

POLITICAL CULTURES IN CONFLICT  
Profiles in the Global Dialogue on Social Issues

Karin Dovring  
Urbana, Illinois

When social issues are discussed in news media today around the world, people are struck by the global sameness in the expressions of universal and domestic problems. This makes many people believe that we are all alike and all the world is in the same village. Our differences seem to be fading away together with all the extreme political vocabularies and their ideas of the past. We seem to use a conceptual lingua franca that is current anywhere.

There are people however who get irritated at the modern sameness in universal communication. Recently the authoritative paper Pravda has warned the Soviet allies in Europe to look out for this innocent-looking communication; its bland lingua franca or "Trans-English" is said to cover both western "imperialist" influence in economic and social issues and Chinese "chauvinism," and therefore to threaten to damage the "Socialist cause."

On the other hand, outstanding Soviet intellectuals deeply sensitive to the individual's human rights have warned the West not to accept totalitarian standards when it communicates with the East - standards which in their turn threaten to influence Western thinking on universal socio-economic issues.

This article takes a look at what really happens in today's creative communication behind its apparent sameness. The analyses cover the ways in which social issues and reforms are communicated to the world by various political cultures in keen competition - the profiles range from the Vatican to Khrushchev, from Mao Tse-tung to Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon.

There has always been a global dialogue. Through the ages trade, diplomacy and religious missions have pioneered conversations across the earth in their more or less intensive contact with different peoples and their leaders. The means of communication have closely followed the technical developments of the epoch, then as now. Yesterday as today there were two trends that emerged from this world-wide communication. One was reflected by the national empires such as the Chinese and the Romans who used it as an instrument for national domination of international relations. The other was mirrored by the Vatican and its Church when it organized the spiritual needs of different nationalities and cultures into an international institution. In the process it did not only risk political secularization but it also became the world's first international communicator. This happened long before the League of Nations, the United Nations and the European Common Market had entered the scene and tried to do the same thing on the political arena.

However, it is first in our time with its accelerating developments of technical communication media that the global dialogue has become everybody's concern (Dovring and Dovring, 1972). The battle for our minds is no longer confined by geography and time. It comes right into our living room anytime, anywhere. And it brings with it problems typical of yesteryear's as well as of today's global conversations: the different languages, the various political or religious creeds, the different cultures and social developments, the search for power and influence and sometimes understanding. And last but not least, it echoes the various civilizations' social problems that can be summed up as a continuous war on poverty in a world of growing affluence versus growing slums. How these problems should be solved has always amounted to a contest between authority and equality. That is, what kind of community are we building, what are our leaders' approaches and what is our own? This is amply illustrated by the centuries-old problem of land reform in all countries. But without birth control the benefits of land reform seem to be nullified. That adds the population explosion to the problem of hunger for food and land which ultimately winds up as a matter of peace or war. All these ramifications show up in the public debate on land reform. And the conversation gets more and more intensified the more education people get in economics and technology and the more they encounter in this debate the old established pattern of communication: the ruling elites and authorities versus the emerging masses. The political profiles that emerge in this public debate tell us eventually the stage of our social developments and where we are heading. This is revealed in the vocabulary used and what attitude it creates to the society and its problems. The different balance in the use of the vocabulary - its quantitative semantics - also gives us a look at the mood of the authority when he talks to his public and an insight into the public's mood as well.<sup>1</sup> The character of this mood is important for the solution of the social problem. As we shall see later, the concern an authority shows for his and the public's mood affects in a very real way his ability to cope with social problems (Dovring, 1965a).

A political culture sums up all these features and of course its communication reflects them. Needless to say, a political culture and its communication realm is not limited to a certain nation always (Dovring, 1965b); just as a religious movement can transcend any national barrier, so can a political creed and its organizations such as Communism or Fascism, to be extreme. This complicates the global and domestic communication a great deal; in fact, the concepts of its political communication often are slowly influencing the national language's form or meaning, however conscious of it or not we may be. Finally, this creates a special, often extreme vocabulary, a communication ghetto, that may create a communication realm by triggering off different attitudes within the individuals or the masses, depending on the fact whether they belong to the political culture or whether they are outsiders. The spectrum of response varies of course with people's more or less conscious positive or negative involvement with the political culture and its communication realm (Dovring, 1959).

Today many feel that all the extreme political vocabularies and the realities they cover are a thing of the past (Richter, 1953; Jacob, 1942). This may be easily assumed if we just take a look at the public debate in news-media -- from telstar to our hometown papers -- which since the time of John XXIII and Khrushchev has taken on a remarkable sameness across the globe and sports more economic and technological terms than ideological concepts. So, the Nazis' German, Eva Perón's or Franco's Spanish, de Gaulle's French, Lenin-Stalinist lingo, Chou En-lai's English a la Mao Tse-tung, and even the Vatican's

Church-Latin are being replaced. In newsmedia today we face communication of our daily problems in a language of words or pictures that more often than not uses bland concepts that could belong anywhere. That is, we can hardly distinguish one communicator's political profile from another. We are told that the world is getting smaller and that co-operation and co-existence and ecumenic peace seem to be just around the corner. Travellers from various parts of the globe come home after some weeks abroad and tell us that "people are the same everywhere" - that is, they are just like you and I. "The ideologies are dead." While the international dialogue in our newsmedia is taking on a "sameness" which seems to back up the global coziness in a world of negotiations, not everybody takes this at face value. The look of "sameness" in communication has recently prompted Pravda to warn Soviet allies in Europe that clever Western propaganda is out to disunite the "Socialist camp." On the surface, the newspaper continues, the communication does not look hostile. But in fact, its result is subversive. And the "Western forces" are using "political and economic contacts and other forms of ideological penetration" to infiltrate the Socialists. The People's Republic of China is not much better, according to Pravda. The Socialist cause is heavily damaged by the "Chinese chauvinistic" attitudes.

Such recent examples do not seem to illustrate that "the ideologies are dead." And beneath the surface, nationalism still seems to exist at the expense of internationalism. There is obvious fear on the part of the ideologues that the use of the seemingly same concepts in our communication may undermine deeply rooted old differences in political behavior and finally in doctrine. It is of course an old secret that a pattern of communications can indeed lead to changes in public opinion and creed and give new solutions to social problems.

Let us see what is happening in international communication today with its roots in yesterday. As we said, there are two features in communication that reveal a communicator's profile and his message's purpose. One is his vocabulary. The other is the creative way in which he uses it to build up not only his own but also his public's attitudes to his vocabulary and the light in which it puts the social issue that is up for public debate. All this can be seen in the contents of his message as every skillful communicator knows. The former Senator and movie star, George Murphy of California, once told that he more often than not had the same facts to tell his different publics. But just before a political rally began, Murphy usually went out without being seen and looked over the crowd, estimated its size and what kind of people made up the crowd. So he did with every crowd, giving all the different crowds the same facts but changing the presentation of the facts according to the face of the crowd. Senator Murphy is not the only illustration of this. It can be observed among any political communicators. "Presentation of the same facts according to the face of the crowd" leaves the communication wide open to all kinds of ideologies since the face of the crowd reflects its ideological and social background. It is to this background the communicator must appeal when he offers his social program. And the mood in which he does it reveals his own ideology and approach to people's problems" (Szalay, et al., 1971).

In the 1890's the Vatican set off a global social debate when it made its first major effort to discuss a social issue (Dovring, 1965a). The result was the famous encyclical "De rerum novarum...", a document of wide consequences for labor and capital relations through many years to come. Praise for the effort was mingled with criticism since the message's vocabulary was applied not only

to spiritual matters but also to economic issues and social relations. From a communication viewpoint the effort was even more important since the concern for the individual's soul now was extended to his social conditions. This at once put the Vatican in confrontation with other politico-religious communicators around the world who later released to the globe their concern with the same social facts but put in their ideology's light. The faces of the international crowds were clearly visible in the contents of the message and so were the communicators' profiles. The masses were poor and oppressed and ignorant. The epoch was a time of revolutions and unrest or wars. The vocabulary used was colorful and often extreme.

The "Rerum Novarum" was followed by other important social communications from the Vatican. They confronted soon enough the Marxists, the Socialists and the Communists headed by Lenin and his followers. The Vatican and the Marxists were immediately in hard competition to influence political leaders around the world. And these leaders communicated in their turn the new doctrines - pro or against - to their national societies when land and labor and their social implications became an issue in the community. The extreme vocabularies and profiles of the communicators dominated the global debate up to the 1950's. At that time modern technology and increasing affluence versus global slums made the different parts of the world communicate on a scale never experienced before. It was the confrontation in the same technical communication media that helped to break down the extreme vocabularies. The communicators' profiles became vague. The public easily got the impression that the same words - such as peace, democracy or economic development - covered the same concepts and attitudes in the debate at home and abroad.

The important question remains if the confrontation in the modern media and the lack of extreme vocabularies also changed the communicator's old mood in which he approached social issues. That is, did his policy really change when he discussed the same old social problems with crowds of new faces? Let us try to answer.

From 1890 up to the 1950's the Vatican used symbols in its communication of social reforms that emphasized favorably concepts such as "the individual, human dignity, authority of Church and God, private ownership, reasonable wages, Catholic labor-unions." Holy anger was directed against the "greedy Capitalists," the emerging Socialists and later Communists, and the workers' miserable social conditions. In fact, these symbols were so frequently stressed, literally or by synonyms, that they created a special vocabulary typical of Vatican profiles in communication. But when the Vatican used its extreme vocabulary to clarify its demand for social reforms, what kind of opposition it ran into and what the Vatican identified as its own social or religious values (Table 1), it was not in the mood to concentrate on social reforms. The principal interest was paid to the Vatican's own authority while the opposition was largely ignored. The authoritative communicators in the Vatican also had a rosy outlook on the social themes their vocabularies covered (Table 2) similar to the optimistic outlook that is typical also of Popes John XXIII in 1961 and Paul VI in 1969 despite their lesser use of extreme vocabularies.

It follows from the authoritative mood of the Vatican communicators before the 1950's that there is very little variety in the balance they use in favorable references to their public egos and social programs (Table 1). But when they take a look at the character of their opposition that seemed so irrelevant

(Tables 1 and 2), the picture of their strength is changing. The opponents are overwhelmingly referred to in a negative mood - an admission of serious trouble brewing (Table 3). Only the practical Catholic politician in Italy feels powerful enough in his community to follow up his belittling of his opponents (Table 1) and his rosy mood (Table 2) with an account of his opposition in a very favorable light (Table 3).

John XXIII and Paul VI, who represent the new time of emerging affluence and technical knowledge, break with the old Vatican pattern of communication when they pay much less attention to their authority and show more interest in their social program (Table 1). Both of them express also more favorable attitudes to their opponents than did the earlier spokesmen from the Vatican. Fresh from the Second Ecumenic Council, John XXIII looks at his opposition in an almost totally favorable light - 90% - whereas his successor, Paul VI, gives his sympathetic opponents the benefit of doubt (Table 3). What the different moods of John XXIII and Paul VI do to their social programs as political undercurrents we shall see later (Table 4).

Among the Vatican's opponents in the global debate are the Communists. Their leader, Lenin, and his followers are, like everybody else, concerned with land reform and its social ramifications. Khrushchev represents the new time and became for a while the free world's talkative enfant terrible and evoked much public sympathy by dropping most of his extreme vocabulary and talking like "everybody else."

Like the early spokesmen for the Vatican, Lenin and his followers before the 1950's created their own vocabulary and Communist communication ghetto. The positive frequent symbols were, for instance, comrade, leader, the Socialist state, the correct road, proletariat, revolution, people's democracy, the Soviet Union, class struggle, co-operative farms, working class, people's property, etc. And on the negative side were some symbols that had a positive value in the Vatican, for instance big landowners, private property. But there were also concepts that were targets of both Communist and Vatican anger, for instance exploiters and capitalists.

Lenin's situation was revolutionary, but so is that of his followers, or should be according to the tenet. There are, however, interesting differences in their communication. Table 1 presents Lenin of 1918 - a revolutionary who fights for social justice and reforms. But his situation is so desperate that his positive confidence in his political ego dominates his keen awareness of his opposition with only 7%. And the reforms he pleads for do not even get 10% of his attention.

His dark outlook is contagious also in his handling of his themes (Table 2). How shaky his position is becomes clear when his restrained references to his political ego are surprisingly negative - an image no other communicator than a fighting revolutionary dares to use with success before a public (Table 3). However, the character of his calls for social reforms have a strong positive overtone - but so have the characters of other communicators of various creeds. It goes without saying that no demands for social ref can be successfully communicated without an overtone of belief in success. And this belief must be strong with Lenin since almost 84% of his image of his opposition is referred to as dangerous enemies.

The situation for Lenin's Hungarian fellow-traveller in the aftermath of World War II is just as precarious as Lenin's (Table 1). Even though his outlook is a bit more optimistic (Table 2), his references to his opponents (Table 3) are almost as bitter as his mentor's. In sharp contrast to this are the later Communists whose revolution was blessed with success. Bulgaria's prime minister Chervenkov, and later the world-famous Soviet leader Khrushchev, each gives his own version of a successful communist leader's profile. Chervenkov identifies himself as a very powerful politician (Table 1) with an overwhelmingly optimistic outlook (Table 2). He is filled with self-indulgence in his references to his political ego and is exuberant when he demands reforms (Table 3). But all this positive thinking goes to pieces when he takes a close look at his opposition to whom he earlier has devoted a casual 10% of his attention (Table 1). No less than 58% of his remarks on his opponents are derogatory, an undercurrent in his communication revealing him as a colossus on clay feet.

Khrushchev's situation is more safe. He was the ruler of the Soviet Union and so well established that he could afford to be generous. He paid almost equal attention to his demands for social reforms and to his opposition but of course with a light preference for his own political ego (Table 1). His outlook was altogether optimistic (Table 2), another sign of his real power. In the same vein went all his positive attitudes to himself and to his ability to solve the social issues and even the opposition's role (Table 3). Khrushchev was not only a strong ruler. He was also strong enough to drop most of his extreme vocabulary when he encountered the new global community where the profile of the Vatican's John XXIII was his most skillful competitor both in communication and in suggestions to solve social problems.

This new world is also joined by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Tse-tung, 1967). When Chairman Mao calls for reforms (Table 1) his pattern of communication is more close to John XXIII's and Khrushchev's than to those of earlier authorities in the Vatican and the Kremlin. His outlook on his program also has the modern optimistic tone (Table 2). But even though he equals Khrushchev in his all favorable image of his own political ego (Table 3), he is realistic enough to have some doubts when he discusses social issues. Surprising is his image of his opposition. Despite Chairman Mao's power, almost half of his remarks on his opponents are negative. The problems in his community are obviously serious and keenly experienced by the government. Mao Tse-tung keeps more of his ideology's extreme vocabulary than any modern communicator. In global relations today this is a sign of weakness which indicates that his own community is still an extremist society. In fact, the Chinese language and its various dialects is today as yesterday a prototype for a closed political and social communication ghetto of "inner speech" or political shorthand among the insiders (Vygotsky, 1962). This has even created a certain program for their learning of foreign languages: Let us speak Chinese in foreign languages! (Dovring, 1973a). That is, let us dress our ideological concepts in a foreign coat that makes us incognito abroad.

Mao Tse-tung is not the only leftist power with serious problems. Communicators of the modern New Left in the Western world are even more besieged when they discuss social issues. The American scholar Noam Chomsky, a self-styled social reformer, is a case in point. When he talks of war or peace in Indochina in the struggle between authority and equality there, he is even less confident about his positive image than was the revolutionary Lenin (Table 1) (Dovring, 1973b).

His desire for reforms is not strong, commanding only 3.5% of his attention. But his interest in his opponents is so much stronger with almost 65% (Table 1). His outlook is rather depressing and creates a rare profile in political communication. He does not expect success. Over 68% of his themes are put in a gloomy light (Table 2). The confidence there is in his positive image and his will to fight which fade out completely by his 100% derogatory reference to his opponents - an indication of their real strength (Table 3). His social program must therefore fare badly and it does. It is launched in a negative mood - over 93% negative concepts express it - which is a pessimism or an academic exercise in revolution no serious reformer or revolutionary can afford.

If it looks as if the extremists dominate the profiles in global communication, the moderates do not let them run the whole show alone. French socialists after World War II had plenty of social problems on their hands. Reality was close upon them. This may account for their moderate confidence in themselves (Table 1) and their strong attention both to the problems they faced and the social reforms they called for. In fact, it was a down-to-earth approach that was nearly matched later by an American committee in the 1960's summing up "prospects for America" (Table 1). The French Socialists also showed the same moderation in positive outlook (Table 2) and in estimate of reality when they took a close look at their own political ego (Table 3). Even though they as serious reformers had a highly positive outlook on their reforms, they were fully aware of the opposition's power. Obviously they were willing to fight for their program, in keen contrast to the communicator of the later New Left.

The same moderation shows in the United States' Lyndon B. Johnson (Johnson, 1966) when he refers to his political ego (Table 1), even when he goes beyond his strongest political field - domestic social reforms - and ventures out on foreign policy and the Atlantic community. He is even here more concerned than any other global communicator with social reforms for a new society (Table 1). Even though he does not underestimate his opposition, his approach is optimistic (Table 2), and his political ego is unruffled when in a strongly positive mood he calls for reforms (Table 3). But he is not unrealistic. The existence of opposition is noted, but in an overwhelmingly positive way (Table 3). And this may be interpreted as a sign of strength on the part of the builder of the new society - or of wishful thinking as long as the foreign soil does not yield to the new plans.

This positive mood is missing with Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon (Nixon, 1972), when he faces in domestic policy the centuries-old problem of equality in its modern phase - school busing versus education.

The balance in his use of his community's values seems to feed on pessimism. He strikes a neutral note in his communication when he pays equal attention to his political ego and his opponents (Table 1). His appeals against school busing are many enough to vouch for the fact that he means business. But his outlook displays his doubts about his success (Table 2). And his positive opinion on his own political ego is neutralized by his self-criticism. In line with all this pessimism is his reluctant attitude when he demands educational reforms (Table 3). As we have said, it is a common feature among political reformers that they display a positive mood when they call for social change if they are to have a chance to succeed. We discounted the New Left

communicator as a serious reformer when his reforms were called for in an overwhelmingly negative mood. But the neutral profile is not likely to be a vigorous social reformer either. Especially not when his image of his opponents (Table 3) is just as neutral as his own in the distribution of positive and negative qualities.

Among all these political communicators there appears also on the scene the professional specialist pleading for social reform. He is a British agricultural economist talking in technological terms to his colleagues. He tries to sell them a program of big industrial farms which in fact amounts to a social revolution. Since he is a scholar his creed is in objectivity and facts freely debated in an open society. It follows from this academic creed that his references to his scholarly ego and his colleagues' - always potential or real opponents - are about equal with a slight preference for his own (Table 1). His social program is carefully sandwiched in between the two scholarly camps (Table 1). His outlook is optimistic (Table 2) and both his ego, his opponents and his program are 100% good (Table 3). Despite all this optimism, his situation among his colleagues is not quite convincing. The balance he strikes when he uses the technical terms of his agrarian revolution emphasizes certain aspects of his message and makes him a revolutionary himself close to Lenin's profile in communication, pleading the same collective approach to social issues (Table 1). The scholarly enthusiast is probably not the first specialist or the last who identifies himself so much and in such a manner with his topic that he turns a propagandist for certain interests while he happily believes that he communicates facts and nothing but the facts.

What we have seen now are profiles in communication that reflect social and psychological moods of certain political cultures and of the individuals who represent them both as communicators and public. As we saw with Senator Murphy, and as every successful communicator knows, the possible public response to a message must always be created already in the contents of a communication (Meredith, 1961; Dovring, 1965b,c). This permits the communicator to guide his public both to feel at home with his message and to respond accordingly. This is an aspect of communication analysis that is missed by mere public opinion polls.

As we can see from our tables, the profiles in communication cover a spectrum from totalitarian and authoritative political cultures to open societies in Western democracies. The more stress the communicator has laid on his own political identification or religious values at the expense of his interest in social issues and opposition to his reforms, the more he shows an authoritarian profile. We have various examples of this in the Vatican up to the 1960's and among the successful Communist leaders, such as the Bulgarian Stalinist Chervenkov. And Lenin's profile created a prototype for the fighting revolutionary.

More intriguing are the profiles which emerged from the Vatican and the Kremlin in the 1960's, when Mao Tse-tung also begins to make his profile visible to the world. As we recall, the Vatican and the Kremlin at that time turned more to economic and technological terms in their debate of social issues than to their old extreme vocabularies. Their apparent interest in their authoritative egos seemed to be less emphasized (Table 1). The same moderate profile was shown by Mao Tse-tung in regard to his authority despite his extreme vocabulary. The fading out of colorful profiles made the authoritarian communication similar to political profiles in the western world. And the public wanted to believe that

peaceful co-existence and co-operation were just around the corner. We had examples of this communication in open societies already among the French Socialists (Tables 1, 2 and 3), followed by the American committee, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Even the New Left's profile belongs to the communication in this open society since total opposition is one of its many options for its citizens.

When these profiles meet at home or abroad in the communication media, they impress the public with their vagueness and sameness in goals and expressions - "peace everybody" - which inspires not only a claustrophobic talk of a global village but also made the Soviet ideologues nervous. But have the different political cultures disappeared? Are the moods and interests of the communicators changed? What is their approach today to social problems? What kind of society are they interested in building?

Without exception all of them claim that their communications deal with social issues and relations. In fact, some of them make a point of telling that it is the social issue that is the principal topic of their conversation. But if we take a close look at the concepts the communicators use to claim their great interest, we get another story. These concepts and their synonyms should, in various contexts by their frequent or less frequent appearance, build up themes that cover a mostly factual debate of the social problem - if the communicators do what they say. It is however remarkable that this presumed main concern with the social issue has a strong competitor for the communicators' interest: the various aspects of their authority which they exercise when they supposedly concentrate their attention on the social problem. From Table 4, their wandering attention looks like this:

Throughout the Vatican's communications from the 1890's to our days, there is a rising interest in the communicators' authority in dealing with social issues. Even though the social problem is the main theme, especially when the coverage of negative social conditions is added, the rising interest in consolidation and increase of the ruling authorities' power over social decisions is obvious. This strong interest in power culminates with Pope John XXIII which is remarkable when we think of the surface of his new mood in his communication of old doctrines in sharp competition with other ideologies in our time (Table 1). His attention to his authoritative ego was, as we saw, the smallest among the Vatican spokesmen. It was, however, a sign of his firm determination to influence the social process that this small attention to his own authoritative capacity was 100% positive (Table 3).

His successor, Paul VI, is even more interesting. On the surface (Tables 1 and 2), his profile was very close to that of John XXIII. But the deep difference in their profiles comes up when Paul VI refers to his opposition (Table 3) in many more negative terms. And this new profile comes out in full light when (Table 4) Paul VI concentrates on the social issues' positive and negative aspects by two-thirds of all his concepts. At the same time he lets his authority drop to hardly one third of his interests - the lowest attention to clerical authority in our Vatican records.

The communicators' strong, still living interest in their authority when they handle social relations leaves the door wide open to the influence from their old psychological and political moods in the communication of today's global and domestic policy. As we remember, these moods formed the communicators' political

profile and identity and the purpose of their communication. This influence is still at work even where the extreme vocabulary is replaced and the bland everyday expressions have to communicate both the universal meaning of a concept and its extreme undercurrent from the old communication ghetto. So for instance, peace may still mean "a universal peace" or "peace on our terms," or "peace in our time" or "Pax Romana" or "we shall bury you."

Turning to the Communists, we find first as we might expect the fighting revolutionary Lenin and his Hungarian follower overwhelmed by social issues, negative and positive (Table 4). Their poor interest in their own authority is a victim of their highly critical social situation - revolution and the immediate aftermath of a world war.

The global pattern in communication of authority repeats itself however when we look at those Communists who are now, or have recently been, in power. The Bulgarian prime minister Chervenkov is keenly interested in the exercise of his authority, even though his attention to negative social conditions may tax his power. And the Soviet's Khrushchev had no place for negative conditions in his workers' paradise. His strong authority set to work on peace and land and human progress as well as industrialization of his country. If Chervenkov is the totalitarian dictator at work, successful but still somewhat struggling, which we also found in our earlier tables, Khrushchev was the dictator in a community which has no negative problems (Table 4), and his authority therefore was much stronger than the figures reflect. We get in fact the same picture of Khrushchev as we had before - he was in such absolute power that even the opposition is looked upon in a benevolent light - 100% favorably. That is, there is no real opposition. His work on social issues was therefore paid much attention to since the "imperialists and capitalists" were successfully liquidated in his society (cf. Tables 1-3 with Table 4).

As we could see earlier, Chairman Mao's position is shakier or perhaps more realistic. The social problems in his country are many. His authority is hard put to influence the solution of the social question according to his thoughts (Table 4). The modern New Left American communicator, Chomsky, claims more authority than Chairman Mao even though the social issue is overwhelming. But this powerful authority is only apparent. The authority is the Viet Cong and the social question is a negative appraisal of the United States. Since the communicator does not belong to the Viet Cong and at the same time is highly critical of his home country, his position of power and authority is almost nil. His communication is an act of faith more than a serious social program.

But the temptation for the self-styled revolutionaries to do an academic exercise is not unique for the extremists only. The dream of Utopia instead of day-to-day work on practical social reforms culminates in fact with the British scholarly specialist when he pleads for large scale business in agriculture. His social issues cover research and education and high agricultural production. The extremely strong authority which shall achieve this is technical progress and agricultural revolutions and future farmers. Nothing negative exists to shatter this dream of the future.

But there are dreams that may come true if a practical politician takes care of them. Lyndon B. Johnson (Table 4) represents the American dream of the do-gooder to the rest of the world. The authority he claims is as yet the

strongest among all the communicators. And the social issue - ties with the East and peaceful engagement - are swallowed up by the authoritative wave. Compared with this, the 100 member committee report five years earlier on "Prospects for America" continues its moderate profile in communication. But its academic authority is realistically rated as very low, even though the positive thinking about the social issues is of the deepest concern (Table 4).

We are back to active politicians again with communicators such as Richard M. Nixon. As we remember, he turned out to be a reluctant social reformer (Tables 1 and 2). His attention to his political authority, which would make his reforms come through, is not even as strong as it seems. The balance between his social opposition's positive and negative sides - the latter also include a hostile Congress and Court (Tables 3 and 4), tends to lead to the same pessimistic neutrality as his previous moods. His performance as a communicator strikes in fact a similar tone as that of the Vatican in 1941 (Table 4) when a hostile world beleaguered its values.

As we have seen, the different psychological and political moods of the communicators have practical impact on their approach to social issues just by the very kind of authority they claim, which is derived from their politico-religious cultures. When these cultures confront each other in modern newsmedia today - at home and abroad - it is not enough for us as a public or as negotiators to look for what we have in common in our conversations. The questions to be settled are more often than not our differences. They are, like the communicators' authority, deeply rooted in our different political and social cultures. These communicators who turn out eventually as our social leaders use their authority to communicate in a way that settles our common universal dispute to the satisfaction of, above all, their own culture and its purpose. Despite the apparent sameness in communication today in vocabulary and concepts - often called lingua franca or Trans-English -, the political culture at home is still the communicator's power base when he reaches out to a universal public. No matter how international he seems when he applies universal, bland concepts to common global problems such as "ecology" or "peace," for instance, he interprets his Trans-English in a parochial way (Oliver, 1960). This he must do because the strength of his own authority to call for reforms at home and abroad ultimately rests with his home public and its social doctrine. It is this domestic public he must influence and keep in touch with if he is to succeed in saving the globe. This calls for a bland, ambivalent communication where the same words or pictures may mean different things to different publics. But this authority backed up by his home ideology creates very often parochial solutions to social problems. Therefore, parochial and nationalistic solutions are offered to universal social issues (Dovring, 1973a). That is why the conflict of political cultures today has not changed much since the time of the Romans. The advanced technology in modern communication media has only accelerated (F. Dovring, 1969) the conflict which has taken over under the apparent sameness in our use of a global lingua franca such as English. In fact, the Soviet ideologues in Pravda are not the only ones who might be concerned at the creative way practical social problems are communicated around the world.

## FOOTNOTE

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For semantic theory and method of analysis used here see references under Dovring, 1951; 1954-55; 1959; 1965a,b, and c; 1967; 1973a and b.

For applied analysis in English and other languages see especially Dovring, 1951; 1965a, b, and c.

Cf. also Besson, 1955; Boulanger, 1956; Jacob, 1942; Lasswell, 1949 (1965); Lasswell, Lerner and Pool, 1952; McKee, 1962; Merritt, 1966; Paechter, 1944; Pool, 1951 and 1952; Ranulf, 1944.

This article sums up many years of my research in international communication in various languages and political cultures in different parts of the world. For the many research problems that have come up during the analysis - for instance, foreign languages in international communication - I refer the interested to my works quoted in this article and others authored by me. See also bibliographies in international communication such as B. L. Smith, H.D. Lasswell and R. D. Casey, Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946; B. L. Smith and Chitra M. Smith, International Communication and Political Opinion, Princeton University Press, 1956; and Hamid Mowlana, International Communication: A Selected Bibliography, Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt Publ. Co., 1972.

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Table 1.

## Proportions of Concepts at the Communicator's Attention.

(The analysis covers the entire text of the messages delivered by the communicators).

Message	Concepts of communicator's ideological ego and authority	Demands on social issues	Social opposition	Total %
Vatican 1891 (Rerum Novarum)	66.7	13.6	19.7	100
Vatican 1931	64.8	11.3	23.9	100
Vatican 1941	63.6	21.7	14.7	100
Vatican 1961 (John XXIII)	53.0	27.5	19.5	100
Vatican 1969 (Paul VI)	54.9	24.1	21.0	100
Member of Italian government 1953, Catholic	72.9	13.8	13.3	100
Lenin, 1918-1919	48.8	9.8	41.4	100
Communist official, Hungary, 1947	37.4	14.1	49.5	100
Chervenkov, Communist (Stalinist) prime minister, Bulgaria 1950	72.9	16.8	10.3	100
Khrushchev 1961	40.7	30.2	29.1	100
Mao Tse-tung: Building Our Country, 1967	52.7	31.1	16.2	100
Modern New Left: Professor, U.S.A., 1970	31.7	3.5	64.8	100
French Socialist government, 1945	46.0	29.3	24.7	100
Prospect for America, Rockefeller committee of 100, 1961	40.5	26.0	33.5	100
Professional agriculturist, Great Britain, 1961	44.8	13.9	41.3	100
Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S.A., 1966: A New Political Environment	39.3	46.3	14.4	100
Richard M. Nixon, President, U.S.A., 1972: School Busing and Education	31.9	36.4	31.7	100

Table 2.

Tendency (Bias) in the Distribution of Favorable and Unfavorable Light on the Concepts in the Messages.

(The themes are created by the context of the concepts and their quantitative balance. The analysis covers the entire text of the messages delivered by the communicators).

Message	Themes communi- cated in favorable light	Themes communi- cated in unfavor- able light	Total %
Vatican 1891 (Rerum Novarum)	83.0	17.0	100
Vatican 1931	74.3	25.7	100
Vatican 1941	82.8	17.2	100
Vatican 1961 (John XXIII)	97.4	2.6	100
Vatican 1969 (Paul VI)	90.7	9.3	100
Member of Italian government, 1953, Catholic	88.7	11.3	100
Lenin 1918-1919	46.3	53.7	100
Communist official, Hungary, 1947	54.3	45.7	100
Chervenkov, Communist (Stalinist) prime minister, Bulgaria 1950	88.4	11.6	100
Khrushchev 1961	100.0	--	100
Mao Tse-tung: Building Our Country, 1967	91.7	8.3	100
Modern New Left: Professor, U.S.A., 1970	31.9	68.1	100
French Socialist government, 1945	66.0	34.0	100
Prospect for America, Rockefeller committee of 100 members, 1961	100.0	--	100
Professional agriculturist, Great Britain, 1961	100.0	--	100
Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S.A., 1966: A New Political Environment	96.7	3.3	100
Richard M. Nixon, President, U.S.A., 1972: School Busing and Education	52.0	48.0	100

Table 3.

The Undercurrents of Positive and Negative Symbols that Build Up the Three Main Categories (see Table 1) of a Message.

(The analysis covers the entire text of the messages delivered by the communicators).

Message	Concepts of communicator's ideological ego and authority		Demands on social issues		Social opposition	
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable
Vatican 1891 (Rerum Novarum)	91.0	9.0	97.6	2.4	45.8	54.2
Vatican 1931	84.9	15.1	98.3	1.7	34.3	65.7
Vatican 1941	89.7	10.3	85.4	14.6	49.3	50.7
Vatican 1961 (John XXIII)	100.0	--	98.1	1.9	89.4	10.6
Vatican 1969 (Paul VI)	100.0	--	100.0	--	57.3	42.7
Member of Italian government, 1953, Catholic	93.1	6.9	95.7	4.3	56.9	43.1
Lenin 1918-1919	63.6	36.4	86.9	13.1	16.3	83.7
Communist official, Hungary, 1947	75.1	24.9	91.3	8.7	27.6	72.4
Chervenkov, Communist (Stalinist) prime minister, Bulgaria 1950	94.6	5.4	89.8	10.2	42.0	58.0
Khrushchev 1961	100.0	--	100.0	--	100.0	--
Mao Tse-tung: Building Our Country, 1967	100.0	--	98.7	1.3	51.3	48.7
Modern New Left: Professor U.S.A., 1970	100.0	--	6.8	93.2	--	100.0
French Socialist government, 1945	73.5	26.5	84.8	15.2	29.7	70.3
Prospect for America: Rockefeller Committee of 100, 1961	100.0	--	100.0	--	100.0	--
Professional agriculturist, Great Britain, 1961	100.0	--	100.0	--	100.0	--
Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S.A., 1966:A New Political Environment	100.0	--	95.8	4.2	90.4	9.6
Richard M. Nixon, President U.S.A., 1972: School Busing and Education	58.7	41.3	50.9	49.1	46.5	53.5

Table 4.

Themes Built Up by Symbols Through Contexts and Frequency.

(The analysis covers the entire text of the messages delivered by the communicators).

Message	Themes	Per Cent
Vatican 1891 (Rerum Novarum)	<u>Social issue</u> : Man as a social being, Labor-remuneration-possession, Approved labor unions	47.0
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): God, Church, State, Moral justice, Lawful order	36.0
	<u>Negative social problems</u>	17.0
	Total	100.0
Vatican 1931	<u>Social issue</u> : Man as a social being, Labor-remuneration-possession, Approved unions, Right to property	33.1
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): God, Church, Rerum Novarum, State, Justice, Lawful order, Active resistance	41.2
	<u>Negative social problems</u>	25.7
	Total	100.0
Vatican 1941	<u>Social issue</u> : Man as a social being, Approved unions, Labor-remuneration-possession, Supplies of the earth	29.4
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): God, Church, Rerum Novarum, Moral, Justice, Lawful order	53.4
	<u>Negative social problems</u>	17.2
	Total	100.0
Vatican 1961 (John XXIII)	<u>Social issue</u> : The world of today and yesterday, Right to private property, Remuneration of work, Co-operative enterprises, Progress of science and technology, Family farm	39.4
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Church, State, International organizations, Justice, Man's essential dignity	58.0
	<u>Negative social problems</u>	2.6
	Total	100.0
Vatican 1969 (Paul VI)	<u>Social issue</u> : Sacrament of matrimony, Transmission of life, Observation of the natural rhythm, Help from medical science, World population grows, Proper education for all children	58.2
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Church's teaching, Second Vatican council, Catholic scientists and physicians, Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, Priests, Venerable Brethren	32.9
	<u>Negative social problems</u> : All artificial birth control	8.0
	Total	100.0
Member of Italian government, 1953, Catholic	<u>Social issue</u> : Land reform, Land and labor	32.5
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Sincerity, confidence in my authority	56.2
	<u>Negative social problems</u>	11.3
	Total	100.0

Message	Theme	Per Cent
Lenin, 1918-1919	<u>Social issue:</u> Land and Labor, Worker's union, Peasant's qualities, Solution	32.0
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Community Party	14.3
	<u>Negative social problems:</u>	53.7
	Total	100.0
Communist official, Hungary, 1947	<u>Social issue:</u> Land reform, New owner	45.6
	<u>New authority:</u> (sponsoring the program): Progressive intellectuals, Class struggle	8.7
	<u>Negative social problems:</u> Feudalism, Capitalism, Enemies of the new State	45.7
	Total	100.0
Chervenkov, Communist (Stalinist) Prime Minister, Bulgaria 1950	<u>Social issue:</u> Land reform, Task ahead, co-operative farms	46.5
	<u>Authority:</u> (sponsoring the program): Communist state and policy, Confidence in victory, Self-criticism, Heroes of labor, Class struggle, Progressive intellectuals	41.9
	<u>Negative social problems:</u>	11.6
	Total	100.0
Khrushchev 1961	<u>Social issue:</u> Human progress, Peace, Industrialization, Land and peasants, Peoples of former colonies	56.4
	<u>Authority:</u> (sponsoring the program): Workers' democracy, Revolution, Communist Party	43.6
	<u>Negative social problems:</u>	--
	Total	100.0
Mao Tse-tung: Building Our Country, 1967	<u>Social issue:</u> Socialist economies, Agricultural production, Improved relations between the army and the people, Revolutionary cause	70.1
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): The whole people, China	21.6
	<u>Negative social problems:</u> Feudal systems, False arguments	8.3
	Total	100.0
Modern New Left: Professor, U.S.A. 1970	<u>Social issue:</u> none	--
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Viet Cong	31.9
	<u>Negative social problems:</u> The U.S.A. the villain	68.1
Total	100.0	
French Socialist government, 1945	<u>Social issue:</u> Land reform, Co-operation, Peasants' qualities, Saving, Thrift	44.5
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Socialists, Confidence	21.5
	<u>Negative social problems:</u>	34.0
	Total	100.0

Message	Theme	Per Cent
Prospect for America: Rockefeller committee of 100 members, 1961	<u>Social issue</u> : United States security, International security, Economy, Social policy, Future of America, Democratic idea, Freedom, Peace, Our strategy	80.0
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): This panel and scholarly committee, American society, Our allies	20.0
	<u>Negative social problems</u> :	--
	Total	100.0
Professional agriculturist, Great Britain, 1961	<u>Social issue</u> : Research, Education, Raising the level of agricultural production, Efficiency	21.5
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): Technical progress, Large-scale progressive farmers, Well organized farming business, Agricultural revolutions, Future farmers	78.5
	<u>Negative social problems</u> :	--
	Total	100.0
Lyndon B. Johnson President, U.S.A. 1966: A New Political Environment	<u>Social issue</u> : Ties with the East, Peaceful engagement	16.4
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): United States, Atlantic Alliance, Atlantic Council, Europe's History, The United Europe	80.3
	<u>Negative social problems</u> :	3.3
	Total	100.0
Richard M. Nixon, President, U.S.A. 1972: School Busing and Education	<u>Social issue</u> : Better education	29.0
	<u>Authority</u> (sponsoring the program): The great majority of Americans, I am opposed to busing	53.8
	<u>Negative social problems</u> : Federal courts, The Congress of the U.S.	17.2
	Total	100.0