for the congress as translators and interpreters. A Russian doctor and some Russian nurses were also stationed at the congress. Those in charge of food and weekend recreational activities were also Russians. Indeed, the Chinese functionaries at the congress who had been brought in from Sun Yat-sen University were impressed by the excellent cooperation and spirit of service shown by their Russian hosts. At that time the relationship between the Russian and Chinese Communist parties seemed quite cordial and harmonious. Who would have dreamed that thirty years later these two fraternal parties would be as antagonistic to one another as fire and water. In nature oceans
can be converted into paddy fields, but changes in human affairs and politics are much less predictable.

**CH’EN SHAO-YU (WANG MING) AND THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONGRESS**

Ch’en Shao-yu, also known as Wang Ming, was a member of the first class that Sun Yat-sen University graduated. After graduation in 1927 he remained as a translator at Sun Yat-sen University, where he also assisted Mif in studying the reports and other documents that the CCP sent to the Comintern. When the Sixth National CCP Congress was scheduled for June, 1928, Mif assigned Ch’en as his aid to help organize the congress. Mif did not, however, give him any official title. Ch’en Shao-yu was neither a delegate nor an alternate delegate, and officially he was not even present at the congress. One source states that a faction of Russian-educated students headed by Ch’en Shao-yu, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Yang Shang-k’uen was one of five factions of delegates to the congress and that it functioned in behalf of Mif in seeking to gain control of CCP leadership there. Yet none of the members of this alleged faction, except for Ch’en Shao-yu, appeared even briefly at the congress. Indications are that the authors have confused the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC with this congress. They also seem to have mistakenly identified the so-called 28 Bolsheviks as members of this supposed faction. It was only later, though, that a group of students at Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, came to be called the 28 Bolsheviks. At the time of the Sixth CCP Congress, the 28 Bolsheviks had not yet come into being. But I will discuss this matter in detail in subsequent chapters.

Ch’en Shao-yu, as we have mentioned, was only one of Mif’s assistants in making preparations for the Sixth CCP Congress. It is naturally possible that Ch’en made suggestions about drafts of some resolutions and that Mif accepted some of his suggestions. But such activities constituted Ch’en’s personal, behind-the-scenes activities; they did not represent the activities of a so-called faction of Russian-educated students. As I learned later, Ch’en Shao-yu was assigned some specific tasks connected with the congress, such as helping Russian receptionists with meeting delegates and seeing to their accommodations and, before the congress convened, distributing Russian-language documents to selected students at Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, who
could translate them into Chinese. Ch’ing Man-yun recalls that Ch’en Shao-yu did visit the congress now and then to find out how it was progressing, on the one hand, and to visit his fiance, Meng Ch’in-shu, whom he subsequently married. Miss Meng, her bosom friend, Chu Tzu-shun, and P’an Wen-yu, who was an interpreter at the congress, were drafted for work at the congress on Ch’en Shao-yu’s recommendation.

Mif may have had something up his sleeve when he brought Ch’en Shao-yu in as an assistant. Perhaps Mif sought to provide Ch’en with an opportunity to meet CC members and influential delegates from various provincial and municipal Party organizations. Perhaps, too, Mif hoped that Ch’en could find out the sentiments of the delegates, information which the Comintern could utilize in directing the congress. It was no secret that Ch’en Shao-yu had been a favorite of Mif’s since early 1927.

It is beyond dispute that Ch’en Shao-yu was an ambitious young man. When Mif in 1927 replaced Radek as rector of Sun Yat-sen University, Ch’en made every effort to win Mif’s confidence. From then on, Ch’en freely made recommendations to Mif on university and Party affairs. All of these undertakings of Ch’en’s naturally prepared the way for his subsequent leap into prominence. But Ch’en Shao-yu played no significant role in the decisions of the Sixth CCP Congress, nor was he a person of any prominence in connection with the congress.

The Fifth National Congress of the CYC

Ch’ing Man-yun recalled that the Fifth CYC Congress convened on July 15, 1928, and remained in session for a bit more than one week. Its delegates were fewer in number than those to the Sixth CCP Congress. They were less divided in viewpoints than delegates to the Party congress, and they pretty much followed the general line adopted by the Party congress. Thus, this CYC congress proceeded smoothly. The head of the Young Communist International, Chitarov, a bright young man whom I knew, participated in the congress. The Young Communist International representative in China was summoned back for the congress, so he, too, was there. The congress, which, as mentioned, followed the political line of the Sixth CCP Congress, adopted many resolutions and elected a new CC, with Kuan Hsiang-ying as
secretary general. Kuan had been a student at KUTV in its early years. Hua Shao-feng, who became a well-known Chinese Communist historian better known as Hua Kang and whose close friend I was to become, was elected to direct the propaganda department of the CC. Li Tzu-fen became director of the organization department. And Wen Yu-ch’en, a steel-factory worker from Shanghai, was elected director of the department in charge of the workers’ economic struggle.

After the congress closed, Li Tzu-fen returned to work in Shanghai, while Kuan Hsiang-ying, Hua Shao-feng, Wen Yu-ch’en, Hu Chun-ho, Yuan Ping-hui, who now lives in Taiwan, and others stayed on to take part in the Fifth Congress of the Young Communist International.

A few students from Sun Yat-sen University attended the Fifth CYC Congress as observers. Others worked at the congress, of whom Ch’ing Man-yun can recall the names of only two—Li Yuan-ch’u and Wang Ho-shu. Li was to leave the CYC and the Communist movement when he returned to China, perhaps in 1929. But Wang Ho-shu remained in the Communist movement and is today a government official in Peking.

**THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONGRESS**

Because they were urgently needed in China, delegates to the Sixth CCP Congress and the Fifth CYC Congress had to be sent back there at the earliest possible date. Groups of five to seven of them departed separately and at staggered intervals, Ch’ing Man-yun recalled. As soon as one group had safely crossed the Russian border and reached a designated spot, the next group would depart from the site of the congress. While delegates awaited their turn to depart, Comintern authorities gave them, and the Sun Yat-sen University students who had worked at the Congress, military training. A Russian officer conducted this military-training program. They learned how to use the basic weapons manufactured in each country, techniques of street fighting, techniques of guerrilla warfare, and other practical facets of military activity. The program lasted only one month, by which time the delegates, and all of the Sun Yat-sen University students who had worked at the Congress, had left for the real battlefields in China.

At that time, travel between Russia and China was a highly dangerous undertaking for a Chinese Communist. Yet, because of careful
planning by the secret-service people of the Comintern, in close cooperation with the GPU, everyone made it uneventfully back to China.

Ch'ing Man-yun described the trip as follows: The delegates made the trip to China by way of three routes. The first route was through Europe. Those who went this way traveled in the guise of students or rich merchants. Needless to say, only a few delegates enjoyed this privilege because of the high cost involved. Chou En-lai and his wife, for example, took this route. The second route involved taking the International Express, a luxury train with a dining car, to Manchouli, just on the Chinese side of the Sino-Russian border in Manchuria, a trip that took nine days. The third route was to take the Siberian Express, a slower, plainer train with no dining car, to Sedanka station near Vladivostok, a trip of twelve days. At Sedanka they caught a train to Wuchan station on the Sino-Russian border. In both Sedanka and Wuchan the travelers were put up at a rest house. The rest house in Wuchan, however, had its doors and windows tightly shuttered, and the delegates were admonished to speak only in hushed voices. Security precautions were far stricter for the delegates who went to Wuchan, which was close to the Chinese border, than at Sedanka, which was well inside Russia. The Russians at both rest houses were experts in smuggling people back and forth across the border. The travelers stayed at both Sedanka and Wuchan for a day or two or more, depending on circumstances. During these stopovers, Russians carefully went over their luggage and their clothing. If the clothes that the delegates wore were judged unsuited to their assumed travel identity, the delegates had to be suitably reclothed. Before the travelers passed the Russian scrutiny, they had to be appropriately dressed from head to toe. Most important of all, they were not allowed to carry over one sheet of paper, or anything made in Russia. When everything was in order, the travelers got in a horse-drawn carriage on a dark night and cautiously drove off. When they neared the Chinese side of the border, they went ahead on foot, nervously inching their way along as best they could, with a Russian guide leading them. Soon they had crossed the border illegally and stood on Chinese soil. Then they were taken to a small cafe, which was the cover for a communications center operated by Russian agents. “The moment we stepped in the cafe’s door,” Ch'ing Man-yun, who made this trip, recalled, “our tension fell
away, and we relaxed, feeling exhausted and hungry. A cup of steaming coffee and a snack wonderfully revived us. There we rested our taut and weary bodies. When we were sneaking along in the darkness, I deeply felt that to take part in a revolution was an act of total self-abnegation—a form of self-sacrifice. I cannot help feeling despondent when I recall that heroic attitude of my youth, and I wonder what that sacrifice accomplished in the end."

The mission of the escorting Russian agents ended in the coffee shop. It was up to the delegates themselves to deal with the problems that lay ahead. Occasionally, some inept travelers inadvertently revealed their identities or by their conspicuous nervousness attracted the attention of the Chinese police and were detained for questioning. Fortunately, bribes apparently were capable of solving any problem. Usually, the police gave free passage to the ones they detained as soon as their pockets were filled with money.

When the travelers stopped over at Sedanka, Comintern agents there gave each of them some Chinese currency and some U.S. dollars. The amount was in direct proportion to the person’s status; delegates, for example, received more than students. But even the smallest amount was adequate for the traveler to reach his destination. Also, each traveler received enough money to cover living expenses for one month, just in case he encountered difficulty in establishing contact with the Party at his destination, a distinct possibility under the “White terror” in China at that time. It was, of course, important that, should no contact be established, the traveler have enough money to go elsewhere or, at least, to feed himself. It cannot be denied that the Russians were extremely prudent and that they thought of all eventualities and provided travelers with the means to cope with them.

It was late fall when the last of the delegates had left for China, except for those who stayed on in Moscow in connection with Party work, such as Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, Chang Kuo-t’ao, and others.

Notes

1. Chung-yang t’ung-hsun (Central correspondence), no. 13. In the hui-lu Collection, Taipei.

2. The Sixth Comintern Congress met from July 17 to September 1, 1928. The Fifth Congress of Young Communist International met from August 20 to September 18, 1928. The Profintern congress, apparently, convened in April, 1928. Some Chinese Communist delegates to the Profintern congress stayed on in Moscow for the Sixth National Congress of the CCP.
3. According to Li Ang (Hung-sze wu-t'ai [The red stage], p. 61), whose account of this matter strikes me as uninformed, “The sponsors of the Third International wanted to have control over the Chinese Communists in their own hands, and so the Third International issued an unusual command, ordering the Chinese Communists to hold the Sixth National Congress in Moscow.”

4. Hu Hua, ed., Chung-kuo hsin min-chu chu-i ko-ming-shih (First draft of a history of the new democratic Chinese revolution; Peking: People’s Publishing House, 1953), p. 97. See also Mif, Heroic China, who gives the figure as 57,000.

5. From interviews with Ch’ing Man-yun in Lawrence, Kansas. Miss Ch’ing was a Communist Party member at the time of the Sixth National Congress of the CCP and a student at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. She and a number of other students were recruited to take care of secretarial and assorted administrative chores at the congress, so she was present throughout the Sixth National Congress of the CCP and was in a position to follow its activities closely. She returned to China from Moscow soon after the congress closed, accompanying a group of delegates who had attended the congress. Off and on for more than a year we have discussed the congress together, seeking to test and refresh our memories of the events and people involved in it. She has kindly read this chapter to insure that it has not done violence to her recollections.

6. Ch’ing Man-yun interview.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 124. According to Ch’ing Man-yun, the following people listed as delegates by Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank were not, to the best of her recollection, delegates to the Sixth National Congress of the CCP: Chang Wen-t’ien, Ho K’e-ch’uan, Li Wei-han, Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-chu), Liu Po-ch’eng, Shen Tse-min, Tso Ch’uan, and Wang Chi-hsiang. According to Ch’ing Man-yun, at the time of the congress Chang Wen-t’ien, Ho K’e-ch’uan, Shen Tse-min, and Wang Chia-hsiang were either students or teaching assistants at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow (an observation with which I concur), but they were not delegates to, nor did they put in an appearance at, the congress. Tso Ch’uan, who had been a student at Sun Yat-sen University, was studying at Moscow Military Academy at the time of the congress. Li Wei-han was not in Moscow at the time of the congress; he was in Shanghai. Similarly, Lin Tsu-han was in China at the time of the congress; it was not until later that he went to Moscow. None of these people, again, as Ch’ing Man-yun recalls, was a delegate to, nor did they visit the congress. However, according to Ch’ing, Liu Po-ch’eng did attend the congress either as an observer or as an alternate delegate, but not as a full delegate.

11. Ch’ing Man-yun interview.


16. Ch’ing Man-yun interview.


18. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, Documentary History, p. 127, state that the congress lasted from July to September, 1928. It seems unlikely that a political party heavily engaged at the time in fighting on all fronts could afford to have its leaders sitting in meetings for three whole months.


20. In personal correspondence with the author. This former student at KUTV would prefer that I not use his name.

21. This information, and that which follows, unless otherwise indicated, was supplied by Ch’ing Man-yun, who could not recall the name of the nearby town at which she got off the train from Moscow to reach the site of the congress.

22. See Li Ang, Red Stage, for his remarks on Bukharin’s speech and other aspects of this congress.


Chapter XV

The Struggle Against the Second Line
at Sun Yat-sen University and the
Origin of the 28 Bolsheviks

Ch'EN SHAO-YU ATTAINS PROMINENCE IN A STRUGGLE
BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS IN SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY

In the early summer of 1927 conflicts and clashes within the united front of the Chinese revolution reached a new peak, and this was a factor in intensifying the power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. Karl Radek threw his full weight behind Trotsky in opposing Stalin's leadership. His public hostility towards Stalin cost him the rectorship of Sun Yat-sen University. The CC of the CPSU appointed Agoor, as I recall, the dean of academic affairs at the university, as acting rector to replace Radek, because Pavel Mif, the vice-rector, was at that time in China on a special mission. Agoor was a very ambitious man. Taking advantage of the power vacuum in the administration of the university at the time, he sought to make himself rector. In order to strengthen his position, he won over some influential students to support him, such as Chou Ta-ming, Yu Hsiu-sung, and Tung Yi-hsiang, who were Party veterans with established reputations. Yu Hsiu-sung, for example, had worked with Gregory Voitinsky, the Comintern representative, in establishing the Foreign Languages School and then the Socialist Youth League in Shanghai in August, 1920. Agoor, with men of such stature around him, quickly rallied a considerable number of students behind him and became a ruthless dictator at the university, completely ignoring the secretary of the CPSU branch, Comrade Sednikov. Thus, there arose a bitter power struggle between Agoor and Sednikov. Sednikov in turn recruited to his side the former leaders of the Moscow branch of the CCP, such as Hu Chung and Li Chun-che, and through them successfully courted Chang Wen-t'ien, Shen Tse-min, and Shih Shih. Thus, in the university two hostile camps were formed—the so-called Academic Affairs faction with Agoor at its head, and the Party Branch faction led by Sednikov.

This power struggle reached a climax at the concluding conference
of the semester, which ended about the end of June, 1927. The two factions fought a "blood" battle at this conference, heatedly arguing about academic and Party affairs. The Academic Affairs faction contended that Party affairs at the university were handled disastrously, and the Party Branch faction insisted that the university's academic affairs were in a shambles; and neither side would yield an inch in its arguments. This conference lasted for seven consecutive days and nights, recessing only for meals, without reaching any compromise. I was only one of a great many students who were not associated with either faction who were greatly annoyed by this tiresome power struggle. Thus a third force emerged, which further complicated the situation at the university. The internecine strife continued, so that when Mif returned, he found the university quite literally torn apart by factions. To combat the chaos, Ch'en Shao-yu, who had accompanied Mif to China and back, proposed a plan to Mif to end the strife. He suggested that Mif firmly grasp the third force and use it in collaboration with the Party Branch faction to defeat Agoor's Academic Affairs faction, thus paving the way for Mif to become rector of the university. Ch'en's plan was implemented, and it proved to be a sound one. Agoor's faction was completely defeated, and Mif was soon formally promoted to the rectorship. Ch'en Shao-yu, as one of the active organizers of this movement, became Mif's principal favorite. This struggle was the first occasion on which Ch'en Shao-yu entered into an alliance with Chang Wen-t'ien, Shen Tse-min, and the others, and it was out of this alliance that eventually the alliance known as the 28 Bolsheviks emerged, an alliance of far-reaching significance for Sun Yat-sen University and for the CCP itself.

**THE ANTI-TROTSKY STRUGGLE BECOMES ENTANGLED WITH THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SECOND LINE**

The struggle between the above-named factions had just subsided when the struggle against the Trotskyite opposition broke out at the university. This latter struggle was touched off by an incident during celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, on November 7, 1927. It had become a tradition, starting in 1918, for the people of Moscow to celebrate this anniversary with a big march through the streets, with the Red Square as their destination. A more
elaborate celebration than ever before was carried out to commemorate the tenth anniversary, and I was among the marchers from Sun Yat-sen University. As the procession approached the entrance to Red Square, Russian Trotskyites among the marchers suddenly pulled cloth banners from their pockets, waved them, and shouted anti-Stalin and pro-Trotsky slogans. This provocation promptly touched off retaliation from other marchers who supported the CPSU leadership, and the two groups had a fistfight. A professor at Sun Yat-sen University, who taught Leninism there, Dogmarov, was badly beaten up by the Trotskyites in this skirmish. His nose was bleeding and his face had obviously suffered numerous blows. But while this scuffle continued, the march also continued without pause into Red Square and past Lenin's mausoleum, on top of which stood Stalin and other dignitaries reviewing the procession. Naturally, they also viewed the fisticuffs that took place before them. As the Chinese students approached the mausoleum, the Russian leaders, as they had on these occasions in the past, raised their arms and shouted slogans of support to them—"Long live revolutionary Chinese youth," "Long live the victory of the Chinese revolution." It had been the practice for the Chinese students to respond to this greeting merely with a shout of "hurrah" in Russian (ypa). But on this occasion, to everyone's astonishment including my own, some Sun Yat-sen University students responded by shouting their support for Trotsky and for the beleaguered Russian Trotskyites in the procession somewhere ahead of them. They shouted at the top of their voices and seemed to make more noise than the Russian Trotskyites. This public insurgence of Chinese Trotskyites from Sun Yat-sen University was utterly unexpected. It could not have failed to shock the CPSU and Comintern leadership assembled there, and taking place, as it did, in front of visitors—many of them important ones, from all over the world—it must have seemed to Stalin as though someone had publicly spit in his face.

This incident intensified the struggle against Trotsky and his supporters within the CPSU. Earlier, on October 14, 1927, Pravda had accused the Trotskyite opposition of intending to form a new party; and on October 23, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev had been expelled from the CC of the CPSU. But one week after this incident, on November 14, 1927, they were expelled from the CPSU itself. The case against
Radek, Kamenev, Rakavsky, and other oppositionists, moreover, was at this time referred for decision to the Fifth Congress of the CPSU to be held in December of the same year. 2

Meanwhile, Stalin angrily instructed Mif to conduct a thorough investigation of Trotskyite activities at Sun Yat-sen University and to report his findings promptly to the CC of the CPSU, which I know as a result of being in the bureau of the CPSU branch in the university at the time. This painstaking investigation lasted for several months. The more important students found to have shouted the pro-Trotsky slogans in Red Square, such as Lu Yen, Liang Kan-ch’ao, and others, were deported to China. Guilty students of lesser importance were either sent to work in factories to reform their thinking or put on Party probation. Professors and staff members who were found definitely to be Trotskyites or Trotsky sympathizers were fired.

But the struggle against Trotskyism in Sun Yat-sen University was not limited to these organizational and administrative measures. When the investigation was launched, a simultaneous ideological struggle began. Those students, including Ch‘en Shao-yu and myself, who had united in the previous struggle against the Academic Affairs faction, now rallied around the bureau of the Party branch against the Trotskyites. But the further we pressed our struggle, the greater were the difficulties we encountered. For we found that the Trotskyite opposition as such was not the only opposition to be reckoned with. The defeat of the Chinese revolution had raised all sorts of complex questions among students. Who, for example, should be held responsible for the defeat? Many students both at Sun Yat-sen University and in the Chinese class of KUTV felt inclined to question the leadership of Stalin and of the Comintern as a whole. Disenchantment, skepticism, and frustration were widely prevalent. Such students were not Trotskyites. Perhaps, in fact, they had never even been attracted by Trotsky’s positions. Nevertheless, they had something in common with the Trotskyites, for both were disaffected from the leadership of Stalin, of the CPSU, and of the Comintern. Their reaction to the struggle against the Trotsky opposition in Sun Yat-sen University was to take advantage of this opportunity to form an independent force of their own to oppose the leadership of the bureau of the CPSU branch at the university and Mif. They waged a vigorous struggle against those students who supported
the bureau of the Party branch. And the course they subsequently took was labeled the "Second Line," which could not truly be identified with Trotskyism but which could not easily be separated from Trotskyism either. Thus, the struggle against the Trotsky opposition became entangled with a struggle against the "Second Line."

THE SECOND LINE COALITION:
THE ALLEGED KIANGSU-CHEKIANG COUNTRYMEN'S ASSOCIATION
AND THE INTERFERENCE OF HSIAANG CHUNG-FA

The coalition that supported the Second Line was composed of three groups of students—the remnants of the Academic Affairs faction, the "vanguardists" of the CYC members, and the so-called Worker Oppositionists.

The Academic Affairs faction had been defeated, and Agoor had been disciplined by being dismissed from the university. Yet students such as Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung Yi-hsiang, who had formed the Chinese elite of this faction, remained in the university. Being ambitious, they watched every new development closely and functioned tirelessly to benefit themselves. It was natural, then, that they should join the Second Line against a common enemy. Still, since they had only recently been discredited, they were active only behind the scenes. They sought to avoid detection, but they failed to do so. Ch'en Shao-yu and many others who later were to be listed as the 28 Bolsheviks quickly disrupted their activities. It might be noted that many students who were regarded as members of the Academic Affairs faction were natives of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. For example, Yu Hsiu-sung's home was in Shao-hsing County in Chekiang. Tung Yi-hsiang came from Changchow in Kiangsu Province. Graduates of Sun Yat-sen University who were sent to study in military colleges in Moscow and Leningrad on the recommendations of Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung Yi-hsiang, when they were influential, came from these two provinces. There were many rumors about the significance of this provincial cliquishness. There was speculation that the two had formed a Chekiang-Kiangsu Countrymen's Association. This alleged association provided Ch'en Shao-yu and his comrades-in-arms with a fine weapon to use against Yu Hsiu-sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, and their followers. Since the formation of such organizations ran counter to the rules of
Party organization, and since, in any event, this alleged organization could be branded as feudal, Ch’en Shao-yu and others demanded a complete investigation of it. In response to their demands, the bureau of the Party branch promptly initiated an investigation in which it invited the GPU to participate. Some slight evidence was uncovered to suggest the vague possibility that such an organization may have been formed, although at the time I did not believe that it existed formally. But the use of exaggeration as a weapon in power struggles is not an unusual undertaking anywhere, and perhaps this weapon is used within Communist parties more freely than elsewhere.

If my memory serves me well, the investigation took place early in May, 1928. Hsiang Chung-fa had already arrived in Moscow to attend the Fourth Profintern Congress in April, 1928. In the hope of frightening the Second Line coalition, Mif, at the suggestion of Ch’en Shao-yu, induced Hsiang Chung-fa to speak against the alleged association at Sun Yat-sen University and at the other colleges and universities in Moscow and Leningrad that Chinese students attended. Thus, one day he came to Sun Yat-sen University and lectured, as a representative of the CC of the CCP, on the issue. In his speech he affirmed the existence of the Kiangsu-Chekiang Countrymen’s Association as a factional organization among members of the CCP residing in the USSR. In the strongest terms he condemned those who, he said, had organized this association, which he characterized as an anti-Party institution; and he warned all members of it that the evidence already in hand enabled the Party to punish them. He went so far as to threaten leaders of the organization with execution. I can still hear his jarring Hankow dialect as he delivered this ultimatum. He had not, so far as I know, investigated the matter himself, but had accepted Mif’s side of the case. Not unexpectedly, his speech aroused both indignation and fear among students from Chekiang and Kiangsu at Sun Yat-sen University, KUTV, and elsewhere, who had long maintained a close relationship with Yu Hsiu-sung and Tung Yi-hsiang. Those who were united in their struggle against the bureau of the Party branch and Mif were naturally also disturbed. Beyond any doubt, Hsiang Chung-fa’s speech greatly intimidated not only Yu Hsiu-sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, and their supporters, but also the Second Line as a whole.

The psychological victory caused by Hsiang Chung-fa’s blast, how-
ever, was short-lived. The Second Line coalition, after its initial shock, began to pull itself together and to undertake countermeasures, designed to destroy Hsiang's charges. They appealed directly to the CC of the CCP and to the Chinese delegation to the Comintern to carry out another investigation of the case. Their appeal did not consist of one petition signed by everyone. Instead they deluged the CC and the Chinese Comintern delegation with appeals, each of which was signed by a few individuals. Under the pressure of these numerous appeals from Chinese students in the USSR, the CC of the CCP instructed the Chinese Comintern delegation in Moscow to settle the controversy on the spot. By this time, the Sixth CCP Congress had convened and closed, and the chief of the Chinese Comintern delegation was Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who himself was of Kiangsu origin. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, moreover, much resented Mif, who apparently had had a hand in his degradation at the Sixth CCP Congress. At the same time, Ch'u was jealous of Hsiang Chung-fa, who had replaced him as secretary general of the CCP as a result of decisions of the Sixth CCP Congress. When, then, the CC instructed Ch'u Ch'iu-pai to look into the matter of the Chekiang-Kiangsu Countrymen's Association, he took advantage of the instruction to strike back at Mif and Hsiang Chung-fa. He formally summoned dozens of people who were supposedly members of the alleged organization to his office, where he interrogated them. All of these suspects denied Hsiang Chung-fa's charges and assured Ch'u that it all constituted a plot of Mif and Ch'en Shao-yu and their followers. At least that was what some Chinese Comintern staff members reported to Mif. In the end, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai asked the suspects to present their arguments in written form to him, which they did. He also asked their opponents to submit evidence, in addition to the tenuous material revealed in the first investigation, to support their charges. But this request was ignored by Ch'en Shao-yu and the rest of us on the grounds that the existence of the association already was an established fact so that no additional evidence was needed. Unhappily for us, our uncooperativeness merely strengthened Ch'u Ch'iu-pai's hand in reporting to the CC that there was inadequate evidence for the existence of such an association. Ch'u's report further stated that the agreement on certain issues among some of the students of Chekiang-Kiangsu origin was not a criminal matter but a matter of
political disagreement, which should be dealt with as such. To clarify and strengthen his position, he pointed out, moreover, that Chang Wen-t’ien, Shen Tse-min, and many others of Kiangsu and Chekiang origin stood against the alleged Kiangsu-Chekiang organization. And, he wrote, not all of the supposed members of this alleged organization were from Chekiang or Kiangsu. Chou Ta-ming, for example, who was listed as a leader of the association, was a native of Kweichow. In fact, we could not deny that there was some truth in Ch’u’s report. But what seemed important to us was not the alleged association itself, but the political course that those who were identified with it were taking, which was regarded as inconsistent with that of the Comintern and the bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University.

Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s report was sent to the CC of the CCP accompanied by the written statement of the suspected students. It was not, however, presented to any meetings of Party members as a whole at Sun Yat-sen University, nor was it published. But the contents of Ch’u’s report were widely known among Second Line students at Sun Yat-sen University and elsewhere, apparently because Ch’u had told them about it. For our part, on Mif’s instruction, the bureau of the Party branch briefed a select body of us on the report. On the one hand, Ch’u’s report encouraged students in the Second Line coalition to grow more riotous in their struggle against Mif and the bureau of the Party branch in Sun Yat-sen University. On the other hand, it intensified the conflict between Ch’u and Mif. Thus the struggle against the Second Line in Sun Yat-sen University became entangled with a struggle between Mif and the Chinese Comintern delegation headed by Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, which I shall discuss in greater detail later.

**Vanguardists Among CYC Members in the University constitute a Second Group in the Second Line Coalition**

From the very beginning of the struggle against the Second Line, many CYC members at the university demonstrated support for the Second Line. Some leading figures in the bureau of the CYC branch in the university even publicly advocated defiance of the bureau of the Party branch. Hsi-men Tsung-hua was the most outspoken of these CYC leaders, but Kao Ch’en-lich, Lin Ch’i-t’o, and others were also
They criticized the bureau of the Party branch in the same destructive tones that other followers of the Second Line used.

The struggle against the Second Line, indeed, revealed in all its stark gravity the lacerating divisions within Sun Yat-sen University in the late autumn of 1928. The bureau of the Party branch simply could not tolerate loss of control over the bureau of the CYC branch in the university. In the first place, the state of affairs ran counter to the basic organizational principle that was supposed to govern the relationship between the Party and the CYC. The CYC, as an auxiliary Party organization, was supposed to act only in accordance with Party decisions. In the second place, the Hsi-men-Kao clique in the bureau of the CYC branch, because of sympathy for Trotskyism, was held responsible for the high percentage of Trotskyites among the CYC members at the university.

In a general Party meeting of the university held in the autumn of 1928, I made a major speech criticizing the Hsi-men-Kao clique. I characterized its course as “vanguardism,” because its defiance of Party leadership had been demonstrated by its insistence that the line of the bureau of the Party branch be reversed. After that, they were known as “Vanguardists,” and they became an important component of the Second Line coalition. It was to weaken this Second Line coalition that the university authorities, upon the recommendation of the bureau of the Party branch, began in October, 1928, to send the most troublesome members of the Second Line coalition to Siberia, where they worked at hard labor. Kao Ch’en-lieh, Lin Ch’i-t’o, and others were among those sent to Siberia. Others, such as Hsi-men Tsung-hua, were sent back to China the following year.

**The “Worker Oppositionists” As Part of the Second Line Coalition**

The Worker Opposition faction, headed by Li Chien-ju and Yu Tu-san, constituted the main force of the Second Line coalition. It could be said that the Li-Yu faction supplied the manpower for the battle. Those who made up the faction were of working-class origin and came from Wuhan and Shanghai. Li Chien-ju, for example, was a much-honored hero of the three workers’ uprisings in Shanghai in 1926 and 1927. Yu Tu-san had been an important activist in the Wuhan workers’ movement. As illiterates, both linguistically and politically,
they could not have played a significant role in the struggle at the university if others had not directed them from behind the scenes. There were, in fact, all sorts of people functioning behind the scenes, such as Ch’u Chi’iu-pai and Yu Fei, who had been a tram conductor in Shanghai and who at the time was a member of the CC of the CCP and a member of the Chinese delegation to the Comintern. Yu Hsiu-sung, Tung Yi-hsiang, and Ku Ku-yi, all three from the former Academic Affairs faction, and Li Pen-yi and others from the group that had initiated the Second Line in the first place were active behind the scenes, too. All of these people played upon the discontent of the Li Chien-ju–Yu Tu-san faction with the university’s academic policies, and they goaded them into opposing the bureau of the Party branch and the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. Hiding behind the impeccable mantle of the Chinese workers’ movement, they were able to place the bureau of the Party branch and the university authorities in a highly uncomfortable position.

Why were some of the worker-students in the university dissatisfied with the university and Party administrations? It happened in this way: Prior to 1928, intellectuals had made up a majority of the student body at Sun Yat-sen University. During 1928, however, the number of students with worker and peasant backgrounds increased rapidly and suddenly. And the university administration was hard pressed to shift its educational machinery—which was primarily geared to the education of intellectuals—to the education of generally illiterate workers and peasants. Many new faculty members and courses had to be added. A course in the Chinese language, for example, was added to try to bring literacy to the illiterate students. Also, instead of studying Marxism-Leninism as we had studied it, a course called “The Common Sense of Politics” had to be introduced for these newcomers, who simply could not cope with more sophisticated matters. Although the university was quite willing to provide courses that the newcomers needed, the administration also regarded its task of converting such students into polished proletarian leaders as an altogether impossible one. Consequently, the university pressed ahead as energetically as ever with intensive education of the intellectuals, especially in advanced areas of theoretical and technical work. It was this dichotomy in educational approach that led to the charge of discrimination by some of the
worker and peasant students. Although they had been given prominent positions in Party and student organizations at the university, many posts still were held by intellectuals, such as those of vice-rector, deputy director of the Academic Affairs department, research associates in many of the seminars, translators, and so forth, for such positions were beyond the capacity of people who had no education at all. This state of affairs was, in a way, a manifestation of the difference between physical and intellectual labor which Marx had indicated would vanish only in the final development of a Communist society. The university, in truth, should not have been blamed for discrimination. Yet Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and others, to accomplish their own political ends, instigated worker and peasant students to make such charges as a way of attacking the university administration, Mif, and Mif’s Chinese supporters in the university.

The Second Line coalition, then, consisted of the initial group of the Second Line, the remnants of the former Academic Affairs faction, the “Vanguardists” among CYC members, the Worker Opposition faction, and the Trotskyites.

**WHO WERE THE 28 BOLSHEVIKS?**

Against the powerful Second Line coalition, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks took a firm stand. They were supported by students who supported the leadership of the bureau of the Party branch and of the university. The 28 Bolsheviks were united more by their ideological position than by any formal organization. Nor did they need a separate organization of their own, for they controlled the bureau of the Party branch, and the Russian authorities supported them. The group, moreover, had no recognized leader. Most of them had good academic records and were efficient and active in Party, academic, and administrative affairs at Sun Yat-sen University. Their good command of the Russian language gave them extensive contacts with Russians both within the university and outside it, and caused the Russians in general to be favorably impressed by them. Nevertheless, except for Ch’en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), whom Mif had long regarded highly, none of the 28 Bolsheviks were members of a special elect group specifically selected by Mif until this struggle had begun. Mif did not create the 28 Bolsheviks. But because of their outstanding performance
in the struggle in Sun Yat-sen University, they came to Mif's attention as a disciplined force which could be useful to him. For these twenty-eight people became the enemy of all "anti-Party" factions in Sun Yat-sen University. They were, as a result, dubbed the 28 Bolsheviks, which implied that they were merely the tag-ends of the Russian Bolsheviks.

Much nonsense has been written about who the 28 Bolsheviks were. It was either my good fortune or my bad fortune to have been at Sun Yat-sen University at the time that the 28 Bolsheviks appeared, and to have been one of them, and so far as I am concerned, the list below is a definitive identification of the 28 Bolsheviks. But first it might be noted that the name 28 Bolsheviks was provided by "Oppositionists," and that there was some arbitrariness and flexibility as to which individuals were lumped together in the group. Thus, to one Oppositionist, perhaps, the people constituting the 28 Bolsheviks might conceivably be a bit different from those named by another Oppositionist. Nevertheless, the list below, I believe, is the valid identification of the 28 Bolsheviks. I have given the names in alphabetical order.

Chang Ch'ìn-ch'iu (Mme. Shen Tse-min), Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu or Szu Mei), Ch'ên Ch'ang-hao, Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), Ch'ên Yuan-tao, Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Chu Ah-ken, Chu Tzu-shun (a woman), Ho K'e-ch'uan (K'ai Feng), Ho Tzu-shu, Hsia Hsi, Hsiao T'e-fu, Li Chou-sheng, Li Yuan-chieh, Meng Ch'in-shu (Mme. Ch'ên Shao-yu), Shen Tse-min, Sheng Chung-liang (the author, Sheng Yueh), Sun Chi-min, Sung P'an-min, Tu Tso-hsiang (Mme. Ch'ên Ch'ang-hao), Wang Chia-hsiang, Wang Pao-li, Wang Sheng-ti, Wang Sheng-yung, Wang Yun-ch'eng, Yang Shang-k'u'en, Yin Chien, and Yuan Chia-yung.

I shall give biographical sketches of the above persons later. At this point, I shall present some general data about the twenty-eight.

1. Only five of them had working-class backgrounds: one from Shanghai, three from Wuhan, and one from Nanking. The others were intellectuals.

2. A majority of them were CCP members; perhaps three to five were members of the CYC only. It seems to me now that all of them were either CCP or CYC members.

3. There were four women in the group, and they constituted...
roughly 5 percent of the approximately eighty women students then
at the university.

4. Eight of the 28 Bolsheviks came from Hupeh Province, the
largest number of persons from any one province. Five came from
Anhwei Province, four came from Hunan, four from Szechuan, one
from Kiangsi, and six from Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces.

5. All of the 28 Bolsheviks came from the Yangtze River valley.

6. Of the 28 Bolsheviks, about twenty had received higher educa-
tions and were fluent in one or two foreign languages such as Russian,
English, French, or German.

7. One of them—Hsia Hsi—was a member of the CC of the CCP
before he returned to China, and ten—Ch’en Shao-yu, Ch’in Pang-hsien, Ho K’e-ch’uan, Shen Tse-min, Li Chou-sheng,
Sheng Chung-liang, Wang Chia-hsiang, Wang Yun-ch’eng, and Yang
Shang-k’uen—were elected members or alternate members of the CC
of the CCP at one time or another after their return to China, three of
them—Ch’en Shao-yu, Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Chang Wen-t’ien—bec-
coming secretaries general of the CCP. Two became in succession
chairmen of the Shanghai bureau of the CC of the CCP—Li Chou-
sheng and Sheng Chung-liang. Four—Ch’in Pang-hsien, Wang Yun-
ch’eng, Sun Chi-min, and Ho K’e-ch’uan—became members of the
CC of the CYC, two of them—Ch’in Pang-hsien and Wang Yun-ch’eng
—becoming secretaries general of the CYC. The rest of the 28
Bolsheviks became Party leaders at the provincial level or became
Front Army political commissars.

8. Among the 28 Bolsheviks, four died of illnesses or in plane
crashes. Three were captured by the KMT and executed. Eleven were
captured by the KMT and left the Communist Party. Of these eleven,
three were subsequently captured by the Chinese Communists when
the Communists came to national power in China, and were executed.
Of the rest of the eleven, seven stayed in mainland China when the
Communists came to power there, and I know nothing about how
they have fared except that indications are that Ch’en Shao-yu now
lives in the USSR. I, too, have settled abroad. Seven of the 28 Bolsheviks
remained in the CCP, four of them in the CC, prior to the advent of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But either prior to the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution or during it, these four all fell into disgrace with Mao Tse-tung.

THE TEN-DAY PARTY MEETING AND CHANG KUO-T’AO

The 28 Bolsheviks were born and grew up in the political struggle in Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Although they and their supporters engaged in a fierce fight with the Second Line coalition, the coalition elements greatly outnumbered them. Nevertheless, they pressed for a showdown with the Second Line coalition in the early part of the summer of 1929. As part of their “win a quick victory” strategy they made a series of proposals to the bureau of the Party branch, all of which were accepted. They proposed that a general Party meeting in Sun Yat-sen University be convened to carry out a comprehensive debate on the pertinent issues. They also proposed that Finkovski, secretary of the CPSU committee of the district in which Sun Yat-sen University was located, address the meeting. They proposed, furthermore, that the Chinese delegates to the Comintern attend the meeting so that they could be exposed to public criticism in an effort to stop their behind-the-scenes activities—a strategy of “drawing them out and then beating them.” While Finkovski accepted the invitation with pleasure, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai politely refused the invitation, and Chang Kuo-t’ao came in his stead as representative of the Chinese Comintern delegation. The 28 Bolsheviks were disappointed by the absence of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, who was known to the Russians as Comrade Strakhov, for he constituted their principal target for attack. Clearly, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai declined the invitation so as to avoid a direct confrontation with the 28 Bolsheviks at Sun Yat-sen University. Most likely, he did not wish to openly wager his prestige on what was, after all, a lost cause, for the weight of both the Comintern and the CPSU lay behind the 28 Bolsheviks.

The meeting convened. Chang Kuo-t’ao was elected to its presidium, and the 28 Bolsheviks were among those who voted to put him there, where he could be publicly gotten at. Chang Kuo-t’ao then presided at the first session of the meeting, the chairmanship of the presidium rotating with each session. Finkovski was the main speaker, which was to our liking. For, as mentioned, Finkovski was secretary of the CPSU committee of the Moscow district in which the university
was located, one of twenty-six administrative districts in Moscow. This district was well known as a district of culture, rather than as a working-class district. Many important academic institutions such as the Marx-Engels Communist Academy of Science, the Military Academy, and KUTV were located in this district. Comintern headquarters, which was near the university, was in this district, too. Thus it was a district of senior intellectuals and veteran political figures, and its particular characteristics called for great sophistication and skill on the part of the CPSU secretary who presided over it. The CC of the CPSU, in fact, sought to insure that especially capable men filled the post. Finkovski, for example, was an old Bolshevik who was well educated. He was a beguiling and imposing orator and a well-known trouble-shooter. His appearance at the meeting, and the fact that he planned to speak, was a threat which the Second Line coalition and its behind-the-scenes supporters had to reckon with seriously. To their surprise, however, while Finkovski in his speech vigorously defended the political line of the bureau of the Party branch at Sun Yat-sen University, he delivered himself only of gentle criticism of the Second Line coalition, apparently in the hope that he might win some of them over to the side of the bureau of the Party branch. Indeed, his arguments were so persuasive that the leaders of the Second Line coalition apparently began to feel that if they did not silence him by violence right away, it might be impossible to prevent him from winning over the audience. In any case, when Finkovski was only about half way through his speech, from all over the auditorium there arose raucous shouts, catcalls, booing, and the thunderous noise of stamping feet. Students shook their fists at him. They completely disrupted the meeting. It became impossible to accomplish anything productive. The chaos reached a climax when two students of working-class origin leapt onto the rostrum and tried to drag Finkovski away. Naturally, such unprecedented behavior infuriated the 28 Bolsheviks and all of the others who opposed the Second Line coalition. They demanded that the presidium do whatever was necessary to stop such disruptive activities and to keep the Party meeting going. Chang Kuo-t’ao was on the horns of a dilemma. As chairman of the presidium of that session, it was his responsibility to maintain order. But by doing so, it would be easy for him to slide into a position that would be undesirable both for
himself and for the coalition. Yet if he allowed the chaos to continue, he would lay himself open to a frontal attack by the 28 Bolsheviks and he would fall into utter disgrace with the Russians. Whatever he may have been thinking, he had no choice but to function as presidium chairman and as the representative of the Chinese Comintern delegation on the side of order. And so, presently he stood up, and in a loud voice urged the audience to be orderly. The disturbance continued, however, and his appeal was ignored. In a still louder voice he repeatedly pleaded with the audience to listen to him. At last, the coalition elements, who must have realized that if they thwarted Chang Kuo-t'ao altogether they would force him into bitterly opposing them, quieted down. Chang then appealed to the audience to maintain order and to listen carefully to what Finkovski had to say. Everyone, Chang said, had the right to agree or disagree with Finkovski, but they must not take the floor to express their views until Comrade Finkovski had finished speaking. He admonished them to submit to the regulations governing a Party meeting and to behave like Communists. Nothing he said went beyond points of parliamentary procedure; he did not touch upon the substance of the dispute. Quite naturally, it would not have been proper for him to speak right out at the start, nor would it have been proper for him to involve himself openly in the dispute at the meeting. Surely, too, he must have been aware that he would lay himself open to a concerted attack from the 28 Bolsheviks if he favored the side of the Second Line coalition at the meeting. We were ready to attack anyone who did so. And he must have learned a good deal about the political situation at the university from his brother, Chang Kuo-shu, then a student there, who deeply sympathized with the Second Line coalition.

During his stay in Moscow as a delegate to the Comintern after the Sixth National CCP Congress in 1928, Chang Kuo-t'ao acquired the alias Chang Piao. He was best known among the Russians as Comrade Chang Piao. At the meeting, while he was calling for order, two Russians moved close to me and asked me what song Comrade Chang Piao was singing. To the Russians, his way of chanting over and over again in Chinese, "Comrades, listen to me," sounded like some sort of musical rendition. I assured them that Chang was not singing, but speaking. They made some mocking remarks about his performance,
and then asked me to interpret what he was saying. Later I learned that those two Russians were staff members of the Chinese section of the Far East Secretariat of the Comintern.

The meeting lasted for ten consecutive days. I cannot now recall whether or not Chang Kuo-t’ao, after his bitter experience that first day, attended the rest of the sessions.

The wall newspaper at the university, which was an organ of the bureau of the Party branch and which I edited at the time, played an important role in the fight against the Second Line coalition. The paper gave a day-by-day account of the meetings and analyses of the debates, and it provided readers with directions as to what they ought to do at the meetings.

This ten-day meeting was the most dramatic event in the political struggles that occurred at Sun Yat-sen University. It was ten days of wild storms, chaos, and purposeful disruption, which considerably surpassed the raucous tenor of the seven-day meeting held at the university in 1927, which started out as a routine meeting on university affairs but which was converted into a forum for the heated debate of political issues. At the ten-day meeting, all “anti-Party” factions in the university attacked the 28 Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the 28 Bolsheviks survived these furious attacks by their mastery of Marxist-Leninist tactics and by their devotion to the Comintern line. They succeeded in stripping naked the Second Line coalition, even though the coalition was far from having been completely defeated at the meeting. Relying on the support of a great many students at the university and the encouragement of the Chinese Comintern delegation, the coalition fought on after the meeting closed as stubbornly as ever. The struggle continued into the events of the CPSU purge, which soon engulfed the Soviet Union. Thus the struggle against the Second Line coalition became entangled with the CPSU purge, which began in the autumn of 1929.

**THE 28 BOLSHEVIKS AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST DELEGATION**

Since the 28 Bolsheviks failed to lure Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and the rest of the Chinese Comintern delegation to the meeting, they promptly planned another battle against Ch’u and the delegation as a whole. Defeat of the delegation, they were convinced, was a prerequisite for
defeating the Second Line coalition. Let me briefly recount this development.

The so-called Worker Opposition faction within the Second Line coalition could not find sympathetic ears among the Russians. Thus, they pleaded their case with the Chinese Comintern delegation, to which they presented their grievances. They detailed the injustices perpetrated against them by the university administration and by the 28 Bolsheviks, and they said that the 28 Bolsheviks, under the wing of the Russians, functioned in defiance of the Chinese Comintern delegation, which, of course, was a fact. This latter charge apparently struck an especially sensitive spot in Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and the rest of the Chinese Comintern delegation. For with the university under Mif’s rectorship, the Chinese delegation in truth had little to say in the university nor was it consulted or advised about university affairs. The university was completely under the control of the Russians, a state of affairs which the Chinese delegation found odious, to say the least.

Mif was a fast-rising young Communist who had little regard for the Chinese delegation. Although, for the sake of appearances, he did confer with Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and the others on CCP matters, it was not difficult to see that he was only half-hearted in his attitude toward such conferences. Often he held to positions that were radically different from those of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and others on the Chinese delegation. Generally Mif heeded the opinions of men he regarded as Chinese experts, such as Volin and his favorite aid, Ch’en Shao-yu, rather than to those of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai. Mif’s attitude toward Ch’u Ch’iu-pai, coming on the heels of Ch’u’s demotion at the Sixth CCP Congress from secretary general of the CCP to a mere delegate to the Comintern, intensified Ch’u’s feelings of humiliation. The conflict between Mif and Ch’u grew progressively worse.

From the very beginning of the struggle against the Second Line in the university in 1928, Ch’u and other Chinese Comintern delegates seemed to feel that the time had come to revenge themselves against Mif’s slights. They thus encouraged the Second Line coalition in its attacks on Mif. In fact, the behavior of this delegation provoked hostility among the 28 Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, for tactical reasons, the 28 Bolsheviks refrained from direct public attacks on the delegation.
as long as the situation permitted. At the same time, though, the 28 Bolsheviks missed no opportunity to criticize them without mentioning their names. However, this restraint ended when it was learned that Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and the others were growing more aggressive. The 28 Bolsheviks began collecting evidence of their behind-the-scenes activities. At the same time we began meticulously scrutinizing their utterances since the Sixth National CCP Congress for statements that were at variance with CCP and Comintern positions. There was a weekly, I think, Comintern publication which had a restricted distribution and which contained most of their statements; and we went through this publication with a fine-toothed comb. You might say that we made ideological preparations for a full-scale political offensive against Ch’u and the other members of the delegation. According to our plans, this offensive was timed to coincide with the Party purge at Sun Yat-sen University. It had become traditional in CPSU purges that a discussion of the situation in the unit involved preceded the examination of each individual Party member in that unit. Thus we decided to begin the assault on Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and the rest of the delegation during the first, general-discussion phase of the purge, since they would not come up for interrogation at Sun Yat-sen University in the subsequent stage of the purge.

The first Party-purge meeting at Sun Yat-sen University opened sometime, I think, in October, 1929. Guests from the Comintern, the CC of the CPSU, the district committee of the CPSU, and others attended the meeting. After a brief speech outlining the procedure of the purge by General Pavel Ivanovich Berzin,* chairman of the Party-purge committee assigned to Sun Yat-sen University and an old Bolshevik, who at the time, I believe, was chief of intelligence for the Red Army General Staff, I took the floor to deliver my second major speech in Moscow. I openly accused Ch’u Ch’iu-pai and his co-workers of being guilty of opportunism. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai was guilty of leftist opportunism, I said, and Chang Kuo-t’ao of rightist opportunism. I accused them all of having fostered the “anti-Party, Second Line coalition” at the

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* Berzin’s real name was Jan Karlovich Berzin. At the age of fifteen he had joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1905, following the events in February. During the October Revolution, he had guarded the Smolny and Lenin’s person, and Felix Dzerzhinsky had appointed him deputy chief of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army General Staff in 1921, and then named him chief of the department. (See New Times, Moscow, 1969, no. 41, pp. 23-24.)
university. To give weight to my charges, I produced a great array of quotations from their speeches and articles, and gave abundant evidence of their behind-the-scene activities. I spoke in Chinese, without having to pause for my words to be interpreted into Russian, for Wang Chia-hsiang and another Chinese, whose name I have forgotten, provided a simultaneous translation in tandem fashion. Speeches were limited to five minutes, but I talked for about forty-five minutes, with Berzin’s permission.

My speech elicited varying reactions from the audience. There was clamorous applause from those loyal to the 28 Bolsheviks and angry shouts and catcalls from the students who belonged to the Second Line coalition. All Russians at the meeting, including the representatives of the Comintern and of the CC of the CPSU, applauded approvingly. It would, of course, have been more appropriate for the Russians to have maintained a show of neutrality. As it was, their applause clearly signaled their stand against the Chinese Comintern delegation. Because of my open attack and the numerous other open attacks of the 28 Bolsheviks that followed, relations between the Chinese Comintern delegation and the 28 Bolsheviks grew rapidly worse. The political position of Ch’u Ch‘iu-pai and his co-workers was seriously threatened. Ch’u’s younger brother, Ch’u Ching-pai, who attended Sun Yat-sen University, became so enraged that he turned back his CPSU candidate membership card to the Party’s district committee. The day he turned in his Party card, he disappeared. We did not know whether he had been arrested or, as rumor had it, whether he had committed suicide. Whatever happened to young Ch’u, it was a blow to Ch’u Ch‘iu-pai; and from that day onwards the atmosphere in which the struggle took place became graver than ever.

**INTERFERENCE OF THE CPSU AND THE CCP**

The struggle against the Second Line had brought all university activities to a standstill. Finally, the CCs of both the CPSU and the CCP were obliged to intervene. The wife of the chairman of the CPSU’s Central Control Committee, Mrs. Emelyian Mikhailovich Yaroslavsky—or Kirsanova, which was her own name—who was a member of the CC of the CPSU in her own right, was chosen to investigate the situation at Sun Yat-sen University. Her assignment
worried the 28 Bolsheviks. For she was friendly with Chou Ta-ming, Tung Yi-hsiang, and Yu Hsiu-sung, the leaders of the former Academic Affairs faction in the university who were supporters of the Second Line. She had made it abundantly clear on numerous occasions that she regarded Chou Ta-ming as a "Chinese Lenin." It seemed a strong possibility that Chou Ta-ming would be able to influence her views on the matter. Moreover, when she launched her investigation, it did indeed seem as though she was not gathering all the data that she needed to prepare an impartial report. She did not, so far as I remember, for example, consult any of the 28 Bolsheviks, although she did gather the views of some members of the Second Line coalition. We acquainted Mif with the special relationship between her and Chou Ta-ming. He used his influence with Stalin to induce Stalin to ask Mrs. Yaroslavsky not to submit a biased report. Because of Stalin's intervention, no doubt, Mrs. Yaroslavsky in the end submitted a report which temporized a good deal. She recommended that the CC of the CPSU endorse the general political line of the bureau of the Party branch at the university. At the same time, though, she criticized the bureau for numerous shortcomings in its day-to-day Party work. The CC of the CPSU accepted her recommendation and instructed her to present her findings at a general Party meeting at the university, which was held sometime early in 1930. I remember that when she reached the point in her report at which she recommended support for the general political line of the Party bureau, the 28 Bolsheviks and their supporters greeted her words with enthusiastic applause, while the members of the Second Line coalition listened with bowed heads. Her statements represented nothing less than a recognition that the Party bureau and the 28 Bolsheviks were basically correct and a condemnation of the Second Line coalition as being basically anti-Party.

The Second Line coalition and its backers, Ch' u Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao, suffered complete defeat. For shortly after the CPSU adopted its resolution endorsing the political line of the Party bureau in the university, Russian delegates to the Comintern introduced a similar resolution in the Comintern, which criticized the attitude of the Chinese Communist Comintern delegates in their struggle. This gave Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks an additional victory, while Ch' u Ch'iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t'ao were completely routed. Although Mif
advised the 28 Bolsheviks of this Comintern resolution, few of us had a chance to actually see the document.

After the CC of the CPSU and the Comintern adopted the resolution, the CCP recognized the gravity of the situation. It sent a special envoy, Chou En-lai, to Moscow in the spring of 1930 to resolve the conflict. Chou En-lai, representing the CCP, formally accepted the judgments in the CPSU and Comintern resolutions, and he reorganized the Chinese delegation to the Comintern. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chang Kuot'ao, Teng Chung-hsia, and Yu Fei, one after another, returned to China within a year or so.8

The 28 Bolsheviks emerged victorious from this fray. In this struggle against the Second Line coalition, they laid the foundations for their future struggle for the leadership of the entire CCP.

Notes

1. It was the practice at Sun Yat-sen University to hold a concluding conference at the end of each semester to appraise the successes and deficiencies of the semester's work. Initially both faculty and students were supposed to attend and present their views. But after 1927 students were excluded from the concluding conferences, for their presence had made the conferences unwieldy.


3. Hsi-men Tsung-hua was a student in the first graduating class of Sun Yat-sen University. After he graduated in 1927, he remained at the university as a translator until 1929. Sometime in 1929, as I recall, he was sent back to China. He arrived in Shanghai, where he did not report to the CYC center there. Instead, he went immediately to Nanking, where he turned himself over to the authorities of the Nationalist government and renounced his CYC membership. Shortly afterwards he joined the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist government. In 1940 he was appointed an attaché to the Chinese embassy in Moscow. Presently he was recalled to Nanking. Two or three years later he was designated Chinese Consul General of Khabarovsk. But the Russians refused to accept this appointment, taking the unusual diplomatic position that he was unacceptable for reasons of "personal character." Soon after that he resigned from the Foreign Ministry and accepted a teaching position in the American-sponsored Chinling University at Nanking. He is the author of numerous books on the USSR. Toward the end of 1948 he was one of the ten professors who signed the famous joint declaration urging peace talks between the Nationalists and Communists. So far as I know, he remained in mainland China when the Communists came to power, and I have heard nothing about him since.

Kao Ch'en-lich and Lin Ch'i-t'o both were overseas Chinese from the Philippines. Kao was well known among Chinese in the Philippines, I understand, as the publisher and editor of a Chinese-language newspaper in Manila.

4. By one of those singular occurrences, Ch'ing Man-yun (see note 5 of chapter 14) who recalls leaving Moscow for China by train in October, 1928, discovered during the first train stop at which passengers got off to buy food that among the fellow passengers were Kao Ch'en-lich, Lin Ch'i-t'o, and others who made up the group being sent to Siberia, many of whom were old friends. She and some Chinese with her, none of whom had any idea of the plight of Kao and his group, naturally began talking to them. But a Russian who was escorting Kao and the others walked up and bluntly ordered Ch'ing and those who were with her not to talk to the others, and so they moved apart. But at the next stop, when they all got off for a meal, Ch'ing Man-yun was able to talk to them. Kao and others with him told her that they were being sent to Altai, on the USSR-Sinkiang border, to work in the gold mines there. They got off the train either at Omsk or at Novosibirsk to proceed to their destination by a southward train, then by bus, and finally by dog sled, facts which I
learned years later when I met several of them back in China. Among those in the group with Kao Ch’ên-lieh, whom Ch’ing Man-yun now recalls, were Yen Yu-chen, Wang Yu-chih, Hsiang Yu-mei, Lin Ch’i-t’o, and Ch’iu Tung-wan (Lin Ch’i-t’o’s wife, who was an old friend of Ch’ing Man-yun’s and who came from Tsinan in Shantung Province, as did Ch’ing). After they had served their specified period of hard labor at Altai, they all, I believe, were sent back to China, where I met a number of them, or to wherever they had come from in the first place. Kao and Lin were sent back to the Philippines. Wang Yu-chih, it will be recalled, became prominent as an aid to the Nationalist General Hu Tsung-nan. He was at one time head of the Shensi provincial committee of the KMT.

5. For example, Wan Yah-kang (The Rise of Communism in China, 1920–1950 [Hong Kong: Chung Shu Publishing Co., n.d.], p. 23) states: "Among this group of new men there were the so-called Twenty-eight ‘model Bolsheviks,’ including Liu Shao-ch’i, Wang Chia-hsing, Chang Wen-t’ien, Ch’en Yun, Jen Pi-shih [sic], Ch’in Pang-hsien, Li Fu-ch’un, and Chao Yun." Five of the eight names he gives were not among the 28 Bolsheviks. Liu Shao-ch’i, Jen Pi-shih, Li Fu-ch’un, Ch’en Yun, and Chao Yun did not study at Sun Yat-sen University and, of course, could therefore not have been among the 28 Bolsheviks. None of them was even in the USSR at the time of the struggle in Sun Yat-sen University out of which the 28 Bolsheviks emerged.

6. I never did learn what happened to Ch’u Ch’ing-pai.

7. It had become common practice for the Russian Comintern delegation to seek and get Comintern endorsement of all CPSU resolutions that in any way related to Comintern activities.

8. Concerning this development, Hsiao Tso-liang has this to say: “Interviewed in Hong Kong in late October, 1959, Chang Kuo-t’ao disclosed the background of this factional struggle like this: Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t’ao, as noted previously, objected to the educational policy of Pavel Mif as president of Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Consequently, there was no love lost between them and the Russian. The party unit in the university was then under Pavel Mif’s control. Li Chien-ju and Yu Tu-san were both workers from Shanghai and were mere tools in the power struggle. It had turned out that Mif was victorious in the tussle. Accordingly, the Comintern passed a resolution in condemnation of the Chinese delegation. Chou En-lai was called to Moscow to take over the duties of a liaison officer between the Kremlin and the Chinese party. Both Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t’ao fell into disgrace" (Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934: A Study of Documents [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961], pp. 144-145).
Chapter XVI
The 28 Bolsheviks and Their Struggle Against the Li Li-san Line

During the one and one-half years from the Sixth National Party Congress in 1928 to January, 1930, the CCP, in accordance with the resolutions passed at the congress and with instructions from the Comintern, reasserted itself. It not only patched up the wounds that the Party suffered as a result of the failure of the revolution in the period 1925 to 1927, but also made real progress toward Party consolidation. For instance, its membership rose probably to at least 65,528 in January, 1930, possibly to 120,000. Compared with the total membership of some 57,900 at the Fifth National Party Congress in April, 1927, the increase in membership was impressive and important. It is to be noted that before the Fifth National Party Congress—from 1924 to April, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek initiated his anti-Communist purge, or coup, in Shanghai—the Communists had enjoyed freedom of political activities in KMT-controlled areas. Even after Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist coup d'état in Shanghai, the Communist Party still had some freedom in the areas under the control of the Wuhan government. But as soon as the leftists of the KMT in the Wuhan cities rose against the Communists in June and July, 1927, the Chinese Communists were forced to carry on their activities underground throughout the country. Under the “White terror,” many Communists were brutally slaughtered. Many members withdrew from the Party in view of the danger that threatened them. Moreover, after the August 7 Conference in 1927, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s putschism made matters worse and martyred many Party members. The organization of the Communist Party and its membership thus suffered many severe blows in succession. Probably at the time of the Sixth National Party Congress its membership was less than half the 57,900 at the time of the Fifth Congress. Thus a great majority of the 65,528 Party members in early 1930 were newly recruited. Under the conditions of “White terror” and “underground activities,” it was no easy matter for the Party’s organizational structure merely to survive. It is therefore
truly remarkable that the Chinese Communists in this period were able to advance despite the adverse situation.

But good things don’t last. The Party regeneration was seriously handicapped by unstable leadership, and the CCP, like a convalescent, suffered a relapse. From the Sixth CCP Congress until his execution in June, 1931, the Party’s leader was a rustic fellow, Hsiang Chung-fa, whose power was quickly assumed by a revolutionary wild man, Li Li-san. When the situation became more favorable to the Chinese Communists in the summer of 1930, Li Li-san began to put into practice his madly adventurous revolutionary plan.

Explaining the reasons for the formation of the Li Li-san line, Huang Ho, a Chinese Communist historian said the following:

The Red Army and the revolutionary bases had brought about some constructive developments in the KMT-controlled areas, the Party organization work had been restored to a certain extent, especially in May of 1930, when the large-scale outbreak of civil war between Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Hsi-shan, and Feng Yu-hsiang presented a situation highly favorable to revolutionary development. The “Left” radicalist remnant in the Party burst out again. The Party’s Central Politburo under the direction of Comrade Li Li-san passed a resolution on June 11, the leftist “New Revolutionary Rising Tide and Preliminary Successes in One or More Provinces.” From then on, the Left line reigned over the Party center’s leading organizations.8

Mif considered that “Li Li-san’s policy was based on the assumption that the Chinese and world revolution would soon break out. Exaggerating the maturity of the revolutionary situation throughout China, he led the Party to organize insurrection everywhere, including the principal centers of the country, which turned out to be mere putschist actions.” He strongly opposed the Li Li-san line and regarded it as running counter to the line of the Comintern. He listed the main points of the Li Li-san line as follows:

Li Li-san completely ignored the everyday struggle of the workers and peasants. He dissolved the Red trade unions on the ground that they were superfluous during an insurrection. He strove to liquidate the partisan movement on the ground that guerilla warfare had become obsolete. He instructed the leaders in the Soviet districts to organize state farms and collective farms, and to prohibit free trade and the buying and selling of land. All these measures served to complicate the economic and political situation in the Soviet regions.5

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Li Li-san’s putschism has been labeled “the second ‘Left’ line” by CCP historians, whereas Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s is labeled the “first ‘Left’ line.” According to Mif, Li’s blind revolt was far more serious than Ch’u’s. Perhaps in jest, it could be said that Li’s revolutionary mania combined explosively with his native Hunan ruffianism, while Ch’u’s Kiangsu scholarly gentility contributed to his behavior. But it is to be noted that when Ch’u assumed leadership, the Party had just suffered a fatal blow. His efforts for survival in a distressing situation were desperate. But when Li rose to power in the summer of 1930, the situation was quite favorable to the CCP, which then possessed considerable armed forces in the Soviet districts and well-functioning Party organizations in the cities. Besides, internal strife within the KMT at the time also presented a favorable opportunity for the Communists. But Li Li-san’s putschism seriously impaired the Party’s growth and, indeed, destroyed much of what the Party had painstakingly built.

One KMT intelligence source describes the situation thus:

Under the direction of the Li Li-san line, the entire efforts of which went into engaging in military radicalism and opportunistic activities, many party organizations outside of the Soviet districts were totally shattered. The Communist organization in Shanghai, which had been quite solid, consisting of eight district committees—Central, Western, and Eastern Shanghai, Cha-pei, the French Concession, Pu-tung, Wu-sung, and the waterfront—had a membership of some three thousand at the beginning of the reign of the Li Li-san line. But as an outcome of Li Li-san’s leadership . . . the Shanghai organization was almost entirely destroyed, with seven of the eight districts eliminated. The Party members dropped from 3,000 to 700. All the mass organizations under the control of the CCP were destroyed. . . . The situation in other places was similar to that in Shanghai. 6

Chinese Communist historians treat the Li Li-san line as an ill-fated star for Chinese communism. For instance, Ho Kan-chih says, “The reign of Li Li-san’s line in the Party was short-lived, lasting only from June to September 1930. Since the Party and the revolutionary forces invariably suffered losses wherever the line was put into practice, great numbers of Party members demanded its rectification.” 7

The call to severely reprimand Li Li-san rose higher and higher among the Chinese Communists. Far away in Moscow the Comintern had noticed the serious situation in the CCP. Upon learning of the resolution entitled “The New Revolutionary Rising Tide and Pre-
liminary Successes in One or More Provinces,” passed by the CCP Central Politburo on June 11, 1930, and the upheaval in the Party caused by the strict implementation of the resolution by the Li Li-san leadership, the ECCI passed a resolution on July 23, 1930, which aimed at rectifying the drastic undertakings of the Li Li-san line. To implement this ECCI resolution, Ch’u Ch’iu-pai was sent back to China, where he convened the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC; but Ch’u failed to carry out his mission.

The so-called 28 Bolsheviks returned to China separately between 1929 and 1932. Those who returned in the summer of 1930 constituted the main force of the 28 Bolsheviks, and they made Shanghai their headquarters. At the time of their return, Li Li-san was in control of the CC of the CCP and had just seen to it that the June 11, 1930, “Left” putschist resolution was passed by the Central Politburo. The 28 Bolsheviks, as supporters of the policy of the Comintern, began to attack the Li Li-san line. Armed with Marxist-Leninist arguments and supported by the Comintern, they constituted a fatal threat to the reign of Li Li-san.8

But the attack by the 28 Bolsheviks on the Li Li-san line did not always enjoy smooth sailing:

In a meeting of staff members of the Central Committee held in late June or early July, 1930, Ch’en Shao-yü and others, who had just returned from Moscow, objected to the June 11 Politburo resolution. As a result, Ch’en Shao-yü was placed on probation as a party member for six months and Ch’in Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-ch’iang, and Ho Tzu-shu were reprimanded most severely.9

However, they were not discouraged by the punishment that the Party inflicted on them. On the contrary, the resolution concerning the China question passed by the ECCI on July 23, 1930, which censured the Li Li-san line, was no doubt a clear support for them. Greatly encouraged, they renewed their unrestrained attacks on the Li Li-san line. The Comintern sent Ch’u Ch’iu-pai back to China in, apparently, July or August, 1930; and the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC, which he called, convened in September, 1930. Chou En-lai also returned to China from Moscow to assist Ch’u in rooting out the Li Li-san line. But the Third Plenum did not accomplish its intended purpose because of Ch’u Ch’iu-pai’s compromising attitude towards the Li Li-san line. One may wonder why Ch’u did not carry out the
mission that the Comintern gave him. According to his own statement of repentance he admitted that his compromising attitude at the plenum was not without cause.\textsuperscript{10}

Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai admitted that his compromising position was not accidental but that it dated back before the Sixth National Congress of 1928. From his adventures in 1927 through the Third Plenum in 1930, he stated, he had shared many basic ideas about the Chinese revolution with Li Li-san. . . . In consequence, he admitted that he made the mistake of confusing Li Li-san’s policies with the Moscow line despite the fact that he took part in the discussion of the Comintern directive of July 23, 1930, before it was adopted.\textsuperscript{11}

It seems apparent that although Ch’u was severely criticized for his putschism at the Chinese Communists’ Sixth National Congress and was relieved of his position as secretary general, he did not give up his putschism. It thus appears quite natural that he should adopt a compromising attitude toward the Li Li-san line, which favored putschism. Furthermore, “Ch’ü confessed that his conception of intraparty factional conflicts was also absolutely wrong. During his stay in Moscow as representative of the CCP, he admitted, he not only failed to help the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to eliminate the quarrels among the Chinese Communists in Moscow, but became involved in the quarrels himself.”\textsuperscript{12} Ch’u was defeated in the factional struggle within the Party at Sun Yat-sen University and in his power struggle with Mif. His hatred of Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks was thus understandable. Therefore at the Third Plenum, he tried to compromise with the Li Li-san faction, on the one hand, and attempted to win the Party veterans to his side in order to prevent the 28 Bolsheviks from securing the leadership of the CCP, on the other. Doubtlessly this was his retaliation against Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks. It also reveals the fact that the factional struggle within the Party at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow exerted a deep-rooted influence on the CCP.

The Third Plenum in essence was a failure. And Ch’u Ch’iu-pai again became the target of attacks from the 28 Bolsheviks. They also criticized the resolution passed at the plenum. A Chinese Communist historian has some pertinent comments on the plenum:

Thus in putting an end to the above-mentioned mistakes of the Li Li-san line, the Third Plenum achieved some positive results. . . . But since the Third Plenum and the Central Committee did not undertake to thoroughly criticize the Li Li-san
line, so at the session and for a time after it, the mistake of sectarianism con­
tinued in the Party and "Left" ideas and policies still found frequent expression.13

The compromising attitude toward the Li Li-san line at the Third Plenum outraged many CCP members and sped up the formation of a strong opposing force with the 28 Bolsheviks in the lead. Their heroic bravery won Mif's unreserved tribute:

A fight against Li Li-san's semi-Trotskyist policy was started in the Shanghai section of the Party under the leadership of Ch'en Shao-yu. The fight for a correct line was quite successful. Gathering the best forces of the Party around himself, Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), one of the most prominent and gifted leaders of the Communist movement in China, together with other leading members of the Party such as Comrades Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang, Ho Tzu-shu, Shen Tse-min and Ch'en Yuan-tao, fighting on two fronts, succeeded in securing the recognition of the correct Leninist-Stalinist line on questions con­cerning the Chinese revolution.14

The "best forces of the Party" glorified by Mif all belonged to the so-called 28 Bolsheviks. While the struggle against the Li Li-san line and the compromising policy of the Third Plenum was reaching its zenith in the CCP, the ECCI wrote a 7000-word-long letter to the CC of the CCP, in which it reiterated that the Li Li-san line in essence was totally in opposition to the policy of the Comintern. The letter reached the CC of the CCP in Shanghai on November 16, 1930.15 The letter virtually vetoed the decisions of the Third Plenum, which pro­claimed that Li Li-san did not err in line but in tactics. Moreover, the letter strengthened the political status of the 28 Bolsheviks in the CCP. In addition to accepting the instructions from the Comintern at an enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo held on November 22, 1930, the Central Politburo also passed a resolution rescinding the punishment of Ch'en Shao-yu, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Ho Tzu-shu.16 This resolution cleared the way for the 28 Bolsheviks to establish their leadership of the CC of the CCP. Even before the passage of the resolution, they had defeated Li Li-san, who was summoned back to Moscow for instructions. Now the position of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Chou En-lai, and others was weakened. This was particularly true in the case of Ch'u, whose efforts to get control of the CC of the CCP proved to be a complete failure. But this situation helped to inflame the ambition entertained by the faction of Ho Meng-hsiung and Lo Chang-lung
to control the CC. So a new power struggle between this faction and the 28 Bolsheviks or "The Returned Student Clique" grew sharp. Under the direction of Mif, who by then was in Shanghai, the so-called anti-"Right"-opportunist movement against Ho Meng-hsiung and Lo Chang-lung and against the remnants of the Li Li-san line began almost at the same time.

To secure a CCP completely loyal to the Comintern, the Comintern dispatched Mif to China as its representative in November or December, 1930. Mif carried an important mission to China: to reorganize the CC of the CCP by introducing the 28 Bolsheviks into it and thus to expedite the "Bolshevization" of the CCP. In other words, his mission was to put the Chinese Communists under the absolute control of the Russian Communists. However, there are varying versions as to the approximate date of Mif's arrival in China and the return of the 28 Bolsheviks to China. For example, Benjamin I. Schwartz says, "Thus we find out when Mif was appointed Comintern Delegate to China in the spring of 1930, his young protégés accompanied him back to China." But Hsiao Tso-liang reports that Chang Kuo-t'ao told him in an interview: "He [Pavel Mif] arrived in China as Comintern delegate probably in June, 1930, and went back to Russia toward the end of 1930 or early in 1931... Mif brought with him to China a group of young students centering around Ch'en Shao-yu." There is another version claiming that Mif arrived in China in November, 1930, after the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC, which was held in September of that year. In this connection Hsiao Tso-liang states, again according to the interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao:

Chou En-lai was sent by the CCP to Moscow in the spring of 1930 at the behest of Pavel Mif, chief of the Chinese Section, Eastern Department, Communist International. After his arrival in Moscow, Chou En-lai took over practically all the business of the Chinese delegation in Moscow, conducting negotiations on behalf of the CCP at the bidding of Mif. Both Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai and Chang Kuo-t’ao were kept in the background by the Comintern on account of their hostility to Mif, which came to the fore in what was known as the Sun Yat-sen University case, in which they attacked the educational policy of Mif as president of that university and thus were punished.

My own experience in these matters was this: From the spring of 1930 until August, when I went to the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk area,
I remained in Moscow. I was assigned at this time to help with the translation and evaluation of all documents sent by the CCP to the Comintern, the job Ch’en Shao-yu had held prior to his departure for China. I translated documents and then prepared brief analytical summaries of them for use by the Comintern. In this position, I saw Mif once or twice each week in his Comintern office. He was then talking with Chou En-lai about a settlement of the Sun Yat-sen University case. Thus I know that Mif remained in Moscow at least through August, 1930. Ch’u Ch’iu-pai left Russia for China some time after the resolution on the China question was passed by the ECCI on July 23, 1930. For Ch’u returned to China to implement the July 23, 1930, resolution, and he attended the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC of the CCP in September. It seems altogether unlikely, then, that Mif and Ch’u Ch’iu-pai went to China at the same time. For it would have been almost impossible for Mif to have reached China in time to attend the Third Plenum of the CC of the CCP which Ch’u attended. Furthermore, Mif and Ch’u Ch’iu-pai were practically at war with one another, and it seems improbable that they would have been sent to China together merely to transfer their battle ground from Moscow to Shanghai. At the same time, it seems improbable that the Comintern would have sent Ch’u to China unless it trusted him to carry out his mission. It is more likely that when Ch’u failed in his mission at the Plenum of the Sixth CC in September, 1930, his old antagonist Mif went to China to rectify the situation, probably arriving in October or November or possibly later.

The next problem of concern to us here is how and when the so-called 28 Bolsheviks returned to China. Most secondary sources indicate that they all returned home with Mif in 1930. Nothing could be further from the truth.

First, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks did not return to China together. Some of them went back at the end of 1929, but their impact was not immediate. For instance, Ch’en Shao-yu went to China before Mif had been appointed Comintern delegate to China. Upon his return from Russia, moreover, Ch’en was not immediately put into an important position by the CC of the CCP. He was assigned to be a Western Shanghai correspondent for Red Flag magazine. The editor-in-chief of Red Flag then was a veteran Communist, Hsieh Chueh-
tsai, who much later became Minister of Interior in the Chinese Communist regime in Peking, a position from which he retired in the spring of 1965. Sometime between May and June, 1930, Ch'en Shao-yu was arrested while attending a mass rally in Western Shanghai. He was not recognized at the police station, where he was imprisoned as an ordinary law violator. In truth, Ch'en at that time was not important in the CCP. But Ch'en was anxious to get out of the prison. He disregarded elementary security measures and endangered his Party by writing to P'an Wen-yu, a graduate of Sun Yat-sen University, then secretary of the Propaganda Department of the CC of the CCP, for help. He bribed an Indian policeman to deliver the message to P'an. When P'an received Ch'en's letter, he was shocked. Because of Ch'en's stupidity most of the underground agencies of the Chinese Communists in Shanghai had to move to new locations, for Ch'en had sent a policeman directly to one of them. Ch'en was soon released. He then wrote to Mif, and falsely claimed that he had been beaten in prison and complained that the CC of the CCP had ignored him. Mif was furious. He wrote to the CC of the CCP before its Fourth Plenum, praising Ch'en Shao-yu for his heroism and for being the best example of a brave revolutionary, and attacking the leadership of Li Li-san for failing to give Ch'en an important position.

The above episode attests to the fact that the so-called 28 Bolsheviks did not return to China in a body with Mif, and that these returned "heroes" did not immediately rise to power upon their homecoming.

Second, the great majority of so-called 28 Bolsheviks returned to China successively in the summer of 1930. Most of them chose Shanghai as the center of their activities, including Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), Ch'in Pang-hsien, Shen Tse-min, Li Chou-sheng, Wang Chia-hsiang, Yang Shang-k'uei, Ho Tzu-shu, Yin Chien, Ch'en Shao-yu, Meng Ch'in-shu (Mme. Ch'en Shao-yu), Ch'en Yuan-tao, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Tu Tso-hsiang (Mme. Ch'en Ch'ang-hao), Wang Yun-ch'eng, Chu Ah-ken, Ho K'e-ch'uan, and Li Yuan-chieh. They were altogether seventeen in number, representing almost two-thirds of the whole group.

Third, a small number of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks came back to China in 1931 and 1932. They had been assigned to work in the Far Eastern area of Soviet Russia in the fall of 1930. This was one of the
special personnel arrangements that the Russian Communist Party made in the Far Eastern area after the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident in 1929. More than twenty students from Sun Yat-sen University, of whom I was one, were sent there to work, including the Communist veteran Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-chu), who later became a member of the CC and the Politburo of the CCP, Wu Yu-chang, Pu T'ao-ming, and Li Yao-k'uei. Four of the 28 Bolsheviks were sent there. They were Sheng Chung-liang (the name I used then), Wang Sheng-ti, Sun Chi-min, and Yuan Chia-yung. When I learned of my new appointment to Russia’s Far East, I was quite upset. I went to see Chou En-lai at the Comintern building to request that he revoke the assignment and let me go back to China. Chou told me that he could not change the assignment because, as a representative of the CC of the CCP, he had already consented in writing to all of the appointments. He advised me to obey my instructions and go to the Russian Far East. I reluctantly took his advice and in August, 1930, went to work as a member of the propaganda group of the CC of the CPSU in the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk area, where I stayed until August, 1932. Then the Comintern summoned me back to Moscow, where I stayed until I returned to China at the end of 1932.

Without question, the so-called 28 Bolsheviks were painstakingly cultivated by the Russians. The Russians’ sole purpose in doing this was to control the CCP and transform it into a party with irrevocable loyalty to Soviet Russia and the Comintern. Upon their return to China, the 28 Bolsheviks became the main force against the Li Li-san line. With assistance from the Comintern, and especially from its representative Mif, they won an overwhelming victory in the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC in January, 1931. They continued to exercise complete control over the CC until the Tsunyi Conference in January, 1935. At the Tsunyi Conference, Ch’iin Pang-hsien was relieved of his job as secretary general. However, his successor, Chang Wen-t’ien, was also one of the 28 Bolsheviks, and he served as secretary general from the time of the Tsunyi Conference until 1940.22 Chang Wen-t’ien’s election in 1935 was probably dictated primarily by expediency and compromise, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Nominally, then, the 28 Bolsheviks may have retained their power even after 1935. In fact, though, Mao Tse-tung exercised the real power in the Party
then, which made more acute a continuing power struggle between Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks.

Notes

1. Mif, *Heroic China*.
2. Wang Shih, Wang Ch’iao, Ma Ch’i-ping, and Chang Ling, *Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang shih chien pien* (A brief history of the CCP; Shanghai: Jen-min ch’u-pan she, 1958), p. 127. Possibly Mif’s figure (see note 1) covers only KMT-controlled areas, whereas the figure of Wang Shih et al. covers both KMT-controlled areas and Soviet areas.
5. Ibid.
8. See also Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, p. 182.
10. “Statement of Comrade Ch’u Ch’iu-pai,” in *Reconstruction of the Party*, no. 3 (Feb. 15, 1931), pp. 45–48. This statement was issued some time between the Fourth Plenum and the last days of January, 1931.
12. Ibid.
15. Letter from the ECCI to the CC of the CCP, received on Nov. 16, 1930, Chinese version, an outline of which was printed in *Kuo-wen chou-pao* (National news weekly), July 27, 1931, p. 2.
16. The resolution was adopted by the Central Politburo of the CCP on Dec. 16, 1930; its text was printed in *Reconstruction of the Party*, no. 1 (Jan. 25, 1931), pp. 29–30.
21. Pan Wen-yu had formerly been a student at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and a close friend of Ch’en Shao-yu’s. After the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Pan, serving as their interpreter, accompanied Chou En-lai and his wife to southern Russia for a rest. When he returned to China toward the end of 1928, he worked as secretary in the CC’s Propaganda Department, of which Li Li-san was then the director.
Chapter XVII
The 28 Bolsheviks and Their Struggle with Mao Tse-tung for Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party

The Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC of the CCP convened in Shanghai on January 13, 1931. Mif attended the meeting in person to give instructions. At the plenum, the 28 Bolsheviks won an overwhelming victory in their political struggle. They were fighting on two fronts: on the one hand they wiped out the remnants of the Li Li-san line and invalidated the qualifications of the members elected to the CC at the Third Plenum, on the grounds that they belonged to the Li Li-san line. They also terminated the memberships of Ch‘u Ch‘iu-pai, Li Wei-han, Li Li-san, and Ho Ch‘ang on the CC of the CCP. On the other hand, they elected Ch‘en Shao-yu a member of the CC, a member of the Politburo, and secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee; Shen Tse-min, a member of the CC and director of the Central Propaganda Department; Chang Wen-t‘ien, a member of the CC, director of the Rural Work Department, and chairman of the Editorial Board of the Central Party organ; Ch‘in Pang-hsien, a member of the CC and secretary general of the CYC. Chao Yun (K‘ang Sheng) was elected to the CC and to directorship of the Organization Department, and Chou En-lai was reelected to the CC and to chairmanship of the Military Committee, a post he continued to hold—except for a brief period in 1931 while he was traveling to Jui-chin from Shanghai, during which time Li Fu-ch‘un temporarily filled the post—until he relinquished it to Mao at the Tsunyi Conference in January, 1935. The 28 Bolsheviks truly made a splendid show. With his mission successfully accomplished, Mif, in a jubilant mood, paid his tribute to the achievements of the Fourth Plenum by declaring:

Owing to its conciliatory position, however, the Third Plenum of the Central Committee held in September, 1930, did not yet bring the Party on to a correct road. It was only at the Fourth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, held in January, 1931, that the political line of the Party leadership was straightened out. The Fourth Plenum elected a new Party leadership, exposed the anti-Leninist character of Li Li-san’s policy and repelled the attempt of the Right opportunists...
to impose a defeatist program of retreat upon the Party. In doing this the Fourth Plenum played an extremely important part in the further Bolshevization of the Party.\(^3\)

Mif’s label of “Right opportunists” here was directed against the “Ho Meng-hsiung–Lo Chang-lung group,” which was in fact the “Real Power Clique,” or “Labor-Union Faction,” and was against the Li Li-san line. But this group was criticized by the 28 Bolsheviks for opposing the “Left” by way of the “Right,” and by Mif for imposing “a defeatist program of retreat upon the Party.” Therefore, although this group triumphed over the Li Li-san line, it did not enjoy the fruits of its victory. None of the members of the group secured membership on the CC. Infuriated, they hoisted their own banner and on January 17, 1931, established their own Kiangsu Provincial Committee in opposition to the CCP Provincial Committee. Wang K’e-ch’uan, a member of the Ho Meng-hsiung group, assumed the secretariatship of this splinter Kiangsu Provincial Committee. But quite unexpectedly, on the second day of the establishment of their provincial committee, Ho Meng-hsiung was arrested in Shanghai. Some thirty important members of the Ho Meng-hsiung group were also arrested on the same day.\(^4\) They were executed by KMT authorities on February 7, 1931. Although Wang K’e-ch’uan escaped safely, he later repented to the CC of the CCP by withdrawing from the Ho Meng-hsiung faction. The splinter Kiangsu Provincial Committee naturally collapsed. After the death of Ho Meng-hsiung, Lo Chang-lung assumed the leadership of the “Right” faction within the CCP in Shanghai. Under Lo’s direction, a “Central Extraordinary Committee” was organized on January 31, 1931. Sun Cheng-i, a blockheaded workman, served as its secretary general. The Department of Propaganda was headed by Lo Chang-lung himself. Hsu Wei-san was appointed head of the Central Organization Department; Liu Tzu-ts’ai, chief of the Administration of the CC; and Li Ta-han, secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee. During the early period after the establishment of this Central Extraordinary Committee, the faction had agencies in Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hupeh, Hopeh, and Manchuria, and it created the sharpest and most conspicuous intra-Party struggle since the establishment of the CCP. But this committee, like its predecessor, Ho Meng-hsiung’s Kiangsu
Provincial Committee, was short-lived. Its leader, Lo Chang-lung, soon gave himself up to KMT authorities, and the committee collapsed.

In this way the Russian Returned Student Faction took over the leadership of the CC of the CCP. After the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC of the Party, they emphasized that the Right opportunists constituted the greatest threat to the CCP. "They sent their representatives to various places over the country to strive for the so-called anti-Right struggle." Not only did they want to control the CCP's organs of the first echelon in the KMT-controlled provinces, but they attempted to control every Soviet district. Under their gigantic plan they first made Ch'en Shao-yu head of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee, which was of first importance in the CCP. Yin Chien, Wang Yun-ch'eng, and Chu Ah-ken stayed in Shanghai to take part in the workers' movements or in the CYC. Li Yuan-chieh was assigned to work in Shantung; Ch'en Yuan-tao in Manchuria; Ho Tzu-shu in Hopeh. Wang Chia-hsiang was transferred to Jui-chin, where he became director of the Political Department of the Chinese Red Army. Ch'en Ch'ang-hao became political commissar of the Fourth Front Army under the command of General Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet district. Later, Shen Tse-min and his wife, Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, were sent there to work towards strengthening the Party leadership. Hsia Hsi served as representative of the CC of the CCP at the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh Soviet district. There Hsia presided over a purge of alleged A-B Corps members and Trotskyites in which a shocking number of Party and CYC members were executed, many of whom, I understand, were innocent. I knew Hsia fairly well. He was an ugly, sinister-looking man who viewed events in a narrow, oversimplified way and who apparently saw Party enemies everywhere, almost as though he were the only true Bolshevik in the Party. After I left the Party, I heard that the CCP executed him for the excesses of this purge. Sung P'an-min was sent there to take charge of the CYC. A brilliant young man at the time, Sung was of working-class origin—his father was a worker and he too was a worker—and he came from Wuhan. Sometime later in the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh district, during the purge for which Hsia Hsi had chief responsibility, in a truly terrible search for A-B Corps people and Trotskyites, Sung was executed. It is my understanding that Sung was
innocent of the charges leveled against him. The area belonged to the Second Army Corps under Ho Lung's command, and strategically it was of considerable importance. Ho Lung, at that time, as I understand it, was rather weak intellectually and obeyed the instructions of Hsia Hsi. Returned students from Sun Yat-sen University who had been dispatched there included Wang Lan-yin (the wife of Chang K'uen-ti, a member of the CC of the CCP), Chuang Tung-hsiao, and K'ang Yun-shun. Wang Lan-yin, a native of Canton, had gone to Moscow early in 1927 and had studied at Sun Yat-sen University. She worked in the secretariat of the Sixth CCP Congress. She returned to China in 1928 and was assigned to work in Tientsin with her husband, Chang K'uen-ti. At the end of 1929 she and Chang were summoned back to Shanghai to work in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Chang K'uen-ti participated in the Fourth Plenum of the CC in January, 1931. In the summer of 1931 she and Chang K'uen-ti were assigned to work in Hsiang-ho-hsi, the name by which the Hunghu-Hunan-Western Hupeh district was commonly known. Wang Lan-yin stayed in Hsiang-ho-hsi for only about a year. She became ill there, and in 1932 she left Hsiang-ho-hsi and went to Shanghai. Her mother came from Canton to Shanghai to visit her and took her back to Canton. Meanwhile Wang remained in the Party; and after she had recuperated at Canton, she was assigned to work in Hong Kong. Shortly afterward, British authorities arrested her in Hong Kong and deported her under guard, along with a man who was arrested with her, on a British ship to Shanghai. It was expected that she would be freed upon reaching Shanghai. The CC of the CCP at Shanghai learned of this deportation, and its intelligence department planned to meet her in Shanghai. K'ang Sheng was in charge of preparations to meet her at the dock; but contact was not made, for apparently the British had informally notified KMT secret agents of her arrival. Just as the ship entered the mouth of the Wusooong, KMT agents boarded the ship and seized her. Her fellow deportee escaped by leaping overboard and swimming away. And while this was happening, CCP agents waited at the dock. She never landed. Presumably armed CCP agents on the dock could have started a serious fight. And so she was kept aboard and the KMT agents accompanied her back to Hong Kong when the ship made its return trip. When she arrived
back in Hong Kong, the British immediately deported her to Canton, where, at the end of 1932, after a brief period of interrogation, KMT agents executed her. Chuang Tung-hsiao, another woman who was sent to the Hunghu–Hunan–Western Hupeh district, had studied at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1925 and was a member of its first graduating class. Her husband, P’an Chia-ch’en, was an interpreter at Sun Yat-sen University. Both of them returned to China in 1927, where P’an served as a translator for the CC. In 1928 they both went to Russia to serve as interpreters for the Sixth CCP Congress. After the congress they entered the Lenin School in Moscow, an institution for foreign Communists, to take advanced study. In 1931 they returned to China, where they were assigned to Hsiang-ho-hsi. In 1932 Chuang returned to Shanghai, where she was reassigned to work in Manchuria, and there my knowledge of her activities ends. K’ang Yun-shun, the other person mentioned above as having been sent to Hsiang-ho-hsi, joined the CCP in Paris, where, I think, he was a worker; and he went to Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow from France. He was a big fellow. I understand that K’ang Yun-shun was executed in the above-mentioned purge that claimed Sung P’an-min and so many others. The CC of the CCP especially appointed Kuan Hsiang-ying to be Political Commissar to the Second Army Corps. Kuan Hsiang-ying, who was just as much a Party veteran as Hsia Hsi, of course was administratively below Hsia Hsi. As I understand it, Kuan Hsiang-ying counseled moderation in the purge mentioned above, but his counsel was ignored by Hsia Hsi. Wang Lan-yin, Chuang Tung-hsiao, K’ang Yun-shun, and Kuan Hsiang-ying did not belong to the group called the 28 Bolsheviks, but they were devout supporters of the new CC, which was dominated by the 28 Bolsheviks. Kuan Hsiang-ying was a graduate of KUTV in Moscow. Another returned lady student from Sun Yat-sen University, Li Han-fu, was sent to work in the Northeastern Kiangsi Soviet District.

When in 1932 the CC of the CCP made its decision to move to Jui-chin in Kiangsi, it sent Yang Shang-k’uen, one of the 28 Bolsheviks, to the Central Soviet district to make preliminary preparations. The Central Soviet district in Kiangsi was the largest and the most promising of the Chinese Soviet districts. It naturally became the first target for the 28 Bolsheviks to conquer. Mao Tse-tung, who was in possession
of a large army, was their first rival. Although Mao was far away in Kiangsi when the 28 Bolsheviks took over the CC in Shanghai, he was no less interested in the leadership of the CC of the CCP after the Fourth Plenum. He seemed to have already foreseen the inevitability of a violent and long power struggle between himself and the returned Bolsheviks. This struggle, which started at the Fourth Plenum, was not fully exposed until after all members of the CC of the CCP had arrived at Jui-chin from Shanghai around November and December, 1932. Then the 28 Bolsheviks faction, led by Ch’in Pang-hsien, and Mao Tse-tung headed for a direct confrontation in their power struggle.

The situation inside the CCP at that time was as follows: First, the situation in Shanghai, the seat of the CC of the CCP, had deteriorated. Not long after the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC, Ku Shun-chang, head of the CCP’s intelligence networks, was arrested in the Wuhan cities, to which he had just escorted Chang Kuo-t’ao, who was on his way to the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Soviet. Ku’s arrest was accidental, K’ang Sheng later told me. Two days before his arrest, the garrison headquarters at Wuhan captured a Communist, whom they threatened with death unless he disclosed a secret CCP agent or agency in Wuhan. But any underground CCP addresses that the poor man might have supplied had been changed as soon as he was arrested. So, in hope that he might by chance encounter some of his colleagues, the garrison authorities took him walking through the streets of Hankow. They met Ku on one of those streets. The prisoner immediately identified Ku as a Communist, and the garrison officials arrested Ku on the spot. That happened sometime in April, 1931. Ku had joined the CCP in 1924. He had long been a member of the CC, and Chou En-lai considered Ku to be one of his most capable assistants. Ku was in charge of the Intelligence Department of the CCP in Shanghai. His long-time membership in Shanghai’s leading secret society had been most useful to the Party, moreover, and he had managed to become an influential member of the Shanghai Municipal Police Department, too. Ku’s spendthrift private life and conduct, which he carried on behind Chou En-lai’s back, had become notorious; and Chou was criticized by other members of the CC for overlooking Ku’s extravagance. Chou En-lai privately complained, I was told, that Ku was as hard to control as an unbridled wild horse. In any event, after his arrest, Ku immediately
capitulated to the KMT authorities, who sent him to Shanghai by special plane in the hopes that he could direct the simultaneous destruction of all secret CCP institutions there. But a secret CCP agency in Wuhan had reported Ku’s arrest to Shanghai headquarters before the KMT could take any action. However, as a participant in the underworld of Shanghai’s secret societies, Ku nevertheless helped the KMT to raid many CCP secret organizations. His greatest “contribution” to the KMT was the capture on June 22, 1931, of Hsiang Chung-fa, secretary general of the CC of the CCP, who was shot two days later in prison. Furthermore, on June 15, the Pacific Secretariat of the Profintern had been raided. Its director, who used the name Noulens, and others were imprisoned. The case made international headlines. Indeed, a succession of devastating raids on secret CCP institutions in Shanghai caused panic to, and shattered the morale of, higher-echelon CCP members.

Ch'en Shao-yu was hastily elected secretary general of the CC to fill the vacancy left by Hsiang Chung-fa. Before Ch’en’s promotion, he was secretary of the CCP’s Kiangsu Provincial Committee, which directed Party work in the Shanghai area. The duties of this position left Ch’en constantly open to the threat of arrest. He was not so much threatened by KMT agents who might have infiltrated his Kiangsu Provincial Committee, for it seems to me that the KMT rarely was successful in infiltrating CCP organizations at the provincial level or higher. But KMT agents were quite successful in Shanghai at infiltrating CCP organizations below the level of the Provincial Committee; and Ch’en Shao-yu, as secretary of the CCP’s Kiangsu Committee, had had to maintain constant contact with Party organizations at lower levels, any one of which might have been infiltrated by KMT agents. Ch’en had initially sought the leadership of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee when it was not such a risky job to hold; but by the time he actually got the position, it had become a most dangerous one, and he lived, with good reason, in constant terror. But his sudden promotion, although it diminished the danger to him, did not in any means lessen his fear. He seldom appeared at meetings of the CC. Like a bird frightened by the hunter’s arrow, Ch’en dared not live in a hotel or an apartment or even in a secluded private house. After lengthy deliberation he decided to move into a sanitarium located in
the outskirts of Shanghai. He appointed K’ang Sheng to make the arrangements for him. Another member of the CC, Ch’en Yun, also became his aide-de-camp, since Ch’en Yun had been reassigned to directorship of the Intelligence Department of the CCP after Ku Shun-chang’s arrest at Hankow in April, 1931. In this capacity Ch’en Yun had to obey Ch’en Shao-yu’s commands. Ch’en Shao-yu and his attractive wife, Meng Ch’iin-shu, soon moved into the sanitarium. For the sake of their safety, the Ch’en Shao-yu’s wanted to rent a whole floor. They asked K’ang Sheng and Ch’en Yun to consult in this matter with the sanitarium authorities. Despite K’ang’s and Ch’en’s advice that this would only arouse suspicion and endanger their safety, Ch’en Shao-yu still insisted upon having his way. K’ang and Ch’en reluctantly rented a whole floor of the sanitarium. The rent, which was considerable, was paid by the CC of the CCP. After moving into the sanitarium, the Ch’ens never stepped through their door and virtually became hermits. Ch’en Shao-yu entrusted all matters, important or otherwise, to K’ang Sheng and Ch’en Yun. Without capable leadership, the work of the CCP was in fact almost suspended. The hermitry of the Ch’ens lasted until July or August, 1931. Sometime in July an agency for the CCP Propaganda Department and a secret printing house in Shanghai were raided. Some twenty-three important figures in the Propaganda Department, including Lo Yi-yuan and Yang P’ao-an, were arrested. Afraid to stay in Shanghai any longer, Ch’en Shao-yu resigned as secretary general of the CC in July or August, 1931. Assigned to the post of CCP representative to the Comintern, Ch’en Shao-yu returned to Moscow, where he stayed until 1937, at which time he went to Yenan.

Ch’en Shao-yu tried to return to China between the latter part of 1933 and the spring of 1934. In the latter part of 1933 the Shanghai bureau of the CC of the CCP, of which I was a member, received instructions from the Comintern to make arrangements for getting Ch’en Shao-yu to Jui-chin, Kiangsi Province. The instruction said that Ch’en would arrive in Hong Kong via Europe, and that he was to be conducted from Hong Kong to Jui-chin. Upon receiving the Comintern’s instruction, the Shanghai bureau made two attempts to send personnel to Hong Kong to make arrangements, but failed. Once the man who was dispatched to make the arrangements was quickly arrested. The
next time, Li Chin-yung, who was director of an underground radio station and a former Sun Yat-sen University student who had had special radio training in Moscow, received the instruction about Ch’en Shao-yu from the Comintern, and he was arrested. In both cases, of course, security was compromised. Further attempts to get Ch’en to Jui-chin seemed just too risky, and so Ch’en stayed in Moscow for another four years. He did not reach China until 1937, when he went to Yenan.

Ch’en Shao-yu exiled himself to Moscow, still entertaining, no doubt, the illusion that in due time he would be invited to become the helmsman of the Chinese revolution, as Lenin returned to Russia in April, 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution. But Ch’en overlooked the possibility that “When the sun rises, there comes a Mao Tse-tung out of the east!” After having remained safely abroad and then having returned when it was safe to do so, he was confronted by the fact that Mao had recruited a strong crew both in the Party and the Army, and that Mao had already made himself known to the world. Indeed, Mao had seized Party leadership, and Ch’en had returned too late to effectively dispute that leadership. Ch’en’s failure and defeat were the outcome of his own cowardice and opportunism.*

When Ch’en Shao-yu left Shanghai sometime in July or August, 1931, Lu Fu-t’an, a member of the Central Politburo, became acting secretary general of the CC. Lu, a mine worker by profession, joined the Party in 1926. He had, among other things, been secretary of the CCP’s Tsingtao Municipal Committee, of the Shantung Provincial Committee, and secretary of the CCP faction in the All-China Trade Union. Though a veteran Communist, his capabilities as acting secretary general of the CC left much to be desired. He was soon replaced, on September 1, 1931, by Ch’in Pang-hsien, a member of the CC and secretary general of the CYC, who now relinquished his CYC

* One account of the relations between Mao Tse-tung and Ch’en Shao-yu in the early 1930s has it that Mao, in an effort to curb Chou En-lai’s power, tricked Ch’en Shao-yu into going to the Kiangsi Soviet, where Mao placed him under house arrest. It was only as a result of intervention by the Comintern representative, so this account goes, that Mao eventually released Ch’en, after which Ch’en went to Moscow. (See Wu Hsiang-hsiang, ed., Chung-kuo Kung-cti an-tang chih-t’u shih [A penetrating look at the Chinese Communist Party], p. 158).

This account obviously dramatizes the power struggle within the CCP. To my certain knowledge, however, Ch’en Shao-yu did not at any time visit the Kiangsi Soviet. The account, therefore, strikes me as wholly inaccurate.
post to become secretary general of the Party. That date marked the
beginning of Ch’in’s reign of three years and three months. At the
time of Ch’in’s assumption of his new position, the CC was in a sad
state of disorganization: some members had been arrested, some had
been dispatched to various Soviet districts, and some, like Ch’en Shao-
yu, had left the country. Not enough CC members were in Shanghai
to form a quorum; so to cope with this dismal situation, the CC re-
cruited a few additional functionaries, who were not members of the
CC. For longer than the past twenty years Chinese Communist publica-
tions have referred to this organization as a “provisional” CC. During
the period of its control, however, it was not, so far as I can recall,
referred to as a provisional body; nor did it issue documents as a
provisional body. It was regarded as, and regarded itself as, the CC.
Indeed, the Comintern acknowledged it as the CC. The label of
“provisional” seems to have been appended by Mao Tse-tung as part
of an effort to belittle the influence of the 28 Bolsheviks. But to my
knowledge, in addition to Ch’in Pang-hsien, only Chang Wen-t’ien,
K’ang Sheng (whose real name was Chang Yun, later changed to
Chao Yung, and finally to K’ang Sheng), and Ch’en Yun came reg-
ularly to Committee headquarters to take care of Party affairs. Huang
Wei-yung, who adopted the pseudonym Ah Chiang, was the tem-
porary chief-of-staff of the CC. It is unlikely that the local committees
in the provinces were in better shape than the CC.

This was the dreary state of the CCP’s organizational affairs after
the Fourth Plenum. It was the result of the “White terror” from
outside and an “intra-Party struggle” which split the Party.

However, the 28 Bolsheviks did not cease their struggle against
the “Right” opportunism within the Party after the Fourth Plenum.
Mao Tse-tung and his crew were not satisfied with the policy of the CC
controlled by the 28 Bolsheviks, and Mao’s and his people’s evaluation
of the Fourth Plenum was entirely different from Mif’s. At that time
—from January, 1931, to early 1933—it was not possible for the 28
Bolsheviks to launch a nationwide attack on Mao Tse-tung by name;
but attacks aimed at Mao were nevertheless carried on. For example,
the CC resolution of May 9, 1931, proclaimed the “Right” line to be the
principal danger in the Party. The so-called Rich Peasant line men-
tioned in the resolution was aimed at the Central Soviet Area in
Kiangsi Province and at Mao Tse-tung. It was this CC position that Mao stigmatized as demonstrating "that the new 'Left' line was already being concretely applied and developed in practical work."8 The resolution was a prelude to the forthcoming open power struggle between the 28 Bolsheviks and Mao Tse-tung.

On September 1, 1931, moreover, the 28 Bolsheviks again challenged Mao Tse-tung in "A Letter of Instruction from the Central to the Soviet Areas."9 This instruction was issued as a circular to all Soviet districts, but it actually attacked the Central Soviet area, which was under the direct control of Mao Tse-tung. The letter pointed out that the main problems in the Central Soviet Area were that a clearly defined class line did not exist and that work among the masses was insufficiently advanced, both of which sprang from the influence of the Li Li-san line. The grievous errors of Party and government leadership in the Soviet areas, which were mentioned in the instruction, included a list of serious strategic errors, particularly in the Central Soviet Area. For example, concerning the Red Army and the Soviet areas, the instruction pointed out the absence of well established, secure headquarters and insisted that it was necessary to liberate and occupy one or more of the larger cities and to use them as headquarters. In regard to the policy toward rich peasants, the letter objected to the distribution of fertile land to rich peasants. It also attacked the Red Army for unwisely engaging exclusively in guerrilla warfare and emphasized that its structure was unsuited to the large-scale warfare that could be expected. Although he far from accepted the instructions from the CC, Mao did not make immediate counterattacks. For the CC of the CCP was then in Shanghai, too far away to make it necessary for Mao to take its instructions altogether seriously. Moreover, Mao's position in the Party at that time did not allow him to have a direct confrontation with the 28 Bolsheviks. Mao knew that he had to tolerate them because of their powerful position in the Party. But as soon as the CC of the CCP moved to Jui-chin, starting around November of 1932 through early 1933, the situation changed. Then the power struggle between Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks headed by Chi'in Pang-hsien entered a new phase.

This raises the issue of when the CC moved to Jui-chin. An official Chinese Communist source gives the date of this move as early 1933.10
Other sources have given conflicting and confusing dates.\textsuperscript{11} My own information about the CC’s move to Jui-chin, in addition to my own knowledge of the events, comes from discussing it with Ch’ing Man-yun, who was a functionary in the CC from 1931 through the mid 1930s. In the autumn of 1931 a few individual members of the CC, such as Chou En-lai, left Shanghai for Jui-chin. Teng Ying-ch’ao, Chou En-lai’s wife, and her mother joined Chou at Jui-chin in the spring of 1932. Before Teng’s departure for Jui-chin, she arranged personally with Ch’ing Man-yun to communicate with her by a secret code of their own. The bulk of the CC of the CCP began to move to Jui-chin more than a year after Chou En-lai’s departure from Shanghai. From late 1932 through early 1933, these CC members and their staffs trickled into Jui-chin. The official CCP version, insofar as it designates the date by which the CC had arrived at Jui-chin, is therefore correct.

Before the CC had finished moving to Jui-chin, it had decided to establish a bureau of the CC in Shanghai. The CC members who stayed in Shanghai to work in this Shanghai bureau were K’ang Sheng and Li Chou-sheng, who was one of the 28 Bolsheviks. Others who stayed in Shanghai to work in the Shanghai bureau, but who were not CC members, included Huang Wei-yung, better known as Ah Chiang, his pseudonym, and another returned student from Moscow’s Sun Yat-sen University, Huang Wen-chieh. I joined the Shanghai bureau as chief of its Propaganda Department upon my arrival in Shanghai from Russia in January, 1933. K’ang Sheng, who had been in Shanghai for many years and was a figure known to too many people for his own safety, soon left for Moscow with his wife, Ts’ao Shu-ying, to replace Ch’en Shao-yu as the CCP representative to the Comintern. As has already been mentioned, though, Ch’en did not return to China as planned; so he remained in Moscow as head of the CCP delegation to the Comintern, while K’ang Sheng stayed in Moscow as a member of that delegation. Ts’ao Shu-ying was the real name of K’ang’s wife, although in the CCP she used the name Ts’ao I-ou. She was a native of Shantung Province and had graduated from the Shantung Girls School at Tsinan in Shantung Province. She then entered Shanghai University, where K’ang Sheng was studying at about the same time and where I would guess that the two met. When I arrived in Shanghai
in early 1933, Ch’in Pang-hsien and others had just left for Jui-chin, and probably the Shanghai bureau of the CC was established shortly before my arrival.

The move of the CC of the CCP to Kiangsi is an important event in its history. It marked a new phase in the power struggle between Mao Tse-tung and the 28 Bolsheviks. Viewed from one angle, the move of the CC of the CCP to Jui-chin somewhat weakened Mao’s leadership in the Central Soviet area and placed him temporarily in an unfavorable position. But viewed from another angle, the move of the CC of the CCP from the largest city in China to an isolated area in inland China meant that the CC could not root its support in a workers’ movement and therefore had to rely on the support of the armed forces led by Mao. Generally speaking, armed force is the most vital instrument needed to establish or overthrow a regime. Without direct control of the armed forces, Ch’in Pang-hsien and his faction were helpless to oppose the rising power of Mao Tse-tung, who finally defeated them.

Soon after Ch’in Pang-hsien and his crew arrived at Jui-chin in early 1933, they launched a campaign against Right opportunism. Ch’in and Chang Wen-t’ien wrote and published many articles in the Jui-chin journal *Struggle*, in which they attacked Right opportunism in general and the Lo Min line in particular. At the same time Ch’in Pang-hsien repeatedly appealed at Party meetings for the rectification of Right opportunism and the Lo Min line. It should be noted that the struggle against the Lo Min line in the Kiangsi Soviet area, which Ch’in Pang-hsien and Chang Wen-t’ien vigorously launched, was actually aimed at Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, most of Mao’s close associates at that time, such as Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Mao Tse-t’an, Ku Po, Hsieh Wei-chin, T’an Cheng-lin, Hsiao Ching-kuang, Ho Shu-heng, Teng Tzu-hui, and Lu Ting-i, came under fire and were subjected to various forms of disciplinary action. Some were formally tried in special courts. Thus the political threats and pressures directed at Mao Tse-tung became progressively heavier.

In 1933 Chiang Kai-shek gathered some one million troops to launch his “Fifth Encirclement Campaign” against all of the Soviet districts. But against this overwhelming enemy superiority, the CCP showed not unity but dissension and confusion. How to defeat the Fifth Encirclement Campaign became the main point of the vigorous
debate between Mao Tse-tung and the so-called Third Left Line under
the leadership of Ch’in Pang-hsien. In reality, beneath the surface of
that debate lies the power struggle of Mao Tse-tung and the 28
Bolsheviks.

Mao Tse-tung’s condemnation of the so-called Third Left Line
may be seen in the following excerpt from his own account of it:

The period from the establishment of the provisional central leadership headed
by Comrade Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) in September 1931 to the Tsunyi Meeting
in January 1935 was one of continued development of the third “Left” line . . . .

The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, convened by the
provisional central leadership in January 1934, marked the peak of the develop­
ment of the third “Left” line . . . . the Fifth Plenary Session blindly concluded
that . . . . the struggle against the fifth “encirclement and suppression” was a
“struggle for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution” . . . .

In the revolutionary base areas the most disastrous consequence of the third
“Left” line was the failure of the campaign against the fifth “encirclement and suppression” in the area where the central leading body was located and the
withdrawal from there of the main forces of the Red Army. In the military
operations during the withdrawal from Kiangsi and on the Long March, a differ­
ent error, the error of flightism, was committed under the “Left” line, causing
further losses to the Red Army.¹³

The controversy between Mao Tse-tung and Ch’in Pang-hsien and
Ch’in’s supporters regarding the strategy for coping with the Fifth
Encirclement Campaign of Chiang Kai-shek was a ferocious one. As
a member of the Shanghai bureau of the CC at the time, I was to some
extent involved in this controversy and had particular knowledge of
certain aspects of it.

Mao Tse-tung had the accumulated experience of having broken
through four of Chiang Kai-shek’s previous encirclements, and it was
natural for him not to pay much attention to the unrealistic slogans
of Ch’in Pang-hsien. Ch’in and his followers thus sought the support
of the Comintern military adviser to strengthen their pressure against
Mao Tse-tung. This military adviser, Albert List, and a political ad­
viser from the Comintern then stayed in Shanghai. Both were German
Communists. When I arrived in Shanghai, they were already there.
They used to confer with the other members of the Shanghai bureau
and me once or twice a week. At these meetings we usually gave them
radio communications concerning military matters which we had
received from Jui-chin. Upon receiving these messages from Jui-chin, List invariably wrote out a reply on the spot, which we then transmitted to Jui-chin using the Shanghai bureau’s underground transmitter.

In the summer of 1933, the Shanghai bureau of the CC received orders from the Comintern, assigning this young German military representative to Jui-chin, where he could make his advice available on the spot and thus avoid the misunderstandings and misjudgments inherent in being in Shanghai, remote from the battles. The Shanghai bureau promptly arranged a safe route for him. Its department which handled the network of underground communications beyond Shanghai supplied escorts who saw to it that List got safely to Jui-chin. In Shanghai he had known Ch’in Pang-hsien and other members of the CC; and when he arrived at Jui-chin, he worked with the CC. When the controversy between Ch’in and Mao occurred, he stood on Ch’in’s side in opposition to Mao. But Mao had the stubborn temperament characteristic of the Hunanese, and he would not bow to Ch’in and his supporters. So Ch’in Pang-hsien, confident of Comintern support, sent a message to the Comintern in his capacity as secretary general of the CC, in which he outlined the main points of the controversy. This message to the Comintern was sent to the Shanghai bureau, and we transmitted it to the Comintern on the bureau’s underground radio. After reading the text of the message and before it was transmitted to Moscow, another colleague and I in the Shanghai bureau discussed it with a newly arrived Russian who was the senior military representative in China from the Comintern. This senior military representative had been a brigade commander during the civil war that followed the October Revolution in Russia and had had practical experience in guerrilla warfare. He was a very learned man in the field of military affairs. At our meeting we handed him a copy of Ch’in’s message and asked him to express his personal opinion of it. He said that it was unwise for the German military representative in Jui-chin to involve himself in the controversy by standing on Ch’in Pang-hsien’s side, for his position should be strictly objective and his work should reconcile the diverse opinions of both sides. He thought that Mao Tse-tung’s views on military affairs should be respected on account of Mao’s military experience and his encyclopedic knowledge of the geography of the area, and that political issues should not be allowed to interfere
with military decisions. Since the lack of an air force and of sufficient heavy arms in the Red Army limited its ability to counterattack the huge, well-armed force that Chiang Kai-shek had mobilized against it, he agreed with Mao Tse-tung that a strategy of breaking through the penetration should be adopted as had been the case in the past four encirclements. He also said that on the battlefield, military decisions must be made in response to rapidly changing situations and not necessarily in response to political resolutions. He also pointed out that it would be inappropriate for Moscow to judge the situation in Kiangsi from a single message such as that from Ch’in Pang-hsien. Since the war in Kiangsi was in a crucial stage, as soon as we had relayed Ch’in Pang-hsien’s message to Moscow, he transmitted to Moscow, on an underground Shanghai radio that his organization controlled, a message of his own, in which I assume that he stated essentially the views that he had expressed to me. I also assume that, as the senior Comintern military representative in China, his message was intended to advise the Comintern on how to reply to Ch’in Pang-hsien’s communication. In any event, he urged that Moscow reply immediately to the CC of the CCP.

As I recall, another member of the Shanghai bureau and I sent a message to Ch’in a few days after Lunar New Year’s Day, 1934. Since our message contained the views of the senior Comintern military man in China, we expected that he would carefully consider it. But instead he reacted with a furious reply, sent the same day he received our message, in which he told us to keep hands off military affairs in the Soviet areas and reminded us that the Shanghai bureau was supposed to direct CCP work only in the KMT-controlled areas. Ch’in’s arrogance made us sick! Two days later we received the Comintern’s reply to Ch’in’s message. Not unexpectedly, the Comintern did not support Ch’in Pang-hsien; it took a stand against neither party in the dispute. Its instruction was to advise both parties to work out together a better defense plan. It also insisted that the Comintern, which was thousands of miles away, had no intention of curtailing the activities of commanders in the field by insisting that its instructions be followed to the letter. The Comintern, it said, could only offer guiding principles for the CC to consider. Details of the text, after the lapse of more than thirty years, are fuzzy in my mind, but its main points were roughly
as follows: (1) The Central Soviet area, as the headquarters of the Soviet movement in China, should be defended. However, in view of the overwhelmingly strong power of the enemy's forces, the Red Army should adopt a flexible strategy which would enable it to choose wisely between defending its headquarters and preserving its military strength. (2) The Red Army should take contingency measures for withdrawal in order to avoid the possibility of being totally annihilated while trying to defend its headquarters. (3) The Comintern suggested that one-third of the Red Army be dispersed around the Central Soviet base and its surrounding areas to conduct guerrilla warfare aimed at fragmenting the military strength of the attacking enemy; should the main force of the Red Army and the various Party and government organizations have to withdraw, this would hamper the enemy's pursuit. (4) To minimize losses in case of withdrawal, it advised selecting a spot in the enemy's line which was poorly defended as a possible break-through point. (5) In order to fragment the strength of the enemy's pursuing forces, the Comintern suggested that Red Army troops in other Soviet districts, together with scattered guerrilla forces, should harass the enemy by surprise attacks. The Comintern made no suggestion with regard to the place that the Red Army should go to in case of retreat.

Although the Comintern's message avoided giving rigid instructions, its main emphasis obviously was on maintaining the Red Army's military strength, not on the blind defense of its headquarters. The spirit of the message complied with an old Chinese saying: "As long as the green mountains remain, one does not need to worry about lacking firewood." The Comintern message noted that the very vastness of China made it impossible for the KMT to assert its authority over every part of the country, and that it would not be difficult to establish new base areas where the Party's military strength could be preserved.

The total strength of the Red Army in the Central Soviet area in Kiangsi was less than one hundred thousand, while Chiang Kai-shek's troops that were attacking the Central Soviet area alone numbered about half a million. As to equipment, the Red Army could in no way be compared with Chiang's army. Nevertheless, the "Fifth Encirclement Campaign" lasted almost one whole year, which is an
indication of the stubborn resistance that the Red Army put up against Chiang. Nevertheless, when the military situation deteriorated in October, 1934, the Chinese Communists had no choice but to give up their headquarters in the Central Soviet area and to start out on their famous Long March of twenty-five thousand li (a little more than 8,000 miles). During this retreat many Communists died or ran away. Not until after they had crossed the Wu River and had occupied Tsunyi, Kweichow, were they able to chance a brief rest in January, 1935. At that time, morale in the Party and the Red Army was low.

At an enlarged conference of the Central Politburo held that January in Tsunyi, which is historically known as the famous “Tsunyi Conference,” Mao blamed Ch’in Pang-hsien, quite rightly, it seems to me, for the reverses that the Party and the Army had suffered. Ch’in had energetically opposed placing primary emphasis upon guerrilla warfare and had put forward his military slogan “The Red Army must firmly hold its positions in the encirclement campaign and not yield one inch of Red territory to the enemy.” Apparently Mao rallied a majority around his own position, for official Party history credits this meeting with having “inaugurated a new central leadership, headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.”

Ch’in Pang-hsien, demagogically stubborn, not only infuriated most of the leaders at the conference, but was apparently not even able to win the support of all of the 28 Bolsheviks who were there. Such important figures among the 28 Bolsheviks as Chang Wen-t’ien, who had long harbored grudges against him, apparently backed Mao at Tsunyi. Thus, by uniting with Chang Wen-t’ien and by gaining the support of other leaders, Mao Tse-tung finally defeated Ch’in Pang-hsien. But while Mao may have held the real power, nominally he was not the Party’s leader. Ch’in Pang-hsien was relieved of the post of secretary general, but Chang Wen-t’ien became the new secretary general. This strongly suggests that Chang Wen-t’ien was on good terms with Mao Tse-tung. It also is a sure indication that the 28 Bolsheviks were not, for the time being, a unified power.

Mao Tse-tung established his de facto leadership of the Party at the Tsunyi Conference, but, for the time being, he let Chang Wen-t’ien hold the coveted position of secretary general. Why?

To begin with, Mao Tse-tung must have been fully aware that
Chang Wen-t'ien, a man of literary bent and a man of prudence and amiable disposition, was not at heart a political creature. He was therefore an ideal choice to nominally head the Party during the period of transition from Ch'in Pang-hsien's leadership until Mao felt able to formally proclaim his own leadership.

Then, too, Ch'en Shao-yu, who, after a seven-years' sojourn in Moscow, had attained a considerable international reputation and the support of the Russian Communist leaders, still remained an important potential political rival to Mao Tse-tung. Besides, the 28 Bolsheviks still exercised a considerable influence in the Party. Some of them were members of the CC of the CCP, while others were members of the powerful Central Politburo as well. In order to maintain a friendly relationship with the Comintern and the CPSU, while consolidating his own leadership in the Party, Mao Tse-tung did not want to undertake drastic measures against the 28 Bolsheviks, which might have alienated the Comintern and the Russians. Furthermore, an open assault on the 28 Bolsheviks might have offered an opportunity to the anti-Mao faction headed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, Mao's old rival, to form a united front against him with the 28 Bolsheviks. History proved the correctness of Mao's strategy. The 28 Bolsheviks, really, were no more than a handful of intellectuals who were better at writing articles and slogan-shouting than at practical work. Their threat to Mao Tse-tung was far less than the threat of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who was backed by troops. When the Red Army headed by Mao Tse-tung and the Fourth Front Army commanded by Chang Kuo-t'ao met at Mao-kung in western Szechwan Province on June 16, 1935, they both proceeded to move northward. But when they reached Mao-er-kai, southwest of Sung-pan, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Mao Tse-tung had a serious dispute. Mao wanted to continue their march northward, but Chang wanted to move westward. To dramatize his opposition to Mao, Chang formed a rival CC of the Party. As one Communist historian put it:

A serious dispute thus arose between him [Chang Kuo-t'ao] and the CC of the Party. The CC held that the Red Army should march north and open up a base in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area to coordinate with the daily growing nationwide anti-Japanese movement. But Chang Kuo-t'ao opposed this policy and advocated
instead the defeatist line of withdrawing to the areas of national minorities in Sikang and Tibet.16

Although Chang later reluctantly followed Mao’s policy, he never wanted to be under Mao’s thumb. And it was precisely the deep-rooted struggle between Mao and Chang that prevented Mao from taking severe measures against the 28 Bolsheviks, because of his fear that Chang might make common cause with the 28 Bolsheviks against him. For Chang had already won Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, one of the 28 Bolsheviks, to his side. Although he relieved Ch’in Pang-hsien as secretary general of the CC of the CCP, it was politically prudent for Mao Tse-tung to show his magnanimity to the 28 Bolsheviks as a group. He waited another whole decade before he proclaimed the total defeat of Ch’en Shao-yu and his faction.

At the beginning of 1937, Ch’en Shao-yu returned home. No doubt in his own mind it was a triumphal return. Both he and the Russians probably expected that he would lead the Party in its United Front policy against Japan and, in the process, would presumably regain the secretary generalship of the CC. He was a conceited man. When he arrived at Yenan, Ch’en started to work to build his influence within the Party. Seeing Ch’en’s unquenchable ambition, Mao Tse-tung adroitly managed to have Ch’en and others sent to Wuhan and later to Chungking to serve as CCP representatives in conferring with the KMT on matters with regard to relations between the two political parties in strengthening the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Mao’s sending Ch’en away from Yenan removed a strong political rival from the Party headquarters temporarily. It also suggested that Mao was keenly aware of Ch’en’s international prestige. Chang Kuo-t’ao’s threat to him had by then been removed, but Mao Tse-tung must have felt that he had to be particularly ingenious in moving against Ch’en. A covert power struggle between Mao and Ch’en thus ensued. This power struggle can be characterized from Mao’s standpoint by a Chinese Communist Party historian thus:

But in 1937 after the Anti-Japanese National United Front was formed, some comrades who had committed “Left” opportunist mistakes, as represented by Comrade Chen Shao-yu, began to commit Right opportunist mistakes instead. These Right opportunist mistakes were the main danger at that time because they hindered the Party from struggling against reactionary forces and reactionary
trends in the united front and exposed the proletariat to the danger of losing its independence.  

Ch’en Shao-yu and other prominent figures of the 28 Bolsheviks had been characterized by Mao Tse-tung and his crew as being “Left” opportunists from the time of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC of the CCP to the Tsunyi Conference in January, 1935. Now Ch’en was condemned as a “Right” opportunist on the issue of the united front! Yet indications are, so far as their published positions at the time are concerned, that Mao and Ch’en Shao-yu had few if any disagreements over the nature of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. And when in October, 1938, the CC at an enlarged plenum passed a resolution on the united front, both Ch’en Shao-yu, if my memory serves me correctly, and Mao Tse-tung were members of that Politburo; and while Chinese Communist historians tend to state that “Right opportunist mistakes” with regard to the united front were evaluated at this meeting, they do not state that there was a policy disagreement at the meetings.  

I have no intention here of defending Ch’en Shao-yu. I only want to point out that Chinese Communist official history is written strictly according to the “Resolution on Some Historical Problems,” which apparently was drafted by Mao and passed by the CC under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, by which time Mao had openly asserted his superiority over Ch’en Shao-yu and the 28 Bolsheviks and was prepared to disparage all of their activities. This resolution enabled Mao Tse-tung and his followers to vindicate themselves and revenge the wrongs done them by the 28 Bolsheviks while they were in power. The resolution is an important document in the power struggle between Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks. Furthermore, it contains a good deal of indirect evidence of dissension between Russian leaders and the Comintern, on the one hand, and Mao Tse-tung, on the other.  

The Comintern hailed the Fourth Plenum of the CC of the CCP as a milestone in the Bolshevization of the CCP. And Mif and the Comintern praised the 28 Bolsheviks as genuine Leninists. In sharp contrast, Mao later castigated the CC elected at the Fourth Plenum as instigators of the “third Left line,” and he characterized the 28 Bolsheviks in the united-front period as “Right” opportunists, with
the main blame falling on Ch'en Shao-yu. There is evidence in all this of the deep-rooted dispute between the CCP under Mao Tse-tung and the CPSU. The remarkable independence of Mao Tse-tung as evidenced in the build-up of his power in the CCP has long been a worry to the Russian Communists, dating from as early as 1931. It often occurs to me to wonder whether relations between China and Russia would be as they are today if Ch'en Shao-yu or some other prominent members of the 28 Bolsheviks were still in power in Communist China.

In any event, the struggle between Mao and the remnants of the 28 Bolsheviks was not laid to rest in 1945 when Mao formally proclaimed their past waywardness and his own correctness. Ch'en remained on the Politburo. At the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956, however, Ch'en Shao-yu and his supporters were again castigated as Right opportunists, and this time indications are that Ch'en was utterly defeated. After the Eighth Congress, he vanished from the Politburo, holding only the lowest position on the CC.

Yet while Mao's differences with the remnants of the 28 Bolsheviks were set to rest by the time of the Eighth CCP Congress, they, and others who had studied in the USSR, apparently continued to be something of a thorn in his flesh, for they came under attack during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and during the prelude to it. On these latter occasions, however, there was a noticeable difference in the way Mao treated them as compared to his treatment of them in earlier battles. This time, there seems to have been no need to keep any of them in even nominal positions of importance. Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yu, Wang Chia-hsiang, Yang Shang-K'uen, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, and Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, who married Ch'en Ch'ang-hao after Shen Tse-min's death, were the last of the 28 Bolsheviks left in mainland China in the mid 1960s. Some of them, such as Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, had lived politically secluded lives for years. But all of them have reportedly lost whatever official positions they had. One is tempted to speculate that Mao no longer feels the need to make even a gesture of approval to Chinese Communists who have been identified with Russian Communist policies. Indeed, indications are that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seeks, among other things, to thoroughly discredit all such Party members.

Thus, it is not just the tag end of the 28 Bolsheviks whom Mao has
sought to destroy in the 1960s, but a good many other former students at Sun Yat-sen University or at other Soviet institutions as well. For a great many of the Chinese Communists who were subjected to merciless attacks in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had studied in Russia, a great many of them at Sun Yat-sen University. It might be noted that Chang Wen-t’ien, the temperate, literary Bolshevik, was among those publicly discredited during the recent events in mainland China. There is an exception which I cannot resist noting, that Ch’en Po-ta, a student of the second graduating class of Sun Yat-sen University who generally is credited with being a chief architect of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at one time, as I recall, was a member of one of the factions at Sun Yat-sen University. Ch’en is one of a few Russian-educated Chinese Communists who sided with Mao in his struggle against the 28 Bolsheviks.

In any event, the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Ch’in Pang-hsien, Ch’en Shao-yu, Chang Wen-t’ien, and others who were identified with Russian policies at one time or another spanned more than a quarter of a century. And much of it began with a handful of us who, by chance, found ourselves at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow.

Notes
1. After my return to Shanghai in January, 1933, I was told that this plenum lasted only about four or five hours. The security problems presented by this gathering of Mif and members of the CC in Shanghai were formidable. Mif summoned the plenum on short notice, as I was told, and disbanded it as quickly as possible. In addition to the security reasons for this procedure, it might be pointed out that the plenum merely gave formal sanction to things that actually had already been put into effect. Furthermore, this “blitz” approach to the plenum gave the opposition (Lo Chang-lung) little chance to prepare and present its case.

2. I assume that this is why Hsiang Chung-fa, in his confession to the KMT authorities who arrested and executed him in June, 1931, named Li Fu-ch’un as the director of the Military Committee.


4. It has often been suggested that Ch’en Shao-yu or those around him caused these arrests by leaking information to the KMT. It is my understanding, as one of the 28 Bolsheviks, based on information gleaned from contacts in the USSR, where I was at the time of the arrests, and in China after my return, that this was not the case. I supposed that the allegation was spread by Lo Chang-lung, who replaced Ho Meng-hsiung as leader of the faction. I do not know the circumstances that led to these arrests and executions. But I would guess that, perhaps, the KMT had penetrated the Ho Meng-hsiung group with its agents long before the arrests, for the KMT was remarkably successful during those years in penetrating a good many CCP organizations. I suspect that it was KMT agents who had a hand in splitting the Ho Meng-hsiung group off from the CC, a task that should not have been difficult; for after helping to defeat the Li Li-san line, the Ho Meng-hsiung group was given no positions at all in the reorganization that took place at the Fourth Plenum of the CC. The very fact that the Ho Meng-hsiung group, once it split from the CC, no longer was in a position of influence within the CCP leadership group, may have prompted the KMT to decide to liquidate it. For while the Ho Meng-hsiung group might have been
useful to the KMT as a force against the CCP, it nevertheless maintained an energetic opposition to the KMT.


6. He was a Shanghailander of working-class origin, and this was his given name and not a familiar way of addressing him. It was not uncommon for working-class people in Shanghai to have such names.


11. For some statements on when the CC moved to Jui-chin, attributed to Chang Kuo-t'ao or to Kung Chu, see Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations, p. 160. These statements, it seems to me, confuse the issue considerably.


14. We never did have radio communication with other Soviet areas; we communicated with them solely through couriers.


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