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THE CONTINUITY OF VIOLENCE IN THE STAGES OF
THE *SHI-SHI* MOVEMENT
OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN

YUICHI TAMURA
University of Kansas

Some scholars place violence as prominent in an early stage of a social movement, whereas others argue that violence is characteristic of a later stage. This paper addresses the question of whether there is a specific movement stage that is particularly characterized by violence through an analysis of the shi-shi movement (1858-1864). The shi-shi movement helped create the revolutionary situation which culminated in Japan's Meiji Restoration (1868). Violence was prominent and consequential in the shi-shi movement and was found throughout the career of the movement. This study of a single case is by no means sufficient to claim primacy over existing models of the place of violence in social movements. The shi-shi movement, however, significantly varies from theoretical models that link violent actions to a specific movement stage.

Social movements have careers. They go through stages as they emerge, develop, and decline. Scholars have characterized successive stages of social movements as indicated by the forms of action found in each stage. Violence is one of the indicators used to identify the action said to typify particular social-movement stages. In this paper, I examine the pattern of violence in stages of the *shi-shi* movement in 19th century Japan in comparison with two ways in which scholars have linked violence to phases of social movements.

Violence is one type of action often associated with social movements. Research on violent actions in social movements mainly addresses two issues. One line of exploration focuses on the causes of violent actions. For example, violence has been explained as an effect of relative deprivation (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962), resource allocations (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973, 1993) or political conditions (Snyder 1979; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1978; Tilly et. al. 1975). The other issue concerns the phase of a social movement in which violent

actions take place (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner and Killian 1987; Tarrow 1993, 1994; Feagin and Hahn 1973; McAdam 1983; Miller 1983; McAdam and Moore 1989).

This paper discusses little about the causes of violent actions in social movements and focuses on the second issue of whether there is a specific movement stage which is particularly characterized by violent actions. This issue is examined for the pattern of violent actions in the *shi-shi* movement of 19th-century Japan. The *shi-shi* movement is characterized by the persistence of violent actions that had significant effects on ongoing social and political struggles and the emergence of the revolutionary situation.[1] The main tasks of this paper are 1) to evaluate characterizations that relate violence to a particular social-movement stage and, more specifically, 2) to assess empirically the contrasting arguments about whether violence is a characteristic of an early or a later phase of the *shi-shi* movement. The main questions to be explored in this paper are: How do the arguments by the scholars relating violence with stages apply to the *shi-shi* movement, and what does the *shi-shi* movement suggest about the usefulness of identifying movement stages in terms of the presence or absence of violence?

Violence as a Characteristic of Social Movement Stages

There are two contrasting arguments on the characterization of social movement stages in terms of violent actions. Some writing from "collective behavior" perspectives view violent actions as prevalent in an early stage of a movement (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner and Killian 1987). Others emphasizing the "political process"[2] variant of the "resource mobilization" perspective argue that violent actions take place in a later period of a social movement (Tarrow 1993, 1994; McAdam 1983, 1986; Miller 1983; Evans 1983; Della Porta 1995). This paper will compare patterns of violence in the *shi-shi* movement in 19th-century Japan with these contrasting characterizations of social-movement stages in terms of violence.

Blumer's perspective on social movements raises important issues for empirical analysis. Blumer conceives of a social movement as "episodic in its career, with very scattered manifestations of activity..." (1939, p.257). He claims, "It is necessary to view social movements from

this temporal and developmental perspective..." (Blumer 1939, p.259). He analyzes a career of a social movement as the development of successive stages. "In their early stages, social movements are likely to be merely an aggregation of individual lines of action based on individual decisions ..." (Blumer 1939, p.258). A movement's "organization and its culture are developed in the course of its career..." (1939, p.259). Successive stages have "increasing organization" (Blumer 1939, p.259). Sporadic, uncoordinated actions characterize the early stage and organized, coordinated actions, a later stage.

Similarly, in their life-cycle models of social movements, Turner and Killian (1987) and Hopper (1950) emphasize a developmental nature of social movements which is characterized by the increasing organization of movement actions. In these models, social movement action proceeds from a dispersed stage to an organized stage. Violence is one type of action specifically thought to occur in the early stage of a social movement.[3] The main issues of this paper in relation to the argument of Blumer (1939) are, therefore: Does sporadic violence characterize an early stage of the *shi-shi* movement? Does violence decrease or disappear as a movement progresses, to be replaced by more organized and coordinated actions?

Others argue that violent actions occur later in the career of a social movement. Tarrow (1993, 1994) and Tilly (1993) examine repertoires of contention in the cycles of protest and argue that an early stage of a movement is characterized by the prevalence of "conventional" tactics (Tarrow 1993, p.289) that minimize the costs of protest. These scholars regard violent actions as prevalent in the later phase when social movements lose their mass support (Tarrow 1994, p.103; McAdam 1983, p.311; Feagin and Hahn 1973, p.43) and face countermovements (Della Porta 1995, p.162). The later-stage characterization is also supported by McAdam's "model of recruitment to high risk/high cost activism" which argues that movement actions start with the "low cost/low risk activity" and later move on to actions with higher risk (1986, p.68-71). This paper will examine empirically their arguments that 1) violence is a characteristic of a later movement stage, because 2) violence occurs

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[1] Thus, the *shi-shi* movement is historically significant, as well as exhibiting an interesting pattern of violent actions. The revolutionary situation it helped to create set the stage for the *Meiji* Restoration (1868), the social revolution which began Japan's rapid transition from feudalism to a modern system.

[2] "Political process" writers emphasize political opportunity structures as well as movement organizations and resources in understanding social movements.

[3] Some terms used to characterize actions in the early stage of a social movement, such as "sporadic", "random and erratic behavior", "agitation", "dispersed", "impulsive behavior" (Blumer 1939, pp.259, 260), "unorganized and unformulated" (Hopper 1950, p.271) can be interpreted in different ways. Violence is by no means the only type of sporadic action, but clearly is one of them (cf. Blumer 1978, p.17). Violent actions are not necessarily sporadic and unorganized. The researchers on collective violence (Tilly 1978; Snyder 1979; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Rule 1988) show organized and coordinated aspects of violence. This paper by no means denies a diversity in sporadic actions nor the coordination of some violent actions. Rather, the initial question is whether violence constitutes an empirically valid indicator of the stages of the *shi-shi* movement.

when social movements lose resources and opportunities for conventional political actions[4].

In the following section, I will trace violent actions in an early phase of the *shi-shi* movement. Then I will describe the concurrence of violent actions with organized, sustained political campaigns in a later phase. This empirical analysis of the *shi-shi* movement will show that sporadic violent actions were continuous throughout the movement's career. Moreover, close examination of the *shi-shi* movement indicates an increase in sporadic violence when political opportunities for the *shi-shi* expanded, rather than when other channels of social movement actions closed.

The *Shi-Shi* Movement

The abolition of the shogunate political system in 1867 and the sweeping reforms that followed, constituted the most dramatic political transformation in Japanese history. Called the *Meiji* Restoration, this social revolution was achieved through political actions taken by a variety of actors, including the *bakufu* (the national shogun government), nobles of the emperor's court, feudal domain bureaucrats, samurai, and foreign states.

One of the factors that contributed to the failure of the shogun governmental system was a series of actions attributed to *shi-shi* (literally, men of high purpose), young *samurai* who began with little political power. The *shi-shi* actions taken between 1858 and 1864, constitute the *shi-shi* movement. These actions included terrorism against foreigners and Japanese officials and campaigns for political influence in Kyoto, the capitol, as well as in several important feudal domains.[5] This movement significantly contributed to the creation of a revolutionary situation which soon culminated in revolutionary outcomes ensuing from the *Meiji* Restoration in 1868.

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[4] My discussion on this point does not imply any causal conclusions on the relationships between violent actions and loss of resources and opportunities, although their relationships are examined in empirical analyses of social movements by the scholars (McAdam 1982, 1983; Della Porta 1995; Miller 1983; Tarrow 1993, 1994). Rather, this paper simply raises the question of the scholars' characterization of the coincidence of violence and loss of resources and opportunities. In other words, this paper asks empirically whether violence in the shi-shi movement coincided with the changing political conditions in which the movement lost support from outside groups, and thus political opportunity structure had contracted.

[5] The feudal domains in the *Tokugawa* shogunate system are of three types: *Shinpan*, related by blood to the *Tokugawa* family; *fudai*, supporters of *Tokugawa* when they consolidated power in the battle of *Sekigahara* in 1600; and *tozama*, opponents in the battle of *Sekigahara*. *Tozama* domains were headed by subordinated, but rival families to the *Tokugawa* shogunate. *Choshu, Satsuma, and Tosa* were *tozama* domains active in significant ways in the political campaigns of the *shi-shi* movement

Early Shi-Shi Violence

The *shi-shi* movement began, as Blumer (1939, p.259) suggests movements do, as an aggregation of sporadic actions without central coordination and control. Most of the significant actions taken in the initial stage of the *shi-shi* movement were agitating acts of terrorism. On June 2, 1859, in accordance with a commercial treaty concluded in the previous year, the representatives from five countries (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and Holland) began residing in Japan for the purpose of international trade[6].

The first incident of terrorism occurred against foreigners on July 20, 1859, when an officer and a seaman, both from Russia, were attacked and cut to pieces. Russia planned retaliation, but settled for the *bakufu*'s official apology and its promise to arrest the assassins (Konishi 1966, p.243). In October, a Chinese man employed by the French consulate was attacked and killed (Konishi 1966, p.243). On January 7, 1860, a translator for the British legation was killed. The *bakufu* (the shogun government) paid compensation to Great Britain. Assassinations of two Dutch merchant captains in February and of an Italian working for the French consulate in June followed (Konishi 1966, p.244).

On December 5, 1860, Hendrix Heusken, a secretary and translator for the U.S. representative was assassinated by *shi-shi* from Satsuma domain (Hesselink 1994, pp.331-337). The *bakufu* paid $10,000 to Heusken's family (Konishi 1966, pp.244-245). Then, in May, 1861, fourteen *shi-shi* from Mito domain attacked the British legation in Edo. They aimed to kill all foreigners at the legation according to their subsequent confession, but they were arrested first (Konishi 1966, pp.245-246).

Except for the case of the attack on the British legation, no terrorists responsible for these incidents were arrested. Because of the anonymity of the assassins in most cases, it cannot definitely be asserted that all of these actions were actually taken by those who identified themselves as *shi-shi*. These events, however, were seen as types of action the *shi-shi* would take, because the anti-foreign character of these incidents

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[6] The *bakufu* (the shogun government) had enforced the seclusion policy since the early 17th century until a treaty with Commodore Matthew C. Perry of America in 1854. The controversy surrounding the opening of the country and the subsequent political process, including the "*Ansei* purge" against those who continued to resist the presence of foreigners, constituted the setting for the *shi-shi* movement. Detailed descriptions of this political process are provided by Beasley (1972), Craig (1961), Huber (1981), Jansen (1961), Konishi (1966), and Pyle (1978).

corresponded with the *shi-shi's* anti-foreign sentiments (Morikawa 1967, p.38; Konishi 1966, p.242; Shibahara 1975, pp.130-131).

In an analysis of violence, such as terrorism, the question of whether it was under the control of any particular groups or organizations must be considered. Edwards argues that disruptive actions are "always raised and organized for the purpose by a small group of leaders ... and carefully planned out beforehand" (Edwards 1970[1927], p.101). Some terrorist episodes were carried out by groups of *shi-shi*, and thus imply some coordination. Unlike Edwards' assertion, however, there is no indication that anti-foreign terrorism during these years was purposefully planned and coordinated by any particular group. Rather, as Blumer (1939) suggests, these anti-foreign actions in the early stage of the *shi-shi* movement appear to be an aggregation of sporadic, separately-mounted actions.

Violence against foreigners occurred frequently between 1859 and 1861. During this early stage, however, "the most dramatic act of terrorism was the assassination of [*bakufu* leader] Ii Naosuke, [a] symbol of the arbitrary attitude of the *bakufu* and of its concession to the foreigners" (Duus 1976, p.67). On March 3, 1860, eighteen *shi-shi* (one from Satsuma domain and the others from Mito domain) attacked Ii's procession at the Sakurada gate of Edo castle and killed him. Five of the *shi-shi* lost their lives in the fighting. The others surrendered themselves to the *bakufu* authority and submitted a prospectus explaining their action (Konishi 1966, pp.151-156).

The significance of the assassination of Ii Naosuke for the political process in Japan was enormous (Sakata and Hall 1956; Harootunian 1970; Duus 1976). First, it had an intimidating effect on the officials of the *bakufu* and resulted in moderation of the *bakufu* policy (Sakata and Hall 1956, p.43; Huber 1981, p.100). After Ii's assassination, the *bakufu* never again asserted firm control in the state decision-making process. Second, this event gave the *shi-shi* an example of a successful direct action that influenced national politics (Beasley 1972, 1990). As Tilly argues, prior success and failures may produce a "change in the repertoire of collective actions" (1978, p.158). Before Ii's assassination, no direct action against a *Bakufu* official with such superior status was recorded in the *Tokugawa* period (Hirao 1930; Morikawa 1967), whereas the *shi-shi* engaged in many direct actions against officials after Ii's assassination. As Harootunian notes, the assassination of Ii marked the beginning of "a new kind of play with the imperial capitol of Kyoto as its stage" (1970, p.247).

Blumer (1939) and some other scholars (for example, Hopper 1950; Turner and Killian 1987) characterize actions at the beginnings of social movements as *not* taken by an organization. During the early years of the movement, *shi-shi* took a number of very similar terrorist actions. The assassination of Ii and the violent attack of the British legation, at least, were carried out by groups of *shi-shi*, implying coordination and planning. There is, however, no indication of unified coordination or control of the *series* of actions or the movement in its early stage. As Blumer (1939) leads us to expect, the early stage of the *shi-shi* movement was an aggregation of sporadic actions.

The Later *Shi-Shi* Movement

After Ii's assassination, *shi-shi* attacks were less frequent for about two years. Only two attacks of foreigners are recorded. Then, an attempt in early 1862 to assassinate Ando Nobumasa, one of the most powerful *bakufu* officials after Ii, marked the beginning of the *shi-shi* movement's most active period, which lasted until 1864. This later stage followed Blumer's generalization that "as a social movement develops, its behavior which was originally dispersed tends to become organized, solidified and persistent" (1939, p.259). *Shi-shi* actions included organized, centrally-coordinated political campaigns in Kyoto and several feudal domains. Also, however, this phase of the *shi-shi* movement mixed sporadic episodes of political terrorism with sustained political campaigns. *Shi-shi* terrorism against Japanese political opponents continued.

Concurrence of political campaigns and sporadic violence raises the questions about characterizations which associate violence with movement stages. In the *shi-shi* movement, sporadic violent actions continued and increased in frequency during the later period of the movement. The process of organized campaigns during the *shi-shi* movement follows the arguments of Blumer (1939), Hopper (1950) and Turner and Killian (1987) that a movement proceeds from dispersed to organized and coordinated action. In the *shi-shi* movement, however, an increasing organization of movement actions did not entail a disappearance or even a decrease of sporadic actions.

Secondly, in the *shi-shi* movement, violent actions *increased* when the *shi-shi* gained the support of polity groups such as feudal domains and the imperial court, then stopped when it lost that support. This is the reverse of the argument by Tarrow (1994), McAdam (1983) and Miller (1983) that violence occurs in the later period of a movement when activists lose broad support. In the following section, I will describe the

concurrence of organized *shi-shi* political campaigns with sporadic, but consequential, violent actions.

Political Campaigns[7]

During the later stage of the *shi-shi* movement (1862-1864), those who identified themselves as *shi-shi* conducted influential political campaigns in Kyoto[8] and in some feudal domains, such as Choshu and Satsuma. After Ii's assassination, Ando Nobumasa attempted to placate opposition by adopting what was called the *kobugattai* policy, which signified a political coalition between the imperial court and the *bakufu* through a marriage between the shogun and a sister of the emperor. The term "*kobugattai*" embodied the ideal of cooperation of court nobility and *samurai*, presumably for the purposes of the whole society's well-being (Totman 1975, p.393). Initially, this policy was supported by a number of lords of great domains[9], including the *tozama* domains of Tosa, Satsuma, and Choshu (Sakata and Hall 1956, p.43). The *kobugattai* policy permitted feudal domains to enter national politics. At the forefront was Choshu. In 1861, the Nagai Uta, one of the Choshu top officials, proposed to the feudal lord of Choshu a strategy to participate in national politics.[10] The Choshu lord agreed to this proposal and submitted it to the court and the *bakufu*. The court and the *bakufu* accepted the Choshu proposal.

Meanwhile, Shimazu Hisamitsu, a leader of Satsuma, was planning the emergence of this important domain into national politics. On April 16, 1862, Shimazu arrived in Kyoto and began mediating between the court and the *bakufu*. He submitted to the court a proposal for *kobugattai* mediation, which was more favorable to the imperial court than that of Choshu. The court which had once supported the Choshu proposal, now turned it down and accepted the Satsuma proposal. Satsuma's ascendance in Kyoto was significant for the development of the *shi-shi*

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[7] Detailed descriptive studies of the *shi-shi* political campaigns are provided by Totman (1980), Craig (1959, 1961), and Beasley (1972).

[8] Kyoto was the capital of Japan. The *shi-shi* political campaigns in Kyoto were attempts to exert national influence through the growing importance of the imperial court which was located there.

[9] Konishi points out that the meaning of *kobugattai* was taken in various ways. The *bakufu* adopted this policy to restore its authority through the attachment to the emperor. For the emperor, the coalition with the *bakufu* was the first step to stabilize the nation and to fight against foreigners. For some feudal lords, this policy meant an opportunity to participate in national politics (Konishi 1966, p.216). Thus, the wide support for this policy was based on a constellation of perceived interests rather than consensus on the concept of the policy.

[10] Nagai's proposal "was ostensibly a compromise between the interests of the court and of the *bakufu*" (Huber 1981, p.102) and consisted of two steps. First, Japan should open the country temporarily and acquire industrial and military power through trade. Then it would return to its seclusion policy under the leadership of the emperor with the *bakufu* cooperation (Shibahara 1975, p.176).

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political campaigns, because it enabled *shi-shi* of Choshu to turn the policy of this domain toward the anti-*bakufu* ideology of *sonno-joi*[11] (Huber 1981, p.108; Craig 1961, p.174).

Before Choshu was superseded in national politics by Satsuma, the *shi-shi* in Choshu had condemned Nagai's *kobugattai* proposal as no better than the *bakufu* policy to open the country to foreigners. These *shi-shi* opposed even the temporary discarding of the seclusion policy (Shibahara 1975, p.178). Choshu's loss to Satsuma in the competition for influence in Kyoto was the opportunity which permitted a *shi-shi* political campaign to turn the government of Choshu toward a more radical challenge to the *bakufu*. On July 6, 1862, the Choshu government adopted *sonno-joi* as the official domain policy.

Once the *sonno-joi* position was adopted by the Choshu government, *shi-shi* from Choshu began to exert influence on the imperial court in the name of Choshu. *Shi-shi* contacted the court nobles who favored the *sonno-joi* position[12] and supported them. Also, *shi-shi* strengthened their influence on the decisions of the court by frequent use of violence against the *bakufu* officials and the court nobles who had the conflicting political plans[13].

Tilly argues that "contention of power consists of the application of resources to influence other groups, and power itself consists of a group's making its interests prevail over others with which they are in conflict. Contention for political power involves applying resources to a particular kind of organization: a government" (Tilly 1978, p.125). The course of the *shi-shi* political campaign in Kyoto can be seen as a series of resource acquisitions and applications. First, the *shi-shi* utilized their personal relationships with Choshu officials to turn the domain policy toward *sonno-joi*. Then, the domain support for *sonno-joi* was utilized as a resource to exert influence on the imperial court.

This political campaign proved effective. The imperial court which had earlier dismissed Choshu's mediation in favor of that of Satsuma now dropped Satsuma and aligned with Choshu. On August 27, 1862, an imperial decree for the expulsion of foreigners was issued. On October

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[11] *Sonno-joi* literally means "revere the emperor and expel the barbarians." As a political idea, it was the antithesis of *kobugattai* position. Although both aimed at national reconstruction and expulsion of foreigners, they differed over whether temporary entry of foreigners into Japan was an acceptable method to achieve the goal.

[12] In this paper, the term "*sonno-joi* court nobles" means the court nobles who favored the *sonno-joi* position and cooperated the *shi-shi* campaign.

[13] I will call these court nobles "*kobugattai* court nobles", since they supported the *kobugattai* policy. The later-stage pattern of *shi-shi* violence is discussed in the next section of this paper.

27, an imperial mission handed the imperial decree of *joi* to the *bakufu*. On December 5, the *bakufu* accepted the *joi* order. In the meantime, the *sonno-joi* court nobles in Kyoto and *shi-shi samurai* petitioned the court for the creation of imperial troops, with the excuse of protecting the court from the barbarians (Shibahara 1975, p.193). In the early months of 1863, the *shi-shi* of Choshu tightened their hold over the imperial court by influencing the emperor through *sonno-joi* court nobles to create new positions in the court and to appoint court nobles favorable to the *sonno-joi* cause.

At the same time, *shi-shi* had been demanding in the name of the imperial court that the *bakufu* set a definite date to carry out the *joi* order. On April 20, the *bakufu* reluctantly informed the court that the expulsion of the barbarians would begin on May 10, 1863 (Huber 1981, p.119). These events suggest that in 1862 and 1863, for the first time in Tokugawa period (1603-1867), national politics in Kyoto were no longer controlled by the *bakufu*. Shibahara claims that the political situation was as if there were "two national governments within one nation" (1975, p.202). The imperial court during these years was a resource gained and used by *shi-shi* to legitimize their actions and to compete with the *bakufu* policy.

The *shi-shi* activists directed sustained political campaigns at several levels of the existing polity, most significantly toward the governments of several feudal domains, the imperial court, and the *bakufu* itself. However, the concrete process of the *shi-shi* movement shows concurrent sporadic violent actions were also a significant part of the movement in 1862 and 1863. In the following section I will document violent actions in this later phase of the *shi-shi* movement.

Later Shi-Shi Violence

Ando Nobumasa's *kobugattai* policy, begun in 1861, was initially well accepted by the imperial court and even the lords of *tozama* domains with little loyalty to the *bakufu*. *Shi-shi* activists opposed it, however. While most powerful opponents of the *bakufu* still supported the *kobugattai* policy, *shi-shi* criticized it, characterizing the marriage between the shogun and the emperor' sister as sending her as a hostage to the *bakufu* (Shibahara 1975, p.140). On January 15, 1862, four *shi-shi* from Mito attacked Ando, who managed to escape with his life but lost his political power[14]. The *shi-shi* political campaigns (described above) followed.

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[14] The Japanese feudal system was led by individuals of the samurai (warrior) class. The leader of the *bakufu* was supposed to be the leader of warriors, whose code of behavior (at least ideally) was chivalrous. Thus, escaping from the attack by the lower class samurai was disgraceful enough to deprive Ando of his power in the system.

A series of "*tenchu*" (heaven's revenge) assassinations coincided with the *shi-shi* political campaigns. According to Huber, "*tenchu* was unmistakably political in its timing, its objectives, its publicity activities and its effects. One of the peculiarities ... lay in its uncanny timing.... The abrupt oscillations in the assassination rate can easily be explained by reference to concurrent political events" (1982, pp.109-110). During 1861 and the first half of 1862, only four incidents of political terrorism had been recorded. Then, in the second half of 1862 and 1863, forty-six terroristic incidents were recorded (Hirao 1930). Similar to the violent actions during the early phase of the movement, there is no evidence that these assassinations were under the coordination and control of any particular social movement organization. Also, there is no indication that individual incidents of violence in the later phase were more organized or centrally coordinated than the incidents in the early phase of the movement.

The first *tenchu* assassination was of Shimada Sakon on July 20, 1862 (Konishi 1966, p.257; Shibahara 1975, p.186; Huber 1982, p.112). Shimada, a retainer of a court noble, had spied on opponents of the international treaty which permitted foreigners to enter Japan to trade. Shimada revealed opponents' identities to the *bakufu* who killed many of them during the *Ansei* purge. Tanaka Shinbei, a *shi-shi* from Satsuma, killed Shimada, whose head was publicly displayed. A script was left with his head, saying "he is a great traitor unfit for heaven or earth" (Huber 1982, p.113). In August, 1862, Okada Izo, a *shi-shi* from Tosa, killed and publicly displayed the head of a *bakufu* officer who also had played a role in the *Ansei* purge.

"The largest single stroke of *tenchu* assassination" (Huber 1982, p.112) occurred on September 23, 1862. Four *bakufu* officials in Kyoto, on their way to Edo, were killed by a group of *shi-shi*, which included Tanaka (from Satsuma), Okada (from Tosa), and Kusaka (from Choshu). The assassinated officials were sergeants of police under the *bakufu*'s city commissioner in Kyoto, and had been very active during the *Ansei* purge (Shibahara 1975, p.188; Huber 1982, p.112). In early 1863, violent actions continued against court nobles and *bakufu* officials (Morikawa 1967; Hirao 1930).

Edwards argues that "terrorism is under the control of small number of individuals" ([1927] 1970, p.103). There is not sufficient evidence, however, to support an argument that the series of *tenchu* assassinations in the shi-shi movement can be explained by the coordination of a small number of particular individuals. Oliver notes that "social movements are ... made up of lots of small collective units, each [possibly] acting

autonomously in accord with their own internal logic" (Oliver 1989, p.4). Actions and events within a movement influence each other, but they are "outside the control or direction of any person or organization" (Oliver 1989, p.4). Seeing the *shi-shi* movement in 1862-63 as interdependent actions without centralized control seems consistent with Huber's (1981) careful conclusion that "the sympathetic nobles in the court provided the *shi-shi* movement with imperial support for radical activism. The court, Choshu, and *tenchu* assassinations worked in concert" (Huber 1981, p.118). The imperial court's acceptance of Choshu's *sonno-joi* proposal and the personal relationships between the *shi-shi* activists and the officials in Choshu affected the occurrence and timing of *shi-shi* direct action. This does not mean that *shi-shi* violence was centrally controlled or coordinated.

The vital political role of mediation between the court and the *bakufu* was given to Choshu in the summer of 1862. It was precisely during this ascendancy of *shi-shi*-led Choshu in national politics that political assassinations -- carried out by *shi-shi* who supported the same sonno-joi objectives advocated by Choshu -- occurred most frequently in Kyoto. Huber concludes that the *shi-shi* who engaged in the assassinations were almost certainly responding to the significantly *improved* political environment that the Choshu mediation represented (Huber 1982, p.110). Huber's argument of reciprocity between Choshu's political ascendance and the *tenchu* assassinations is also supported by the fact that assassinations ceased as soon as Choshu *sonno-joi* faction was expelled from Kyoto in the summer of 1863. These significant patterns of violence in the *shi-shi* movement seem to directly contradict certain interpretations of "later stage" violence.

Discussion

This paper has traced the process of the *shi-shi* movement, and raised the issue of the characterization of social movement stages in terms of violence. The literature shows contrasting viewpoints on violence and movement stages. Some scholars (Blumer 1939; Hopper 1950; Turner and Killian 1987) characterize violence as a sporadic type of action found in an early movement stage. Others (Tarrow 1993; McAdam 1983; Miller 1983; Feagin and Hahn 1973) say that violence is characteristic in a later movement stage which occurs after the loss of outside support and resources.

The examination of the *shi-shi* movement reveals several contrasts with these arguments. First, the characterization of movement stages in terms of the presence or the absence of violent actions does not capture the empirical patterns in the *shi-shi* movement. As this paper has shown,

violent actions continuously occurred in the *shi-shi* movement. As Blumer (1939) argues, the *shi-shi* movement shows the prevalence of sporadic violent actions in an early movement stage. Also, as Blumer leads us to expect, organized political campaigns developed in the later stage of the movement. Unlike Blumer's model, however, uncoordinated sporadic violent actions continued to occur during the later phase of the *shi-shi* movement. They were interdependent with, but apparently not coordinated by the organized political campaigns. Also, unlike Tarrow (1994), McAdam (1983) and Miller (1983) suggest, violent actions are not confined to a later period of the social movement.

Second, unlike the argument that violent actions occur when political opportunities for movements contract, violent actions occurred continuously (and increased) in the *shi-shi* movement when political opportunity had expanded in favor of the *shi-shi* causes. The coincidence of *tenchu* assassinations and the success of *shi-shi* political campaigns shows that violent actions may increase even when political opportunities allow more conventional actions. In this case, at least, violence is not an effect of narrowing support or the loss of resources.

These empirical differences of the *shi-shi* movement from the theoretical models of violence and movement stages direct students of social movements to several issues. First, the description of the *shi-shi* movement suggests a different basis for stage distinctions. The *shi-shi* movement can be divided into stages, not in terms of types of actions, but in terms of expansions of its repertoire of actions. Blumer's notion of a movement's stage is based on types of action, "sporadic, dispersed" actions in the early phase and "organized, solidified and persistent" actions in the later period (1939, p.259). The *shi-shi* movement shows that the early sporadic violent actions were supplemented by rather than replaced by organized, coordinated action in a later stage. The repertoire of actions actually *used* in the movement diversified as it developed[15]. Thus, instead of characterizing each phase of the *shi-shi* movement in terms of *a* type of prevalent action, it is more correct to say that the transition to a later stage occurred when the repertoire of actions actually used by movement participants expanded.

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[15] Tarrow (1989, pp.49-56, 1993, pp.284-287) discusses the cycle of protest and the expansion of the repertoire of contention. Tarrow argues that "new forms of collective action develop within the experimental context of cycles of protest. The most successful becomes part of the future repertoire of collective action" (1993, p.286). My argument of repertoire of actions as the basis of stage differs from Tarrow's discussion in the sense that Tarrow views the repertoire as "not only what people do, [but] what they know how to do" (1993, p.283). Movement stages are distinguished in terms of actions taken, not actions that could be taken.

Second, during the *shi-shi* movement, violent actions coincided with organized political campaigns. That is, violent actions occurred most frequently when the structure of political opportunity was most favorable for movement participants to use non-violent actions. This contrasts with the concrete patterns of violence attributed to the American civil rights movement and student movements in the United States. In these movements (as Tarrow, 1994, observes), violent actions occurred when the movements lost outside support and the political opportunities became unfavorable. Further analysis of the social mechanisms relating political opportunity with movement violence is necessary.

Third, the usefulness of the notion of a generalized social movement career needs to be reassessed. A characterization of the phases of *any* social movement can provide a model to compare and contrast with other cases. The stages characterized from the analysis of the *shi-shi* movement, however, are not claimed to be a generalizable model of social-movement careers. Rather, it is a "hypothesis forming model" (Kalberg 1994) which may be used to focus empirical examinations of other cases.

This paper has discussed contrasting characterizations of the place of violence in stages of social movements, as it examined the *shi-shi* movement in 19th century Japan. It is a single case study. It by no means constitutes a fully-developed criticism of the characterizations of movement stages in terms of violence. The results of this empirical study of the *shi-shi* movement, however, vary from Blumer's or Tarrow's tendencies to see violence as characteristic of a particular stage of social movements. At least, this analysis of the *shi-shi* movement, points out a significant variation from models that characterize movement stages in terms of violent actions.

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GEORGE LUNDSKOW
University of Kansas

Increasingly, scholars are looking at right-wing extremist and fascist movements today in the post cold war era. Instead of broader freedom, opportunity, and peace, the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought uncertainty, fear, and aggression. Some of the new movements chillingly recall Nazism and fascism from mid-century, while other incorporate new beliefs and agendas. A full understanding requires an historical perspective, to understand the development of the beliefs and changes over time as social conditions change, and also a look at what type of person joins an extremist movement, and why. All three books rely primarily on historical narrative. Although the timeframe varies, all seek to reconstruct the past as a means to understand the present. All three more or less succeed with this effort, but all three similarly lack a theory to explain possible causal relationships. Basically, they narrate historical events in their proper context, but they mostly do not discuss the findings beyond their immediate meaning. All three tend to take what people or groups say about themselves at face value, and do not critically analyze it further. Lamy and Laquer in particular discuss the wide array of right-wing extremist groups today, an array sufficiently diverse that the