

- Melbin, Murray  
1978 "Night as Frontier." *American Sociological Review* 43:3-22.
- Moore, Wilbert E.  
1963 *Man, Time, and Society*. New York: Wiley.
- Mott, Paul  
1965 *Shift Work: Social, Psychological, and Physical Consequences*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Parsons, Talcott  
1951 *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Robinson, John P.  
1985 "The Validity and Reliability of Diaries Versus Alternative Time Use Measures." In F. T. Juster and F. P. Stafford (eds.), *Time, Goods, and Well-Being*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Schwartz, Barry  
1970 "Notes on the Sociology of Sleep." *Sociological Quarterly* 11:485-499.
- SPSS Inc.  
1986 *SPSSX User's Guide*. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Stoneall, Linda  
1983 *Country Life, City Life*. New York: Praeger.
- Turner, Jonathon H.  
1986 *The Structure of Sociological Theory*. Chicago: Dorsey Press.
- Zentner, Henry  
1966 "The Social Time-Space Relationship: A Theoretical Formulation." *Sociological Inquiry* 36:61-79.
- Zerubavel, Eviatar  
1979 "Private Time and Public Time: The Temporal Structure of Social Accessibility and Professional Commitments." *Social Forces* 58:38-58.

APPENDIX: CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES ANALYZED

	AGE	EDUC	INCOME	HEALTH	ORGACT	RELACT	LIFSAT1	LIFSAT2	LIFSAT3	LIFSAT4
AGE										
EDUC	-.1538**									
INCOME	.1149	.3538**								
HEALTH	-.0581	.2511**	.1755**							
ORGACT	.1368**	.1033	.1039	.1341**						
RELACT	.0661	.0560	-.0100	.0428	-.0134					
LIFSAT1	-.0556	.1146	-.1413**	.2087**	.0187	.1878**				
LIFSAT2	.0642	.0852	.2733**	-.0085	.0336	.1088	.2400**			
LIFSAT3	.0634	-.0062	.1639**	.0923	.0741	.1905**	.3573**	.4536**		
LIFSAT4	-.0077	.0854	.2036**	.0366	.0393	.0800	.3325**	.4915**	.4295**	
LIFSAT5	.0717	.0708	.1926**	.0094	.0486	.0672	.2098**	.3464**	.2840**	.4542**

\*\*Significant at the .01 level.

AGE: Age in years.

EDUC: Years of education.

INCOME: Income from wages in 1975.

HEALTH: Perceived health compared to others of same age.

ORGACT: Active participation in organizations or groups outside of work.

RELACT: Religious activity compared to others in congregation.

LIFSAT1: Satisfaction with life as a whole.

LIFSAT2: Satisfaction with income.

LIFSAT3: Satisfaction with standard of living.

LIFSAT4: Satisfaction with success and achievement.

LIFSAT5: Satisfaction with job.

OBSTACLES TO COLLECTIVIZATION  
AMONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES:  
TWO VENEZUELAN CASES

Lourdes Gouveia  
University of Kansas

Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1988, Vol. XIII, No. 1:41-58

*State-sponsored programs of collectivization continue to generate a great deal of theory and policy debates. When Indian communities are involved in such national programs, the debate acquires newer and even more complex dimensions which have not yet been adequately addressed. In this paper, I examine a program of collective Empresas Indigenas organized in Venezuela in the early 1970s, with particular focus on two of those empresas. I argue that pre-existing forms of economic and social organization (whether traditional or inherited) are not necessarily contradictory with more complex forms of cooperation in production. In fact, these pre-existing arrangements often represent an important foundation for the transition to higher forms of collectivization. However this is not an automatic process and much depends on the particular approach that is used to effect the transition, as well as on contingent, external forces which impinge upon the development of these cooperatives.*

INTRODUCTION

For those of us who value principles of collective organization and participatory democracy in economic production, the news concerning the success rates of production cooperatives and collectivization programs around the world is mostly bad. Galleski (1973), Fagen, Deere, and Coraggio (1986), and others tell us that peasants historically have resisted collectivization. For Latin America, Stavenhagen (1975), de Janvry (1981), Fals Borda (1977), and Zamosc (1986) present us with pictures of collapses and parcelization of cooperatives, and eventually total disillusionment with collectivization programs. Yet, neither governments, independent organizers, nor social scientists appear ready to abandon the ideal of production cooperatives as a means to address both the agrarian and peasant questions.<sup>1</sup> This is partly due to the fact that, despite general consensus on the forces which shape the successes and failures of cooperatives, many questions remain about obstacles to democratic forms of production within a capitalist environment, and about how the different compositions of peasant groups affect their socio-economic situation.

Both policy makers (concerned with intractable rural poverty and recurring food crises) and progressive intellectuals lured by components of equality and self-determination continue to consider collectivization as a viable option for individual communities and entire societies in Latin America. However, the disturbing co-existence of big failures with small successes, and of unquestionable

"improvements" with failed "transformations" (Long, 1980) puzzles even the ardent supporters of collectivization. Some wonder whether supporting state-initiated cooperatives and full collectivization is politically correct, while others, such as de Janvry (1981), believe state-supported rural development programs in general, may simply prolong the misery of the peasantry.

The questions surrounding collectivization, and rural development programs in general, become even more complex when they are raised in conjunction with Indian communities.<sup>2</sup> The historical and structural particularities of Indian communities dictate that we carefully assess the validity of widely accepted explanations about the forces which shape rural development programs, and which affect their long-term consequences. To date, very few studies which base their analysis on field data have done this.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, I help to address this research void by examining an unprecedented Indian development program which emerged in Venezuela in the early 1970s, and which had as a major objective the establishment of collective production enterprises or *empresas Indigenas*.<sup>4</sup> I argue that within a certain category of Indian communities, one finds unique socio-economic and cultural features which facilitate (rather than obstruct) the organization of more encompassing cooperative arrangements. However, this is not an automatic process, and the benefits of new cooperative arrangements are not uniformly positive across communities. The effects depend on the particular approach that is used to create collectives, and on a composite of structural and contingent (external and internal forces) which impinge upon them.<sup>5</sup>

I focus specifically on two *empresas*: the *empresa* of Kumani organized among the Pume or Yaruro in the state of Apure and the *empresa* of Saimadoyi organized among the Bari in the state of Zulia. The data for this paper was collected during six months of field work in these two *empresa* communities, and from government archives.<sup>6</sup>

In the following section I briefly review the most widely accepted theses on rural development projects and the establishment of production cooperatives in Latin America. This will help situate the local debate that took place in Venezuela as a result of the Indian collectivization program. The main purpose is to demonstrate that while the broader critique of rural development projects and collectivization in Latin America has been generally accurate, a mechanistic application of such analysis to the case of Venezuelan production collectives results in serious inaccuracies. Much of what are assumed as foregone conclusions of state-supported *empresas Indigenas* must instead be empirically investigated. The main section of this paper contains such an investigation.

#### COLLECTIVIZATION: MOTIVES, FORCES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Students of rural development remain skeptical about the motives behind government-initiated collectivization programs in Latin America, because the organization of collectives is inevitably tied to the national political and economic goals of capitalist states. State intervention often leads to a neglect of the more peasant-oriented goals of egalitarian and democratic forms of participation in production. For example, Bartra (1976) demonstrates that reorganization of Mexican peasants into collective *ejidos* was intended to avert a serious economic

and political crisis likely to result from the advanced decomposition and proletarianization of the peasantry.

Zamosc (1986), writing about Colombia, contends that institutionally supported efforts to mobilize the peasantry, and the organization of *empresas campesinas* (peasant cooperative enterprises) during the late 1960's, were part of a larger economic and social strategy to resolve a severe crisis of poverty, unemployment, and capital accumulation.

Fals Borda, (1977:15-my translation) in summarizing the classical works on the subject, concludes that in "Latin America, the cooperative movements have generally been stimulated by political motives: they are like a medium to pacify a rising people...they have taken place primarily during economic and political crisis or in the middle of threats of a rural uprising; or when fears about the 'threat of communism' have emerged and the impact of the Cuban revolution is being measured."

Although somewhat less critical of government goals, those who have studied Peruvian collectivization during the early seventies write of the ultimate subordination of peasant empowerment, self-determination, and equal distribution of rural resources, to issues of productivity and efficiency -- both political and economic (Huizer, 1984; Kay, 1983; Long, 1978).

Critics of the Venezuelan *empresas Indigenas* have also tied the birth of this program to broad economic and political goals of the state. Generally, they view the program as a concerted attempt by a variety of state agents to transform the Indian population into either a full- or a semi-proletarianized peasantry<sup>7</sup> contributing their cheap food and labor to the capitalist market. The program has also been seen as a mechanism of political control allegedly thwarting a spontaneous Indian movement, and which, through clientelist politics, created an Indian leadership tied to the *empresa's* administrative bodies and state supported Indian Federations.<sup>8</sup>

However, the rather insignificant place that frontier Indian communities occupied in the overall pattern of Venezuela's economic development raises serious doubts about such sweeping criticism. Perhaps critics are guilty of simplistically applying broad theoretical concepts and popular explanations about rural development in Latin America among the non-Indian peasantry to the special situation of the Indian communities. The issue of subordination of more democratic goals to those of economic productivity set by national plans must then be carefully investigated rather than assumed.

*Empresa* critiques have also argued that decision to implement a "design" of collective economic organization chosen by the promoters of these *empresas* was also connected to the "state's" need to control Peasant/Indian production, and that such a design was highly contradictory with the internal socio-economic organization of traditional Indian communities.

I believe the literature on cooperatives points to a more fruitful approach which considers the success of group farming to be determined by a combination of broad political and economic factors which are external to the individual production units, and by factors internal to particular communities and their collectives (Gallesky, 1987; Reed, 1975; Fals Borda, 1977; Carter and Kanel, 1985). Such an approach suggests that the successes or failures of these economic organizations are not inevitably connected to a contradiction between all pre-existing Indian socio-economic forms of organization and the establishment

of more extensive forms of cooperation. In fact, and as I contended earlier, it is possible in some cases to argue the exact opposite: pre-existing forms of cooperation will facilitate the establishment of more complex cooperatives. Similarly, the "relative autonomy" of some of these communities and control over the most important aspects of their socio-economic reproduction, can facilitate the retention and even fortification of democratic and emancipatory goals.

Space does not allow me to address both the broad political and economic factors and the factors related to the internal organization of Indian communities. The investigation of the first set of factors is part of a larger project (Gouveia, 1988). Here, I will summarize my conclusions in the larger research project about "external" factors, introduce the background discussion on "internal" factors, then examine the connection between pre-existing internal organization and the *empresas'* particular trajectories in the two cases of the Pume and the Bari.

#### *External Factors in Collectivization*

Among the broader "external factors" affecting collectivization projects, scholars have invariably focused on the issue of state commitment. Such commitment is evaluated in terms of adequate funding, technical assistance, and favorable marketing strategies. But beyond these narrower goals, those interested in collectivization as a means to rural transformation look toward policies which provide mechanisms for the implementation of broader goals of self-management and autonomous development.

My larger research project has confirmed that, contrary to *empresa* critics the Venezuelan government was not committed to a major policy of incorporation of Indians to the national economy through the organization of *empresas Indigenas*. From the beginning, the program was plagued by budgetary problems and inadequate resources to provide the *empresas* with much needed technical assistance and adequate marketing mechanisms. In brief, rather than being vehicles for pursuing dominant aims of Indian policy, the *empresas* were, at least for some important elements in the state, a potential threat to such aims. The fact that these semi-autonomous communities were not as easily controllable as the less autonomous non-Indian clientele meant that the Indian *empresas* and the accompanying Indian federations could become (at least in some cases) mechanisms for entrenching the territorial roots of Indian communities. This entrenchment effect was an important factor behind the drastic moves made by two administrations to constrain the program's personnel scope, and direction after the personnel had moved to significantly strengthen the program.

But external factors were not the only forces related to the problems and few successes experienced by individual *empresas*. Critics are certainly correct when they point to the poor fit that existed between *empresa* "design" and at least some of the communities where they were established. However, such a claim must be empirically established. Furthermore, the internal socio-economic composition of Indian communities and levels of political organization can introduce important variations in the final outcomes of policy processes at the local level. In the next section, aided by the theoretical and empirical literature on cooperatives, I select key factors affecting the connection between internal socio-economic organization and the organization of complex cooperatives. Then, I illustrate those factors in my case studies.

#### *Internal Organization of Indian/Peasant Communities and the Introduction of Newer Forms of Cooperative Organizations*

At the "micro" level of individual socio-economic units, factors which have been considered to affect the organization and functioning of production cooperatives include the pre-existing organization of production, type of land tenure, available skills and resources, political organization and mobilization capacity, supporting cultural and ideological practices, and the specific form (design) assumed by the new economic organizations and its effective adaptation to pre-existing community structures and social processes.

Within these categories, the issue that acquires special significance in the context of Indian cooperatives is whether pre-existing communal forms of production and socio-cultural practices facilitate or impede the transition to more complex forms of socialized farming (Gros, 1987; see also Painter, 1986). The debate goes back to Lenin and the populists who argued that the alleged "backwardness" and conservatism of Russian communes was an obstacle to modern socialized production. Contemporary students of collectivization generally agree that pre-existing forms of cooperation, collective ideologies, and communal ownership of means of production such as land, play a role in the transition to higher forms of collectivization. But few studies have explored these connections.

Most often, these connections are discussed in reference to the category of peasants resulting from the fragmentation of precapitalist communities, whose current forms of cooperation are viewed as isolated relics mixed with more "capitalistic" elements. However, the debate over the effects of pre-existing communal forms and practices acquires new meanings when applied to at least some of the Indian communities targeted under the *empresa* program. These communities are arguably closer to the category of (pre-capitalist or re-constituted) cohesive villages, and are characterized by a wider and more integrated array of collective socio-economic and cultural practices. Even in those cases where drastic transformations have occurred within recent years, Indian communities constitute an excellent laboratory to explore the roles of pre-existing communal forms in the transition to complex collectivization. In other words, the examination of these special cases could bear fruits for those concerned with the larger issue of linking spontaneous with introduced forms of cooperation.

Some of the thorniest questions come to the fore when dealing with the specific case of contemporary Latin American Indian communities' forms and levels of communal practices. At issue is what "communal" patterns are truly present within these communities, and which forms and levels of spontaneous cooperation are most significant for new cooperative arrangements. Land tenure and the socialization of work are two key, and highly interconnected, elements often considered in the determination of forms and levels of collectivism.<sup>9</sup> Most discussions revolve around the latter and specifically around the issue of whether work is exclusively kin-based and confined to the household, or whether community-wide mechanisms of production exist which are presumably more compatible with the cooperatives' structures (*empresas Indigenas* in this case).

In the recent Venezuelan debate between proponents and critics of the *empresa* program, the central issue has been whether or not failures were due to a "design" which incorrectly assumed that Indian production was communally

organized, or whether there was a problem of implementation -- meaning basically a lack of state support.

Proponents of these collectives have spoken in very general terms about "communal property and exploitation of the land" being part of the "Indigenous cultural world" (Clarac and Valdez, 1976) and of how the existence of "mutual help" and reciprocity networks supported collectivization (Heinen, 1981).

On the other hand, Morales and Jimenez (1981), two of the staunchest critics of the *empresa* program, concluded that the extended family is the basic unit of production and consumption for three different groups of Carib families<sup>10</sup>, even though land is communally held. Therefore, the organization of production worked against collectivization.

A few points are in order concerning the Venezuelan debate. First, proponents of the *empresa* program were too vague about their conceptualization of traditional communal arrangements. Much of this vagueness was due to the already mentioned dearth of studies, a fact recognized by both sides. Unfortunately, in practice, *empresa* promoters often assumed the homogeneous presence of communal patterns in Indian communities. On the other hand, Morales and Arvelo (1981), failed to appreciate the significance of community-wide patterns of cooperation in such activities as the clearing of fields. They also underestimate the importance of communal ownership of critical means of production, such as land, which, especially in the case of Indian communities, encourages strategies for maintaining territorial integrity. As Roseberry (1986)<sup>11</sup> points out, the fact that the household was the main unit of production in traditional peasant societies does not mean that it was always identical with a residential unit, nor that there were no other community-wide relations of production also crucial for the socio-economic and cultural reproduction of these communities.

Significantly, both sides fail to take into account the variegated forms of socio-economic organizations in contemporary Indian communities resulting from the uneven penetration of capital and state agents into their areas. Such penetration may have in fact reduced production to the minimal level of the family, and, concomitantly, undermined traditional leadership structures (often identified with the authority of the elders). In others cases, however, it might have generated new forms of cooperation and communal practices. Uneven penetration appears to have had these divergent effects in the two cases considered here.

An additional concern is whether the transition from simple to complex forms of cooperation is attempted in an abrupt, totally top-down, and radical manner (i.e. jumping from very minimal forms of mutual assistance to full collectivization). Top-down, abrupt collectivization programs (starting with the Russian Kolkhoz) handled only ineffectively the tension between family and collective production. But this problem can be solved, as in Hungary, Santo Domingo, and others. There is no necessary "ideological" opposition on the part of the peasantry (although there may be on the part of the analysts of the peasantry) to balance more traditional forms of kin-based economic strategies with new forms of joint work. Successful, and willing, collectivization among different categories of rural toilers is related to the degree of control they are allowed to exercise over the transitional process, and their own evaluation of the benefits which will accrue from such a transition (Petras and Haven, 1981; Williams, 1982).

The above discussion indicates that both sides in the Venezuelan debate on

*empresas indigenas* are inadequate because they stress one or another cause of the *empresas'* problems. The thesis maintained here is that problems arise due to a combination of both, unequal support from the state throughout the *implementation* of these projects, and the poor adaptation of the collective's *design* to the real conditions of each Indian community.

In the next section I focus on the program of the *empresas indigenas*, and two *empresas* in particular.

### THE PUME AND BARI EMPRESA COMMUNITIES

Despite the problems confronted by the Venezuelan Indian program, and general lack of support for the *empresas Indigenas* by powerful state agents, a few *empresas* have managed to survive and a few others have been organized anew, yielding very mixed and heterogeneous results. The *empresa* of Kumani of the Apure plains was organized during the period of lowest state commitment (1977-1979). The Bari *empresa* of Saimadoyi was organized later, in 1982, after the temporary return of the *Indigenistas* (pro-Indian intellectuals) to National Agrarian Institute (IAN) offices. It is these surviving *empresas* that permit evaluation of the role played by local factors in the determination of heterogeneous results.

I will concentrate on the combination of two factors: the internal organization of the communities, with special emphasis on the presence of communal elements; and, the two *empresas'* final organizational structure, as well as available skills and resources.

#### *Organization of Production: Communalism and Relative Autonomy*

The Bari and the Pume are tropical horticulturalists occupying rather different ecological systems. The Bari are located in the remote Sierra de Perija on the frontier with Colombia. The Pume live in the open savannas of the Apure state.

Both groups' "ethnographic pasts" reveal an important presence of communal elements, though perhaps more evident among the Bari than among the Pume. Originally the Indians inhabited longhouses, or *bohios*. The *bohios* housed up to 50 people in the case of the Bari, and even more for the Pume. Each *bohio* was organized into different hearth groups consisting of individuals or small groups of families, with or without close kinship ties. A communal garden, informally divided into parcels for each hearth group, encircled the *bohios*. However, many garden tasks, such as clearing and burning, were performed collectively by the *bohio* (and according to a culturally prescribed gender division of labor). Fishing and hunting expeditions were often organized by different combinations of community members. This was particularly true for the Bari, where fishing was truly communal because it required the labor-intensive task of damming the river.

There were other differences in the traditional organization of these two groups. For the Bari, major activities, including building the *bohio*, were supervised by a respected chief (whose name was subsequently given to the *bohio*). A second chief assisted the first in all of his functions and took his place during his absences. Authority was much more diffused for the Pume, partly because they moved more often. They moved with every change of season, from wet to dry, and were fragmented into small family units with no logical need for more formal

authority. Production during the dry season was literally reduced to the household level, usually consisting of only a nuclear or extended family. Since colonial times, the *capitan* has replaced the Pume chief, but his authority continues to be quite limited. He acts primarily as a go-between for the community and the regional and national authorities.

The Bari experienced successive cycles of severe confrontations with Hispanic and *Criollo* elements, always resulting in a major reduction of their territory. Yet, they were notorious warriors and escaped the *conquistadores'* *encomiendas*, the missionaries' *pueblos de Indios* (missionary outposts called Indian towns), and Shell Oil Company's infamous Indian hunting expeditions. Many individual Bari died but the social group survived.

By the 1960s, however, the Bari had been driven higher into the hills and onto ever-smaller parcels of land by the advancement of "civilization" into the rugged terrain of the Perija Sierra and the lowlands. Ironically, the same Catholic missionaries who established the *pueblos de Indios*, the Capuchins, came to their rescue, demanding that the state decree an Indian reserve. The Capuchins then established four missionary outposts in the reserve. Saimadoyi was one, today the largest of all Bari settlements (about 300 inhabitants) and proudly called by the missionaries the "capital" of the Bari territory.

The change from a semi-nomadic to a sedentary residence pattern brought several changes to the Bari. The most important was the disappearance of the communal longhouse and its surrounding community garden. However, the Bari continue to organize production around a combination of individual and communal principles. Land is still held collectively by all residents of Saimadoyi and the old hearth groups have been reconstructed around sets of single-family households located in close proximity and tied by closer kinship relations. But the disappearance of the *bohio* and communal garden has also meant that the labor process in crop production has been increasingly reduced to the level of individual families or shrinking hearth groups. In fact, assistance from non-family workers is now often remunerated in cash. On the other hand, labor and food exchanges still take place in the building of houses. Most significantly, fishing, carried out twice a week, continues to be organized at the level of the community. The only difference is that "community" now means 300 as opposed to just 20 to 50 people.

The Bari are still largely self-sufficient, and are not significantly "proletarianized." Similarly, their level of subordination to financial or commercial capital seems to be quite low, given their sporadic participation in the market economy as sellers of cheap agricultural products. In summary, the Bari retain a large degree of control over their own labor process, the overall social organization of production, and the marketing of their products.

Their "relative autonomy" is not simply due to the protective presence of missionaries, or to their capacity to resist additional encroachments. It has also been conditioned by the unique configuration of the local agrarian structure. Contrary to the situation in Apure where large estates dominate the local economy, capital penetration in Zulia was largely based on small livestock husbandry. As an exciting new chapter in the peasant literature has begun to point out, the latter type of local agrarian structure is much more conducive to the rise of independent and even capitalized family farms than is a local structure dominated by large estates.<sup>13</sup> The differing effects of local agrarian structures highlight the importance of a

relational approach in examining the internal logic of these communities.

One last point needs to be made with regard to communal elements present in today's Saimadoyi. An interesting syncretism, cleverly manipulated by missionaries, between the old collective values represented in the Bari cosmology and the "new" Catholic "patrimonialism" upholds both the collectivity as a superior entity and the natural hierarchichal order where "God and the Prince" stand above the collectivity.<sup>14</sup> This ideology, reinforced daily in a variety of ways, has further unified the Bari against outside influence.

In contrast to the history of the Bari, the Pume lost all of their land to the large cattle ranches which cover the entire territory. Today, they are confined to small plots of government land where they have regrouped in the form of corporate communities composed of individual nuclear families connected by kinship and marriage. Although endogamous marriage is still the norm, Pume women are increasingly marrying criollos, very possibly in an effort (not always successful) to escape the poverty and social disintegration of their own collectivity. As a result, the Pume are a much less homogeneous social group than are the Bari. Social homogeneity can play an important role in the internal solidarity and potential formation of ethnic or regionally based movements. On the other hand, it can also preclude wider solidarity networks.

Unable to practice shift cultivation, or to expand their level of production given the small size and relatively poor quality of their land, the Pume are highly integrated into the local cattle ranching economy. This integration takes place within the context of what Bonacich (1980) calls a split labor market: Pume are consistently paid at levels below those of criollo workers. Subsistence production is now totally organized at the level of the individual family or household, and individualistic elements are evident in various aspects of Pume socio-economic organization and cultural representations. For example, families fence their individual gardens to both delineate their private ownership of the land and to limit sharing of their products with other community members. They also greatly prefer to work by themselves and to have individual rights to various means of production (an aspect that became very obvious during the organization of the *empresa*). Reciprocal work exchanges, locally known as *cayapas*, have almost disappeared and succumbed to the monetized economy, even further subordinating their reproduction to local commercial and industrial capital.

As with the Bari, there is a sort of ideological syncretism between the Pume's ancient cosmology and current local values. But, this helps to reinforce contemporary forms of Pume reproduction and subordination, and individual as opposed to communal practices. New circumstances render largely meaningless the value the Pume had traditionally placed upon the careful balance between individual and communal practices. Today, the Pume's cosmology is heavily penetrated by notions of rugged individualism and male dominance, both more consonant with the local capitalistic herding society. Moreover, de-humanizing notions have been formally incorporated into contemporary versions of Pume creation myths. According to one contemporary myth, the explanation for the Pume's lack of horses and cattle (key factors in the local economy) is that Pume were destined to perform the less prestigious and poorly payed *trabajo de mano* (hand work), while the the more skillful criollos could literally grow up "to be cowboys" (*montas*).

On the other hand, new forms of collectivism and communal ties have evolved as necessary adaptive strategies for survival. These are no longer based on the rather disrupted traditional kinship system, but on a broader "emergent ethnicity" which activates new systems of mutual help (particularly within communities, but also between the various ethnic enclaves and individuals dispersed across the state). However, local repression precludes the evolution of these new forms of ethnic solidarity into organized social movements. Rather, political actions take the form of defensive measures. These include a capacity to retreat into their native language and ethnic enclaves, and a mutism which continues to puzzle and confuse the criollos. Unfortunately, as with the Bari, ethnic-based separatist strategies (though they may be necessary) aggravate the political fragmentation of the peasantry into Indian and non-Indian factions, thus reducing their capacity to form meaningful alliances.

#### *Organizing the Empresas of Kumani and Saimadoyi: Skills, Resources, and the Reorganization of the Political Economy*

The different paths followed by the Bari and Pume as capital and state agents penetrated their territories left them with an unequal inventory of new and old skills, resources, and adaptive strategies. The structural background just outlined, together with this inventory of the "human capital" of each community, conditioned the manner in which the *empresas* were organized.

The Bari *empresa* of Saimadoyi emerged from a prolonged and rather smooth process of transition from crop to mixed crop and livestock production. In the early 1970s the missionaries distributed a few cattle to individual families who used them mainly for milk and sporadic sales. Later, in 1979, IAN donated 90 cattle to be managed by the community as a whole. Teams formed to clear pastures and perform the general tasks connected with animal husbandry. In addition to this incremental acquisition of skills related to livestock production, a few Bari worked on surrounding ranches performing similar tasks.

It was only later, in 1982, that the Bari accepted IAN's suggestion that they form a legally constituted *empresa Indigena* and thus become eligible for additional state support and credit sources. By this time the *Indigenistas* who had conceived the adaptation of the *empresas campesinas* model to Indian collectivities were back in IAN's Indian Development program. This meant that, at least at the level of this state office, there was a renewal of commitment to an *empresa* organizational structure that would yield not only economic results, but would support principles of democracy and self-management. The structure was intended to generate new levels of social cohesiveness and solidarity. This was, in fact, reflected in the organizational process.

Major decisions were made with the active participation of the entire Bari community, and concessions were made to adapt the legally prescribed structure to the system of production and leadership operating in the community. With regard to leadership, the Bari tried to meaningfully merge the office of *empresa* president with the authority of the community chief. Similarly, the old notion of a second chief was revived in the figure of the cattle boss, who also assumed responsibilities for the *empresa* in the absence of the president.

The Kumani (Pume) *empresa* was organized in 1977, after the exodus of IAN *indigenistas*, and after general support for the organization of collective *empresas*

(as conceived by these *indigenistas*) had plunged to the lowest levels. Nevertheless, and despite tremendous opposition from local capitalists, a new group of well-intentioned individuals (taking advantage of a political opening provided by the election year) successfully obtained the transfer of a ranch to the Pume families. But the Pume's lack of experience in the production and management of large collective enterprises, and livestock production in particular, resulted in their minimal participation in the design of the *empresa's* administrative and production structure.

The contrasts between the Pume and the Bari are notable. The absence of a Pume land base meant that a collective enterprise, also with an emphasis on livestock production, could only be organized on large tracks of available government land. Individual Pume families were thus relocated to a cattle ranch that had been expropriated during the early years of the agrarian reform. This resulted first and foremost in the additional fragmentation of family and other primary ties. But it also meant that subsistence production was reorganized in very radical and sudden terms. This 30,000 hectare ranch with a herd of approximately 500 cattle was managed according to an extensive production system requiring significant labor as well as capital inputs and husbandry skills. In contrast to the Bari, the Pume had very little, if any, experience in livestock production, despite the predominance of this activity in Apure. They also had lower levels of literacy and formal education in general. Literacy was a requirement for *empresa* office holders, and its concentration undermined the democratic principles behind the organization.

Production was, as with the Bari, organized around work teams of individuals as opposed to families or other types of primary relations. Many of the members did not even know each other before the organization of the *empresa*. But in the Pume case, this constituted a much more drastic change because they lacked the benefit of the Bari's years of practice with this organizational pattern. In the first, and only, organizational assembly, the Pume expressed their preference for cattle (not land, which must be collectively owned by law) to be distributed to individual families or groups of families as opposed to the membership as a whole. They maintained that the collective aspect should be confined to the larger management tasks and to the marketing of livestock. But these notions were rejected.

Also critical, independent Pume families from three different communities established three separate settlements inside the ranch. This inevitably inhibited collaborative relations and communication among all members, aspects crucial to collective organization. Finally, the change from an informal authority figure like the *capitan* to the rigid administrative structure of president, vice-president, and treasurer contrasted with the Bari's relatively successful integration of old and new political structures.

#### THE EMPRESAS' PERFORMANCE

Not surprisingly, results both in terms of economic gains and social changes were very different for these two *empresas Indigenas*. Economically, the Bari more than doubled their herd, and showed a moderate positive balance during the 1982-1985 period. In addition, with very few exceptions, semi-proletarianization among the

Bari of Saimadoyi has been virtually halted. In contrast, the Pume reduced their herd by more than two thirds, and experienced a progressive loss of capital. Semi-proletarianization became even more prevalent as the productivity of subsistence plots was greatly diminished due to the combined factors of poor soils, labor requirements of extensive livestock production, and the incapacity of the *empresa* to generate any meaningful incomes.

Social change and benefits were equally divergent. Social cohesiveness, educational opportunities, and a consciousness of the collectivity were much more evident among the Bari. In contrast, the difficult conditions that have confronted the Pume since their move to the *empresa* have often fostered conflictual and anti-collective behavior, such as the illegal sale of cattle by individual members.

While the Bari retained control of their labor process and a degree of autonomy in decisions pertaining to the organization of production and distribution of their products, the same cannot be said of the Pume. The problems involved in running a large *hacienda*, combined with the aggressive antagonism of local criollos toward land-owning Indians, increasingly led IAN *indigenistas* to assume almost total control over the operation of the *empresa*. The principles of self-management and participatory democracy were never really upheld in Kumani. Instead, the Pume's continued reliance on semi-proletarianization, plus the state's increasing control over their *empresa's* productive process, meant that their subordination to outside agents had not been alleviated, but had actually increased.

At the level of individual enterprises, it is evident that communal factors became even stronger among the Bari compared to the Pume. And contrary to *empresa* critics, the household-based organization of production most prevalent among the Pume was not a remnant of their traditional economies, but evolved as a result of capital penetration in their areas. Contrary also to modernization and orthodox Marxist theories, the presence of communal elements in these communities do not necessarily constitute a backward obstacle to more complex forms of collectivization, but can, as in the case of the Bari, be mobilized on behalf of complex collectivization.

The presence of collective modes of cooperation and ideologies are not sufficient grounds for the creation of new forms of collectivization. In the context of the Venezuelan political economy, state support was again crucial. The erratic and minimal levels of commitment to Indian collectivization by dominant class fractions in the state proved fatal in the case of Kumani where the historically problematic situation of the Pume could not be overcome. In the case of the Bari, however, the presence of a coherent set of collective values, a communally-held land base, pre-existing joint work arrangements, and even the kind of protection provided by the church, presented the appropriate incentives and special qualifications for experimental forms of cooperation in production. Internal organizational factors impinged on each groups' risk calculations and their ability to determine the level at which they would commit themselves to a new and rather risky production process. The Bari had, in the land, a relatively self-sufficient economy, and in the missionaries, an "insurance policy" that the Pume did not have. The Pume resorted instead to those defensive strategies that had helped them survive for so many years among the exploitative and repressive criollos. They retreated; said "yes" when they meant "no"; held on to the *empresa* land while working on someone else's livestock ranch; and sold the cattle to feed their families.

## CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Collectivization is *not* the soundest solution to the economic and social problems of all Indian communities. Gros (1987) has indicated that those Indian groups which have experienced a situation much like the semi-proletarianized non-Indian peasantry, no longer possess many of the attributes which contribute to more autonomous forms of cooperative development. The Pume certainly fall under this category. A question remains: what alternatives are available for ameliorating the exploitative conditions under which these groups live and for reconstructing the sense of community which was lost in the not-so-distant past? This question cannot be fully answered here, but several relevant points can be raised.

First, contrary to those who maintain a functionalist view of peasant production, individual *empresas* (like that of the Bari) can not only survive, but can even achieve levels of growth and diminish Indian subordination to various capital and state agents. Admittedly, given the present direction of the Venezuelan Indian policy, chances are rather dim for a large number of communities to achieve this status.

Secondly, there is some possibility that these and other cooperative experiments taking place among Venezuelan Indian groups will ignite the spark for a more autonomous grass-root movement which would help to spread and improve the success rates of a variety of forms of cooperatives (including health and educational services cooperatives). Again, the possibilities for building broad coalitions are not great. The unfortunate polarization of the peasantry into Indian and non-Indian fractions (while recognizing the validity of ethnic-based movements) forestalls the possibility of a new alliance which could once again redirect the course of Indian policy.

Yet, transitions from state-initiated efforts to more autonomous movements in other countries suggest that broad-based coalition demanding alternative to exploitative forms of community organization as relations are not all that far-fetched. Lessons should be drawn from the experiences of CRIC in Colombia, and from the Shuar in Ecuador. But even in the Venezuelan context, there are certain elements that give at least some hope that progressive coalitions will emerge. Serbin (1983), for example, recognizes that despite mediation by state interests, and factionalism problems, the Indian movement which emerged as part of IAN's efforts has had a significant grass-root component. I have found ample evidence that many attempts to subordinate the movement to dominate party interests and goals were soundly defeated. Despite the absence of a coherent Indian movement, and at least partly as a result of the mobilization efforts of the early 1970s, Indian groups have become a permanent voice in the Venezuelan media and a frequent and influential presence in government offices where they come to protest the latest affronts to their lives. Just a few months ago, the Bari, together with other groups from the state of Zulia, made the front pages of leading Venezuelan newspapers as they protested new government leases for open pit mining which again raised fears about the stability of their land rights.

An exhaustive analysis of the Indian development program's intended and unintended long-term consequences could not be performed in this article. But,

it should already be evident that *empresa* evolution has seldom conformed to the interests and purposive actions of the policy makers who created them.

## NOTES

1. The first question is often used to refer to the economic issue of productivity while the latter refers to the socio-economic situation of the peasantry within the agrarian structure.
2. This is not to suggest that Indian groups have not before been directly or indirectly affected by national agrarian reform programs. See for example Stavenhagen (1977). I am referring here to the very special cases in which the program is designed specifically for Indian communities as opposed to an all-encompassing category of peasants. Also, the main category of Indian communities I have in mind is that of frontier and more isolated groups which have retained some degree of autonomy from the national society. As we will see however, one of the cases studied here did not quite conform to that definition, and it was in essence a deviation from the intended clientele of the *empresas*.
3. Case studies are most commonly found among Peruvian Indian communities during the military reform of the late sixties, and of the Chilean Mapuche during Allende. In both cases, however, we are still dealing with Indian communities which were largely integrated into the local and regional political economy. More traditional anthropological studies of alternative development projects among native groups are reported in publications like *Cultural Survival*. In Venezuela, Heinen (1983-1984) conducted evaluations of an *empresa Indígena* among the Ye'Kuanas and in this article contends that the *empresas* do not produce negative changes in the communities. Frechione (1981) also did a study of a cooperative among another Ye'kuana community which was independent of IAN's *empresa* program.
4. The *empresas Indígenas* were conceived as alternative forms of collective organizations which stressed autonomous self-development, (autogestion), and the development of a cash economy that would not compromise the subsistence sector in these communities.
5. This notion is generally supported by the works of authors like Galleski (1973) and Fals Borda (1977).
6. I spent approximately six months in Venezuela in 1985 divided between the two Indian communities and national and regional government offices. I conducted informal interviews with many community members as well as the founders and current staff of the program. I continued to collect archival as well as interview data through 1987 primarily with the assistance of Venezuelan colleagues. This paper is part of a larger study I conducted for my doctoral dissertation and in which I address the second question more fully.
7. Semi-proletarianized peasantry refers to those individual producers who due to the reduced size of their holding are no longer able to reproduce themselves without also participating in wage labor activities.
8. This is a simplified and combined version of several of those critics. See for example Morales and Arvelo-Jimenez, 1984; Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo, 1983; Serbin, 1980.
9. Galleski (1973), in particular, elaborates this point more fully. He points to the

logical connection between communal land tenure and socialized work. However, he also notes that degrees of socialized work will vary significantly between different cases.

10. The three groups considered were The Pemon, the Ye'Kuanas and the Karinas in Venezuela. However, the authors did not conduct a parallel study of the *empresa*, only of the traditional forms of production and as far as I can determine at least some of the data was based on studies conducted as early as the 1970s
11. Roseberry's argument is made in the context of a renewed debate in the peasant literature about the importance of family economy and its equivalence with peasantry or simple commodity production.
12. The following analysis is based on both a large number of ethnohistorical materials, my own field interviews, and archival materials.
13. See for example Lehman (1985), and Llanbi, (1988).
14. Portes and Walton (1981, chapter 4).

## REFERENCES

- Arvelo-Jimenez, Nelly  
1984 "The Politics of Cultural in Venezuela: Beyond Indigenismo." In Marianne Schminck (ed.), *Frontier Expansion in Amazonia*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Arvelo-Jimenez, Nelly and Abel Perozo  
1983 "Programas de Desarrollo Entre Poblaciones Indigenas De Venezuela: Antecedentes, Consecuencias y Una Critica." *América Indígena* XLIII:3 (July-Sept).
- Bartra, Armando  
1976 "Colectivización o Proletarización: El Caso del Plan Chontalpa." *Cuadernos Agrarios* 1:4 (October-December):56-110.
- Clarac, Geraldo  
1983 *Las Comunidades Indígenas del País. Nucleos Fecundos Para un Proceso Autogestionario Basado en el Ecodesarrollo y Etnodesarrollo*. Caracas: IAN.
- Clarac, Geraldo and Alberto Valdez  
1976 "Empresas Indígenas y Autogestion en una Estrategia de Desarrollo Regional." Paper presented at the XLII International Congress of Americanists, Paris.
- Carter, Michael and Don Kanel  
1985 "Collective Rice Production in Finca Bermudez: Institutional Performance and Evolution in the Dominican Agrarian Reform Sector." Research paper #83. (May) University of Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center.
- Cox, Paul Anthony Ilston  
1981 "Agrarian Reform by Petroleum: The Contribution of Borrowers' Unions and Peasant Enterprises in Venezuela." Ph.D. Diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- de Janvry, Alain  
1981 *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.



- Fagen, Richard R., Carmen Diana Deere, and Jose Luis Coraggio (eds.)  
1986 *Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Fals Borda, Orlando  
1977 *El Reformismo Por Dentro en America Latina*. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Frechione, John  
1981 "Economic Self-Development by Yekuana Amerinds in Southern Venezuela." Ph.D. Diss.: University of Pittsburgh.
- Galleski, Boguslaw  
1973 "The Prospects for Collective Farming." Madison, Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center Publication #75.  
1987 "Rural Social Change: General Typology, Family Farms, Collectivization." In Teodor Shanin *Peasants and Peasant Society* New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.
- Gouveia, Lourdes  
1988 "Economic Development among Indigenous Groups: The Case of Venezuela's *Empresas Indigenas*." Ph.D. Diss.: University of Kansas.
- Gros, Christian  
1987 "Luchas Indigenas y Practicas Autogestionarias: Algunas Reflexiones a Partir de Tres Estudios de Caso." *Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos* 10:55-69.
- Heinen, H. Dieter  
1981 "Las Empresa Indigenas en Venezuela." *America Indigena* XLI:4 (October-December).  
1983 "Traditional Social Structure and Culture Change among the 1984 YéKuana of the Upper Erebató, Venezuela." *Antropologica* 59-62:1-7. 263-298.
- Huizer, Gerrit  
1984 "The Politics of Rural Development in Latin America: Constraints on Cooperatives and Popular Participation." *Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*.
- Huizer, Gerrit  
1984a "Social Polarization as a Disruptive Force in Cooperatives." *Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*.
- IAN  
*Memoria y Cuenta*. (Published annually.) Caracas: Instituto Agrario Nacional.  
1983 "Informe Integral. Unidad De Desarrollo Indigena (Nov)." Caracas: Unidad De Desarrollo Indigena. (Unpublished manuscript.)
- Kay, Cristobal  
1983 "The Agrarian Reform in Peru: An Assessment. In Ajit Kuma Ghose (ed.), *Agrarian Reform in Contemporary Developing Countries*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lehman, David  
1985 "Dos Vias de Desarrollo Capitalista en la Agricultura o 'Critica de la Razon Chayanoviano-Marxizante'." *Revista Andina* 2 (December).
- Llambi, Luis  
1988 "Emergence of Capitalized Family Farms in Latin America." Unpublished manuscript.

- Long, N. and B.R. Roberts  
1978 "Peasant Cooperation and Underdevelopment in Central Peru." In N. Long and B. Roberts (eds.), *Peasant Cooperation and Capitalist Expansion in Central Peru*. Austin: University of Texas.
- Long, Norman  
1980 "Some Concluding Comments: Directive Change and the Question of Participation." In David Preston (ed.), *Environment, Society, and Rural Change in Latin America: the Past, Present, and Future in the Countryside*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Ministerio de Educacion  
n.d. "Politica y Accion Indigenista de la Dirección de Asuntos Indigenas del Ministerio de Educacion." Caracas: Direccion de Asyntos Indigenas. (Unpublished manuscript.)  
*Memoria y Cuenta*. (Published annually.) (Section on the Oficina de Asuntos Fronterizos y Para Indigenas.) Caracas: Ministerio de Educación.
- Morales, F. and Nelly Arvelo-Jimenez  
1981 "Hacia un Modelo de Estructura Social Caribe." *America Indigena*. XLI:4 (October-December).
- El Nacional  
1988 "Indigenas Bari y Yukpa Firmes en la Defensa de sus Tierras." Sunday: June 12.
- Painter, Thomas M.  
1986 "In Search of the Peasant Connection: Spontaneous Cooperation, Introduced Cooperatives, and Agricultural Development in Southwestern Niger." In Michael M. Horowitz and Thomas M. Painter (eds.), *Anthropology and Rural Development in West Africa*. Boulder and London: Westview Press.
- Petras, James and Eugene Havens  
1981 "Comportamiento Campesino y Cambio Social en Peru: Cooperativas y Tenencia Individual de la Tierra." *Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos* 4:165-180.
- Portes, Alejandro and John Walton  
1981 *Labor, Class, and the International System*. New York: Academic Press.
- Reed, Edward P.  
1975 "Introducing Group Farming in less Developed Countries: Some Issues." In Peter Dorner (ed.), *Cooperatives and Communes*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Roseberry, William  
1986 "The Ideology of Domestic Production." *Labour, Capital and Society* 19 (April):70-93.
- Serbin, Andres  
1983 "Estado, Indigenismo e Indianidad en Venezuela, 1946-1979." *Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* 34:17-40.
- Serbin, Andres and Omar Gonzalez N. (eds.)  
1980 *Indigenismo y Autogestion*. Caracas: Monte Avila.

Stavenhagen, Rodolfo

1975 "Collective Agriculture and Capitalism in Mexico: A Way Out or a Dead End." *Latin American Perspectives* 11:2.

1977 "Indian Ethnic Movement and State Policies in Latin America." *Praxis International*.

Williams, Gavin

1982 "Taking the Part of Peasants." In John Harris (ed.), *Rural Development Theories of Peasant Economy and Agrarian Change*. London: Hutchinson & Co.

Zamosc, Leon

1986 *The Agrarian Movement and the Peasant Question in Colombia*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

## THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DRIVING BEHAVIOR: COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF JOINT-ACTION

L. Alex Swan

M. Belinda Owens

Texas Southern University

Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1988, Vol XIII, No. 1:59-67

*This paper identifies destiny-drivers, casual-cautious drivers, and social-occasion drivers, as the primary participations in the driving environment, and argues that accidents occur when there is a breakdown in establishing joint-action among and between these drivers. Leftlaners are also discussed within the context of the above designated drivers, and another potentially dangerous driver, the meditator, is introduced. The meditator is one who, for a variety of reasons, has some unresolved issue in contemplation. Other drivers emerging in the driving environment are dining-room, powder-room, library, and indicator drivers.*

### INTRODUCTION

Social scientists have paid little or no attention to driving behavior as a social phenomenon even though it has been the cause of thousands of deaths and injuries. Driving is one of the most intense forms of communication and interaction -- where joint-action, interpretation, observation and social participation take place. Driving behavior is said to account for over 50,000 deaths each year. It has been argued that more deaths have resulted from accidents than resulted from all the wars in which the United States participated. In Houston, Texas, approximately 250 of an estimated 260 to 530 accidents are reported each day to the Records Division of the police department. This suggests a serious breakdown in joint-action in the driving environment of the city.

Fitting lines of action together or establishing joint-action in the driving environment requires taking note of the action of others as indications are made. This assumes that the meaning of the indications are shared by the actors in the environment.

Eighty-five percent of the accidents in the city occur when drivers are not taking note of action in their driving world. This means that they are not able to fit their action to the actions of others or form joint-action in driving. The other fifteen percent of the accidents result from inadequate interpretations of acts and symbols, inappropriate designations, confused meanings, and mischosen alternative responses.

Most accidents occur in Houston between 7 to 8 a.m and 5 to 6 p.m. Thus, hostility is not a powerful enough variable to explain accidents, as psychoanalysts might be tempted to suggest. Other explanations of freeway accidents cite rampant aggressiveness, high speeds, and crowded freeways and highways. However, these are not distractions to establishing joint-action on highways. Some distractions are the attitudes of drivers, their dispositions in driving, combing hair, eating, feeding babies, husbands, and wives, applying make-up, lighting cigarettes, attempting to kill an insect, picking up objects on the car floor, meditating or reflective thinking,