

War in the North?
A Critical Study of News Coverage of the Lord's Resistance Army 2004-2008

BY

Nicole P Reiz

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Co-Chair Steve Egbert

Co-Chair Shannon O'Lear

Garth Myers

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The Thesis Committee for Nicole P Reiz
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

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Co-Chair Steve Egbert

Co-Chair Shannon O'Lear

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Abstract

In the northern region of Uganda a conflict between Ugandan governmental forces and the Lord's Resistance Army, a regional rebel movement, has been ongoing for more than 20 years. Though this conflict has resulted in the abduction of thousands of children, the mutilation and murder of thousands more and the displacement of millions, it has been largely ignored in the international media. This study employed mixed methods to evaluate the volume, frequency, tone and type of coverage the conflict has received in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* (London), *The Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg, SA) and the *Monitor* (Kampala, Uganda) from January 2004 – December 2008 to gain some sense in how the media is covering this conflict. To attain a deeper understanding of why the discourse surrounding this conflict is being shaped in the way it is through the media, the Theory of Media Gatekeeping was utilized to posit possible explanations for the differences in coverage between the four media outlets under study. The analysis demonstrated a general lack of coverage in the international periodicals in respect to the conflict, however, the *Guardian* and *Mail & Guardian* though low in volume provided generally more nuanced and in-depth analysis of the conflict than *The New York Times*. The study highlighted the general lack of coverage in the international press but also further demonstrated the ways in which the US media differs from the European press, a point that previous studies have identified. Results of the study revealed that the conflict is framed differently in the various periodicals and certain aspects are focused on more heavily in some periodicals than others. For instance, in the *Mail & Guardian* the Juba Peace Talks received more attention while in *The New York Times* episodes of violence were more prevalent. In line with other popular geopolitical studies, the results of this study further demonstrate the need for critical analysis of the press and other media because of their ability to shape public perception and knowledge of places and events.

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Introduction

In the U.S. media and much of the Western world, news coverage of Africa tends to be dominated by war, violence, disease, and disasters, both natural and man-made. Coverage of these events is usually graphic, accompanied by violent images and often lacking in-depth analysis or background information. The result of this episodic coverage is a public perception in the West of Africa as a “dark continent” with many problems and few solutions (Kothari 2002, 2). The dominance of negative coverage of Africa by the Western media has consequences. Reader fatigue can push editors to run fewer and shorter stories regarding Africa, further exacerbating the simplistic and negative perceptions of Westerners towards Africa. With the development of technology, the increased ease of communication, travel, and the proliferation of news availability, one would think that coverage of Africa would improve and become more nuanced and diverse, however this is seemingly not the case. Numerous studies indicate that in the current 24-hour news environment, news coverage of Africa continues to be dominated by violence and framed in graphic, simplistic, and tribal terms (Hawk, 1992; Fair 1992; Myers et al. 1996; McNulty 1999).

This study examined news coverage of one specific conflict in Africa through four geographically diverse media outlets over a four-year period. Specifically, this study examined media coverage of a four-year period (2004-2008) regarding the long-term conflict in northern Uganda from *The New York Times*, *Guardian* (London), *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg, South Africa) and the *Daily Monitor* (Kampala, Uganda). I analyzed the coverage through content and intertextual analyses to assess whether the

simplistic and negative media bias seen in other studies still held true, and posited possible factors for why or why not this bias does or does not remain.

The following study examined a subset of media coverage of a civil war that has been affecting the peoples of northern Uganda for over 20 years. Although this conflict has affected millions of Ugandans, few outside of Uganda know little if anything about the conflict. Jan Egeland, the former UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, has said of the situation: "I cannot find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda, that is getting such little international attention," (BBC 11/10/2003, last accessed 6/12/2009). This raises the question: why has the conflict in northern Uganda, which has killed thousands and displaced millions, been largely ignored by the international community and international press?

Media are a powerful mechanism for distributing information. Because the media are powerful hubs of information dissemination and shapers of public awareness and perception, the way in which they frame events and issues is worthy of study and critique. This study followed methods set out by previous popular geopolitical and communication studies (e.g., Sharp 1993, 1996; Dodds 1996; Myers et al. 1996) to examine the different narratives found in the national and international media regarding the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda. We can generate possible explanations for the existence of multiple narratives by integrating the theory of media gatekeeping set out by Lewin (1947), White (1950) and Shoemaker (1991, 1999) into the methods set out by Sharp (1993, 1996); Dodds (1996) and Myers et al. (1996). The possible explanations for these different narratives were set in relation to the agents and power structures located at different scalar levels within the structure of the media, as well as extra-media influences.

The objectives of this study were: to ascertain if there are measurable differences in the amount of coverage regarding the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the northern conflict in the four periodicals under study, to qualitatively demonstrate how the conflict is portrayed differently through four geographically distinct print media outlets, to highlight missing voices regarding this conflict within media reports, and finally to posit possible explanations for the differences in coverage and frames. The aim of this study, while accomplishing the previously mentioned goals is to also add to popular geopolitical literature by incorporating the multi-scalar analysis found in media gatekeeping studies.

The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter one provides historical background to the conflict in northern Uganda. Chapter two includes a review of the literature that is central to the theoretical approach of this study. Chapter three outlines the methodology used in this study and includes the justification for focusing on the four periodicals used in this study. Chapter four includes the results and discussion of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage. Chapter five is a discussion of the possible explanations for these conflicting frameworks through a critical geopolitical analysis and media gatekeeping theory and includes the conclusion to the study.

Chapter One

The Lord's Resistance Army: A Symptom of Colonialism and the Militarization of Politics

To critically examine media coverage of an event, situation, or conflict, it is not enough to merely analyze the differences in coverage; one must be conscious of the history of the subject in question for the results of the analysis to have meaning. This study is primarily concerned with how the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the crisis in northern Uganda are being portrayed in the domestic media in contrast to a chosen subset of the international media. A brief history of this complex situation is presented here to place the analysis in context. This background requires a brief discussion of British colonial practices and the conduct of the post-independence political leaders of Uganda to lay the groundwork for understanding the ethnically and geographically divided nature of Uganda and why the conflict is a "northern" problem, or as it is called "the northern conflict."

Colonial Uganda

As the British sphere of interest in Africa expanded, a royal charter assigned the areas of what are now Kenya and Uganda to the Imperial British East Africa Company in the late 1880s. The present state of Uganda was formed in 1894 when the already established Kingdom of Buganda and the peoples and land to the north of the Bugandan Kingdom were placed under a "formal British protectorate" (US Dept of State website,

visited on 11/12/09). The established borders of the protectorate disregarded the preexisting ethnolinguistic and cultural differences of the peoples it encompassed. The current state of Uganda holds roughly 13 ethnic groups, speaking more than 32 different languages (US Dept of State website, visited on 11/12/09). For the sake of brevity, only the north-south or the ethnolinguistic Nilotic-Bantu division will be discussed here, as these are the main groups involved in the northern conflict. It is worth mentioning, however, that this is not the only ethnic divide in Uganda.

Upon the establishment of the protectorate, the British were confronted with very different cultures and practices in the northern and the southern regions of the protectorate's defined territory. The northern region of the protectorate was and currently is dominated by Nilotic speaking groups or tribes including the Langi and Alur (Nannyonjo, 2005). Though termed "Nilotic," the groups residing in the north speak a variety of languages, including Nilotic, Luo, and Central Sudanic languages (Kurian, 1992). The Acholi, the ethnic group that is considered to be at the center of the northern conflict, is a postcolonial construct, coming from the word An-loco-li, meaning simply "I am a human being" (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 10). The Acholi group is a blanket term for many smaller groups, which prior to 1930, were referred to as the "Gangi" or "Shuli", though the term Acholi is seemingly accepted by many of the people in northern districts of Acholiland, Kitgum and Gulu (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). Politically, the northern areas of Uganda contained no central governmental body or authority in the region; instead, the area contained a series of villages led by chiefs known as *rwodi* who seemingly had little administrative authority (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Nannyonjo, 2005; Sturges 2008).

Unlike the north, the southern areas of today's Uganda were, and are, dominated by Bantu-speaking groups of people including the Baganda, Banyoro, Bayakole and Batoro (Kisekka-Ntale 2007) and, in contrast to the north, had long established centralized monarchies (Nannyonjo, 2005). Not only are the northern and southern areas divided along cultural, political, and ethnic lines, but also by environmental conditions and the distribution of natural resources.

Southern Uganda's mineral resources and the favorable environment for growing cash crops (e.g. coffee, cotton, sugar cane) and the already established central authority led the colonial administration to establish the governmental and industrial base in the southern region of the protectorate. The area became the "economic backbone" of the protectorate as a result (Kisekka-Ntale 2007, 427). The British practice of indirect rule placed the leaders of the southern tribes including the Baganda, Banyoro, Bayakole, and the Basoga in a favorable position of power within the colony by favoring these groups for white-collar jobs and positions of political authority. Because the north had less favorable environmental conditions and a lack of mineral resources, it subsequently became the base for labor extraction by providing the workers for the plantations in the south. In step with the colonial practice of "divide and conquer", the British recruited exclusively from the north to fill the so-called King's African Rifles, formally dividing the different ethnic groups (Kisekka-Ntale 2007, 427). The practices of the British and the colonial structure "produced a variegated nation with an eminent ethnic divide between the north and south" (Kisekka-Ntale 2007, 422). This ethnic divide has survived through independence and into the current political environment of the country. As such, the many political coups d'etat and rebellions have been strikingly divided along ethnic

lines. Though absent from power for over four decades, the British colonial practice of divide and conquer continues to have wide-ranging consequences for Uganda's political environment and regional identities.

Post-Independence Uganda

Uganda declared independence from Britain in 1962. The positions of President and Prime Minister were occupied by the then King (*Kabaka*) of the Buganda kingdom, Sir Edward Mutesa II, and Milton Obote, respectively. President Edward Mutesa II was British-educated and a leader of the southern Bagandan people. Prime Minister Milton Obote, in contrast, was born in the north of Uganda and educated at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda. Though the two leaders seemingly cooperated and tried to create a unified state, the coalition between the two leaders ended in 1966 when Obote suspended the constitution of Uganda and became both President and Prime Minister, subsequently instituting a republican constitution under the ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress (Nyeko, 2005).

Under the newly centralized government, Obote attempted to move the country of Uganda away from a tribal, capitalist system to a leftist, socialist system (Nyeko 2005). In reaction to the rule of a northerner, the socialist programs he instituted, and the general dissatisfaction of the southern Bagandan people of the affairs of the state, Obote's army chief, Idi Amin, led a successful coup in January of 1971. Seen as agents of the newly ousted Obote, the Langi and Acholi soldiers that dominated the military were treated harshly by Amin. Ethnic tensions were further exacerbated when many of these Langi and Acholi soldiers were assassinated in a massacre at the Mbarara barracks. The

survivors then fled north and formed rival armed forces (Kyemba, 1977; Nannyonjo, 2005; Cox et al. 2008). Rebel Ugandan soldiers of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and the Tanzanian army ousted Amin after eight years in power in 1979. Contested elections reinstated Milton Obote as president in 1980. During his second period of rule, Obote overran the southern areas of Uganda and “committed numerous atrocities” in Buganda and the Luwero Triangle fighting against the southern dominated National Resistance Army (NRA) (Ngoga, 1998; Cox et al. 2008, 500). The war between Obote’s northern-dominated government and the southern-led NRA lasted five years, resulting in Obote’s overthrow in July 1985 by Tito Okello Lutwa, an ethnic Acholi. Lutwa ruled for 6 months before he was also ousted by a southern opposition movement, the National Resistance Movement and Army (NRM/A), led by Yoweri Museveni in January of 1986 (Cox et al. 2008).

Uganda’s colonial experience was similar to other regions of the continent, where a successful foreign occupation is reliant on “establishing, maintaining, and stabilizing control over the social and political order of indigenous societies” (Van Acker 2004, 341). The colonial legacy of the British occupation left present-day Uganda with an “entrenched racial separation of economic function and privilege, keenly felt religious divisions, and a widespread resentment of preferential treatment accorded to the Baganda”(Van Acker 2004, 341). Due to the divisions created by the practices of the colonial government, the attempts by post-independence leaders to create a unified state with equal political agency have largely failed as the underdevelopment of the north, the overrepresentation of northerners in the military, and the full or partial federal status of a number of southern kingdoms has proved insurmountable (Van Acker 2004). As Van

Acker (2004) notes, it has been the “tragedy of Ugandan politics that violence became a solution of first rather than last resort, in which every war can be justified since it is always embedded in a history of attack and counterattack, of suffering and revenge” (336).

In the present environment of Uganda, long lasting peace seems elusive as militarization is institutionalized and used as a method for gaining agency, rather than attempting to attain it through democratic methods (Daley 2008). As Doom and Vlassenroot (1999) say of the Lord’s Resistance Army, “Kony's LRA is not a sudden or inexplicable disaster, but the outcome of a long political process wherein both the harsh struggle for power and the use of violence became institutionalized” (7).

The Rise of Rebellion in the North

Yoweri Museveni’s successful military coup in 1986 led to the instatement of a southern-dominated government and the establishment of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force/Army (UPDF/A), formerly the NRA, as the national army. In the creation of his government, Museveni also abolished all political parties besides his own. This one-party system lasted until 2005 when elections overturned Museveni’s one-party rule and multiparty rule was re-established. However, Museveni retained his presidential seat during the 2006 elections. During the period 1986-2006 Museveni has faced more than 27 armed insurgencies and opposition from 56 different ethnic groups from throughout the country (Quinn, 2009). The longest and most violent of these insurgencies is taking place in the northern areas of Uganda and is led by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an offshoot of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).

Rise of the Lord's Resistance Army

Allegations of mistreatment and torture by Museveni's UPDF/A in 1986 towards the northern people of Uganda and the retreating northern soldiers of the recently ousted government led to the formation of the northern-dominated Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).

The HSM, led by Alice Lakwena, emerged as a response to threats both external and internal to the Acholi group. The external threats involved the actions of the UPDF/A toward the peoples of northern Uganda, including the torture of ethnic Acholis, and their placement into "politicization camps" (Behrend 1998). The internal threats included the belief that the "enemy bullet that killed an Acholi was not viewed as the true cause of death; rather, a relative or neighbor with whom the deceased had been in conflict was supposed to have bewitched him, to ensure that the bullet would strike the victim and no one else" (Behrend 1998, 108). Effectively, such beliefs turned the war against the "exterior enemy," or the National Resistance Army (NRA)/UPDF/A, inwards, intensifying internal tensions between Acholi civilians and the returning Acholi soldiers.

Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was created on orders by the spirit who inhabited her to "bring down the government, purify the world of sin, and build up a new world in which humans and nature would be reconciled" (Behrend 1998, 109). The HSM was a highly structured, organized military entity, containing many Acholi soldiers of the recently defeated Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), and fought a more-or-less conventional war against the UPDF/A (Behrend 1998). Lakwena was herself the leader, "Chairman," and "Commander of Forces," and under her were four companies, A, B, C, and Headquarters. Included in the HSM were military wings, Medical Offices, and

Production Offices, demonstrating the highly organized nature of the movement. Men and women within the movement were seen as equals, both fighting as soldiers, and were ordered to be chaste, living as brother and sister (Behrend, 1998). Contradictions that arose in the HSM discourse between men, women, and the different ethnic groups included in the movement eventually caused its downfall. The HSM was defeated by the UPDF/A as it marched on Kampala in October 1987 (Behrend 1998, 113). After the sound defeat of the HSM, Alice Lakwena fled to Kenya.

Out of the remnants of the now defunct HSM movement, Joseph Kony built his own army. Established in 1988, under the former title of the Holy Spirit Movement and then the Ugandan Democratic Christian Army, Joseph Kony renamed his movement the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 1994. Kony adopted the Holy Spirit Tactics of Alice Lakwena, combining Western military tactics with ritual practices, though through the years these practices have been substantially altered (Behrend 1998). Because Kony's movement was considerably smaller, he was, and is, only able to fight a guerilla war, fighting in small, more-or-less independent groups based in the Acholi region, Southern Sudan, and the northeastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Behrend 1998, 115).

According to Adas (1987), Kony envisions himself as the "mouthpiece of a widely accepted view that the Acholi people are on the verge of genocide" in which the "only way out is a deep transformation of the Acholi people itself, a revitalization underpinned by a strong call for moral rejuvenation" (Adas 1987; Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 22). Kony's aim is to overthrow the Ugandan government in favor of a government that follows the Ten Commandments of the Bible. Kony's other demands have included

greater representation of the Acholi in the high echelons of the military and the government. The areas *most* effected by the violence perpetrated by the LRA and the UPDA/F are the districts of Gulu and Kitgum, also called Acholi-land (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). The region is small in area, similar to the size of Belgium, and is not densely populated, holding about 4% of Uganda's population of roughly 700,000 people (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). Though Gulu and Kitgum are the sites of the majority of the violence, upwards of 1.8 million people have been displaced and affected by the conflict throughout northern Uganda as seen in Figure 1 (Quinn, 2009).



Figure 1- Internally displaced peoples throughout northern Uganda due to the conflict between the Ugandan government and the LRA as of November 2008. Source: <http://www.internal-displacement.org>

The conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government is not politically or geographically isolated. In 1994, the violence in the northern areas of Uganda escalated as the LRA emerged as a proxy force of the Sudanese government against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in southern Sudan. President

Museveni's government openly supported the SPLM/A insurgent group after peace talks between the LRA and negotiator Betty Bigombe failed (Van Acker 2004, Doom and Vlassenroot 1999; Dehez 2007). Due to the support of the Sudanese government in Khartoum, the LRA evolved from a loosely governed group of rebels into an organized, well-supplied military enterprise with access to weaponry such as machine guns and communications technology including satellite phones (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). It is during this time that the abduction of children and their subsequent training to become soldiers became the trademark of the LRA. With the expansion of their numbers through the use of child soldiers and Southern Sudanese assistance, the violence perpetrated by the LRA against the people of the northern areas escalated through 2002 (Van Acker 2004, 338). Publicly Sudan ended its support in 2000, though the reality of this pledge has been openly debated in the press (BBC 4/4/2009, last visited 7/12/2009).

The domestic war between the government of Uganda and the LRA has since escalated into a regional conflict. Failed Ugandan military operations against the LRA and the end of open Sudanese support of Kony have caused the movement of the LRA from the majority of its bases in Southern Sudan, to northern Uganda and the northeastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This movement has affected Southern Sudan as well as the DRC, as Kony's forces have set up bases in the northeastern areas of that "failed state" and have committed numerous attacks and mass killings in the area (Cox et al. 2008). In 2002, Uganda's military, along with some Southern Sudanese military support, launched a major offensive against the remainder of the LRA bases in Southern Sudan. This offensive largely failed, and after some months of uncertainty, LRA forces began to cross into Uganda once more, carrying out violent

attacks on a scale not seen since 1994-95 in the wake of the failure of the first peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA.

Important Events 2004-2008

The conflict in the northern areas of Uganda have been ongoing since the mid 1980's; however, the focus of this study focuses on the time period between January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2008 due to the diverse nature of events that occurred during this period and the availability of news articles from South Africa and Uganda. The following is a summary of important events during the period analyzed.

In February of 2004, the LRA killed 200 people at an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp, prompting action by the government, which ended in unsuccessful face-to-face peace talks in December of that year. In the same year, President Museveni called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the actions of Kony and his commanders on suspicion of war crimes. The ICC agreed that the actions of the LRA commanders fit the definition of war crimes and the ICC issued warrants for Joseph Kony and his top 4 commanders, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya, in October of 2005 (BBC, Timeline last visited 7/20/2010). There was substantial press coverage during the issuance of these warrants as they were the first warrants issued by the newly formed International Criminal Court. Not only were these the first warrants issued by the court, but this was also the first time that a state party had “invoked Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute in order to vest the Court with jurisdiction” (Akhavan 2005, 403).

The issuance of these warrants presented an opportunity to both Uganda and the ICC. In the case of Uganda, the warrants represented an attempt to “engage an otherwise

aloof international community by transforming the prosecution of the LRA leaders [into] a litmus test for the much celebrated promise of global justice” (Akhavan 2005, 404). For the ICC, Museveni’s invitation into the matter of the LRA represented confidence in the ICC’s power and abilities, in addition to presenting an opportunity to prove its viability. Unfortunately, the warrants did not accomplish either of these goals. The issuance of the warrants was also not without criticism, even from within Uganda. Kasaija Apuuli notes that Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Refugee Law Project (RLP) from Makerere University have both contested the neutrality of the warrants. Specifically, the RLP has stated “the ICC has shown bias by ignoring evidence of similar crimes committed by the government army, the UPDF” (Apuuli 2006, 185). Human Rights Watch has also commented on crimes committed by the UPDF/A, including rape, torture and killings of the civilian population in the northern areas of Uganda, and have called on the government of Uganda and the ICC to investigate (Apuuli 2006, 186). To a limited extent there have been some investigations. Even President Museveni seems to have been aware of this possibility and has stated that he would fully cooperate and give up any person to the ICC that was found to be involved in any crimes (Akhavan 2005, 411).

In July 2006, the LRA and the government of Uganda established the Juba Peace Talks in Juba, Southern Sudan. The talks were mediated by Southern Sudan’s Vice President Riek Machar and attended by peace teams from the LRA and the government of Uganda. Though Joseph Kony’s deputy, Vincent Otti, signed unilateral ceasefire agreements, violence continued as the LRA leader was not in attendance. The rebel movement was fractured and President Museveni’s forces refused to commit to the

ceasefire until all of the rebel forces gathered to the designated sites in Southern Sudan (BBC 8/26/2006, last visited 7/25/2009). Though much of the LRA's forces did indeed gather at the designated areas in mid-August 2006 and the truce was signed by the LRA in late August, small-scale violence between the LRA and Museveni's UPDF resulted in a pause in negotiations.

Throughout the rest of 2006 and into 2007 the Juba Peace Talks were stop-start, as the LRA pulled out of the talks in early December of 2006, only to rejoin the talks in March of 2007. The talks resumed once again in Juba in May of 2007, mediated again by the Government of Southern Sudan, with support from the UN, and also witnessed by Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa. Throughout the peace talks the issuance of the warrants by the ICC has been problematic, often becoming an excuse for the leaders of the LRA, especially Joseph Kony, to not join the talks in order to sign treaties, for fear of arrest and prosecution. President Museveni requested that the ICC withdraw the warrants, to remove the issue from the negotiations, a request the Court denied, as it stated the withdrawals would undermine the authority of the ICC (BBC 7/12/2006, last visited 7/25/2009).

In order to circumvent the warrants in a mutually acceptable manner, in June of 2007 the peace delegations from the government and the LRA agreed upon a joint system of formal justice proceedings along with the traditional ceremony of Mato Oput that focuses on apology, forgiveness and reconciliation (Doom and Vlassenroot, 1999). Although a formal agreement was signed in February of 2008 to bypass the ICC indictments by trying the accused in a special section of the High Court of Uganda, another dilemma arose when the government refused to ask that the indictments be

retracted until the rebels had demobilized (BBC 2/28/2008). A final peace treaty was drafted in March of 2008, a treaty that Kony refused to sign. Throughout the summer of 2008, the LRA began to rearm and remobilize with abductions rising to one thousand by June. Sporadic LRA attacks on SPLA forces caused Southern Sudan to refuse to continue as mediators in the peace process. Violence continued throughout 2008, when the LRA forces moved into the northeastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Figure 2). In a special meeting, the UN Security Council recalled the ICC warrants in December of 2008 (Meeting 6058).




Figure 2: Attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army December 2007-January 2009
 Source: BBC 4/4/2009

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the ongoing violence during the past 23 years in northern Uganda cannot be fully understood without taking into account the affects of colonialism, the political dynamics of Uganda after independence, the role of uneven development, and the militarism of politics in the evolution of Uganda since its creation in 1894.

Importance of the Newspaper and International News

The conflict in northern Uganda is a complex matter involving post-colonial and post-independence issues of governmental control, ethnic tensions, and uneven development. A long-running conflict, now on-going for over twenty years at the time of this study, it has received relatively little coverage in the international press compared to other international conflicts. Myer et al.'s 1996 study of the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda from October 1990 to April 1994 showed that during that time period six American newspapers ran a total of 14,114 stories referring to Bosnia and 560 articles referring to Rwanda (Myers et al. 1996, 30). Within the present study, the number of articles found in the three international papers over a four-year period that mentioned the LRA and the conflict in northern Uganda numbered only 187. This number decreased further to 144 articles as stories were excluded during the qualitative analysis for reasons explained in the methodology chapter of this study.

The hypothesis guiding this study is that this particular conflict receives little attention in the international press and is framed much like other African conflicts, as violent, simplistic, and ethnic (Myers et al 1996; Wall 1997; McNulty 1999). The power that the volume and type of news coverage has in the development of a person's

perception of places and the effects this perception may have on foreign policy makes this a salient issue. Numerous studies (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Seaver 1998; Althaus and Tewksbury, 2002; Soroka 2003) have demonstrated how the amount of news coverage of an event and the way in which it is framed can affect agenda-setting and foreign policy. Findings by Wanta and Hu (1993) in a study of four news media (the *New York Times*, ABC, CBS and NBC) demonstrated that press coverage of an event and the way in which it is framed can increase public concern of certain issues, but can also decrease concern, a finding that supports findings in previous studies. More recently, a study by Lim and Seo (2009) found that after President Bush declared North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” the three-dominant frames and the magnitude of coverage in the news media regarding North Korea over the four-month study period shifted U.S.-North Korea relationships. The relationship shift, according to the authors, caused the public to support economic sanctions over military solutions in North Korea due to the magnitude of coverage and the way in which the media framed the issues.

While the direct effect of media coverage on national agendas has been questioned (Huck et al. 2009), the power of the press in affecting public awareness, perception, and concern is not in dispute. It is because of this power that scholars must be consistently critical of how the press presents the world to readers as, more often than not, this is the only medium in which individuals encounter places such as Uganda.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

In this study, I utilized critical geopolitics and popular geopolitics as the conceptual tools with which I analyzed four media outlets reporting on the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda and the Great Lakes region. In order to justify the use of critical and popular geopolitics, I will first address the historical genesis of the term "geopolitics" to understand the potential for the creation of "critical geopolitics" as an alternative (Cowen and Smith 2009). It is also worth mentioning that critical geopolitics is not a perfect analytical tool due of the lack of a clear definition of what is meant by "discourse" and clearly defined method of analysis, as has been pointed out by many critics (Mamadouh and Djink 2006; Shotter and Billig 1998; Megoran 2006). These critiques will be noted in the analysis and discussion of the shortfalls of the methods of analysis of this thesis.

Brief History of Geopolitics:

Geopolitics as a term originated in 1899 with Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen (Ó Tuathail 2006, Dodds 2007, 24). Kjellen's creation and usage of the word emphasized territory and natural resources as measures of the potential power of a state. This focus and the term as a whole attracted the attention of geographers from Germany, especially Professor of Geography Friedrich Ratzel, who saw the state as a "super organism" requiring the best resources and the "fittest" people to be the most successful

(Dodds 2007). This coincided with the rising popularity of Social Darwinism in many of the social sciences. Social Darwinism, a term coined by sociologist and philosopher Herbert Spencer in the late 19th century, follows Darwin's concept of "survival of the fittest," though the "fittest" here refers to human individuals and races competing for resources and territory.

Drawing from Ratzel's works as well as those of other German geographers, including Rudolf Hess and Karl Haushofer, Adolf Hitler utilized the ideals of Social Darwinism for his political agenda in pushing policies of expansion for the benefit of the German people. He viewed the Aryan race as the fittest and thus able to command more territory and resources, and he used the media to spread this position throughout Germany. Hitler placed particular emphasis on the importance and promotion of the "fittest people" and territorial expansion to improve the health of the state. In doing so, he utilized geopolitics as justification of his genocidal actions, violent methods of spatial expansion, and domination of space to create more *lebensraum* (living space) for his idealized Aryan race (Cohen 2003; Ó Tuathail et al. 2006; Dodds 2007, 22). The way in which Hitler viewed the world accords with what John Agnew (1998) calls "naturalized geopolitics" (94-95). In this view, geopolitics was "largely determined by the natural character of states that could be understood 'scientifically,' akin to the new understanding of biological processes that also marked the period" of the late nineteenth century through World War II (Agnew 1998, 95).

The Nazi regime's adoption of "geopolitics" to justify its actions led most American geographers to avoid using the term in the decades after World War II. Respected American geographer Richard Hartshorne for example called geopolitics an

“intellectual poison” as well as a “pseudo-science” in 1954 (Dodds 2006, 211). The stigma surrounding the word “geopolitics” resulted in most academics, with the notable exception of American geographer Saul Cohen in the 1960s, refusing to use the term until Henry Kissinger began utilizing it as “a synonym for the space of global politics” (Ó Tuathail 1996, 17; Dodds 2006, 2007).

Cold War Geopolitics

As noted above, the revival of the term geopolitics in the 1970s is often credited to Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State under Richard Nixon. Seeking to explain the balance-of-power political relationship between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, Kissinger drew upon geopolitics to grapple with the new “strategic landscape” in which he was operating (Dodds 2007; Ó Tuathail 2006). From Kissinger’s reintroduction of the term came the intersection of geographic thought and foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War, superpower rivalry, namely between the US and the USSR, dominated geopolitical discourse (Ó Tuathail 1998). Agnew (1998) notes that after World War II, geopolitics shifted from a “naturalized” view of competing states similar to biological organisms to an “ideological geopolitics”(105) dominated by competing conceptions of how “best to organize the international political economy”(105). In this Cold War era of “ideological geopolitics” the political administrations of the US and the USSR put forth geopolitical arguments about the other. The US argued that the USSR was a “red menace”(Barson and Heller 2001, 106) spreading the evils of communism throughout the world and creating situations that forced the US to intervene in places such as Vietnam, Latin America, and Africa to prevent weak states from falling like dominos to communism (Ninkovich, 1994). The USSR in turn depicted the US as a

country in excess; using nuclear weaponry as a tool of coercion in international politics. The following Soviet poster by Tereshenov from 1983 is an example of Soviet propaganda:



Figure 1- Under the Roof of the Capital by G. Tereshkov, 1983.
Courtesy of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Journalist Walter Lippman might have said it best when he referred to the “Cold War” as “a period of forty years of Soviet-American geopolitical and ideological competition”(Stephanson 1998, Dodds 2003, 206).

During the Cold War, global space was reduced and simplified by American administrations into areas that were either “friendly” or “hostile” to America. This distinction was based on whether a government was Communist or friendly to the USSR, or was an American ally (Dodds 2003). The USSR was painted as a dangerous, expanding entity, with the spread of Communism likened to a cancer or a disease. As Dodds states “[g]eographical proximity to the Soviet Union was considered to be the prime source of infection and as such neighboring states would not only have to be

vigilant but also prepared to fight the spread of communism”(Dodds 2003, 209).

This geopolitical reasoning shaped many US Cold War era policies regarding the containment of Communism in Korea, Vietnam, and much of Latin American and Africa as well as many of the dominant views of the average American towards the rest of the world.

Geopolitics after the Cold War

The collapse of the USSR and loss of the specter of world Communism precipitated a new political ideology and geopolitical situation in the 1980s dominated by the perceived victory of capitalism and liberal democracy. Labeled in speeches by then President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, the “New World Order” promoted a world driven by free market capitalism, a more powerful United Nations, and a renewed pursuit of peace and justice. The following excerpt is from President George H.W. Bush’s address to Congress on September 11, 1990 in which he uses the term “new world order” for the first time publically:

“a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come”(Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, September 11, 1990 from the Bush Presidential Achieves, Public Papers).

The argument made by President Bush in this speech is a geopolitical narrative, where he presents this Western dominated New World Order as restoring peace and justice to a formerly terrorized world. As he notes, “Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the *rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle*” (Bush 1990, emphasis added). Bush puts forth a geopolitical argument here that places the capitalist, democratic West as the bearer of peace, justice and the rule of law to a world of chaos formerly ruled by the law of the jungle.

Though the idea of a “New World Order” originated with US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and The League of Nations after World War I, it has become more closely associated with the political ideology following the end of the Cold War. The mainstream geopolitical rhetoric of the post-Cold War era in the West has been dominated by the supposed success of free market capitalism, Western democracy and the bearing of peace and justice to the rest of the world. This is different than the previous geopolitical rhetoric of the Cold War era, which was dominated by the battle between capitalism and communism. Though abandoned for a short while, the use of geopolitics as a way of thought and a term by intellectuals of statecraft and the media began to grow during the late 1980s into the 1990s, likely because of the purported ability to explain complex situations in more simple terms, promote certain ideologies as truths, and predict the future.

Geopolitical discussions in the 1980s were dominated by political realism. Put simply, political realism is a political philosophy that “attempt(s) to explain, model, and prescribe political relations” with “the assumption that power is (or ought to be) the

primary end of political action” (Moseley 2001, iep.utm.edu) in both the domestic and international arena and were mostly concerned with American and Soviet interests and influence (Moseley 2001, iep.utm.edu). The current popularity and wide use of geopolitics in the media and the political rhetoric of world leaders seems to stem from this realist position in that it explains the world, relationships, events, power and places in terms as to “how it is” (Ó Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge 2006, 2). The binary language of traditional geopolitics, i.e. good versus evil, civilized versus barbaric, saturates our lives as it is found throughout news magazines, blogs, radio commentaries, military and security reports, and political addresses (Cowen and Smith 2009, 22).

The propensity toward these polar relationships, as previously mentioned, and the apparent simplicity of geopolitical relationships as depicted in popular sources including newspapers, televised news programs, movies and magazines has aroused criticism in certain areas of academia, geography included. This criticism is due to the tendency of the arguments presented in these sources to disguise important issues, or divert attention away from certain situations towards those deemed more important by the media, state administrations, political parties and so on.

Critical Geopolitics

Concerned with the insufficient attention paid to the ways in which geopolitical discourses are affected by and “saturate” popular culture, academics began to assess the traditional uses of geopolitics, with a deep skepticism of the ability of those discourses to “tell it like it is” (Ó Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge 2006; Dodds 2007; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Political geographers John Agnew and Gearóid Ó Tuathail have argued

that geopolitics needs to be critically examined and re-conceptualized as not “how it is” but as a “discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (Agnew and Ó Tuathail 1992, 95). Coined “critical geopolitics,” this academic movement’s aim is to “question and even subvert the taken-for-granted geographical reasoning underlying those formal, practical and popular varieties” (Dittmer and Dodds 2008, 441), while also deconstructing the “hegemonic fixations of spatial imaginations” (Muller 2008, 322). In essence, critical geopolitics exposes the obscured power structures and hidden agendas behind geopolitical arguments, showing them to be subjective statements or positions rather than objective truths.

Critical geopolitics addresses several issues: 1) how we think about how geopolitics works, 2) what we define as geopolitics, and 3) the structures of power that promote certain geopolitical discourses over others. Geopolitics has been divided by some authors into three main categories of study: formal, practical, and popular (Ó Tuathail 2006, 5; Dodds 2007). Formal geopolitics is concerned with the ideas and principles proposed by intellectuals and for the purpose of guiding the conduct of statecraft and the continuation of a “geopolitical tradition” (Agnew and Ó Tuathail 1992, 95; Dodds 2007, 45). Practical geopolitics deals with how political officials use geographical models, common sense, and culturally constructed narratives to represent global politics (Agnew and Ó Tuathail 1992; Dodds 2007). Popular geopolitics, with which this thesis is most concerned, refers to “role of the media and other forms of popular culture, which citizens use to make sense of events in their own locale, country,

region and the wider world” (Dodds 2007, 46). Popular geopolitical studies include analysis of printed and broadcast news, political cartoons, movies, novels, and other forms of publicly accessed information and mass media. Early studies in critical geopolitics were pioneered by John Agnew and Gearóid Ó Tuathail in defining critical geopolitics and how geographies of global politics are represented and interpreted, or what they term geo-graphing (earth writing) (Agnew and O Tuathail 1992; O Tuathail 1996). Other studies have analyzed the frameworks used by political leaders to describe the world and the effects of those frameworks on public opinion, as well as examining the role the popular media play in disseminating a particular narrative of places, events, and relationships (Sharp 1993, 1996; Myers et al 1994).

The concept of discourse plays an important role in popular geopolitics. For the purposes of this study, I follow Foucault’s notion of discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about...a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Hall 1997, 44). These statements form a discourse, which constructs the topic in that “[i]t defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about” (Hall 1997, 44). French philosopher Michel Foucault asserted that language and knowledge are closely linked to power, so the media, whether spoken or written, is not just the passing of facts in a vacuum. These links between power, language, and knowledge make it important to analyze what is said as well as who decides what is said, for language and knowledge inherently have a political edge (Foucault 1980). Klaus Dodds furthers this view, stating that critical geopolitics is instrumental in exposing the “supposedly objective elements of geopolitics to be contingent, rather than absolute and...considers how the networks of

power-knowledge site, sight and locate global politics” (Ó Tuathail 1994; Dodds 1996, 573). In other words, it is necessary to examine places where geopolitical narratives and arguments originate and to critically examine the power structures underlying the arguments being presented. In the case of this study, the “place” is the print media. The critical examination involves demonstrating the subjectivity involved in creating narratives about the conflict in northern Uganda and the power of those who create and distribute those narratives.

Interestingly, the prominent role that “discourse” plays in critical geopolitical studies has drawn considerable criticism. There are those who point out the lack of an adequate conception of “discourse” in the critical literature (Ó Tuathail 2002, 2004; Muller 2008) and lament the relative lack of depth and breadth in the exploration of the term (Muller 2008, 323). Discourse is an inherently tricky term and can vary conceptually depending on whose interpretation is used. The main criticism is that there is no set, agreed upon definition of discourse to be used within critical studies. This lack of a clear definition presents a situation where consistency from one study to another may be lacking, weakening the overall impact of the use of discourse within the critical geopolitical literature. Though aware of this criticism, I closely followed the concept of discourse put forth by Foucault in which discourse is created through the relationship between power and knowledge. It is controlled by objects, social constraints of what can be said, where it can be said, who may speak, and the position of the privileged (Foucault 1980). I demonstrate in the final chapter of this thesis how different discourses, narratives, and relative truths can be constructed about the same situation by a variety of media outlets and the power/knowledge relationships.

Geographical knowledge is constantly produced by intellectuals of statecraft, academics, journalists, and others at many different spatial levels beyond the nation-state, in the popular media (e.g., newspapers and film), and at the local level such as in a living room or movie theatre. Because of the multi-scalar nature of this phenomenon, the challenge to those studying geopolitics is to understand how this knowledge is “transformed into the reductive geopolitical reasoning of intellectuals of statecraft” (Agnew and Ó Tuathail 1998, 327) as well as understanding how complex situations are simplified and commodified towards an easily understood controllable geopolitical abstraction. By applying Agnew’s and Ó Tuathail’s (1998) challenge, as stated previously, to the situation in northern Uganda, one can see how the elements of colonial practices, the involvement of the West during the Cold War, the current ethnic makeup of the Ugandan government, and uneven development and distribution of power between the northern and southern areas of Uganda has been simplified by the media, and likely by many Western leaders. Instead, all of these factors are largely ignored and the situation boils down to a simple “rebel insurgency” which is not placed in any historical or spatial context. Thus, a complex situation is simplified and written as an easily understood story of another ethnic African conflict, commodified and sold to readers throughout the Western world. The objective of this study is to understand why this simplification happens, what power relationships are acting on the media to create the drive towards simplicity, and to identify how these stories portray the conflict in northern Uganda.

The Role of Popular Geopolitical Case Studies

The media have become a powerful force in shaping public opinion of places, events, and relationships. Consequently, media are often subject to governmental monitoring, regulation, disruption and forced shut-downs. The power and ability of media to shape or “frame” stories, and therefore public perception, produces the need for rigorous academic analysis of the geopolitical narratives presented as fact. The following are critical studies of the media’s framing of events and global politics to demonstrate what popular geopolitical studies have done thus far, and to show how this study builds upon and furthers this literature.

The USSR, Cold War Politics and the *Reader’s Digest*

In her 1993 and 1996 critical studies of *Reader’s Digest*, Joanne Sharp examined the production of a perception of the Soviet Union and communism from 1930-1945 in the *Reader’s Digest*. Not only did Sharp (1993, 1996) examine how the perception was manufactured through the magazine but also how the geographic location of the *Reader’s Digest* played a role in how the Soviet Union projected to readers. As she stated, “if geopolitics is a discursive practice constructed out of cultural norms and standards, then any interpretation of a geopolitical text must be situated within a study of the particular institutional location of its production”(Sharp 1996, 557). Sharp asserted that one facet of geopolitics that had been overlooked is the assumption that the location of agency in geopolitics rests only with those “intellectuals of statecraft”. To remedy this oversight, she stated that critical and popular geopolitical studies must locate and analyze the locations of production of discursive practices that lie outside the “formal arena of the state” (Sharp 1996, 557). This point must be taken seriously, as readers often do not consider that news stories are subjective interpretations of reality, influenced by personal

and cultural biases of the journalist, whether consciously or otherwise. The journalist writing the story, as well as his or her location, affects the narrative, tone, and geopolitical view of the article. An article written by an embedded journalist in a place of conflict will have a much different narrative than an article written by a reporter in a hotel in a capital city based on second hand knowledge from refugees, military personnel or governmental agents. Viewing a news story as a product while ignoring the labor and process that created it is an issue needing more in depth study. Readers often, if not always, lack the knowledge of the where, the who, and the circumstances that influence the creation of the stories they read.

Sharp (1996) concluded in her study that geopolitical narratives cannot be solely explained by capitalist motivations, simple manipulations or pure ideology. Instead, she asserted that the *Reader's Digest* should be “regarded as a particular institutional site in the networks of power/knowledge...and that those who produce it are themselves constructed through discourses of individuality, morality, Manifest Destiny and American Exceptionalism” (567). Furthermore, Sharp demonstrated the power of widely circulated periodicals such as *Reader's Digest* and the important role they play in reproducing depictions of people and place, as well as geopolitical narratives, and she highlighted the necessity of critically examining the positive and negative effects they might have on the views and attitudes of readers (Dodds 1996).

A Critical Geopolitical Eye, The British Press and the 1982 Falklands War

Another popular geopolitical study regarding place perception as depicted in the print media is Klaus Dodds' (1996) article “The 1982 Falklands War and a Critical

Geopolitical Eye: Steve Bell and the If. . .Cartoons,” which explores the importance of place in producing conflicting representational scripts. Dodds examined the way in which the Falklands War was represented in the British media. The focus of his study centered on the convergence of fact and fantasy in defining the Falklands as a far away place. Some media outlets presented the Falklands as a place where Britain must protect and defend the people from fascism and domination, while other outlets, notably the London *Guardian*, presented the war as just another “imperial dream gone sour” (Dodds 1996, 572). These conflicting narratives, Dodds stated, were important due to “the ways in which they structure the means of seeing places of conflict within international affairs” (Dalby 1993; Silvan and Majeski 1995; Dodds 1996, 572).

Dodds’ analysis focused specifically on the political cartoons of Steve Bell, who sought to confront the nationalist and realist view of the conflict and instead addressed the “complex relationship between the mass media, the reporting of war and the response of the domestic population” (Dodds 1996, 589). Dodds’s critical assessment demonstrated the power of the media to critique not only itself, but also the geopolitical narratives presented by politicians and foreign policy experts.

The Inscription of Difference

Myers, Klak, and Koehl analyzed the different narratives the American press utilized regarding the Bosnia and Rwandan civil wars and subsequent genocides in the mid-1990’s in their article, “The Inscription of Difference: News Coverage of the Conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia” (1996). The authors contended that American news media distorted the narrative regarding the events in Rwanda to fit a particular frame as

“bloody” and “tribal.” This frame was quite different from the more civil and “tactical” narrative regarding Bosnia, even though the two events were similar in many ways (Myers et al. 1996). The authors used content and intertextual analysis to demonstrate how the Rwandan genocide and civil war was framed by journalists to be dominated by “tribal and “ethnic” hatreds rife with bloody orgies of senseless violence (Myers et al. 1996 32-33). Alternatively, the Bosnia conflict was housed in a narrative of more civilized warfare complete with “tactics” and “strategies”. These different narratives of similar conflicts “direct [the authors’] analysis toward the press, rather than the places themselves, as a creative source of place images” (Barnes and Duncan 1992; Myers et al. 1996). Myers et al. (1996) demonstrated how the media created an “othering” effect toward Rwandans that is often attributed to Africa as a whole, creating an overall negative impression of the continent that is reinforced by subsequent stories of endless ethnic violence. Bosnia, on the other hand, was treated rather differently, creating an impression that the violence is less horrific and part of “everyone’s war” (Myers et al. 1994, 22). The media has such a profound influence on public perception through the ability to use imagery in a very powerful way, necessitating critical examination (Entman 1989, 75 1991; Lee and Solomon 1990, 257; Myers et al. 1994, 22).

The preceding case studies have presented different ways in which the media have been examined in critical geopolitical studies. Sharp (1993,1996) illustrated that it is not only the enculturation of the journalists that affect how the articles are framed, but also the physical places where they are written and published. Dodds (1996) demonstrated the media’s capability of critically examining itself through various means including the

imagery of political cartoons. Finally, Myers, et al. (1996) displayed how the media can be guilty of treating similar situations and conflicts differently, further promoting narratives that may be false or misleading and confirming that the media does need critical examination and should not be taken as objective fact.

A Critique of Critical Geopolitics

Critical geopolitics is not a perfect methodological or conceptual tool -it does have its drawbacks. As Nicley (2009) notes, “a robust critical geopolitics should provide for a balanced emphasis upon both narrative and practice as elements of a critical geopolitical discourse” (19). In other words, there needs to be an emphasis on deconstructing narrative itself as well as examining practices and structures that created the narrative within a study for it to present a well defined critique of the targeted narrative. Depending upon the type of analysis, however, this balance between the deconstruction of the narrative and the practices and structures that created it might not always be possible. There are also those who lament the focus on textual narratives. They claim that the focus on these texts might bring an incomplete picture to the analysis by ignoring the knowledge created and disseminated from the local level (Mamadouh and Djikink 2006; Muller 2008). Furthermore, the focus on “elite representations” and the emphasis on discourse can create a situation in which individual experiences and the everyday understandings of situations are unaddressed or even erased (Megoran 2006; Muller 2008). I remain aware of these critiques and will address the shortcomings and potential issues of my analysis in later chapters. . What I intend to accomplish with this

study is to demonstrate that there are missing voices in the arguments that are made through the press regarding the situation in northern Uganda. These missing voices include members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), members of the Acholi leadership, Ugandans living in northern Uganda, and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) among others. This study is also aimed at demonstrating how the economy, socio-cultural practices, the situatedness of journalists and other locations of power affect the way in which the conflict in Uganda is presented and how often it is present in the four press outlets within this study.

Trends in International News Coverage and the Power of Shaping Perceptions

As the previous section demonstrates, the media is a powerful force in shaping reader's perceptions of foreign places, events, and so on. The power of the media can be used in constructive as well as destructive ways. The following is a brief history of the trends in Western international news coverage to illustrate how the nature of international news coverage has changed since the 19th century.

The technological advancements in the 19th century made global communication exponentially faster with the invention and installation of undersea telegraph cables. International news, consequently, became cheaper and more relevant, as events were relayed around the world in hours and days instead of weeks and months. This new era of global communication created an appetite for news of far off places, "darkest Africa" being amongst the most fascinating to readers in the Western world. *King Leopold's Ghost* by Adam Hochschild (1998) is one account of how lucrative the international news business was, and it demonstrates the lengths newspapers were willing to go, and the

finances they were willing to provide, for stories of “deepest, darkest Africa.” These stories were often exaggerated and sensationalized to draw in as many readers as possible in the highly competitive newspaper market. “Yellow journalism”, or news that is highly sensational, subjective and often including “faked interviews, misleading headlines, pseudo-science, and a parade of false learning from so-called experts” (Mott 1941, 539) was widely used around the turn of the century during the battles for circulation numbers, especially in the New York City newspapers.

The 1920s saw an overhaul of journalism practices with the formation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1922, which adopted a code of ethics. This code, the “Canons of Journalism” (American Society of News Editors, asne.org, visited 2/16/2010), addresses the responsibility of the reporter and the newspaper to the public, including “Sincerity, Truthfulness, Accuracy” and “Impartiality,” canons four and five, respectively. As journalism evolved into a respected profession, the ideology of reporting “objectively” became an industry standard (Schudson 2003, 82). The consequence of “objective” ideology is that newspapers could claim that the stories they printed were simply objective reporting of the facts without personal bias. This mask of objectivity presents the situations depicted in news stories in terms of “how it is,” much like traditional geopolitics, rather than as interpretations of situations, or as situated views of events because of the limitations that are placed upon journalists.

Numerous studies have noted that stories in the US media regarding developing countries are usually negatively framed (Riffe and Budianto 2001), which influences the way in which people see such places. Other studies have noted that international news coverage is often limited in scope to a few strategically important counties. Larson’s

(1984) content analysis, for example, demonstrated that between 1972-1981 a few select countries (USSR, Israel, South Vietnam and Britain) dominated US international network news, while the rest of the world received little to no coverage. This study intends to add to this literature by again demonstrating how news outlets, in this case four geographically and culturally diverse newspapers, portray an event differently.

Chapter Three

Methodology

This study was completed under the assumption that news reporting is a complex, multi-layered process involving gatekeepers at multiple scalar levels, organizational routines, economic considerations, and other constraints (Gans 1980, Kothari 2008). To complete a balanced analysis, I applied complementary quantitative and qualitative approaches to my research questions. Given the questions outlined in this study, a quantitative approach can be useful in demonstrating the presence or absence of a particular geopolitical discourse or framework by measuring the occurrence of key words associated with a particular frame. It can also quickly display the visibility of a story/event or the lack thereof within a certain periodical by quantifying the frequency of certain variables, namely article frequency within each periodical. A quantitative approach is complemented by a more in-depth qualitative method. The qualitative analysis enhances the overall analysis by validating the results from the quantitative methods as well as providing a deeper level of context to the results. The use of multiple methods is aimed at avoiding the weaknesses inherent in using single method designs regarding something as complex as news reporting (Jick 1979). This chapter discusses the concept of framing, describes the periodicals under study and the justification for their inclusions, and discusses the methodological background for this study.

Framing

One method of investigation within this study is an analysis of the key words within language sets or frames present within the four periodicals. To this end, what framing “is” becomes a rather important question. As Myers et al. (1996) note, the “most analytically useful and insightful concept in media analysis is ‘the frame’, which refers to the information-processing principles or guides underlying the actual content of news stories” (24). The exact meaning of framing has been a topic of some discussion within media studies, with Entman (1993) referring to it as a “scattered conceptualization” (51). The vague conceptualizations have led to the term being used to label similar but rather different approaches within media studies (Scheufele, 1999). Considering this, I will be following Entman’s (1993) and Parenti’s (1993) explanations of framing, as Myers et al. do in their 1996 study.

For Entman (1993) to frame “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (52). Many studies of news coverage of Africa, for example, tend to emphasize the violent events and place them within a tribal context for a cause (Hawk, 1992; Myers et al., 1996; Schraeder and Endless, 1998). Parenti states “framing is achieved in the way the news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the placement... the tone of presentation... the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the labeling and vocabulary” (Parenti 1993, 201 as quoted in Myers et al. 1996, 25). In other words, framing is how the story is presented to the reader, usually with some underlying message, which may or may not be explicitly or intentionally presented by the

journalist. Following Parenti's explanation of framing, stories regarding the LRA and the northern conflict are examined by the frequency of stories found within each periodical (exposure), the length of the articles, and the dominant tone/language of the articles through key word analysis (tone of presentation).

As framing can be seen as either an independent or dependent variable within media studies, I will be analyzing it as a dependent variable as outlined by Scheufele (1999, 107). The framing of a story can be affected at the individual level where a journalist's view of an issue or event may be influenced by a number of factors, both socio-structural and organizational (Shoemaker and Reese 1996) as well as ideological variables or biases (Tuchman 1978), thus making the story a dependent variable. Further discussion of the possible reasons for certain frames existing and persisting in the media are discussed in chapter five of this study.

Periodicals Under Study

The following newspapers were selected because of their reputations for quality journalism, and because all four periodicals were available online, in full text, both on their respective online locations and through Dow Jones' Factiva database. The following criteria were used for selecting these sources: all four are independently owned, have a relatively long history respective to the newspaper industry in the country of origin, have a high degree of readership, and each paper is internationally recognized for its quality of journalism. The four media outlets that were chosen for analysis include *The New York Times* (USA), the *Guardian* (UK) in London, England, the *Mail & Guardian* of Johannesburg, South Africa and the *Daily Monitor* in Kampala, Uganda.

The following section includes a brief description of each outlet and the justification of the use of each.

The New York Times

The New York Times is a daily newspaper published by the publicly traded The New York Times Company. *The New York Times* was founded in September of 1851 by Henry Jarvis Raymond and George Jones and came under the ownership of the Ochs-Sulzberger family in 1896 when Adolf Ochs bought the paper and became owner and publisher (nytco.com). Although *The New York Times* is publicly traded, the Ochs-Sulzberger family has maintained its control over the company by controlling 88% of the Class B shares. Currently, the Ochs-Sulzberger family maintains control of 8 of the 13 Board positions including the position of Chairman (Fine, 2007). *The New York Times* was chosen as a representative outlet for the U.S. as it is often considered one of the premier newspapers in the United States, having won 101 Pulitzer Prizes and Citations, more than any other newspaper in the US. The Times has eleven national news bureaus and twenty-six foreign news bureaus and an average daily circulation of over 1 million (nytco.com visited on 9/12/2009) It also maintains an extensive and easily accessed archive of articles.

The Guardian

Since Uganda is a former British protectorate, it is important to analyze news coverage from a British periodical to capture the current British perspective as the former colonial power. *The Guardian's* history and current situation is not unlike that of *The New York Times*, which better lends itself to a comparative analysis. John Edward Taylor

established the *Guardian* in 1821 as a weekly paper, which became a daily-published paper in 1855 (guardian.co.uk visited on 9/16/09). The paper was bought by C.P. Scott in 1907 and remained in the ownership of the Scott family until it passed into the Scott Trust in 1936. The Scott Trust put the *Guardian* in a position where it could maintain its independence from the influence of shareholders as the only holders of shares were members of the Scott Trust (guardian.co.uk, visited 7/12/2009). As it is not beholden to shareholders, the “Guardian Media Group does not seek profit for the financial benefit of an owner or shareholders. Instead, it seeks profit to sustain journalism that is free from commercial or political interference, and to uphold a set of values laid down by C.P. Scott” (gmgplc.co.uk). According to the *Guardian*, the paper maintains a position, politically, as the voice of the left, countering politically right leaning *The Times* (London) and *The Daily Telegraph* (guardian.co.uk). The *Guardian* was chosen for this study, due to its similarities to *The New York Times* in terms of ownership, its high degree of readership in the UK and its foreign correspondents in Uganda.

Mail & Guardian Online

The *Mail & Guardian Online* is published in Johannesburg, South Africa. This paper was chosen as part of the study to gain the perspective of another former British holding in Africa that was not directly affected by the Ugandan conflict. The *Mail & Guardian Online* is the Internet counterpart of the *Mail & Guardian* periodical established in Johannesburg in 1985 by a group of journalists. The paper version of the then titled *Weekly Mail* was a small company owned by hundreds of small shareholders until 1995 when the *Guardian* (UK) became the major shareholder in the company and

renamed the paper the *Mail & Guardian*. In 1994, M&G Media, Ltd established the *Electronic Mail & Guardian* making it “one of the world's oldest news websites and among the first news sites on the African continent” (mg.co.za). Renamed the *Mail & Guardian Online*, the paper was 65% owned by Internet service provider MWeb from 1997 until it was bought back by M&G Media, Ltd in 2008. M&G Media’s current shares are 10 percent owned by the Guardian Media Group, and 87.5 percent is owned by Newtrust Company Botswana Limited, a company owned and controlled by Zimbabwean publisher and entrepreneur Trevor Ncube (mg.co.za). The *Mail & Guardian Online* was chosen for this study as it has been internationally recognized by winning the British IPD Best International Newspaper Award in 1995 and the Missouri Medal for Distinguished Journalism in 1996 (mg.co.za). It also enjoys a high level of readership and is rated one of Forbes.com world’s top 175 websites in 2001 (Forbes.com). It is also in the top five most visited web sites in South Africa as rated by Nielsen/Netratings.

Monitor Online

The *Monitor Online* is the online counterpart to the *Daily Monitor* out of Kampala, Uganda. The paper was established in 1992, and the online edition followed two years later in 1994. The online edition differs from the paper version in that it does not publish foreign content unless written specifically for the *Daily Monitor* (monitor.co.ug). The Nation Media Group and five individual shareholders jointly own the *Monitor Online* (monitor.co.ug). The *Monitor Online* was included in this study because it provides articles by Ugandan journalists covering the news of their country. The *Monitor Online* is, according to its mission statement, outspoken in its commitment to report stories regardless of the wishes of the government (monitor.co.ug). It has also

been shut down on numerous occasions for its criticism of the government and for reporting events that the Ugandan government would prefer not be made public, including the loss of military helicopters (monitor.co.ug). Though based in Kampala, the *Monitor Online* does have correspondents in the northern areas of Uganda reporting on the conflict.

Overall, this selection of newspapers provides an international, regional, and local perspective, as well as that of a former colonial power. All of the periodicals can also be accessed electronically, so in theory all of these periodicals can provide information to anyone with an Internet connection. The wide range of access to these sources of information create a situation in which the perspectives given by these outlets can permeate outside of their territorial containers, in other words, they are not confined to their countries of origin.

To reiterate, the methodology included in this chapter was used to answer the following questions:

- 1) Is there a measurable difference in the amount of coverage among the four periodicals under study?
- 2) Is there a qualitative difference in the way the conflict is portrayed between the four periodicals?
- 3) Whose voice dominates the stories presented in the news? Are there missing or absent perspectives on the conflict?
- 4) If there are differences among the four periodicals in either the amount of coverage or the portrayal of the conflict, why might these differences exist?

Mixed Methods

The use of multiple methods of analysis within one study is not new to the social sciences (Jick 1979; Kidder and Fine 1987; Mathison 1988; Neuman 2000). This research structure is usually described as “one of convergent methodology, convergent validation or, what has been called ‘triangulation’” (Webb et al. 1966 as cited by Jick 1979, 2). Denzin (1978) has defined triangulation as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon”(291). Within the GIScience community, it is accepted that a greater number of global positioning satellites allows for greater accuracy of pinpointing a location. Similarly, triangulation within the social sciences proposes that researchers can “improve the accuracy of their judgments by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon”(Jick 1979, 2). Proponents of this line of research structure share the view that quantitative and qualitative approaches should be seen as complementary rather than incompatible. Campbell and Fiske (1959) argue that the use of multiple, complementary methods should be used within the process of validation to ensure that the variance seen within a given trait is an actual reflection of the trait and not the method of analysis. More recent studies (Koenig 2006; Woolley 2009) demonstrate the benefits of multiple methods research but call for stronger methodological and cohesive practices. The practice of using multiple methods in the social sciences has produced a journal dedicated to multiple methods research, i.e. The Journal of Mixed Methods Research established in 2007.

Under this framework, one can assume that if two or more methods agree, then the results of an analysis are valid and not an artifact of the methodology. This study follows Campbell’s and Fiske’s (1959) argument, so multiple methods will be used to assess the news coverage of the LRA and the conflict in northern Uganda to determine

whether there was a discernable difference in how the situation is portrayed across the four periodicals. To this end, three quantitative methods and two qualitative methods were employed. First, the frequency per periodical was calculated to determine the relative amount of press coverage (Myers et al. 1996). Second, all of the articles relevant to this study were analyzed for article length as a proxy for indicating depth of coverage. Third, key words chosen within four language sets were tallied up to determine, quantitatively, if a certain frame was dominant within a periodical and across all four periodicals. The key word analysis is also, in part, qualitative as it is identifying frameworks. I elaborate on this point in the discussion of the keyword/framework analysis. The final method employed was a qualitative assessment of what type of news story was dominant that is, episodic versus thematic coverage. The remainder chapter is a discussion of the methods utilized in the study.

Article Selection and Quantitative Methods

Articles chosen for analysis were those that focused on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the four previously mentioned newspapers during the period January 1, 2004-December 31, 2008. The conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government has been ongoing since roughly 1988; however, analyzing the entire 20 year period would be not be possible as two of the periodicals included in this study had not yet been established. The years between 2004-08 were selected for several reasons. Not only were data from all periodicals available during this time window, but there were also alternating periods of multi-state peace talks and increased violence, the International Criminal Court issued warrants for the arrest of the LRA leadership, and the conflict went

from a domestic to a regional issue as the LRA fled into the DRC. This time period, therefore, was chosen for analysis because it was expected that newsworthy events such as the Juba Peace talks in 2006 and the movement of the LRA into the Democratic Republic of Congo might be covered differently by these newspapers.

Similar to the approach in Papacharissi's and Oliveira's 2008 "New Frames of Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers", reviews of books, films, plays, and other artistic events were excluded from analysis as were letters to the editor/responses. Before any quantitative analysis was completed, all articles were screened to justify inclusion in the study. Justification was on the basis that the majority of an article was in regard to the conflict or the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Articles in which the LRA or the conflict was a passing reference or included in a sentence or less within an article of over 300 words were excluded. Factiva was the search engine used to collect the articles from each periodical. From the initial pool of over 1,000 articles, duplicates, articles regarding cultural events, i.e. movies, television shows, art exhibitions, were excluded. Also excluded were responses to news articles and articles that mentioned the LRA in passing (two sentences or less). Other articles were omitted on a case-by-case basis during the qualitative portion of the analysis. All articles that were predominantly focused on the Lord's Resistance Army or the northern conflict in Uganda were analyzed, a final sample size of N=928.

After the pool of articles was created, three quantitative methods were utilized within this study. Following the quantitative methodology as outlined by Myers et al. (1996):

- 1- Calculating average article length by word count for a given periodical as a proxy indicator for depth of coverage assuming that a longer article will give a more in-depth, thematic analysis.
- 2- Calculating the number of articles over a given time period to determine the frequency of coverage or visibility in the periodical.
- 3- Calculating the frequency of key words used within a language set to quantify the abundance of a certain frame presented by the news story.

Article Frequency and Article Length Analyses

Article frequency was calculated simply by tabulating how many articles were present in each periodical per month for each of the four periodicals under study. This follows a similar method used by Myers et al. 1996 which compared the amount of coverage of the events in Rwanda and Bosnia in six American newspapers from October 1990 through April 1994. In that study, Myers et al. (1996) were comparing the coverage of two separate events within six American newspapers to demonstrate the lack of coverage of an African genocide compared to the high degree of coverage of a similar event in Eastern Europe. This study, using a similar method aims to show the difference in coverage of the same event in four periodicals from various countries and continents, the hypothesis being that there would be a generally low volume of coverage outside of the affected country of Uganda.

Average word count for the study period was calculated for each periodical. This measure was taken because it should not be assumed that a high frequency of articles relating to the conflict translates to high quality or great depth of coverage. To place the results into some context, benchmarks for article length are generally 600 words as a limit for general articles and 1500-2000 words for a feature length article (Ricketson

2004, 79). It should be noted, however, these are standards from one source. Other factors, such as the circulation size of the periodical, can also dictate the word count restrictions. This point is demonstrated by a study from 2004 by stateofthemedias.org. The results of the study indicate the largest newspapers (circulation size of >750,000) in the United States had the highest average word count. *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *USA Today* and *The Washington Post* had an average article length of 1,200 words, with 64% of stories having a story length of 1,000 words or greater. Medium (circulation of 100,000-700,000) and small circulation (circulation of <100,000) newspapers had significantly lower average word lengths of 800 and 600 words per article respectively (stateofthemedias.org/2004, visited 9/12/2009).

The frequency of coverage and the average story length in a given periodical can superficially indicate the value or importance of the story, i.e. longer and more frequent coverage indicating a more valuable and important story. These results, however, do not indicate the nature of the stories or how they shape people's perception of a place. As discussed in the methodology chapter, an abundance of coverage or a lack thereof can both affect public policy, as Lim and Seo's (2009) study demonstrated.

Key Word/ Frame Analysis (Quantitative)

Closely following Myers et al. (1996), after an initial first reading of all of the articles, four language sets were identified as characterizing the four dominant frames. The language sets chosen for analysis include: *civil war*, *insurgency*, *peace* and *conflict*. The exact words included in the four frames are outlined in the results section of this

study. These frames were chosen specifically to add to similar studies that have demonstrated that foreign coverage of Africa tends to be negative in nature (Gans 1980; Hatchen and Beil 1985; Zein and Cooper 1992; Myers et al. 1996), and is often housed in ethnic and tribal terms. The peace frame was added to test the hypothesis that, though there were significant periods of peace talks during the four-year period under study, the foreign press still tended to cover violent episodes more frequently than episodes of peaceful negotiation.

Words included in each language set were tallied by hand twice, for verification, to ensure the words counted towards the study were all in relation to the LRA or northern conflict. The dominant framework analysis is both quantitative, through the tallying of words, as well as qualitative, in that it demonstrates which “frame” dominates within a particular periodical. As noted by Fairclough (1995, 2000) and van Dijk (1997), qualitative textual analysis techniques such as the one applied in this study, pursue a deep explanation of meaning by observing and recording patterns present in mediated texts (Papacharissi 2008, 61).

To be sure, other frames could likely be identified; however, as this study’s aim is to add to the literature regarding the negative presentation of conflicts in Africa in the media, the language sets as stated previously were selected for examination. To this end, a final analysis was undertaken to corroborate the findings of the framework analysis. To pair with the intertextual analysis, a discourse analysis was undertaken following Papacharissi (2008) between episodic and thematic coverage.

Restrictions of the Quantitative Analysis

While the quantitative analysis of article frequency and length can perhaps demonstrate the disparities in reporting of the crisis in the international press, since comparison was made of articles regarding similar events by these periodicals, the analysis was very limited in what information or insights it could actually provide. Article length restrictions and guidelines differ by periodical, and by the standards set by the editors for each section, i.e. national news, world news, sports and so on, as well as the type of article, i.e. News in Brief, Feature and so on. Frequency and article length alone also do not provide information on the quality of the information given in the article.

Key terms analysis can provide insight as to the how the conflict is framed or depicted, yet falls short when we question the context of these terms. And again, without interviewing the journalists to gain an understanding of their thought process, we do not know if a certain framework is being chosen more for its location and preconceived notions, over the conditions of the conflict. Another issue with the keyword analysis is multiple frameworks occurring in the same article. Often journalists will employ terms from both the language of *civil war* and *insurgency/rebellion*. This is problematic as the occurrence of both in a single article can cancel the effects of both on shaping the “framing” of the article. Without placing these results in the context of the history of the conflict, it is not clear if these frameworks are justified or not. For the previously discussed reasons, an in-depth reading of each article and a qualitative analysis of episodic versus thematic coverage were completed.

Episodic vs. Thematic News Coverage

Episodic and thematic framing is best described by Iyengar (1994) where an episodic news frame “takes the form of a case-study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances” (14). Thematic news coverage or framing, on the other hand, “places public issues in some more general or abstract context and takes the form of a ‘take out’ or ‘backgrounder’ report directed at general outcomes or conditions” (14). Put another way, these two frames present very different geopolitical arguments. As Iyengar notes, episodic coverage tends to give a distorted image of “recurring issues as unrelated events” that “prevents the public from cumulating the evidence towards a logical, ultimate consequence” (Iyengar 1991, 6). The consequence of episodic coverage dominating the coverage of an event is that complex issues or events are simplified to the level of anecdotal evidence that “encourages reasoning by resemblance – people settle upon causes and treatments that ‘fit’ the observed problems” (Iyengar 1991, 7). Thematic coverage, on the other hand, tends to emanate from a specific event but places it into a wider context and provides background information (Papachrissi 2008, 65).

News articles are rarely entirely episodic or thematic; however, one type of frame tends to dominate (Papachrissi 2008). To that end, each article in the study was read and determined to be either dominantly episodic, thematic or equally both, in which case it was labeled “combination.” Articles deemed episodic were those that depicted concrete events with little discussion, background information, or wider context. Articles were deemed thematic if they gave substantial background information, related an event in a wider context, or discussed the wider implications of an event. In the event that an article was equally episodic and thematic, it was deemed as a combination article. Articles were

discarded if they were deemed inappropriate for this analysis, taking the sample set down to 675 articles from an initial 928. These were mostly interviews and letters from President Museveni, so the majority of stories excluded from this particular analysis were from the *Monitor* while the majority of the foreign news stories were retained.

Following the triangulation method as described earlier in this section, this thematic vs. episodic discourse analysis was used for two reasons. One, it validates the quantitative analysis in that one would expect to find less in-depth coverage in the periodicals that did not cover the conflict to any great extent. That is, shorter articles tend to give few details, little background information, or discussion of how the story relates to the region or global politics. It was expected that “episodic” coverage would dominate in papers that run fewer stories and/or shorter articles regarding the conflict. Two, thematic vs. episodic analysis can help validate or challenge the findings in the framing analysis. As Papachrissi and Oliveira (2008) demonstrated in their study of terrorism in the US vs. British news, episodic/thematic analysis can capture “several similarities and differences in the tone and orientation of the coverage that were evident in the sample” that were also captured in the word groups examined in their framing analysis. However, episodic/thematic analysis can also find additional differences between how different periodicals frame and present a situation outside the initial scope of the study (Papachrissi 2008, 68). Three, examining each periodical for the dominant type of story adds depth towards understanding the differences in how these periodicals portray the conflict. The quantitative analysis can give a relative understanding of the amount of attention each periodical gives this specific conflict while the framing analysis can inform on how the conflict is presented to the reader. The episodic vs. thematic analysis,

however, can inform one on how a given periodical assigns responsibility for an event/conflict and whether or not it tends to relate the story to a wider context that is, what kind of geopolitical argument tends to dominate.

It has been my intention from the methodological examination in this section to demonstrate that the results in the following chapter should be viewed as a whole and not in isolation. While the quantitative results may indicate that the conflict in northern Uganda is underrepresented in the Western media, for example, this says nothing of the type of coverage the conflict is receiving in these periodicals. It is for this reason a mixed methods approach was taken.

Chapter Four

Results

Quantitative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of LRA

Newspaper coverage of the Lord's Resistance Army and the conflict in northern Uganda was analyzed using three different quantitative methods. First, the frequency of published articles in each periodical was calculated to determine amount of press coverage. Second, article length was analyzed, to capture the depth of coverage. Lastly, frequency of term usage per periodical was analyzed to determine the extent to which a certain language set used in framing the events in northern Uganda was dominant in particular newspapers under study, or throughout all four periodicals.

Article Frequency Analysis

Articles focusing on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the four previously mentioned newspapers were analyzed during the period January 1, 2004-December 31, 2008. The Northern Conflict has been ongoing since roughly 1988; however, analyzing the entire 20 year period would be difficult, as two of the periodicals included in this study had not yet been established. The years between 2004-08 were selected for the following reasons: data from all periodicals were available, there were alternating periods of multi-state peace talks and periods of increased violence, the International Criminal Court issued warrants for the arrest of the LRA leadership, and the conflict went from a

domestic to a regional issue as the LRA fled into the DRC. With this in mind, this period was chosen to analyze how coverage differed across the diverse events that occurred including, as previously outlined: spikes in violence, governmental attempts to militarily neutralize the LRA, two periods of peace talks, and the expansion of the national conflict to a regional conflict. All articles that were predominantly focused on the Lord's Resistance Army or the northern conflict in Uganda were analyzed. Articles that mentioned the Lord's Resistance Army in passing (two sentences or less) were excluded from analysis. The articles were first analyzed quantitatively by frequency of published articles in each newspaper (Figure 1).




Figure 1- Number of articles regarding the LRA or the northern conflict in Uganda monthly from 2004-2008 for all four periodicals.

In examining the frequency of published articles regarding the LRA, noticeably absent from the early part of the study period are articles from the *Mail & Guardian Online*. Though the online edition of the newspaper began in 1994, there were no articles

regarding the northern conflict in Uganda or the LRA until April 2005. The reason for this lack of coverage is unclear. Disregarding the gap in the *Mail & Guardian Online* dates from Figure 1 it is possible to conclude that in these four newspapers, geographic distance does not seem to be a factor in determining the frequency of coverage, as *The New York Times* and the *Guardian* both have higher rates of coverage than the *Mail & Guardian Online*. More likely, the perceived newsworthiness of events to the readership base of the particular periodical drove the frequency of coverage.

As can be expected, the amount of coverage peaked in the course of “newsworthy” events, the most noticeable spikes in coverage occurring in early 2004, early 2005, mid-year 2006 and a small rise in coverage in early 2008. The spikes coincided with the following events: In February 2004, the LRA was cited as killing 200 villagers in an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in northern Uganda. In December of 2004 the first “face-to-face” peace talks between the LRA and the government of Uganda occurred, prompting an increase in national coverage; however, international coverage was almost absent during this period. International coverage increases in October of 2005 with the issuance of arrest warrants for the top five leaders of the LRA on charges of war crimes by the newly formed International Criminal Court (ICC).

The largest increase of coverage during the study period was from June-December 2006, during which the Juba Peace talks were initiated between the LRA and the Ugandan government in Juba, Sudan. The slight increase in coverage throughout 2008, as seen through the following qualitative analysis, was mostly in regard to the movement of the LRA from southern Sudan and northern Uganda into the northeastern

areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. This movement of the LRA, and the resulting increase of coverage marked the beginning of the transformation of this mostly domestic conflict into a regional matter and prompted a joint offensive by the armies of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Southern Sudan against the LRA in late 2008.

It is worth noting that the increase in domestic and international coverage varied throughout the period. Most dramatically, international coverage increased during the issuance of the ICC warrants and after the movement of the LRA from northern Uganda into the northeastern areas of the DRC. During the same period domestic coverage remained relatively stable or dropped off. The reason for this phenomenon was sought through qualitative analysis.

Article Length Analysis

Average word count for the study period was also calculated for each periodical (Figure 2). This measure was taken because it should not be assumed that a high frequency of articles relating to the conflict translates to high quality or great depth of coverage. To place the results into some context, benchmarks for article length are generally 600 words as a limit for general articles and 1500-2000 words for a feature length article (Ricketson 2004, 79). It should be noted, however, these are standards from one source, and other factors, such as the circulation size of the periodical, can also dictate the word count restrictions. This point is demonstrated by a 2004 study of US newspapers by stateofthedia.org (visited on 1/10/2010). The results of the study indicated the largest newspapers (circulation size of >750,000) in the United States had

the highest average word count. *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *USA Today* and *The Washington Post* had an average article length of 1,200 words, with 64% of stories having a story length of 1,000 words or greater. Medium (circulation of 100,000-700,000) and small circulation (circulation of <100,000) newspapers had significantly lower average word lengths of 800 and 600 words per article respectively (stateofthemedias.org).




Figure 2- Mean word count per newspaper of articles about the LRA during the study period January 1, 2004 - December 31,2008.

| Periodical | Word Count (Mean) | Word Count (Mode) |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <i>The Daily Monitor</i> | 614 | 402 |
| <i>Guardian</i> | 443 | 413 |
| <i>New York Times</i> | 479 | 190 |
| <i>Mail & Guardian Online</i> | 700 | 526 |

Figure 3 - Mean and mode of article word count for *The New York Times*, *Guardian*, *Mail & Guardian Online*, and *The Daily Monitor*.

Average word count can also be deceiving due to the sample sizes. Because of the relatively small sample size for the *Guardian* (N=42), *Mail & Guardian Online* (N=43) and *The New York Times* (N=59) the average or mean is easily skewed by outlying values.

The distinct difference in mean and mode for *The Daily Monitor* and *The New York Times* can be explained by the uneven distribution of sample values. Though the majority of the articles in each newspaper fall towards the lower end of the distribution, there are enough very long feature articles of 3000+ words that the overall average is drawn upwards.

The *Guardian* has a relatively uniform distribution of word counts as seen in Figure 4. This distribution produces a mean of 443 words per article and a mode of 413 words per article. Due to a small sample size and uneven distribution, the average word count for *The New York Times* is skewed by high outlying values. The average word count for the Times is as 479 words per article, while the mode is 190. A histogram of the articles (Figure 4) demonstrates that roughly two-thirds or 41 of the 59 articles are below the calculated average.

Average word count might have also been useful when comparing the average word count of articles regarding the Lord's Resistance Army or Uganda's Northern Crisis to the overall average story length of *The New York Times*. Unfortunately statistics for average story length for *The New York Times*, nor any of the remaining three periodicals, are unavailable. Were they available, such statistics would provide more context in which to situate the previously discussed results.




Figure 4 - Histogram of article length for the *Guardian*.




Figure 5 - Histogram of article length for *The New York Times* articles.




Figure 6- Histogram of article length for *Mail & Guardian Online* articles.




Figure 7 - Histogram of article length for *The Daily Monitor*.

Key Terms Analysis

The final quantitative analysis included coding for certain “sets of language” regarding the conflict and the LRA. Similar to Myers et al. (1996), two sets of key words were identified for two contrasting frameworks for the conflict, the *language of insurgency* and the *language of civil war*. As with similar studies (Entman 1991; Sharp 1993,1996; Myers et al. 1996; Dodds 1996) the interest here was to see what words were used to describe or frame the article, and how often these terms were used to determine quantitatively if one framework dominated throughout a periodical, or overall throughout the four periodicals. Two further language sets were also identified: those of “peace” and “conflict.”

The first language set analyzed was the *language of insurgency/rebellion*. The purpose for coding for this specific word set was to see if the conflict was housed in language depicting it as “rebellion” or “insurgency.” The words of this set were designed to reasonably describe this type of conflict “insurgency,” “bloody,” “rebels,” “rebellion,” “terror/ist/ism,” as well as other terms that house the framework of the crisis as being uncivilized, one-sided, and without clear leadership. This framework also implies that the rebelling population is unjustified in its uprising and that the rebellion is an unsanctioned act of hostility or war.

The language of civil war counters the previous language set. This word set frames the conflict in ways that validate the actions of the non-governmental force by placing them as equals to the government, not merely as “rebels.” This is done by showing a clear hierarchy in the leadership structure in using terms such as “commander,” “leader,” “general,” “deputy” and so on as well as the use of terms of

“tactical” or “strategy.” As Myers et al. (1996) state, these terms “imply a degree of sophistication, calculation, coherence or order to the conflict” and together “suggest[s] a race- and region-neutral characterization of military or geopolitical strategy in a conflict”(29).

The third language set consists of a single word, “conflict,” as this term is often used to describe the events that have taken place over the last 20+ years in northern Uganda. The use of this term takes a somewhat neutral stance on the nature of the events, in the opinion of the author, being neither a war, nor a rebellion/insurgency.

The final word set analyzed is the *language of peace*, including the terms “peace,” “negotiations,” and other derivatives of “negotiate.” This language set was identified to determine if the *languages of civil war and /or insurgency/rebellion* dominated the news articles over the *language of peace*, even though during the period of study, 2004-2008, the amount of time the two opposing sides were engaged in peace talks and out of peace talks is roughly equal.

In coding for the above mentioned language sets, articles that included the term “Lord’s Resistance Army” were identified, though not all were analyzed. Those not analyzed included articles that may have mentioned the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) briefly in a larger discussion of insurgencies in other Central African nations. Other articles were dismissed because, though they identified soldiers of the LRA as perpetrators of mutilations and abductions, the body of the article was not about the conflict. As in the Myers et al. 1994 study, irrelevant articles were excluded if the key words from the language sets were not within 30 words of the subject, that is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Articles were also eliminated if deemed irrelevant by the

author on a case-by-case basis during the qualitative portion of the study. Table 1 displays the results of the coding analysis for all of the articles (Total N=928).

| Key Terms | <i>The New York Times</i> | <i>Guardian</i> | <i>Mail & Guardian Online</i> | <i>Daily Monitor</i> |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Language of Civil War</i> | | | | |
| Commander or Leader | 170 | 138 | 73 | 19 |
| Civil War | 57 | 28 | 7 | 683 |
| Tactic or Strategy* | 4 | 7 | 4 | 15 |
| Total Terms | 231 | 173 | 84 | 717 |
| % Of All Terms | 26% | 25% | 20% | 11% |
| <i>Language of Insurgency/Rebellion</i> | | | | |
| Rebel/Rebellion* | 361 | 240 | 93 | 1976 |
| Insurgent/Insurgency* | 23 | 23 | 19 | 512 |
| Bloody | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Terror/ism* | 51 | 0 | 4 | 278 |
| Total | 435 | 267 | 116 | 2770 |
| % Of All Terms | 48% | 39% | 26% | 45% |
| <i>Language of Peace</i> | | | | |
| Peace* | 142 | 78 | 161 | 1936 |
| Negotiate* | 34 | 108 | 23 | 462 |
| Total | 176 | 186 | 184 | 2398 |
| % Of All Terms | 19% | 27% | 44% | 39% |
| Conflict (Total) | 63 | 54 | 37 | 338 |
| % Of All Terms | 7% | 8% | 9% | 5% |
| Total Number of All Terms | 905 | 680 | 421 | 6223 |

Table 1- Key term frequency of use in the periodicals under study.

Note: For all terms, the singular and plural forms were counted. Terms denoted by an asterisk * were also searched with included suffixes, such as rebel and rebellion.

The results of the key word analysis seem to indicate that all four of the newspapers under study favor the *language of insurgency/rebellion* over the *language of civil war*. The possible reasons for this phenomenon range from the geopolitical relationships between places, to media selectivity tailored to maximize readership. If a topic, for instance is seen as attractive to a readership base, it will likely receive more

coverage in longer articles or more frequently occurring articles. In the same vein, if there is a strong geopolitical relationship between two places, in the case of the United States this may include China, the United Kingdom or Pakistan, then it is likely that there will be more and longer articles about these areas.

The most likely reason for the prevalence of the *language of insurgency/rebellion* in *The New York Times* and the *Guardian* is that it is this language set that most conforms to “prevailing negative assumptions” of many US and European readers of the nature of conflicts on the African continent (Myers et al. 1996, 31). Characterizing the conflict as a government vs. rebel insurgency rather than a civil war also helps to reinforce the position taken by Uganda’s current president, Yoweri Museveni, an important ally of the US government in the Great Lakes Region (Art 1991; Quaranto 2006). As noted by Julia Preston of the *Washington Post* “it is a truism that in US foreign reporting the State Department often makes the story” (Myers et al. 1996, 24; quoted from Lee and Solomon 1990, 257).

In the case of the *Monitor Online*, use of the *language of rebellion/insurgency* likely prevents government shutdowns of the paper and conforms to the assumptions that many southern Ugandans hold regarding the northern conflict, who make up the base of the *Monitor Online*’s readership (Nantulya 2001). Setting the conflict between the LRA and Uganda’s governmental forces in the *language of rebellion/insurgency* is not surprising, as this further legitimates the actions of the government towards the LRA, as all states must “legitimate the wars they fight, whether they are relatively powerful or weak, democratic or authoritarian”(Falah et al. 2006, 142). That the other periodicals follow suit in the framing of this conflict is also not surprising; as noted earlier, much of

the West has preconceived notions as to the nature of such conflicts in Africa. The similar frameworks throughout all four newspapers may also be a symptom of heavy borrowing by journalists. Myers et al. (1996) note that not many newspapers have foreign bureaus in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of Kenya and South Africa, so “news stories will often reveal thematic parallels that suggest the interdependence of news gatherers and writers”(24). The high number of articles penned by Reuters, Associated Press and Agence France-Presse also suggests a high degree of interdependence.

The high percentage of the *language of peace* throughout the four periodicals coincides with the earlier study of frequency. The largest increases in coverage occur during the 2006 Juba Peace Talks (Figure 1). This trend is perhaps not surprising, as successful peace talks in a “democratic” African nation bolsters the United State’s post-Cold War position of spreading democracy to promote peace (Art 1991). This increase in press in connection with peace talks also draws attention to such talks and places pressure on the government of Uganda to reach some sort of lasting peaceful resolution as failure at war, domestically, undercuts the authority of the political elites and, internationally, legitimacy is at stake (Falah et al 2006).

The results of the key term analysis, while perhaps demonstrating a favored narrative regarding the conflict in Uganda in the press both domestically and internationally, or a high degree of press interdependence, only presents the results of four frameworks, and are subjective, inasmuch as the terms were chosen by the author. Doubtless, other frameworks could have been identified if sought using different key words or language sets. These four language sets were chosen in part following the

example set by Myers et al. 1996, but they were also developed by reading a small sample of articles previous to the analysis.

Restrictions of the Quantitative Analysis

While the quantitative analysis of article frequency and length can perhaps demonstrate the disparity of reporting of the crisis in the international press, since comparison was made of articles regarding similar events by these periodicals, the analysis is limited in what information or insights it can actually provide. Article length restrictions and guidelines differ by periodical, and by the standards set by the editors for each section, i.e. national news, world news, sports and so on, as well as the type of article, i.e. News in Brief, Feature and so on. Frequency and article length alone also do not provide information on the quality of the information given in the article.

Key terms analysis can provide insight as to the how the conflict is framed or depicted, yet falls short when we question the context of these terms. Again, with nothing with which to compare these results, we do not know if a certain framework was chosen more for its location and preconceived notions over the conditions of the conflict. Another issue with the keyword analysis is the problem of multiple frameworks occurring in the same article. Often journalists will employ terms from both the language of *civil war* and *insurgency/rebellion*. This practice is problematic as the occurrence of both in a single article can cancel the effects of both on shaping the “framing” of the article. Without placing these results in the context of the history of the conflict, it is not clear if these frameworks are justified. For the previously discussed reasons, an in-depth reading of each article and a qualitative analysis were completed.

Episodic versus Thematic Framing Analysis

The pool of articles that were analyzed in this qualitative analysis was smaller (N = 655) than the pool analyzed in the quantitative methods (N = 928) as letters to the editor and letters from governmental officials were excluded. This number of eliminated articles is not insignificant in the pool of articles from the *Monitor*. These articles were left in for the quantitative analysis, as they are widely read and often contain very descriptive language pertaining to the conflict. These types of articles, however, are not appropriate for an episodic versus thematic analysis as they often were not reporting on any particular event or situation, but were more social and personal commentary.

As the episodic and thematic criteria on which an article is judged were outlined in the previous methodology chapter it will not be repeated here. Rather, I have provided examples of each in appendix of this study. (Monitor 10/9/08 Thematic, New York Times 12/30/2008, Monitor 12/22/04 combo). The results of the analysis are included in Table 2 below.

| | Episodic | Thematic | Combination | Total |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|-------------|--------|
| <i>New York Times</i> | 35 | 12 | 0 | 47 |
| <i>Guardian</i> | 14 | 15 | 5 | 34 |
| <i>Mail & Guardian</i> | 17 | 23 | 3 | 43 |
| <i>Monitor</i> | 182 | 267 | 182 | 531 |
| Total of each type | 248 | 317 | 190 | N= 655 |

Table 2 - Episodic versus Thematic (and combination) framing analysis.

The results of the episodic vs. thematic framing are interesting in that they support as well as contradict the previous quantitative and framing analyses. From Table 2, *The New York Times* is the periodical most dominated by episodic coverage. This result supports the language set analysis as dominated by the *language of insurgency/rebellion* as episodic coverage is very event oriented. Taken all together, *The New York Times* had the 2nd lowest word count, being dominated by very short articles that were heavily framed in the language of insurgency/rebellion and were mostly episodic in nature. In this case, all of the analyses tend to support the conclusion that coverage from *The New York Times* was generally simplistic, violent, and focused on brief episodes of violence lacking in background, context and not set into a wider world view. Though there were a few articles that did provide a more nuanced account of the events occurring in northern Uganda, as mentioned in previous chapters, these were the exception.

Interestingly, the episodic versus thematic framing analysis challenged some conclusions gathered from the quantitative and framing analyses for the *Guardian*, *Mail & Guardian*, and the *Monitor*. The *Guardian* and the *Mail & Guardian* both had rather low coverage statistics and were both dominated by the language of insurgency/rebellion. However, unlike *The New York Times*, thematic coverage was more abundant than episodic coverage. This would indicate that though coverage was sporadic and generally low over the four-year period, the articles tended to set the conflict into some wider context that is, how the conflict affects the region around it, and/or the wider effects of the conflict on the population in northern Uganda, and so on.

The results for the *Monitor* are not surprising, as it should be expected that the national newspaper would set the conflict into many different aspects and contexts, economic effects, cultural effects, regional and international context, criticism of the government and army and so on as such thematic framing should be expected to be dominate in coverage. The high number of combination articles is also not surprising, as many articles in the *Monitor* were episodic coverage of particular events that then discussed the wider implications or ripple effects of that event within a wider context, nationally, regionally and sometimes at an international scale.

Limitations and Potential Issues

All of the analyses completed through this study have limitations. In particular, the two framing analyses can be highly subjective and subject to inappropriate conclusions if taken alone. For the sake of time and scope only four language sets were chosen for analysis and for a specific purpose: to see if the conflict is framed much like other conflicts in Africa, following other studies within the literature that have indicated a propensity towards housing African conflicts in violent terms (Myers et al. 1996). Other language sets could be analyzed in studies with different goals. The episodic versus thematic frame analysis is also subjective in that it relies on the judgment of the author in determining each article's category, though it should be noted that certain guidelines were set out before the analysis took place, as explained in the methodology section. It is due of the limitations of each analysis individually that multiple analyses were undertaken (triangulation) to either validate the conclusions or question the validity of the interpreted results.

Chapter Five

Discussion

Following the results in the preceding chapter a brief discussion is necessary regarding the possible issues with the four periodicals chosen. As noted in Chapter 3, *The New York Times* was chosen for its dedication and reputation for reporting on international news within the top American newspapers. *The Guardian* was chosen to represent the former colonial power and specifically because politically and institutionally was the most similar to *The New York Times*. The *Mail & Guardian* was chosen for reasons discussed in Chapter 3, but also for its similarities politically and institutionally to the previously discussed papers. What I mean by “institutionally” is all three papers are not government-owned, they have lengthy histories, and they have been noted for their excellent journalism. A possible issue in the choice of these periodicals is that each is considered “left-leaning” politically and represents only one periodical of many within each market. If more time had been available, multiple periodicals from each market would have been analyzed to determine if political bias were an issue, however this was not possible for this particular study. *The Monitor* in Kampala was chosen for the same reasons as discussed above, and again if time had allowed it would have been beneficial to include analysis of the government owned *New Vision* paper to compare the narratives. The most unfortunate gap in the qualitative analysis is the lack of a northern Ugandan paper. Having a northern Ugandan paper to analyze would have been beneficial as its situatedness within the area most affected and the perspective of a

northern paper would have countered the media dominance of the south, namely the capital of Kampala. However, at the current time there is no comparable paper located in the northern areas of Uganda.

Towards a Critical Geopolitics

Key questions of this study were: is the situation in northern Uganda portrayed differently within various periodicals? If so, what are these differences and why might they exist? As the methodological framework for this study is poststructural, the notion of one correct answer is rejected. The methodology allows for multiple competing factors. Therefore, rather than answer the questions posed previously, I will instead create space for *possible explanations* as to why these differences occur. Some factors that likely affect how news articles are framed and what geopolitical arguments are present in the different media outlets include economic conditions and the locations and working conditions of foreign bureau journalists and stringers (or freelance journalists). A journalist's own preconceived notions of place, the influence of media gatekeeping, and the commodification of the news are also factors. The following sections address the questions posed previously and include a discussion of what the different frameworks promote or hide regarding the conflict and the effects on reader's perception of place.

Media Gatekeeping

Since the 1990s, critical geographers have examined popular geopolitics in mass media. Many of those (Sharp 1993, 1996; Dodds 1996; Myers et al. 1996; McFarlane and Hay 2003; Dodds 2006; Falah et al. 2006) have demonstrated that media sources

frame stories differently depending on preconceived notions of place, as well as the location of the periodical. However, few of these studies consider multiple influences at different scalar levels that produce these narratives. To remedy this, we must look to the “Gatekeeping Theory” within the discipline of Communications Studies. Kurt Lewin’s (1947) Gatekeeping Theory” and subsequent analyses within Communication Studies using this methodology have critically examined the media at multiple scalar levels (Epstein 1973; Harmon 1989; Shoemaker 1991, 1999). Though not stated explicitly, multiple levels of scale were examined in many of the gatekeeping studies, as the goal was to determine at which level (i.e. individual, organizational, societal) gatekeeping was the most influential in shaping a story.

The concept of a “gatekeeper” was first proposed in 1947 by Lewin, who saw the news as “flowing in a channel containing several gates controlled by gatekeepers, each of whom decides whether a news item would proceed along the channel to eventually reach news audiences” (Kim 2002, 432). Utilizing Lewin’s concept, White (1950) wrote the first media gatekeeping study in his analysis of news selection patterns, or what stories are chosen and why by wire agency editors. Studies such as White’s (1950) analysis of one lone journalist and his focus on the personal and subjective characteristics of that individual’s decision-making have since shifted to demonstrate that “gatekeepers are not single individuals making decisions independently” (Kim 2002, 432). This shift occurred as scholars within Communication Studies identified other factors acting upon news selection processes. These studies, building upon White’s initial 1950 study saw that gatekeepers are influenced by multiple variables at different scales including the media owner’s ideology, media routines, and sources from the government and corporations

(Gieber 1964; Epstein 1973; Dimmick 1974; Kim 2002).

More recently, gatekeeping studies have expanded to include broader socio-cultural influences and have demonstrated different levels of controls over mass media or gates involved. Shoemaker (1991) posits that there are five levels of gatekeeping within the media that can be studied. These levels include the individual, routines of work, organization, societal and institutional (extra-media), and the social system (Kim 2002, 432). These five levels are influenced by different variables such as the likes and dislikes of the individual journalist at the personal level to “a pre-established and generalized set of practices in judging newsworthiness, including accuracy, the right length, good visuals, human interest, novelty, negativity, conflict and violence, loss of lives and the story’s timeliness” at the routine of work level (Kim 2002, 432). At the societal level, broad socio-cultural influences (i.e. preconceived notions of place by a population, the ability of readers to relate or understand the subject) result in various areas of the world being unevenly represented in the media. For instance, the U.S. news media provides more coverage of European events than events located in South America or Africa (Shoemaker 1999, Kim 2002). This point is further demonstrated by Myers et al. (1996) who showed U.S. news coverage of events in Bosnia was far greater than coverage of the genocide in Rwanda though the events were remarkable similar.

In summary, the gatekeeping viewpoint maintains that “news items, including international items, are accepted or rejected based on various factors, such as journalists’ perceptions of a news event, daily working norms, the written and unwritten rules of television news organizations (and periodicals), and extra-media pressures as well as societal and cultural influences”(Kim 2002, 432). These influences will be examined to

demonstrate how the combination of these factors and influences produce different narratives of the same conflict dependent on the location and geopolitical situation of the periodical.

Economic Influences on the Selection of News Stories

“There was only one sure way of selling a story from Africa to an editor. It was what is called in the trade ‘color’: a quirky opening vignette, a twist of pathos, the exotic or the bizarre”- Aidan Hartley, former Reuters reporter (Hartley 2003, 100)

Within Shoemaker’s five levels of gatekeeping, economics tend to affect all five levels in various ways. For the editor and the periodical, what sells newspapers will influence what type of stories run. Which story will be picked up by a wire agency influences what a stringer writes. Several scholars have studied the effect that economics play in the reporting of foreign news (Bennett 1983, Winship and Hemp 1992; Seaton 1999).

Generally, stories that tend to draw in more readers are picked up. Economic pressures (i.e. the high cost of foreign bureaus, the loss of subscribers after the invention of the internet) have driven the growth and consolidation of the media into vast empires, a process that Jean Seaton notes has had a negative effect on the quality of the international news (Seaton 1999). Not only have scholars noted this trend, but newspaper editors also have addressed how economic factors lessened the amount of room international news receives in the print media. Edward Seaton, editor-in-chief of *The Manhattan* paper in Manhattan, Kansas and President of the American Society of News Editors 1998-99 made the following statement in his presidential address to the International Press Institute in 1998:

Newspapers...never gave as large a percentage of their space to international news [as television], but the decline in the amount they do allocate is even greater than television, from 10.2 percent in 1971 to something less than 2 percent today. That's a decline of more than 80 percent.

No U.S. newspaper editor would disagree with these figures. What might surprise them, however, is that readers and viewers in other countries apparently are seeing significant declines as well. Even the United Nations' human rights chief has taken on the issue. Marking World Press Freedom Day earlier this month, Mary Robinson...told a conference on press freedom that the world's media are irresponsibly downplaying international news and reducing complex issues to sound bites. She expressed fear that this is leading to foreign policy created in a news vacuum.

There are exceptions to these trends in the U.S., of course. In reality, what we have there is a two-tier press. The elite newspapers, like The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal, offer wonderful coverage of the world to an elite readership highly interested in foreign policy...Then there are the rest of us, 1,550 dailies - many of whose editors seem to believe readers aren't interested in international news and, apparently, don't have need for it. Ten inches about mayhem is often their norm.

Most U.S. newspapers today are driven by the need to keep their ownerships' stock prices up. (Emphasis added) If news helps the newspaper's bottom line, it tends to be the lead story. And local news does that, so local tops every editor's marching orders. This is not necessarily new thinking or wrong. We've always known editing is mostly a matter of making the news relevant to readers' lives.

But today our readers are more engaged with the world than ever, yet our news columns seldom help them understand that world. If they read or hear about the world at all, they often see unconnected disasters that they learn to ignore - with confidence they will go away - and come to view the world outside the United States as inexplicably complex and even dangerous.

The situation cries out for better ideas, information and explanations that help readers figure out how international forces are affecting and changing their local communities and their lives (Seaton, Edward. ASNE Presidential Address. International Press Institute. Moscow, Russia. 26 May 1998).

These excerpts from Edward Seaton's 1998 Presidential Address as President of the American Society of News Editors to the International Press Institute demonstrate that scholars, as well as those in the industry, have recognized the decline in international

news and the negative effects that it might have or has had on readers. The statement by Mary Robinson highlights a point made in this study that the “world’s media are irresponsibly downplaying international news and reducing complex issues to sound bites” (Robinson as quoted by Seaton 1998). In line with Jean Seaton’s statements about the negative influence of economics on international news coverage, Edward Seaton states “If news helps the newspaper’s bottom line, it tends to be the lead story”(Seaton 1998). This statement tends to explain why during the height of the Rwandan genocide, it was not stories about the hacking to death of thousands of Africans that dominated the news, but the trial of O.J. Simpson and US figure skater Tonya Harding (Dallaire 2007, 14).

This growth and consolidation of media outlets into large empires has created a situation in which “[u]nlike the previous generation of press barons, the new masters of the universe do not invest in the news...they ruthlessly cut costs by asset stripping news rooms” (Seaton 1999, 58). Asset stripping leads to fewer journalists in some foreign news bureaus and the complete closure of others. The consequence of closures and downsizing leads to less specialization of journalists and less specialized reporting. The result of this situation is a pool of journalists who “know less, they cost less, but produce news that is disseminated more powerfully than ever before” (Seaton 1998, 58).

Technological advances, such as the Internet and satellite phones, have transformed the news into a rolling news day with an almost continuous flow of news which forces deadlines to occur so frequently that “journalists have less and less time to collect news themselves”(Seaton 1998, 58). The limited amount of time and the push for real-time images also makes it easy to prevent some information from being reported on,

as well as creating conditions in which it is easy to “feed” journalists a certain line of interpretation (Allen 1999, 38). Intense competition for being the first to publish a story leads to a situation in which journalists often find themselves at a loss for time to reflect or thoroughly assess the story before publication (Allen 1999, 37). Consequently, the combination of these two factors, powerfully dispersed news and the shortened time span between deadlines, creates *more news but not better news* (Seaton 1999).

Foreign news bureaus are expensive to maintain. Considering the increasing financial pressure most print news agencies are under, it is not surprising that more bureaus are closing or are losing considerable funding and staff. Keith Richburg, the foreign news editor at *The Washington Post* does not see this situation improving any time soon. In a 2007 article in the *American Observer*, Richburg lamented that “[n]ext year is going to be tough for foreign news in general, I can’t even begin to tell you how enormously expensive it is to cover Iraq. It’s the cost of three other bureaus” (O’ Rear 2007). The increased cost to foreign bureaus operating in the Middle East, and especially Iraq, of armored cars, security staff and advisors translates to less cash flow to other foreign bureaus. Less cash flow to bureaus in areas deemed less important leads to greater dependence on wire news agencies in these areas, a factor that is discussed later in this chapter.

Commodification of the News

News stories are no different than any other commodity, and like any commodity, they have value. The value of a news story is its ability to capture a reader’s attention so that he or she will buy the periodical in which the story is located or will continue to pay for a subscription to a paper because the stories that the periodical prints are interesting

and captivating and/or conform to the reader's preconceived notions. This attention to the audience is to avoid creating discomfort to the reader, or to "elicit favorable reactions from readers and viewers"(Entman 1991, 7; Myers et al. 1996). Numerous studies have noted the role that value (readership drawing power) plays in the framing of stories (Bennett 1983, Entman 1991, 1992; Hawk 1992; Myers et al. 1996).

The media's presentation of information about Africa, in particular, according to Hawk (1992) is limited by the commercial and financial considerations of editors. Bennett (1983) also notes that "it is no secret that reporters and editors search for events with dramatic properties and then emphasize those properties in their reporting" (14) to engage readers and increase news value. Other studies have noted a negative bias in foreign news stories in the American and Western media (Adams 1964, Lent 1977, Beaudoin and Thorson 2001) and also in the American wire services (Weaver and Wilhoit 1981; Wilhoit and Weaver 1983). Leopold (1999) notes that in particular, "in Europe and North America, the predominant image of Uganda is still that of inexplicable, limitless violence; its synecdochal (sic) image the figure of Idi Amin" (219). These studies demonstrate that, although perhaps exacerbated by the current economic trend in the print media, this negative bias and decreased attention to international news, and to Africa in particular, is not a new phenomenon.

The Role of Wire Agencies and Stringers

Foreign news is expensive. It requires the maintenance of a foreign bureau office, staff, travel expenses, and so on. For these reasons it is not surprising that many papers, including the three international papers included in this study, rely on wire agencies and stringers to cover much of foreign news in corners of the world, heavily in some cases,

that are not high on the list of readers' priorities. As Carol Stevens, the managing editor for *USA Today* notes, the foreign news has not historically been the most heavily read section of the news and this factor has likely contributed to the downsizing and closure of many foreign bureaus (O'Rear 2007). To compensate for the relatively low number of company journalists covering large sections of the world, papers have begun to rely more heavily on wire agencies and stringers.

Within the structure of the main wire agencies including Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP), and Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), there are regularly paid, full-time journalists as well as stringers. To clarify, stringers are freelance journalists who are paid by the story as opposed to salaried full-time staff journalists (Hartley 2003). While many stringers often do obtain full-time status after contributing to an agency regularly, in the age of the Internet there are now "superstringers" or journalists who remain freelance in the long-term.

As noted earlier, editors have expressed concern over the increasing usage of wire agencies in reporting from low-priority corners of the world. What are the issues of wire agencies and stringers in the international press? Aidan Hartley's account of his life as a stringer and then regular reporter for Reuters wire service provides an in-depth look at the lives, biases, and practices of stringers and reporters in Central and Eastern Africa. Though this point is from a particular individual's narrative, it raises many issues and highlights many problems that these journalists face. One challenge is a lack of interest in Africa. As Hartley notes "as far as a Western editor was concerned, the death of a single white American equaled five Israelis, fifty Bosnia Muslims, or fifty thousand Africans" (Hartley 2003, 116). Because of this low interest in stories out of Africa and

the reader fatigue of “violent Africa”, Hartley notes that “[i]mportant stories could be ignored simply because they were too complicated” (Hartley 2003, 117). Hartley also notes that the constant pressure to file first, to keep the reputation of Reuters as a top wire agency, results in perhaps a partial, incomplete or simplified account of the situation on the ground. Through Hartley’s account of his time as a Reuters journalist, both as a stringer and a regularly paid employee, one gets a sense of the pressures and issues that these journalists face. I do not doubt that most journalists want to write the best story, the most complete story, and the most objective story. However, the pressures of the economy, editors, the news agency, and the readers add up to force journalists to produce perhaps not the best story but the most captivating story to capture the most readers and gain the most profits.

Personal bias may also play a role in how an individual journalist might frame a story. To quote a brief portion of the Society of Professional Journalists’ Ethics Code (<http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp> last visited 9/13/09):

Journalists should:

- Always question sources’ motives before promising anonymity. Clarify conditions attached to any promise made in exchange for information. Keep promises.
- Make certain that headlines, news teases and promotional material, photos, video, audio, graphics, sound bites and quotations do not misrepresent. They should not oversimplify or highlight incidents out of context.
- Never distort the content of news photos or video. Image enhancement for technical clarity is always permissible. Label montages and photo illustrations.
- Avoid misleading re-enactments or staged news events. If re-enactment is necessary to tell a story, label it.

While professional journalists might do their best to adhere to these ethics codes, invariably personal reactions, preconceived perceptions of a people or a place, and

knowledge of what will sell to their editor likely invade the tone and word usage within news articles. Again referencing the experiences of Aidan Hartley:

“When the Scot (Hartley’s superior) finally sent me on assignment to Bosnia, I was shocked by the intensity of my reactions to a war in Europe. To be honest, it was because the bodies were Caucasian, not black; the starving POWs filing the cattle barns were white, not black; the bruised faces of soldiers were white, not black; the teenage girls weeping in fear as they fled a village being cleansed were white, in platform shoes and flares, not black in rags” (Hartley 2003, 305).

Aidan Hartley’s father was a British colonialist; consequently, he grew up primarily in Kenya and Tanzania. Most of his assignments as a journalist for Reuters were also in Africa, Somalia in particular. The point to make here is if this was Aidan Hartley’s reaction to the violence in Bosnia a white man whose home was East Africa, who grew up amongst black Africans what reactions do other journalists of differing backgrounds have in Africa? And how do these personal reactions influence, subconsciously, how journalists frame their stories? The next section considers these questions.

Issues of Journalist Placement and Reporting in Conflict Zones

Along with the pressure of the news industry and personal perceptions/biases, in conflict zones journalists also have to contend with the dangers of reporting in situations where they could possibly be killed. In some conflict, zones journalists are not permitted entry which forces them to rely on secondary sources of information refugees, military personnel, and militia members, for information on the conflict. This lack of access leads to uncertainty as to the reliability of the information, so much of it is not reported, even if it may be true. In the case of northern Uganda there is a general lack of information coming out of the conflict zone (Lajur 2006). There is no possibility of citizen reporting

as in Iran with the technologies available there the Internet, cell phones and so on. Along with the lack of information, the government of Uganda is particularly concerned with its international image, specifically that it is “progressive, democratic, a respecter of human rights and such other good qualities” (Lajur 2006, 72) so it tends to suppress negative information coming out of the conflict zone. Not only does the Ugandan government interfere with the flow of information, individual communities within the conflict zone also prevent the reporting of violence since they are afraid that reported violence will scare away potential foreign investors (Lajur 2006). In one case, after reporters from the Ugandan papers *New Vision* and the *Monitor* had reported on LRA activities near a Kitgum regional town in northern Uganda, leaders in Kitgum threatened to mobilize villagers to spear any incoming journalists who reported on rebel actions (Lajur 2006).

The combination of these factors, the inherent danger of being in a conflict zone and government and community suppression of reporting, leads to a situation where it is relatively easy for powerful actors, such as the military and the government to control the spin on the northern conflict at the level of the individual journalist. As Lajur (2006) notes, “The LRA has never encouraged the use of the media as other rebel movements have.” which in his view is unfortunate as “otherwise we would be quoting many of the LRA statements alongside UPDF ones” (82). Lajur is referring to the fact that the lack of media usage by the LRA leads to all unfavorable acts being attributed to the LRA and not to UPDF officers who have been accused of violent acts against civilians as well, painting an uneven or perhaps untruthful account of the actual situation in northern Uganda to the international community.

Conflicting Frameworks

Examining the news through Lewin's Gatekeeping Theory, it is possible to determine or hypothesize *why* the media in different areas of the world promote differing accounts of the same conflict. We can also ask, what do these different narratives promote? What does framing the conflict in northern Uganda as a 'bloody, ethnic conflict' as opposed to a 'civil war exacerbated by a corrupt government and ignored by the international community' convey to the reader? As Seaton (1999) notes, the media "act as agents of war and the press and broadcasting increasingly have become the institutions that accord wars legitimacy, and judge their outcome"(44). The media are a powerful force that, by framing a conflict in a certain way, can elicit action from communities and in turn cause discussion and sometimes action from their respective governments.

It can also be used to encourage public consent of military action *or* inaction. In the case of the U.S. military actions in Iraq since 2002, at least one study has demonstrated how the media have been used to elicit public consent. By framing the situation in such a way that inaction seemed irresponsible and even dangerous the media encouraged the public to support the invasion of Iraq according to Kull et al. (2003). The reverse of public encouragement can also occur. Media and think-tank press releases can frame an event or situation so that military action or political intervention is seen as irresponsible, futile; or a story may be ignored all together, thus discouraging public

action or any outcry for action (Conry 1994). Presenting the LRA as an Acholi movement as ideologically devoid and senselessly violent, also delegitimizes or hides the real issues of uneven development and political isolation that peoples in northern Uganda face. The conflict in northern Uganda can also become depolitized by the media hiding legitimate grievances that people in the northern areas of Uganda might have that can help explain why these conflicts are occurring but instead labeling them as senseless, historical ethnic violence international action is seen as useless.

Within the Ugandan media, neglect by the West and the irresponsibility of the ICC in not rescinding the arrest warrants promotes a view that Uganda has become less useful in post-Cold War geopolitics. Many of the stories also tend to emphasize government corruption, human rights violations by UPDF forces, and the inherent tensions between the northern and southern regions of Uganda due to uneven development and political representation in the government.

These frameworks may be influential in shaping the place perception of the readers. Those reading the international periodicals are likely to get the view or perception that Uganda is a homogenously violent, corrupt, ethnically polarized state, just another problematic country in “darkest Africa”. While every reader might not believe this particular depiction of Africa because of his or her own knowledge and experience, it is what the majority of the news stories examined in this study seem to promote. Discussions of the peace talks in Uganda tend to be brief and lack confidence, often citing who did or did not show up, or the violent events during the peace talks, not necessarily focusing on the subject matter discussed within the peace talks themselves. The longest stories are almost all humanitarian pieces, describing the horrible events one

or two individuals have gone through in their interactions with the LRA. These stories usually put forth a sense of hopelessness, of no clear end to the violence, and describe life as tribal and impoverished with no culture, no happiness, and no hope.

The Monitor, serving the mostly English speaking, as opposed to the Luo-based Acholi language spoken by northern Ugandans in the main conflict zone of Gulu and Kitgum, promotes a view that further promotes the north/south divide. Editorials that are published tend to discuss the ethnic distinctions between the two areas and describe the north as an “other” Uganda, undeveloped, traditional, conflict ridden. This bias towards editorials that conform to the norm is not surprising; as discussed earlier, periodicals tend to print stories that do not conflict with the preconceived notions of their readers. Scholars have noted this divide and the negative perceptions of southern Ugandans of their northern neighbors (Allen 2006, 427; Finnstrom 2008). These studies note that the divide is not dissipating, but rather is strengthening with the growing affluence of southern Uganda.

Discussion

In this chapter, I have posited possible explanations for the different frameworks and amounts of coverage. Chapter four, through media Gatekeeping theory, economics, and the personal narrative of a Reuters journalist. The point here is to demonstrate that it is the various combinations of these factors that produce the different narratives. In the *Monitor*, the conflict is housed the as it is because the new economics of the news industry show that national news sells (Seaton 1998; Seaton 1999). Since the Lord’s Resistance Army is big national news, it is heavily reported on in a variety of sections in

the paper: the economy section, national news section, business section and so on. The northern region is portrayed the way it is as to fit with the preconceived notions of the north by southerners (Allen 2006), who make up the majority of the readership for the *Monitor*. Also, just as it is difficult for wire journalists and international journalists to gain entry into the north to gather information, the same goes for Ugandan journalists, so they often rely on military personnel and aid workers coming out of the north for information which may be heavily biased. Stories often discuss government corruption, blame the government for the conflict lasting so long and call out the international community for neglect. Still they tend to simplify the complex situation and stereotype the north because it likely conforms to the reader's preconceived notions.

As for the international periodicals, stories regarding the conflict in northern Uganda just do not sell. International news, as I have discussed, is expensive to gather and not a huge draw for readers (Seaton 1999, O'Rear 2007). Under these conditions, why would journalists risk their lives and waste their time writing a story that likely will not make it past the editor's desk? The stories that do make it into the media rotation often are hyped and framed in very violent, graphic terms as to make them stand out and conform with readers' preconceived notions of central Africa as dark and violent (Myer et al. 1996), and they are often, if not always, simplified. The problem with this simplification is that it reduces the complexities of conflicts (historical, social, economic) to purely 'ethnic' issues, thereby de-politicizing them (Seaton 1999). By labeling a conflict purely ethnic, it removes the political aspects that are involved. Is the conflict solely based on ethnic issues or is it a struggle for power? Are there real grievances involved such as underdevelopment of regions by their respective government? These

questions seemingly and problematically disappear from discussions when a conflict is given the “ethnic” label.

The greater question following all of this analysis is: Why does the difference in the amount of coverage and how the story is framed matter? Why does it matter if the news oversimplifies or buries a story about a rebel group committing violence against civilians in an African country thousands of miles away? These differences matter because of the way in which people see the news and the *power* that news has over telling people not only how to think but what to think about. More importantly, news often influences what readers think about. In Foucauldian terms, this power is derived from the casual acceptance of the discourse with which we are presented by those who have the means of communication and the ability to present such a discourse (Foucault 1980). What I mean by “how people see the news” is that the news is often seen as objective fact, reported without personal bias or motive, but purely as facts seen on the ground by journalists, written down, and published. This view is naïve and troubling, especially when considering that the public’s perception of an event and subsequent action or inaction can influence public policy. If a story is heavily reported on and framed in a certain way, it can influence how the public pressures the government to action or inaction.

The media is powerful because it is a site of knowledge production that is, it is the site where knowledge of an event is gathered, shaped and distributed, widely and powerfully because of the technological advances of the last 20 years. Where exactly is this power located? I argue that this power is located at multiple locations within the structure of the media. Like Shoemaker’s (1991) five levels of media Gatekeeping,

power is located with individual journalists in what they think is newsworthy and what is not. A journalist also has the power to frame a story in a certain way and decides what should be included in a story and what isn't necessary, thus determining how the reader should view the situation. Power is also located with the editor, who determines what stories are going to make the cut, also determining what the reader should be reading about, or what is important enough to read about. The editor's turn is affected by power within the structure of the media itself, the ideology of the organization he or she works for, what society determines is important and so on.

Socio-cultural conditions of a readership base (values, preconceived notions) and the capitalist structure that media conglomerates are located within, derive power by disguising how they influence reader's view of the news. Following Marx's "commodity fetishism" (Singer 2000) the news is often seen as a product, a situation that ignores all of the social relations behind it and the labor used to produce it. Where is the author of the story located? How much labor was used to produce the story? Is the information first-hand? Are certain aspects emphasized to conform to the reader's preconceived notions of a place? Is this particular media outlet influenced by the ideology of its owners or shareholders? And so on. In this way, the story is valued not for its labor or its usefulness, but for its ability to be exchanged for something, in this case money. Will the story entice readers to buy the newspaper, or continue their subscription? If the answer is yes, the story is printed, if not then the story is discarded. This may be a cynical view of the news industry to some, but in view of researching the economic conditions many print news companies are in currently, it seems increasingly realistic.

A final point of discussion is the necessity for popular geopolitical studies to consider the multitude of scales that influence the production of the knowledge within the media. It is no small thing to demonstrate that there is uneven representation of the developing world in the news of the developed world, or that discourses and narratives of situations are framed in ways as to invoke a certain reaction or conform to a preconceived view of a place.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The media saturate our lives from daily newspapers and nightly televised newscasts to news radio and 24-hour news channels. For this reason, critical studies of the media, how they portray the world, their effects on people, and their place perceptions are important. The aim of this particular study was to add to the critical media scholarship, namely the often negative and simplistic portrayals of African conflicts and issues in the news and to offer possible explanations for this at different scalar levels. To this end multiple methods of analysis were used, both quantitative and qualitative, following the concept of triangulation.

The concept, also called cross-validation, states that multiple methods will either produce similar conclusions, thus validating the findings, or produce conflicting conclusions, indicating that the research question might need to be reframed or that methods should be questioned. While the conclusions of most of the methods within this study agreed that outside of Uganda the conflict in northern Uganda was largely underreported and often simplified, the thematic versus episodic analysis seemed to challenge this assumption. Specifically, this analysis demonstrated that though quantitatively and from intertextual analysis this negative bias and relatively low level of reporting seemed to hold true, often the stories provided more depth than these first analyses indicated; that is, the number of thematic stories was higher than was expected in the *Guardian* and *Mail & Guardian*.

Through the process of completing this study and addressing other media studies, it has become clear that media are complex entities with gatekeepers and pressures existing at multiple scalar levels. That said, there is no one scale that can easily be targeted as the most important or influential on how a story is written or framed before being disseminated to the public. What is consistent is that power plays a role in every scalar level. The power the journalist has or doesn't have in gathering information, accessing areas, deeming a source credible or not and so on. Power is exercised at the editor and organizational level in determining which stories will be picked up and published and how they should be altered before being sent out for publishing. At the societal level, the power of what the public finds interesting and the economic considerations of the companies that own these periodicals drives what stories are published, where in the paper they appear and how much space they are granted. This raises the question, though power is exercised at all scalar levels, is the flow of power bottom-up or top-down? Though it remains outside the scope of this particular study, it is a question worthy of study.

This study, consistent with post-structural thought raises more questions than it answers. While it does demonstrate that (Western) press coverage of Africa still tends to be negatively portrayed, simplified and void of many historical references, definitive reasons for this negative tendency remain largely elusive. Further studies might consider examining the effects that the Internet, blogs and online papers have had on the economics and subsequent behaviors of the print news industry. While the largest newspapers (e.g. *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*) will likely remain in circulation, smaller regional and local papers will continue to fold if the current trend

continues. What this means for the larger papers and the place perceptions of people in areas that lose their local and regional papers remains to be seen.

Index: Sample Articles of Thematic, Episodic and Combination News coverage

Example of an Episodic Article:

Foreign Desk; SECTA
Rebels Kill Nearly 200 In Congo, U.N. Says

By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN

466 words

30 December 2008

The New York Times

Late Edition - Final

13

English

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NAIROBI, Kenya -- The Lord's Resistance Army, the fearsome Ugandan rebel group notorious for its lurid violence and penchant for turning children into killers, massacred nearly 200 people in Congo last week, United Nations officials said Monday.

The rebels were being chased by a multinational military offensive against them, and as they fled, they hacked to death dozens of villagers in their path, according to Ugandan military officials.

The killings may not be over. Most of the rebels escaped the military offensive and have scattered across a vast swath of rugged territory in the northeastern corner of Congo.

"The civilian population is really in danger," said Ivo Brandau, a United Nations spokesman in Congo. "They are under attack."

The Lord's Resistance Army used to be the bane of Uganda's existence. Starting in the late 1980s, the rebels terrorized villages in northern Uganda, killing tens of thousands of people and displacing nearly two million. They were notorious for kidnapping girls and boys as young as 10 and forcing them to serve as sex slaves and in death squads. They were driven by a strange mix of political grievances, bloodlust and self-proclaimed fundamentalist Christian beliefs.

The Ugandan military drove the rebels out of Uganda about five years ago and the rebels have been mostly hiding out in a thickly forested area of northeastern Congo ever since. There have been several high-profile efforts, backed by the United Nations and the United States, to persuade Joseph Kony, the rebel's phantom-like commander, to surrender.

The latest peace effort failed in late November when once again Mr. Kony did not show up to sign a peace agreement. The armies of Congo, Uganda and semiautonomous South Sudan then teamed up to wipe out the rebel bases.

But the rebels are known as excellent jungle fighters. They often carry solar panels on their backs to power their satellite phones and they can live on very little food and water. In the past several weeks, they seemed to have eluded the government troops and airstrikes.

In the process, they have raided several Congolese villages, possibly to signal that they are still a lethal force to be reckoned with. According to United Nations officials, the rebels struck a village called Faradje on Thursday, killing 40 people. Over the next two days, they attacked two more villages, Doruma and Gurba, killing 149 more people.

Ugandan military officials have said that most of the victims were women and children, who were cut into pieces. A rebel spokesman denied responsibility for the killings, telling Agence France-

Presse that the rebels were not in the area.

Mr. Kony is wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

Example of a Combination Article:

The Monitor (Uganda) - AAGM: Ugandans Protest to UN On Kony.

Gerald Walulya

402 words

22 December 2004

The Monitor

English

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Ugandans in the Diaspora on Saturday held a peaceful demonstration at the United Nations headquarters in New York to protest the United States' and UN's failure to take part in ending the 18-year insurgency in northern Uganda.

The demonstration started at about 10am. It was organised by the African Trans Atlantic Alliance (ATA), a USA-based organisation that fights for the rights of African refugees and immigrants in America.

Mr Peter Okema, the ATA President, told The Monitor on Sunday that the demonstration was aimed at attracting the UN and US attention to participate in ending the Lord's Resistance Army rebellion led by Joseph Kony.

Okema said whereas the US and UN acted fast on the Darfur crisis in Sudan, the two administrations have not given direct attention to the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda.

He accused the UN and US of pretending that the humanitarian crisis in the north was not as terrible as it is reported.

"This kind of selective justice is not acceptable especially when practised by the UN and the USA that claim to cherish democracy and human rights around the world," Okema said.

About 500 demonstrators carried placards calling for action to end the Kony war. Other placards condemned the abuse of children's and women's rights in the war-torn north.

"Many people turned out from all over the US as well as Ugandans representing all parts of Uganda, pressing for an end to the war in northern Uganda," Okema said in an e-mail to The Monitor.

Demonstrators wrote a letter to United States President, George W. Bush, asking his government to take keen interest in ending the Kony war.

They specifically requested that the United States becomes a mediator to end the conflict. "Mr President, we want to raise awareness and incite necessary action on the part of your

administration and the international community to help end the suffering of thousands of victims in northern Uganda," Dr Ocan Otim, the president of Friends for Peace in Africa, said in the letter.

The letter was copied to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the United States Secretary of State.

Demonstrators also demanded that the United States invites the international community to support rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged northern Uganda.

Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media. (allafrica.com)

Example of a Thematic Article:

The Monitor (Uganda) - AAGM: War Trauma Causing Mental Disorders in North.

Joseph Mazige and Justine Muboka

1,114 words

9 October 2008

The Monitor

English

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The military war in northern Uganda could be almost over, but not the mental war where scars on victims are not only on their bodies but also in their minds, Joseph Mazige & Justine Muboka write

Sarah (not real names) in her 30s loiters around the streets of Gulu town, making noise and picking rubbish from the open manholes. She is mentally sick.

A man suspected of being mad was arrested after he destroyed property in Makindye near the Military Police. People caught up in terrible violence could suffer a barrage of images that keep on returning long after the events were over.

It all started with a simple headache that resulted into a mental disorder. According to her sister Monica (not real name), the headache persisted and after a few days, Sarah started soiling her beddings. Sarah was in the Lord's Resistance Army's captivity for more than three years and when she escaped to reunite with her family in Bobi sub-county she never regained her abilities.

"When she got back, she was cleansed (traditionally) but days to the time ...we realised that she had gone mad she used to suffer nightmares," Aloyo says.

Sarah has now left Bobi and is in Gulu town where she eats from dustbins and makes noise on the streets. Her sister said they never visited any hospital or clinic and only used the traditional methods as it was believed to have been witchcraft or spirits from the bush at work. This did not work as Sarah became very violent.

During the World War II, doctors realised that people caught up in terrible violence could suffer a barrage of images that kept on returning long after the events were over. They saw this not only among soldiers, but also in the civilians, the priests, doctors and journalists who had been with those fighting the war.

This after-attack of stress, anxiety and reliving the terrible events has come to be known in

psychology terminology as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS). People suffer trauma when they go through life threatening experiences or events.

Walking on the streets of Gulu town and in the camps, one will not fail to see a mentally unstable person. Most of these are small children, women and middle-aged men.

Most people in Northern Uganda who suffered the 20 year Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency are traumatised as a result of the experiences they went through during the war, the medical personnel here has revealed.

Some were tortured and forced to kill others including close relatives, raped, and others witnessed gruesome killings and activities. In addition, those who escaped the consequences of the insurgency have never seen members of their families after the war ended.

A clinical psychologist at Gulu regional referral hospital mental health department, Mr Benjamin Alipanga says, "Everyone in the region is traumatised in one way or the other. There is individual and societal trauma."

Individuals went through horrifying experiences and the rest are either relatives or friends traumatised by the worry of what could have happened to their relatives. The whole society is affected," Alipanga said.

He says even the people working with the victims are also traumatised.

"Just listening to persons narrate what happened to them is traumatising, but the extent is difficult to rank," he says adding, "Studies and research are still being conducted on the trauma in the region."

He stated the commonest post-traumatic disorder conditions as being substance abuse, anxiety, depression, schizophrenia and epilepsy. He said that in a week they receive an average of 10-15 in-patients and over 50 out-patients at the clinic.

Gulu has other centres like Gulu Support the Children's Organisation (GUSCO), World Vision Centre for war affected Children and Caritas, a Catholic founded organisation for counselling of war victims, HIV/Aids and vocational courses on top of taking care of trauma cases.

There is an increased rate of alcohol consumption by people living in camps and, attributed to the stressful experiences they went through.

Interventions

Dr Alipanga says that depending on the condition, medication is sometimes given to lessen trauma or talk therapy. In most instances both are important.

"For example, parents blame themselves for the abduction of their children, while other people blame themselves for what happened to them."

He noted that through talk therapy, they make trauma victims understand that what is happening to them and what needs to be done.

"It is very difficult for someone to forget a bad experience but we tell them that what happened will not change but they have to realise that life must go on. We help them to focus on the future and how to make it better." He said, they advise victims to talk more about the experience, which Dr Alipanga says has been of help.

"With the cooperation from the affected person, the trauma can be treated."

He adds that prayer helps but not in a magical way, "The care and support given to the person is more healing, when a person is surrounded by people, given food and clothed, they heal faster. Approaches taken by traditional healers, doctors and religious leaders are all similar."

People suffering from trauma conditions lose hope and need it restored. Most cases just need care and support for a person to get fine.

A psychiatrist at the hospital, Dr James Okello says through mental health, emergency medication is given in instances where people have turned out to be hyperactive or violent especially when they may hurt themselves and people around them. The medication helps to relax them.

Dr Okello said people suffering from trauma are brought to hospital late because the community cannot detect it.

"If people were brought early enough to hospital, most trauma conditions would be mitigated in their early stages."

Some people, he said fear stigma and instead keep away from the public and by their families yet this is violation of their rights.

Mr Alipanga said trauma tends to manifest more in children and women because culturally they are not afraid to show that they are weak and men on the other hand may be forced to get medical care.

He adds that mental health is important but people do not take it seriously. "It can lead to a break down (burn out) if not handled," he explained.

With this situation in Gulu and the northern region in general, the authorities will need to come up with comprehensive interventions in a bid to sustain the peace.

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