

"the National Socialist weltanschauung" as well as "the National Socialist philosophy and theory of science" (354).

²⁰See Lothar Samson, "Nachwort," GA 2, 414ff.; Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, "Nachwort des Herausgebers," GA 3, 753f.; George Leaman, *Heidegger im Kontext*, 41; Gerwin Klinger, "Freiheit als 'freiwillige Aufgabe der Freiheit.'" Arnold Gehlens Umbau des Deutschen Idealismus," *Deutsche Philosophen 1933*, hrsgg. v. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 188ff.

²¹At one place Kant is for example frankly called a "prepragmatist" (GA 3, 639). For a connection of Hobbes to James and Dewey, with a reference to Baumgarten, see GA 3, 579f.

²²Gehlen in this chapter several times points to the close relation between his notion of "supreme systems of guidance" and Alfred Rosenberg's notion of "disciplinary ideal orders [Zuchtbilder]" (cf. GA 3, 710, 733, 742).

²³In the article *Der Idealismus und die Gegenwart* from 1935 Gehlen states that "the National Socialist weltanschauung is total, i.e., lays claim to penetrate every area of life and to bring it in correspondence with its fundamental views" (GA 2, 354). In comparison the task of a weltanschauung in *Der Mensch* seems to be more restricted; it shall not interfere in the tasks of science and (in a restricted sense) religion. How this restriction is compatible with the claim that science too is in need of guidance isn't quite clear to me.

²⁴It should be noted that this is a weltanschauung in which an antisemitism, as far as I can see, plays no essential role. Gehlen's philosophical anthropology is on the contrary said to be a "science of utmost importance, just because it's situated before every science of race" (GA 3, 487).

AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS: MISSION COMPLETED? DOWNWARD TRENDS IN AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 1970-1992 WITH AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF WORLD DATA

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Abstract

Three basic hypotheses on authoritarianism in The Netherlands are proposed. A composite Middelburg data set was used, that included five national random samples in The Netherlands: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1992. The first hypothesis maintains that the authoritarianism syndrome will not disintegrate in time. This stability-hypothesis was strongly supported in the 1970-1992 period. The second hypothesis suggested that the levels of authoritarianism have steadily decreased in time. This decreasing-levels hypothesis also received consistent support. Non authoritarian attitudes are now supported among a majority of the population. It is argued that the decrease of authoritarianism levels cannot be attributed to disintegration of the authoritarianism syndrome proper. Hypothesis three stated that The Netherlands is among the lowest in levels of authoritarianism and state authoritarianism in the world. This lowest level-hypothesis was explored using cross national data of authoritarian attitudes and state authoritarianism. The indicators indeed suggest that The Netherlands rank among the lowest in authoritarian attitudes as well as in state authoritarianism, together with Scandinavia, Iceland, Canada and New Zealand. The results suggest that the quest of Adorno et al. may have been completed, at least for countries like The Netherlands in the 1990s.

Introduction

The research questions

From the beginning of research on authoritarianism three main issues often were speculated about, but hardly have been investigated. These main issues included the basic questions of (1) whether the authoritarianism syndrome was stable as time went by, whether (2) the levels of authoritarianism would increase or decrease in time, and (3) whether there are high or low authoritarian cultures (or nations).

The authoritarianism syndrome often has been suggested to be rather stable from a psychological point of view, mainly as a matter of assumption. If there was no stability, this syndrome could not be measured, and as a result there would not be a need for investigation. However, this does not seem to be the case after decades of research (Stone, Lederer, Christie 1993, Muelen 1983, 1993, Muelen, Hagendoorn, Raaijmakers, and Visser 1988, Muelen, Van der Linden, and De Witte 1996). The main method to assess stability in psychology is by applying reliability measures. Many authoritarianism scales have been developed that showed adequate and relatively strong reliabilities. This way the stability of authoritarian answers is tested, but not the stability in time. It is suggested that such reactions will be rather stable, but little authoritarianism research involves retesting respondents after a period of time, years or decades. Most contributions to authoritarianism studies were typically so called 'one shot' studies. Only a few were of the retest type.

The *first research question*, therefore, to be answered is whether there is evidence that the authoritarianism syndrome is stable in time, that is, whether the coherence of authoritarian opinions can be considered stable, and whether there is a coherent syndrome of such opinions.

In many studies the level of authoritarianism was measured, but little has been done to find out what such levels mean, or what the differences in levels mean. This leads to the rather opportunistic approach of considering someone, or some group, scoring just a little higher than others to be 'more authoritarian'. However, if all respondents or groups would show low levels of authoritarianism, *neither* of them could be called 'authoritarian'. This appeared often the case (Muelen 1983). Lack of standards for levels of authoritarianism have obscured much research in this field. An investigation among hundreds of published sample levels showed that differences in (means) levels did seem to have social relevance, and a theoretical model for interpretation was born (Muelen 1983, 1993). Subsequent analyzes have strengthened this model ever since.

The *second research question* is whether authoritarianism levels have changed in time, increased or decreased. An increase is associated with a higher risk of anti democratic reactions and support for related movements. Since typical authoritarian behavior and reactions tend to be something of the past, an overall decrease in authoritarianism is expected, at least in West Europe. Lederer (1982, 1983) showed that such a decrease was possible employing non random high school samples in Germany. Their authoritarianism levels were compared to those of similar groups in 1945 (after Germany's surrender) and the mid sixties. A general decline of authoritarianism levels seems to have some face validity as West Europe became increasingly more democratic and the last dictatorships (Portugal, Spain, a short period in Greece) were dissolved in the seventies.

The *third research question* concerns the internationally comparative levels of authoritarianism. From the early studies on in the 1950s on in non western cultures, like those of Lebanon (Diab 1959), India, and later in Brazil, Zimbabwe, Hongkong, and (communist) Yugoslavia much higher authoritarianism levels have been encountered, but such results were never analyzed in a com-

parative international framework (Meloan 1983). They were easily forgotten or discarded as culture related artifacts. However, recent studies have revealed that some of this early work may have had some significance: levels of state authoritarianism and authoritarian of attitudes seemed to be strongly related (Meloan 1996). This supported partially the Fukuyama thesis, of more democracy among those nations with longer democratic traditions (Fukuyama 1992). Fragmented and isolated results from the early authoritarianism studies now do seem to have a relevant meaning. This has been reported elsewhere more in detail (Meloan 1996). We will explore the question, whether the authoritarianism level in The Netherlands is among the lowest in the world and the country can be considered to constitute a non authoritarian society. In that case the mission of Adorno et al. can also be considered to have been completed, at least for this country.

The three hypotheses for this analysis then are as follows:

Hypothesis (1) - The stability hypothesis: the authoritarianism syndrome will not disintegrate in time.

Hypothesis (2) - The decreasing levels hypothesis: the levels of authoritarianism have steadily decreased in time in The Netherlands

Hypothesis (3) - The low level hypothesis: The Netherlands is among the lowest in levels of authoritarianism and state authoritarianism in the world.

The Middendorp Data-Base

One main methodological fallacy of authoritarianism research was the inadequacy of the - mainly student - samples for generalizing results (Meloan 1983, 1993). Such student samples hardly appeared to be representative of the population as a whole. The majority of psychological investigators based their conclusions on student samples, and hardly bothered finding out whether

their results were representative at all. It was shown that most students were much less authoritarian and consistently so, than the population as a whole. Students appeared not to be representative for the general (nation wide) population. The consistent relationship with educational level was a sign that this was to be expected too. Conclusions of much authoritarianism research seem, therefore, now somewhat limited, and at least partially invalid. Large random national samples could have been used for correcting results from student samples. However, such national random samples typically were either absent completely, or F Scales were used that were too short, unreliable, or hardly validated.

Even more rare were *repeated* random samples using exactly the same methodology and concepts, variables and scales. Not one of these was available in more than fifty years of research on authoritarianism in all the countries known to have contributed to authoritarianism research. There was only one exception: the repeated national random samples (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1992) of Middendorp (1978, 1991, Meloan and Middendorp 1991) in The Netherlands. This exceptionally large and consistent database will be analyzed here, with respect to the three mentioned research questions. The first two research questions can only be tested in a database, like the one of Middendorp. He used national random samples of the Dutch population in the ages of 16 to 69 years. A composite database over the five surveys of 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1992 was constructed, with exactly the same items and variables in every survey. In this way, longitudinal trends became available among the five cross-sectional surveys. A few variables are only available in less than five surveys. These five surveys included more than 9,000 respondents.

The general approach of Middendorp was to construct the values of freedom and equality, and find their meaning in the political attitudes of the population (Middendorp 1978, 1991). Both freedom and equality were operationalized, as were ideologies of

liberalism, conservatism, socialism and authoritarianism. Two dimensions appeared, one libertarian-conservatism (1978, later on called by Middendorp libertarian-authoritarian, 1991) dimension, including an Adorno et al. short F Scale, and a left-right wing dimension. The libertarian-conservatism dimension included many 'moral' or 'immaterial' political and social issues, while the left-right dimension included mostly 'material' economic issues.

We will not redo this analysis of Middendorp, but only use the concepts related to the Middendorp F Scale. This scale included original Adorno et al. items, covering most of the nine sub syndromes mentioned by Adorno et al. (1950). Since this F Scale loaded highest on the rather extensive libertarian-conservatism dimension, this F syndrome can be considered much wider than the F Scale itself. Therefore, we have taken a number of related concepts and items to construct several authoritarianism scales, according to various theoretical positions of authors, mainly Adorno et al. (1950), and Altemeyer (1988).

This way, various operationalizations of authoritarianism could be tested. Another reason for including more than one operationalization is that after fifty years many different scales have been suggested and used, and much relevant and sometimes less relevant criticisms have been published (Shils 1954 for instance). Therefore, several operationalizations of a similar concept could provide more chances to test this concept and more confidence in the produced results. Most of the analyses were carried out by using the Middendorp F Scale, a widely tested, reliable, and one dimensional scale (Meloan and Middendorp 1991). The Middendorp surveys included a majority of economic issues and government policy items, not analyzed here. Therefore, response set was less likely to occur in the data of the present analysis.

Stability of the Authoritarianism Syndrome

According to the first hypothesis the authoritarianism syndrome will not disintegrate in time (the stability-hypothesis). First, the reliability and validity coefficients of authoritarianism will be examined. If they appear to be adequate, the hypothesis will be tested by comparing these coefficients in the time period of 1970 to 1992.

Trends Reliability

To test the reliability of authoritarianism, nine operationalizations of authoritarianism were constructed (scales and items: see appendix). The Middendorp F Scale (7 items: F7 therefore) was included, since this was the scale used by Middendorp, and analyzed earlier (Meloan & Middendorp 1991). This scale was part of the F10, F16 and F30 versions, that included additional authoritarianism items. The longer F Scales show higher reliabilities (Tables 1 and 3: alpha's of .71 to .87), and the longest one even approached the reliability of the original F Scale (1950; then: .90 for 30 items).

Using the same item pool, the three sub syndromes of Altemeyer were operationalized as well, in scales of authoritarian conventionalism, submission and aggression (Tables 2 and 3). The conventionalism scale performed somewhat poorer (alpha of .60), but the other two seemed adequate (alpha's of .73 and .68) for a short scale. The complete Altemeyer operationalization showed even a rather high reliability (18 items: .85). The three sub syndromes also correlated substantially (.59*** to .63***), supporting Altemeyer's claim that they do covary, and that they belong to one authoritarianism syndrome.

These results demonstrate that both the Adorno et al. and Altemeyer's concepts reliably can be operationalized on the level of a national random sample. Remarkably, this has never before

been undertaken. Usually less than ten items were used in such random (national) samples.

Additionally, a scale was constructed, with items that discriminated best between the extreme right wingers and democrats. This scale (REX11) was added for reasons of exploration, and for optimizing the discriminating performance (an original strategy by Adorno et al.; see Table 3). Its reliability seems adequate (alpha: .76), but its content is theoretically less clear.

A separate analysis (Table 1) showed that the four main F Scale versions are reliable among a number of relevant subgroups as well: between men and women, age groups, class identification, educational levels, religious identification, and willingness to vote. None of the scales collapsed among these social subgroups, although their reliabilities did vary. The short F Scale (7) showed the lowest reliabilities among groups with little education, the lowest social class self rating, and among those unwilling to vote. However, the lowest reliabilities seem to be artifacts of the length of the scale: this effect disappears almost completely for the longer scales. Authoritarianism is even slightly more reliable among the lowest class (.85) than among the highest class (.83) for the longest F Scale. Indeed, the criticism that authoritarianism among the 'working class' does not exist, because scales collapse for such groups, seems unwarranted. Such studies typically used short F Scales, and the lack of reliability can now be attributed to the length of such scales.

We may, therefore, assume that these scales are adequate for our analysis. The short ones will be closer to the original F Scale. The longer ones, with more items, will better represent the F Syndrome as a whole. We will now test whether the F Syndrome collapses in time, or remains stable. If this syndrome had disintegrated in time than it is inevitable that the reliabilities diminish in size as well. We computed the reliabilities for every scale, and separately for each of the five surveys between 1970 and 1992

(Table 3). The results show that there is little indication of lower reliabilities as time passes by, in a period of 22 years.

Table 1. Reliability F Scales and Sub Groups

Scales	Alpha Reliability F Scales			
	F7	F10	F16	F30
Number Items	7	10	16	30
Alpha All Groups	.71	.77	.85	.87
Alpha-30 All Groups	.91	.91	.91	.87
Men	.71	.78	.85	.87
Women	.71	.76	.85	.86
Young Age	.69	.77	.85	.86
Middle Age	.72	.78	.85	.87
Old Age	.66	.73	.81	.83
Self Working Class	.67	.74	.83	.85
Self Lower Middle Class	.69	.74	.83	.86
Self Higher Middle Class	.71	.77	.84	.85
Self Upper Class	.71	.76	.81	.83
Primary Education	.62	.68	.79	.83
Secondary Education	.64	.70	.80	.82
Grammar Education	.70	.76	.83	.85
University Education	.72	.77	.83	.85
No Religion	.73	.79	.85	.86
Roman Catholic	.66	.73	.82	.83
Dutch Reformed	.71	.76	.83	.85
Calvinist	.65	.73	.83	.87
Votes	.72	.78	.85	.87
Don't know	.70	.75	.82	.84
Does not vote	.64	.74	.82	.85

Reliability = Cronbach Alpha; F7: Middendorp F Scale

Table 2. Reliability and Inter Correlation Altemeyer's Authoritarianism

Scale	Nit	Alpha	Correlations
Authoritarian Conventionalism	6	.60	x
Authoritarian Submission	6	.73	.63*** x
Authoritarian Aggression	6	.68	.61*** .59*** x
Altemeyer's Authoritarianism	18	.85	

Alpha = Cronbach Alpha; Nit = Number of items; Pearson Correlations

Table 3. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Reliabilities F Scales

Authoritarianism Scale	Nit	Alpha Reliabilities Year of Survey					Alpha Total 1970-1992	Cit	Ntot	Alpha-30
		1970	1975	1980	1985	1992				
Middendorp F7	7	.70	.67	.67	.72	.76	.71	.26	7031	.91
Adorno F10	10	.77	.75	.75	.76	.79	.77	.25	6655	.91
Adorno F16	16	.84	.84	.84	.83	.85	.85	.27	6445	.91
Adorno F30	30	.86	.85	.86	.83	-	.87	.18	2493	.87
Altemeyer CONV6	6	.54	.56	.55	.53	-	.60	.20	6146	.88
Altemeyer SUBM6	6	.72	.72	.72	.73	.75	.73	.32	7536	.93
Altemeyer AGR6	6	.68	.67	.65	.67	.68	.68	.28	7525	.91
Altemeyer ALT18	18	.84	.84	.84	.83	-	.85	.24	4973	.90
Meloen REX11	11	.76	.75	.75	.76	.77	.76	.23	5859	.90

Five National Random Surveys Netherlands; Total Cases = 9112; Nit = Number of items; Cit = Mean Interitem Correlation; Ntot = Total Number of Cases Included; Alpha-30 = Cronbach Alpha, if the scale had 30 items of similar cohesion; F7: Middendorp F Scale; CONV = Conventionalism; SUBM = Submission; AGR = Aggression; ALT = Altemeyer F Scale: CONV+SUBM+AGR; REX = Right Wing Extremism; - = not available due to two missing items in this survey

There is only a slight variation. But by no means is there a decline shown in the strength of the reliabilities. This is true for *all*

the authoritarianism scales in the consecutive surveys of 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1992. This result firmly supports the stability hypothesis of both the F Scales and the F Syndrome.

Trend Validity

Scales can be reliable, but not valid. However, there seems to be less agreement on what makes a scale valid, considering the numerous validity indicators that are used. We will distinguish the following main types of validity of the F Scales: *discriminant validity*, *concurrent validity*, and *explanatory validity*. We will also test the trends in time of the various validity coefficients.

Discriminant Validity

Discriminant validity means that scales discriminate between groups of respondents. Since F Scales are also considered potential fascism scales, to be valid they should discriminate between those who prefer or voted for extreme right wing parties, and those who vote for democratic parties (Meloan, Hagendoorn, Raaijmakers, and Visser 1988, Meloan 1993).

The present F Scales seem to meet this condition: the extreme right shows the highest mean scores (Tables 4 and 5), although not always significantly different from the fundamentalist right (or orthodox Christians). However, fundamentalists may not share many brutal habits of extremists. But they often do share authoritarian and theocratic ideas. The scale, especially constructed from items that discriminated between the extreme right and democrats (REX11), showed highly significant differences. The validity tendencies of these F Scales seem slightly more outspoken in the voting behavior, then in the voting preferences. This would suggest that asking for behavior patterns can be more effective than asking for rather (speculative) intentions. These results support the discriminant validity of the used F Scales.

Table 4. Authoritarianism and Voting Preference (1970-1992)

Political Parties Preferred	Authoritarianism Scales							
	F7		F10		F16		REX11	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Green Left	3.21	501	2.88	426	2.70	413	2.73	401
Social Democrats	4.19	1928	3.81	1388	3.54	1355	3.59	1260
Liberal Democrats	3.67	724	3.34	577	3.11	553	3.16	511
Christian Democrats	4.36	2013	4.02	1465	3.85	1408	3.67	1320
Conservative Democrats	4.16	1114	3.84	898	3.59	871	3.67	791
Fundam Christians	4.28	191	4.42	127	4.27	133	3.74	111
Right Wing Extremists	4.85*	41	4.62*	29	4.28*	29	4.46*	28
Total Population	4.11	6512	3.76	4910	3.54	4762	3.51	4422

F7: Middendorp F Scale; Range All Scales: 1 00 Low Authoritarian to 7 00 High Authoritarian; F30 not shown: too few cases left for target group of extremists; Right Wing Extremists: Farmers Party, Center Party, Center Democrats

Table 5. Authoritarianism and Voting Behavior (1970-1992)

Political Parties Voted for	Authoritarianism Scales							
	F7		F10		F16		REX11	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
Green Left	3.30	444	2.95	363	2.74	351	2.76	339
Social Democrats	4.16	2176	3.77	1576	3.52	1543	3.57	1417
Liberal Democrats	3.67	610	3.32	488	3.07	469	3.14	420
Christian Democrats	4.36	2181	4.01	1593	3.83	1530	3.66	1409
Conservative Liberals	4.18	1136	3.84	909	3.58	880	3.67	812
Fundam Christians	4.28	190	4.39	132	4.22	138	3.72	115
Right Wing Extremists	5.08*	42	4.72*	32	4.39*	30	4.41*	28
Total Population	4.14	6779	3.78	5093	3.55	4941	3.52	4540

F7: Middendorp F Scale; Range All Scales: 1 00 Low Authoritarian to 7 00 High Authoritarian; F30 not shown: too few cases left for target group extremists; Right Wing Extremists: Farmers Party, Center Party, Center Democrats

The number of right wing extremists was too small in the separate surveys. Therefore, a trend in this type of validity could not be computed.

Concurrent Validity

Concurrent validity applies to correlations between authoritarianism and external variables, within the same survey. Positive correlations between F Scales and anti feminism, authoritarian parental attitudes, authoritarian attitudes toward children, anti homosexual attitudes, anti freedom attitudes, anti democratic attitudes, nationalism and anomia, all can be considered to support the concurrent validity of the used F Scales. All the correlations between authoritarianism and external variables

shown here (Table 6) are significant and a number is quite substantial, although elsewhere sometimes higher correlations have been reported. The longer F scales also show somewhat higher correlations here (there is no item overlap between the external scales) as can be expected from their higher reliabilities. The results here support the concurrent validity of the F Scales.

Table 6. Authoritarianism and External Variables: Trend in Correlations 1970-1992

	Nit	Alpha	F7	F10	F16	F30
Nit			7	10	16	30
Alpha			.71	.77	.85	.87
Anti Freedom Attitudes	7	.75	.31***	.39***	.44***	.53***
Anti Democratic Attitudes	3	.80	.13***	.18***	.20***	.26***
Nationalism	4	.73	.47***	.54***	.57***	.61***
Anomia	5	.77	.58***	.59***	.54***	.48***
Nmin			4638	3477	3394	1627
Nmax			9112	6655	6445	2493

F7: Middendorp F Scale; Pearson Correlations; *** = $p < .001$; ** = $.001 < p < .01$; * = $.01 < p < .05$; Nit: Number of items; Nmin/Nmax: Minimum/Maximum Number of Respondents; there is no overlap in items between the external variables and with the F scales

We can now assess whether the external validity of F Scales will collapse in time or remain stable. In case of collapse the external correlations will become lower and insignificant in time. This appears not to be the case (Table 7) in most instances. The F Scales correlate survey after survey at a stable level, and as expected with anti feminism, authoritarian parental attitudes, authoritarian attitudes toward children, anti homosexual attitudes, anti freedom attitudes, anti democratic attitudes, nationalism and anomia, and also with the general conservatism-libertarianism dimension of Middendorp (with conservatism therefore), but hardly, and stable so with the socioeconomic left-right wing dimension of Middendorp.

Also, there seems to be a slight decrease in the correlations until 1985 for some variables, but this is compensated by higher corre-

lations in the last survey of 1992. Over all, there may be some variation, but the main impression is one of great stability. Only the results for the F7 Scale are presented, but the pattern is roughly similar for the other F Scales. The longer F Scales also show somewhat higher correlations in this respect.

Table 7. Authoritarianism and External Variables: Trend in Correlations 1970-1992

Authoritarianism (F Scale F7) and:	Nit	Alpha	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total
Anti feminism	4	.73	.49***	.45***	.44***	.41***	.43***	.47***
Authoritarian Parental Attitudes	3	.75	.54***	.52***	.51***	.49***	.51***	.53***
Authoritarian Attitudes to Child	6	.55	.34***	.29***	.34***	.29***	-	.35***
Anti Homosexual Attitudes	3	.76	.33***	.32***	.23***	.20***	.24***	.30***
Anti Freedom Attitudes	7	.75	.29***	.30***	.33***	.30***	.28***	.31***
Anti Democratic Attitudes	3	.80	.23***	.16***	.24***	.16***	.02ns	.13***
Nationalism	4	.73	.53***	.47***	.49***	.47***	.43***	.47***
Anomia	5	.77	.58***	.52***	.52***	.56***	.65***	.58***
Nmin			1255	893	927	1090	1170	4165
Nmax			1783	1683	1666	1700	1623	8400
Conservative-Libertarian	9	-	.53***	.53***	.53***	.50***	.49***	.52***
Left-Right Economic Conservatism	9	-	-.00ns	.00ns	-.05*	.02ns	.19***	.07***
N			1905	1803	1859	1791	1754	1992

F7: Middendorp F Scale; Pearson Correlations; Social Class = Self Rating; *** = $p < .001$; ** = $.001 < p < .01$; * = $.01 < p < .05$; ns = non significant; there is no overlap in items between the presented scales

Again there is little indication of collapse of the authoritarianism scales or syndrome, instead there seems to be quite some stability. The results seem to suggest strong support for the concurrent validity of the used F Scales in time.

Explanatory Validity

Although not very commonly used, this type of validity can be considered to be related to social background variables like sex and age, educational level, and social class. Stable relations with these variables indicate stable explanations on a social level. Indeed, the most reported background variable related to F Scales is educational level, but also age and social class have been associated with explanations of authoritarianism.

The results show (Table 8) that there is no relation with being male or female, and this lack of relation is rather stable in time, 58

even though in 1970 females tended to score slightly higher. The difference has become insignificant since (see below). Most remarkable is that age, educational level, educational level of the father and social class show quite a stable relation with the F Scales in time. On a national random sample level there hardly seems to be a trend up or downward at all. This is also the case for the other F Scales (not shown here).

From these results we can again only conclude that stability in the relations with the social variables is the over all impression. It supports the explanatory validity of the used F Scales, and therefore the stability-hypothesis.

Table 8. Authoritarianism and Social Variables: Trend in Correlations 1970-1992

F Scale (F7) and:	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total
Male/Female	.06*	.02	-.03	-.01	-.02	-.002
Age	.26***	.28***	.28***	.28***	.27***	.26***
Education	-.41***	-.38***	-.37***	-.39***	-.44***	-.41***
Education Father	-.27***	-.26***	-.27***	-.30***	x	-.28***
Social Class	-.28***	-.26***	-.20***	-.18***	-.32***	-.26***
Town Size Youth	.12***	.11***	.07**	.05*	.08**	-.002
Size Community	x	-.09***	.01	.10***	.06*	.06***

F7: Middendorp F Scale; Pearson Correlations; Social Class = Self Rating; *** = $p < .001$; ** = $.001 < p < .01$; * = $.01 < p < .05$

Conclusion Stability Hypothesis

The authoritarianism syndrome will not disintegrate in time. This hypothesis was strongly supported. It was tested by comparing the reliabilities of authoritarianism operationalizations in time, by comparing main validity coefficients in time, and by comparing the relation with social variables in time. The reliabilities of the nine authoritarianism scales did not decrease in time, but showed considerable stability.

Some of the main validity coefficients (Anti feminism, authoritarian parental attitudes, authoritarian attitudes toward children, anti homosexual attitudes, nationalism, anti freedom attitudes,

anti democratic attitudes, anomia) also did not show any weakening in time, and finally the social variables (male/female, education, education of the father, age, self rating of social class) mainly showed stable relationships in time. This was the case for the short Middendorp F Scale, as well as for the wider F Syndrome.

It was concluded that there does not seem to be any sign of weakening of the authoritarianism syndrome: a syndrome of related authoritarian attitudes and opinions. This is rather remarkable, considering also the next hypothesis.

Change in Authoritarianism Levels

Now that it is shown that the authoritarianism syndrome has not disintegrated in time and the instruments show considerable validity, we can assess the changes in authoritarianism *levels* (mean scores) over a time period of 22 years. We will show this for the over all trend, as well as for various relevant subgroups and social categories. According to the second hypothesis we expect a decrease in authoritarianism from 1970 on.

Trend in General Authoritarianism Levels

The results (Table 9) show indeed that the general trend is one of decreasing levels of authoritarianism, ever since the first survey of 1970. This trend is almost linear as in every following survey year the means are lower, than in the former survey. There is no instance of a temporary rise in authoritarianism levels. This is also the case for every one of the F Scales shown.

This very consistent downward trend is again quite remarkable. In the early 1980s there was an economic crisis in The Netherlands, like in many other countries at the time. However, no immediate increase in authoritarianism has been registered here. But right wing extremist activities did increase in this period.

This may support the thesis that not the attitudes change in an economic crisis, but the attitude-behavior relation among authoritarian extremists: they will act more consistent with their authoritarian attitudes in such crises. Unfortunately, we cannot test this thesis here, mainly due to the low numbers of such extremists in our database.

The trend is consistent with the results of Lederer (1982, 1983) in Germany. Meloen (1983) also found a decrease during the 1960s in the USA among students, while Altemeyer found an increase since the mid 1970s among Canadian students (1988). Therefore, the authoritarianism levels may fluctuate in time somewhat, although not dramatically. It also suggests that the trend in North America may not be similar to the one in West Europe, if these results could be generalized. We lack enough studies to do so at the moment, but the few available studies may suggest this.

Table 9. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores

Authoritarianism Scale	Year of Survey					Total 1970-1992		
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Mean	Sd	N
Middendorp F7	4.48	4.33	4.10	4.01	3.83	4.15	1.21	9112
Meloen F10	4.07	3.99	3.74	3.66	3.50	3.80	1.07	6655
Meloen F16	3.93	3.77	3.50	3.38	3.22	3.57	0.97	6445
Meloen F30	3.67	3.32	3.05	2.99	-	3.27	0.82	2493
Altemeyer CONV6	4.25	3.85	3.40	3.30	-	3.72	1.08	6146
Altemeyer SUBM6	4.78	4.71	4.55	4.33	4.19	4.52	1.15	7536
Altemeyer AGR6	3.07	2.93	2.57	2.47	2.44	2.70	1.08	7525
Meloen REX11	3.82	3.77	3.47	3.43	3.26	3.56	0.99	5859

Five National Random Surveys Netherlands; Total Cases = 9112; F7: Middendorp F-Scale; for all F Scales: differences between groups significant, as well as linearity, by means of ANOVA ($p < 0001$); - - not available due to two missing items in the 1992 survey

Trend in Levels for Men and Women

The trend for men and women is similar to the general authoritarianism trend. Both men and women show lower levels in time. However, an additional trend is that men and women seem to have become more equal in their authoritarianism levels. The differences have become somewhat smaller, and are not significantly different since 1970. In the 1970 survey women still

showed slightly higher levels than men, as was the case in many older studies. This was interpreted as women to be more submissive (toward men) in general. Since the general trend here is in the direction away from authoritarianism, a new interpretation can be that women now are less different in this respect from men. This seems to be the case for the society as a whole as well, as in the last decades feminist activities have lead to greater (although not complete) equality in social roles of women compared to men.

Table 10. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Men and Women

	Year of Survey					Total 1970-1992
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	
Men	4.41	4.31	4.14	4.02	3.86	4.16
Women	4.54	4.35	4.07	4.00	3.80	4.15
Total Population	4.47	4.33	4.10	4.01	3.83	4.15
N	1903	1789	1859	1791	1754	9096

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Trend in Levels for Age Groups

The decline of authoritarianism levels is also visible in the age groups (Table 11). In general, the older groups have shown higher levels than the younger ones, with the exception of the youngest groups. Earlier birth cohort analysis with the same surveys showed that this is not due to higher levels within the same birth cohorts in time: one does not become more authoritarian when one gets older (Meloan and Middendorp 1991). Actually a slight, but rather consistent *downward* trend can also be shown for most of the birth cohorts (diagonals top-left to bottom-right in table 11). They represent the same groups, born in the same time period and upon close inspection one can see that their levels tend to decrease in time.

In cross sectional analysis the youngest groups (17-19 year) seem an exception. Their levels are almost consistently somewhat

higher than the next, older group (20-24 year), and this rise is more outspoken in the later surveys. One explanation could be that these young people are much influenced still by their parents at the ages of 17 to 19 years, but less so when they become older and independent. At the same time their parents are some twenty to thirty years older (ages of 40 to 50), and in every survey (Table 11) show higher levels of authoritarianism, than their youngsters. Getting away from their parents could therefore mean a tendency toward lower levels in their early twenties. The same difference in levels was probably also true between the parents and their grand parents.

Table 11. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Age Cohorts

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992
Age Group					
17-19 Year	4.10	3.96	3.79	3.60	3.67
20-24 Year	4.08	3.80	3.67	3.62	3.50
25-29 Year	4.16	4.00	3.75	3.64	3.44
30-34 Year	4.32	4.19	3.98	3.82	3.48
35-39 Year	4.62	4.39	3.93	4.02	3.66
40-44 Year	4.52	4.50	4.24	4.03	3.75
45-49 Year	4.61	4.51	4.29	4.16	3.92
50-54 Year	4.61	4.51	4.29	4.16	3.92
55-59 Year	4.68	4.56	4.41	4.47	4.29
60-64 Year	4.68	4.56	4.41	4.47	4.42
65-69 Year	4.83	4.61	4.53	4.39	4.42
	5.05	4.81	4.46	4.59	4.53
	5.08	4.73	4.75	4.51	4.57
Total Population	4.48	4.33	4.10	4.01	3.83
N	1905	1803	1859	1791	1754

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Trend in Levels for Educational Groups

The general decrease in authoritarianism is shown (Table 12) for the various educational levels, most outspoken in the levels of those with secondary school education and higher. There seems to be a slackening of this decrease for the lowest educational levels. These groups showed a decrease over the 1970s, but this is

less the case in the 1980s, and there may even be a slight rise in the 1990s. However, this does not seem to alter the general trend for the educational levels.

A similar trend is shown for the educational levels of the father of the respondent (Table 13, in 1992 survey not available). In general, the decrease is visible here too, although less outspoken. This time, the trend is less clear for the secondary and highest educational levels. Since this question was less well answered (about one third apparently did not know their father's education), the respondent's educational level seems a better indicator for our analysis here.

Table 12. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Educational Level

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1970-1992
Primary School	4.91	4.67	4.49	4.49	4.55	4.64
Secondary School	4.37	4.23	4.00	3.96	3.77	4.06
Grammar School	3.79	3.70	3.58	3.47	3.20	3.53
University	3.46	3.30	3.22	3.11	2.98	3.18
Total Population	4.47	4.33	4.10	4.01	3.83	4.15
N	1868	1796	1853	1784	1732	9033

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Table 13. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Educational Level Father

	1970	1975	1980	1985	Total 1970-1985
Primary School	4.74	4.51	4.34	4.28	4.49
Secondary School	4.22	4.04	3.46	3.72	3.90
Grammar School	4.03	3.85	3.71	3.47	3.74
University	3.74	3.35	3.19	3.17	3.42
Total Population	4.55	4.37	4.15	4.03	4.29
N	1315	1299	632	1392	4638

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian; 1992: not available

Trend in Levels for Social Class Groups

The various social classes (by self rating) show again (Table 14) a similar decrease of authoritarianism in time, most consistent in the middle class groups. Both working class and upper class show a less consistent pattern.

The results for the occupational groups support this general decrease in time too (Table 15), but there are exceptions to this trend among the various occupational groups themselves. An explanation is not clear. The differences between groups do show some consistency, as was reported before (Meloan and Middendorp 1991). Low levels can be found among the free professions and the higher and mid level employees, and relatively high authoritarianism levels among the groups of unskilled laborers, farmers, and fishermen. Remarkably, directors tend to show levels in between these groups.

Table 14. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Social Class (Self Rating)

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1970-1992
Working Class	4.95	4.68	4.41	4.34	4.38	4.56
Lower Middle Class	4.54	4.35	4.16	4.09	4.03	4.24
Upper Middle Class	4.16	3.95	3.86	3.76	3.39	3.81
Upper Class	3.62	3.77	3.61	3.82	3.06	3.57
Total Population	4.50	4.34	4.11	4.04	3.83	4.17
N	1661	1671	1744	1648	1610	8334

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Table 15. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Occupational Levels

	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1970-1992
Director > 10 Employees	4.73	3.94	3.92	3.74	4.07
Director < 10 employees	4.62	4.22	4.32	3.98	4.34
Professionals	3.27	3.58	3.67	2.06	3.11
Farmers-Fishermen	4.93	4.65	4.23	4.44	4.54
High Level Employees	3.72	3.76	3.21	3.05	3.37
Mid Level Employees	3.99	3.76	3.81	3.41	3.73
Low Level Employees	4.31	4.16	4.24	4.13	4.20
Skilled Labor	4.48	4.38	4.34	4.36	4.40
Unskilled Labor	4.91	4.62	4.75	4.64	4.74
Total Population	4.34	4.13	4.03	3.85	4.09
N	1405	1366	1335	1436	5542

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Trend in Levels for Religious Identification

In The Netherlands the main religious groups are the Protestants (Calvinists, Dutch reformed) and Catholics. The Protestants dominated the Netherlands from the time of its independence in the 17th century, and lived north of the Rhine, the Catholics mainly south of this river. The trends in authoritarianism for the religious groups are both in general and for specific religious groups almost similar, and downward in time (Table 16). This is consistent with the ongoing secularization of the Dutch population, both Protestant and Catholic. Only among the Dutch reformed the trend is less outspoken.

Table 16. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores Religious Members

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1970-1992
Not member	4.35	4.08	4.04	3.84	3.68	3.97
Roman Catholic	4.63	4.63	4.27	4.24	4.24	4.43
Dutch reformed	4.49	4.50	4.09	4.17	3.86	4.26
Calvinist	4.47	4.27	4.02	4.03	3.75	4.13
Population	4.48	4.33	4.10	4.00	3.83	4.15
N	1799	1739	1796	1741	1682	8757

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Trend in Levels for Regions

The general regional trend for the eleven provinces is similar to the general trend for the country as a whole (Table 17). Since the differences in authoritarianism between provinces are rather small, the trend is not always very consistent as time passed by. The higher levels of Limburg, Zeeland and Friesland (relative orthodox and rural regions) remain relatively high, while the lowest, Holland, Utrecht, Groningen and Gelderland remain low. These provinces are more advanced, urban, liberal and less orthodox in a religious sense.

Considering the size of the community where the respondents live, the downward trend is only visible in the general results in time, but less so for the most populated (largest cities) and least populated communities (smallest villages). The regional differences in authoritarianism are not expected to be very impressive in The Netherlands. This is because the country has been for a long time the most densely populated of the (post)industrial world. After World War II it was completely modernized, heavily industrialized and urbanized, and differences between cities and rural areas are ever decreasing, now with less than 5 percent of the population in farming. Regional differences therefore seem to have lost their traditional meaning, although some remaining differences in authoritarianism might be related to surviving regional traditions.

Table 17. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Provinces

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1975-1992
Groningen	4.42	4.27	4.02	3.76	3.87	3.99
Friesland	4.29	4.59	4.16	4.32	3.83	4.23
Drenthe	4.25	4.28	4.01	4.08	4.05	4.10
Overijssel	4.49	4.28	4.12	4.24	3.84	4.11
Gelderland	4.47	4.32	3.95	3.94	3.75	4.00
Utrecht	4.42	4.13	4.18	3.93	3.63	3.94
North Holland	4.24	4.04	3.96	3.86	3.71	3.89
South Holland	4.42	4.31	4.15	3.92	3.86	4.07
Zeeland	4.54	4.64	4.05	4.26	3.91	4.23
North Brabant	4.57	4.39	4.23	4.05	3.79	4.11
Limburg	4.56	4.80	4.26	4.32	4.14	4.39
Total Population	4.41	4.33	4.11	4.01	3.83	4.07
N	1925	1799	1859	1791	1754	7203

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Table 18. Trend in Authoritarianism 1970-1992: Mean F Scores of Size Municipality

	1975	1980	1985	1992	Total 1975-1992
> 400.000 inhabitant	4.20	4.12	3.83	3.87	4.02
100.000-400.000	4.26	4.02	3.82	3.59	3.94
50.000-100.000	4.26	4.19	4.00	3.74	4.03
20.000-50.000	4.35	4.07	4.05	3.85	4.06
10.000-20.000	4.41	4.07	4.25	4.00	4.18
5.000-10.000	4.47	4.26	3.92	3.79	4.12
< 5.000	4.56	3.98	4.32	4.24	4.29
Total Population	4.33	4.10	4.01	3.83	4.07
N	1798	1859	1791	1754	7202

Middendorp F Scale F7; Range: 1.00 Low Authoritarian to 7.00 High Authoritarian

Conclusions Decreasing Levels Hypothesis

The authoritarianism levels have steadily decreased in time, between 1970 and 1992. The second hypothesis was again strongly supported by the presented results. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the authoritarianism levels (F Scale means) in time.

Contrary to other social and political issues in The Netherlands, and contrary to such levels in other countries, like the USA, the levels of the various operationalizations of authoritarianism have all decreased since the first survey of 1970, in a rather linear, consistent way. Since the mid eighties all these levels have moved also to the non authoritarian side, providing evidence that non authoritarian attitudes and values are now supported among a majority of the population. The age cohorts may provide some indication that this trend will hardly change in the near future. Only a small rise was noted among the youngest age groups.

Considering the stark support for the stability hypothesis of the F syndrome, it is argued that the decrease of authoritarianism levels cannot be attributed to disintegration of the authoritarianism syndrome proper, the 'tainting' or 'wearing out' of the used items or scales. Therefore, this hypothesis (2) is well supported in the period covered by the surveys.

Secularization, Education and Authoritarianism

The decline of authoritarianism levels in The Netherlands is quite clear, but why this is so, is still rather obscure. Indeed, it is not clear, what the longitudinal influences are. There seem to be more hypotheses in this field, than tested theories (Meloan 1983). To shed some more light on this very important issue, we will analyze some of our longitudinal data.

According to Middendorp (1978, 1991) the secularization in The Netherlands played a major role in the support for political parties, especially the Christian Democrats and their predecessors. The powerful position of the Christian Democrats (Christian parties ruling the country in coalitions for over a century) has deteriorated especially since the late 1960s.

Table 19. Secularization in The Netherlands

	<i>Raised Religious</i>	<i>Membership Religion</i>	<i>Church Attendance</i>
1970	1.77	1.59	3.78
1975	1.74	1.55	3.38
1980	1.73	1.48	3.34
1985	1.70	1.45	2.10
1992	1.70	1.40	1.93
N	8616	8757	6611

differences between groups are significant by ANOVA; Church Attendance = 5 categories, low (1) is 'never', high (5) is 'often'; for Membership Religion and Raised Religious = 2 categories: low (1) is 'no', high (2) is 'yes'

However, it took several decades, until 1994 before the first government without Christian Democrats emerged. Secularization has been a main factor here. In the past decades a considerable decrease of religious identification (membership) and activities (church attendance) were reported, and this is also reflected in our present data set of the Middendorp surveys.

To understand a possible relation between this process of secularization and the decreasing levels of authoritarianism, an additional analysis was needed. Time series analysis was not possible, since we have only five measurement points in time (time series analysis requires at least 30 points in time). Therefore, we had to resort to a combination of cross sectional and limited longitudinal analysis. The intention was to find (relevant) factors that would be related to authoritarianism both cross sectionally and longitudinally. The factors that would only be associated in cross sections might not be related to longitudinal trends, and vice versa.

Table 20. Longitudinal Trend 1970-1992

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Direction</i>
<i>Authoritarianism</i>		
F7 F Scale	p = .001	decrease
F10	p = .004	decrease
F16	p = .002	decrease
REX11	p = .007	decrease
AGR6	p = .022	decrease
SUBM6	p = .002	decrease
<i>Related Variables</i>		
Education	p = .038	increase
Religious Membership	p = .001	decrease
Church Attendance	p = .017	decrease
Secularization	p = .013	increase
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Age	p = .81	not significant
Social Class	p = .17	not significant

Pearson correlations between five years of survey and variable; secularization is combination of religious membership and church attendance; control variables should not change in time (non significance)

The cross sectional relations have been reported above. After extensive analysis the only relevant variables significant in both cross-sectional and longitudinal ways, and relevant to authoritarianism theories were the following: religious identification (combination of membership and church attendance) and levels of education. These two were the only factors in the present surveys that met our criteria.

The significance of the level of education is rather surprising, since it is a main social variable, if not the most important social variable of authoritarianism (Simpson 1972, Duckitt 1992, Meloen and Middendorp 1991). In the past decades the level of education has been rising slowly but steadily. As a result older generations received less education than the younger ones that replace them. Since more education has consistently been associated for the last fifty years in research with lower levels of authoritarianism,

this effect appears apparently even in highly educated societies. Whatever the relation between education and authoritarianism (explanations were often not clear), it can be considered a main social influence on authoritarianism.

In a cross sectional analysis using the LISREL-procedure a rather simple model was tested. In this model authoritarianism was represented by authoritarian aggression and submission separately. It was hypothesized that rising levels of education would lead to lower levels of both authoritarian submission and aggression. These lower levels would then lead to more secularization (that is: less religious identification).

This model was indeed allowed by LISREL-analysis, with a slightly different, but interesting outcome (see Figure 1). Education showed a negative influence on both submission and aggression, but a stronger one on aggression. Aggression hardly influenced religious identification, but did influence submission considerably. Submission was most strongly and positively influenced by aggression, while the influence of education was less strong, but in a negative direction. This can be explained by assuming that education leads to lower levels of authoritarian submission, while aggression leads to higher levels of submission. Finally, secularization was finally most strongly influenced by submission, and hardly by aggression. When submission weakens, secularization will become stronger.

The finding that authoritarian submission could be a main factor influencing religious identification (or secularization), whereas authoritarian aggression only works indirectly through submission, may suggest a new perspective in analyzing the relation between religion and authoritarianism. Although some religions used violence in certain periods (the Spanish Roman Catholic inquisition, Iran's Islam fundamentalists), refraining from 'world' matters and from aggression seems a more general feature of most religions. Authoritarian aggression otherwise has never been rec-




Figure 1. Authoritarianism between Education and Secularization

ognized as a relevant element in religious thinking. Submission, however, is recognized as such: submission toward the church or toward the worshiped God. The role of aggression seems not absent, but apparently increases submission. This would indicate one reason for the close relation between aggression and submission, once considered the core of authoritarianism: the sadomasochist element stressed originally by Fromm (1941). Aggression frightens people into submission, and as a result they will seek refuge, and some do so in religion. By contrast lack of authoritarian aggression, that is lack of personal and social fear, will in the end lead to less a need for submission and religion.

With more than fifty years of peace and prosperity in The Netherlands, together with a lack of territorial or economic threat from outside, a lack of experienced aggression indeed may be a main factor leading to lower levels of authoritarianism. Unfor-

tunately, this 'peace' factor cannot be operationalized with the Middendorp surveys. But some face validity seems to have been recognized abroad as 'Hollanditis': its (mainly assumed) history of trying to stay out of trouble, mostly European trouble.

This analysis, therefore, suggests that secularization may be the result of declining levels of authoritarian submission and aggression, which in turn can be the result of a better and higher educated population. This is a long range longitudinal effect, possibly related to a long-term-peace factor or a lack-of-threat factor.

International Comparison

Introduction

It is hard and almost impossible to interpret authoritarianism levels without information of these levels in other countries, regions or cultures. A preliminary inventory of authoritarianism levels was made earlier from hundreds of studies in authoritarianism (Meloan 1983). It included research from 24, mainly western countries, like the US, West European countries and some Third World countries. Ever since, data from additional countries have been collected (Meloan, Farnen, and German 1994a, 1994b; Farnen and Meloan, 2000). The cross-national results lead to a preliminary model for interpreting authoritarianism (Meloan 1996).

The Low Level Hypothesis

By using the mentioned international data we will explore hypothesis (3): The Netherlands is among the lowest in levels of authoritarianism and state authoritarianism in the world. The reason for this hypothesis is not petty local ethnocentrism, but the finding that with various authoritarianism scales Dutch students scored rather consistently low, from the first studies of the late 1960s on. Their levels indicated even lower levels than their

American or European counterparts, although relative few studies were available, and cross national research was as a result not very well comparable. On the other hand, authoritarianism was widely recognized in many countries and often associated with dictatorial tendencies. This also leads to a need for the international comparison of authoritarianism levels.

We will make a distinction between authoritarian attitudes and state authoritarianism for reasons of clarity, in presenting the following results.

Authoritarian Attitudes

The first exploration of authoritarian attitudes concerns the authoritarianism measured by the included Middendorp F Scale. We will report here preliminary results from the international Meloan and Farnen database over the first 30 countries. Samples were included from North America, West and East Europe and Russia, Latin America, Africa and Asia, in all, with some 7500 respondents. We will first examine the reliability and validity coefficients of the used authoritarianism scales.

Three related versions of the F Scale were included: the seven item Middendorp scale (F7), an eight-item Eisinga & Scheepers scale (Auth8), and a ten-item Meloan scale (Auth10). A reliability analysis showed substantial alpha's. This may suggest that the reliability of the authoritarianism scales does not disintegrate, when used in other countries and with international samples (Table 21). The over all reliability of the Middendorp F Scale is only slightly lower than in the Dutch random samples (of around .70). This is a most remarkable result. The European samples that answered translated questionnaires produced equal or even higher reliabilities, than the American samples that used the original version. Translation, therefore, does not seem to hinder the results in this respect. If the scales had been culture specific, then lower reliabilities would be inevitable in other cultures. But this

does not seem to be the case. Obviously, Europeans have some experience with authoritarianism in their recent history, probably more so than Americans, who never lived under authoritarian government.

Table 21. Reliability Authoritarianism over 30 Countries World Wide - 1991-1996

	Nit	Alpha	Cit	N	Alpha-30
Middendorp F7	7	.67	.22	7441	.90
Eisinga & Scheepers Auth8	8	.75	.27	7432	.92
Meloen Auth10	10	.75	.23	7044	.90

Alpha = Cronbach Alpha; Nit = Number of Items in Scale; Cit = Mean Inter Item Correlation; N = Number of Respondents; all scales original Adorno items; Alpha-30 = reliability if the scale included 30 items of similar coherence

A number of indicators were included in the international survey that could indicate the concurrent validity of the three authoritarianism scale versions (Table 22). It was expected that authoritarianism was positively related to militarism, ratings of dictators (Hitler, Mao, Stalin, Saddam Hussein) and scaled self ratings of being right wing, militarist, conservative and authoritarian, while being negatively related to multiculturalism and scaled ratings of reformers (Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Gorbachev).

For all three authoritarianism scales this expectation is confirmed by the results. Although the correlations are not always very high, they are highly significant, and all of them in the expected direction. This suggests that authoritarianism has international dimensions and that it is possible to investigate it. This increases also the confidence in the used authoritarianism scales. Not shown here is that factor analysis revealed a strong first factor (also after varimax), which included amongst others most of the F Scale

items. This suggests again that the authoritarianism factor may indeed be very international.

Table 22. Authoritarianism and External Variables World Wide - 1991-1996

	F7	Auth8	Auth10
Multiculturalism	-.23***	-.24***	-.26***
Militarism	.44***	.47***	.48***
Pro Dictator	.24***	.24***	.25***
Pro Reformer	-.25***	-.29***	-.31***
Self Right Wing	.20***	.23***	.27***
Nmin-max	6398-6892	6393-6883	6357-6748

Pearson Correlations; 30 Countries; student samples mainly; Nmin-max: Minimum and Maximum Number of Respondents; F7: F Scale Middendorp; Auth8: Authoritarianism Scale Eisinga & Scheepers; Auth10: Authoritarianism scale Adorno et al. (includes items F7 and Auth8); *** = p < .0001

Authoritarianism Levels

We can now also explore the authoritarianism levels in the 30-country analysis and assess if Dutch student samples show rather low levels (Table 23). The preliminary results, indeed, indicate that Dutch samples show very low levels, the lowest so far of all the samples included. In general, contrary to our expectations, most West European samples show low levels, even lower than American samples. American samples used to have lower levels than those of the Europeans in the 1960s and 1970s. Low levels were also found among (West) German samples. The West European samples in general showed low levels, compared to those from other continents. Especially samples from Africa, Russia and South Asia (not so much East Asia) were among the highest in our survey. East Europe, Latin America and East Asia show rather moderate authoritarianism levels.

What these differences in levels mean is yet to be investigated. Levels in totalitarian or recently totalitarian countries were clearly higher than in those countries with longer democratic traditions. But apart from political explanations, cultural factors maybe related as well. However, these explorative results do not warrant yet very extensive conclusions, and need further research.

Table 23. Authoritarianism World Wide - F Scales 1991-1996

	F7		Auth8		Auth10	
	Mean	N	Mean	N	Mean	N
USA	4.01	1205	4.03	1200	4.06	1192
West Europe	3.38	2100	3.27	2097	3.47	1739
Netherlands	2.77	443	2.57	443	2.80	100
East Europe	4.27	1849	4.36	1847	4.39	1843
Russia	4.57	879	4.73	877	4.75	873
Latin America	4.23	313	4.40	315	4.30	310
Africa	4.81	192	4.90	192	4.79	192
Asia	4.32	903	4.28	904	4.25	895
Total	4.03	7441	4.05	7432	4.14	7044

Total Cases = 7869; student samples mainly; F7 = F Scale Middendorp; Auth8 = Authoritarianism Scale Eisinga & Scheepers; Auth10 = Authoritarianism scale Adorno et al. (includes F7 and F8 items)

State Authoritarianism

In a recent approach is the concept of state authoritarianism was developed (Meloan 1996, 2000). This concept is not assessed in the classic questionnaire way of constructing attitudes from opinions of individuals. It is being constructed from information on the performance of states world wide. The oldest approach is the one by Freedom House, that produces since the early 1980s a 'freedom rating' for most of the countries in the world. This rating includes both civil rights and civil liberties. Our approach is related, but since Freedom House (1993, 1995) only publishes final results, statistical analysis of their concept was not possible. Using other international sources, a ten-item state authoritarianism scale was constructed. It consisted of the fol-

lowing ratings: trade unions being illegal or not, the existence of state terror practices, state suppression of deviation, and state beliefs being imposed, the legal tolerance of homosexuality, the existence of state censorship, the use of capital punishment, the status of abortion being legal or not, the number of military per 100 Physicians, and repression of the opposition (holding prisoners of conscience, and being obstructive to human rights bodies; see Meloan 1996 for details).

The tested reliability of this state authoritarianism scale was quite high for a short scale in a pilot study (alpha: .85, over 52 countries). Adding countries did not dramatically decrease this value (final alpha: .83, over 95 countries). The included ratings are taken from independent sources, and therefore a similar judgment of the raters cannot have improved this reliability. Also, most of the important countries were included and only some minor ones were missing (due to some missing ratings). Much of the data relates to the situation of the early 1990s, when many authoritarian and totalitarian governments were still in power.

From this state authoritarianism scale the levels were computed for each country (Meloan 1996, preliminary scores; Meloan 2000, definite scores). This was also done in order to explore the discriminant validity of the scale. High levels of state authoritarianism should be associated with dictatorship and authoritarian or totalitarian government. This appeared to be the case. The definite score runs from zero or low state authoritarianism to 100 or high state authoritarianism. Among the countries with high levels of state authoritarianism appears Iran (93), Laos, Burma (89), Ethiopia (86), Sudan (85), and Libya (83), all countries, at the time, noted for authoritarian types of government in one way or another. Laos and Ethiopia have since become more democratic, but the other ones still remain among the most dictatorial ones. High scores were also found for communist countries (Soviet Union 60, China 63) and Apartheid South Africa (63).

Most democratic countries showed indeed low levels, although there is some variation here too. Among the lowest is The Netherlands (0), Canada (3), Iceland (3), Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden 10, Norway 12) and New Zealand (12), countries known for their liberal and democratic climate. It should be noted that none of the judged country ratings originated in The Netherlands, or from Dutch judges. Most western countries tended to have low scores as well (USA 18, France 10, Germany 12, UK 34, Japan 22). Not surprisingly, the state authoritarianism scale also correlated highly with the Freedom House ratings.

For our present exploration it is important that the state authoritarianism scale shows considerable discriminant validity, and that we can employ this scale with some confidence here. A very liberal climate indeed is available among a number of states in the world, among them The Netherlands. If our results point in the right direction, it is understandable that in a liberal climate students show low, to very low authoritarianism levels. Many of them never experienced authoritarianism, that is only known from history books. In other countries with less liberal climates and less democratic traditions students may not have absorbed the norms and values of liberal and democratic society and therefore do not show low levels of authoritarianism. A high correlation between this state authoritarianism and authoritarian attitudes of our international samples has indeed been computed, suggesting a strong relation between them, as can be expected. Further research is needed to assess the scientific value of this rather unique finding.

Conclusions Low Level Hypothesis

The mentioned indicators all show that The Netherlands rank among the lowest in state authoritarianism, but also that it is not the only country with such low levels. Similar very low levels are found in Scandinavia, Iceland, Canada and New Zealand. If in those countries low levels are associated with low levels of

authoritarian (or better: high levels of non authoritarian) attitudes, this would not be surprising, considering the presented results. These last conclusions are not final, but strongly indicated by this analysis. The third hypothesis, therefore, seems to receive support as well.

Conclusions

In this analysis three basic hypotheses on authoritarianism were tested. A composite Middendorp data set was used, including five national random samples in The Netherlands: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1992 (Middendorp 1978, 1991). These surveys totaled more than nine thousand respondents. Thirty authoritarianism related items, including eight original Adorno et al. items, were used in nine operationalizations of authoritarianism. In most analyses the Middendorp F Scale was used. The various operationalizations were mainly based on Adorno et al. (1950) and Altemeyer (1988). Most of the nine operationalizations showed adequate reliabilities (alpha's of .71 to .87), and satisfactory coefficients of concurrent validity, discriminant validity and explanatory validity, consistent with those reported in the literature (Meloan 1983, 1993, Meloan and Middendorp 1991). The longer authoritarianism scales showed typically higher reliabilities and validity coefficients.

Hypothesis (1) - the authoritarianism syndrome will not disintegrate in time (stability-hypothesis) - was strongly supported. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the reliabilities of authoritarianism operationalizations in time, by comparing main validity coefficients in time, and by comparing the relationships with social variables in time. The reliabilities of the nine authoritarianism scales did not decrease in time, and showed considerable stability. Some of the main validity coefficients (nationalism, anti freedom attitudes, anti democratic attitudes, anomia) also did not show any weakening in time, and finally the social variables (education, education father, age, self rating of

social class) mainly showed stable relationships in time. This was the case for the short Middendorp F Scale, as well as for the wider authoritarianism syndrome. It was concluded that there does not seem to be any sign of weakening of the authoritarianism syndrome: a syndrome of related authoritarian attitudes and opinions. This is remarkable, considering the support for the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis (2) - the levels of authoritarianism have steadily decreased in time (decreasing levels-hypothesis) - was tested by comparing the authoritarianism levels (group scale means) in time. It was shown that the levels of the various operationalizations of authoritarianism have all decreased since the first survey of 1970, in a rather linear, and consistent way. Since the mid eighties all the authoritarianism levels have moved to the non authoritarian side. This indicates that non authoritarian attitudes are now supported among a majority of the population. The age cohorts seem to indicate that this trend will not easily change in the near future. Only an insignificant small rise was noted among the youngest age groups.

Considering the stark support for hypothesis (1), it is argued that the decrease of authoritarianism levels cannot be attributed to disintegration of the authoritarianism syndrome proper, the 'tainting' or 'wearing out' of the used items or scales. Therefore, this hypothesis (2) is well supported in the period covered by the five Middendorp surveys.

Finally, hypothesis (3) - The Netherlands is among the lowest in levels of authoritarianism and state authoritarianism in the world (low level-hypothesis) - was explored using the Meloen state authoritarianism analysis (1996, 2000) and the Meloen and Farnen 30 countries database, which included the same Middendorp authoritarianism scale. All indicators, indeed, show that the Dutch population rank among the lowest in authoritarian attitudes and The Netherlands among the lowest in state authoritarianism,

together with the Scandinavian countries, Iceland, Canada and New Zealand.

These results seem to indicate that the quest Adorno et al. (1950) departed upon may have been completed in The Netherlands. The objective of a low authoritarian, or non authoritarian, society now seems to have been realized. The authoritarianism syndrome, however, has not disintegrated and is still present. It can be demonstrated empirically. Considering the steadily decreasing levels of authoritarianism in the past decades in this country, we may conclude from the results that Dutch society and its people have changed considerably. They may now be at the forefront of the world's most non authoritarian societies.

The preliminary analysis of the longitudinal trend may suggest that rising levels of education are partly responsible for this decrease of authoritarianism. It is argued, however, that a main influence that could not be included in this analysis, might be a general situation of prolonged peace and lack of territorial and an economic threat. Such factors may induce or facilitate a trend toward a non authoritarian, democratic society as well. It should be mentioned also that in this respect a number of rival hypotheses remain.

The general results of this analysis also should be considered with some caution. History has shown that in times of less prosperity authoritarianism can be on the rise again. In fact, the Altemeyer (1988) time series showed that among North American students such a rise occurred during the 1980s. Additionally, where American students scored very low in the late 1960s and 1970s (Meloan 1983), such low scores have hardly been found recently (Farnen and Meloan, 2000). In the 1990s the West European students tend to show the lowest scores. This may indeed indicate that the presented trend toward less authoritarianism can be reversed in changing circumstances. This could be a warning for too optimistic conclusions from this analysis.

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Appendix

Content of the Used Scales

The text of a complete scale item appears only once; thereafter the item is represented by *key words* only (printed in italics). Text/translations according to Middendorp 1978, Adorno et al. 1950. For Reliabilities, see Tables. Answer categories: mostly 5 or 7; specific information: see Middendorp 1978.

Scale Authoritarianism F30

1. *Wishes abortion* - If a woman so *wishes*, it should be possible for her to have an *abortion*.
2. *Death penalty* - It might be a good thing to reintroduce the *death penalty* for certain crimes.
3. *Teenagers obey* - It is mostly for the good of *teenagers* that they *obey* their parents.
4. *Obedience* - The most important thing children should learn is total *obedience* to their parents wishes.
5. *Show regard* - Obviously a child should *show regard* and respect for their parents.
6. *Woman children* - A *woman* is more capable of bringing up small *children* than a man.
7. *Woman over men* - In a firm it is unnatural when a *woman* hold a position of authority *over men*.
8. *Good schooling* - It is not so important for a girl to get a *good schooling* as it is for a boy.
9. *Boys more freely* - *Boys* can be raised *more freely* than girls.
10. *Bad manners* - A person who has *bad manners*, habits and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.
11. *Prying* - Nowadays more and more people are *prying* into matters that should remain personal and private.
12. *Devoted leaders* - What we need are fewer laws and institutions, and more courageous, tireless and *devoted leaders*, in whom the people can put their faith.

13. *Immoral people* - Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the *immoral*, crooked and feeble-minded *people*.

14. *Rebellious ideas* - Young people sometimes get *rebellious ideas*, but as they grow up, they ought to get over them.

15. *Familiarity* - Most people fall short of your expectations if you get to know them better (*familiarity* breeds contempt).

16. *Weak and strong* - There are two kinds of people: the *weak* and the *strong*.

17. *Send aid* - The government should: [*send*] *aid* to developing countries.

18. *Aid countries* - If everybody would give up 1% of his income for *aid* to developing *countries*, would you think that too much, too little or just about right?

19. *Woman household* - Do you, or don't you object to a *woman* with children who go to school, having a job in addition to her *household* duties, or is this to be recommended?

20. *Work day-nursery* - Following item 19: And when there are children at home that would have to be sent to a *day-nursery*?

21. *Not children* - A married couple decides on principle *not* to have *children* although there are no medical objections. Can you approve of such a point of view or do you think it is unacceptable?

22. *Say you* - Are you for or against children addressing their parents as '*you*' (instead of '*thou*')?

23. *Read anything* - Do you think a 18-year old boys and girls should be allowed to *read anything* they like or do you think that some books might be unfit?

24. *Tell girl home* - Do you think that the parents of , say a 20-year old *girl*, should *tell* her at what time she has to be back *home* at night, or do you think it better that they leave it to their daughter's discretion?

25. *Homosexuals firmly* - *Homosexuals* should be *firmly* dealt with

26. *Homosexuals eliminated* - *Homosexuals* should be *eliminated* from society

27. *Sexual intercourse* - I think that a girl can have full *sexual intercourse* with a boy even if she doesn't care for him.

28. *Abortion allowed* - Are there circumstances in which *abortion* should be *allowed*?

29. *Euthanasia* - Suppose a physician is able to put a patient out of his misery, at his own request, by giving him an injection. What do you think he should do?

30. *Homosexuals opposed* - Do you think that *homosexuals* should be left free as free as possible to live their own life, or do you feel that this should be *opposed* as much as possible?

Scale Authoritarianism (F7 - Middendorp): 1. *Weak and strong*, 2. *Familiarity*, 3. *Rebellious ideas*, 4. *Immoral people*, 5. *Devoted leaders*, 6. *Bad manners*, 7. *Prying*

Scale Authoritarianism (AUTH8 - Eisinga & Scheepers): 1. *Weak and strong*, 2. *Familiarity*, 3. *Rebellious ideas*, 4. *Immoral people*, 5. *Devoted leaders*, 6. *Bad manners*, 7. *Sex crimes* - *Sex crimes*, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped or worse, 8. *Talk less* - If people would *talk less* and work more, everybody would be better off.

Scale Authoritarianism (AUTH10 - Meloen & Farnen): 1. *Weak and strong*, 2. *Familiarity*, 3. *Rebellious ideas*, 4. *Immoral people*, 5. *Devoted leaders*, 6. *Bad manners*, 7. *Prying*, 8. *Sex crimes*, 9. *Talk less*, 10. *Force to save* - Our true and traditional way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use *force to save* it.

Scale Authoritarianism (F10): 1. *Bad manners*, 2. *Prying*, 3. *Devoted leaders*, 4. *Immoral people*, 5. *Rebellious ideas*, 6. *Familiarity*, 7. *Weak and strong*, 8. *Homosexuals firmly*, 9. *Obedience*, 10. *Death penalty*.

Scale Authoritarianism (F16): 1. *Death penalty*, 2. *Teenagers obey*, 3. *Obedience*, 4. *Show regard*, 5. *Woman children*, 6. *Woman over men*, 7. *Good schooling*, 8. *Boys more freely*, 9. *Bad Manners*, 10. *Devoted leaders*, 11. *Immoral people*, 12. *Rebellious ideas*, 13. *Familiarity*, 14. *Weak and strong*, 15. *Homosexuals firmly*, 16. *Homosexuals eliminated*.

Scale Authoritarianism (ALT18 - Altemeyer concept, Middendorp items)

1. *Authoritarian Conventionalism (CONV6)*: 1. *Women more capable*, 2. *Good schooling*, 3. *Bad manners*, 4. *Familiarity*, 5. *Not children*, 6. *Sexual intercourse*.

2. *Authoritarian Submission (SUBM6)*: 7. *Obedience*, 8. *Show regard*, 9. *Teenagers obey*, 10. *Devoted leaders*, 11. *Rebellious ideas*, 12. *Weak and strong*.

3. *Authoritarianism Aggression (AGR6)*: 13. *Death penalty*, 14. *Woman authority*, 15. *Boys more freely*, 16. *Immoral people*, 17. *Homosexuals firmly*, 18. *Homosexuals eliminated*.

Scale Right Wing Extremism (REX11): 1. *Death penalty*, 2. *Good schooling*, 3. *Boys more freely*, 4. *Bad manners*, 5. *Prying*, 6. *Devoted leaders*, 7. *Immoral people*, 8. *Familiarity*, 9. *Weak and strong*, 10. *Send aid*, 11. *Aid countries*.

Scale Anti Feminism (AFEM4): 1. *Women children*, 2. *Woman over men*, 3. *Good schooling*, 4. *Boys more freely*.

Scale Parental Attitudes toward Children (PARENTS 3): 1. *Teenagers obey*, 2. *Obedience*, 3. *Show regard*.

Scale Attitudes towards Children (CHILD 6): 1. *Woman household*, 2. *Work day-nursery*, 3. *Not children*, 4. *Say 'you'*, 5. *Read everything*, 6. *Tell girl home*

Scale Anti Homosexuality (AHOMO3): 1. *Homosexuals firmly*, 2. *Homosexuals eliminated*, 3. *Homosexuals opposed*.

Scale Anti Freedom Attitudes (UNFREE7)

1. *Demonstrate* - Should you be free to *demonstrate* for or against something?
2. *Criticize* - Should you be free to *criticize* openly members of the Royal Family?
3. *Strike* - Should you be free to *strike* for pay rises?
4. *Conscientious objector* - Should you be free to a *conscientious objector*?
5. *Occupy building* - Should you be free to *occupy buildings* (e.g. schools, universities) in order to enforce justified demands?
6. *Write whatever* - Should you be free to *write whatever* you like in public?
7. *Say whatever* - Should you be free to *say whatever* you like in public?

Scale Anti Democratic Attitudes (UNDEMO3)

1. *Student's say* - Do you think that the *student's say* in management of the university should increase or lessen?
2. *Say of pupils* - Do you think that the *say of pupils* in secondary schools and training colleges should increase or lessen?
3. *Citizens say* - Do you think that the *citizen's say* in government of towns and provinces should increase or lessen?

Scale Nationalism (NAT4)

1. *Better country* - Generally speaking, The Netherlands is a *better country* than most other countries.
2. *Instilling patriotism* - *Instilling patriotism* in pupils is an important educational task.
3. *Respect flag* - Every Dutchman should show the necessary *respect* towards out national symbols such as the *flag* and the national anthem.

4. *Dutch ways* - When striving for international cooperation, we should at the same time guard against the loss of the typically *Dutch ways* of life.

Scale Anomia (ANOMIA5)

1. *Many opinions* - There are so *many opinions* about what is right and what is wrong that you hardly know where you stand.
2. *Things change* - *Things change* so rapidly these days that often you hardly know what is right and what is wrong.
3. *Future uncertain* - The *future* is so *uncertain* that it is best to live from day to day.
4. *Need luck* - To be successful in society one *needs* a lot of *luck*.
5. *Who trust* - You hardly know *who* you can *trust* nowadays.