A World Ripe for the Gods: 
Regime Theory and Religion in International Relations

by

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Abstract

This thesis adds to the burgeoning literature on the role of religion in International Relations (IR), and adds theoretical depth to the emerging subfield of International Political Theology (IPT), by examining the subject through the prism of regime theory, which is necessarily augmented by Vendulka Kubálková’s linguistic model of constructivism. Since religion does not appear to be a rule-governed issue area in IR, religions are treated as regimes, or, as Stephen Krasner defines them, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Founded primarily on the work of George Modelski, this interdisciplinary study elucidates the nature of transnational religious regimes, which have been functioning since at least the reign of the Roman emperor, Constantine the Great (r. 306-337). By utilizing regime theory, and by tackling the case of the Vietnam War, this thesis also demonstrates that the modern transnational religious regime did not come to an end with the election of John F. Kennedy as the first Roman Catholic President of the United States. It also demonstrates that the view of the Iranian Revolution as the chief example of the global resurgence of religion is flawed, obscured by the early prominence of the modernization theory and secularization thesis in the Social Sciences. Ironically, modernization theory, it is seen, was an instrument of the existing Protestant-based religious regime, illustrating, like the case of the Roman Empire, that religion’s importance is nothing new: religion has always been important in world affairs.
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to

Ralph Edward Parker II

Friday, September 13, 1985 – Sunday, September 19, 2010
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This thesis represents the culmination of years of research that no doubt began during my high school career. It was at Archbishop O’Hara High School, with my courses in government, history, and theology, that I first became fascinated by the interrelated study of religion, politics, and history. As such, I am grateful to each of the teachers that influenced my earliest thoughts on the matter. I would like to thank especially though, Jessica Brookman, and other former teachers, like Shirley Cotter, who first instilled within me a passion for writing.

I am also grateful to a host of thinkers like Madeleine Albright, Daniel Philpott, and others too numerous to name for providing me with my first in depth introductions to the subject of religion in International Relations (IR), as well as other scholars who have no doubt left their marks on my thought process. This thesis, as evidenced by my bibliography, could not have been written without many of their insights, and I am proud to carry on the intellectual torch. Most of all, I am heavily indebted to George Modelski whose insights about culture and long cycles are foundational in this thesis. That said, I am also grateful to Professor Modelski and a number of other scholars who have contributed, or will be contributing, to the special series (for which I am the editor) commemorating regime theory’s thirtieth anniversary at e-International Relations. Some of their influences are no doubt present herein.

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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>Tuesday, 11 September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFV</td>
<td>American Friends of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Communist Central Committee (People’s Republic of China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (United States of America)</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOR</td>
<td>Economics of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HST</td>
<td>Hegemonic Stability Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRD</td>
<td>International Center for Religion and Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<td>IPT</td>
<td>International Political Theology</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>International Relations Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWT</td>
<td>Just War Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Library of Congress (United States of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI-6</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service/Military Intelligence, Section 6 (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>New Religious Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (United States of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCB</td>
<td>Operations Coordinating Board (United States of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Secretary of State (United States of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIN</td>
<td>Transnational Ideological Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRA</td>
<td>Transnational Religious Actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFO</td>
<td>Unidentified Flying Object</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

*Mundus est ingens deorum omnium templum:*
the world is the mighty temple of the gods
~Seneca the Younger (Quoted in Stone, 2005: 64),
*Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, c. 62-65 AD

Globalization has made possible a worldwide resurgence of religion, but mainstream International Relations Theories (IRTs), which have historically marginalized the place of the gods in global affairs, have only recently started coming to terms with the important place of faith in human life and identity. As a matter of fact, the subject remains largely understudied, especially outside the bounds of mainstream IRT. Though some scholars of International Relations (IR) tend to focus myopically on the Islamic World, history is actually replete with examples of religion’s pervasive role in politics, society, culture, and economics. Even Western history shows that religion and politics have been engaged in an intimate dance for centuries: the modern predilection for dividing religion from state is truly the strange occurrence in the grand scheme of historical reality. It is important to recognize this, because moving away from mainstream paradigms allows room for the application of ancillary IRTs to religion, which will ultimately expand the field’s understanding of the place of faith in foreign affairs.

One such theory is regime theory. Regime theory might not seem like an especially relevant paradigm, for religion in international relations, as Jack Snyder (2012) cautions, is hardly a “rule-governed issue area, and what rules do exist (e.g., aspirational norms of religious freedom) are not consensual and are not institutionalized.” In a certain sense, this is a very good point. But religion itself is normative, and institutional religion fosters rules in other issue areas of human life. In other words, in certain contexts, *religions are regimes*. For instance, early Christianity—in the Roman Empire—seems to feature the characteristics of an international regime, as defined by Stephen Krasner (1995a). If regime theory can be used to understand the
role of religion in IR, then there are a number of insights that might be gleaned. In the case of the Roman Empire though, first consider that Christian values and expressions of morality are characteristic of international norms. Second, Biblical commandments, and obligatory expressions of faith, through festivals such as Easter, are not entirely inconsistent with regime theory’s emphasis on rules. Third, the use of councils as a procedure for reaching decisions also corresponds to the definition of a regime. Finally, the fact that regime Christianity was made manifest, and structurally reinforced by the institutional Church also seems a reliable corollary. Therefore, in the research that follows is an argument that religion’s intellectual marginalization in IR—indeed, in the Social Sciences more broadly—was unfortunate, not because it is a potent political force in the world today, but because it always has been. To begin, this research uses the concept of culture in George Modelsiki’s theory of long cycles as its point of departure, then applies the concept of regime analysis to three distinct cases where religion has inserted itself into the international system: the first, as Chapter 1 points out, represents the beginning of the modern transnational religious regime, which has its origins under Dutch hegemony in the 17th century.

**Culture in George Modelsiki’s Theory of Long Cycles**

Writing about the politico-economic long cycles of world leadership in his seminal book on hegemonic stability theory (HST),¹ *Long Cycles in World Politics*, George Modelski (1987),² in what might be his most overlooked insight, inadvertently posits the existence of a transnational religious regime. This discovery is remarkable for at least two interrelated but

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¹ Having fallen largely out of favor in the 1990s, HST has been recast for contemporary audiences under the moniker of Systemic Leadership Theory (see, for example, Reuveny and Thompson, 2004; Toronto and Cox, 2011).
² Modelski would take issue with the idea that his theory of long cycles is an analysis of *hegemony* per se, for he asserts that “hegemony” represents a deviation from “normal” leadership, in part because of its emotional association with “domination.” Thus, he prefers the word “leadership” to “hegemony,” seeing the former as a “normal and necessary function of politics,” and the latter as “the practice of acting in an overbearing fashion or acquiring domains in an imperial manner” (Modelski, 1987: 17-18; Modelski, 2012). This is ironic, of course, because it is easy to argue that Modelski is one of the oft most cited doyens in the HST literature (Cox, c.1998: 1).
distinguishable reasons. First, IR as a discipline, especially with the emergence of the world politics approach to transnational relations in the 1970s, has been criticized for its state-centricity (for example, see Keohane and Nye, Jr., 1973; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Fox and Shmuel, 2004: 27-28; Willetts, 2011: 328-330). Of course, this state-centricity should come as no surprise, partly because Modelski was writing very near the end of the Cold War, at a time when the ideological conflict between the Communist East and Capitalist West deemphasized the role of non-state actors and non-national identities in international affairs, and partly because the predominant theory in IR is Realism, which, with its focus on state power, self-interest, and sovereignty, hinges on the marginalization of religion by the establishment of the Westphalian system of states in 1648 (Fox and Shmuel, 2004: 26-27; Thomas, 2005: 54-56). To paraphrase Hobbes (1651), this represents the point at which the state displaced God as the Leviathan to which individuals owe their security in global affairs. What is actually surprising is that in the face of this, Modelski recognizes the value of more intangible, non-state, cultural variables in IR, even though his theory of long cycles fits squarely within the HST literature.

To elaborate, HST can be perceived as a state-centric paradigm; indeed, it might be dubbed one of IR’s most state-centered theories, for it focuses almost entirely on the role of a single state in the international system: the hegemon (Smith, 1987: 254; Gilpin, 2008). For that matter, regime theory, paradoxically both the former’s stated rival and logical corollary (Sachse, 1989; Modelski, 2012), has also been criticized for its state-centeredness. For instance, the late Susan Strange (1995) challenges its utility to IR, saying that the field is “far too constrained by the self-imposed limits of the state-centered paradigm.” Regime theory, she goes on, asks only what the issues that matter to governments are, “implying that the important and significant political issues are those with which governments are concerned,” and that scholars pursuing this
line of interrogation exclusively will inevitably “[leave] in shadow all the aspects of the international economy [and the international system] where no regimes exist” (Strange, 1995: 349).

The second reason that Modelski’s observation is so astounding is that, at the time of his writing, the social sciences were still largely beholden to the secularization thesis—the idea that religion would fade in relevance and influence as a result of the process of modernization. Throughout the 1960s, social scientific theory absorbed the secularization thesis, and though the process known today as the “global resurgence of religion” apparently began in the 1970s, experts did not come to recognize the importance of the phenomenon for another twenty years. There were, however, notable exceptions. In 1980, French philosopher-economist Cornelius Castoriadis, in what may be the earliest work to reference the modern “resurgence of religion” that allegedly began in the 1970s, applied the term to an analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Two political scientists, Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (1986), echo Castoriadis, acknowledging that this resurgence has been taking place for some time, especially in the Islamic World. But Modelski does not seem familiar with either of these works—at least, not judging from his bibliography—and, most of the dialogue on the resurgence of religion did not emerge until after Long Cycles in World Politics was published (see, for instance, Casanova, 1994; Kepel, 1994; Berger, 1999; Westerlund, 2002), especially in IR, where the phenomenon was not widely recognized until after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003a; Fox and Shmuel, 2004; Thomas, 2005; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011).

Though his inspiration is unclear—perhaps it was Robert O. Keohane’s and Joseph S. Nye Jr.’s (1973) theory of transnational relations, which highlights that neither states nor their agents exist “in a vacuum,” and that geography, domestic politics, and other matters comprising
a state’s “environment” supply “inputs into the interstate system” (329-330)—it does not really matter; Modelski makes his position on state-centricity rather clear:

World politics does not exist in a vacuum, social or otherwise, and must always be seen in a broader context. The study of [IR] is part and parcel of contemporary social science and it cannot be conducted as though the world of states, or the international system existed in some splendid isolation from the world economy, from world culture, or from the physical environment. [...] For it is clearly impracticable to discuss, for example, questions of global leadership, without examining the ways in which it might be related [...] to other matters that are, in the first place, unpolitical, such as questions of education and knowledge, or those of values and community, that nevertheless need to be systematically related to the study of world politics. In particular, the functions of world politics cannot be meaningfully discussed without a clarification of the wider framework they might be serving” (Modelski, 1987: 19; Modelski’s emphasis).

By abandoning a rigid commitment to state-centricity, and recognizing the value of culture in IR, Modelski bridges the gulf between HST and regime theory on the one hand, and culture on the other, ultimately enabling the student to 1) examine the manner in which culture (or religion) can legitimate the functions of the international system, and 2) subject culture (and religion) to theoretical analysis in a way that elucidate culture’s place in the function of the system.

Cultural factors are important to Modelski because, like alliances, “linkages of solidarity” serve to bind those concerned with international problems to a single “social infrastructure.” Additionally, the international system derives its identity from these cultural links, from the competition between leading states, and from the regulatory mechanisms (international regimes) that govern the system. Invoking the world systems approach, he adds that trade, immigration, military operations, and the wide spectrum of global political arrangements “are the substance of world processes and the social institutions that organise them are the grids that hold the whole together” (Modelski, 1987: 9, 12, 20; emphasis added). From this, Modelski infers that identity
names and frames the entire international system (28). But, what constitutes identity? Modelski does not answer this explicitly, but in the case of the international system, at least one answer lies at the intersection of religious belief and international regime formation.

**The Origins of the Transnational Religious Regime**

Modelski avers that the Industrial Revolution altered the dominant character of the international system by imposing economic values and activities on the system. Based on this, he has an epiphany that “similar functional concerns may be assigned in a tentative way to other (preceeding and following) eras.” Said differently, he muses, other ages, like the Renaissance, the Age of Discoveries, and the Reformation, could have been responsible for “laying the socio-cultural foundations of the global system” (Modelski, 1987: 130). He goes on—foreshadowing Daniel Philpott (2000; 2001), who argues that sovereignty was an outgrowth of the Reformation crisis—to show that the Renaissance first differentiated religion from lay society, and that the Reformation, which flowed from this, resolved the problem of organizing societal community around religion at the global level. Moreover, maintains Modelski, the consolidation of Protestantism engendered a common international identity through the establishment of a post-1648 transnational religious regime by:

> creating the central core of the global system of solidarity: the inner community that, by means of elite networks covering key nation-states, integrated and lent cohesion to the successive leadership elements of the global system, without at the same time instituting a world religion (Modelski, 1987: 131; emphasis added).

Thus, quoting sociologist Talcott Parsons (1971: 123), Modelski says that “there has been ‘since the Renaissance and the Reformation a broad general stability in the main patterns of value orientation that have been institutionalized,’” ultimately becoming the “social-emotional foundations” that made possible the political and economic innovations of the world leaders that
followed over the course of the next four hegemonic leadership cycles (Modelski, 1987: 131-132; Modelski’s emphasis).

Christianity then—Calvinism to be more accurate—became the ideational component of international stability through the auspices of the transnational religious regime. The regime itself was an instrument of the Dutch Empire, and ultimately served to mollify conflict between the hegemon and other Protestant great powers by bonding them together in a common identity. With this common identity as its basis, Calvinism encouraged adherence to the hegemon’s agenda and other international regimes and agreements. Indeed, following “the consolidation of the Reformed Churches in key areas of Western Europe and North America,” the transnational networks of the Calvinist International, the institution responsible for the maintenance of the religious regime in the 1600s, facilitated the cultural and political exchange that unified people across the globe, especially at the elite level. Headquartered in The Hague, this transnational religious actor (TRA) built a web of international linkages that enhanced international stability throughout the reign of Dutch hegemony (Modelski, 1987: 131, 184-188).

The Calvinist International was an ecclesiastical entity for sure, but it gradually evolved into an economic and military apparatus for the Netherlands as well. Indeed, the Dutch Calvinist Church not only assumed leadership of the Reformation itself, but it also led the forces of Protestantism against Spain, whilst erecting the very network responsible for facilitating pro-Reformation alliance formation. Said differently, the Calvinist International ultimately served as the foundation of “the winning coalition in the war against Spain’s universal monarchy, and even more important, the first concrete implementation of the structure of international solidarity that was to bind the modern world system at the elite level (Modelski, 1987: 186; emphasis added; Modelski and Modelski, 1988: 110). As such, the Calvinist-led religious regime helped
institutionalize a new common identity ensuring that Protestant powers conformed to other international regimes, and the rules of Dutch hegemony.\footnote{The example of the Netherlands is used here, because the Dutch hegemonic leadership cycle is especially notable for “the prominent role that religion holds within it.” The Netherlands assumed the mantle of world leadership at a time of religious upheaval (i.e., the Reformation and Religious Wars), and though French Huguenots and German Lutherans were on the frontlines of the Reformation conflict, the Dutch “were at the very core of the struggle.” Though religion would eventually become a less prominent feature of the cyclical process of hegemonic decline and accession—that is, religion is not a hallmark of English or American hegemony—religious rhetoric propagated by the citizens and leaders of a hegemon remains common. Here again, the Dutch Calvinists are notable; it is their notion of election and predestination—that is, John Calvin’s idea that God “has chosen ‘into salvation, a set number of certain men, neither better nor more worthy than others’” for whom salvation is assured—that sets them apart. Of course, “[t]he notion of ‘election’ is not really confined to Calvinist doctrine,” for “feeling ‘holier than though’ has in the past” been a profound manifestation of hegemonic will (Modelski and Modelski, 1988: 110-113).}

This is not entirely dissimilar to the way the free-trade regime of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, “having institutionalized in state-society relations new state identities and interests that conform to the regime,” altered international identity. As Alexander Wendt (1994) argues, a regime can “define a transnational community of interest,” but these communities are constituted by rhetorical practices, the goal of which “is to create solidarity” in collective action (391). For a TRA, such as the Calvinist International, the key ontological elements responsible for shaping identity include words, speech acts, and rules (Kubálková, 2000: 687), thus rhetorical and discursive practices, such as symbolic action, discussion and persuasion, dialogue, and political argument permeate the religious actor’s actions. This is critical because rhetorical practices manipulate the “shared meanings and significations” of the social world, ultimately changing “others’ conceptions of their [own] interests” (Wendt, 1994: 391), and explaining why and how a regime molds collective identity.

\textbf{American Hegemony and the End of the Transnational Religious Regime}

The transnational religious regime established under Dutch hegemony persisted for centuries. Though Scott M. Thomas (2005) apparently discerned the relationship between regimes and religion independently of Modelski, he recognizes that Protestantism has been an
especially important feature of American hegemony. As a matter of fact, he argues, “[i]t was the Protestantism of American political culture […] that provided the cultural foundation of [United States] foreign policy” after World War II (160). A coalition of Christian Realists and Liberals, with a roster including Reinhold Niebuhr, he says, was instrumental in the articulation of the ecumenical Protestantism that underpinned U.S. hegemony. Moreover, many of these theologians were influential in promoting the U.S.’s post-World War II foreign policy. They helped generate support for the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, and the United Nations (UN). They believed that Christian engagement with international politics and interchurch relations could mitigate hostility in the Cold War, and they often used the church to legitimize those international arrangements that “accorded with Christian order.” In this way, the transnational religious regime was reinforced by the establishment of the World Council of Churches (WCC), an event which was paralleled in the political realm by the founding of the UN. It is no coincidence that these two organizations were established at the same time, and in fact, both were meant to maintain Christian order at the international level. However, in Thomas’s view, it was the election of John F. Kennedy as the United States of America’s (U.S.) first Roman Catholic president in 1960 that brought the 312-year-old transnational religious regime to its end (Thomas, 2005: 158, 160-162).

Incidentally, HST evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and was given its name by Keohane (1980), when he used the “theory of hegemonic stability” to account for the decline of the international monetary, trade, and petroleum regimes (131-132, 143-154). Though the benefit of hindsight reveals that the U.S. never lost its global leadership positioning—U.S. hegemony persists even today—scholars such as Keohane were not entirely unjustified in their perception that the collapse of these vital regimes heralded the end of American world
leadership. It is no coincidence, suggests Thomas, that signs of hegemonic decline were evident as early as 1963. With the passage of the Interest Equalization Tax Act that year, says Keohane (1984), the U.S. enacted its first protectionist measure designed to safeguard the dollar from “the consequences of the open world economy that it had struggled to create.” Thus, it could be argued (at least, it could have been back then) that “the end of the American Century and the end of [the] ecumenical Protestantism that determined the moral and political vision as well as the culture of the American Century roughly occurred at the same time” (Keohane, 1984: 138; Thomas, 2005: 160).

For obvious reasons, anti-Catholicism was inherent to the transnational religious regime founded by the Dutch Calvinists. Chief among those was the fact that Calvinism, and the Reformation more broadly, rejected the authority of the popes and of the Roman Catholic Church at-large. In fact, the assertion that the transnational religious regime came to an end with Kennedy’s election is based on the belief that, with his election, Kennedy “broke one of the oldest and strongest cultural prejudices in America” and in the regime: this tradition of anti-Catholicism (Preston, 2012: 502). Interestingly, the apparent end of the regime and Kennedy’s election also coincided with the increasing secularization of U.S. society (Preston, 2012: 502), the globalization of secularism in the world at-large, and the emergence of the secularization thesis. Many IR scholars criticize these trends for influencing the field in such a way that it

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4 While a prominent theme in this thesis, the subject of anti-Catholicism and its relationship as an ideological component of the transnational religious regime deserves more attention than can be justified here. However, it should be noted that, like the alleged decline of U.S. hegemony and its regimes, hindsight reveals a more nuanced history. Philip Jenkins (2003), for instance, points out that anti-Catholicism is infinitely adaptable, and that it can manifest itself in different times and places to meet the needs of varying interest groups without ever vanishing entirely. In fact, Jenkins suggests, the public disclosure of the Catholic Church’s child sex abuse scandal in the early 2000s ignited a firestorm of anti-Catholic activity on a scale not seen since the early 20th century, revealing the resilience of this particular prejudice. It has even been suggested that in the years immediately following President Kennedy’s assassination “anti-Catholicism was actually more potent than it had been before [his election], the event […] commonly believed to have laid the ghost of nativism to rest for all time” (Jenkins, 2003: 1-2, 45, 47). If the regime has ended, it might be appropriate to pinpoint its termination in 1998, with the passage by Congress of the International Religious Freedom Act (Herrington, 2011a).
prevented many of their predecessors from seriously considering the role of religion in the world, but a closer look at the regime dynamics at play will reveal that these trends were actually an outgrowth of the religious regime. Of course, this will be explored in depth in Chapter 5.

**Framework of What Follows**

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that, even in the post-Westphalian era, religion, especially through the aegis of international regimes—has remained a potent force in the world. Regime theory and HST, though founded as competing paradigms, represent useful corollaries, especially with regard to transnational religious regimes, which, at the very least, help forge and maintain international identity and solidarity. This was the case with the Calvinist International under Dutch hegemony, and it was especially the case with the Catholic Church under the Roman Empire, which shall be discussed in Chapter 4.

Going forward, the ontological, epistemological, and methodological framework of this thesis builds upon the qualitative, interdisciplinary approach previously employed by IR scholars to examine religion. Adopting the linguistic constructivism of Vendulka Kubálková’s (2000; 2006; 2009) International Political Theology (IPT), it is necessary to recognize an ontological distinction between secular and religious worldviews. From the very beginning, this acknowledges that religious actors largely perceive the existence of multiple realities that might not be “sensed” by traditional observation in the social sciences. Building on this, the subjectivist epistemology common to constructivism is recognized, though the research in this thesis will be augmented in the vein of Ron E. Hassner’s (2009; 2011) “thick religion” by an empirical epistemology through the use of two case-studies. As already suggested, this thesis naturally adopts a qualitative methodological approach, relying largely on historical narrative. In the spirit of the present ontological, epistemological, and methodological framework though, this
thesis rejects the premise of methodological atheism, and instead, prefers a methodological agnosticism that recognizes that multiple realities of existence could exist, even if they cannot be perceived scientifically.

In this spirit, Chapter 2 will discuss the important problem of defining religion, which relates to the broader ontological, epistemological, and methodological dilemmas plaguing the study of religion in IR. Addressing this, however, will actually provide an opportunity to elaborate and justify the framework of this thesis, the most important aspect of which is that a synthesis of linguistic constructivism and regime theory be used to better understand the concept of a transnational religious regime. By beginning with an overview of the debate on the definition of religion in Religious Studies, Chapter 2 will illustrate that incorporating religion into IRT is difficult because of its complexity. IRT is generally dependent on its ability to describe the world in a parsimonious manner and religion is almost too complicated a variable to achieve parsimony. This will ultimately build towards the literature review in Chapter 3, which seeks to synthesize the two paradigms mentioned above, because regime theory augmented by linguistic constructivism can make for the most parsimonious approach to religion in IR. This synthetic theory will be applied to two case-studies, representing distinct geographical and historical contexts that will help limn the nature of transnational religious regimes like the one posited above by Modelski and Thomas.

In Chapter 4, the first case-study will illustrate that the Roman Empire established one such regime as a consequence of its imperialist, expansionary ambitions. The globalization of early Christianity—or the “Jesus Movement”—and a crisis of identity within the empire, however, would spark the need to reevaluate anti-Christian policies and the practice of polytheism itself. This would ultimately lead the Emperor Constantine on a course of action that
would establish an altogether new religio-identity regime, one that persisted in Europe, likely until the Reformation.

The transnational religious regime established in the aftermath, as is now known, would itself last until the 20th century. Thomas argues that this Protestant regime, which underpinned hegemony from the 1600s on, collapsed with Kennedy’s accession to the White House in 1961. Increasing secularization may reinforce this conclusion. However, as noted (see footnote 4), the regime may not have actually ended until 1996. If this is the case, then it is necessary to evaluate the place of religion, social science, and even anti-Catholicism in U.S. foreign policy in the era of the Vietnam War and Iranian Revolution of 1979. Chiefly, as Chapter 5 will make clear, certain regime dynamics not only expose the limits of the secularization thesis and further justify the study of religion in IR, they reveal that the transnational religious regime persisted after Kennedy’s election.

Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude with a summary of the research, proposals for further investigation, and some policy-relevant considerations.
Chapter 2 – Religion in IR Theory: Four Dilemmas

Prior to 9/11, religion was by and large an understudied subject in the discipline of IR. Few works emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War seeking to fill this lacuna. Notable exceptions, of course, were the late Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (2003), Douglas Johnston’s and Cynthia Sampson’s *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (1995), and Mark Juergensmeyer’s *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (1994). Each of these efforts was in some ways hamstrung by the fact that they were trying to forecast the future of post-Cold War geopolitics. In that sense, they join the contributions of Thomas Friedman, Paul Kennedy, Francis Fukuyama, and Robert Kaplan, in that none truly conceives of the post-Cold War world in a holistic way.

Nevertheless, there has since been a great awakening in IR. Many scholars now recognize the importance of religion and its impact on world affairs. Though some scholars might be apprehensive of the idea, Kubálková (2000: 675; 2006: 142-145; 2009: 26-28) even asserts that the study of religion in IR is deserving of its own subfield, IPT. The field’s effort to come to terms with religion has been so thorough, that Shireen T. Hunter (2010) suggests the subject has gone from neglect in IR, to over-emphasis, while Mona Kanwal Sheikh (2012), on the other hand, assumes that *a growing subfield has already emerged*. Of particular interest though, is the place of religion in IRT, for the best understanding of religion in IR should follow from a robust theoretical foundation. In this spirit, some scholars have laid the foundation for an altogether new paradigm to examine religion’s place in IR—Huntington’s clash of civilizations
thesis being the most prominent such attempt\textsuperscript{5} (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 15, 51, 135; Snyder, 2011: 5)—while consensus is instead forming around the idea that religion be incorporated into existing IRT. Particularly, the big three mainstream theories—Constructivism, Liberalism, and Realism—feature prominently in this discourse (Keohane, 2002; Fox and Sandler, 2004: 166-172; Sandal and James, 2011; Snyder, 2011).

Many of the works on religion that have been published since 9/11, and many from before, unfortunately lack this theoretical foundation and focus primarily on issues of violence. If the online catalog at the Library of Congress (LOC) is to be trusted, there were only nineteen books published on the subjects of religion and IR between 1991 and 2001, while there were sixteen published on religion and violence with an additional twenty-three on religion and war. The taxonomy for The Clash of Civilizations does not even fall into any of these categories, but it was one such work. Cecelia Lynch is critical of Huntington’s thesis because it “analyze[s] religion almost exclusively in terms of its propensity to sow the seeds of conflict” (2009: 385-386), while marginalizing other aspects of religion, such as its capacity to foster reconciliation in war-torn communities. Using similar LOC data, Hassner (2011) finds that half of the books published on religion and IR after 1973 were not published until after 9/11, but what is more staggering is that publications on religion in war have skyrocketed from an average of two or

\textsuperscript{5} Some (for example, see Katzenstein, 2011: 150; Haynes, forthcoming: 44-46) have actually suggested that Kubálková’s IPT represents “a new theoretical approach to theorise about religion in international relations,” claiming that, like Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” it is a “dedicated religion-focused approach” to IR. Calling IPT a theory though is a misrepresentation of Kubálková’s actual approach. Indeed, linguistic constructivism is the theory she really employs in her work. Thus, hers is not a call for a new theory; it is a call for a new subfield. Yes, it is true that in her view, IPT hinges on linguistic constructivism (for instance, see Kubálková, 2006: 143), but the fact of the matter is that IPT is meant to act as an altogether new subfield in IR, “an intellectual space for the literature on the subject of religion and world affairs.” Kubálková (2000: 675; 2009: 26) has made the fact that IPT is meant to be a subfield as opposed to a theory very clear. But, if that is not enough, Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (2003b), editors of the Millennium special edition on religion and subsequent book, Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, in which Kubálková’s original article (2000) calling for IPT is published, make it more explicit: “Kubálková calls for a new subfield of IR, what she terms International Political Theology (IPT), in order to battle the fixity of Western social science that remains unwilling (and unable) to treat religions as important social factors” (Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003b: 5; emphasis added).
three a year to fourteen since 2001. Meanwhile, since 9/11, more books have been published about Islam and war (155 total) than were published from the invention of the printing press in the 15th century to 2001 (154 total). Hassner worries that the need for reliable information in the aftermath of 9/11 has been met in large part by authors he calls “scholars of opportunity,” who lack the credible expertise and “substantive knowledge” to adequately address these topics (Hassner, 2011: 38-39; Library of Congress).

On such group, including Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens, is that of the neo-Atheists, who view religion as “always and everywhere hard-wired to be irrational, violent, and repressive” (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 8). Not only do the new atheists lack the knowledge to provide reliable accounts of the place of religion in world affairs, but they all have an obvious axe to grind in their anti-religion bias. Hassner points out that the new Atheists like to emphasize correlations between religion and violence while ignoring or dismissing any relationship between religion and “the promotion of morality, science, or art.” They also ignore the relationship between atheism and violence, suggesting instead that fascism and communism are essentially religions “at their core” (Hassner, 2011: 39). But Ken R. Dark (2000) peers through the inconsistencies of this claim and highlights that that the polities historically responsible for promoting “state-sponsored atheism” have persecuted “not only religious believers but other sections of the public as well.” Indeed, Dark argues, human rights and personal freedom in general have been subject to heavy restriction in officially atheist states, which immediately undermines the neo-Atheist claim that their irreligious worldview “promotes greater freedom and tolerance of difference than does religious belief.” Of course, the neo-Atheists are not alone; nonbelieving IR scholars, such as Jeffrey Haynes, a leading voice in the study of religion in IR, have also taken little interest in the global politics of atheism. But
Haynes stands apart from his more agenda-driven counterparts, in that he *does* recognize religion’s productive capacities, such as its ability to play a role in conflict resolution (Haynes, 1998: 2n; Dark, 2000: 61-62, 79n; Haynes, 2007: 178-186).

More reliable works with foundations in IRT are limited, but they do exist in feminism and linguistic constructivism, for example. Before addressing this though, it is essential to address four interrelated, but independent problems. That is, scholars face definitional, ontological, epistemological, and methodological dilemmas when trying to integrate religion into the study of IR. Addressing these problems will lay the groundwork for a synthesis of linguistic constructivism and regime theory that is the lynchpin of the present study’s effort to evaluate the concept of a transnational religious regime. First though, to address the problem of definitions, a typology of religion is needed.

**Definitions: A Typology of Religion in IR**

Thanks to the field’s need for analytical precision, and the international community’s concordant need for legal precision, IR is not new to the definitional dilemmas of world affairs; the debates over such terms as “terrorism” (see, for example, Cox, Falconer, and Stackhouse, 2009: 8-25) and “globalization” demonstrate this thoroughly. However, given that the issue of religion is still relatively new to the field, one can say with certainty that the definitional dilemmas of religion are also new to IR. With this, IR experts may be tempted to ask an otherwise innocuous and straightforward question: what is religion? But, as religious studies scholars have demonstrated (especially) over the past fifty years, religion is nigh ineffable, and attempting to capture the full scope of its meaning in a single definition is a complex and difficult task. For hundreds, even thousands of years really, many scholars and theologians have
struggled to define religion. It is closely tied to spirituality, yet, it is not spirituality alone. Faith is an integral part of religion, but it is not faith alone. It is tied to metaphysics and tradition, too. In many cases, religion is even tied to mighty institutions. If one looks at religion solely as an institution then it becomes easy to define: the institution itself is hardly more than a group of people, bound together by a common set of beliefs, traditions, and practices. In this vein, religion is exemplified by specific institutions such as, *inter alia*, the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scientology. Looking more at the philosophy of religion, groups of religious people might be classified by the religious tradition to which they adhere: Muslims, Buddhists, Taoists, Raëlians, Jains, Jews—the list goes on. Yet, looking at religion in these ways underestimates its versatility and limits the scholar’s ability to fully appreciate the subject. So, a broader perspective is necessary.

One of the problems with defining religion is that, as a Western concept, it tends to favor specific traditions or creeds, particularly from Western traditions, at the expense of Eastern religions, Native American religions, and the religions of the so-called “savages” (E. Ritchie, 1901: 2; Gill, 2005: 7-8; Fitzgerald, 2011: 162). E. Ritchie (1901) points out, for instance, that by mischaracterizing “savages” as having “no religion,” experts in the quest for a definition of the concept may tread dangerously close to dogmatic pronouncements of “true” religion versus “false” religion (2). Such an understanding of religion, if taken to the extreme, could even lead to persecution, as was the case with the Native Americans. When Christopher Columbus discovered the New World, his view was that religion was synonymous with “creed and church,”

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6 Although spirituality can be tied deeply into the elusive definition of religion, it actually does differ substantially. Spirituality is a more modern, even “fashionable,” attempt to allow people to disassociate themselves from religious institutions, while being able to maintain a veil of piety. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with this. And IR scholars need not necessarily be concerned with this distinction. But, if one accepts that spirituality is deeply connected to religion, then it is necessary to be aware of this phenomenon, as new age spirituality movements in particular are Western phenomena that help explain why religion remains important in the West even if it appears to be on the wane.
and Christianity. With such a limited understanding of religion, Columbus and others came to see the Indians as lacking anything even resembling religion (Gill, 2005: 8); they were barbarians, lacking reason and soul, subject as slaves, under Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, to the whims of a colonial elite (Keen and Haynes, 2004: 58-60, 76-78, 101-104; Gill, 2005: 5-7).

One of the earliest definitions of religion comes from Saint James, who relies on similar Christocentric ideas for obvious reasons. He says “[r]eligion that is pure and undefiled before God, the Father, is this: to care for orphans and widows in their distress, and to keep oneself unstained by the world” (James 1: 27). Never mind the inherent truth claim in James’ definition, or the fact that its limited understanding of religion could foster prejudicial assumptions about non-Christian traditions, the definition is simply too narrow. Scholars employing James’ understanding of religion might inadvertently pigeonhole themselves, limiting their understanding of religion’s influence in IR to the role played by faith-based humanitarian aid groups in certain relief operations. This is not to say that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS) or Heart to Heart International,7 are not a vital manifestation of religion’s agency in international affairs, but rather that IR’s understanding of religion cannot be limited exclusively to this type of actor.

7 Some might view Heart to Heart International, an NGO headquartered in Olathe, Kansas, as a faith-based organization rooted in Christian values, and in a certain respect, they would be right. Heart to Heart, which derives its name from the 1992 Heart to Heart Airlift that delivered desperately needed medical supplies from the “heart of America,” to the crumbling hospitals in Moscow, at the heart of the former Soviet Union, once claimed “Faith” as one of its values. According to Kansas City Global, Heart to Heart’s statement of values used to say the organization believes that “each person is uniquely gifted by God to help those in need—and that acting on this belief has the power to create a healthier world.” Now, however, a review of the Heart to Heart International website reveals that “Faith” has been omitted entirely from the organization’s list of enumerated values. Adele Hillner, an executive assistant at the NGO says that Heart to Heart’s Board of Directors struggled with the place of faith in the organization, but that the board ultimately adopted a “faith-friendly” position in 2011. Hillner says that Heart to Heart is involved in 140 countries, and that many would refuse to admit the organization if it were an officially faith-based, or Christian NGO. Of course, the organization may still have “Christian values,” but these derive from the actions, attitudes and beliefs of Heart to Heart’s employees more than anything. Regardless, the NGO remains committed to helping and working with people of all stripes, no matter their faith (Heart to Heart International, 2012; Hillner, 2012; Kansas City Global, 2012).
Ritchie (1901) then, suggests a more expansive definition in an effort to capture the essentials of religion. It is, he says, an individual’s “vital apprehension” of, belief in, and emotional response to the broadest conceivable reality, “whether such reality be regarded as coextensive with, as included in, as inclusive of, or as distinct from, the world of natural phenomenon (Ritchie, 1901: 4-5). However, even this definition might be too limited to encompass such traditions as Confucianism, and it is probably flawed in other ways too. Indeed, religious studies scholars spent the better part of the 1960s and 1970s obsessing over the definition of religion, illustrating their predecessors’ various flaws.

Trying his own hand at defining religion, Frederick Ferré (1970) suggests that the “over-arching” characteristic of religion “is that of valuing. Not all valuing is religious; but all religious phenomena […] can be shown to spring from a valuational root” (8). The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1966), on the other hand, defines religion more broadly still, as a system of symbols acting to “establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men” through the formulation of ideas about order and existence, then making all of this seem realistic and palatable by surrounding these ideas “in an aura of factuality” (4). Drawing on Geertz’s famous definition, Robert N. Bellah (1991) argues that religion is “a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence” (21), but Bellah elaborates on this, offering what might be dubbed the “cybernetic theory of religion” (9). The cybernetic approach treats religion as a symbolically controlled action system that functions through a generalized understanding of group and individual identity. That said, to Bellah, religion is a social instrument that can be understood by what it does to and for the social animal. In this sense, religion is a support system meant to help members cope with the stress of life disturbances, and, at its most basic level, to help them understand their place in the world (9-11).
Bruce Lincoln and Talal Asad are opposed to the Geertz-Bellah approach. Asad, on the one hand, argues “that no universal definition of ‘religion’ is possible, since all such definitions are themselves the historical product of culturally specific discursive processes.” Moreover, he suggests that most attempts to identify a universal definition of religion are Western, post-Reformation constructs that fail to yield analytical validity when applied to non-Western and pre-Reformation religious traditions. More specifically though, Asad criticizes Geertz’s formulation of religion for its focus “on symbols, consciousness, dispositions, and affirmations,” chiefly because this places too much emphasis on the Protestant archetype, while also failing to acknowledge the “disciplinary practices and systems of institutional authority” important to non-Protestant religions, such as, *inter alia*, in the Roman Catholic Church (Lincoln, 1995: 83-84).  

Asad’s is essentially an argument rooted in cultural relativism. Ironically though, in criticizing Geertz’s use of the Protestant archetype, Asad himself inadvertently treats Protestantism as a monolith, failing to consider the relative examples of religion from within the tradition. This is evident in his argument about “institutional authority.” Asad simultaneously criticizes Geertz for conflating the Protestant archetype with all religion, and failing to consider the role of institutional authority. The example of the Roman Catholic Church illustrates only a specific type of institutional authority: that of hierarchy. But most, if not all, Protestant religious traditions feature elements of institutional authority in some incarnation, and they are not all devoid of hierarchy. Most notably, the Anglican Church, with the Archbishop of Canterbury as its head, and ultimate authority residing in the hands of the monarchs, is an obvious example of hierarchy in Protestantism. In small Baptist churches affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention, however, institutional authority is shared by members of individual congregations who hold only loose affiliations with their umbrella organization. While avoiding the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church or Church of England, Southern Baptists still possess institutional authority. The only difference is that voters within an individual congregation possess the ultimate authority over clerics instead of visa versa. The point is that Asad’s culturally relativistic arguments are inconsistent, because he too ultimately fails to recognize the diversity of institutional authority within Protestantism. By treating distaste for hierarchy as universal, he conflates all Protestant traditions as a single, monolithic religion. In doing so, moreover, Asad fails to take account of antinomianism. The doctrine of antinomianism takes the Protestant notion of salvation through faith alone to the logical, but extreme conclusion, suggesting that by having professed belief in Jesus Christ, Christians are no longer subject to the moral laws and teachings of religion or church. In some cases, this can be stretched even further to suggest that Christians need not adhere to any law. Bordering on anarchism, this form of antinomianism disregards the aspects of Christianity that might otherwise legitimize the state or its laws, such as Christ’s instruction to “[g]ive therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s” (Matthew 22: 21). Asad also fails to recognize that antinomianism is regarded—nearly ubiquitously—as a sin in both Catholic and Protestant traditions. Such thought, after all, would undermine religion and institutional churches themselves. In this spirit, he may have done well to reflect on John Calvin’s Geneva. In reforming the Genevan church, Calvin created a structured, four-tiered institution that favored discipline above all else. At the top two tiers of the institutional hierarchy were pastors and scholars; deacons and elders comprised the bottom two. Elders, who were technically at the bottom of the hierarchy, were the reformed church’s “governors in all moral matters.” Responsible for enforcing a “strict Calvinist moral code that extended into all aspects of private life,” the elders had the authority to discipline their wayward coreligionists (Kishlansky, Geary, and O’Brien, 2003: 421-422). To bring the matter full circle, the promotion of discipline in Geneva became the basis of the Protestant religious regime in the early modern era. Exported through
Without recognizing the inherent subjectivism in his definition, Geertz then, falls prey to those mistakes cautioned against by Ritchie. That is, as Lincoln notes, Geertz’s definition privileges certain aspects of religion, which normalizes “specific traditions […] while dismissing or stigmatizing others” (Lincoln, 2003: 5).

Thanks to Asad’s critique, Geertz’s previously hegemonic definition of religion has largely fallen out of favor in religious studies. But, even if he normalized features of his Protestant background as Lincoln and Asad assert, it is still important to understand the concept. Thus, Lincoln argues for a polythetic definition of religion that recognizes discourse, practice, community, and institution as the four necessary parts of religion (Lincoln, 2003: 1, 7). Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1963) complicates this discussion, introducing the concepts of faith, tradition, and transcendence into the debate (Jagger, 2004). First, he argues that the term “religion” may be most valuable to the individual believer setting out to explain his or her own faith, whilst also setting it apart from another:

One’s own ‘religion’ may be piety and faith, obedience, worship, and a vision of God. An alien ‘religion’ is a system of beliefs or rituals, an abstract and impersonal pattern of observables (Smith, 1963: 43).

But, like Asad, Smith suggests that the word be “dropped,” except in this personal sense of course. He argues that, academically speaking, it is a confusing, misleading, and superfluous concept. Smith prefers other concepts like faith, and insists that “religion” blocks serious attempts to conceptualize the former (Smith, 1963: 50).

So, while Smith defines religion as (1) a “sense of personal piety,” as “an overt system, whether of beliefs, practices, values, or whatever,” that transforms a specific community into (2) “an ideal” religion or into (3) an empirical phenomenon, or (4) as a general universal label like the framework of the Dutch Empire, Calvin and his followers essentially built the “infrastructure of religious governance and social control that served as a model for the rest of Europe—and the world” (Gorski, 2003).
“religion in general,” which has meaning derived from an individual’s subjective understanding of the preceding three dimensions of the concept (Smith, 1963: 48-49), he actually prefers that the term, as mentioned, be abandoned altogether. Instead, he favors concepts like “faith” and “tradition.” Where Ferré reduces religion to valuing, Smith sees faith as the generic quality that “cuts across religious boundaries” (Jagger, 2004). To Smith, faith is the most fundamental force driving “different religious expressions whether they be in symbols, beliefs, rituals, or scriptures,” and it is faith that links humanity to transcendental reality, a concept he actually prefers over the more singular concept of “God.” Generalizing from a broad view of human history, Smith, a historian by trade, sees faith as a natural aspect of the human condition, “and the denial of faith” as an historical aberration (Jagger, 2004).

Faith, according to Smith, is “essential to being truly human” (Jagger, 2004). Intriguingly, Sam D. Gill (2005), who defines “the religious” as including “images, actions, and symbols that both express and define the extent and character of the world,” echoes this, pointing out that religion is a “general human phenomenon” distinct to the entire race. Taking this further, Gill suggests, humans can be distinguished by the very fact that they are religious. For this reason, Gill, Bellah, and others characterize the human race as homo religiosus (Bellah, 1991: 21; Gill, 2005: 7-8). As a natural outgrowth of the human condition, religion can be seen as an attempt by humankind to understand the unknown, to understand its surroundings, to understand its identity, and to understand the transcendent. What can be gleaned from the long debate about the definition of religion is that it often involves conviction to moral principles, and can be associated with a belief in a higher power; though belief in a higher power is admittedly no prerequisite for religion. Short of that, religion can allow humanity to perceive some kind of transcendental or supernatural existence. Of course, religion is more than a collection of belief
structures filled with symbols, traditions, stories, and rituals. It is these things and none of these things, and yet, somehow, religion is actually much more: it is an avenue by which humanity seeks to better itself.

Religion so defined is still an unruly, extraordinarily broad, and potentially problematic concept. Religious studies scholars would probably still find fault with it, just as IR scholars may if they become too concerned with defining religion. As the overview of the literature on the definition of religion has thus far tried to convey, “many brilliant and careful thinkers have set themselves to the task of trying to define religion,” including both believers like Saint James, writing from the vantage of a specific tradition, and outside observers, like Geertz, Bellah, Smith, Lincoln, and Asad. Yet, as Smith contends, they all “have failed to satisfy each other, and none of their suggestions,” perhaps with the exception of Bellah’s definition, “has commanded wide acceptance” (Smith, 1963: 11). Said differently:

“The rich panorama of man’s religious life over the centuries presents the observer with a bewildering variety of phenomena, and the studies of those phenomena present him with a cacophony of interpretation. Those who would understand, and those who would intelligently participate, are confronted with a task of no mean proportions (Smith, 1963: 4).

If scholars never come to agreement on the subject though, perhaps a better way to approach it would be to consider some of its basic, distinguishable features. As Martin E. Marty (2000) notes, identifying the features of religion can help place boundaries around the concept. He suggests five: First, religion focuses on “ultimate concern”; second, it builds community; third, it appeals to symbols and myth; fourth, it strengthens faith through rites and ceremony; and fifth, it requires a certain standard of behavior from its members (Marty, 2000: 10-14). Haynes (2007) adopts Marty’s parameters, highlighting that this particular definition allows for religion’s agency in the world through “what it says and by what it does” (11-12; emphasis removed).
Monica Duffy Toft, Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2011), like Haynes, are among the few IR scholars to consider the definitional dilemmas associated with the study of religion in world affairs. They point out that some definitions of religion are broad enough that some secular ideologies and philosophies—nationalism, Marxism, and secularism, to name three—inspire similar fervor, and “appear to share some of religion’s characteristics.” Of course, Smith would take issue with the inclusion of these ideologies and philosophies being included under the rubric of religion, since they are not defined by faith, and since the “denial of faith [is] an aberration,” but Toft, Philpott, and Shah do not seem overly concerned by this issue. Instead, they draw on William P. Alston’s definition of religion, and, taking the same basic approach as Marty and Haynes, they use a series of seven elements to delineate the boundaries of the religious. First, religion involves “a belief in a supernatural being.” Second, it involves “prayers or communication with that or those beings.” Third, it accepts the existence of some kind of transcendental reality. Fourth, it distinguishes “between the sacred and the profane and between ritual acts and sacred objects.” Fifth, it seeks to explain humanity’s place in the world. Sixth, it offers a code of conduct. Seventh and finally, it features a “temporal community bound by its adherence to” some combination of these elements. That said, many religion’s many not include all of these elements, but “all religions,” argue Toft, Philpott, and Shah, “include most of them, such that we understand that religion involves a combination of beliefs, behavior, and belonging in a community” (Jagger, 2004; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 20-21). The approach employed by Marty, Haynes, Toft, Philpott, and Shah is worthy of note, because it is a dimensional approach that recognizes the overlapping but distinct elements of religion (i.e. institution,

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9 The idea of looking at the secular “religions,” philosophies and ideologies like humanism, Marxism, socialism, nationalism, and so on, is understandable given their similarities. However, it might be best to look at religion, philosophy, and ideology as three parts of a larger, indistinguishable whole. Obviously, this would explain areas of overlap, without necessarily allowing the discussion to be confused by the superfluous conflation of philosophy and ideology with religion.
culture, identity, location) without at the same time attempting to delineate exclusive or exhaustive boundaries and specifications that inevitably leave some religions unaccounted for as might happen under the provisions of the strictest definitions.

This is all fine and good, but ultimately the reader—indeed, students and scholars of IR in general—must rely on their own instincts. As religious studies scholar W. Richard Comstock (1984) says, “Augustine’s famous observation about time applies with equal force to religion; *if not asked, we know what it is; if asked, we do not know*” (499; emphasis added). The debate over what religion actually is, is an important one. But it is unresolvable. As such, the parameters outlined in the review above will help provide a general sense of what is meant by the use of the word religion, while a more productive approach for IR scholars would be to employ a typology of religion. Yes, it is important to be specific about which traditions and sects are under discussion. Whether or not one is looking at Christianity or Islam in general, or Roman Catholicism, Mormonism, Wahhabism, or Shi’ism in particular, specificity will help scholars overcome some of the definitional obstacles religion presents. But, it cannot overcome them all. For this reason, IR scholars must also be aware of such concepts as world religions, new religious movements (NRM), indigenous religions, religious actors, and TRAs.10

The concept of “world religions” is a dubious one, widely contested—even if not as disputed as the concept of “religion” itself. It is criticized, for instance, for being a Christocentric concept that applies the “form” of Christianity to non-Western religions in an artificial way (Beyer, 2007: 169). And many use the term pejoratively when discussing such traditions as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, by labeling these the “so-called world religions”

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10 TRAs, or transnational religious actors, though there are areas where the distinction may be blurred, should not be confused with Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) or Transnational Ideological Networks (TINs). These are three different concepts, despite the fact that some religious actors might fall into more than one of the three categories.
(for example, see Fitzgerald, 2011: 164; emphasis added). Timothy Fitzgerald (1990) argues that the “world religion” concept is a confusing, “highly artificial,” analytical “fallacy.” First, he points out that the concept of a “world religion” evolved out of the messages of universal salvation in evangelical Christian theology. Fitzgerald posits that this apparently Christocentric concept emerged as liberal theologians recognized a need to understand other religious systems with claims to universal salvation. Concordantly, he avers that the distinction between world religions and smaller, geographically-bound religions is based on the assertion that smaller religions are “group-tied” to a social group and indistinguishable from that group’s culture, while world religions are somehow universally available and applicable. Just because Christian theology or institutions may claim “themselves to be universally available” though, does not transform their specific tradition into some kind of new “empirical object of study that transcends any particular social group.” Instead, it means that those religions have simply developed a universalist ideology through institutional flexibility (Fitzgerald, 1990: 101, 103-104, 108-109).

Second, Fitzgerald also points out that the distinction of a world religion from a smaller religion on the grounds that the small religions are “group-tied” is logically flawed for two reasons. The first is that it is illogical to assume that a world religion is not “group-tied.” The second is that the very use of the phrase “group-tied” is an unnecessary and obvious tautology. Said differently, all religions are “group-tied” so it is unnecessary to highlight this in the different classifications of religion. Just because one religion crosses some kind of social boundary or transcends a national border does not mean it loses its connection to various social

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\[^{11}\text{A Google Scholar search of this exact phrase yields 437 scholarly articles that qualify their use of the term “world religions” with the phrase “so called.” The same search on Google Books yields nearly 2,500 results, while the same search on the general Google search engine produces over 50,000 results. Needless to say, though the debate over the term is not as prominent as the one over “religion,” use of the phrase “world religions” is widely unappreciated.}\]
groups. As a matter of fact, to assume that the “world religion” concept contains scientific validity when applied to Christianity, in Fitzgerald’s view, is to assume that Christianity is a monolith, “not tied to any one specific social group.” But this idea sounds dubious to Fitzgerald, for “it means that several distinct social groups of quite different kinds claim to believe in something called Christianity.” The truth is though, that Christianity is not monolithic, that it changes in different social and geographical contexts, and that it will be understood differently by the various social groups to which it is attached. From this point of view, even the universalist tendencies of Christianity can be seen as ideas that are only “transplanted into different social groups” where they are reinterpreted according to a unique perspective and acted upon “according to the context of their own cultural life” (Fitzgerald, 1990: 107, 109).

Donald Wiebe (1994) does not care if “world religions” is a theological concept. He argues that Fitzgerald misses the point, because “a taxonomic structure that allows for distinguishing those [universalist] cultures from others that lack the notion of a transcendent and universal reality” is analytically important and very appropriate (Wiebe, 1994: 839). In any case, given the inherent meaning of the phrase and the nature of international affairs, particularly with regards to globalization, it would come as no surprise if scholars of IR gravitate towards the use of this term. So, some additional background is in order. The idea of “world religions” has its origins in the religious studies discourse of the mid-19th century. At that time, scholars were moving away from a classification system that divided the religions of the world into the four categories of Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Pagan. They started speaking of religion in terms of its national context, and using terms like “universal” or “great” to distinguish the more globalized traditions from indigenous ones. By the 1920s and 1930s, the term was “crystalized [...] into a taken-for-granted” concept (Schmidt, 2006: 230). In its classical sense, Immanuel
Wallerstein (2004) suggests, the “world religion” concept came into use “to describe the limited number of religions that exist in wide areas, as opposed to the religious structures of tribes” (99). That is, it dichotomizes religion into global and local (read: indigenous) contexts.

Nowadays, “world religions” takes on two meanings. There is the classical meaning described by Wallerstein, and there is the wider notion of “religions of the world.” In this sense, “world religions” loses any meaning associated with scale or geography, and becomes the subject of *Idiot’s Guides* (for example, see Toropov and Buckles, 2004) and departmental curricula. This, however, is the meaning of “world religions” that deprives IR scholars of its analytical utility, because it treats groups as small as the Baha’i and Rastafarians similar to the way it treats Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists. This is not to say, of course, that such religions are inferior, or that they might not matter in terms of IR. No, it only means that these smaller groups deserve a more appropriate label; to categorize them as “world religions” would simply be misleading in the context of the IR discipline. So, if IR scholars are to employ this concept, what are the world religions? Generally speaking, they include *transnational* religions, like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Though Hinduism is largely confined to the Indian subcontinent, thanks to the sheer population of that country, and the large size of the Hindu diaspora, Hinduism too, may be regarded as a world religion. Other traditions sometimes (though not always) listed include Judaism, Confucianism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, and Taoism. Scale makes the idea of a “world religion” problematic, but for the IR scholar, the most important thing to remember about this classification is that world religions are transnational in nature, even if the overarching religion is comprised of some innumerable multitude of sub-sects.

Smaller religious movements, like the Rastafarians and Baha’i, can be classified as NRMs, or new religious movements. Typically, NRMs are those “alternative religions,” that
have long been “the subject of ridicule and persecution.” They are the religions often polemically described as cults or sects, and the scholars studying NRM are usually derided by anti-cult activists as “cult-apologists.” IR scholars may take interest in NRM such as Aum Shinrikyo and the Branch Davidians for their involvement in violent activities. Indeed, NRM scholars are often employed in consultative roles by agencies including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Scotland Yard. Of course, other such groups, like the Cao Dai in Vietnam, have marshaled their own standing armies (see footnote 29), which might reinforce this interest. However, Thomas (2005) notes that NRM are facilitated by globalization and will undoubtedly “play an important role in shaping the contours of world politics in the twenty-first century.” It follows from this that narrowing their agency to violent activity alone would render IR’s understanding of the NRM obsolete. Take Falun Gong, which has millions of followers around the globe, for example. The Chinese central government represses the religion, fearing its existence could lead to another Boxer Rebellion. Ironically, state-repression of the NRM (and other religious groups) actually threatens the regime’s stability.12

Falun Gong had itself targeted by the Communist Central Committee (CCC) in China after several thousand members surrounded the CCC’s leadership compound, Zhongnanhai, in Beijing on 25 April 1999. Theirs was a silent protest, in which adherents “petitioned the central government for nothing more than tolerance” for the Falun Gong community. China’s premier, Zhu Rongji, negotiated with Falun Gong, and assured them that their religion would not be banned by the central government. Infuriated by the incident at Zhongnanhai, however, Jiang Zemin, then-president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), had Falun Gong declared an illegal cult by July that year. The PRC then even tried to have Li Hongzhi, the movement’s founder and spiritual head, who was then living in New York City, arrested by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). With Interpol having refused to participate in the crackdown on Falun Gong, however, Li Hongzhi, a man also believed to be the reincarnation of God, remains at large, and adherents of the NRM continue to struggle against the PRC. They have staged multiple protests in Tiananmen Square and have offered themselves as martyrs up to Chinese security forces. According to Gordon G. Chang (2001), “[i]t was inevitable that the state would battle the sect.” The CCC cannot idly tolerate highly organized, mass organizations, such as itself or Falun Gong. Especially since Falun Gong refused to submit to the CCC, as the so-called “patriotic” Catholic Church had done when it threw off the yolk of the pope in Rome, the party and central government really had no choice but to drive the movement underground. The irony, of course, is that by driving Falun Gong into the shadows, the CCC inadvertently spawned a “more dangerous […] and infinitely harder to suppress” organization. The state’s tactics against the NRM have only engendered further resentment among Hongzhi’s followers; indeed, many average Chinese citizens—already disgruntled by central government policy—have joined Falun Gong simply as a sign of protest. When taken together with repression of Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Buddhists in Tibet, the repression of Falun Gong almost certainly portends future instability for the communist regime in China (Chang, 2001: 19-32; also see Herrington, 2011a).
who have actually “raised the money to build ‘the first embassy to welcome people from space’” to Earth. Interstellar diplomacy aside, the Raëlians could also influence debates in international law, as their company Clonaid, seeks to successfully clone a human being (Lester, 2002: 38-40; Thomas, 2005: 13, 30, 98; Herrington, 2011a).

Generally speaking, NRMs are, as their categorization suggests, relatively new when compared to the temporal longevity of the world religions. But it is important to remember that older religious traditions, once upon a time, were also NRMs—the Manicheans of Central Asia come to mind. Some NRMs, as the product of globalization, are also synthetic traditions that blend the doctrines and beliefs of previous religious traditions. The Cao Dai, for instance, revere both Buddha and Jesus. The Baha’i combine elements of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism. Scientology also combines the Eastern notions of enlightenment, with the Western “born again” experience. Other NRMs are branches of older existing traditions, including the world religions. The Ahmadiyyat is an Islamic movement founded in India with the goal of reforming the whole of the Islamic community. Even Buddhism, which is today a world religion, was actually founded as a Hindu reform movement. NRMs can be distinct from other traditions, or they can be branches of world religions, and they can be small and domestic in nature, or transnational in character. By and large, the only thing that unifies the NRMs is their categorization, and the fact that many of them are relatively new when compared to the long-established world and indigenous religions (Toropov and Buckles, 2004: 300-301; Esposito, Fasching, and Lewis, 2008: 526-527, 534-536; Foltz, 2010).

As expansive a category as the NRM is though, there are still certain religions and religious traditions that might fall through the proverbial cracks of classification if the typology of religion in IR only includes world religions and NRMs. That’s why scholars like Graham
Harvey (2000) expand this classification scheme into a trichotomy that includes indigenous religions. Indigenous religions are the smaller, often-times older traditions that persist in hyper-local contexts. They are typically the geographically, culturally specific religious tradition of a given local community regardless of size though, meaning that regional and national religious traditions could fall into this category, too (Harvey, 2000: 6-7).

This typology of religion remains incomplete though, because it does not yet allow for the agency of religion in world affairs. While believers can act through a single religion, like Roman Catholicism, or a central institution like the Roman Catholic Church which provides an effective structure for such agency, Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) note that “[f]ew religious organizations are unanimous in their beliefs […], either because their members disagree or simply because they are decentralized.” The Roman Catholic Church offers a great example then, of the “maddening variety of people and organizations [that] adopt political pursuits in the name of religion.” From individuals, like Archbishop Oscar Romero, to national councils of bishops, different religious actors in the Catholic Church have different political ideas on which they may act. In the U.S. for instance, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has aligned itself with the politically conservative cause against legalizing gay marriage, while the organization Catholic Democrats, on the other hand, has no public statement about marriage, and instead, tries to persuade Catholic voters that the Democratic Party’s liberal political platform statements are consistent with Catholic social teachings. This paradox of agency manifests itself in other organizations like CRS, Catholic and Christian political parties, universities, and among individuals everywhere. Among other things, it reinforces the fact that no religion should be treated as a monolith (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 22-23; Catholic Democrats, 2012; Hagerty, 2012).
Many religions—if not all—include individuals or groups of individuals that are politically motivated in some aspect of life. Examples outside of the Catholic Church include the Muslim Brotherhood, the World Hindu Council, the National Association of Evangelicals, individual missionaries, the Mennonite Central Committee, and transnational and sub-national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, Al Shabab in Somalia, or Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. Other religious actors unaffiliated from specific religious traditions include ecumenical and interfaith organizations, *inter alia*, the Parliament of the World’s Religions, the WCC, and NGOs like the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD). Religions are legion, and the individuals, groups, and organizations that comprise them are likewise multitudinous. Though “an imperfect solution to this diversity,” Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) offer an excellent definition of religious actors. They are the individuals, groups, and organizations:

> that [espouse] religious beliefs and that [articulate] a reasonably consistent and coherent message about the relationship of religion to politics. It is understood that [these actors] might well be a part of a larger religious entity and might be a collectivity whose members themselves are not unanimous (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 23).

This definition may be expanded upon, for it should be understood that religious actors may also be independent of other religious entities. Furthermore, to allow for their agency, religious actors not only articulate consistent messages about religion and politics, *they act on those messages*, whether it is at the voting booth, in the halls of power, or through advocacy, journalism, dissent, propaganda, or some other medium (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 22).

With the exception of those associated mostly with indigenous religious, religious actors are not typically bound to a specific territory. As Toft, Philpott, and Shah observe, religion spans each of the sub-fields “through which modern political science approaches global politics: international relations (between states) and comparative politics (within states).” To elaborate,
religion fits neither model, for religious actors are often transnational in nature. To be sure, they operate within states, and across state borders, so IR’s typology of religion can only be complete when TRAs are taken into account. Thomas (2005) does not offer an explicit definition for TRAs, but he points out that many non-state actors influence IR (98) and that many of those actors are transnational in nature, because they operate within states influencing domestic and national politics, and outside of states indiscriminate of a polity’s frontiers (100). Many of these actors, furthermore, are religious in character, and because they have regular contacts, form coalitions, and interact across state borders, they can rightly be dubbed TRAs. There are a large number of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that fall into this category, such as the Salvation Army and Save the Children. The rare religious intergovernmental organization (IGO) is a TRA comprised only of states using religion as its only criterion for membership. The Organization of the Islamic Conference stands alone as the world’s only religious IGO (Thomas, 2005: 100-105).

Haynes has written extensively on the TRAs (2001; 2007: 123-156; 2009; 2012), and he treats them as religious actors seeking to spread their influence through the construction of “cross-border networks” (2007: 125). Largely enabled by the process of globalization, especially the technological and communications revolutions, TRAs have experienced rapid growth and continue to utilize their transnational networks to spread their influence (2007: 124-125; 2012: 4). However, TRAs rarely exert control over a defined geographic area in the way that the Holy

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13 Haynes (2012a), who actually refers to “religious transnational actors,” argues that the growth of religious actors into transnational actors is a result of their expression of soft power, mostly through missionaries. In the case of Christian and Muslim missionaries, Haynes asserts, the chief aim of their proselytizing efforts was to alter people’s “religious norms, values and beliefs” from old to new. In this way, transnational religious networks developed gradually over time, as “new religious communities came into being which had the same beliefs as the original proselytisers” (Haynes, 2012b: 13).
See exerts sovereignty over Vatican City, or the way Al Qaeda vis-à-vis the Taliban roamed freely through Afghanistan prior to the U.S. invasion in 2001. As such, TRAs lack the type of power distinct to nation-states: the hard power of military might. With that in mind though, Haynes (2007; 2012) argues that TRAs are largely dependent on the use of soft power, or the ability to deploy attractive, persuasive, ideas to influence international outcomes. That is, TRAs matter because they “represent the capacity to influence international relations by their ability to disseminate ideas and values” (Haynes, 2012a: 6; Haynes’ emphasis).

Religion is difficult to define, so IR scholars might best trust their instincts when it comes to “knowing” this elusive subject. With that said, it is necessary to continue reflecting on this issue from a cross-disciplinary perspective. Not only is careful reflection a useful epistemological exercise, but the exercise itself might be a resolution to the definitional debate. Moreover, this exercise can help IR avoid slipping into too firm and uncritical a commitment about “religion.” A typology that values world religions, NRMs, indigenous religions, religious actors, and TRAs will make it easier to grasp the concept, while also providing for the agency of religion in IR, but regardless of how sensible this approach might be, even typologies are ideal types that need to be nurtured. As such, participating in the definitional exercise may also help keep IR’s typologies from becoming too rigid here.

By looking at the concept of religious actors and TRAs, the definitional dilemma can be temporarily displaced. In this way, religion can be incorporated into IRT, allowing scholars to

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14 Interestingly, much of the scholarship—even the earliest scholarship—on TRAs focuses almost exclusively on the Roman Catholic Church (for example, see Vallier, 1973; Casanova, 1997; Haynes, 2001: 148-151; and Haynes, 2007: 136-143). More intriguingly though, Ivan Vallier (1973) contributes to the concept of a religious regime by pointing out that the Church’s “transnationality […] ties it to many situations, no two of which are exactly alike,” but form its center in Rome, it “coordinates and shapes the actions of the subsidiary field units by supplying them with general norms, symbolic leadership, and authoritative decisions” (129; emphasis added). José Casanova builds on this, by saying that Catholicism is “a religious regime,” that its “transnational character […] can almost be taken for granted,” and that it is “likely to outlast the modern world system of nation-states” (121; emphasis added). While religion is easily lumped in with transnational civil society (Thomas, 2005: 115-116; Haynes, 2007: 126-128), these fascinating insights legitimate the study of transnational religions as international regimes.
analyze its ability to assist in the provision of collective goods, and how it might help discourage free riding in the international system, especially when considering problems of order, interdependence, and cooperation (Thomas, 2005: 111). Another way to consider religion’s agency in IR would be to consider the implications of such issues as worldview, but this foregrounds the ontological dilemmas of incorporating religion into IRT.

**Religious Worldviews and Ontology: The Debate**

So, in what ways can IR scholars come to terms with the challenging subject of religion? Keohane (2002) argues for a synthetic approach that studies religion under the combined rubric of the Big Three (classical realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism to be more accurate). He castigates his peers for failing to take religion seriously, though he recognizes the “relentlessly secular” nature of IR’s mainstream paradigms. Ultimately, however, he only suggests that these three theories be synthesized in order to “take alternative worldviews—including religious ones—more seriously” (Keohane, 2002: 41-42; also see Kubálková, 2006: 141; and Tickner, 2009: 228-229). Ignoring the deficits of this approach, Fareed Zakaria answer’s Keohane’s call in his book, *The Post-American World* (2008), by suggesting that, even where foreign policy and international affairs are driven by “universal forces, […] there’s no doubt that a basic worldview organizes the way people perceive, act, and react, particularly in crises” (113).

Discussing one of the most geopolitically significant events in current affairs these days, the rise of China and India in Asia, Zakaria avers that there are important lessons to be learned in exploring Chinese (read: Confucian), American (read: Protestant), and Indian (read: Hindu) worldviews. He argues that important differences in worldview begin with God, religion, and morality. In the U.S., he points out, 57% of Americans say one must believe in God to be moral,
while in China, 72% claim the opposite. This might not ordinarily seem that important, but it is significant because East Asians generally do not share the West’s belief in a creator. In fact, the belief that God set forth morals and laws that must be adhered to, though shared by Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, is completely “alien to Chinese civilization” (Zakaria, 2008: 109). As noted, the Protestant worldview has obviously been important to the U.S. throughout history, especially in regards to the early chapters of its hegemonic accession. Perhaps more importantly though, countries influenced by a belief in God, specifically Islamic and Christian nations, “have developed an impulse to spread their views and convert people to their faith” (Zakaria, 2008: 112).

This missionary zeal is evident, according to Zakaria, in the foreign policies of various states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom (UK), Iran, and, of course, the U.S. Zakaria attributes this, in the cases of the UK—to be more accurate, Great Britain—and the U.S., to their power. The protestant sense of purpose that undergirded their respective hegemonic reigns, he intimates, has left “a deep mark on global affairs” (Zakaria, 2008: 112). Fox and Sandler (2004) might agree. In their discussion of Iranian attempts to export the Islamic revolution to the greater Islamic World, they point out that communist (read: atheist) revolutions were also exported beyond the confines of their origins, as was in the case of the spread of communism from Russia to Cuba, for instance. Foreshadowing Zakaria’s notions of missionary zeal in foreign policy though, they also argue that “the U.S. desire to export democracy to the rest of the world is in a way the exporting of the American Revolution” (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 72). Said differently, policies of democratization—and forced democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan under the George W. Bush administration—can be tied back to the U.S.’s protestant worldview. This is epitomized by the promotion of democracy under President Bush, whose evangelical
worldview was already discomforting to many Muslims in the Middle East, where the promotion of democratic reform came to serve as the basis of his administration’s policies there, and by the president’s unfortunate use of the word “crusade,” in the aftermath of 9/11, which became fodder for those edging to conflate the U.S.’s agenda with Western imperialism (Aslan, 2009: 59-64, 160).

The need to spread its views does not exist in China (at least not in the same form). It lacks the sense of missionary zeal emblematic of the Western and Islamic Worlds, because “[s]imply being China, and becoming a world power, in a sense fulfills its historical purpose (Zakaria, 2008: 112; Zakaria’s emphasis). Instead, China’s foreign policy is impacted by its understanding of qi, the concept in feng shui that leads to an “understanding of the structure of the world as a set of interacting forces, complexly interrelated.” This, says Zakaria, can impact China’s approach to diplomacy and negotiation. Inherent in this worldview is a sense of practicality that can help people understand why China behaves (in some cases) the way it does. For example, with regards to human rights, some might perceive the PRC as ruthlessly realpolitik on the issue, but in this case, the PRC simply values practicality and stability above devotion to a set of abstract rights (Zakaria, 2008: 112).15

Max Weber and Modelski may see the Protestant Ethic as being an important dimension of capitalism and hegemonic stability in the West, but Kennedy (1987), another author frequently cited in the HST literature, sees certain aspects of culture as “indigenous retarding factors” in the economic development of Indian society prior to the arrival of the British. “The sheer rigidity of Hindu religious taboos,” charges Kennedy:

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15 This sense of practicality is not a ubiquitous feature in Chinese policymaking, at least not when compared to some of the more revolutionary projects launched by the incumbent regime since the communists first took control of the government. One could hardly argue that every aspect of the CCC’s early campaigns, like the so-called Great Leap Forward, were rooted in pragmatism. Ultimately, however, the idea that China refuses to commit to human rights reform as a matter of practicality is Zakaria’s.
militated against modernization: rodents and insects could not be killed, so vast amounts of foodstuffs were lost; social mores about handling refuse and excreta led to permanently insanitary conditions, a breeding ground for bubonic plagues; the caste system throttled initiative, instilled ritual, and restricted the market; and the influence wielded over Indian local rulers by the Brahman priests meant that obscurantism was effective at the highest level (Kennedy, 1987: 13).

Left unsaid by Kennedy is the fact that businessmen in India typically find themselves in a low position in the caste system, while those that have achieved success have historically been subjected to the whims of local rulers. That was then though; economics and politics can change culture, so now, the culture that was once perceived as limiting Indian growth (as is also the case with Confucianism in China) is now attributed with driving the emergence of India as a great power (Zakaria, 2008: 60-61).

In the foreign policy realm, says Zakaria, Hinduism’s “live and let live” philosophy inheres in India’s global orientation. That is, Indians are less likely to perceive of “foreign policy as a crusade or to see the conversion of others to democracy as a paramount national aspiration.” Moreover, Hindus are uncomfortable with public commitments that restrict their country’s orientation. With that, Zakaria avers, they may be uncomfortable with formal alliances, and as the U.S. seeks to balance against the rise of the PRC in the Pacific, they may not want to be labeled as the U.S.’s ally or special partner (Zakaria, 2008: 156).

Zakaria sees value in Keohane’s call to understand religious worldviews. Through their efforts to study religion through the lenses of feminism and linguistic constructivism respectively, J. Ann Tickner (1996; 2009) and Kubálková (2006; 2009), on the other hand, point out the flaws of Keohane’s approach, paving the way for ancillary IRTs (like regime theory)—and the field more broadly—to better engage with religion. Kubálková, for example, contests that Keohane’s proposal overly complicates the subject of religion by forcing scholars who
might wish to take the subject seriously to do so through the prism of positivist—and still secular—paradigms. Furthermore, she criticizes efforts to incorporate the study of religion in IR exclusively into the studies of culture and identity. To elaborate, in her critique of Keohane’s approach, she argues that the synthesis of mainstream, positivist constructivism with realism and liberalism improperly colors religion as “irrational,” and ultimately only treats “it as a culture or identity.” This indictment is not entirely out of line, considering how Kennedy’s comments on Hinduism mesh with the wisdom of modernization theory, and the way it treats traditionalism and religion as anathema to development (see chapter 5), but Kubálková considers the conflation of religion with identity and culture superficial, especially since it leads to a tendency to reduce religion to other categories of positivism, such as transnational civil society16 (Kubálková, 2009: 27-28). While her reluctance to treat religion as identity and culture is understandable, they are three parts of the same whole. This is important to note, for it is actually the feminist approach to identity—and by extension, religion—that provides the next best place from which to start integrating religion into ancillary IRT.

Tickner, perhaps IR’s leading feminist thinker, points out that feminism’s focus on gender made it open to matters of identity long before the mainstream theories. In fact, as Tickner demonstrates, feminism looks at national and state identity, plus matters of race, class, and ethnicity. In her view, feminism contributes to the study of identity in IR primarily through its emphasis on hierarchy. Tickner concludes that national identities are built on foundations of inequality, and their exclusionary nature necessitates a dialogue “across racial, ethnic, gendered, and international boundary lines” to construct nonhierarchical identities, whilst also gaining a

16 This is not to suggest that religion cannot be understood as an aspect of transnational civil society, but more to suggest that there is so much to the study of religion, that it cannot be chained to positivist approaches alone.
better understanding of identity issues that transcend the “statist and nationalist ideologies embedded in the theory and practice of [IR]” (Tickner, 1996: 148-158, 161-162).

Tickner extends her understanding of feminism and identity to explain why Keohane’s proposed synthesis of mainstream IRT actually cannot fully comprehend the place of religion in IR. First, she points out that mainstream IRTs are “built upon the epistemological and ontological foundations of secular rationalism,” which, reflecting Kubáčková’s earlier arguments, illustrates that realism, institutionalism, and constructivism “are not particularly useful for understanding [the] religious worldviews of those who express a deep hostility to modernity and secular thinking.” For example, both Islamic and Christian extremist groups are hostile to modernity, globalization, and secularism. Taken together, notes Tickner, these three phenomena have left extremist groups with “a sense of rootlessness and loss of identity.” Second, drawing on Kubáčková’s earlier IPT work, she illustrates the ontological incompatibility of secular and religious worldviews, pointing out that the latter distinguishes “between ordinary and transcendental reality.” This may seem axiomatic, but the creation of deities in religious ontology is necessary in humanity’s search for transcendence and identity itself (Tickner, 2009: 224, 234). Indeed, agrees Kubáčková (2000), religion is organized not solely on the basis that belief is fundamental to reality, but also to human identity (684).

Fitzgerald (2011) takes issue with Kubáčková’s and Tickner’s desire to distinguish between secular and religious ontologies, and he scolds the former for her “Christocentric assumptions” (162), her “wild fabrications” (163), and her “completely circular” arguments (164). Really though, Fitzgerald criticizes Kubáčková for her inherent and implicit ability “to identify the essential characteristics of ‘religion,’ and therefore of all ‘religions.’” Like many others, Fitzgerald is generally opposed to any effort that tries to capture the “essence” of all
religions, which, in his view, is not possible especially since there are scholars enmeshed in the linguistic study of specific putative religions in Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan that “are themselves involved in complex published debates about the relevance or validity of the term ‘religion.’” Though these are essentially definitional issues, Fitzgerald demonstrates that this undermines her argument about the ontological distinction between secular and religious worldviews if one takes seriously the fact that many secular worldviews share similar characteristics with religion. Such ideologies and philosophies as nationalism, Marxism, liberalism, and humanism can inspire fervor and zeal, but ultimately, argues Fitzgerald, Kubálková probably “senses that” pursuing this “potentially fruitful line” of investigation may actually “weaken her claim that religion and the secular are ontologically distinct (Fitzgerald, 2011: 161-163).

Similarly and finally, Fitzgerald’s indictment charges Kubálková with projecting her personal ideas about religion onto the whole world of putative religion, which he implies represents a misunderstanding of Eastern religions. Fitzgerald is disappointed that Kubálková does not provide any empirical evidence to support her generalizations and universal applications of the “religion” concept, but this is both a definitional and epistemological issue. He may criticize Kubálková for “already [knowing] that they [religions] exist,” but hers is a constructivist approach, and such a subjectivist epistemology recognizes the fact that, as Comstock through Saint Augustine said, people know religion when they see it, even if they cannot adequately describe it when asked. So, Fitzgerald can argue that her argument “exemplifies tautological metaphysical reasoning from intuitively cognized premises,” rendering empirical verification of her claims moot, all he wants (Fitzgerald, 2011: 161-164; see also Haynes, forthcoming: 45-46). Kubálková already knows that the scholar cannot be completely objective, and already knows
that her own inherent value judgments may seep into her analysis. Such is the reality of the social construction: an individual’s understanding of the world around him or her is acculturated and built largely in his or her mind. But that is why she uses linguistic constructivism in her analysis of religion. Its focus on rules and language elucidates the “linguistic and nonlinguistic aspects of human existence” without at the same time reducing all reality (or IR for that matter) to text alone (Katzenstein, 2011: 150).

“Thick” Religion, Subjectivism and Epistemology

Unlike the ontological issues that have been thoroughly debated so far, fewer scholars have addressed the epistemological dimension of the discussion of religion in IR. As such, a discussion of epistemology may offer less depth than one of ontology, but that should not be construed to mean that it is any less important. The empiricist epistemological approaches of mainstream IRTs easily lend themselves to the biases of an ontological predisposition that relegates religion to the status of irrational. Given that empiricism relies on human observation and senses to come to terms with knowable facts (i.e. the observable universe), it does not easily mesh with the relativist ontology of Kubálková’s rule-oriented constructivism that concedes the possibility of multiple realities given relative perspectives. Of course, empiricism can augment an epistemological approach that successfully integrates the subject of religion into the study of international affairs, but how is such an epistemology to be selected in the first place?

In his own review of the academic and popular literature, Hassner (2009; 2011) indicates that the selection of an appropriate religion-sensitive epistemology is tied up with the classic “levels of analysis” problem, which Singer (1961) characterizes as the researcher’s dilemma.

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17 The author has made valuable use of *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) throughout this section, and as a matter of convenience, has opted not to cite it with any regularity to prevent an overly cumbersome disruption of the text. No direct quotations were taken from the handbook, but readers should be aware of this reference’s contribution, especially with regards to the author’s understanding of epistemology, subjectivism, and empiricism.
when he or she is confronted with a system, various strata of sub-systems, and all of their operational environments (77). In IR, scholars generally focus on the international or global system level, but the national level matters where foreign policy decisions are concerned, and other sub-strata can be important, too. In the case of a terrorist organization, researchers could be dealing with transnational or subnational actors, while looking at foreign policy elites necessitates a look at the individual level of analysis. To Hassner, the study of religion at the international level is reduced to politics, economics and the like. Scholars studying religion exclusively at the international level of analysis, he says, are engaged in a “broad” approach to religion, which emphasizes the impact of religious behaviors on diplomacy, globalization, conflict, and cooperation. Alas, this approach is limited methodologically by its tendency towards positivism (Hassner, 2009; 2011: 37, 46).

Approaching religion at the individual level of analysis, however, looks at “the political impact of a particular religious movement or the impact of religion in a particular region” without offering the kind of generalizations applicable to theoretical IR research (Hassner, 2011: 37). This is the “deep” approach. Hassner argues that the field is lacking a “thick” approach—one that combines the analytical depth of the deep approach while also translating the results of such study into useful information applicable to the international level of analysis. However:

[1]L]inking an explanation from outside the political realm to an outcome in IR necessitates shifts in both levels of analysis and epistemology. Whereas international relations works its immediate effects at the very top of the level of analysis ladder, religion affects the individual and group levels most directly. Scholars can approach either discipline with any of a variety of available epistemologies. Yet should they choose to employ a different epistemology for religion, on the one hand, and IR, on the other, then connecting the various levels of analysis that separate the individual or group level from the international level will also require ‘translating’ one epistemology to the other, possibly using an intermediary epistemology to bridge the two. Connecting
religion and IR thus requires ascending the level of analysis ladder while presenting arguments with the appropriate methodology for each rung (Hassner, 2011: 47).

Thus, Hassner’s thick religion approach demonstrates a sensitivity to iconography, ceremony, religious organization, theology, and belief itself, while making it possible to generalize from specific cases to reach broad conclusions at the international level of analysis by linking together a chain that can connect a specific religious idea at the individual unit of analysis all the way up to an outcome in international politics (Hassner, 2011: 38, 49). In this vein, Hassner favors interpretivist epistemologies at the individual level of analysis, complemented by empiricist epistemologies as he scales his way back to the international system for his thick religion approach (2009: 178).

Shifting gears somewhat, Michael Barnett (2011) says that efforts to demonstrate the importance of religion in IR can lead scholars to variable centrism. As social scientists, he concedes, IR scholars “cannot and should not avoid thinking in terms of variables,” but reducing religion to nothing more than a variable can omit, even if unintentionally, a number of important factors in explaining religion’s place in world affairs. One such omission occurs because the variable-centric approach fails to recognize how religion and religious actors “make their world meaningful.” Further, Barnett maintains, many of the concepts that help group actors and individuals derive meaning from specific events are often loaded with religious meaning. In the case of the U.S., in the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks, religion helped “define the meaning and significance” of the tragedy (Barnett, 2011: 107). Use of such seemingly innocuous words as “sacrifice,” and “forgiveness,” as well as others further removed from abstraction, such as “sin,” “redemption,” and “atonement,” are concepts usually burdened with Christian meaning. Not unlike President Bush’s use of the word “crusade,” these all legitimate
foreign policy preferences, which is a fact too difficult to deduce through variable-centric reasoning alone (Barnett, 2011: 107-108).

Thus far, this may seem like more of a methodological problem than an epistemological one, but Barnett addresses it because the variable-centric approach also “neglects discursive formations.” In other words, discourse shapes subjectivity and “categories of meaning.” Returning to the feminist approach to IR, Barnett argues that there are scholars who have tried to reduce gender to its biological denominators, ultimately “leading to questions like whether the world would be peaceful if women were in charge.” Yet, this misses the whole gamut of socially constructed gender issues that situate identity in the broader framework of historical context. This is significant, because Barnett argues that the whole “debate over gender raises the need to note that the study of religion does not need any special epistemology” at all; for that matter, he is unconvinced that any special ontology needs elucidation either (Barnett, 2011: 108-109, 114n).

It is interesting though, that Barnett emphasizes the nature of loaded language, especially given Fitzgerald’s previous criticisms of Kubálková’s contribution to the ontological debate. Fitzgerald’s comments point to the direction of definitional problems, but together, both highlight the subjectivist epistemology that undergirds the constructivist approach. Kubálková’s approach to religion might have made the “wild generalizations” of which Fitzgerald accuses it, but hers is a theory of constructivism that recognizes the epistemic and subjective constraints of knowledge production, including her own. That is, since an individual’s understanding of the world is built in part by his or her own mind, in addition to his or her socialization through various epistemic communities, knowledge of the world cannot be completely objective. Thus, the use of loaded terms with inherently Christian meanings is a natural part of one’s
acculturation, and can be forgiven. Kubálková’s Western-centric idea of religion then, can be understood, not as a mischaracterization of Eastern religions, but instead as a natural outflow of her own “gut” feeling. Religion is hard to define, so it is likely that Kubálková simply expects her readers to “know” religion when they “see” it. Back to Augustine: “if not asked, we know what it is.”

**Methodological Atheism and the Quantitative God Gap**

Fox and Sandler claim that one of the primary reasons religion has been neglected in IR is because the field “is perhaps the most Western-centric of the social science disciplines.” The place of religion in social science will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 5, but this remains a significant dilemma, for secularism and the belief that religion does not matter in earthly affairs, especially politics, is a basic aspect of the Enlightenment tradition in Western culture. Particularly in the U.S., they note, where people “are socialized from childhood to believe in classical liberalism which […] advocates the separation of church and state,” social scientists often accept—ironically, on faith—that government should not endorse or interfere with religion and religious practice (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 9, 17). When combined with the ontological and epistemological prejudgments of IR’s mainstream theories, it is easy to infer how this might limit the investigatory scope of the discipline’s research programs. Not only can religion be perceived as irrational, but it is difficult to observe, and socialization reinforces the need to leave religion isolated from the study of the political.

Musing about the implications unidentified flying objects (UFOs) might have on the sovereignty regime if these phenomena are ever verified to be piloted by extraterrestrial life, Wendt and Raymond Duvall (2008) refer to IR’s Western-centric approach as “methodological atheism.” Ignoring the implications of subjectivist epistemology, they argue that social scientists
are required to study religion, regardless of their own religious beliefs or backgrounds, as methodological atheists, “assuming that God plays no causal role in the material world” (612-613). This also forgets the ontological assumption of Kubálková’s constructivism, which recognizes that multiple realities could exist beyond the average human’s ability to perceive them. IR can comprehend religion in this way, not by denying that a god, God, or transcendental reality exists, but by simply admitting that they could, that people believe in them, and that human’s cannot observe them. However, the Western-centric, post-Enlightenment approach to IR is one that dismisses, as Jürgen Habermas proclaims, any “philosophy that oversteps the bounds of methodological atheism” as unserious, or—dare one say?—irrational (Habermas quoted in Wendt and Duvall, 2008: 613).

Another problem, as alluded above, is that religion is notoriously difficult to define, complicating its operationalization in any statistical or scientific manner, and rendering any meaningful measure of the variable nearly too difficult to delineate. Influenced by the enlightenment traditions of secularism, behavioralism, positivism, and empiricism, IR scholars favor quantitative methodologies heavily. Unfortunately, one of the chief criticisms of quantitative methodology though, is that scholars tend to ignore that which they cannot measure, creating a perfect storm of ignorance with regards to the religious issue. Quantitative methodologies can be extremely useful in the study of international conflict, or International Political Economy (IPE), but it is not especially relevant to the study of religion’s place in international affairs. Though religion is difficult to operationalize, the quantification of theories and selection of variables is typically accomplished only after turning to the qualitative literature on a given subject. Thus, Fox and Sandler claim ironically, part of the problem results from the field’s lack of qualitative literature on the subject of religion, but given IR’s lack of sensitivity
towards the topic, scholars have only answered the call to fill this gap in the last eleven years (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 31).

Resultantly, many of the previous attempts to quantify religion have invoked “crude variables,” and they ultimately only succeed at measuring a partial aspect of the influence of religion on political behavior. Though IR scholars have to walk a fine line between variable-centrism and variable-ignorance, as Barrett suggests, Fox and Sandler still hope for improved methods as time passes—and as the qualitative literature grows. For now, they argue, the only way to elucidate a fully accurate measure of religion’s influence on world affairs is by reading the minds of the group and individual actors that influence international events. Of course, IR scholars have yet to train Jedi or psychics, and Dr. Phil is unavailable to the field, so inefficient variables will still have to suffice if quantitative methodology is to be employed in the study of religion. That is if the promising and innovative research in the Economics of Religion (EOR) field does not yield reliable results over the long-term. EOR looks at religion through the prism of market theory and, refusing to let methodological “perfection” become the enemy of methodological “good,” it uses variables, including measures such as church attendance, to determine outcomes in political economy. For instance, Rachel McCleary (2011b) seems to confirm the Protestant Ethic, because her data indicate a relationship between high church attendance and strong economic growth (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 31; McClearly, 2011a: 7-8; McCleary 2011b).

In spite of this, most scholars have hitherto been more willing to adopt a qualitative methodology. This, of course, naturally meshes with the constructivist approach to IR, which when employed, can overcome many of the aforementioned definitional, ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues associated with the study of religion in international
affairs. Before this can be accomplished though, a rather natural synthesis of regime theory and linguistic constructivism is necessary.
Chapter 3 – Linguistic Constructivism and Regime Theory: A Synthetic Approach

In her rule-oriented model of linguistic constructivism, Kubálková highlights the need to understand the roles texts, narrative, and language play in shaping identity, and the formation of religious identity in particular, because at the ontological foundation of her linguistic model are words, speech acts, and rules (Kubálková, 2000: 687). Her approach articulates human existence at the level of language and reason, conceding that they shape the world, and in turn, reflexively reshape identity. Take the cases of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam as examples: these three communities “derive divine meaning from stories” found in sacred texts, “which are constantly read and reread and subjected to exegesis” (Kubálková, 2000: 684, 686-687; Kubálková’s emphasis). Since religions hold texts and the interpretation of those texts at their core, holy books cannot be dismissed in favor of only observable facts. Language creates identity vis-à-vis social reality, and as such these texts can influence the modus operandi of religious actors. This, maintains Tickner, explains why extremist groups employing religious violence selectively “use militaristic language, frequently from religious texts, to describe a world in a perpetual state of war” (Kubálková, 2006: 143; Tickner, 2009: 225).

Texts, Reason, and Religious Identity

It also helps explain the source of gender discrimination in, specifically, the conservative threads of the Abrahamic religious tradition. Tickner emphasizes that patriarchy is ubiquitous in these traditions, and furthermore, patriarchy’s prodigious influence contributes to conflict and violence, something she suspects can be alleviated by engaging with feminist theology. Though women are often subject to oppressive policies implemented in religion’s name, Tickner believes restrictions on women are not based on real scriptural dictates, but by men misusing holy texts to
satisfy their own agendas. In part because feminists believe that reading scripture is a reflexive activity—a fact that applies to them as well—that cannot be separated from the reader’s gender, race, socioeconomic status, or the like (Tickner, 2009: 235-236, 240), this ultimately suggests that scholars turn to another paradigm, like linguistic constructivism, in order to better engage the issue of religion in IR.

From a field that emphasizes the role of the rational actor, that some scholars might dismiss religion as irrational, or primitive, and hence unworthy of study should come as no surprise given this type of behavior. But, while it might be tempting to maintain these traditional biases, IPT makes room for abductive reasoning (as opposed to deduction or induction), which understands that metaphors, articles of faith, and so on, seek to make sense of the world. It is a form of rationality derived from language that transcends the Western model of rational choice, itself founded in economics and based exclusively on material interests. Thus, abduction is the form of reasoning largely distinct to religious actors. This even clarifies why individuals are disallowed from questioning their faith: belief precedes reason (Kubálková, 2000: 698-699; Kubálková, 2006: 144; and Kubálková, 2009: 26).

Drawing on the work of Jean Bethke Elshtain, another feminist, John A. Rees (2004) argues that “really existing” sacred texts are an understudied resource in IR discourse. Religious communities are taught about the purpose of government, proper relations with neighbors, duties of citizenship, and the nature of war through sacred scripture. He reiterates that narratives shape the identity of religious actors, and that stories are not told just for “posterity’s sake,” but also for their ability to provide direction to both local and transnational faith communities (Rees, 2004: 18-19). In an analysis of faith-based diplomacy and the Just War Tradition (JWT), Maureen H. O’Connell (2011) elaborates that religious tradition is constructed by “centuries of
storytelling.” Religion is relational, emotional, and imaginative. Through song, ritual, dance, and scripture, religious actors share their own narratives. Furthermore, she insists, storytelling triggers the imaginative process that “knits people together” and “bridges distances among persons.” In this line of thought, holy texts are the basis of storytelling, which is itself the basis for triggering the “moral imagination.” Religious actors invoke a kind of imaginative thinking that breaks “the logic of the way things are,” and cultivates an awareness of alternatives to social order. This can be done “through a sacramental imagination that” encourages involvement in God’s work in human history, prophecy, or “theo-political imagination that resists the stifling apathy of comfortability with the status quo”; even where Holy Scripture does elicit acts of violence, imagination and storytelling encourage “collective participation in” whatever is perceived to be the “common good” (O’Connell, 2011: 18-20, 24).

**Regimes and Identity**

What the feminist and linguistic constructivist approaches demonstrate is that religion shapes identity. If this holds true, then religion can become the *a priori* basis of an international regime. Regimes, like religion, are normative structures in the international system. As a matter of fact, Ronald L. Jepperson, Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) argue that “religion and societal ideologies may exercise stronger control functions over global society than do international law and industrialism” (49). Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein also suggest that normative structures are useful for implementing identity, and there is no doubt that both religion and regimes play a role in shaping actor identity. Krasner (1995d) argues that regimes are responsible for identity formation because they change actor interests, including the interests that led to the initial creation of the regime in the first place. Information, he says, that is disseminated through the structure of a given regime alters both an actor’s interests and
conception of those interests. In this way, regimes change behavior. Since new behavior is often associated with a shift in values among actors, this can actually lead to the formation of an entirely new set of interests (Haas, 1995: 57; Krasner, 1995: 362-364).

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein reinforce the idea that regimes are capable of altering identities through their ability to mold new actor interest. They also argue that “[c]onfigurations of state identity affect interstate normative structure, such as regimes or security communities.” This may happen because some states actually seek to institutionalize (or spread and enact) their identities through the superstructure of an international regime. Using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to illustrate their point, Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein argue that the alliance is at once an expression of a common identity—liberal democracy—and an institutionalizing force for the practices of collective defense. That is, by establishing a norm of consultation, NATO has clashed with and altered the U.S.’s own urges to act unilaterally. Indeed, they suggest, the norms of consultation have not only helped member states acquire a common identity, NATO has reinforced that identity, ultimately enabling the alliance to persist even in the absence of a monolithic enemy like the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 34-35, 62-63; Jepperson’s, Wendt’s, and Katzenstein’s emphasis).

**Regime Theory Explained**

Regime theory originally evolved out of the IPE subfield as a response to HST. Accordingly, some view it as diametrically opposed to the latter (Sachse, 1989). In fact, regime theory did evolve as a means to counter the assertion of hegemonic stability theorists that the decline of a world leader necessitated the decline of an international regime. Krasner argues that HST was confronted with awkward empirical developments in the late 1970s, as international
stability did not degrade along with the collapse of the petroleum and Bretton Woods monetary regimes in the way its analyses might have forecast. While the benefit of hindsight has revealed this to be an episode of declinism, theorists now believe that even if hegemony is a prerequisite for regime formation, as Keohane explicates, regimes can persist and thrive “after hegemony,” becoming the basis for cooperation in nonhegemonic world orders. Meanwhile, Krasner confirms this: not only can hegemons interact with regimes in various ways that either strengthen them or lead to their decline, but “once created, they may assume a life of their own” (Keohane, 1980: 131-132, 143-154; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1995b: viii; Krasner, 1995c: 15-16; Kaufman, Parker, Howell, and Doty, 2004: 487). Modelski (2012), on the other hand, still maintains that the longevity of regimes is connected to the lifespan of world leaders, but in either case, these arguments show that regime theory, rather than being a critical alternative to HST, can function as its logical extension and corollary.

Inspired by the tumultuous 1970s, regime theory attracted scholars because of its incredible relevance. The collapse of Bretton Woods, _inter alia_, increased IPE’s significance. Many students, however, are now losing interest with IPE. Even the classical regime theory discourse can be difficult to slog through. Susan Strange’s prediction, that regime theory was but a passing fad, seems all the more prescient now that scholars of IPE are questioning the possibility that their journals, in Benjamin J. Cohen’s words, are “becoming boring.” For example, he argues that the intellectual prowess of IPE research today is astounding, but that “[i]t’s just not very interesting” (Strange, 1995: 337-342; Cohen, 2010: 887; Aggarwal, 2010: 894). Regime theory, criticizes Strange, is imprecise, woolly, and narrow-minded. She may have well just called it boring herself; it certainly is not a criticism requiring any stretch of the
imagination given that boredom has actually been characterized as a symptom of modernity (Strange, 1995: 337; Kustermans and Ringmar, 2011: 1775-1776).

Keeping this in mind, it may come as no surprise that, nowadays, regime theory may seem as if it has little utility or like it is an outmoded paradigm. But scholars have not lost all interest with the regime concept. In fact, both environmental geopolitics and international law, especially human rights analysis, have found regime theory quite useful. Yet, this may not always be the case. In the example of environmental geopolitics, for instance, a new critical theory has emerged, itself a descendant of IPE: green theory. Green theorists are an outgrowth of the so-called “fourth debate,” and they view themselves as activists offering an alternative to regime theory on matters of ecological significance (Eckersley, 2010: 265-268).

Not only does green theory seek environmental justice, but these theorists seek to elucidate ways to improve the efficacy of environmental regimes. Contrary to the neoliberal globalist approach that seeks to optimize the exploitation of nature, green theorists refuse to accept that capitalist markets and sovereign states are the only actors that matter when it comes to regimes. They seek to “expose the ways in which these social structures serve to thwart the development of more effective environmental initiatives,” and green theory views rationalist regime theory as deficient in this quest. While green political economy has adopted the regime as an analytical concept, green theory defines itself as the opponent of regime theory, especially due to its state-centric focus, a criticism echoing Strange’s concern that state-centeredness hamstrings the paradigm and IPE. Green theorists worry about this because other regimes, such as the trade regime, tend to overshadow environmental concerns. With that in mind, they actually consider establishing a counter-institution to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
such as a World Environment Organization, which itself would welcome the involvement of an array of non-state actors (Strange, 195: 349-351; Eckersley, 2010: 265-268, 272).

Green theory yields little in the way that might help scholars of IPT though, perhaps with the exception of efforts to link environmental stewardship among Christian advocacy groups to the Biblical story of Creation. Jim Wallis (2005) and his magazine and national network of progressive Christian activists, Sojourners, advocate that “caring for God’s earth,” that is, creation or the environment, “is a religious issue” on which political policy should be designed. He suggests that a “Christian insurgency on ecology” is budding, and that its most successful campaign so far, was a 2002 effort to challenge the international politics of oil and U.S. energy dependence by asking “What would Jesus Drive.” He goes further, even suggesting that good theology on the environment may be the only thing left that “can save the Earth now” (Wallis, 2005: xxiii, 353). Given the failure of the international community so far to build a new environmental regime around the issues of climate change and global warming, it is not out of the realm of possibility that such theology could be usefully analyzed under the rubric of Green Theory. Beyond this though, regime theory represents a far superior paradigm in the effort to understand religion in IR, and as Oran R. Young (2012) argues, regime theory is still alive and well. In fact, he says, “regime analysis still has much to offer.”

Moving past regime theory’s flaws, ceteris paribus, an ideational component can emerge and breathe new life into regime theory. As Ernst B. Haas (1995) avers, “regimes are artificial creations designed to bring about particular orderings of values among actors” (27). Following from Modelski’s point that Protestantism ordered international society, this enables transnational religions to function as regimes. Applying regime theory to the global resurgence of religion has
real world consequences then, which might reignite the interest of students by creating new relevance for the paradigm.

So, what are regimes? When John Ruggie first conceived of “international regimes,” he used the concept to depict one form of state interaction necessitated by the rapid growth of science and technology. By his definition, regimes consist of “sets of mutual expectations, generally agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which organizational energies and financial commitments are allocated.” Ruggie goes on to give examples of international regimes that include the World Weather Watch and the international system for safeguarding nuclear materials. Finally, in defining the instrumentalities of regimes, Ruggie suggests that regimes can integrate national behavior to establish more precise systems of ordering and scheduling conduct, or that they can eliminate the “autonomy of action altogether” (Ruggie, 1975: 569-571). This is important, because it can be expanded to the ordering of belief and identity, the purpose of some transnational religious regimes as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 4.

Krasner defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of [IR].” Principles, he elaborates, “are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.” Norms, however, are the “standards of behavior,” usually defined in terms of rights and responsibilities. Meanwhile, rules are specific instructions and prohibitions, or “prescriptions and proscriptions” for action. Finally, Krasner says, decision-making procedures are the prevailing practices that make collective choice possible. Additionally, a hegemon’s leadership may be necessary for a regime’s establishment, but superfluous for its survival; regimes can easily outlast the hegemon responsible for their founding. That said, even if a hegemon is not a necessary actor in the
formation of some regimes, hegemonic powers can still veto the formation of many of them. Regime theory also “presupposes quite a high level of institutionalization,” and can thus be associated with the emergence of international organizations dedicated to administering and enforcing their rules, norms, and principles (Krasner, 1995c: 2; Little, 2011: 298, 305; Modelski, 2012).

Regimes are entities built to manage international complexity,\(^\text{18}\) which increases with interconnectedness (Haas, 1995: 56-59; Krasner, 1995c: 12; Krasner 1995d: 362-363; Modelski, 2012). Indeed, Richard Little (2011) suggests that the establishment of regimes represent “[a]n important dimension of globalization” (296). Noting that globalization has both positive and negative aspects, he points out that technology can make it possible on the one hand, to communicate with someone on the other side of the world, and on the other, to build powerful weapons of mass destruction, to pollute the environment, and to commit criminal activity. As such, it is important that the process of globalization be managed, which is actually the purpose of international regimes. In this line of thought, regime theorists believe that surviving the

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\(^{18}\) Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins (1995) point out that regimes “serve to channel political action within a system and give it meaning.” Interestingly, though, they also point out that for every political system, at every level of analysis, “be it the United Nations, the United States, New York City, or the American Political Science Association, there is a corresponding regime” (Puchala and Hopkins, 1995: 62). This is a fascinating observation, as the general observer might normally disassociate the traditional domestic regime from an international regime. For sure, there are obvious differences in both institutionalization and scale: on the one hand, domestic regimes have typically been in existence for such a long time that they have been formalized to a high degree through local and national bureaucracies; international regimes, on the other, though lacking in the formality of a domestic regime, are not territorially bound and thus operate on a global scale. The idea that domestic and international regimes are conceptually similar then, could have profound ramifications in the study of transnational religious regimes. First, this is because domestic regimes are usually conceived of as democratic, authoritarian, and the like. They can also be characterized as theocratic. Second, the definition advanced by some scholars studying domestic regimes is not only not inconsistent with regime theory, it could be inferred that it further legitimizes the possibility of a transnational religious regime. “As with all regimes,” say David Easton, John G. Gunnell, and Michael B. Stein (1998), “democratic ones may be seen as consisting of three basic elements: institutions, operational rules of the game, and ideologies (goals, preferred rules, and preferred arrangements among political institutions)” (8-9). Recalling that religion, philosophy, and ideology are overlapping phenomenon, and the fact that religion can fall into the category of a TIN, the fact that regimes contain ideology as a basic element then means that they could also contain religion, or at least, aspects of religion, as fundamental elements.
process of globalization “depends upon our capacity to regulate global activity by means of regimes” (Little, 2011: 299).

Of course there are several different kinds of regimes; in Little’s typology, there are three. But first, if there are no formal agreements and no convergence in expectations about rules, there will be no regime at all. Second, if there is an absence of formal rules but informal rules are still expected to be followed, then there is a tacit regime. Third, where formal rules exist without expectations that they be followed (or enforcement mechanisms), there are “dead-letter regimes.” Finally, where there is a high expectation to follow formal rules, there is a “full-blown regime” (Little, 2011: 298). The modern international religious freedom regime might, in certain respects, be a dead-letter regime because, as Snyder cautions, there really might not be any generally agreed upon rules and expectations in this issue area at the international level today. However, regimes have only started proliferating rapidly since the 20th century. Many regimes “pre-date the emergence of the modern state,” and with that in mind, it might be possible to identify full-blown transnational religious regimes in times past (Little, 2011: 296), as shall be demonstrated in the following chapter.

**The Grotian Tradition in Regime Theory and Constructivism**

According to Christian Reus-Smit (2002), constructivism views IR “as deeply social, as a realm of action in which the identities and interests of states and other actors are discursively structured by intersubjective rules, norms, and institutions” (488), while to Young (1995), regimes are patterns of human behavior and practice. In this way, regime theory makes a natural bedfellow for constructivism, because regimes can be seen as social constructions that do not exist or have meaning if they are discussed without reference to human behavior. Regimes, says Young, may not be easy to reform or build from scratch, but they simply “do not exist as ideals
or essences prior to their emergence as outgrowths of patterned human behavior” (Young, 1995: 95). That said, they are without a doubt, a type of “rule-governed activity within the international system” (Little, 2011: 296), making them great subjects to study under Kubálková’s rule oriented constructivism. And though some authors, such as Little (2011), only acknowledge a liberal institutionalist and realist school of thought in regime theory (301), others, such as Young (2012), insist that one of the paradigm’s most attractive features “is that it is compatible with many varieties of […] constructivism.” Even Krasner (1995c) admits that some regime theorists, including Young, Puchala, and Hopkins, “are strongly informed by the Grotian tradition, which sees regimes as a pervasive phenomenon of all political systems.” Indeed, the Grotian analysts see power, norms, customs, and knowledge all as factors playing a role in regime formation. Many of these factors are made manifest through a variety of non-state actors, so one could assume that religious actors might play a role here too (Krasner, 1995c: 6, 8-10, 20-21).

The Grotian tradition of IRT and international law derives its name from Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth century jurist credited for conceiving the concept of “international society” that has strongly influenced the English School of IRT. The Grotian tradition, according to A. Claire Cutler (1991), conceptualizes the politics of international affairs as largely taking place within the framework of an international society responsible for binding states through rules, morals, and international law. She emphasizes that the Grotian tradition “directs attention to the ‘rules which constitute and govern political life within and between sovereign states’” (Cutler, 1991: 41). Largely associated with the English School of IRT, there have been noteworthy attempts that associate the Grotian tradition with constructivism as well (see, for instance, Wendt, 1999: 3). In fact, Timothy Dunne (1995) argues that first generation English School theorists, such as
Martin Wight and Headley Bull, are in fact “classical constructivists,” while a new generation of constructivists, including Wendt, can be classified as “neoconstructivists.” Though the English School and constructivism do represent two distinct and “bounded” bodies of theory, their overlap and mutual affinity to the international society tradition does clearly demonstrate that both paradigms represent an aspect of the Grotian tradition (Dunne, 1995: 384; Reus-Smit, 2002: 487-490). This makes a synthesis of regime theory and constructivism all the more palatable. Interestingly though, this synthesis is made even more compelling by the fact that some see regime theory and the international society concept as being born out of the same tradition, while also arguing that international society functions as the politico-legal “foundation on which the whole idea of regimes rests” (Buzan, 1993: 328, 350).

Now, to elucidate the manner in which this new synthesis of regime theory and linguistic constructivism may be applied to the study of religion in IR, it is essential to turn to the Roman Empire, circa 300 AD.
Chapter 4 – The Christianization of the Roman Empire, 284-397 AD

The Roman Emperor Diocletian (r. 284-305) was responsible for briefly ending a period of instability that had befallen the empire. Recognizing that the polity was too large for a single ruler, he established the tetrarchy in 293, dividing executive responsibilities among four rulers. Though this would ultimately prove an unsustainable arrangement, Diocletian prevented his would-be rivals from rising against him by dividing the empire into two separate halves, and by appointing himself the senior-most emperor. Seeking to further solidify order, he took a conservative position, reestablishing traditional institutions and practices. Thus, religion also came to play an important role in his efforts to rebuild the fractured empire, which is why, in 303, Diocletian reportedly launched “the Great Persecution” against an NRM—“the Jesus movement”—that had recently grown to prominence within the empire. Foreshadowed by a purge of Christians from the military and bureaucracy, a series of four edicts that, according to one documentary, amounted to “a final solution for Christians,” ordered Christian scriptures destroyed, churches torn down, and forced sacrifices to the Roman deities as an alternative to execution (Pohlsander, 1996: 9-10; Roos and Katz, 2001).

The First Regime: Paganism and Superstitio

The irony of all this was that the extant religious regime had been constructed to serve the empire by promoting an early form of religious pluralism. Harold Mattingly describes Roman paganism as “usually carelessly tolerant” (Mattingly, 1967: 33). This regime of inclusion was designed to welcome (and assimilate) newly conquered subjects into the empire as a means by which to prevent their alienation and to ensure stability. As an ancient globalizer, Rome was an expansionist power that had to accommodate foreign cultures, cults, and philosophies as its sphere of influence expanded beyond the confines of the Italian peninsula. Though neither
monolithic nor united, Roman Paganism under the umbrella of a single pantheon paradoxically evolved into a unifying force of sorts. In such a “fluid and amorphous” context, Roman Paganism facilitated the coexistence of, *inter alia*, Persian, Egyptian, and Greek practices (Lunn-Rockliffe, 2011).

Under this early transnational\(^\text{19}\) regime, however, religion had to demonstrate civic *utilitas* (usefulness). In cities throughout the empire, religion was thereafter inextricably linked to both social and political life, because honoring the gods guaranteed the wellbeing of the cities and the empire itself—*res publica*. Further, the tolerance regime bound the citizenry of the empire together by fostering a “spirit of kinship and mutual responsibility” (Wilkin, 1990: 18). Religion, according to Cicero, was about piety towards the gods, the disappearance of which would “entail the disappearance of loyalty and social union among men” (Cicero quoted in Wilkin, 1990: 18).

The Romans perceived Christianity as a superstitious cult; *superstitio* connotes not just superstition in the modern sense, but an otherness that distinguished Christians from the rest of society. Where religion sustained the life of the Roman state, Christian superstition was perceived as undermining it. It was believed that *superstitio* led to impiety. Since Roman conceptions of piety were civic expressions of loyalty and obedience to custom and tradition, as well as expressions of reverence to the gods, Christian *superstitio* and impiety were perceived as threats to imperial stability. Hence, Christian persecution was both political and spiritual (Wilkin, 1990: 17-19), and it—along with the persecution of other groups, such as the

\(^\text{19}\) The terms, “transnational,” and “international,” can be misleading when applied to Antiquity or the Middle Ages. They are used here for lack of a better term, as the empire’s massive size would have allowed it to cross the boundaries of various groups loosely described as nations. Moreover, the terms certainly make sense when referring to the Eastern Roman Empire and Western Roman Empire as separate political units. Otherwise, the fact that the term “catholic” translates to “universal” illustrates that this regime was meant to be global in scope.
Manicheans—was ironically meant to protect the extant regime that might otherwise promote diversity and eclecticism.

In spite of this, the tetrarchy was inherently unsustainable. Upon his retirement in 305, Diocletian had to watch as the tetrarchy sparked a new civil war. In 312, Constantine the Great (r. 306-337), launched a campaign from the British Isles to conquer Rome (MacCulloch, 2009: 189). Eusebius, Constantine’s hagiographer, chronicles that the emperor:

> surveyed the other parts of the world, so that he might bring healing where help was needed. When he then perceived that the whole earthly element was like a great body, and next became aware that the head of the whole, the imperial city of the Roman Empire, lay oppressed in bondage to a tyrant […], he declared that his life was not worth living if he were to allow the imperial city to remain in such a plight, and began preparations to overthrow the tyranny (Eusebius, 1999: 79).

Just outside of Rome, Constantine allegedly converted to Christianity. On the eve of a battle with rival, Maxentius, Constantine apparently saw a sign from God, a cross, and the words “in this sign you shall conquer.” So, his men marked their shields with the Chi-Rho, and at the battle of the Mulvian Bridge, Constantine’s forces routed Maxentius (Mattingly, 1967: 59; Eusebius, 1999: 80-82; Roos and Katz, 2001; MacCulloch, 2009: 189).

**Constantine and the Edict of Milan: Towards a Second Regime**

Constantine, maybe to reward the Christian faith for his victory, issued the Edict of Milan in the following year, officially expanding tolerance to Christians throughout the empire. Though it was a logical addendum to the preexisting regime, in many ways, the edict marked the beginning of a new transnational religious regime. First, it was an international agreement between the eastern and western emperors: both Constantine and Licinius (r. 308-324), his eastern counterpart, pledged toleration of all religions in their respective territories (Roos and Katz, 2001; Goalwin, 2007: 7-8). Second, Krasner (1995c) argues that “[c]hanges in principles
and norms are changes of the regime itself” (4; Krasner’s emphasis). Here, with the Edict of Milan, by altering Roman norms to allow Christianity the right to exist, Constantine and Licinius effectively changed the religious regime.

In 324, Licinius breached the regime by instituting a new wave of persecution against the Christians of the eastern empire. Furthermore, Licinius attempted to rally eastern pagans to his cause in an effort to sully the regime, and to undermine Constantine’s authority. Using the breach of the Edict of Milan as justification, Constantine “wasted no time coming to the defense of Christians in the Eastern Empire” (Mattingly, 1967: 60; Roos and Katz, 2001; Goalwin, 2007: 7-8). By 324, the emperor finally defeated his only remaining rival claimant to imperial power; and when Licinius was subsequently put to death, the empire was once again reunited (Mattingly, 1967: 60).

After decades of internecine war, Constantine’s paramount objective was the maintenance of political unity. In Christianity, he found “one of his most powerful tools in his quest to attain that unity” (Goalwin, 2007: 6-7). However, Mattingly muses, “undoubtedly inspired by the hope that the united Church would make an admirable partner for his united empire,” Constantine was likely dismayed to learn that even this minority religion, with its monotheism, was rife with internal fissures (Mattingly, 1967: 61). With political stability in mind, Constantine’s primary concern was that “the attitude towards the Divinity of all the provinces should be united in one consistent view.” His secondary concern was that the “body of the republic” be healed. Constantine told Eusebius:

I knew that if I were to establish a general concord among the servants of God in accordance with my prayers, the course of public affairs would also enjoy the change consonant with the pious desires of all (Constantine quoted in Eusebius, 1999: 116).
Hence, Constantine found reason to intervene directly in church affairs. Religious unity was a matter of imperial unity; so, he sought to quell various heresies and to reconcile theological rifts. “Indeed,” says Constantine:

when [...] those who had dared with ill-considered frivolity to split the worship of the [African] population into various factions, and when I personally desired to put right this disease, the only cure sufficient for the affair that I could think of was that [...] I might send some of you to help towards the reconciliation of those at variance with each other (Constantine quoted in Eusebius, 1999: 116).

Regime theory dictates that actors must have decision-making procedures around which their expectations can converge in a given area of world affairs. Understanding the integral role that Christianity could play in unifying the empire, Constantine therefore called the first ecumenical council of the church in 325. Dispatching letters to bishops all over the empire, he summoned them to Nicaea, setting a precedent for decision-making in the religious regime for centuries to come (Krasner, 1995c: 2; Leclercq, 1911).

Linguistic constructivists might surely agree about the importance of the First Council of Nicaea, for it played an important role in shaping Roman and Christian identity vis-à-vis the promulgation of the church’s first official common profession of faith: the Nicene Creed. In Kubálková’s ontology, words and speech acts matter. Recall that O’Connell insists that speech acts are what knit communities together. Nicaea dispensed with the overwhelming diversity of Christianity first by deliberating and defining the nature of Jesus. Confronted with the Arian heresy, which held that Jesus was not one with God, Constantine and the bishops at Nicaea had to wrestle with the nature of Christ. In defining Christ’s identity, they were defining their own; and in a vote of 300 to 3, the council confirmed that Jesus was in fact one with God the Father (Mattingly, 1967: 61; Roos and Katz, 2001), a fact echoed in the Nicene Creed:
We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, […] And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, and born of the Father before all ages. God of God, light of light, true God of true God. Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father, by whom all things were made (Nicene Creed quoted in Joseph Wilhelm, 1911).

The Nicene Creed was pivotal in the Roman religious regime, not least because it was an oath to which all Christians were expected to adhere (Roos and Katz, 2001), but in defining the identity of Christ, it established a “belief of fact,” or one of the major principles of the regime.

Regimes are not exclusively decision-making procedures or principles though. They are a web of these things, but also rules and norms. Linguistic constructivism shows that rules follow from speech acts (Kubálková, 2000: 691), such as the recitation of the Nicene Creed. Accordingly, Nicholas Onuf explains that assertive rules are used to help individuals “make sense of their situation through conjecture and ceremony” (Onuf quoted in Kubálková, 2000: 691). In fact, one of Constantine’s chief aims at the Council of Nicaea was to place one Christian festival—or ceremony—at the center of the religious regime. In fact, the emperor perceived Easter as the core of the new religion. However, as a leader that placed “great importance to the externals of religious observance,” he “must have been shocked to find different Churches celebrating the feast on different days” (Jones, 1949: 166; Mack, 1996: 288). According to Eusebius, Constantine once asked if anything could be better for the empire than celebrating the Easter festival “invariably in every community on one system and declared principle” (Constantine quoted in Eusebius, 1999: 128). By resolving the Easter calendar problem, and requiring that Christians attend its associated festival, the regime not only started issuing assertive rules, but Constantine was able to place a single day at its center.

Kubálková expands on Onuf, noting that religion itself is a possible manifestation of assertive rules. Joining both O’Connell and Modelski, she connects the emotional importance of
religion to human experience. Through religion, assertive rules with strong emotional appeal will be more attractive than those without. She reinforces the idea of religious regimes noting that “the social arrangement consistent with religion […] has been that of informal networks and associations, stressing the status of ‘priests,’” who themselves are important rule givers. In fact, “priests,” she continues, “deploy rules telling us what we should believe and how we should act. These are instruction-rules” (Kubálková, 2000: 691, 694; Kubálková, 2006: 145).

What better source could a priest, or an entire religious regime for that matter, invoke to promote rules and norms, than holy texts? It took nearly 300 years after the death of Jesus to complete the first Christian Bible, not least because early Christianity possessed multitudinous texts, including a number of books not found in the modern Bible, such as the Gospel of Thomas, the Gospel of the Egyptians, and the Revelation of Peter. These books, while not necessarily discarded by the majority of Christianity, did represent a source of division. Books like the Gospel of the Egyptians, for instance, inspired the proliferation of Gnostic sects, a problem that could not be tolerated after dispensing with the Arian heresy. Without a single, agreed upon Bible, different communities and congregations all over the Roman Empire had their own collections that, along with traditional books of the New Testament, included some of these rarer tomes. Thus, in a process that began with Nicaea, and lasted into the 390s, Constantine and the bishops of the empire found it necessary to devise a uniform Bible (Roos and Katz, 2001).

Establishing the biblical cannon was the penultimate step in the process of creating an exclusively Christian religio-identity regime. After all, the Bible is undoubtedly a source of commandments (read: rules), and the morality inherent in the New Testament would certainly have been of normative value to the empire. Contrary to popular belief, neither the Council of Nicaea nor Constantine was directly responsible for codifying the Christian Bible. Still, this was
a process that likely began when the emperor commissioned Eusebius to “order fifty volumes” for the purpose of “reading in church” (Eusebius, 1999: 166-167; Roos and Katz, 2001).

Eusebius, who had already compiled a list of “acknowledged books,” probably used the same in the Bibles commissioned for Constantine. Indeed, David L. Dungan (2007) argues, this amounted “to de facto implementation of Eusebius’s [list] as the standard Bible of the Catholic Church” (95). Even if this was the case, the actual enumeration of books was not officially announced until 367 by Saint Athanasius. Then, finally, the Synod of Hippo in 393 and the Council of Carthage in 397 cemented the texts in the New Testament, creating a Bible that is largely still used by modern Christians (Roos and Katz, 2001; Dungan, 2007: 134).

Theodosius and the Third Regime

To this point, the history of the Roman Empire’s religio-identity regimes has proceeded in two phases. First, prior to the issuance of the Edict of Milan, a pagan-based tolerance regime meant to welcome newly conquered subjects into the empire generally fostered eclecticism, while excluding the so-called superstitious NRMs, like the early “Jesus Movement.” Religious, philosophical, and cultural diversity was accepted, so long as its civic utility brought the favor of the gods to the empire. After the edict, the regime began anew. Its gradual evolution made this religio-identity regime a transitional one, for the most dramatic—even revolutionary—change to the regime would not occur until well after Constantine’s death, under the reign of one of his successors: Theodosius I (r. 379-395).

Under Theodosius, the imperial policy of religious freedom, however limited, was brought to an end. In 380, he issued the Edict of Thessalonica, officially declaring Christianity the state religion of the whole Roman Empire. Then, in 391, pagan practices were brought to an end, their temples shuttered. This not only completed the conversion of the Roman Empire to
Christianity, it finally concluded the construction of a purely Christian Roman religio-identity regime (“Banning of Other Religions,” 1997; Matthew Bunson, 2002: 534). The regime was made manifest by the Church, and though the decline of the empire was imminent, both the regime and the Church itself lived on. It is not entirely uncommon, so the regime theorists speculate, for one to outlive the hegemon responsible for its founding. Though this transnational (or catholic) regime would eventually give way to the tumult of the Reformation, it shaped European identity for centuries, even metastasizing into medieval Christendom. To this day, it may be the only regime to ever evolve into an actual territorially bound polity: the Papal States, or Vatican City in its present incarnation. And none of this could have happened save for Constantine’s need to redefine Roman identity.
Chapter 5 – Religion and Social Science in U.S. Foreign Policy: Iran and Vietnam

The religious regime established by the Roman Empire eventually collapsed in the turmoil of the Reformation. But, did the Protestant religious regime that emerged from its ashes truly collapse in 1960 as argued by Thomas? The globalization of secularism and the emergence of the secularization thesis in academic circles may lead scholars to answer in the affirmative. Indeed, the idea that religion would fade into historical oblivion was so strong that foreign policy experts at both the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed to forecast the 1970 Islamic Revolution in Iran. But, a closer look at the regime dynamics, especially the ideational principal of anti-Catholicism, during the Cold War, and especially in the Vietnam conflict might limn a different portrait. First, however, it is necessary to tackle the issue of secularization.

The Globalization of Secularism and the Secularization Thesis

The secularization thesis became prominent in social scientific thought during the 1950s and 1960s, when “every major religion on every continent seemed to be rapidly losing its influence on politics, economics, and culture.” It was a time when Peter Berger, a leading sociologist, composed the epitaph for religion, predicting that, by the 21st century, communities of faith would likely be huddled in small groups in an effort to resist a global culture of secularism. It was a period when Time magazine printed issues boldly emblazoned with the nietzschean question, “Is God Dead?” And, it was a time when the president of the U.S. broke with his predecessors’ tradition of public piety bystrictly relegating religion to the private portion of his life (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 1; Preston, 2012: 504). As a matter of fact, the secularization thesis came of age when all signs seemed to portend the decline of religion. Not
only had the world just witnessed the horrors of two World Wars, each products of the "idolatrous and unaccountable authority of the Westphalian sovereign state" (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 178-179), it also saw a belt of countries, starting with Turkey and stretching all the way through Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India20 embark on programs of secularization throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Esposito, 1984: 95-100, 120-125; Embree, 2003: 39-42; Barfield, 2010: 159-160, 228, 231; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 11-12; DeVine, 2012: 24). Furthermore, the ideologically driven Cold War divided the world into three camps (communist, capitalist, and nonaligned), a trifurcation that may have ultimately been responsible, if only temporarily, for the suppression of identity-based conflicts.21

20 Interestingly, this belt of countries represents a large swath of a region often referred to by evangelical Christian missionaries as the “10/40 window.” Named for a swath of territory stretching from Africa through the Middle East to Asia between the 10th and 40th north latitudes, the concept of the 10/40 window was conceived of in 1989 by Luis Bush, an evangelist that believed the extremely poor inhabitants of the region had been “enslaved” by Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and, according to a Time article on the subject, Satan. This approach holds a special place for millennialist Christians too, as many evangelical missionaries believe that by spreading the Gospel to “every nation” they will trigger “the long-awaited end times.” Additionally, the 10/40 window is a geo-religious paradox, simultaneously perceived by evangelicals as the most important site for missionary activity in the world, and deeply impoverished on a spiritual level. To say nothing of the fact that Jesus of Nazareth was born and raised within the window, in missionary-speak of course, this is due to the fact that the region is “unreached” by Christianity. Needless to say, framing the 10/40 window as a bastion of slavery insinuates a need for liberation. Perhaps this is why Bush once told his followers to “[p]ut on the full armor of God and fight with the weapons of spiritual warfare.” He was not explicitly advocating the use of military force within the window, but some missionaries have entered post-invasion Iraq, for instance, saying that “diplomacy does not work with Satan,” and without regard for the fact that their intrusion might provoke hostility; others simply bandwagon on the human rights agenda, advocating for the “persecuted Church” within the 10/40 window under the pretense of supporting religious freedom abroad. Mixing in the 10/40 cauldron, many would likely agree that these ingredients complicate an already complex geopolitical situation, which explains at least one reason why the 10/40 window is forecasted to be a source of international instability for decades to come (Van Biema, 2003; McAlister, 2005: 252; McAlister, 2008: 20; Liotta and Miskel, 2009; Woods, 2012: 209).

21 Consensus on this assertion is strong. Indeed, it can be inferred from Huntington’s “clash of civilizations thesis” (1993: 22-23; 2003), and Douglas Johnston, the founder of the ICRD, makes this case explicitly (1995: 3-4; 2003: 5). Not to beat the proverbial “dead horse,” but the seminal texts on the reemergence of culture and identity in IR are also post-Cold War tracts (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1995; Katzenstein, 1996a). Indeed, Katzenstein (1996b) argues that the end of the Cold War replaced existing national security issues with new ones, including issues of ethnic conflict, migration and refugee flows, environmental degradation, “and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion” (7). However, even during the Cold War, religion did have at least rhetorical significance. During the earliest years of the Cold War, many Americans spoke of “godless communism,” because communism was perceived as a challenge to the West’s Christian self-identity. This was particularly the case in the U.S., where Christianity became a “prerequisite for patriotic citizenship.” Moreover, no group was more “robustly anticommunist” than American Catholics. In fact, the Catholic Church launched, for lack of a better term, a crusade against communism, which reached its pinnacle in Joseph McCarthy’s efforts to root out communist sympathizers and spies in the U.S. (Aiello, 2005; Preston, 2012:
None of this, however, says anything of the data. Unsurprisingly, quantifiable trends underpinned the belief that modernization, societal progress, and secularism were all intertwined. Polling confirms that church attendance among U.S. Catholics dropped from 75% in 1955 to 50% in 1985, a trend augured by the astonishing growth rate of individuals self-identifying as atheists. There were only 226,120 in 1900, and 165,400,320 by 1970, making for an exponential increase over a period of only seventy years (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 2001; Saad, 2009).22 Finally, the secularization thesis was further legitimized when Russia, a bastion of Christianity, and China, home to the world’s largest population, each became officially atheist states (Walls, 1995: 7; de Burgh, 2006: 115).

By the 1960s, religion’s influence over public life had diminished significantly, especially compared in the grand scheme of history to its prominence in the Middle Ages. Religion legitimately appeared to be “in global retreat” as a result of secularization, that is, the process through which societies are freed from the primacy of religion, religious institutions, and religious symbols. The secularization of public life was not, in the words of Toft, Philpott, and Shah, “simply an atheist phantasm” (2011: 10-11). However, it was driven, ironically, by the same forces that are today driving religion’s resurgence—namely globalization, but also its companions: technological modernization, democratization, economic development, industrialization, and urbanization (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 14-15, 77-78, 209). Given all of this, scholars like Berger can be forgiven for their predictions.

470). Of course, even in the latter years of the Cold War, religion had a vital role to play in the downfall of communism. Pope John Paul II’s historic visits to Poland and public support for the Solidarity movement were instrumental in bringing about the end of the Cold War (Thomas, 2005: 3-7; O’Sullivan, 2006; Herrington, 2011c).22 These data on atheist self-identification are also available in an excellent and highly informative graph that charts and forecasts global trends in the demographics of religion at http://www.gem-werc.org/gd/wct-1-2.pdf (accessed 28 April 2012).
The secularization thesis retained its predominant position in Sociology until the 1990s, but it actually represents the analogue to an earlier school of thought: modernization theory, Political Science’s principal paradigm from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Modernization theory, which posits that the forces of modernization—indeed, all of the forces associated with globalization mentioned above—would “lead to the demise of primordial factors” in identity formation, focuses primarily on ethnicity. Of course, the secularization thesis is essentially a subset of this paradigm, so the former clearly could have been extended to “traditional” religions as well. Together, these two progressive theories of development suggest that societal modernization marginalizes religion as a consequence of the shifting sources of legitimacy invoked by the modern nation-state. Said differently, the nation-state no longer derives its legitimacy solely or primarily from the gods, God, or other supernatural forces. Instead, its foundation in rational thought, bureaucracy, and legalistic principles encourages the state to search out the will of the people and scientific discovery for its legitimacy (Fox and Shmuel, 2004: 10-11). If these paradigms had held true, religion, and piety more broadly, would have been indiscriminately relegated to the private sphere of human life (Haynes, 2007: 8).

Interestingly, this could have more to do with the apparent demise of the transnational religious regime than the alleged significance of Kennedy’s election and his so-called triumph over anti-Catholicism.

President Kennedy and the end of the religious regime aside, that the secularization thesis evolved into a core assumption of the social sciences, even reaching, according to Jeffrey K. Hadden, “the level of a doctrine or ideology that resulted in the idea rarely being subjected to any real scrutiny,” is undisputed (Haynes, 2007: 9; Hadden paraphrased in Fox and Sandler, 2004: 11). Indeed, the idea that religion would fade as an important force in public life animated
various scholarly ideas. Maryann Cusimano Love (2010), for instance, contests that Realism, though it “denounced the rise of ‘Godless’ Communism,” was “Godless” itself. Moreover, she stresses, Idealism, Marxism, and dependency theory, *inter alia*, all “discount the role and study of religion in international politics” (Love, 2010: 174). Haynes (2007) agrees that dependency theory is overly secular. In fact, he traces the genealogy of dependency theory to modernization theory and the secularization thesis. Given that the former school of thought originated in the 1960s, when the secularization thesis was widely unchallenged, Haynes reasons that dependency theory implicitly accepts “that the course of both international relations and of integrated nation-states lay squarely in participatory politics” (2007: 9-10). These claims may be too harsh though.

**Religion and Dependencia**

Neither Love nor Haynes substantiates their claims with anything more than circumstantial evidence to support their arguments, which is regrettable since these assertions seem to give way under interrogation. Haynes (2012b), for instance, levels his accusations against dependency theory simply because it never directly addresses matters of religion, and he further assumes that this topical exclusion is evidence that dependency theorists did not take religion seriously in their pronouncements. From a theory of economic development, though, absence should not be mistaken with rejection. Indeed, in a more accurate representation of dependency theory’s origins, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) trace the theory to Karl Marx, who viewed religion as the opiate of the masses, and believed religion was an instrument to determine the direction of society (49). In this way, dependency theorists could surely agree that religion may have been used by core states to keep the periphery in check (through the transnational religious regime, perhaps). Beyond this, missionaries can be viewed as harbingers
of cultural imperialism, as in the case of Buganda, where “the flag followed the cross” (Curtin, 2002: 125). Then, finally, there is liberation theology, which could not have existed without dependency theory. Indeed, removing the dependency paradigm from the foundations of liberation theology fundamentally alters the spirit and logic of the latter (Smith, 1991: 230). Critics of liberation theology even criticize its proponents “because of their excessive reliance on dependencia,” something they consider “a discredited theory […] that ignores the need for promotion of the domestic source of productivity and entrepreneurship” (Sigmund, 1993: 340).

First, the absence of religion from dependency theory, or dependencia, is easily understood when put into the wider context of methodological distinctions between it and modernization theory. Dependencia is not an outgrowth of modernization theory; rather, it is a response to the latter. Both modernization and dependency theory, say J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (1978):

> are two sharply different perspectives seeking to explain the same reality. They originated in different areas, with different evaluative judgments, different assumptions, different methodologies, and different explanations (536).

Modernization theory focuses on social organization, value systems, and the features of traditional society, and assumes that traditionalist values and institutions (the Catholic Church, for example) are the most prominent roadblocks on the path to development and modernization. In the case of Latin American development—the region of which dependency theory is primarily focused—modernization theory considers religion the fatal remnant of colonial history responsible for undermining social, economic, and political development. Following this through to its logical fruition, the values of Catholicism, for instance, allegedly contribute “to ‘irrational’ patterns of behavior highly detrimental to modernization” (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978: 537-538, 540-541).
*Dependencia*, on the other hand, rejects modernization theory’s assumption that the national society ought to be the key unit of analysis. As such, notes Valenzuela and Valenzuela, “[t]he domestic cultural and institutional features of Latin America are in themselves simply not the key variables accounting for the relative backwardness of the area” (1978: 544; emphasis added). To the dependency theorist then, Catholicism in Latin America may be an intervening variable at best, not because religion does not matter, but because it is simply not the subject under study. Thus, when one important contributor on the subject, Osvaldo Sunkel (1972), fails to discuss religion in an article on big business, it is not because religion has not played a role in core-periphery relations, but because his analysis simply focuses on multinational corporations.

Of course, religion can act as an intervening variable in *Dependencia*, because internal constraints, such as social structure can in fact impact development. Nevertheless, while religion may differentiate a modern society from one in the developing world, “it does not explain the origins of modernity in some contexts and the lack of modernity in others” (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978: 544; Mingst, 2008: 71).

Second, if dependency theory is traced to its Marxist origins, then these internal constraints on development can be elaborated upon. That is, social forces distinct from religious actors (i.e. classes) can set the agenda for a society while manipulating religion for the purposes of enforcing said agenda. At the heart of this belief is Marx’s indictment that religion is actually the opiate of the masses, a tool used to drug and manipulate the public. According to Fox and

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23 This is contrary to Haynes (2012b) assertion; in an e-mail to the author, Haynes suggest that both modernization and dependency theory came of age in an era where development theory in general “discounted the importance of ‘traditional’ religion.” This may be true in the case of modernization theory, but its simply irrelevant to *Dependencia*.

24 This holds true throughout the dependency literature. Though Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1986)—two other leading dependency theorists—admittedly omit religion from their list of “social forces” responsible for the orientation of industrialization, their essay is about exactly that, *industrialization*, making the forces they do list—the bourgeoisie and trade unions, to name two—the most important, most relevant subjects of study (153-154).
Sandler, the Marxist position is that religion is used by the bourgeoisie to “keep those at the bottom of the economic ladder in line.” Furthermore, they argue that this position is found, at least indirectly, in the dependency literature. Though “most of the literature,” Fox and Sandler argue, “does not directly address religion,” this Marxist idea is consistent with Dependencia, because one could argue that religion keeps periphery states in check (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 49). By extension, religion can also function as an agent of imperialism. Take the case of Buganda for example. According to Philip D. Curtin (2002), Christian missionaries infiltrated Buganda, where they were welcomed because of the guns and technical knowledge they could provide. In a conflict between Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims, missionaries in Buganda triggered the deployment of forces from the Imperial British East African Company, which led to the annexation of the territory and the establishment of the Uganda Protectorate. Though this ultimately led to the rise of a “modernizing oligarchy,” it was an oligarchy led by Protestants, illustrating how “missionary penetration” can lead to colonialism (Curtin, 2002: 122-127).

Finally, there is the issue of liberation theology, which could not have evolved without Dependencia at its base. Liberation theology represents the fusion of the Catholic religion with Marxist ideology that was used from the 1960s to the 1980s by low level clerics within the Catholic hierarchy of the Latin American churches to advocate for the rights of the poor and against the disagreeable policies of the elite and government. It borrowed from the social sciences, especially from Marxism, to create a politically driven social justice movement that considered Jesus a revolutionary figure for standing up against the establishment of his own time. Indeed, liberation theology advocated a gospel of revolution (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 41; O’Sullivan, 2006), and drew uncritically on dependency theory not least because dependency is perceived as being the most important element of Latin America’s politico-economic reality.
Moreover, since dependencia blames core states for the periphery’s problems, liberation theologians came to stress “liberation” from the oppressive, dependency-promoting structures of life. Consequently, liberation itself evolved into a struggle to end the patterns of social injustice and socio-economic dependency that characterize Latin America (Dodson, 1979: 208, 210; Sigmund, 1993: 337-338). Dependency theory thus played an integral role in the development of liberation theology, and without the former, liberation theology would become something entirely different (Smith, 1991: 230; Aguas, 2007).

Modernization and Foreign Policy: Towards an Irreligious Regime?

Although dependency theory may not be quite as reliant on modernization theory or the secularization thesis as one might think at first glance, it remains very “difficult to overemphasize the extent to which these paradigms were dominant in the social sciences during much of the twentieth century,” Fox and Sandler maintain. Actually, their ubiquity spread beyond the social sciences, infecting the humanities and even policymaking circles. After his election, says the diplomatic historian Andrew Preston (2012), Present Kennedy “was concerned not to let it appear that his faith was determining his policies, including his foreign policy.” Though religious faith was the basis of distinction between East and West, Kennedy repeated on various occasions that religion could not be regarded as a weapon in the Cold War. Instead, modernization theory became that weapon. As such, the modernization theorists who had been exiled to Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) during the Eisenhower

25 Thomas F. Madden (1999), for instance, an authority on the Crusades, points out that scholars living through the end of imperialism, and the influence of positivism on academia, confused the crusades with a colonial venture, suggesting “the night they burned down the mountain that men travelled to the Middle East for wealth alone, using piety only as a pretext for their adventurism. Indeed, these same historians were influenced by the same post-Enlightenment views of religiosity that led social scientists to take matters of faith for granted. Positivism, that is, left many scholars presuming “that medieval men and women could not possibly take seriously the pious words they uttered and wrote.” However, the newer historiography does in fact recognize that medieval society was far different than its modern successor, and that many of the people who joined the crusades really did do so “from a simple and sincere love of God” (Madden, 1999: 11-13).
administration found new relevance in Kennedy’s Washington. They filled the ranks of the National Security Council (NSC); they flooded the U.S. Department of State; and they were led by Walt Whitman Rostow, a professor who advised the Kennedy administration, and worked at MIT’s Center for International Studies, which was itself financed by the CIA (Blackmer, 2002; Fox and Sandler, 2004: 11; Preston, 2012: 510-511).

Rostow and the modernization theorists influenced the Kennedy administration in a way that transformed federal aid programs to the developing world. Under their intellectual leadership, the focus of aid became about nation-building and the promotion of self-sustaining economic growth. Moreover, the programs launched by Kennedy as a result of Rostow’s influence sought to promote U.S.-style economic progress, modernization, and development. So, while the acolytes of modernization theory might, at first glance, appeared to have taken religion’s decline as a given, and though some may have preferred to displace the transnational religious regime with a secular regime, their efforts actually conformed to the contours of the religious regime in interesting ways. Specifically, since modernization theorists actually advocated against “traditional” social structures, including traditional religion in, for example, Latin America, their theory would inevitably usurp the transnational religious regime’s inherent anti-Catholicism.

As Valenzuela and Valenzuela aver, modernization theorists saw “[t]he values of Catholicism, of large Indian populations, or aristocratic rural elites” as contributing to “irrational” behaviors at the expense of true modernization. Moreover, contends Seymour Martin Lipset (1967), countries such as the U.S., and the other former colonial holdings of Great Britain, contrast from Latin American states for one key reason: they had derived their values
from the Protestant Ethic,\textsuperscript{26} which encourages worldly work, while the Latin American states were trapped in feudal social systems by their Catholicism (Lipset 1967; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1977: 540-541; and Haefele 2003: 81-83). In other words, modernization theorists reinforced the idea that Protestantism was responsible for undergirding Western hegemony and development. Working from the predisposition that Protestantism furthers development then, modernization theorists revealed that they were not as irreligious as previously believed, whilst also subtly coopting the transnational religious regime’s anti-Catholicism—and this, in an age when Kennedy’s election was to have heralded the end of anti-Catholicism as an element of U.S. and Western identity. Nevertheless, the modernization theorists in Kennedy’s administration did obscure the role of religion in foreign policy and IR, which may have transformed the religious regime into a more tacit regime than it had been, even after World War II. Consequently, while religion may have always mattered, experts in the national security and foreign policy community were blinded to its effects. Having taken religion’s continued role as a variable in human life for granted, agencies such as the CIA and State Department would inevitably be caught off guard by events such as the Iranian revolution, a virulent manifestation of the global resurgence of religion.

\textbf{The Iranian Revolution}

In August 1953, the CIA—likely in collusion with British MI6—successfully orchestrated the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, thus securing the tenuous position of the regime’s constitutional monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Both

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\textsuperscript{26} George and Sylvia Modelski (1988) point out that in attempting to determine the sources of great success in capital accumulation by Protestants, Weber may have inadvertently offered at least a partial answer to the question of Protestant predominance in positions of global leadership starting with the Dutch long cycle and continuing to the present. Modelski and Modelski elaborate on this, noting that especially from Calvinism, with its doctrine of double predestination, one can perceive the origins of the Protestant Ethic, which “developed, in those who accepted it, inner strength and confidence, favourable conditions for the exercise of leadership of all kinds” (Modelski and Modelski, 1988: 110-113; emphasis added).
the Shah and his father had promoted salubrious relations with the West, and the U.S. could hardly find a better ally during the Cold War than Pahlavi Iran. However, both Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah implemented a top-down secularization program—the submission of sharia courts to the Ministry of Justice, and the reduction of those courts jurisdictions to matters of marriage and divorce, a banning of the veil, and the implementation of a Westernized dress code for men, the restriction of polygamy, enfranchisement of women, the secularization of education, and the attempted halt of the hajj, or the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca—that alienated the nation’s clerical elites, a group with a consistent penchant for revolutionary activity in Iran. However, since academics and foreign policy elites generally recoil at the thought that religion could really matter in the material world, they failed to comprehend the involvement of Iran’s clerics in revolutionary activity. This fact might have been discerned by the CIA before the revolution, but when analyst Ernest Oney suggested a study of Iran’s religious leaders, his proposal was rejected and dismissed as “sociology,” a phrase “used in intelligence circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant” (Esposito, 1984: 120-121; Luttwak, 1995: 12-13; emphasis added; Risen, 2000; Herrington, 2011b; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 11-12).

As a matter of fact, argues James A. Bill (1988), “experienced analysts,” knowledgeable of Iranian culture and politics “were routinely ignored.” They were even mocked; after Oney’s idea was dismissed by his superiors, others in the government came to refer to him condescendingly as “Mullah Ernie” (Bill, 1988: 417). Of course, the State Department also carries some of the blame for this narrow-sighted misreading of the Iranian revolution.

According to John L. Esposito (1984), the department’s Middle East experts on Iran avidly
“insisted that nationalism remained the dominant political force in that country and that the prevailing religious fervor [of the revolution] was but a passing fancy” (xii).

Since the 1990s, when the global resurgence of religion started receiving widespread attention, a number of scholars have turned to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and now to 9/11—when four airplanes were hijacked by members of the sub-national Islamic terrorist organization, al Qaeda, and turned into weapons that would inflict more than 3,000 casualties on the U.S.—to justify the study of religion’s role in international affairs. Of course, these two events are indeed seminal ramifications of the global resurgence of religion, and they have both altered Middle Eastern geopolitics for years to come, but the truth is that discussions of religion’s resurgence should not imply that religion ever really ceased to matter in world affairs. Former U.S. Secretary of State (SOS) Madeleine Albright says it best: “Like many other foreign policy professionals, I have had to adjust the lens through which I view the world, comprehending something that seemed to be a new reality but that had actually been evident for some time” (Johnston, 2003: 3-4; Albright, 2007: 9-10; emphasis added; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2012: 3-4).

No irreligious regime ever came to supplant the transnational religious regime, but this is not to say that the admittedly epiphenomenal trend of secularization did not occur in the early to mid-1900s. The global resurgence of religion that reversed this trend has been well documented. Yet, even those tired old examples of religion’s resurgence, the revolution in Iran, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, only limn a partial portrait of religion’s role in world affairs. Of course, these two events were examples of religion’s resurgence, but religiously motivated terrorism has occurred since long before 9/11, and as mentioned above, Iranian clerics have a long history of involving themselves in revolutionary activity. The only thing truly novel about the latter episode was that it culminated with the establishment of a theocracy! Nevertheless,
postcolonialist IR theorists—who aspire to contest and deconstruct Eurocentrism and create new truths “that advance justice, peace, and political pluralism”—would likely point out that the secularization thesis and modernization theory are nothing more than Western-centric constructs, continuing a tradition that reduces non-Western, non-European “markers of culture, arts, […] science,” and in this case, religion, to “folklore, myths, and shamanism,” thus reinforcing the point of view that religion is but an archaic remnant of man’s premodern, uncivilized past. After all, notes Siba N. Grovogui (2010):

knowledge, or what is said to be, is never a full account of events. Gaps between what is said to have happened and what actually happened can frequently be understood by examining how imperial and colonial structures shaped such institutions as academic research (239-241).

In this case, the secularization thesis and modernization theory could be seen as guilty for conflating an incomplete view of the Western experience with that of the rest of the world. From its post-Reformation, post-Westphalian, post-Enlightenment perspective, the experience of Africa, for instance, may have been disregarded entirely. Yet, when African Christians hear about the secularization of the West, they dispatch their own missionaries to evangelize there (Philpott, 2000: 206-208, 244-245; Lester, 2002: 45; Carlson and Owens, 2003: 1-5; Lynch, 2009: 85-87).

**Roman Catholicism and the War in Vietnam**

Edward Luttwak (1995) reinforces the postcolonialist perspective by turning to one of the most controversial military endeavors in U.S. history: the war in Vietnam. Though the influence of the modernization theorists was at its apogee when Kennedy’s administration oversaw the conflict, religion continued to matter in world affairs; recall, for instance, the theory’s inherent Protestant bias. Unfortunately, thanks to the blinders worn by foreign policy elites at the
encouragement of the modernization theorists, the U.S. remained largely ambivalent to the role religion played in the Vietnam War. Of course, Vietnam represented a scenario wherein religion was by no means the most significant variable in the conflict, but it was an important dimension of the conflict nonetheless. Thanks in part to the “secularizing reductivism [sic]” of journalists and the diplomatic corps, however, the U.S. subjected “every demographic, economic, ethnic, social, and, of course, military aspect of the conflict [...] to detailed scrutiny” without ever exposing the “deep religious cleavages” afflicting South Vietnam (Luttwak, 1995: 11). It almost goes without saying that this would have deep consequences for the Kennedy administration’s policy in Indochina, but first, it is necessary to look at the earlier aspects of the conflict.

As in Iran, where Islamic clerics and theocrats would eventually partner with Marxists to overthrow the shah in 1979 (Herrington, 2011b), Catholics joined with the Viet Minh in the struggle against the Japanese during World War II. Working side by side with communists, socialists, nationalists, and Buddhists, Vietnamese Catholics played an important role in the effort to push Japan from Indochina. After 1945, when Japan surrendered, Ho Chi Minh declared an independent country paving the way for a communist takeover of the state. When France, which had lost many of its colonial holdings to the Japanese before 1945, returned to Vietnam in the aftermath of the war seeking the restoration of its empire in Indochina, “the Viet Minh revived their armed resistance, and many Catholics joined them.” In fact, Harry Haas (1968b) asserts, when nearly 100,000 Vietnamese left the South for the North, thousands of them were Catholic members of the Viet Minh, including at least five priests. In this respect, Catholics were bound to their communist neighbors in the north by the powerful force of nationalism. Of course, the political indoctrination of the army by the North Vietnamese
Communist Party did not begin until 1955, so many Catholics were largely “unaware of how much [the Viet Minh] was dominated by Communists” (Haas, 1968b: 174-175).

It is likely that the place of Catholic’s in the Viet Minh influenced Ho’s 1955 decree on religion, which provided for the freedom of worship, left a meager amount of the Church’s property intact, allowed for the continued loyalty of Vietnamese Catholics to the pope in Rome, and did not prohibit evangelization on the part of foreign missionaries. This is in stark contrast to the CCC’s attack on religion in China, which compelled citizens and the national church to break their ties with Rome. Of course, religion did come under restriction; for instance, the state limited the teaching of religion to the confines of church property. Moreover, the people were given administrative authority over the incomes of clergy, and the church’s activities had to be approved by the state. No doubt this contributed to most Catholic’s decision to support the French over the Viet Minh, which, at this point, was recognized as a communist organization.

Combined with news of the CCC’s “ruthless treatment of missionaries, Catholics, and indigenous clergy” in China, fear of the possibility of these events certainly encouraged nearly 700,000 refugees in 1954 to flee from the North “in a dramatic, well-organized exodus” (Haas, 1968b: 175-177).

Preston (2012) indicates that the refugee resettlement to the South was one of the U.S.’s “only propaganda victories during its entire involvement in Vietnam,” because the U.S. Navy played an integral role in the effort to help the Catholics fleeing from communist North Vietnam. Beyond the U.S.’s efforts to help the Catholics in 1954, the place of Catholicism in the Vietnam conflict played a major role in sustaining American support for South Vietnam. Organizations like CRS wanted to help solve the Vietnam problem, and Catholics in general firmly backed the war until the Tet Offensive in 1968. Preston reasons that this was not to be unexpected, for
“South Vietnam was in part a Catholic country, and the fiercely anticommmunist Catholic
hierarchy had given it staunch support from its very inception”; indeed, Catholics regarded
protests against the U.S.’s place in Vietnam as unpatriotic assaults on America itself (Preston,
2012: 536-537).27

Religion may have been a motivating factor for the public at-large, but it is less clear if
this was the case for the government itself. Regardless, the Eisenhower administration, at least,
was conscious of “the religious issue.” At an NSC meeting on 4 February 1954, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower interrupted a discussion on the dynamism of Franco-Vietnamese
leadership to ponder if the U.S. could “capitalize on the religious issue[s]” of Vietnam. President
Eisenhower actually wondered if the U.S. could install a “good Buddhist leader to whip up some
real fervor,” given that the majority of Vietnamese were in fact Buddhists (Eisenhower quoted in
Jacobs, 2004: 48). At least some of Eisenhower’s staff dismissed the relevance of the religious
issue. Then-Vice President Richard Nixon expressed doubts about the conviction of the
Vietnamese, implying that the peoples of Indochina could not be relied on to hold firm to their
own religious views. Even if the folly of Nixon’s view had been rejected though, another

27 It might seem strange, at first blush, that Catholics would join an essentially Protestant program of modernization,
rooted in Rostow’s modernization theory. Its outwardly secular nature makes this unlikely alliance seem especially
ironic, given that Protestants, Catholics, and modernization theorists were all partnered against “Godless”
communism, especially in South Vietnam where Catholics committed to modernization against northern Marxists.
This might seem especially unlikely, too, given the inherently anti-Catholic nature of the transnational religious
regime, but the fact of the matter is that the Cold War, from the vantage point of the religious regime, was a fight
between Calvin and Marx, not between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, or between Woodrow Wilson and
Vladimir Lenin as has been suggested before. In this case, Catholics, who were already anticommunists,
represented what might be dubbed the lesser of two evils in the fight against a common enemy. The inverse is also
ture: Catholics were willing to work through the existing power structure alongside their Protestant neighbors to
bring about the demise of communism. One has to admit that the Catholics certainly benefited from this
partnership. Not only were they regarded with less suspicion having proven themselves strong patriots, but in many
ways American Catholics were rewarded with the election of the U.S.’s first Catholic president. As had happened in
Vietnam and would happen in Iran, nationalism was the glue that held these groups together in the U.S. Nationalism
is a powerful force, and its relationship to religion is far more complex than the typical “either or” dichotomy allows
for. That is, one need not abandon his or her religious faith to prove a patriot. Indeed, as the case of Buddhism
demonstrates (see footnote 28), they can be mutually reinforcing phenomena. In the case of the U.S., it was enough
to suppress anti-Catholic attitudes for a long enough time that Catholics, Protestants, and secular modernization
theorists were able build a rather effective partnership.
administration official quipped that Buddha was a pacifist, suggesting that a Buddhist leader would not be the fighter the president envisioned. Still, the president remained convinced that there was something to the idea of religious motivation, highlighting the role of Joan of Arc in French history. Capitalizing on Eisenhower’s allusion, then-SOS John Foster Dulles retorted that “there were, of course, a million and a half Roman Catholics in Vietnam,” and that they included some of the country’s sharpest minds. Perhaps the president was only “thinking out loud,” but he concluded “that the Catholics be enlisted” (Jacobs, 2004: 48).

Here again, the anti-Catholicism characteristic of the transnational religious regime manifested in the U.S.’s search for a new leader of South Vietnam. Indeed, argues Seth Jacobs (2004), “many of the familiar tenets of American Catholic-bashing” that hindered Kennedy

28 If there is one thing for certain in the study of religion—regardless of the discipline in which it takes place—it is that no putative religious system, whether Christianity, Islam, or in this case, Buddhism, can be treated as a monolith. As nebulous as the concept of religion may be for some, surely all could agree that these systems do not evolve in a vacuum. Different branches of different religions emerge, at least in part because of the social, cultural, temporal, and geographical contexts in which they operate. The same again, is true of Buddhism. Though clearly operating at a time when communications and surveillance technologies were not as developed as they are today, and clearly discussing the religious issue in Vietnam at a time long before the intelligence and defense communities came to take religion seriously, the fact is that some historical investigation would have revealed quite a few instances in which certain Buddhist actors had employed violence in conflict, especially when buttressed by a strong sense of nationalism. First, take the case of Japan’s medieval monastic warriors, for example. Often characterized as sōhei, or warrior monks, these fighters have been—perhaps erroneously—described as a religio-military order comparable to the Teutonic Knights and Hospitallers of medieval Europe. While Mikael S. Adolphson (2007) aptly demonstrates that the sōhei-image might actually be an inappropriate stereotype that describes “warrior monks” instead of “monastic warriors”—the latter being a group of largely secular employees dedicated to protecting Buddhist temples and holdings—he still points out that schools of Buddhism largely distinct to Japan and China were never isolated from the socio-political contexts in which they functioned. Indeed, they were acculturated to the naturally violent tendencies at the time of Buddhism’s emergence in these lands, especially in Japan where its spread was steeped in bloodshed from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, the emergence of monastic warriors in the Heian (794-1185 AD) and Kamakura (1185-1333 AD) periods correlates, at least in part, to the increasing militarization of society at-large (Adolphson, 2007). The sōhei-image, however obscure to Eisenhower’s NSC, represents an archetype of sorts, the kind of which he was probably interested. Still, if the sōhei was an obscure historical artifact to the NSC, surely Eisenhower’s national security team could have gained intelligence on a second case, that of the role of Zen Buddhists in the Japanese war machine during World War II. In this case, nationalism and obedience to authority became potent factors in the mobilization of Zen Buddhists for the war (Victoria, 2006). Third and fourth, and more relevant still, Eisenhower’s NSC might have been interested in the fact that Buddhists, as mentioned above, partnered with Catholics (and communists) against the Japanese in Vietnam around that same period, while nationalism was also an important force for communists in China mobilizing Buddhists in the effort to expel U.S. forces from Asia during the Korean War (Yu, 2010). While the idea of exploiting religious fervor in war may represent questionable moral judgment, the validity of the idea’s strategic component can hardly be questioned. If Eisenhower or his administration had been more aware of the nuanced history of Buddhism in their effort to exploit the religious issue, they may still have found their zealot, while ultimately avoiding the persecution of the Buddhist majority on the part of the Catholic minority. Of course, such counterfactual reasoning cannot be tested.
during his presidential campaign “lost their sting when applied to Vietnam,” and actually helped catapult a Catholic into the forefront of South Vietnamese politics. Anti-Catholic writers, such as Paul Blanshard, accused the Roman Catholic Church’s hierarchy of brainwashing the religion’s adherents, leaving Catholics incapable of free thought, and “programmed” to treat their leaders “as infallible.” As such, Catholics were “unfit for citizenship in a democracy whose constitution made the separation of church and state absolute.” This might have been a problem, Jacobs suggests, for politicians like Kennedy, but for people like Ngo Dinh Diem, on the other hand, it represented a major credential. American anti-Catholics, that is, did not believe Vietnam was ready for democracy, so if religion left Diem predisposed towards authoritarianism, then the Eisenhower administration could tout it as an additional qualification (Jacobs, 2004: 86-87).

The installation of Diem as the leader of South Vietnam was a major example of how religion could function as a significant factor in the policymaking process. It was the fact that Diem was Catholic that encouraged both Eisenhower and Dulles to support his bid for leadership (Preston, 2012: 449). But this is to say nothing of his avowed anticommunism, which many historians regard as being the chief determinant in the Eisenhower administration’s decision to install him as one of South Vietnam’s leaders. Of course, like many in the West, Diem’s anticommunist attitude had religion as its basis. This is exemplified by the fact that, once in power, he used the Catholic refugees from North Vietnam as a “solid core of militant anti-Communists,” placing many in his administration. They not only provided Diem with a capable administrative structure, but they also joined the army in droves, scoring top positions in the officer corps. Some estimates indicate that Catholics from Northern Vietnam could have made
up as much as 50% of the officer corps after winning promotions in combat (Haas, 1968a: 165-166; Jacobs, 3-4).\(^{29}\)

Diem won the support of U.S. policymakers and the general public as a consequence of his anticomunist attitudes. Part of this was thanks to the Vietnam lobby, and specifically, the special interest group, American Friends of Vietnam (AFV), which was comprised of a diverse array of esteemed members, including then-Senator Kennedy, Republicans like Walter Judd, liberal academics like Arthur Schlesinger Jr., conservative publishers like Henry Luce and William Randolph Hearst, and the president of the American Socialist Party, Norman Thomas.

Though the AFV did not steer U.S. anticomunism unilaterally, it did play a vital role in the selection of Diem as the U.S.’s surrogate in Vietnam, and it helped ensure that his reign in South Vietnam lasted as long as it did. First, the special interest group orchestrated a conference on “America’s Stake in Vietnam” in 1956 that included the likes of Kennedy, Catholic Monsignor Joseph Harnett, and renowned IR scholar, Hans Morgenthau. At this conference, Kennedy praised Diem’s “amazing success in meeting firmly and with determination the major political and economic crises which had heretofore continually plagued Vietnam,” then asserted:

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29 The role of religion in the Vietnam War is also evidenced by the fact that religious sects were capable of raising and maintaining standing armies. For example, in an effort to maintain order, Bishop Le Huu Tu of Phat Diem, actually organized a militia of Catholic soldiers in the aftermath of Japan’s withdraw from Indochina (Haas, 1968b: 175). The Cao Dai, a product of globalization, was a syncretic sect that drew on both Eastern and Western traditions that also established its own armed forces. Its organizational structure is heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, even led by a pope with a capital in Tay Ninh called “the Holy See.” The Cao Dai religion, which combines its Catholic genes with the teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism, Geniism, and Islam, was founded in 1926, and today claims more than 3 million members around the globe. Intriguingly, its saints and pantheon of divine beings include Jesus, Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tzu, Victor Hugo, Joan of Arc, Napoleon Bonaparte, William Shakespeare, Thomas Jefferson, and Leo Tolstoy. In the Vietnam War, the paramilitary armies of the Cao Dai were so important, that at least one observer found the “considerable influence of religious sects and politico-confessional groupings” worthy of note. The Cao Dai militias that formed under Japanese occupation were simultaneously clandestine nationalists, traditionalists, and religious militants. They would, during the civil war, emerge as important actors in shifting alliances that included the Viet Minh and the French. Of course, Diem’s government would eventually try to repress the Cao Dai, so this 15,000 strong militia defected back to the North Vietnamese insurgency. After Diem’s eventual assassination though, the Cao Dai understood that they could not function in the structure of rigid communism, so they again defected back to the South (Lester, 2002: 39-40; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007: 190-19, 198).
[i]f we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future… This is our offspring. We cannot abandon it (Jacobs, 2004: 230, 241-242; Kennedy quoted in Jacobs, 2004: 242).

Kennedy, who had been an anti-war advocate in the early 1950s, had previously spent time in Vietnam where he was convinced that U.S. aid to France’s war in Indochina was a waste of resources. In 1951, he quipped that he was convinced that no amount of U.S. military assistance could defeat “an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere” (Kennedy quoted in Maier, 2003: 387). However, “the confluence of Catholic and anti-Communist influences,” says Kennedy family biographer Thomas Maier, “played a significant role in Kennedy’s” change of heart and concomitant “commitment to South Vietnam, […] Diem, and the direction of U.S. foreign policy.” Indeed, his speech to the AFV “was pure domino theory,” and his support for Diem was unequivocal, for Kennedy believed that the spread of communism in Southeast Asia was a serious threat (Maier, 2003: 386-387).

Second, the AFV coordinated and promoted Diem’s four-day tour of the U.S. the following year. Upon his arrival, the South Vietnamese leader was greeted by President Eisenhower at the airport, and the following day, he addressed both houses of Congress, where he was interrupted by “thunderous applause at several points.” Incidentally, the AFV was so successful in leading the Vietnam lobby because a good portion of its members were leading figures in what partisans today would call the mainstream media. Editors and publishers from Newsweek, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the New York Herald Tribune, Time and Life magazines, and other U.S. publications were able to generate incredible pro-Diem propaganda in the news media, which prevented the press from scrutinizing Diem’s regime in any substantive way (Jacobs, 2004: 233-234, 241, 254-258).
Another influential member of the AFV was one of the staunchest supporters of the Vietnam War in the American Catholic Church, Cardinal Francis Spellman, the Archbishop of New York City (Jacobs, 2004: 229, 232-233; Preston, 2012: 537-538). Spellman vigorously promoted Diem’s candidacy as the new leader of South Vietnam to U.S. policymakers, including President Eisenhower. Diem had been connected to Spellman through the former’s brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, who happened to be an archbishop himself. Thuc’s influence at the Vatican played a direct role in Spellman’s eventual promotion of Diem to administration officials. Of course, Spellman was already impressed—like so many Americans— with Diem’s ardent anticommunism and devout Catholic faith. As such, the church launched a campaign to prop up Diem; in doing so, Spellman turned to the Kennedy family for aid. Joe Kennedy and Cardinal Spellman lobbied on Diem’s behalf to U.S. foreign policymakers, stressing that his Catholic faith would be the cure for socialism in Indochina and greater Southeast Asia. Together, Spellman and the elder Kennedy formed a committee to promote Diem’s leadership candidacy and U.S. interests in Vietnam, which included Senator Kennedy, whose 1956 speech to the AFV was actually a “by-product of this alliance” (Maier, 2003: 387-388).

The role religion played in the crafting of the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy is difficult to discern, in part, because it is difficult for some to reconcile the actions and rhetoric of John F. Kennedy the Senator with those of John F. Kennedy the candidate, or those of John F. Kennedy the president. Historians (and IR scholars for that matter) have had little to say about religion in Kennedy’s Vietnam policy specifically; those that have, like the president’s biographers who have given the subject some attention, are conflicted on the matter. Take Thomas J. Carty (2004), for example. Carty attests that Kennedy, as a congressman in the late 1940s, openly embraced the “Catholic Church’s militant anticommunism.” Astonishingly, then-
Congressman Kennedy even endorsed Richard Nixon over his own Democratic ally in the 1950 California Senate race, earning for himself, a reputation as a “Cold Warrior.” Running for president in the 1960s, however, Kennedy faced an up-hill battle with liberals who still feared McCarthy’s intense anticommunist witch hunt. Thus, his efforts to distance himself from the Roman Catholic Church did not manifest *ex nihilo*; rather, Kennedy altered his position to earn the trust of liberals while attempting *not to alienate conservative anticommunist Catholics* at the same time. The Vietnam policy he tried to articulate, then, became about peaceful coexistence with communist countries instead of acquiescence in the Cold War (Carty, 2004: 113-115).

Ironically, Kennedy’s Catholicism was, according to the conventional wisdom at the dawn of the 1960 campaign, expected to insulate him and the Democratic Party from the charges of softness on communism that were typically leveled at prominent liberals. Indeed, Kennedy’s religious affiliation was initially portrayed as an advantage on the campaign trail for this reason; the Church’s dogmatic anticommunism was to protect Kennedy’s national security strategy from conservative opponents. As that familiar dimension of the transnational religious regime—anti-Catholicism—reared itself on the campaign trail, Kennedy had to distance himself from the American Catholic Church and the Vatican, for the notion that a Catholic “could loyally serve the [U.S.] was controversial,” especially among Evangelicals and fundamentalists, who had difficulty believing that a Catholic president could manage the difficulties of having “two loyalties, one to Church and one to state.” With anti-Catholic writers arguing that the infallible papacy had to be resisted as ardently as the communist dictatorship, Kennedy had to dispel any notions of his allegedly divided loyalty by expressing his “support for absolute separation of church and state.” Not only did the candidate distance himself from the Catholic hierarchy, he flat out denied any accusation that he would be responsive to ecclesiastical pressures or
obligations. Kennedy may have been proud of his Catholic identity, but the candidate’s strongest belief about religion was “that it should be an entirely private and personal matter (Carty, 2004: 75-76, 113; Preston, 2012: 503). Of course, his actions as a senator, and issues in Vietnam counter this argument.

Kennedy was not devout, but neither was he irreligious. He did not want to be a Catholic president, even though he certainly believed in both the Catholic Church and God. Thus, when he was elected, he refused to appoint an ambassador to Vatican City, he refused to commit on the issue of international birth control regulation, and he rejected efforts to supply federal aid to parochial schools. And, in terms of foreign policy, Carty maintains that President Kennedy avoided foreign policy decisions that might even suggest bias toward Catholic politicians abroad (Carty, 2004: 76, 160; Preston, 2012: 502-503). If Kennedy’s election had really smashed the anti-Catholicism of the transnational religious regime, surely this would not have been a concern to a Catholic president presiding over the military and economic resources of the world’s hegemon.

Jacobs (2004), whose analysis of the role and influence of religion on the Vietnam War stands virtually unrivaled, even argues that “the fervent religiosity of the 1950s” had faded by the time Kennedy took the helm of state. Resultantly, the policymaking process became “more overtly secular” under the new president than it had been under Eisenhower, so “Diem’s staunch Catholicism, an asset in the Eisenhower era, worked against him with Kennedy” (Jacobs, 2004: 270). Carty agrees: in the run up to a coup d’état in October 1963, Kennedy, apparently in his effort to avoid favoritism to Catholic politicians, refused to authorize protection for Diem, who was subsequently assassinated (Carty, 2004: 160). Yet, Roger Hilsman, former Undersecretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, suggests that religion played a pivotal role in Kennedy’s
decision to support Diem in the first place. “The long answer,” says Hilsman, “is that Kennedy was a Catholic, Ngo Dinh Diem was a Catholic, and when Diem became president of Vietnam, American Catholics generally thought that this was a wonderful hero [who] should be backed” (Hilsman quoted in Maier, 2003: 387). Maier actually disagrees with the assertion that Kennedy refused to protect Diem, instead suggesting that the president was racked with indecision over whether or not his administration should even support the coup. This, he argues, “sealed his [Diem’s] fate” (Maier, 2003: 391). On the other hand, Chris Matthews, a different biographer, avers that Kennedy authorized the coup in an August cable to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., who took the cable as a death warrant. Of course, this actually does mesh with Maier’s argument that Lodge’s actions were responsible for enabling the coup and murder of the South Vietnamese president, but none of this really matters. The fact is, that on 1 November 1963, All Saints Day, President Kennedy left a cabinet meeting for Mass “vexed” by the impending coup. Alas, All Saint’s Day, which was instituted as a government holiday by Diem’s regime, was the day the generals moved against the government. On that day, assassins removed Diem from a church, and placed him in an armored vehicle, along with his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, where both were shot in the head (Maier, 2003: 391; Matthews, 2011: 387).

Regardless of his public statements on religion, Kennedy was shaken by the news of Diem’s death. When intelligence reports indicated that Diem committed suicide, Kennedy rejected the notion based on the former leader’s “strong religious career,” and the fact that he himself had helped project the image that Diem was a devout Catholic. When the assassination was confirmed, President Kennedy expressed remorse that he might have been responsible for Diem’s death. One aid described his reaction as both “personal and religious,” for the president
was especially worried about the fact that a “Catholic President had participated in a plot to assassinate a co-religionist” (Maier, 391-392).

The downfall of the Diem regime was sparked by the 1963 Buddhist uprising, an event where a resentful Buddhist minority resorted to public self-immolations to protest the burdensome rule of the dominant Catholic minority, “caught the Kennedy administration completely flatfooted,” and left the president wondering who the Buddhists were, and how the U.S. failed to forecast their revolt. Preston doubts that the Kennedy administration knew much about any of the world’s people that were not Christians or Jews, especially since the Buddhists comprised as much as 90% of South Vietnam’s population. Furthermore, he avers, “the fact that Kennedy […] found their presence shocking is shocking in itself” (Luttwak, 1995: 11; Preston, 2012: 517), but the truth is that this misreading of the Vietnamese religio-political landscape was ingrained into the U.S. foreign policy apparatus during the Eisenhower administration.

American policymakers did not wait until Buddhist monks started lighting themselves on fire to take religion seriously in Vietnam policy as Luttwak suggests. As illustrated above, policymakers, including President Eisenhower himself, considered the “religious issue.” Of course, Luttwak is correct that a Buddhist identity might be a favorable attribute in Saigon’s leadership circles, but Diem was chosen, not out of ignorance to religion, but precisely because of his religion (Luttwak, 1995: 11; Jacobs, 2004: 48).

After Eisenhower mused that the religious issue ought to be considered seriously, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the president’s chief source of intelligence on Indochina, commissioned a report in April 1955 that provided “Recommendations Concerning the Study of Religious Factors in International Strategy.” In the report, the OCB suggested that an understanding of religious belief was the key to understanding a people’s culture, psychology,
and historical conduct. This suggested that someone like Diem, though the report did not name him specifically, would make an ideal candidate for a leadership role in South Vietnam. His “genuine Catholicism,” anticommunism, and “Spartan lifestyle” were rare findings in “the East,” according to the report, a reality that needed to be nurtured. As such, the OCB demoted Buddhism and Taoism from legitimate religions, to philosophies not incompatible with the communist scourge. The board later issued a report from its so-called Committee on Buddhism, which included representatives from the U.S. Information Agency, the CIA, and the State Department. The report, echoing Nixon’s and other administration officials’ earlier sentiments, suggested that the Buddhists priests were oriented towards neutralist pacifism, and away from the competitive strategy of the U.S.’s Vietnam policy. Moreover, the Buddhist-bashing report charged the religion’s monks of being so reactionary that Buddhism simply could not function as an appropriate vector for implementing U.S. influence in the region (Jacobs, 2004: 49-51). Thus, the Kennedy administration and the modernization theorists filling the ranks of the president’s national security team were not guilty of taking religion for granted. On the contrary, it was by taking Buddhism itself for granted, and by exploiting Diem’s Catholicism, that the U.S. government failed to grasp the magnitude of popular discontent, especially among the Buddhist monks.

When the first monk, a 73-year-old man, self-immolated, he left a letter behind with the media that pressed Diem for religious equality. Having instituted Catholicism as the state religion of South Vietnam, Diem had turned his religion into a weapon of brutal repression and political control for Buddhists and other religious groups, like the Cao Dai. Needless to say, many Vietnamese recalled the role that the Catholic clergy had played in propping up and perpetuating the oppressive infrastructure of French colonialism. But on top of that, Diem used
conversion to Catholicism as an anticommunist litmus test, and restricted Buddhist activities, including the flying of the Buddhist flag on the Buddha’s 2,587th birthday. When the Buddhists protested the flag ban, Diem’s forces, led by a Catholic officer, fired on the crowded, killing nine people, including a number of children. Diem’s regime also directed Special Forces to raid Buddhist pagodas, and to arrest monks and nuns alike. Matthews (2011) suggests that the Diem regime’s oppression of the Buddhists encouraged the Kennedy administration to abandon the embattled South Vietnamese president, but obviously, this does not mesh with the fact that Kennedy and the U.S. government were largely unaware of the Buddhists in Vietnam.

Nevertheless and concordantly, a Buddhist delegation was dispatched to the Vatican, and after receiving an audience with Pope John XXIII, the Roman Catholic Church even took measures to distance itself from the Diem regime (Maier, 2003: 388-390; Matthews, 2011: 386).

Avro Manhattan

The Roman Catholic Church played a vital role in Diem’s installment in South Vietnam. Here, it played at least a passive role in his demise. This is ironic though, because at least some thinkers believe Kennedy and the Catholic founders of the AFV were the architects of a Papal conspiracy to restore the Church’s hegemony over Vietnam in the power vacuum left by the withdraw of its former French colonial overlords. Some suggest that Diem was presented to the American public in totally secular terms, but the truth, as has been demonstrated above, lies somewhere in the middle. The fact that the Catholic Church is one of the largest, oldest religious institutions in the world lends itself to the idea that Catholicism had to play at least a small role in Kennedy’s conception of international politics and foreign policy, but to accuse him, and the likes of Spellman, the AFV, and other prominent Catholics of intentionally sparking the war in
Vietnam borders on conspiracy theory. Of course, it almost goes without saying that this represents another manifestation of anti-Catholicism within the transnational religious regime.

People the likes of Avro Manhattan, a dedicated anti-Catholic, propagate this idea to denigrate the Church. That Manhattan is an anti-Catholic conspiracy theorist is almost indisputable. His works include, *inter alia, Vietnam... Why Did We Go: The Shocking Story of the Catholic “Church’s” Role in Starting the Vietnam War* (1987), *Vatican Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*, and *Vatican-Moscow Alliance*, some of which often appear on conspiracy theorist websites like Reformation.org, which argues that the Earth exists in a geocentric universe. Manhattan, who Reformation.org lists as one of the foremost experts on the Roman Catholic Church, perceives the Vatican’s influence as being so pervasive in world affairs that no event in the world can be evaluated without considering the role of the Church. Conversely, Justus George Lawler (2012), a leading Catholic intellectual, calls Manhattan “a crank of the first water.” Though the conspiracy theory that American Catholics and the Vatican orchestrated the Vietnam War might be entertaining, it is certainly a relief to know that most historians do not accept this position (Manhattan, 1987; Burnett, 2005: 255; Carty, 2011: 51, 54-55; Lawler, 2012: 227n).
Chapter 6 – Conclusion

Starting with the implicit recognition of a transnational religious regime by George Modelski and the subsequent, independent and more explicit recognition of a religious regime under U.S. hegemony by Scott M. Thomas, this thesis has applied a synthesis of linguistic constructivism and regime theory to two dramatically distinct cases in an effort to elucidate and expand upon the concept of a transnational religious regime. Introduced in a brief survey of culture in Modelski’s long cycle theory, the modern religious regime was briefly discussed at its inception under Dutch hegemony in the seventeenth century. This, of course, was expanded upon by analyzing the formation of the modern regime’s predecessor in a case-study of the Roman Empire’s religio-identity regime at an important juncture in history. In just under 100 years, the Roman Empire experienced three different religious regimes as Christianity went from being an illegal, persecuted cult, to the official, state-sanctioned religion of the empire. The Emperor Constantine, inter alia, used Christianity vis-à-vis the religious regime to forge a common imperial identity, and to overcome the divisions of persistent internecine conflict.

The fact that a transnational religious regime has persisted, in some form or another, since at least 284 AD demonstrates that religion has always been a force to be reckoned with throughout the spectrum of human life, but especially in politics. Thus, evidence of a religious resurgence notwithstanding, the regime theory concept was also deployed in an analysis of U.S. foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1980s, by looking at the cases of Iran, and especially Vietnam. What this demonstrated was that, even in the face of increasing secularization, the transnational religious regime persisted. By considering the Anglo-American tradition of anti-Catholicism, it was shown that the religious regime did not collapse with the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, as speculated by Thomas. Instead, the traditional forces of religion that have
dominated public life for centuries simply found themselves in competition with other forces, such as modernization theory and the process of secularization, and at least the former remained a component of policymaking in a world still dominated by Protestant powers and ideals. Since modernization theory was more anti-Catholic and anti-traditionalism than anti-religion in general, it can be argued that, if anything, this intellectual force helped move Protestantism more to the category of a tacit religious regime instead of displacing it altogether. Even where anti-Catholic tendencies faded in favor of an anticommunist alliance between modernization theorists, Protestants, and Catholics, like Kennedy, this was only because communism represented a greater threat to the established order and the religious regime than did the Catholic Church or the pope in Rome. Even then, Catholics still had to prove themselves with vitriolic anticommunist rhetoric and actions, but this paved the way for the important role of the Church in the eventual downfall of communism.

Interestingly, the case of Vietnam, at the height of the secularization thesis’ prominence, clearly demonstrates that religion continued to matter even then. It also demonstrates one of the most important reasons why religion must be taken seriously in IR and elsewhere. Failure to understand religion undermines knowledge production, and ultimately, the learning process. If IR and other disciplines fail to take religion seriously, individuals who wish to consider its place in the world will succumb to the whims of capricious conspiracy theorists, like anti-Catholic writer Avro Manhattan, whose screed fallaciously indicts the Roman Catholic Church for starting the war in Vietnam, and other “scholars of opportunity,” like the neo-Atheists with their questionable, agenda-driven methodologies.

If IR scholars are going to take religion seriously though, they have to take matters of agency and definition seriously, which is why the earlier literature review considered the
definitional, ontological, epistemological, and methodological dilemmas of studying religion in IR. Of course, the dialogue with Keohane, Zakaria, Fitzgerald, Tickner, and Kubálková also shows that theories such as feminism and linguistic constructivism hold as much, if not more promise to the study of religion than do mainstream paradigms. Ultimately, this created the intellectual opportunity to further understanding of religion in IR under the rubric of regime theory, a paradigm in which this thesis has sought to breathe new life. Still, there are many implications of the integration of religion into ancillary IRTs.

For all the evidence behind the secularization thesis, it is no longer relevant. Notwithstanding that fact that religion is resurgent, religion has always mattered. As in the case of Constantine and the early church religion has historically been used for political ends, demonstrating that its political and intellectual marginalization has been an unfortunate episode for academe. No doubt a consequence of the overly reductionist tendencies of positivism, misunderstanding of religion has even contributed to real world problems, as was the case in both Vietnam and Iran.

No, new theories should not be articulated to elucidate its place in the world. In many cases, mainstream IRTs have done just fine. Even where those theories have fallen short, ancillary paradigms, such as linguistic constructivism and feminism, have demonstrated a capacity for productive engagement with the sacred that allows scholars to compensate for the shortcomings of mainstream IRTs; and they have paved the way for other theories to start creatively sorting out matters of the religious sphere. Linguistic constructivism, especially, seems an invaluable tool; as demonstrated it can breathe new life into regime theory, making it capable of comprehending some aspect of religion’s place in IR.
Thanks are due to Modelski for exposing the existence of a transnational religious regime. In the centuries following the Reformation, this regime has contributed to the general stability of the international system, and consequently, to the longevity of hegemonic leadership cycles. In the case of the Roman Empire, stability was fleeting, but the transnational religious regime, which developed over three evolutionary phases, is certainly a luculent example of regime theory’s utility to IPT. This regime met each of the characteristics outlined in Krasner’s definition, most especially by establishing a pattern for decision-making procedures that would come to characterize, not just medieval Christendom, but the European states system itself. Indeed, the model of ecumenical councils used by the empire and Church starting at Nicaea influenced and begot the international conference system that was employed at Vienna, Versailles, Yalta, and eventually institutionalized in the UN. For that matter, Martin Wight (1977) argues that the ecumenical Council of Constance in 1417 could be described as the first modern international conference (131-132).

Infusing regime theory into IPT has several potential avenues for further exploration. First, based on Wight’s assertion about the Council of Constance, the idea of a religio-identity regime may be used to diminish HST’s small N problem. Where HST has too many variables and not enough cases to back it up, analysis of Renaissance Italy might yield interesting fruit. The city-states of the Italian peninsula have been described collectively by both Joshua Goldstein and Modelski as a proto-typical hegemon, despite the fact that these were a disjuncted group lacking a unified polity (Goldstein, 1988: 285, 292; Modelski, 1987: 95). In the absence of national identity or political union, the transnational religious regime may have added a level of stability to the peninsula that may not have otherwise existed. Finally, the Council of Constance may very well have marked the beginning if Italian hegemony, itself.
Second, HST may have further benefit in fleshing out the concept of the transnational religious regime in the debate over U.S. hegemonic decline and Chinese hegemonic accession. Given that the religious regime that made possible 400 years of Western hegemony is still intact, and given China’s domestic policy of religious suppression, it may be difficult for the would-be hegemon to rise to the top without drastically altering the religious regime (Herrington, 2011a), or adopting new policies more in line with the embryonic religious freedom regime. In the former scenario though, given the longevity of the regime and its predecessors, such an unprecedented challenge seems unlikely.

Third, the evidence of a global resurgence in religion and the implications of the present research indicate a need to take Kubálková’s proposal for a distinct subfield seriously. The concept of IPT may be off-putting to some scholars, and it may be too narrowly conceived, but the fact is that the literature is growing exponentially and it needs to be accommodated within the framework of some subfield or another. While identity, culture, and religion can each be treated as three separate variables, they can also be viewed as three parts of the same whole. Contrary to Kubálková’s assertions, a subfield that incorporates the full spectrum of these social experiences might actually be more appropriate than one that singles out religion alone. Such a subfield would have the capacity to accommodate studies of nationalism, ethnicity, and even gender. However, the scope and nature of this subfield is still a matter for debate.

Fourth, and perhaps most obviously, the transnational religious regime of the Roman Empire itself unfolded in three phases that might best be understood as distinct regimes. While the transitional regime of Constantine’s reign was the primary focus of the case-study above, 

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30 One could in fact argue that religious regimes have actually contributed to 600 years of Western hegemony given the possibility of Italian hegemony starting around 1417. Both Spain and Portugal in the 1500s, and Italy in the 1400s were pre-Reformation Catholic powers, meaning that Western hegemony began before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and that the modern, Post-Westphalian transnational religious regime would not apply in the context of Italian or Iberian hegemony (Herrington, 2011a).
each may deserve further study. Indeed, medieval Christendom is worthy of study as a religious regime, too. Modelski’s post-Reformation regime also needs more attention. Even the JWT might be usefully understood as a religious regime. Finally though, the most important alteration of the transnational religious regime—since the Reformation—happened in 1998. That year, the U.S. Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act. Of course, this could be looked at as a subset of the existing human rights regime, but both the State Department and the UN have set up offices explicitly dedicated to religious freedom. Here, regime theory can once again find meaning in the real world, by considering the fact that the international religious freedom regime has real consequences today!

Fifth, the utility of ancillary IR paradigms, having been demonstrated by feminism, linguistic constructivism, and regime theory, paves the way for IR scholars to look at religion through other lenses as well. Scholars should refrain from casting blanket indictments on other theories, for, as was the case with dependency theory, they may not be as intolerant of religion as they might appear at first glance. Dependency could serve as a useful starting point for a new analysis of religion through the lenses of ancillary IR paradigms for the reasons outlined in Chapter 5, but also because there is room for the incorporation of religion under dependency theory’s “basic needs approach,” which, while never explicitly describing religion as a basic human need responsible for giving people meaning and purpose, stresses that individuals must be able to find “a sense of purpose in life and work” (Deneulin and Rakodi, 2011: 46).

Finally, although dependency is no monolith in IRT, understanding the sacred’s influence on the world vis-à-vis the genealogy of this and other paradigms can help illuminate some of the theoretical, methodological, and historical causes of religion’s marginalization in IR. Whether it is the methodological puritanism of positivism, the difficulty of quantifying religion, or part of a
grand historical trend, understanding this will remove the God-shaped-blinders that obstruct IR’s full view of the world.

In conclusion, one might still ask if all this really matters. Religion may be resurgent, but many of the people—at least, in the West—who shape policy and public opinion are secular, so why take religion’s resurgence seriously? Of course, echoing the postcolonialist, this question naively projects what is believed to be Western reality onto the rest of the world. The truth is, however, that while religion may not be the most important factor in the world, it is gaining in influence everywhere (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011: 3). Just because secular civil society predominates in the West, does not mean sacral civil society should be taken for granted. Even organizations like Heart to Heart International, which is technically secular, remain convinced that the faith and values of their employees will ultimately impact the world through the aegis of the NGO’s operations and commitments abroad (see footnote 7). Even if this were not the case though, religion is still very much alive in the West. Traditional world religions might appear to be declining, but this is caused as much by the rise of new age spirituality and NRMs as it is by secularization. As a matter of fact, NRMs, such as UFO cults and Scientology, are rapidly growing. As early as 2002, the World Christian Encyclopedia, had already accounted for 9,900 distinct religious sects throughout the world, but that number itself is augured by a growth rate of 2 to 3 a day. That the Vatican, Scotland Yard, and the FBI have all had to consult on these movements, including such NRMs as Aum Shinrikyo and the Branch Davidians, illustrates that they must be taken seriously (Lester, 2002: 38).

In the best case scenario, failing to take religion seriously, even smaller NRMs can lead to a misunderstanding of their role in the world vis-à-vis the “scholars of opportunity.” Manhattan is called an “authority” on political Catholicism, so the uncritical student, scholar, or
average citizen might not recognize that his are nothing more than anti-Catholic polemics propagating broad conspiracy theories. As a matter of fact, a number of scholars with interest in the Vatican and IR have cited Manhattan in articles published in scholarly journals without realizing that his books are not sources of reliable information (see, for example, Abdullah, 1996; Bathon, 2001; Troy, 2008). If taken to the extreme, this could undermine efforts by such scholars as Seth Jacobs, whose work considers the legitimate role of religion in the Vietnam War. In the worst case scenario though, failing to understand religion in IR can lead to foreign policy blunders such as those that plagued the U.S. in both the Vietnam War and the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979.
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