Social Psychology of Prejudice:

Historical and Contemporary Issues

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Ethnocentrism and Prejudice: A Search for Universals

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The term "ethnocentrism" was coined by William Graham Sumner in his book *Folkways* (1906). The concept was driven by the observation that human social arrangements are universally characterized by differentiation into in-groups and out-groups—the we-they distinctions that demarcate boundaries of loyalty and cooperation among individuals. Attitudes and values are shaped by this ingroup-outgroup distinction in that individuals view all others from the perspective of the ingroup. In Sumner's words, ethnocentrism is

> ...the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it...Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones...(E)thnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others" (Sumner, 1906, pp. 12-13).

From the Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism to the Minimal Group Paradigm: A Personal Odyssey

When I began my graduate studies at Northwestern University in 1964, Donald Campbell had just initiated an ambitious interdisciplinary project in collaboration with anthropologist Robert LeVine (then at the University of Chicago) to test cross-culturally the universality of ethnocentric perception as postulated by Sumner. In a volume that provided the theoretical background for the Cross-Cultural Study of Ethnocentrism (CCSE), Levine and Campbell (1972) identified 23 facets of culture that differentiate attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors toward the ingroup from those directed toward outgroups. Based on Sumner's observations, they derived a list of characteristics of the ethnocentrism syndrome, including viewing "us" as virtuous and superior, "them" as immoral and inferior; viewing "us" as peaceloving and cooperative, "them" as treacherous and untrustworthy; loyalty, respect and obedience toward ingroup authority, contempt for outgroup authority; and differential sanctions for acts of aggression toward ingroup vs outgroup members.

In order to test the idea that these ethnocentric orientations are characteristic of human society, the CCSE project (funded by a grant from the Carnegie Foundation) introduced a novel method of data collection designed to blend ethnographic case study and structured interview techniques. Experienced ethnographers in field sites in Africa, New Guinea, North America, and Asia were commissioned to use their best local informants to obtain information on precolonial ingroup organization and intergroup attitudes, using a structured, open-ended interview format. Back in Evanston, Illinois, I took on the position of Graduate Research Associate for the project, responsible for processing, organizing, and archiving the fieldnotes from each of the project sites as they were submitted by the ethnographers. That experience exposed me to the rich detail of ethnographic accounts of social behavior and provided exotic examples of customs, practices, and beliefs that reveal the enormous range of ways in which groups manage both intragroup and intergroup relationships. It also established in me a fascination with the study of group identity and intergroup attitudes that determined my research career path in social psychology from that point on.

Lessons from Across Cultures

When the data collection phase of the CCSE project was complete, the fieldnotes (re-typed in standardized format) were archived with the Human Relations Area Files at Yale University where they are available in bound form as an HRAFlex book series (Brewer, 1972). The series contains transcripts of detailed interviews with informants from 19 cultures, in many cases representing discussions with the last living members of those societies who had personal memories of life prior to European contact. To this day, those interviews constitute a yet largely unmined source of rich data about intergroup relations, attitudes, and stereotypes among small, stateless societies in precolonial times. By the time the interviews had been systematized and archived, LeVine, Campbell, and I had all moved on to other projects, including analyzing the results of a large-scale survey study that had been conducted in East Africa as an adjunct to the CCSE ethnographic data collection (Brewer, 1968; Brewer & Campbell, 1976). But that initial immersion in cross-cultural investigation of social relations left an indelible mark on my own thinking about human nature and social group behavior.

The CCSE project did provide some evidence relevant to Sumner's original hypotheses about the nature of ethnocentrism and human societies. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the coded interviews and survey responses confirmed the robustness of the tendency to differentiate the social environment in terms of ingroup-outgroup distinctions and to value ingroup characteristics over those of other groups (Brewer, 1979a; 1981; Brewer & Campbell, 1976). Interestingly, however, the findings did not confirm Sumner's basic assumption about the reciprocal nature of ingroup and outgroup relations. In his initial portrayal of the ethnocentrim syndrome, Sumner (1906) included negative attitudes toward outgroups as well as positive feelings and evaluations of the ingroup. As he put it…

> The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder. . . (Sumner, 1906, p. 12)

Further, he assumed an explicit negative correlation between ingroup and outgroup attitudes such that the greater the attachment and solidarity within the ingroup, the greater the hostility and contempt directed toward outgroups. This hypothesized relationship between ingroup love and outgroup hate derived from Sumner's functional theory of the origins of social groups and intergroup conflict:

> . . .The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. . . Thus war and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup situation. . . Sentiments are produced to correspond. Loyalty to the ingroup, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all all group together, *common products of the same situation* (Sumner, 1906, pp. 12-13, emphasis added).

Contrary to this strong position that ingroup and outgroup orientations are mutually reinforcing and arise from the same conditions of intergroup conflict and competition over scarce resources, our interviews with representatives of nonwestern societies revealed a wide range of attitudes toward recognized outgroups, from respect and mutual admiration to relative indifference to outright hostility. As one of our informants put it "…we have our ways and they have their ways," and preference for the ingroup ways did not necessarily require intolerance of the outgroup. Further, the level of ingroup cohesion and loyalty did not appear to be correlated with degree of negativity of attitudes toward outgroups. In the East African survey segment of the CCSE, we collected interview data on reciprocal attitudes and stereotypes among 30 tribal groups within Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Although respondents from almost all of the groups surveyed exhibited systematic differential positive evaluation of their ingroup over all outgroups on dimensions such as trustworthiness, obedience, friendliness, and honesty, the correlation between this measure of ingroup positivity and distancing from outgroups was essentially .00 across the thirty groups (Brewer & Campbell, 1976, p. 85).

Thus, it was the experience gained from the CCSE project that first convinced me that ingroup preference and outgroup prejudice are two different things. Although related, the two have different origins and different consequences for intergroup behavior (Brewer, 1999; 2001).

Lessons from the Laboratory

Approximately simultaneously with the data collection phase of the CCSE project, Henri Tajfel's social psychology research group in Bristol, England, was developing a very different paradigm for studying ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination. In a laboratory setting, experiments with the so-called "minimal intergroup situation" (Tajfel, 1970) provided a powerful demonstration that merely classifying individuals into arbitrary distinct social categories was sufficient to produce ingroup-outgroup discrimination and bias, even in the absence of any interactions with fellow group members or any history of competition or conflict between the groups.

Remarkably, results of the cross-cultural field research and these laboratory studies converged in confirming the power of we-they distinctions to produce differential evaluation, liking, and treatment of other persons depending on whether they are identified as members of the ingroup category or not. The laboratory experiments with the minimal intergroup situation demonstrated that ethnocentric loyalty and bias clearly do not depend on kinship or an extensive history of interpersonal relationships among group members, but can apparently be engaged readily by symbolic manipulations that imply shared attributes or common fate. What appears to be critical for ingroup attachment is that there be a basis for distinctive identification of who is "us" and who is "them"--a rule of exclusion as well as inclusion.

Additional experimental research demonstrated just how powerfully mere social categorization can influence differential thinking, feeling and behaving toward ingroup versus outgroup members. Upon social categorization of individuals into ingroups and outgroups, people spontaneously experience more positive affect toward the ingroup. They also favor ingroup members directly in terms of evaluations and resource allocations (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), as well as indirectly in valuing the products of their work (Ferguson & Kelley, 1964: Dustin & Davis, 1970). In addition, ingroup membership increases the psychological bond and feelings of “oneness” that facilitates the arousal of promotive tension or empathy in response to others’ needs or problems (Hornstein, 1976) so that prosocial behavior is offered more readily to ingroup than to outgroup members (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981). Moreover, people are more likely to be cooperative and exercise more personal restraint when using endangered common resources when these are shared with ingroup members than with others (Kramer & Brewer, 1984), and they work harder for groups they identify more as their ingroup (Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 1998).

Further, experiments with the minimal intergroup situation also provided additional evidence that ingroup favoritism is prior to, and not necessarily associated with, outgroup negativity or hostility. In my review of the early miminal group experiments I concluded that ...

> The majority of studies…indicate that increases in bias are associated with enhanced in-group evaluation, whereas out-group ratings remain relatively constant…The results in general, then, are consistent with the conclusion that in-group bias rests on the perception that one's own group is better, although the out-group is not necessarily depreciated…

These conclusions were further supported by results from the program of research conducted by Amelie Mummendey and her colleagues on the positive-negative asymmetry in ingroup bias (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Although the initial experiments by Tajfel et al. (1971) claimed that ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation occurred for allocations of both positive and negative outcomes, subsequent research suggested that when the outcomes to be distributed are negative or harmful, the usual intergroup discrimination may be lessened or may disappear all together. Hewstone, Fincham, and Jaspars (1981) modified the original paradigm by asking group members to subtract money from ingroup and outgroup recipients. Although some ingroup bias was observed in this context, the levels were lower than those obtained with the standard allocation matrices. Mummendey et al. (1992) extended this finding by asking participants to distribute different durations of an unpleasantly high-pitched tone to ingroup and outgroup members. With harm as an outcome, ingroup bias was generally eliminated and strategies to equalize or minimize the amount of aversive stimulation were observed.

In general, individuals in these laboratory experiments show little reluctance to favor the ingroup when distributing positive outcomes, but are much less likely to show bias when discrimination involves delivering negative outcomes to the outgroup. Subsequent research in both laboratory and field settings has come to acknowledge the important distinction between ingroup bias that reflects beneficence and positive sentiments toward the ingroup that are withheld from outgroups ("subtle" prejudice) and discrimination that reflects hostility, derogation, and intent to harm the outgroup ("blatant" prejudice) (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). This is not to say that ingroup-based discrimination is benign or inconsequential. Indeed, many forms of institutional racism and sexism are probably attributable to discrimination based on ingroup preference rather than prejudice against outgroups (Brewer, 1996). Nonetheless, the absence of positive regard and lack of trust for outgroups that is characteristic of most ingroup-outgroup differentiation can be conceptually and empirically distinguished from the presence of active hostility, distrust, and hate for outgroups that characterizes virulent prejudice.

Laboratory Experiments on the Contact Hypothesis

For many American social psychologists who do research on intergroup relations and prejudice, the study of race relations in the U.S. constituted the prototypical case that both motivated and informed their interest in this field of research. As the initial section of this chapter indicates, my own introduction into the field had a somewhat different origin. Nonetheless, it was impossible to be a researcher interested in the study of intergroup relations and not get involved in the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 70s and the social policy issues surrounding desegregation and affirmative action that ensued.

Inspired in part by Gordon Allport's classic book on *The Nature of Prejudice* (Allport, 1954) and the Social Science Statement submitted as part of an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Brown v Bd of Education of Topeka case in that same year, the so-called "contact hypothesis" became social psychology's focal contribution to prescriptions for reducing intergroup prejudice. The history of the contact hypothesis and its influence on social policy is best treated elsewhere (see Pettigrew, this volume), but this history provided the backdrop for the next phase of my own program of research, after the CCSE.

The basic idea behind the original contact hypothesis was elegantly simple: If separation and unfamiliarity breed stereotypes and intergroup prejudice (negative attitudes, hostility), then these effects should be reversible by promoting contact and increased familiarity between members of different groups or social categories. The underlying theoretical assumptions were that contact under cooperative interactive conditions provides opportunity for positive experiences with outgroup members that disconfirm or undermine previous negative attitudes and ultimately change attitudes toward and beliefs about the group as a whole. But contact theory was born in the crucible of racial conflict and research on the effects of contact during the 1960s and 70s took place almost entirely in highly politicized field contexts (i.e., schools, public housing, the military) where a multitude of variables determined the social and psychological conditions of contact and the success or failure of the contact experiences (cf. Amir, 1969; Cook, 1985). As a consequence, the contact hypothesis itself accumulated a growing list of qualifiers and modifications (beyond the initial list of equal-status, intimate, cooperative contact) based primarily on experience rather than underlying theory. By late 1970s (as one social psychologist put it), the elegant hypothesis had become more like a "bag lady, encumbered with excess baggage" (Stephan, 1987).

By 1980 it was apparent that contact research needed a more elaborated theory of what the underlying processes are and how they mediate the effects of intergroup contact under different conditions. At that time, it seemed to me that the implications of the minimal group paradigm experiments and the theory of social categorization and social identity that these experiments gave rise to in European social psychology could be brought to bear on contact research in the U.S. First, the minimal intergroup experiments had demonstrated that intergroup processes could be created and studied in the laboratory, providing a potential testing ground for hypothesized effects of proposed interventions to reduce intergroup discrimination and hostility. Second, social categorization theory, as represented in the work by Doise (1978) and Tajfel (1969; 1978), could provide a conceptual framework for understanding the processes by which intergroup contact might produce changes in intergroup attitudes and behavior.

Both of these ideas were further developed in a chapter that Norman and Miller and I wrote for our edited volume on the contact hypothesis (Brewer & Miller, 1984). In that chapter we hypothesized that the effectiveness of intergroup contact for reducing prejudice and ingroup bias would depend on whether the conditions of contact promoted *person-based* or *category-based* information processing. If category membership remains a salient feature of the contact situation, contact merely reinforces ingroup-outgroup differentiation and associated ethnocentric biases. However, if the interaction context encourages personalized attention to individual group members, then a process of *decategorization* should result that eliminates category-based favoritism and prejudices. We hypothesized further that cooperative contact would be most likely to reduce category-based processing when (1) the nature of the interaction in the contact situation promotes an interpersonal orientation rather than a task orientation to fellow participants, and (2) the assignment of roles, status, and functions in the cooperative system is independent of category membership.

In order to test these hypotheses, we undertook a program of research using a laboratory paradigm derived from the minimal intergroup situation. As in the original experiments, participants in this paradigm are first divided into arbitrary social categories based on a meaningless classification task. Going beyond the minimal conditions, however, participants assigned to the two categories are then separated to talk or work together in their respective ingroups. Following this ingroup formation phase, representatives from both categories are then brought together to participate in an interactive, cooperative team effort. (During the interactive contact, group members wear colors or badges that clearly indicate their category identity throughout the contact period.) The phases of the experiment are designed to provide a laboratory "analogue" for intergroup segregation and desegregation (contact) in the real world. The conditions of the cooperative contact could then be systematically manipulated to alter the cognitive representation of the interaction context from an intergroup situation characterized by category-based information processing to an interpersonal situation characterized by person-based information processing.

Effects of Personalization

Our initial experiments using this laboratory paradigm attempted to manipulate directly the degree of personalized attention to fellow team members required in the cooperative setting (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992; Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985). Following categorization and ingroup formation phases of the experiment, four-person teams consisting of two "underestimators" and two "overestimators" were formed to engage in a cooperative problem-solving discussion task. Teams were randomly assigned to one of three social orientation conditions: 1) task focus instructions, 2) interpersonal focus instructions, or 3) a control (default) condition with no explicit social orientation specified. In the task-focus condition, team members were instructed to attend to the quality of task-relevant suggestions generated by team members. In the interpersonal orientation condition, participants were told that it was important to form an accurate impression of what fellow team members are really like. Following these instructions, teams were given time to generate individual ideas and then to engage in discussion to reach a team consensus on a problem solution.

After completing their team task, individual participants responded to post-interaction questionnaires assessing their evaluations of the team effort and each of their fellow team members. These measures included evaluative ratings of each member's cooperation and friendliness, and a point-allocation measure of each member's perceived contribution to the group solution. One indicator of category-based information processing is the degree of ingroup bias present in these measures following team interaction. If team members are being perceived in terms of their category membership, then average ratings of the fellow ingroup team member should be higher than average ratings of the two outgroup members, independent of actual differences in behavior or contribution. Results on this measure indicated that the degree of category-based bias was significant in the no-focus control condition, highest in the task-focus condition, and virtually eliminated in the personal-focus condition.

Two other post-interaction measures were also taken as further indicators of category- and person-based differentiation among team members. One was a measure of perceived within-category similarity, based on ratings of similarity between the two outgroup team members and similarity between self and the other ingroup member. The second was a measure of intrapersonal complexity based on the number of different items checked from a list of behaviors when respondents were asked to indicate which behaviors they could "visualize" each team member engaging in (see Bettencourt et al., 1992). Following the team interaction phase, intracategory similarity ratings were higher in the no focus and task focus conditions than in the personalized condition, especially for outgroup perceptions. These effects were mirrored in the visual complexity scores, which were significantly lower in the task focus conditions. Together these results provided convergent evidence that an interpersonal social orientation could increase person-based processing (as indicated by intracategory differentiation) relative to category-based processing in intergroup contact situations.

The Generalization Question

Although the reduction of ingroup bias in judgments about individual category members represents one positive effect of increasing person-based processing in intergroup situations, this approach to changing intergroup relations is not without its drawbacks. The primary criticism of the effectiveness of personalization in intergroup contact situations revolved around the issue of generalization from the contact experience itself to attitudes and perceptions about the outgroup category as a whole. Critics argued that interactions that are defined as interpersonal rather than intergroup do not generalize beyond the immediate situation (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Rothbart & John, 1985). This is a legitimate criticism based on the assumptions of the dual mode model itself. If category-based processing and person-based processing are two distinct modes that result in different types of cognitive representations, then personalized experiences with outgroup members will not have any direct effects on attitudes toward the outgroup category as a whole. Interpersonal (person-based) interactions are disassociated from the category identities of the participants and hence cognitive representations of the categories themselves are not affected.

In response to these criticisms, Brewer and Miller (1988) argued that there are different forms of generalization from specific contact experiences to cognitive representations of categories and category differences. Single, personalized contacts with individual members of an outgroup category may not generalize in a way that alters the overall category prototype. However, repeated experiences with personalizing or individuating outgroup members may affect category structures by way of two other generalization processes.

First is the process of decategorization itself. In the original presentation of the theory (Brewer & Miller, 1984) we contended that personalized contact experiences would generalize because "…extended and frequent ultilization of alternative information features in interactions undermines the availability and usefulness of category identity as a basis for future interactions with the same or different individuals" (p. 288). In effect, through personalization experiences, categories lose their diagnostic significance as a way of organizing cognitive representations of the situation. Repeated experiences in which category boundaries are made less salient eventually reduces the social meaningfulness of the category distinction itself. As categories become less socially meaningful, category-based processing and associated category-based biases are reduced in general.

The second generalization process involves changes in the differentiation or complexity of the category representation. Even though the abstract prototype of the category as a whole may not be altered, representations of the category may come to include differentiated subtypes or individual exemplars that increase perceived heterogeneity of the category membership (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). Like decategorization, increased complexity also reduces the usefulness of the overall category distinction as a meaningful way to organize social perception and hence should also reduce category-based errors and biases.

In our laboratory experiments on intergroup contact, we did obtain some evidence that cooperative contact experiences that promote personalization of outgroup members do generalize to perceptions of the social category as a whole. Following cooperative team interaction in the Bettencourt et al. (1992) experiment, participants engaged in another task that involved viewing a videotape of another group interaction between members of underestimator and overestimator categories. After viewing the video, participants rated the individual performers on evaluative scales and with a reward allocation measure of contribution to the team efforts. These ratings provided an opportunity to assess whether the reduction in ingroup bias within the contact situation generalized to new situations involving other category members. Overall, results from the video ratings paralleled those from ratings of own team members. The participants in the personalized social orientation condition showed significantly less ingroup bias on both evaluative and reward allocation measures than did participants from the no focus or task focus contact conditions.

Based on these findings, the personalization/decategorization model of intergroup contact suggests an alternative mechanism for prejudice reduction. Instead of changing the content and evaluation of the cognitive representation of the outgroup, personalized contact between members of different social categories may reduce the ingroup-outgroup differentiation itself by increasing the complexity of category representations and ultimately eliminating the cognitive and social meaning of the category distinction. This alternative calls attention to a potentially important distinction between the content of social category representations and the process of ingroup-outgroup differentiation and its associated affect and emotions. Both derive from social categorization and both can lead to prejudice and discrimination, but by different routes, as I describe in the final section of this chapter.

Social Categorization, Stereotyping, and Prejudice:

A Perspective on Current Research

At least since the 1950s (cf. Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1956; Tajfel, 1969), social psychologists have recognized that intergroup prejudice and stereotyping arise in part from normal processes of categorization of the social world. Just as category learning and category representations are functional necessities for dealing with objects and events in the environment generally, discrete social categories serve to simplify, structure, and regulate our understandings of and interactions with other people. By carving variability among individuals into discrete groupings, categorization reduces complexity and leads to enhanced perceived similarity within categories and contrast (differentiation) between categories. Category distinctions influence both perception of and behavior toward category members, individually and collectively.

Social categorization underlies the phenomena of group cognition and social stereotypes. Social categorization also underlies ingroup-outgroup differentiation and associated intergroup processes. Because of this common origin, there has been a tendency in the social psychological literature to conflate studies of stereotyping, prejudice, and ingroup bias – as if *group* cognition and *intergroup* relations were one and the same. By contrast, I think it is important to maintain a distinction between these two consequences of social categorization, as represented in Figure 1.



On the one hand, as represented on the left side of Figure 1, social categorization gives rise to social stereotypes in the form of category prototypes, perceived trait distributions, and implicit theories about the social meaning of the category. Category stereotypes in turn have both evaluative and behavioral implications. Evaluations of individual category members and the category as a whole are derived from the positivity and negativity of the category stereotype, which may be predominantly positive, predominantly negative, or a mixture of both positive and negative characteristics.

Category stereotypes also regulate behavior toward category members. Stereotype-based discrimination arises when persons are treated differentially as a function of their category membership based on beliefs about the category as a whole. Gender discrimination provides a good illustrative case for the disassociation between stereotype-based discrimination and negative prejudice. Stereotypes about women are predominantly positive in evaluative connotation, yet women are often disadvantaged in employment selection and promotion because of the implications of those stereotypes for expectations regarding competency and power. An important feature here is that such stereotype-based discrimination can follow from beliefs about *any* social category, *regardless of whether the perceiver is a member of that category or not.* In that sense, stereotyping is the product of "cold cognition," uninfluenced by self-referencing and associated emotional significance.

It is precisely this element of self-referencing or self-involvement that distinguishes stereotyping from prejudice, as represented on the right side of Figure 1. Prejudice arises when ingroup-outgroup differentiation is engaged in connection with particular social categorizations. In other words, prejudice involves thinking of social groups or categories in me-not me terms. Category membership alone is not sufficient to engage this differentiation between self and not-self. Even though I recognize that I am a member of the category "women," I can think about women as a social category (with associated stereotypes) without thinking of women as an "in-group." Ingroup differentiation involves an additional process of self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987) or social identification whereby my sense of self is extended to the group as a whole (Brewer, 1991). Similarly, I can think about a category (e.g., "librarians") to which I do not belong without invoking "out-group" feelings. A category becomes an outgroup only when the self is actively disassociated from the group, in a "not-me" sense.

As depicted in Figure 1, prejudice arising from ingroup-outgroup differentiation processes can have three different loci. One form is the *ingroup* favoritism that has been the focus of much of the research on intergroup relations conducted within the social identity theory tradition. Here the focus in on differentiation of the ingroup from everyone else (the "us" – "not us"distinction). In this case there may or may not be any explicit outgroup; just the generalized "others" is sufficient. Prejudice and discrimination arise from differential favorability/positivity toward those who share this ingroup identity, but without any corresponding negativity or hostility toward non-ingroup members. Discrimination results from withholding from others favors and benefits that are extended only to the ingroup. As reviewed earlier in this chapter, ethnocentric bias usually reflects this type of ingroup prejudice.

A second form of prejudice – perhaps the most virile form – is focused on the outgroup, without the necessity of any explicit ingroup identification being involved. The important distinction here is between "them" and "me," an explicit dissociation of the self from the target outgroup usually accompanied by negativity and hostility toward that group. In many cases, prejudice against gays or against specific stigmatized groups such as "skinheads" is probably outgroup prejudice of this type. Discrimination that is derived from outgroup prejudice (hate) is actively directed at harming or disadvantaging members of the outgroup, whether or not any personal benefit is gained in the process.

Finally, a third form of prejudice derives from the relationship *between* an ingroup and specific outgroups—the classic "us"- "them" distinction. This is the type of prejudice that is aroused when intergroup comparison and competition is activated, with the consequence that ingroup benefits come at the expense of the outgroup and vice versa. It is the type of prejudice aroused when the outgroup is perceived as a threat, not only to the self but to the integrity, interests, or identity of the ingroup as a whole. Discrimination derived from this form of prejudice is motivated more by ingroup protection (rather than enhancement) as well as antagonism toward the outgroup.

These forms of ingroup-outgroup prejudice are, of course, not mutually exclusive. All share the characteristic of strong emotional and affective investment ("hot" cognition) associated with self-involvement. Many chronic prejudices (and associated discrimination) probably involve elements of all three types of ingroup-outgroup prejudice. In some cases, however, claims of ingroup preservation and protection may be used to justify what is really outgroup prejudice or hate. White supremists, for instance, frequently claim that their real purpose is enhancing and maintaining the identity and interests of the white race (as opposed to being anti-outgroups). But close scrutiny of their rhetoric and internal communications reveals a heavy dominance of outgroup hate speech relative to ingroup promotion (Polifroni, von Hippel, & Brewer, 2001).

My emphasis here on the conceptual and empirical distinction between group cognition as represented by stereotyping and intergroup processes as represented by ingroup-outgroup prejudice is not meant to imply that the two are unrelated. On the contrary, there is probably a great deal of "leakage" between group cognition and ingroup-outgroup feelings and vice versa. Strong negative stereotypes of a particular social category (to which one does not belong) are very likely to lead to negative affect and prejudice directed against that group. On the other hand, ingroup favoritism and outgroup antagonism can color the evaluation of characteristics associated with that social category. Even positive stereotypic traits can become negatively valued when they are attributed to an outgroup, and ingroup traits can be positively valued even when they are stigmatizing characteristics (Campbell, 1967). Nonetheless, even though there is certainly this type of mutual influence between stereotypes and prejudices, it is important to understand and recognize the difference between discrimination that is based on group cognition and discrimination that is driven by group identification and emotion.

Some compelling evidence for the distinction between stereotype-based processes and ingroup-outgroup processes comes from recent research on implicit cognition. Initial research on behavioral priming (Bargh, Dhen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000) indicated that priming the label or content of a social category automatically activates stereotype-related concepts which in turn elicit behavioral responses that are assimilated to the activated concept. This assimilation to the category stereotype occurs even for persons who are not themselves members of the primed category. Thus, young college students who have been primed with terms associated with the elderly have been found to walk more slowly (Bargh et al., 1996), and intelligent college students primed with the category "hooligans" perform more poorly on a subsequent cognitive task than students primed with the category "professor" (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998) Such assimilative behavioral priming is apparently elicited by the mere activation of the mental representation of the social category, independent of its self-relevance.

More recent experiments, however, demonstrate that these priming effects are significantly altered when ingroup-outgroup categorization is made salient prior to the category priming experience. In this case, priming the outgroup category label elicits automatic behavioral contrast rather than assimilation (Schubert, 2001; Spears, Gordijn, & Dijksterhuis, 2001). Apparently, engaging the self concept and social identities significantly changes responses to the category representation, even at this nonconscious level. Thus, the most current work on group cognition serves to validate historical differences within social psychology between the study of social cognition and the study of prejudice and intergroup relations. Although I agree that we have much to benefit from better integration of these two literatures (e.g., Mackie & Smith, 1998) we also have something to lose if we fail to understand the differences as well.

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