Security Policies in East Asia: Four Essays

edited
By
Chae-Jin Lee

Conference and Colloquium Series, Number One
Center for East Asian Studies
The University of Kansas
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Cover Painting by Dong Shouping (1904 - )
Preface

In the spring semester of 1981 the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Kansas sponsored a "Colloquium on Asian Security Policies." The colloquium was partially supported by a National Resource Center grant from the United States Department of Education.

In an attempt to examine various salient aspects of the changing Asian security issues, five distinguished scholars were invited to give public lectures at the colloquium. Since each scholar's presentation stimulated a great deal of interest and follow-up discussion among the colloquium participants, the Center for East Asian Studies decided to edit a volume of their presentations as revised and to share it with those who were unable to take part in the colloquium. I regret that this volume cannot include Dr. Thomas W. Robinson's paper on "The Soviet Security Policy in Asia" because it was not submitted on time. It is hoped that this volume will further encourage intellectual discourse on security policies of East Asia.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the five scholars for their presentations, to the colloquium participants (especially those from the United States Army Command and General Staff College) for their sustained and enthusiastic interests, to Randall Oestreicher, Anne Wallace, and Nancy Kaul for their able assistance, and to the Department of Education for its partial financial support. The cooperation provided by G. Cameron Hurst III is also gratefully acknowledged. Needless to say, each individual author is solely responsible for the contents of his essay and he does not represent the views of the Department of Education or the Center for East Asian Studies.
It has been my privilege to organize the colloquium and to assume the editorial responsibility for this publication.

January 15, 1982

Chae-Jin Lee

Center Co-Director
After a hiatus following the war in Vietnam, the question of Asian security seems once again to be agitating the governments of America and Asia. Does the increasing naval presence of the Soviet Union in the region pose a threat to peace in Northeast Asia? How long will the antagonism between the Soviet Union and China continue to be a factor in the Asian balance of power? Should Japan play a more active role, politically and militarily, in maintaining that balance, or would such a policy have destabilizing consequences? Should, and could, the United States remain a viable Asian power committed to the defense of the status quo? Can regional stability be maintained as old leaderships gradually give way to a younger generation of leaders in China, Japan, Russia, and other countries, where the process of succession has not always been smooth?

Many symposia have discussed these questions and numerous writers have published books and essays addressed to them. While I claim no special expertise to add to their wisdom, I will try in this paper to place in historical perspective the problem of national security as perceived in the United States, then relate it to the present and future of Asian security.

First, it is worth emphasizing that the concept of security is neither a simple nor an unchanging concept. Each generation defines it anew, bringing to the redefinition many assumptions about its own country and its position in the world. Consider this simple example from the early Cold War years. A key American strategic document drafted by the National Security Council and approved by President Harry S. Truman in November 1948, NSC 20/4, concluded, "[the] gravest threat to the security of the
United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.\textsuperscript{1} There are three ingredients in this conception of American security: Russia's power, hostile designs, and socio-political system. First, the "formidable power" of the Soviet Union is identified as immediately relevant to America's own security. As another National Security Council paper put it, the USSR "has engaged the United States in a struggle for power . . . in which our national security is at stake and from which we cannot withdraw short of eventual national suicide."\textsuperscript{2} But why should the mere existence of Soviet power be viewed as a threat to American security? Throughout the nineteenth-century Britain was, if anything, an even more formidable power on the global scene, but it did not impress the Americans as a menace to peace. The answer is that the Soviets are perceived to have not only "formidable power" but also "hostile designs." The Russians are portrayed as being intent on using their power for "the domination of the world." They will do so by extending their influence and control over the territory, manpower, and resources of vast areas of the world. Thus, it is not so much Soviet power per se, but the uses to which it is (and will be) put that are a threat to the survival of the United States.

But do the Russians really have such designs? Is their alleged objective of world domination a true reflection of reality, or is it a figment of American imagination? While people disagree in their responses to these issues, the crucial fact remains that security is as much a matter of perception, or in Daniel Yergin's phrase "a state of mind," as it is a given objective.\textsuperscript{3} What matters is whether the Americans believe the Russians have evil designs, not whether they have such ambitions in fact. Arguing that the Soviet Union was no ordinary state, but a Communist
country with its peculiar traditions and orientations, American strategists were convinced in the Cold War years that the Soviet threat was indeed very real. As the document cited asserted, the Soviet system made Russia ipso facto a threat to peace, because it was in the nature of a Communist state to seek to "threaten the existence of free nations." The raison d'être of a Communist state consisted of undermining international order; it could not survive otherwise. The very existence of a Communist country, therefore, created problems of security for the United States and other countries not yet under Communist domination. For this reason, American security was viewed as bound up with the survival of all non-Communist countries. As expressed in the Truman doctrine of March 1947, the spread of Communist regimes "undermine[s] the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." In such an equation, America could never be secure until the Soviet state ceased to exist, or at least was compelled to adjust itself to the security requirements of the free world, in the words of the famous memorandum, NSC 68, which codified the Cold War strategy for years to come.

This example indicates that security must be comprehended in a number of contexts. It can be understood in terms of military power, that is, the number of troops, ships, aircraft, bombs, and other weapons that countries possess, or could possess. It is possible to view international affairs as interpower relations and define national security accordingly. When defined solely with reference to the size of military budgets and armed forces, one country's power is interchangeable with that of another. At the same time the reference to the Soviet system in the example cited suggests that it is also relevant to consider the characteristics of a society possessing military power. This is because power in the abstract may be less important as a factor contributing to, or undermining peace,
than is power in combination with certain characteristics in a potential power wielder. These characteristics would include a country's history, traditional behavior patterns, ideologies, politics, and other factors that constitute its "culture." It is power combined with culture that creates a specific challenge in international relations.

This, however, is not all. As the National Security Council memos cited earlier reveal, one country's power and culture must be interpreted by another. The Soviet Union was defined as a threat to American security when Russian power and Soviet ideology were interpreted by Americans in such a way that they appeared to be a fundamental challenge to world peace and American survival. In theory, Russian power and the Soviet system could have been viewed as compatible with these values. Such a view was held by some officials who dissented from the Cold War doctrine. Why one interpretation prevailed over the other was in part a function of Soviet policies and behavior that tended to confirm one view as against the other. But Cold War perceptions were also a product of America's own military power and domestic politics. After World War II quick demobilization and budgetary restrictions left the U.S. global military power inferior to that of the Soviet Union, except for the American atomic monopoly which was broken in 1949. Characterized by deep hostility to what was considered the internal equivalent of world Communism, including, in some extreme cases, the New Deal and various radical movements before and during the war, the domestic political culture produced a revulsion to the emergence of Communist and pro-Communist governments in Europe and Asia. These factors combined to dispose American leaders and the people to interpret Soviet intentions in certain specific ways.

Another important factor, illustrated by the Cold War superpower confrontation, is the expansion of a country's power into other
geographical areas. It was not so much the Soviet Union's large armed forces on its own territory that alarmed American strategists and policymakers, but their presence in Eastern Europe, Iran, and China. Similarly, strategic planners considered America's own military buildup inadequate to counter the Soviet challenge. What was required, the National Security Council asserted, was to "strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations." Since a pro-American orientation could not be expected to develop automatically, it became necessary for the United States to undertake massive economic and military aid programs in those countries, and to station American forces in a number of them to ensure the countries' security from both internal and external foes. America and Russia in fact never threatened each other's security directly. Yet there were serious confrontations in Berlin, Iran, Cuba, and elsewhere, in which the two countries were involved extraterritorially. National security became a function not only of what was happening within America or even in Russia, but also in third countries. It goes without saying that these events in third countries must be viewed both in power and cultural terms, and both as they are and as they are perceived and interpreted by outsiders.

Security is thus an enormously complex phenomenon. It would be an oversimplification to say that there is only one plausible definition of a country's security problem, or only one solution to it. Much depends on the global power realities at a given moment, on cultural developments in other countries, and on domestic orientations that force certain interpretations on external events. This is particularly true when dealing with America's role in Asian security. In the context of this region of vast human and natural resources, cultural diversity, and political turmoil, Asian-American relations have typified the intricate mixture of
power and cultural factors that underlie all security questions. American perceptions of security in the area are worth examining within such a framework.

To understand contemporary developments in American-Asian relations, it is imperative to examine briefly the history of Asian security challenges faced by the United States and the ways in which they were dealt with. First, security involved the problem of establishing a framework for regional stability and order, so that Americans could conduct their affairs without fear of molestation. This concern was related primarily to the diplomatic, military, and economic presence of Western countries in Asia, and to the need for maintaining a balance among them. Second, Japan's emergence as the first modern state in Asia posed a challenge to the Western powers in general and to the United States in particular. After the beginning of the twentieth century, Americans in Asia became hostage to Japanese power, and United States territories such as the Philippines and Hawaii appeared increasingly vulnerable. Equally important, Japan represented an alien culture, and this alienness, combined with Japanese power, enhanced a periodic sense of crisis producing war scares in America. Third, China posed a challenge to Asian security as a consequence of its vast size and its political turmoil during most of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. It was not that Americans in China were in a particularly precarious situation. In general, they enjoyed safety and comfort to a greater extent than did most Chinese immigrants in nineteenth-century America. (A Chinese diplomat insisted in 1887 that "in China not a single American has lost his life by mob violence, while in the past three years more than thirty Chinese have been murdered through mobs in the United States.") Rather, China's challenge lay in its potential as a modern economic and military power. China's population, once organized
and mobilized economically and politically, would not only develop into a vast market for foreign products, but in view of the Chinese cultural heritage, could become a threat to regional and even global stability. Finally, nationalist movements in the colonial areas of Southeast Asia could jeopardize Asian security. Although national liberation movements did not acquire major significance until after World War I, the U.S. having experienced serious opposition to its own colonial regime in the Philippines would be concerned with this phenomenon.

Faced with these challenges, the United States traditionally responded in a number of ways. America became an active participant in diplomatic maneuvers and arrangements with European nations. Contrary to America's reputation for having avoided "entangling alliances" in the early years of its national existence, recent historical studies have demonstrated convincingly that from the beginning active diplomacy aimed at preventing the development of a hostile power bloc against the United States was a cardinal objective of government. Such diplomacy was primarily intra-Western diplomacy, insofar as it involved ties with the European powers. In Asia, too, the United States was always involved in attempts to preserve regional stability through diplomacy. One concrete manifestation of this policy was the treaty system, which established a framework for the protection of American citizens in Asia, and ensured that all privileges accorded other Westerners were also extended to Americans. In addition to diplomacy, the United States attempted to ensure its Asian security by augmenting its military presence in the region. This was particularly true after the Spanish-American War which not only resulted in the acquisition of the Philippines, but also in the establishment of a Pacific fleet. Military strengthening was considered particularly important as Asian affairs came to be viewed in the framework of rivalries among the major
powers. There was little dispute concerning the fact that the United States was a major Asian power. Without such an image, the United States could not defend its possessions and its nationals. The security of American nationals became a serious concern as Japanese power came to be seen as potentially hostile. It would be essential for the United States to offset the growth of that power through naval expansion and fortifications, a theme that characterized American-Japanese relations during the half century between the Spanish-American War and the Second World War.

But military expansion alone was never considered sufficient, because it could easily provoke other countries to do likewise, thereby resulting in an arms race. Complementing it, therefore, was an interest in geopolitical arrangements as a means for maintaining stability and strategic balance. The objective was to conclude an understanding with another power with the signatories pledging not to attack each other's possessions and if necessary to collaborate against third powers with potentially hostile intentions. President Theodore Roosevelt's policy toward Japan, one of the earliest applications of this policy tool, sought to minimize chances of military conflict between the two countries by pledging non-interference in their respective spheres of influence, and by attempting to keep Japanese and Americans apart as much as possible. This was a power-oriented approach based on the assumption that Japan and the United States could maintain a stable relationship as long as they kept within their own spheres of influence and observed the regional status quo. There was a risk in such a political power approach that the parties to the understandings might not always agree on a definition of the status quo. Such was the case during the 1930s when Japan decided to enlarge its sphere of influence on the continent of Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. In these
years the American government never abandoned the idea that some power-oriented agreement with Japan was possible. At one point President Franklin D. Roosevelt toyed with the idea of dividing the Pacific into two spheres of influence. As late as November, 1941, the State Department was interested in a *modus vivendi* with Japan through which Japan would establish control over China but refrain from expanding further southward. War came because no such agreement was achieved, and because the Japanese military had resolved to enlarge its sphere of control by force.

Power politics, however, was not the only means of coping with the Japanese challenge. Apart from the risks as outlined above, it never succeeded in providing a satisfactory answer to the problem of cultural diversity. Could two countries with such diverse historical and cultural roots really remain committed to the same conception of stability and order? Were not the two societies so different in outlook as to make any enduring understanding unattainable? These were crucial questions because they had relevance for American relations not only with Japan but with the other countries of Asia, and above all China. From the beginning of the twentieth century American officials grew acutely conscious of the need to define a policy that would ensure Asian stability and American security in an environment of cultural diversity, where political and economic upheavals were widespread and where Western colonial domination was being challenged by nationalistic movements.

One solution to these questions, representing an attempt at providing a comprehensive framework for coping with Asian security issues, was what came to be known as Wilsonian internationalism. Although its premises and inspirations antedated President Woodrow Wilson, he did more than anyone else to define a systematic approach to international affairs, especially in regard to American relations with non-Western countries. Briefly put,
his solution was to work for an interdependent, international order in which all countries would advance economically and politically, thus giving them a stake in a stable, peaceful world. Their destinies would become intertwined, and domestic and external developments would become closely integrated. This was a security policy in its broadest definition. As the Wilsonian internationalists saw it, security could best be guaranteed in a world of economic interdependence in which countries would help each other through trade, investment, and other transactions. Economic development would bring about political maturation, which in turn would produce more peaceful orientations. Asia seemed to fit into this picture admirably. Japan, the one advanced Asian country, would contribute to regional development in cooperation with other industrialized nations. Its economic affairs would become increasingly internationalized, and as a consequence its domestic politics, too, would become oriented toward international cooperation and peace. China, where all power would work together for economic development, would be more tightly integrated into the world economy, and modernization would bring about an end to internal political chaos. The country would be reunified and centralized, and a new mass market would generate a wholesome nationalistic sentiment. Similarly, in the colonial regions of Asia, economic development would prepare the indigenous peoples for political modernization and reform, and ultimately, for autonomy and self-determination. Gradually, an interdependent global order would replace colonial domination.

Wilsonian internationalism never had an adequate chance to prove itself. A little more than a decade after the doctrine's enunciation the world was plunged into an unprecedented economic crisis, putting an end to nobler projects about global interdependence and cooperations. Instead, nations, including the United States, reverted to traditional solutions
such as armament and power politics to safeguard their security interests, and they vied with one another in establishing exclusive autarkic regions rather than an open world system. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the Wilsonian vision never completely disappeared. From time to time attempts were made to reestablish some principles of international cooperation. Those principles supplied American officials with a vocabulary for condemning Japanese action in Asia. Most important, the belief persisted that once the turmoil of economic crisis and militaristic aggression was overcome, it would be possible to reconstruct the world order along Wilsonian principles. This was the agenda announced, for instance, by the Atlantic Charter and various other declarations of the United Nations during the war.

This brief survey indicates that long before 1945 the United States had defined the question of Asian security in a number of contexts. Furthermore, Washington's traditional handling of the question revealed a complex interplay of power and cultural factors in Asia and in the United States. In a sense, what developed after 1945 was a continuation of these themes. In the aftermath of the war, the United States defined its Asian-Pacific security in terms of the prevention of a resurgence of Japanese militarism. This objective was to be realized by the occupation and demilitarization of Japan, by the use of some Pacific islands as American bases, and by encouraging the development of Japan along liberal, democratic lines. Such a policy joined an emphasis on America's military power with the Wilsonian faith in reformism. Washington believed that Japan's peaceful behavior could be guaranteed best by defining a new domestic order oriented toward democracy and economic pursuits.

There was also a geopolitical aspect to the immediate postwar Asian policy. The United States considered Japan and virtually the entire
Pacific its spheres of influence. Regional stability would be built on the recognition of this fact. America was willing to accept Russia's sphere of influence in Northeast Asia, including parts of southern Manchuria and northern Korea. One problem with this formulation was that it was not always clear how far the Russian sphere was to extend. Although the secret Yalta Conference protocol had presumably defined the limits of Soviet power in Asia, the chaos in China appeared to invite further Russian penetration. For this reason, it seemed necessary from the American viewpoint to try to clarify the two powers' respective spheres of influence. This concern can be seen in the various announcements by the Truman Administration about defense perimeters. These differed little from the prewar attempts to delimit Japan's spheres of control. However, as John Gaddis has pointed out in his recent study, defense perimeters were not easily established because of the pressure of an American domestic opinion that would resist any abandonment of China, especially if this was based on the argument that China was outside America's perimeter.¹ The postwar confusion over America's China policy stemmed from the fact that until this time Wilsonianism, that is, the idea of promoting modernization, had been the only policy framework vis-a-vis that country. This framework had justified the traditional emphasis on helping China become a centralized, democratic and economically developed nation. When this failed to materialize, and when Communist influence appeared ascendant, the United States faced the need to redefine its Asian security policy. In this situation the tendency to view China as a power factor, virtually for the first time in the history of American strategy in Asia, was a notable development. As Warren Cohen and others have noted, China under Communist rule was considered a formidable power, but not necessarily a hostile one.¹² Nowhere was the importance of perceptions more strikingly demonstrated than in the debate
among American officials throughout 1949 and 1950 as to whether Chinese power should be regarded as a potential threat or a potential asset to American security. Concealed under this debate were the Wilsonians such as John Carter Vincent, who continued to argue that China would be relevant to American interests not as a power, but as an economic and political partner in building a more interdependent, liberal world order. The Korean War put an end to all argument by bringing about a direct military confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

In the periods between 1945-1950, then, America's perceptions of Asian security continued to be shaped within prewar frameworks such as military strengthening, geopolitical arrangements, and Wilsonian internationalism. Superimposed on these perceptions, of course, were the developing conceptions and ideologies of the Cold War. But, as I have indicated elsewhere, the Cold War in a sense of American-Soviet global confrontation, both in power and cultural terms, did not inspire a new definition of American policy in Asia, at least not until late 1949. It would be more accurate to say that the vision of a global power and ideological struggle with the Soviet state was adapted to pre-existing policies regarding Japan, China, and elsewhere. Moreover, even after the outbreak of the Korean War, a bipolar confrontation between America and Russia provided only one context within which the United States Asian security policy evolved. Although there remains much to be researched about American-Asian relations during the 1950s, two themes stand out. One theme was Washington's encouragement of regional economic development, particularly through close ties between Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia. Certainly this fitted into the Cold War policy of containing Communism, whether Soviet, Chinese, or indigenous in the area. But it should be recalled that the objective of economic development and interdependence had been at the heart
of Wilsonianism. There was a fundamental continuity between Wilsonian internationalist policies of the 1920s and the integrationist policies of the 1950s. Both aimed at modernization, and both assumed that economic development and political reforms were conducive to stability, thus frustrating the more revolutionary movements. It was assumed that "militant nationalism," a force viewed with increasing concern by American officials, could be moderated by economic and technical assistance, provided either directly by the United States or indirectly through Japan.

A second major theme of the 1950s was the emergence of China as the major antagonist in Asia. By 1955, the year of the Austrian neutrality treaty and the first summit conference, the bipolar confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR could be said to have reached a culmination. In Asia, where the bipolar confrontation had never been as decisive, China rather than Russia was viewed as a major challenge to the status quo. A number of mutual security pacts were concluded to contain China's putative expansionism. Taiwan's independent existence was sustained by an American military presence. All these measures were taken in the pursuit of regional stability and justified on the grounds that the Chinese state represented a threat to that stability. As with the earlier conceptions of the Soviet threat, such perceptions combined a recognition of China's military potential with an interpretation of that country's culture, which was reflected in its Communist totalitarianism and anti-imperialist rhetoric. This degree of extensive antagonism between the United States and China was certainly unprecedented. It eventually led to the American military involvement in Southeast Asia to prevent the spread of Asian Communism, believed to be centered at Peking.

American security policy in the 1960s evolved around the war in Vietnam. In a sense it represented a culmination of the earlier strands
that had characterized American-Asian relations. It entailed the use of force, a massive military build-up, and the sheer presence of American power and prestige as guarantees for peace and order. It continued the policy of encouraging Asian economic development and of self-determination by denying indigenous Communists the chance to impose their will on the people. American security policy fitted in with the policy of strengthening close bilateral ties between Japan and the United States which were viewed as the key to Asian peace and development. Designed as a check in Chinese power American security policy sought the maintenance of regional balance and stability. Finally, it represented a response to the problem of nation-building. As Henry Kissinger remarked in 1965, the basic challenge in Vietnam was "to discover how a nation can be built when the society is torn by internal schisms and in the middle of a civil war." This challenge was a familiar one which had long confronted the United States in its dealings with non-Western countries. Traditionally, Washington's response had been shaped in the basically Wilsonian framework of moderate nationalism and economic development. Vietnam was no exception; it was going to be a testing ground for America's reformist ideals.

It was because the Vietnam War summed up all earlier strands in America's Asian strategy and policy that its termination led to a questioning of those themes in the 1970s. If American perceptions of Asian security had resulted in an unfortunate war in Southeast Asia, it followed that whatever "lessons of Vietnam" one learned had to deal with the premises upon which American policy had been based. In many ways it can be argued that the questioning has not ended, and that it has not yet produced clearly articulated alternative approaches. One result was a reduction of America's military presence in Asia, as exemplified by the so-called Guam
Doctrine of 1969, in which President Richard Nixon called on the Asians themselves to share in the defense of the area. United States forces were totally withdrawn from Southeast Asia, and under the Carter Administration preparations were made to reduce them in the Korean peninsula. Another consequence of the Vietnam experience was the discrediting of some Wilsonian principles. In America the very liberals who had advocated Wilsonian internationalism began to ridicule the nation-building crusade in Asia as useless, irrelevant, and even immoral. But they offered no alternatives other than leaving the Vietnamese on their own in accordance with the principle of self-determination. They were disillusioned when they discovered a few years later that the Vietnamese were themselves trying to impose their control over neighboring Cambodia and Laos.

One notable development in America's Asian policy has been the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. As Kissinger has written the rapprochement indicated "the absolute primacy of geopolitics" in international affairs. According to the former Secretary of State, both the Chinese and the Americans felt the need for a mechanism to maintain the Asian balance of power which was dangerously close to being upset by the growth of Soviet power. One could view this as a very hard-headed, power-oriented strategic decision in which the perceived interests of the two countries happened to coincide. The use of geopolitical devices was certainly not unprecedented. However, insofar as the United States and China had never been close partners in the maintenance of the Asian balance of power, the very undertaking of this experiment underscored the failure of earlier strategies, as well as a willingness to try out something new. In addition, it may be noted that the formation of an entente with China, which defined itself as the leader of the Third World, reflected America's frustrations in dealing with Third-World countries. It was as if the
United States had decided to abandon its traditional initiatives in those areas and work through China in dealing with them.

This in turn may be related to the rise of Third-World nationalism and assertiveness throughout the 1970s. This phenomenon is not confined to Asia, but it is nevertheless relevant insofar as it points to an erosion of optimism about the modernization of the non-Western world. The conflict in Vietnam, even to a greater extent than the Communist victory in China, seemed to indicate that American conceptions of modernization were not necessarily the pattern preferred by non-Western peoples. A number of them asserted that they did not want to follow the Western model of modernization and in some cases repudiated the modernization option. Precisely how they would transform themselves is not yet clear. Lacking American initiatives, it is difficult to visualize what alternative schemes of national development Third World peoples are going to follow.

Vietnam and its aftermath also caused some erosion of American ties with Japan. Their bilateral relationship had constituted the cornerstone of United States security policy in postwar Asia. But in the late 1970s the two countries began to show signs of drifting apart because of uncertainty about the reliability of American commitments in Asia, the growing economic and military power of Japan, and the rivalry between the two countries in trade and investment matters. Voices have been heard questioning the putative stability of the American-Japanese relations.

Finally, the American people began to express doubts about some of the traditions and orientations of their own society. Although some of this questioning would have occurred even if there had been no Vietnam War, that episode served as a catalyst for a cultural revolution in America, in which traditional values, standards, and institutions came under attack. Societal bonds and convictions weakened just as American power and prestige
suffered a decline overseas. Abetted by severe domestic economic crises which were related to the massive spending of the 1960s, this situation fostered an atmosphere in which it was common even for public figures to talk of America's becoming a second-class power, and of its society having lost the vitality and sense of direction that had made the country what it was.

Today, the situation in Asia is volatile. As I suggested at the outset, there are a number of major unresolved questions involving security and new ones emerge constantly. It may be that Americans and other peoples are finally coming to the realization that they must devise an effective approach to these problems if they are not to become engulfed in major crises from sheer passivity. But is is far from clear precisely how they should define their objectives, and what means they should utilize to achieve them. Despite past frustrations and failures in pursuing certain objectives, the blanket rejection of these goals as irrelevant to the needs of the present would be ill-advised. On the other hand, mere perpetuation of past themes and methods would obviously not do. We must create a fresh synthesis of traditional ideas and novel approaches. I would suggest, for example, that the Wilsonian concept of global interdependence through peaceful communication across national boundaries is still valid in today's world, but it would need to be updated by stressing the necessity for dealing with other peoples on an equal footing. Americans and Asians would need to cooperate as human beings in reducing prejudices and chauvinistic excesses. Traditional geopolitics could be useful if leaders and nations realized that its purpose is to maintain regional balance and stability, not to ostracize another country as a perpetual hypothetical enemy. In this context, it is important to try to incorporate the Soviet Union within the system of Asian regional security, for otherwise the balance between
the USSR and the other countries would be little more than a temporary truce or a perpetual Cold War situation. It is evident from this sketch that world security is inseparable from domestic stability and health in each country. National and international security hinges not on military power in the abstract, but on the uses to which it is put, its perception by others, its combination with economic, political, and cultural factors, and its role in domestic society. To the extent that Asian security awaits a new definition, we should consider how each country seeks to organize itself for production, stability, and well-being. For the United States, regeneration of self-confidence through economic recovery and social cohesiveness seems to be an urgent task without which it would be futile to speak of national prestige or of national power. American perceptions of Asian security, then, may depend on American self-perceptions ultimately. Years ago, Henry L. Stimson asserted that the goal of United States foreign policy was "the achievement of security and peace under conditions which preserve to us our conceptions of liberty." Preservation of liberty at home would still seem to be the most fundamental prerequisite for devising a viable security policy for Asia, or for any other parts of the world.
NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 165.
4. Ibid., p. 281.
5. Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 385-442.
10. Ibid., p. 13-52.
12. Ibid., p. 1063.
Japan and the Asian Triangle

Martin E. Weinstein

During the last ten years, much has been written concerning the Asian triangle and triangular diplomacy. The basic assumption of this writing and analysis has been that Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking in 1971 and President Nixon's in 1972 transformed international politics from a bipolar into a triangular system. The public statements of Nixon and Kissinger reflect their conviction that they had called forth China as a major new force in international politics much in the manner of British Foreign Secretary Canning who claimed in 1822 that by introducing the newly independent Latin American republics into the European system he had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

Keeping in mind the history of Latin America since 1822, the analogy assumes a certain ironic appropriateness. Canning's declaration was a clever stroke in English domestic politics, and a brilliant exercise in rhetoric. However, it did not transform European international politics.

From the Japanese point of view, the idea that Asian politics or world politics can be usefully approached in terms of a Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle is immediately suspect because of the exclusion of Japan, a country whose industrial output for the past several years has surpassed that of the Soviet Union and is far greater than that of China. Most Japanese regard it as more realistic to approach Asian politics in terms of a Moscow-Peking-Washington-Tokyo quadrangle, and global affairs in terms of a Washington-Tokyo-NATO-OPEC-Moscow-Peking hexagon. If the Japanese were able to express their views in a friendly, informal way, they would probably
question the utility of triangles, quadrangles and hexagons for understanding international relations.

For most of Japan's foreign policy community (government officials, Liberal-Democratic Party leaders, academic and media analysts) the Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle does not represent a real power configuration. Rather it is seen as a symbol of the American effort, since the early 1970s, to restructure Asian and global politics by dramatically improving Sino-American relations, thus transforming a tense, rigid, bipolar Cold War world into a world characterized by detente and rapprochement. It is worth recalling that for fifteen years before the 1972 Shanghai Communique signaled a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, the Japanese government had urged and indeed undertaken relatively flexible, pragmatic policies toward Moscow and Peking. It is also important to remember that the Japanese government wanted to act as an intermediary between Washington and Peking, and that it was acutely embarrassed by Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in the summer of 1971. More importantly, Japanese officials were very apprehensive in the early 1970s that Washington's unilateral approach to Peking would give the Chinese opportunities to play Washington and Tokyo against each other, and that the enormous strategic importance that the Nixon Administration publicly attributed to China would weaken Japan's position as America's most important ally and trading partner in Asia.

By the end of the 1970s, these initial concerns had faded. Although the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations had all trumpeted the fundamental historic importance of the Washington-Peking rapprochement, the volume of U.S.-Chinese trade remained relatively small, and strategic cooperation largely verbal and symbolic. At the same time Japan continued to be America's leading overseas trading partner and key military ally in Asia and the Pacific. In contrast to the early 1970s, when Chinese
warnings about the dangers of a revival of Japanese militarism seemed aimed at isolating Japan, by the end of the decade, the Chinese were encouraging Japanese defense efforts and cultivating the symbols, if not the reality, of a Peking-Tokyo-Washington alignment against Soviet "hegemony."

As Tokyo saw it at the beginning of the 1980s, the problem with the American effort to create and manipulate a Moscow-Peking-Washington triangle was that, while allowing the American Pacific fleet and air forces to decline from their former position of unchallengeable superiority to one of numerical inferiority vis-a-vis Soviet naval and air forces in Northeast Asia, Washington was willing to rely excessively on China's limited military power to offset the Soviet military buildup in Asia. The danger, in Japanese eyes, was that detente, rapprochement and triangular diplomacy had become American rationalizations for the growing Soviet conventional naval and air preponderance in the Asian-Pacific region. Insofar as Japan's security policy, and indeed Japan's prosperity and well-being, had rested for three decades on an American commitment to defend Japan and, in a broader sense, on American maintenance of an international order in which Japan had secure access to resources and markets around the world, the loss of U.S. conventional military preponderance in the region fostered growing anxiety in Japan. This anxiety has not yet produced fundamental or dramatic changes in Japan's modest military posture or in its diplomatic stance in part because Tokyo is reluctant to renounce policies that have proven effective and inexpensive, and which represent a fragile internal consensus.

In early 1981 the new Reagan Administration was talking tough to the Soviets, de-emphasizing the importance of Sino-American ties, reassuring the Japanese and South Korean governments of the firmness of U.S. military commitments, and urging Japan to augment its Self-Defense Forces. In
addition, the Reagan Administration called for a five-year build-up of American military forces, including naval and air forces in the Pacific. This program will take time, will require annual Congressional approval, and will correct the U.S.-Soviet imbalance only if it is accompanied by the improved competence and combat-readiness of American forces. From the Japanese government's perspective, therefore, this policy shift is at once encouraging and worrisome. If the tough talk to Moscow does not become excessive and provocative, and if a deliberate, long-range American military build-up actually materializes, a more stable, U.S.-Soviet military balance is likely to be the result. On the other hand, the Japanese regard as reckless and potentially destabilizing any approach which risks provoking the Soviets while failing to demonstrate clearly that well-armed American forces are prepared to back up the tough talk.

In order to understand Japanese anxiety over the current military imbalance, as well as Japanese reluctance to do much about it, it is necessary to step back from current issues, and to see Japan in recent historical perspective. Among the major industrialized nations, Japan is decidedly the most resource-poor. In the crucial matter of energy, for example, Japan now imports more petroleum than any other country in the world, and depends upon foreign purchases of petroleum for nearly 70% of its total energy consumption--far more than either Western Europe or the United States. This extreme dependence upon imports extends to minerals, lumber, and even food.

Japanese foreign policy makers realized by the end of the First World War that, while industrialization would be the basis of Japan's wealth and power, it would also be a source of chronic vulnerability and insecurity. The more productive Japanese industry is, the more dependent it is upon imported fuels and raw materials. This remains true even when fuel and raw
material imports are a declining proportion of gross national product, because, while the declining proportion shows that Japan is adding increased value to its manufactured products, the fuels and raw materials remain indispensible, and their volume grows. This being the case, the inevitable task of Japan's foreign policy in the 1980s--as it was in the 1920s and the 1950s--is to maintain access to a far-flung, overseas network of fuel and raw materials.

The fundamental foreign policy options for Japan, therefore, derive from the question of whether and how Japan can maintain this access. Japan must (1) control the foreign sources of energy and raw materials, or (2) be able to buy from those who control the sources of energy and raw materials, or (3) face industrial stagnation and decline.

We have become so accustomed to living with a Japan that thrives by peaceful trade that we may have forgotten that the men, now in their fifties and sixties, who will lead Japan through this decade, clearly remember the disaster of World War II. They know that the war, and the defeat, resulted in large part from Japan's efforts to use its industrial might and its military forces to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was intended to ensure Japanese access to the coal and iron of Manchuria and North China, to the tin and rubber of Malaya, and to the petroleum of the East Indies. They know that as a consequence of Japan's phenomenal economic growth, its dependence upon essential imports has grown enormously and is now global rather than regional. For example, Japan now meets only 12% of its petroleum requirements from Indonesia, while close to 80% of its oil comes from the politically volatile Middle East. Moreover, the unification of China and the economic development of the Soviet Far East have eliminated the strategic advantages that rapid industrialization and superior organization conferred upon Japan in the
half century before the Pacific War. In fact, advances in military technology have rendered the narrow, densely populated Japanese islands extremely vulnerable to air and missile attacks, to the interdiction of essential sea lanes, and to wars and disruptions in areas as remote from Japanese control as the Persian Gulf. It is no wonder that Japan's leaders find it difficult to see how increasing Japan's admittedly modest Self-Defense Forces will solve or even significantly reduce Japan's strategic dependence and vulnerability.

Moreover, the men who govern Japan know that economic decline and stagnation are not purely theoretical alternatives. From the surrender in 1945, until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, they and their countrymen lived in extreme poverty and deprivation, with little hope that they would ever again see the frugal comforts that had been attained in the 1930s. Japan's industries had been destroyed by American bombs, and its merchant marine virtually wiped out by American submarines. The Japanese had the skills to rebuild what had been destroyed. The most serious obstacles to economic recovery were the blockades, embargoes and restrictions on Japanese overseas trade, which were imposed by the Occupation and by states Japan had invaded or threatened during the war. As a result of these obstacles, Japan, for almost five years, simply had no access to the resources and markets necessary for economic reconstruction.

Not only was Japan an economic cripple in those grim years, 1945-50, it was also completely demilitarized, and even without adequate police forces to cope with riots or insurrections. Although in Japanese eyes the Soviet threat was not as pressing and urgent as the economic malaise, it had to be given serious attention. Japan's leaders wondered what was to become of their country when the American Occupation forces went home. The Soviets were not then a formidable military power in Asia, yet Stalin had
attempted to occupy northern Hokkaido, and had in fact occupied the Northern Islands, an issue which continues to this day to rankle in Japanese-Soviet relations. Moreover, the uncommonly large 400-man Soviet mission in Tokyo was busy helping the Japan Communist Party to gain control of the newly formed labor unions. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was not alone in fearing that unless the Japanese government had adequate police and internal security forces and an American guarantee against external aggression, Japan, following the conclusion of a peace treaty and the end of the Occupation, might very well be pulled into the Soviet orbit in much the same way Czechoslovakia was in 1947.6

By the time war broke out in Korea in June, 1950, American policy toward Japan had shifted dramatically from its original emphasis on demilitarization and economic punishment, to a policy of actively stimulating Japanese economic recovery and encouraging Japan to build at least limited armed forces for internal security and territorial defense. Most importantly, by the time Prime Minister Yoshida signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, in September 1951, it was evident to the Japanese government, and to economic planners and businessmen, that an alliance with the U.S., and alignment with the Free World offered Japan the prospect of relatively unfettered access to overseas sources of fuels and raw materials, access to the richest markets in the world, and the military protection of what were at the time unchallengeably preponderant American naval and air forces operating in the Western Pacific and from Japan itself, as well as the American ground forces in South Korea.

It is worth looking back briefly to the aftermath of World War II and to the Occupation, because the basic lines of Japan's present foreign and defense policies were drawn in those years. Japan's security was then
perceived, and is still perceived, in both economic and military terms, with economics usually receiving more attention. The Soviets were, and still are, the principal threat. China, even in its most belligerent and vociferous anti-Japanese phase in the 1960s, was not seen by Japanese policy makers as a serious military threat—certainly not as serious a threat as U.S. policy makers perceived China to be. The U.S. was, and still is, Japan's most important trading partner, as well as the protector of trading routes and of Middle East oil. The American Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force and the U.S. forces in South Korea remain the most important elements in Japan's military defense.

Although the Sino-Soviet dispute has become a major factor in Japan's security environment during the last twenty years, and changes in American policy toward the Soviet Union and China during the past decade have given Japan more room to maneuver, the government of Japan has shown little inclination to take major initiatives or departures toward the Asian Communist giants. Significant developments occur from time to time, such as the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Peking, which followed the Long-Term Trade Agreement with China reached earlier that year, or Japan's periodic negotiations with Moscow over trade or political issues. Yet the impact of actions such as these on the organization of Japan's economy and the direction of its foreign policy are limited. Close, cooperative ties with Washington still take clear precedence over relations with Peking or Moscow; and the expansion of Japan's relations with the Russians and the Chinese is constrained by uncertainty about how far, how fast, and in what direction the Americans are moving.

It becomes apparent upon comparison that Japan's foreign and defense policies have changed less during the past fifteen years than have those of the United States. In part, the reason is that the Japanese had less to
change. Their relations with Peking were never as economically restrictive or bitter as ours, nor did they have sizeable military forces in East Asia which they could withdraw. Nevertheless, the pendulum of American policy swings in a wider arc than does that of Japan, and the swing from Cold War toward detente and rapprochement, and now back toward Cold War, has gone further in Washington than in Tokyo. During a policy-planning conference of American and Japanese officials in early 1976, one Japanese--after discussing the limitations of Washington's openings to Moscow and Peking--asked what the U.S. government planned to do after detente, if it were successful. The American officials were put off by the question. The senior American present explained that detente would continue indefinitely because there was no acceptable alternative. The Japanese nodded politely but skeptically. In their minds the question still remains unanswered. 7

In the 1950s and 1960s, there were pro-American, politically conservative Japanese, staunch defenders of the Security Treaty, who were concerned that American military predominance in the Western Pacific, combined with U.S. anti-Communist fervor and Yankee obstinacy, could lead to an unnecessary war with the Soviets and the Chinese--a war into which Japan would have been unavoidably drawn. The thrust of Japanese policy then was to keep the shield of the Security Treaty raised while seeing to it that the American sword stayed safely and unprovocatively in its sheath. This was the purpose of the Prior Consultation Notes appended to the 1960 Security Treaty by the Kishi Cabinet. In the Prior Consultation Notes, the U.S. government agreed to consult with the government of Japan and to gain its approval prior to making any major changes in the force structure or weaponry of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan or prior to deploying these forces to a combat area outside Japan.
In 1981, the questions in the minds of Japan's ruling conservatives are of an entirely different order. These men are still pro-American, and they still support the Security Treaty, but they wonder whether the treaty and the American forces that stand behind it are adequate for Japan's defense. Given the changes that occurred in America's world outlook, in Congressional and bureaucratic attitudes toward overseas military interventions and, perhaps most importantly, given the erosion of American military strength in the Western Pacific, the Japanese now wonder what the Mutual Security Treaty will mean to the United States in the 1980s. Does it represent an unequivocal commitment to fight in Japan's defense, or does it mean something less? If so, how much less? Are the Seventh Fleet and the Fifth Air Force an effective deterrent against the Soviet Pacific Fleet and air forces? If deterrence policy fails, will American naval and air forces be able to keep open the lines of communication to Japan and the Western Pacific? What should Japan do?

The most significant change that has occurred in Japanese foreign and defense policy is that moderate, cautious Japanese conservatives are now asking themselves these questions, not in a panicky or even urgent way, but deliberately and seriously. Ten or twenty years ago they did not. Then, they accepted American military predominance, nuclear and conventional, in the air and on the seas, as an unshakeable premise upon which Japanese policies were built. Now no one in Japan has yet proposed clear, convincing answers to the above questions. And in view of the demonstrated success and enormous inertia of existing policies, dramatic departures in Japanese foreign and defense policies do not appear imminent.

Nevertheless, we should realize that fundamental changes have occurred in Japanese perceptions, and that perceptual changes carry the potential of substantial alterations in Japanese policy in the 1980s.
It should be noted that during the past few years, a number of respected writers have argued that the Japanese government has already made basic changes in its foreign and defense policy, or is in the process of doing so. These arguments are built on interpretations of the economic quarrels that have beset the United States and Japan, on the issues that have continued to divide Japan and the Soviet Union, on improvements in Sino-Japanese relations, and on evidence of growing Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia. While government spokesmen in Tokyo and Washington insist that their two countries have never been closer, some scholars and journalists tend to argue that Japan has adopted—or is adopting—basic policies of greater economic and political independence from the United States, that Japan is assuming a leadership role in Southeast Asia, and that Japan is moving toward extensive economic and even security ties with China.

This essay, in contrast, was written in the belief that while fundamental changes in Japan's foreign and defense policies are likely, they have not yet taken place, nor have they been decided upon by the Japanese government. On the contrary, the senior Liberal Democratic Party politicians who rule Japan are struggling to preserve as much as they can of the domestic and international positions Japan gained in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, as the impressive and surprising Conservative victory in the June 1980 general elections suggests, there are no substantial domestic pressures that are likely to cause a major shift in foreign policy. Fundamental policy changes are not likely to take place incrementally; they are more likely to occur suddenly, should a reversal in the U.S.-Soviet military balance in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific be unmistakably brought home to the Japanese, perhaps by an American failure to honor a security commitment in that region. That is why this essay focuses on the
changing Japanese perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, which could shock Japan into making basic changes in its foreign and defense policies.

Although it is next to impossible to pinpoint the beginnings of Japanese skepticism about detente, rapprochement and triangular diplomacy, one of the early official expressions of this skepticism occurred in 1975-76, when the Japan Defense Agency issued its second White Paper. In the first, which had appeared in 1971, Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was then Director General, had called for expanded Japanese forces to fill the gap left by the reversion of Okinawa that year and by the reduction and consolidation of American forces in the Far East. His White Paper had also made a strong plea for heightened defense consciousness among the Japanese people. Mr. Nakasone had a reputation as a hawk and as an aspiring Prime Minister, and many Japanese viewed his White Paper as an effort at self-promotion. In any case, it became clear in the ensuing defense budgets that Prime Minister Sato's Cabinet would not act on Mr. Nakasone's proposal. In contrast to its controversial 1971 predecessor, the 1976 White Paper was a model of bureaucratic action and blandness. It received less media attention, and one is tempted to pass over it as having little significance for Japanese foreign and defense policy.

There are, however, two aspects of the 1976 White Paper that deserve attention. First, the preparation of the White Paper led to a revealing disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency on the future strategic environment in the region. Second, the 1976 White Paper had an unprecedented and unusual set of statistical tables and charts appended to it.

When the paper was drafted in the Defense Bureau of the Defense Agency in late 1975, it had a clear, consistent purpose and argument. Defense
Agency Director General Sakata Michita wanted to gain public approval and greater legitimacy for the Self-Defense Forces. The budget outlook was not promising, and the price of weapons was rising rapidly. Moreover, between 1972 and 1976, personnel costs in the Defense Agency had risen from 47 percent to 56 percent of the defense budget, while procurement outlays had dropped from 25 to 16 percent. In these circumstances, Mr. Sakata saw no likelihood of substantially improving the Defense Force's weapons and equipment, or even reaching the procurement goals of the modest Fourth Defense Plan (1972-76). Consequently, instead of clamoring for budget increases that were certain to be refused, he set out to gain greater public acceptance and legitimacy for the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces. Minister Sakata directed the Defense Bureau to prepare a White Paper that would reassure the opposition parties and the doves—a White Paper free of the mildly hawkish arguments that characterized previous Defense Agency publications.

The early drafts of the White Paper took the line that Japan could look forward to ten years of peace and security in an era of detente. There was no mention of "gaps" and no discussion of U.S. force reductions. Despite the debacle in Saigon earlier in 1975, the United States was expected to continue to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China. Japan would follow suit. With the major powers behaving peacefully, war was improbable in Korea, and the level of tension there would drop. Given the stable, secure international environment predicted in the draft, there would be no need for expensive improvements or expansion of the Self-Defense Forces. Instead, the draft White Paper proposed a modest cut in Self-Defense Forces personnel during the coming decade and the application of the funds freed by these cuts to a moderate upgrading of weapons and equipment. The new, non-demanding Defense Force,
in the new, safe, secure world of detente, was to be known as the "basic standing force."

The thrust of Mr. Sakata's approach to the Liberal Democratic Party doves and the Opposition was that since he was not pushing for more powerful, expensive Defense Forces, it was only appropriate for these political critics to respond by giving the Defense Agency a more respectable place in Japanese political life. His suggested quid pro quo was the establishment of a Diet Committee on Defense. The fate of Mr. Sakata's extremely modest proposal for a Diet Committee on Defense is symptomatic of the political sensitivity and low priority that defense policy has in Japan. The Committee did not materialize until April 1980, when it was created, in part in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in part to show the suddenly aroused Carter Administration that Japan was becoming serious about defense questions.

Since the draft White Paper's analysis of the international political trends and of Japan's strategic environment dealt with broad foreign policy questions, copies were sent to the Foreign Ministry. There it landed in the Security Treaty Division of the North American Affairs Bureau, and in the Research and Analysis Bureau. In both offices the draft White Paper was sharply criticized for being unrealistic and excessively optimistic. The Security Treaty Division people argued that the international political and strategic analysis was so completely at odds with the actual situation that it was beyond salvage and repair. They urged that it be completely rewritten to take into account what they saw as the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, the uncertainties of Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, and the continuing tension and instability in the Korean peninsula. The Defense Agency's prediction of a ten-year period of peace
and security came under especially harsh criticism. It was quickly scrapped.

The Research and Analysis Bureau agreed with these criticisms but felt that the Defense Agency's draft could be salvaged if it were revised. The analysts proposed a number of substantial revisions that were intended to balance and hedge the Defense Agency's assessments, most of which were incorporated into the final version of the White Paper. As a result, the Defense Agency was left with its "basic standing force" concept, but without most of the analysis and predictions that made it a logical response to Japan's international environment.

Oddly enough the inter-agency hedging and balancing process did not extend to the tables and charts appended to the White Paper. Among these were a table of the "Trend of Forces Around Japan" and a chart on "Deployment and Basing Around Japan." The deployment and basing chart showed the Soviets holding an approximate 2:1 advantage in naval combat vessels and combat aircraft in the Western Pacific. The table on force trends showed that while the tonnage and numbers of Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East had grown by approximately 80 percent between 1965 and 1975, those of the United States had declined by about 70 percent. In brief, the figures showed a reversal of the U.S.-Soviet military balance around Japan, and Soviet naval and air predominance.

There was nothing classified or secret about these figures. Most of the data in the charts and tables were taken from The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and from Jane's Fighting Ships. The data were consistent with statements, published in October 1975, by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, in which Admiral James Holloway declared that the Sea of Japan had become a Soviet lake, and that it was uncertain whether U.S. naval and air forces could
keep open the lines of communication in the Pacific west of Hawaii, should the Soviets attempt to interdict them. The Defense Agency had begun to feed this information to the Japanese press in the autumn of 1975, together with reports of Soviet naval operations in the waters close to Japan. In the course of the Foreign Ministry-Defense Agency discussions on the draft White Paper, the diplomats pointed out that these data on the balance of military forces around Japan seemed inconsistent with the Agency's rosy analysis and predictions about Japan's future security. The Defense Agency agreed: they did seem inconsistent. The diplomats asked whether the reversal in the U.S.-Soviet balance might not have serious strategic implications for Japan. The Defense Agency replied that, based on their talks with U.S. defense officials, they did not believe that the actual shift was as dramatic as the statistics suggested, and moreover, that the Soviets did not intend to take any military actions in Asia and the Pacific against Japan and the United States. Defense Agency representatives argued that the main significance of the changed balance of forces around Japan was, as they put it, more political and diplomatic than military.

The Defense Agency's draft analyses and predictions were based on President Nixon's 1972 and 1973 Foreign Policy Reports, and on discussions held in 1973-1975 with Defense Department and State Department officials. As the Japanese diplomats pointed out, however, by late 1975 and early 1976, when the White Paper was being revised, Secretary of State Kissinger's statements on U.S.-Soviet relations had become decidedly less optimistic. The debacle in Saigon had contributed to this change. So had the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. SALT had bogged down, and so had U.S. discussions to normalize relations with Peking. And President Gerald Ford was preparing to present Congress with the first real defense budget increases since 1969.
The table on the "Trend of Forces Around Japan" and the chart on "Deployment and Basing Around Japan" were published, without alteration or comment, with the White Paper. In a conversation with a Foreign Ministry official who participated in its preparation, I asked whether he and his colleagues had thought of explaining the alarming statistical data in the analytical section of the White Paper. The official smiled and said, "Certainly not. You know what is in those tables. What could we have said? We could have quibbled with some of the numbers, or gotten into a discussion of Soviet intentions, but that would only have made it worse. We would end up looking ridiculous if we tried to make that data harmless."

Although the American Asian-Pacific military forces have not increased in tonnage or in numbers of vessels or aircraft, since 1975 a modest modernization program has improved their quality. Several new Spruance-class destroyers, Perry-class guided missile frigates, Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines, and Tarawa-Class amphibious assault ships have been added to the Seventh Fleet. Within the next few years, four of the six aircraft carriers in the Seventh Fleet will have replaced their F-4 Phantom fighters with F-14 Tomcats, and the Air Force Tactical Fighter Wing on Okinawa will be equipped entirely with F-15 Eagles.\textsuperscript{14} The Reagan Administration plans to accelerate and expand this program, possibly to include the construction of a new, nuclear powered aircraft carrier for the Seventh Fleet.\textsuperscript{15}

This modest trend in U.S. force deployments in the Asian-Pacific region, however, has been more than offset in Japanese eyes by two negative factors. The hostage crisis in Iran and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led the Carter Administration to suddenly create what appears to be a permanent U.S. naval and air presence in the Indian Ocean, intended to stabilize the Persian Gulf region, and to convince the Soviets of the
seriousness of American commitment in the Gulf. Since Japan is more dependent on Middle East petroleum than either the U.S. or Western Europe, the Japanese government favors these U.S. deployments, and devoutly hopes they will produce the desired results. At the same time, however, the Japanese know that the American build-up in the Indian Ocean has been made by transferring vessels and aircraft previously stationed in the Western Pacific, thus further weakening U.S. capabilities around Japan and Korea.

Moreover, during the past three years, the Soviets have significantly augmented their naval and air forces around Japan.16 Following the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978, the Soviets ostentatiously reinforced their garrisons on the disputed Northern Islands. Since the Sino-Vietnamese fighting of February and March 1979, Soviet naval vessels and aircraft on the Pacific-Indian Ocean run have made full and regular use of the facilities at Camranh Bay and at Da Nang Air Base. In 1979, the new Kiev-class aircraft carrier Minsk joined the Soviet Pacific Fleet, together with a larger-than-usual complement of new missile armed cruisers, nuclear submarines and supply ships. By the end of 1980, this increase had pushed the total of Soviet naval combat tonnage in the Western Pacific from the 1.2 million tons of 1975 up to 1.52 million tons.

Soviet missile forces in the Far East have been reinforced by new SS-20 MIRVed missiles. Perhaps the most significant new addition to the Soviet Far Eastern forces, however, is the Backfire bomber, a variable wing, twin-engined craft with a speed between 2.25 and 2.5, designed to operate effectively in both low and high altitude missions, and possessing an estimated combat range of 3,100 nautical miles, without refueling. Approximately ten Backfires have already been stationed in the Far East, and U.S. intelligence sources anticipate that between 50 and 60 Backfires will be on station by 1984. Deployment of the Backfires to the Pacific
Fleet will pose a severe threat to Western shipping and to U.S. carrier task forces anywhere in the Western Pacific, adding to the already powerful threat from the large number of Soviet submarines. Given the reliance of the U.S. on sea routes for maintenance, supply and reinforcement of its forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and given Japan's almost total dependence on sea routes, the military balance around Japan appears to have become even more fragile and unstable than it was in the mid-1970s.

Finally, it should be noted that there is another long-range factor that suggests that the Soviet strategic position in the Far East will continue to grow stronger throughout the remainder of this century. That factor is the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) Railway and its feeder lines, which will substantially improve communications between the European and Asiatic regions and will probably further stimulate the economic development of the Soviet Maritime Provinces.

There is little evidence that improved relations between Tokyo and Peking, and Washington and Peking, are compensating adequately for the continued Soviet build-up in Asia and the Pacific. China's forces are largely equipped with aging, obsolete weapons. However, the Chinese have been reluctant to become dependent on American weapon imports, while the U.S., despite sporadic gestures to the contrary, is wary of selling weapons to China. Moreover, even if both sides were to suddenly decide that China should be armed by the U.S., the enormity of China's weapon requirements would probably be greater than the American arms industry could meet. One likely result would be a marginal and provocative Chinese military augmentation that would increase the likelihood of Sino-Soviet hostilities without improving China's chances of success.

There has been an increase in economic relations with China during the past few years, which has been profitable and encouraging to the China
traders in both the U.S. and Japan. Given the size and population of China, the scale of its economic problems, and China's relatively limited ability to absorb and make effective use of advanced technology and machine imports, these economic ties with the U.S. and Japan are not likely to dramatically transform China's economic and strategic position during the 1980s.

Although the Sino-Soviet dispute unquestionably diverts Soviet forces from possible deployment in Europe, the Middle East, or elsewhere in the world, Japanese officials have come to believe that the strategic significance of the Sino-Soviet dispute tends to be exaggerated in American eyes. Ten years ago, when the Soviet forces were approximately half their present strength, and when the extent of the American military decline was not anticipated, it was easier to draw comfort from the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to view the Chinese as an effective counter-weight to the Soviets in Asia. By the beginning of the 1980s, however, the Soviet build-up in Asia and the Pacific, which may have begun as a defensive reaction to what Moscow saw as a Chinese threat, had assumed offensive, destabilizing proportions, not only against China, but against Japan as well. Awareness of the changed strategic balance in the region has led to greater willingness in both Tokyo and Washington to plan for military cooperation against the Soviets. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ships, aircraft and well-trained forces necessary to make this cooperation effective will materialize.
NOTES


2. For a well-informed, thoughtful Japanese reaction to initial ideas and policies of detente and rapprochement, see Okazaki Hisahiko, A Japanese View of Detente (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974).


5. Ibid.


7. Professor Weinstein served as Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to Japan from August 1975 to August 1977. Portions of this article reflect his observations and experiences during that service.


10. The Director General of the Defense Agency holds the rank of Cabinet Minister.

11. This account of the evolution of the 1976 White Paper is based on the author's discussions with Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency officials.

12. It should be noted that the bulk of U.S. military deployments to Vietnam, including naval and air forces, were made in 1966-67.


China and the Security of Asia*

Jonathan D. Pollack

Introduction

In a seminal essay written nearly three decades ago, Arnold Wolfers described national security as an "ambiguous symbol" laden with a broad range of objective and subjective connotations. The intervening years have not diminished the value of his insights. Then as now, judgments about the security (or insecurity) of nations derive from far more than the accumulations and exercise of military power. No doubt this particular consideration retains a certain singularity in any assessment of international relations, yet so much more is involved in such a complex equation. The complicated interaction between the deterrence of armed conflict and the need to defend against actual physical attack in its various potential forms; the determination of what precise values and interests--economic, political, diplomatic, as well as military--need to be secured, at what cost, and with what degree of risk; a recognition of the continuing "security dilemma" between nations, where one nation's actions may contribute substantially to perceptions of threat on the part of others; and the role of national security objectives in relation to bureaucratic power within nations all constitute recurring issues for political and military leadership alike.

Despite the timeless quality of these issues, there is a renewed salience to these considerations in the 1980s. Such a phenomenon is

*All opinions expressed in this essay are the author's own, and should not be attributed to the Rand Corporation or any of its governmental sponsors.
readily discernible in the United States, but it is highly visible in Asia, as well. Notwithstanding the centrality of Europe in the post-war alliance structure and the international security system as a whole, it has been principally in Asia where the lines of demarcation have been far more fluid, and hence more the object of great power contention and conflict. Other than the Middle East, Asia has been the principal locale of the hot wars of the past three or more decades which have centrally and recurrently affected the global distribution of power. For good or for ill, these conflicts have involved the security and diplomatic interests of the United States. The roster, while well-known, is worth recounting: the triumph of Communism on the Chinese mainland; the Korean War; the prolonged agonies of Indochina; and contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Kampuchea are among the principle entries on this historical record.

Indeed, what to many Americans seems like eons ago, it appeared in the mid-1970s that the United States had generally decided to reduce its external obligations and pull back from a policy once termed the "globalization of containment." An overall war weariness derived from the divisions and agonies of Vietnam accelerated dramatically with the collapse of the non-Communist governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the spring of 1975. The Carter Administration's early determination to proceed with the withdrawal of the remaining ground forces from South Korea seemed to flow inexorably from such developments, as well. In the early 1980s, however, political, economic, and military circumstances appear profoundly different; some of these factors are worthy of brief mention.

First, there is a vastly enhanced appreciation of the long-term American stake in Asia. In economic terms, the remarkable economic growth in various neo-Confucian cultures--felt initially in Japan, but now also extending to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, to name the
more prominent examples--has transformed long-existing trade patterns. Trade between the United States and East Asia has outstripped U.S. trade with Western Europe since the mid-1970s; this trend is all but certain to become even more pronounced in the coming decade. The expectations within these societies of a continued, stable U.S. presence (in both political and military terms) has also increased rather than diminished, as has American awareness of these expectations. The new pattern of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), while first evident at the outset of the 1970s, accelerated dramatically in the waning years of the decade, with the United States increasingly (and publicly) committed to the long-term goal of "a strong and secure China." Inasmuch as U.S. ties with Peking also presuppose a vigorous American involvement in Asia, there seems even less likelihood of a diminished U.S. role in this region.

Second, the unquestioned growth in Soviet political and military power in Asia and the increasing extension of the Sino-Soviet lines of cleavage to Asian regional disputes have placed the security issues of the area in a strikingly different light. Many observers have noted that military power appears to be the central (and, some would argue, the exclusive) instrument of Soviet influence in East Asia. The cementing of Soviet-Vietnamese ties in 1978 and Moscow's subsequent access to the naval and air facilities in Vietnam, along with a further enhancing of Soviet ground, naval, air, and strategic assets deployed to Northeast Asia, underscore this increased presence. Judgments about the effectiveness of these forces in enhancing Soviet political objectives in the region remain far less certain, but the salience of these considerations for various regional actors (not to mention the United States) has increased measurably.

A third factor (related to both previous considerations) is intellectual as much as political: a significant degree of revisionism in
judging the relevance of military power in contemporary international politics. If for a time increasing emphasis was devoted to the notion of global issues (for example, energy and North-South relations) transcending the traditional agenda of international relations, this view has now been supplanted if not wholly discarded. It has become increasingly clear that "power oriented" views of the international system as well as "value oriented" approaches are inextricably intertwined. No doubt the renewed attention to the role of military power testifies to the passage of time from the traumas of the Vietnam era. Yet it also reflects a heightened awareness that in the elite political cultures of other key global actors (notably, both the USSR and the PRC), prevailing attitudes about the accumulation and use of military force remain profoundly different. To leaders in both Moscow and Peking, the existence of military strength (irrespective of the economic constraints evident in both societies) is inseparable from the maintenance and enhancement of national power. Military power and interstate conflict are thus perceived not as aberrational phenomena, but integral to the dynamics of the international system. This is not to suggest that all leaders in the USSR and PRC are thinly disguised militarists, but that the accumulation of military power has had a singular and recurring importance in the historical experiences of both elites. Such considerations are given a far more serious hearing today than they were only a few years ago.

Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, hindsight suggests that the events of 1975 represented a beginning, not an end. A coincidence of domestic and external trends, especially those involving China, set new international patterns in motion whose consequences continue to be felt today. Vietnam's consolidation of power throughout most of Indochina; Deng Xiaoping's momentary consolidation of power within China (interrupted by
the convulsive events of 1976); and a sense of profound strategic change in
the superpower relationship all contributed to an admittedly inchoate
impression of historic realignment in global political and military
relations. To gain a degree of perspective on these tumultuous changes, we
need to turn briefly to the concept of strategy and its relation to China's
national security.

Global Strategy and Chinese Security in the 1980s

The renewed salience of national security (both as a political and
intellectual issue) has heightened attention on the subject of strategic
thought. Indeed, Chinese insistence that international events be evaluated
from "the higher plane of global strategy" has contributed significantly to
this awareness. Long-standing Chinese traditions of strategy and
statecraft (not to mention a Marxist-Leninist frame of reference) stand in
marked contrast to an American preference for "logic of the situation"
analysis. To the Chinese, issues of strategy and security are best
understood as a process, not a terminal policy objective. PRC writings
suggest that we cannot freeze events in time and place, since this lends a
far too static quality to what are always highly dynamic international
processes.

Chinese analysts and policymakers alike, however, still seem reluctant
to depart from the global logic underlying their strategic pronouncements
and define a more explicit regional identity and posture. Does this
suggest modesty or uncertainty on their part about China's prospective
international role in the 1980s? While there is a certain comfort in
assuming a largely reactive stance in relation to global political and
military trends, one suspects that China protests too much in this regard.
To acknowledge a more explicit and even pivotal identity and posture would

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draw the PRC into the maelstrom of great power activity that Peking long tried to avoid. Although the PRC has in the past sought to insulate itself against global strategic trends, China has been a central participant in most of the major transformations of the international system since the end of the Second World War. We do not need to review this historical record to appreciate that China has long been a key factor--and as a player, not a "card"--in global as well as regional politics. No state has system-transforming capabilities comparable to China's. The test for China in the 1980s, therefore, will be to devise a regional security perspective which pays heed to both China's limits and potentialities as a political and military actor, seeking somehow to combine the strategic imperatives worrisome to Peking with the more immediate consequences of China's role as the dominant (if not dominating) Asian power.

In the coming decade, therefore, China will be increasingly compelled to assess its role as a regional power. It is in Asia that the PRC has engaged in armed conflict, sought to avoid encirclement and isolation, and has proven capable of exerting substantial influence in relation to other states. The goal of securing a regional environment supportive of Chinese policy directions remains central to PRC strategic planning, all the more so given China's absence of "global reach." Yet this goal requires a set of differentiated responses and actions in relation to other powers. They range from cultivating growing diplomatic and security bonds with the West and Japan and assuring predictable, long-term sources of economic and technical assistance for China's overall modernization effort, to winning friends and influencing people among the smaller states of Asia who must live in the shadow of both Soviet and Chinese power and seeking to pressure or intimidate others defiant of Chinese expectations and solicitations.
The range and complexity of these issues complicate these tasks considerably.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Chinese in certain respects have been so circumspect in publicly defining a security strategy for the 1980s. Even the central preoccupation on this policy agenda—the long-term Sino-Soviet political and military competition—remains subject to considerable ambiguity and diversity in leadership opinion. The Chinese are only too aware of the consequences of a debilitating frontal military confrontation with the Soviet Union—a confrontation, moreover, that Peking (in purely physical terms) cannot possibly hope to dominate. Leaders in the PRC also remain highly mindful that what Liddell Hart termed the "indirect approach" to strategy far more effectively serves the interests of the weaker, more vulnerable power. The Chinese remember only too well that the U.S. threat to China was ultimately removed without China having to fire as much as a single shot; an equivalent long-term logic may well pertain vis-a-vis the USSR.

Other tasks also confront Peking in formulating and achieving the goals of a more powerful and secure China. China's emergence as a modern major power in world and regional politics cannot be pursued independent of a range of economic and political factors, both at home and abroad. The overall character of China's relations with the outside world—whether with adversaries or with friends—will continue to exert a pivotal influence on the scope, pace, and direction of the PRC's modernization effort. Indeed, the relative political fortunes (or misfortunes) of various Chinese leaders seem certain to be strongly affected by the degree of success in China's programs for national economic development. Pursuit of these programs will depend on China's adversarial relations not degenerating into open-ended military conflicts. At the same time, China must seek to develop long-term
relations with external political and economic forces (both states and multinational institutions) which will facilitate Peking's effort at enhancing its indigenous manpower and management capabilities and in improving upon the present levels of its agricultural, industrial, and defense technology.

Such objectives are readily discernible in China's effort of recent years to secure "a long-term peaceful international environment" within which to pursue national development goals. The leadership's commitment reflects a decision to buy time rather than race against it. As acknowledged by the Chinese in their own writings, the nation must avoid the more heated (and even frenzied) pursuit of various development goals, since this approach more often than not has contributed to China's repeated shortcomings in economic development. A siege mentality seems incompatible with a more measured, orderly effort to rectify the extraordinary difficulties confronting Peking's economic planners.

No matter what the political atmosphere accompanying this modernization effort, China's bureaucratic and political groupings cannot be expected to share equally in the results of these policies. While only a small circle of institutional interests could possibly have stood to gain from the convulsive politics of the 1960s and much of the 1970s, the available political and budgetary resources remain limited, and thus the object of continued political competition within China. Nowhere is this more apparent than among military policymakers. As a consequence both of China's economic retrenchment and Peking's political and diplomatic successes, the exclusively military element in China's national security equation has diminished considerably. The military leadership, disgruntled by their reduced political role in recent years, have been given little choice but to accept a subordinate status in China's modernization effort.

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Yet China's generals remain all too aware of the shortcomings of Peking's armed forces in terms of logistics, organization, training, and readiness. Deficiencies in weaponry and the parallel need to upgrade Chinese approaches to military doctrine are of potentially even greater magnitude: they can only be rectified by the infusion of major resources (institutional as well as budgetary) for a sustained period of time. If the likelihood of major armed conflict is judged slight, the political justification for greater and more immediate attention to China's military needs is judged less compelling than competing organizational and economic priorities. Indeed, however foreboding the tenor of many recent Chinese strategic writings, several conclusions are incontestable. According to Peking, the Soviet Union's pursuit of "world hegemony" is waged by political as much as by military means; at the same time, the immediate military challenge to China is considered far less pressing than the Soviet threat in the more vulnerable, unstable areas, notably Afghanistan and Kampuchea. As a consequence of these and related judgments, China's dominant political forces have greatly diminished the voice and weight of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) high command. The appearance of non-military figures at the highest levels of the military leadership (notably, Geng Biao's designation as Minister of National Defense and Yang Shangkun's appointment as Secretary General of the Party's Military Commission) lends further credence to these developments.

Nevertheless, it seems premature to relegate the exclusively military element of Chinese national security policy to a lower status within China for the duration of this decade. China's immediate security environment could turn more confrontational, or could be judged so imbalanced as to require more urgent efforts at rectifying the deficiencies in the Chinese armed forces. Defense policymakers, perhaps persuaded that their own needs
have been deemphasized to the point of neglect, could again assert their interests far more vocally. Indeed, they may well insist that their continued acquiescence to current policy priorities sooner or later must require compensation in terms of heightened attention to their specific concerns and budgetary requirements. To justify the risks engendered by China's "tilt" toward the United States (for example, the risk of an indefinite prolongation of the Chinese civil war), Deng Xiaoping and his allies must persuade China's high command that they stand to benefit substantially by this policy, as well. Under circumstances where U.S. policy has been more favorably disposed toward the transfer of sensitive defense technology to the PRC, the Chinese armed forces could in time derive substantial benefits from this relationship. Finally, with Deng's ultimate passing from the political scene, it may prove far more difficult for his designated successors to maintain as firm a grip on the overall directions of national security policy.

These observations suggest that unduly rigid demarcations between China's internal and external policymaking obscure a much more complicated political dynamic. Rarified discussions of global strategy bear directly on the allocation of scarce resources; more generally, they evaluate the nature of the contemporary international situation and the policies they permit or support. Chinese economic planners in particular benefit by a relatively benign (or at least not overly threatening) external environment, since it enables pursuit of China's developmental objectives unfettered by worries that war might be imminent or unavoidable. Thus, assessments of China's security environment (global as well as regional) assume an ongoing salience, and not only for the Chinese high command. To assess these issues further, we need to turn our attention briefly to the politics of the Sino-Soviet-American "triangle."
The Superpowers and China's National Security

China's highly political conception of national security finds its most concrete and significant expression in the PRC's complicated dealings with the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, for all of Peking's declaratory contempt for a world dominated by two superpowers, it is not entirely clear whether the Chinese are all that troubled by such circumstances. To the extent that Washington and Moscow remain powers distinct from all others locked in a long-term competition on a global basis, their rivalry deflects political and military pressure that either (or both) might otherwise direct against China. Since the initial breakthroughs in U.S.-Chinese relations of the early 1970s, the Chinese have been only too aware of how such "contention" could be turned to China's advantage. The dilemma, as always, has been to cast China as an important but not pivotal factor in the Soviet-American competition, thereby positioning China as an independent strategic asset whose power could develop apart from the superpower fray.

Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the assumptions in the logic of a "strategic triangle" began to prove more questionable. The issue of whether China could in fact stand apart from the global competition was increasingly challenged by a Soviet effort to heighten both political and military pressure against the PRC, while U.S.-Chinese relations foundered on domestic uncertainties and instabilities in both systems. Equally significant, the commitment of Mao and others to a largely autarkic conception of economic development resulted in China falling even farther behind world levels of economic, scientific, and educational achievement. Under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping (and with increasing American interest in facilitating the advancement of China's defense and development), Peking justified a burgeoning relationship with the United States as both a
strategic and economic necessity. The "united front" logic pursued so assiduously by the Chinese meant that Washington and Moscow could no longer be deemed co-equal threats to global or regional stability. It also assumed that the United States and other Western powers could serve as dependable sources of economic and technological assistance for China (including the defense sector) in the face of a growing Soviet challenge. China, in effect, yet again had chosen to "lean to one side," and on equally compelling grounds of national security and economic development as had governed the Sino-Soviet alliance of the early 1950s.

Yet the resurrection of a united front strategy in recent years does not mean that the stark bipolarity of the early Cold War era will characterize the international system of the 1980s. Even as the Chinese insist that their dealings with the West are of a strategic, long-term nature, it is only too apparent that political and diplomatic alignments in the coming decade will remain highly fluid. The PRC leadership has consistently indicated that its conception of an anti-Soviet security coalition remains informal rather than highly institutionalized. Based on Peking's unhappy experiences with Moscow in decades past, a "never again" mentality pervades Chinese security planning. China will therefore avoid an overly dependent, entangling alliance with the U.S., no matter how substantial the seeming benefits of this relationship to the PRC. As the recent tensions surrounding the Taiwan issue suggest, misconceptions or reversals in various national policies continue to place limits on a fuller American and Chinese security relationship. At the same time, both Peking and Washington (for somewhat different reasons) share an interest in avoiding any direct military confrontation with the USSR. Thus, both elites remain aware that the scope of their dealings will be closely followed in Moscow. Even as Peking and Washington seek to move forward in
their relationship, they do not wish to take steps that preclude more positive relations with the Soviet Union when and if separate national interests could benefit by such a change.

These observations are not intended to slight the very real gains for Peking as well as Washington in closer (if not wholly intimate) U.S.-Chinese relations. Both leaderships benefit substantially by no longer having to plan seriously for war against each other; both can and do facilitate parallel security objectives in Asia, in particular countering the expansion of Soviet power. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that Chinese expectations of the U.S. may have less to do with the direct assistance America might provide for China's defense modernization and more to do with assuring a stable, predictable American political-military role in a manner consonant with Chinese policy goals. At the same time, the United States benefits by China turning its attention to the tasks of internal reconstruction, with Peking's concomitant effort to secure positive ties with most of the smaller states along its periphery.

In practical terms, however, some of the limits of an American-Chinese security relationship become more evident. The United States remains mindful that numerous states in Asia continue to voice concern that the U.S. might become overly identified with the growth of Chinese power, which could prove detrimental to various regional actors. Notwithstanding heightened U.S. willingness to transfer critical defense technologies to China, regional sensitivities thus set limits on the scope and pace of such transfers. At the same time, Chinese budgetary and manpower deficiencies will constrain both Peking's capacities to purchase significant quantities of equipment and the PRC's capability to absorb and fully utilize such technology. Perhaps most critically, however, China's steadfast insistence on maintaining control over its defense planning and programs will set
limits on the types of technologies to which China might gain access and the manner of their transfer. Leaders in Peking have consistently indicated that their principal interest is in upgrading their defense industrial structure, not in purchasing significant quantities of "off-the-shelf" weaponry. Yet transfer of such means of production raises extremely sensitive issues related to the potential end uses of advanced technology. Whether and how the PRC might be willing to accede to U.S. insistence on end use guarantees on various items and technologies speaks to central issues of Chinese sovereignty and autonomy. To prove overly yielding to the U.S. on this issue would be exceptionally risky for any Chinese leader, all the more so when the U.S. (in Peking's view) has been equivocating on its earlier commitments to the principle of one China.

Thus, it is shared concern over the growth of Soviet power which more than any other factor continues to draw China and America together. Undeniably, the globalization of the Soviet political-military role has placed the USSR's position as an Asian power in a different light. At the close of the 1970s, Soviet actions throughout Asia--in Afghanistan, in Southeast Asia, along the Sino-Soviet border, on the territories disputed with Japan, and in the Pacific--had greatly accelerated the development which Moscow feared the most: the coalescence of an anti-Soviet security coalition in Asia paralleling (if not duplicating) the U.S. alliance with Western Europe. Under such circumstances, historic Soviet concerns about a two-front war have grown substantially.

Indeed, the Chinese have recurrently raised the issue of whether Soviet military power is best judged an indication of strength or weakness. Increasing Soviet assets tied down in Asia as well as Europe, but with questionable political gains; a heightened strategic and naval rivalry with the United States; continuing problems in Eastern Europe along with a live
if limited war in Afghanistan; and major aid commitments to Cuba and Vietnam all suggest the growing "burdens of empire" which the USSR must address in the context of declining economic growth rates, growing ethnic tensions, and an impending leadership transition.

Can this reliance on what Liddell Hart terms the "acquisitive approach" to grand strategy be sustained throughout the 1980s? Chinese strategic thinkers seem somewhat divided or at least uncertain about this pivotal question. To the extent that Soviet leadership calculations can be influenced by the actions of others, however, the dominant view in Peking sees an urgent need to constrain and complicate the unfettered exercise of Soviet power or the actions of those deemed Soviet surrogates. According to Chinese officials, this need is particularly critical in the cases of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, since consolidation or legitimation of a direct or indirect Soviet presence in either location involves direct gains for Moscow's power in areas where its influence had previously been more limited. The contrast between Soviet activity in these areas and continuing instabilities in Eastern Europe is obvious, but worth noting. Thus, when and if the Soviet Union moves more decisively to reverse the pattern of events in Poland, Chinese leaders would appropriately view such actions as reasserting Soviet hegemony in an area where Moscow has long been the predominant power. Potential gains for the Soviet Union in Asia, however, are in geographic locations immediately proximate to China. They would also represent very real transfers of political "real estate" in Moscow's long-term effort to encircle the PRC.

Thus, the interpretation of Soviet political-military strategy (in both global and Asian terms) has assumed a pivotal importance for China's leaders in the 1980s. Chinese strategic assessment, as noted in a previous section, focuses on the evaluation of long-term capabilities, constraints,
goals, and calculations, rather than short-term planning. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the Chinese have a vital stake in avoiding the outbreak of major war. It is difficult to see how leaders in Peking would possibly benefit by such an event. By instead seeking to deflect direct Soviet pressure against China and by continuing to assert that Soviet power is directed most immediately against nations and regions far more vulnerable to penetration than the PRC, Peking hopes to create a situation of neither war nor peace. The deferral of more rapid acquisition of fully modernized defense capabilities and the concentration on the long-term rehabilitation of the Chinese economy represent steps that are not lost upon decision-makers in the USSR. Thus, in the continuing "great game" between Moscow and Peking, both elites could well see the benefits in a modulated long-term political and military competition, irrespective of underlying historical, racial, or territorial conflicts.

Such judgments no doubt contrast with a widespread view that Sino-Soviet differences and hostilities are so widespread and deep-seated as to preclude reasonable state-to-state relations. A fuller picture of the long-term Sino-Soviet rivalry thus contains elements of both a wider (and often strident) political competition in both the Communist and non-Communist world as well as the narrower sphere of interstate relations. If the immediate Soviet threat to China can be ameliorated by political and diplomatic means and by judicious, non-provocative steps to enhance China's military power, political sentiment in both capitals could coalesce around a less confrontational posture in Sino-Soviet relations. Even under present circumstances, "rules of the game" have evolved whereby leaders in Moscow and Peking have chosen not to test the stability of the Sino-Soviet deterrence equation. The emergence of such tacit restraints over the past decade has surely not been lost on military planners in either capital.
As the Chinese recurrently suggest, therefore, there is no single undifferentiated "Soviet threat" upon which all those states deemed part of the "anti-hegemony united front" can agree to act in concert. According to Peking, the imperatives prevailing in one region can differ markedly with circumstances elsewhere. It is thus hardly surprising that the Chinese see their interests best served by informal security arrangements with the West, since none of the involved parties is bound to highly explicit responsibilities and expectations. By instead seeking common or parallel ground on specific issues and actions, and on largely bilateral terms, the encumbrances of more rigid, formalized security ties can thereby be avoided. As a consequence, China's freedom of action--political as well as military--will remain considerable, particularly within those areas where Chinese military power is more likely to be employed. Some of these considerations become apparent by turning attention to Peking's emergent regional security environment.

The Regional Security Environment

China's understandable preoccupation with the Soviet-American rivalry and Peking's relations with both superpowers obscures a more immediate issue: the PRC's present and future role in East Asia. It is frequently noted that China (with respect to most conventional measures of great power status) will remain a regional rather than global power throughout the coming decade. To the smaller states which must live in the shadow of Chinese power, Peking can only continue to be a source of long-term concern, no matter how backward China might appear in comparison to the advanced industrial states. Thus, China's growing voice and activities in world politics and the all but certain enhancement of Chinese industrial
and military power, now abetted by Western assistance, will serve as pivotal factors in the Asian political-military environment of the 1980s.

These considerations assume increased urgency in the context of renewed great power rivalry in Asia evident toward the end of the 1970s. Notwithstanding the growing political and economic autonomy of various states in the region, it is only too apparent that further polarization in Asia threatens these developments. To these emerging regional powers, Asian security should be cast neither in narrow military terms nor as simply the extension of great power competition from other areas. The Chinese, however, have yet to articulate a view of regional developments which considers fully the implications of this growing devolution of national power. By continuing to cast regional security not in Asian but in global terms, the Chinese leadership avoids or ignores issues of paramount concern to states along China's periphery.

Foremost among these considerations is whether China will assume an increasingly assertive role as Asia's foremost military power. Though China continues to depict its military role as purely defensive in intent and action, it is doubtful that many observers in Asia are reassured by such claims. This is not to suggest that Peking will soon or suddenly embark upon a classic expansionist role for achieving its security objectives. The economic and political benefits of the indirect approach to strategy discussed earlier are all too obvious to leaders who wish to restrain the demands of the defense sector on the Chinese economy as a whole. Moreover, the PRC leadership understands how rapidly it could fritter away its political gains in Asia by resorting more fully to the use of military power.

Yet certain facts remain inescapable. In absolute terms, China's armed forces already constitute one of the world's most imposing military
establishments. When key Chinese interests have been threatened in the past, the PRC has shown little hesitancy about resorting to force to achieve its political ends. The PRC leadership continues to voice concern about a number of such issues, with China not only retaining the military option, but steadily if slowly improving on its military assets. When the prospect of considerable access to Western technological assistance is added to this picture, it is hardly surprising that Chinese pledges of defensive intent are greeted with suspicion in many other Asian capitals.

China's troubled dealings with Vietnam in recent years offer some instinctive examples in this regard. Without seeking to apportion responsibility to either Peking or Hanoi for the rapid and remarkable deterioration in interstate relations, both elites saw fit to rely on highly coercive approaches (Vietnam in Kampuchea and China against Vietnam) to achieve their goals of countering each other's power. The Chinese, however, have from the first insisted that their actions have nothing to do with regional power rivalries or the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. In an ironic transposition from the mid-1960s (when U.S. officials argued that Vietnam was a cat's paws for Chinese revolutionary expansionism), Peking argues that Vietnam is a pure and simple accomplice of the USSR. By designating Vietnam as the "lesser hegemonist," the PRC has thereby been able to depict its avowedly punitive policies as directed not against Hanoi, but against Moscow. Not surprisingly, such a distinction may be readily lost upon other nations in the area, many of whom view Chinese actions in a far less benign light. The crossing of national boundaries with large numbers of troops--however brief Chinese operations may have been--conveys a very potent message about China's willingness and ability to act forcefully.
More broadly, China's overall strategy towards Vietnam aims at Hanoi's international isolation and economic and military exhaustion. It thus increases rather than decreases Vietnam's dependence upon the Soviet Union, providing Moscow with new opportunities to exercise its influence on the region. China's approach is based on a belief that the leadership in Hanoi will respond only to pressure and punishment. In view of the intransigence of leaders in both Hanoi and Peking and the history of Indochina over the past three and a half decades, it is doubtful in the extreme that such an approach will contribute to a reasonable political settlement in the area.

Moreover, if China's strategy toward Vietnam should succeed, its principal long-term consequence would be to provide Peking with a decisive say in the affairs of Southeast Asia. Even now, the affiliations of the non-Communist nations in the area have become the object of solicitation (mixed intermittently with pressure and intimidation) by the central parties to the armed conflicts. Yet China steadfastly refuses to dissociate itself from the Pol Pot forces in Kampuchea; there is also very little evidence to indicate China's willingness to tolerate the existence of a powerful Vietnam acting independently of Peking. It is little wonder that so many in Southeast Asia doubt the sincerity and durability of China's long-term intentions toward the area.

It is possible, however, that some elements in the Chinese leadership have doubts about the wisdom of their long-term policy towards Vietnam. Irrespective of geographic proximity, Hanoi seems no more likely to prove pliant and accommodating to China than it was to France or the United States in earlier conflicts. At the same time, the militarization of the Sino-Vietnamese border and the enhanced Soviet military presence in and around Indochina have created new and potentially serious security problems for the PRC. The tacit limits sought by Peking in order to avoid conflict...
escalation along the Sino-Soviet border find few if any parallels in China's actions to the south. Some leaders in Peking may have cause to wonder how much security has been achieved by the opening of a major new combat front to the south where the economic, political as well as military requirements could well prove substantial and long-term.

Yet Vietnam is not the only powerful, independent-minded regional Communist power with which China must deal. Notwithstanding China's long and close ties to North Korea, there are immediate comparisons one can draw with Vietnam. However great Kim Il-song's suspicions of the Soviet Union, he is no more likely than Le Duan to prove pliant and yielding to Chinese policy preferences when they differ from his own. North Korea's vocal and unambiguous denunciations of American policy in Northeast Asia--a region where China has a strong interest in maintaining a considerable U.S. presence--provide ample testimony to this fact.

The risks and dilemmas for Peking in this case are very great. At one level, the Chinese cannot afford to offend Pyongyang's sensibilities; thus they continue to provide declaratory support for North Korea's long-term policy objectives. At the same time, however, Deng Xiaoping has sought to reassure the United States of the clear Chinese interest in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. This delicate balancing act requires a degree of Chinese disassociation from some of the North's more provocative views of U.S. and Japanese policy, yet without running major risks to China's long-term relationship with and commitment to Pyongyang. Yet Kim, like Vietnam's leaders, has both the opportunity and capability to act independent of the PRC. This does not mean that China in some inevitable way will face a moment of decision vis-a-vis the North comparable to its outright break with Vietnam in 1978, but the general circumstances cannot preclude this possibility. China may then yet again have to ask whether
and how it is prepared to live with a powerful if smaller state on its borders (whether Communist or non-Communist) that acts on its own behalf, no matter what the consequences for its relations with China.

It is clear, therefore, that the 1980s could well force the Chinese to confront the limits of their strategic vision in several respects. In both the Communist and non-Communist world, the multiplicity of national voices and the capability to pursue distinct national interests continue to grow. The time may not be too far distant when the Chinese will have to concede that issues of international security derive from far more than the machinations of one or another "hegemonic" power. At the same time, it will prove increasingly difficult for China to continue to describe itself as a defensive inferior power which seeks simply to deflect challenges to PRC sovereignty and security. Indeed, broader political-economic trends in Asia may well point in contrary directions. To consider this issue further, we need to turn briefly to the possible consequences of China's emergence in Asian politics in the coming decade.

Some Concluding Observations

The dramatic and even remarkable departures in Chinese policymaking in recent years have provoked considerable speculation on both the limits and consequences of political change, both within China and in terms of China's international role. There seems little doubt that leaders in the People's Republic have a growing stake in the international system, with China assuming a larger and vital presence in both Asian and global affairs. As we have tried to demonstrate, much of this change was generated by an increasing recognition of China's vulnerability and international isolation. Yet, to the extent that China was no longer able to stand apart from the international system as a whole, the need for China to reconsider
the viability of its past approaches to diplomacy, security, and economic
development has also increased.

How far might this process lead? How seriously, for example, have the
Chinese thought not only about the growth of Soviet power, but about the
political and economic transformations underway within Asia independent of
either of the superpowers? How long and how much can a highly centralized
planned economy such as China's continue to facilitate the pledges of
Peking's leaders to achieve breakthroughs in economic development? To what
extent do the Chinese see the need to accommodate to the economic,
technological, institutional, and commercial practices, not only of the
West, but of the newly industrializing societies of Asia? What risk does
such accommodation pose to China's professed commitment to Marxist-Leninist
values? And to what extent will coercion (or the threat of coercion) serve
as a pivotal factor in China's security strategy, or are other approaches
feasible and less costly?

There are no obvious answers to these questions, nor does it appear
that all levels of the Chinese leadership hierarchy have demonstrated equal
creativity in "emancipating the mind." Yet the long-term prospects for
stability and peace in Asia could well depend on how fully and
unequivocally China is prepared to interact with the outside world,
irrespective of how others approach issues of international security and
development. Thus, as China seeks to move more fully into the ranks of the
industrializing countries, its power and influence will be felt first and
foremost in Asia. No one can dispute that China will have a central role
to play in determining Asia's political, economic, and security courses in
the coming decade. It remains for the Chinese not only to recognize this
role, but to weigh the potential effects of the growth of Chinese economic,
political, and military power. Leaders in Peking will hopefully appreciate
their potential contribution if Asia in the coming decade is to break out of its long, unhappy history of major power competition and armed conflict.
The objective of this paper is to delineate South Korean perceptions of matters that have a bearing on their country's national security policy. A virtual obsession with the threat of North Korea pervades the thinking of South Koreans. For them, it is an article of faith that North Korea has both the intent and military capability to unify Korea by force. This belief is related to their interpretation of the North Korean theory and strategy of unification. North Korea views unification as the liberation of South Korean compatriots from the "yoke of American colonialism and imperialism" and its "puppets" in the South. The revolution to which North Korea is committed is not complete without a corresponding revolution in the South. North Korea has maintained that there is no more urgent and supreme national task than unification of the country. The South Koreans see North Korea's commitment to the goal of unification as a powerful driving force shaping its actions.

On numerous occasions North Korea has affirmed its desire for and commitment to a peaceful approach to reunification. According to the North Korean view, peaceful unification is possible only when a successful revolution in South Korea results in the expulsion of "American imperialism" and the overthrow of its "puppets," thereby establishing a "people's democratic government." This conception, the South Koreans argue, is proof that North Korea has not, and indeed, cannot abandon the goal of the forcible overthrow of the South Korean government.

*This paper is primarily based on the conversations the author has had with South Korean analysts in recent years.
The North Koreans also say that another peaceful method would be operative if a patriotic and nationalistic government were established in South Korea. Presumably, such a government would successfully confer with North Korea regarding the issue of a unified political authority. The South Koreans argue that the North Korean definition of "patriotic, nationalistic, and democratic" leaders who would lead such a government means only those who would accept North Korea's terms for unification.

An alternative peaceful method that the North Koreans propose is the establishment of a confederation. To the South Koreans the idea of a confederation is a sinister scheme for subversion and eventual control of the South.

According to the official view held in Pyongyang, the possibility of war arises only if war is forced upon the North by the South. In that event, the "imperialistic" forces would be defeated and the "war for the liberation of the South" would be won. The South Koreans contend that, since North Korea still claims that the South started the 1950 war, North Korea could initiate a war at any time and claim that it was responding to the invading forces of the South. The South Koreans insist that North Korea intends to employ military means for realizing its goal of unification.

Aside from these interpretations of the North Korean "theory" of unification, the South Koreans find clear evidence of Pyongyang's aggressive intent in the record of North Korea's behavior, especially in the following:

1) North Korea has advocated the overthrow of the government in the South in unequivocal terms;

2) North Korea has insisted that the American military presence in South Korea be terminated;
3) North Korea has persistently rejected South Korean proposals designed to reduce the tensions between the two Koreas. The proposals include calls for economic and cultural exchange, the negotiation of a non-aggression pact, and a summit meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea. For South Korea, the North's categorical refusal to negotiate a bilateral non-use-of-force agreement is a most eloquent testimony of North Korea's aggressive intent.

4) North Korea has persisted in its claim that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the sole legal government for all of Korea. North Korea has never acknowledged the legitimacy of the government in the South.

Evidence of North Korean aggressive intent is not limited to the spoken and written word, however. South Korea cites specific instances of aggressive behavior as well, namely:

1) a series of armed infiltrations into South Korea, the most dramatic of which was an attempted raid on the Blue House (the presidential office and residence);

2) the North Korean capture of a U.S. vessel, the Pueblo;

3) the construction of underground tunnels in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area; and

4) North Korea's all-out invasion of the South in 1950.

South Korean analysts believe the North Korean military capability to be far superior to their own. They express particular concern about North Korean firepower and mobility. In terms of tanks, artillery, and tactical aircraft, North Korea has a two- or three-to-one advantage. This ratio is four to one in naval vessels. North Korea is also considered superior in defense production and logistical preparedness; and this preparedness further reinforces South Korea's perception of North Korea's aggressive
intentions. Specifically, certain developments and activities in North Korea are cited:

1) the forward deployment of substantial combat forces;
2) a sharp increase in tanks and artillery units in the forward areas;
3) the construction of naval bases near the DMZ and a few airfields in the forward areas;
4) the construction of hardened facilities, especially in the forward areas;
5) the fortification of the northern half of the DMZ;
6) the construction of tunnels underneath the DMZ; and
7) the augmentation of the Special Forces.

The scope of the threat is further augmented when North Korea's allies are considered. In the view of the South Koreans, the probability of a North Korean attack on the South is shaped in part by the character of North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The South Koreans are fully conscious that Pyongyang's two important allies have contiguous land borders with North Korea and that the mutual defense treaty North Korea has with each of these allies provides for prompt military assistance.

Both the Soviet Union and the PRC have expressed their strong support—at least publicly—for the North Korean policy of unification. Neither has responded to South Korea's overtures for official government-level contacts. The Soviet Union has permitted limited private contacts, while the PRC has shunned practically all forms of contact with the Republic of Korea. Both supply military and economic assistance to the Pyongyang government. The Soviet Union provides North Korea with highly sophisticated weapon systems. If war occurs, the South Koreans feel
certain that both the Soviet Union and the PRC would, perhaps reluctantly, be drawn into it against South Korea and the United States.

The increasing level of cooperation between the United States and the PRC, and between Japan and the PRC has somewhat attenuated the intensity of South Korea's concern about the PRC. In view of China's preoccupation with modernization as well as its concern for the Soviet Union, the PRC is thought to desire stability in the Korean peninsula. The outbreak of war would be likely to increase North Korea's dependence on the Soviet Union. China, the South Koreans reason, would not want greater Soviet influence over North Korea. The Soviet policy toward Korea is thought to be constrained by a desire to avoid military confrontation with the United States. Until recently, South Koreans saw a degree of Soviet restraint operating on North Korea. Lately, however, the South Koreans have become fearful that, as Moscow perceives an increase in anti-Soviet cooperation among the United States, the PRC, and Japan, Soviet restraint may not last long.

According to South Korean analysts, war on the Korean peninsula is most likely to be initiated by surprise attacks from the North Korean Special Forces on such targets in the rear of South Korea as military, industrial, and communication installations. The Special Forces units would reach South Korean targets by air, sea, and ground. This, they reason, would be followed by a blitzkrieg invasion across the DMZ designed to conquer the entire country within a week or two. Such a strategy would be designed to subjugate South Korea militarily before any effective assistance could arrive from the continental United States. Thus, the U.S. government would be confronted with a fait accompli regarding the fall of all of South Korea.
Another scenario envisages a North Korean invasion of Seoul. Depending on U.S. counter-measures North Korea, upon capturing that city, might call for a ceasefire and negotiations. The conquest of Seoul, however, would lead to an effective strangulation of South Korea.

Still another scenario envisages limited North Korean attacks on the five islands on the West coast. The successful seizure of the islands might or might not be followed by attacks elsewhere. North Korea would gain not only an important strategic, naval advantage but also important political and psychological victories. The lack of a firm military response by the United States would severely test relations between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. Disregarding U.S. restraint, South Korea might retaliate unilaterally. Such an incident would probably heighten the level of American concern about the danger of U.S. involvement in a ground war in Korea, giving rise to domestic pressures for U.S. disengagement.

Any discussion of South Korean security policy would be incomplete without some survey of South Korea's conception of effective deterrence and countermeasures. South Korean analysts are firm in their belief that the most important deterrent to North Korean attacks on the South has been the presence of U.S. military forces, especially ground forces. The strength of these troops units and their deployment below the DMZ have been such that North Koreans know that their attack would bring about a virtually automatic U.S. military involvement. Furthermore, the South Koreans acknowledge that a number of other factors have contributed to the overall effectiveness of deterrence. First, a substantial consensus exists in South Korea regarding the question of opposition to the North Korean regime and rule. North Korea would have to overcome deep anti-Communist--more accurately, anti-North Korean--sentiments to generate South Korean support for its policies. This has not been conducive to any unconventional
operations by the North. Second, the South Korean government is conscious that the economic development achieved under the late President Park has contributed to the political stability in the South. And third, the South Korean government is aware that stability on the Korean peninsula can be sustained only by a favorable distribution of regional power, in particular the military capabilities of the United States vis-a-vis North Korea and its allies. Thus, the South Korean government is sensitive to any developments that might alter the balance of power in the region.

In recent years the growing Soviet military capability has been worrying the South Korean government. The shift of the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union would make the Soviet Union and the PRC less sensitive to U.S. objectives in South Korea. Similarly, North Korea might be more willing to take risks in the belief that the Soviet Union could effectively neutralize any U.S. countermeasures.

South Korean analysts have watched with increasing dismay and concern what they view as signs of a paralysis of U.S. foreign and military policies, particularly under the Carter Administration. Recent developments that have deepened their anxiety include: the fall of South Vietnam, President Carter's initial policy of troop withdrawal, his decision not to produce the B-1 aircraft, his initial decision to defer production of neutron bombs, his weak response to Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the fall of the Shah and Carter's handling of the hostage crisis, and Carter's ineffectual response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. South Koreans are greatly concerned about the impact these developments might have on North Korea's (and her allies') perceptions of U.S. resolve and capabilities to defend South Korea.

To the South Koreans, the fall of their capital, Seoul, would be their demise. Whether militarily feasible or not, the South Korean government's
strategy advocates the destruction of any invading forces north of Seoul. Conscious of the military superiority of the North, the South Korean government has been striving to strengthen its own military capabilities by successive force modernization programs. The government considers it imperative that, in order to attain a desired degree of military self-sufficiency, the momentum of economic development be sustained. This, in turn, assumes a degree of political stability.

In relations with the Third World, with Japan, and with the U.S. South Korea has vigorously pursued what it calls "security-diplomacy." It has sought--without much success--political, economic, and cultural contacts with the Soviet Union and the PRC. The objectives are to lessen whatever enmity the Soviet Union and the PRC might feel toward South Korea and to provide these countries with some incentives to restrain North Korea. Even if the two countries lack leverage or make no attempt to restrain North Korea, a mere possibility of ties between South Korea and North Korea's allies might restrain North Korea. At the same time, South Korean analysts are concerned that any movement in South Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and/or the PRC might accelerate an American demarche toward North Korea without exacting corresponding flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union and the PRC.

South Korea has also sought to improve its relations with the Third World countries to ensure its access to natural resources and to win diplomatic support from non-aligned countries. In view of the North Korean diplomatic efforts directed toward these countries, such a policy is deemed essential. The South Koreans are convinced that as the magnitude of Japan's economic stake in South Korea increases, Japan's interest in the security of South Korea will become greater. They are, of course, aware of the constitutional and political constraints operating on Japan's military
role and do not expect any overt military assistance. Instead, they seek Japanese economic and technical assistance, which would accelerate South Korea's economic development and defense industry.

The South Koreans are also conscious of the indirect impact Japanese-South Korean ties would have on U.S. policy toward South Korea. They believe that as Japanese interests in South Korea become greater, the United States itself will attach greater importance to South Korea. This is not because Japan would attempt to exert greater influence on the United States on South Korea's behalf, but because the United States, as it became aware of Japanese sensitivity to South Korea's security, would also become more sensitive to South Korea's security interests. South Korean analysts are aware that the Japanese government's position on the troop withdrawal question was generally beneficial to South Korea. They feel that South Korean security is of vital importance to Japan's own security and expect Japan to provide more diplomatic and economic support. South Korea also expects Japan to try to persuade the Soviet Union and China to exert a moderating influence on North Korea.

South Korea does not object to normal trade and cultural relations between Japan and North Korea, but has expressed strong displeasure whenever political contacts have occurred. South Korea objects strenuously to Japan's export of items that would have military application.

To the South Koreans, the United States has always been the single most important ally and protector of their independence. They have not yet reconciled themselves to the idea that U.S. troops could someday be withdrawn. Using all means available, the South Korean government has attempted to prolong the U.S. military presence and to maximize American military assistance. Indeed, the history of South Korea's security policy
may be summarized as the history of a singular pursuit in strengthening political, economic, and military ties with the United States.

In 1953, the South Korean government insisted upon—and obtained—U.S. consent to the Mutual Defense Treaty. In 1965, South Korea dispatched combat troops to South Vietnam in compliance with American requests. Complex motivations underlay that decision. The sense of obligation to the United States for rallying to South Korea's defense in 1950-53 played a significant role. Of greater importance, the decision was made in the belief that the move would forestall a further withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.

Several incidents of the late 1960s contributed to the South Koreans' growing anxiety, both in general and concerning the U.S. The cautious attitude shown by the United States regarding the North Korean raid on the Blue House was one cause of major dissatisfaction. The U.S. response to the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo, especially secret negotiations conducted between the United States and North Korea, intensified South Korea's concern. Doubts grew about U.S. determination to deal decisively with North Korea's aggression. South Korea reacted to the situation by strengthening its military reserve system and announcing the establishment of a defense industry. The United States attempted to placate South Korea by agreeing to aid the development of South Korea's munitions industry and by increasing the level of U.S. military assistance to South Korea.

The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine came in July 1969, and during the following May, South Korea was informed of U.S. plans to withdraw the U.S. Second Division from Korea. During the ensuing period of negotiations, South Korea again sought unsuccessfully U.S. consent to transform the existing security treaty into a NATO-type of treaty. The U.S. government pledged to support a force modernization program.
Korea was to be further shocked, however, by the announcement in July 1971 of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking. In response, the South Koreans pursued with even greater intensity the development of its defense industry and a military modernization program. The fall of South Vietnam and the militant speech given by North Korean President Kim Il-song in Peking greatly heightened a sense of crisis and insecurity among the South Koreans. As a result, the implementation of the military modernization program was given even higher priority.

President Carter's decision in 1977 to withdraw U.S. ground forces within four to five years deepened South Korean concern about the dependability of U.S. defense commitments. The South Koreans found the U.S. government's rationale for the decision totally unconvincing. To them, the move signaled the erosion of America's political will to defend South Korea and the end of a certain and automatic involvement of U.S. forces in the event of war.

South Korea subsequently sought U.S. assistance in expanding its defense industry and in strengthening its military capabilities to compensate for the decreasing U.S. presence. South Korea grudgingly accepted the compensatory measures offered by the United States, but insisted that these measures be taken prior to or at least simultaneously with the U.S. troop withdrawal. The July 1979 announcement by the Carter Administration that further U.S. troop reduction would be held in abeyance until 1981 somewhat allayed the intensity of South Korea's concern and the sense of imminent crisis.

South Korean leaders greeted President Reagan's electoral victory with much enthusiasm. For them, the electoral outcome signified not only an end to American preoccupation with human rights, but also an end to the
vacillation and weakness in the conduct of U.S. foreign and military policies.

The result of the February 1981 summit meeting between President Reagan and President Chun Du-hwan far exceeded the expectations of the South Korean leadership. South Koreans were immensely gratified with the substantive contents of the talks as well as the symbolism that accompanied the meeting. They were duly impressed with the strong reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to South Korea's defense and with the willingness of the Reagan Administration to be forthcoming on weapons transfer and on the build-up of the South Korean defense industry.

South Korea has been extremely sensitive to any indications of the development of U.S.-North Korean relations. South Korea's position has been one of reciprocity, i.e., as long as North Korea's allies (the Soviet Union and the PRC) enter into the same level of relationship with South Korea, Seoul has no objection to comparable contacts between the U.S. and North Korea. In 1979, South Korea, together with the United States, called for a tripartite conference among the United States and North and South Korea. However, it remains opposed to the bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea in the absence of corresponding movement in the relations of South Korea with North Korean allies.

South Koreans generally viewed Congressman Stephen J. Solarz' trip to Pyongyang in 1980 with disfavor. South Koreans reason that North Korea's insistence on bilateral talks with the United States has the sole objective of terminating the U.S. military presence from Korea. This is precisely a major reason why South Korea is so sensitive to U.S.-North Korean contacts.

It should be noted, finally, that the perceptions discussed in the preceding pages are those of the South Korean government—or more accurately, the South Korean perceptions as I see them. Whether all of
them are consistent with reality or to what extent I share them are separate questions.
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