

“Weapons of the Weak” in the European Union: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism and its Implications for Domestic Terrorism

By

© 2019

Kirk Sampson

M.A., Naval Postgraduate School, 2009

M.A., Webster University, 1995

B.A., University of Kansas, 1988

Submitted to the graduate degree program in Global and International Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Chair: Ebenezer Obadare

Brittnee A. Carter

Eric A. Hanley

Date Defended: 4 November 2019

The thesis committee for Kirk Sampson certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

“Weapons of the Weak” in the European Union: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism and its Implications for Domestic Terrorism

Chair: Ebenezer Obadare

Brittnee A. Carter

Eric A. Hanley

Date Approved: 4 November 2019

Abstract

The European Union (EU) appears nearing the end of a second wave of Islamist-inspired terrorism that peaked in 2015. However, the focus on Islamist terrorism may have diverted attention from a more pressing domestic terrorism threat. While not as lethal as Islamist terrorism, the total of non-Islamist terrorist attacks was significantly higher during the same timeframe. Of the non-Islamist attacks, right-wing terrorism accounted for a small percentage, but these numbers may be misleading. How the various EU members define right-wing terrorism may be contributing to an underestimation of the threat, but there could also be a temporal explanation. Right-wing terrorism appears to be cyclic, with the last major wave ending in the early 2000s. A concern is a new wave of right-wing terrorism may appear fueled by the same grievances that have led to increasing support for right-wing populist parties.

Right-wing populist parties now have parliamentary representation in 22 of 28 EU member states and have a sizeable presence in the European Parliament. While right-wing populist parties have refrained from openly calling for violence against their perceived antagonists, the rhetoric of these groups has nonetheless helped to create a climate encouraging hatred of outgroups. These toxic narratives have inspired lone actors to commit acts of domestic terrorism around the world. Could the underlying societal issues and grievances contributing to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe also fuel a corresponding rise in right-wing terrorism?

In determining the nature of future terrorist threats to the EU, this thesis explores the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and its potential impact on domestic terrorism. Specifically, in what ways might the presence of right-wing populist parties in government (either at the national or supranational level) effect right-wing terrorism in the EU?

In helping to conceptualize the terrorist threat to the EU, this thesis discusses the various definitions of terrorism, the goals and strategies of terrorist groups, the current terrorist threat assessments, and the latest trends shaping how terrorists operate. Next, the thesis focuses on conceptualizing populism to help understand the us vs. them construct and the demand- and supply-side drivers contributing to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. This is followed by an in-depth look into the current European political and social environment to show how the various issues play into right-wing populist narratives. The European case study offers a unique opportunity to analyze right-wing populist politics simultaneously at the state and supranational levels. Also discussed are the various theories underpinning political mobilization, radicalization, us vs. them narratives, and terrorism pathways, to understand how right-wing populism factors into the radicalization process. The paper concludes by discussing seven hypotheses on how the right-wing populism could shape domestic terrorism in the EU.

Acknowledgments

My gratitude goes out to the many people who made this thesis possible. I saw a banner in Wescoe Hall that said, “It takes a University to make a graduate,” the same holds true for this thesis. This thesis reflects the culmination of two years of discussions with faculty across multiple departments and my classmates. The various perspectives and suggestions for improvement helped to shape the final product. However, special thanks go out to my thesis committee Ebenezer Obadare, Brittnee Carter, and Eric Hanley. Thank you for your guidance, academic expertise, extra materials, and encouraging me to think about things in a different way. Due to your efforts this thesis is significantly better than what I initially conceptualized.

Next, I would like to thank my family for their support and understanding during my attendance in this program. To my wife, Raenise, who in addition to picking up the slack around the homestead, had the added pleasure of helping proof this work. To my children, Rebecca and Kahner, also KU students, who helped me to live the whole college experience by accompanying to a range of the sporting events ,, Rock Chalk Jayhawk! To my grandchildren, Landon and Brynlee, thanks for providing me a break from school and work, and for serving as a reminder there is still an age of innocence and a hope for the future that the “bad guys” cannot take away.

Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to Kaiser and Koda, who unfortunately did not get to see this process through to the end. While they did not provide material support or help proof, they were always there for me. Without them I would have become radicalized through the thesis process. Rest in peace my friends.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Problem Statement	6
Research Question	7
Methodology	8
Significance of Research	8
Chapter 2: Conceptualizing the Terrorist Threat	10
Defining Terrorism	10
Defining Terrorists.....	14
The Effect of Social Media.....	16
The Goals and Strategies of Terrorism.....	18
Terrorism in Europe.....	19
Determining the Future Terrorist Threat	21
Chapter Conclusions	25
Chapter 3: Conceptualizing Populism	28
Defining Populism	28
The Structure of Populism	31
Defining Right-Wing populism	32
Drivers of Right-wing Populism.....	35
Growth of Right-wing Parties in Europe	38
Chapter Conclusions	42
Chapter 4: Identity and Othering in a European Context	45
Why Right-Wing Populism is So Popular in Europe	46
Religion, Identity, and Religiosity in Europe	48
A Clash Between Religiosity and Secularism	51
Islam in Europe: A Threat to Christianity or Identity-Driven Paranoia?	52
A Clash of Civilizations?.....	53
The Return of Foreign Fighters	54
What Lies Ahead for Europe?	56
Chapter Conclusions	59
Chapter 5: Political Mobilization, Radicalization and Othering.....	62
Conceptualizing Political Mobilization	63
Conceptualizing Terrorist Organizations.....	65
Is There a Terrorist Mindset?.....	66
The Radicalization Process.....	66

Sociological Theories	69
The Root Causes of Terrorism.....	70
The Role of Grievances	72
Right-Wing Terrorist Pathways in Europe	73
Chapter Conclusions	74
Chapter 6: Implications for Domestic Terrorism in the EU	77
Hypothesis 1: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, inspires far-right extremists, regardless of party or group affiliation, to conduct domestic terrorism.	78
Hypothesis 2: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, has no effect on current levels of organized right-wing domestic terrorism (as reflected in the EUROPOL TE-SATs).	80
Hypothesis 3: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral gains leads to right-wing parties changing their stance on actively advocating for violence.	81
Hypothesis 4: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action. ...	82
Hypothesis 5: Changes in right-wing populist party agendas pulling them towards the political center leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action.....	82
Hypothesis 6: An increase in extreme right-wing violence leads to a corresponding increase in left-wing violence.	83
Hypothesis 7: A resurgence of Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism leads to an increase in right-wing domestic terrorism.....	84
Theoretical Wild Card: What if Emphasis on Right-Wing Populism is Misplaced?	85
Limitations and Areas for Future Research	86
Concluding Thoughts.....	88
References.....	90
Appendix 1: Terrorist Attacks in the EU by Affiliation (2015-2018)	100
Appendix 2: European Union Membership	101
Appendix 3: Deadliest Terrorist Attacks in Europe.....	102
Appendix 4: Terrorism Definitional Elements	104
Appendix 5: Terrorist/Extremist Categories and Definitions	105

List of Figures

Figure 2-1: The Capability Spectrum of Political Violence (Whelan, 2016, p. 15).....	11
Figure 2-2: Terrorist Plots/Attacks in EU, 2018 (EUROPOL, 2019).....	20
Figure 3-2: Relationships in Right-wing Populist Constructs.....	32
Figure 3-2: Theoretical Model of Party Competition (Norris, 2005).....	37
Figure 3-3: Major European Parties and Agendas (Ashkenas and Aisch, 2016, p. 23).....	39
Figure 5-4: Levels of Political Commitment and Behavior (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2007)..	63
Figure 5-2: AVID Ring Model (Akerboom, 2003).....	65
Figure 5-3: The Casual Relationship of the Root Causes of Terrorism (Newman, 2006).....	71

Chapter 1: Introduction

The European Union (EU) appears nearing the end of a second wave of Islamist-inspired¹ (also referred to as Jihadist) terrorism that peaked on 13 November 2015 with six simultaneous attacks in Paris killing over 130 people and injuring another 400 (Klausen, 2018). The Paris attacks were the worst France had experienced since World War II and the deadliest in Europe since the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings with 191 fatalities and 2000 injuries (World Atlas, 2018). In 2015 there were 150 fatalities in the EU due to Islamist-inspired terrorism, followed by 135 in 2016, 62 in 2017, and 13 in 2018 (Klausen, 2018; EUROPOL, 2019). One could interpret this declining trend as a positive sign. Unfortunately, focusing solely on the lethality of Islamist attacks may be diverting attention from other terrorist threats. During this same timeframe, the number of attacks in the EU motivated by other ideologies was significantly greater than those by Islamists. Non-Islamist terrorists (left- and right-wing, ethno-nationalist, separatists, and single interest) accounted for 92% of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in the EU in 2015, 91% in 2016, 84% in 2017, and 81% in 2018 (EUROPOL, 2019) (see Appendix 1 for yearly comparison of attacks by ideology).

Inspirations aside, the issue of terrorism remains a major concern across the EU. A 2018 YouGov Survey of eleven EU members² ranked terrorism as the second most important issue, surpassed only by immigration. The economy ranked third. These results are not surprising. Since 2015, the combination of terrorism, immigration, and economics, has played a key role in

¹ Term is often used interchangeably with political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. For this thesis, Islamism refers to a form of social and political activism advocating public and political life should be guided by Islamic principles, specifically full implementation of *sharia*.

² Survey conducted in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Greece, Italy, and Spain (YouGov, 2018).

shaping election results at both the national and EU parliamentary levels. Another issue shaping the parliament elections throughout Europe is the surprising rise of right-wing populist parties.

Right-wing populism is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric. These parties have successfully exploited public discontent with mainstream political parties, as well as concerns over the economy, immigration, and Islamist terrorism. Right-wing populist parties have representation in 22 of 28 EU member national parliaments (see Appendix 2 for party representation by country). Despite the appearance of a common linkage, classification of right-wing populism into a single political family is difficult. In addition to the top three issues, European populist agendas also touch on Euroscepticism (also known as EU-skepticism), globalization, economic austerity measures, social welfare programs, taxes, multiculturalism, and nationalism. Given the complexity and intertwining of issues, right-wing populist platforms can be confusing and contradictory at times (e.g., anti-tax but pro-state funded social welfare programs). The one theme linking all right-wing populist groups is an ideology centered on exclusion and inequality.

Often ill-defined and misused in mass media, populism is an appeal to certain segments of society who feel their identity or lifestyle is threatened by political or societal changes and believe their concerns are ignored by an “elite” group. While populists are anti-elitist, this is not a sufficient condition. Populist parties are also anti-pluralist (Muller, 2016). Only these parties can represent the people (who tend to be specifically defined). Thus, besides being anti-establishment in nature, populism contains an inherent “us vs. them” narrative. This construct is presented as a “zero-sum game” with the gains of one group coming at the expense of another. The “us vs. them” dynamic has had a polarizing effect on domestic politics throughout the EU and has led to the emergence of a particularly virulent form of right-wing politics.

The media interchangeably labels right-wing populist parties as far right, radical right, and extreme right, which adds to the confusion when discussing the political agendas of these groups. Mudde (2018) offers a useful conceptual framework for explaining how the terms relate to liberal democracies. As a starting point, it is necessary to position the left from the right based on their view on equality. Whereas the left considers inequalities between people to be artificial; the right believes inequalities are natural and are to be defended by the state. Within this context the far left calls for rapid wide-spread changes to the current political, social, and economic structure. The far right, threatened by these changes, looks to reverse them. However, it is an oversimplification to position the far right as just the opposite of the far left. Mudde (2018) sees the far right consisting of two sub-groups: extreme right and the radical right, with the main difference centered on their attitude towards democracy. The extreme right fundamentally opposes democracy and does not believe all people should be involved in selecting a country's leadership (e.g., authoritarianism and totalitarianism). The term radical right best describes right-wing ideologies that are accepting of electoral democracy, but oppose certain values, such as minority rights and pluralism. Thus, radical right-wing populist parties tend to combine elements of nativism and a desire for a strictly ordered society (Mudde, 2018). That said, it is reasonable to assume some right-wing populist parties' supporters harbor extreme right views.

A distinction must also be made between right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. The right-wing extremist spectrum ranges from subculture-oriented extremists (e.g., fascists, neo-Nazis) to legalistic acting parties. Some extremists may participate in one or multiple right-wing groups or organizations, whereas others may not participate in any. While some right-wing extremists may be oriented towards violence, this does not mean it is true for all. A study of right-wing extremists in Germany estimated 50% of the 24,000 extremists in the country would

be labeled as “violence oriented” (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2019).³ Similarly, it should not be assumed all violent oriented right-wing extremists are terrorists. Right-wing extremists use a variety of politically motivated crimes short of terrorism. Terrorism, further defined in Chapter 2, is the use, or threat, of violence to trigger far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target (Hoffman, 2017). However, in the case of right-wing terrorism, the deliberate use of violence for political purposes can be hard to ascertain because perpetrators rarely issue demands or claim responsibility for the attacks they carry out (Ravndal, 2018). As a result, there is some debate on what types of right-wing violence qualify as terrorism. The definitional dilemma is reflected in a recent announcement by German authorities who recategorized the 2016 Munich Olympia Mall shootings as a “politically motivated crime” (DW Staff, 2019, October 25). Previously, German authorities did not consider the attack to be motivated by a political ideology.

While right-wing populist groups have refrained from openly calling for any form of political violence against perceived antagonists (political or non-political), the rhetoric of these groups has nonetheless contributed to a climate encouraging hatred of outgroups. This toxic environment has inspired lone actors to commit acts of mass-casualty domestic terrorism. On 9 October 2019, 27-year-old German national Stephan Balliet failed in an attempt to attack a Jewish synagogue in Halle, Germany. The attack coincided with the beginning of Yom Kipper and if successful could have killed over fifty worshippers (Der Spiegel Staff, 2019, October 11). Balliet’s attack was partially inspired by right-wing attacks outside of Europe. On 16 March 2019, 28-year-old Brenton Tarrant (a self-described white supremacist and fascist) attacked two

³What is interesting about this number is it reflects a 21% increase in violence prone extremists from 2014 yet associated violent crimes have decreased by 30% since 2016 (Der Spiegel Staff, June 27).

mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand killing 50 people, making it the country's deadliest incident since World War 2 (DW Staff, 2019, April 4b).

Despite occurring on the other side of the world, the Christchurch attack had at least an indirect tie to European right-wing extremism. Tarrant had previously sent money to Generation Identity (*Génération Identitaire*), a French extreme right anti-migrant movement and an Austrian branch of the Identitarian movement⁴ (DW Staff, 2019, April 4b). Tarrant, an Australian, claimed traveling in Europe played a key role in his radicalization process by seeing how Muslim immigration had weakened European identity. Besides Balliet, the Christchurch attacks also inspired the perpetrators of racially motivated attacks in Ponway, California (April 27, 2019) and El Paso, Texas (August 3, 2019) (Weill, 2019). A commonality to all these incidents is the idea of “the Great Replacement” (*le Grand Remplacement*), a conspiracy theory promoted by French writer Renaud Camus that claims a global elite is colluding against the European white populations to replace them with non-European peoples (Williams, 2017; Weill, 2019). Another French writer associated with this line of thinking is Michel Houellebecq who wrote the European bestseller novel *Submission (Soumission)* which generated controversy and criticism for its portrayal of Islam. Clearly, the toxic sentiments underlying European right-wing populism has a global audience.

Returning to the 2018 YouGov Survey, it did not specifically ask what “terrorists” Europeans most feared. One could logically assume survey participants were thinking about Islamist groups like al-Qa’ida or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)⁵ who were either

⁴ “Identitarianism” is a white nationalist movement originating in France which portrays Muslim immigration as an existential threat (Williams, 2017).

⁵ Also known as Da’ish (*al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham*). Prior to the ISIS rebranding, the group was referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and before that, al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).

directly or indirectly responsible for the most lethal attacks in Europe in the post-9/11 era (see Appendix 3 for list of deadliest attacks in Europe). While Islamist terrorists remain a credible threat to the EU, given the EUROPOL's Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) from 2016-2019, it is obvious there are other threats. If Halle, Christchurch and El Paso are any indication, the greatest future threat may be domestic terrorism fueled by the same rhetoric, issues and grievances contributing to the rise of right-wing populist parties.

Problem Statement

Europe has hosted a range of terrorist groups (anarchists, anti-colonialists, Islamists, ethno-separatists, etc.) and there are no indications terrorism as a political strategy or tactic will go away in the foreseeable future. Despite the downward trend in fatalities related to Islamist attacks, the most recent national-level threat assessments (both European and American) continue to primarily focus on the Islamist-inspired threat. While religion is likely to continue playing a key role in inspiring terrorism, research shows secular grievances are increasingly becoming a motivating factor. The continued national-level focus on the Islamist threat may cause government officials and researchers to miss the indicators of an emerging threat or cause them to underestimate an existing one. As such, consideration must be given to what might be the source of inspiration for future terrorism in the EU.

Unfortunately, some of the same grievances used to attract followers to terrorist groups are the same ones right-wing populist parties are leveraging to attract voters. This should not be too surprising. Like terrorism, populism is a means of challenging the social and political status quo and is considered a "weapon of the weak." This concept, in a non-terrorism sense, comes from James Scott (1985) who uses the term to encapsulate the ordinary, everyday forms of

resistance and their symbolic and ideological underpinnings.⁶ Similarly, terrorism is also considered a weapon of the weak as it is an asymmetrical response to state power (i.e., the power ratio of government to the challenger is highly disproportionate). Unlike terrorism then, populism relies on democratic elections to change the status quo. Ironically, the political structure allowing for current right-wing populist gains in multiple European parliaments may also serve to marginalize these gains with the formation of counter-populist coalitions at both the national and EU levels. Continued marginalization could lead populist parties to consider more radical agendas. Even if populist parties continue to rely on the electoral system to achieve their objectives, a lack of success in addressing the concerns of their support base could lead to organizational splits and the development of factions more willing to engage in political violence, to include terrorism.

Research Question

While right-wing populist groups have refrained from openly calling for acts of violence, the rhetoric of these groups has nonetheless created a climate fueling and encouraging an extreme hatred of outgroups. Could the underlying societal issues and grievances associated with the rise of right-wing populism inspire the next major terrorist threat in Europe?

In determining the nature of future terrorist threats to the EU, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism and its potential impact on domestic terrorism. Specifically, in what ways might the presence of right-wing populist parties in government (either national or EU) affect right-wing terrorism in the EU?

⁶ Scott (1985) feels an inordinate amount of attention has been paid to the rare occurrences of open revolt, and too little to ordinary, everyday forms of resistance.

Methodology

This thesis is structured as a case study to understand how the issues contributing to the rise of right-wing populism could shape future terrorist behavior in Europe. Chapter 2 provides a conceptual foundation for determining future terrorist threats by discussing: the various definitions of terrorism; the goals and strategies of the terrorist groups; the current terrorist threat assessments; and the latest trends shaping how terrorists operate. Similarly, Chapter 3 provides a conceptual foundation for understanding right-wing populism by discussing the components of populism and the underpinnings of the “us vs. them” construct, as well as the demand- and supply-side drivers contributing to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth look into the current European political and social environment to show how the various issues play into right-wing populist narratives. The European case study offers a unique opportunity to analyze right-wing populist politics simultaneously at the state and supranational levels. Chapter 5 addresses the various theories underpinning political mobilization, radicalization, “us vs. them” narratives, and terrorism pathways to understand how supporters of right-wing populism could transition towards using terrorism as a tactic. This thesis concludes by looking at seven hypotheses theorizing how right-wing populism could directly or indirectly affect the future domestic terrorist threat to the EU.

Significance of Research

This thesis has a twofold purpose. The first is to provide a better understanding how the rise of right-wing populism could shape domestic terrorism in the EU. Second, to contribute to the broader discussion on the influences of domestic terrorism.

The EU is expected to face a credible domestic (or homegrown) terrorist threat, both Islamist and non-Islamist inspired, for the foreseeable future. The most unpredictable domestic

terrorist threat is from small groups and individuals. Given the ability of this smaller element to blend into their local surroundings, attacks can occur with little or no warning. As a result, indicators of a pending attack are mostly hidden from traditional intelligence and law enforcement collection means, which are primarily oriented at transnational threats.

Determining the nature of the threat is extremely important, as the strategy to address one aspect can serve as the catalyst for radicalization of another. A failure to understand how the differing aspects interact risks mischaracterizing the current situation and misinterpreting what it means for the future domestic security situation in countries with democratic electoral systems.

Chapter 2: Conceptualizing the Terrorist Threat

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks targeting the United States (henceforth 9/11), the world entered a new “age of terrorism” with the beginning of a Global War on Terrorism. Despite this global initiative to mitigate the threat, it was not long after 9/11 that Europeans had their own dates to remember, the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings (referred to as 11-M) and the 7 July 2005 London bombings (referred to as 7/7). Prompted by these attacks and others around the world, researchers have produced a significant amount of literature on terrorism. Given the global rise of groups like al-Qa’ida and ISIS, a considerable part of this material focuses on religiously inspired terrorism; however, Islamist groups do not represent the entire threat to the EU. While not receiving the media coverage of their Islamic counterparts, as discussed in Chapter 1, non-Islamist terrorist groups (e.g., right- and left-wing, ethno-nationalists and separatists, and single interest) account for a greater combined percentage of attacks in Europe. To fully grasp the nature of the current and future terrorist threat the EU faces, it is necessary to take a broader look at the conceptual issues related to the topic. Failure to do so will result in a myopic perspective concentrating on only one aspect of the problem.

Defining Terrorism

Despite the vast amount of literature on the topic, defining terrorism remains problematic. The concept of terrorism is heavily contested and it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition distinguishing terrorism from other politically motivated violent behavior (e.g., riots, kidnappings, assassinations, insurgencies) or the illegal activities supporting terrorist activities (e.g., armed robberies, counterfeiting, drug trafficking). At the very foundation of all political violence are political grievances and a willingness to use violence to communicate discontent and force a resolution. One way to conceptualize how terrorism fits in the political violence spectrum is based on a

movement's shift in capability and intentions. Whelan (2016) sees terrorism as a movement's desire to increase its capabilities (e.g., membership and resources) and to "militarize" its action (see Figure 2-1). A shift to terrorism reflects a change in capabilities and intentions, as the group's increased capabilities enable them to move from employing communicative violence to violence which aims to erode the opposition's will and power. In short, terrorism marks the first stage whereby a group attempts to control the violence employed for a cause (Whelan, 2016).




Figure 2-1: The Capability Spectrum of Political Violence (Whelan, 2016, p. 15)

While we can theoretically place terrorism along the capability spectrum, it is still difficult to define as it holds similarities with other forms of political violence. In their research on terrorism in the 1980s, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman compiled over a hundred academic definitions of terrorism, which when coded contained twenty-two definitional elements (Weinberg et al., 2004). Twenty years later Weinberg et al. (2004) found little success towards creating a universal definition as they found seventy-three definitions with twenty definitional

elements (see Appendix 5 for the definitional elements from both studies). Trying to incorporate all the various elements makes for a cumbersome definition with little analytic value.

Adding to the conceptual confusion is the stretching of the term over time. To some it is a tactic used only by religious fundamentalists and ultra-nationalists. To others, the definition includes single-interest groups (e.g., environmentalists and anti-abortionists). Others may include transnational criminal organizations and internationally based gangs (e.g., Mexican drug trafficking organization and Mara Salvatrucha/MS-13) by using the label of narcoterrorism. Even non-violent actors are labeled as terroristic (e. g., cyberterrorists). Then there is the added dynamic concerning the legitimacy of the actor. For instance, Yasser Arafat's claim: "The difference between a revolutionary and a terrorist ... lies in the reasons for which each fights" (Hoffman, 2017, p. 17). Which in turn leads to the much-used cliché, "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." Given the multitude of definitions and related definitional elements, the word "terrorism" means different things to different people (academics, policy makers, law enforcement, participants, victims, and society at large).

With so many definitions already existing, the goal is not to create another. This thesis uses the definition created by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) team at the University of Maryland which defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (LaFree, 2018). Based on this definition, the GTD team has six criteria to determine whether an incident is included in the database. The three following criteria must be present for an incident to be included: it must be intentional; it must include some level of violence or immediate threat of violence; and the perpetrators must be sub-national actors (LaFree, 2018). Additionally, at least two of the following three criteria must be present: the act

must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal; there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience than the immediate victims; and the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (LaFree, 2018). Underscoring the difficulty in defining terrorism, the Director of National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) admits there are incidents sharing many of these characteristics that are not included in the GTD (LaFree, 2018).

Terrorism is further distinguished between transnational (or international) and domestic variants, the significance of which is the distinction of the target of the violence and the audience targeted. Transnational terrorism is “when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments, or citizens of another country” (Rosendorf and Sandler, 2005, p. 172). Domestic terrorism is “when an incident involves perpetrators, victims, and an audience of the country in which the incident occurs” (Rosendorf and Sandler, 2005, p. 172). These differentiations are useful for understanding the intended victims. Most transnational terrorist attacks target civilians, or noncombatants in military lexicon, while domestic terrorism tends to focus more on combatants, or state institutions (military, security, law enforcement, etc.) (Sánchez-Cuenca de la Calle, 2009). The exception is extreme-right wing terrorism; where between 1965-2000, noncombatants accounted for 82% of victims (Sánchez-Cuenca de la Calle, 2009). Given the 2019 attacks in Halle, Christchurch and El Paso, right-wing terrorism may be taking a page from Islamist terrorism and returning to targeting civilians.

Based on the various definitions and labels, it is easy to see why there is no universally accepted definition. Unfortunately, the conceptual confusion is not limited to academia. Terrorism definitions and classifications of specific incidents can vary by country and even by different agencies within the same country. Definitions across government departments and

agencies tend to reflect their missions and legal authorities to address the problem. For example, the primary division among U.S. agencies is between foreign (external) and domestic (internal) based threats but this is not always clear cut. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alone has sixteen categories/definitions related to transnational and domestic terrorism/extremism (see Appendix 6). The DHS list of definitions has another term widely used in U.S. and European government documents, homegrown violent extremist (HVE). HVEs are individuals supporting political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization but acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are considered distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in acts of violence without direction from or influence from a foreign actor. In short, HVEs represent a combination of both domestic and transnational grievances further blurring traditional definitions of terrorism.

Even defining a specific category of terrorism is challenging. Adequately classifying right-wing terrorism is difficult due to the lack of clarity among the different concepts used to describe this form of political violence. Based on various national definitions and selection criteria, a significant amount of violent crimes committed by individuals or groups motivated by an extreme right-wing agenda are not categorized as terrorism by EUROPOL but rather as “hate crimes” (Koehler, 2016). As a result, incidents of right-wing terrorism are likely underreported.

Defining Terrorists

When one thinks of terrorists, what likely comes to mind are organized groups with a chain of command or a hierarchical organizational structure that persists over time, and have the ability to project power globally (e.g., al-Qa’ida, ISIS, Hizballah, etc.). However, on the other end of the spectrum are individuals who conduct terrorist attacks but are not members of any known organization and who have no formal links to a specific group. Between these two

extremes is a range of adaptations. It is important then to clarify how the terms are being used to avoid creating an inaccurate picture. For example, when discussing right-wing terrorism, it is important to note there is no comparison to groups with a global presence like al-Qa'ida or ISIS. Drawing these inaccurate parallels can make it harder for security agencies to detect and react because a comparison with Islamist extremism creates political and tactical biases that hinder the ability to detect a much different threat (Koehler, 2016).

While it is still possible for large, formalized terrorist groups to take shape, they are unlikely to resemble traditional organizational models. With the proliferation of post-9/11 counter terrorism measures, many terrorist groups embrace an operational model referred to as “leaderless resistance.” This concept is based on a cell structure where cells do not report to a central headquarter or a single leader for direction and operate independently of each other. Lacking a centralized command and control structure, these cells draw inspiration from a larger ideological movement. Often attributed to white supremacist Louis Beam, the originator of this concept was Ulius Louis Amoss, an anti-communist who developed the strategy in the early 1960s to prevent a communist takeover of the U.S. (Beam, 1992). While intended for a specific audience, Beam’s 1992 essay is available in multiple languages and easily accessible on the internet. This example shows ideological differences do not prevent these groups from learning from each other’s successes and failures, which allows for a more readily adaptable threat.

A derivative of leaderless resistance is lone actors or lone wolves. As the name implies, these individuals prepare and commit violent acts alone, outside of any command structure and without material aid from any group. Interestingly, in a study of 119 individuals who engaged in or planned to engage in lone-actor terrorism, Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) found lone actors tend to fall into three primary groups: religiously inspired (43%), right-wing (34%), and single

issue (18%).⁷ However, this was not always the case. Prior to 2001, only 7.8% of the lone actors were religiously inspired, with right-wing extremists making up 32.5% and single-issue offenders 47.6% (Gill et al, 2014). Given the high proportion of religious and right-wing lone actors, it would not be surprising to see similarities in the tactics and techniques used by both.

It may be difficult for some to conceptualize the threat posed by lone actors, but their acts can be quite lethal and extremely difficult to prevent. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the deadliest terrorist attack in the U.S. (168 killed) was the 19 April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing carried out by Timothy McVeigh (aided by Terry Nicholas) (Hoffman, 2017). Lone actors are also responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in Europe. Inspired by ISIS, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a dual citizen of Tunisia and France, killed 86 people and injured 458 in Nice, France (July 14, 2016) (Counter Extremis Project, 2019). On 22 July 2011, far-right extremist Anders Behring Breivik executed dual attacks in Oslo and Utøya (referred to as the July 22 attacks), killing 77 and injuring 319, the deadliest incident in Norway since World War II (Ray, 2018).

The Effect of Social Media

The National Intelligence Council (2017) assesses the threat from terrorism will increase in the coming decades as small groups and individuals leverage new technologies, ideas, and relationships to their advantage. The internet will play a crucial facilitating role with this threat as it allows individuals to interact with other radicals and extremists in ways other than face-to-face. The importance of formal terrorist organizations appears to be increasingly overshadowed by the ideology inspiring and motivating individuals to conduct acts of violence.

⁷ Historically, there have been very few lone-actor incidents involving left-wing or nationalist inspired individuals (Gill et al., 2014).

Besides negating the need for physical interaction with other like-minded individuals, the internet supplies the technical knowledge for individuals to maximize the effect of their attacks. Just like the use of dynamite by the anarchist's in the 19th century, the internet has proved to be a game changer for those trying to draw attention to their cause. Today's individual has access to much deadlier technology and the internet provides "do it yourself" knowledge to produce weapons and how to best use them. The internet dynamic is important, as it provides extremists across ideologies an opportunity (either directly or indirectly) to create common "playbooks" based on lessons learned, as in the case with Beam's leaderless resistance.

Just as concerning, Precht (2007) found radicalization appeared to be occurring quicker than just a few years before the publication of his report. Over a decade later, taking into account the increasing role of social media, it is reasonable to assume the radicalization process has continued to accelerate. Social media allows violent extremists to spread their ideology to a much wider audience, faster and more effectively than ever before. Social media has also changed how individuals become radicalized, replacing the traditional face-to-face meeting places used for recruitment and radicalization. This obviously has major implications for lone actors. For instance, ISIS has created a vast global library of propaganda that influenced terrorists such as Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people in the 2016 Pulse nightclub attack in Orlando, Florida (Bergen, 2019). Mateen never met with anyone in ISIS and never traveled to Iraq or Syria; his radicalization was entirely driven by what he viewed on the Internet. Similarly, Brenton Tarrant (see Chapter 1) tapped into a large library of white nationalist material from around the world available on the internet (Bergen, 2019). Additionally, both Tarrant and Stephen Balliet live streamed their attacks for posterity and motivation purposes (Der Spiegel, October 11). Whether a Jihadist or a white supremacist, individuals can become radicalized with

the help of what they watch or read online. Radicalization takes place in the social climate in which people live. The internet and social media allow terrorists unprecedented ways to network globally and the ability to propagate their ideologies.

The Goals and Strategies of Terrorism

Although goals amongst terrorist groups and lone actors vary, Kydd and Walter (2006) identify five enduring themes: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance. Regime change is the removal of the current government and its replacement with one led by the terrorists or at least one more in line with their hard-core objectives. Territorial change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state or to join another state. Policy change is a broader category of lesser demands, such as stopping migration. Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the states, such as oppressing a minority population. Finally, status quo maintenance is the support of an existing government or a territorial arrangement against political groups seeking to change it. Some organizations hold multiple goals and may view one as helping another. Of these goals, right-wing extremists are likely to see violence as a means of obtaining the latter three. Arguably, these are the same three objectives of right-wing populist parties.

To achieve their long-term objectives, terrorists can pursue a variety of strategies. Kydd and Walter (2006) identify five strategies terrorists employ: attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding. Of these strategies, outbidding and provocation are the most relevant for organizations competing against each other or dealing with factional splintering. In line with populist narratives, splinter groups seek to convince the party support base they are the only alternative capable of protecting “the people’s” interests and that more moderate competitors are weak and untrustworthy. Extremists engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public

the extreme factions have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival political groups, and therefore are worthy of public support. Additionally, provocation would help in trying to get the government or other adversaries to overreact, which in turn can be used as a propaganda tool to help mobilize support for the cause.

In understanding the linkage between goals and strategy, it is necessary to consider the group's ideology as this serves as both a motivational factor for participating in terrorist acts as well as attracting societal support. Terrorist groups rely on ideological arguments for recruitment and to garner financial or other support from local communities. However, the effect of ideology should not be treated as a constant across terrorist categories. As discussed in Chapter 5, its impact can vary from group to group, and from individual to individual.

Terrorism in Europe

The 2019 EU TE-SAT identifies five broad ideological categories of terrorist threats targeting EU members: Jihadist (or Islamist), left-wing/anarchist, right-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatists, and single-interest. Compared to previous years, in 2018, the number of attacks and the number of victims in the EU dropped significantly across terrorism of all ideological tendencies (see Appendix 1 for comparison of years 2015-2018). In 2018, individuals or groups associated with the five categories were responsible for 129 (foiled, failed and completed) attacks in nine EU Member States (see Figure 2-1). Thirteen people died in these attacks and 53 were injured, with all the deaths attributed to Islamist attacks (EUROPOL, 2019). It should be noted, all the Islamist attacks in 2018 were conducted by lone actors (EUROPOL, 2019).

Member State	Jihadist terrorism	Left-wing terrorism	Right-wing terrorism	Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism	Single-issue terrorism	Not specified	Total
Belgium	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
France	10	-	-	20	-	-	30
Germany	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Greece	-	6	-	-	-	-	7
Italy	1	10	1	-	1	-	13
Netherlands	4	-	-	-	-	1	4
Spain	1	3	-	7	-	-	11
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom	4	-	-	56	-	-	60
Total	24	19	1	83	1	1	129

Figure 2-2: Terrorist Plots/Attacks in EU, 2018 (EUROPOL, 2019, p. 68)

The 2018 numbers do not appear to be an anomaly. In 2017, nationalists/separatists accounted for 67% of the plots/attacks (99), Islamists 16% (33), left-wing 12% (24) and right-wing 3% (5) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 9). Combined, these attacks resulted in 68 deaths and 844 injuries. The majority of the fatalities and casualties (62 and 819 respectively) were the result of Islamist-inspired attacks in six countries (UK 35, Spain 16, Sweden 5, France 3, Finland 2, and Germany 1) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 23). However, ethno-nationalists/separatists accounted for 137 attacks. The least amount of attacks was attributed to right-wing extremists (five attacks and one death) (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 51).

Despite the low number of attacks associated with right-wing terrorism from 2016 to 2018, EU Security Commissioner Sir Julian King claims there is a growing threat of right-wing extremism and there is not “a single EU Member State that is not affected in some way by the phenomenon” (EUROPOL, 2018, p. 51). An assertion supported by Peter Neumann, head of the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, who sees an increase in the number of hate crimes and right-wing “terrorist violence” over the past five years (France 24

Staff, 2019). While extremism is not synonymous with terrorism, it is reasonable to assume, based on the radicalization models discussed in Chapter 5, there should be some increase in terrorist attacks along with increased levels of violent extremism. Why then the discrepancy in the number of attacks and the perception of the threat? Ravndal (2019) believes since EUROPOL's data relies on EU states' own reporting based on different legal definitions of terrorism, the numbers and portrayal of right-wing terrorism are understated compared to other types. Sir King also mentioned the possibility of underreporting (EUROPOL, 2018). A reason for the underreporting may be tied to the conceptualization of right-wing extremism which is fragmented and manifests itself in a variety of forms. Right-wing groups reflect a variety of goals, ranging from the condemnation of the political establishment and the membership of international organizations (e.g. NATO and the EU), to the rejection of asylum policies, migrants and individuals and groups associated with different racial, ethnic, religious (e.g. Jews and Muslims), or political backgrounds (EUROPOL, 2019). Despite the lack of empirical support, there is a strong belief among EU member states that there is an increased right-wing threat.

Determining the Future Terrorist Threat

Based on data from GTD, 2017 marked the third consecutive year of declining numbers of combined terrorist attacks around the world (domestic, HVE, and transnational). Despite this trend, terrorism remains above historical levels. In 2017, 369 groups (not all Islamist inspired) conducted 10,900 terrorist attacks around the world, killing over 26,400 people (START, 2018). To put this into perspective, the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks, both frequency and lethality of terrorism each year was less than one-third of what occurred in 2017 (START, 2018). It appears terrorism will stay above historical levels for the foreseeable future. But what will the future terrorist threat look like?

The U.S. National Security Strategy sees the primary threat coming from “jihadist terrorists and transnational criminal organizations,” of which the former presents the most dangerous (White House, 2017). This concern is also reflected in the 2019 US Intelligence Community’s World Wide Threat Assessment, which states Sunni extremists will remain the primary terrorist threat to the U.S., with U.S.-based HVEs the most frequent and unpredictable threat (Coats, 2019). The Islamist threat also carries over to European assessments as well. The United Kingdom’s CONTEST Strategy also has Islamist terrorism as the foremost terrorist threat (Her Majesty’s Government, 2018). Even Lithuania, a country that has not experienced an attack by Islamist terrorists, sees ISIS as a major threat (Republic of Lithuania, 2019).

While the Islamist threat appears enduring, when looking at the number of terrorist attacks committed in Europe, solely focusing on this specific threat does not represent a complete picture of the threat. Looking at the EU TE-SATs since 2016, proportionally it was non-Islamist terrorists who conducted the most attacks. The disproportionate number of casualties from Islamist terrorism likely explains the continued focus despite the greater number of non-Islamist attacks. Given this disparity between the two categories, could the various national level intelligence assessments be off the mark? If so, why?

An influential theoretical framework for understanding contemporary terrorism is Rapoport’s (2002) Wave Theory of the Rebel Terrorism which sees contemporary terrorist/extremist movements as being divided into four distinct phases: Anarchist, 1880s-1920s; Anti-Colonial, 1920s-1960s; New Left, 1960s-1990s; and the current Islamist phase (started in the 1980s). While each wave has a distinct focus, a “revolution” to create a New World order is an overarching theme. The Anarchist Wave followed in the footsteps of the revolutions that transformed European politics in the 19th century and fundamentally changed

how political extremists would act. At the turn of the century, political extremists felt the traditional techniques of producing mass uprising (e.g., pamphlets, books, meetings, demonstrations, etc.) were obsolete and a new means of communicating to the masses was required. One of these new methods was based on Carlo Pisacane's theory of "propaganda by deed" which saw violence as not only necessary to generate publicity for one's cause, but "to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution" (Hoffman, 2017, p. 5).

The Anarchist wave was followed by the Anti-Colonial wave spurred by the dismantling of empires after World War 1 and 2 and the desire for national self-determination. The late 1960s witnessed the birth of the New Left wave, a product of the Cold War that saw terrorist groups emerge in the developed world (e.g., American Weather Underground, West German Red Army Faction/, Italian Red Brigade, Japanese Red Army, and the French *Action Directe*) who envisioned themselves as vanguards for liberating the exploited masses of the Third World. Out of this wave would emerge the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seen as "internationalizing" terrorism with such spectacular events as airline hijackings and the 1972 Munich Olympic attack. The fourth and current Religious wave began in 1979, influenced in part by the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran by Islamic fundamentalists and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Rapoport's analysis found a wave's duration is determined by a combination of factors including internal weakness of the group, generational change, and external pressures. Based on these factors, each wave has a life span, which based on the first three waves is approximately forty years. Based on the previously discussed government threat assessments, it appears the current phase is likely to last longer than the previous non-religious waves. However, a point to keep in mind is the waves tend to overlap, so it is reasonable to assume by the end of a wave, the

signs of the next wave will start to appear. So even though the religious wave has lasted longer than anticipated, it does not rule out that another wave has already begun.

While Rapoport's theory provides a reasonable conceptual model for understanding contemporary terrorism, it is not without critics. Parker and Sitter (2016) propose an alternative framework for analysis based on the idea that terrorism comes in four different strains. The four strains they identify are Nationalism, Socialism, Religious Extremism, and Social Exclusion. While the first three strains can easily be seen in Rapoport's waves, the idea of Social Exclusion (based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.) is noticeably missing. Parker and Sitter (2016) feel the four strains fit the historical record better and help explain how terrorism spreads and evolves from one period to the next. The strains analogy helps to explain the cyclic, enduring nature of right-wing terrorism, and why this threat can co-exist with the Islamist threat as both focus on social exclusion.

Regardless if terrorism follows a wave or a strain, much like the previous threat estimates, the literature addressing the future remains primarily focused on the Islamist-inspired threats. Laqueur (2018) touches on right-wing groups, but believes European polices have kept it in check, as such, the bulk of his work focuses on ISIS and Al-Qa'ida. Celso's (2015) analysis of a Fifth Wave also focuses on jihadi groups. An exception is Kaplan (2007) who characterizes the next wave as New Tribalism. Kaplan's research is based on groups like the Khmer Rouge (Kampuchea) and the Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda and surrounding area), as a result, the nature of this threat is a more localized third-world threat than a transnational one. Motivation aside, conceptually the localized threat supports the trend of increased domestic and homegrown terrorism within the EU.

Interestingly, despite the proportionally higher number of left-wing attacks in the EUROPOL reports, none of the future threat assessments address this issue. Nevertheless, one of the side effects of increasing right-wing sentiment is a corresponding growth in left-wing extremism. Left-wing extremists are stepping up attacks on right-wing groups and political parties both in the US and Europe. An organization common to both regions is Antifa (short for anti-fascist) which is made up of loosely affiliated, left-leaning anti-racist groups that originally emerged in response to far-right groups. Antifa does not have a unified structure or national leadership but has emerged in the form of local bodies/cells.⁸ As early as 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had warned state and local officials Antifa had become increasingly confrontational and was engaging in domestic terrorism (Meyer, 2017). Antifa members claim violence is necessary to combat authoritarianism, implying the use of force is intrinsic to their political agenda (Williams, 2017). A perceived increased threat from the left could lead to a corresponding increase in right-wing extremists' willingness to use violence to meet objectives.

Chapter Conclusions

The first issue in trying to conceptualize the terrorist threat to Europe is defining the problem. As reflected by the various definitions, it often comes down to the perspective of the researcher, the agency responsible for addressing the problem, and the individuals who choose to participate in violent political action. The "freedom fighter versus terrorist" debate best illustrates the range of perspectives. These definitional issues in turn impact threat

⁸ A tactic associated with Antifa and similar left-wing groups is the "black bloc" a reference to groups wearing black clothing and protective gear to conceal wearers' identities. The tactic allows participants to appear as one large unified mass. This tactic was developed in the 1980s by European left-wing groups as a means of "popular resistance to the police state and the New World Order" (Rossman, 2017).

characterization. This is exemplified by the problem of gauging the threat posed by right-wing terrorism in Europe. EUROPOL's TE-SAT data relies on EU member states' reporting based on their respective legal definitions of terrorism. Without a consistent definition there is a risk the reported number of right-wing terrorist incidents are understated (i.e., categorizing as hate crime vs. terrorism). Clearly, there is a disconnect between the number of reported incidents in Europe and EU member states' perception of the right-wing threat.

Definitional issues aside, there should be no disagreement Europe currently faces a diverse terrorist threat with both transnational and domestic vectors. While the various national intelligence estimates continue to focus primarily on the transnational aspect of the threat, it appears domestic or homegrown variants pose a greater threat based on number of incidents. Adding to the complexity of both the transnational and domestic terrorist threat is the changing organizational structure of extremist groups influenced by the concept of leaderless resistance and lone actors "united" by the internet and social media.

Online engagement provides the opportunity for anyone to get involved in far right activism. The process is not led by any one individual or organization, but by networks of activists in different countries who use a range of social media platforms and websites to focus on issues that cut across state borders. By facilitating cross-border collaboration, social media fuels the internationalization of extreme right-wing movements. A person living in Australia can donate to a European Identitarian cause or threaten someone without ever leaving home. Research has demonstrated a number of clear areas in which online communication is helping to fuel the rise of right-wing extremism by facilitating the dissemination of extremist material to new constituents (Shapova, 2018). Online communication channels enable right-wing extremists to broadcast their activities and terrorist attacks (as with Christchurch and Halle) to a global

audience. Combined with the higher proportion of right-wing lone actors, this makes for an extremely lethal combination. Compounding the situation, extreme right-wing supporters are gravitating towards lesser-known parts of the web and displaying greater security awareness, which will make it even harder to detect emerging threats (Wilson, 2019).

As for the future threat to Europe, there appears to be some disagreement. If Rapoport's wave theory is correct, a new wave threat could be emerging; however, none of the national-level threat assessments offer any insight into new threats. If Parker and Sitter's strain theory is correct, future threats will be a pre-existing one reenergized by a new political or identity crisis. Two of their strains are particularly relevant to the rise of right-wing populism, nationalism and social exclusion. Although a few of the assessments touch on the potential threat from right-wing extremism, the EUROPOL numbers do not support those conclusions. However, one must be careful when focusing on the current numbers. While ethno-separatists are responsible for the greatest number of attacks, these are geographically clustered in a few countries and do not pose a broad threat to the EU. What other issue or set of grievances might serve as the catalyst for the next threat?

Returning to right-wing terrorism in Europe, while the number of attacks is currently low, this may be more than a case of underreporting. Ravndal (2018) suggests right-wing terrorism comes in waves, with the last wave in Europe beginning around the late 1980s and ending during the early 2000s. The concern is a new outbreak of right-wing terrorism could start based on grievances related to the recent migration crisis, the lingering effects of the European debt crisis, and Islamist terrorism which has fueled growing support for radical right-wing parties (discussed further in Chapter 4). Coincidentally, these are the same issues contributing to the rise of right-wing populism, one of the most politically polarizing phenomena of the 21st century.

Chapter 3: Conceptualizing Populism

Populism, an identity-driven form of political mobilization, is spreading globally and is found in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev refers to the current populist surge as the “Age of Populism” (Müller, 2016). The commonality of the emergence of populism in all regions is its function as a warning sign of a pending political crisis (Judis, 2016). This crisis is due to a perception that existing policies, created and defended by mainstream political parties, are at odds with public desires, fears, and concerns.

Regardless of geographical context, populism is a political philosophy supporting the rights and power of the common citizen in a struggle against a perceived corrupt elite. Based on the results of the 2016 US and European elections and the 2016 UK public referendum on leaving the EU (Brexit), much has been written about populism. As with terrorism, despite the increase in academic and media coverage, a universally accepted definition of populism is just as contested. Populism is identified with particular classes (e.g., the petty bourgeoisie, blue collar workers, etc.) motivated by fears (modernization, globalization, migration, etc.) or feelings of anger, frustration, and resentment. Populism is used to simultaneously describe, right-wing parties in Europe, left-wing presidents in Latin America, and both Democrat and Republican political candidates in the US. The term is so broadly used it is becoming a catch-all phrase which can mask what candidates and parties are trying to accomplish.

Defining Populism

While populism has received a significant amount of attention since 2016, it is not a new phenomenon. One of the first political parties to use a populist platform was the People's Party, a short lived American agrarian-based, anti-establishment party founded in the late 19th century

(Judis, 2016). One of the first populist movements in Europe was the 19th century Russian *Narodnik* (populist) movement which sought to mobilize the rural class to resist the Tsarist government. Also short lived, the significance of this group is some members later transitioned into one of Europe's first terrorist groups, *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) (Rapoport, 2002).

Despite the global growth of populist parties and politicians, the concept is easily misunderstood. Müller (2016) best sums this up when he writes “for all the talk about populism...it is far from obvious that we know what we are talking about” (p. 2). The main critiques against definitions of populism is they are too broad and can potentially apply to all political actors, movements, and parties. As Canovan (2005) writes, populism has an “awkward conceptual slipperiness.” An example of the conceptual confusion is found in *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* in which different contributors define populism as an ideology, a movement, and a syndrome (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Further complicating things, in different regions populism tends to be equated, or conflated, with distinctly different phenomena. For instance, in the European context, populism is often associated to anti-immigration and xenophobia, while in Latin America it alludes to clientelism and economic mismanagement (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).

According to Müller (2016), the reason for the confusion is there is nothing like a theory of populism. Nor is there an acknowledged common history, ideology, program or social base (Canova, 2005). As a result, there is not a coherent set of criteria for explaining when political actors turn populist. Since populists do not claim a defining text or ideology, academics and journalists use the term to describe a diverse range of political candidates and parties. Some of the characteristics and political tactics associated with populism can also be associated with non-populist politicians and political parties. As Müller points out, every politician in poll driven

democracies wants to appeal to “the people.” Thus, like terrorism, it is difficult conceptualizing exactly what is populism.

Another reason for the confusion stems from the fact populist, like the word terrorist, is a label seldom claimed by people or organizations themselves, instead it is ascribed to them. In the American and European media, the term has negative connotations. It is often used by mainstream politicians as a pejorative term to describe the opposition, much like Hillary Clinton calling Donald Trump supporters a “basket of deplorables...The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic - you name it” (Reilly, 2016). Another image often associated with populism is one of far-right extremism; however, there are left-wing populists as well. Depending on political orientation, populist agendas can range from inclusive, egalitarian platforms to extreme chauvinism. Some populist platforms have a combination of progressive and nationalist platforms, such as the Netherland’s Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, or PVV). Led by Geert Wilder, a politician who is gay, the PVV’s platform includes anti-immigration and anti-Islam elements, yet is pro-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, and women’s rights.⁹ Occasionally centrist parties are categorized as populist, but, as will be explained later, they do not fit the typical populist model.

Adding to the misperception, populism is frequently described as an ideology (e.g. a form of nationalism, fascism, etc.) but it is not. Rather, it is a way of thinking about politics that taps into constituencies feeling marginalized by the political establishment. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) depict populism as a thin-centered ideology that divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and calls for politics to be

⁹Similarly, Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland (*Alternative für Deutschland*, or AfD) is led by Alice Weidel, who identifies as a lesbian.

an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people. The “thinness” allows populists to easily adapt their narrative to the most current issues.

The Structure of Populism

Typical of all forms of populism are three core concepts: “the people,” “the elite,” and “the general will” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). The “people” represents a shared common identity (this constitutes the “us” or ingroup), a social construct framed to appeal to multiple constituencies. This identity combines socioeconomic and specific cultural traditions and values to form a vaguely defined “common” or “ordinary” people. Representatives of this common identity are typically described as virtuous, righteous, hardworking, and gifted with common sense (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). This identity is used to mobilize voters against a perceived adversary (the “them” or outgroup), which can be internal to the country, external, or both. However, the primary threat is represented by “the elite,” which can include the political establishment (state or supranational), cultural elites, and the media. The elite are often characterized as being self-serving, corrupt, and “out of touch” or indifferent to the concerns of the “common person” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Lastly is the general will, which refers to the people joining together to protect their common interests (jobs, individual rights, social benefits, etc.). While populism can lead to illiberal forms of government (as in the case in Eastern Europe), populist parties initially require a democratic electoral environment to be legitimized as acting in accordance with “the will of the people.”

A useful way of understanding these interactions is looking at the relationship of us and them from a horizontal and vertical perspective (see Figure 3-1). The vertical axis represents the people and the elite. The elite are always depicted as being on top. The horizontal axis represents the relationship between insiders (the ingroup) and outsiders (the outgroup). Another way of characterizing the relationship is those who share a way of life and those threatening that way of life. Common threats are globalization, unrestricted trade, supranational institutions (e.g., United Nations, EU), religious extremism, etc. However, the threats are not always external, there can be “internal outsiders” as well, those living within a state but not necessarily seen as belonging to the state, for instance ethnic diasporas or political adversaries. Depending on the intersection of the various issues, populism can have a dyadic relationship (people vs elites) or a triadic relationship (people vs elites and outsiders).




Figure 3-1: Relationships in Right-wing Populist Constructs

Defining Right-Wing populism

Right-wing populism is always triadic in nature. Based on a definition of “the people” as culturally homogenous, right-wing populists juxtapose their identity and interests with the identity and interests of “others,” usually minorities such as migrants, which in turn are perceived to be favored by the elites at the expense of the people (e.g., Identitarism). This

process of “othering” involves identifying groups perceived to have lesser moral or ethical status than the people, this can include race, ethnicity, geographic origin, language, etc. Related to this othering process, right-wing populists use highly negative forms of communications intended to go against formal and informal societal rules (e.g. emotional appeals, personal insults, a lack of political correctness, etc.). In line with its anti-pluralist conception of the people, right-wing populists tend to demand radical solutions concerning their core interests. Central to these radical solutions is the othering process, which also has a strong legitimizing effect on the use of indiscriminate violence (see Chapter 5).

However, the concept of populism in itself is not a useful category when trying to measure the extent of the radicalism or extremism of a particular political party (Greven, 2016). Right-wing populists are not necessarily extremists, and right-wing extremists are not necessarily populists. However, the latter is likely, as extremism lends itself to populism (Greven, 2016). The more ethno-centric the conception of the people, the more xenophobic the positioning against the other, and the clearer the desire to overthrow democratic governance, the more likely it is that a right-wing populist is also an extremist.

As discussed in Chapter 1, right-wing populist parties are characterized as far right, radical right, and extreme right, with the terms often conflated. Mudde’s (2018) categorization between extreme right and the radical right is crucial for understanding the right-wing populist dynamic. The main European populist parties are best described as radical right-wing ideologies that are accepting of democracy, but want to oppose certain values, such as limiting minority rights and pluralism. However, many of these groups have membership pulling from the extreme right. For instance, Germany’s AfD, currently the third largest party in the Bundestag, draws from the same constituency as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West

(*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlande*, or Pegida), a German nationalist, anti-Islam, extreme far-right political movement. However, it would be inaccurate to say Pegida is a branch of the AfD. Rather, AfD tries to publicly downplay any association so as not to be linked to extreme-right activities. Yet, it is important to note public displays do not necessarily reflect the private opinions of party members. So, while AfD success offers the extreme right a politically effective voice, there are limitations that could create seams between the two. The AfD has already had defections of extreme-right members. Andre Poggenburg, one of the more extreme nationalist and xenophobic leaders within the AfD, left to form a more radical party, Uprising of German Patriots (*Aufbruch deutscher Patrioten*), to compete with the AfD (Jefferson, 2019). Some see the fracturing of the right-wing populist parties as a positive sign; however, when considering the terrorist strategy of outbidding (see Chapter 2), the splintering of the most extreme elements of right-wing populist parties has a more ominous feel.

Given the previous example, attempts to group all supporters of right-wing populist parties together is problematic as they tend to span the entire right-wing spectrum. Zito and Todd (2018) identify similar problems with media depictions of Donald Trump voters as reflected in newspaper headlines. Voters were economically distressed, uneducated, and angry (“Where were Trump’s Votes? Where the Jobs Weren’t” – Eduardo Porter, *New York Times*, December 13, 2016). Or, Trump was reliant on white voters without a college degree (“How Trump Won the Presidential Election: Revenge of the Working-Class Whites” – Jim Tankersley, *Washington Post*, November 9, 2016). In short, voters are characterized as either incapable of making a reasoned decision or acting out of rage. Zito and Todd’s analysis of Rust Belt Trump voters shows pre- and post-election depictions on Trump’s coalition often shortchange the complexity of the various subgroups’ motivations.

A more nuanced explanation requires considering both grievances and political opportunities. Building on the idea of rational voters and rational political parties, the radical right phenomenon is best understood through the concepts of public “demand” and party “supply” (Norris, 2005).

Drivers of Right-wing Populism

Inglehart and Norris (2016) see voter attraction to right-wing populist parties grouped into three categories: the demand-side of public opinion; the supply-side of party strategies; and the constitutional arrangements governing the electorate. Of the three categories, the most common approach in earlier literature was on understanding how changes in the social structure fueled public demand for the radical right (Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2007). Demand side factors emphasize “bottom up” conditions (e. g., marginalized underclass, migration flows, long-term-unemployment, cuts in the welfare state, mistrust of political parties/systems). These conditions are considered “structural” in that they are understood as being persistent and enduring developments in society, which constrain the behavior of all political actors.

A common theory related to the demand-side drivers is the economic insecurity thesis which emphasizes the consequences of the changes transforming the workforce and society. According to this view, rising economic insecurity and social deprivation among the “left-behinds” fuel popular resentment. Looking at evidence for the economic insecurity thesis, the results are mixed and inconsistent. Right-wing parties do receive significantly greater support among the less well-off and among those with experience of unemployment, supporting the economic insecurity thesis (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). But other measures do not consistently confirm this claim. For example, in terms of occupational class, right-wing voting was strongest among the petty bourgeoisie, not unskilled manual workers (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).

Supporting this research, the more successful European parties have tended to rally a coalition of economically insecure lower middle-class citizens and skilled and unskilled manual workers, but this is not common across all parties. Other groups are more dependent on a base of working-class and poorly educated men.

Another popular theory is the cultural backlash thesis which suggests the surge in votes for right-wing populist parties is not a purely economic phenomenon but in large part a reaction against progressive cultural change. For right-wing populists, immigration is not simply a question of economic competition, it constitutes a threat against the presumed (constructed) identity of the people and their traditional values. Although the principle of othering, or “us vs. them” construct, is uniformly applied by all right-wing populists, the definition of the others varies based on nationally specific conditions. For instance, in Hungary, one target is the Roma minority, while Islamophobia characterizes right-wing populists’ positions regarding the immigration (and integration) of Muslims elsewhere (Greven, 2016). Based on the cultural backlash thesis, Inglehart and Norris (2016) found right-wing support in Europe is stronger among the older voters, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities, indicating these groups are most likely to feel they have become “strangers in their own country” or left behind by progressive tides of cultural change. All the cultural value scales proved consistent predictors of voting support for right parties. Inglehart and Norris (2016) conclude that cultural values, combined with social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent explanation for voting support for right-wing parties. However, other research suggests demand-side centered explanations alone are insufficient. Grievances, like attitudes and preferences, are not easily directly translated into political outcomes. Instead, they only become politically salient or powerful when mobilized and organized by politicians and parties (Berman, 2019).

Understanding populism also requires paying attention to the supply-side explanations which include the political program parties offer, their party organization, and political opportunity structures (such as electoral systems, elite responses, and the media). Supply-side approaches focus on patterns of political competition, including where parties place themselves (e.g., left, center, right) across the ideological spectrum. Based on the Theoretical Model of Party Competition (see Figure 3-2), rational voters choose the party closest to their ideological preference (Norris, 2005). At the same time, mainstream political parties look to maximize their share of voters by adopting the ideological position closest to the median voter. Thus, there is a tendency for mainstream political parties to converge to the center. The distribution of public opinion across the ideological spectrum is assumed to follow a normal curve. Within the ideological space there is a “zone of acquiescence” bracketed by party policy options on the far right and far left. It is these peripheral areas where populist parties initially reside. However,




Figure 3-2: Theoretical Model of Party Competition (Norris, 2005)

this zone is not static and public preferences on the demand side may shift as a response to a shock to the status quo (e.g., 2008 Global Financial crisis, 2015 European Migrant crisis, etc.)

(Norris, 2005). With the convergence of mainstream political parties to the center, space is created on the borders to allow peripheral parties to enter the electoral marketplace.

Not driven by a universal cause, right-wing populist parties are dependent on how their ideological narrative appeals work within the constraints set by the electoral system and the distribution of public opinion. Under systems with low electoral thresholds¹⁰ right-wing populist parties can be successfully elected into parliament using rhetoric and ideological appeals (such as cultural protectionism) by targeting spaces outside the zone of acquiescence. A determinant of populism's success is also dependent on traditional parties' policy profiles. Right-wing populists tend to be more successful when center-left and center-right parties converge (Norris, 2005). Grand coalitions also seem to boost populist parties' electoral fortunes.

Growth of Right-wing Parties in Europe

Partially a response to the number of deaths from Islamist terrorism, 2016 was a banner year for right-wing populist candidates who won several seats in national and European parliament elections. This trend appeared to peak in 2016 with Marine Le Pen (France), Norbert Hofer (Austria), and Geert Wilders (Netherlands) making it to the final round of their respective presidential elections. Their resulting defeat seemed to signal an end to the right-wing populist run. However, right-wing populist parties are now found in the national governments of 22 of the 28 EU members and are either the ruling party or in a ruling coalition in five countries (see Appendix 2). Rather than fading, right-wing populist parties represent a significant oppositional political force. Populist gains reflect voters' continued disenchantment with mainstream political parties, both at the state and EU level.

¹⁰ National-level representational thresholds across the EU tend to range from 3-5%, with some countries having no threshold for the European Parliament elections (Sabbatti, Sgueo, and Dobрева, 2019).

Given the parliamentary structure of European governments, these right-wing gains are significant as they are preventing mainstream political parties from achieving outright majorities, thus forcing the formation of less unified coalition governments. In the 2017 German Federal Elections, the third-place finish of AfD caused a six-month delay in forming a government as mainstream parties negotiated forming a coalition without AfD participation. Even when not the majority, right-wing populist parties are still impacting policy, as illustrated by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) orchestrating the 2016 Brexit referendum and the resulting “yes vote” on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

While frequently grouped together, all populist parties in Europe are not the same and have differing agendas (see Figure 3-3 for a sampling of right and left party agendas). Returning to Brubaker’s horizontal-vertical approach, European populism can be placed into two broad categories of positioning between the people and the elite and between the inside and the outside.




Figure 3-2: Major European Parties and Agendas (Ashkenas and Aisch, 2016)

One category is the nationalistic populisms of Southern and Central Europe, and the UK.

Another distinct cluster is the populists of Northern and Western Europe, especially those in the

Netherlands, France, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. This cluster is characterized as having a “civilizational” focus centered on a perceived threat from Islam. However, this identity is more complex than just race or religion. “The preoccupation with Islam has given rise to an identarian ‘Christianism’, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defense of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech” (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1193). Thus, the ability of populists to reach out to a broad constituency.

Another difference between the two populist categories is the north-south division, which also represents a division in support for left-wing and right-wing populism. The most popular groups in the southern tier (Spain’s Podemos, Greece’s Syriza, and Italy’s Five Star Movement (*Movimento 5 Stelle*, or M5S)) are left-wing and primarily focused on EU induced austerity measures. Immigration is not as central to these parties’ platforms. Given these countries’ systemic economic problems, they are not as attractive to migrants. The southern tier countries are primarily seen as an entry point to access the more prosperous countries in northern and western Europe, which correlates to better job opportunities and more robust social welfare programs. Possibly indicating a change in the dynamic of populism in the southern tier, is the rise of right-wing groups in Spain (Vox) and Italy (League, or *Lega*).

While much of the focus on populism (both right- and left-wing) is at the state-level, the number of seats won by populist candidates (of all types) in the European Parliament has also steadily increased. Between 2009 and 2014, populists in the European Parliament grew by 50% accounting for 99 of 751 Members of the European Parliament, MEPs) (Dempsey, 2016). After the 2019 European Parliament elections, populists (of all types) now account for 238 MEPs (32% of parliament) (Garcia and Whiteside, 2019). Of this total, there are 163 right-wing populist MEPs. The ramifications of this sizeable populist presence is hard to determine.

Despite their seemingly common agendas, the right-wing factions have struggled to work together in the past, but this could change. Prior to the 2019 elections, far-right populist parties were divided among three groups in the European Parliament: the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (included Poland's Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PIS); the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) (included Ital's *Lega*) and France's National Rally (*Rassemblement National*, RN); and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) (included UKIP). In the run up to the 2019 elections, twenty different right-wing political groups and parties met to discuss forming a new right-wing coalition (Scholz, 2019). The resulting coalition was to become the European Alliance of Peoples and Nations (EAPN) but this failed to come to fruition. However, on 12 June 2019, it was announced the successor to the ENF would be named Identity and Democracy (ID) (Reuters, 2019). ID has representation from nine EU member countries and accounts for 73 seats, making it the fifth-largest grouping in the European Parliament (Reuters, 2019). ID consists of *Lega* (28 MEPs), RN (22 MEPs), AfD (11 MEPs), Austria's (Freedom Party of Austria, (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) and Belgium's Flemish Interest (*Vlaams Belang*, VB) (3 MEPs each), Finland's True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*, PS) and Czech Republic's Freedom and Direct Democracy (*Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie*, SPD) (2 MEPs each), and Denmark's People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF) and Estonia's Conservative People's Party (*Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond*, EKRE) (1 MEP each) (Reuters, 2019). Other right-wing populists in parliament include the UK's Brexit Party and Spain's Vox accounting for another 29 MEPs (Reuters, 2019). Even if the right-wing groups struggling to work together, individual they will still be a disruptive force within the EU parliament for at least the next 6 years.

Chapter Conclusions

Like the challenge of creating a universally accepted definition of terrorism, so is it with defining populism. The lack of a common theory, history, political program, or social base prevents the establishment of a coherent set of criteria for explaining when and how political actors turn populist. Since populists do not claim a defining text or ideology, academics and journalists use the term to describe a diverse range of political candidates and parties. While there is a range of political actors with populist tendencies, the majority of populist parties and candidates are right-wing in nature.

Some see populism as a temporary phenomenon; however, this may be more a case of wishful thinking. As indicated by election results since 2016, right-wing parties are steadily becoming a significant oppositional political force at both the national and EU levels. Right-wing populist parties have established a foothold across Europe with representation in 22 national governments and account for roughly 10 percent of the European Parliament. There are no indications the right-wing populist trend in Europe is ending anytime soon. In fact, in Spain, Vox won their first seats in the country's parliament, the first time a far-right party has been in the legislature in 40 years (DW Staff, 2019, April 29).

The support for right-wing populist parties and candidates reveals growing public discontent with contemporary economic and political agendas at both the national and EU levels. The literature shows public dissatisfaction is based on a wide variety of demand-side factors: economic anxiety, unemployment, immigration, inequality, weakening social welfare benefits, government spending (either too high or not enough), perceived government dishonesty, threats to national sovereignty, etc. The enduring nature of these issues, some of which go back

decades, is what makes radical political parties increasingly attractive to voters, as these parties present an opportunity to change the political establishment blamed for today's problems.

The populist construct always sees the political problem from a weakened position, whether one feels left behind or that their way of life is under attack. Populism in the most basic sense is another means of resistance by those who perceive themselves marginalized by the political system. However, unlike terrorism, it is a means of using democratic elections to challenge the status quo.

None of the leaders of the major right-wing populist parties have openly called for terrorist acts. In fact, they tend to downplay violence. An example of this is an exchange between Jordan Bardella, a politician for France's RN, and a party supporter when discussing the EU, immigration, and terrorism at a local rally. During a RN gathering a supporter yelled "Let's kill them." Bardella replied, "No, we're not going to kill them, but let's defeat them at the polls on May 26" (a reference to the 2019 EU elections) (Sandberg, 2019). However, this example also highlights the fact there are individuals within these groups who are willing to use violence (or at least entertain the idea) to achieve their individual political objectives. The concern is when do these individuals decide to take matters into their own hands, like in Christchurch, El Paso or Halle? While right-wing populists do not currently represent a direct terrorist threat, they do pose an indirect threat based on their toxic rhetoric.

Another concern is the splintering of more extreme elements from the populist parties. Given that splinter groups will have even more extreme political views, it is unlikely these factions can replicate the electoral success of the larger populist parties. When considering the structural constraints of the Model of Party Competition, there is only limited space on the fringes to operate outside the Zone of Acquiescence. Party fragmentation becomes more

concerning when taken into account with the terrorism strategy of outbidding (see Chapter 2).

Splinter parties may see violence as the only way of convincing supporters they are the only ones capable of defending the people from the plethora of issues across the EU.

The next chapter takes a more in depth look into the factors shaping the “us vs. them” narrative and the social and political issues which have created the opportunity for the expansion of right-wing populism in Europe.

Chapter 4: Identity and Othering in a European Context

Today's European identity was born from post-World War 2 necessities to create a unifying regional identity to suppress national identities to prevent a repeat of the conflict and to counter communist expansion. Such an identity was a useful construct for the bi-polar Cold War world order. However, the process of constructing this collective identity is conceptually no different than the one described in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (2016).

Anderson depicts imagined communities as a social construction invented by people who perceive themselves as part of that group. Unfortunately, the idea of a European identity is more recent than many of the imagined nationalist identities it was meant to counter.

Today's European identity, based on the insecurities of World War 2 and the Cold War, is now being shaped by the uncertainties resulting from a globalized, multi-polar world. One could argue the right-wing populist rise in Europe reflects cracks in the postwar narratives and a need for a new European narrative. The current political situation within the EU allows one to see how right-wing populists are leveraging both old and new societal grievances to create nationalist appeals. However, it would be shortsighted to put all the blame on populism. While populist parties have successfully leveraged societal fears and uncertainty, they are not the source of the various issues. In fact, it is the other way around. The failure of previous administrations across the EU to address the underlying societal and political issues has fueled populism's rise. The rise of European right-wing populism should be seen as a warning sign of a pending political crisis. Europe's political and social issues provide a "perfect storm" creating the conditions for populist inspired right-wing sentiments and terrorism to converge once again.

Why Right-Wing Populism is So Popular in Europe

The idea of Europeans working together and freely crossing one another's borders (i.e., Zone) is being tested by a range of rapidly developing and somewhat interrelated crises that undermine a pan-European identity. The most significant of these threats is the increasing level of Euroscepticism among EU voters. The main source of Euroscepticism among populists is the belief integration weakens national sovereignty and the nation state. Others have lost confidence in the Euro since the 2008 global economic crisis. Efforts to control the value of the Euro limit countries' ability to use certain fiscal policies to manage budget and trade deficits. Increasing Euroscepticism and decreasing confidence in the Euro is reflected in support for populist parties across the political spectrum.

The multitude of issues European governments face are documented in several books, including: Christopher Caldwell's *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West* (2009), Douglas Murray's *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam* (2017), William Drozdiak's *Fractured Continent: Europe's Crises and the Fate of the West*, Bruce Bawer's *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within* (2006). The wording in these titles (e.g., revolution, death, fractured, destroying) reflects the attitudes of voters susceptible to right-wing populist narratives. If anything, right-wing populists are adept at rallying to the fears associated with the traditional concerns and can quickly refocus platforms to address the new concerns as they arise, such as the current Euro debt and refugee crises. While the issue regarding immigrants from Muslim countries is not new, the 2015 crisis brought the issue of religion and identity to the forefront of right-wing agendas.

Although the fear of *le grand remplacement* resonates with many Europeans, this was not always the case. There was a period during the post-World War 2 economic recovery when immigration was welcomed due to labor shortages. But in the 1970s and 1980s, when European economic growth started slowing down, labor shortages started changing to labor surpluses (Murray, 2017). Thus, the beginnings of anti-immigrant sentiments, but not necessarily with a religious component. By the early 1990s, this discontent was beginning to show up in European polling (Judis, 2016). Despite public concerns, many European leaders ignored or denigrated these sentiments. Political “elite” condescendence, combined with economic stagnation, led to increasing public frustration with mainstream political parties. This anti-establishment sentiment created opportunities for right-wing populist parties to gain entrance into the public sphere.

Populists are more flexible with their platforms than mainstream parties, as their history is one of adaptability. The first populist parties, such as France’s *Front National* (now RN) and Austria’s FPÖ, were *petit-bourgeoisie* parties focused on small business and anti-tax platforms (Judis, 2016). By the 1990s, populist parties started expanding their base into the working-class constituencies formerly supported by the left (Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists) (Judis, 2016). With a new focus on immigration and economic policies, populist parties became workers’ parties. Incorporating leftist agendas continues with right-wing groups now focusing on protecting and increasing social welfare programs to become people’s parties. Right-wing populist adaptability is key to attracting voters from seemingly unrelated demographics.

As already mentioned, frustrations with the EU and the Eurozone are key factors in the rise of European populism. In establishing the EU, member states adopted a principle of freedom of movement for people and businesses (freedom of establishment) among its member states (Judis, 2016). Populists see the policy of open borders as not only weakening a state’s

sovereignty and the ability to control immigration, but as a security vulnerability. Although the EU's economic and immigration policies are developed and reviewed by the member states, it is not always done in a way transparent to the average European citizen. Thus, it is not just EU policies and euro-related austerity measures that are the source of discontent, but the belief the EU is making decisions not in the best interests of member states. For example, the EP trying to impose immigrant quotas on all 28 members, some of which already have high unemployment rates (e.g., Greece, Italy, Spain) and no way to absorb additional refugees into their economies.

Based on the above trends, the appeal of populism in Europe can be summed up in four ways. First, populist supporters (the people) feel the important issues are not being addressed by the elites. This ties issues like European integration and immigration, on which established mainstream parties (either at the state or EU levels) have been unwilling to campaign, to socio-economic issues like economic stagnation, unemployment and welfare state reform. Second, the elites are perceived as being all the same. Governments with parliamentary coalitions have brought left and right mainstream parties closer to the center of the political spectrum. Third, more and more people see state elites as essentially powerless and subservient to the EU. Finally, social media provides a favorable environment for political opposition compared to the past when established mainstream parties controlled the key mass media platforms. The combination of these factors ensures a political environment allowing right-wing populist parties to flourish.

Religion, Identity, and Religiosity in Europe

The introduction of over 3.5 million asylum seekers (since 2015) from Muslim countries¹¹ to an exceedingly secular region adds a unique aspect to European right-wing

¹¹ Over 5.7 million refugees and asylum seekers documented since 2008 (Eurostat, 2018).

populism (Eurostat, 2018). A byproduct of the issue is the emergence of competing Christian and Muslim identities, but not necessarily in the sense of religiosity of either migrants or host nations. While none of the West European populist parties have a solely religious platform, religion still provides several points of contention. The intersection of right-wing populism and religion has a significant shaping function on the immigration debate, which can be characterized as a clash of faith-based identities, civilizations, religiosity and secularism, or an amalgamation of all.

Given the close correlation between right-wing populism and national identity, religion factors into the issues in different ways; however, to what extent religion plays a role is debatable. According to a recent Pew Research Center study (2017, February), there are widely disparate views on the importance of religion to national identity in Europe. For example, in Greece, 54% believe it is very important to be a Christian to be considered a true national (Pew Research Center, 2017, February). In contrast, in Spain (57%) and Sweden (57%), the majorities say religion is *not at all* important to national identity (Pew Research Center, 2017 February). Regardless of the overall percentage, two important trends stick out. First, people on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely to view religion as very important to nationality (Pew Research Center, 2017, February). Second, the importance of religion to nationality is often divided along generational lines. People ages 50 and older are significantly more likely than those ages 18 to 34 to say being Christian is very important to national identity (Pew Research Center, 2017, February). The age difference is partly explained by research from St Mary's University showing most young people (16- to 29-year-olds) in several European countries do not follow a religion. In twelve out of the twenty-one countries surveyed, over half of this demographic claimed not to identify with any religion or denomination (Bullivant, 2018).

Returning to Brubaker's (2017) argument, this data tends to support the secular nature of "Christian Identitarianism." While there is some irony in the emergence of a Christian identity in what is considered one of the most secularized regions of the world, it is important to keep in mind that Christianity is not being embraced as a religion but as an identity opposed to an Islamic identity. This may seem counterintuitive; however, as Brubaker points out, this allows Christianity to be privileged as a culture in a way that it cannot be privileged as a religion under secularist policies in the region, such as under France's policy of *laïcité*. However, the level of religiosity associated with Christian Identitarianism may be understated.

Another Pew Center survey (2017, May 10) looked at the way in which people connect (or do not) to religion in Central and Eastern Europe. The three criteria used for determining religiosity was: belief in a higher power; participation in prayer and rituals; and belonging to a congregation, spiritual community or religious group (Pew Center, 2017 May 10). The research suggests most religious practitioners around the world engage with religion in at least one of these ways, but not necessarily all three. In Central and Eastern Europe, the Pew Research Center survey (2017, May 10) found religion was reasserting itself as an important part of individual and national identity. Solid majorities of adults across much of the region say they believe in God, and most identify with a religion. The comeback of religion in a region once dominated by atheist regimes is interesting. Given this trend, it is reasonable to ask if a similar trend is occurring in secular Western Europe. While the Pew Research study did not include Western Europe, it referenced a 1994 study by Grace Davie describing Christians in Great Britain as "believing without belonging," supporting a belief religion can coexist with low participation in religious institutions (Pew Center, 2017 May 10).

A Clash Between Religiosity and Secularism

This brings us to the first point of contention within the EU, one between religiosity and secularism. Central to the discussion on immigration is how people integrate into host societies. Homegrown Islamist extremism and migrant-related violent crimes has fueled right-wing populist narratives that Muslim populations in Western Europe were not integrating into host countries. Part of this debate involves a critique of multiculturalism, which some see as a failed policy. Modood (2013) feels the greatest challenge to multiculturalism is what he characterizes as a “crisis of secularism.” Modood sees Europe as transitioning from a secular to a post-secular society. This post-secular society can be characterized as one between secularism and religiosity. “Instead of treating religion as sub-rational and a matter of private concern only, religion is once again to be recognized as a legitimate basis of public engagement and political action” (Modood, 2013, p. 169). Following along the reasoning of Modood, a key issue driving the “crisis of secularism” is the place of Muslim identities. Paralleling the emergence of a Muslim identity, there is an emergence of a Christian identification in areas near large Muslim population concentrations. Modood fears a radical secularist and Christian identity trend may combine in a form of cultural nationalism or “cultural Europeanism.” Modood’s concerns are validated by Brubaker’s Christian Identitarianism argument. Of course, based on social identity and realistic group conflict theory (see Chapter 5), when trying to elevate a minority group identity to a majority level, these trends are expected.

However, the clash between secularism and religion may have as much to do with an internal struggle as an external one. The data concerning the secularization of the younger European demographic does not tell the complete story about the religiosity amongst people identifying as followers. A study conducted in the US shows there may be a correlation between

ethnicity, age, and religiosity. Even as the US and Europe see a growth in atheism and agnosticism, Christianity and religious faith in general continue to rise in parts of the world that are not white. In the US, people of color are more likely than whites to be Christians (Carter, 2018). They are also more likely to believe their faith is the place to find answers to questions about right and wrong (Carter, 2018). Another noticeable trend, white Christians are aging, while Christians of color are “youthening” (Carter, 2018).

Given the connection between race, ethnicity, age, and faith it offers another explanation for the attraction of Islam to younger immigrants in Europe. Religious identification provides a sense of righteousness and camaraderie. In short, Islam, when shari’a law is factored in, provides a “total solution” for finding a meaningful identity lacking in places like the *banlieues* of Paris. A parallel youthening of Christian and Muslim believers could add a new dimension to the “crisis of secularism” in Europe.

Islam in Europe: A Threat to Christianity or Identity-Driven Paranoia?

In all countries where the St Mary’s University survey was conducted, some affiliation with Christianity was identified, whether Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, or another form. The countries with the largest percentage of Muslims are in Austria (10%), France (10%), Belgium (10%), Netherlands (8%), Switzerland (8%), and Germany (8%). These numbers are interesting in that the largest Muslim populations are in the same countries where Brubaker (2017) identified the emergence of “Christian Identitarianism.” Regardless, whether the populations are actively participating in religious activities, or are even religiously literate, religion is a clear marker between the “us” and “them.”

Given the significance immigration plays in right-wing populist rhetoric, are these concerns of an increasing Muslim presence valid (i.e., *le grand remplacement*), or is this just

identity-driven paranoia? There is certainly precedence for Europeans imagining an Islamist-inspired threat, particularly given the rash of recent attacks inspired by ISIS. Post-9/11 attempts to mobilize Muslim communities has created antagonisms and a stereotype of Muslims being associated with fanaticism and violence (Kepel, 2002). This perception is partially illustrated in Manent's (2016) book on radical secularism in France, particularly how he characterizes the nature of the Muslim presence. Throughout the book Manent uses statements like: "those who now attack us" (p. 6); "a war against us has been declared and is happening" (p. 33); and "the French State is in a state of war both internally and externally" (p. 42). While these statements are intended to serve as a call to action for addressing the issue of radical secularism, they still adequately capture the sentiment of right-wing populist parties and their supporters.

A Clash of Civilizations?

Brubaker's (2017) civilizational argument parallels Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations." Huntington (1993) argues with the "end of history" (a reference to Francis Fukuyama's 1989 essay), the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the fault lines separating civilizations, particularly between Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

Huntington defines a civilization as the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity ... defined both by common objective elements, such as language, a history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people" (1993, p. 24). While Huntington's argument is geared towards interstate conflict, it may hold true with the emergence of Muslim and Christian identities in Europe. Modood (2013) points out the trend of Christian identification emerging in areas near large Muslim population concentrations. Of course, central to the "clash of civilizations" argument is the idea of a common Muslim identity.

While “civilization” gives these arguments a primordial sense, the reality is more in line with Anderson’s (2016) concept of imagined communities, which is an imagined concept lying dormant until needed. Arguably, the creation of an imagined global Muslim community requires both external and internal constructs to solidify its foundation. In the case of right-wing populism, a rival construct is also a necessity.

Returning to Huntington’s (1993) argument, he saw the world shrinking and the resulting interactions between people of different civilizations intensifying identity consciousness. He also saw modernization and social change further separating people from their local identities and weakening the nation state as a source of identity, creating an opportunity for religion to fill the identity gap. He described this as an “unsecularization” of the world, which allows religion to provide a basis for identity. Huntington sees this form of identity being much stronger than national identities. Along Huntington’s line of reasoning, a person can be half French and half Algerian, and simultaneously be a citizen of both countries. However, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to be half Christian and half Muslim. Huntington was making a faulty assumption that religious identity and religiosity were one in the same, as a result he underestimated the importance of national identity, and the possibility of Brubaker’s secularized Christian identity.

The Return of Foreign Fighters

While right-wing narratives and national threat estimates tend to focus on homegrown Islamist terrorism, another dimension of the “clash of civilizations” argument is the return of EU citizens who went to Syria and Iraq to fight for groups like ISIS and al-Qa’ida. These individuals are often referred to as foreign fighters, or foreign terrorist fighters, and are defined as “individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the

providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict” (CTC, 2019). In comparison, the number of HVEs are relatively small when compared to the number of foreign fighters. In 2016, it was estimated of the approximately 15,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, between 3,922 and 4,294 originated from EU states (ICCT, 2016). Of this total, 2,838 foreign fighters come from four countries: Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, with Belgium having the highest per capita foreign fighter contingent (ICCT, 2016). It is estimated 14% of the EU foreign fighters were killed and around 30% have returned to their countries of departure. There are concerns among EU members that the return of foreign fighters could result in another spike of HVE attacks (ICCT, 2016). This is not an unfounded concern. Radicalized to an Islamist worldview, and in many cases having experienced armed combat or at least undergone some sort of military training, these returning foreign fighters add a new lethal dimension to an already disenfranchised community.

As with trying to identify terrorists, there is no clear-cut profile of those who traveled abroad; however, there are two interesting findings on the role religion may or may have not played into their decisions to becoming violent extremists. With regard to the place of residence before traveling, between 90% and 100% originate from large metropolitan areas or peripheral suburbs with many foreign fighters clustered around the same neighborhoods (ICCT, 2016). This would seem to indicate that acquaintance or friends radicalize as a group and decide to leave jointly for Syria/Iraq or recruit each other from abroad. Thus, initially group bonding or identity appears to have had a stronger effect than religious ideology. As Belgian counterterrorism official Alain Grignard has noted, many foreign fighters in this generation appear to be Islamized radicals rather than radicalized Islamists (Heinke, 2017).

Another trend seen with foreign fighters is a large number had been the subject of criminal investigations prior to becoming radicalized. For example, for foreign fighters originating in Germany, two-thirds had been the subject of criminal investigations prior to Islamist radicalization, with 62% linked to property crimes, 60% linked to violent attacks (assault, robbery, etc.), and 35% to drug trafficking (Heinke, 2017). Politically motivated offenses made up only 4% of the crimes (Heinke, 2017). More than 53% of the individuals with a criminal record were suspected of or were tried for three or more offenses, including nearly 32% charged with six or more crimes (Heinke, 2017). More than half of the departees were suspects in ongoing criminal investigations when they left (Heinke, 2017). Thus, given the history of many foreign fighters, in addition to the possibility of a spike in HVE attacks, there is also the potential for a spike in criminal activity as these individuals return home. Either of these outcomes would further fuel right-wing narratives. However, there might be a completely different outcome. Roy (2004), in discussing the internationalist commonalty between anti-globalization movements and radical Islam said, “for a rebel, to convert is to find a cause” (p. 49). “Twenty years ago these men would have joined a radical leftist movement, but such movements have disappeared from the spaces of social exclusion...” (Roy, 2004, p. 48). Instead of a renewed Islamist threat, the EU might face an entirely new threat.

What Lies Ahead for Europe?

Despite the EU’s best efforts to reduce nationalism, the rise of right-wing populist parties indicates national interests are making a comeback in European politics. Denmark is a good example of this unexpected turn. Considered one of the most open and egalitarian countries in the world, when it comes to immigration, Denmark is shifting to the right (Eakin, 2006). There is a growing domestic consensus large-scale Muslim immigration is incompatible with European

social democracy (Eakin, 2016). While Denmark has experienced its share of terrorism, what Danes are most concerned about is the threat Muslim immigrants pose to their way of life. Though Muslims make up less than 5% of the population, the perception is they fail to enter the workforce, are slow to learn Danish, and end up in high-crime immigrant neighborhoods where, while relying on extensive state handouts, they and their children are isolated from Danish society (Eakin, 2016).

While the Danish government has started taking steps to appease public discontent over immigration, other countries are still finding it difficult to publicly discuss the topic. France's policy of *laïcité* leaves little room for serious discussion of religious identity in the public realm. When Muslim immigration is brought up by French populists, they are quickly silenced or labeled as Islamaphobes and fascists. Yet, Muslims are equally frustrated by French secularism and feel just as marginalized. Given Germany's history with Judaism, Germans are also struggling to find an appropriate way to address immigration issues without being labeled a racist or a Nazi. While there is an element of truth in these labels when placed on French and German far right-wing supporters, it nonetheless reflects the trend of mainstream politicians attacking the secondary symptoms of a problem rather than the primary problem (i.e., government policies related to immigration). This trend further reinforces perceptions among right-wing populist supporters that government officials and mainstream politicians are ignoring their concerns. Public frustrations ensure a continued right-wing populist presence in European politics.

Another trend in European politics is the "pull effect" of populism on the left and center political parties. In Germany's newly formed coalition parliament, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the sister party to Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union, is endorsing more conservative policy positions, particularly on immigration. According to the CSU leader,

the rationale for doing this is to prevent “others” from occupying the space to the “right of center,” a clear reference to the AfD (Amann, Neukirch, and Pfister, 2018). Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron has taken a hardening stance toward radical Islam. Macron’s centrist party is helping put into law government tactics applied before only as part of the state of emergency following the 2015 Paris attacks; a policy the FN (now RN) advocated for during the 2016 elections (Nossiter, 2018). In both the German and French cases, by forcing the center and center-right to shift to more conservative positions, the right-wing populist parties are indirectly achieving their goals.

Interestingly, the opposite effect has occurred with left-wing populist parties such as Syriza (Greece) and Podemos (Spain) (Judis, 2016). Instead of pulling mainstream parties towards them, they have moved towards the center and in the process their policies have become more mainstream. This does not mean the issues launching them into government are resolved, it just means they are becoming more like the establishment. Thus, public frustrations remain ready for exploitation by other populist parties. The question then, at what point do the people forego mainstream and populist parties and decide to act on their own?

Shaping mainstream policies is not the only influence of populism. An unusual twist is past support for the FN (now the RN) among some French Muslims. Given the FN’s strong anti-immigration and anti-Islam platforms pose a direct threat to French Muslims, this is an unintuitive connection. However, there is a ready-made connection between the two in the form of anti-Semitism. Additionally, some Muslims reportedly voted for the FN as a rejection of Muslim extremists who have resisted integrating into French society (Kerkoud, 2012). While “the enemies of my enemies are my friends” logic may be a factor in some cases, there may be more to it. In structure, Islamic fundamentalism has the appearance of a right-wing populist

movement (exclusionary, critical of the elites, charismatic leaders, and a claimed will of the people). For some Muslims, the populist narrative may be attractive. After all, both have a similar theme of hatred, and both the populist voter and the radicalized Muslim feel abandoned.

Chapter Conclusions

In trying to understand the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, the challenge is defining what it means to be European. The meaning of the term has frequently changed over time. A common theme throughout European history is the most cohesive identities were influenced by external threats. For early European inhabitants it was the rise of Islam providing them with a sense of identity through their spirituality. The current European identity was born from post-World War 2 and Cold War necessities requiring collective forgetting of atrocities. This process is best summarized by Judt (2005) as “institutionalized public remembering,” which is the foundation of all collective identities. Interestingly, this is echoed in Ernest Renan’s well quoted 1882 lecture “*What is a Nation?*” (*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*), where he claims, “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.” Renan believed that nations developed from the common needs of the people, who consisted of different social groups seeking a "collective identity." Today’s challenge is the imagining of a unifying European identity is much newer than the national or ethnic identities it is intended to replace.

Compounding the situation, past European insecurities have been replaced by new anxieties and fears related to globalization. Right-wing populist parties are attempting to fill in cracks in the long-held postwar narrative. Today’s generation did not experience these events firsthand, therefore it is easier for them to “un-forget” and attempt to create new narratives to

address today's issues. New narratives ensure the addition of new social cleavages, which in turn will increase anger and anxiety amongst certain demographics across Europe.

Public dissatisfaction in Europe is based on a variety of long-standing concerns: economic anxiety, unemployment, immigration, inequality, weakening social welfare benefits, government spending (either too high or not enough), perceived government dishonesty, threats to national sovereignty, etc. The enduring nature of these issues is what makes right-wing populism increasingly attractive to voters, as these parties represent an opportunity to change the political establishment largely blamed for the problems. Right-wing populist parties are particularly successful in combining these issues to take advantage of fears related to migration, including loss of national/cultural identity and threats to public security (both criminal activity and terrorism). While migration has an internal (EU vs non-EU) and external (non-European) component, the latter is one of the most heatedly debated, and racially charged topics in European politics.

Could the societal conditions contributing to the rise of right-wing populism mark the beginning of a new wave of right-wing violent extremism? Given the convergence of religion with a secular identity (e.g., Christian Identitarianism), it is not unfathomable for identity-driven politics to become even more confrontational. Given the emergence of new identities and the return of foreign fighters, it could be that new forms of radicalization are moving into the "spaces of social exclusion" throughout Europe. Returning to the issue of the 2016 Munich Mall shooting, although now characterized as motivated by right-wing extremism, it should be noted the perpetrator, David Ali Sonboly, was an 18-year-old Iranian German with dual nationality (DW Staff, 2019 October). This incident shows that the extreme right-is not just the bastion of white nationalism.

The next chapter explores the political mobilization and radicalization processes to determine how supporters of right-wing populist parties could transition from non-violent forms of protest to conducting terrorist acts.

Chapter 5: Political Mobilization, Radicalization and Othering

As discussed in the previous chapters, there are a myriad of issues attracting people to support right-wing populist parties, some more salient than others. Saliency can also vary across group members with some feeling more strongly than others about a particular issue. While it is reasonable to assume some supporters of right-wing populist parties have extreme views, not all will conduct acts of political violence let alone become terrorists. Nevertheless, given the number of mass causality incidents from around the world, this option may seem a viable course of action for some. This chapter examines how individuals make the transition from non-violent political behavior to conducting acts of terrorism.

The literature reveals a range of sociological and psychological theories explaining the radicalization process. The various theories fall into two broad categories: dispositional and situational. The dispositional perspective implies there are internal determinates for extremist behavior and that certain individuals are predisposed to conduct acts of violence. The situationist perspective argues the situation exerts the greater power over individual actions. A similar means of categorizing the various theories is offered by the “syndrome” and “tool” perspectives. As with the dispositional approach, the syndrome perspective focuses on internal psychological traits and suggests terrorism is “a kind of ‘disease’ with a definite etiology, developmental trajectory, and consequences” (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006). On the other hand, the “tool” perspective views terrorism as a means to an end, a tactic all can use (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006). Much like the situationist perspective, the tool perspective focuses on the conditions under which an individual decides on a violent course of action.

Conceptualizing Political Mobilization

Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) use a “conveyor belt” analogy to conceptualize political mobilization. Their model is useful for understanding the transition from passive support to more radical political behavior. The conveyor belt represents a stage-theory interpretation of levels of political commitment, which is depicted as a pyramid (see Figure 5-1). The foundation of the structure is sympathizers who have a minimal level of commitment and may see party affiliation as part of their identity. Next are those who justify radical actions but themselves are unwilling to physically take part in those acts. This level of involvement can include both non-material and material support. Next are those willing to take part in non-violent action (demonstrations, protests) to support the cause. At the apex are the most committed, the violent actors. As the pyramid reflects, there is a proportional relationship from base to apex. As radical beliefs, feelings, and behaviors increase in intensity the overall numbers having those sentiments decrease.




Figure 5-1: Levels of Political Commitment and Behavior (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009)

Within this model, individuals are assumed to move toward violent behavior through ascending stages of radicalization; however, it does not require one to pass through each level

sequentially or at a consistent rate. An un-politicized individual can move from the base to the top quite rapidly by experiencing a life changing event. While the conveyor belt provides an upward trajectory, it is not continuously in motion. Much like any personal journey, individuals can choose to stop at various points along the route to reflect or speed ahead to its conclusion. Thus, there are supporters and activists who never become extremists, and there are extremists without a history of activism.

Ideology can play a key role in radicalization as it provides a central guiding force throughout the process to assist those moving through the various stages (or to the next floor). Ideology also helps to structure individual thoughts during their conversion. The supporting narrative is also crucial, as this helps to frame the actions of a group, or individual. Both ideology and narrative are important in maintaining an individual's commitment to extremist activities and group cohesion. However, it is rare for individuals to commit acts of violence for purely ideological reasons (Moghaddam, 2006; Baran, 2008). Personal frustrations, perceived injustices, and a multitude of other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their current situation and be more receptive to alternative worldviews, particularly if there is a strong narrative supporting the ideology. Rather, those who engage in militant activities usually do so for a combination of ideological and social reasons. In fact, there is evidence to suggest many individuals move into radical circles after having already decided they want to engage in some form of confrontational politics indicating it is not necessarily the ideology that serves as the "radicalizing agent" but rather personal experiences (Mandaville, 2008). Thus, personal frustrations, perceived social injustices, and other grievances can lead individuals to be more receptive to the use of violence.

Conceptualizing Terrorist Organizations

An issue when conceptualizing terrorist groups is assuming all members are equally radicalized or committed to conducting acts of violence. As with non-violent political organizations, terrorist groups have differing levels of participation and commitment. The Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) uses a concentric ring model to depict the interaction between the various organizational elements (see Figure 4-2) (Akerboom, 2003). At the apex are those conducting violent acts, the “soldiers.” The next ring represents the facilitators supporting operations (e.g., logisticians, financiers, etc.), followed by sympathizers. The outer ring consists of the communities or societies from which group members originate. Like Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) model, the AVID model also reflects the relative proportionality of participation within each ring, with foot soldiers, or terrorists, representing only a small fraction.




Figure 5-2: AVID Ring Model (Akerboom, 2003)

The ring structure is used to depict the radical intent of group members, with the most extreme at the top. While sympathizers may only be minimally radicalized, and most of society not at all, as with political mobilization there are a variety of factors that can serve as

agents to motivate individuals towards the center (an identity crisis, personal trauma, a lack of political alternatives, cause seeking, etc.). Given the similarities between the two models

discussed, a reasonable question is if there is a common mindset for the those at the apex of Moskalenko and McCauley's pyramid and the center ring of the AVID model?

Is There a Terrorist Mindset?

The research did not find any overwhelming evidence of a common terrorist mindset, or that specific personality traits can be used as a predictor for understanding why people become terrorists. According to McCormick (2003), although some researchers suggest terrorists are abnormal in some ways, most observers believe terrorists are “disturbingly normal.” Victoroff (2005) sees extremist behavior shaped by a combination of innate factors, biological factors, early development factors, personality, temperament, environmental influences, and group dynamics. Extremists are like everyone else, they are motivated by their own “psychosocial experiences and traits” (Victoroff, 2005). Since there is no clear psychological answer to why a person becomes a terrorist, it is impossible to create a clear-cut terrorist profile. Likewise, there is no universal profile for lone offenders, despite often being characterized as emotionally or cognitively impaired. Research shows while they display elevated levels of negative emotions (namely anger, resentment, and vengeance), they can also have high-cognitive complexity (Baele, 2017). While situational perspectives offer a better explanation why people become terrorists, there are still important unanswered questions. Why are some people more susceptible to a given situation? How do psychologically normal individuals decide violence is the best alternative? While there is no psychological profile to determine who might become a terrorist, there does appear to be a common radicalization pathway, or pattern.

The Radicalization Process

Based on a study of disrupted western HVE plots, Silber and Bhatt (2007) developed a four-stage model to depict the radicalization process:

- *Pre-radicalization*: The period before an individual is exposed to an incident or episode making them receptive to an extremist ideology.
- *Self-identification*: Influenced by either internal or external factors, an individual begins to change their worldview and associate with like-minded individuals.
- *Indoctrination*: Individual fully adopts a political ideology and becomes willing to take action to further the cause.
- *“Jihadization”*: Individual decides to take action and participates in the planning, preparation and execution of an act.

All the individuals analyzed by Silber and Bhatt (2007) followed this sequential process. However, as with the earlier conveyor belt analogy, there is no guarantee all entering this process will follow through to the end. Another key point is there is no timeline associated with this process. The first three phases could take place over multiple years, or it could be a very rapid process, taking only a few months or weeks to run its course. The NYPD findings were validated in a Danish Ministry of Justice report looking at homegrown radicalization in Europe. Precht (2007) uses basically the same model with slightly different labels for the phases (Pre-radicalization, Conversion and Identification, Conviction and Indoctrination, and Action). Similarly, Moghaddam (2006) uses a staircase analogy to conceptualize the decision process a person uses in becoming a terrorist. The stairway represents a narrowing passageway that as individuals progress, they see fewer options, until the final culminating point:

- *Ground Floor*: Equivalent to the pre-radicalization stage of the previous two models. What matters most is an individual’s feelings of deprivation, and perceptions of fairness and justice, all of which contribute to the formation of their “identity” (how they value themselves).

- *First Floor*: Equivalent to the conversion part of Precht's second phase. A person moves to this level in hopes of improving their living conditions, finding justice, and achieving a satisfactory identity.
- *Second Floor*: Equivalent to the identification phase of both models. Unable to rectify their grievances, individuals become more receptive to messages identifying the causes of their problems. A key aspect of this level involves the displacement of aggression, which creates an "us" versus "them" mentality.
- *Third Floor*: Equivalent to both the identification and conviction stages of Precht's model. This level involves the development of a belief structure that the individual is involved in a struggle to achieve the ideal society by any means possible. This process not only provides them a "meaningful" identity, but also helps to build a morality supportive of the use of violence to further the cause.
- *Fourth Floor*: Equivalent to the indoctrination stage of both models. Psychologically, the individual fully assumes the "terrorist" identity and is socialized into the terrorist organization.
- *Fifth Floor*: Equivalent to the "jihadization" and action phases. A person is ready to commit a terrorist act (Moghaddam, 2006).

While the models show what appears to be a common pathway towards radicalization and political mobilization, there is no single route to this process, instead there are many individualized routes. The radicalization process seems largely influenced by the environment in which people live. A consistent theme across the various models and motivational factors is individuals seeking a positive identity (individual or collective) and a just cause. Based on the evidence, "group, organization and social psychology, with a particular emphasis on 'collective

identity,' provides the most constructive framework for understanding terrorist psychology and behavior" (Post, 2007).

Sociological Theories

A good starting point for understanding collective identity is Social Identity Theory. Henri Tajfel and John Turner's (1970) work on intergroup conflict found when individuals see themselves in a situation where people can be categorized as an "us" (ingroup) and a "them" (outgroup), they will favor the ingroup and discriminate against the outgroup (Cottam et al., 2016). The populist nuance to this model is the people are always the ones being victimized, either by the elite or by outgroup gains. Associated with Social Identity Theory is Fritz Heider's (1958) attribution theory, which focuses on how people judge and evaluate others (Cottam et al., 2016). These attributes can lead to overly biased perceptions about outgroups. For example, attributing outgroup behavior to dispositional causes rather than situational causes (fundamental attribution error); or using prejudices and existing beliefs to evaluate others (ultimate attribution error) (Cottam et al., 2016). Attribution errors often result in exaggerated stereotypes, which in turn are incorporated into decision-making schemas, or cognitive structures used to organize information, experiences, attributes, etc.

Alternatively, intergroup contact theory says exposing people to increased intergroup contact can help breakdown stereotypes (Cottam et al., 2016). However, when looking at external issues such as immigration, it seems the opposite typically occurs. Realistic conflict theory shows when perceived discrimination is a result of competition for limited resources, this will lead to even stronger negative perceptions of an outgroup (Cottam et al., 2016). Finally, there is social causality, which during perceived crises, groups that people are associated with provide an ideological blue print for creating a "better world" and identifying the antagonists

who must be “defeated” to fulfill that vision (Cottam et al., 2016). The latter theory partially helps explain how people can transition from non-violent political behavior to violent extremism.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of othering helps to explain why certain forms of terrorism are more lethal than others. Othering refers to the process of identifying groups perceived to have lesser moral or ethical status than members of a terrorist group. This can include race, ethnicity, geographic origin, language, etc. The significance of othering is it has a strong legitimizing effect on the use of indiscriminate violence. If there is a clear dividing line or boundary between group members and others, there is no reason to discriminate when killing. Pushed by distinct types of differences, the confluence of ethnonationalism and religion (especially when tied to ethnicity) heightens the effect of othering (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). As a result, the most lethal forms of terrorism are motivated by religion and ethnonationalism. Weaker forms of othering involve ideology (Leftist, Rightist), religion (without clear ethnic affiliation), environmentalism, anti-globalization, communism, and anarchism. This phenomenon helps explain the difference in lethality of Islamist terrorism within Europe as opposed to the other variants.

The Root Causes of Terrorism

The idea of “root causes” of terrorism suggests there is some type of causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorist activity. Along this line of reasoning, certain underlying conditions and grievances help explain how, where, and why terrorism occurs. If terrorism is considered the dependent variable, then root causes form the independent variables. However, Newman (2006) shows the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is far more complex and one must also consider intervening and condition variables (see Figure 5-3). Root causes can be further broken

down into permissive structural factors and individual grievances. While premise structural factors create an enabling environment, alone they offer little explanatory value until combined with other variables. For example, poverty alone does little to explain why someone becomes a terrorist; however, the combination of poverty and inequality, along with nationality, religion, culture, and/or ethnicity, tells a much different story. The last component of Newman's framework is intervening factors (leadership, funding, state sponsorship) that can serve as an essential catalyst. When combined, the structural factors and underlying grievances provide a source of recruits, an ideology, and operational base. The precipitant factors provide a political agenda, opportunity, leadership, and organization.




Figure 5-3: The Casual Relationship of the Root Causes of Terrorism (Newman, 2006)

The Role of Grievances

Grievances, both actual and perceived, are considered one of the most important variables in the radicalization process (Ross, 1993). According to Crenshaw (1981), the first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. Unaddressed grievances can lead to the development of a social movement, interest group, political party, or in extreme cases an individual, cell, or organization that engages in terrorist actions (Ross, 1993; Crenshaw, 1981). Presence of other forms of unrest, social, cultural, and political, can heighten the intensity of existing grievances. Grievances leading to terrorism can be divided into seven categories: economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social (Ross, 1993). Alternatively, in non-violent organizations, the intensification of grievances or lack of success in obtaining the group objectives may lead to organizational splits, and the development of elements more willing to engage in terrorism.

The grievances leading to right-wing terrorism can be grouped into three categories: economic restructuring; societal changes challenging white male privilege; and political and public policy fueling resentment (Piazza, 2017). Economic hardships are often linked to anti-government and anti-status quo grievances advocated by the extreme right. As a result, right-wing hate crimes are more frequent in economically depressed communities because right-wing extremists seek to exact “revenge” against racial and ideological enemies they hold responsible for their economic difficulties (Piazza, 2017). Another common motivation for violent right-wing extremism is societal changes that have led to greater inclusion and empowerment of minorities (ethnic, racial, and religious) along with the general diversification of society. These societal transformations are seen as displacing the traditional dominance of white, Christian

males, the demographic most predominately represented within right-wing extremist movements and right-wing terrorist organizations (Piazza, 2017). The final motivation category involves perceptions of government and the mainstream political system. Right-wing extremists feel alienated from mainstream politics, deeply resent mainstream politicians, and believe they have no voice within government. They justify their activities as moves to “patriotically” cleanse and renew the political system. However, there is research showing when the political environment is controlled by politicians more aligned ideologically with right-wing extremists, terrorist activity may be exacerbated because extremists find the political environment more permissive and encouraging (Piazza, 2017).

Right-Wing Terrorist Pathways in Europe

While the grievances addressed above can be applied to many right-wing extremist groups, European terrorist pathways can also reflect a geographical component. Similar to the north/south division identified by Brubaker (2017) with European populist parties, a similar divide exists amongst right-wing pathways to terrorism. In the northern tier, Ravndal (2018) found grievances related to high ethnic diversity or immigration appear to be most pronounced in countries lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties during the period 1990–2015, thereby creating mobilization opportunities for the extreme right. Right-wing mobilization may also have been fueled by previous public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and opinions in countries like Sweden, Germany and the UK (Ravndal, 2018). While repression and stigmatization may have discouraged some from joining radical and extreme right groups, they may have also pushed the most ardent supporters into more clandestine and revolutionary paths, which can lead to embracing terrorism (Ravndal, 2018).

In the southern tier, the pathway involves a combination of socioeconomic hardship, authoritarian legacies, and left-wing militancy (Ravndal, 2018). However, the legacies of former authoritarian regimes create opportunities for radical behavior on both sides of the political spectrum, intensifying an already polarized left-right divide. Once a sufficient number of radicals have been mobilized on both sides, a reciprocal spiral of violence and terrorism is likely to follow, as illustrated in Italy and Spain where a majority of right-wing attacks targeted left-wing militants as opposed to the northern countries where immigrants constitute the largest target group (Ravndal, 2018). The left-right political cleavage in this region may also be related to Italy, Spain and Greece still having active communist parties. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, with Antifa this cleavage seems to be spreading both in Europe and the US.

However, as already discussed with the radicalization process, these pathways do not guarantee any particular grievance by itself will automatically lead to terrorism. Instead, a highly polarized environment between far-right activists and their enemies, including (leftists, political elites, ethnic groups, etc.), represents a necessary condition for extreme levels of violence (Ravndal, 2018). From a social movement theory perspective, the extent of polarization may be a key factor determining whether the final outcome is non-violent, or if terrorism is likely to occur. The increased presence of the right-wing populist parties seems to serve as an accelerant to the polarization of politics in Europe and abroad.

Chapter Conclusions

An overarching theme connecting right-wing populists and right-wing terrorists is a “revolution” against the perceived status quo to create a new social order or return to a lost golden age. This belief makes it easy for these groups to divide the world into us and others. Although right-wing populist parties have refrained from advocating for violence and sometimes

publicly distance themselves from the extreme right, the rhetoric addressing the perceived grievances has fostered increased resentment. As indicated by the research, just the presence of the groups in government may serve to embolden right-wing extremist behavior because they see the political environment more permissive and encouraging. Yet, while many people share similar grievances and experiences, proportionally few become terrorists.

While there is no psychological profile to decide who might become a terrorist, there are several models to help explain how an individual becomes radicalized. Through these models, one can find common elements playing into the radicalization process such as a sense of alienation, feelings of marginalization, political oppression, discrimination, poverty, and a desire to do something important. Arguably, these are the very same grievances of right-wing populist party supporters. But again, this does not explain why all individuals exposed to similar situations and experiences are not prone to becoming a terrorist. No single factor seems necessary in leading someone down the path of terrorism (Precht, 2007). Rather, radicalization is the product of a combination of individual motivational factors.

The grievances leading to right-wing terrorism can be further grouped into three general categories: economic restructuring; societal changes challenging white male privilege; and political and public policy fueling resentment. For right-wing extremists in Europe, geography also appears to be the key intervening variable. Following along the lines of Brubaker's (2017) civilization identarian split, right-wing pathways also have a north/south split. The northern pathway involves the combination of high immigration, low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and public repression of radical right actors and opinions. However, the southern pathway opens up a new threat vector that is not one of the typical grievances related to right-wing populism; confrontation with left-wing militants. These

pathways do not guarantee terrorism, which requires a combination of grievances, opportunities, and increased polarization.

Radicalization takes place in the social climate in which people live. This is normally assumed to mean physical locations; however, as discussed in Chapter 2, the internet has broadened the space where radicalization can take place. Whether an Islamist or a white supremacist, individuals can become further radicalized because of what they watch or read online. The internet and social media allow terrorists unprecedented ways to network globally and the ability to propagate their ideologies and their grievances.

Regardless of how the message is received, the key component of intergroup conflict is how people are categorized within an ingroup (us) and an outgroup (them) construct. The significance of othering is it has a strong legitimizing effect on levels of violence. The effect of othering is demonstrated in past mass casualty attacks by both Islamists and right-wing domestic terrorists. The increasingly toxic narrative of the radical right only serves to intensify the othering dynamic amongst this demographic.

The concluding chapter looks at the implications of the rise of right-wing populism on domestic terrorism in the EU. Specifically, how might the presence of right-wing populist parties in government (national or EU) effect domestic terrorism?

Chapter 6: Implications for Domestic Terrorism in the EU

Many see the increasing presence of right-wing populist parties in local, national, and EU parliaments as a concerning trend. Others see right-wing populism as a temporary aberration limited by electorate demographics (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the current European parliamentary environment is structurally conducive to the spread of right-wing populism. Low representational thresholds (3-5% at state and EU levels) provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties, or any radical party, to enter their respective parliaments. With representation in 22 national governments and in the European Parliament, it does not appear right-wing populism is going away any time soon. Right-wing populist gains reflect growing public discontent with mainstream political parties and their policies and agendas, at both the national and EU levels. Even if the public sentiment across the EU starts to turn against populism, a populist presence is ensured at least through the next round of national (term limits across the EU varies between 4-5 years) and EU Parliamentary elections (next election 2023). However, given the low representational thresholds it would likely take more than one election cycle to reverse the current right-wing populist wave.

While no right-wing populist parties have openly called for violence within the EU, their othering narratives have nonetheless served to inspire lone actor right-wing extremists to commit acts of violence. Thus, the question remains, what are the implications of the rise of right-wing populism on domestic terrorism in the EU? More specifically, in what ways might the presence of right-wing populist parties in government (either national or EU) affect domestic terrorism in the EU? Based on the previous chapters, there are seven hypotheses to consider:

- Hypothesis 1: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, inspires far-right extremists, regardless of party or group affiliation, to conduct domestic terrorism.
- Hypothesis 2: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, has no effect on current levels of organized right-wing domestic terrorism (as reflected in the EUROPOL TE-SATs).
- Hypothesis 3: Mainstream political parties or coalitions' attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral gains leads to right-wing parties changing their stance on actively advocating for violence.
- Hypothesis 4: Mainstream political parties or coalitions attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action.
- Hypothesis 5: Changes in right-wing populist party agendas pulling them towards the political center leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action.
- Hypothesis 6: An increase in extreme right-wing violence leads to a corresponding increase in left-wing violence.
- Hypothesis 7: A resurgence of Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism leads to an increase in right-wing domestic terrorism.

Hypothesis 1: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, inspires far-right extremists, regardless of party or group affiliation, to conduct domestic terrorism.

Right-wing narratives have already emboldened a few lone actor extremists, all outside the party structure, to conduct terrorist attacks. But is this a case of a few “one offs” or are these incidents indicative of a larger trend? If the latter is true, what could help explain this? One explanation is extremists might interpret the presence of right-wing populists as a public endorsement or validation of their beliefs. Additionally, given the sizable electoral gains (ranging from 3-49%), right-wing extremists may perceive the political environment as more accepting of far-right views. Based on these two explanations, right-wing extremists may perceive the current security environment as more permissive. Lastly, it could be the same democratic system that allows populist participation makes it vulnerable to terrorism. The latter is supported by the democratic vulnerability theory of terrorism.

According to democratic vulnerability theory, political and civil liberties are positively correlated with terrorism because of the permissiveness of democratic systems (Chenowith, 2010). According to Piazza (2006) and Li (2005), terrorism is more frequent in democratic societies due to easier communication and dissemination of ideology. Also, terrorist events are more likely to be reported in democratic countries. Access to free press is arguably more important than freedom of movement when considering terrorism as a means of communication, recruitment, or mobilization.

Linking democratic vulnerability to populism is social cleavage theory, which posits a large number of political parties in the legislature (more than two or three) usually signifies deep social divisions in the electorate that contribute to government fragility and general political disorder. Specifically, countries with multiparty systems are plagued by frequent elections, unmanageable governing coalitions, extremist or “anti-system” parties, and government policies that are the result of complex compromises in party coalitions. Multiparty systems, therefore, are “weaker” than two- and three-party systems and are also more prone to political violence.

Hypothesis 2: Right-wing populist electoral gains, in either the national or EU parliaments, has no effect on current levels of organized right-wing domestic terrorism (as reflected in the EUROPOL TE-SATs).

One cannot assume an increased presence of radical right-wing populist parties in government, either at the state or EU levels, will automatically lead to an increase in right-wing domestic terrorism. In theory, it could have the opposite effect. According to political access theory, democracies reduce prospects for terrorism because they offer avenues for citizens to air their grievances (Chenowith, 2010). Because of the increased opportunity to express grievances, individuals and groups are more receptive to pursuing non-violent alternatives. The radical right-wing populist parties in the EU with representation in state or EU parliaments are by definition accepting of democracy as a means of obtaining their political objectives (see Chapter 1). Based on political access theory, if radical right-wing populist parties are allowed to participate in democratic elections, they are unlikely to change their stance on using terrorism.

Political access theory may partially explain the low numbers of right-wing inspired domestic terrorism reported in the EUROPOL TE-SATs. Taken into account with the Model of Party Competition, it also helps explain why right-wing populist parties are not openly calling for violence. The area outside the Zone of Acquiescence from where these parties originated only offers limited votes. For right-wing populist parties to expand their support base, they must attract voters in the Zone of Acquiescence. Seeking a course of action incorporating domestic terrorism would have the opposite effect. Thus, based on political access theory, if right-wing populist parties gain or maintain seats in either national or EU parliaments, right-wing terrorism should remain at current levels or possibly decrease.

Hypothesis 3: Mainstream political parties or coalitions' attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral gains leads to right-wing parties changing their stance on actively advocating for violence.

However, political access in itself does not entirely reduce prospects for domestic terrorism. Although right-wing populist parties have found some success at the state and EU parliamentary levels, it does not mean their political views will be embraced by mainstream political parties. While there are instances of mainstream parties adapting certain aspects of right-wing agendas in an attempt to regain lost voters (e.g., changing positions on immigration quotas), mainstream political parties have mainly moved to counter right-wing electoral gains (see Chapter 4). For instance, in Germany, an AfD candidate (party controls 92 of the 709 seats) has been blocked six times from becoming a deputy parliamentary speaker, despite the tradition each party provides a deputy (DW Staff, 2019 April 4a). If mainstream political parties succeed in forming alliances/coalitions to marginalize/block right-wing populist gains, frustration among populist parties may lead them to re-evaluate their position on openly calling for violence. Chenowith (2010) found support for the hypothesis that intergroup competition, motivated by the competition within the political environment, can explain an increase in domestic terrorism. Chenowith (2010) also found a positive relationship between political competition and the number of terrorist groups emerging within a state and a positive relationship between the density of domestic interest group participation and terrorist activity.

While the possibility exists that right-wing frustration could lead to more extreme actions, given the current electoral trends at both the national and European Parliament levels, it seems unlikely right-wing populist parties would risk losing their newly acquired foothold in the Zone of Acquiescence. Despite the political maneuverings of mainstream parties, at this time

there are no indications the right-wing populist parties are willing to change their stance on advocating for terrorism, or other acts of political violence. As with the earlier *Rassemblement National* example from Chapter 3, in this case it makes more sense to “defeat them at the polls” than to kill them. In fact, oppositional maneuvers to counter populist gains may actually reinforce populist anti-elite narratives, helping to attract more public support.

Hypothesis 4: Mainstream political parties or coalitions’ attempts to marginalize or reverse right-wing populist electoral leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action.

A variation of Hypothesis 2 is that individual frustration over political obstacles results in the more radicalized supporters, or factions, splitting from the populist parties. Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) model of political mobilization shows there is a range of commitment and radical behaviors within political parties. Within their pyramidal model, there already exists a small proportion of party members willing to commit acts of violence. Based on the sociological theories discussed in Chapter 5, it is assumed party identity/participation helps moderate these inherent extremist tendencies. However, if members feel their needs are not being fulfilled or protected by the group, this could lead them to seek other alternatives. This fragmentation could lead to radicalized cells or lone actors deciding to use terrorism to achieve their political objectives (e.g., Christchurch). For those already feeling marginalized by the political system, it may seem reasonable to turn from one “weapon of the weak” (populism) to another (terrorism) to address their grievances.

Hypothesis 5: Changes in right-wing populist party agendas pulling them towards the political center leads to extreme right-wing cells splintering from parent organizations and choosing domestic terrorism as a course of action.

Frustration over the actions of mainstream political parties may not be the only reason for populist parties splintering. According to the Political Competition Model, to maximize electoral support, political parties and candidates eventually migrate towards the largest concentration of voters. In trying to expand voter base, populist parties will need to adapt to a broader range of interests at the expense of their most extreme policies. Similarly, for those populist parties currently participating or seeking to participate in coalition governments, they will likely have to make some compromises or moderate their policies. Such compromises will likely lead to a disconnect amongst hardline party elements. Disillusioned supporters may decide the only acceptable option for changing the distribution of power or demonstrating political resolve is to resort to terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the terrorism strategy of outbidding is intended to show the public that the extreme factions have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival political groups, and therefore are worthy of public support.

Hypothesis 6: An increase in extreme right-wing violence leads to a corresponding increase in left-wing violence.

This hypothesis builds on the north/south differences in right-wing pathways to terrorism discussed in Chapter 5. As demonstrated in the southern tier of the EU, the right-wing gains in governments has led to a spiral of increasing violence and terrorism between right- and left-wing extremists. The southern-tier conflict may be unique to the geographical differences in the underlying political and social issues; however, similar sentiments contributing to the increased presence of groups like Antifa (see Chapter 2) seems to reveal a much broader geographical diffusion. A 2018 YouGov poll of Democrat and Republican supporters conducted in the US found 38% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans believe those who identify with the other party are *threats* to their way of life, compared to 25% and 21% in 2017, respectively

(Frankovic, 2018). While these responses may be a reflection of the emotions associated with the current polarization in American politics, the threat perception is not totally unfounded. As discussed earlier, groups like Antifa are increasingly seeing violence as a means of responding to the far right.

Hypothesis 7: A resurgence of Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism leads to an increase in right-wing domestic terrorism.

Similar to the right/left spiral, is the potential for a right-wing/Islamist spiral. Given the return of foreign fighters to EU countries of origin, it would not be surprising for the current decline in Islamist inspired terrorism to reverse. For those returning, it is hard to imagine the drivers that convinced them to go to Syria and Iraq have diminished in any way and in the countries where right-wing populism has emerged, the environment could arguably be worse. This combination could serve as a source of motivation to bring the war back to Europe. Unfortunately, the EU policies related to open and uncontrolled borders, mismanagement of the immigration crisis, and a lack of the information sharing between EU countries that contributed to the success of previous attacks in France, Belgium, and the UK still remain. For this reason, Europe is likely to continue experiencing homegrown terrorism at current or higher levels. The latter would have significant consequences for right-wing populism and right-wing terrorism.

Immigration and terrorism are already key components of the right-wing populist narrative, any change for the worse would reinforce populist claims and increase public support for these parties, both of which would likely embolden populists to seek more radical policies. Based on the spiraling logic of Hypothesis 6, a resurgence in Islamist-inspired homegrown terrorism could lead to a corresponding increase in right-wing attacks. There is some precedence for this occurring after previous Islamist attacks in Europe. Following the 2005 London

bombings, there was a 600 percent increase in the rate of right-wing violence against Muslims in the UK and following the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, similar incidents rose by 281 percent in France (Koehler, 2016)

Theoretical Wild Card: What if Emphasis on Right-Wing Populism is Misplaced?

While the focus of this thesis is on the influence of right-wing populism on domestic terrorism, the emphasis on political parties as a source of inspiration could be misplaced. An interesting development that may indicate the evolution of the populist trend in Europe is the French anti-establishment grassroots movement known as the *Mouvement des gilets jaunes* (Yellow Vest Movement) which started as an online petition against an increase in the country's fuel tax and quickly grew to a series of protests against the French government. At the high point of the movement, up to 280,000 protestors were involved across the country (BBC Staff, 2018). The movement was concerning enough that President Macron conceded to conduct a national debate aimed at encouraging ordinary people to propose changes to France's economy and democracy. Some see this as a win for direct democracy in which people interact with the country's leadership to decide policy initiatives, as opposed to a representative democracy in which people vote for representatives who then decide policy initiatives.

What makes the Yellow Vest revolt so different is it did not follow the usual populist playbook. The movement has kept its distance from both the far right and left, allowing it to attract membership from across the political spectrum. This has allowed the movement to bring people together from vastly different ages, social classes, occupations, and views (Rose and Baker, 2018). In many ways the movement represents a form of leaderless resistance (see Chapter 2). With no centralized leadership or structure, the Yellow Vest movement is the epitome of the "anti-elite" movement, almost to a fault. Members are broadly opposed to

decision making authority and attempts by individuals within the movement to bring order often faced internal resistance which some see as the inherent weakness of such a movement (Rose and Baker, 2018). Unfortunately, without a centralized leadership to restrain group actions, there is a risk of small cells or lone actors conducting terrorist acts.

A variation of the Yellow Vest movement, but on a vastly smaller scale (hundreds as opposed to thousands of protestors), is a group calling themselves the “Black Vests.” This group consists of hundreds of undocumented workers primarily from West Africa (BBC, 2019, July 12). Group members describe themselves as “the voiceless and the faceless of the French Republic” (BBC, 2019, July 12). Like the Yellow Vest protestors, they are also looking for direct interaction with the government. While it is unlikely this movement will be as successful as the Yellow Vest movement, the willingness of groups to seek to direct interaction with their governments seems to be steadily increasing, even in some unlikely locations. The 2019 demonstrations in Hong Kong also had several similarities to the Yellow Vest Movement.

What do all three movements have in common? All reflect public anger with the status quo and distrust of organized politics. Given the ability of these self-organizing movements to rapidly mobilize across traditional boundaries in the age of social media, one has to wonder if this might become the new norm of contentious/confrontational politics, much like how lone actors and HVEs have changed how terrorism is understood.

Limitations and Areas for Future Research

In exploring the relationship between right-wing populism and domestic terrorism, two data shortfalls stand out. In his study of right-wing violence, Ravndal (2019) found mainstream media outlets rely on incomplete data drawn from data sets suffering from critical shortcomings. Media reporting often relies on two well-known terrorism databases, the Global Terrorism

Database (GTD) and EUROPOLS's TE-SAT (used for this thesis), which Ravndal (2019) argues are "poorly equipped" to capture right-wing terrorism and violence. According to Ravndal (2019), GTD does not code for the perpetrator's ideological motivation and only includes a fraction of right-wing attacks registered in other data sets. As previously discussed, EUROPOL's TE-SAT data relies on EU states' own reporting based on different legal definitions of terrorism. What is defined as domestic terrorism in one country may be considered a hate crime in another. Given the definition limitations in these commonly used sources, there is a possibility the numbers of related incidents are underreported and right-wing terrorism is inaccurately portrayed compared to other types. Ravndal (2019) argues there needs to be a new means of distinguishing right-wing attacks from other types of violence, such as apolitical crimes (e.g. armed robbery) committed by members of far-right groups. Additionally, Ravndal (2019) believes there needs to be some kind of systematic measurement displaying reliable patterns of change over time. Based on the research for this thesis, the same argument could be said of how left-wing terrorism is measured.

At the root of the measurement problem identified by Ravndal is the issue of how terrorism is defined and conceptualized. Past definitions tend to focus on what could be considered traditional terrorist groups, whereas the current terrorist threat to the EU is increasingly becoming more individualized, whether it be domestic or homegrown variants. While inspired by different ideologies, the commonality between the two is the membership consists of socially alienated individuals. While academia already has hundreds of definitions of terrorism, it could be these efforts to define or label certain forms of public protest as terrorism (or populism for that matter) takes away from why these individuals are alienated in the first place. Rather than focusing on a specific act, the research focus should take a broader look at the

entire spectrum of “weapons of the of weak.” Such an approach would help to better understand the inherent similarities and linkages between political mobilization, radicalization, and the most extreme product of the two, terrorism.

Concluding Thoughts

The narratives promoted by right-wing populist parties have served to radicalize those with extreme right-wing views. Events like Christchurch and El Paso appear to be following an eerily similar trajectory to that of lone actors and HVEs inspired by al-Qa-ida and ISIS. The similarities should not be a complete surprise. Religious fundamentalism tends to uphold a belief in strict, literal interpretations of guiding documents, has a strong othering effect, and is strongly opposed to change. Similarly, far-right extremism has a strong othering effect and is strongly opposed to change. Given these similarities, it could be how governments label the two is preventing them from seeing the terrorism issue in its entirety, as with the current disconnect between the number of instances and lethality of terrorist attacks across the EU. When looking at the radicalization process and pathways, the issues contributing to terrorism (transnational, domestic, or homegrown) are ubiquitous.

Pankaj Mishra, in his book *Age of Anger: A history of the Present* (2017), contributes today’s contentious global political and social environment as a response to the globalization and the normalization of Western ideals such as individualism, capitalism, and secularism. There is no doubt these factors have fueled the emergence of nationalist, isolationist, and fundamentalist sentiments, but they are not the sole explanation for individuals willing to use violence to address their fears, frustrations, and transgressions of others (real or perceived).

Right-wing populism and domestic terrorism represent two forms of protest against the status quo. While there is currently no direct linkage between the two, there is an indirect one.

There is no doubt some supporters of radical-right populist parties have extreme right views.

There are certainly some supporters willing to use violence to achieve their political objectives;

however, it should not be construed all group members do. None of the leaders of the major right-wing populist parties have openly called for violence against their perceived adversaries.

Yet, while the parties in themselves do not represent a direct threat, they do pose an indirect threat through their toxic and inflammatory othering narratives that inspire individuals on the fringes to commit terrorist acts, as in the cases of attacks in Christchurch and El Paso.

Based on the seven hypotheses discussed in this chapter, the greatest concern is not that right-wing populist parties will turn to terrorism (Hypothesis 3). Although, there is a risk right-wing parties could fragment (Hypothesis 4 and 5), with the more extreme elements, cell, or individual choosing a pathway towards terrorism. Disillusioned supporters may see the only acceptable option to changing the distribution of power or demonstrating political resolve is to commit acts of violence. Additionally, there is the potential of the presence of right-wing or an increase in right-wing violence contributing to a spiraling effect of violence between right-wing extremists and their ideological protagonists (Hypotheses 6 & 7). But for now, based on the research presented in this paper, the most likely implication of the rise of right-wing populism and its effect on domestic terrorism in the EU is it will inspire lone actors to conduct attacks with the potential for some to mimic the attacks in Christchurch, Halle, and Oslo and Utøya.

References

- Akerboom, E. S. M. (2003). *Counter-terrorism in the Netherlands*. General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD). Retrieved from: <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/publications/2003/11/11/counter-terrorism-in-the-netherlands>
- Amann, M., Neukirch, R., and Pfister, R. (2018). “Merkel's Conservatives Divided and Discordant.” *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-angela-merkel-s-conservatives-divided-and-discordant-a-1199626.html>
- Anderson, B. (2016) [1983]. *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, revised edition.
- Asal, V. and Rethemeyer, R. K. (2008). The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. *Journal of Politics*, 70(2): 437-449.
- Ashkenas, J. and Aisch, G. (2016). European Populism in the Age of Donald Trump. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/05/world/europe/populism-in-age-of-trump.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FWilders%2C%20Geert&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection.
- Baele, Stephane J. (2017). Lone-Actor Terrorists' Emotions and Cognition: An Evaluation Beyond Stereotypes. *Political Psychology*, 38(3): 449-468.
- Baran, Z. (2008, July 10). Written testimony of Zeyno Baran, Senior Fellow and Director of Center for Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on “The Roots of Violent Islamic Extremism and Efforts to Counter It,” July 10, 2008. Retrieved from http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071008Baran.pdf
- Bawer, B. (2006). *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within*. New York: Doubleday.
- BBC Staff (2018). France fuel unrest: 'Shame' on violent protesters, says Macron. *BBC Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46331783>
- BBC Staff (2019, May 24). Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide. *BBC Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006>
- BBC Staff (2019, July 12). Black vest' protesters storm Panthéon in Paris. *BBC Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48969438>

- Beam, L. R. (1992). Leaderless Resistance. *The Seditonist*, 12. Retrieved from <http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm>
- Bergen, P. (2019). Why terrorists kill: The striking similarities between the New Zealand and Pulse nightclub shooters. *CNN*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/18/opinions/why-terrorists-kill-striking-similarities-bergen/index.html>
- Berman, S. (2019). Populism and the embrace of complexity. *International Politics and Society Journal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/global/article/show/populism-and-the-embrace-of-complexity-3417/>
- Brubaker, R. (2017). Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Movement in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40 (8): 1191-1226.
- Bullivant, S. (2018). *Europe's Young Adults and Religion: Finds from the European Social Survey (2014-16) to Inform the 2018 Synod of Bishops*. London, UK: Benedict XVI Centre for Religion and Society, St Mary's University.
- Caldwell, C. (2009). *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
- Canovan, M. (2005). *The People*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Carter, S. L. (2018). The Ugly Coded Critique of Chick-Fil-A's Christianity. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-21/criticism-of-christians-and-chick-fil-a-has-troubling-roots>
- Celso, A. N. (2015). The Islamist State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror Groups. *Orbis, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Journal of World Affairs*, Spring 2015, 59(22). Retrieved from <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/04/the-islamic-state-and-boko-haram-fifth-wave-jihadist-terror-groups/>
- Chenoweth, E. (2010). Democratic competition and terrorist activity. *Journal of Politics*, 72(01): 16-30.
- Coats, D. (2018). Statement for the Record, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, before the U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on the "Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment," January 29, 2019. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- Cottam, M. L., Mastors, E., Preston, T., Dietz, B. (2016). *Introduction to Political Psychology*. New York, NY: Routledge, 3rd edition.
- Counter Extremism Project (2019). Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel. Retrieved from: <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/mohamed-lahouaiej-bouhlel>

- Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) (2019). Foreign Fighters. United Nations Security Council. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/>
- Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4): 379-99.
- Dempsey, J. (2016). Will populist parties run Europe? *Newsweek*. Retrieved from: <http://www.newsweek.com/europe-populism-front-national-ukip-435122>
- Der Spiegel Staff (2019, January 4). Europe's Right Wing Takes Aim at the EU. *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/right-wing-populists-seek-to-flex-muscles-in-the-eu-a-1246433.html>
- Der Spiegel Staff (2019, June 27). Germany's Chilling New Far-Right Terror. *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/father-neighbor-killer-germany-s-new-far-right-terror-a-1273689.html>
- Der Spiegel Staff (2019, October 11). Deadly Attack Exposes Lapses in German Security Apparatus. *Spiegel Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/far-right-terrorism-in-germany-shooting-exposes-lapses-in-security-apparatus-a-1291075.html>
- Drozdiak, W. (2017). *Fractured Continent: Europe's Crises and the Fate of the West*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
- DW Staff (2019, April 4a). AfD lawmaker Mariana Harder-Kühnel fails again in vice presidency bid. *DW Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/afd-lawmaker-mariana-harder-kühnel-fails-again-in-vice-presidency-bid/a-48204545>
- DW Staff (2019, April 4b). Suspected Christchurch shooter sent money to French group. *DW Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/suspected-christchurch-shooter-sent-money-to-french-group-report/a-48192751>
- DW Staff (2019, April 29). Spain: Pedro Sanchez's Socialists win election but miss majority, Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/spain-pedro-sanchezs-socialists-win-election-but-miss-majority/a-48521710>
- DW Staff (2019, October 25). Germany: 2016 Munich attack had 'radical right-wing' motives, say police. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-2016-munich-attack-had-radical-right-wing-motives-say-police/a-50991641>
- Eakin, H. (2016). Liberal, Harsh Denmark. *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/03/10/liberal-harsh-denmark/>

- EUROPOL (2017). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2017*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Retrieved from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat/2017/>
- EUROPOL (2018). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2018*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Retrieved from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018>
- EUROPOL (2019). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2019*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Retrieved from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2019-te-sat>
- Eurostat (2018). Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded). *Eurostat*. Retrieved from: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en
- Federal Ministry of the Interior (2019). *Brief Summary 2018 Report on the Protection of the Constitution*. Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building, and Community. Retrieved from: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/annual-report-2018-summary.pdf>
- France 24 Staff (2019). European intelligence services see far-right extremism as growing threat. France 24. Retrieved from <https://www.france24.com/en/20190319-europe-intelligence-far-right-extremism-growing-threat-christchurch>
- Frankovic, K. (2018). The opposition is different, and maybe even a threat. *YouGov*. Retrieved from: <https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/07/06/opposition-different-maybe-threat>
- Fukuyama, F. (1989). "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer), 3-18. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184>
- Garcia, C. A. and Whiteside, P. (2019). European Parliament elections: What happened to the populist surge? *Sky News*. Retrieved from: <https://news.sky.com/story/european-parliament-elections-what-happened-to-the-populist-surge-11729667>
- Gill, P., Horgan, J. and Deckert, D. (2014). Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists. *Journal of Forensics Science*, 59(2): 425-435.
- Greven, T. (2016). *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States*. Washington, DC: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

- Heinke, D. H. (2017). German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The Updated Data and its Implications. *CTC Sentinel* (10)3. Retrieved from: <https://ctc.usma.edu/german-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-the-updated-data-and-its-implications/>
- Her Majesty's Government (2018). *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*. Retrieved from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf
- Hoffman, B. (2017). *Inside Terrorism* (Third ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3): 22-49.
- Inglehart, R. F, and Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. *IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc*, 2016.
- International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) (2016). The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. Retrieved from: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf
- Jefferson, C. (2019). Extreme-right defectors deal a blow to Germany's far-right AfD. *DW Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/extreme-right-defectors-deal-a-blow-to-germanys-far-right-afd/a-47044059>
- Judis, J. B. (2016). *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York: Columbia Global Reports.
- Judt, T. (2005). *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Kaplan, J. (2007). The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19(4): 545-570.
- Kepel, G. (2002). *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kerkoud, M. (2012). If French Muslims are largely left-leaning in their voting preferences, there are exceptions. *France 24*. Retrieved from: www.france24.com/en/20120427-arab-muslim-vote-le-pen-national-front-french-elections-immigration/
- Klausen, J. (2018). Snapshot: Why Jihadist Attacks Have Declined in Europe. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-12-19/why-jihadist-attacks-have-declined-europe>

- Koehler, D. (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future. *Prism*, 6(2): 85-104.
- Kruglanski, A. W. and Fishman, S. (2006). The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(2), 193-215.
- Kydd, A. H. and Walter, B. F. (2006). The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security*, 31(1): 49-80.
- LaFree, G. (2018). Is Antifa a Terrorist Group? *Society*, 55: 248-252.
- Laqueur, W. and Wall, C. (2018). *The Future of Terrorism: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Alt-Right*. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books.
- Li, Q. (2005). Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2): 278–297.
- Mandaville, P. P. (2008). Written testimony of Peter P. Mandaville, Co-Director, Center for Global Studies, George Mason University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing on “The Roots of Violent Islamic Extremism and Efforts to Counter It,” July 10, 2009. Retrieved from http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071008Mandaville.pdf
- Manent, P. (2016). *Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian West Should Respond to the Islamic Challenge*. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press.
- McCormick, G. H. (2003). Terrorist Decision Making. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6: 473-507.
- Meyer, J. (2017). FBI, Homeland Security warn of more ‘antifa’ attacks. *Politico*. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/01/antifa-charlottesville-violence-fbi-242235>
- Mishra, P. (2017). *Age of Anger: A History of the Present*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
- Modood, T. (2013). *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, Second Edition*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). *From the terrorists’ point of view*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Moskalenko, S. and McCauley, C. (2009). Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(2), 239-260.
- Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.


- Mudde, C. (2018). *The Far Right in America*. New York: Routledge
- Müller, J. W. (2016). *What is Populism?* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Murray, D. (2017). *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2018). *Background Report: Global Terrorism in 2017*.
- National Intelligence Council (2017). *Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress*. Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- Newman, E. (2006). Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(8): 749-772.
- Norris, P. (2005). *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Nossiter, A. (2018). Macron's Fight on Radical Islam May Lead to Exile of Vocal Imam. *New York Times*, 6 Apr. 2018, p. A1(L). *Academic OneFile*, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A533525203/AONE?u=ksstate_ukans&sid=AONE&xid=a3c9b60c.
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (2011). *Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Violent Extremist Lexicon*. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/-U-FOUO--Domestic-Terrorism-and-Homegrown-Violent-Extremism-Lexicon-1343-1347.pdf
- Parker, T. and Sitter, N. (2016) The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2): 197-216
- Pew Research Center (2017, February). *What it Takes to Truly be 'One of Us'*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
- Pew Research Center (2017, May). *Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
- Piazza, J. (2006). Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18: 159-1771.
- Piazza, J. (2017). Determinates of domestic right-wing terrorism in the USA: Economic grievance, societal change and political resentment. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34(1): 52–80.

- Porter, E. (2016). Where were Trump's Votes? Where the Jobs Weren't. *New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/economy/jobs-economy-voters.html>
- Post, J. M. (2007). *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.
- Precht, T. (2007). *Homegrown terrorism and Islamic radicalisation in Europe: From conversion to terrorism*. Danish Ministry of Justice.
- Rapoport, D. C. (2002). The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. *Anthropoetics*, 8 (1). Retrieved from: <http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror/>
- Ravndal, J. A. (2018). Explaining right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe: Grievances, opportunities and polarization. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(4): 845-866.
- Ravndal, J. A. (2019). Right-wing terrorism and violence may actually have declined. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/02/is-right-wing-terrorism-violence-rise/?utm_term=.b839ac21f528
- Ray, M. (2018). Oslo and Utøya attacks of 2011. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Oslo-and-Utoya-attacks-of-2011>
- Reilly, K. (2016). Read Hillary Clinton's 'Basket of Deplorables' Remarks About Donald Trump Supporters. *Time*. Retrieved from: <http://time.com/4486502/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables-transcript/>
- Renan, E. (1992) [1882]. "What is a Nation?", text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992. (translated by Ethan Rundell). Retrieved from: http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf
- Republic of Lithuania (2019). *National Threat Assessment, 2019*. State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National Defence. Vilnius, Republic of Lithuania.
- Reuters (2019). France's Le Pen unveils new far-right European Parliament group. *Reuters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-jobs-lepen/frances-le-pen-unveils-new-far-right-european-parliament-group-idUSKCN1TE1IG>
- Rose, M. and Baker, L. (2018). No leader, lots of anger: can France's 'yellow vests' become a political force? *Reuters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests-future/no-leader-lots-of-anger-can-frances-yellow-vests-become-a-political-force-idUSKBN1O51ON>

- Rosendorf, B. P. and Sandler, T. (2005). The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2): 171-182
- Ross, J. I. (1993). Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30(3): 317-329.
- Rossmann, S. (2017). G-20 Summit Protests: What is a Black Bloc? *USA Today*. Retrieved from: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/02/02/what-black-bloc/97393870/>
- Roy, O. (2004). *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Rydgren, J. (2007). "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 241-262.
- Sabbatti, G., Sgueo, G., and Dobрева, A. (2019). *At a Glance Infographic: 2019 European elections: National rules*. European Parliamentary Research Service. Retrieved from: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/623556/EPRS_ATA\(2018\)623556_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/623556/EPRS_ATA(2018)623556_EN.pdf)
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I. and de la Calle, L. (2009). Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 31-49.
- Sandberg, B. (2019). The Fresh Young Face of France's Populist Right. *Spiegel Online*. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/jordan-bardella-the-fresh-face-of-the-french-populist-right-a-1263121.html>
- Scholz, K-A (2019). Euroskeptic, anti-immigrant parties team up for EU election. *DW Online*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/euroskeptic-anti-immigrant-parties-team-up-for-eu-election/a-48233168>
- Scott, J. C. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. Yale University Press:
- Shapova, M. (2018). Reclaiming the digital space: Fighting right-wing extremists online. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Connect*. Retrieved from: <https://www.fes-connect.org/people/reclaiming-the-digital-space-fighting-right-wing-extremists-online/>
- Silber, M. D. and Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*. New York City Police Department Intelligence Division.
- Tankersley, J. (2016). How Trump Won the Presidential Election: Revenge of the Working-Class Whites. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/09/how-trump-won-the-revenge-of-working-class-whites/>

- Victoroff, J. (2005). The Mindset of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1), 3-42.
- Weill, Kelly (2019). From El Paso to Christchurch, a Racist Lie Is Fueling Terrorist Attacks. *The Daily Beast*. Retrieved August 9, 2019 from: <https://www.thedailybeast.com/el-paso-shooting-racist-lie-great-replacement-fuels-terrorist-attacks>
- Weinberg, L., Pehahzur, A., and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16: 777-794.
- Whelan, T.E.A. (2016). The Capability Spectrum; Locating Terrorism in Relation to other Manifestations of Political Violence. *Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations*, 7(1): 11–19. White House (2017). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Retrieved August 5, 2017, from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>
- White House (2017, December). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Retrieved from <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>
- Williams, T. C. (2017). The French Origins of “You Will Not Replace Us”. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-french-origins-of-you-will-not-replace-us>
- Wilson, M, (2019). Extreme right activists build transnational narratives online. *Janes* 360. Retrieved from: https://www.janes.com/images/assets/724/87724/Extreme_right_activists_build_transnational_narratives_online.pdf
- World Atlas (2018). The Deadliest Terror Attacks in Europe. World Atlas Online. Retrieved March 3, 2018 from <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-deadliest-terror-attacks-in-europe.html>
- YouGov UK (2018). “YouGov/EUI Topline Results, Apr 2018.” *YouGov UK*. Retrieved from: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6qz917s9ky/EUIResults_Europe_April2018_Toplines_FINAL_180430_w.pdf
- Zito, S. and Todd, B. (2018). *The Great Revolt: Inside the Populist Coalition Reshaping American Politics*. New York: Crown Forum.

Appendix 1: Terrorist Attacks in the EU by Affiliation (2015-2018)



(EUROPOL, 2019, p. 13)

Appendix 2: European Union Membership

Country	Euro Zone	Schengen Zone	Right-Wing Populist Parties in Government (% of Vote in most Recent Elections)
Austria	X	X	Freedom Party of Austria* (26%)
Belgium	X	X	Flemish Interest (3.7%)
Bulgaria			United Patriots (9%), Volya
Croatia			
Cyprus	X		National Popular Front, or National People's / Ethniko Laiko Metopo (ELAM)(3.7%)
Czech Republic		X	Freedom and Direct Democracy (11%)
Denmark		X	Danish People's Party (21%)
Estonia	X	X	Conservative People's Party (17.8%)
Finland	X	X	Blue Reform*, Finns Party* (17.6%)
France	X	X	National Rally (13%)
Germany	X	X	Alternative for Germany (12.6%)
Greece	X	X	
Hungary		X	Fidesz*(49%), Jobbik*(19%)
Ireland	X		
Italy	X	X	Lega*(17.4%)
Latvia		X	National Alliance (11%)
Lithuania	X		Order and Justice (7.6%)
Luxembourg	X		Alternative Democratic Reform Party (8.3%)
Malta	X		
Netherlands	X		Freedom Party (13%)
Poland		X	Law and Justice (43.6%)*
Portugal	X	X	
Romania			
Slovakia	X	X	Slovak National Party (8%)
Slovenia	X	X	Slovenian National Party (4%)*
Spain	X	X	Vox (10.3%)
Sweden		X	Sweden Democrats (17.5%)
United Kingdom**			UK Independence Party (12.6% prior to Brexit vote, has since split to form), The Brexit Party

(European Union, 2019; Der Spiegel, 2019, June 27; BBC, 2019, May 24)

* Ruling party or member of a governing coalition.

** At time of publication the UK government is still negotiated exit from EU.

Appendix 3: Deadliest Terrorist Attacks in Europe

Date	Incident	Country	Group	Casualties
1985-06-23	Air India Flight 182 Bombing	Atlantic Ocean, Irish airspace	<i>Babbar Khalsa</i> (Sikh militants)	329 killed
1988-12-21	Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing	UK (Scotland)	State Sponsored, Libya	270 killed
2004-03-11	Madrid Train Bombings	Spain	Homegrown cell, inspired/directed by al-Qa'ida	192 killed, 2,050 injured
1925-04-16	St Nedelya Church Bombing	Bulgaria	Bulgarian Communist	150 killed, 500+ injured
2015-11-13	Paris Attacks	France	Homegrown cell, directed/inspired by ISIS	137 killed, 368 injured
1921-12-13	Bolgrad Palace Bombing	Romania	Bessarabian separatists	100 killed
1974-09-08	TWA Flight 841 Bombing	Greece	Black September Organization/ Palestine Liberation Organization	88 killed
2016-07-14	Nice truck attack	France	Lone actor, inspired by ISIS	87 killed 434 injured
1980-08-02	Bologna Massacre	Italy	<i>Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari</i> (Far Right Extremists)	85 killed 200+ injured
2011-07-22	Norway Attacks	Norway	Lone actor, inspired by right- wing extremism	77 killed 319 injured
1967-10-12	Cyprus Airways Flight 284 Bombing	Cyprus	No group claimed responsibility	66 killed
1985-11-23	Egypt Air Flight 648 Hijacking	Malta	Abu Nidal Organization	60 killed
2005-07-07	2005 London Bombings	UK	Homegrown cell, inspired by al-Qa'ida	56 killed 784 injured
1970-02-21	Swissair Flight 330 Bombing	Switzerland	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command	47 killed
2016-03-22	Brussels Bombings	Belgium	Homegrown cell, inspired by ISIS	35 killed
1973-12-17	Rome Airport Attacks	Italy	Black September Organization/ Palestine Liberation Organization	34 killed 22 injured
1974-05-17	Dublin and Monaghan Bombings	Republic of Ireland	Ulster Volunteer Force	34 killed 300 injured

1998-08-15	Omagh Bombing	UK (Northern Ireland)	Real Irish Republican Army	29 killed 300+ injured
1961-06-18	Vitry-Le-Francois Train Bombing	France	<i>Organisation Armee Secrete</i> (French Right wing)	28 killed 100+ injured
1972-01-26	JAT Flight 367 Bombing	Czechoslovakia	Blamed on Croatian émigrés	27 killed
1985-12-27	Rome and Vienna Airport Attacks	Italy/Austria	Abu Nidal Organization	23 killed 139 injured
2017-05-22	Manchester Arena Bombing	UK (England)	Lone actor, inspired by ISIS	22 killed 120 injured
1974-11-21	Birmingham Pub Bombings	UK (England)	Provisional Irish Republican Army	21 killed 182 injured
1987-06-19	Hipercor Bombing	Spain	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> (Basque Separatists)	21 killed 45 injured
2015-01-07	Ile-de-France Attacks	France	Homegrown cell, inspired by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	20 killed
1985-04-12	El Descanso Bombing	Spain	Islamic Jihad Organization	18 killed 82 injured

(World Atlas, 2018)

Appendix 4: Terrorism Definitional Elements

Definitional Element	Schmid & Jongman Survey (1988) Frequency (%)	Weinberg et al. Survey (2002) Frequency (%)
Violence, force	83.5	71
Political	65	60
Fear, terror emphasized	51	22
Threat	47	41
Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5	5.5
Victim-target differentiation	37.5	25
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32	11
Method of Combat, strategy, tactic	30.5	31.5
Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30	0
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28	5.5
Publicity aspect	21.5	18
Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21	0
Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5	22
Intimidation	17	11
Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5	10
Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14	29
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to other	13.5	5.5
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9	1
Clandestine, covert, nature	9	7
Repetitiveness, serial, or campaign character of violence	7	0
Criminal	6	5.5
Demands made on third parties	4	1

(Weinberg et al., 2004, p. 781)

Appendix 5: Terrorist/Extremist Categories and Definitions

Categories and definitions used by the US Department of Homeland Security to describe differing forms of terrorism.

Anarchists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means of changing the government and society in support of the belief that all forms of capitalism and corporate globalization should be opposed and that governing institutions are unnecessary and harmful to society.
Animal Rights Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.
Anti-Abortion Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion-related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.
Black Supremist Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-black people and Jewish people.
Domestic Terrorism	Any act of violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. The act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.
Environmental Rights Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.
Facilitators	Groups or individuals who knowingly provide one or more of a wide array of services to other operatives that enable the execution of terrorist plots, training, travel, or financing. Such activity might include setting up bank accounts, acquiring or producing false identification or travel documentation, aiding travel, disbursing funds, procuring materials, or enabling communications via electronic means or couriers. A facilitator who participates in a conspiracy without knowing the final object of the conspiracy, or even knowing that a conspiracy exists, should be referred to as an unwitting co-optee.
Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE)	HVE is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the US or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
Lone Offender	An individual motivated by one or more extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.
Militia Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure in response to their

	belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.
Racist Skinhead Extremists	Groups or individuals who are a sub-category of white supremacist extremists that facilitate, support, or engage in acts of violence directed towards the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons. Racist skinheads consider themselves to be the frontline soldiers of white supremacist extremists, and frequently distinguish themselves from other violent white supremacist extremists by a distinctive style of dress.
Radicalization	The process through which an individual change from a non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use violence as a method to effect societal or political change.
Sovereign Citizen Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.
Terrorism	Any activity involving an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
Unwitting Co-optees	Groups or individuals who provide support to terrorism without knowing that their actions are contributing to terrorism. Such individuals may suspect that they are being used. Not all unwitting co-optees are engaging in criminal behavior
White Supremacist Extremists	Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.

(Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2011, pp. 1-3)