

THE FATE OF IDEOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF MARXISM
(PART I)*

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Historically the concept of Ideology belongs to the recent past. The concept of Ideology is central to all genuine criticism of culture and society and is for this reason intimately associated with the Idea of Freedom. In the first part of this article I have attempted an analysis of the historical movement of the concept of Ideology in order to salvage its critical function from the danger of its neutralization by the sociology of knowledge. In the second part, the fate of this concept and its relation to the crisis of Marxism will be examined.

Ideology has ceased to be ideology in the proper sense; only that which exists, reality, is ideological. This apparent paradox is the thesis of the last chapter of the recently translated book Aspects of Sociology by the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. It was already revealed by Theodor Adorno in his essay Kulturkritik und Gessellschaft ("The criticism of culture and society") written in 1949 and which later served as the first chapter of his collection of essays published in book form in 1955 under the title of Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft. The book Sociologica II by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer which appeared in German in 1962, also contains an elaboration of this thesis. In general, I would say that this thesis is at the basis of most of the contemporary criticism of advanced capitalist reality. The "absorption of ideology into reality," as Marcuse, one of the most outstanding propounders of this thesis would say, is simply revealed by a situation in which "individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction! This identification is not illusion but reality...There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in all forms" (Marcuse, 1966:11).

To comprehend why this thesis is being proposed today it is necessary to review not only the concept of ideology in its historical movement but the present crisis of Marxism as well. The insight that reality has become its own ideology does in fact reflect the crisis of Marxism. The desperate attempts to combine existentialism and the phenomenology of Husserl with Marxism, as well as the attempts by the Frankfurt School to go back, according to its critics, to the criticism of the Neo-Hegelians, indicates both the sense of impotency of critical Marxism and its connection to the conception of reality as its own ideology. The crisis of Marxism was already evident in 1923 when Karl Korsh published his Marxismus und Philosophy and when Georg Lukacs published his History and Class Consciousness. It may even be possible to say that the rediscovery or anticipation of the early Marx by these two authors was of no consequence, except to bring to the surface the crisis of Marxism. The emphasis on the critical side of Marx rather than the more "positivistic" or "scientific" side, was already intimately connected with the sense of loss of a revolutionary

subject or agency to change the oppressive and exploitative conditions of domination. Marxism since 1890 had shown its inability to bring about this change, and since Korsh this was attributed to the neglect of its critical side and the emphasis on the "latent positivism" of the later Marx. Marxism was even held to have degenerated into different ideologies ranging from "mechanism," "economicism," to an extreme "subject voluntarism."

The transformation of Marx's theory into a completely deterministic theory objective materialism similar to that of the natural sciences facilitated this degeneration. The positivistic interpretation of Marx had shown itself to be more useful to the development of bourgeois capitalism than in overcoming it. Korsh and Lukacs were among the first to become aware of this fate of Marxism and to realize that the revolutionary consciousness had been repressed and forgotten. This was attributed to the fact that the origins of Marx in the idealist philosophy of Hegel had been strained. The mechanistic materialism of the Second International with its elimination of man as a subject had a great deal to do with the return of Korsh and Lukacs to Hegel and their stress on the critique of alienation. The changed conditions of capitalism in the industrially advanced countries appeared to reveal two things clearly: reality itself had become its own ideology, and the proletariat was lost as a revolutionary subject. The conception of reality as ideology cannot, then, be separated from the sense of loss of a revolutionary subject. The concept of ideology in Marx was inseparable from the criticism of ideology, that is, it must implicitly or explicitly address itself critically to the question of the possibility of changing society.

From the beginning the goal was to end reification and alienation. But two problems are involved here, and both relate to the conception of what is the active agent in society that could bring about the end of reification. At one extreme we have the objective necessity of reification and the dialectic of immediacy and mediation are assumed to realize the end of reification. Criticism of reification by itself, according to the opponents of the objective necessity of reification, is contemplative, that is, it leaves the question as to how and who is to realize dereification problematic. It is held to ultimately end in either an extreme subjective voluntarism or an objective determinism. At the other extreme we have the subjective possibility: reification is not accepted as necessary, although it is acknowledged to be present, and the problem comes to be one of finding or creating a subject which by becoming the "subject-object identical" would end reification. This possibility, it is entertained, ultimately ends up in an objective voluntarism or in a subjective determinism. The present so-called crisis of Marxism is faced precisely with the problem of a clearly sensed absence of an active agent, hence the conception that reality has become its own ideology. It has appeared, to Marxists and bourgeois analysts alike, that the conditions of advanced industrial societies have precluded the working classes from attaining a revolutionary class-consciousness. The fate of the New Left is only the most recent evidence.

One cannot find more charges of being ideological than among Marxists themselves. Given the crisis of Marxism, the criticism of ideology has not only come to occupy a central position, but it has turned the process into a kind of paranoia; it is not strongly suspected that a critique of ideology can itself turn into ideology. "The concept of ideology is today ideology. The same is in store for reification. . . . Reification has become a pass word for reification; under the brand of authenticity, more of the same is retailed. . . . No critical concept is immune to depletion." (See Review of Adorno's Aufsätze zur Gesellschaftstheorie und Methodologie by Jacoby, 1970:343). It is for this

reason that Marxism and its conception of ideology hopes that it can remain critically effective only if Marxism develops critically or if it is constantly updated. One type of updating is the shift within Marxism from a concern with revolution to the concern with the critique of everyday life, to the return to intersubjectivity, to Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world." This self-critical Marxist renaissance, furthermore, emphatically demands "demystification" of Marxism by critical reexamination. The various brands of this neo-Marxism, which all meet the official disapproval of Soviet Marxism, range from the Humanism of the anti-bureaucratic Eastern European Marxists, the "Critical Theory" of the Frankfurt School, the existentialist Marxism of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the Freudian Marxism of Marcuse and Fromm, and the phenomenological Marxism (which has flourished since the appearance of Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences) of Paul Piccone and Enzo Paci, to name only a few. What all these brands of Marxism have in common is their concern with the criticism of the ideology of advanced capitalism which includes heavy doses of criticism of science and technology. They all emphasize the early Marx and either criticize the late Marx, or attempt to show his continuity. In addition, they all seem to agree on the sense of loss of a revolutionary agent, although some among them have tried to single out the university student as a potential revolutionary. In fact, the more philosophically oriented neo-Marxists regard the discussion of the revolutionary character of the workers as the cornerstone of dogmatic Marxism which they reject. They, instead, prefer to examine the critical tenets of Marx's own Marxism. Finally, most of these varieties of neo-Marxism assume that reality has become its own ideology and that the criticism of ideology is synonymous with the criticism of everyday life and distorted everyday communication. The level that criticism of ideology achieved and the acute penetration into the capitalist society has nevertheless brought intellectuals to a stronger awareness of their ambiguous role in the revolutionary movement. Their concern with the explanation of why the revolutionary consciousness has failed to emerge is part of this feeling of ambiguity.

The concept of ideology in Marx was ultimately connected to the possibility of a revolution that would throw out the fetters of capitalism. In fact, a concept of ideology which does not lead to a criticism useful for revolutionary emancipation is itself acritical; it fails to realize the oft-repeated phase of Marxism--the unity of theory and praxis. Ultimately, the criticism of ideology, if it is not to remain an academic pasttime, must aid revolutionary praxis.

Since the concept of ideology is so crucial, for on this concept depends effective criticism, I am obliged to review its historical development before we can begin to examine the crisis of Marxism. I will attempt such a review in this article, leaving the latter point for the second part. There I will come back to the problem presented by reality as its own ideology, and also to the possibility that Marxism, in spite of its opposition to the so-called bourgeois thought, may represent an avant-guard Enlightenment, an advanced bourgeois ideology as an historical force which could serve the development of capitalism up to the exhaustion of all its possibilities.

The word "ideology," like many other expressions, has achieved universal acceptance today in common parlance and therefore, although not because of this, it has lost most of the theoretical and critical significance that it could have enjoyed. Ideology is frequently understood as a particular point of view, a theory, an intellectual position, a particular intellectual inclination, or, as in the case of Mannheim, a formal and abstract totality of thought ("total ideologies"). Groups, political parties, and factions of the most diversified

characters have employed this word to refer to their so-called principles or "philosophies." The subsumption of such multifarious thoughts under the concept of ideology is more an expression of an impotent relativism than a penetration and clarification of this concept in its historical movement; the criticism of ideology must then necessarily resolve into the same impotency.

Underlying the commonly accepted concept of ideology is the conception that the intellectual products of man, although incorporated into the social processes, have an independent existence which is subject to criticism. Their independence together with the conditions by which they gain their independence are conceived under the name of "ideology." This independence itself and the constitution of a class that takes up the sphere of the spirit as its own distinctive domain of activity is conceived to be the result of the division of labor. The eternal world of ideas is the privilege of those exempt from manual labor. These spiritual products then allegedly serve particular interests (The Frankfurt Institute, 1972:182). Such is more or less the accepted condition of "ideology" which thinks it has brought its concept, and the sociology that deals with it, into opposition with the traditional philosophy of external essences (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:182). The use of the word "ideology" in such an amorphous and apparently universal sense has, in fact, obscured and obliterated the possibility of criticism. The critical element that it contains, and which opposes the pretentious intellect that considers itself unconditioned, remains hidden in the past.

The historical movement of thought culminating in this cloudy concept of ideology conceals the fact that ideology had once exerted itself critically, but that it has also surrendered to the opposite. For example, when at the end of the eighteenth century the opposition to the absolutism of the French government articulated by the thought of the Enlightenment lost its political function, it became clear that the speculative thought of the Enlightenment was diminished with the results of the bourgeois revolution. It finally came to incorporate the sensualism imported from England and resulted in the positivism which has prevailed up to this time. The initial insight into the content of false consciousness and its criticism put forward by the Enlightenment was not developed but, in fact, sabotaged by this positivism. The development of the concept of ideology and past attempts to criticize ideology need to be exposed if we want to understand not only the commonly accepted conception held today, but the delusions that it entails as well. Such delusions may, needless to say, be concealed with the amorphous use of the concept of ideology itself. The reasons for such exposition seem then to need little justification. If the concept of ideology is mistaken, or if such a concept is pre-empted of all content, then the criticism of ideology may itself be ideological. This is in fact the case in the sociology of knowledge which in dealing with ideology as its subject matter has itself become ideology. Furthermore, the possibility mentioned earlier in connection with the crisis of Marxism that every critical concept may be surreptitiously neutralized is a danger which deserves careful examination. One must do justice to the historical movement of the concept of ideology even if only in a sketchy manner.

In the early Enlightenment, Bacon already pointed to the collective prejudices which oppressed mankind. He called these prejudices "Idols": for example, the idols of the market and mass society. He furthermore noticed that the ill and unfit choice of words distorts communication and understanding and throw all into confusion. Bacon's concept of ideology, contained in his doctrine of the idols, "sought to further the emancipation of the emerging bourgeois con-

sciousness from the tutelage of the Church and, in this . . . progressive character. . . the limitations of . . . bourgeois consciousness are already discernable. . ." (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:184). The abstract subjectivism of Baconian philosophy is inseparable from its materialism. The latter, with Bacon and later with Hobbes, put forward the idea that the senses are infallible and are the source of all knowledge. As a consequence, Baconian philosophy attributed men's delusions, men's false consciousness to an inherent property of human beings, that is, to human nature as a law of Nature. Materialism in this sense is hostile to thought itself, especially since within its conception all critical thought could be dismissed as "ideological" when it does not comply with sense-based knowledge and materialist "reason." If man's senses are the source of all knowledge, then thought which contradicts and criticizes the given is nothing but the false ghost of the material world which must be eradicated by the adequate knowledge of the laws of Nature. The conditions which make men what they are are ignored and their delusions in the end are justified. This abstract subjectivism, which in modified form will reappear in the Ideologues, is, ironically, still contained within the commonly accepted concept of ideology today. For example, Geiger in his Ideologie und Wahrheit attributes false consciousness or ideology to "name giving," to "logical impurities," to the "subjects' fallibility," to a "mentality" unrelated to the social structure, et cetera. As a result, the study of ideology is reduced to the "classification of ideologies." According to Geiger; "Till now such a systematically comprehensive investigation has not been undertaken. . . It would require the collection and analysis of many hundreds, perhaps thousands of statements suspected of ideology" (Geiger, 1953:quoted in Frankfurt Institute, 1972:203). False consciousness is forever justified. This is the result of the subjectivistic abstractions of positivism and of its allied relativism. Geiger's positivism accepts only the historically handed-down idea of false consciousness in the abstract but cannot penetrate it. The concept of ideology remains at the Baconian level. The critical functions that can be derived from such a conception of ideology can only be applied to an age such as Bacon's, if it even goes that far.

A further and decisive step in the historical movement of the concept of ideology as sketched by Bacon is already discernible in the Enlightenment with the English Hobbes, the Italian Giambattista Vico, the left-wing French encyclopedists such as Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvetius, and finally Holbach. Such a decisive step crystallized later only in connection with the social movements of the nineteenth century and became the core of Marx's theory of historical materialism.

For the encyclopedists Helvetius and Holbach, prejudices serve the maintenance of unjust and inhuman conditions. They oppose "the realization of happiness and the establishment of a rational society" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:185). For Helvetius "all questions of morals and politics are decided by force and not by reason. If opinion rules the world, then, in the long run, it is the powerful who rule opinion" (Helvetius, De l'Homme, quoted in Frankfurt Institute, 1972:185). Holbach similarly says that "Authority generally considers it in its interest to maintain received opinions: the prejudices and errors which it considers necessary for the secure maintenance of its power are perpetuated by this power, which never reasons" (Paul Heinrich von Holbach, Systeme de la nature on des lois du monde physique et du monde moral, quoted in Frankfurt Institute, 1972:185). And Helvetius again, "Our ideas are the necessary consequence of the society in which we live" (Helvetius, De l'Esprit, quoted in Frankfurt Institute, 1972:185). Although there is a trace here of Marx's famous statement that the ideas of an age are the ideas of its ruling class, we must

not forget that the encyclopedists' conception of ideology as prejudices tends to reduce false consciousness to the mere machinations of the rulers and does not penetrate into the objective roots of ideology. The clarification of this point must be postponed. What I want to stress, though, is important. The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century opposed not only the existing political institutions, religion and theology, but the metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza) which supported these institutions and rationalized theology. Their concept of ideology was critical and without it we cannot proceed to understand what would be a critical concept of ideology today. Yet, what actually is ideology today cannot be understood by simply incorporating an already changed concept of ideology and by disregarding its historical realization. Thus, those who hold fast to a concept of ideology such as that of the encyclopedists, who no doubt conceived it critically, regress to the affirmation of social conditions which long ago have relegated such a conception to the realm of acritical conformism and passive acquiescence. Instead of letting the criticism of the past serve as the sanctification of the present, we must see how the criticism of the past has materialized in the ideology of the present.

The most radical expression of the Enlightenment, besides Helvetius, is found in Denis Diderot, the editor of the Encyclopedie ou Dictionnaire Raisonne des Sciences, des Arts, et des Metiers. In the essay which Diderot wrote to define the word encyclopedie, and which appeared in Volume V (1755), we have a clear indication of the conception of ideology that had to be criticized and overcome. In essence, it was nothing more than the prevalent views that justified the feudal order. Three major aspects of this ideology had to be confronted: the yoke of authority had to be shaken off, the common prejudices had to be critically exposed, and the traditional secrecy of the crafts had to be ended by divulgation. The laws of reason and of nature were to be counterposed to the prevalent ideology. "The progress of reason," Diderot wrote, "will overthrow so many idols." Everything which was not "founded upon the truths of nature" was to be indicted for it did not promote the realization of freedom and virtue. (See: Diderot, 1964:287). The Encyclopedie would have "the power to change men's common way of thinking. . . , to throw down the whole edifice of mud and scatter the idle heap of dust" (Diderot, 1964:296). The reeducation of men was indispensable and necessary; it had to be carried out mercilessly and to the disregard of anyone's sensibilities. Diderot powerfully emphasized that "all things must be examined, all must be winnowed and sifted without exception and without sparing anyone's sensibilities" (Diderot, 1964:297). Furthermore, "we must trample mercilessly upon . . . ancient puerilities, [and] overturn the barriers that reason never erected. . ." (Diderot, 1964:298).

A "revolution . . . in the minds of men and in the national character" (Diderot, 1964:287) was then necessary to emancipate man from the idols that enslaved his mind, and lack of knowledge was assumed to sustain the conditions preventing man from the achievement of progress and happiness. The Encyclopedie, for this reason, had to consciously aim at the general education of all men--the word encyclopedie was chosen from the Greek enkyklios-circular, total; and paideia-education, instruction, knowledge--through the divulgation of the practical knowledge of the various arts and crafts developed by man. Since that knowledge is still confined within the respective trades, its divulgation would not only end that secrecy, but in doing so, would release the great potentialities for progress. It is well known now how this divulgation paved the way for the industrial revolution and the rising of the bourgeoisie.

The divulgation of the crafts had an extremely critical significance for it meant bringing the real active, working, creative man to the center of all things.

Diderot wrote:

. . . if one banishes from the face of the earth the thinking and contemplating entity, man, then the sublime and moving spectacle of nature will be but a sad and silent scene; the universe will be hushed; darkness and silence will regain their way. . . It is only the presence of men that makes the existence of other beings significant. What better plan [for the Encyclopedie], then, in writing the history of these beings, than to subordinate oneself to this consideration?. . . Why should we not make him [man] the center of all that is? . . . With man at the center, how lively and pleasing will be the ensuing relations between man and other beings, between other beings and man! . . . For man is the unique starting point, and the end to which everything must finally be related if one wishes to please, to instruct, to move to sympathy. . . (Diderot, 1964:292-293).

And he continues:

Why should we be so concerned to preserve the history of men's thoughts to the neglect to the history of their good deeds [arts, crafts, work]? Is not the latter history the more useful? Is it not the latter that does the most honor to the human race? (1964:300).

This remarkable statement forecasts the anthropocentric view which Marx was to use as the basis of his criticism of bourgeois ideology. But for Diderot it summarized the criticism of feudal society. The freedom and progress of man require that man be brought to the realization that he is the center of all things, "for man is the unique starting point, and the end to which everything must finally be related." Diderot's criticism was then explicitly based on a concept of ideology which essentially saw man in a state of religious alienation that supported the feudal order. Once this concept was made operative it necessarily pointed at the primacy of material history over the "history of men's thoughts" in order to understand man and to achieve that "revolution in the minds of men" which Diderot so vehemently hoped for as the would-be contribution of the Encyclopedie.

It is also important to mention briefly that one of Diderot's most brilliant criticisms of morality, religion, government, the family, law, property, and imperialism is found in his Supplement to Bougainville's Voyage. (See Diderot, 1964:179-228). The criticism of civilization which Diderot conveyed in the Supplement brought to the surface the contradictions between an artificially contrived ascetic morality on the one hand and a disgusting license on the other. The contention that the non-contradictory life of "natural man" was lost in civilization was later taken over by his one-time friend Rousseau.

The opposition that Diderot encountered as well as the enemies of the Encyclopedie faded away after the French Revolution of 1789. Their ideas had established the most important philosophical basis as well as the principles of equality and dignity of all men, which were the departure of the only true revolution--the bourgeois revolution of 1789. The criticism of ideology carried out by the Enlightenment materialized in a revolution because it already had a struggling subject or agency--the emerging bourgeoisie. After that, the criticism developed by the Enlightenment not only met little, if any, opposition, but it became the literary pasttime of the upper and middle bourgeois sectors of French

and European Society.¹ The criticism of ideology lost its political function; it exerted itself critically but surrendered to the opposite by incorporating the sensualistic empiricism imported from England.

It is evident that today we would be inclined to say that the Enlightenment, despite its merciless criticism of the dying absolutist order, did not contain as yet a criticism of the emerging bourgeois order that it served. The concept of ideology held by the Enlightenment did not and could not penetrate the basis of reification, as objectively necessary false consciousness, which was to appear as the ideology of the economic basis of developed capitalism. It nevertheless allowed criticism of the prejudices, idols, and lack of knowledge which assumedly prevented the realization of progress, freedom, equality and justice among men as well as the establishment of reason. It critically exposed the secrecy of the trades and the contradictions of an official morality which co-existed with an opposite licentious behavior, a contradiction believed to be lacking in the "natural state" of man. It was also critical of the theological justification of temporal authority. And this is why their concept of ideology was both critical and useful in dethroning the absolutistic feudal order; the emerging bourgeoisie found in it both a perfect justification for their real interests which the philosophy of the state transformed later into the interests of all. The idea of reason further served to justify the state, the idea of the self-destiny of man was embodied in a democratic idea of self-governance, and the idea that knowledge of the laws of nature would end man's mystifications about nature and themselves paved the way for the development of science and technology. The education of all men was a requisite for the eradication of false consciousness. Thus, although their criticism regarded ideology as an epiphenomena not grounded in objective conditions--such a conception did not arise until the advent of the market economy of developed capitalism--the criticism of authority, property, law, religion and the family, even if it appealed idealistically for a reform of consciousness, was effective, that is, it aided praxis because it had an already struggling subject--the emerging bourgeoisie.

After the French Revolution and with the stabilization of the new bourgeois order, the genuine criticism which the concept of ideology in the Enlightenment contained faded away; or, if we prefer, it was realized in the new order. In a diabolical reversal, the criticism of ideology became the new ideology. It was left to Hegel and Marx to understand this phenomena as we will see below.

Meanwhile, and surprisingly enough, the study of ideology as conceived by the sociology of knowledge today, and which in fact claims Marx as its originator, was begun. Even the word "ideology" was coined. This took place in France when L'Association des Ideologues undertook the task of investigating the independence of ideas among themselves and the physiologic processes of the human body. The word "ideology" was in fact coined by one of the chief exponents of L'Association, Destutt de Tracy. The main concern of the ideologues was to study the content of consciousness as mental phenomena. Their aim was "to prevent false abstract principles from establishing themselves. . . because they hindered not only communication between human beings but also the proper construction of the state and of society" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:186). False consciousness was neither to be refuted nor to be denounced; only "the laws governing all sort of consciousness, whether false or correct, are to be established" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972: 186). This was to be accomplished by a science in the image of physics: intellectual life was to be explained as the mechanism of representations. A natural science of the spirit was to "end once and for all the arbitrary and optional character of opinions. . . ; false consciousness, that which later is called ideology, is to dissolve when confronted by scientific method" (Frankfurt

Institute, 1972:186). From then on the word "ideology" was to mean spirit or intellect which depends on grossly material processes. It was not until Marx's criticism of the French mechanistic materialism that the concept of ideology of the ideologues was uncovered as acritical.² As I have already indicated, mechanistic materialism lends itself adequately to the dismissal of all critical thought as the false ghost of the material world. The relation of this to the similar mechanistic interpretation of Marx by the official Marxism of the Soviets need not be discussed here.

The emphasis on the analysis of consciousness and ideology, as held by the Ideologues, had its political effects; and the criticism that derived from it, if we can call it criticism, had a progressive purpose in consonance with the emancipatory interests of the bourgeoisie. To be more precise, this criticism had the political purpose of eradicating any "prejudice" which was not in consonance with the march of the bourgeoisie and their order. The idea that reason was to rule the world was coupled with the conception that knowledge of the formation of thought from the standpoint of the natural scientific method could provide legislators and statesmen with the tools to implant reason and therefore to preserve the order desired by them. The natural scientific outlook came then to define what ideology was. Anything that was not scientific was arbitrary opinion which had to be both studied by science and eradicated by it. False consciousness, rooted in grossly material and individual psychological processes, was to dissolve once it had been analyzed by the natural scientific method. The impartiality of science and the dismissal of any critical thought as "unscientific" dates back precisely to the achievements of the ideologues. It is interesting to note that included in what was considered as ideology was precisely that thought which was critical of the new ideology.

Natural science since its inception with Galileo was critical and, in a sense, contributed towards a definition of false consciousness of the time. The demythologization and deanthropomorphization of nature which science carried out served as the criticism of an approach to Nature dominated by theology. The conflict between science and theology was not so much due to a repudiation of theology by science, but to the interest of the latter to divest itself of the former's domination of the sphere of nature. Ever since the idea of the superiority of science, corroborated by its success in the domination of nature, has given it not only the ability to criticize anything which would interfere with the development of capitalism, but the self-assurance of being the knowledge by which man could finally establish reason in the world. The extension of the natural scientific method to the sphere of man in society has led to the unquestionable and universal conviction that science is to save man. Today, the same arguments advanced by the Ideologues have reappeared in a more sophisticated manner, no doubt with all the good intentions and the sincere critical spirit of their propounders. The efforts to scientize man are inevitably connected with the increasing rationalization of life; to the domination of man by man these efforts represent the extension of that "instrumental reason," as Horkheimer called it in his Critique of Instrumental Reason, which has served man in his mastery of Nature. The natural scientific method contains a manipulative moment which it cannot and does not want to extricate. The power of science does not reside in its method; on the contrary, it resides in the men who can use it. The inherent manipulative moment of science represents its own indictment. "The traditional idea of science which once helped philosophy to free itself from the fetters of theology has itself meanwhile become a fetter which forbids thought to think" (Adorno, 1970: 51-52). The criticism of science, and especially the attempt to extend the natural scientific method to the study of man, was only possible with the advent of the concept of reification and the concept of ideology which is applicable to

today's conditions. I must therefore postpone its discussion till Part II. For the moment, my purpose is again to illustrate how what was once critical can serve now to reassert the very conditions that sustain it; yet, this intellect thinks itself to be independent! With the ideologues, the study of "ideology" turned itself into ideology; the concept of ideology was neutralized and totally deprived of its critical content.

A more recent example of this phenomenon is provided by the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto. According to Pareto, human action derives from the so-called "residues" or innate inclinations which are irrational in the sense that they are not necessarily beneficial for the individual or society. But man finds means to justify to himself and to others the motives behind his actions. This he accomplishes through the so-called "derivations," that is, logical reasons, appeal to authority, or general principles. Pareto's concept of "derivations" is close to the psychoanalytic concept of rationalization. The motives of man are then fundamentally irrational and the explanation of their action must be sought behind the derivatives. For Pareto, then, all is ideology. The ultra-relativism behind this conception of ideology is, of course, consonant with the denial by positivism of knowing the content of false consciousness. Thus, the subjectivism of Pareto, which readily lends itself to social relativism, allows him to derive the falsity of ideologies from the proposition "that men seek to give a rational foundation and a justification for their true motives after the fact" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:194). The study of ideology reduces then to the abstract examination, by the logical experimental method of the derivatives (or rationalizations) behind man's actions. Since, according to this conception of ideology, truth--if it exists at all--is purely relative, only power is to decide. The adequacy of this concept of ideology for the totalitarian state is no longer a secret, as attested by Pareto's affinity to Mussolini's fascism. Only this concept of ideology can allow power the claim to be the defender of the eternal values of national destiny. Any critical thought which conflicts with this destiny is debased to the level of an opinion or a rationalization of interest. It is no coincidence that a similar conception of ideology prevails in the atmosphere of political liberalism with its concept of freedom of opinion.

So much talk and concern with the study of ideology has deprived the concept of ideology of its critical content. The modern sociology of Knowledge, for example, has taken ideology as its object of study and thereby ceases to be critical. Accepting the idea of the ambiguous conditioning of consciousness by existence, the sociology of knowledge has taken the task of describing the spiritual inclination and the world of ideas of a given social stratum and grounding them in a static typology. For example, Max Scheler, disregarding all history, has sought to enumerate the most general types of consciousness and their strict dependence on class position. According to him, the contemplation of becoming is rooted in the lower class; that of being, in the upper class; the mechanistic conception of the world has its basis in the upper class. Realism, that is, the conception of the world as resistant, is found in the lower class; the upper class inclines towards idealism or the world as the realm of ideas. Materialism is attributed to the lower class while spiritualism belongs with the upper class. Induction and empiricism is the inclination of the lower class in contrast to rationalism and a priori knowledge which finds its foothold in the upper class. The optimistic view of the future and the pessimistic judgment of the past are modes of thinking of the lower class, where by contrast, the upper class would assume a pessimistic look to the future in conjunction with a romantic, optimistic retrospective look at the image of the "good old times." Scheler furthermore insists that these points of view are not theories but that

they are unconscious inclinations conditioned by class. They are also more than mere prejudices; they are formal, inevitable laws of the formation of judgments deeply rooted in class status, independent of individuality, race, or nationality. Scheler wanted thereby to construct a systematic sociological theory of the idols (Scheler, 1926; taken from Adorno and Horkheimer, 1971:60).

The concept of ideology in Pareto was intimately bound to a relativistic position which did not exclude the absolutist doctrine of values. The sociology of knowledge, on the other hand, is the other face of the relativist outlook that now attempts to proclaim the conditioning of the spirit as an eternal philosophical principle. Both conceptions share the disregard of any historical consciousness. The criticism of existing conditions is therefore obliterated by this conception of ideology for such criticism would appear as an arbitrary imposition of metaphysical constructs. If praxis needs to be justified by immutable and necessary essences, but at the same time the historical conditioning of consciousness represents a denial of this philosophical necessity, then this contradiction itself represents the impotency of the concept of ideology to be critical of anything.

The criticism engendered by the Enlightenment's concept of ideology was identical with a theory of revolution. Utopia, the free creation of tomorrow's truth, although stimulated by the immediately present existing conditions of humanity and by man's created need to transcend these conditions, is not ultimately deducible from the latter. It represents an independence of consciousness which is more than a mere mark or impression of that which exists. With the Enlightenment, these utopian independent consciousnesses put forward the ideas of freedom, equality, justice, humanity, progress, and reason. Whether these represented the self-deceptive false consciousness of the dying feudal nobility which became self-destructive as Solomon claims, is not as important as the fact that it served, in the hands of the emerging bourgeoisie, to repudiate that order which the feudal nobility sought to justify.³

The repudiation of the feudal absolutist order by the bourgeois revolution materialized in the liberal capitalist order. The triumphant bourgeoisie came to regard their immediate class interests, their aspirations and their advancement as synonymous with the interests of all. Capital, the transcendental God of the bourgeois, was the principle of democracy that broke the bonds of superstition of the Church. Industrial property, increase in wealth and prosperity was to give power to the people; it was also the condition of freedom. Liberty was the abolition of monarchy and the nobility; the abolition of feudal landed property was the prerequisite for equality. In this new order the utopian ideas of freedom, equality, justice, and reason came to be conceived of as already realized. The free exchange of the market economy sustained this conception in the new capitalist reality. The freedom of contract, or the equal opportunity for wage labor and capital to exchange equivalents, sustained the belief of freedom and equality. The legal order was shaped under the banner of "equality of all before the law" as the realization of equality and justice. The state was finally the embodiment of reason (Rousseau) and was to defend the interests of all for all. What was actual was rational. What had been put forward by the Enlightenment as the criticism of ideology materialized into the self-comprehending ideological legitimation of capitalism. This dialectical negation came, then, to be sustained by the very reality of the capitalist functioning; it was itself part of and functioned as the comprehension of this reality. It became the false consciousness par excellence that obscured and concealed the possibilities for the realization of the utopian elements that it itself contained. It was an objectively necessary and yet false

consciousness which masked the consciousness of a "real" exploitation and alienation, thereby obliterating the possibility of ending them.

Ideology, then, is ideology only when it is thought that claims to be independent of its social foundation but is all the while dependent; it is thought which is not conscious of its dependence. This dependency has to be interpreted carefully; it refers to nothing more, again, than that thought is shaped as if the ideas of freedom, humanity and justice were already realized in the conditions of human existence as immediately given, and is consequently tied to this immediacy without attempting to go beyond it. This thought is consequently as much determined by, as it in turn determines, the immediate conditions; yet this thought thinks itself dependent. The so often called untruth of ideology refers precisely to the fact that ideological thought either denies this mutual determination or it is unconscious of it; it is a false consciousness tied to the appearances of capitalist reality. The submissive certitude of this consciousness manifests itself in a conformistic realism which when wanting to be critical does not and cannot go beyond skeptical fatalism. Freedom is reduced to the bare minimum of freedom to express opinions and the advocacy of controversy. For this consciousness, the serious attempt to go beyond the immediacy in which it is involved is regarded as another expression of the game of controversy. The success of this false consciousness that thinks itself to be critical is an expression, as Adorno would say, of "the forms of competitive society . . . in which the critic measures himself exclusively by his success in the market and he is, for that reason, a product of the market" (1962:11).

The truth of ideology, on the other hand, must be an unrealized truth; it refers to the unrealized utopian components which ideology regards as already realized in the reality to which it both refers and at the same time justifies. Ideology is then ideology only if it is simultaneously false and true. The fact that this statement must appear paradoxically contradictory to an ideological consciousness is precisely a manifestation of a thought which is constrained by a logic which examines immediacy as necessarily non-contradictory. I will not elaborate this point here. When we say that ideology is false only by its relationship to existing reality although it can be true in itself, or when we say that ideology is ideology only to the extent that it contains something which independently emerges from the social process, as something with its own proper claims, we simply mean that ideology presents the unrealized "true" ideas of freedom, humanity, justice, and equality as though they were already realized. Thus, ideology is the false thought which presents the historically earned truth contained within itself as if it were already realized truth.

* * *

This is the concept of ideology which the young Marx formulated out of his criticism of Hegel. I will return to this in Part II. But first we must see how its germs are already found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in relation with the dialectic of Mastery and Slavery which alone, according to Hegel, can comprehend History. For this, I follow Kojève's presentation of Hegel (See Kojève, 1969:31-70).

For Hegel, to understand the collapse of feudal society and the emergence of bourgeois capitalism is to understand the realization of the ideal of the French Revolution and this in turn entails understanding the ideas of the Aufklarung, the Enlightenment. But for Hegel, this was possible only by virtue of the conquest of Europe by Napoleon whereby the idea of man was realized and history came to an end or history was completed. The real process of historical evolution created by man and transforming him came to an end. It was then possible to become self-conscious of this process; this self-consciousness was the absolute knowledge to be revealed by Hegel in the Phenomenology.

Hegel begins by saying that human existence cannot be conceived without consciousness of the external world, that is, there must be revelation of "objective," "external" being by speech. But this consciousness, which Hegel calls "sense certainty" is "contemplative," "passive;" it leaves being independent of the knowledge that apprehends it. Consciousness is absorbed in the contemplation of the thing and does not yet represent self-consciousness and consequently no opposition between the apprehending subject and the apprehended object. In fact, man is yet not conscious of his existence; he cannot posit the "I am." For this to be possible, something other than purely passive contemplation must be present; this other is desire. Only then can man become aware of himself, for example, when he is hungry, thirsty, cold, et cetera. By desire man is brought back to himself and this entails the realization that there is he and an opposed external reality which is non-he. But desire cannot be desire without its entailing the transformation of that which is non-I, the negation of its independence by action, that is, action that negates or transforms the given. "The human I must be an I of Desire--that is, an active I, a negating I, an I that transforms Being and creates a new being by destroying the given being. . . Man is what he is only to the extent that he becomes what he is; his true Being is Becoming, Time, History; and he becomes, he is History only and by Action that negates the given, the Action of Fighting and of Work. . ." (Kojève, 1946:38).

Desire as yet is not sufficient for self-consciousness to exist, for the animal also negates nature but does not transcend itself as given; the animal simply remains in the immediacy of the satisfaction of its desire. To be human, then, entails more than just the satisfaction of animal desire; it entails not action to subjugate a thing, but action to subjugate another desire. Thus human desire is desire of an other desire; it is the desire for recognition and the action which ensues from it-- that reveals a distinctively human, nonbiological I. In other words, man cannot be conceived of without the existence of "several Desires that can desire one another mutually, each of which wants to negate, to assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the other Desire as Desire" (Kojève, 1946:40). Man, then, cannot be fully satisfied except by a universal recognition (by universal recognition (by universal self-consciousness)).⁴ In the beginning, though, the action that derives from this multiplicity of desires for universal recognition can be nothing other than a fight for life and death, a fight for recognition, for pure prestige. This is because desire of other desire is a negating action which goes beyond the biological given; and this is what is truly human. Human, historical existence is only possible where there have been bloody struggles and wars for recognition.

Since human reality cannot be conceived without the struggle for mutual recognition of one man by another, the fight for life and death cannot result in the death of one of the adversaries, for if such were to occur the victor would be left alone to be recognized by no one. The fight must therefore end in such a way that both adversaries remain alive. But this implies that the vanquished

submit to the victor whom he recognizes but who does not recognize him in turn. The victor becomes the Master of the vanquished while the latter becomes the Slave of the victor. And this amounts to the vanquished having to relinquish his desire for recognition and accepting the desire for biological survival.

For Hegel, then, four irreducible premises are required to understand the possibility of history, which is the history of fight and work: 1) the existence of revelation of given being through speech (sense certainty); 2) the existence of a desire which engenders action that destroys, negates, and transforms given being; 3) the existence of a multiplicity of desires striving for mutual recognition; and 4) the existence of the possibility of a future difference between Master and Slave. It is important to stress that the last premise underlies freedom. This is because nothing is assumed which predisposes the Master to mastery and the Slave to slavery; only the free act that creates the difference is assumed. By definition the free act is undeducible, hence, an absolute premise.

Now, the true and most vicious enemy of man is Nature, and it is the desire of being liberated from Nature which marks the first act of man as human. This liberation entails more than just animal desire, for as we have seen this is a necessary but not sufficient condition. What makes man human is the existence of non-biological desires of other's desires; he cannot be conceived otherwise. To rise above Nature, then, means to rise above the mere satisfaction of biological instincts. Liberation from Nature requires, therefore, its transformation, its negation. Work is the unique activity of man which accomplishes this. Work is "an essentially human and humanizing action" (Kojève, 1946:42). But true liberation from Nature, although accomplished through work cannot be realized within work. The Master's true liberation from Nature, his superiority over Nature, is realized by interposing work between him and Nature through the Slave who transforms it in conformity to the Master's demands. The work process is a creation of a second nature, a humanized world created by man in the course of his negating interaction with Nature. It is easy to understand now why for Hegel, universal history, which includes the interaction between men in relation to Nature, is the history which can be comprehended only through the dialectic of the opposition between belicose masters and working slaves. It is also easy to see why Hegel conceived the end of history at the moment of the dialectical overcoming of both Master and Slave, that is, when mankind is no longer split between masters and slaves. It is then that the possibility of full mutual understanding of "absolute knowledge," of "universal recognition" can be realized. What is less clear is that Hegel seemed to have concluded that he was able to have this "absolute knowledge" because history had in fact ended, that the synthesis of Mastery and Slavery had been realized in the Citizen of the universal and homogeneous state created by Napoleon. In order not to be detracted from Hegel's pathbreaking contribution, we must disregard this aspect (already criticized by Marx) for the time being.

We have seen that the Master's superiority over nature, his liberation from nature, has granted him Freedom. But this freedom, according to Hegel, involves a contradiction. On the one hand, the Master risked his life in a fight for recognition and this created the Slave who recognized him but was not recognized in turn. His act was not reciprocated. Reciprocal recognition entails recognition by someone else who is like oneself.⁵ But the Slave's recognition of the Master is only the recognition of a Slave, a Thing, an extension of the Master between him and Nature through the Slave's work; to be recognized by a Thing is like not being recognized at all. This involves the central assumption that the Master is not satisfied with his "real" freedom because it precludes recognition by another human being. The Master is only recognized by a Slave

who is not a human being but a thing. On the side of the Slave this entails that he is not recognized. We have then an "existential impasse." Master can either make himself brutish in pleasure or die on the field of battle as Master, but he cannot live consciously with the knowledge that he is satisfied by what he is" (Kojève's italics; Kojève, 1946:46-47). But this impasse cannot be resolved by the Master, as we will see below. Yet the human ideal contained in this impasse, born with the Master, "can be realized and revealed . . . only in and by Slavery" (Kojève, 1946:47). The ideal of freedom, after all, could only exist if Slavery exists.

The Slave, who has opted for a slavish existence because he feared death, works in the service of the Master. Since there is no other instinct forcing the Slave to work for the Master, just as there is nothing which predisposes the Slave to slavery, his survival depends on the fact that he works. By work, he negates, transforms the given Nature, and this entails the possession of a science, a technique, and the faculty of abstract notions. "Understanding, abstract thought, science, technique, the arts--all of these, then, have their origin in the forced work of the Slave" (Kojève, 1946:49). If the working Slave was the condition which realized the Master's freedom, now the Slave, by his work, succeeds in subduing the same Nature that dominated both him and the Master at the moment of the fight. Thus through his work, the Slave "by using the thought that arises from his Work, he forms the abstract notion of the Freedom that has been realized in him by this same Work" (Kojève, 1946:49). Of course, the notion of Freedom is abstract, not real, for the Slave remains in fact a Slave, albeit with an idea of Freedom and the consciousness of being a Slave, that is, unfree.

The Master, on the other hand, is free; he has no abstract idea of Freedom. Either freedom is real, or the idea of freedom is to be realized in the conditions of slavery. The Master strengthens the reality of Freedom by forcing the Slave to work more, that is, by further restricting the Slave's freedom. But this also strengthens the Slave's abstract idea of Freedom. The Master's freedom is at an impasse. In addition, it is particularistic and cannot be universally recognized as the idea of human Freedom. The latter can only be realized by the active abolition of Slavery and consequently the abolition of the Master's freedom; it is a qualitatively different freedom. Since the Master's freedom is realized only through and by the fight; it does not entail the transformation of the world of Nature. Man could not have changed, or engendered historical change, without the Slave's work. The liberation from Nature entailed in the Master's freedom is only a rising above Nature which leaves Nature untouched; it is an abstract negation of Nature in its totality. Only the Slave's work achieves a concrete negation of Nature and engenders the historical becoming of man. Work is the true liberating activity of man from his most acerbic enemy--Nature. It is this activity which has not only produced man's humanized Nature but through it man has changed himself. "Therefore, the historical process, the historical becoming of the human being, is the product of the working Slave and not of the warlike Master" (Kojève, 1946:52). For this reason also, the perpetuation of Master's freedom is the perpetuation of universal slavery of man by man and of man by Nature. The recognition of work as the essential liberating activity of man, hence humanizing, the conception that man is the point of departure and the point of arrival of all things, and the abstract idea of universal Freedom--all these are the legacy of the Enlightenment.

With this we come now closer to what interests us most. The Slave, through his work, elevated himself to the abstract idea of Freedom, and I will add the ideas of equality, justice, and humanity; but he can only realize these ideas by

the practical abolition of Slavery. But before realizing Freedom which entails facing the Master in a fight and risking his life, the Slave, in his failure to overcome mastery or in his inability to rise against the Master, invents a series of justifications to "reconcile the ideal of Freedom with the fact of slavery" (Kojève, 1946:53). These justifications we can call, for the moment, Slave "ideologies," although they do not yet correspond to the concept of ideology which I have briefly introduced above. For Hegel, the first of these ideologies is Stoicism. The Slave, with his abstract idea of freedom, convinces himself in thought that he is free and disregards the real conditions of existence which actually maintain him as a Slave. Freedom is still identical with freedom of thought. The similarity of a modern version of this Stoicism in the state was already pointed out by Hegel. The stoic's freedom precludes action and as long as there is "freedom of speech" things need not be changed. Inaction and changed conditions which still maintain slavery result in the next Slave ideology--skeptical-nihilism. Freedom of expression and the self-persuasion that there is freedom of thought regardless of the actual conditions of slavery turns into the abstract negation of the given conditions. Skeptical-nihilism in its extreme form culminates in solipsism: all that is not-I is abstractly denied. The contradiction of existence which Slave ideologies try to reconcile is not resolved in practice and is finally justified in thought by the most "rational," and therefore last, of Slave ideologies. For Hegel, this last Slave ideology is the Christian ideology. It is the central characteristic of Christianity that it does not try to deny the contradictory character of existence; on the contrary, it accepts it as necessary and inevitable. Freedom, equality, and justice are no longer either abstract and unrealizable ideas, nor an abstract negation of the given. Freedom is real in the "other world." The contradiction between the ideal freedom of the soul in the beyond and its servitude on earth is reflected in what Hegel called "unhappy consciousness." The synthesis of mastery and slavery can only be realized in the Beyond. In this world everything is slavery, and since Freedom and equality can only be realized in the "next life," there is no need to confront the Master. Action is therefore reduced to purely ethical and individualistic conduct that would merit one's attainment of the transcendental world without changing the conditions in this world. We must "give Caesar what is Caesar's and God what is God's." But in Christianity, Hegel says, the acceptance of worldly mastery is only at the expense of positing an absolute Master--God. Both the worldly Master and the Slave are made the slaves of a transcendental Master to whom everybody is a slave. The abstract quality between worldly Master and worldly Slave is achieved by accepting an absolute slavery. The solution is both ingenious and paradoxical. Now the Slave "although no longer has a Master, he does not cease to be a Slave." "He is a Slave without a Master, he is a Slave in himself, he is the pure essence of Slavery" (Kojève, 1946:56). In the final analysis we have, with Hegel, that the worldly Master was engendered when the vanquished, in the fight, accepted slavery as the price to be paid to preserve his biological life. The absolute transcendental Master was ironically engendered by a similar defeat: the necessity of accepting both the worldly Master (or Slave) and the condition of man's "necessary" existence--death, finiteness. Thus, the resolution of the internal contradiction of the Christian ideology requires now the liberation of man from the absolute Master while accepting the idea of death. The realization of Freedom in this world is possible then under the condition that man accept atheism.⁶ For Hegel, a definite step in this direction was effected in the French Revolution, which was still not a revolution in the sense that the Slave overthrew the conditions of slavery and was to be completed only by the universal "Absolute" State. The problem then becomes one of understanding the realization of the Christian ideology in the real world when there has been no fight between Masters and Slaves.

This is an important point for the understanding of a critical concept of ideology in the capitalist world.

The realization of the Christian Slave ideology in the real world can be understood as the emergence of the last and present form of ideology, that is, as we have mentioned before, the belief that the ideas of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity are already realized in the present conditions of bourgeois existence. Although a more detailed analysis of this would require showing how the pagan world of mastery becomes a Christian world of universal slavery, I will forego this analysis which is presented by Hegel in Section A of Chapter VI of the Phenomenology and summarized in Kojeve, 1946:57-63.

The Slave's Christian ideology was characterized, as all Slave ideologies, by the reconciliation of the fact of slavery with the idea of Freedom. But this reconciliation differed substantially from that of former Slave ideologies, as for example, stoicism and skepticism, in that it transformed both worldly mastery as well as slavery into a universal slavery of a transcendental Master--God. The crucial transition which interests us is the moment when the worldly masters accept their Slaves' ideology. It is at this point that "the pagan Man of Mastery has become the Christian Man of slavery; and all this without a Fight, without a Revolution properly so-called--because the Masters themselves have become Slaves . . . This Slave without a Master, this Master without a Slave, is what Hegel calls the Bourgeois, the private property owner" (Kojeve, 1946:63).

The emergence of the bourgeois is characterized by the fact that he must work like a Slave but unlike the latter he has no worldly Master. The bourgeois believes that he works for himself. Whereas the Slave worked, supported by the idea of the Master, the bourgeois works only for himself but he acknowledges no worldly master and he does not work supported by even the idea of the illusory community of the state which he does not yet have. The early capitalism of the working bourgeois was nothing but "an agglomeration of private property-owners, isolated from each other, without true community" (Kojeve, 1946:65). The bourgeois therefore must elevate property, production, money, profit capital to an absolute value and to a transcendental entity which "becomes independent of him and enslaves him just as the Master enslaved the Slave" (Kojeve, 1946:65). The Master of the working bourgeois is no longer a transcendental God but capital to whom he devotes his actions and sacrifices his sensual and biological desires. The existence of a transcendental ideal world represented in reality by money, capital presupposes an abnegation, an abstinence through which the working bourgeois transcends himself.⁷ But abnegation still reflects the dualism of the Christian ideology between a transcendent world, represented in reality by money, capital, and the actual, sensual, sacrificing and enslaved individual. Furthermore, the ideal of individuality, the synthesis of the particular and the universal which Christian ideology resolved in the "after-life," must now be resolved during man's life here on earth. For Hegel, the complete realization of the Christian ideal on earth is achieved by the bourgeois state: "The transcendent Universal (God), who recognizes the Particular, must be replaced by a Universal that is immanent in the World" (Kojeve, 1946:67). And this is what at the closing of the bourgeois revolution was to be achieved by Napoleon's empire: the realization of the Christian kingdom of heaven on earth.

The realization of the Christian ideal on earth requires the elimination of the idea of transcendence; it requires the unity of thought and action, of theory and praxis. This unique historical event happened precisely in the

bourgeois revolution. On the one hand, the working bourgeois prepared the social and political conditions, and on the other, the thought of the Enlightenment provided the theory which was successfully used by the revolutionary bourgeois. This theory destroyed the Christian theology while preserving the utopian elements which were to be realized. The thought of the Enlightenment was joined to the real process of the fight by the working bourgeois. In the bourgeois revolution, though, the synthesis of mastery and slavery took a peculiar form. It was not the result of a fight between Masters and Slaves, for in the bourgeois world there were no Masters. "The Fight in question, therefore, cannot be a class fight properly so-called, a war between the Masters and the Slaves. The bourgeois is neither Slave nor Master; he is--being the Slave of Capital--his own Slave. It is from himself, therefore, that he must free himself" (Kojève, 1946:69).

This is, in essence, Hegel's interpretation of history which provides the basis for an understanding of a critical concept of ideology. But before proceeding, some possible misinterpretations must be cleared up. It may appear that Hegel's exposition of the dialectic of fight and work and the struggle for recognition is an inversion of the real dialectic. Marx has often been quoted to support this warning. For example, in Capital, Marx points out that Hegel's mystification of the dialectic "must be turned right side up again if you want to discover the rational Kernel with the mystical shell" (Marx, 1967:20). But more frequently than Marx, it has been Engels who has been quoted for this purpose. In Anti-During, Engels indicates that for Hegel "things and their evolution were only the realized copies of the 'Idea' existing somewhere from eternity before the world was" (1962:38). And elsewhere Engels says: "The Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down"(1941:24). The insistence by mechanistic Marxism on such an "inversion" has resulted quite often in a position which regards consciousness as automatically determined by material processes and therefore has tried in vain to derive it mechanically from such processes, a procedure not different from that of the ideologues. The presentation that I have given, which follows Kojève's quite closely, has attempted to avoid such a mechanistic sheath while avoiding the extreme idealist mystification. That human desire is desire of an other desire, that it is the desire for recognition, cannot be denied without denying man as human, that is, different from the animal. In fact, man cannot be conceived otherwise. To attempt a derivation of consciousness from the dialectic of material processes is self-contradictory for it demands precisely what it opposes--the explanation of consciousness by consciousness.

Hence, we must be cautious about interpreting the dialectic of pure consciousness as the prejudiced account which sides with the Master's view. It is not nobility, honor in battle, heroic valor and bravery which account for the fact of slavery, although such concepts have in fact been used by the Masters themselves to justify domination. The servitude of the vanquished (the Slave) does not continuously result from the victor's superior valor but from the latter's advantageous position, as an already constituted Master to subdue the Slave and to enslave. To say that slavery emerges because the development of the forces of production made the employment of Slave profitable would beg the question of what and for whom it is profitable. Similarly, if recognition is made to result from the experience of real struggles, then, the dialectic of consciousness and existence is obliterated. That wealth, the monopolization of power and bellic technology, as well as the time for dedication to the arts of combat are ultimately bound to the Slave's recognition of the superiority of the Master is perfectly consistent with the dialectic of mastery and servitude. But this does neither imply

a justification of slavery nor of war for its own sake or in the name of a pure fight for recognition. Established slavery obviously means that Slaves are produced and reproduced under that system without being continuously the result of defeat in the field of battle. It is not the heroism of the Master or the spirit of submission of the Slave that reproduces the slave system. It is the alienation within this system which simultaneously allows its maintenance and raises consciousness beyond the system itself. Far from condoning slavery as a system of oppression, Hegel has shown how the "universal self-consciousness" of man, his total satisfaction, can only be achieved by the synthesis of mastery and slavery, that is, the end of slavery and oppression. Only the dialectic of fight and work could make this clear; but only a dialectic which allows consciousness not to be mechanically determined by sheer material processes, a dialectic which instead exalts man's consciousness above and beyond the real conditions with which it interacts, can grasp both the "unhappy consciousness" and its self-transcendence in reality. Rather than concealing the real struggles of the Slaves in history, or intellectually condemning the system of slavery, Hegel has provided a powerful interpretation of history whereby the illusions of man's consciousness are deciphered in connection with the real historical circumstances which accompanied them and which simultaneously brought their overcoming. It was left to Marx to continue the same task for the historical period of established capitalism.

Hegel comprehended both the dependent and independent components of the Slave ideology in its historical movement. But Hegel's account of the abolition of the historically developed Slave's ideology by its realization in the bourgeois revolution resulted not in the abolition of ideology in general but in the establishing of ideology in its new form and its new content. To the extent that Hegel regarded the historically won truth as already realized in the bourgeois order, in the absolute state, he was advocating the ideology of the new order. It was the acceptance of the critical thought of the Enlightenment as already realized. In spite of this, Hegel must be credited for having shown that the new ideology can only be understood as the dialectical overcoming of the last Slave ideology--Christianity--in the bourgeois revolution, which was not a revolution properly so-called. The bourgeois revolution, and this point must be stressed, did in fact abolish the Slave ideology by realizing it but it did not abolish slavery. Slave ideology, if we recall, resulted from the failure to realize the abstract idea of freedom; these ideologies were therefore characterized by theoretical attempts to reconcile the ideal of Freedom with the fact of slavery. The Master, with no ideal to realize, for freedom is not an ideal to him but a reality, cannot succeed in going beyond this freedom. His thought could be said to be oriented toward the maintenance of the condition of mastery and the subjugation of the Slave by force and domination. The first step toward the abolition of Slave ideology was taken when the Masters accepted the ideology of their Slaves. It is only at this point that we can talk about a Master's ideology; the reason is because the Masters themselves have become Slaves. This is what happened with Christianity as the last of the Slave's ideologies. It was the abolition of this ideology, the Slaves' ideology taken up by their masters, which the working bourgeois, which was neither a Slave nor a Master, accomplished and in doing so established the ideology of the capitalist era. The theoretical abolition of the Master's ideology carried out by the Enlightenment joined the actual bourgeois movement and was realized in practice. The new order contained now the abolished Master's ideology in a new form and with a new content--freedom, equality, and justice were perceived as realized, not in thought, but in the actual political and economic bourgeois order. The actual workings of the bourgeois order, based on the principle of exchange, came

in fact to sustain this conviction. Thus, a critical concept of ideology must allow the criticism of the actual working of this order, and this is what Marx proposed.

Footnotes

*Part II to be published in a subsequent issue of the KANSAS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY will deal with the development of the concept of ideology and the critique of science.

¹Maynard Solomon has advanced the idea that the Enlightenment was in part the false consciousness of a dying class (the feudal nobility). It was the dream world of a feudal society in dissolution. The Enlightenment simultaneously served as a critique of feudal society and as a vehicle for the bourgeois repudiation of that society. It co-opted and neutralized the radical intellectualism but it was one of the means by which absolutism was ultimately destroyed. "The Utopia of the nobility was an affirmation of rationality and beauty. . . . But the rational was not real: The history of the declining years of feudalism was marked by the eruption of the 'irrational' forces of revolution, war, decadence and decline. Therefore the affirmation of rationality involved a self-deception which required a reality-transcending affirmation." Thus the enlightenment as feudal self-justification was self-destructive. (Solomon, 1971:32-47, esp. 32-33 and 40).

²Consciousness is not dependent on merely individual physiological processes, or is an independent and ahistorical datum; on the contrary, consciousness is rooted on the underlying objective processes of society. The forms and content of consciousness change with the change of man's praxis. This conception was clearly established by Marx in the Holy Family and The German Ideology. Ideology is not rooted on individual consciousness but it encompasses all the false consciousness embodied in man's political, juridical, artistic, and religious forms of thought. It is for this reason that "neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life" (Marx, 1970:20).

³Solomon's contention that the main line of Enlightenment thought "was developed by men of aristocratic origin or was encouraged under the aegis of aristocratic patronage" (he mentions for example the cases of Holbach, Montesquieu, Turgot, Grim, Dalember, who were aristocrats by birth, but also those who were not but who were patronized by the nobility such as Rousseau, Diderot, Herder, Voltaire, etc.) does not prove that the Enlightenment was an ideology. In fact this more than confuses matters, for labeling these ideas as ideology may lead to a dangerous interpretation which would eliminate the possibility of something better (See: Solomon, 1971:33-34).

⁴It must be mentioned that expressions such as "desire as desire," do not appear in Hegel. He uses instead expressions such as "self-consciousness finds its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."

⁵It has been pointed out by Kojève somewhere else that the relation domination to servitude does not take in account the recognition of masters among themselves. See: Alexandre Kojève, "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme," Critique (August-Sept.), 1946:353.

⁶Nietzsche's "principle of ressentiment" and "bad conscience" follows the same dialectic of Hegel. Ressentiment develops among the Slave. Having produced the idea of Freedom, the Slave resents the evaluation of mastery as good, aristocratic, beautiful, happy, and effects a transvaluation by which his wretched, poor, weak, lowly, suffering condition becomes the good, pious, the blessed, the saved. This transvaluation is only an imaginary revenge, a reaction, a revolt in morals. The idea of Freedom is only expressed as a critical ressentiment. The reconciliation of the idea of Freedom with the fact of slavery becomes diverted resentment: if I suffer it must be somebody's fault; the fault is in myself against myself. The concepts of guilt, sin, corruption, develop simultaneously with the displacement of Freedom to the other world. This is the "bad conscience" that accompanies the diverted ressentiment of the Slave and is eventually adopted by the Master. The contradiction of existence reflected in the Slave's "bad conscience" is elevated to the level of universality. Its resolution, freeing mankind from "bad conscience," is only possible with atheism.

⁷Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism grasped this moment of the bourgeois revolution. "With great regularity," Weber says, "we find the most genuine adherents of Puritanism among the classes which were rising from a lowly status, the small bourgeois and farmers." The "calling," the "asceticism" of hard work for the sake of capital found among the emerging bourgeoisie were the worldly substitutes of the transcendental God. "The pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions" (See Weber, 1958:174, 181-182).

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