“THROUGH THE NATIONAL LENS”: NATIONALITY, TERRITORY, AND THE FORMATION OF “CRIMEAN-RUSSIAN” IDENTITY

By

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Austin Charron

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________________________________
Shannon O’Lear, Ph. D., Chair

________________________________
Barney Warf, Ph. D.

________________________________
Stephen Egbert, Ph. D.

________________________________
Alexander Tsiovkh, Ph. D.

Date Defended: 12/07/2012
The Thesis Committee for Austin Charron
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

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______________________________
Shannon O’Lear, Ph. D., Chair

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Abstract

Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea is a highly contested territory both culturally and politically. With an ethnic Russian majority and a sizeable population of indigenous Crimean Tatars living alongside ethnic Ukrainians within Ukrainian territory, national identities are particularly salient in Crimea. However, a strong sense of Crimean regional identity has also been shown to persist among members of all of Crimea’s ethno-national communities. Using survey data collected in the region, I demonstrate how the territory of Crimea itself figures prominently in competing narratives of national identity in the region and how Crimean regional identities are differentially negotiated and constructed through these narratives. I focus primarily on Crimea’s ethnic Russian population in order to define a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity as one that denotes an attachment to Crimea as viewed through a Russian “national lens” and understood through Russian national narratives. With this study I address the need to examine more critically the relationships between ethnic/national identities and the formation of territorially-based identities at scales below and across the nation-state.
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Chapter I: Introduction

This thesis takes a critical look at the dynamics between national and regional identity among residents of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea, with a particular focus on its ethnic Russian population. By examining the ways in which national and regional identities have been constructed in Crimea through competing national narratives about the region, I seek to elucidate and define a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity and ask the question: what roles do nationality and territory play in the formation of regional identities in Crimea and in similar regions around the world?

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea, located within the Crimean Peninsula in southern Ukraine, is home to a unique and diverse blend of ethnic groups. While it is a part of Ukraine, a majority of the population is ethnically Russian following years of inclusion within the Russian Empire and the Russian portion of the Soviet Union. In addition, Crimea is home to the indigenous Crimean Tatars – a Muslim, Turke-speaking group – as well as a myriad of small ethnic communities that have settled in the region over the course of centuries.

While Crimea has rightly been celebrated for its diversity and multiculturalism, these ethnic and cultural divides have also served as regional centrifugal forces, particularly in the post-Soviet era. Due to a relatively minor bureaucratic decision made in the 1950s, Crimea emerged from the Soviet period as a part of Ukraine and not of Russia, much to the chagrin and consternation of its ethnic Russian majority. As such, Russians in Crimea have generally expressed a weak sense of Ukrainian civic identity, a strong sense of Russian national identity and, often, a strong nationalistic agenda in response to the geopolitical realities they have faced since the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991. For these reasons, in the aftermath of the Soviet
Union’s collapse many observers feared that Crimea was a potential “flashpoint” for the type of secessionist fervor and ethnic violence seen in other places around the region such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transdnistria. While such conflict has successfully been evaded in Crimea, it is still cited as a region with the potential for interethnic violence because of ongoing Russian nationalist sentiment there and the tension between Ukraine and Russia over the basing of Russia’s Black Sea Naval Fleet in the Crimean city of Sevastopol (Kuzio, 2010).

Figure 1: Ukraine with Crimea Circled. Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ukraine_pol91.jpg
On the other hand, residents of Crimea – Russian or otherwise – have consistently demonstrated a close sense of attachment to Crimea itself and a strong sense of regional identity. Many in the region, even the most ardent Russian nationalists, often speak of Crimea as their “homeland” even though it is no longer a part of Russian territory in a political sense. Initially it would appear that these two competing identities among Crimea’s Russian population – i.e., both a strong Russian national identity and a strong regional identity centered upon a region outside of Russia – are at odds with each other. How can a group whose members identify so strongly with their nationality simultaneously fixate upon this small region that is no longer a part of Russia and yet identify so strongly with it as their “homeland?” How can there be such a large incongruity between senses of national and territorial identity and the geographic scales at which they are most saliently inscribed?

**Figure 2: The Crimean Peninsula.**
**Source:** [http://www.crimeahike.com/images/Crimea_Map_en.jpg](http://www.crimeahike.com/images/Crimea_Map_en.jpg)
To begin approaching this issue, it is important to consider the place of Crimea vis-à-vis various national territorial structures and what they mean for each of the region’s predominant ethnic communities and their “hierarch[ies] of geographically based identities” (Kaplan, 1999). Gradirovsky (1999) notes that in the former Soviet Union there is a tendency among many people to understand “homeland” within a two-tiered hierarchy. First, one’s *rodina* (motherland) is typically equated with the region in which a person lives and with which they have an intimate, personal connection through experience in and knowledge of the region. Second, one’s *otechestvo* (fatherland) is equated with the broader national territory that belongs to one’s national group at large and within which one’s *rodina* is “nested.” Considering such multiscalar processes through which senses of homeland are constructed is crucial to overcoming what Agnew (1994) has dubbed the “territorial trap” of focusing on the nation-state as the most salient scale of analysis for issues such as identity formation.

Because Crimea is a region politically “nested” within the Ukrainian nation-state (i.e., the Ukrainian national homeland), senses of national, civic, and territorial identities for ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea are bounded and negotiated within a single territorial hierarchy. Ukrainians in Crimea are simultaneously residents of Crimea and citizens of Ukraine, and so to be Crimean is still to be Ukrainian in national and civic terms. Thus, a strong attachment to Crimea as one’s home region (*rodina*) within the broader homeland (*otechestvo*) should not be at odds with a strong sense of Ukrainian national identity. In other words, using a term such as “Crimean-Ukrainian” to describe Crimean regional identity among Ukrainians would be redundant, as “Crimean” already implies “Ukrainian” by virtue of the fact that Crimea is part of Ukraine.

For Crimean Tatars the story is very different. As an indigenous people of Crimea whose very ethnogenesis is a product of Crimea’s history, the Crimean Tatars’ concept of homeland
(otechestvo) is fixed squarely upon the Crimean Peninsula only. Descended from numerous groups that settled in Crimea over the course of many centuries, the Crimean Tatars coalesced as a conscious ethnic community within Crimea and, as such, being from Crimea is an inextricable component of Crimean Tatar national identity. Their connection to Crimea was tested in the Soviet era through decades of forced exile from Crimea and proven through their unwavering and ultimately successful crusade for their right to return. Hence, a strong sense of Crimean Tatar national identity and a strong sense of Crimean regional identity are in no way at odds with one another. In fact it is quite the opposite: a sense of attachment to Crimea alone is part and parcel to Crimean Tatar national identity and is arguably the most important component thereof.

In other words, the conception of national territory and a sense of territorial identity for Crimean Tatars are coterminous at the shores of the Crimean Peninsula. As with “Crimean-Ukrainian,” using a term like “Crimean-Crimean Tatar” would be redundant because “Crimean Tatar” already denotes identification with Crimea as homeland.

Russians in Crimea face an altogether different scenario. Crimea had been part of Russia since its annexation in 1783 and continued to be part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of the Soviet Union until its transfer to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. As such, Crimea had long been viewed both by its Russian residents and by the Russian people at large as an integral component of Russian national territory. Therefore, both Russian/Soviet national identity and a strong identity with Crimea as a region or rodina “nested” within the broader national territory (otechestvo) were not at odds with each other in the Russian or Soviet periods because they were both bounded within a structured territorial hierarchy.

However, today Crimea is politically severed from the Russian Federation as a part of Ukrainian national territory, and for Crimean Russians this means that to live in their home
region is no longer to live within their national territory. The *rodina* has been separated from the *otechestvo*. In this way, a politico-territorial discontinuity exists for Russians between senses of regional and national identity that does not exist for Crimea’s other primary national groups. Regional and national identity are no longer bounded within a single territorial hierarchy for Russians in Crimea, but are instead fractured by post-Soviet political boundaries. “Crimean-Russian” thus becomes a useful term when discussing identity, as it refers to two different aspects of identity which are no longer implicit to each other as would be the case with “Crimean-Ukrainian” or “Crimean-Crimean Tatar” identity. Hence, questions regarding the dynamics between nationality and territory in identity formation are particularly salient in regards to Crimea’s Russian population.

Because the term “Crimean” has different meanings for Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and Russians, I argue that members of each of these groups relate to Crimea in different ways. While residents of Crimea may feel a strong sense of regional identity regardless of their nationality, I aim to demonstrate that national identity plays a critical role in why Crimean regional identity is so strong, and how it is constructed in different ways through competing national narratives. For Ukrainians, Crimea is an important symbol of national-territorial legitimacy and their on-going struggle to be disentwined from Russia and their Soviet past. For Crimean Tatars, Crimea is the very cornerstone of their sense of national identity and the homeland for which they yearned and to which they struggled to return during decades of Soviet-imposed exile. For Russians, Crimea is a powerful symbol of imperial glory, deep cultural roots, military victory, and ultimately the losses suffered following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I use the term “Crimean-Russian” identity to define a particular sense of Crimean regional identity among ethnic Russians in Crimea who feel an attachment to the region largely because of its meaning and importance in
broader Russian national narratives. In other words, “Crimean Russian” identity implies that Russians view Crimea through their own national lens that emphasizes certain characteristics that make it an important place to Russians and Russia in general.

By examining how specific national narratives have been constructed in Crimea through the use of survey data collected in the region, I aim to contribute to a greater understanding of regional geography and of regional identity by critically considering the role of national identity in regional identity formation. While these issues are especially salient in Crimea, a deeper understanding of national-regional identity dynamics has implications for a broader understanding of regional identity in general. This work is particularly relevant and applicable to regions that have a multiethnic population or are politically contested between two or more national groups and in which a sense of regional identity is strong. The findings of this study may be particularly relevant to other regions in the former Soviet Union for two primary reasons: (1) the connection between nationality and territory here has been deeply institutionalized at many geographic scales since the Soviet era, and (2) the break-up of the once-unified Soviet territory has created a plethora of ethnic communities scattered throughout many different territories and fractured along political boundaries.

Considering the ways in which national identity may shape and inform regional identity helps us better understand the nuanced meanings of and interactions among nationality, territory, regions, and place, and helps us overcome the “territorial trap” or common fixation upon the nation-state as the primary scale of analysis. By ignoring the multifaceted and multiscalar processes that shape identity and therefore reifying the primacy of the nation-state, we do injustice to the social heterogeneities found within nation-state boundaries and the social continuities spanning across them that the “territorial trap” masks. As the number of national
groups far exceeds the number of nation-states in the world, the role of nationality in identity formation is clearly a much more rich and dynamic area of study than the “territorial trap” could ever allow. Ignoring how nationality and territory influence identity formation at scales above or below the nation-state not only deprives us of a more complete understanding of identity dynamics, but may render invisible those marginalized groups whose stories do not necessarily play out at the scale of the nation-state. In this way, there is something of a social responsibility underpinning the need to consider the multifaceted and multiscalar processes at play in identity formation.

Chapter Two reviews the pertinent literature relating to issues of ethnicity, nationality, territory, region, identity, and their meanings within the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. Chapter Three provides an overview of key events and developments in Crimea’s history relating to its changing demographics, political status, and place in larger territorial structures. Chapter Four examines the meaning of Crimea for its three primary national groups – Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars – and discusses how these meanings have been socially and historically constructed through competing national narratives about Crimea. Chapter Five discusses the survey and statistical analytical methods used in this study as well the limitations of the study. Chapters Six through Nine discuss results from different components of the survey and interpretations of their meanings with respect to the questions at the heart of the study. The components of the survey discussed in these chapters relate to topics including: concepts of homeland (Chapter Six); distinguishing characteristics of Crimea (Chapter Seven); different factors of identity formation (Chapter Eight); and the roles of nationality and scale in group identity formation (Chapter Nine). Finally, the thesis concludes in Chapter Ten with a summary of arguments and a reiteration of key points.
Chapter II: Ethnicity, Nationality, Territory, and Identity, and their Soviet/Post-Soviet Contexts

Crimea’s storied history has made it the site of numerous interwoven narratives of identity constructed through the myriad ethnic, national, and territorial traditions that have shaped the region over millennia. The relationships among ethnicity, nationality, and territory – and the ways in which they shape and inform identity – are complex and nuanced, and Crimea provides an excellent example of a region where these factors are particularly salient in the construction of regional identity. Before discussing how these issues have played out specifically in Crimea, it is important to consider how the works of others have shaped general understandings of the meanings of and relationships between the concepts of ethnicity, nationality, and territory, both broadly and within Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. In this project I build upon the works of geographers and non-geographers alike who have explored these themes and critically considered how the complex interplay between them is instrumental in identity formation. However, I also identify ways in which previous works are lacking in their ability to provide a theoretical framework that sufficiently addresses such identity dynamics in Crimea. Specifically, I argue that greater attention should be paid to the ways in which regional identities are shaped by broader national identities in regions such as Crimea where so many ethnic, national, and territorial traditions are overlapping and intertwined.

Ethnicity and Nationality

The terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” are often used interchangeably to describe the unique assemblage of human characteristics around which common group identities are formed and by which the earth’s population can be organized and categorized. Although the two ideas are closely linked, the distinction between ethnicity and nationality and the ways in which they
inform identity are important. The term “ethnic” comes from the Greek word *ethnikos* and had been used in English since the 14th century, traditionally to mean “heathen, Pagan, or Gentile” (Williams, 1976, 119). By the 19th century “ethnic” had become nearly synonymous with the term “racial,” while the pejorative expression “ethnics” had become popular in the United States as “a polite term for Jews, Italians, and other lesser breeds” (119). In its popular usage today, “ethnicity” is still typically associated with the more contentious term “race” and often serves as its more politically correct substitute in everyday speech.

“Nation” has been used in English since the late 13th century, initially as something akin to “race” in a way similar to the later usage of “ethnic” (213). By the 16th century “nation” had become a less-commonly used synonym for “kingdom” or “realm” used to describe a ruler’s sovereign territory, and in the early 17th century the term was applied to the people who lived within a given territory (213). Today a “nation” may refer to territory (i.e., the nation-state) or to its people, and “nationality” typically denotes identity with a given nation. However, these uses simply do not encapsulate the complexity with which “ethnicity” and “nationality” are constructed and the intricate ways in which they are enmeshed.

Weber (1922) challenged the belief in “primordial” ethnic and/or national groups, according to which ethnicity and nationality are rooted in a deep mythical past and are therefore perceived to have existed since time immemorial. Instead, Weber argued that ethnicity and nationality are both socially constructed group affinities based upon perceptions of common cultural and historic traits and are used primarily to distinguish one’s own group from another. He defined “ethnic groups” as “those human groups that entertain subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities in physical type or of custom or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration” (Weber, 1922, 389). Weber emphasized the role of
customs and visible cultural traits in the construction of ethnicity, claiming that “the belief in ethnic affinity has at all times been affected by outward differences in clothes, in the style of housing, food and eating habits, the division of labor between the sexes and between the free and the unfree” (391). All of these characteristics, Weber argued, “concern one’s conception of what is correct and proper and, above all, of what affects the individual’s sense of honor and dignity,” and that this sense of “ethnic honor” is the crux of ethnicity as a rallying point for group identity formation (391).

Weber viewed nationality as being similar to ethnicity in that, as forms of group identity, they both share “the vague connotation that whatever is felt to be distinctively common must derive from common descent” (395). What distinguishes nationality from ethnicity is that nationality implies an inherent political ideology as a component of a group’s common sense of identity. National political aspirations typically center on the protection or establishment of a nation-state, as “the more power is emphasized, the closer appears to be the link between nation and state” (398). Nationality, Weber explained, is “a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a common language, or religion, or common customs, or political memories,” adding that the political imperative implies that “such a state may already exist or it may be desired” (398). In Weber’s view, the foregrounding of political goals means that a sense of common nationality must not necessarily be derived from the same set of cultural attributes upon which ethnic identity is based, and that “feelings of identity subsumed under the term ‘national’ are not uniform but may derive from diverse sources” (397). Weber cited a number of examples – including Switzerland, Alsace-Loraine, and Quebec – where ethnic identity and nationality are not only incongruous but are often completely divergent. Weber challenged the prevailing understanding of his time that equated nationality
with the use of a common language, instead arguing that a sense of nationality may also be derived from “common political experiences” (396) or differences in social, economic, and power structures (397).

Gellner (1983) emphasizes the link between ethnicity and the nation in the formation of nationalism. He defines nationalism as “a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state… should not separate the power holders from the rest” (1). A nation, Gellner argues, implies two primary assumptions about the interaction if its members:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating… [and] Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artifacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. (6-7)

Gellner describes the ubiquity with which the nation – insofar as it has been paired to ethnicity – has become a factor of human identity and existence. “Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity,” Gellner maintains, “but it has now come to appear as such” (6). In this sense, Gellner argues that a sense of national identity has come to mean something discrete, exclusive, and obligatory for all people, for to not be a member of a nation would be tantamount to not being a person.

Nationalism, Gellner argues, is also contingent upon the idea of the state – which he defines as “that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (4) – in that “[i]f there is no state, one obviously cannot ask whether or not its boundaries
are congruent with the limits of nation (4). However, he maintains that the nation and state are mutually contingent but have not necessarily been congruent historically:

Neither nation nor state exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreover, nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy. But before they could become intended for each other, each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. (6)

Gellner argues that the emergence of the nation in particular is a condition of modernity and more specifically of industrial society, as in order for an industrial society to function its members “are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation” (35). In this endeavor, “they must constantly communicate with a large number of other men, with whom they frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context” (35). According to Gellner, a sense of national community, loyalty, and identity emerges from these productive activities and interactions and the culture it engenders. Furthermore, Gellner maintains that education is the primary institution through which nations are reproduced, as it instills and imparts the specific sets of cultural skills and knowledge that individuals need in order to function and participate within their national community. Gellner explains that

The employability, dignity, security, and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the culture within which they are educated are also the limits of the world within
which they can, morally and professionally, breathe. A man’s education is by far his most precious investment, and in fact confers his identity to him. (36)

Gellner thus identifies nationalism as an inherently political project that equates the nation – as a product of industrial society and its educational institutions – with the state and seeks to bring the two into alignment, although he neglects to adequately account for the role that ethnicity plays in the construction of the nation and how the two concepts may differ.

Anderson’s (1991) view of nationalism is similar to Gellner’s in that they both view it as a product of modernity. However, Anderson argues that Gellner, in attempting to “show that nationalism masquerades under false pretenses,” conceives of nationalism as something that is “fabricated” rather than “imagined” or “created” (6). Instead, Anderson argues, “[c]ommunities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6). To this end, Anderson defines the nation as

an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6).

Anderson argues that the emergence of such “imagined communities” has been contingent upon the erosion of three “fundamental cultural conceptions” within the past few centuries: (1) “the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth;” (2) “the belief that society was naturally organized around and under high centers – monarchs who are persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation;” and (3) “a concept
of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essentially identical” (36).

In Anderson’s view, the nation as an imagined community thus differs from these earlier concepts of society because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship,” rather than a vertical division as these prior societal models espoused (7). Anderson further contends that the proliferation of modern ideas of the nation was accelerated by the spread of print-capitalism, “which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to related themselves to others, in profound new ways” (36).

Smith (1986) rejects the modernist view of the nation embraced by Gellner, Anderson, and others (e.g., Breuilly, 1982; Hobsbawm, 1990). Instead, he examines the historical emergence of ethnic groups – or ethnie – as the foundation of nationality. While conceding that “certainly, it was not until the early modern period in Europe (the late seventeenth century, to be precise) that the idea of populations being divided by ‘national character’ and possessing a common identity became widespread among the European educated class” (11), Smith points to a number of pre-modern and even ancient societies which possessed many of the trappings of what we would today call a nation. He argues that the social changes brought about in the modern era “have occurred within a pre-existing framework of collective loyalties and identities, which has conditioned the changes as much as they have influenced the framework” (13). The framework to which he refers is constructed through “the quartet of ‘myth, memories, values, and symbols’ from which are derived “the characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations” encapsulated in the concept of ethnicity (15).
Smith defines *ethnie*, or ethnic communities, as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (32). Smith contends that ethnicity “has remained as a socio-cultural ‘model’ for human organization and communication from the early third millennium BC until today, even if not every ‘society’ has followed this model of organization” (32). While also rejecting the so-called “primordialist” understanding of the nation and its claims to the spatial and temporal universality of national identity, Smith does maintain that “[u]sually, there has been some ethnic basis for the construction of modern nations, be it only some dim memories and elements of culture and alleged ancestry” (17). “[W]hile making no claims to its universality,” Smith argues for “the widespread and chronic, if intermittent, appearance and persistence of this phenomenon [of ethnicity]” in the formation of nation and of national identity (32). Thus, in Smith’s view, the concept of nation is deeply rooted in the concept of ethnicity, although “nationalism” as a political project is a modern phenomenon.

Eriksen (2002) further problematizes the relationship between the terms “nationalism” and “ethnicity” and the assumption that the two are more or less congruent. Although he concedes that the two are “kindred concepts” and that “the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in character,” Eriksen points to a number of ways in which the two concepts can be at odds if we are to assume the common definition of nationalism developed by Gellner as the political project which seeks to bring the state into alignment with the nation (or ethnic group) (119). For one, he argues, “nationalism may sometimes express a polytechnic or supra-ethnic ideology which stresses shared civil rights rather than shared cultural roots” (119). Furthermore, “certain categories of people may find themselves in a grey zone between nation and ethnic category” in that the political goals of certain members of an ethnic group may differ from those of others.
Also, Eriksen points out that one’s relationship to their ethnicity or nationality depends upon social, spatial, and temporal context, as in the example that “[a] Mexican in the United States belongs to an ethnic group, but belongs to a nation when he or she returns to Mexico” (119). Eriksen further highlights the potential for conflict “between a dominating and dominated ethnic group within the framework of a modern nation-state” (119-120).

While there remain important distinctions between the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism/nationality, they can both be understood as a social framework in which groups are distinguished by some form of shared customs, beliefs, memory, language, identity, or other cultural traits through which members may recognize and acknowledge those with whom they share an ethnicity or nationality. The key difference between the two terms is that nationality – as expressed through nationalism – implies some form of political aspiration, typically (though not always) embodied by the concept of the independent nation-state. Implicit to the political goals of nationalism and the concept of the nation-state is the role of space and territory, to which we now turn.

The Role of Territory in Nationalism and National Identity

Because ethnic and/or national communities exist in space and have a certain spatial distribution, nationalism necessarily takes on certain spatial components. Since a nation implies some form of political aspirations, nations are inherently tied to the spatio-political concept of territory. Sack (1986) defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area,” while the area in question is defined as the territory (19). Territories, according to Sack, differ from other spaces because they are instruments of power in that a
territory’s “boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access” (19). It is through this process of territorialization that power is expressed spatially at any given geographic scale – from the nation-state to the broom closet – and both people and things are defined as either belonging or not belonging to or within a given territory. Territoriality is part and parcel to the concept of nationalism regardless of the spatial scale or degree of national political goals.

A number of geographers have emphasized the role of territory in the forming of nations and nationalisms. Gottman (1973) argues that “[n]ationalism, in its modern expression, has been built on territorial foundations, and it required a territorial base upon which the sovereignty of the nation could apply its jurisdiction” (95). According to Gottman, nationalism “implies a promise to promote the welfare of the people [who belong to the nation], which means a set of material resources at their disposal and, if they so decide, at their exclusive disposal. It is the right to exclude others that could not be implemented without territorial sovereignty” (95).

Implicit in the territorial foundation of the nation-state is a reliance on and construction of borders, as effective territoriality cannot exist without a clear delimitation of the territory in question. Shapiro (2003) highlights the centrality of territory and borders to the contemporary concept of the nation-state in comparison to earlier forms of sovereignty:

The contemporary nation-state’s departure from the pre-modern state consisted of both its establishment of clearly marked borders rather than ambiguous frontiers and its development as a political form that became increasingly associated with territorial rather than dynastic markers. (279)

In this way, national identity as expressed through nationalism has been institutionalized territorially in the nation-state making territory an intrinsic component of nationalist goals and of national identity.
Others have explored the ways in which territory and the landscapes bound within it become important components of national identity. Burghardt (1973) argues that territory typically becomes institutionalized as an important marking of identity for those who occupy a given territory especially in the case of the nation-state:

Territorial units are perceived to exist, and the members of the group [in a territory] come to identify themselves with these units. Man has fashioned space in his own image. The group learns to understand itself in terms of, and in conjunction with, the land it perceives as being its own. (243-244)

In other words, while many territories are constructed for the sake of the (national) group that a territory’s boundaries are meant to contain, the territory itself – along with its boundaries – in turn gives definition to the nation and becomes an important aspect of national identity.

Knight (1982) emphasizes the point that territories are socially constructed and not naturally pre-determined. As he explains, “territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning” (517). Knight recognizes the power of territory to appear as though it does have meaning independent of its social and political construction. He argues that “many people ‘see’ meaning in or ‘obtain’ meaning from territory and the landscape within it, fully believing in the territory and its landscape as living entities that are filled with meaning,” and that these “landscapes as perceived by the occupants [of a territory] can have powerful symbolic links to a group’s territorial identity” (517).

Häkli (1999) further explores the link between territory and identity by employing the theoretical concept of discursive landscapes, wherein a “landscape” is understood as “a socially constructed relation of the natural and cultural environment,” while “discursive” refers to the fact that such landscapes are produced and reproduced socially through “textual or text-like
materials” (124). These texts – whether they are historical, rhetorical, or cultural, and expressed through any medium – serve to reify common conceptions of a shared territory and fix collective identity at that territorial scale. Häkli explains that at the scale of the nation-state, “the consciousness of ‘history’ and ‘region’ come together in the emergence of national discursive landscapes, giving them both legitimacy and territorial extension on different geographical scales” (145). Such “territorial imagery,” Häkli argues, “is, thus, part and parcel to the historical negotiations of national identity” (145). In this sense, consciousness of a given territory – its shape, borders, symbolic meaning, etc. – is constructed by its occupants through social discourses about territory and ultimately becomes an integral component of identity for those occupants.

Others, such as Herb (1999) and Kaplan (1999), have emphasized the preeminence of the nation-state as the most salient territorial scale around which identities tend to form. Kaplan points out that:

We are all part of the ‘global community,’ and we are all unique individuals. Between these two extremes lie several intermediary scales of identity, and, in our modern world, national identity has emerged as the single most significant of these; it is an identity both global and pervasive. (31).

Herb has highlighted the role of territory in constructing national identity, arguing that imagery and descriptions of place form an essential part of national consciousness and even nationalism among most national groups. At the scale of the nation-state, national territory is usually equated with the concept of “homeland,” or the territory in which a given national group belongs and to which it is eternally linked. Herb explains that
There is something about the territory itself – composed of the actual space inhabited by members of a group, the particular terrain that helps define the group, the locational context vis-à-vis other powers, the historical legacy of a specific area, and the boundaries surrounding the national territory – that adds an essential component to national identity… As territory becomes reified, individual members of the nation become socialized within the territorial unit that exists. The space itself helps to weld together fragmented individual and group experiences into a common nation story. The territory creates a collective consciousness by reinventing itself as a homeland. (17).

Insofar as it represents the spatial expression of nationality and is the most visible example of territoriality in the modern world, the nation-state is typically given the greatest consideration when discussing the relationship between territory and identity.

Elsewhere, some geographers have been critical of the general tendency to focus the geographic scale of discussion and analysis solely at the nation-state. They have argued that this privileging of the nation-state is ultimately shortsighted and counterproductive for it ignores dynamic trends that occur above, within, or across the narrow confines of the nation-state. This criticism applies not only to the role of territory and identity but to geographic thought and analysis as a whole. Agnew (1994) has dubbed this tendency to favor the nation-state the “territorial trap,” in which basic assumptions about the nature of sovereign territory have been responsible for misguiding much scholarly analysis – particularly within the field of International Relations. Agnew identifies three geographic assumptions as the pitfalls of this “trap:” (1) the reification of state territories as spatially and temporarily static; (2) the false dichotomies of domestic/foreign and national/international that obfuscate many complex multi-scalar processes;
and (3) the antecedence of the territorial state to a society which it is supposedly meant to contain (59). According to Agnew, “Each of these assumptions is problematic, and increasingly so. Social, economic, and political life cannot be ontologically contained within the territorial boundaries of states through the methodological assumption of “timeless space”” (77).

Murphy (2010), speaking specifically about identity, reaffirms the need to think beyond the narrow confines of the nation-state but warns of the need to think critically about the basic concepts that underline the “territorial trap” in the first place. He points out that territorial identity at non-state scales is, in most cases, still expressed through the desire for sovereign statehood, and thus the basic assumptions of the “territorial trap” continue to shape understandings of space and societal aspirations even for those who do not identify at the scale of a given nation-state. Murphy explains that

Despite some clear examples of a weakening of state-based territorial identities among some communities, there is much to suggest that the ideological is not keeping pace with the functional. Not only does territorial nationalism retain great significance in local and global affairs … many substate and extra-state identity communities seek to carve out their place in a world of nation-states, not to change the nature of the system itself. Thus, the ultimate objective of many movements for self-determination is to create independent states, not simply some variant of territorial autonomy. (771)

Murphy contends that in order to truly escape the “territorial trap” there needs to be a broad reconsideration of the nation-state system that accounts for the multifaceted and overlapping processes that occur across many different geographic scales – most significantly, identity.
Place, Region, and Regional Identities

One way in which geographers have overcome the “territorial trap” is to focus on the concept of region, which may be contained within or cut across nation-state boundaries. Traditional regional geography, which was popular in the early to mid-20th century, took a chorological view by focusing on the “association of diverse phenomena in sections of space, or areas” (Hartshorne, 1958, 97). This approach treated geography as being similar to history in that both were considered reducible to discrete units (of time or space) that feature their own unique assemblage of phenomena that distinguish them from one another. Thus, chorologists argued that the essence of geographic study lies in the study of those unique assemblages within specific spatial units, i.e., regions. While the popularity of this regional geography waned in the mid-20th century, the concept of region reemerged as a powerful analytical device towards the end of the century.

Much more so than the nation-state, region and regional identities are closely related to the concept of place given its smaller and more “intimate” geographic scale. Lukermann (1964) offers a number of useful components of place as it is understood by geographers. He argues that (1) space is locational in its relationship to other spatial structures, i.e., there is a clear distinction of what is inside and what is outside of a given place; (2) that places are uniquely constructed around both natural and cultural elements; (3) that places are not static but rather in a constant process of becoming; and (4) that they become or emerge through the social meanings ascribed to them. Essentially, what distinguishes place from space are the particular meanings associated with place as perceived by individuals or groups either from within or outside of place.

Relph (1976) discusses the idea of “the identity of places,” noting that differences between the related concepts of identity of place and identity with place. He states that “[t]he
identity of something refers to a persistent sameness and unity which allows that thing to be differentiated from others” (45). Furthermore, Relph argues that “while every individual may assign self-consciously or unselfconsciously an identity to particular places, these identities are nevertheless combined intersubjectively to form a common identity” (45). However, Relph also notes the importance of meaning ascribed to groups or individuals that derive from place, i.e., identity with place. He notes that “it is not just the identity of a place that is important, but also the identity that a person or a group has with that place, in particular whether they are experiencing it as an outsider or an insider” (45). Relph’s work illuminates the recursive process of identity formation between groups or individuals and places and the overall salience of place in identity formation.

Tuan (1977) explores the ways in which humans form attachment to place at all different spatial scales. “At one extreme a favorite armchair is a place,” he explains, “at the other extreme the whole earth” (148). Tuan argues that, of all conceivable scales of place, the concept of the “homeland” is particularly salient in the formation of identity. “Homeland,” he argues, “is an important type of place at the medium scale. It is a region (city or countryside) large enough to support a people’s livelihood. Attachment to the homeland can be intense” (148). Tuan identifies two important ways in which attachment to homeland is formed. On the one hand, he argues that a homeland can have deep historical and symbolic meaning which tie groups to certain memories of place:

A homeland has its landmarks, which may be features of high visibility and public significance, such as monuments, shrines, a hallowed battlefield or cemetery.

These visible signs serve to enhance a people’s sense of identity; they encourage awareness of and loyalty to place. (159)
On the other hand, Tuan notes that attachment to homeland can emerge from personal experiences or sensuous perceptions:

Attachment of a deep though subconscious sort may come simply with familiarity or ease, with the assurance of nurture or security, with the memory of sounds and smells, of common activities and homely pleasures accumulated over time. (159).

Both meanings of homeland help engender a powerful bond between the homeland itself and those groups and individuals who live there and have an intimate experience of it. In this way, the meaning of place at the scale of the homeland differs from that of national territory. While both are places that have specific meaning and important implications for identity, the meaning of homeland is often tied to direct and intimate knowledge and experience of an individual or group’s immediate natural and social environment.

By the 1990s a “new regional geography” emerged that theorized regions and their meanings within broader spatial structures. Paasi (1996), a prominent figure within the “new regional geography” movement, provides a useful theoretical framework for examining the ways in which regions as territories are produced and perceived and the way identities are formed around them. He identifies the concept of the “institutionalization of regions,” defining it as “the process during which specific territorial units – on various spatial scales – emerge and become established as parts of the regional system in question and the socio-spatial consciousness prevailing in society” (32). Paasi’s argument holds that regions are socially constructed, as “[t]hrough the institutionalization process and the struggles inherent in it, the territorial units in question ‘receive’ their boundaries and their symbols which distinguish them from other regions” (33). Paasi further identifies four components of this institutionalization process: (1) the development of *territorial shape*, through which “specific symbols for expressing and
demarcating the territory [are] established” (34); (2) the development of *symbolic shape*, which includes “abstract expression of supposed group solidarity” meant to “[embody] the actions of political, economic, administrative and cultural institutions in the continual production and legitimation of the system of practices that constitute and demarcate the territorial unit concerned” (34); (3) the development of *regional institutions* “through which the perpetual production and reproduction of social consciousness takes place at territorial levels” (35); and (4) the establishment of a *territorial unit* as a distinct region within the societal consciousness and prevailing socio-spatial structures (33). These steps ultimately lead to what Paasi labeled “structures of expectations,” which “are constitutive of the story which expresses where the territorial unit has come from and where it is going” (35). Paasi effectively moves beyond the “territorial trap” by theorizing how regions and senses of regional distinctiveness are produced and reproduced at all scales, not only the nation-state.

Agnew (2001) discusses the phenomenon of regionally-based movements of secession of autonomy. He notes that most scholarly attention given to these movements has focused primarily on ethnic dimensions insofar as regions are often constructed as the territorial homelands for ethnic minorities within or across nation-state boundaries. He therefore argues that more attention should be paid to the explicitly spatial dimensions of such regional political movements. Agnew notes a number of ways in which geographers have adequately considered space in their study of these movements, such as by examining “the emergence of regional and local identities in response to the pressures of globalization” (104); by viewing the emergence of regions as a symptom of “the unfinished character of many nation-states” (104); by considering the role of “[c]ultural division of labor within states” (104); and by considering how “government territorial arrangements can … encourage regional identities by partitioning the
national space into units that can generate degrees of loyalty/disloyalty” (105).

However, Agnew argues that a number of key concepts in the study of regions have been insufficiently examined. One is the “‘nesting’ of regional identities and movements based on the larger framework of political identities such as those of existing states and alternative nonterritorial identities and supranational ones” (105). He also maintains that the “symbolic as opposed to the economic aspects of regionalism” have been inadequately considered, arguing that “there is a dearth of information about how movements recruit members and create popular support by deploying symbolic constructions drawing on highly selective and often not well-known stories about the pasts of their regions and how the stories live on into the present” (106). Agnew thus recognizes the important role that regions play in the formation not only of ethnic identities but of explicitly spatial or territorial identities.

To Agnew’s argument for the need for a wider study of regional identity dynamics, I add that the relationship between regional and broader national identities has not received adequate attention. While a great deal of literature has explored the roles of ethnicity, nationality, territory, place, and region in identity formation, little has been written about how senses of national or ethnic identity among minority or nonminority groups alike (vis-à-vis the nation-state) may influence identity with or attachment to substate, trans-state, or extra-state regions. What role does a sense of identity with one’s national group or nation-state play in forming a sense of substate regional identity? How does national identity among members of diaspora communities influence identity with a region located outside of the nation-state? What role do individual regions play in the construction of broader national identities? The present study attempts to address these questions with regards to the Ukrainian region of Crimea. In order to understand the ways in which ethnic, national, and regional identities have developed in Crimea, I turn now
to a discussion of these concepts as they have played out in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts.

**Nationality, Territory, and Identity in the Soviet Union**

Nationality and territory have been particularly salient issues of identity formation in the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet historical contexts. As the tsarist state began building its enormous empire through the colonization of much of northern and central Eurasia, it encountered and incorporated into the state polity a staggering diversity of ethno-linguistic and religious groups (see Kappeler, 2001; Khodorkovsky, 2004; Sunderland, 2004). By the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the empire’s ethnic diversity was seen as potentially destabilizing to the Bolsheviks’ vision of the Soviet Union as a united, proletarian state. As Commissar of Nationalities (head of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, or Narkomnats in its Russian abbreviation) during the Bolshevik revolution and the initial years of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin was tasked with solving this so called “national question” and designing a federal structure that would incorporate the young republic’s far-flung national groups into a cohesive socialist state. It should be noted for the sake of understanding that the meaning of “nationality” in its Russian parlance (natsional’nost’) is closer to the English usage of “ethnicity” then of “nationality.”

Stalin was critical of the Austro-Hungarian model of national cultural autonomy in which members of the empire’s various nationalities were granted the same autonomous rights regardless of where they lived within the empire. Instead, Stalin insisted upon the need for territorially-based regional autonomy wherein autonomous rights would be tied to the geographic area inhabited by a specific national community. He believed that “regional autonomy for border regions marked by specific social customs and national composition [is] the only expedient form...
of alliance between the center and the border regions,” and that this form of autonomy would “connect the border regions with the center by federal ties” (Stalin, 1942, 78-79).

Thus, Stalin and the Narkomnats created and instituted a complex federal system based upon a hierarchy of nested territorial units, many of them the “homelands” for various national minority groups. At the highest federal level were the 15 Union Republics (SSRs) representing the homelands of the Soviet Union’s largest ethnic groups. These would ultimately be the same territories to emerge as independent states following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. One of these Union Republics, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), was itself defined as a separate federation within the USSR. Below the SSRs were a number of smaller territorial units, many of which were autonomous based upon the presence of a large ethnic minority group. These included the Autonomous Republics (ASSRs), Autonomous Oblasts (AOs), and Autonomous Okrugs. The degree of de jure autonomy that these units wielded varied among each type of unit and generally weakened as the scale grew smaller, although de facto political power always rested in Moscow as the Soviet Union was highly centralized. As Kagedan (1990) notes, “[t]he republics’ importance rest[ed] less in their capacity to wield political power than in their ability to serve as areas licensed for ethnic cultural life and ethnic educational and occupational advantage” (165).

Scholars debate whether the calculations behind Stalin’s policies on national territorial autonomy were more political or economic in nature (see Pipes, 1968; Iroshnikov et al, 1982; D’Encausse, 1992; Suny and Martin, 2001). Martin (2001) asserts that among other policies, the creation of nationally-informed internal territorial units of the Soviet Union represented an early form of “affirmative action” in which ethnic minorities were propped up and granted autonomy.
in various political and social matters. Martin contends that this was done largely to appease nationalist sentiments and foster integration of all national groups into the Soviet socialist polity.

Hirsch (2005), on the other hand, maintains that the creation of national autonomous territories in the Soviet Union was done according to interpretations of “ethnographic knowledge” of the Russian empire collected by ethnographers in the imperialist and Soviet periods. Challenging Martin, Hirsch insists that the policies of ethnic territorialization based upon this knowledge were not aimed at appeasement but rather at accelerating the processes of economic development in under-developed regions in order to bring socialism to the entire empire. Indeed, the amalgamation of individual ethnic territories was ultimately the long-term goal.

Regardless of the logic behind these policies, national autonomy in the Soviet Union became defined in spatial terms. Autonomy was assigned to territories in order to create territorial “homelands” for various national groups, and in contrast to the Austro-Hungarian model these autonomous rights did not follow members of these groups outside of their titular homelands.

While autonomous regions were generally meant to enclose one national group inside a cohesive territorially unit in principle, in practice, territorial autonomy was often used as a tool to create or impose national identities. In fact, clear senses of national identity remained largely undeveloped in many regions during the early years of Soviet rule and emerged only after national territories had been established. Hirsch explains that the 1926 All-Union Census reported a large number of people living in nonurban areas across the Soviet Union who “identif[ied] themselves primarily in terms of clan, tribe, religion, or place of origin” (Hirsch, 2005, 145). In many cases this trend was reversed after only a few short years of national
development, and by the early 1930s these same groups “were describing themselves as members of nationalities –and were using the language of nationality to argue for economic, administrative, and political rights” (145).

Though the push to create national identities may seem contradictory to the basic principles of socialism and proletariat solidarity, national consciousness was viewed as necessary in many regions to eradicate localized or “backwards” identities and was ultimately a crucial step towards an integrative Soviet identity (43). Megoran (2010) contends that the development of national consciousness among non-Russian minorities despite contradictory socialist ideology was justified as a temporary measure that “would eventually weld a common sense of identity but which, in the meantime, worked with existing realities” (38). However, Hirsch (2000) maintains that

the Soviet regime was not interested in making nations for their own sake. The regime’s administrators and experts delineated and manipulated nationality categories and territories with the aim of consolidating the Soviet state. They frequently denied ‘national-rights’ to groups that they deemed were not ‘ethnographically distinct.’ And they placed limits upon nation-making in order to ensure that long-term, all-union concerns took precedence over the diverse and often competing interests of the component parts. In practice, the Soviet effort to “make nations” became an important mechanism for assimilating a diverse population into a rapidly modernizing state preparing for the transition to socialism. (209)

Thus, according to Hirsch, nations were proactively created through Soviet nationalities policies in order to provide greater social cohesion for the Soviet state. This vision was achieved by
establishing national territorial autonomy at the level of Union Republic and Autonomous Republic alike. In cases where fostering national consciousness was the objective, establishing an autonomous territory became a means to an end. Borders were drawn to create territories in places where they had not previously existed in order to give physical form to “homelands” of “nationalities” whose prior existence was often tenuous at best. And while several of the groups to receive autonomy had certainly developed some form of national consciousness prior to these policies, discrete boundaries of their national territory had not previously been “institutionalized” in the formation of a distinct region. In other words, these were not territories in search of autonomy, but rather the territorial manifestations of autonomous rights granted for the sake of national identities – whether or not they had existed previously.

The early decades of the Soviet Union saw a state-led program aimed at fostering national consciousness among the country’s many national groups within their established territorial homelands. This program, known as korenizatsiya (literally “putting down roots”), was viewed by Soviet authorities as a crucial step in the social equalization of the Soviet Union’s widespread and developmentally disparate ethnic communities required for the building of communism and an integrative Soviet identity. According to Kaiser (1994), the goal of building national consciousness was generally pursued through “the promotion of indigenous cultural forms (especially language), and affirmative action-type programs providing easier access to higher education and elite positions in the socioeconomic and political institutions for the indigene in his or her own republic” (125). However, Kaiser notes that despite the official goal of korenizatsiya to draw the many peoples of the Soviet Union into a cohesive socialist polity, and despite later programs of Russification, korenizatsiya was perhaps too successful in its methods of establishing national consciousness:
[N]ationality policies designed to promote international equalization in the USSR served not to “draw together” the national communities in the state as their members became more socially and geographically mobilized, but on the contrary encouraged both a rising national self-consciousness among upwardly mobile indigenes and the continued geographic segregation of national communities, each in its own respective homeland with its own national territorial agenda. (125)

Because korenizatsiya programs aimed at specific national groups were carried out only within their territorial homelands, Kaiser argues that one of the most important legacies of korenizatsiya was “to ensure that the territorial dimension of national self-consciousness would become of paramount importance” (125). Kaiser also notes that Russians, as the Soviet majority national group and de facto leaders of the Soviet peoples, accordingly did not experience any form of korenizatsiya that would foster a sense of national identity within any sub-state territorial unit. Rather, he argues, most Russians in the Soviet period tended to view the entire Soviet Union as their homeland (169-170). This conflation of the Soviet Union with Russian national territory has been noted by others as well (Smith, 1999; Kolstø, 2000).

The Soviet Union would reap what it had sown with korenizatsiya when, in 1991, the socialist regime collapsed and fractured along the boundaries of its constituent Union Republics (SSRs) into 15 newly independent states. Although they were effectively meaningless during the Soviet period, it was specific provisions within the Soviet constitution giving the Union Republics the right to secede from the USSR that enabled the Union Republics to become independent and not the smaller autonomous territorial units (ASSRs, etc.). However, national consciousness among many of the myriad Soviet peoples had grown rather strong by the end of the Soviet period, and a number of nationalist movements had begun to emerge at this time.
Moreover, a number of territorial and boundary disputes erupted all across the post-Soviet space in the wake of the collapse as many of the boundaries drawn in the Soviet period had bisected many national groups or otherwise isolated them from their established national homeland. The breadth and depth of work published on the problems of post-Soviet national identity, ethnic conflict, borders, territory, and state-building is extensive (Smith, 1990; Bremmer and Taras, 1993; Suny, 1993; Khazanov, 1995; Barkey and Von Hagen, 1997; Smith et al., 1998; Smith, 1999; Kolstø, 2000; Hughes and Sasse, 2002; O’Lear and Whiting, 2008, to name only a few). For the sake of this study, a few key themes from this body of literature are important to address.

**Russians in the Post-Soviet States**

One of the major unforeseen consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the separation of over 25 million Russians from the Russian Federation (their ostensible post-Soviet homeland) due to Soviet-era internal border-making policies and large-scale migration both before and during the Soviet period. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia in particular have large ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking diaspora populations, and each has met the challenge of dealing with these communities in different ways. While much of this literature considers each of these unique cases individually, attention is also paid to common themes among them.

Kolstoe (1995) focuses on the historical conditions that gave rise to the Russian diaspora communities, namely the patterns of ethnic Russian migration from the core to the periphery both during the Tsarist period and the Soviet period. He compares the Russian Empire to other colonial empires, noting that a key difference lies in the fact that others stretched and expanded across oceans, meaning colonial settlers became scattered and isolated. The Russian Empire, on
the other hand, was land-based, meaning that Russian settlers “did not lose contact with the core group in this way” (18). Kolstoe traces the historical expansion and contraction of Russian migration to the periphery, emphasizing the role of both “socio-economic” and “ethno-political” factors. The latter category Kolstoe links to the idea that “a wellnigh omnipotent center had a considerable influence on social processes, including migration, in the Soviet Union” (52), and may have included concerted efforts at stabilizing peripheral regions or diluting peripheral ethnic communities.

Melvin (1995) examines the way in which the Russian Federation has identified and defined the Russian diaspora community towards which it feels some social or political responsibility. He explains that Moscow does not simply view ethnic Russians as part of this diaspora, but that it also includes “Russified groups across the former USSR – Koreans in Kazakhstan, Ukrainians in Tallinn, and Jews in Ukraine” (22). Addressing the issues surrounding all these groups, Melvin argues, “has helped to consolidate a new political elite around a self-image of Russia as the historic ‘homeland’ for the Russian-speaking communities outside Russia (the diaspora) with Russia directly responsible for their well-being” (23).

Chinn and Kaiser (1996) examine the political dynamics of post-Soviet states with large Russian populations using the theoretical model of interactive nationalism. This model, rather than relying on either primordial or reactionary theories of nationalism, “contends that international tensions and conflicts are less the result of ancient, tribal hatreds than the consequence of an interactive process initiated by the majority, titular or dominant nation seeking hegemony in the state” (33). In other words, nationalist sentiments are recursively stimulated between majority and minority groups in the struggle for hegemony and counter-hegemony within a given state or territory. Chinn and Kaiser note that while Russians served as the hegemonic group
broadly at the state scale during the Soviet period, the relationship has been reversed in a number of post-Soviet states where they have become a prominent minority:

The titular nationalist elites have attempted to restructure the national stratification system in their homelands to secure the hegemony of the titular nation, which they view as its “rightful” position in its homeland. Russians – the formerly hegemonic group in the USSR as a whole – has sought to reduce their loss of status by developing counter-hegemonic strategies or by emigrating to Russia or abroad. (271)

Chinn and Kaiser further argue that “accommodation and inclusion should dampen counter-hegemonic reaction on the part of national minorities” (33).

Laitin (1998) considers the emergence of a new national category within a few key post-Soviet states that he calls the “Russian-speaking population.” He argues that language has been the most salient point around which minority identities have developed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia, and he includes in the category of “Russian-speakers” “Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, all of whom speak Russian as their first language in republics outside their putative national homelands” (x). Laitin notes that “[i]dentification as a member of this population is in some way an alternative to assimilation (as titulars), and mobilization (as Russians)” (263). While conceding that “Russian-speaking” is a more salient notion of identity in Estonia and Latvia, Laitin argues that it is likely to emerge in Ukraine and Kazakhstan as “a fulcrum of intratitular conflict” (264). Each of these authors gives considerable attention to Ukraine in their examination of the issues surrounding post-Soviet Russian and Russian-speaking diasporas. As the Russian-dominated region of Crimea plays a central role in
these questions with regards to Ukraine, a brief discussion of the literature on post-Soviet Ukraine is useful.

Ukraine as a Divided Post-Soviet State

A recurring and seemingly inescapable theme throughout much of Ukrainian studies has been the relationships between Ukraine and Russia and between Ukrainians and Russians. While significant works have examined these relationships “in their historical encounters” (see Potichnyj et al., 1992; Szporluk, 2000; Kappeler et al., 2003), the dynamics of nationality, culture, language, and regionalism with regards to post-Soviet Ukraine’s ethnic Ukrainian and Russian populations has received a great deal of attention. A common cliché of post-Soviet Ukrainian studies has been a focus on the east-west divide representing separate and monolithic “Russian” and “Ukrainian” portions of the country. A brief discussion of the ways in which this trope has been reified or challenged – and the extent to which Crimea has been explicitly considered – is of great relevance to the study of Crimea and to the present study in particular.

Pirie (1996), echoing Agnew’s (1994) critique of the assumptions that underline the “territorial trap,” argues that the reduction of group identities in Ukraine to one national category or the other (Ukrainian or Russian) is generally misguided because “such categorization impedes the study of national identity, as many individuals in these regions have multiple ethnic identifications, or are undergoing a transition from one identification to another” (1079). He further argues that “inter-ethnic marriage, language usage, and urbanization are all factors which contribute to mixed self-identification” (1079). In this way, Pirie not only moves beyond the typical Ukrainian east-west dichotomization, but also problematizes the entire Russian-Ukrainian ethnic dichotomization as well. However, while Pirie argues that it would generally be
“misguided to assume the existence of a strong Russian identity” (1099) in the more Russophone regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, he notes that “Crimea is a special case in this regard” as it is “the only area with a large portion of individuals with a strictly Russian national identity” (1099-1100). Hence, Pirie accordingly treats Crimea as a unique case among regions of Ukraine that have traditionally been more “Russian” in character.

Shulman (1998) also examines Russian and Ukrainian identity dynamics within Ukraine, and in particular how ties between Ukraine and Russia impact the identity of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. He argues that “[m]ost Ukrainian nationalists, especially in western Ukraine, favor a unitary territorial-administrative structure” for the Ukrainian state, while “a federal structure is more popular in eastern Ukraine” where there are more ethnic Russians (630). Shulman’s analysis is based upon survey results taken in the western Ukrainian city of L’viv and the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk that are meant to represent the two broad, ethnically-defined regions into which Ukraine has typically been conceptually divided. In this regard, Shulman falls into the trap of treating Ukraine as composed of two separate monolithic regions with two separate senses of identity. Furthermore, he fails to consider how Crimea in particular may differ from the rest of the “Russian” portion of Ukraine.

O’Loughlin (2001) examines a handful of studies conducted on regional differences in Ukraine as viewed through voting patterns, noting that “the most regionally-diverse issue is the so-called Russian question that involves both relations with the neighboring state as well as the relative acceptance of Russian language and culture within Ukrainian society” (36). Ultimately, however, O’Loughlin argues that an explicitly regional model for examining Ukraine is not useful and suggests that a more nuanced understanding of scale should instead inform the study of political differences observed across Ukraine. Although he makes no explicit argument that
Crimea should be treated separately from the rest of the country for these purposes, O’Loughlin does remark that one possibly more nuanced approach to understanding Ukrainian regional differences would at least separate Crimea from the rest of southern Ukraine.

Barrington and Herron (2004) challenge O’Loughlin’s dismissal of a regional approach to studying Ukraine and instead argue for a specific division of Ukrainian territory into eight distinct regions. Such a model, they argue, “underscores that regional divisions in Ukraine are not as simple as an ‘east versus west” divide – or even a continuum from west to east” (78). Crimea by itself constitutes one of the regions in this model, and the authors argue that “[c]ertain regions of the country (the southwest and [Crimea], for example) differ greatly not only from each other but also from regions next to them” (78). Barrington and Herron, to some degree, certainly account for crucial differences among regions of Ukraine that the “east-west divide” model masks particularly in respect to Crimea and its unique circumstances.

Finally, Malanchuk (2005) plays into traditional understanding of Ukraine’s “east-west” divide by noting simply that “[b]ecause of the historic separation of western and eastern Ukraine under Polish and Russian spheres of influence, respectively, regional subpopulations have been seen as an important factor in Ukrainian politics” (345). This historical divide, she argues, has meant that “[t]here is no question but that there are clear distinctions in the attitudinal makeup of eastern and western Ukraine” (364). Such an approach ignores important cultural, historical, economic, and political differences observed among Ukraine regions and in particular between Crimea and the rest of eastern (i.e., “Russian”) Ukraine.

While only some studies of regional differences within Ukraine have treated Crimea as a separate region unto itself, there are a number of historical, cultural, political, and demographic circumstances in Crimea that demand that it not be regarded as simply one section of a broadly
monolithic regional bloc of “Russian” Ukraine, however it may be defined. Accordingly, a number of scholars have examined issues of identity specifically within Crimea, and their works clearly merit a discussion here.

**Identity Dynamics in Crimea**

Much has been made of the potential ethnic conflict in Crimea (see Drophobycky, 1995; Chase, 1996; Dawson, 1997; Mal’gin, 2000; Sasse, 2002; Wydra, 2004; Kuzio, 2007; Sasse, 2007; Korostelina, 2008a) as well as the specific challenges accompanying the return of the indigenous Crimean Tatars from their Soviet-imposed exile (see Williams, 1997; Allworth, 1998; Williams, 2001; Uehling, 2004; Aydingun and Aydingun, 2007; Pohl, 2010). Meanwhile, others have studied the dynamics of national and regional identity among residents of this diverse and contested region. Kiseleva (1999) found that a majority of those who live in Crimea exhibit a strong regional identity. In response to the her survey question, “who do you consider yourself to be?”, 40% of 16-20 year-olds and 24% of 21-30 year-olds answered “resident of Crimea” rather than “Russian,” “Ukrainian,” “Crimean Tatar,” “Soviet Person,” or any other nationality. In response to the question, “what do you consider your homeland?”, 67% of 16-20 year-olds and 47% of 21-30 year-olds answered “Crimea” rather than “Russia,” “Ukraine,” “the Soviet Union,” or “the whole world.”

Korostelina (2008b) reveals through her study that regional identity tends to be the most salient type of social identity among those who live in a number of autonomous republics in the Russian Federation and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in contrast to those who live in non-autonomous regions. Korostelina shows that in Crimea – along with the Russian republics of Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Yakutia, and Tatarstan – survey results indicate that regional
identity among respondents was more salient than their ethnic or national (state) identity by a wide margin, while respondents to the same survey in non-autonomous regions of Russia indicated that ethnicity is their strongest identity factor (85). These results corroborate Kaiser’s (1994) argument that territory has played a crucial role in identity formation within national “homelands” in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

Similarly, in a survey conducted by Efimov (2008), participants in Crimea are shown to consider themselves “Crimeans” above any other sense of territorially-based identity by a wide margin. In this survey 41.5% of Crimean Tatars, 52.3% of Russians, and 35% of Ukrainians indicated that they “consider themselves above all else” to be Crimean. Only Ukrainians chose another option (citizen of Ukraine) at a higher rate than “Crimean.”

While these studies reveal a strong sense of regional identity among residents of Crimea regardless of nationality, they do not reveal much about how a different sense of national identity may differentially impact a sense of regional identity. I have argued for the need to examine more thoroughly the relationship between national identity and regional identity, and in the present study I approach these questions using Crimea as a case study. How do Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars understand and relate to Crimea? What meanings does Crimea hold for each of these national groups, and how might they be different? In what way might one’s national identity specifically shape their sense of regional identity within Crimea? These are questions that the present study attempts to address. In order to understand the various sets of meanings that have been applied to Crimea within different national contexts, I turn now to the competing national narratives of Crimea.
Chapter III: Crimea in Historical Context

Crimea stands out among the many post-Soviet regions that have a history of autonomy for its unique historic, demographic, and geographic circumstances. The Crimean Peninsula’s position at the crossroads of numerous empires, states, and civilizations has made it into a complex, cultural palimpsest and a region of both great ethno-cultural hybridity and cleavage since long before it passed into Russian hands. Due to the fact that it is an isolated and narrowly-attached peninsula, Crimea has been conceived of as a distinct region for thousands of years. In this way, Crimea has existed as a territorial construct since long before there was ever any notion of a Russia, a Ukraine, or virtually any other territory as we now know them within the post-Soviet space. This historical understanding of Crimea has been reified throughout the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods. During the Russian and Soviet periods between 1783 and 1991, Crimea underwent a series of drastic ethno-demographic and politico-administrative changes that have resulted in a complex and contested legacy of ethno-national and territorial identities and affinities. These conditions make issues of ethnicity, nationality, and territory in identity formation in Crimea particularly salient compared to other regions across the former Soviet Union and beyond.

Early Origins of Crimea’s Ethnic Diversity

Throughout its long and complex history, Crimea has been settled, conquered, colonized, or otherwise inhabited by myriad ethno-cultural communities, most of which left their mark upon Crimean culture and society in one way or another. Crimea’s physical geography – divided among its northern steppe, its southern mountains, and the narrow strip of coastline south of the
mountains – has had a tremendous influence on its history of conquest and in the development of its ethnic diversity. A brief overview of early Crimean history and of the groups that shaped its ethnic demographics throughout the centuries is useful in understanding the historical perception of Crimea as a region of ethno-cultural diversity and pluralism.

While some point to evidence of earlier inhabitants (Vozgrin, 1992), the first two groups believed to have settled in the Crimean mountains and along its southern coast were the Cimmerian and Tauri people as early as the 10th century BC. Scholars debate the precise chronology of their appearance in Crimea and whether or not the two groups were related or became mixed in Crimea, though the Tauri are thought to descend from the Caucasus while the Cimmerians are believed to be an Indo-European tribe originating in the Eastern European steppe (Vozgrin, 1992; Kogonashvili, 1995). Both groups were known to the Ancient Greeks; there are references to the Cimmerians in Homer’s *Odyssey*, and the Greek name for the Crimean Peninsula, “Tauris,” comes from its Tauri inhabitants. In the 20th century, some primordialist Ukrainian national narratives identified the Tauri people as proto-Ukrainians in order to bolster Ukraine’s claims to Crimea (Mindiuk, 2000). Cimmerians and Tauris were largely driven from Crimea by the Indo-Iranian Scythian tribes arriving from the steppes of central Eurasian during the 7th century, though many pockets of Cimmerians and Tauris remained in the Crimean mountains while some likely assimilated into Scythian culture (Vozgrin, 1992, 42).

Around the same period that the Scythians established a kingdom in the steppe region of Crimea, colonists from various Greek city-states began to arrive in order to establish trading colonies along the northern coast of the Black Sea, mainly in search of wheat, metals, and slaves (Burov et al., 2007). Many Greek settlements in eastern Crimea were eventually united under the Bosporus Kingdom in the 5th century BC, which later fell under the rule of the Pontus Kingdom
and the Roman Empire until it passed to the Byzantine Empire in the 6th century AD. Throughout much of this period, the Bosporus Kingdom was at war with the Scythians in central and western Crimea.

Many of the settlements founded by the Greeks became some of Crimea’s largest cities – including Feodosea, Evpatoria, and Kerch – and this early Greek presence in Crimea later took on great significance for Russian national narratives about Crimea. According to Russian mythology, the history of Crimea’s eventual drift towards the Slavic realm began in the year 988, when the armies of Kievan Rus led by Prince Vladimir the Great seized the Greek colony of Chersoneses. It was here that Prince Vladimir accepted the Orthodox faith and was baptized in the church, officially turning Kievan Rus from a Pagan to a Christian kingdom. From Kievan Rus’ Christianity would eventually diffuse to Muscovy, where it became enshrined as the official religion of eastern Slavdom.

Between the 3rd and 8th centuries AD, Crimea saw numerous waves of invasion and settlement from several different nomadic peoples: from the east came Indo-Iranian tribes such as the Sarmatians and the Alans, the Altaic Huns, and the Turkic Bulgars, and from the northwest came Germanic Goths (Burov et al., 2007). As numerous kingdoms continually displaced one another during this period, small numbers of most occupying groups were driven into the Crimean mountains, where they sought refuge and mixed with the descendants of Cimmerians and Tauris who had been there for centuries. Although the Crimean mountains are not especially lofty or rugged, they are characterized by a series of steep bluffs that are difficult to access and therefore easy to defend, and thus remnants of numerous groups who inhabited Crimea over the centuries have been isolated, protected, preserved, and integrated in the mountains far past their Crimean heydays. A series of cave cities carved from these rocky bluffs
began to appear between the 6th and 10th centuries, providing further refuge to successive groups of inhabitants.

By the 8th century the Turkic Khazar Khaganate absorbed most of Crimea north of the mountains, while the southern shore remained in the hands of the Byzantine Empire and was populated mainly by the descendants of Greek colonists but also included sizeable numbers of Jews and Armenians by this time. The Khazar Khaganate adopted Judaism sometime in the 8th century before being ousted from the northern Crimean steppe by Turkic Kipchak nomads and from eastern Crimea by the Kievan Rus affiliated principality of Tmutarkan in the 10th century. Like so many groups before them, small numbers of Jewish Khazars remained after the fall of the Khaganate in the Crimean mountains, where most likely with some influence from Jews living along the coast in Byzantine communities (Kozlov and Chizhlova, 2003), they became known as the Karaims and Krymchaks. These groups continue to exist in small numbers in the mountainous regions of Crimea, where they still practice a form of Talmudic Judaism (Kogonashvili, 1995).

Byzantine influence began to decline on Crimea’s southern coast in the 13th century, leaving an opening for colonists and merchants from the Italian city states of Venice and Genoa to establish trading outposts in settlements such as Balaklava and Sudak, with the Genoese ultimately prevailing as the regional economic power (Burov et al., 2007). Around this time the northern Crimean steppe fell under the control of the Golden Horde of the Mongol Empire, and Mongol nomads quickly integrated with the Turkic Kipchaks already inhabiting this region. By the early 14th century the Crimean steppe along with the rest of the Golden Horde adopted Islam following the conversion of the Horde’s supreme leader Khan Uzbek (Williams, 2001).
The Crimean steppe remained under the control of the Golden Horde until 1443, when, as the Horde began to fracture and fragment, an independent Crimean Khanate was declared under Khan Haci Giray covering the territory of the northern Crimean steppe along with large portions of modern southern Ukraine. Seeking to expand its influence over the entire Crimean Peninsula, in 1475 the Crimean Khanate enlisted the help of the Ottoman Empire to conquer the Genoese colonists along the south coast, after which the Ottomans annexed both the coast and the Crimean mountains. The peninsula became united under Islam for the first time, and despite the Crimean Khanate’s ostensible independence, it largely remained under the aegis of the Ottoman Sultan for the next three centuries. However, as Uehling (2004) argues, the Crimean Khanate “possessed all the characteristics of a fully developed, premodern state” (32). It was during this period that the Crimean Tatar ethnic group first began to coalesce in Crimea under Islam and the Turkic language of the Golden Horde, incorporating the myriad groups left over from centuries of conquest and settlement into a common Crimean ethnic community.

Although the Crimean Khanates’ relationship with the Cossack Hetmanate to the north was marked during most of its history more by mutual aggression than by cooperation, Ukrainian historians point to critical periods where Crimean Tatars and Cossacks – seen as the forbearers of the modern Ukrainian state – entered into strategic and mutually beneficial alliances against common enemies. These historical narratives have been used in the post-Soviet period to further strengthen Ukrainian claims to Crimea. The Crimean Khanate ruled over Crimea and parts of the Ukrainian steppe to the north until the region was conquered and annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783 (Burov et al., 2007).
Crimea in the Russian Imperialist Period

The 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman and Russian Empires at the end of the Russo-Turkish war placed the Crimean Khanate under Russian protection, and in 1783 it was formally annexed into the Russian Empire and became part of the Tauride Governorate in 1784 (Fisher, 1978). To Russian Empress Catherine the Great and her court, Crimea exuded an air of exoticness largely because its landscape and climate differed so greatly from that of the Russian core or any of its hitherto conquered territories along its periphery. As Seymour (1855) notes in his travelogue, “after a weary journey over the flat steppe from Petersburg or Moscow, the total change which [Crimea] presents to the gloomy and monotonous aspect of their own country must make it seem to them like a land of enchantment” (198).

More importantly, Crimea represented Russia’s first conquest of the “Orient” at a time when Orientalist themes were popular in the art and literature of Western European imperial powers (Dickinson, 2002, 3). Russia’s colonization of Crimea was largely meant as a display of its own growing prowess as an imperial power and its rightful place among Europe's great empires. Russian perceptions of Crimea as an exotic and substantively different place stem largely from this early period of acquisition and subsequent “discovery” of Crimea and its exotic wonders. Indeed, following its annexation, much of the Russian discourse about Crimea even presented it as Russia’s own Garden of Eden (Zorin, 1998; Schonle, 2003). However, Dickinson (2002) argues that Russian Orientalism in Crimea did not follow the more “academic” model of “modern Orientalism” already common by the late 18th century (Said, 1979, 22, 119). Instead, Dickinson (2002) suggests that this period is better understood as a “preliminary process of ‘otherization,’” which was characterized by “the production and circulation of images and stereotypes that expressed the region’s ‘otherness’ or ontological difference from the norms of
the dominant culture, in this case those of Western Europe” (4). Schonle (2003) also points out that Crimean orientalist tropes were less a reflection of Russian perceptions of Crimea’s natural state of being and more an expression of what Catherine and those close to her saw as Crimea’s symbolic potential under the proper stewardship. In this sense, the early Russian perception of Crimea was that of a place of exotic beauty and wonder, but only within the Russian Empire itself was it believed that Crimea could realize this potential and flourish as a true Garden of Eden.

As Crimea became an integral part of the Russian Empire it also became a destination for numerous poets, authors, painters, and other artists and creative members of the Russian intelligentsia. Upon discovering its superlative beauty, exotic flair, rich history and diverse cultural heritage, Crimea inevitably became the muse of countless artists who wished to capture the peninsula’s unique spirit in their chosen media. Sasse (2007) notes that “[t]he literary symbols and myths about Crimea share an emphasis on the geography of the peninsula, the beauty of its landscape, its diversity, its special atmosphere, its distance from the mainland, and its distinct path of development” (53). Alexander Pushkin, arguably Russia’s most beloved poet, wrote a number of poems about his travels in Crimea, most famously “The Fountain of Tears,” which was inspired by a tragic tale of the Crimean Khan and two members of his harem. Hokanson (1998) notes the way in which Pushkin exoticizes and feminizes the Crimean landscape in this poem, depicting it as being “there for the pleasure of the male traveler … to shelter him, cool him, beckon to him” (147). Sasse (2007) argues that Crimea-themed poetry in the Russian tradition tended to be largely “self-replicating” in its styles and themes as poets have “deliberately evoked symbols and myths, recycled them, and embedded their works firmly in a common cultural tradition” (57). Hence, from the early Russian period Crimea has been
presented through the arts and through cultural texts as being substantively unique in its wild, exotic, yet submissive character.

Orientalist discourses aside, Crimea did present Russia with a crucial geopolitical advantage, namely a prominent presence in the Black Sea region and access to strategic ports. A location was chosen to build the port city of Sevastopol adjacent to the ruins of the Greek colony of Chersoneses along a well-protected deep-water bay near the far southwestern tip of the Crimean peninsula. In Sevastopol the Russian Empire based its Black Sea Naval Fleet. Its location and military significance made Sevastopol the focal point of the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 that pitted Russia against an alliance of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and the Republic of Sardinia for influence in the Black Sea region as the Ottomans’ power in the region began to wane (Burov et al., 2007). Although the theater of war extended to the Caucasus, the Baltic region, and even the North Pacific, the vast majority of warfare took place on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula – lending the war its name – and Sevastopol became the setting of the most intense battles. The city came under siege for 349 days beginning in September, 1854 as the Russian army staved off invading forces while undergoing massive bombardment, leaving Sevastopol in utter ruin and devastation by the time enemy forces broke through the city’s defenses in September, 1855. The capture of Sevastopol ultimately heralded the end of the war five months later. Despite Russia’s defeat, the defense of Sevastopol quickly became the stuff of legends among the Russian elite and public alike. The events surrounding the defense of Sevastopol first spawned the “Sevastopol Myth,” which became a critical component of Russian national identity (see Chapter Four).
Crimean Ethnic Demographic Changes in the 19th Century

While small numbers of Slavs began settling in Crimea following its annexation by Russia, it was not until after the Crimean War that they began to constitute a large portion of the region’s population. Before the war, Crimean land had been largely confiscated from Crimean Tatars and distributed among the Russian nobility, who in turn enlisted small numbers of agricultural landlords or pomeshchiks to oversee the Crimean Tatars tending to the land. Those Crimean Tatars who suddenly found themselves living on land that was now claimed by the recently-arrived Slavs were either forced to pay exorbitant rents to their new landlords or forced to leave the land they once owned and occupied (Kirimli, 1996). Furthermore, the Crimean Tatars felt that the occupying Russians and Ukrainians had little respect or tolerance for their religion and customs and for their very connection to Crimea itself. Crimean Tatar political leader Mustafa Jemilev (1995) argues that Russian authorities purposely and aggressively drove the Tatars out of Crimea in order for Slavic immigrants to settle and more affectively colonize the region. He argues that

To meet this objective, Russia applied a broad arsenal of well-developed methods: terrorism and systematic plundering of the civilian population; seizure of the most fertile lands by high tsarist officials; the displacement of Crimean Tatars to territories unsuitable for farming, thus depriving them of their means of existence; and the harsh violation of the Crimean Tatars’ religious beliefs, which was painful for this deeply religious people (Cemiloglu, 1995, 88).

This harsh treatment and disrespect shown towards the Crimean Tatars precipitated a drastic reduction in their numbers within Crimea as many began to emigrate to Anatolia or other regions still under Ottoman control, thus forming the Crimean Tatar diaspora. An accurate number of
Crimean Tatars who fled Crimea during the Tsarist period is difficult to determine, though Karpat (1985, 66) estimates the number of emigrants between 1783 and 1922 to be at least 1,800,000 (quoted in Kirimli, 1996, 7). While such figures remain highly controversial, Kirimli (1996) maintains that the number of Crimean Tatars who left Crimea during the 19th century “far exceeds the number of those who stayed” (7).

The largest wave of emigration from Crimea came in 1860 following Russia’s deportation and genocide of the Circassian community in the North Caucasus and the subsequent fear it caused as rumors spread to other Muslim groups throughout the Russian Empire (Williams, 2001). This mass exodus left a gaping hole in the Crimean labor force, and thus ethnic Russians and Ukrainians soon settled in the region to fill the void left by the diminishing Crimean Tatar population. In 1858 Crimean Tatars accounted for 73% of Crimea’s population, with Russians accounting for 12.6% and Ukrainians accounting for 4%, but by 1864 the Crimean Tatar population had dropped to 50.3% with Russians and Ukrainians together comprising 28.5% (Vodarskyi et al., 2003). By 1897 Crimea’s population was only 35.6% Crimean Tatar, with Russians making up 33.1% and Ukrainians 11.8% (ibid.). Furthermore, as Fisher (1978) contends, “throughout the nineteenth century, the [Crimean] Tatars experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of Russification anywhere in the Empire” (81). The Russification of Crimea ultimately helped foster and buttress Russian claims to the region while also diluting and delegitimizing the presence of the Crimean Tatars. This period of shifting ethnic demographics thus brought deep social and cultural integration between Russia and Crimea at the expense of Crimea’s indigenous peoples and cultures.
Crimea in the Early Soviet Period

Like most regions of the former Russian Empire, Crimea was thrown into chaos during the Russian Civil War following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. A series of temporary governments and territorial claims were declared in Crimea between 1917 and 1921. Crimea became the site where the last units of the Tsarist White Army under General Wrangel made their final stand against the Red Army before fleeing by ship to Istanbul in 1920. Following the Bolshevik policy of establishing autonomous homelands for the country’s ethnic minority groups, Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR in 1921 as the homeland of the Crimean Tatars. The peninsula experienced a short famine from 1921 to 1923 due to drought and the new Soviet regime’s ineffectual policies, which resulted in over 100,000 deaths (Sokolov, 2010).

The events and aftermath of World War II had a devastating and transformative effect upon Crimea. The Germans occupied Crimea from 1941 to 1944, and the fact that Crimea had once been home to a branch of the Germanic Goths made it of particular interest to Hitler, who hoped to repopulate the peninsula with Germans after the war and remake it into the Republic of Gotenland after its Gothic heritage (Roman’ko, 2009). Intense fighting between the German and the Soviet Armies commenced throughout Crimea, although the most significant battle again happened in Sevastopol. The Nazi air campaign against Sevastopol lasted from October, 1941 to July, 1942 and was carefully orchestrated to take out all of the city’s military installations, social services, and infrastructure (Qualls, 2009, 13-18). Sevastopol resisted capture long after the rest of the Crimean Peninsula had fallen to the Nazis. Once it had been completely annihilated after eight months of bombing, the German army managed to seize the city and the scant few inhabitants who had not fled or already been killed. When the Red Army recaptured the city in
1944, they found it in almost complete ruin. Sevastopol thus became the site of a heroic defense of the Russian/Soviet motherland twice over, taking the “Sevastopol Myth” to new heights in the Soviet popular imagination. As a side note, the Crimean resort city of Yalta famously became the site of the 1945 post-war summit between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, which shaped global geopolitics for the next half century.

The Deportation of the Crimean Tatars

The most tragic outcome of the war came after it had been liberated by the Soviet army. On May 18, 1944, shortly after Crimea had been liberated from German forces, all the Crimean Tatars in Crimea were systematically rounded up and deported en masse to the far corners of the Soviet Union – most of them to Uzbekistan – to be resettled and forever forbidden from returning to their native Crimea (Williams, 2001). Some have suggested that Stalin’s decision to have the Crimean Tatars removed from Crimea and settled in distant Central Asia was made out of fear of a potential war with Turkey following the fight against Germany, in which the Crimean Tatars would have been a likely Turkish alley and fifth column just across the Black Sea (Williams, 1997, 237). However, the decision was officially made by Stalin to punish the Crimean Tatars collectively for supposedly collaborating and conspiring with the German occupying forces against the Soviet regime – accusations that Crimean Tatars have emphatically denied. Although exact figures do not exist, it is believed that roughly 46% (110,000 out of 238,500) of the Crimean Tatar population died in transit during their deportation due to disease, starvation, dehydration, and trauma in the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of the packed cattle cars used to transport them (Williams, 1997, 238). Along with the Crimean Tatars small numbers of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians were deported from Crimea following the war as well.
Exiled from their homeland and scattered throughout the Soviet Union, it appeared in the decades following their deportation that the Crimean Tatars were all but doomed to obscurity. As one contemporary source (Quelquejay, 1968, 25) articulated it, "the Crimean Tatars are doomed to be assimilated by the peoples among whom they are now living. Thus a people with a long, glorious and tragic past will disappear from history" (quoted in Williams, 1997, 239). However, the Crimean Tatar community proved resolute in their efforts to maintain their national identity and in their fight to return to their homeland throughout the Soviet period (see Chapter Four).

**Changes to Crimea’s Political Status**

With the Crimean Tatars removed from the region, Crimea was no longer home to a significant ethnic minority group and thus no longer met the requirements for the status of an autonomous republic. Hence, on June 30, 1945, Crimea’s status was downgraded to that of an *oblast* – essentially a non-autonomous province – of the RSFSR as its population was now predominantly Russian by nationality. A second change to Crimea’s political status came nine years later on January 25, 1954 when, under the directives of new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, the Crimean Oblast was transferred administratively from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.

Justifications for the transfer were rather nebulous and poorly presented to the Soviet public at the time, adding to the speculation and debate over its meaning and significance in the post-Soviet era. Most accounts of the transfer emphasize that it was meant as a symbolic gesture of “friendship” between the Soviet Union’s two largest ethnic communities. Crucially, the transfer of Crimea happened to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, which in 1654 brought the Hetmanate of the Zaporozhian Cossacks under the allegiance of the
Russian Tsar. It is often cited as the moment Russian and Ukrainian lands became historically linked. Despite the fact that at the time of the treaty Crimea was an Ottoman vassal state ruled by a khan who was hostile towards both Russia the Cossacks, the transfer of Crimea was treated through public discourse as a meaningful commemoration of the glorious unification of Russia and Ukraine.

However, Ukrainian narratives of the transfer instead tend to highlight the abundant evidence that the transfer was based in large part upon sound and thoughtful economic considerations (Sergiychuk, 2001). Official deliberations over the transfer did in fact emphasize economic development as a primary motivation though they were often expressed in vague and simplistic terms. In the official proceedings that initiated the transfer, many representatives emphasized the territorial continuity between Ukraine and Crimea as a facilitating factor of the peninsula’s economic development. One representative of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR involved with the transfer commented at the time that

the Crimean Oblast … is territorially adjoined to the Ukrainian Republic, forming in some way a natural continuation of the southern Ukrainian steppe. The economy of the Crimean Oblast is closely linked with the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. For geographic and economic reasons the transfer of the Crimean Oblast to the brotherly Ukrainian Republic is practical for the general interests of the Soviet Union (Burov, et al., 2007, 372).

Economic considerations, however, were still typically couched within the standard rhetoric of brotherhood and friendship, as exemplified in another representative's comments that ”the unbreakable and eternal friendship between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples will be key to the
further economic strengthening of the Soviet Union on its path towards communism” (“Iskliuchitel’no…”, 2004).

At that time the transfer meant very little for the people of Crimea. It simply meant that the chain of command and administration now went through Kyiv rather than directly from Moscow to Simferopol, and Crimea was still part of the highly centralized Soviet state no matter which republic to which it was attached (Sasse, 2007, 124). However, today many Russians living in Crimea and beyond curse the name of Khrushchev for his role in splitting Crimea from the Russian homeland, while many Ukrainians celebrate this decision and praise Khrushchev – himself an ethnic Ukrainian – for his shrewd judgment in uniting Crimea with Ukraine.

**Development under the Ukrainian SSR**

Sizeable numbers of Ukrainians were already living in Crimea long before it was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Ethnic Ukrainian migration to Crimea had gradually increased since its annexation by Russia in 1783, accounting for 64,510 people or 11.8% of the regional population by 1897 (Vodarskyi et al., 2003). However, the growth of the Ukrainian population in Crimea was outpaced by that of Russians throughout this period. Following the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944, Soviet authorities began forcibly resettling Slavs in Crimea to make up for the sudden labor shortage. Most of the resettled population was ethnically Russian, although many Ukrainians from parts of the central and northern Ukrainian SSR were moved to Crimea as well (Sasse, 2007, 117). In terms of overall numbers the repopulation of Crimea by resettlement progressed slowly, with only 74,000 more people in 1959 than before the outbreak of World War II (121).
Efforts to bring in more Ukrainian settlers continued following the 1954 transfer, although the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian settlers remained approximately the same as it had been a decade earlier. Thus between 1959 and 1989 the relative proportions of Russians to Ukrainians in the Crimean Oblast remained more or less the same, i.e., approximately 68% and 25%, respectively (Sasse, 121, 275). However, Sergiychuk (2001) points out that in 1970 there were 361,500 Ukrainians living in the Crimean Oblast, which represented an increase of 113,000 since 1959 – a difference of only 11 years (239).

More importantly, Sergiychuk notes that rural settlers accounted for a majority of the increase in Crimea’s Ukrainian population. In fact, with the exception of the Transcarpathian Oblast in western Ukraine, the Crimean Oblast was the only one in the Ukrainian SSR to see an increase in its rural population in the decades following World War II while the rural population of the entire republic fell by 2 million (239). Sergiychuk explains that one of the main reasons for this increase in Crimea’s rural population is the fact that entire villages that were flooded by the construction of the Kiev Reservoir during the 1960s were relocated specifically to Crimea (239). In Ukrainian narratives the fact that ethnic Ukrainians bolstered Crimea’s rural population in the post-war decades is significant because it shows that ethnic Ukrainians and the Ukrainian SSR “took on the burden of recovery for the war-devastated peninsula” by rebuilding its agricultural and industrial infrastructure (238).

Another critical project that further strengthened economic, infrastructural, and social ties between Crimea and the Ukrainian SSR was the construction of the Northern Crimean Canal (Sergiychuk, 2001). Built through the Perekop Isthmus connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine between 1961 and 1971, the canal brought much-needed water from the Dnieper River to Crimea’s northern steppe, as well as an influx of state investment to the oblast (Sasse, 2007).
Furthermore, the construction of the canal meant that Crimea was now reliant upon Ukraine for much of its water supply, and the fact that Crimea’s water now came from the Dnieper – the very river that flows through the heart of Ukraine and which has been so central to Ukrainian history and culture – has had great symbolic as well as practical meaning for the construction of Ukrainian national narratives about Crimea.

Crimea’s cultural integration into Ukraine during the Soviet period was not nearly as strong as its economic and infrastructural integration. As Crimea’s population remained predominantly Russian and the processes of Russian/Soviet cultural homogenization continued to prevail throughout the Soviet Union, the institutionalization of Ukrainian culture in Crimea proved meager at best. This is especially true in regards to Ukrainian language usage and education. Initially following the transfer, it appeared that the language was making inroads as the number of Ukrainian language teachers in Crimean high schools increased rapidly from only two in 1950 to 345 by 1955 (Sasse, 121). By 1958 Ukrainian language classes had become standard in all second, third, and fifth grade classes, with a total of 19,766 students studying it that year (Sergiychuk, 250). However, by the early 1970s Ukrainian language education in Crimea had all but disappeared (256). As virtually everybody in both Crimea and the rest of Ukraine already spoke the Soviet lingua franca (i.e., Russian), the drive to promote Ukrainian language education eventually fizzled out.

**Crimea’s Status as a Soviet and post-Soviet Vacation Destination**

Due to its warm climate, extensive coastline, recreational opportunities, and supposed health-restoring properties, Crimea became the vacation destination of choice for millions of Soviet holidaymakers (Bagrova, Bokov and Bagrov, 2001). Crimea continues in the post-Soviet
era to attract millions of vacationers every year, primarily from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. To most people who grew up in the Soviet Union or its successor states, Crimea means family vacations, relaxing on the beach, hiking in the mountains, rejuvenating in a sanatorium, and happy childhood memories. For the millions who have been able to spend their vacations there, Crimea represents a place of retreat from the hardships of everyday life and a place that is separate from their day-to-day realities both physical and psychological. For example, the introduction to one Crimean guidebook published in 1989 begins:

You are in Crimea. Here you may forget about your workaday concerns and replace the rhythm of business with relaxation and contemplation, or with exciting travel filled with vivid impressions ... Rejoice in the sun and sea breeze, wander through exotic parks, enjoy “one of the most celebrated seas on planet Earth” – the Black Sea. While relaxing and regaining your health and strength, all that is amazing, wonderful, and new to you is just around the corner. (Kryukova, 1989, 3)

As the playground for the entire Soviet Union, narratives of Crimea have largely been shaped by the collective experiences and memories of the Soviet people who came to cherish it, and this process continues in the post-Soviet era.

As most citizens were prohibited from traveling abroad, Crimea was transformed into a workers’ paradise within Soviet borders, a giant “workshop, the product of which is the health and happiness of millions of people” (Sirota, 1980, 3). Crimean tourism numbers grew steadily throughout the Soviet period from 4 million annual visitors in 1968, to 5.7 million in 1978, to over 8 million in 1988 (Bagrova, Bokov and Bagrov, 2001, 206). The economic turmoil of the 1990s meant a severe drop in tourist numbers, and even by 1999 the number of yearly visitors
only reached 3.3 million (208). In recent years Crimea has finally seen tourism numbers comparable to its Soviet heyday with over 5.7 million visitors in 2007 (“V Krymu s nachala…”, 2007, Dec 10). With so many annual visitors, vacationing in Crimea has long been something of a cliché of Soviet and post-Soviet society. Even in 1980, as Sirota writes, “to be sure, it would be difficult to find a person who has not been [to Crimea] at least once” (5).

One important aspect of the Crimean tourist industry has been its numerous children's health resorts and summer camps. The city of Evpatoria in particular has become synonymous with resorts catering to ill and disabled children. However, the most popular and famous destination for children in Crimea has long been the summer camp “Artek.” Located near Yalta on Crimea’s south coast, Artek was a camp for Soviet “Pioneers”¹ and the premier destination for children from around the Soviet Union and from numerous Soviet-aligned countries around the world. Artek was founded in 1925 as part of Lenin’s effort to create a workers’ paradise in Crimea, and as Kondrashenko (1977) states, “The motherland gave to the children the biggest piece of bread and the last bit of sugar. They needed sun, a lot of sun, and they received a fairytale-like spot on the shores of the Black Sea” (7).

The objective of camps like Artek was to bring together children from all corners of the Soviet Union and the socialist world at large to expose them to the broad ethnic and cultural diversity of their fellow citizens and their socialist brethren abroad and to promote the Soviet values through which they were all united. This theme is evident, for example, in the lyrics of a typical song sung by children at Artek: “Buryats, Negros, Russians / all in a single crowd. / Here we strengthen our muscles / for our unitary fight!” (Kondrashenko, 1977, 6). In this way, camps like Artek and Crimea itself have become sites of intercultural exchange and exposure for millions of Soviet youths. These activities have helped shape and reinforce perceptions of

¹ The Pioneers, or “Pionery” in Russian, were the Soviet equivalent of Boy Scouts.
Crimea in Soviet and post-Soviet society both as a place of retreat and relaxation and as a sanctuary of diversity and exotic multiculturalism. Artek and several other children’s camps remain open in Crimea today, and while they are no longer used as tools of Soviet indoctrination they remain a vital component of Crimea’s tourism industry.

As millions were experiencing and consuming narratives of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness as tourists during the Soviet period, expressions of this distinctiveness persisted in Soviet literature as well. Undoubtedly the most prominent work to emerge about Crimea in this period is Vasily Aksyonov’s 1981 novel, *The Island of Crimea*. Though initially banned in the Soviet Union, it has since become a popular depiction of a world – and of a Crimea – that could have existed under different geographical and historical conditions. Somewhere between historical and science fiction, the novel imagines Crimea as an island rather than a peninsula, a fact that enabled the White Army to successfully defend Crimea from the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War and establish Crimea as an independent capitalist haven just off the shores of the Soviet Union – something of a Taiwan to the Soviet Union’s China. The novel is ripe with narratives related to Crimea’s unique qualities and clearly distinguishes it from the rest of the Soviet Union through its intriguing portrayal of an alternate reality. The plot revolves around a prominent Crimean newspaper publisher’s attempts to reconcile his love for what Crimea has become with his love for mother Russia despite its present Soviet “occupation.” In an impassioned quote one character describes his feelings towards Crimea:

I love this island; I love its memory of the old Russia and the dream of a new one; I love its rich and dissolute democracy, the ports of its rocky south open to the entire world, the energy of historically doomed but eternally resilient Russian capitalism; I love the girls of Yalta and its bohemian atmosphere; I love
[Simferopol’s] architectural turbulence; I love the well-fed flocks in the eastern pastureland and the sweeping wheat fields in the west; I love even its supple seal-like contour. (Aksyonov, 1984, 310).

Although this is obviously a description of a fictitious version of Crimea, it nevertheless reifies common perceptions of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness even in the shape of the territory itself. Despite its radical diversion in many ways from the standard Russian Crimean literary tradition, the novel does provide a crucial element of continuity with those older works in that it treats Crimea as a place that is separate from the rest of Russia. In Sasse’s words, throughout The Island of Crimea “[t]he enduring image is of Crimea as a place set apart from Russia, a place that is different, that needs to take a distinct path, and that demands special treatment” (58). Aksyonov merely expands upon these common narratives by imagining how Crimea’s distinct characteristics might have found political and social expression if circumstances had been different.

**Crimea at the End of the Soviet Period**

The end of the Soviet period brought great social and political turbulence to Crimea. In the rapidly changing atmosphere of glasnost and perestroika, many across the Soviet Union grew weary of the uncertain direction the country was heading. In Crimea this was of particular concern to ethnic Russians who constituted a majority of the regional population. With major shifts happening within the Soviet political structure, Crimea’s Russians began to understand the potential consequences of Khrushchev’s 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Many grew concerned over the possibility of the Soviet Union fracturing along the lines of the Union Republics and potentially placing Crimea within an independent Ukraine. Alarmed by the
thought of being politically severed from Russian territory, many began to push for a reinstitution of Crimea’s autonomous status, which “would provide an exit from Ukraine, should it secede from the USSR” (Sasse, 2007, 134). Sasse also argues that autonomy in Crimea was viewed as “an inherent part of the democratization process” (135) in such times of change, but that it was also a preemptive measure taken against “exclusivist ethno-territorial demands” (134) by Crimean Tatars who had recently began to return to Crimea in small numbers.

In November, 1990, the Crimean Supreme Soviet approved the proposal to hold an oblast-wide referendum on the reinstatement of autonomy in Crimea (Sasse, 2007). Such a referendum was unprecedented in Soviet history, as the establishment of all autonomous territories had been decided by the central government. In the midst of the Soviet collapse, Crimea was permitted to move forward with the referendum. Held on January 21, 1991, the referendum resulted in massive support for the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR as well as for Crimea’s inclusion in the Union Treaty that was currently under negotiation – a document that aimed to preserve the Soviet Union as it faced the increasing threat of disintegration. With a turnout of 81.4% of eligible voters, the referendum passed with 93.3% of the vote (138). With such a booming mandate for autonomy, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet confirmed the referendum results on February 12, and Crimea once again became an autonomous republic, only this time within the Ukrainian SSR and according to the will of its own people.

**Crimea after Ukrainian Independence**

Upon the Soviet collapse in December, 1991, Ukraine – including the newly re-established Autonomous Republic of Crimea – became an independent state. Feeling disillusioned by their sudden exclusion from their Russian “motherland,” many Russians in
Crimea scrambled for a solution to their woebegone political fate. So began nearly a decade of difficult political negotiations that subsequently saw a Crimean separatist movement, the brief institution of a Crimean presidency, and numerous political parties struggling to maintain Crimea’s Russian cultural and political heritage. This was compounded by the return of thousands of Crimean Tatars to their estranged homeland and caused serious disputes over property rights as many returnees sought to reclaim the land they had once owned but now found occupied by Russians or Ukrainians (Uehling, 2004). While this period of political uncertainty inspired many observers to proclaim Crimea the next hotspot of ethnic or geopolitical conflict, serious conflict was ultimately averted through a protracted and often painful process of cooperation between Kiev, Simferopol, and Crimean Tatar leadership to negotiate the terms of the autonomous republic’s constitution that was finally enacted in 1998 (see Sasse, 2007).

With the fall of the Soviet Union also came the complete abolition of the restriction on Crimean Tatars’ return to Crimea, although many had already started trickling back. Those Crimean Tatars who chose to return to Crimea and had the means to do so were met with the grim reality that their homeland was no longer the place it had been before they were deported (Williams, 2001). The region had been thoroughly Russified in their absence and what little remained of their once flourishing society in Crimea had been largely sterilized and co-opted as a tourist attraction depicting some forgotten, backwards culture. More troubling, the homes and lands once belonging to Crimean Tatars were now occupied by Russians and Ukrainians who had little sympathy for the returning people’s plight, either viewing them as invasive outsiders or continuing to begrudge them for their supposed treason against the Soviet people during World War II. Discrimination by locals and harassment by officials were rampant. Furthermore, returning to Crimea became more difficult and weighted with bureaucracy as emigrating no
longer meant moving between two regions of the Soviet Union but rather between two newly independent countries, both of which were struggling to get on their feet. Despite the difficulties they faced (see Chapter Four), hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars chose to return to their homeland, with roughly half of the 500,000 Crimean Tatars scattered throughout the Soviet Union returning to Crimea by the mid-1990s (Williams, 2004, 40).

Deciding what should be done with the Black Sea Fleet following the collapse of the Soviet Union was another exceedingly difficult task, and indeed became one of the dominant issues during the negotiations of power transfer and the terms of sovereignty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. By 1997, a complicated series of negotiations concluded between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk over the future of the fleet, which ultimately awarded Russia the majority of its ships, armaments, and facilities, and a 20-year lease of the port of Sevastopol, while Ukraine retained a small portion of the original fleet (Simonson, 2000). The decision over who among the fleet’s personnel would serve in which navy was largely left to the individual officers and servicemen themselves. In 1994 the city of Sevastopol was severed from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and given the status of Federal City within Ukraine – a distinction deemed necessary because of its status as both a Russian and Ukrainian naval base. Although initially set to expire in 2017, in 2010 Russia’s lease on Sevastopol’s naval facilities was extended another 25 years with the option of an additional five in exchange for lower prices on Russian gas, meaning that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is set to stay in Crimea at least through 2042.

Today Crimea remains an autonomous republic within Ukraine according to the division of power established by the constitutions of both Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Crimea maintains its own unicameral parliament similar to that of the Ukrainian state
parliament (both named Verkhovna Rada in Ukrainian). As of the last Ukrainian census in 2001, Russian account for 58.5% of Crimea’s population, Ukrainians account for 26.7%, and Crimean Tatars account for 12.1% (State Statistical Agency of Ukraine, 2004). While the political situation has largely stabilized since the late 1990s, there remain a number of pro-Russian political and activist groups – both at the regional (Crimean) and state (Ukrainian) scales – which advocate for the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Such groups include the Russian Community of Crimea, Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia, and the Bloc of Yulia Vitrenko, which is a Ukraine-wide pro-Russian party with strong support in Crimea. Along with the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine, Crimea has consistently voted for more mainstream pro-Russian political parties in every national election by a wide margin.

Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, have been largely loyal to the Ukrainian state and supportive of national political parties that are less conciliatory towards Russia, as they tend to view a strong Ukrainian state as a guarantor of their rights as the indigenous people of Crimea and as a bulwark against Russian chauvinism both regionally and state-wide (Sasse, 2007). Additionally, since 1991 the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars – along with its parliamentary assembly the Qurultay – has been the primary representative body for the Crimean Tatars both at the regional and state level where it has advocated for Crimean Tatars’ rights and fought to rehabilitate their status as the indigenous people of Crimea. Mustafa Jemilev, the chair of the Mejlis and de facto leader of the Crimean Tatar national movement, is also a deputy of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada.

**Territorial Imagery and the Crimean “Logo-Map”**

Worth noting is the fact that the image of the Crimean peninsula itself has played an
important role within the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet popular imaginations. Because of its narrow and tenuous attachment to the Ukrainian mainland and projection southward into the Black Sea, it has been noted that the Crimean peninsula appears to be “suspended” or “dangling” from Ukraine. As such, the expression “a medal upon the chest of the earth,” supposedly coined by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, has become a popular trope used by Crimeans to describe the peninsula’s appearance while simultaneously expressing their attachment to the region by conceiving of Crimea as some kind of “prize.” Meanwhile, Glazkova and Landa (2007) claim that Crimea's outline resembles “a giant bird or dragon, flying to the east” (4). Clearly, the unmistakable outline of the Crimean Peninsula has captured the imagination of many. Because its boundaries are defined by its coastline rather than arbitrary borders drawn in the Soviet era like virtually every other post-Soviet territory, the shape of Crimea has become an attribute of its regional distinctiveness both for those within the region and outside of it, and it is used to embody and symbolize the perception of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness in countless ways.

Anderson (1991) defines the basic and simplified outline of a territory as a “logo-map,” and argues that they serve a crucial role in developing a national or territorial consciousness. “Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrate[s] deep into the popular imagination,” explains Anderson (175). The “logo-map” of Crimea can be seen throughout the peninsula and used in a number of capacities. It can be found emblazoned upon a wide variety of souvenirs – including postcards, magnets, mugs, towels, t-shirts, and bags – typically adorned with images of popular tourist destinations around the peninsula or scenes of popular recreational activities. These images are meant primarily for consumption by tourists and serve to reinforce the connection between Crimea as a territory and the qualities that make it regionally distinct from a tourist’s perspective.
Beyond the tourism industry, the Crimea “logo-map” appears on countless signs, advertisements, newspapers, and other forms of media, whether or not the message is directly related to Crimea itself. While the outline of Crimea may be found on signs for regional political or social organizations, it is seen just as commonly on signs for stores or restaurants or incorporated into a company’s logo. The ubiquity of this “logo-map” throughout Crimea serves to reinforce collective consciousness of the region itself among Crimean residents, helps to mentally distinguish and isolate Crimea from surrounding territories, and ultimately plays an important role in fostering senses of regional identity.

Unique Factors of Crimea’s Political Status

Compared to other autonomous regions of the former Soviet Union, Crimea’s autonomy is unique in a number of important ways which are worth noting in order to understand how Crimea has been perceived and treated as a unique region in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts. Soviet nationality policies established a number of territorial “homelands” for many of the Soviet Union’s ethnic minorities, and these groups were nominally guaranteed varying degrees of autonomy over the use of their native language and expression of their national culture in these territories. In most cases, borders were drawn to create these autonomous territories in places where such political organization of space had not previously existed in order to give physical form to the “homelands” of various national groups. While several of the groups to receive autonomy had certainly developed some form of national consciousness prior to these policies, discrete boundaries of their national territory had not previously been “institutionalized” in the formation of a distinct region. In other words, these were territories established around groups of people in order to serve and facilitate their national autonomy rather than the political
institutionalization of territorial units previously acknowledged to be distinct or cohesive. In most cases the borders of these autonomous regions appear to have been delimited erratically as they were drawn to accommodate population distributions and according to the whims of Soviet central planners.

Crimea was unique within the Soviet Union both as an autonomous region whose borders conformed to physical geography and as the political institutionalization of a territory previously acknowledged to be distinct. Crimea had been acknowledged as a distinct region since before it was first annexed into the Russian Empire, as this chapter has demonstrated. Meanwhile, Crimea’s political boundaries have always been congruent with the shores of the Crimean Peninsula itself as a landmass that is nearly detached from the Soviet/Ukrainian mainland. While the fact alone that it is a separate landmass does not make Crimea a “territory” or “region” – as such distinctions are socially constructed – it has provided a conveniently bounded and discrete space within which “territorial shape” can be produced. According to Paasi (1996), the process of constructing territorial shape “refers to the localization of social practices through which regional transformation takes place and a territorial unit achieves its boundaries and becomes identified as a distinct unit on some scale of the spatial structure” (34). In this sense, I argue that the political expression of Crimea’s uniqueness in the form of autonomy has been applied evenly across the Crimean Peninsula despite the fact that, in terms of physical location, much of the characteristics that are typically thought of as distinguishing of Crimea (beaches, mountains, exotic cultures, etc.) are confined mainly to the southern and eastern portions of the peninsula. The Crimean Peninsula has proved to be a convenient territorial “container” for the political expression of Crimea’s unique character.

\(^{2}\) With the current exception of Sevastopol being a separately-administered Federal City of Ukraine
In its original incarnation Crimea’s autonomous status did fit the Soviet model in that it was established as a homeland for a distinct ethnic minority, i.e., the Crimean Tatars. However, there is evidence to suggest that, if the general rule of Soviet national territorial autonomy had been strictly applied, the boundaries of a Crimean Tatar autonomous territory would not have necessarily conformed to the outline of the Crimean Peninsula. Conducted five years after the establishment of the Crimean ASSR, the 1926 All-Union Census of the Soviet Union indicates that Crimean Tatars constituted a minority of the population in many regions of Crimea, particularly in the northern and eastern regions around the cities of Dzhankoi, Feodosia, and Kerch (Krymskyi Etnograficheskyi Muzej). In these regions, Russians and Ukrainians constituted the majority after nearly 150 years of Slavic settlement in Crimea. Moreover, census data from the same year indicates that 22,281 Tatars\(^3\) lived outside of Crimea within the Ukrainian SSR indicating that the population of Crimean Tatars was not strictly territorially confined to the Crimean Peninsula (*Demoskop Weekly*, 2011). This information indicates that the boundaries of the Crimean ASSR were fairly incongruent with the spatial distribution of Crimean Tatars – the national group for whom the autonomous republic had been established. This pattern lends further credence to the notion that the perception of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness – in this case characterized as the homeland of Crimean Tatars – has been broadly applied to the Crimean Peninsula as a whole. The establishment of autonomy across the entirety of the peninsula represents, according to Paasi, another element of the institutionalization of Crimea as a region through the establishment of a crucial regional institution, furthering the perception of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness.

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\(^3\) The 1926 census did not include a separate category for Crimean Tatars, and thus they would have been counted only as “Tatar.”
The institutionalization of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness can also be observed in the various names that the region, as a politically-defined territory, has adapted during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. In the first place, during the Soviet era the Crimean ASSR was the only autonomous region not to derive its name from the national group for which it was created. In fact, unlike other national groups in the Soviet Union who lent their name to the autonomous territories constructed around them (Tatarstan from the Tatars, Abkhazia from the Abkhaz, etc.), Crimean Tatars have conversely derived their ethnonym from their native region. In other words, Crimean Tatars are named for the territory that they inhabit while virtually every other minority national group in the Soviet Union has instead been used to define the territories constructed around them. That Crimean Tatars have long been distinguished in name by their native territory speaks to the notion of regional distinctiveness and the institutionalization of Crimea as a distinct region from a very early period. The fact that the Crimean ASSR was not named the Crimean Tatar ASSR instead also reinforces the idea that Crimea’s autonomous status is derived more from a sense of regional distinctiveness than from the presence of a minority national group.

When Crimea’s status was downgraded from an autonomous republic to an oblast in 1945 following the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, the subsequent name change of this territorial unit continued to reflect a sense of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness. While nearly all oblasts in the Soviet Union were named after their primary city and/or seat of territorial government, the Crimean ASSR did not become the “Simferopolskaia Oblast” as this trend would dictate. Instead it simply became the Crimean Oblast, thereby preserving the name “Crimea” and retaining this marking of regional distinction despite the loss of autonomy. Today, as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the name of this political-territorial unit continues to be

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4 After the Crimean capital of Simferopol.
synonymous with the physically-defined and socially-constructed region with which it is equated.

In its current incarnation Crimea continues to be unique among the autonomous regions of the former Soviet Union due to the circumstances surrounding the reinstitution of its autonomous status. Crimea became autonomous again following an oblast-wide referendum in February, 1991, the first of its kind, just months before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Crucially, this referendum was held at a time before the Crimean Tatars had begun to return to the region in any significant numbers. Thus, while every other autonomous region had been established on the pretext of being a homeland for a national minority, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lacked such a “titular” nationality at the time of its re-establishment. While Crimean Tatars began to return soon thereafter, the fact remains that Crimea’s current autonomous status was predicated not upon the presence of a national minority, but rather upon the will of its people for the political expression of their regional distinctiveness. In contrast, nearly every other autonomous region in the former Soviet Union is the successor of its Soviet-era equivalent, ostensibly still predicated upon the presence of a national minority during Soviet times.

Some may argue that because Russians are a minority within Ukraine as a whole, autonomy in Crimea represents a measure of protection of Russians’ minority rights much as other autonomous regions are intended to be for other minorities. This argument does not account for the fact that Crimea’s Russians make up a small percentage of Ukraine’s total ethnic Russian population despite the fact that Crimea is the only region where they constitute a majority. According to the last Ukrainian census in 2001, Russians in Crimea account for only 14.2% of the entire Russian population of Ukraine (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2004).
Furthermore, Crimea stands as the only autonomous territory in any region with a large Russian population outside of the Russian Federation.

Crimea has proved a political-territorial anomaly among the various territorial units – both autonomous and non-autonomous – within the Soviet Union and in the post-Soviet space. It is the only region where autonomous borders are defined by physical geography; it is the only autonomous region not to derive its name from a “titular” national group; it is the only region to have its autonomy decided by a popular vote rather than a central mandate; and in its current form it is the only autonomous region not established as a homeland for a distinct national minority group. Fundamentally, Crimea is distinct from other post-Soviet autonomous regions in that it is not a territory born from the need for autonomy of a particular group. Rather, it is a region that had already been recognized as a distinct territory – physically and culturally – to which autonomy has been accorded in symbolic acknowledgement of this distinct character. “Crimea” as a region is not only a political construct created by Soviet authorities; it is a discrete territory distinguished by its physical boundaries and perceived as being regionally distinct since long before it became an autonomous republic.

**Summary**

Crimea’s history has been shaped by numerous groups over time that have called it home and made it into a region of great ethnic and cultural diversity. In addition to this diversity, perceptions of Crimea’s exotic landscape, climate, and natural beauty have lent it a certain mystique in the eyes of its Russian conquerors, who view it as a unique and distinctive region, and this perception has subsequently shaped the trajectory of Crimea’s history in the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods. Crimean history has also been quite turbulent as numerous
conflicts have brought successive regime changes and shifts in Crimea’s political status. For over 200 years Crimean history was shaped by the Russian and Soviet regimes that fundamentally altered the cultural and demographic character of the region, sometimes to tragic ends in the case of the Crimean Tatars and the struggles they have endured as a result of their deportation. In 1991 Crimea entered a new phase in its history as it became a part of an independent Ukraine and faced a number of new challenges due to the complications of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Today the story of Crimea continues to be shaped by its three predominant groups – Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars – and historical circumstances have meant that each of these groups possess their own unique perspective of Crimea. In Chapter Four I explore the ways in which each of these groups have constructed their own national narratives of Crimea, and in subsequent chapters I demonstrate how these competing narratives and perspectives shape identity dynamics among Crimea’s three main ethnic communities.
Chapter IV: Constructing Competing National Narratives about Crimea

In the post-Soviet era, Crimea has become the subject of three major narratives that construct it within different ethno-cultural and ethno-territorial contexts: the Crimean Tatar narrative, the Russian narrative, and the Ukrainian narrative. Each of these perspectives borrow from and rely upon different aspects of Crimea’s history and culture to lend credence to its particular claims to the region.

The Crimean Tatar Narrative

Of the three groups actively constructing their own narratives of modern Crimea, the Crimean Tatars claim the deepest roots and arguably maintain the most intimate connection to the region itself. Although their recent history and relationship with Crimea have been complicated by their 1944 deportation and nearly fifty-year absence from the region, the territory of Crimea itself has unquestionably remained central to Crimean Tatar identity. The concept of homeland among Crimean Tatars is overwhelmingly and inextricably tied to Crimea, and reclaiming this homeland has been the lynchpin of the Crimean Tatar national movement since the Soviet period.

The Role of Crimean Geography in Crimean Tatar Ethnogenesis

The story of the Crimean Tatars’ ethnogenesis and appearance in Crimea is rather controversial, as concerted attempts have been made by Soviet and Russian authorities to diminish their role in the region’s history and undermine their claims to the title of indigenous
people of Crimea following their deportation and subsequent return to Crimea (Sasse, 2007, 74). Crimean Tatars have sought to demonstrate their deep roots in Crimea that they believe afford them a special claim and right to the territory. As Crimean Tatar political leader Mustafa Jemilev (1997, 3) explains, “in the formation of the Turkish base of our Crimean Tatar nation there are definite waves of all races and ethnic groups who settled in the Crimea from ancient times” (quoted in Williams, 2001, 9). According to this view, the Crimean Tatar nation itself was born of Crimea’s diversity, and their connection to the region is a testament to the fact that they could not have come from anywhere else.

While they are in part the descendants of Mongol invaders and Turkic nomads much like other Tatar groups spread throughout the Eurasian steppe, Crimean Tatars have argued that this Mongol heritage makes up only a small part of their diverse lineage. While those who seek to diminish and delegitimize the Crimean Tatars’ claims to the region identify them as merely the decedents of Mongol invaders, Crimean Tatars and their supporters argue that their roots in Crimea go much deeper. As Voitovich (2009) explains, the arrival of Mongol invaders and the establishment of the Golden Horde’s dominion over Crimea served primarily to “accelerate the process of symbiosis” between various groups already present in Crimea, ultimately leading to the integration of these groups into a common Crimean Tatar ethnic group (3).

According to Crimean Tatar narrative, the region’s diverse cultural heritage and geography play vital roles in the formation of Crimean Tatar ethnicity and culture. Williams (2001) accounts for the fact that the Crimean peninsula’s three distinct landscape zones provided the setting for the formation of three distinct groups who formed the Crimean Tatar ethnic group, known as the Nogais, Tats, and Yaliboyus, respectively. The Nogais appeared in the northern steppe through the interbreeding of Mongols and Kipchaks. The Tats formed within the Crimean
mountains from the remnants of various diverse Crimean civilizations that had sought refuge there over the centuries. The Yaliboyus formed along the southern coast from Greek, Italian (Genoese and Venetian), and Armenian communities. It was only under the hegemony of Islam within the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars argue, that these groups were first “Tatarized,” or united under the ethnonym of Crimean Tatars. Williams explains that as these groups began to adopt the religion, language, and culture of the Crimean ruling elites

The subsequent amalgamation of the ancient mountain and costal populations with the Kipchak-Tatars of the plains led to the formation of a uniquely Crimean version of the “Tatar” ethnic group. The mixed “Tatars” who came into being on the Crimean Peninsula differed in many ways from the Tatar populations of the Khanates of Kazan, and Astrakhan and the ‘pure’ Tatar nomads of the steppes of the Desti-i Kipchak, known as Nogais. (27)

Although even today the three Crimean Tatar sub-groups are distinguishable from one another in appearance, together they have “formed the foundation of a new people who gradually internalized a vague sense of ‘Kırım Tatarlık’ (‘Crimean Tatarness’) in spite of their variegated ethno-linguistic backgrounds” (29).

Thus, Crimean Tatars have come to understand themselves as much more than simply the descendants of the unruly Mongols, as others would have them believe. They see themselves, in a sense, as an expression of Crimea-ness itself. Nowhere else on earth could their specific blend of ethno-cultural heritage be combined into a modern ethnic group but in Crimea, where history and physical geography created the conditions necessary to make the Crimean Tatars what they are today. In this way, Crimean Tatars believe that they are the true indigenous people of Crimea
and nowhere else. In describing the unique role that Crimean territory has played in the formation of its own distinct ethnic group, Kuftin (1992) writes that

All these myriad cultural influences left their trace in the present population of the Crimea. Bringing to its soil characteristics that were reshaped here in a unique mutual relationship with one another and, adapting to the local natural conditions and native forms of living, they long survived in other, superseding ethnic waves. (quoted in Williams, 2001, 31).

Although it was Islam that ultimately united the different groups of Crimea into a single ethnic community as the Crimean Tatars, Williams contends that “[t]here are grounds for believing … that the Crimeans of this [early] period did have a vague identification with the Crimean Peninsula in a larger sense, identifying themselves with the Tatar term *Kırımli* (Crimean)” (29). In other words, a sense of territorial identity was beginning to prevail alongside religious and cultural identity among Crimean Tatars early on. Furthermore, many Crimean Tatars have argued for the removal of “Tatar” from their ethnonym, stating that it disproportionately aligns them with their Mongol heritage and its sometimes negative connotations (35). Those who take issue with the “Tatar” element in the Crimean Tatar ethnonym have advocated for the simple use of “Crimean” to distinguish their ethnic group, claiming that it more appropriately conveys the fact that it was formed on Crimean soil and is therefore intrinsically Crimean (35).

Thus, since their very appearance as an ethnic community, Crimean Tatars have retained an unbreakable connection to the territory of Crimea. Crimean Tatars believe and are proud of the fact that they are the product of no one ethnic or cultural tradition, but rather a product of Crimea itself and the diverse conditions that history and geography have created there. While
other groups may lay claim to the region, Crimea Tatars maintain that theirs is the most legitimate due to the fact that, if it were not for Crimea, they would not even exist as a people.

**The Glory of the Crimean Khanate**

The Crimean Khanate and its first ruler Haci Giray symbolize to Crimean Tatars not only their realization as a cohesive national group, but their identity as the rightful rulers of Crimea (Williams, 2001). The Giray dynasty’s hegemony over Crimea became complicated and controversial following Haci Giray’s death in 1466 and the subsequent involvement of the Ottoman Empire in Crimean affairs, though Crimean Tatars maintain that the Crimean Khanate remained independent throughout this period until its dissolution following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This period remains a source of pride for Crimean Tatars, and is an important component of their identity as a people belonging to Crimea.

Despite its complicated relationship with the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars choose to remember that “even if it relied on the Ottomans, the Crimean Khanate possessed all the characteristics of a fully developed, premodern state” (Uehling 2004, 32). According to Fisher (1978), the Crimean Khanate maintained its own diplomatic relations with Poland and Muscovy, collected tribute from them and from regions that were under Ottoman rule, and for much of its history minted its own coins bearing the symbol of the Giray dynasty rather than that of the Ottomans (13-14). Fisher maintains that “[s]ince the conduct of diplomacy is one of the prerogatives of a sovereign state, one must conclude that here … is evidence of an incomplete Crimean dependence upon the Ottomans” (14).

Although a detailed picture of this period and the specific relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate remains incomplete, Crimean Tatars choose to
remember it as a halcyon period when their own people ruled over the Crimean Peninsula unopposed and unencumbered. Then, Crimean Tatar culture was allowed to flourish. In Williams’ (2001) words, “[i]n the popular Crimean Tatar imagination, the epoch of the Crimean Khanate was a glorious time when the Crimean Khan ruled a ‘national’ state inhabited by ‘millions’ of unified, free Tatars” (39-40). In the subsequent Russian and Tsarist periods, and especially following the Crimean Tatars’ deportation, the Crimean Khanate was yearned for and romanticized as the political expression of a Crimean Tatar national movement and as a legitimization of Crimean Tatar claims to the region itself. While Russian and Soviet authorities have attempted to disprove their claims, Crimean Tatars still cling to this period as their lost glory days.

The Deportation of Crimean Tatars and the Loss of Homeland

The Crimean Tatars’ mass deportation from Crimea in 1944 remains the single most significant event in their national history. Not only did it result in the death of nearly half the population of all Crimean Tatars (Williams, 1997, 238), but it removed them from the homeland around which their entire sense of national identity revolved. The official pretense for this decision – as ordered by Stalin – was the accusation that the Crimean Tatars had collectively acted as traitors to the Soviet Union by collaborating with the Germans during their occupation of Crimea and the charge that they must be collectively punished for these treasons.

Crimean Tatars of course remember the occupation differently and vehemently deny the accusation that they acted collectively against the Soviet Union. As Jemilev\(^5\) explains, most Crimean Tatars at that time “viewed the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as no more than a skirmish

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\(^5\) While Jemilev is the Russified version of his name, he has published using the Tatarized Çemiloglu.
between two villains, neither of which promised any kindness or relief” (Cemiloglu, 1995, 93). In this view, many Crimean Tatars simply acted in their own best interests during the war, siding with whichever side appeared most tolerable, which inevitably meant that “[d]oubtless, some Crimean Tatars who were not sufficiently informed about the essence of German fascism entertained hopes, for a time, of deliverance from the hated Bolshevik regime which had succeeded in bringing so much suffering to their people within a short period of time” (Cemiloglu, 1995, 92).

Largely ignored by Soviet sources but touted by Crimean Tatars is the fact that great numbers of Crimean Tatars fought and died defending the Soviet Union during the war. One source (Bugai, 1992) argues that as many as 20,000 Crimean Tatars served in the Soviet military during the war, a number equivalent to approximately 10% of the entire Crimean Tatar population at that time (131, cited in Uehling, 2004, 52). Furthermore, among the Crimean Tatars who served in the war, six were decorated with the highly prestigious title of “Hero of the Soviet Union,” a very high number considering they made up a very small percentage of the entire Soviet Army (Uehling, 2004, 53). One prominent Crimean Tatar to receive this honor was Amet Khan Sultan, a fighter pilot who earned the title of “hero” for completing over 500 flights and destroying over 20 enemy planes (53), and who is now a beloved figure among Crimean Tatars. Moreover, some have pointed out that scores of Crimean Tatars fought alongside Russians and Ukrainians in the Crimean partisan (guerilla) armies against the Germans during their occupation of Crimea. While Soviet and Russian historical accounts of the war have emphasized their supposed treason, Crimean Tatars choose to emphasize their contributions to the Soviet war effort and the patriotism that they displayed. In Jemilev’s words, “with the exception of an insignificant number of ‘traitors to their people,’ almost all Crimean Tatars
remained faithful to the ‘Soviet motherland’ and the Communist Party during the years of occupation and bravely fought against the Nazis on the fronts and in partisan groups” (Cemiloglu, 1995, 92).

Crimean Tatars now understand the deportation as a Soviet attempt to deny them their national identity by denying them their national territory, and to erase any notion of a distinct Crimean Tatar nationality from the pages of history. Virtually the entire Crimean Tatar community in exile during the remainder of the Soviet period denied the allegations for which they have suffered and demonstrated their contributions to the war effort, but most importantly they came to fight for the right to return to their native Crimea. Narratives of loss and longing caused by the deportation from Crimea have come to dominate the Crimean Tatar national movement since 1944 (Uehling, 2004).

Keeping the Memory of Crimea while in Exile

Throughout their period of exile the territory of Crimea itself remained the central focus of the Crimean Tatars’ culture and social lives and political activism. The phrase “homeland or death” became a common slogan during their decades-long campaign for the right to return to Crimea (Uehling, 2004, 200). In the words of one Crimean Tatar recalling the period of exile in Central Asia, “not a single action, great or small, took place during visits to houses among friends and acquaintances, during the entire deportation period, without recollections of the Crimea, of the land on which our parents, grandfathers and great grandfathers lived and worked” (Finogeev et al., 1994, 15, 19 [quoted in Williams, 2004, 38]). Another Crimean Tatar who lived through the period of deportation explains that “every Crimean Tatar child had it drummed into his head that he had a homeland … Most children say ‘mama’ or ‘papa’ as their first word. Our
children said ‘Krym’ [Crimea]” (Popeski, 1994). A number of Crimean Tatars attempted to simply move back to Crimea once they were allowed to move about the Soviet Union in 1967, but the vast majority of them were quickly expelled as this freedom of movement implicitly excluded Crimea (Uehling, 2004, 208). Though Crimean Tatars were permitted to live anywhere in the Soviet Union except Crimea, a large number chose to settle in the regions just north and east of the peninsula either after being re-deported from Crimea or “having moved there deliberately, positioning themselves to repatriate at the first opportunity” (208).

More than in any other period in their history, during the period of exile the Crimean Tatars’ connection to the territory of Crimea became the single most salient and galvanizing component of their national identity. Rather than completely assimilating ethnically and culturally into their surrounding communities the Crimean Tatars clung tenaciously to their own “Crimean Tatarness.” Because they typically shared many cultural, linguistic, and culinary traits with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia among whom they had been placed, the most important aspect of their national identity remained their attachment to and memories of their Crimean homeland. Through tight-knit networks of family and friends the memory of Crimea was kept alive and passed along to younger generations of Crimean Tatars who had never even seen Crimea for themselves, creating a trans-generational narrative of homeland and of the injustice they suffered by being removed from it. Unlike other groups who had been settled in Soviet Central Asia and quickly acculturated, such as the Uyghurs and Koreans (Williams, 1997, 244), the Crimean Tatars remained steadfast in their assertion that they belonged only in Crimea and refused to give up their crusade to return to their homeland.

The Crimean Tatar national movement remained non-violent throughout this period, although there were a number of well-documented cases of self-immolation by its members. One
famous instance happened in 1978 when 47-year-old Musa Mahmud, who had illegally returned to Crimea along with his family, set himself on fire when approached by police officers attempting to have him arrested and expelled from Crimea, making him an instant martyr of the Crimean Tatar national movement (Uehling, 2004, 169-170). It was during this time that the Crimean Tatars’ most influential political leader, Mustafa Jemilev, first rose to prominence for his activism, for which he spent years in prison. The Kremlin finally conceded the Crimean Tatars’ demands in late 1989 during the period of reforms under glasnost, officially allowed them to return to Crimea for the first time since their deportation 45 years earlier (Uehling, 2004). Crimean Tatars rejoiced, and thousands began flocking to their long-lost homeland.

**Rebuilding and Reestablishing Their Lives in Crimea**

Despite the harassment, discrimination, and lack of resources waiting for them upon returning to Crimea, the draw of homeland proved too strong as scores of Crimean Tatars chose to return to Crimea. By the mid-1990s, nearly 250,000 out of their total population of approximately 500,000 had already arrived (Williams, 2004, 40). From the very beginning of this period of repatriation Crimean Tatars were extremely well-mobilized and organized both socially and politically. It was typical for entire villages, collective farms, or extended familial networks to migrate in convoys from Central Asia to Crimea, where others who had already arrived were waiting to help place them into temporary settlements (Williams, 2001, 440). Under the leadership of Mustafa Jemilev the Crimean Tatar parliamentary assembly known as the Mejlis was founded in 1991, comprised of representatives elected from various Crimean Tatar settlements around the peninsula. Through their assemblies, known as Qurultays, members have
shaped the Crimean Tatar national agenda moving forward after returning to Crimea. According to their website,:

The main goal of Mejlis is [the] elimination of the consequences of the genocide, committed by the Soviet state against Crimean Tatars, restoration of the national and political rights of the Crimean Tatar people and implementation of its right to free national self-determination in its national territory. (“General information about Mejlis,” 2011)

The Mejlis along with other informal organizations proved vital in asserting Crimean Tatars’ rights in Crimea by mobilizing protests and campaigns against violence and harassment suffered at the hands of local police, government officials, and mafia groups during the early 1990s (Williams, 2004, 442).

The Crimean Tatars returned to find their former homes and land occupied by Russians and Ukrainians, and were faced with few options for housing. They quickly began a campaign of *samozakhvat’* (self-seizure) of unused lands belonging to the state, typically on communal farms (*kolkhozy*). Entire neighborhoods of squatters quickly sprang up in the outskirts of cities and larger towns with homes made from crude building material and constructed quickly in order to lay claim to the territory. These squatter districts have sprawled and become integrated into the transportation infrastructures of many of Crimean’s larger cities, however few of these roads are paved even today and can become extremely muddy and difficult to navigate in the winter. As of 1999 only 20% of the 290 such Crimean Tatar settlements in Crimea were supplied with electricity, 30% with running water, and 4% with gas, while none of them had a sewer system (Uehling, 2004, 44).
Because the extremely powerful attachment to Crimea as their one true homeland had persevered through their period of exile and become the driving force behind their national movement, returning to Crimea at any cost became the goal of so many Crimean Tatars despite the difficulties that they would encounter. Williams (2001) recalls a common mantra used in the Crimean Tatar National Movement: “the Crimean Tatars have only one homeland, the Crimea, and, unlike other nationalities, they have nowhere else to emigrate to avoid endless discrimination and violence” (447). This belief is exemplified in the following report by Kaplan (1992), after speaking with newly arrived Crimean Tatar repatriates:

Saniye, now 65, and her husband, Seidjalil Asanov, 71, left behind a six-room house in Tajikistan. "There was a garden, an orchard with grapes and figs, an aisle of flowers -- it was so beautiful," she recalled. Now they live in a flimsy shack made of sheet metal, burlap and wood, surrounded by dust, mud and weeds. They couldn't be happier. "We're living in our motherland," she beamed. (1)

Since their return the Crimean Tatars have asserted that they are not merely a minority group of Crimea, but are in fact the region’s true indigenous people and are therefore entitled to the rights afforded to indigenous people according to the United Nations (Williams, 2001, 445). This claim has been supported by the Ukrainian government, which recognized the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people in 1996. Along with their affirmation of indigenous status, the Crimean Tatars continue to strive for equality and improvement of the quality of their lives in Crimea. The fact that they have been able to return to their homeland after nearly a half century of exile and to reestablish their roots in their native soil has been a tremendous victory for them. Their connection to the territory of Crimea remains paramount to Crimean Tatar identity as it is, in their view, the only thing that distinguishes them from other groups in Crimea or elsewhere.
Islam in Modern Crimean Tatar National Narratives

Whereas Islam had once been the primary marking of identity for Crimean Tatars, their current national identity has been couched primarily in more secular discourses of ethnicity and homeland. Islam does remain an important component of Crimean Tatar life, however, and there has been a large-scale revival and rediscovery of Islam among Crimean Tatars since the collapse of the Soviet regime and its restrictions on religious practice. Muratova (2009) proclaims that “clearly, Islam is one of the most important factors of ethnic self-identification of Crimean Tatars” (4). Furthermore, Crimean Tatars are engaged in many ongoing disputes with Crimean political and religious figures over the siting and construction of mosques throughout the region.

Regardless of a revival in Islamic belief and practice among Crimean Tatars, their concept of homeland appears to be largely detached from their religious identity. Williams (2004) notes that “for the newly-repatriated Crimean Tatars, the Crimea is defined in purely secular terms that combine Western nationalism with a uniquely Soviet version of territoriality” (41). Muratova’s (2008) argument that the Mejlis – a secular political organization – has had a “significant influence” (193) on the development of Islamic revival in Crimea further supports Williams’ assertions. While Islam is certainly a vital component of Crimean Tatar identity, the Crimean Tatar National Movement should not be understood as a religious one.

For Crimean Tatars, Crimea clearly has a very special significance. They believe that unlike the region’s Russians, Ukrainians, and other small minority groups, only Crimean Tatars can claim Crimea as their own. It is from Crimea that they have originated, from which they were forcibly removed, to which they fought and struggled to return, and in which they can once again feel at peace. The territory of Crimea is in every sense intrinsic to Crimean Tatar identity,
for to be a Crimean Tatar is to be *from Crimea*. Even those who were born and raised in exile, never having set foot in Crimea, were raised with the narratives and memories of Crimea that taught them to cherish it, yearn for it, and fight to return to it. Uehling (2004) gives an example of the spiritual connection that Crimean Tatars felt with their homeland while in exile:

Some members of the second generation had a metaphysical theory that the molecules of the Crimean fruits and vegetables their parents ate became part of their bodies. Those molecules, composed of atoms, then exerted a magnetic pull. This was their metaphysical explanation for how the second and third generations of Crimean Tatars were not only figuratively, but literally drawn back to the peninsula. (115)

While members of other nationalities living in Crimea certainly do maintain a strong connection to the region, only the Crimean Tatars, as a national group, feel they have the right to claim it as their own.

**The Russian/Soviet Narrative**

Unlike the Crimean Tatars, Russians can make no reasonable claims of indigeneity in Crimea. Crimean Tatars first coalesced as a singular national group within the Crimean peninsula while the presence of ethnic Russians there today is wholly the result of the annexation, colonization, and settlement of Crimea by the Russian state beginning in the late 18th century. Despite the fact that the Russian epoch of Crimea is a relatively recent development in the region’s long and diverse history, Russian national narratives speak of Crimea’s deep Slavic and Orthodox roots that place it squarely within Russia’s orbit for millennia. This historical interpretation has been common since the era of Catherine the Great and the Russian conquest of
Crimea, when it was used to bolster the Empress’s imperialist claims to the region. Since then, Crimea has become thoroughly Russified both culturally and demographically. More importantly, however, Crimea has achieved an almost mythical preeminence within the Russian popular imagination as constructed through tales of its heroic role in major international conflicts; through the collective memories of the millions who spent their summers vacationing on its shores and in its mountains; through narrative of loss following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the territorial exclusion of Crimea from the Russian Federation; and through the post-Soviet struggle with Ukraine over Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet and their symbolic meaning for Russians both within and outside of Crimea.

**Constructing Crimea’s Early Slavic and Orthodox Heritage**

The first Russian claims to Crimea were tied to its colonization by Ancient Greeks beginning as early as the 7th century BC (Kozelsky, 2010). Such claims emerged during the period of Enlightenment in the 18th century when the popularity of Greek culture was experiencing a renaissance among the European elite. Engaging with this trend, many within the Russian aristocracy began actively linking Russian culture and civilization via Byzantine Orthodoxy to ancient Greece and thus to the very hearth of Western civilization. Crimea’s Greek heritage and the desire to incorporate it into Russia’s cultural lineage served as a driving ideological force behind early Russian claims to the Crimean Peninsula.

The fact that all of Russian Orthodoxy began in Crimea – when Prince Vladimir of Kievan Rus was baptized in Chersoneses in 988 – in many ways became the lynchpin of Russia’s imperial claim to the peninsula and the northern Black Sea littoral (Kozelsky, 2010). As a distinct brand of religious nationalism began to predominate in Russia under Catherine the Great,
Chersoneses’ and Crimea’s significance in Russian history became a critical narrative in the era of Russian imperialism (Kozelsky, 49). As Schonle (2001) suggests, Catherine and those close to her believed that given Chersoneses’ legacy as the birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy, “restoring Christian rule over the Tauric region … would confer a fitting closure to historical evolution” (2).

Kozelsky (2010) argues that the legend of Prince Vladimir’s reception of Orthodox Christianity at Chersoneses conveniently appealed to proponents of two distinct brands of philhellenism within the Russian aristocracy of the late 18th century that helped build support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. To Graecophiles in the Western European model of the Enlightenment – for whom ancient Greece represented the very pinnacle of democracy, artistic expression, scientific achievement, and sophistication to which they aspired – absorbing Crimea and its Hellenistic roots into the empire helped reify the genealogical bond between Russian and Greek civilization that they wished to promote (Kozelsky, 2010, 43, 45). To adherents of the so-called “phil-Orthodox” movement – who looked to the Byzantine period of Greek history and the birth of Eastern Orthodoxy as the true forbearer of Russian civilization – Crimea, as the very grounds upon which Orthodoxy was first transmitted into eastern Slavdom, was considered sacred territory.

Throughout the 19th century the Russian fascination with Crimea’s Greek and Christian roots only intensified. Much of the interest in further bolstering the link between Russian and Greek/Byzantine civilizations was driven by a growing interest in archaeology among the Russian intelligentsia. The Odessa Society for History and Antiquities – a “hodge-podge collection of archaeologists, amateur historians, ethnographers, and philologists” founded in 1839 (Kozelsky, 50) – sponsored numerous excavations and ethnographic studies in Crimea over
the course of the next several decades. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Moscow Macarius I published his book *The History of Christianity in Russia before Prince Vladimir, as an Introduction to the History of the Church* in 1846, in which Crimea was featured prominently. The work focuses heavily upon Crimea’s early Scythian occupiers, whom Macarius identifies as Russia’s proto-Slavic ancestors and to whom he claims the Apostle St. Andrew had proselytized in the first century AD (55, 56). “In a few deft rhetorical movements,” Kozelsky notes, Macarius “gave Russia a first-century Christian pedigree, provided imperialists with a claim to [Crimea], further alienated Tatars from their homeland, and eroded Crimea’s Greek heritage” (56).

Driven and enabled both by scholars and religious figures in a period of rising Russian nationalism rooted in the Orthodox Church, Kozelsky thus argues that the early Russification of Crimea was first and foremost a “Christianization” of the region through historical re-interpretation. She suggests that “[i]ntentionally or not, scholars … slowly began to shape Crimean history in the image of its Russian conquerors. This Muslim territory acquired a Christian past” (51). Moreover, leaning upon Vladimir’s acceptance of Christianity at Chersoneses and the supposed evidence of the region’s early exposure to Christianity, Russian nationalist narratives identified Crimea as the holy grounds upon which the Russian nation was first imbued with Orthodox Christianity. Crimea, as the narrative goes, is thus part and parcel to Russian national identity.

**The “Sevastopol Myth”**

The “Sevastopol Myth” that was born of the events surrounding the 349-day siege of the eponymous city from 1854 to 1855 during the Crimean War became a tool of national
propaganda both in the Tsarist and Soviet periods, and would later become further entrenched in the Russian and Soviet psyche following the events of World War II when Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea came under siege once again. Sevastopol’s wartime exploits and their significance for the Russian people and state have become heavily mythologized, creating “some of the inmost mental shrines of Russia,” and the feeling among Russians that “Sevastopol can never be cut out of Russia” (Ascherson, 1995, 42).

The valorization and glorification of Sevastopol became important Russian nationalist themes in what Smith (1996) refers to as the “territorialization of memory,” through which “certain kinds of shared memories are attached to particular territories so that the former become ethnic landscapes (or ethnoscapes) and the latter become historic homelands” (453-454). Smith argues that “perhaps the most important of the sites of territorialized memory are the various fields of battle which [mark] critical turning-points in the fortunes of the community” (454), in which case Sevastopol and Crimea have indeed become hallowed ground in Russian nation-building narratives.

Despite a defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russian elites and subjects alike quickly latched onto the stories of bravery and heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol that, despite the losses suffered, they believed demonstrated the Russian spirit of honor and courage. The siege was even viewed as something of a minor victory, for if the city had fallen early the consequences for Russia might have been much graver. Plokhy (2000) explains that “[t]he Russian public at large viewed the siege of Sevastopol as a symbol of the heroism of the Russian people, which saved Russia from foreign invasion, despite the inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist administration” (375).
Epic tales from the battlefield became popularized through such works as Leo Tolstoy’s *Sevastopol Sketches*, which compiled three short stories based upon the author’s experiences as a second lieutenant during the siege of the city and which he would later incorporate into his novel *War and Peace*. Tolstoy’s work displayed a certain populism in the celebration of the achievements in Sevastopol, “[presenting] the defense of Sevastopol as a story of the suffering, sacrifice and heroism of the common people – rank-and-file sailors, soldiers, and civilians” (376). According to Plokhy, *Sevastopol Sketches* retained its popularity well into the Soviet era, even remaining a part of school curricula (376). Nearly 60 years after the war, the Siege of Sevastopol also became the subject of the first feature film ever produced in the Russian Empire, 1911’s *Defense of Sevastopol*.

By all accounts, the Sevastopol Myth grew as much from a public discourse as it did from a state-sponsored campaign. Much of the early commemoration and memorialization of the war was initiated by veterans of the defense themselves, who privately raised funds to erect the first monuments to the admirals who led during the siege and to establish a Sevastopol military museum in St. Petersburg (375). Chief among the figures memorialized was Admiral Pavel Nakhimov, who was shot and killed by a sniper towards the end of the siege. The name Nakhimov remains synonymous with Russian naval might and glory; the Nakhimov Medal was later introduced during the Soviet Era to honor distinction among Soviet sailors and naval commanders, and the Nakhimov monument still stands at the center of Sevastopol’s main square to this day.

Following the war, Sevastopol was rebuilt into something of a living monument to the defense of the city in a process that Sasse (2007) relates to Anderson’s (1991) notion of “museumization” of memory and imagination. Numerous monuments commemorating various
achievements and losses suffered during the siege were erected around the city. Among the most prominent became the aforementioned Nakhimov monument and the Sunken Ship Monument – commemorating the Russian Navy’s sinking of their own ships to block enemy ships from entering the bay – which sits atop a rock in Sevastopol Bay and has become the *de facto* symbol of the city. However, the grandest of all the monuments commemorating the Defense of Sevastopol is the Panorama of the Great Defense, built in 1905 at one of the city’s highest points amidst a memorial park. Adorned around the outside with busts of the defense’s heroes, the interior is an enormous life-sized panoramic fusion of mural and tableau depicting the siege and defense of Sevastopol in all its tragic glory. Receiving over 40 million visitors since it was first erected (Qualls, 2009, 164), the Panorama provides “a vital link in the city’s heritage and traditions as a city of glory” (137) and a bold testament to the fact that “the Crimean defense became a defining moment for Russian military and political power [and] identification” (165).

The Sevastopol Myth was revived anew and fundamentally altered when, during the German invasion of World War II, the city again fell under siege and became a crucial site of Russian – and now Soviet – defense of their homeland. Although Sevastopol’s legendary status as a symbol of the country’s strength and glory had long been entrenched in Russian and Soviet lore, the events of World War II served to amplify the Sevastopol myth to an unprecedented degree. Even before the war had ended, the parallels between the events in Sevastopol during the Crimean War and World War II were lost neither on Soviet leadership nor the public. As Qualls notes, “[c]onnections between the second great defense (World War II) and the first (Crimean War) emerged from the pens of journalists, writers, and military and political officers in the days of the siege” (31). Sasse remarks that following World War II, “Sevastopol became a ‘double’ myth, a Tsarist and a Soviet one that was unified in the Russian consciousness” (70).
In 1945, Sevastopol became one of the first cities to be given the title of “Hero City” for its role in the defense of the Motherland during the war, a prestigious distinction that was eventually granted only to 13 cities across the Soviet Union, and which later included the eastern Crimean city of Kerch as well. Twice decimated in heroic defense of the Russian/Soviet Motherland, Sevastopol emerged from World War II as one of the most potent and enduring symbols of Soviet national identity.

In reconstructing the devastated city, both recreating the original monuments to the first siege of Sevastopol and erecting new ones to memorialize the second siege became important projects. Much of Sevastopol’s original character was recreated and its many monuments to the first siege reconstructed. The Panorama, which had been completely leveled during the German bombardment and occupation, was meticulously restored to its original state and symbolically complemented by the new Diorama Museum. That museum similarly depicted the second defense of Sevastopol, although it was constructed at a site just outside of the city. Of course the new urban model also reflected its World War II-era tribulations and now includes numerous imposing monuments to the second siege of the city. The urban landscape of Sevastopol is now punctuated by monuments to the city’s two great moments of triumph in defense of the Russian/Soviet Motherland creating a continuity between these events that serves to reify the “Sevastopol Myth” and the place the city holds in Russian and Soviet national narratives.

The Sevastopol Myth has undergone numerous revivals and reinventions since its birth over 150 years ago. Sasse aptly summarizes its evolution:

[T]he siege of Sevastopol originated as an imperial myth of the Russian people, was appropriated by the Tsarist state, was revived in its Soviet-Russian variant during World War II, and was gradually transformed by the Soviet state back into
a myth of the whole “people.”” The steady development of the myth over time allowed its powerful grip on the Russian imagination to tighten (73).

The myth has become an important part of post-Soviet Russian nationalist narratives about Crimea not only because of the significant role that the city played in the defense of the Russian homeland, but also because it conveniently blends two periods of history that each form an important piece of these narratives. As Sasse notes, “post-Soviet Russian nationalism has been quick to endorse a blend of the imperial Russian and Soviet-Russian myths of Sevastopol in order to assert the ‘Russianness’ of Crimea” (73).

The post-World War II reincarnation of the Sevastopol Myth – while labeled a triumph for the entire Soviet people during the Soviet period – further legitimized in the eyes of Russian nationalists the superiority of the Soviet state with which many still identified. This event followed the post-Soviet Russian nationalist trend of reclaiming Soviet-era achievements as those of the Russian people since they viewed themselves as the leaders of Soviet society. In this way, the Sevastopol myth was incorporated into and made indistinguishable from broader narratives about the Crimean wartime experience, making the Sevastopol Myth the “cornerstone of all Russian claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol” (Plokhy, 2000, 372).

**Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Post-Soviet Period**

Inseparable from the Sevastopol Myth are the narratives pertaining to the city’s naval history and more specifically its hosting of the Black Sea Fleet (Sasse, 2007). Founded as a base for Russia’s newly established position of power in the Black Sea region immediately following the annexation of Crimea in 1783, Sevastopol has served as one of the most important naval base of the tsarist, Soviet, and Russian navies. The fleet itself serves as an active and tangible
reminder of the city’s glorious and turbulent history and a powerful symbol of both Sevastopol and Crimea’s significance in the Russian national psyche.

The sense of uncertainty surrounding the future of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, and indeed Crimea itself after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 offered new fodder for Russian nationalist narratives, and in particular new opportunities to invoke the Sevastopol Myth in laying claim to the now-contested region. In many regards Sevastopol became a synecdochical symbol for all of Crimea in post-Soviet Russian nationalist narratives, as the majority of the most impassioned claims to the region pivoted upon the history and symbolic importance of the city for Russia’s past, present, and future. As Sasse (2007) notes, “[i]n Russian and Russian-Soviet historiography, Sevastopol had even more salience than Crimea as a whole” (70). Beyond any discussion of a Russian spiritual or emotional connection to Crimea, the contested status of the Black Sea Fleet and the city of Sevastopol presented Russian nationalists with a real issue of urgent geopolitical importance. Thus, the most virulent Russian nationalist rhetoric about Crimea focused squarely upon Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet and upon fears of them being lost to “Ukrainization” or what was even dubbed by some as the “third siege of Sevastopol” (74).

Much of the post-Soviet Russian nationalist rhetoric has sought to exploit and further obfuscate the seemingly tenuous legal precedents that placed Sevastopol in Ukraine rather than the Russian Federation. While many have challenged the legality of the 1954 proceedings over the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR (Fedorov, 1999), others have focused specifically on Sevastopol and advocated for its return to Russian control in lieu of the entire Crimean Peninsula. Leading the charge of Russian revanchism in Crimea while invoking the Sevastopol myth were prominent Russian nationalist politicians such Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennady Zyuganov, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov as well as prominent nationalist cultural
figures such as author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Luzhkov famously spent a great deal of money from the Moscow city budget to support the families of Russian soldiers in Sevastopol by building apartment complexes and establishing a “Black Sea” branch of Moscow State University in the city (Mochalov, 2007, 214-215). A number of Russian social and political movements concerned primarily with the status of Sevastopol appeared within Crimea as well, including the prominent group Sevastopol’–Krym–Rossiia (Crimea–Sevastopol–Russia), which has adopted as one of its slogans the phrase “Crimea is not just the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, but a symbol of the completeness of Russia itself!” (“Narodny Front,” 2007). Expressions of Sevastopol and Crimea’s intrinsically Russian character permeate popular and literary culture, as exemplified by the following poem by Liudmila Gusel’nikova:

We know what they won’t speak
In circles large or small
As it has emerged historically
That Sevastopol is a Russian city
(Quoted in Mochalov, 2007, 215)

The Black Sea Fleet has served a double purpose in galvanizing Russian national narratives around Sevastopol and Crimea in the post-Soviet era. On the one hand, it has given the Russian state a strategically important toehold in Crimea; the naval facilities in Sevastopol remain the only territory in Crimea over which the Russian Federation retains sovereignty, and the navy’s continuing presence in Crimea means that Russia has been able to maintain an active role in regional political discourses. On the other hand, to Russian nationalists and those who identify strongly with the Russian state, the Black Sea Fleet is a powerful living symbol of Russian and Soviet military strength and national pride, and of the heroic sacrifices made in
Sevastopol and Crimea in defense of the motherland on multiple occasions. For both those in the Russian Federation and many ethnic Russians living in Crimea, the fact that a region so deeply embedded within the Russian national psyche – and crucial to the continuing security of the Russian state – is no longer Russian sovereign territory has proven one of the most difficult pills to swallow following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Crimea in Soviet Nostalgia

A phenomenon seen across the former Soviet Union in general and among Russians in particular in the post-Soviet era has been a powerful feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet period. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union and the social, economic, and political transitions experienced in the former Soviet republics have brought some positive changes, many still long for the stability, security, and way of life they associate with the Soviet regime, even among younger generations with little or no first-hand experience of Soviet life (Nikolayenko, 2008). Among Russians in particular, the feeling of nostalgia for the Soviet Union is not derived only from a sense of loss of their culture or way of life, but often of territory that they consider part of their homeland as well whether or not they identified strongly with Soviet political or economic ideology. In the post-Soviet context, Kolstø (2000) notes that “[e]ven if the Soviet Union was gone, identification with the former state entity remained strong among much of the Russian populace” (203).

Of the many ways this sense of territorial loss has been expressed and entrenched in national discourses is through Russian popular cultural narratives, as best exemplified in the song “Made in the USSR” by popular Russian rock musician Oleg Gazmanov. The song is a bold proclamation of identification with Soviet society expressed through a laundry list of its
achievements and cultural benchmarks, but it is also a lament for all that was perceived to have been lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union, not least of which was the Soviet territory itself. In the opening lines of the song, Gazmanov (2005) declares:

Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova – This is my country!
Sakhalin and Kamchatka, the Ural Mountains – This is my country!
Krasnodar Krai, Siberia, and the Volga Region;
Kazakhstan and the Caucasus and the Baltic Region too;
I was born in the Soviet Union! I was made in the USSR!

It is telling that Crimea features so prominently among this list of places that together comprise the “lost” Soviet homeland – and that it is listed separately from the rest of Ukraine. Crimea indeed figures quite prominently among the places and regions of the Soviet Union that were particularly salient in the production of Soviet popular cultural narratives. Crimea holds a preeminent place in the hearts and minds of people from across the post-Soviet space chiefly because of its status as the vacation destination of choice and thus as an important geographic location in the selective memorialization and production of narratives related to the happiness and quality of life afforded under the Soviet regime. Hence, for many Russians both in the Russian Federation and in Crimea who closely associate Russian national identity with their Soviet pasts, the fact that Crimea is no longer a part of Russian/Soviet sovereign territory is doubly emblematic of nostalgia for the Soviet Union; it represents a loss both culturally and territorially. For this reason, Russia’s loss of Crimea has proven to be one of the more difficult consequences of the Soviet collapse for many Russians to accept.

For many within Russia who identified strongly with the Soviet territory as their
homeland, the loss of Crimea more so than any other territory has been perceived in a way comparable to the severing of a vital appendage. Zorin (1998, 123) ruminates that

Among the most sudden and unpredictable phenomena of the past years [following the Soviet collapse], we must include the relative ease with which a large portion of the [Russian] population has accepted the break up of the empire. However, in the long list of regions that have fallen away, it would seem the loss of one in particular continues to strike a raw nerve in our social consciousness.

Without a doubt, it is clear to everyone that the region in question is Crimea. The break up of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of Crimea in an independent Ukrainian state has had virtually no adverse effect on the region’s accessibility or popularity among Russians as a tourist destination. However, many of those in Russia who feel a nostalgic attachment to their Soviet pasts still see the separation of Crimea from Russia as powerfully symbolic of the loss of their former way of life.

Accordingly, Soviet nostalgia plays an important role in nationalist narratives among Russians in Crimea itself. For those in Crimea who identify weakly with the Ukrainian state and resent its exclusion from the Russian Federation, the Soviet period represents a time when Crimea was still united with the broader Russian/Soviet homeland within a single territory even after 1954, when Crimea was attached administratively to the Ukrainian SSR. Soviet nostalgia has been expressed in Crimean public discourses through numerous media, including the publication of regional magazines and book series that discuss Crimean history and culture form an unabashedly Russo- and Soviet-centric perspective. One example is the magazine Ostrov Krym (The Island of Crimea), a short-lived magazine published in Crimea in 1999 devoted primarily to regional political and social commentary and which regularly featured articles and
photographs related to Crimean popular history from the Russian and Soviet eras.

Although Soviet nostalgia has grown in popularity throughout the post-Soviet space, it holds a particularly significant place in Russian narratives about Crimea. Many Russians in Crimea look to the Soviet period as a time when they felt included within their broader national homeland and before they felt that their language and culture were threatened by a state with which they weakly identified. Despite the problems experienced under the Soviet regime, it represents a simpler period of stability and certainty for which many now yearn. Because of its role as the Soviet vacation destination of choice, Crimea figures prominently in broader Russian narratives of Soviet nostalgia as well. In this way, nostalgia drives Russian Crimean narratives both internally and externally.

Russian nationalist narratives about Crimea incorporate deep religious, nationalistic, and cultural elements that portray the region as inseparable both from Russian national territory and from the Russian national psyche. While it is true that Crimea has a large ethnic and linguistically Russian population and therefore represents a portion of the Russian nation “severed” from its eponymous nation-state, Russians in Crimea account for a very small portion of the total Russian diaspora community in Ukraine, let alone all the post-Soviet republics. Thus, narratives related to Crimea go beyond broad Russian nationalist/revanchist narratives concerning the ethnic Russian enclaves “beached” outside of the Russian Federation. To those whose national identity is Russian or Soviet, Crimea represents the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy, the heroism demonstrated by their compatriots in two major conflicts, and the mythical memory of happier times experienced in the Soviet period. Crimea’s Russian character, according to these narratives, is not simply due to its large ethnic Russian population; Crimea is deeply entrenched in Russian history, mythology, legend, culture, and national identity.
The Ukrainian Narrative

As Jaworsky (1995) notes, “[i]n historical terms, Crimea does not have the same symbolic importance for Ukraine that it has for Russia” (138). Because Crimea’s historical and cultural connections with Ukraine have been more difficult to establish and mythologize than those with Russia and the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian narratives about Crimea and its importance to the Ukrainian state have been couched more within the post-Soviet context and institutionalized through national and state rhetoric. Despite (or maybe because of) the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and demographic differences between it and the rest of Ukraine, Crimea has become an important symbol and cause of Ukrainian nationalism in its struggle to assert Ukraine’s political and cultural sovereignty and territorial integrity in the shadow of Russian regional hegemony and potential revanchism. While much of eastern and southern Ukraine is Russian-speaking and seen as susceptible to potentially destabilizing influences from Russia, Crimea is viewed as the most vulnerable region due to its legacy as a place of great historical and cultural significance for Russia, its short-lived experience of political integration with Ukraine, its ethnic Russian majority, and the fact that Russia still maintains a powerfully tangible and symbolic presence in the region with its Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian narratives have thus stressed the importance of Crimea in terms of its meaning to the stability and legitimacy of the Ukrainian state as it struggles to shake its Soviet, Russian-dominated past.

Institutionalizing Crimea’s Place in the Ukrainian State

One need look no further than to the Ukrainian constitution to see the extent to which Crimea has been rhetorically enshrined within state doctrine as a crucial region while also
reflecting the concern for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the only autonomous territory in Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is also the only region to which an entire chapter of the state constitution is devoted. The chapter outlines the division of power between Kyiv and Simferopol and the autonomous republic’s place within the larger federal structure of the state. The first article of the chapter states that “[t]he Autonomous Republic of Crimea shall be an integral constituent part of Ukraine and shall resolve issues relegated to its authority within the frame of its reference, determined by the Constitution of Ukraine” (Constitution of Ukraine, Ch. 10, Art. 134). This statement also appears verbatim at the beginning of the first article of the first chapter of the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea itself. Both constitutions are the products of a long and arduous process of bargaining and conciliation between Kyiv and Simferopol during the 1990s through which the current balance of power was struck (Sasse, 2007). The assertive language used in both constitutions to establish and institutionalize the place of Crimea within Ukraine perfectly embodies Ukrainian national narratives about the state’s territorial integrity vis-à-vis Crimea.

This process of carefully establishing the place of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within the Ukrainian state polity is reflective of the broader idea that Ukraine must be treated as a “state of regions,” which has been pervasive since independence. Although more nationalist groups have rejected the regionalist approach to state-building in favor of more universalizing and centralizing tactics, the fact that Crimea did not devolve into ethnic or separatist violence in the 1990s as many at the time had predicted is a testament to the success of more measured approaches to statecraft that recognize the need to accommodate regional differences and which have characterized Ukrainian mainstream politics since independence. Sasse (2007) notes, however, that regional accommodation has not translated to outright federalism for Ukraine, as
the strengthening of a unitary state has been the most important political goal at least since the 1990s (25). Because of its unique circumstances, Ukrainian political leaders recognized early that Crimea was a special case among Ukraine’s regions and that certain accommodations needed to be made to promote political stability in Ukraine. Specifically on the importance of Crimea’s autonomy for Ukrainian state stability, Sasse suggests that “it is not the inherent power of the Crimean autonomy per se that has been stabilizing, but the process of deliberation by which the autonomy was created” (33).

Many of the more nationalist Ukrainian political parties such as Svoboda have advocated for the abolition of Crimea’s autonomous status, while more radically pro-Russian parties’ platforms have called for everything from greater autonomy in Crimea to the complete reunification of Crimea, eastern Ukraine, or all of Ukraine with Russia. Yet Ukrainian politics have been dominated by parties that support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while recognizing its regional differences including the currently-ruling and aptly-named Party of the Regions. It should be noted, however, that many Ukrainians view the Party of the Regions and its leader – Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich – as being too acquiescent towards both Russia and ethnic Russians in Ukraine and negligent of the demands of ethnic Ukrainians. These accusations are best exemplified by the highly controversial 2012 law establishing the official use of Russian and other minority languages of Ukraine in regions where speakers constitute at least 10% of the population. Nevertheless, as this recent law demonstrates, the Party of the Regions continues in the general tradition of successful Ukrainian political parties that have acknowledged Ukraine’s inherently “regional” character.
Celebrating Ukraine as a “State of Regions”

An important example of how a regionalist understanding of Ukraine – and the importance of reigning in its regions – has been institutionalized is the state holiday known as *Day of Sobornost*. “Sobornost” is a word in both Russian and Ukrainian that has no real direct translation in English, but which implies unification and collaboration of individuals for the sake of a common goal at the expense of the individual. Celebrated on January 22, the holiday was officially established in 1999 to commemorate the 1919 unification of the short-lived Ukrainian Peoples Republic and the Western-Ukrainian Peoples Republic in the midst of the Russian Civil War. Day of Sobornost’ is a celebration of Ukraine as a country cobbled from separate regions to form something greater than the sum of its parts. Although Crimea was never a part of the territorial unification that the holiday commemorates, it stands today as a crucial component of Ukraine’s modern-day project of “Sobornost.” As Sasse (2007) comments, “Crimea [has been] Ukraine’s most immediate and most serious center-periphery challenge” (2).

In his address to the people of Ukraine commemorating the Day of Sobornost’ in 2012, President Yanukovich exemplified the rhetoric of regional unity in Ukrainian national narratives:

Our combined efforts and our devotion to the great goal of building a strong Ukraine are guarantors of the fact that a unified (sobornaia) independent Ukraine will forever belong to the circle of the world’s developed, advanced, and powerful states. (“Yanukovich pozdravil…”, 2012)

Similarly, Anatoliy Mogilev, a representative of the Soviet of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, commented during the 2012 celebration of the Day of Sobornost’ in Simferopol that

on the coat of arms of Crimea are written the truthful words, “prosperity is in
unity.” When all are united we see a prosperous region and state, therefore we need to make every effort to make Ukraine into one large developed state. (“V Krymu po sluchayu…”, 2012)

Such comments highlight the role of Crimea in Ukrainian state-building projects such as the Day of Sobornost’ and the important role Crimea’s autonomy has played in facilitating Ukrainian state stability through regional compromises. Mal’gin (2005) further notes the symbolism in the fact that Day of Sobornost’ falls just two days after the anniversary of the 1991 referendum to reestablish Crimea’s autonomy.

Crimea has been so crucial to Ukrainian state-building processes as expressed through the idea of regional sobornost’ precisely because it has posed the greatest potential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the post-Soviet political disarray of the 1990s – with Crimean separatist groups threatening to consolidate power and Russia breathing down Ukraine’s neck as it struggled to come to terms with the loss of Ukraine and Crimea in particular – effective diplomacy was required on the part of Ukraine if it hoped to avoid conflict while retaining the territory with which the Soviet Union had endowed it. Thus, narratives of Ukraine’s regionally-diverse character have emerged mostly in response to the threat of conflict, instability, and violation of territorial integrity that Crimea posed after independence. In this way, Crimea has played a central role in the successful Ukrainian national rhetorical strategy of defining Ukraine as a “state of regions.”

Furthermore, such diplomatic approaches towards Crimea and its unique circumstances have been crucial in the way Ukraine has addressed (and continues to address) the issue of Russia’s continued military presence in Crimea, which has been of paramount concern for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Jaworsky (1995) notes, “developments in
Crimea and the Russian military’s presence there are, first and foremost, perceived as a crucial symbol of threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity” (138). Moreover, because Crimea is so heavily militarized, Ukraine immediately recognized the potentially devastating repercussions of ethnic or inter-state conflict there. Thus, a regionally-minded approach to state-building that takes seriously the need for diplomacy in regards to Crimea and the construction of national narratives that place Crimea within a broader Ukrainian “state of nations” has been crucial both for protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and averting potentially disastrous conflict.

In lieu of a cultural, linguistic, or demographic argument, Ukrainian narratives have highlighted Crimea’s vital importance to Ukraine as a “state of regions,” acknowledging Crimea’s unique circumstances and treating it accordingly, yet doing so as a tactic of ameliorating potentially destabilizing elements in the region and ultimately asserting state sovereignty in the region and Ukraine’s territorial integrity at large. While they may have weaker historical or cultural foundations than Russian or Crimean Tatar claims, Ukrainian national narratives have at least been partially responsible for promoting stability in the region and successfully navigating the rocky post-Soviet geopolitical landscape despite its many hurdles and potential landmines.

Summary

Crimea remains situated within and therefore claimed as an integral part of multiple overlapping ethno-cultural territorial traditions. Crimean Tatar, Russian, and Ukrainian national narratives each construct Crimea within broader cultural, national, and/or political contexts that have shaped Crimea’s history and cultural trajectory. Crimean Tatar narratives emphasize the role that the territory of Crimea itself has played in their very emergence as an ethnic community
and sense of national identity, the hardships that they have suffered in being exiled from their national homeland, and the lengths to which they have gone to reclaim it and reestablish their presence in Crimea. Russian narratives highlight deep religious and civilizational linkages between Russia and Crimea, the mythological role of Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea in defending the Russian motherland, and Crimea’s place in Russian nostalgia for Soviet culture and territory. Ukrainian narratives focus on the role of Crimea in state-building efforts that define Ukraine discursively as a “state of regions” in which Crimea has played a vital role in forming and stabilizing the state polity. In this way, meanings of Crimea are as diverse and potentially polarizing as the region’s population itself.
Chapter V: Data and Methods

In order to approach empirically the issues regarding national and regional identity at the heart of this study, it was important to hear directly from residents of Crimea about their attitudes towards Crimea and other territories and about their own sense of national identity. To this end, I developed a questionnaire designed to gauge such perceptions and opinions among Crimean residents and used it in a survey conducted in Crimea in the summer of 2011. Once data was collected from this survey, I employed a number of statistical techniques to interpret and make conclusions regarding their meaning. This chapter provides an outline of the structure of this questionnaire, the survey and data collection methods used, the statistical analytical methods employed, and a discussion of the limitations of the study both in terms of its methodology and of my own positionality vis-à-vis the research topic and my research subjects.

Statement of Positionality

As a researcher, it is important to acknowledge and declare any personal background, experiences, interests, or biases that may influence the treatment of a research topic or the human subjects who are its focus. For example, the researcher’s age, gender, class, or ethnic background may shape the way he or she views certain groups or issues (Bennett, 2002). Additionally, the personal experiences that a researcher may have from previous research, travel, or personal interactions may also impact the way in which he or she approach a given issue. Here, I attempt to declare any such background or experiences that may have shaped my own views in the course of this research project.
My interest in the regions of Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea is not derived from my own ethnic heritage as I have no Russian, Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar ancestry. Thus, I do not feel any sense of personal identity with any of the groups at the center of this study that might otherwise influence my perspective in an unbalanced way. Regardless of my personal ancestry, I am aware that as an American studying social and political issue in a foreign country, I am likely perceived as an outsider by my research subjects and that this perception may have influenced the way in which my research subjects interacted with me and may ultimately influence the way in which they responded in surveys and interviews. Additionally, as a straight, white, middle-class male, I acknowledge that I may not be sufficiently sensitive to the ways in which differences in race/ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality may have influenced how my research subjects engage with me and with the topic of my research. Also, being the age of 25-26 at the time of my fieldwork, I am aware that my age may have affected my research subjects’ perceptions of me and of my research.

I feel I must also comment upon how my personal experiences and academic interests may have impacted my research. I have formally studied both the Russian and Ukrainian languages, although I have much more experience with Russian and thus feel much more comfortable using it than Ukrainian. As such, Russian was the only language that I used both in surveys and in interviews. Because Russian is universally used and understood in Crimea, I do not feel that my inability to communicate with Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars in either of their native languages negatively impacted my relationship to them, nor did it significantly affect their responses. Although my background regarding language study is mainly in Russian, I do not believe that I harbor any biases towards other ethnic or linguistic groups within the post-Soviet region. My interest in studying Russian has been largely pragmatic, as I am interested in the
former Soviet Union and Russian is certainly the single most useful language to know in order to study this region. I have traveled extensively throughout the former Soviet Union, visiting all 15 former Soviet republics and interacting with a wide array of ethnic communities, and I have not adopted the plight of any specific groups over any other as my own personal cause célèbre. In other words, I do not have any specific political agendas that I wish to advance through my research.

I also acknowledge that in the course of my research and time spent in the region I have developed a personal attachment to and appreciation for Crimea. I feel that this situation is only to be expected of someone who spends a great deal of time living in a new place and who devotes a large amount of his or her time and efforts to learning about it. However, I am aware that my own personal relationship with Crimea may predispose me to thinking about it and presenting it in certain terms. I have made every attempt to remain unbiased in my presentation of Crimea as being a special place and to let the words and actions of others speak for themselves in this regard. However, my own personal sympathies for this understanding of Crimea still likely color my work.

**Structure and Purpose of Survey**

The survey I conducted in Crimea in May, July, and August 2011 (HSCL# 19373) included 798 participants (N=798) (see appendix for English version). In order to examine variations in responses according to nationality, the participants were divided into four discrete ethnic groups according to their responses to the question, “what is your nationality?”: Russians (N=384, 48.1%), Ukrainians (N=199, 24.9%), Crimean Tatars (N=137, 17.2%), and Other (N=78, 9.8%). These groupings represent the three largest nationalities in Crimea that together
account for 95% of the region’s population (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001), along with an “other” category to account for the members of Crimea’s many ethnic minorities who also took part in the survey. This group included mainly Armenians, Belarusians, Jews, and those who identified as “Russian/Ukrainian,” as they could not be included into discrete Russian or Ukrainian categories. Because I chose to limit the focus of this study to Crimea’s three predominant ethnic groups, responses from “Other” nationalities were not included in the data analysis. In addition to their nationality, survey participants were also asked to provide other demographic information including: age; gender; birthplace; current place of residence; number of years they have lived in Crimea; other towns they have lived in; native language; nationality and native language of their father and mother; and religious affiliation. Because this study focuses specifically on the effect of nationality in identity formation, these additional demographic data were excluded from the analysis but may prove useful in future studies.

In addition to collecting this basic demographic information, the questionnaire used in this survey was comprised of six sections with each aimed at gauging different aspects of participants’ sense of identity and perceptions of Crimea. The first section asked participants to rate the importance of various factors for their self-identification, using a Likert scale with ratings from 1 (“not important”) to 5 (“very important”). These factors included four territorially-based factors (“Living in Their Town or Village;” “Living in Crimea;” “Living in Ukraine;” and “Living in Europe”), four factors related to culture and/or ethnicity (“Their Soviet Past;” “Their Nationality;” “Their Native Language;” and “Their Religious Beliefs”), and an optional “Other” factor.

Another section of the questionnaire also asked participants to use a Likert scale of 1 to 5 in order to rate how strongly they identify with groups of people living at various territorial
scales. These groups were divided according to nationality ("Members of Their Nationality" and "Members of All Nationalities") at each of the following scales: Their Town or Village, Crimea, Ukraine, Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and The World. These questions yielded a total of 12 groups defined by nationality and territorial scale (for example, “Members of Their Nationality Living in Crimea,” and “Members of All Nationalities Living in Crimea”). In this section participants were informed that their responses must range from “I do not identify myself with this group of people in any way” (a rating of “1”) to “I fully identify myself with this group of people” (a rating of “5”). The goal of this section of the questionnaire is to gauge whether participants’ senses of group identification are determined more by nationality or territory, and at which scales territory is most salient for group identification.

The third section of the questionnaire presented participants with a list of features that have commonly been invoked in discussions of Crimea’s regional distinctiveness (see Chapters Three and Four) and asked participants to indicate which features they believe define or distinguish Crimea. The directions were to place an “x” next to each of the features that they chose, and to underline or otherwise indicate a single feature that they believe most defines or distinguishes Crimea. There are a total of 17 features (see Chapter Seven), including an optional “other” feature with space to write in their own if desired. The purpose of this section is to understand participants’ perceptions of Crimea and how their attitudes towards the region are shaped by the tropes that are most often used to depict and describe it.

The fourth section provided participants with a small amount of blank space and asked them to write a few words of their choosing (three to five) that characterize Crimea in their opinion. Much like the previous section, this exercise is aimed at revealing participants’ perceptions of Crimea, although instead of choosing from a list of provided features they are free
to describe or characterize Crimea in any way they chose. The goal of this section is to uncover common perceptions and/or beliefs about Crimea that participants may not have been able express in other sections of the questionnaire.

The fifth section of the questionnaire asked participants to indicate what they believe Crimea’s political status should be. Participants were presented with six options and asked to chose only one: “Remain an Autonomous Republic of Crimea;” “Become an Oblast of Ukraine;” “Join the Russian Federation as an Autonomous Republic;” “Join the Russian Federation as an Oblast;” Become an Independent State;” and “Other.” The purpose of this section is to gauge both participants’ identification with the states of Russia and Ukraine and the degree to which they believe Crimea should be self-governing.

The sixth and final section of the questionnaire is a cognitive mapping exercise, in which participants were given a blank space, asked to draw a map of their homeland (Rodina), and to label on it the three places that they consider to be the most important to them. The purpose of this exercise is to uncover participants’ perceptions of their homeland, more specifically to what geographical scale and/or ethnic/national space they attribute the term “homeland.” By asking participants to label the three most important places on their maps I hope to identify trends in the towns and/or features within the space of “homeland” that may help explain the attachment that participants feel to this particular territory. Previous studies that have employed this method have found that when presented with a cognitive mapping exercise, “it is possible that respondents will be challenged to rationalize a situation which previously had lain in a dormant, even subliminal state. Indeed, it is probable that some material will be ‘knitted’ together for the first time” (Pocock 1976, 493). In this way, cognitive mapping is useful in revealing people’
perceptions of and relationships to space and territory whether or not they had previously been cognizant of these specific relationships.

**Sampling Methods**

In order to have a large number of participants in this survey, I primarily employed the “snowball sampling” technique (Sheskin, 1985) that relies on networks of connected individuals to identify potential participants and to distribute and collect questionnaires throughout a population. The “snowball sampling” method has been shown to be an effective way of collecting survey data specifically in Russia due to prevailing suspicious attitudes towards foreigners and questions related to social and demographic issues (Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002). Prior to this fieldwork I spent a year in Crimea in 2008-2009 with support from a Fulbright Research Grant doing preliminary research on this topic. During that time, I developed a large network of friends, acquaintances, and professional contacts that I relied upon heavily during my subsequent fieldwork. Through these networks I distributed a large number of surveys to participants in various locations around Crimea, and once they were completed they were returned to me through these same networks. Participation was limited to adults over the age of 18, but beyond this criterion participation from all individuals was welcomed and encouraged.

A large portion of the questionnaire distribution and re-collection was done with the help of a professor of political sciences at Tavrichesky State University in Simferopol, Natalia Kiseleva, with whom I had been in contact since my first trip to Crimea. She distributed a large number of questionnaires to students from the university who were then asked to take them to their homes in various towns and villages around Crimea and to solicit participation from the
residents there. A wide variety of locations was chosen in order to represent both urban and rural environments, and students were given explicit instructions to sample evenly between males and females and within a wide age range. Professor Kiseleva also trained students to obtain verbal consent from survey participants before they completed each survey and to inform participants of the purpose and source of the study. In all, 555 questionnaires out of the total 798 (roughly 70%) were gathered with the help of Professor Kiseleva and these students, and as a result the survey reflects a wide range of ages and a broad geographical distribution. However, there are a disproportionate number of survey participants from the city of Simferopol (N=401, or just over 50%) due to the fact that many students lived in Simferopol and because I based my own surveying efforts in this city as well.

In addition to the questionnaires distributed with the help of Professor Kiseleva and her students and those that I distributed through my own network of friends and acquaintances, I also gathered a number of completed questionnaires by soliciting participation from individuals on the street or on public transportation. This approach is commonly known as the “convenience sampling” method and has been shown to be a useful and easy way of selecting survey participants (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2000). Often with the assistance of local friends, I took several excursions around Simferopol and to small towns and villages nearby in order to find individuals who would agree to participate in the survey. Participants were typically chosen from people who did not appear busy, such as those waiting at a bus or train station or sitting in a park, for example. Approaching people while they are idle in such a way has been shown to be an effective surveying technique (Ryan and Huyton, 2000). One additional method of soliciting survey participation that I found particularly effective was to approach people while they were riding on *elektrichkas* (commuter trains) between Simferopol and Sevastopol or Evpatoria. These
are relatively slow-moving trains that take approximately two hours to reach their destinations, and I found that many people were willing and often eager to participate in the survey because they were sitting for a long period with little else to do. These *elektrichkas* are comprised of several train cars that are often full and thus provide for a large potential pool of survey participants and a sufficient amount of time to approach many of them. Between the “snowball” and “convenience” sampling techniques I was able to collect a large number of completed questionnaires (N=798) that represents a wide cross-section of the Crimean population.

**Statistical Methods**

In order to analyze the results of the survey, I employed two different statistical methods suited to the types of data collected. For the two sections in which participants used a Likert scale to rate their answers, a method was required that would determine whether a group’s mean ratings for one question displayed a statistically significant difference from their mean rating for another question and whether or not mean ratings for each question were statistically significant between groups as well. In order to make these assessments, the one-way (univariate) Analysis of Variance Test (ANOVA) was most useful as it allowed me to determine whether the difference in means between any two questions within or between groups is statistically significant and therefore indicative of potential real-world differences in attitudes or opinions (Stevens, 1992).

Although one of the general assumptions of an ANOVA test is a normally distributed sample, Rutherford (2012) argues that non-normality becomes less of an issue as sample sizes grow large (beginning from 12 and above), and that ultimately variations in normality will have little effect upon the robustness of an ANOVA test with large sample sizes (245). Thus, I
determined that the sample sizes for each of the national groups at the center of this study are large enough to not require the assumption of a normal distribution for a robust statistical analysis.

For the remaining four sections of the survey, the type of data collected is considered to be nominal that means that a mean score for any one questions would be impossible to calculate. An ANOVA test would therefore be ineffectual for testing for statistically significant differences within or between groups. In these cases I instead used a Chi-Squared test, which is used to determine whether the observed frequency of a given outcome in a binary (in this case, whether the answer to a given question was “yes” or “no”) diverges from the expected frequency at a magnitude that is statistically significant and therefore reflective of real-world differences. In order to determine whether results from a Chi-Squared test are statistically significant, I examined the adjusted residuals derived from a comparison of the observed and expected frequencies of any given test. According to Haberman (1973), adjusted residuals of 2 or greater (or -2 or lower) may be considered to represent a statistically significant difference in the real world observation of a given phenomenon.

**Limitations of Study**

Because the focus of this research project is the effect of national identity on Crimean regional identity, a number of other factors that may also have an important effect on identity dynamics are not taken into consideration. This study does not account for the ways in which age, gender, class, or sexuality – or the ways in which they intersect with each other and with nationality – may impact the ways in which residents relate to Crimea vis-à-vis other territorial structures. As these factors are all crucial components of identity and perspective (Shurmer-
Smith, 2002), they should all be taken into consideration if a comprehensive understanding of identity dynamics is desired. Further studies are needed in order to account for these factors of identity as I make no claim to offer a complete picture of identity in Crimea with this study. For the purposes of this project and for the sake of brevity, the focus of this study must remain on the role of nationality.

Furthermore, it must also be acknowledged that the responses of survey participants may not accurately represent actual attitudes and beliefs as responses may have been distorted by the methods and structure of the survey. Because identities are spatially and temporally contingent, the responses given by survey participants likely depend upon when and where they participated in the survey. In this way, it is very difficult to assess and generalize accurately about the opinions, attitudes, and beliefs of groups independent of the context in which they are expressed.

Moreover, data collection methods such as the Likert scale and yes/no answers are inherently restrictive as they force participants to conform to a set number of possible responses. Such approaches cannot account for all the nuances in the ways people act, think, or feel. Statistical methods are also innately restrictive in that they seek to generalize about entire populations based upon the responses from a very small portion of that population, and therefore certain subsections of the population and their voices may be underrepresented. While statistical analyses can be incredibly useful and powerful in inducing generalizations, their limitations must always be taken into account. I therefore acknowledge that the results of this study may in no way be considered definitive, although I maintain that they are useful in helping us better understand the patterns and processes of national and regional identity in Crimea.

I also acknowledge that the limitations of my Russian language abilities may have influenced both the wording and structure of the questionnaire used in the survey, and my ability
to carry out interviews. While I am highly functional as a speaker, reader, and writer of Russian, I do not consider myself fluent, and thus my choice of words or syntax may have influenced the responses I received from survey participants. For example, it was pointed out to me by a regional expert who has conducted similar surveys in Crimea that the Russian term I used for “self-identity” on the questionnaire (samoidentifikatsiia) may not have been generally understood by some survey participants, and that instead the term samoopredelenie would have been preferable. While I feel that my Russian language abilities have been more enabling of this research than they have been restrictive, I acknowledge that my limitations may have affected the outcome.
Chapter VI – Crimea and National Conceptions of Homeland

Before we can examine the role of region in national/territorial identity dynamics among Crimean residents, we must first understand the ways in which they view and relate to Crimea itself. As I have discussed, Crimea is the site of numerous competing narratives through which its meaning and significance have been constructed in diverging ways according to different national perspectives. Central to these narratives is the idea of homeland. How do members of Crimea’s different national groups conceptualize their homeland, and what role does Crimea play in their understanding of homeland? In the post-Soviet context the word “homeland” (Rodina) implies certain meanings, as Soviet nationality policy guided the establishment of territorially-defined “homelands” for dozens of the state’s ethnic minorities embedded within the larger territory of the Soviet Union (Kaiser, 1994). Thus, “Rodina” typically connotes territory to which a person is bound first and foremost by nationality, insofar as post-Soviet territory has been defined according to nationality. However, this narrow understanding of homeland has been challenged by some, including Gradirovsky (1999), who conceives of rodina (which also translates as “motherland”) as the small region in which a person lives and with which they are most familiar, while the broader national territory with which they identify is more appropriately defined as otechestvo (Fatherland).

Given that competing senses of national territory overlap and converge in Crimea, how does nationality influence conceptions of homeland among its residents? Do various national groups view Crimea alone as their homeland or simply as part of a larger homeland? In particular, how might Russian perceptions of homeland vis-à-vis Crimea be articulated with the term “Crimean-Russian” identity? This chapter addresses these questions by discussing results from an exercise in which survey participants express their views of homeland with a cognitive
mapping exercise. This exercise helps us understand how identities in Crimea are tied to territory, and more specifically the extent to which Crimea itself figures into perceptions of homeland.

**Cognitive Maps of Homeland**

In this section of the survey that I conducted in Crimea, participants were asked to draw a map of their “homeland” (*Rodina*), and to mark the three places on it that are most important to them. Because territorial identity is strongly associated with the notion of homeland, especially within the post-Soviet context (Kaiser, 1994), determining which geographic scales participants most closely associate with the term “homeland” and specifically what places they most identify with is crucial to understanding spatial components of identity. Free-form cognitive mapping is an exercise that allows people to express different aspects of their spatial awareness without restrictions or limitations, and is useful in examining the relationships that people have with the various spatial scales with which they interact (Pacione, 1978).

For this and all subsequent sections of the survey, I divided responses according to nationality in order to examine the differences in attitudes and opinions between Crimea’s three major national groups: Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars. However, I found it prudent to further divide Ukrainians into “Russified” and “non-Russified” categories for the sake of this analysis. In order to distinguish between these two groups, I considered those who listed Russian as their native language to be Russified and those who listed Ukrainian as their native language to be non-Russified. Many Ukrainians, especially in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, are Russian-speaking and thus considered to be Russified. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, roughly 60% of Ukrainians in Crimea are Russified (State Statistics Committee of
Ukraine, 2001). These Russified Ukrainians are likely to have different attitudes towards the Ukrainian state than those who consider Ukrainian to be their native language (Laitin, 1998).

Within the Ukrainian sample from this survey (N=199), 117 participants listed Russian as their native language and 74 listed Ukrainian. The remaining eight indicated that their native language is “Russian/Ukrainian;” thus they could not be classified into either discrete category and were excluded for the purposes of comparing these two groups. Roughly 61% of Ukrainian survey participants are Russified, meaning their distribution within the sample is extremely close to that of the Ukrainian population of Crimea.

In order to analyze and interpret the results of this exercise, maps were grouped by nationality and subsequently categorized into a number of different binaries according to whether or not they met certain requirements. One category of binaries relates to the geographic scale (hereafter referred to in this chapter as “scope” in order to avoid confusion with the term “map scale”) that participants chose to represent their homeland. For instance, a binary was established to express whether or not the scope of homeland on each map is Crimea alone, where a “0” means that the scope of a participant’s map includes more than Crimea and a “1” means that it is only Crimea. Another category of binaries relates to the cities that participants chose to include on their maps while another category relates to whether or not a number of specific physical, political, or cultural features were included in participants’ maps. For example, a binary was established that expresses whether or not a map includes the city of Yalta, where “0” means that Yalta is not included, and “1” means that it is. I then performed a Chi-Squared test within each category of binaries in order to determine whether the frequency of any particular map scope or feature is significantly higher than the expected frequency. Expected frequencies are determined mathematically by multiplying the total number of responses (both “yes” and “no”) to any one
set of binaries (in this case equivalent to N) by the total number of “yes” responses for all sets of binaries within a test (scope of map, cities included, etc.), then dividing by the total number of responses to all sets of binaries within the test (or N times the number of binary sets in these cases).

**Table 1: Various spatial scopes used to categorize discretely homeland maps for all participants.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House/Neighborhood</th>
<th>Ukraine (including Crimea)</th>
<th>Crimea is Excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>Russia (including Crimea)</td>
<td>Scope of Map is Ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Crimea</td>
<td>Soviet Union (including Crimea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Europe (including Crimea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea with Something Else</td>
<td>The World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to evaluate the significance of difference between observed and expected frequencies, I examined the adjusted residual derived from the comparison of observed and expected frequencies. According to Haberman (1973), an adjusted residual of 2 or greater should be considered an accurate indication of a significant difference between the expected and observed frequency within a cross-tabular statistical test such as the Chi-Squared. If the differences between the expected and observed frequency of any outcome within a given binary construction produces an adjusted residual of 2 or greater we may surmise that the frequency of this outcome is significantly high. Similarly, if the adjusted residual is lower than -2 we may surmise that the occurrence of this outcome is significantly low. It should be noted that this is a less accurate method of determining statistical significance of difference than the ANOVA test used in other sections of this study, as it does not produce a p-value and findings therefore cannot be discussed in terms of confidence. Rather, it is a useful – however informal – method of determining whether or not special attention should be paid to the observed frequency of a given outcome.
In light of works regarding the meaning of “homeland” (Rodina) in the Soviet and post-Soviet understanding (Kaiser, 1994), and given my own personal experiences in the region, I expected a large number of Russians to indicate that Crimea alone was their homeland, although a considerable number would also include at least portions of Russia. I expected that few Russians would draw Ukraine to represent their homeland, as Ukrainian civic identity remains low among Russians in Crimea (Korostelina, 2003). I also expected that the city of Sevastopol would appear significantly more frequently on the maps drawn by Russians as it is the single largest symbol of Crimea’s Russian character. Consequently, I expected that Ukrainians would be the most likely to draw all of Ukraine as their homeland though many would also display a strong regional identity and drawn only Crimea. I also expected that nearly all Crimean Tatars would draw only Crimea as their homeland given their national and historic connection to the region and the struggle they have endured to return to it.

Scope of Homeland

Table 2: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 28.5) and the observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by Russians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 374)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequent:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea - 49.5% (OF = 185, AR = 31.7)</td>
<td>House/Neighborhood - 0.8% (OF = 3, AR = -5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea w/ Something Else - 14.2% (OF = 53, AR = 5.0)</td>
<td>Part of Crimea - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6)</td>
<td>Ukraine - 8.0% (OF = 30, AR = 0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency Not Statistically Significant:</td>
<td>Europe - 0.5% (OF = 2, AR = -5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town - 5.3% (OF = 20, AR = -1.7)</td>
<td>The World - 3.7% (OF = 14, AR = -2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine - 8.0% (OF = 30, AR = 0.3)</td>
<td>Crimea is Excluded - 1.6% (OF = 6, AR = -4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union - 8.3% (OF = 31, AR = 0.5)</td>
<td>Scope is Ambiguous - 4.0% (OF = 15, AR = -2.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Homeland map drawn by a 52 year-old Russian woman showing Crimea with the cities of Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yalta.

Figure 4: Homeland map drawn by a 50 year-old Russian woman showing Russia with Crimea and Sevastopol, with the note that Sevastopol is a "Russian city" both in ethnic and civic terms.
Figure 5: Homeland map drawn by a 41 year-old Russian man showing Crimea and Simferopol along with the Russian cities of Moscow and Kaliningrad.

Figure 6: Homeland map drawn by a 63 year-old Russian woman showing Ukraine with the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Kerch. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated.
As I predicted, Crimea by itself proved to be by far the most common spatial scope at which Russians placed their homeland as 49.5% of Russian participants drew Crimea exclusively. The only other scope to appear significantly more frequently than expected is “Crimea with Something Else,” which was drawn by 14.2% of Russian respondents and which, in the case of Russians, most often means including a portion of Russia lying adjacent to Crimea. Also as predicted, a relatively low number of Russians (8.0%) drew Ukraine as their homeland at a frequency that was determined to be not significant. Interestingly, a nearly equal amount of Russian respondents drew the Soviet Union as their homeland (8.3%).

Results among Crimean Tatars were also consistent with my expectations as 78.3% of Crimean Tatar respondents drew Crimea exclusively as their homeland. This makes it the only scope to be drawn significantly more frequently than the expected frequency. These results are certainly consistent with Crimean Tatar narratives about Crimea’s importance to their national character.

Table 3: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 9.9) and the observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by Crimean Tatars, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 129).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequent:</th>
<th>Ukraine - 2.3% (OF = 3, AR = -2.4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea - 78.3% (OF = 101, AR = 31.3)</td>
<td>Soviet Union - 3.1% (OF = 4, AR = 2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency Not Statistically Significant:</strong></td>
<td>House/Neighborhood - 2.3% (OF = 3, AR = -2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea w/ Something Else - 3.9% (OF = 5, AR = -1.7)</td>
<td>Part of Crimea - 0.8% (OF = 1 AR = -3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope is Ambiguous - 4.7% (OF = 6, AR = -1.3)</td>
<td>Russia - 0.8% (OF = 1, AR = -3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significantly Less Frequent:</strong></td>
<td>Europe - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town - 1.6% (OF = 2, AR = -2.7)</td>
<td>The World - 1.6% (OF = 2, AR = -2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea is Excluded - 0.8% (OF = 1, AR = -1.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Ukrainians, both Russified (Russian-speaking) and non-Russified (Ukrainian-speaking), my predictions also remained consistent with participants’ responses. Between both groups of Ukrainians, both Crimea and Ukraine were the only geographic scopes of homeland to
be drawn significantly more frequently than any other. However, among Russified Ukrainians Crimea was chosen more frequently than Ukraine as homeland (47.4% versus 29.3%), but among non-Russified Ukrainians the opposite was true – with 45.7% drawing Ukraine and 30% drawing Crimea as their homeland.

The fact that Crimea appears so frequently as homeland among all national groups is by no means groundbreaking, as it has been previously demonstrated that Crimeans of all national persuasion tend to understand the term “homeland” at this regional scale (Kiseleva, 1999). Furthermore, the concept of homeland as it was institutionalized in the Soviet period generally tends to refer to the regional scale as well (Kaiser, 1994). Moreover, it is not surprising that Crimean Tatars tend to associate homeland so monolithically with Crimea, nor that non-Russified Ukrainians display a stronger identification with the Ukrainian state than other groups, since in both cases these geographical scopes represent national territory.

Figure 7: Homeland map drawn by a 46 year-old Crimean Tatar man showing Ukraine with "my home," Simferopol, and the Black Sea.
Figure 8: Homeland map drawn by a 20 year-old Crimean Tatar woman showing Ukraine with the cities of Bakhchisarai, Simferopol, and Yalta.

Figure 9: Homeland map drawn by a 71 year-old Crimean Tatar woman showing Crimea with the cities of Simferopol and Balaklava and Uzbekistan with the city of Yangiol, both located inside the Globe.
Figure 10: Homeland map drawn by a 44 year-old Crimean Tatar man showing an ambiguous territory with labels for Crimea, Kiev, and Tashkent (Uzbekistan).

Table 4: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 9.6) and the observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by Russified Ukrainians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 116).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequent:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea - 47.4% (OF = 55, AR = 16.0)</td>
<td>House/Neighborhood - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine - 29.3% (OF = 34, AR = 8.6)</td>
<td>Town - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part of Crimea - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe - 0.9% (OF = 1, AR = -3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea is Excluded - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scope of Map is Ambiguous - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea w/ Something Else - 9.5% (OF = 11, AR = 0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union - 4.3% (OF = 5, AR = 1.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World - 6.0% (OF = 7, AR = -0.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 5.8) and the observed frequency (OF) of various spatial scopes of homeland in maps drawn by non-Russified Ukrainians, with resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 70).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequent:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea - 30% (OF = 21, AR = 6.9)</td>
<td>House/Neighborhood - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine - 45.7% (OF = 32, AR = 11.8)</td>
<td>Part of Crimea - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency Not Statistically Significant:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea w/ Something Else - 7.1% (OF = 5, AR = -0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope is Ambiguous - 4.3% (OF = 3, AR = -1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union - 2.9% (OF = 2, AR = 1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town - 4.3% (OF = 3, AR = -1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe - 0% (OF = 0, AR = -2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea is Excluded - 1.4% (OF = 1, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11: Homeland map drawn by a 23 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine with the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Yalta. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated.
Figure 12: Homeland map drawn by a 23 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine with the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Yalta. The size of Crimea is greatly exaggerated.

Figure 13: Homeland map drawn by a 67 year-old Ukrainian man showing Crimea with the cities of Simferopol, Kalinovka, and Kerch.
Figure 14: Homeland map drawn by a 64 year-old Ukrainian woman showing Ukraine with part of Russia and including the cities of Kiev, Simferopol, and Sochi (Russia).

Focusing on responses from Russian participants, perhaps the most interesting aspect of these results is the fact that so few Russians (1.6%) drew Russia (i.e., the Russian Federation) as their homeland. A larger number drew the Soviet Union (8.3%), although this frequency did not differ significantly from the expected frequency. I argue that, more than anything else, this trend speaks to the fact that identifying territorially with the Russian nation-state is a difficult concept for Russians in Crimea despite their strong national ties to it. Crimea was once a part of Soviet territory, and for those who still identify strongly with their Soviet heritage or conflate the Soviet Union with Russian national territory there is no difficulty in following the territorial hierarchy from Crimea upward within what was once a single politically-bounded space. But Crimeans are now excluded from Russia’s national territory in a political sense, and thus many appear to have difficulty incorporating it into their own sense of national homeland.
Compare these results as well to the number of Russian participants who drew Ukraine, which, despite much weaker identification with the Ukrainian state among Russians in Crimea (Korostelina, 2003), is five times larger than the number of participants who drew Russia. Ukraine is at least an easily identifiable and understandable territorial “container” within which Crimean residents live whether or not they identify with Ukraine in national or cultural terms. Hence, the low frequency with which Crimean Russians identify Russia as their homeland is indicative of discontinuities between their concepts of nation and territory caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and not of a weak identity with Russia in national terms.

**Cities Included on Maps**

When considering which cities to choose in order to examine the frequency with which participants included various places on their maps, it was important to narrow possible choices to a select few. Including a large number of cities and/or towns that appear only a small number of times would dilute the expected frequency for the entire list and potentially render the Chi-Squared test inconclusive as a minimum expected frequency of 5 is typically required (Haberman, 1973). Thus, I chose to examine most of the larger cities of Crimea that tend to carry particular significance for various national groups in the region.

Simferopol, as the capital and largest city of Crimea, was an obvious choice, although as the center of Crimea both culturally and geographically it arguably holds equal significance for all groups. It should also be noted that a large proportion of survey participants (54.8%) live in Simferopol and are thus more likely to include it in their maps as their hometown. Sevastopol and Kerch are both cites of Soviet military glory, and both continue to carry the distinguished title of “Hero City” of the Soviet Union for their roles in World War II. Bakhchisarai and
Belogorsk are both important historic centers of Crimean Tatar culture, and both have relatively large populations of Crimean Tatars today. Yalta, Alushta, and Evpatoria are probably the three cities most closely associated with the Crimean tourism industry, and Evpatoria is also home to Crimea’s largest mosque and one of the most well-preserved Crimean Tatar old towns. Finally, Dzhankoi is the largest city in northern Crimea and includes a relatively large number of both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. In this test only the maps of those participants who drew Crimea as their homeland were included because the inclusion of other territories in a participant’s map would likely influence their choices of Crimean cities to include.

Table 6: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 39.6) and the observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by Russians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 185).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simferopol - 69.2% (OF = 128, AR = 16.8)</td>
<td>Evpatoria - 13.5% (OF = 25, AR = -2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol - 51.9% (OF = 96, AR = 10.7)</td>
<td>Alushta - 9.7% (OF = 18, AR = -4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yalta - 28.6% (OF = 53, AR = 2.6)</td>
<td>Kerch - 9.2% (OF = 17, AR = -4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhchisarai - 4.3% (OF = 8, AR = -6.0)</td>
<td>Dzhankoi - 4.3% (OF = 8, AR = -6.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belogorsk - 1.6% (OF = 3, AR = -7.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Russians, Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Yalta appear significantly more frequently while the remaining cities appear significantly less frequently. Simferopol and Sevastopol are the only cities to appear significantly more frequently than expected among Ukrainians. While it would be useful in this case to examine the difference in responses between Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians, the number of non-Russified Ukrainians who drew only Crimea for their homeland (21) proved too low to yield expected frequencies greater than five as is required in a Chi-Squared test. Among Crimean Tatars we observe that Simferopol is the only city to appear significantly more frequently than the expected frequency. Although the frequency with which
Crimean Tatars include Bakhchisarai on their maps is not significant, it is worth noting that they did include it much more frequently than either Russians or Ukrainians both in terms of percentage (19.8%) and total numbers (20).

The fact that Simferopol appears so frequently among all groups is almost certainly biased by the large portion of Simferopol residents in the survey sample. As I have discussed, Sevastopol is an extremely important symbol of Crimea’s role in Russian and Soviet history and culture, and its frequency of appearance among Russians suggests certain correlations between their regional and national identities. Sevastopol’s frequency of appearance on maps drawn by Ukrainian participants may also suggest a lingering identification with Russian and/or Soviet culture among Ukrainians in Crimea, particularly those who are Russified. Meanwhile, Yalta is essentially shorthand for the most prestigious and well-known region of Crimea along its southern coast and is the indisputable center of Crimean tourism. That Russians included Yalta so frequently in their maps further suggests a uniquely Russian perspective of Crimea that may be influenced by the region’s status as the premier vacation destination among Russians since the Soviet period. The fact that Russians include cities such as Bakhchisarai and Belogorsk on their maps so infrequently suggests that these symbolic cities – which help form counter-narratives to the dominant Russian narrative of Crimea – are not considered to be very important to the way Russians relate to Crimea. Conversely, that Bakhchisarai does appear so much more frequently on Crimean Tatars’ maps than on other groups’ is reflective of their own unique attachment to Crimea.
Table 7: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 16.3) and the observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by Ukrainians, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 77).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>Kerch - 14.3% (OF = 11, AR = -1.6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simferopol - 76.6% (OF = 59, AR = 12.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol - 36.4% (OF = 28, AR = 3.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alushta - 7.8% (OF = 6, AR = -3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhchisarai - 6.5% (OF = 5, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yalta - 24.7% (OF = 19, AR = 0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evpatoria - 16.9% (OF = 13, AR = -1.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Significance of difference between the expected frequency (EF = 18.6) and the observed frequency (OF) of various cities included in the homeland maps drawn by Crimean Tatars, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N = 101).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simferopol - 71.3% (OF = 72, AR = 14.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dzhankoi - 9.9% (OF = 10, AR = -2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alushta - 8.9% (OF = 9, AR = -2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belogorsk - 8.9% (OF = 9, AR = -2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol - 7.9% (OF = 8, AR = -2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerch - 7.9% (OF = 8, AR = -2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakhchisarai - 19.8% (OF = 20, AR = 0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yalta - 18.8% (OF = 19, AR = 0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evpatoria - 11.8% (OF = 12, AR = -1.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

This cognitive mapping exercise reveals that while there are important cleavages among Crimea’s major national groups in the way they tend to conceive of their homelands, Crimea itself figures prominently for each of them. For Crimean Tatars there is an undeniably strong tendency to equate the notion of “homeland” solely with Crimea, which is consistent both with previous works (Williams, 2001; Uehling, 2004) and with the rhetoric of the Crimean Tatar national movement. Crimean Tatars also appear more likely than other national groups to emphasize places that hold particular significance for Crimean Tatar history and culture, such as the city of Bakhchisarai. Among Ukrainians there appear to be strong tendencies to fix the notion
of homeland both at the regional and state scales as large numbers of both Russified and non-
Russified Ukrainians drew either Crimea or Ukraine as their homeland. The difference regarding
which of these scales Ukrainians more typically privilege as “homeland” appears to reflect
whether or not they may be considered Russified; Russian speakers are more likely to choose
Crimea and Ukrainian speakers are more likely to choose Ukraine. This suggests that cultural
and linguistic affiliations influence the degree to which Ukrainians have come to identify with
the Ukrainian state at large and to which they are likely to identify with symbols of
Russian/Soviet culture in Crimea such as the city of Sevastopol.

Russians also exhibit a strong tendency to associate their concept of homeland solely
with Crimea, although they also appear to include territory outside of Crimea or Ukraine in
general as part of their homeland more often than do Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars. They are
also more likely than these other groups to identify still with the Soviet Union as their homeland.
They also tend to consider places like Sevastopol and Yalta to be important places within Crimea
– both of which hold particular and significant places in the Russian narrative of Crimea.
Importantly, however, their identification with the Russian nation-state (i.e., the Russian
Federation) is extremely low. These results appear to reflect an emphasis of a certain “Russian-
ness” about Crimea, which suggests that Crimean Russians’ regional identity is imbued with a
sense of national identity. Yet this national identity does not appear to inspire a sense of
identification with Russian national territory as it is institutionalized in the form of the Russian
Federation.

Thus, I argue that “Crimean-Russian” identity implies an understanding of and
identification with Crimea that is heavily influenced by the Russian narrative of the region. In
other words, the reason Russians in Crimea exhibit a strong regional identity is due primarily to
Crimea’s prominent role in broader Russian national narratives and a certain sense of pride in being from a region of such national importance. In this way, Russians in Crimea view the region – which many consider their homeland – through a certain national lens that emphasizes the qualities and factors that lend it a unique significance in Russian national narratives.

The same may be said for both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, as both groups apply their own cultural filters to their view of Crimea that bring out features of different national significance. However, the fact that Russians in Crimea do not live simultaneously within their regional “homeland” and their broader national territory sets them apart from both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. I argue that this discontinuous relationship between regional homeland and national territory means that for Russians territorial and national identity are decoupled, and a distinct “Crimean-Russian” identity has appeared in light of this discontinuity. I explore the decoupling of national and regional identity and the meaning of “Crimean-Russian” identity more deeply in further chapters.
Chapter VII - Distinguishing and Characterizing Crimea

In the previous chapter I established that a significantly large proportion of each of Crimea’s three main national groups view Crimea as their homeland, although their distinct national perspectives appear to influence the specific terms in which they each relate to it. Crimea plays a particular role in Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar national narratives about territory and culture, and the narrative with which a group or individual is most engaged will naturally influence their own understandings of the region. How do these narratives play out in the attitudes and opinions of Crimea’s residents? Which aspects of Crimea’s history, geography, and culture become the most important components of the senses of place felt by members of each group in the region, and how do they play into broader national narratives? How do these different national perspectives influence opinions about Crimea’s political status?

In this chapter I present findings from three sections of the survey that are designed to gauge attitudes and opinions about Crimea held by members of its major national groups. Responses from these exercises help to better understand which of Crimea’s characteristics its residents believe are most distinguishing, how competing national narratives influence these beliefs, and how they in turn influence opinions about Crimea’s political status. The findings in this chapter lend further credence to the argument that Crimean regional identity is derived in different ways from different national perspectives and help form a clearer understanding of the implications of a “Crimean-Russian” identity.
Crimea’s Defining and Distinguishing Characteristics

In this section of the survey participants were presented with a list of 16 characteristics that I identified to be common to various narratives related to Crimea and that are often cited to distinguish Crimea as being a unique or special place. Participants were prompted to indicate characteristics they believe “define or distinguish” Crimea and to choose one characteristic that they believe is the single most important. For the sake of simplicity this second category of responses was disregarded in the statistical analysis, and instead all characteristics were classified into a binary of whether or not the participant considered it a distinguishing or defining feature of Crimea. As with the previous section of the survey responses were then grouped according to nationality.

Table 9: List of defining or distinguishing characteristics of Crimea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crimea’s Autonomous Status</th>
<th>Presence of Russian Military Facilities in Crimea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimea’s Landscape and Climate</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military Facilities in Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape of the Crimean Peninsula</td>
<td>Crimea’s Status as a Place of Relaxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance of Russia Among Residence of Crimea</td>
<td>Crimea’s role in Past Wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians in Crimea</td>
<td>Crimea’s Pre-Russian History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Crimean Tatars in Crimea</td>
<td>Presence of Ancient Civilizations in Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Other Ethnic Groups in Crimea</td>
<td>Crimea’s Important Archaeological Monuments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Diversity of the Population of Crimea</td>
<td>Depiction of Crimea in Famous Art, Literature, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Chi-Squared test was performed within and between national groups using the program SPSS Statistics in order to determine whether or not the observed frequency of “yes” responses for each characteristic differed significantly from the mathematically-determined expected frequency of responses and whether or not this difference was statistically significant. As with the analysis from the cognitive mapping exercise, I examined the adjusted residual derived from the comparison of each frequency to determine where there are statistically significant
differences. As before, an adjusted residual greater than two indicates that the observed frequency is significantly higher than the expected frequency and an adjusted residual less than negative two indicates that it is significantly lower than the expected frequency.

The purpose of this section of the survey is to illuminate the terms in which various groups in Crimea relate to or understand the region itself. As the previous chapter demonstrates, Crimea is frequently regarded as homeland by members of each national group, although there are important differences in the way members of each group view the region that influence their sense of place and identification with Crimea. As I am interested primarily in the Russian perspective of Crimea, examining the results from Russian participants helps present a more complete picture of how national narratives influence Russian attitudes towards Crimea.

Table 10: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 184.4) and observed frequencies (OF) of “yes” responses from Russians to whether or not various characteristics are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=384).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Relaxation - 86.7%</td>
<td>Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. - 52.6% (OF = 202, AR = 1.9)</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military - 14.8% (OF = 57, AR = -13.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 333, AR = 15.7)</td>
<td>Ethnic Diversity - 51.8% (OF = 199, AR = 1.5)</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians - 16.4% (OF = 63, AR = -12.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape and Climate - 84.6%</td>
<td>Presence of Russian Military - 50% (OF = 192, AR = 0.8)</td>
<td>Presence of Crimean Tatars - 21.6% (OF = 83, AR = -10.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 325, AR = 14.8)</td>
<td>Ancient Civilizations - 49% (OF = 188, AR = 0.4)</td>
<td>Presence of Other Ethnicities - 22.9% (OF = 88, AR = -10.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeological Monuments - 70.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Russian History - 32% (OF = 123, AR = -6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 270, AR = 9.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shape of Peninsula - 35.9% (OF = 138, AR = -4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Status – 63.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 245, AR = 6.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance of Russians - 61.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 237, AR = 5.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Past Wars - 53.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 207, AR = 2.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test results among each national group indicate a clear divide between the characteristics that they believe are defining or distinguishing features of Crimea and those that they believe are not. However, three characteristics were chosen with significantly high frequency by all groups as “defining or distinguishing” of Crimea: its landscape and climate; its status as a place of
relaxation; and its archaeological monuments. Additionally, all groups except non-Russified Ukrainians cited Crimea’s autonomous status as a defining or distinguishing characteristic with significantly high frequency. Russians also indicate with significantly high frequency that the dominance of Russians in Crimea and its role in past wars are also defining or distinguishing of Crimea. Crimean Tatars also indicate that the presence of Crimean Tatars, its ethnic diversity, and its pre-Russian history are defining or distinguishing of Crimea with significantly high frequency.

Examining the differences between the characteristics each group chose with significantly less frequency is even more revealing of the divides between national groups. Concerning the characteristics chosen significantly less frequently among Russians, nearly all of them present a decidedly non-Russian narrative of Crimea, including its pre-Russian history and the presence of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, other national groups, and the Ukrainian military. Russians appear to believe that their presence in Crimea – and not that of any other national group – is among its important characteristics. Moreover, as a Ukrainian military presence in the region may pose a potential threat to their regional autonomy, Russians clearly do not believe this is an important aspect of Crimea’s character.
Table 11: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 53.4) and observed frequencies (OF) of “yes” responses from Russified Ukrainian to whether or not various characteristics are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=117).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landscape and Climate - 88.9%</td>
<td>Ethnic Diversity - 52.1%</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians - 19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 104, AR = 9.7)</td>
<td>(OF = 61, AR = 1.5)</td>
<td>(OF = 23, AR = -5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Relaxation - 81.2%</td>
<td>Role in Past Wars - 49.6%</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military - 20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 95, AR = 8.0)</td>
<td>(OF = 58, AR = 0.9)</td>
<td>(OF = 24, AR = -5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeological Monuments - 69.2%</td>
<td>Ancient Civilizations - 47.9%</td>
<td>Presence of Crimean Tatars - 20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 81, AR = 5.3)</td>
<td>(OF = 56, AR = 0.2)</td>
<td>(OF = 24, AR = -5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Status - 59%</td>
<td>Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. - 45.3%</td>
<td>Presence of Other Ethnicities - 27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF =69, AR = 3.0)</td>
<td>(OF = 53, AR = -0.1)</td>
<td>(OF = 32, AR = -4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominance of Russians - 41%</td>
<td>Shape of Peninsula - 30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 48, AR = -1.0)</td>
<td>(OF = 36, AR = -3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Russian Military - 39.3%</td>
<td>Pre-Russian History - 35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 46, AR = -1.4)</td>
<td>(OF = 42, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 35.1) and observed frequencies (OF) of “yes” responses from non-Russified Ukrainian to whether or not various characteristics are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=74).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Relaxation – 79.7%</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians – 58.1%</td>
<td>Presence of Russian Military - 25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 59, AR = 5.7)</td>
<td>(OF = 43, AR = 1.9)</td>
<td>(OF = 19, AR = -3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape and Climate - 73%</td>
<td>Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. - 58.1%</td>
<td>Shape of Peninsula - 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 54, AR = 4.5)</td>
<td>(OF = 43, AR = 1.9)</td>
<td>(OF = 20, AR = -3.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeological Monuments - 68.9%</td>
<td>Autonomous Status – 52.7%</td>
<td>Dominance of Russians - 28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 51, AR = 3.8)</td>
<td>(OF =39, AR = 0.9)</td>
<td>(OF = 21, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ancient Civilizations – 52.7%</td>
<td>Presence of Other Ethnicities - 29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 39, AR = 0.9)</td>
<td>(OF = 22, AR = -3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role in Past Wars - 51.4%</td>
<td>Pre-Russian History - 32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 38, AR = 0.7)</td>
<td>(OF = 24, AR = -2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Diversity - 47.3%</td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military - 35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 35, AR = 0)</td>
<td>(OF = 26, AR = -2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Crimean Tatars – 39.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 29, AR = -1.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13: Differences in expected frequencies (EF = 54.9) and observed frequencies (OF) of “yes” responses from Crimean Tatars to whether or not various characteristics are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=137).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significantly More Frequently:</th>
<th>No Significant Difference:</th>
<th>Significantly Less Frequently:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Crimean Tatars - 80.3%</td>
<td>Depiction in Art, Literature, etc. - 43.1% (OF = 59, AR = 0.7)</td>
<td>Dominance of Russians - 5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 110, AR = 9.9)</td>
<td>Ancient Civilizations - 40.9% (OF = 56, AR = 0.2)</td>
<td>(OF = 7, AR = -8.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape and Climate - 72.3%</td>
<td>Role in Past Wars - 33.6% (OF = 46, AR = -1.6)</td>
<td>Presence of Russian Military - 8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 99, AR = 7.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 12, AR = -7.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Relaxation - 62.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians - 14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 86, AR = 5.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 13, AR = -7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Status - 61.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military - 14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 84, AR = 5.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 20, AR = -6.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeological Monuments - 51.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shape of Peninsula - 26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 71, AR = 2.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 36, AR = -3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Diversity - 51.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Other Ethnicities - 32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 70, AR = 2.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(OF = 44, AR = -2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Russian History - 48.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(OF = 66, AR = 2.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same lack of emphasis of attributes unrelated to one’s own nationality is observed among responses from Crimean Tatars as well, who chose all factors related to Russians, Ukrainians, and other nationalities in Crimea with significantly less frequency. They did, however, choose Crimea’s ethnic diversity as a distinguishing characteristic with significantly high frequency. Russification appears to make an important difference in attitudes among Ukrainians. Russified Ukrainians de-emphasize all the same characteristics as do Russians, including those related to Crimea’s Ukrainian attributes, while non-Russified Ukrainians de-emphasize its Russian attributes without significantly emphasizing its Ukrainian attributes. These results clearly speak to the notion that members of each group view Crimea through their own distinct national lens that bring forward the region’s various national characteristics.

The differences in responses among each national group are further highlighted by comparing them to each other in a separate Chi-Squared test. In this test expected frequencies are
determined for each characteristic by multiplying the total number of “yes” and “no” responses from each group by the total number “yes” responses from all groups, then dividing by the total number of “yes” and “no” responses from all groups. While within-group Chi-Squared tests allow us to see how frequently each group chose a given characteristic relative to other characteristics, this between-group test allows us to see how frequently each group chose a given characteristic relative to the frequency with which other groups chose the same characteristic. This method allows us to see which groups feel more or less strongly that a given characteristic is defining or distinguishing of Crimea. It should be noted that the nationality group “other” was included in this test but are excluded from this discussion in the interest of focusing on how different national narratives influence attitudes towards Crimea.

While all groups strongly indicated that Crimea’s status as a place of relaxation, its landscape and climate, and its archaeological monuments are defining or distinguishing of the region, we see that Russians chose all of these characteristics with significantly higher frequency compared to all other groups. Furthermore, we see that all of the characteristics chosen by Russians with significantly high frequency were also chosen with significantly higher frequency compared to all national groups. Meanwhile, non-Russified Ukrainians chose only the presence of Ukrainians and of the Ukrainian military with significantly high frequency compared to other groups, and Crimean Tatars chose only the presence of Crimean Tatars and Crimea’s pre-Russian history with significantly high frequency compared to other groups. These findings further corroborate the notion that each national group tends to emphasize its own characteristics of Crimea, but suggest that Russians are more likely to also emphasize a number of other characteristics that are not necessarily “Russian” by nature. However, when we consider a
number of these characteristics’ significance in broader Russian national narratives about Crimea, their relevance to Russians become clearer.

Table 14: Difference in observed and expected frequencies (OF / EF) of “yes” responses between all national groups to whether or not various characteristics are defining or distinguishing of Crimea, with resultant adjusted frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Russified Ukrainians</th>
<th>Non-Russified Ukrainians</th>
<th>Crimean Tatars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>245 / 228.9</td>
<td>69 / 69.8</td>
<td>39 / 44.1</td>
<td>84 / 81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape/Climate</td>
<td>325 / 312.5</td>
<td>104 / 95.2</td>
<td>54 / 60.2</td>
<td>99 / 111.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape of Peninsula</td>
<td>138 / 123</td>
<td>36 / 37.5</td>
<td>20 / 23.7</td>
<td>36 / 43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance of Russians</td>
<td>237 / 162.8</td>
<td>48 / 49.6</td>
<td>21 / 31.4</td>
<td>7 / 58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Ukrainians</td>
<td>63 / 72.4</td>
<td>23 / 22.1</td>
<td>43 / 14</td>
<td>13 / 25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Crimea Tatars</td>
<td>83 / 126.4</td>
<td>24 / 38.5</td>
<td>29 / 24.4</td>
<td>110 / 45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of other Groups</td>
<td>88 / 98.2</td>
<td>32 / 29.9</td>
<td>22 / 18.9</td>
<td>44 / 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Diversity</td>
<td>199 / 201.7</td>
<td>61 / 61.5</td>
<td>35 / 38.9</td>
<td>70 / 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Russian Military</td>
<td>192 / 140.5</td>
<td>46 / 42.8</td>
<td>19 / 27.1</td>
<td>12 / 30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Ukrainian Military</td>
<td>57 / 65.6</td>
<td>24 / 20</td>
<td>26 / 12.6</td>
<td>20 / 23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status as a Place of Relaxation</td>
<td>333 / 308.7</td>
<td>95 / 94</td>
<td>59 / 59.5</td>
<td>86 / 110.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Past Wars</td>
<td>207 / 182.8</td>
<td>58 / 55.7</td>
<td>38 / 35.2</td>
<td>46 / 65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Russian History</td>
<td>123 / 133.2</td>
<td>42 / 40.6</td>
<td>24 / 25.7</td>
<td>66 / 47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of Ancient Civilizations</td>
<td>188 / 181.8</td>
<td>58 / 55.4</td>
<td>39 / 35</td>
<td>56 / 64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Monuments</td>
<td>270 / 254.2</td>
<td>81 / 77.5</td>
<td>51 / 49</td>
<td>71 / 90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depiction in Art, Literature, etc.</td>
<td>202 / 190.5</td>
<td>53 / 58.1</td>
<td>43 / 36.7</td>
<td>59 / 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bold Text** and sold-line boxes indicate that the characteristic in the row was chosen significantly more frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups. **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the characteristic in the row was chosen significantly less frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups.

At least three of the characteristics chosen significantly more frequently by Russians than other groups – the dominance of Russians, the presence of the Russian military, and Crimea’s
role in past wars – are quickly identifiable for their significance to Russian national identity. Because of its central role in the Crimean War and World War II, Crimea has become a site of Russian and Soviet military glory, which is among the reasons why many in Russia have had difficulty accepting its loss to Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mochalov, 2007). Much of Crimea, particularly the city of Sevastopol, has become a living monument to Russia and the Soviet Union’s storied military exploits (Qualls, 2009), and the Russian Navy famously maintains the port of Sevastopol as the base of its Black Sea Fleet.

Crimea’s autonomy was hard-fought by regional politicians during the 1990s, and most Russians view autonomy as a guarantor and protector of the region’s distinct Russian qualities against Ukrainian nationalizing processes (Sasse, 2007). Although all groups chose autonomy with significantly high frequency, the fact that autonomy was won largely due to the concerns and efforts of ethnic Russians would account for the frequency with which Russians chose this characteristic compared to other groups.

A strong belief among all groups that Crimea’s landscape and climate are among its most defining and distinguishing characteristics, which is not surprising considering that landscape is an important aspect of identity with space and territory at any scale (Tuan, 1974). However, as I have discussed previously, landscape and climate were among the most important characteristics that made Crimea appear exotic and for which it became a highly coveted region at the time of its annexation into the Russian empire. Comparisons to the “Garden of Eden” (Schonle, 2001) and observations about the stark contrast between Crimea and the Russian core (Seymour, 1855) were common tropes throughout this period, and the peninsula’s physical beauty became the subject of countless works of Russian poetry and prose. Crimea’s mountainous landscape and sub-tropical climate certainly hold a particular significance in Russian culture as Crimea was the
first region of such exotic and “Oriental” beauty to be incorporated into the Russian Empire (Dickinson, 2002).

Related to the landscape and climate is Crimea’s status as a place of relaxation, which began in earnest in the Soviet era due to the region’s landscape and climate. To the average Russian living anywhere in the post-Soviet space, tourism, relaxation, and recreation are probably the single most associable characteristics with Crimea since most have likely vacationed in the region at some point in their life. Despite the fact that they call this tourist destination their home, Russians in Crimea rated its status as a place of relaxation as its single most important characteristic, and to a much higher degree compared to all other national groups. I contend that this observation, among all results from this section of the survey, speaks most convincingly to the notion that Russians’ attitudes towards Crimea are shaped by a broader Russian perspective of the region, as they appear to relate to it much in the same way a Russian from outside of Crimea would.

I find the high rating among all groups of Crimea’s archaeological monuments as a defining and distinguishing characteristic of the region surprising considering that archaeology in Crimea has been used predominantly as a Russian and Soviet political tool. In the case of Russians I surmise that these results may likely be related to the archaeological work done in places such as Chersoneses during the Tsarist and Soviet periods, which sought early evidence of Greeks, Slavs, and Christianity in Crimea in order to bolster Russian and Soviet narratives of dominance in Crimea from an early period (Kozelsky, 2010). On the other hand, it may be unrelated to any particular national narrative and simply reflect an interest among all national groups in the history of their surrounding region. However, the fact that Russians chose it with
significantly higher frequency compared to all other groups suggests that they do exhibit a greater interest in Crimea’s archaeology that may be related to these broader national narratives.

Crimea’s depiction in art and literature is certainly related to larger Russian narratives about Crimea, which is why its relative infrequency among these characteristics is surprising. Crimea’s beauty and legend have been built up through Russian art and literature for centuries, and has been the subject of works by many of Russia’s great masters. This relatively low response rate may be the result of unfamiliarity of such works to younger generations of Russians, which make up a large portion of the survey sample. It should be noted that this characteristic was chosen with no particular significant frequency by any national group, although Russians did chose it somewhat more frequently when compared to responses from all national groups.

Lastly, as the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol has been an extremely important issue for Crimea’s more nationalistic Russians, it is surprising that it did not rank higher among the characteristics chosen by Russian survey participants. Many Russians in Crimea view the Fleet’s presence as a statement of Russia’s legitimate claims to the region, and have made its prolonged presence a cause célèbre of their political activism (Mochalov, 2007). Its relatively low rating may be explained by the fact that fervor over this issue has diminished considerably among Russians following Ukrainian President Yanukovich’s decision in 2010 to extend Russia’s lease on the port of Sevastopol through at least 2042. Importantly, however, Russians certainly did chose this factor significantly more frequently than all other national groups to a very high degree, which appears to be more a reflection of non-Russians’ de-emphasis of this characteristic than of Russians’ particular emphasis of it.
Together, the results of this section of the survey support my argument that regional identity among residents of Crimea is derived in different ways from different national perspectives that are informed by competing national narratives about Crimea. For Russians, Crimean identity comes primarily from a sense of pride in being from a region of great significance to the Russian nation, and therefore to their own sense of national identity as well. Crimean Russians appear to view Crimea and assess its distinguishing characteristics much in the same way a Russian with strong national identity would from outside Crimea, emphasizing its role in Russian history and culture and de-emphasizing those characteristics that depict Crimea as being non-Russian. Other national groups also de-emphasize those characteristics that are unrelated to their own nationality’s place in Crimea, reflecting their own national narratives about the region. However, when we compare responses from each group against one another, we see that Russians significantly more frequently emphasize a number of characteristics that can be understood to carry particular significance in Russian national narratives about Crimea, suggesting that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity is especially salient among various forms of Crimean regional identity. We observe similar differences in the way members of each national group view Crimea in the next section of the survey.

**Characterizing Words about Crimea**

This section of the survey simply asked participants to write three to five words that, in their view, “characterize Crimea.” The results of this exercise unsurprisingly produced a large number of individual words and phrases. In order to determine which words appeared most frequently among the responses of all participants I entered the entire set of responses into an online application that produces “word clouds” from bodies of text. Word clouds provide a
visualized summary of the words that appear most frequently within a given body of text by arranging them into a unique pattern where the size of each word is adjusted relative to its frequency of use within the text, with the most common words appearing the largest. By doing this I was easily able to identify the most common words that participants chose to write as being characteristic of Crimea. In discerning which words appeared most frequently, I was careful to consider the fact that Russian words may appear in a number of different conjugations or declensions, meaning a specific word may appear with a number of different spellings. Therefore, when tabulating the actual frequency of each word I was sure to do so according to the word’s root or to multiple roots with the same general meaning. This way collections of differently spelled words with shared meaning are grouped together.

Figure 15: Word cloud of all the words given by survey participants that they believe “characterize Crimea.”
Table 15: Fifty most frequently used words to characterize Crimea among all survey participants, with Russian translations where appropriate. Asterisks denote the ten most frequent words and those which appear most prominently in the word cloud.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air (vozdukh)</td>
<td>Health (zdrav/-zdrav-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazing (udvivit)</td>
<td>History (istori-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy (avtonom-)</td>
<td>Home (dom)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beach (pliazh)</td>
<td>Homeland (rodn/-rodn-)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty (kras-)*</td>
<td>Hospitable (gostepri-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate (klimat)*</td>
<td>Hot (zhark-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Diverse (raznoobraz-) | Interesting (interes-) | Russian (ross/-ross-)
| Ethnic (Etni-) | Landscape (landshaft) | Scenic (zhivopis-) |
| Fleet (flot) | Love/Favorite (liub-) | Sea (mor-)* |
| Forest (les) | Miracle (chud-) | Sevastopol |
| Friend (drug/-druzh-) | Monument (pamiat-) | Simferopol |
| Fruit (frukt) | Mountain (gor-)* | Singular (nepovtorim-)
| Green (zel-) | Multinational (mnogonats-) | Steppe (step-)
| | | Summer (let-)
| | | Sun (slns/-solnich-)*
| | | Tatar |
| | | Tourism (turi-)
| | | Ukrainian (ukr-)
| | | Unique (unik-)
| | | Warm (tepl-)
| | | Wine (vino/vina)
| | | Work (rabot-)
| | | Yalta
| | | Youth (uiut-)

After compiling a list of the most frequent words from all participants, I grouped the results according to nationality and performed a Chi-Squared test on each of the words, measuring their observed frequency against their expected frequency. For this test I established a binary system for examining each word in which a participant either “did not” write a given word or “did” write it. To test for significance I used the same method of examining adjusted residuals as I did in the previous section, where an adjusted residual greater than 2 or less than -2 is considered to reflect a significant difference between the observed and expected frequencies.

Similarly to the previous section, this exercise is intended to elucidate participants’ perceptions of Crimea, albeit in a more freeform and less restrictive framework. This section allows survey participants to describe or depict Crimea in any way they may choose as opposed to the more limited framework of the previous section that asks participants to choose from a given set of characteristics. If we observe that any single word appears significantly more frequently than others, then we may surmise that this is indicative of a commonly held perception or understanding of Crimea among members of a particular group.
Table 16: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the expected frequency (EF = 19.1) among responses from Russians prompted to write words that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=369).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>OF (%)</th>
<th>AR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea (mor-)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain (gor-)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxation (otdykh)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun (solnts-/solnich-)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature (prirod-)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland (rodin-/rodn-)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty (kras-)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate (klimat)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the expected frequency (EF = 10.8) among responses from Ukrainians prompted to write words that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=188).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>OF (%)</th>
<th>AR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea (mor-)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain (gor-)</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxation (otdykh)</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun (solnts-/solnich-)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty (kras-)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature (priroda)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resort (kurort)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Words whose observed frequencies (OF) were significantly higher than the expected frequency (EF = 6.0) among responses from Crimean Tatars prompted to write words that characterize Crimea, with percentages of total responses and resultant adjusted residuals (AR) (N=120).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>OF (%)</th>
<th>AR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea (mor-)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland (rodin-/rodn-)</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain (gor-)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty (kras-)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home (dom)</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxation (otdykh)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, due to the relatively small number of non-Russified Ukrainian survey participants, dividing the Ukrainians into separate Russified and non-Russified categories was not feasible for this test as it would produce expected frequencies lower than 5 for most words among non-Russified Ukrainians. Instead, Ukrainians are included here as a single group. As
these tables illustrate, only a small number of words appear significantly more frequently among responses from each group compared to the expected frequency, with the remaining words appearing significantly less frequently or with no significant difference to the expected frequency.

Observing the words given significantly more often among responses from all groups we see many similarities, and most relate to Crimea’s landscape, climate, and status as a vacation destination. These include the words “beauty,” “mountain,” “nature,” “sea,” “sun,” “relaxation,” and “resort.” The high frequencies of these types of words suggest that most people think about Crimea first and foremost in terms of its physical and natural characteristics. “Sea,” for example, is by far the most commonly chosen word among all groups. In addition, “Homeland” was given with significantly high frequency by Russians and Crimean Tatars, while only Russians wrote the word “climate” with significantly high frequency.

As with the previous survey section, here it is helpful to examine the differences among responses from each group using a separate Chi-Squared test. Because of the large number of words included in this test only a handful met the requirement of having expected frequencies greater than five for each group when compared to each other, and fewer still yielded adjusted frequencies greater than two or less than negative two indicating a significant difference. Also, as before, “other” nationalities were included in this test but are omitted from discussion here.

Here we see that Russians are significantly more likely than other groups to give the words “resort” and “health,” although “health” is not one of the words that they chose significantly more frequently than other words. Russians also wrote “beauty” and “homeland” significantly less frequently than others. We also see that Crimean Tatars are significantly more likely to give the words “home” and “homeland” than other groups, and less likely to give
“nature” and “resort.” Ukrainians, on the other hand, are no more or less likely than other groups to write any of the given words.

**Table 19: Difference in observed and expected frequencies (OF / EF) between all national groups of words that characterize Crimea, with resultant adjusted frequencies (Including only those words for which at least one adjusted residual had an absolute value greater than two, and for which all groups had an expected frequency greater than 5).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russians (N=369)</th>
<th>Ukrainians (N=188)</th>
<th>Crimean Tatars (N=120)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beauty (kras-)</td>
<td>34 / 46.7</td>
<td>31 / 23.8</td>
<td>18 / 15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature (priroda)</td>
<td>46 / 45.8</td>
<td>30 / 23.3</td>
<td>8 / 14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home (dom)</td>
<td>15 / 20.7</td>
<td>6 / 10.5</td>
<td>17 / 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (zdorov/-zdrav-)</td>
<td>22 / 16.3</td>
<td>8 / 8.3</td>
<td>2 / 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resort (kurort)</td>
<td>61 / 51.7</td>
<td>28 / 26.3</td>
<td>9 / 16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland (rodina/rodn-)</td>
<td>36 / 48.3</td>
<td>17 / 24.6</td>
<td>35 / 15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bold Text** and sold-line boxes indicate that the word in the row was given significantly more frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups.  
**Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the word in the row was given significantly less frequently by the national group in the column compared to all national groups.

From these results, we can clearly surmise that Crimean residents of all national persuasion relate strongly to Crimea’s natural and aesthetic characteristics. Such elements of the physical landscape and aesthetic appearance of a given place constitute a fundamental component of spatial identity (Tuan, 1974). The fact that Crimean Tatars more frequently wrote the words “home” and “homeland” further strengthens the argument that Crimean Tatars’ association of the term “homeland” is much more singularly tied to Crimea than other groups, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter. Meanwhile, the fact that Russians more frequently wrote the words “resort” and “health” provides further support for my argument that Russians view Crimea through a distinct national lens that emphasizes the characteristics of the region that are most significant in Russian national narratives. It must be noted that the root for “health” appears
most often among these words in the word for “health resort” (*zdravnitsa*), referring to Crimea’s many sanatoria that are a major draw for vacationers. As discussed, Crimea is most famous among non-Crimean Russians as a vacation destination, yet those who live there also appear to think of Crimea in these same terms. In this sense, Russians both within and outside of Crimea cherish it largely for its status as the Russian/Soviet vacation destination of choice, just as it is often presented within Russian national narratives at large.

Results from these last two sections of the survey compliment each other well in their presentation of perceptions of Crimea among its Russian population specifically. Both when given a list of characteristics to choose from and when asked to produce their own characteristic descriptions about the region, Russians tend to highlight the same aspects of Crimea that make it important within a larger national context. In this way, their sense of regional identity is filtered through their own national lens to produce a distinct sense of regional identity largely informed by their sense of national identity. How, though, does this sense of layered regional-national identity translate to attitudes about Crimea’s political status? This is the subject of the next section of the survey.

**Crimea’s Political Status**

This section of the survey asked participants to choose what they believe Crimea’s political status should be from a list of six options:

- Remain an Autonomous Republic of Ukraine
- Become an Oblast (non-autonomous region) of Ukraine
- Join Russia as an Autonomous Republic
- Join Russia as an Oblast
• Become an Independent State

• Other, with space provided to describe their ideal option.

In order to evaluate opinions expressed by each national group about Crimea’s political status, a simple breakdown of the percentages of each option chosen within each group is sufficient. In this way, this section of the survey resembles more of an opinion poll than a sociological survey, and thus I feel that a more sophisticated statistical analysis is not required to gauge the differences in opinion between each group.

This question is designed to uncover nuances in how participants think about Crimea in political terms. I am interested both in attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia and in the role of autonomy in their opinions about Crimea’s political status. The first section of this chapter revealed that most residents of Crimea of various national backgrounds consider the region’s autonomous status to be one of its most important characteristics, but how are their views on autonomy considered alongside their opinions towards Ukraine or Russia? As autonomy can be an important aspect of territorial identity in regions like Crimea (Safran and Maiz, 2000), it is important to consider the role of autonomy in shaping geopolitical opinions among residents of Crimea.

I expected that most Russians would opt to have Crimea join Russia instead of remaining a part of Ukraine, although I also anticipated that autonomy would be favored over non-autonomy within either state. I also expected that both Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars would strongly favor Crimea remaining in Ukraine over becoming part of Russia, but autonomy would be very important to them as well. I expected that Russified Ukrainians would be more likely to opt for joining Russia than non-Russified Ukrainians, with or without autonomous status. I also
expected that Crimean Tatars would be more likely to opt for Crimean independence than any other group.

Figure 16: Responses to the question, “what should Crimea’s political status be?” expressed as the percentages of each option chosen out of the total responses within each national group.

Answers to this question show a clear divide in opinions along national lines. As expected, Russians clearly show a much stronger preference for Crimea to join Russia compared to every other group, with 60.8% choosing to join Russia either with or without autonomy and only 24.9% choosing to remain in Ukraine with or without autonomy. Meanwhile, both Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians strongly prefer that Crimea remain a part of Ukraine to joining Russia with or without autonomy. A total of 53.9% of Russified Ukrainians chose to remain in Ukraine while only 34.2% chose to join Russia with or without autonomy. Non-Russified Ukrainians favor remaining in Ukraine even more strongly, with 80.8% choosing to remain in
Ukraine and only 15.1% choosing to join Russia. 56% of Crimean Tatars chose to remain in Ukraine with a mere 3% choosing to join Russia. Also as expected, Crimean Tatars are the most likely to favor independence for Crimea, with 32.8% of participants choosing this option.

These results clearly suggest a sense of national identity inherent in Crimean residents’ attitudes towards regional geopolitics. Given their recent history of political struggle and the amount of pro-Russian political activism in the region, it is unsurprising that so many Russian participants would prefer for Crimea to join Russia if given the choice. As Ukrainians demonstrably identify more strongly with the Ukrainian state, their preference regardless of Russification to remain a part of Ukraine is also unsurprising. Because of their tribulations during the Soviet period and fear of Russian chauvinism in Crimea, Crimean Tatars understandably look to Kiev for protection of their political rights and indigenous status in their native region, and thus overwhelmingly favor remaining in Ukraine to joining Russia. Moreover, because Crimean Tatars identify nearly unanimously with Crimea as their national homeland, the fact that many also prefer independence for Crimea reflects a fairly strong sense of Crimean Tatar nationalism, of which territory and independence are intrinsic components (Gottman, 1973; Gellner, 1983).

More interesting, then, are the opinions expressed here within each group regarding regional autonomy. Regardless of opinion over which state Crimea belongs in, all groups overwhelmingly believe that it should remain autonomous. Only 11.9% of Russians would chose for Crimea to rejoin Russia as an oblast – that is, without autonomous status – which is more than four times fewer than the number who would opt for Crimea to join Russia while retaining its autonomy. More striking, we see that nearly twice as many Russians would opt for Crimea to remain an autonomous region of Ukraine (20.9%) rather than surrender its autonomy to be
reunited with Russia (11.9%). Viewed another way, a combined total of 69.8% of Russians favor autonomy for Crimea, either within Ukraine or Russia, while only 15.9% would see it lose its autonomy under any circumstances.

Similarly, one-fifth as many Russified Ukrainians chose to join Russia as an oblast (6%) than those who chose to join it as an autonomous republic (28.2%). Among those who chose to remain a part of Ukraine over four times more would have Crimea retain its autonomy (43.6%) than lose it (10.3%). In other words, 71.8% of Russified Ukrainians favor autonomy in either circumstance, while 16.3% favor a loss of Crimea’s autonomy. Among both non-Russified Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars not a single participant chose to join Russia as an oblast, while small numbers of each did choose to join Russia as an autonomous republic. Non-Russified Ukrainians, despite their strong identity with the Ukrainian state, chose to keep Crimea’s autonomy within Ukraine over losing it by a greater than two-to-one ratio (54.8% versus 26%). Meanwhile, nearly five times as many Crimean Tatars chose autonomy over oblast status within Ukraine (47% to 9%).

We may therefore conclude that all national groups uphold retention of regional autonomy as Crimea’s most important geopolitical objective among the given options, although opinions regarding which state autonomy should be upheld within differ according to national perspectives. To Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, who both look more to Kiev for protection of their cultural and linguistic rights than to the Russian-dominated Crimean government, autonomy does not appear to be an institution through which the achievement of national political goals may be facilitated. Crimea’s autonomy must therefore represent to them the political acknowledgement and institutionalization of the region’s distinct characteristics – as each group
understands and identifies with them – without the loss of cultural, linguistic, and political protection that the larger state offers them.

For Russians Crimea’s autonomy has different meanings. On the one hand, it is the institution that provides political protection of their ethnic/national interests both in the region and within Ukraine at large, and so Russians would likely uphold regional autonomy more for political reasons than Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars. However, results of this section of the survey show that they would continue to uphold Crimea’s autonomous status if it were to become a part of Russia, where their ethnic/national interests would be essentially no different from those of the state. In other words, if Crimea were to become a part of Russia there would be no need for autonomy to safeguard Russian culture, language, and political interests against the nationalizing processes of a nation-state with which the region’s Russians weakly identify as Crimea’s autonomy does now within Ukraine.

That Russians would uphold Crimea’s autonomy within Russia and would prefer autonomy within Ukraine to non-autonomy within Russia may initially seem to contradict the argument that they view the region from a broader Russian perspective. Their strong national identity should arguably drive a desire to be included in the Russian state over other geopolitical goals, in which case regional autonomy would no longer be required to protect the “Russian-ness” of Crimea. I therefore argue that like Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, Russians in Crimea view regional autonomy primarily as the political acknowledgment and institutionalization of Crimea’s unique and distinctive characteristics as viewed from their own particular national perspective, as this chapter has demonstrated.

As I have maintained, Crimean Russians take pride in a number of factors that are distinct to the region, but their understanding of these distinctions is filtered through a uniquely Russian
lens that leads them to cherish Crimea for the same reasons it is cherished within the broader Russian popular imagination. Their strong regional identity is a reflection of this understanding of Crimea and of the sense of pride they feel for being from a region of great importance in Russian history and culture more broadly. Crimean Russians thus view autonomy as the political expression of the region’s distinguishing characteristics as expressed through Russian national narratives. In this sense, Crimean Russians may feel privileged to call themselves Crimean among their fellow Russians. Autonomy within the Russian state, I argue, would continue to uphold this privileged distinction in the hearts and minds of Russians in Crimea. Even more telling is the fact that most Russians in Crimea would prefer that this distinction be upheld through regional autonomy even if it meant remaining within the Ukrainian state. For Russians, Crimea’s autonomy is an important aspect of regional identity because it reinforces their belief that their region is special within a greater national context.

Summary

This chapter demonstrates that while Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars all appear to identify strongly with Crimea, national perspective largely determines which of its characteristics people choose to emphasize. In other words, perceptions of Crimea are shaped by larger national narratives that attribute different meaning and significance to Crimea from different national viewpoints. While all survey participants identify strongly with Crimea’s physical and aesthetic attributes, most also choose to emphasize the role of their own national group and de-emphasize the role of other national groups in their characterization of Crimea. Looking at Russians in Crimea specifically we see a tendency to also emphasize regional characteristics that, while not related to nationality per se, nevertheless imbue Crimea with a
certain Russian character and endear it to the Russian nation as a whole. By choosing specifically to emphasize Crimea’s historic and contemporary role as the vacation destination of choice among Soviet/Russian holidaymakers, Russians in Crimea appear to relate to the region much in the same way that their co-nationals from outside the region would as well.

We also see that Crimea’s status as an autonomous republic – which is a political institution born of the need to protect the rights of ethnic/national minorities – is largely understood by Crimeans of all national background to represent and protect the region’s distinctive characteristics within larger territorial structures. While nationality influences belief in what these distinctive characteristics are, autonomy appears to be universally understood as an effective way to acknowledge and institutionalize these beliefs. Despite their national identity and a strong affinity for the Russian state, Russians in Crimea exhibit a pronounced attachment to the region and largely believe that autonomy should be in place to uphold its distinctive characteristics whether it is a part of Russia or Ukraine. In the remaining chapters I explore in detail the relationship between national and regional identity among Russians in Crimea and how they come together to form a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity.
Chapter VIII- Factors of Identity

Being a member of one’s nationality and living in Crimea both appear to be important aspects of identity among those who live in the region. As I demonstrated in previous chapters, many in Crimea feel a strong affinity for the region and consider it their “homeland.” However, nationality appears to be the lens through which most people in the region view and relate to Crimea, which implies a preeminence of national identity over regional/territorial identity. What is the nature of the relationship between nationality and territory in identity formation among residents of Crimea? How do residents relate to Crimea vis-à-vis other geographical and territorial scales that they live within? This chapter explores the dynamics among these various factors in identity formation for members of Crimea’s different national groups.

This section of the survey presented participants with a list of eight identity factors and asked them to rate the importance of each one to their own sense of self-identity on a scale of one to five. Participants were asked to rate the following factors:

• Living in Their Town
• Living in Crimea
• Living in Ukraine
• Living in Europe
• Their Soviet Past
• Their Nationality
• Their Native Language
• Their Religious Beliefs
Mean scores for each factor were calculated within each national group and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was performed using the program SPSS Statistics in order to identify statistically significant differences between the mean scores both within each ethnic group and between them. For the purposes of this study, a level of 95% (α = .05) was chosen as the measure of statistical significance, as this is the most common and conventional confidence interval used in most analyses (Stevens, 1992). This means that if the ANOVA test between any two mean scores reveals a *p*-value that is less than or equal to the alpha (α) value of .05 we can assume with 95% confidence that the difference between the two mean values is representative of some real-world difference in attitudes towards this factor/question and not simply coincidental within the sample. In such a case we would fail to accept the null hypothesis of the ANOVA test that states that there is no significant difference between the two scores. The greater the number of null hypotheses that we are able to reject the more conclusions we are able to draw with at least 95% confidence about the identity dynamics of survey participants.

I expected “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” to be the most salient factors of identity among survey participants from all national backgrounds, while “Their Native Language” and “Their Religious Beliefs” would be of secondary importance. I expected “Living in Their Town,” “Living in Ukraine,” “Living in Europe,” and “Their Soviet Past” to be the least salient factors among all groups on average, although I expected that “Their Soviet Past” would rate higher among Russians and Russified Ukrainians and “Living in Ukraine” would rate higher among non-Russified Ukrainians. For the purposes of this study I am most interested in how the mean scores for the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” varied compared to each other and to other factors. If the mean score for any one factor is determined to be higher at a statistically significant level (*p*-value ≤ .05) than another factor within a given group, then we
can logically conclude with at least 95% confidence that members of this group consider the first factor to be more important than the second. If the mean scores for a given factor vary at a statistically significant level between groups, then we can also conclude with at least 95% confidence that one group feels more strongly than the other that this factor is important to their identity.

**Results from Russians**

While Russians did rate the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” highly as expected, these did not prove to be the most salient factors of identity for them. “Their Native Language” proved to be the most salient factor at a statistically significant level compared to all other factors, with a p-value of .003 compared to “Living in Crimea,” and .000 compared to all other factors. “Living in Crimea” ranked second among all factors, while “Their Nationality” ranked third. In other words, we can conclude with more than 99% confidence that Russian survey participants consider their native language to be the most salient factor of their identity among the factors listed in the survey. With a mean score of 4.44, this means that Russians rate their native language to be “quite important” to “very important” for their self-identification according the parameters of the likert scale used in this section.

Mean scores for the factors “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” exhibit a difference of .10, which was determined to be not statistically significant. While both of these factors rate higher than “Living in Their Town” and “Their Religious Beliefs,” neither was determined to be significantly higher. In fact, none of these four factors was determined to be significantly higher than the other. We may conclude that Russians consider the importance of both living in their town and living in Crimea – as well as their nationality and religious beliefs –
to be roughly equivalent in importance to their self-identification. Each of these mean scores may be rounded to the nearest integer of 4, which means that Russians consider these factors to be “quite important” to one degree or another.

Figure 17: Mean scores provided by Russians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

“Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” are by far the weakest factors of identity, both exhibiting p-values of .000 when compared to every other factor and therefore representing a significance level greater than 99.9%. With mean scores of 2.49 and 2.70 respectively there is no significant difference between these two factors, and both scores represent an evaluation of these factors as being somewhere between “somewhat important” and “important” for the identity of Russians in Crimea. While “Their Soviet Past” proved to be significantly more important than “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” ($p = .000$ in both cases), it is
significantly less important than every other factor \((p = .000\) in all cases). With a mean score of 3.19 Russians consider it to be slightly more than “important” to their identity.

Table 20: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Russians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Living in Their Town</th>
<th>Living in Crimea</th>
<th>Living in Ukraine</th>
<th>Living in Europe</th>
<th>Their Soviet Past</th>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Native Language</th>
<th>Their Religious Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living in Their Town</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Crimea</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Ukraine</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Europe</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Soviet Past</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Nationality</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Native Language</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td>.944</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is **significantly higher** than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is **significantly lower** than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no **statistically significant difference** between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

From these results we are able to make some broad observations. When considering spatial/territorial components of their identity Russians appear to privilege the regional (Crimea) and local (their town) scales. Territorial identity at the scales of the nation-state (Ukraine) and
the supra-state (Europe) are considerably lower among Russians in Crimea, which is consistent with previous findings (Efimov, 2008). Insofar as we can consider the factor “Their Soviet Past” to be reflective of an attachment to the territory of the former Soviet Union, identity at this scale is also considerably lower than at the regional and local scales among Russians in Crimea, though significantly higher than their identification with Ukraine and Europe. As I expected, we observe that territorial identity among Russians in Crimea is most salient at the regional scale. However, the local scale proved to be unexpectedly salient as well with no significant difference between the factors “Living in Their Town” and “Living in Crimea.”

Nationality also proved to be a highly salient factor of identity for Russians in Crimea, as I expected. However, native language – which over 98% of Russian participants listed as being exclusively “Russian” – proved to be a much more important component of their identity than I anticipated, as it is by far the most highly rated factor. This tendency may be a reflection of the fact that many Russians in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine believe that the Russian language is threatened there by Ukrainian state-building processes (Sasse, 2007). Religion also rates higher than I expected, although these results are consistent with previous studies (Korostelina, 2008b). It should be noted that 92.6% of Russian participants identified their religion as “Christian” or “Orthodox,” with 4.8% identifying as atheists and 2.4% divided among a number of other religions.

Considered together, nationality, native language, and religion can all be understood as components of national identity (Eriksen, 2002). Although territory is also an important component of national identity that distinguishes one national group from another, for Russians at the regional scale (i.e., within Crimea) the territorial component of identity must be considered separately from the national component because Crimea constitutes only a very small portion of
what is considered to be “Russian territory” in an ethnic and cultural sense, and lies outside of it in a geopolitical sense. In this way, identifying strongly with Crimea in and of itself does not necessarily reflect a strong national identity among Russians. For Russians living in Crimea, their nationality, native language, and religion can easily be contrasted with those of other non-Russian national groups among which they live, but the mere fact that they live in Crimea does not distinguish them from these other groups.

Thus, I interpret the high mean scores for the factors “Their Native Language,” “Their Nationality,” and “Their Religion” all to be indicative of strong national identity among Russians in Crimea, while high mean scores for “Living in Crimea” and “Living in Their Town” represent a territorial identity that is decoupled from national identity. To better understand the unique characteristics of these observations we must examine responses from other national groups included in the survey.

**Results for Ukrainians**

Since Crimea is included in the Ukrainian nation-state, Ukrainians living in Crimea may consider themselves to be “in place” at least at the state scale, despite the fact that they are a minority regionally. Because of their status as the “titular” people of their nation-state, I expected that Ukrainian participants would generally rate the factor “Living in Ukraine” higher than other national groups, with non-Russified Ukrainians rating it higher than Russified Ukrainians. However, I also expected that “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” would rate highly with Ukrainians as I expected it would with other national groups. The difference between Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians is crucial here, particularly because the factors “Their Nationality” and “Their Native Language” among Russified (Russian-speaking) Ukrainians are
not bound within a single national tradition as they are for non-Russified (Ukrainian-speaking) Ukrainians. Given the role that language has played in Ukrainian nation-building projects in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, this disconnect between nationality and native language should presumably dilute Russified Ukrainians’ sense of national identity compared to those Ukrainians who indicate Ukrainian as their native language.

As with Russians, we see that Russified Ukrainians rate “Living in Crimea” (mean = 3.92) and “Their Native Language” (mean = 3.89) as the two most important factors of their identity. However, unlike with Russians, we see no significant difference between the mean scores for these two factors ($p = 1.000$), and in fact “Living in Crimea” rates slightly higher. Surprisingly, Russified Ukrainians rate “Living in Ukraine” rather low. With a mean score of 3.18, it is significantly lower than both “Living in Crimea” ($p = .001$) and “Their Native Language” ($p = .002$). Interestingly, Russified Ukrainians did rate “Their Nationality” (mean = 3.41) higher than the rated “Living in Ukraine,” but this difference is not significant ($p = .907$). In fact, the mean score for “Their Nationality” is not significantly higher or lower than that of any other factor of identity. Mean scores for both “Living in Their Town” (mean = 3.57) and “Their Religious Beliefs” (mean = 3.62) are significantly higher than “Living in Europe” (mean = 2.87) and “Their Soviet Past” (2.93) and not significantly lower than any other factor. “Living in Europe” and “Their Soviet Past” are not significantly different from each other ($p = 1.000$), but are significantly lower than every other factor except for “Living in Ukraine” and “Their Nationality.”
Figure 18: Mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

Among Russified Ukrainians territorial identity appears to be strongest at the regional scale (i.e., Crimea), though it is not significantly higher than the local scale (i.e., their town). While Russified Ukrainians do rate regional identity higher than identity with their nationality, native language, and religion, the difference is not significant in any case. Generally, the disconnect between nationality and native language seems to have created a weakened sense of both Ukrainian national and civic identity among Russified Ukrainians compared to non-Russified Ukrainians (see below) and a heightened sense of regional identity in lieu of national/state identity. In this sense, Russified Ukrainians appear to relate to Crimea in a manner more similar to Russians than to non-Russified Ukrainians. The fact that Ukrainian nation-building efforts have involved the heavy promotion and official use of the Ukrainian language
over Russian may account for a sense of alienation from the Ukrainian state among Russified Ukrainians similar to that of ethnic Russians in regions of Ukraine where Russian is more predominantly spoken, such as Crimea.

Table 21: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Living in Their Town</th>
<th>Living in Crimea</th>
<th>Living in Ukraine</th>
<th>Living in Europe</th>
<th>Their Soviet Past</th>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Native Language</th>
<th>Their Religious Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living in Their Town</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Crimea</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Ukraine</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.686</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>.902</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Europe</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.686</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Soviet Past</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.874</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Nationality</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Native Language</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.696</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.930</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bold text* and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
*Italic text* and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
*Strike-through text* indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

Looking at results from non-Russified Ukrainians, we see immediately that “Living in Europe” (mean = 2.97) and “Their Soviet Past” (mean = 2.72) are by far the two lowest-rated
factors. With the one exception of “Living in Europe” versus “Living in Their Town” ($p = .084$), these two lowest-rated factors are significantly lower than every other factor and have no significant difference between them ($p = .956$). While non-Russified Ukrainians in Crimea appear largely to disassociate themselves from the Soviet Union and/or Russia, they do not appear to look to Europe as much as Ukrainians from other regions of Ukraine (Shulman, 1998). Instead, as I expected, we find that Ukrainian civic identity rates much higher, with the factor “Living in Ukraine” tying “Their Native Language” for the highest rated factor with a mean score of 4.13. The other factors that may be considered related to one’s nationality – “Their Nationality” and “Their Religious Belief” – also rated highly with mean scores of 4.01 and 3.76 respectively. Meanwhile, the two sub-state territorial factors – “Living in Crimea” and “Living in Their Town” – also rated highly, although slightly lower than the national components with mean scores of 3.74 and 3.62 respectively.

**Figure 19:** Mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.
Table 22: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Living in Their Town</th>
<th>Living in Crimea</th>
<th>Living in Ukraine</th>
<th>Living in Europe</th>
<th>Their Soviet Past</th>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Native Language</th>
<th>Their Religious Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living in Their Town</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Crimea</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Ukraine</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Europe</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Soviet Past</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Nationality</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Native Language</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.  
**Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.  
**Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

The results of the ANOVA test indicate that there are no significant differences between mean scores for each of the territorial factors at the local, regional, or state scale, and all factors related to nationality. In other words, there is no significant difference between any of the following factors: “Living in Their Town;” “Living in Crimea;” “Living in Ukraine;” “Their Nationality,” “Their Native Language;” and “”Their Religious Beliefs.” But for the one exception previously mentioned, all of these factors also rated significantly higher than “Living
in Europe” and “Their Soviet Past.” These results therefore suggest a strong sense of national identity among non-Russified Ukrainians because identity with both the Ukrainian state and with other trappings of nationality rate particularly high. As I have argued previously, for Ukrainians the local and regional scales are both nested within the Ukrainian nation-state and may therefore be considered a part of Ukrainians’ national territory. In this sense, the fact that non-Russified Ukrainians also rate “Living in Their Town” and “Living in Crimea” highly presents no conflict to their prevailing sense of national identity. Rather, Crimean regional identity is merely one aspect of an overriding national identity for these Ukrainians, which includes a strong attachment to their specific region of Ukraine as well as the entire state itself.

Performing a one-way ANOVA test between mean scores of Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians reveals a statistically significant difference only between the factors “Living in Ukraine” and “Their Nationality.” With a mean score of 4.13 versus 3.18, non-Russified Ukrainians unsurprisingly rate the importance of “Living in Ukraine” significantly higher than Russified Ukrainians ($p = .000$). Moreover, “Their Nationality” also rates significantly higher ($p = .003$) among non-Russified Ukrainians (mean = 4.10) than Russified Ukrainians (mean = 3.41). Interestingly, while Russified Ukrainians do rate “Living in Crimea” to be more important than non-Russified Ukrainians (means = 3.93 and 3.74 respectively), this difference is not statistically significant ($p = .290$). This is also true for the factor “Their Native Language,” as the difference in mean scores between Russian speakers (mean = 3.89) and Ukrainian speakers (mean = 4.13) is not statistically significant ($p = .215$).

The fact that there is no significant difference in attitudes towards native language between these groups suggests a high level of Russification among Ukrainians who speak Russian, as language appears to be no less important to their identity than it is to that of
Ukrainian speakers who, by all accounts, identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation, state, and language. Furthermore, regional identity appears to be fairly strong among both Russian and Ukrainian speakers despite their different attitudes towards state and nation, as both rate the fact that they live in Crimea as being closer to “quite important” than to “important.” However, I argue that survey results point to the notion that, for non-Russified Ukrainians, Crimean regional identity is a component of a broader sense of national identity in which Crimea represents their home region within the larger nation-state with which they identify strongly both in terms of nationality and territory. For Russified Ukrainians on the other hand, Crimea has become the primary scale at which they tend to identify in lieu of a broader national/state identity, as Russification has led to a relatively weak attachment both to their Ukrainian nationality and to the Ukrainian state. Thus, while strength of identification with Crimea appears fairly consistent between Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians, there are clear cultural and linguistic cleavages that affect the meaning of Crimea for both of these groups.

**Results for Crimean Tatars**

Because of their unique history and ethnogenesis, Crimean Tatars tend to view the relationship between nationality and territory very differently from other national groups in Crimea. The idea that Crimea alone constitutes their homeland has been the central component of Crimean Tatar identity and the Crimean Tatar national movement since at least the beginning of the Soviet period. In light of this, I expected Crimean Tatars to rate both “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” extremely high, while identification at other geographic scales and especially with the factor “Their Soviet Past” would rate much lower given the oppression that Crimean Tatars experienced during the Soviet era.
As expected, both “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” rated very highly among Crimean Tatars. Moreover, not only is there no statistically significant difference between the mean scores for these two factors, but there is no difference whatsoever; both factors received the same mean score of 4.49, which translates to a rating of halfway between “quite important” and “very important.” Further still, this mean score is nearly identical to both mean scores for the factors “Their Native Language” (mean = 4.57) and “Their Religious Beliefs” (mean = 4.55), meaning that the differences in mean between any two of these four factors did not receive a p-value of less than .999. In other words, it appears rather conclusively that these four factors of identity are equally salient among Crimean Tatars.
Table 23: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Crimean Tatars when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Living in Their Town</th>
<th>Living in Crimea</th>
<th>Living in Ukraine</th>
<th>Living in Europe</th>
<th>Their Soviet Past</th>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Native Language</th>
<th>Their Religious Beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living in Their Town</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Crimea</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Ukraine</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Europe</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Soviet Past</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Nationality</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Native Language</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is **significantly higher** than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is **significantly lower** than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Strikethrough text** indicates that there is **no statistically significant difference** between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

The four remaining factors each easily rated significantly lower than “Living in Crimea,” “Their Nationality,” “Their Native Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs,” with p-values of .000 when compared to the mean scores of each of the four most salient factors. Among the four least salient factors, however, “Living in Their Town” easily rated the highest with a mean of 3.74 and a p-value of .000 compared to each of the other three. “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” both came next with means of 3.10 and 3.02 respectively, which means the difference
between them is not statistically significant \((p = .999)\), although they are both significantly higher than the least salient factor, “Their Soviet Past.” With a mean score of 2.35 the importance of the factor “Their Soviet Past” among Crimean Tatars proved to be significantly lower than every other factor with a \(p\)-value of .000 in every single case.

The portrait painted by these results is rather striking as it depicts a clear hierarchy of identity factors among Crimean Tatars. As I expected, “Living in Crimea” and “Their Nationality” ranked extremely high, and the fact that “Their Native Language” and “Their Religious Beliefs” proved to be equally as salient speaks to the fundamental differences between Crimean Tatars and other national groups in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar concept of national territory is coterminous with the Crimean Peninsula and therefore not merely one region nested within a larger nation-state as it is for Ukrainians, or within a broad ethno-cultural or ethno-linguistic region as it is for Russians. Therefore, unlike Ukrainians and Russians, living in and being from Crimea is an intrinsic component of national identity for Crimean Tatars that is inextricable from other components such as language and religion. Crimean Tatars feel that they are “in place” only in Crimea, as they made clear during their Soviet-era campaign for repatriation.

Concerning the ratings given to the other four factors of identity, the most striking outcome is the low mean score given to “Their Soviet Past,” which follows my prediction. Because the Soviet regime was unduly oppressive towards the Crimean Tatars and, most importantly, robbed them of their national territory, the Soviet years are not remembered fondly by the Crimean Tatars. I interpret the fact that Crimean Tatars rated “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” so significantly higher than “Their Soviet Past” not to be a reflection of a particularly strong sense of civic Ukrainian or European identity, but rather an extremely
negative view of the Soviet Union and a desire among Crimean Tatars to disassociate from their tumultuous past. However, the mean scores given to the factors “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” do translate as “important” according to the Likert scale used, and may reflect the fact that Crimean Tatars have looked to Kiev and to various European organizations for support in their campaign to be recognized as the indigenous people of Crimea.

The fact that “Living in Their Town” rated significantly higher than “Living in Ukraine” and “Living in Europe” appears to reflect a general trend among all national groups that participated in the survey of exhibiting a relatively high level of attachment to the local geographic scale, which is consistent with Tuan (1974). Regardless, the most important message to take away from these results is that, as their very ethnonym indicates, national and territorial identity for Crimean Tatars are both extremely and equally important to each other. At the scale of Crimea, nationality and territory are not decoupled for Crimean Tatars as they are for Russians, but are instead fused into a single indistinguishable facet of identity.

Summary

In order to summarize the differences between responses given by Russians and other national groups to this section of the survey it is helpful to examine how the responses varied statistically. For this, I performed a one-way ANOVA test for each factor of identity between each group rather than within. This allows us to see whether ratings from group to group for each factor differ significantly from each other. For the sake of this study, I present only how ratings differ between Russians and each the other national groups.

As this table illustrates, Russians’ ratings of the factors “Living in Their Town” and “Living in Europe” do not significantly differ from any other group. This may be explained by
the fact that neither of these geographic scales – i.e., the local and the supra-state – can be considered the “national territory” of any of these groups, nor are they generally spaces through or within which their national identities can be expressed territorially. Thus, no one national group is more likely than the others to identify strongly at these geographic scales.

Table 24: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test comparing mean scores provided by Russians to those provided by other groups when rating the importance of various factors to their self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Russians versus Russified Ukrainians</th>
<th>Non-Russified Ukrainians</th>
<th>Crimean Tatars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living in Their Town</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Crimea</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Ukraine</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Europe</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Soviet Past</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Nationality</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Native Language</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the mean score for Russians is **significantly higher** than the mean score for the group listed in the column at the given p-value.
• **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the mean score for Russians is **significantly lower** than the mean score for the group listed in the column at the given p-value.
• **Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the mean score for Russians and the group listed in the column, with the given p-value.

Russians rated the factor “Living in Crimea” significantly higher than non-Russified Ukrainians though significantly lower than Crimean Tatars and not significantly different from Russified Ukrainians. This may be accounted for by the fact that non-Russified Ukrainians more often identify with the Ukrainian state as a territorial component of their national identity, while Crimean Tatars identify exclusively with Crimea as the territorial component of their national identity. Russified Ukrainians, on the other hand, appear to associate less strongly with the Ukrainian state than their non-Russified co-nationals, and more strongly with Crimea much like
ethnic Russians. However, Russified Ukrainians do identify significantly more strongly with Ukraine than do Russians, as do both non-Russified Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. These results indicate that, regardless of their degree of Russification, Ukrainians more often identify with the Ukrainian state than do Russians, as Russians have generally found it difficult to accept and embrace the fact that they are citizens of Ukraine rather than Russia (Sasse, 2007). Furthermore, Crimean Tatars generally view the Ukrainian state as a guarantor of their indigenous rights and safeguard against potential Russian chauvinism, and thus consider living in Ukraine to be more important than do Russians.

Interestingly, only Crimean Tatars consider their Soviet past to be significantly less important to their identity than Russians, which makes sense considering their experiences in the Soviet era. Insofar as they may identify culturally and linguistically in a manner similar to Russians, some Russified Ukrainians may also view the Soviet period as a time when they were part of a dominant and privileged nation. I find it most surprising that non-Russified Ukrainians do not feel significantly differently towards their Soviet past than do Russians, though this may simply reflect the fact that they live in a region of Ukraine that clings to its Soviet heritage more tenaciously than other regions (Sasse, 2007). It is worth noting, though, that the p-value for the difference between mean scores of Russian and Non-Russified Ukrainian ratings of the factor “Their Soviet Past” is not significant by only a very small margin at .056.

Looking at the factors related to national identity (“Their Nationality,” “Their Native Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs”), we find no significant differences between ratings from Russians and those from non-Russified Ukrainians. Compared to Russified Ukrainians, however, we see that Russians rated these factors significantly higher in every case. These results reflects the idea that identity for Russified Ukrainians combines elements of their “Ukrainian-
ness” and their “Russian-ness,” which, these results suggest, has made the concepts of nation, native language, and religion more ambiguous in terms of personal identity when compared to ethnic Russians and non-Russified Ukrainians in Crimea. As for Crimean Tatars, they rate “Their Nationality” and “Their Religious Beliefs” as significantly more important than do Russians, though we see no significant difference when it comes to “Their Native Language.” As a regional minority group that has struggled against discrimination and political obstacles to reclaim its place in Crimea, these elements of national identity have proved vital to the Crimean Tatars’ resilience.

However, concerning native language, all three of Crimea’s predominant national groups may view theirs as a minority language in one way or another. For Russians, theirs is a minority (i.e., unofficial) language at the state scale, and many feel that the Russian language is often threatened by Ukrainian laws regarding language education and official usage (Sasse, 2007). For non-Russified (Ukrainian-speaking) Ukrainians, theirs is a minority language at the regional scale (i.e., Crimea) since Russian is by far the most predominate language used in Crimea. And for Crimean Tatars, theirs is a minority language both regionally and state-wide. Hence, members of each group may feel that their language is threatened within a certain spatial and/or cultural context, and thus each equally consider it an extremely important aspect of their identities. Additionally, it is important to remember that the mean score for “Their Native Language” is the single highest among all factors for every national group.

Together, these results further suggest that how members of different national groups view Crimea is closely related to the meaning of Crimea from their own national perspective. Because territory is an integral component of what defines a nation (Gottman, 1973), territory becomes an integral component of national identity. Crimean Tatars consider Crimea alone to be
their national territory and thus an inseparable component of their national identity as these
survey results have shown. Because Crimea now lies within the boundaries of Ukrainian national
territory, for ethnic Ukrainians to identify strongly with the Ukrainian state does not preclude
identifying strongly with Crimea as well. Because Crimea and Ukraine lie within an ordered
territorial hierarchy, identity for ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea – especially those who are non-
Russified – may conveniently follow the model of a “hierarchy of geographically based
identities” (Kaplan, 1999). In other words, for ethnic Ukrainians living in Crimea and living
within their larger nation-state are simultaneous and not mutually exclusive processes, and so
having a strong regional identity does not necessarily contradict a strong national identity.

Russians, on the other hand, must relate to Crimea in much different terms. While Crimea
does hold great significance for the Russian nation at large and thus may foster an attachment to
the region based on national sentiment, Russians must contend with the fact that, since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, to live in Crimea is to live outside of their national territory in
political terms. Although Russians may view Crimea as part of their national territory it is only
in a cultural and linguistic sense today, as Crimea no longer lies nested within a territorial
hierarchy bound politically within a Russian or Russian-dominated nation-state. Within its
current (Ukrainian) territorial hierarchy, Crimea remains the primary territory that Russians may
consider a vestige of their own national territory, i.e., the best territorial expression of “Russian-
ness” within Ukraine or any larger scale. For these Russians, Crimea is the only territory within a
politically-organized territorial hierarchy where their national culture and language may be
considered dominant and where Russian heritage is most deeply ingrained and palpable.
Therefore, in lieu of inclusion in their nation’s broader national territory (i.e., the Russian
Federation), Crimea is the closest thing they have to a space within which their nationality can find territorial expression.

While Russians and other groups do relate to Crimea in other non-national terms, the results of this section of the survey indicate that nationality accounts for important differences in perceptions of Crimea. Regional identity is clearly strong for all national groups, but for different reasons related to Crimea’s meaning to different national groups. However, these results do not give us a complete sense of the roles that nationality and territory play across various scales. At which territorial scales do members of each of these groups most identify with their co-nationals? At which scales is nationality less important for group identity than simply a recognition of shared territory? These questions are explored in the following chapter.
Chapter IX - Nationality and Scale in Group Identities

In previous chapters I established the significance of nationality and territory in identity formation among Crimea’s various national groups. As I demonstrated, factors related to nationality appear to be the most salient aspects of identity among members of each national group, and a strong regional identity is thus derived in different ways according to different national perspectives and narratives of Crimea. However, these observations do not fully address the dynamics between nationality and territory at play in identity formation in Crimea. Because of its geopolitical history and ethnic diversity, Crimea is situated within a number of different territorial structures, each with contested meanings for members of its various national groups. Furthermore, there are spatial scales below the regional that also appear important according to survey results. Because nationality is such an important aspect of identity, then at which spatial scales do various groups in Crimea believe that their nationality is most clearly expressed and embodied? Moreover, are there any spatial scales at which a sense of community and/or shared space – and not nationality – constitute the most salient aspect of group identity? In other words, does national identity begin to break down at any particular spatial scale? These questions help us arrive at an understanding of how nationality and territory may be either convergent or divergent as key elements of individual and group identity within the former Soviet Union and beyond.

This section of the survey was designed to compare and contrast the salience of national and territorial identity across the hierarchy of spatial scales within which residents of Crimea live. Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 how strongly they identify with the groups “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All Nationalities” at each of the following spatial scales: Their Town, Crimea, Ukraine, Europe, the Former USSR, and
Worldwide. A rating of “1” indicates that the participant “does not identify with this group of people to any degree,” while a rating of “5” indicates that they “completely identify with this group of people.” As with the previous section of the survey, mean scores were calculated from the responses for each ethnic group and a one-way ANOVA test was applied in order to determine whether there are statistically significant differences within and between the responses of each group.

I expected participants from all groups to rate that they identify more strongly with members of their own nationality than with members of all nationalities at every scale. I also expected ratings of either group to be highest at the regional scale (i.e., in Crimea), followed by the local scale (i.e., their town), and to taper off as the spatial scales grew larger. These expectations are based on the assumption that all groups exhibit both strong regional and national identity. The purpose of this section of the survey, however, is to examine how both national and territorial identity become stronger or weaker across spatial scales. How strongly one identifies with members of their own nationality is an indication of national identity at a given scale, while the strength of their identity with members of all nationalities is an indication of territorial identity at a given scale, as territory, not nationality, is the common factor for all those within this category. If, for example, survey participants were to rate their identity with members of all nationalities higher than with members of their own nationality at a given scale, we could surmise that territorial identity is more salient at this scale than national identity. This approach gives us a more nuanced understanding of how Russians and other national groups perceive Crimea and its role in identity dynamics.
Results for Russians

As I expected, Russians rated their identification with members of their own nationality higher than with members of all nationalities at every spatial scale. Furthermore, the difference in mean scores between “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All Nationalities” is statistically significant at every scale, with p-values of .000 in every case except for “Worldwide,” which returned a p-value of .041. Among the ratings for “Members of All Nationalities” at each scale only the “Former Soviet Union” and “Worldwide” proved significantly higher than the others; the rest were not significantly different from each other with a rating of approximately ”3,” meaning they “identify with this group in general.” These results defied my expectations regarding identity at larger scales, as “Worldwide” appears to be the single most salient scale at which Russians identify with people of all nationalities, suggesting a somewhat well-developed sense of cosmopolitanism among Russians in Crimea.

Examining the responses for “Members of Their Nationality” at each scale reveals a much different picture. “Their Town” is the single highest rated scale, though its mean score of 4.02 barely surpasses “Crimea’s” mean score of 4.01. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the mean scores of “Their Town,” “Crimea,” “Ukraine,” or the “Former USSR.” “Worldwide” (mean = 3.58) and “Europe” (mean = 3.46) proved to be the lowest rated factors, each with a p-value of .000 compared to “Their Town” and “Crimea,” however “Worldwide” was not significantly different from “Ukraine.”
Figure 21: Mean scores provided by Russians when rating their identification with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales.

Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale.

These results suggest that among Russians in Crimea, national identity remains relatively constant across scales both below and above the regional scale despite my expectations that they would be strongest within Crimea and “Their Town.” Considering the four scales at which Russians identify most strongly with other Russians – their town, Crimea, Ukraine, and the former Soviet Union – we may observe that the common thread among them is that they all have sizeable Russian populations. We may assume given the overall ethnic makeup of Crimea that most towns in which survey participants live have a majority Russian population. Crimea is of course dominated by Russians, and both Ukraine and the region of the former Soviet Union include large Russian populations throughout. Even though I determined in the previous chapter
that Russians do not identify particularly strongly with Ukraine or their “Soviet past,” national identity remains strong within these territorial structures for Russians in Crimea. Europe, on the other hand, appears to be a space in which Russian national identity is too abstract of a concept, since the previous section demonstrates that Russians in Crimea do not display a strong European identity in the first place. The fact that Russians do not identify strongly with all Russians worldwide may suggest a sense of disassociation with Russian diaspora communities outside of the former Soviet Union.

Table 25: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Russians when rating their identification with groups of people at various spatial scales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Their Town</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
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<td>.204</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
<td>.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td></td>
<td>.833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Nationalities</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their Town</td>
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<td>.999</td>
<td>.886</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>.996</td>
</tr>
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<td>.805</td>
<td>.805</td>
<td></td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.979</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td></td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
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<td>.905</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td></td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>.558</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td></td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
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<td>.395</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.001</td>
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<td>.929</td>
</tr>
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- **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

If we consider the results from this section of the survey and the previous one, then an image begins to emerge about the nature of a “Crimean-Russian” sense of identity. While
regional and national identity both appear to be important components of identity among Russians in Crimea, there does not appear to be a strong sense of a Russian community at the regional scale, as their identification with Russians in Crimea is not significantly stronger than with Russians in their town, in Ukraine, or in the former Soviet Union. In other words, the space within which they most identify with other Russians transcends the territory with which they most strongly identify. Furthermore, Crimean regional identity among Russians does not appear to mean a stronger identification with people of all nationalities living in Crimea than at any other spatial scale. In this sense, they do not appear to feel that they are a member of a multinational community in Crimea any more so than they are of such a community within their town, Ukraine, Europe, the former Soviet Union, or the entire world.

These observations present a complicated relationship between national and regional identity for Russians living in Crimea. Although nationality is clearly a crucial element of their identity, living in and identifying strongly with Crimea appears on the one hand to be decoupled from their national identity, while being closely correlated to it in many ways on the other. How, then, are these two correlated aspects of identity reconciled into something that we might call a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity? I argue that Russians’ regional/Crimean identity is primarily a derivation of their national identity, in that they view it and relate to it from a uniquely Russian perspective. More so than other national groups in Crimea, Russians have internalized Crimea’s meaning and significance within a broader Russian context, and their strong identification with the region can be interpreted as a sense of pride in the fact that they are from a place of great importance to the Russian nation in its broadest sense. In other words, the term “Crimean-Russian” identity should not be understood as an articulated sense of community among Russians specifically at this regional scale, but rather as an expression of their attachment
to Crimea derived from the internalization of its particular meaning and significance for their broader national identity.

Results for Ukrainians

The dynamic between nationality and territory in identity formation among Russified Ukrainians appears to be very different from that of ethnic Russians in Crimea. In particular, mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” are not significantly higher than mean scores for “Members of All Nationality” at every scale as they are among Russians. We see a statistically significant difference between mean scores only at the following scales: town \( (p = .004) \); Crimea \( (p = .012) \); and Ukraine \( (p = .003) \). At the scales of Europe \( (p = .478) \), the Former Soviet Union \( (p = .211) \), and worldwide \( (p = 1.000) \), we see no significant difference between the salience of Russified Ukrainians’ identification with other Ukrainians and with members of all nationalities within a given territory. In fact, among responses from Russified Ukrainians we find the only instance in the entire study where the mean score for “Members of All Nationalities” is higher than the mean score for “Members of Their Nationality” at a given scale (worldwide), although with a difference of .04 and a p-value of 1.000, this difference is hardly significant. This could reflect both a sense of cosmopolitanism and the diluted sense of Ukrainian national identity among Russified Ukrainians that I identified in the previous chapter.

Between mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” we find statistically significant differences only between “Their Town” and “Europe” \( (p = .013) \) and “Ukraine” and “Europe” \( (p = .036) \). Furthermore, p-values between the three highest-rated scales for “Members of Their Nationality” (Town, Crimea, Ukraine) all proved to be 1.000 and are therefore rather conclusively not significant. Between mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities,” we see a
statistically significant difference only between the scales of “Europe” and “worldwide” ($p = .010$). In other words, while “worldwide” ranks highest among all these scales – again indicating a somewhat developed sense of cosmopolitanism – it is not significantly higher than the sense of identification with all people at the scale of the town, Crimea, Ukraine, or the Former Soviet Union. Looking at these results both for “Members of Their Nationality” and “Members of All Nationalities” in a different way, we can conclude that Russified Ukrainians’ identification both with other Ukrainians and with members of all national groups is no more salient at the regional scale (i.e., in Crimea) than it is at any other scale. In other words, identifying with Crimea does not appear to mean a stronger identification with others who also live in Crimea. This observation suggests that trends of identity among Russified Ukrainians follow those of Russians in Crimea in that, in both cases, salience of territorial identity does not appear to be congruent with group identity bounded by the same territory.

This generally narrow dichotomy between identity with other Ukrainians and members of all nationalities living at each of the spatial scales in question parallels the relative weakness with which Russified Ukrainians identify with their nationality, as described in Chapter Eight. The very fact that they have been Russified – that is, that they consider Russian to be their native language rather than Ukrainian – indicates a lack of engagement with and attachment to a Ukrainian heritage. We see this disengagement reflected in the relative weakness of Russified Ukrainians’ identification with other Ukrainians at scales larger than the nation-state (Ukraine). Their Ukrainian nationality appears to be strong enough to serve as a rallying point for group identity at the local, regional, and state scales, but beyond that the notion of Ukrainian national identity begins to weaken vis-à-vis group identification defined by territory but not by nationality.
Figure 22: Mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales.

Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale.
Table 26: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with groups of people at various spatial scales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Their Town</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.482</td>
<td>.587</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.059</td>
<td>.036</td>
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<td>.986</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
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<tr>
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<table>
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<th>All Nationalities</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Their Town</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>.970</td>
<td>.835</td>
</tr>
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<td>.505</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.904</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
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<td>.998</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
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<td>.741</td>
<td>.505</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</table>

- **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
- **Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

Among non-Russified Ukrainians the picture is somewhat similar. As is the case of Russified Ukrainians, we see a significant difference between the salience of identity with other Ukrainians and with members of all nationalities only at the scales of town ($p = .000$), Crimea ($p = .000$), and Ukraine ($p = .000$). Although “Members of Their Nationality” did rate higher than “Members of All Nationalities” at all scales, the difference is not significant at the scales of Europe ($p = .356$), the former Soviet Union ($p = .479$), and worldwide ($p = .497$). Between responses for “Members of Their Nationality” at each scale we see that the lowest-rated scale (Europe) is significantly lower than the three highest scales of town ($p = .006$), Crimea ($p = .028$), and Ukraine ($p = .002$). The second lowest-rated scale (worldwide) is only significantly
lower than the highest-rated (Ukraine, \( p = .044 \)). With these exceptions we see no significant differences between mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at any scale. Additionally, we see no significant differences whatsoever between any mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at any scale.

**Figure 23:** Mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales.

![Graph showing mean scores for different scales](image)

Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale.

Focusing on responses to the scale of Crimea we may ascertain that non-Russified Ukrainians do conceive of and identify with a Ukrainian community of Crimea more so than they do of such a community at the scales of Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the entire world, but no more or less than they do at the scales of their town and Ukraine. Moreover, non-Russified Ukrainians do not appear to have developed a sense of non-national, territorially-
defined group identification with all residents of Crimea any more or less than they have at any other scale.

Table 27: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by non-Russified Ukrainians when rating their identification with groups of people at various spatial scales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<td>Former USSR</td>
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<td>.988</td>
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<th>All Nationalities</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>.997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.997</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.

**Italic text** and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.

**Strikethrough text** indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

In general, we may gather from these survey results that for Ukrainians, whether or not they have been Russified, nationality is an important basis for group identification only at those scales that may be considered part of Ukrainian national territory. In other words, only at the scales of their town, Crimea, and Ukraine do Ukrainians identify significantly more strongly with their fellow Ukrainians than they do with all people who inhabit the same territory regardless of nationality. The salience of national identity at these scales does appear to be stronger among non-Russified Ukrainians than Russified Ukrainians, however both groups do
identify significantly more strongly with other Ukrainians than members of all nationalities living at these scales. At larger scales where Ukrainian national territory constitutes only a small portion of the total territory (Europe, former Soviet Union, and the world), Ukrainian nationality does not appear to be any more potent of a basis for group identification than simply a sense of mutually-inhabited territory.

These findings lend further credence to my argument that Crimean residents’ attitudes towards the region are shaped by the prevailing national narratives to which they ascribe. As Ukrainian national narratives about Crimea emphasize the region’s role in Ukrainian nation- and state-building processes, Ukrainians in Crimea tend to view it as only a portion of the space in which their national culture and community may prosper and flourish, i.e., their national territory (the state of Ukraine). This view of Crimea would explain why, among both Russified and non-Russified Ukrainians, the strength of identification with other Ukrainians is significantly higher than the strength of identification with members of all national groups at those scales at and below the nation-state (town, Crimea, and Ukraine), but not at larger scales beyond the boundaries of Ukrainian national territory. Although Russification has diluted national identity among some Ukrainians in Crimea, it does not appear to impair the primary sense of national identity bound by Ukrainian national space. While Ukrainians generally do tend to identify strongly with Crimea as their home region, they appear to relate to it as merely a piece of the larger territory that is the spatial expression of their national identity, i.e., the state of Ukraine.

**Results for Crimean Tatars**

Much like survey results from Russians, we see that Crimean Tatars identify significantly more strongly with members of their own nationality than with members of all national groups at
every scale with a p-value of .000 in each case. Comparing only the ratings for “Members of Their Nationality,” we see that “Crimea” is the single highest rated scale but find no significant differences between mean scores for any of the scales “Their Town,” “Crimea,” and “Ukraine.” We also find no significant differences between any of the scales “Europe,” “Former Soviet Union,” and “Worldwide.” However, mean scores for both “Their Town” and “Crimea” are significantly higher than those for “Europe,” “Former Soviet Union,” and “Worldwide” with a p-value of .001 or lower in each case, while the mean score for “Ukraine” is only significantly higher than that of “Europe” ($p = .020$). Examining ratings for “Members of All Nationalities,” significant differences emerge only when we compare the mean score for “Europe” against the mean scores of “Their Town” ($p = .010$) and “Crimea” ($p = .021$), where “Europe” rates significantly lower.

These results are reflective of the national solidarity felt among Crimean Tatars that has been galvanized by their struggle for recognition, rights, and territory. This solidarity is most clearly expressed in the starkly significant divide between the salience of Crimean Tatars’ identification with other Crimean Tatars and with members of all nationalities at all spatial scales. Moreover, the Crimean Tatars’ attachment to Crimea and their contention that Crimea alone constitutes their homeland and national territory are also apparent within these survey results. Identification with other Crimean Tatars in Crimea is indeed the single highest-rated nationally- and spatially-defined group among Crimean Tatar survey participants, which reflects the inextricable relationship between Crimean Tatar national identity and the territory of Crimea itself.
Figure 24: Mean scores provided by Crimean Tatars when rating their identification with members of their own nationality and members of all nationalities at various spatial scales.

Black bars represent mean scores for “Members of Their Nationality” at each given scale, and grey bars represent mean scores for “Members of All Nationalities” at each given scale.

However, the mean score for identification with other Crimean Tatars in Crimea is not significantly higher than those for identification with other Crimea Tatars within survey participants’ towns, or within Ukraine. I argue that this is due to the fact that these three scales represent those where Crimean Tatars make up a significant minority of the population, where they may gain effective political and social influence, and hence where they may hope to affect real change in line with their national goals and agenda. Of the three national groups that are the focus of this study (Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars), Crimean Tatars are the only group that is a minority at every spatial scale examined, and thus the struggle for minority rights has become a central component of their national movement and of their national narratives. Because Crimean Tatars have a voice in local, regional, and state political and social institutions,
these have become the most important spatial scales at which Crimean Tatars express their
national solidarity (see Chapter Three).

**Table 28: P-values produced from a one-way ANOVA test performed between mean scores provided by Crimean Tatars when rating their identification with groups of people at various spatial scales.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Their Nationality</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>.637</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td></td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td></td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Nationalities</th>
<th>Their Town</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Former USSR</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.964</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>.908</td>
<td>.964</td>
<td></td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td></td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>.940</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.706</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• **Bold text** and solid-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly higher than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
• *Italic text* and dotted-line boxes indicate that the factor in the row is significantly lower than the factor in the column at the given p-value.
• *Strikethrough text* indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the factor in the row and the factor in the column, with the given p-value.

We therefore see that the strength of Crimean Tatar national identity does in fact transcend the territorial bounds of Crimea, despite their tenacious attachment to this territory as demonstrated in previous chapters. I contend that these findings further suggest that, among all national groups in Crimea, territorial identities are informed and shaped by the prevailing national narratives about a given territory to which a group or individual ascribes. Crimean Tatars may identify significantly more strongly with Crimea than with any other territory, but where national solidarity and the pursuit of national goals are concerned they do not appear to
identify significantly more strongly with the Crimean Tatar community of Crimea than with that of any other territorial scale where their voices have a chance of being heard.

**Summary**

Among all groups examined in this study we see some clear similarities in the ways nationality and territory shape group identification. Broadly speaking, nationality is a greater unifying factor than a sense of mutually-inhabited territory in the formation of group identification, as all groups identify significantly more strongly with members of their own nationality than with members of other nationalities in the majority of cases and scales. We also see very few cases within each group of statistically significant differences between identification with members of all nationalities at various spatial scales. In other words, senses of non-nationality-based, spatially-defined communities are typically no stronger at any one scale than another among members of each national group examined, with some exceptions.

Where we see the most variability in group identification across spatial scales, then, is within the responses to the category of “Members of Their Nationality.” In general, a sense of one’s national community appears to be least salient at supra-state scales – in particular within Europe, and to a lesser extent within the former Soviet Union and worldwide depending on the national group. Interestingly, within responses from all groups we find no significant differences between the strength of identity with members of one’s own national group at any state or sub-state scale. In other words, the strength of survey participants’ senses of national community is statistically consistent within their town, Crimea, and Ukraine, regardless of their nationality.

I argue that these findings dispel any notion of there being a particularly salient sense of various national communities within Crimea specifically. Russians, for example, do not appear
to feel that they are a part of a community of ethnic Russians in Crimea any more strongly than they feel they are a part of a community of ethnic Russians in their own town, in Ukraine, or within the former Soviet Union. The same is true for Crimea’s Ukrainians (both Russified and non-Russified) and Crimean Tatars, at least in regard to their towns and Ukraine. We know from previous chapters, though, that Crimean identity (i.e., the importance of living in Crimea to one’s identity) is particularly strong among all national groups. We may therefore surmise that national and territorial identity constitute separate but related processes, where national identity is not simultaneously “contained” spatially by an expressed sense of territorial identity at a given scale.

I maintain that the relationship between national and territorial identification processes lies in the fact that national perspective shapes the ways in which groups and individuals perceive and relate to a given territory.

Returning to the central focus of this study, the results of this chapter lend further support to my argument that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity does not denote an articulated sense of community among ethnic Russians in Crimea to the exclusion of such national communities existing at other territorial scales. Rather, as I have argued, “Crimean-Russian” identity must be understood as an attachment to and identification with Crimea that is shaped by the internalization of Russian national narratives about Crimea’s role in Russian history and culture, and its significance in the Russian national psyche. While Crimean identity does not appear to inspire any particular sense of Russian national community that is regionally confined, Russian national identity certainly inspires a particular kind of attachment to and identification with Crimea itself.
Chapter X - Conclusions

By examining these survey results, I have illuminated the attitudes and perceptions of Crimea’s three primary national groups regarding their own senses of national and regional identity and how the two are interrelated. Chapter Six demonstrates through an analysis of a cognitive mapping exercise that Russian, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars alike tend to view Crimea as their “homeland,” although to varying degrees. The Crimean cities that residents deem to be the most important also appears to vary depending on nationality, as Russians are more likely than Ukrainians or Crimean Tatars to include on their cognitive maps the cities of Sevastopol and Yalta, which, as I have demonstrated, hold special meaning in Russian and Soviet national narratives.

Chapter Seven reveals that while all national groups relate strongly to Crimea’s physical and natural characteristics, Russians are more likely than others to emphasize the region’s role in past wars and its status as a tourist center among Crimea’s primary distinguishing characteristic, reflecting the role that Crimea has played in broader Russian national narratives. Also revealed in Chapter Seven is the fact that members of all national groups support and uphold Crimea’s autonomous status as the recognition and institutionalization of its unique characteristics. Most importantly, while Russians in Crimea would generally prefer that Crimea be a part of Russia and not of Ukraine, they favor autonomy for Crimea regardless to which state it belongs. Furthermore, more Russians would prefer that Crimea remain an autonomous republic of Ukraine than would prefer that it join the Russian Federation as an oblast (non-autonomous territory). This trend indicates that many Russians in Crimea view the retention of autonomy as a more important political objective than reunification with Russia, which suggests that nationalist
or revanchist sentiments among the Russian population of Crimea may be less potent than is often assumed.

Chapter Eight demonstrates that factors relating to national identity (i.e., “Their Nationality,” “Their Native Language,” and “Their Religious Beliefs”) are among the most salient factors of identity in general among all national groups in Crimea. Among the spatial components of identity, non-Russified Ukrainians identify most strongly with the Ukrainian state while Russians, Crimean Tatars, and Russified-Ukrainians identify most strongly with Crimea, although identity with one’s town or village is nearly as strong among all groups except Crimean Tatars. Overall, this chapter demonstrates the primacy of nationality among different factors of identity among all of Crimea’s national groups. This pattern lends credence to the notion that regional identity is derived from and expressed through terms of national identity.

Finally, Chapter Nine reveals that members of each national group identify more strongly with other members of their own nationality than with members of all nationalities at every scale in nearly every case. This trend suggests that national group identity is stronger than neighborly relations or other forms of group identity. Moreover, among all national groups there are no statistically significant differences between the strength of identity with other members of one’s nationality living at any scales at or below the nation state. This means that there is no greater sense of a community of Russians, Ukrainians, or Crimean Tatars specifically within Crimea than there is within one’s town or within Ukraine as a whole. In regards to Russians, this trend shows that a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity does not mean a stronger sense of identity with other Russians in Crimea than at other geographic scales. Rather, a sense of national identity transcends the boundaries of the region in its territorial expression further supporting the notion that Crimean regional identity is derived from a broader sense of national identity.
By presenting these survey results, I have demonstrated how we must understand the concept of a “Crimean-Russian” sense of identity as one informed by Russian national narratives about Crimea. While nation and region are both clearly important components of identity for Russians in Crimea, the fact that Crimea is no longer a part of Russian national territory creates a discontinuity between these two components. The dynamic between nation and region in identity formation among Crimean Russians therefore requires qualification and explanation. Based on the results of this survey, I present the term “Crimean-Russian” identity not to mean the coexistence of separate and discrete territorial and national elements of identity, nor a heightened sense of identity among Russians who live at the Crimean regional scale specifically. Instead, I argue that “Crimean-Russian” identity denotes a special attachment to Crimea expressed by its Russians residents that is derived from and shaped by broader Russian narratives about Crimea and its place in the Russian national psyche as a symbol of Russian and Soviet imperial glory, deep cultural roots, national sacrifice, military prowess, and an idealized past. Crimean Russians’ attitudes towards and opinions about Crimea are viewed through a Russian national lens, and their strong regional identity emerges primarily from the sense of pride associated with the privilege of living in a region of special significance to the Russian nation.

Neither Crimean Tatars nor Ukrainians experience the same discontinuity that Russians do when reconciling territory and region in their senses of identity. Crimean Tatars consider Crimea alone to be their national territory. Thus, for Crimean Tatars, living in Crimea is an indistinguishable and inseparable component of their national identity. While many Ukrainians in Crimea express a strong sense of regional identity as well, the fact that they simultaneously live within Crimea and within their own national territory presents no internal conflict to their territorial-national identity dynamics. Russians, on the other hand, face a complex dynamic
between nation and territory in Crimea as the two have not been congruous since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, a sense of “Crimean-Russian” identity has emerged that allows Russians to cherish and celebrate their regional homeland in a distinctly Russian way in lieu of their broader national homeland, from which they have been politically severed. Because Crimea has been viewed as a potential “flashpoint” of interethnic and interstate violence (Kuzio, 2010), it is therefore imperative to consider more critically the ways in which each of its primary national groups relate to Crimea and other territorial structures. As this study demonstrates, the relationship between national and regional identity among residents of Crimea is nuanced and complex, and thus before we make any alarmist characterizations about the region as one ripe for conflict we must thoroughly consider the attitudes and opinions of those who live there.

It is important to examine the ways in which identities are constructed through a multiplicity of factors and relationships and not merely a set of mutually exclusive components. While it is certainly important to also consider factors such as gender, sexuality, class, occupation, and education in the construction of identities, nationality and territory are two particularly salient concepts around which group identities coalesce. Because territory is a basic component of national identity and of nationalism, it is important to examine the nuanced relationship between nationality and territory and how they are intimately entwined. In order to move beyond the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) and its masking of important multiscalar issues it is also crucial to consider the relationships between territory and identity at geographic scales other than the nation-state. Indeed, as this study has demonstrated, nationality plays a decisive role in the formation of regional identity at scales below the nation-state.

As this project is only a case study, the question remains of how a more thorough consideration of the dynamics between nationality and territory may help us better understand
regional identity in other regions around the world and particularly in the former Soviet Union. How does national identity inform a sense of regional identity (or vice-versa) in regions with different demographics and historical contexts? How might the interplay between national and regional identities create centripetal or centrifugal forces at regional, state, or suprastate scales? How are perceptions of regional distinctiveness informed through different senses of national identity in different regions? What role does autonomy play in institutionalizing perceptions of regional distinctiveness, and how do different national groups understand autonomy? All of these questions merit further study, and the theoretical and methodological framework presented in this work can provide a useful guideline for approaching these issues and interpreting their meaning.
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Appendix

Questionnaire used in survey

Your nationality: ___________________________
Your age: ___________________________
Your gender: ___________________________
Your place of birth: ___________________________
The town or region in which you live: ___________________________
How long you’ve lived there: ___________________________
Your native language: ___________________________
Your father’s nationality: ___________________________
Your father’s native language: ___________________________
Your mother’s nationality: ___________________________
Your mother’s native language: ___________________________
Your religious affiliation: ___________________________

Rate the following factors according to their importance to your personal identity (1 = completely unimportant, 2 = a little important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important, 5 = very important):

Living in your town or region………………………1 2 3 4 5
Living in Crimea……………………………………1 2 3 4 5
Living in Ukraine………………………………1 2 3 4 5
Citizenship in the Soviet Union……………………1 2 3 4 5
Your nationality………………………………………1 2 3 4 5
Your native language………………………………1 2 3 4 5
Your religious affiliation…………………………….1 2 3 4 5
Other (please write: __________________________)....1 2 3 4 5

To what extent do you include the following groups as members of "your people?" (1 = not included, 2 = generally not included, 3 = somewhat included, 4 = generally included, 5 = completely included)

People of your nationality living in your town or region………………1 2 3 4 5
People of a different nationality living in your town or region…………1 2 3 4 5
People of your nationality living in Crimea…………………………1 2 3 4 5
People of a different nationality living in Crimea……………………1 2 3 4 5
People of your nationality living in Ukraine…………………………1 2 3 4 5
People of a different nationality living in Ukraine……………………1 2 3 4 5
People of your nationality living in the countries of the former USSR……………………1 2 3 4 5
People of a different nationality living anywhere in the former USSR……………………1 2 3 4 5
People of your nationality living anywhere in the world……………….1 2 3 4 5
People of a different nationality living anywhere in the world…………….1 2 3 4 5

Below, Please write 3-5 words that characterize Crimea to you:

In your opinion, what should be the political status of Crimea? Please choose one of the following:

_ Crimea should remain an autonomous republic of Ukraine
_ Crimea should become an oblast of Ukraine
_ Crimea should join the Russian Federation as an autonomous republic
_ Crimea should join the Russian Federation as an oblast
_ Crimea should become an independent country
Do you consider Crimea to be a unique region because of any of the following factors? Place an “x” next to all that apply, and indicate what you consider to be the single most important reason by circling that question.

- Its autonomous status
- Its physical landscape and/or climate
- Its shape / physical boundaries
- The majority of its population is Russian
- It is home to Ukrainians
- It is home to Crimean Tatars
- It is home to other ethnic minorities
- Its ethnically diverse population
- It is the locations of Russian military facilities
- It is the location of Ukrainian military facilities
- Its status as a vacation destination
- Its role in past military conflicts (i.e., Crimean War, Russian Civil War, WWII, etc.)
- Its pre-Tsarist history of independence (i.e., Crimean khanate)
- It was home to various ancient civilizations (i.e., Scythians, Khazars, etc.)
- It is the location of many important archeological sites
- It is the subject of famous poems, songs, films, artwork, etc.
- Other (please write: ______________________________________________________)

In the space below, please draw your homeland and mark the three places that you consider the most important: