

**ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE  
CASE OF PAKISTAN .**

by

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the major problems of Islamic political philosophy as reflected in the development of Pakistan against the backdrop of the historic development of Islam. Since a progressive society depends to a large extent on the ability of her scholars and leaders to think clearly and creatively, constant attention will be given to the assessment of the nature and vitality of the Muslim intellectual's concern about political problems. Further, since Pakistan fell partial heir to the British democratic tradition, a study of Pakistani political thought will of necessity be in part a study of the possibility of developing democratic institutions in Muslim countries.

The discussion of Islamic political theory cannot be carried out in purely secular terms. The religion of Islam claims obedience in religious, economic, political, and social affairs. There is no separation between the rules governing man's life and conduct in this world and the world hereafter. As such the discussion of Islamic political theory must often shift from the secular to the religious and vice versa.

This study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides a survey of Islamic thought and political

institutions from the time of Mohammed (571-632), through the successive periods of the early caliphs (632-661), the reign of the Ommeiyades (661-749), and the Abbasids (749-1268). After discussing the caliphate as a religio-political institution, the study brings in the relevant parts of Muslim Mughal India roughly from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. Special emphasis on the last part of the chapter is placed on the most influential classical Muslim political writers Al-Farabi, Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazzali, and Ibn Khaldun.

Chapter II is confined to the Muslim Middle East and to two of its most representative and influential philosophers. The creative writings and activities of Jamal (1839-1897), and Abduh (1849-1905), have had direct impact on the later developments in the field of political theory as indeed in other related areas.

Chapter III covers the Indo-Pakistan scene. The writings of Saiyyid Ahmed (1817-1899), and Mohammed Iqbal (1876-1938), have been selected for detailed examination. Saiyyid's contributions in the domain of political life of the Muslim community are enormous. He emphasized education to affect a happy blend of the Muslim and the Western modes of thought. Iqbal's status in the political life of the Muslims is immensely important. He not only brought the essence of the struggle for independence into a sharp focus but also wrote an outstanding systematic and philosophical work on

political theory. Iqbal also gave poetic expression to the demands of the Muslim community with an eloquence and inspirational fieriness that was artistically superb.

Chapter IV, entitled "A Century and a Half of Muslim Political Thought," is an important anchoring part of this Dissertation. In addition to spotlighting the major issues of Chapters I to III, this chapter contains a critical analytical study of the ideas of the Muslim reformers discussed in the preceding chapters and sets the stage for the ensuing chapters on Pakistan.

Chapters V and VI embody the contention of this writer that there is a direct relationship between the past Islamic political heritage and the creation of Pakistan as an independent nation in 1947. From the perspective of this study, therefore, Pakistan's constitutional experiment is a test case. The political theories discussed in chapters II and III and their critical analysis have found a fresh expression in Pakistan and have been focussed so sharply as to force all concerned to rethink and restate the problems of Muslim political thought in the present day. An evaluation of the results thus far achieved in the restatement of Muslim political thought is included in the concluding section.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE HISTORY OF MUSLIM POLITICAL THOUGHT

#### Part I: The Arab Middle East

Contemporary Muslim political ideas and institutions are an extension, in part at least, of the past. The more relevant highpoints of early Muslim political experience must be reviewed to provide the necessary background for fully understanding later day Muslim political thought.

During his lifetime, Mohammed (570-632) performed simultaneously the functions of prophet, religious leader, chief judge, commander of the army, and civil head of the state. After his death the Muslim community was confronted with the problem of the election of his successor. The attempt to solve this problem led to the rise of different political factions.

First, there were the Muhajreen-Emigrants who claimed that since they belonged to the tribe of the prophet and were first to accept his mission, they should be given power. Second, there stood the Ansar-Supporters who asserted that had they not given Mohammed and nascent Islam asylum, both would have perished. Later on these two parties coalesced to constitute the Companions--the closest associates of Mohammed.

The Legitimists were the third political faction who reasoned that Allah and Mohammed could not have left the community of believers to the whim of an electorate, and therefore must have made a clear provision for the leadership by designating some particular person to succeed the prophet. Ali, the husband of the prophet's only surviving daughter was, according to this group, the only legitimate successor. Rejecting the elective principle, the Legitimists maintained the divine right to rule.

And last, the aristocracy of the Quraish tribe, the Ommeyyades who had held the reins of authority, power, and wealth in pre-Islamic days (although the last to profess Islam), asserted their right to succession.

The prophet Mohammed made no provision for a successor. It would be idle to speculate why, with a genius for organization, he neglected to make such provision for the future of the new community he had founded. It is probable, wrote Sir Thomas Arnold, that he was a child of his age, and fully realized the strength of Arab tribal feeling, which recognized no hereditary principle in its primitive forms of political life, and which left the members of the tribe entirely free to select their own leader.<sup>1</sup> The lack of a definite procedure for succession resulted in complex problems and in later times became a fruitful source of dynastic wars and religious schisms.

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<sup>1</sup>T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, London: Oxford University Press, 1924, p. 11.

Among the Arabs, the chieftancy of a tribe was not hereditary, but elective. The principle of universal suffrage was recognized as all of the members of the tribe had a voice in the election of their chief who was chosen from among the older surviving male members of the deceased chieftain's family. This old tribal system was followed in the choice of Abu Bakr as the successor to the prophet.

Abu Bakr (632-34), by virtue of his age and position at Mecca, occupied a high place in the estimation of Arabs. He was elected to the office of caliph or vicegerent of the prophet. After the multitude had sworn allegiance to him, the Caliph said:

Behold me charged with the cares of Governments. I am not the best among you. I need all your advice and all your help. If I do well, support me; if I mistake, counsel me. To tell truth to a person commissioned to rule is faithful allegiance; to conceal it is treason. In my sight, the powerful and the weak are alike; and to both I wish to render justice. If I obey God and His Prophet, obey me. If I neglect the laws of God and the Prophet, I have no more right to your obedience.<sup>2</sup>

Before his death, Abu Bakr nominated Omar (634-44) as his successor in the caliphate, and the people accepted the leadership of the nominee. Omar's succession to the caliphate in 634 was of immense value to Islam. He possessed tough moral fibre, a keen sense of justice, great energy, and strength of character.

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<sup>2</sup>Syed A. Ali, A Short History of the Saracens, London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1951, pp. 21-22.

While Omar could easily have nominated as successor Ali or his own son, Abdullah, instead, with the conscientiousness which characterized him, he entrusted the election to six notables of Medina. The general body of the Arabs, always refractory and impatient of control, had been brought to order by the personality of the prophet. The firmness of Abu Bakr and Omar had kept them under discipline.

Osman (644-56), the third caliph and successor to Omar, displaced most of the lieutenants employed by Omar, and appointed in their places generally incompetent and worthless members of his own family.

Ali, the fourth caliph, gave orders in 656 for the dismissal of the corrupt governors appointed by Osman. He resumed the fiefs and estates that had been bestowed by the aged caliph upon his principal favorites and began the distribution of the revenues in accordance with the rules prescribed by Omar. These orders gave great offense to those who had enriched themselves under the previous administration.

From 632 to 661 the caliph was the supreme head of the government. He was assisted by a Council of Elders composed of the prophet's principal companions, who met in the major mosque and who were often assisted by the city notables and Bedouin chiefs present in Medina. Several of the companions were entrusted with special duties. For instance during Abu Bakr's caliphate Omar had charge of the administration of justice and the distribution of the poor

tax. Ali was entrusted with the responsibility for conducting the official correspondence and the supervision, treatment and ransoming of the captives of war. All details of administration were looked after and nothing was decided without consultation.

With foresight often wanting in the rulers of later times, Omar had perceived that the stability of the empire and its material development depended upon the prosperity of the agricultural classes. To secure that object he forbade the sale of holdings and agricultural lands in the conquered countries. As a further protection against the encroachment on the part of the Arabs, he ordained that no Saracen should acquire land from native farmers. The peasantry and the land-owners were thus doubly protected from eviction. In making these rules he was also probably motivated by a desire to keep the Arab race distinct from, and predominant among, the people and the communities wherein they settled.

The early years of Islamic political institutions (600-661) discussed thus far were very much under the influence of the Prophet's ethical injunctions. According to Islamic dogma, all men, rich and poor, were equal in the sight of God. Rulers were considered God's lieutenants and charged with the maintenance of law and order consistent with the basic equality of all men in the sight of God. The revenues of the state were to be used for the good of the people and not the enrichment of the caliph. The caliph played the paternalistic role of the benevolent leader.

The community of Islam, as organized by Mohammed was meant to be a fraternity in which the religious bond took the place of the traditional bond of tribal kinship. This was the first Arabian attempt at a socio-political organization based on religion. The Medinese religious brotherhood was, in miniature, the subsequent world community of Islam. This brotherhood was symbolized in the institution of the caliphate on the one hand and the body politic on the other. The discussion of the implications thereof remains for a later part of this study. A brief comment on the significance of the caliphate, however, seems appropriate at this stage.

#### The Institution of the Caliphate

Unlike the Holy Roman Empire, the caliphate was no deliberate imitation of a pre-existent form of civilization or political organization. It was the outgrowth of conditions that were entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs, and assumed a character that was exactly molded by these conditions. The caliphate as a political institution was the child of its age, and did not view itself as the revival of any political institution of an earlier date.

For an understanding of the status of a caliph, it is important, therefore, to recognize that he is pre-eminently a political functionary. Though he may perform religious functions, these functions do not imply the possession of any spiritual powers setting him apart from the rest of the faithful.

The period that followed the end of a system that was based primarily on simplicity and piety heralded a new era of political rule which relied more on political shrewdness, power and expediency than upon traditional virtues. The worldly Ommeyades changed the republican institutions of a sacramental nature into a secular framework.

The administration of vast newly-acquired territories and the adaptation of the uncodified ordinances of a primitive Arabian society to the needs of a huge cosmopolitan conglomerate living under a multitude of conditions un contemplated by the original lawgiver became the new task confronting the Islamic community.

#### Ommeyades, 661-745

The assumption of power by Muawiyah--the first Ommeyade ruler of considerable significance--marks the end of an era of simple, patriarchal, orthodox rule. In Muawiyah the sense of  finesse politique  was developed to a higher degree than in any other caliph. He resorted to force only when force was absolutely necessary and used peaceful measures in all other instances. The prudent mildness by which he tried to disarm the enemy and shame the opposition, his slowness to anger and his absolute self-control left him master of the situation on all occasions.

He is regarded as the first king in Islam. To the Arabs the title was so abhorrent before his time that it was applied almost exclusively to non-Arab potentates. In secularising Islam and changing it from a theocratic to a

temporal sovereignty, he is regarded as one of the ablest Arab kings. Muawiyah was astute, unscrupulous, clear-headed, miserly, but lavishly liberal when necessary, and outwardly observant of all religious duties. He never permitted human or divine ordinances to interfere with the prosecution of his plans or ambitions. But once firmly seated on the throne and his path clear of all enemies, Muawiyah applied himself with all assiduity to the development of conditions conducive to efficient government.

Under the Republic (632-656) the caliph was elected by the suffrage of the entire population of Medina. The election was accepted without demur by the outside Arabs. The ceremony was held at the public mosque, where the assembled took the oath of fealty.

From Muawiyah's time the reigning sovereign nominated his successor, and the grandees and military chiefs took the covenant in the royal presence; while in the province the oath was taken by the governor on behalf of the presumptive caliph. Once the oath was taken, the support of the people, however obtained, even if by coercion, cajolery, or bribe, was supposed to give a sacramental character to the election.

### The Abbasids (750-1242)

After almost a century of Ommeyades rule political power came into the hands of the Abbasids. For the purposes of this study I have selected Mansur (754-774) and his times to represent the Abbasids. Mansur was the real founder of

the Abbasids. With a remarkable knowledge of human nature, he conceived and carried out, in the course of his long reign, the gradual formation of important doctrines. These added to the hold of the sovereign on the imagination of the people, by establishing other interests on the side of the throne, and helped to create a popular hierarchy bound and devoted to the new dynasty.

The corner-stone of this far-reaching policy was the sacramental idea attached to "the consensus of the people." The caliph once again was not merely a secular sovereign but a spiritual head of the church and of the commonwealth, the actual representative of divine government. The honors that were paid to some of the pontiffs, even when they were puppets in the hands of their Mayors, and the halo that surrounded their personality, show the genius of Mansur in devising the system which constituted the caliphate.

As under the Ommeyades, the ruling pontiff almost invariably nominated his successor in his life time. When the nomination had been made, the chief officials of the empire, including judges, the generals of the army, and the subordinate civil and military officers, were called upon to take the oath of allegiance to the heir designate.

The oath of allegiance to the elected caliph possessed a sacramental virtue, and imparted a sacredness to his personality. This sacredness was enhanced and accentuated by prayers offered by the accepted pontiff in the mosques of Mecca and Medina. It was a fresh enunciation of the

saying: vox populi vox Dei. This sacramental virtue attached to the oath was based upon the idea that all the rules and ordinances which regulate the conduct of the general body of the Muslims are the utterances of the voice of God.

This is the substance of the consensus of the people. For when the spiritual leader was unanimously chosen as the head of the congregation of Islam, a divine sanction was imputed to this spiritual authority. He became the source and the channel of government. He alone had the right of ordaining deputies entitled to rule and decide cases of conflict or lead prayers. It was due to this conception of the sacramental character of the election of the caliph that long after he had lost every vestige of temporal power, conquerors and chieftains like Mahmud of Ghazni solicited from him the consecration of their power.

#### The Rationalist Movement

Before dealing with the Ottoman Caliphate and the Muslim India under the Mughals, it seems useful briefly to comment on a movement, which, if allowed to flourish could have heralded an enlightened era at the time of the earlier Muslim political institutions. Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) was one of the major exponents of the Rationalist Movement. He claimed the right to subject knowledge, except revealed dogmas of faith, to the judgment of reason.

Since the Arabs were not hampered by the centralized ecclesiastical authority, Arab thinkers from Al-Kindi down to Ibn Rushd were more free than their

Christian counterparts to work toward harmonising and reconciling traditional religious beliefs with the result of scientific research and traditional thinking.<sup>3</sup>

The contrast, Russell observes, is striking.

Averroes is more important in Christian than in Mohammedan philosophy. In the latter he was a dead end; in the former, a beginning. He was translated into Latin early in the thirteenth century by Michael Scott . . . his influence in Europe was very great, not only on the scholastics, but also on a large body of unprofessional free-thinkers, who denied immortality and were called Averroists. Among professional philosophers, his admirers were at first especially among the Franciscans and at the University of Paris.<sup>4</sup>

#### Rationalism Under Mamun (813-847)

Mamun was one of the few exceptionally outstanding rulers which the Abbasids were able to produce. With the eye of a genius he foresaw future danger in the changing dogmas that were gradually coming into force in the church of which he was the head. In part these changes resulted from the fact that rulers, with few notable exceptions, hired the so-called "learned men" to manufacture traditions and interpretations of the Quran to suit the personal and selfish interests of the ruler. Such unauthentic innovations began to be incorporated as essential parts of the religious dogmas. These additions were soon accepted with such rigidity and intolerance that they threatened to extinguish

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<sup>3</sup>P. K. Hitti, The Near East History, New York: Macmillan Co., 1951, p. 256.

<sup>4</sup>B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, p. 427.

creative and fresh interpretations more in accord with the changing needs of the community. Mamun realized the rigidity they were acquiring with the passage of time, and the ultimate consequences on society and the state. In his judgment adherence to those doctrines was worse than treason, for they tended to stifle all political and social development, and, hence, threatened the future of the commonwealth.

Mamun foresaw the effect of swathing the mind of man with inflexible dogmas. He, therefore, applied himself vigorously during the last four years of his reign (843-847) to the task of secularising the state and emancipating the human intellect from the shackles which doctors and jurists were beginning to place upon it.

Another exposition of the Rationalist Movement found its advocates in the Mutazilas. Man, they held, is a free agent in the choice of good and evil. They affirmed further that there is no eternal law regarding human actions. Divine ordinances which regulate the conduct of men are the result of growth and development, and are subject to the same process of change to which the Creator has subjected the Universe at large. Mamun adopted the Mutazilite doctrines and tried to introduce them in his dominions. He thought that the safety of Islam and all hope of progress, depended upon their gradual adoption.

**Part Two: Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent**

The Muslim chapter of Indian history opened with Mohammed Bin Quasim's adventure of 710 A.D. and continued with unpredictable ebb and flow into the beginning of the nineteenth century. A common pattern, the obvious consequence of the lack of any established political tradition, seemed to be that India was nominally subject to one sovereign. His real influence was mainly dependent on the energy of his personal character, and the vigor with which he held his reins in control.

Much of his time was consumed in efforts to suppress the rising power of his provincial governors. Instead of concerning themselves about the welfare of the people, these men were continuously striving to advance what they believed to be their own good. This state of affairs may help to explain why:

. . . for five hundred years the Muslims failed to build up a stable polity. Dynasty followed dynasty in quick succession, power was never properly consolidated, and most of the energy of the best rulers was taken up with disposing of rivals, while not a few of the early Muslim kings of Delhi devoted their main energies to the pleasures of the harem. One or two gifted and far-sighted monarchs developed irrigation, organized the revenue system, and advanced the welfare of their subjects, but this was the exception rather than the rule.<sup>5</sup>

In general the early Muslims in India displayed no more constructive political organization than had their Hindu predecessors. Among the Muslim rulers who made

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<sup>5</sup>Sir P. Griffiths, The British Impact on India, London: Macdonald & Co. (publishers), Ltd., 1952, p. 30.

considerable effort to improve social, economic, and political life were, Baber (1482-1530), Humayun (1530-1556), Akbar (1556-1605) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707).

Thereafter the Mughal Empire was in the throes of dissolution; anarchy and chaos reigned everywhere. Law and order were no longer maintained, and throughout India adventurers began to carve new kingdoms for themselves out of the old imperial territories. Henceforth, the race went to the swift, and the battle to the strong. The role played by religion, especially during the later days of the Mughal Empire, was divisive.

Islam, then as now, was divided into the sects of Sunnis and Shiahs, who differed as to the true succession to the Prophet. This abstract disagreement led to hostility and bitterness as great as that which divided the Arians from the Catholics in the early days of Christendom.<sup>6</sup>

The ruler's position was, in fact, maintained by a complete despotism which is the second important characteristic of the Mughal rule. The emperor's will was the law in the most literal sense. It is true that in theory he was expected to follow Islamic principles. In this matter however his own conscience was the sole judge. His absolute power over the kingdom was universally recognized by his subjects.

No John Locke was present to assert that government was based on the consent of the governed, that public authority is a trust and not a family monopoly in the hands

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 124.

of the rulers, and that any breach of that trust deprives the ruling authority from any legitimate demand for obedience. No Montesquieu said that checks and balances are indispensable pre-requisites for individual liberty and no Lord Acton cautioned that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

There was a complete absence of hereditary aristocracy. The nobles held their positions and their territorial grants only at the pleasure of the emperor. Their properties passed to him at their death. It became a matter of state policy not to allow the heirs of nobles to succeed to their posts. This policy robbed the administration of continuity and stability.

This lack of any long-established or hereditary aristocracy had two main effects. In the first place, it strengthened the despotic power of the monarchy; while, secondly, it meant that when, after the death of Aurangzeb, the empire passed into the hands of weaklings, there remained no stabilizing element in the kingdom.<sup>7</sup>

This stabilizing factor, the reader will notice, was provided in Europe for example by the rise of a middle class which often challenged the monopolistic tendencies of the rulers.

Since all power resided in the emperor, his ministers had no functions in their own right. They were the emperor's advisors when he chose to consult them, and his assistants in whatever branch of administration he delegated to them.

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

In practice, however, they were often very important. The problem of finding the correct balance between the central and provincial parts of political organization remained unsolved.

In the intellectual sphere, India, at an early age made great contributions to scientific knowledge, but in the Middle Ages her intellectual life was stagnant. Few signs of the true spirit of enquiry appeared. Nor did she experience anything even remotely comparable to that great revolution in ideas which was brought about in Europe by such men as Galileo, Newton and Descartes. These men emphasized that the natural phenomenon is concrete and requires for comprehension concrete and precise scientific principles.

The history of the Mohammedan period is necessarily more a chronicle of kings and courts and conquests than of organic or national growth. The vast mass of the people enjoy the doubtful happiness of having no history, since they show no development; apparently they are the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Nor was there any such marked change even in the principles and methods of government as might be expected from the diversity of successive rulers of various races.<sup>8</sup>

History in the Muslim countries and the East generally in this period did not mean the growth of constitutions, the development of civil rights, the vindication of individual liberty or the evolution of self-government. And without

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<sup>8</sup>Stanley Lane Poole, Medieval India Under Mohammedan Rule, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903, Foreword p. iv.

these, the chances for the healthy development of creative human faculties tended to be eliminated.

Muslim society presently ceased to advance. By the eighteenth century it was in a serious decline and faced stagnation. It so happened that this stagnation coincided with the regeneration of Europe. At about this time Western civilization launched one of the greatest upsurges of expansive energy that human history has ever seen. With vitality, skill and power the West was presently reshaping its own life and soon the life of all the world.

The new giant, striding forth in exploratory restlessness met the Muslim world and found its own growing might confronted with growing infirmity. By 1800 the West was pressing hard on such centres of indigenous power as remained, and had imposed its domination in many areas. During most of the nineteenth century the pressure and domination increased. The Dutch in Indonesia, the British in India, the Russians in Central Asia and the French in Africa, ruled Muslims. Iran and the Ottoman Empire retained political sovereignty and were independent although not free.

Apart from the matter of political control, Muslim society, once august, forceful and alert, was now everywhere in drooping spirit, and subject both in initiative and destiny to forces outside Islam. The modern period of Islamic history, then, begins with decadence within, intrusion and menace from without, and the worldly glory that reputedly went with obedience to God's law only a distant memory of a happier past.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, New York: The New American Library, 1959, p. 46.

### Classical Muslim Political Writings

Political thought in medieval Islam offers a classical example of the power of Islam to develop a system and theory of its own and to relate to it the systems, theories and ideas which are brought to Muslims from without. Political thought at first centers around the caliphate and is, in fact, a theory of the caliphate, its origin and purposes.<sup>10</sup>

A few more representative writers of this period will be discussed briefly. Al-Mawardi<sup>11</sup> is one of the best known political writers and his Ordinances of Government (1058) was intended as the theoretical basis for the delimitation by negotiated agreement of the sphere of authority

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<sup>10</sup>E. I. R. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, An Introductory Outline, Cambridge: The University Press, 1958, p. 28.

<sup>11</sup>Abu-l-Hasan Ali b. Muhammad b. Habib al-Mawardi, a native of Basra, was a prominent representative of the school of Shafai, and as such his treatise on government is of special interest for our problem. Like other Muslims who received the traditional education, he wrote on many topics besides law, for example, a commentary on the Quran, a treatise on prophecy and several works on ethics. As for his legal writings, it is noteworthy that government and administration at all levels were his principal concern.

As Qadi (judge) under the Caliph Al Kaim, who entrusted him also with diplomatic missions, he was actively engaged in the application and administration of Fiqh, or Jurisprudence. This, no doubt, helped him in his authoritative exposition of the principles of constitutional law as well. His Ahkam al Sultaniya are the result of blending reasoning derived from the traditional bases of law (Quran, Sunna, Hadith, Ijma and Qiyas) with historical and political deductions from the formative period of Islam, supported by the views of the early Muslims, and a realistic appraisal of the contemporary political scene. He also discusses objectively the views of other jurists, not necessarily belonging to his own Shafi-i Madhhab, or one of the four schools of jurisprudence.

between the caliph (in charge of religious affairs) and the Emir (in effective control of civil administration).

The question then may be asked that if effective power was so found in the body of "Buwaihid" emirs, why should they have agreed to recognize the supreme spiritual and temporal authority of the Abbasid caliph, to mention his name in Friday prayers and to make a treaty with him? The answer makes clear the specific character of the Islamic state as a religious political unity under the authority of the Muslim law which bound rulers and the ruled alike. If the rulers wanted to stay in power unchallenged and unhindered, they dared not ignore the fundamental principle that the authority conferred by the consensus of the Muslim community upon the lawful caliph was the only authority in law to which a Muslim would and could submit. To be clothed with the mantle of legality was worthwhile because it legitimized the delegated authority and freed the ruler from the stigma of rebellion or usurpation. Only in this way could the unity of the community of the faithful under their commander be preserved.

Mawardi drew a distinction between government based on reason and the higher form of government based on revealed law. The first merely guarded against mutual injustice, strife, discord and anarchy, while the second provided for the positive enforcement of law and justice in mutual confidence and friendship. Most important of all, the divinely

revealed law enabled the governor to administer religious affairs and prepare man for the hereafter.

The Imamate, i.e., leadership, was established by a contract between two parties: the Iman, or leader, and the Jamaa, or community. The ruler should be just. He must possess knowledge. He should be physically and mentally fit to discharge his duties as a ruler. He must have courage and determination to protect the unity of Islam against foreign attacks.

Abu Hamid Al Ghazzali<sup>12</sup>

The gulf that separated the classical theory of the caliphate based on the ideal Shara, or traditional law from

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<sup>12</sup>Abu Hamid al Ghazzali - 1058-1111

Ghazzali was born in 1058 at Tus Khurasan, where he died in 1111. He reproduced in his religious experiences all the spiritual phases developed by Islam.

"Ever since I was under twenty (now I am over fifty) . . . I have not ceased to investigate every dogma or belief. No Batinite did I come across without desiring to investigate his esotericism; no Zahirite, without wishing to acquire the gist of his literalism; no philosopher, without wanting to learn the essence of his philosophy; no dialectical theologian, without striving to ascertain the object of his dialectic and theology; no sufi, without coveting to probe the secrets of his Sufism; no ascetic, without trying to delve into the origin of his asceticism; no atheistic, without groping for the causes of his bold atheism. Such was the unquenchable thirst of my soul for investigation from the early days of my youth, an instinct and a temperament implanted in me by God through no choice of mine." P. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951, pp. 431-432.

In Baghdad, he composed his masterpiece, Ihya al Ulum al Din (the revivication of the sciences of religion) Cairo 1334. The mysticism of this work vitalized the law, its

the political reality of the Abbasid caliphate dominated by the Seljuq Sultanate was manifested perhaps most strikingly in the utterances on the Imama of the celebrated theologian, religious philosopher and mystic Al Ghazzali.<sup>13</sup>

He was well aware of the complete absence of the conditions necessary for a fully functioning caliph and that the Imama in his days was really a sham. This is acknowledged in his Ihya al Ulum when he says that the Abbasid caliph is the lawful occupant of the office of Imam by contract and as such bears the responsibility which goes with it. But the function of the government is carried on by sultans who owe him an allegiance.<sup>14</sup>

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orthodoxy leavened the doctrine of Islam. In it and Tahaful al Falasifah, Cairo 1332, orthodox speculation reached its culminating point. These works employed Greek dialectic to found a pragmatic system and made philosophy palatable to the orthodox school of theologians.

Hitti, in his History of the Arabs, best sums up the influence of Ghazzali.

"Partly translated into Latin before 1150, he exerted marked influence on the Jewish and Christian Scholasticism. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest theologians of Christianity and later Pascal were indirectly affected by the ideas of al Ghazzali, who of all Muslim thinkers came nearest to subscribing to Christian views. The scholastic shell constructed by al Ash'ari and al Ghazzali has held Islam to the present day, but Christendom succeeded in breaking through its Scholasticism, particularly at the time of the Protestant Revolt. Since then the West and the East have parted company, the former progressing while the latter stood still." Ibid., p. 431.

<sup>13</sup>Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 38.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

Government is in the hands of those who are backed by military force. The caliph is, in his definition, he to whom the wielder of force gives his allegiance. As long as the authority of the caliph is recognized, government is lawful.<sup>15</sup> The legacy of Byzantium and Iran had transformed the original Umma, i.e., the community, into a highly sensitive and differentiated society. This society existed in the midst of a developed civilization that could no longer be reduced to the level of a primitive community living the life of simplicity, sincere piety and devotion.

Theory of the Power State. Ibn Khaldun<sup>16</sup>

In a world in which everything is related to God and His plan we can hardly expect an independent political theory. Yet a North African Muslim of the fourteenth

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>16</sup>Abd-al-Rahman ibn-Khaldun - 1332-1406  
Born on May 27, 1332, in Tunis into an old Arab family of the Hadramaut which had emigrated first to Spain, then to Morocco and finally settled in Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun received a thorough education in the theological and philosophical disciplines taught at the university of Tunis by outstanding scholars. At the age of twenty he entered upon a long and chequered public career, spreading over a period of ten years, beginning as a secretary to the Hafside Sultan of Tunis. Later he also tried his fortune in Spain, gaining the confidence of the Sultan of Granada who sent him on a diplomatic mission to the court of Peter the Cruel of Seville. Khaldun's political philosophy clearly reflected his broad political experience. Rosenthal emphasized the importance of this marriage of theory and practice when he wrote of Khaldun: "Much of his penetrating analysis of Arab and specially Berber character rests on his own experience as servant of princes and negotiator with the Berbers.. It was here that he recognized the fundamental difference between nomadic and settled life between country and cities. He observed and rationalized the driving forces

century, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) did in fact propound a theory of the power state which transcends the opinions generally held in the Middle Ages.<sup>17</sup> Not only is the state an end in itself with a life of its own, governed by the law of causality, a natural and necessary human institution, it is also the political and social unit which alone makes human civilization possible.<sup>18</sup>

Ibn Khaldun's realistic approach to the man in the state made him recognize the will to power and domination as the principal driving force. He was, however, convinced that the higher principles of rational man could only develop in a society efficiently organized in an effective political organization. Only the state could provide this context.

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of political power, rooted in psychological factors. . . . all his life he was torn between a career as a statesman and soldier and as a scholar working in the quiet atmosphere of the study. For four years he lived in the solitude of a Berber castle, where he wrote his Muqaddima and part or whole of his Universal History." Rosenthal, p. 261.

P. K. Hitti eloquently sums up the importance of Khaldun's contribution to Islamic thought.

"As one who endeavoured to formulate laws of national progress and decay, Ibn Khaldun may be considered the discoverer of the true scope and nature of history or at least the real founder of the science of sociology. No Arab writer, indeed no European, had ever taken a view of history at once so comprehensive and philosophic. By the consensus of all critical opinion Ibn Khaldun was the greatest historical philosopher Islam produced and one of the greatest of all time." P. K. Hitti, op. cit., p. 568.

<sup>17</sup>Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 84.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

His interest in politics springs from his Islamic heritage, with its stress on the 'community of the faithful' the 'Ummat' of the orthodox Islam. Together with his impartial observation, his living heritage enabled him to deduce a general law which could be applied to the whole human civilization.

It is no exaggeration to say that Ibn Khaldun's Prolegomena (1377) represents a medieval witness to the premature birth of modern scientific inquiry into the human group transcending the bounds of Islam. It is no coincidence that he speaks of Insanya, *humanitas*, of the citizens of the state.<sup>19</sup> This is a concept we usually associate with the Renaissance and Humanism of the West.

In writing his Summa of civilization he was not concerned with the individual believer but with the human group. He saw it as a creator of culture and civilization in the natural and necessary framework of the state built on power and maintained by force of law and arms under a single sovereign ruler. Monarchy already typifies an advanced stage in the development of political authority and organization.

Ibn Khaldun distinguished three kinds of states according to their government and purpose: (a) Siyasa Diniya, a government based on the revealed law, the ideal Islamic theocracy; (b) Siyasa Aqliya, a government based on law established by human reason; and (c) Siyasa Madaniya, a

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

government of the ideal state of the philosophers. The state as such is a natural result of human life which requires association and organization. Human association is necessary, the philosophers express it by saying: 'man is a citizen by nature.'<sup>20</sup>

This means that association is indispensable. Mutual help is necessary to satisfy man's need for food, clothing and housing, and man must unite with man of his kind to assure his protection and defense. Experience forces men to associate with others and experience, together with reflection, enables man to live.

The evil inclination in man would inevitably lead to mutual destruction if there were not a universally restraining authority in society which is given force by the Asabiya.<sup>21</sup> This restraining authority is called governor or ruler. It has the power to prevent men from killing or injuring each other, since hostility and violence are dominant in their animal nature. The ruler is therefore one among them who has power and authority and can exercise constraint over them. This is the meaning of dominion and it is clear from this that it is specific and natural to man and indispensable for him.

Power is thus the basis of the state and the necessary instrument of that restraining authority without which

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

men cannot exist. The man who exercises authority is the chief who is like the primus inter pares; his rule is a principate. In the opinion of Ibn Khaldun this ruler represents a political organization prior to the state.

His whole theory was based on the fundamental distinction between a life of rural simplicity, courage, violence and striking power and a decadent urban life in which the natural qualities are gradually submerged by the desire for peace and security, ease, luxury and pleasure.

It is clear from Ibn Khaldun's statement that we are dealing not with a state based on Sharia, but an autocracy dependent on a mercenary army for the maintenance of power. It is in this power state that the political and economic egotism of the ruler and his associates leads to abuses much more easily and frequently than in the state based on the moral law founded in revelation.

He does not condone political crimes. Here he stands out as a political scientist who diagnosed the ill-health of the state as an organism comparable to the human body and subject to the same laws of cause and effect. Although he observed Islamic states, he deduced his general law for the state as such, and for human civilization as a whole, quite independent of the ideal Khalifa.

Ibn Khaldun's contribution to political thought consists in two important findings. They are the result of the blending, in his searching mind, of empiricism and traditionalism. They are: (a) that the caliph has survived the

mulk of the Islamic empire and (b) that religion, if not the determining factor as it is in the Khalifa, still remains an important factor in the mulk.<sup>22</sup>

He applies his own experience in Islam to society and civilization in general. He thus combines primarily a theological with a power-political concept of the state without in any way abandoning the accepted Muslim position, since the spiritual and the temporal powers are united in the caliph.<sup>23</sup>

He recognized the inevitable connection between the political situation and the standard of living, the state of civilization of the ruler and the ruled. Significantly, man's humanity is, in his view, profoundly affected by the degree of culture and civilization; it declines with them, and is at its lowest when his moral quality and his religion have been corrupted.

#### Ibn Khaldun Contrasted with Machiavelli

We have seen that in the power state mulk the overriding consideration is the interest of the state, whereas under the first four caliphs the notion of public welfare dominated the political thought.

In the power state the ruler is responsible for the state, its safety, good order and welfare. To discharge his responsibilities he must have sufficient powers. Machiavelli's attitude to the state is basically the same: the interests of the state are paramount. But Machiavelli would go much farther than Ibn Khaldun, who, held to Muslim ethics, was prepared to go.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

Political necessity in the interest of the state, demanded by "reason of state," made Machiavelli condone morally reprehensible actions, such as violence, treason, breach of faith and even murder. For Ibn Khaldun these are evil and bound to recoil not only on the perpetrators but on the state as a whole; they must prove injurious in the end. Machiavelli recognizes that they are bad, but he deems them useful for the state and for that reason justifiable.<sup>25</sup> "It is their insight into human nature and their realization of the importance of force and power, supported by indispensable authority, which links the Muslim historian of human civilization to the man of Renaissance, who had studied the history of Rome and of Christian Italy."<sup>26</sup>

Ibn Khaldun surveyed the political scene dispassionately, and deduced the laws of political life in its various mutually dependent aspects. He was interested in the reasons for the existence of the state and the causes of its development and decline. Preoccupied with the real state as he observed it, he still never lost sight of the original ideal Muslim state out of which it had inevitably grown, though falling more and more short of its requirements.

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

Al Farabi<sup>27</sup>

Both Greek and Muslim philosophers seem to be in agreement that without law there can be no state and that unlawful behavior is damaging to the state. Every departure from the law is bound to bear serious consequences for public safety and morale, and for orthodox belief and convictions. In the state under Sharia such deviation will cause error, heresy and schism, and prove the undoing of the state. In plato's ideal state under the Nomos it will lead to a transformation of the best or the perfect constitution, into a bad or imperfect constitution and so also their respective citizens.

Al Farabi laid the foundations of Islamic political philosophy by his acceptance and transformation of the

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<sup>27</sup>Al Farabi - 870-950

He was born in Transoxiana and died at Damascus in 950 at the age of eighty. He completed the harmonization of Greek philosophy with Islam. His system of philosophy, as recorded by his several treatises on Plato and Aristotle, was a syncretism of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Sufism.

Besides a number of commentaries on Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, Al Farabi composed various psychological, political and metaphysical works of which the best known are: Risalah fi Ara ahl al Madinah al Fadilah (Epistle on the Opinions of the People of the Superior City published in Cairo 1323 and al Siyasaah (Siyasat) al Madaniyah (Political Economy).

In these works, al Farabi inspired by Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics, presents his conceptions of a model city, which he conceives as a hierarchical organism analogous to the human body. The sovereign, who corresponds to the heart, is served by functionaries who are themselves served by others still lower. In his ideal city the object of association is the happiness of its citizens, and the sovereign is perfect morally and intellectually. No other Muslim reached in the philosophical sciences the same rank as Al Farabi.

Platonic legacy.<sup>28</sup> Political science, Al Farabi says, inquires into various kinds of actions, into conscious volitional ways of life, and into the habits, mores and natural dispositions which produce these actions and ways of life.

He asserts that it is natural for man to seek perfection. Man is guided and helped in this endeavor by the successive study of physical science, metaphysics and politics. Physical science furnishes him with rational principles. The highest perfection is unattainable without the help of many men. Therefore another science is needed to examine the rational principles in the light of human necessities in association, namely, 'the human or political science.'<sup>29</sup>

Man enters upon human science (politics) and asks about the ends of human existence: that is, the perfection that man must needs reach. Farabi investigates everything which helps man to reach this perfection, such as virtue and good deeds. He collects the knowledge of the nature of these things, and distinguishes them from that which is an obstacle, such as vice and evil deeds. He collects the knowledge of the nature of these things through modes and relationships with each other until he gains a rational understanding of their working.

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

This is political science; it is the science of the things through which every citizen attains, by political association, the happiness to which his natural disposition conditions him. As there are degrees of happiness, so there are degrees of perfection, which man can reach only in a political association, be it a city state or a nation. It is final happiness.<sup>30</sup>

In conclusion, it may be stressed that Al-Farabi in particular and the other philosophers in general, were concerned with the philosophical nature of the law-giver in the first place, and not with the revelation of the law as such. For the law-giver could only be an effective ruler if he was qualified to interpret the law, and in particular its theoretical teaching about God, man, the universe, reward and punishment, and providence. These writers stressed a thorough training for the rulers in the theoretical sciences and that this could culminate in spectacular virtues. This was the common ground between Greek and Islamic philosophy, at least as far as politics were concerned.

#### Earlier Experience and the Problems of Muslim Political Thought

Having outlined or summarized those aspects of Islamic history that provided the necessary background for this study of late nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim thought, the problem of the past two centuries must be delineated. Manifestly, Islam could never have become across the centuries one of the four or five great religions had it

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

not had something profound, relevant and personal to say directly to all sorts and conditions of men, of every status, background, capacity, temperament and aspiration.

Before passing on to the religious and political changes--and the two are rarely separated in the system under discussion--which resulted as a consequence of the loss of political power by the Muslim world, it may, for the sake of general comparison, be said that for the Classical Greek, the link between finite man and the ultimate scheme of things is rationality. Man, through his intellect participates in ultimate reality in so far as his ideas are true. For the Christian the link is the person of Christ. For the Muslim (and for the Semitic religious tradition generally) the mediator between God and man is righteousness. It is in moral behavior that the human and the divine meet.

At the eve of the breakdown of Muslim power, the fundamental religious innovation was the spread of Sufism. The Sufi mystic's interpretation of Islam went back to, and even through, the classical period. As the Arab dominance began to weaken, the Muslim society turned more and more to this somewhat precious version of the faith. The medieval period expanded it widely. For instance, it developed the organized Sufi order, which gradually spread throughout the length and breadth of the Islamic world.

Politically, the caliph gave place to the Sultan; that is, a religious executive was replaced by an explicitly independent mundane power. It would be an exaggeration to

regard the Sultan as a "secular" ruler. Yet he came much closer to this Western concept than his predecessor had done, at least in theory. In the concept of state and of society that came to be accepted among medieval Muslims, religion was seen as almost coordinate with other aspects of worldly life, rather than as their coordinator.

Classical Islamic political theory had seen faith as ideally the regulator of life and society. Medieval Muslim political theory, on the other hand, saw it as the emperor's task to maintain the balance of mundane society. Each group within the social order was given its due place and function; the army, the bureaucracy, the peasantry, the Ulema or the learned men and others.

Muslim society presently ceased to advance and by the eighteenth century it was in significant decline. There was a disintegration of military and political power and an enfeeblement of commercial and other economic life.

Intellectual effort stagnated. An effete decadence infected art. Religious vitality ebbed. The writings of the great masters elicited comment rather than enthusiasm; and the classical systems were used to delimit the road that one must travel rather than to provide the impetus for one's journey. On the Sufi side, the orders degenerated from mystic perception to guillible superstition; from the serene insight of the Saint to the anxious abracadabra of the charlatan.<sup>31</sup>

It can be said that the Muslim civilization had in the past one weakness, namely its rigidity. It had always

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<sup>31</sup>Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 46.

been difficult for the Muslim states to change their institutions to meet new conditions. This arose from the fundamental idea on which the religion was founded. Islam absorbed much of the outlook of the older religion of Judaism, which held that not only religious beliefs but civil law and society were made and ordained by God and could only be altered by God and not by man. Hence, Islam regulated not only a man's spiritual but also his material life.

The Western Christian world held another and more elastic view on this great issue. They rendered unto Caesar the things that were Caesar's and unto God the things that were God's. In Judaism and Islam, however, people had to render to God not only the things that were God's but also the things that were Caesar's.

This dilemma of Muslim society can, partially at least, be traced to the ramifications of the self-appointed guardians of the interpretation of the Holy Word. When it was said that religion opposed the will of the sovereign, religion meant the ministers of the religion. For as a political engine, religion, without an individual to represent it, was a dead letter. As it was, the priests could only oppose the will of the sovereign when, by their influence over the minds of men, they had acquired power, which the ruler was afraid to challenge.

Muslim society had no regular political machinery to protect the people from the authority, caprice and desires

of the sovereign and his aides. There was nothing save revolution, which prevented people from being made wretched by their masters.

The reader may be reminded here that we have gone over, during the preceding discussion, about thirteen hundred years. We started with Mohammed (570-632), the Prophet of Islam. We dealt with the thirty years immediately following his death. This period of the Islamic history is referred to as of Orthodox Caliphate.

The Ommeyyades and the Abbasid dynasties (661-1242) were considered on the basis of a selection of a ruler judged to be representative of each dynasty. Another offshoot of the Arab influence was represented in India by the Mughal period which spread from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century.

The reader will further remember that only those aspects of the Islamic history have been mentioned which have had a direct bearing on the development of Muslim political institutions and the problems of Islamic political thought. Some of those problems have tended to continue clear up to our own times.

The place of man in the universe, the source and legitimate exercise of power and the place of religion in national life should be re-evaluated by the Muslim intelligentsia. These issues, in fact, had occupied the attention of some of the most representative scholars in the Muslim

world. Some of these scholars, from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, will be discussed in the next section of this study.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FIRST REVIVAL: THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

I have not yet seen a single book written by an Arab of any branch in any Western language that has made it possible for the Western student to understand the roots of Arab culture. More than that, I have not seen any book written in Arabic for Arabs themselves which has clearly analysed what Arabic culture means to the Arabs.<sup>1</sup>

This statement could be extended to include the non-Arab Muslim's failure to interpret his culture both to himself and to the West. It is as true today as it was when it was written, and it is likely to remain true for some time to come. Such failure on the part of the Muslim world, so eminently conscious of its individuality, to attempt and to effect an analysis of the fundamentals of its civilization requires explanation.

Modern Muslim society as a whole is lamentably ignorant of the origin, development and achievement of its civilization. This ignorance is due partly to defective education and partly to present problems of adjustment. Moreover, scientific research methods have not yet found universal acceptance. The Muslim scholar's pronouncement about his own background and about the West is primarily a

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<sup>1</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, The Near East; Problems and Prospects, edited by W. Ireland, Chicago: 1942, p. 60.

political judgment. His presentation is meant to influence rather than describe. A vision of his world as it ought to be, not cognition of this world as it is, is the mainspring and goal of his analytical endeavours.

The attitude of the Muslim intelligentsia towards its own background and toward the West has found expression in the work of a number of outstanding literary figures, some of whom played no small part in the political developments of their day. The views of four of these intellectuals have been selected for detailed presentation. While the personality, as well as the specific aims of these writers are widely divergent, their basic attitudes are nearly identical and, at any rate, their attention is focused on the same problems.

Sayyid Jamal Ud Din Afghani (1839-1897)<sup>2</sup>

Jamal was the chief founder of the modern reformist movement in Egypt. He was born in the year 1839 at Assad-Abad near Kabul in Afghanistan. From his fifth to tenth year Jamal studied in the local school. From his tenth year onward he pursued his studies in different parts of Persia and of Afghanistan. By the time he was eighteen he had studied practically the whole range of Muslim sciences and acquired a remarkable familiarity with all. When

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<sup>2</sup>The biographical information has been taken from C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London: Oxford University Press, 1933, pp. 4-5.

eighteen years of age he went to India, where he stayed about a year and a half, adding to his store of learning some acquaintance with the European sciences and their methods, together with some knowledge of English. He already knew Afghani, Persian, Turkish and Arabic. He concluded his stay in India by making a leisurely pilgrimage to Mecca, arriving there in 1857.

After completing his pilgrimage Jamal returned to Afghanistan. In 1864 the change in the political circumstances compelled him to leave Afghanistan. He went to Cairo for a brief visit of forty days. During this time he frequented Azhar University, holding converse with many teachers and students, and delivered lectures in his lodgings to those who came to him. From Cairo he went to Constantinople in 1869, where he was received with unusual honors by the Sultan Abdal-Hamid and the leading officials and scholars. In 1870 he was invited by the Director of Turkish University to address the students on the importance of crafts and trades. This address was exploited and he was ordered to leave the country. He arrived in Cairo March 22, 1871.

During Jamal's sojourn in Egypt the financial affairs of the country had been rapidly sinking into that condition of hopeless bankruptcy which led to European intervention and, finally, to the deposition of Ismail Pasha. He was succeeded on June 25, 1879, by Tawfik Pasha who had promised to aid Jamal in his efforts at reform.

However, forgetting his promise the moment he assumed power, Ismail Pasha ordered Jamal out of Egypt. After his expulsion from Egypt in 1879, Jamal settled down in Hyderabad in India and composed his The Refutation of the Materialists. In the year 1882, the Young Egyptian Movement, with which Jamal had been so prominently associated, led to the Arabi Rebellion and the subsequent occupation of Egypt by Britain. For the next ten years he carried on international publicity to unite Muslim nations and pointed out the excesses of foreign domination. His death occurred on March 9, 1897.

Jamal was a Pan-Islamist. Pan-Islamism was a movement which sought to unify Muslim states for defensive and aggressive action. It aimed to combine by the ties of religion Muslims of every race and country in order to conserve and propagate the faith and free it by political and military force from alien rule. It sought to make the Muslim world again a triumphant world power. It had a religious side and a political side. Religiously it was conservative and tried to strenuously maintain Islam. Yet it had a platform broad enough to include all sects and parties. Politically it tried to weld into an alliance all Muslim peoples and governments.

Modernism, another term intended for extensive use in this study, needs definition. Wilson in his Modern Movements Among Muslims says:

Modernism in Islam is a tendency and a movement to bring the thought and life of Muslim peoples into harmony with the present age. Its object, in the words of one of its advocates, is 'to dispel the illusory traditions of the past, which have hindered our progress, to reconcile Oriental learning with Western literature and science, to preach the gospel of free inquiry, of large hearted toleration, and of pure morality.'<sup>3</sup>

The true originator of the Liberal Religious Reform movement among the Ulema or the learned men of Cairo was, strangely enough, neither an Arab, nor an Egyptian. Jamal of Afghanistan whose birthplace is not certain came from a family of Central Asian origin. He was born in 1839. By the time he was eighteen he had studied practically the whole range of Muslim sciences and acquired a remarkable familiarity with Arabic grammar, philosophy, all branches of rhetoric, Muslim history, Muslim theology, Sufism, logic, physics, metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, medicine and various other subjects.

Jamal who had already struggled for the liberation of the Muslim people in Afghanistan, Persia, India, and Turkey now (1871) became the intellectual leader of the Young Egyptian Movement. With a view to raising a generation of young writers who could ably set forth in print the new ideas which he was imparting, he trained the more promising of his pupils in the art of journalistic writing. He also took an active interest in Egyptian political

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<sup>3</sup>G. S. Wilson, Modern Movements Among Muslims, London: Flemming H. Ravell Co., 1916, p. 149.

affairs. He did all he could to arouse the country to the danger of foreign intervention and control, and his writings in the press did not conceal his anti-English sympathies. It is not surprising that such activities, continued over a period of eight years, aroused opposition.

The conservative theologians distrusted Jamal's advanced views of learning, particularly his revival of the study of philosophy, which in conservative circles, has always been regarded as the enemy of true religion. This led to his exclusion from Egypt in 1879 and his subsequent move to Hyderabad, India. Here he wrote the only lengthy work which survived him. The Refutation of the Materialists was a defense of Islam against modern derogatory attacks. In the year 1882, the Young Egyptian Movement with which Jamal had been so prominently identified, ended in the Arabi Rebellion, and the subsequent occupation of Egypt by Britain.

During the progress of the Arabi Rebellion, Jamal was placed under surveillance by the Indian government in Calcutta. At the time of the collapse of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement he was permitted to leave India. He went to London, remained there for a few days and then went to Paris, where he stayed for three years. His political views published in the French press were widely read and received the closest attention from those European governments which had political interests in the Muslim countries, especially Britain.

In 1884 he was joined at his own invitation by his friend and former pupil, Mohammed Abduh, who had been exiled from Egypt for complicity in the Arabi uprising. Together they began the publication of an Arabic weekly newspaper called Al Urwah al Wuthkah (The Indissoluble Bond). The newspaper attempted to rouse the Muslim peoples to the need of uniting their efforts against Western aggression and exploitation. The British government excluded the paper from India and Egypt, the two countries to which the paper was directed, and took repressive measures against those who received copies of it. In spite of its brief existence, the paper exerted great influence throughout the Muslim world in stirring up a nationalistic spirit among Muslims.

Upon the collapse of the paper, Jamal went to Moscow and later to Saint Petersburg. Here again his newspaper articles on the political affairs of Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and England created a deep impression in political circles. His stay in Russia extended over four years.

In 1889 while in Munich, on a confidential mission for the Shah of Persia, he met the Shah, Nasir al Din, then on visit to Europe. Having been persuaded to come to Persia, he was appointed the Minister of War. His conspicuous learning and eloquence combined with his great zeal to win for him unusual influence among the learned, the official classes, and the common people. But the Shah became suspicious that Jamal would employ his influence to undermine the Shah's position. The Shah did not hesitate to deport

Jamal, who crossed the Turkish border and remained in Constantinople until his death.

In its early stages Jamal encouraged the Persian Revolution which began in opposition to the Tobacco Monopoly of 1891 and culminated with the inauguration of the Constitution of August fifth, 1906. The successful Young Turk Movement of 1908 was the result of agitation carried on by Jamal during his stay in Constantinople. In the Egyptian Nationalist Movement which had formerly terminated so infloriously in the failure of the Arabi uprising, he was the prime mover. So too was Mohammed Abduh significant in the intellectual and religious awakening. We shall examine his writings later.

The chief aim of Jamal was the unification of all Muslim peoples under an Islamic government, over which the one supreme caliph should maintain an undisputed rule. He sought a revival of the spirit of the glorious days of Islam before its power had been dissipated in the endless dissensions and divisions and the Muslim lands had lapsed into ignorance and helplessness to become a prey to Western aggression. The decadent condition of the Muslim countries weighed heavily upon him. He believed that if the countries were freed from the incubus of foreign domination and interference, and if Islam itself was reformed and adapted to the demands of modern society, the Muslim people would be able to work out for themselves a new and glorious order of affairs without dependence on, or restriction by European

nations. To him the religion of Islam was, in all essentials, a world religion and thoroughly capable, because of its inner spiritual forces, of adaptation to the changing conditions of every age.

His efforts for the union of the Sunnis and the Shiahs by mutual concessions were primarily political in significance. Moreover they reflected a spirit of religious tolerance which he thought to be necessary for healing the age-long divisions in the Muslim world. Although Jamal paid much attention to educational and religious reforms, those who were inspired by him to attempt to bring about such reforms were few. The radical political appeal of Jamal found a ready response among young patriots to whom the field of political agitation appeared to offer an easy method of attaining national independence, and an opportunity for the expression of vociferous nationalistic sentiments. The more sober and fundamental reforms which he also advocated found few champions. That the more constructive ideas were also fundamental in his teachings is demonstrated in the life and work of Mohammed Abduh, one of his disciples who deeply imbibed of his spirit.

#### Summary of Jamal's Philosophy

Jamal's philosophy may be summarized in the following three propositions:

1. The minds of the people should be purified of belief in superstitions and foolish notions;

2. The people should feel themselves capable of attaining the highest levels of nobility of character and should be desirous of doing so; and

3. The articles of belief of the religion of a nation should be the first subject taught to the people. The proper reasons and arguments in support of those beliefs should also be taught. In short, the beliefs of the people should not rest upon mere acceptance of authoritative teachings.

Guizot, in his book maintains that the most potent element in the modern progress and civilization of Europe was the appearance of a religious group that claimed the right of investigating the sources of religious beliefs and of demanding proofs for those beliefs.<sup>4</sup> In like manner Jamal stated that Islam addresses itself to man's reason and demanded that one should accept religious beliefs only upon the grounds of convincing arguments and not mere claim and supposition.

Jamal maintained that in every nation there should be a special class whose function should be the education of the rest of the people, and another class whose function should be the training of the people in morals. One class would combat the natural ignorance and the need of

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<sup>4</sup>Ed. by G. W. Knight, General History of Civilization in Europe, by F. P. G. Guizot, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1900.

instruction, the other would combat the natural passion and the need for discipline. These tasks of the teacher to perform the work of the instructor and the disciplinarian to command that which is good and to prohibit that which should be avoided, are among the most important provisions of Islam.

Faced with the question of why Muslims were in an evil state, Jamal answered in the words of Quran. "Verily God would not change the state of the people until they change their own state." Quran 13. 12.

It may be pointed out here that hitherto the movements of religious reforms in Sunni Islam had not achieved their objective of subjecting the dogmas of faith to reason. Especially in the last two hundred years there had been a vast number of preachers who had taught that the decay of Islam as a world power resulted from the people forsaking the ancient ways of simplicity and the severe observance of the laws of the early ages of the faith.

The political reforms like the Europeanization of administrations in Turkey and Egypt had generally been imposed from above, and therefore, had been condemned by respectable opinion. Jamal's originality consisted of trying to convert the religious atmosphere of the countries in which he preached to the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position. Instead of clinging to the past he urged an intellectual movement in harmony with modern knowledge. His intimate acquaintance with the Quran and Islamic

traditions enabled him to show that, if rightly interpreted and checked, the law of Islam was capable of the most liberal developments and was consistent with most beneficial changes.

Jamal taught that Sunni Islam was capable of adapting itself to all the highest cravings of the human soul and the needs of modern life. He inspired courage by his own boldness, and his critical treatment of the commentaries, such as those of El Hanfi (representing one of the four great schools of Islamic jurisprudence). He freed the popular Muslim conscience from the chains in which it had lain for a long time. He also expounded to his audience the doctrine that the law of Islam was not a dead hand but a system equipped to cope with changing human needs of every age and susceptible of change. All this was similar to what we have seen in the reawakening of the Christian intellect during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe and the adaptation of orthodox doctrines to the scientific discoveries of the day.

Jamal further maintained that the growing absolutism of the Muslim princes in modern times was contrary to the fundamental principles of Islam which in their essence were republican. In such a republican atmosphere every citizen had the right of free speech and of popular assemblage. The authority of the ruler rested upon his conformity to the law and popular approval.

Professor E. G. Brown says of Jamal that he was a man of "enormous force of character, prodigious learning,

untiring activity, dauntless courage, extraordinary eloquence both in speech and writing, and an appearance equally striking and majestic. He was at once philosopher, writer, orator and journalist, but above all, politician, and was regarded by his admirers as a great patriot and by his antagonists as a dangerous agitator."<sup>5</sup>

Another writer of considerable prestige and scholarship has summed up Jamal's contributions:

In his endeavour he expended all his powers and for the sake of it he cut himself off from the world; for he never took a wife, nor did he seek any gain. But for all that, he did not attain what he desired and labored for; and he left no record of his ideas except the treatise against the materialists, . . . . Yet he instilled into the souls of his friends and disciples a living spirit which aroused their energies and sharpened their pens, and the East has profited and shall profit by their deeds.<sup>6</sup>

The major forces of internal reform and external defense are typified and fused in Jamal. His outstanding role is central to the nineteenth century Muslim world. He combined with his traditional scholarship a familiarity with Europe and an acquaintance with its modern thought. Much subsequent Islamic development is adumbrated in his personality and career. In fact, there is very little in twentieth century Islam not foreshadowed in Jamal.

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<sup>5</sup>E. G. Brown, The Persian Revolution, London: 1909, pp. 2, 3.

<sup>6</sup>Zirji Zaidan, Eastern Celebrities, Cairo: 1925, p. 61.

It was not what he introduced into the development of Islamic world that gives him significance, so much as what he brought into very sharp focus. He is important because he was concerned with so wide a sweep of the contemporary Muslim world and its difficulties, and then reacted with a prodigious energy.

He was embracingly catholic: in his concern for the community's new problems, impinging impartially on its various elements, he transcended its traditional divisions and would turn attention from them. He was the firebrand agitator; taking deeply to heart the then condition of Islam, he sensed with a passionate poignancy the plight of his fellow Muslims, and in his rebounding zest stimulated them to a keen consciousness of their situation and to a determination to redress it.<sup>7</sup>

Jamal strove with all his energies to dam and, if possible, to sweep back the encroaching menace of Western domination by means of the organized power of the existing Muslim governments. He brought inspiration and a popular program to the Pan-Islamic movement by restating the basis of Islamic community in terms of nationalism. Although on the political side Pan-Islam was aimed against the European penetration, it had an internal reforming aspect also.

Jamal attacked with the same vigor the abuses which he saw within Islam and the evils of the Muslim governments. It was an essential element in his thought that the Muslim peoples should purify themselves from religious errors and compromises, that Muslim scholars should be abreast of modern currents

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<sup>7</sup>W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 55.

of thought and that the Muslim state should stand out as a political expression and a vehicle of sound Quranic orthodoxy.<sup>8</sup>

Before a beginning could be made to the reformation of Islamic doctrines it was necessary to isolate the religious element in the reformation movement from the emotional influences of the revolutionary and nationalistic programs. This was the task taken up and partially accomplished by Jamal's most influential pupil, Mohammed Abduh.

Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905)

The exact birthplace of Abduh is unknown, nor is the year of his birth entirely certain. The year 1849 is the date most commonly accepted. When ten years of age, the young Abduh, after having learned to read and write, was sent to the home of a professional reciter of the Quran. In 1862, then about 13 years of age, he was sent to the school in Tanta that he might perfect the memorizing of the Quran.

When Jamal returned to Cairo from Constantinople on March 22, 1871, Abduh began to study regularly with him. Jamal opened the doors of Western scientific thought and achievement for him. This was to be scarcely a less decisive influence in his life than was the independent attitude towards the ancient authorities which Jamal exemplified in his teaching. Towards the close of the year 1878, Abduh was appointed teacher of history in a school called Dar al Ulum.

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<sup>8</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago: U. C. Press, 1947, p. 28.

In 1890, after a long teaching career, he was appointed to the Court of Appeals in Cairo.

During his career on the bench, he sought with consistency the promotion of the ends of justice, equity and where possible to resolve the difficulties of legislation by compromise and reconciliation. On June 3, 1899, Abduh was appointed Mufti of all Egypt. As holder of this office, by virtue of his appointment by the state, he was the supreme official interpreter of the canon law of Islam for the whole country and his legal opinions, touching any matters that were referred to him, were authoritative and final. On June 25, 1899, he was appointed as a permanent member of the Legislative Council. Abduh died on July 11, 1905.

The effect of his teaching was to separate the religious issue from the political conflicts so that they were no longer interdependent and each was set free to develop along its own appropriate lines. If he had been able to win more general support, he might indeed have created a revolution in the thought and outlook of the Muslim world. Within the main body of Muslims, whether conservatives or reformers, his solution has never been fully accepted.

The conservatives rejected it, as they rejected almost all of Abduh's ideas a priori and on principle. The modernists who claimed to be his followers, did not understand them. For external reasons, they fell back on Jamal's activism. Although Abduh's influence remains alive and is

continuing to bear fruit in present day Islam, the immediate outward consequence of his activities was the emergence of a new fundamentalist school calling themselves the Salafiya, or the upholders of traditions of the fathers of the church.

In his prolific output of writings and lectures, Abduh dealt with a great variety of topics. The program which he bequeathed to the Reform Movement can be summed up under four main heads: a) the purification of Islam from the corrupting influences and practices; b) the reform of Muslim higher education; c) the reformation of Islamic doctrines in the light of modern thought; and d) the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks.

His real disciples were found among the laymen, most especially the European-educated classes, and that in two directions. In the first place, he and his writings formed, and still form, a shield, a support, and a weapon for the social and political reformers. . . . By the authority of his name "they were able to gain acceptance among the people for those of the new principles for which they could not have gained a hearing before." In the second place he bridged, at least temporarily, the widening gap between the traditional learning and new rationalism introduced from the West, and made it possible for the Muslim graduate of the Western universities to prosecute his studies without being conscious of fear, or incurring the reproach, that he had abjured his faith. With the removal of this inhibition Muslim Egypt seemed to win a release of energy . . . He, more than any other man, gave Egyptian thought a centre of gravity, and created . . . a literature inspired by definite ideals of progress within an Islamic framework.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, IV, Part IV, London: 1928, pp. 757-58.

Abduh spread the teachings of Jamal, and both enriched and solidified the doctrine of his teacher. He was one of the greatest and most influential of Islamic reformers. He lived to fill the position of Chief Mufti (Justice), the highest office to which an Egyptian jurist could aspire. Furthermore, he left an important group of ardent followers to continue his work. Nearly all of the men who became prominent in the cultural life of Egypt during the first three decades of this century had experienced, in one way or another, the influence of Abduh's teachings.

His main goal was to free the spirit from blind adherence to traditional beliefs and to understand religion as it had been understood by the first Muslims. Abduh saw the history of religion as an upward development, into which each successive religion was fitted according to the stages of mankind. In the period of man's childhood, religions were simple in their concepts and rigorous in their discipline. They relied on miracles to overawe the naive believer. Many centuries passed during which man developed his emotional capacities until he became mature enough for a new kind of religion which addressed itself primarily to the heart. While its commands were good, it did not take into account human nature. It inculcated an asceticism that exceeded the capabilities of the average believer and forced him to detach his religious from his worldly life.

Finally, man had grown to comprehend an even higher type of religious teaching. Christianity was superseded by

Islam, the first religion to appeal both to reason and to emotion. Islam recognized man's double nature and accepted an obligation to the body just as it stressed duties to the soul. By moderating the demands on the believer, Mohammed (the prophet) permitted him to fulfill them faithfully. As a rational teaching Islam had freed the human mind.

The reinvigorated Islam freed man of clerical authority and put him in direct contact with the Lord. In science, Islam advocated probing the secrets of the universe and developing those methods of rational investigation which Europe finally borrowed in the sixteenth century.

In the social sphere, Islam freed mankind from fanaticism by permitting adherents of all religions to live amid the Muslims and by abolishing discrimination on racial grounds. Finally, in the moral sphere, Islam freed man of the shackles of asceticism which Abduh considered a grave impediment to cultural progress.

These modifications established Islam as the last and the highest phase of religious evolution, and it is in this sense that Mohammed, the prophet, is called the Seal that closed the era of Prophecy.<sup>10</sup>

When Jamal al-Din was bidding farewell to some of his Egyptian friends and followers at Suez in 1879 as he was leaving Egypt for the last time, he is reported to have said

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<sup>10</sup>Quoted by G. E. von Grunebaum, "Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition," American Anthropological Association Memoirs, 1955, p. 190.

to them: "I leave you Shaikh Mohammed Abduh, and he is sufficient for Egypt as a scholar."<sup>11</sup>

Thus the stream of Egyptian reformation, emerging like the Nile, from a source beyond the borders of the country, was destined to attain its full flood through Egyptian channels. For Abduh was a pure Egyptian; he came from a family belonging to the peasant class of the Egyptian Delta.

His sympathetic understanding of the needs of the great mass of the people and his passionate desire for uplifting the whole nation were the outgrowth of his early peasant life. As a youth he listened to the frequent tales of the days of M. A. Pasha, which were still fresh in the memories of the elders. As always, in the case of Egypt, no matter how brilliant were the outward aspects of the reign of the ruling sovereign, a burden of grinding hardship fell upon the common people.

Further, Abduh noticed that the Khedive Ismail had been introducing European institutions into the country more rapidly than they could be assimilated. But Khedive's efforts led many of the educated people to think that the country was about to enter upon a glorious era of national achievement and they, themselves, were prepared to take part in it. This seemed too superficial to Abduh, who advocated

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<sup>11</sup>E. E. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London: Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 18.

the study of neighboring religions and states to learn the reason for their advancement. And when we have learned it, he argued, we must hasten towards it, that we may overtake what is past and prepare for what is coming.

We see no reason for their progress to wealth and power except the advancement of education and the sciences among them. Our first duty, then, is to endeavour with all our might and main to spread these sciences in our country.<sup>12</sup>

Abduh clearly recognized the lack of any comprehensive works on political science, or the history of the progress of civilization, with the exception of Guizot's History of Civilizations. Abduh proposed the study of all those conditions and causes which had any part in producing the present civilization of Europe. His emphasis upon character development, and upon training in the principles of government within his own classes, shows that he was setting about the task himself.

A Europeanized way of life, he thought, should be built on real and enduring values. It was not simply a matter of acquiring a smattering of European sciences or of imitating Europeans in their customs, buildings, dress, furniture, and expensive luxuries. For this led, by itself, to the creation of a spirit which ignored the straight path of true glory and personal honor.

The uplifting of the nation could only be accomplished by following the path of the uplifting of the

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

individual. Customs were to be changed gradually, beginning with the simplest. The reform of the character, ideas and actions of the people was the most important duty of the nation. Without this, no reform could be possible. But this was a long process which required time. He felt that an important start could be made by the improvement of education.

He reasoned that reverence for the laws of a country is essential for its prosperity. However, these laws should differ according to the circumstances of the people, should be applicable to existing conditions, and should be understood by the people. The concept of representative government and legislation by the people's representatives has always been in harmony with the spirit and practice of Islam. It is the duty of a nation to aid its rulers by counsel through its chosen representatives. The method, however, of realizing such representative government is not defined by the Islamic law (Sharia). The method must be determined according to that which will best promote the ends of justice and the common advantage.

With this position of leadership of the progressive forces of the nation, Abduh advocated representative institutions as not only permissible for a Muslim country like Egypt but as the ideal to be striven for. He was convinced of the evils of foreign intervention. It was inevitable that he should take part in a movement which Lord Cromer in his Modern Egypt characterises as, "in some degree

unquestionably national." Abduh was the leading spirit of the movement.

Abduh historically demonstrated the fact that when revolutions had been successful in limiting the power of the autocratic governments and wresting from them the right of representation and equality, such revolutions had proceeded from the middle and lower classes of the nation. These classes could only spearhead revolution after united public opinion had been developed by education and training. The wealthy, privileged and the governing classes had never sought to put themselves on an equality with the common people and to share their wealth and power with the lower orders.

He himself was strongly in favor of constitutional government, but he believed that such a form of government should be established by the consent of the ruler and his government, not by rebellion against him. Furthermore, a beginning should be made which would accustom the people to the practices and demands of representative government. Experimentation had to be accomplished with teaching and training, until a new generation, nourished with democratic principles, could assume the reins of government.

### The Indissoluble Bond<sup>13</sup>

At this stage, Abduh seemed to be rather erratically shifting back and forth between old and new ideas. At one moment he came up with very bold and new ideas and then suddenly reverted back to the solutions which, while they might have been satisfactory for an earlier day, were completely out of harmony with modern issues. The author hopes to deal with these inconsistencies later on. Right now it is but fair to present his thoughts as they are.

In The Indissoluble Bond there were significant ideas of both Jamal and Abduh. Two of the most important arguments were (1) that Islamic unity had been lost through the ambitions and greed of aggrandizement of Muslim rulers; and (2) that the downfall of the Muslim nations resulted from the lust of the rulers for dainties and luxuries, for titles and honors.

The only solution for the Muslim nation was a return to the rules and practices of religion of the days of the early caliphs. If they thus set their feet in the path of success, and made the principles of true religion their own

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<sup>13</sup>Jamal and Abduh began the publication of this Arabic weekly with the object of arousing the Muslim peoples to the need of uniting their forces against Western aggression and exploitation. Jamal, as political director of the paper, determined its aggressive and strongly anti-English tone, but Abduh, as literary editor, wrote all the articles which appeared in it. The Indissoluble Bond's first number appeared on March 13, 1884. Only eighteen numbers were issued, the last number appearing October 16, 1884. This Weekly was published in Paris.

concern, then they could not fail in their progress toward human perfection.

I do not seek in saying this that the supreme ruler over all should be one person, for this perhaps would be difficult; but I do urge that the supreme authority over all should be the Quran, and the aspect in which they are united should be their religion, and that every ruler, each in his own state, put forth every effort for the protection of others as far as possible. For his own life stands by the life of others, and his continued existence by their's.<sup>14</sup>

From this brief account it should be obvious that the tone and general spirit of The Indissoluble Bond appeared more radical and progressive than did the ideas advocated by Abduh in his earlier editorials in Egypt. It was not surprising that autocratic rulers in Muslim countries, and officials of governments which had interests in these lands, viewed with concern the continued publication of The Indissoluble Bond and eventually suppressed it.

Abduh expressed to Jamal in Europe, his belief that Jamal's political methods would not result in any good. The establishment of a just and reformed Muslim government did not depend alone on the removal of the hindrances occasioned by the foreigners. It would be better, he thought, if the two of them would devote themselves to training men according to their own ideals, in some quiet spot, remote from political influences. These men in turn, would go out to different countries to train others. Thus at some remote

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-61.

date they would have a considerable force of agents at work.

"It is men," he said, "who will accomplish every thing."

But this approach was rejected by Jamal.

A certain pessimism resulted from this state of affairs as reflected in this statement made by Abduh:

But the matter of government and the governed I abandoned to the decisions of fate, and to the hand of God thereafter to arrange. For I had learnt that it is a fruit which the nations gather from plantings which they themselves plant and nourish through long years. It is this planting which requires to be attended to now.<sup>15</sup>

In Europe he learned of faith in progress. "I never once went to Europe," he says, "that there was not renewed within me hope of the change of the present state of Muslims to something better." He believed in cultural borrowing and acknowledged it. When Europe knew no other civilization than that of war and bloodshed, Islam came to it bringing to it the arts, sciences and learning of the Persians and the Aryan peoples of Asia, of the Egyptians, Romans and the Greeks.

The truth is that all nations borrow from one another according to need, and the western Aryan has borrowed from the eastern Semitic more than the depressed East is taking today from the independent West.<sup>16</sup>

#### Role of Reason in Abduh's Thought

Islam, according to Abduh, declared openly that man was not created to be led by a halter but ought to be guided

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 63-64.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

by science and by signs of the universe and indications of events. Teachers were only those who aroused, directed, and guided into the way of investigation. In matters of Taklid or blind obedience, the Ulema believed a certain thing and then sought a proof for it. The proof must not differ from their beliefs. If a proof was advanced contrary to their belief, they proceeded to combat it, even though this might lead to the negation of reason entirely. For most of them believed and then adduced their proofs. Seldom could there be found any among them who adduced their proofs in order to believe.

The belief on authority, according to Abduh, without reason and guidance, was characteristic of the godless. For one became a believer only when he grasped his religion with reason, comprehended it with soul, and thereby became fully convinced of it. But he who was trained simply to admit without the use of reason, and to practice without thinking, was not to be called a believer. Reason and the soul of man should be elevated by knowledge and comprehension.

Devotion to Islam was the controlling motive of Abduh's life. It was his deep conviction that only by a thorough-going reform of the whole system that amounted to the evolution of a new Islam (although to him it meant but a return to the original form) could this religion prove its adaptability to present day conditions.

There arise, says Zaidan, the author of Eastern Celebrities, in the history of any nation, only a very small

number of individuals who attempt the type of reform which Abduh attempted.<sup>17</sup> He did not live to see the fruition of his endeavours, although he set in motion influences which outlived him. He died in the midst of the dawn of the new day which his doctrines and principles have brought to pass in the Muslim world.

That the coming of this day seems even yet remote and uncertain, only testifies to the far-sightedness of his vision, and establishes more firmly his position among the great leaders and reformers of Islam.<sup>18</sup>

To sum up the major ideas reviewed in this chapter, it may be said that Jamal fought to rally the Muslims for liberal reforms which he deemed an indispensable preliminary to a successful struggle against Western encroachment. He conceived of Islam as a world religion, capable of adapting itself to the changing demands of every age. While his political agitation was more immediately effective than his call for educational and religious modernization, both aspects of his teaching are really one and derive from his belief in Islam as the greatest progressive force in history.

Jamal united with traditional Islamic scholarship a familiarity with Europe and an acquaintance with its modern thought. A very great deal of subsequent Islamic

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<sup>17</sup>Z. Zaidan, Eastern Celebrities, Cairo: 1897, p. 284.

<sup>18</sup>C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 103.

development is adumbrated in his personality and career. In fact, there is very little in twentieth century Islam not foreshadowed in Jamal.

Among Jamal's disciples Abduh had the insight to separate the political from the religious reform and to restate the Islamic doctrine. He tried to introduce a broader and more philosophical conception of religious education. His character and teachings exerted an immense influence upon the new generation, who were finding themselves to some extent alienated by the formalism of teaching institutions. Abduh restated the rights of reason in religious thought. He restored some measure of flexibility to what had become a rigid and apparently petrified system, and allowed the possibility of reformulating doctrine in modern instead of medieval terms.

## CHAPTER III

### THE SECOND REVIVAL - THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUB-CONTINENT

Leaving the Middle East for a journey to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent does not prove any harbinger of a refreshingly different act in the Islamic revival "play." In fact you seem to be seeing several versions of the same act with a different cast.

The curtain rises on the controversy between British apostles of radical Western innovation, and conservative defenders of the status quo policy. The dynamic of the first school, both in its rationalist and religious aspects, is justice, reason and humanism; the motive for the second is fear of popular upheaval.

There were many responses to the over-all establishment of British authority on the part of the Indians. To place Saiyyid's reaction in the proper perspective, we must examine some of the other forms of reaction to British authority. Especially notable were the military, the conservative and the radical responses.

#### The Military Response

The first Indian response to the Western impact was military. Indian princes were impressed by the apparent magic of European arms and discipline, and by European cohesion and ability to subordinate personal interests to a

common purpose. Military efficiency, they concluded was the talisman of Western success. They hoped to stave off the European menace by developing comparable military techniques themselves. European adventurers were engaged to train and direct the troops. Indian armies ceased to be bands of military adventurers surrounded by hordes of campfollowers and clouds of plunderers.

The Indian princes had left out of their calculations the cohesive spirit of the West, which made armies the servants of civil directors and prevented soldiers and civilians alike from splitting up into rival factions of adventurers. An Indian soldier could not resist the temptation of personal power for there was nothing in his system to hold him back. Above all, Indians lacked the economic power of the West, which enabled it to pay disciplined forces regularly and replace armies which had been destroyed.

Disciplined troops without pay were more dangerous than the old levies since they had no estates or old jobs to fall back upon and so turned their arms on their employers. Arrears of pay and personal ambitions formed the graveyard of Indian military hopes.

#### The Conservative Response

The next response may be regarded as conservative or reactionary. The West was admittedly stronger said the conservatives, but its ideas were dangerous and its manners odious. Indians should withdraw themselves, so far as they were able, from contact with the foreigner, and live their

own lives in a traditional manner. This reactionary spirit took many forms:

(a) In the religious sphere, it inspired the opposition to such measures as the suppression of Sati--a custom among the Hindus calling for the voluntary jump into fire and death on the part of the wife of a diseased husband, and the glorification of customs which in other circumstances the apologists themselves might have led the way in modifying.

(b) In the intellectual sphere, it strengthened a blind reliance on the textual authority of the traditions handed down once for all to the saints. Unable to answer the new ideas because they were unwilling to consider them on their merits, the champions of the past resorted to a sterile doctrine of authority.

(c) Politically, it colored the outlook of the Indian princes in the considerable territories which they still controlled. One symptom was the nostalgic veneration of the now shadowy Mughal authority and preference for corrupt Indian rule to British order and security.

#### The Radical Response

The supreme expression of the reactionary spirit was the 'Mutiny' of 1857. In one tense and tragic moment everything--the country's love of its old way of life, regret for past glories, and distrust of and disgust at foreign innovations--flared up in a violent explosion of emotional resentment. The actual occasion for the outbreak, the issue of

cartridges greased with the fat of pigs and cows, was nicely calculated to irritate both communities.

The blunder great as it was, would have been retrieved if there had not been a pre-existing atmosphere of suspicion and ill-will. This atmosphere itself was the expression of the conservative reaction against interference and foreign innovation. The 'Mutiny' was the final convulsion of the old order goaded to desperation by the incessant pricks of modernity.

The next response was that of acceptance. There were those among the intellectuals in touch with the British who were dazzled by the new ideas. They set out to modernize themselves in thought, mind, and spirit. Like Renaissance scholars with their Greek, the Indian intellectuals treasured the purity of their English accent.

The conservative response was too comfortable and the radical response too drastic for Indian needs and tastes. India then looked within herself for the secret of renewal. This may be called the orthodox response, the attempt to find the secret of new life in the neglected portion of the religious heritage.

### The Synthesis

There remained the solution of synthesis or the working faith of modern India. It is the work primarily of two creative minds, Ram Mohan Roy among the Hindus and Saiyyid Ahmed Khan among the Muslims. The latter is more

relevant for the purposes of the present study. It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine his ideas a little more closely.

Sir Saiyyid Ahmed Khan - 1817-1899<sup>1</sup>

Saiyyid's ability to combine Oriental with Western learning fitted him for the role of interpreter between the East and the West. His forceful character enabled him effectively to disseminate these ideas, while his integrity was proof against calumny. The most remarkable feature of the first Indian modernist movement led by Saiyyid was its organized character, which was given to it by the establishment of the Anglo-Mohammedan Oriental College in 1875, with its object of combining religious education with modern scientific studies.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>He was born in 1817 and took service under the British in 1837, rising to the rank of Subordinate judge. He remained loyal in the Mutiny (1857) and published an influential essay on its causes. Saiyyid Ahmed came of an aristocratic family of Central Asian origin. His combination of Western with the Oriental learning fitted him to be an interpreter between the conservative East and the encroaching West. He visited England in 1869, and retired from service in 1876. In 1878 he became a member of the Governor General's Legislative Council and was knighted in 1888. He died in 1898. At the time of his death he was acknowledged as the grand savior of Indian Islam.

For further details, The Oxford History of India, by V. A. Smith, published at the Clarendon Press, 1958, may be consulted.

<sup>2</sup>This college in 1920 became the famed Muslim University at Aligarh. It played an outstanding role in the revival of Muslim political consciousness.

### Role of Education

Saiyyid was convinced that the Indian Muslims must come to terms with the West, both politically and culturally. A modern education became the sin qua non for the community's progress. He was the champion of Western knowledge which was consistent with the tenets of Islam.

He was, in fact, a Muslim modernist appealing to general principles outside the scope of the four recognized schools of theology. He accepted the mission of the Prophet and God's revelation in the Quran. But he claimed that reason was also an attribute of God and that nature was His handiwork. The Quran and Islam might, therefore, be interpreted on the basis of reason to meet modern needs and problems.

This, in effect, led him to deny the miraculous element in Islam, and he had to bear the full weight of the hostility of the Ulema. Because of his emphasis on nature, his school gained the name of Nechari (Naturalists) and under that name earned the denunciation of Jamal, whose work, published as The Refutation of the Materialists, was directed primarily against this school of thought.

Nechariya is the root of corruption, the source of unconceivable evils and the ruin of the country. . . . the necharies present themselves before the eyes of the fools as the standard bearers of science, but only give a wider range to treachery. They are deluded by catchwords, call themselves guides and

leaders, when they stand in the lowest grades of ignorance and lack of intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

All this did not deter him. The achievements of the West, so far as they rested on reason, he emphasized, might be welcomed and assimilated. He laid particular emphasis on science as the characteristic feature of Western progress. His efforts were directed toward the general education of his people. He realized that unless they received an adequate modern education, their condition could not improve.

To accomplish this objective, he founded a college in 1875 which later became the famed Muslim University at Aligarh. While starting the school and prescribing the curriculum, he realized that the Indian languages lacked the useful literature, contained in the languages of the West. In a speech delivered in 1863 at Calcutta he said:

The reason, gentlemen why we all are so backward nowadays, is that while we are learned in and have benefitted by the philosophy, sciences and arts of antiquity, we are almost entirely ignorant of those of the modern times.<sup>4</sup>

He tried to supply this deficiency by organising a society for getting useful books in English translated into Urdu. The society published the Aligarh Gazette, which was devoted to the spread of knowledge and education, and was responsible for the translation in Urdu of a number of books

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted by H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, p. 58.

<sup>4</sup>Al Beruni, The Makers of Pakistan, Lahore: Ashraf, 1950, p. 24.

including Elphinston's History of India, Mill's Political Economy, Malcolm's History of Persia and many works on agriculture, chemistry and zoology.

After these translations were made and by the time Saiyyid was pushing for these reforms, a new class of people had risen, particularly in the urban areas of India, which was trained in the political philosophy of Mill and Burke. They had begun to demand that the administrative policies in India should bear some relation to what was being advocated in England by political thinkers and parliamentarians. This frightened many Englishmen who began to advocate the reorientation of Indian education along more traditional lines. By trying to limit education to more traditional Indian lines, British authorities had hoped to keep the masses of Indian people in the dark about the modern concepts of rights, duties, privileges and obligations. This policy in the educational sphere, they thought, would tend to help perpetuate British dominance in India.

Saiyyid who saw in modern education the main hope of progress for his country was extremely sensitive on this point. He was against the proposed change in government educational policy which he frankly characterized as a "fraud." Largely due to his efforts, educational institutions ultimately were able to offer both modern and traditional education.

One of the major responses to the impact of British on the Muslim community in India was Saiyyid's emphasis on

the educational reforms. Such reforms, he thought would gradually penetrate economic, social, and intellectual spheres of Indian national life in general and the Muslim community in particular.

Saiyyid Ahmed's programme was admirably suited to the position of Indian Islam in the Victorian world. It made possible the assimilation of elements of culture which then seemed irresistible; it provided for gradual political progress at the time when that seemed to be the only sort of progress possible. With the advent of twentieth century the conditions changed. Something more dynamic than reason in the religious sphere was needed and something more radical than the advisory councils as a political programme.<sup>5</sup>

His approach had its roots in the traditional culture. He responded to the new ideas without losing faith in the essence of his own tradition. He suggested that East and West could be combined, not merely mechanically and superficially in the world of action, but integrally and organically in the realm of thought.

Saiyyid Ahmed Khan was born in 1817 of a Delhi family with a long tradition of Mughal service. After a classical Muslim education he took service with the British, and at the age of twenty-six published an authoritative account of Delhi antiquities. For him the 'Mutiny' was a dividing line which separated him from the nodding grey-beards of a fading court and the backward view of vain regrets. He spent the rest of his long life in promoting a

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<sup>5</sup>V. A. Smith, The Oxford History of India, London: the Clarendon Press, 1958, p. 805.

synthesis between divergent views based on a progressive outlook among the discouraged Muslim community. His constructive achievement was the foundation of the Muslim college at Aligarh, now the Aligarh Muslim University.

But as with Ram Mohan Roy, an outstanding Hindu reformer and a contemporary of Saiyyid, ideas were important. In essence Saiyyid applied the same principles of reason to Islam as Ram Mohan Roy did to Hinduism. Whereas the Hindu reformer was faced with the custom congealed into law, Saiyyid was confronted with a revelation cemented into a verbally inspired scripture reenforced by a traditional interpretation.

Saiyyid accepted the fact of revelation and defended and interpreted it with reason. He was aided by the Greek tradition in Muslim thought. He used Greek and Western knowledge much like the Renaissance scholars as a weapon both of authority and reason to break the crust of medieval scholasticism. Reason and nature were his oft-repeated watchwords.

Using these ideas Saiyyid launched a Muslim modernism which sought to reconcile traditional Islam with modern needs. He resisted the Wahabi<sup>6</sup> advocacy of primitive Islam

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<sup>6</sup>Directed in the first instance against the laxity of manners and corruption of religion in the local settlements and tribes, the Wahabi movement condemned Saint-worship and all the other Sufi innovations as heresy and infidelity, and finally attacked the other orthodox schools as well for their compromises with these abominations.

on the ground of reason. He countered European criticism of Muslim dogmatism by the new principle of interpretation. Nature, for him, opposed the traditional Muslim social ethics. Islamic law provided the every day ethics for every believer, while Christ offered an ideal for superior spirits. He drew the sting of Western criticism just where it pricked most tenderly.

### Anglo-Islamic Synthesis

Fortified in this manner, he could proceed to borrow from the West as confidently as his Hindu prototype. Indeed his task was easier, since the Muslim and the Western Christian share a common view of external phenomena. For both the world is real and the handiwork of God. For both of them, men are God's children and equal in His sight. Saiyyid was an enthusiastic advocate of Western science. It is significant that the first institution at Aligarh was a Scientific Society. He equally accepted Western democracy as an Islamic principle adapted to modern conditions. Western education followed inevitably in this evolution and found its Mecca in the foundations of Aligarh in 1875.

All this helped produce Muslim political consciousness. Here Saiyyid was cautious and never looked beyond self-government under British protection. He never failed to cooperate with the British and sat in the Viceroy's Legislative Council during the last years of his life. But he was convinced that there was a Muslim consciousness quite

distinct from the Hindu. For that reason he discouraged Muslims from any participation in the Indian National Congress at the time of its formation in 1885. In his whole attitude was implicit the concept of Pakistan. It only needed the prospect of British withdrawal to bring it to the surface.

Where did the Muslims stand in the development of the new synthesis? In general Muslim progress toward the Anglo-Islamic synthesis lagged behind that of the Anglo-Hindu, both because the starting point was later, and because of the less rapid progress of education. There were two other factors retarding the progress. Muslims preferred British to Hindu or Sikh rule, and, therefore, were slower to oppose it. They also felt the weight of the Western challenge less keenly because they possessed more of the Western outlook in their own tradition. But while these considerations made them farther behind at the outset, they tended to hasten the process when Hindu rule threatened and when the irritation of Western rule was withdrawn.

The Anglo-Islamic synthesis was worked out by Saiyyid Ahmed Khan in the seventies and eighties of the last century and was spread by Aligarh from 1875 onward. But it was only after 1921 that wide spread education was developed in the Punjab. No synthesis was acceptable both to the Hindus and the Muslims because of differences in customs, traditions and values. Since the two cultures were radically different, the resulting amalgams were also different.

The first sign of divergence was Saiyyid's refusal to join the Indian National Congress on its foundation in 1885. The next was the formation of the Muslim League in 1907 in response to the Hindu agitation for the Partition of Bengal. The third was the insistence on the Communal or Separate Electorates in the Morley-Minto reform of 1909.

From the time of the formation of the Muslim League in 1906 the vitality of the Muslim separation movement was directly proportionate to the militancy of Hinduism. The threat to the Turks of the potential loss of territories at the hands of expanding European powers in the First World War brought Hinduism and Islam into a temporary alliance in the post-war years. The beginnings of serious self-government saw them draw apart in mutual suspicion. Full provincial autonomy in 1937 and a Congress drive to absorb the League saw the League revived and united under the one time pro-congress nationalist Jinnah.<sup>7</sup>

From this stage to the formal demand for Pakistan was but a logical step which the Congress did more than hasten. Jinnah now realized that Indian Islam was a cultural unit separate from Hinduism, that the Anglo-Islamic synthesis was, therefore, distinct from the Hindu-British

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<sup>7</sup>Quaid-e-Azam (great leader) Mohammed Ali Jinnah, 1876-1948, led the Independence Movement for Pakistan and was the first Governor General of Pakistan. He is considered the George Washington of Pakistan.

synthesis, and that each must in consequence seek a separate political as well as cultural expression.

By a logical process, step by step, Islam built up a system of life and thought which endeavoured to absorb Western ideals without abandoning its own. Since the West expressed itself characteristically in political forms, these new approximations to the West necessarily did so too. As they were different in origin, they varied in their transformation and expressed themselves in separate though partially similar political forms. Only when the cultural differences had been expressed politically could each side cease to emphasize differences rather than the likenesses. Then alone could a sense of common interest begin to create a bridge across the gulf which logical necessity had created.

The new liberalizing theology that followed from Saiyyid's rationalistic approach to Islam brought with it a revaluation of the traditional social ethics of the Muslim community. The latter was probably one of its strongest attractions for the growing body of Muslim intellectuals, who were becoming actually aware of the social evils, linked with such practices as slavery and unregulated polygamy and divorce. In this respect, indeed, the influence of his school has extended far beyond the boundaries of Indian Islam through their new presentations; partly apologetic but also implicitly reformist, of Muslim practice and doctrine.<sup>8</sup>

Only in its acceptance of reason as the guide of life had Islam wavered. Here, however, it may be said that

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<sup>8</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism, London: Home University Library, Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 182.

the older tradition, inherited through the Arabs from the great Greek thinkers, was on its side. While, therefore, little promise could be seen for scholastic Muslim thought (which made Islam a religion of authority based on a divinely inspired book literally interpreted) there seemed less reason than in the case of Hinduism why Indian Islam should not adapt itself to the Western modes of thought. Time and again Saiyyid emphasized this. It would seem that Islam could adapt itself easily to the West, as had happened in Turkey, or that if disintegration had to come it would take the form of shedding one skin for another rather than of a complete transformation.

For the West, the individual is a fixed entity having a single (once for all) life, endowed with rights and saddled with obligations. Though no longer regarded as a separate atom whirling in the universe of mankind unrelated to others, though linked by instinct, interest, and duty to his fellows so that he is not wholly himself by himself, but only in conjunction with the society to which he belongs, the individual is the main spring of western political and social and religious tradition. . . . Personality is supreme, it is the needs of personalities which give rise to rights and duties and the worth of each personality which is central to both Christian and democratic tradition.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of the variety of reactions to Saiyyid's programme, the influence of the school he founded was immense in helping Muslims to adapt a critical attitude toward their traditional way of life and the authorities on which it was based.

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<sup>9</sup>Percival Spear, India, Pakistan and the West, London: Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 231.

## Mohammed Iqbal - 1876-1938<sup>10</sup>

The kind of society which a community builds for itself depends fundamentally upon its belief regarding the nature and purpose of the universe and the place of man within it. Islamic law takes within its scope relationships of all kinds, both toward God and toward men. It includes such things as the performance of religious duties and the giving of alms, as well as domestic, civil, economic and political institutions.

An effective and forceful exponent of thoughts on these and related matters in Indian Islam was Iqbal. Indian Islam needed a dynamic creed and a broad vision and found it

<sup>10</sup>Iqbal was born on February 22, 1873, at Sialkot, now in West Pakistan. Iqbal had been sent to the Mission school and there came in touch with professor M. M. Hassan, who taught Arabic and Persian at the school. Hassan was, by all accounts, a remarkable man, vastly learned in the whole domain of Islamic culture. Hassan first detected the symptoms of a sensitive talent in Iqbal.

Iqbal passed his Intermediate from the Mission College. He left for Lahore in 1895 and graduated from Government College Lahore, winning distinction in English literature and Arabic. He thus qualified for a scholarship. He took his M. A. in Philosophy from the same college in 1899. He was appointed as a lecturer in Philosophy at the Oriental College, Lahore. He sailed for England in 1905 for further studies at Cambridge.

From England Iqbal went for a time to Germany. He studied at the University of Munich. His doctorate which he got from Munich, was on the strength of his thesis which has since appeared under the title: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia. In 1908 he returned to India. Iqbal settled down in Lahore to take up his professorship of Philosophy at Government College, Lahore. Iqbal was knighted in 1922 for his contributions to sciences and literature. In 1926 he contested the elections for Provincial Legislative Council from Lahore Muslim Constituency and was duly elected. He was nominated by the Viceroy to the Second Round Table Conference not too long before his death on April 22, 1939.

in the writings of Iqbal, a poet and philosopher. The role he played in promoting an intellectual revolution among Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent is very significant. He was a profound and dynamic thinker and throughout his poetry and prose he placed the greatest emphasis on action, interpreting it as a movement. The central focus of Iqbal's philosophy was his emphasis on action. Performance was the only criterion for respect and honor. A man had to be doing things and moving about. Life without action and movement is stagnation.

His philosophy found poetical expression in its most mature form in The Secrets of the Self and Mysteries of Selflessness or Non-Ego. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam represented a bold attempt on his part to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with regard both to Islamic philosophical traditions and to recent developments in various domains of human knowledge.

With a steady vision and alertness of mind he brightened the paths of Indian Muslims and guided their foot-steps. It was true that the direction in which he led was essentially the path shown by Saiyyid Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Aligarh Movement. But the path was lit with a new, bright light, and the foot-steps were guided by the magic voice of a poet.

The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, according to Iqbal, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving toward the West. Our only fear is that the dazzling exterior

of European culture may arrest our movement, and we may fail to reach the inwardness of that culture.<sup>11</sup>

He emphasized that an approach to modern knowledge should be based on an attitude of respect and independence. There should be emphasis on the teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from those who have gone before us. The philosophy of Islam, according to Iqbal, received inspiration from Greek thought. This in turn inspired Europe. But since the Middle Ages the world of Islam had lain in "a state of intellectual stupor" and in the meantime, in Europe, infinite advance had taken place in the domain of thought and experience. Iqbal tried to take up the threads again. According to Mr. Kiernan, "On his own showing his view point is essentially European, but he is not a blind follower. He is an independent evaluator."<sup>12</sup>

The impact on Iqbal of European thought was three-fold. First, he was impressed by the immense vitality of European life. It showed in the confident restlessness of the people whom he saw. If they did not like a thing they changed it.

Second, he caught a vision of the tremendous possibilities of human life--the potentialities, of which the

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<sup>11</sup> Poems of Iqbal, Trans. V. G. Kiernan, Bombay: Kutb Publishers, 1947, Introduction p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> V. G. Kiernan, Poems from Iqbal, Introduction.

Orient had not dreamed, but which Europe was already realizing. Man could think, do, or be a thousand things for which Iqbal's fellow intellectuals back in India were not even striving. Once man had attained those things there would be a thousand more callings for endeavour.<sup>13</sup>

Third, Iqbal the critic noticed the severe and damaging limitations of European life, despite all its promises. The soul-destroying frustrations of most individuals even in a prospering capitalistic society, and the bestial competition between fellow-men and between nation and nation, turned Iqbal away from Europe in disgust.

#### The Individual in His Thought

An essential part of Iqbal's philosophy was his conception of man who through self-respect, self-confidence, independence of mind, and strength of credit could establish mastery over his environment.

Iqbal has come a long way from the accepted Islamic moral attitude. In his view, the goal of humanity is not submission but supremacy. The chief end of man is to be the vicegerent of God on earth.<sup>14</sup>

Man's place in Creative Evolution was everywhere stressed throughout Iqbal's Lectures on Religious Thought:

It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around him and to shape his own destiny as well as that of the universe, now by

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<sup>13</sup>W. C. Smith, Modern Islam in India--A Social Analysis, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1946, p. 102.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 105.

adjusting to its forces, now by pulling the whole of his energy to mould its forces to his own needs and purposes.<sup>15</sup>

Iqbal discussed the ingredients of a creative mind. He commented, in particular, over the working of the Persian mind. To him the Persian mind was rather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that organising faculty which gradually worked out a system of ideas by interpreting the fundamental ideas with reference to the ordinary facts of observation.<sup>16</sup>

The political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marked the beginning of the interaction between Aryans and Semites, and it was found that the Persian, though he let the surface of his life become largely Semitized, quietly converted Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the West the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion, i.e., Christianity. The results of the interpretation in both cases were strikingly similar.

In each case the aim of interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed upon the individual from without. In one word it is an endeavour to internalize the external.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>16</sup>S. M. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, (a contribution to History of Muslim philosophy), London: Luzac & Co., 1908.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

Islam was a creed of service and led its followers to seek the welfare and finally the perfection of humanity in a cooperative spirit. It was this ethical ideal of Islam, which furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which had gradually unified scattered individuals and groups. The emotions finally transformed them into a well-knit people called the Millat or nation, possessing a moral consciousness of their own.

As an emotional system of unification, Islam recognizes the worth of individuals as such, and rejects blood relationship as a basis of human society. All human life is spiritual in its origin. Such a conception is creative of fresh loyalties.<sup>18</sup>

It was a matter of ordinary experience that the development of the individual self depended on the nature of society and the ideology, which animated the whole social structure. Numerous factors, therefore, favored and stimulated the development of the individual--they were, in short, the natural and cultural forces that made up his being.

Self-development presupposes a society. An ideal society can only be based on the principles of equality, social justice and human brotherhood. The social order of Islam as a world unity is founded on the principle of Tauhid (Unity of God).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>S. M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, London: Oxford University Press, 1934, p. 205.

<sup>19</sup>Aziz Ahmed in Iqbal as a Thinker (Essays on Iqbal by different authors), Lahore: S. M. Ashraf Kashmir Bazar, 1944, p. 240.

### Individual and the Society

Iqbal was one with Aristotle in holding that the individual could attain to his best only in society. For society was a necessity because man was a social animal and was a "living tomb" without society. Islam, he asserted, did not teach individualism of any crude kind. This was demonstrated by the fact that all the religious functions of Islam such as prayers, zakat or alms-giving and hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca were based on the realization of the necessity of the development of a corporate spirit.

Like the individual, society should also have a personality. The personality of an individual depended upon memory while that of society depended upon its past history. Progress for Muslim society, in fact for all society, lay not in breaking with the past and adopting Western modes of life and thought but in connecting it with its past Arabic civilization. "If you desire an eternal life," he said, "do not break the link of present and future with the past."<sup>20</sup>

The most unique society in the world, according to Iqbal, was the Islamic society, for it alone had proved itself to be eternal. For this remarkable solidarity in Islam was based on those principles on which any true society could be based. The first basis of Muslim solidarity

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<sup>20</sup>B. A. Dar, Iqbal's Philosophy of Society, p. 112, quoted by P. S. Mohar, "Political Philosophy of Sir Mohammed Iqbal," The Indian Journal of Political Science, Bombay: H. C. Rashid Mansion, July and December, 1957, p. 184.

was the Holy Quran which contained the Natural or Eternal Law. For those societies whose position, social and political was safe, Iqbal advocated Ijtihad (literally to exert) or individual judgment in the interpretation of the Quran but for those which were decayed and weak he advocated Taglid--to follow the opinions of the older scholars.

The second basis of Islamic solidarity was the life of the Holy Prophet. The heavenly revelation, the Shariat, which was expounded by him, was necessary for the moral perfection of Islamic society. Another explanation of Islamic solidarity was the existence of a centre to which the activities of the members of society might be directed. This, for the Muslims, was, of course, the Kaba.<sup>21</sup> A still further basis of unity in Islam was the existence of a special ideal. This was the propagation of Tauhid--the unity of God-head. This principle implied equality and liberty. The Quran, therefore, which contained this principle and in other ways furnished the best guidance for the individual or a society must be taken up and taught to the rest of the world. Finally this unity was based on the conquest of the physical world. For man was appointed to lead a life of strenuous endeavour and not to be a lotus-eater. Therefore, any one who taught the hatred of the world was really unable to stand face to face with the hard facts of reality.

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<sup>21</sup>Kaba is the name of a building whose corner-stone was supposed to have been laid by Abraham. Muslims all over the world face Kaba while offering the prayers.

Since Iqbal had been inspired by the teachings of Islam, he neither disregarded the past nor denied that the organic changes occur in human society. No people, emphasized Iqbal, could afford to forget a past which had produced and shaped their present identity. Iqbal preached the social values of Islam, and maintained that they formed the best guide for the modern world. The social order of Islam, to him, was built on the broadest humanitarian basis.

According to Iqbal, the ultimate fate of the people did not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of the individual man. In an over-organized society, the individual was altogether crushed out of existence. He gained the whole wealth of social thought around him and lost his own soul. The only effective force in the words of Iqbal, was the rearing of inner-directed selfless individuals.

Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a league of nations, which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.<sup>22</sup>

Iqbal thus appealed to each Muslim nation "to sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics."<sup>23</sup> The republican form of

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<sup>22</sup>Aziz Ahmed in Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 267.

<sup>23</sup>S. M. Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 223.

government was thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam and was an absolute necessity. A Muslim legislative assembly was the only possible and legal form that Ijma<sup>24</sup> could take in modern times.

### Iqbal's Political Philosophy

The state according to Islam was only an effort to realize the spiritual amid human organization. Philosophically speaking, Islamic political theory, as enunciated by Iqbal, was normative in its character. It was concerned with a special ethical ideal--the raising of humanity to the highest well-being both materially and morally by means of an extensive commonwealth built up on the belief of one God, whose sovereignty was supreme.

The goal of life was the realization and the perfection of the individual self, which depended on the development of human faculties in the right direction. "Islam," said Iqbal, "is not a departmental affair, it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man."<sup>25</sup>

As would be clear from the above, Iqbal did not posit any duality between the spiritual and the secular. The nature of an act, however secular in its import, he said was determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent

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<sup>24</sup>Ijma is a further source of Islamic law, and refers to the consensus of the community.

<sup>25</sup>Iqbal, op. cit., p. 3.

did it. It was the indivisible mental background of the act which ultimately determined its character. In Islam, therefore, the same reality appeared as church looked at from one point of view and state from another. The function of the state was merely to transform the eternal and the ideal principles, typified by Islam, into space-time forces. That is, it attempted to realize them in a definite human organization.<sup>26</sup>

A Luther in the world of Islam, he contended, was an impossibility, for here there was no church organization similar to that of Christianity inviting a destroyer. Besides, Islam rejected all dualism whether it was that of God and the Universe, of church and state or of spirit and matter. And it was exactly that duality between the spiritual and the temporal which was responsible for the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states.<sup>27</sup>

Further, in Islam, state, Millat or nation, Imam or leader, individual and the government could not be treated separately. Islam, to Iqbal, was a single non-compartmentalized reality which was one or the other as your point of view varied. Thus the Quran considered it necessary to unite religion and state, ethics and politics in a single

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-47.

<sup>27</sup>S. M. Iqbal, Presidential Address (1930) All India Muslim League. "In Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time."

revelation. It, in short, represented the noble idea of a harmonious whole.

Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interests of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time.<sup>28</sup>

Islam had set forth a standard of conduct: "Enjoin right and forbid wrong". Quran 22:6. Rightness or wrongness of conduct was considered with reference to their good or evil tendencies. An action was right when it was according to the rule, and an action was good when it was valuable or serviceable to some end.

#### The Kingdom of God on Earth

The kingdom of God on earth meant a government by unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth. According to Iqbal the sovereign power belonged to God and it extended to the entire universe, all of humanity, and all organization. God was the real source of religion, philosophy and law, and the bestower of power, strength and authority.

Iqbal also discussed the doctrine of Ijtihad thus maintaining a correct balance between the categories of permanence and change.

The ultimate spiritual basis of all life as conceived by Islam is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

eternal principles to regulate its collective life; for the eternal gives us foothold in the world of perpetual change.<sup>29</sup>

One of the most urgent and useful contributions of Iqbal in the field of political philosophy of Muslim countries was his emphasis on the doctrine of Ijtihad. The teaching of the Quran that life was a process of progressive creation, required that each generation guided, but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems. This implied the right of Ijtihad--independent judgment and interpretation of law in the light of changed and changing circumstances, which Iqbal held essential to the healthy development of the body-politic. The closing of the door of Ijtihad, contended Iqbal, was a pure fiction.

Islam believed in an active utilization of the forces of nature, and endeavoured to gain an effective control over the material environment in order to fulfil the material needs of the Millat or nation, the proper use of science was essential. Thus the socio-political order of Islam was keenly alive and responsive to the fact of change.

#### Iqbal's Concept of the 'Self'

Since Reality was concrete and finite, the doctrine of Self or Khudi, according to Professor Mohar, played a paramount importance in the philosophy of Iqbal. The

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<sup>29</sup>S. M. Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 207.

doctrine was not original to him since Descartes made it a cardinal principle of his philosophy. Iqbal's master Nietzsche, of course had also made it an integral part of his theory. Even Kant's autonomy of the will was essentially the same doctrine.<sup>30</sup>

The moral and religious ideal of man, Iqbal went on to emphasize, was not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attained to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, "Create in yourself the attributes of God." Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique individual.<sup>31</sup> The secret of life, therefore, was to move around thyself and to be freed from moving around others. The negation of self was a doctrine invented by the subject races of mankind in order to sap and weaken the character of their rulers.

But in man the centre of life became an Ego or Person. Personality was a state of tension and could continue only if that state was maintained. That which tended to maintain this state of tension tended to make us immortal. Thus the idea of personality gave us a standard of value; it settled the problem of good and evil: that which fortified personality was good and that which weakened it was bad.

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<sup>30</sup>P. S. Mohar, "Political Philosophy of Sir Mohammed Iqbal," p. 179.

<sup>31</sup>R. A. Nicholson, The Secrets of the Self, (English translation of Asrar-i-Khudi), London: 1920, p. xviii-ix.

Art, religion in fact, all human institutions must be judged from the standpoint of personality. Personality was the measure of all things, in fact, the value of all values: there was no other external standard.

The self was strengthened not by annihilation of desires but by "keeping desires alive in thy heart." In fact, life was latent in seeking and its origin was hidden in desire. Feeling, desire, and action were the trio which was essential for the development of the self. Also necessary for the full development of the self was the turning of the heart towards God. Faith and not reason, therefore, was the foundation of self-hood and mystic experience. Scientific experiment alone was not the key to inner knowledge. The first and the foremost element in Western culture was the dominance of reason but in reality, said Iqbal, faith or intuition was the senior partner in the joint firm of intellect and faith.

Humanity needs three things today--a spiritual interpretation of the Universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe, has, it is true, built up idealistic system on these lines but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation can alone bring. This is the reason why pure rationalism has always been ineffective while religion has always elevated individuals and transformed whole societies. Western culture is superficial and complicated and, most of all, is characterized by the anti-religious spirit. This is why Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 170.

This religion, however, did not mean the absorption of the self in God, as in the vedanta or in Sufism, but in the preservation of the ego even against God Himself. For man not only absorbed the world of matter by mastering it but he absorbed God Himself into his Ego by assimilating divine attributes.

However, Iqbal's religion was not a religion of dogmas, priesthood, or rituals. For such a faith could not prepare modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which was associated with the advancement of modern sciences. For the modern world stood in need of a "biological renewal." And only the highest type of religion could restore to the modern man that attitude of faith which made him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter.

Religion, according to Iqbal, had passed through three stages. The first was the period of Faith. Here religious life appeared as a form of discipline which the individual or the whole people must accept as an unconditional command without any rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command.<sup>33</sup>

The second stage was the period of Thought. At this stage there was a real understanding of the discipline and the ultimate source of its authority. Religious life here

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

sought its foundation in a kind of metaphysics. Finally, we had the period of Discovery. Metaphysics was now displaced by psychology and religious life developed the ambition to come into direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. It was here that religion became a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieved a free personality not by releasing himself from the fetters of the Law but by discovering the ultimate source within the depth of his own consciousness. This required a highly developed self. The self was strengthened not by the annihilation of desires but by "keeping desires alive in your heart."<sup>34</sup> In fact, life was latent in seeking and its origin was hidden in desire. Feeling, desire and action were the trio which is essential for the development of the self. Equally, and perhaps, even more necessary was the element of love-desire to assimilate, to absorb. It was a stage arrived at by very few people. There are few mystics in this sense of the term.

During the minority of mankind, psychic energy developed what Iqbal called prophetic-consciousness--a mode of economising individual thought and choice by providing ready-made judgments, choices and ways of action. With the birth of reason and the critical faculty, however, life in its own interest, inhibited the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution.

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<sup>34</sup>Nicholson, The Secrets of the Self, pp. 419-420.

Iqbal had based his philosophy of life on his philosophy of the "self." The real cause of Muslim deterioration, according to him, was nafi-khudi, or the lack of self-cognizance. Man had a unique capacity to recognize his self and the purpose of his creation. This capacity made him superior to other creatures. The life of man should, therefore, begin with the study of his self and culminate in the perfection of his self.

Khudi i.e., self, is the name of several attributes found in an ideal character such as self-realization, self-assertion, boldness, spirit of independence, sense of respect, noble idealism and action. The object is spiritual evaluation.<sup>35</sup>

The Universe, as an organized association of individuals, was in a state of organic growth. Man played an important part in the process of evolution. The ethical and religious ideal of Islam was not self-negation, but self-affirmation. The individual attained this ideal by becoming more and more individual or unique. The prophet said: "Create in yourself the attributes of God." Thus, according to Iqbal, man had as an ideal, the most unique individual to follow.

The highest form of life is the Khudi or Ego, in which the individual becomes a 'self-contained exclusive centre,' both physically and spiritually. The individual draws closer and closer to God, until he is the completest person.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Aziz Ahmed in Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 241.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 243.

Success lay in the struggle against all material forces which hindered the progress of man. "The life of ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego."<sup>37</sup> Life is a ceaseless search for the ideal. Man is restless and is engrossed in a ceaseless pursuit of fresh scopes for self-realization and self-expression. He is a "creative activity, an ascending spirit who, on his onward march rises from one state to another."<sup>38</sup>

Iqbal was asking the Muslims (primarily the Muslim middle class intelligentsia) to develop their "Egos," to stand on their own feet, to get going, in fact. That was the way to create a destiny for the Muslims in India and elsewhere.

#### The Influence of Western Thought on Iqbal

Like many of the persons dealt with in the present study, Iqbal's thinking also was affected by the impact of Western thought:

Iqbal's stay in Cambridge coincided with an interesting phase in the history of European thought. It was a period of neo-Hegelian ascendancy, of a return to idealism in philosophy. The Victorian age had been an age, notwithstanding its straight-laced morality, of unbridled materialism, of scientific advances and prosperity, of imperialist consolidation of Britain's world position.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup>Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 143

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>39</sup>I. Sing, The Ardent Pilgrim (The Introduction to the Life and Work of S. M. Iqbal), London: Longman's Green And Co., 1951, p. 38.

During his stay in England, Iqbal was exposed to the writings of some prominent Victorian authors. In the sphere of thought there were Herbert Spencer's positivism, Darwin's theories of evolution and Huxley's scepticism which went under the respectable name of Agnosticism. Toward the end of this epoch, however, a reaction had set in. People were seeking solace in metaphysics and wanted idealistic justifications for a world in which ordinary human intercourse was all on the basis of the cash-register. Thus began, on the one hand, the interest in the Eastern mysticism and religion; and on the other, a revival of enthusiasm for Germany's idealistic philosophers.

Throughout the remainder of his life Iqbal remained influenced by both his English philosophical and his German idealistic backgrounds.<sup>40</sup> Iqbal emphasized that the world of Islamic thought had to be purged of all that was impure, meretricious and alien.

During the centuries that had followed the hard crystal core of the word of prophetic revelation had become overlaid with layer after layer of false and delusive metaphysics. These excrescences had to be removed and the densities of superfluous growth cleared before the heart of Quranic truth could be revealed.<sup>41</sup>

Iqbal's ideas represented the continuation, perhaps the fulfilment, of the Aligarh Movement. Saiyyid, too, had preached the need for an activist view of the life and the

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<sup>40</sup> See footnote number 10 on p. 81.

<sup>41</sup> I. Singh, The Ardent Pilgrim, p. 82.

rejection of fatalism. In Iqbal these ideas acquired maturity and gravity; the message was articulated on an adult level of consciousness; but the idea and the message were the same.

Iqbal gave a careful and critical look at the democracy of Europe. This, he thought, was overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear mainly emphasizing the economic regeneration of European societies. There seemed to be a tendency to base all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an aristocracy of supermen.

The democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of the economic opportunity; it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibility of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebian material of life Islam has formed men of noblest type of life and power.<sup>42</sup>

Iqbal's thought grew out of a life time study of Quranic laws. The Quran, as he understood it, contained nothing out of harmony with the progress of scientific thought. The smallest particle in this universe, as well as the highly complicated system of the stars, were governed by definite laws. These same laws were also applicable to man. And man alone had been endowed by his creator with will. His submission to the law must, therefore, be conscious, not mechanical.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

This assumption was an integral part of Iqbal's religious and political thought:

Humanity, wrote Iqbal, needs three things today--a spiritual reinterpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and the basic principles of universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is the perpetual ego seeking itself through the mutually intolerant democracies.<sup>43</sup>

One of the most important and valuable contributions of Iqbal was his emphasis on the individual as an isolated and independent entity.

There is no poet or thinker of this age who has given expression to a deeper and more sincere faith in the unlimited potentialities of man and his great future. Iqbal is essentially a prophet of optimism and power; he has worked to infuse in the youth of this generation a spirit of enterprise and adventure, of struggle and victory, of the conquest of tremendous forces that lie embedded in the bosom of nature.<sup>44</sup>

Iqbal made an heroic attempt at reconciling modern knowledge with Muslim theology by emphasizing the perfectability and godlike potential of the individual. Especially esteemed characteristics of the individual were boldness, self-assertion, self-respect and self-confidence. His advocacy of an activist life, placed in the context of a later period, led one of his critics partially to equate Iqbal's doctrines with Fascist ideals.

Iqbal's uncompromising emphasis on the value of human personality--a principle which has not been

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<sup>43</sup>Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought, p. 170.

<sup>44</sup>K. G. Saiyidain, Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 86.

adequately emphasized in India till the nineteenth century--has introduced a leaven into his political philosophy which may ultimately pulverize his fascist ideal. For one of the indispensable postulates of democracy is the intrinsic value of human personality. Thus, by emphasizing the value of such an ideal, he may be unwittingly releasing forces which should irresistably draw him towards the democratic ideal and away from his fascist moorings.<sup>45</sup>

We have now dealt with some fundamental problems in Islamic political tradition: the growth among Muslims of a consciousness of belonging to a culture; the unity of Muslim civilization as expressed in literature, political thought, attitude to science, and the interaction of Islam with other cultures.

These are problems which must be dealt with in the study of any culture and its traditions, and, when properly dealt with, one is compelled to consider a civilization as a whole and as a culturally continuous process from past to present.

The reader will further keep in mind that inspite of the high values that the Muslim civilization puts on poetry, learning, and the political community, it has not developed imaginative literature, scientific knowledge, political and urban institutions to the level known in the West.

Some of the ideas and schools of thought discussed so far may well be the harbingers of a genuine and general

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<sup>45</sup>S. Muhar, "Iqbal's Political Philosophy," Indian Journal of Political Science, p. 188.

reversal of the Muslim outlook on man, that may, as in the Western Renaissance five centuries ago, release dormant resources of energy. It is this revaluation of man that has often presaged a cultural renewal. But we must, first, critically analyse some of the major concepts dealt with so far.

## CHAPTER IV

### A CENTURY AND A HALF OF MUSLIM THOUGHT-- A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Before turning to the examination of the development of political thought in Pakistan, it is necessary to make a critical appraisal of the status of Muslim thought on the eve of the creation of Pakistan as an independent nation. In 1947, the Pakistanis were faced with the same chronic difficulties in evolving a culturally acceptable political philosophy faced by Muslims in other countries. Significantly, most scholars who have attempted to analyse these difficulties thoroughly have been scholars from the non-Muslim world.

Not only were the makers of the new nation working in the terms of a religio-political philosophy scarcely designed for the difficult task at hand but they were part of a tradition that had never institutionalized a high value on political participation. This tragic dearth of a well established historical tradition of political participation put the Muslim founders of Pakistan in a relatively awkward position vis-a-vis the modern parliamentary political institutions they had adopted from the West. It might have been said of Pakistan in 1947 as P. W. Thayer was to say of the Arab Muslim countries in 1958:

It is an easy matter to borrow the Code Napoleon, to translate Swiss laws into Arabic, and to introduce a constitutional framework of government worthy of the most advanced democracies. The test is whether the Arabs are capable of enforcing these laws and of managing foreign administrative systems.<sup>1</sup>

The constitutional and representative governments under which the Muslims had lived in the Middle East and Asia had not enjoyed an extended independent experience with democratic procedures and their concomitant assumptions of the rule of law, responsibility, and cooperation. These requisites could never be imported. They must be lived, nurtured, and developed on native soil.<sup>2</sup>

The Muslim's greatest weakness in political thought had been his inability to conceptualize beyond the narrow limits of tribal and provincial loyalties. Unlike the Greek, he was not known to be in love with political ideas and theoretical speculations regarding concepts such as state, justice, the citizen, rights, etc.

The abundant political literature handed down to us by Arabic writers in the classical period consists primarily of detailed legal exposition and historical descriptions. A thorough investigation of these writings reveals the absence of free adventurous thinking (i.e. the courage to examine the state in isolation from Sunnah and Sharia) of analysis, and therefore of universal relevance.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>P. W. Thayer, Tensions in the Middle East, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1958, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup>See p. 13 of Chapter I of this Thesis.

<sup>3</sup>Thayer, op. cit.

It was true that a certain degree of freedom was expressed in the political reflections of a few men like Ibn Sina, Al Farabi and Ibn Khaldun, but their writings yielded no significant results. The reason for this was twofold:

a) These thinkers incorporated Greek political ideas without digestion and in effect reiterated them in Arabic, knowing full well the impossibility of incorporating them into Muslim political institutions.

b) The intellectuals (i.e., the religious leaders and teachers) had always distrusted the intrusion of foreign secular ideas. Not only were the intermediaries, or the so-called "learned" ones who had the responsibility of transmitting Greek concepts to the world of Islam, unqualified, therefore, but the reception itself was poor.

It may be suggested that the Greek learning, while activating Arab philosophy, logic, science and theology, had failed to create a similar connected and coherent chain reaction along the lines of theoretical political speculation. This was partially due to the fact that the scanty political theories of Muslim thinkers, though colored haphazardly with Greek concepts, were never given the ground to mature and gain recognition. While translating and pondering Greek political theory, the Muslim writers found it impossible to utilize this theory in the development of practical politics.

The Greek's rich political heritage had, therefore, no tangible impact on the attitude of the Arabs. The deep and profound inquiries made by the Greeks regarding the state and its purpose (which was defined as the good) were not really raised by the Arabs.

The Arab looks at the world and sees individuals and objects and identifies them as such. The totality, namely, the civil entity, has rarely interested him. His concern is more with the immediate and the practical. This attitude explains in part, but only in part, why Arab political writers tended to ignore the state and concentrated their voluminous writings on the caliph. The allegiance of the Arab is personal, and the domination of the personal over the public interest is at the basis of Arab political problem.<sup>4</sup>

If the lack of a tradition of theoretical reflection on political problems was a serious cause of political confusion in the Muslim world, then the presence of the politically inept and naive notion of "simplicity" was the other side of the coin. The masses in the Muslim countries expected and demanded that their government should remain as simple and direct as that of four early caliphs (632-661).

The historical record shows that most Muslim rulers since the Ommeyade period, with some noticeable exceptions, did not treat their subjects according to the high ideals of Islam.<sup>5</sup> The argument could be made that in the West the

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<sup>4</sup>Elie Salem in Tensions in the Middle East, ed. P. W. Thayer, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1958, p. 71.

<sup>5</sup>See Chapter I, p. , of this study dealing with the absolute powers of some of the Muslim emperor's.

kings lived a no less corrupt life. Their behavior could, therefore, be justified by the spirit of the age in which they lived.

One point, however, should be clarified. In the West there were political writers who, through independent reasoning, were able to discern the excesses of their rulers and to restrain them by guidance and, at times, by force. There was always an intellectual element which tempered the capriciousness of the kings and the princes.

Government in America and Western Europe is greatly influenced by the writings of political philosophers like Locke, Mill and Montesquieu, and Rousseau. In the Arab world the balance is lacking. Government power was too strong for the scanty intellectual tradition in political speculation.<sup>6</sup>

There were many books dealing with the legal aspects of the caliphate and its political history, but there was not a single authentic book on political philosophy written in one of the modern national languages of the Middle East or of the other parts of the Muslim world. This was a serious matter, especially in a land whose people had constantly suffered injustices.

In the Middle East and Asia, the people were unfamiliar with the concept of natural rights and the theory that held the state responsible for the protection and promotion of these rights.

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<sup>6</sup>Elie Salem in Tensions in the Middle East, p. 72.

Islamic law unlike the Western law, was religious and by necessity, therefore, rose above and beyond the political jurisdiction.<sup>7</sup> The allegiance that it nourished was religious and not secular. The explanation lay in the group substratum of Muslim society. A glance at the law of inheritance in Islam or at town administration in the classical period was enough to reveal the dominant position of the family and blood relation.

The question of state and church relationships remained a complex one.<sup>8</sup> How could a religious tradition possibly produce a government or a state when it was nothing but a set of eternal, immutable principles? By contrast, the state and government were by nature, subject to evolution and change.

Under the Western concept of a civil government, political opposition was a national duty, a national trust and a political office which the constitution consecrated and the law respected. The leader of the opposition enjoyed as many rights and as much respect as the head of the government or the chairmen of the houses themselves. On the other hand, under religious government, opposition was criminal and ungodly. However, seemingly tolerant it might pretend to be regarding opposition, religious government was

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<sup>7</sup>See Chapter I, p. 20, paragraph 1.

<sup>8</sup>See Chapter I, p. 26, paragraph 4.

fundamentally and instinctively antagonistic to it. This lack of proper political opposition in Muslim world eased the way for conformity which led to intellectual stagnation.

Having dealt with these general concepts related indirectly to the thoughts of classical Muslim writers like Al-Farabi and Ibn Khaldun who were discussed in the first section of this study, it is pertinent to recall the beginning of a new movement in Muslim political thought best expressed in the writings of Saiyyid Ahmed Khan.<sup>9</sup>

The Western concept of equality, according to Saiyyid, found a certain echo in the equality of all believers before God and their fellowship on earth. All bowed before him in equal humility and all stood together in the congregation of the faithful. The individual, as in the West, was a separate entity with one life here and now and with a single responsibility to God and society. His goal was personal salvation and though he had duties to society, and was a member of social groups, he remained the fundamental unit of Muslim thought. He was real and the work of the Creator, whose handiwork was also the universe.

Islamic thought, like that of the West, Saiyyid asserted, was secular and, therefore, the Muslim could be as interested as the Westerner in material development without any inner conflict of ideas. Like the Westerner, the Muslim looked outward rather than inward, and he was,

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<sup>9</sup>For details, see Chapter III, p. 70, of this paper.

therefore, more open than the Hindu to the scientific attitude toward life, with its emphasis on the reality of nature or the external world.

The logical extension of the ideas of Saiyyid would have led Muslim intellectuals to disentangle the thinking of both the rulers and the ruled from their self-imposed restrictive theological interpretations of Islam.

The nature of man being what it is, the needed rational and scientific evaluation of Muslim life did not take place on the scale needed. The universe, in Muslim eyes, continued to be seen from the perspective of poetry, fantasy, and myth--a far cry indeed from the world view assuming that man is the master of the world. The rational view of the world has been well expressed by Crane Brinton.

The world is really a vast number of particles spinning, combining and forming fascinating patterns of such complexity that we are fooled into all sorts of false common sense and pre-Cartesian philosophical notions. Yet the particles do in fact obey one set of rules, perform their complicated rondo to one tune, and work harmoniously as worked the geometer's mind of Rene Descartes. The clue to unravelling the obscurities and confusions of our experience is then mathematics. We should think out all our problems as we think out mathematical problems, being careful of our definitions, taking each step carefully and reasonably, seeking above all for clarity and consistency, but never embroiling ourselves in scholastic complexities, never arguing for the sake of arguing.<sup>10</sup>

The rational interpretation of the universe and the principles governing it was not readily accepted by the

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<sup>10</sup> Brinton Crane, The Shaping of Modern Mind, Mentor Books, Published by the New American Library, 1959, p. 97.

Asians, of whom the Muslims were a part. They respected nature and approached it cautiously. They feared it and they did not understand it. Victory over nature, however, presupposes understanding.

The generally prevailing poverty and misery in the Arab world did not encourage a more rational or understanding world view.

Balanced men are rarely found in economic misery, and stable political institutions are often the fruits not only of solid men, but also of solid economies.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of the difficulties implicit in the prevailing poverty and the generally held irrational world view, the history of Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a history of revival and efforts at readjustment under the double stimulus of challenge from within and pressing dangers from without.

The first general reform movement in the nineteenth century took on a dual character. On the religious side, it appealed for justification of religious belief and practice, the raising of intellectual standards and the extension and modernization of education. On the political side, it aimed at removing the causes of division between Muslims and uniting them in defense of the faith. The protagonist of both was the Afghan Jamal al-Din (1839-97), whose untiring campaigns throughout the Muslim world

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<sup>11</sup>Elie Salem, Tensions in the Middle East, p. 79.

powerfully stirred Muslim feelings and contributed to both the Arabi rising in Egypt and the Persian Revolution. Professor Gibb meaningfully assessed Jamal's total influence on Muslim thought in the following passage:

Sir Muhammad Iqbal has suggested that if Jamal-ad Din's 'indefatigable but divided energy could have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief and conduct, the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would have been on a much more solid ground today.' If as he seems to imply by the context of this sentence, he means that Jamal ad-Din was a man who by his 'deep insight into the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought and life,' would have been able to 'rethink the whole system of Islam,' then I confess that I find it difficult to agree with him. The time for 'rethinking' was not yet come. The first and most urgent task, and the essential prerequisite for 'rethinking the whole system of Islam,' was to set Islam back again on its old solid foundations, so that the 'new spirit' which Iqbal postulates should work upon principles clear, precise, and free from alloy of any kind. And Jamal ad-Din's sole published work, The Refutation of the Materialists, does not by any means suggest a man of such intellectual capacity as Iqbal indicates.<sup>12</sup>

Among Jamal's disciples, however, there was one who had the insight to separate the political from the religious reforms and to restate Islamic doctrine. This was the Egyptian Shaikh Mohammed Abduh (1849-1905), a man of great breadth, independence and nobility of mind. It may be suggested that the reason why Abduh's ideas were not taken up by the Ulema was precisely because, under prevailing conditions, they tended to open legal interpretations to the layman rather than widen the scope of interpretation by the Ulema.

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<sup>12</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, pp. 28-29.

The program which he bequeathed to the Reform movement can be summed up under four main heads: a) the purification of Islam from the corrupting influences and practices; b) the reform of Muslim higher education; c) the reformation of Muslim doctrines in the light of modern thought; and the defense of Islam against European influences and Christian attacks.

Thus the immediate results of Abduh's activity found expression in two opposing tendencies. On the one hand there grew up in secular circles a widespread but not explicitly formulated modernism, which while, holding to the basic dogmas of Islam, was strongly influenced by Western ideas.

In contrast the second consequence was the formation of a religious party which called itself the Salafiya, the upholders of the tradition represented by the Fathers of the Muslim Community. The Salafis agree with the modernists in rejecting the authority of the individual schools and in accepting the Quran and the Sunnah as the sole authority for the religious truth. In this respect, as against the generality of the Ulema, they are reformists; but as against the modernists they passionately rejected any intrusion of Western liberalism and rationalism.

To meet this challenge Saiyyid Ahmed Khan (1817-98), attempted to formulate Islamic doctrine in terms of modern thought. Believing, like Mohammed Abduh, that Islam and science could not prove antagonistic in the long run, he took the further step of asserting that the true justification

of Islam was its conformity to Nature and the laws of science, and that nothing which conflicted with this principle could be regarded as authentically Islamic. The influence of the school he founded was immense in helping Muslims to adopt a critical attitude toward their traditional way of life and the authority on which it was based.

The argument that in taking over modern Western learning and science Muslims were only resuming the heritage of their own civilization had been most persuasively stated by Sir Mohammed Iqbal (1876-1938), the exponent of the most sweeping modernist reformulation of Islamic doctrine. His activist philosophy made a powerful appeal to the younger generation of Indian Muslims and still exerts a strong influence on Islamic modernist thought.

. . . it may be doubted whether what he called a reconstruction (Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 1928), will ever be regarded as such. When he comes down to details, he is clear and explicit, but when dealing with general principles the poet and mystic come to the fore and it is anything but easy to see what would be the practical outcome of his theories.<sup>13</sup>

According to Professor Gibb, Iqbal's influence remained confined to India. Iqbal was perhaps the most interesting intellectual in the whole modern Islamic community, but also intellectually the most elusive. In order to gain a wider audience he wrote most of his poetry in Persian

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<sup>13</sup>Alfred Guillaume, Islam, p. 160.

and his lectures in English. Professor Gibb found no indication that Iqbal's lectures exerted any influence outside of India.<sup>14</sup>

Having briefly discussed the four most representative writers who dealt with the development and the problems of Muslim political thought prior to the emergence of Pakistan as an independent nation in 1947, a few general and concluding statements may be recorded here.<sup>15</sup>

A great deal of the energy of the entire Islamic world was devoted to the long struggle to ward off or oust foreign domination. Such nationalism, of course, here as elsewhere, was highly complex. The complexity lay in the fact that there had developed in general an ambivalence within the religio-nationalist relation which has as yet not been completely resolved.

The first and altogether fundamental consideration here concerned nationalism regarded in its overriding negative quality as the drive to eject alien control. This was compatible with Islam in its traditional and its religious and its social and every other sense. More: it was part and parcel of Islam's modern resurgence.

The modern Muslim world accepted and espoused with fervour those aspects of nationalism that were relevant or

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<sup>14</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, pp. 59-60.

<sup>15</sup>For further details of these four writers, see Chapters II and III.

contributory to the historical rehabilitation of Islamic society, and compatible with Islam's central precepts. It accepted only superficially those aspects that interfered with or distracted from the practical task of that rehabilitation.

The next important trend to be observed was the endeavour, on the part of the Muslims, to prove to themselves and to others, that Islam was sound. An appreciation of this trend is basic to any understanding of recent Muslim political thought. For an almost overwhelming proportion of Muslim religious thinking during the last half a century came from apologetics. Most books and speeches by such polemic writers were defensive. They tried to champion rather than to understand, to buttress rather than to elucidate.

In general throughout the Muslim world a great deal of the energy of the thinking Muslims had been devoted to the intellectual defense of their traditional faith in the recent past history. At this theoretical level also, as on the practical, the task had been conceived as essentially that of warding off attack. Islam was seen as having reached its modern period weakened and threatened, and the function of reason had been understood as that of bolstering it.

The third new element in modern Islam may be referred to as dynamism: the appreciation of activity for its own sake, and at the level of feeling a stirring of

intense, even violent emotionalism. The transmutation of Muslim society from its earlier nineteenth-century solidity to its twentieth-century ebullience was no mean achievement. It was given poetic expression by the Indo-Muslim Iqbal with an eloquence and inspirational fieriness that were artistically superb.

Recently we have noticed Muslims successfully reasserting their independence in national movements, and vigorously defending their faith in intellectual endeavour. They have moved far towards acquiring freedom not only politically but internally, by substituting activism for passivity. Their destiny now in a significant degree is in their own hands.

Yet this is also the very measure of their dilemma. For in seeking to reaffirm Islam in theory but specially in practice, modern Muslims have had sufficient success that they now face more squarely, and more inwardly, the very problem of their religious quest: the relation of Islam to the actual problems and prospects of the modern world.

This has been, and continues to be, the most central problem of Muslim political thought. And at the present day it is to Pakistan that we must look for the clearest and most uncompromising attitude towards the traditions of the past and the influence of modern historical criticism.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE IN PAKISTAN

Pre-Partition Struggle for Pakistan: The "Two Nation Theory"  
Into the business of rehabilitating Islamic history

in our day, Pakistanis, of all the world's Muslim communities, have plunged most self-consciously and clamorously.<sup>1</sup> This, rather than any particular success they may have yet had in executing the enterprise, gives their case significance. Here is a group that has expressly set out to live together as Muslims. They have sought, and won, political independence: they have as a nation the formal power, and, therefore, the responsibility, of fashioning their community life in the modern world. Here, it was said, will unfold before our eyes the earthly outworking in our day of the

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<sup>1</sup>For a detailed account of the political events--manipulations of parties and politicians, the changes of the regimes, the struggle for the framing of Constitution and other related matters--the reader is referred to Professor Leonard Binder's dissertation: The Constitutional Theory and Politics in Pakistan, Harvard University, 1956. It is an immensely valuable and scholarly piece of research. An enlarged form of this study has since appeared as a book entitled: Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley: University of California, 1961.

A similar work, though smaller and somewhat limited in scope and elaboration, has been done by Professor G. W. Choudhury. The name of his book is: Constitutional Development in Pakistan, London: Longmans Green and Co., 1959. This work gives an analytical account of the constitutional developments in Pakistan from 1947 to 1956 and a study of Constitution then adopted. It is an interesting account of Pakistani politics from a Pakistani writer.

There are two works by Professor Keith B. Callard, covering in between the two the period from 1947-1959. The

religious community, the twentieth-century actualization of Islam as a social ideal. Here if anywhere in the modern world, it might be argued, is a clear opportunity to see what Islam now means in operation. Here explicitly is Islamic history once again in full swing.

In less than a decade of existence Pakistan has already gone through various phases of mood and interpretation regarding the place of Islam in the life of the nation. None of the phases has been decisive or even clear. For a time there was an exuberant emphasis on the close tie between religion and social life. Many were enthusiastically certain that the purpose of Pakistan was to realize a truly Islamic community. The nation, for them, existed so that the religion could be taken seriously, and applied to modern life. This accompanied the almost standard view that Islam and its society had gone through a period of oppression and, as it were, eclipse; the attainment of Pakistan signified

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excellence and depth of scholarship and the genuine understanding with which the basic problems of Pakistan's politics are very cogently brought out, is immensely helpful. His books are entitled: Political Forces in Pakistan 1947-59, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959, and Pakistan: A Political Study, London: Allen and Unwin, 1957.

The author considers Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith's Islam in Modern History (a mentor book) published by the New American Library, 1959, a major contribution. The quality of his first chapter: "Introduction: Islam and History" and the fifth chapter entitled "Pakistan: an Islamic State" are of unique and unsurpassable quality.

The discussion in this study will, therefore, be exclusively from the point of view of the theoretical and conceptual speculative level. Only those aspects of politics will be dealt with which may have direct bearing on political theory.

the emergence from that period and the embarking on a great and glorious enterprise, the society's reimplementation of Islam in our day.

More recently, a mood of disillusionment has widely supervened. To "apply Islam" to the concrete affairs of national life quickly proved vastly more difficult than many had foreseen. And some applications of it that were tried, by devotees more zealous than wise, proved ugly. The Lahore riots of 1953, in which brutality and chaos were proffered in the name of religion, gave pause. Less spectacular but almost as telling, in East Pakistan the Muslim League, which talked of Islam, seemed to proffer nothing at all; the party was rejected at the polls. All in all, many began to feel that the concept of an "Islamic state" was none too helpful; and turned their thoughts to other things. It is our contention, however, that the question of the attainability of an "Islamic state" is important--indeed crucial--for the understanding of the developing political philosophy of Pakistan. However, before discussing the contribution of the developments in Pakistan to Islamic political theory it is necessary to scan briefly certain aspects of the background of the emergence of Pakistan as an independent nation.

The consciousness of separate identity amongst the Muslims of India is not new and it would be quite wrong to imagine that Iqbal and Jinnah<sup>2</sup> created the feeling of

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<sup>2</sup>For further details see Jinnah--Creator of Pakistan, by Hector Bolitho, London: John Murray, 1954.

national identity and common interest. More than eighty years ago Sir William Hunter could write of the Muslims of India "not only as a community but also a 'race' and of their exhibiting at intervals their old intense feeling of nationality."<sup>3</sup>

The same author could and did point out the growing separation of the Muslims from Hindus; a section of the former he called "the fanatical section." He insisted that: "During the last forty years they have separated themselves from the Hindus by differences of dress, of salutations and other exterior distinctions, such as they never deemed necessary in the days of their supremacy."<sup>4</sup>

The most significant personality in Pakistan's struggle for independence was Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader) Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). Much of the strength behind the Pakistan movement came from his concepts and ideas. His pronouncements are, therefore, of special significance. He was born in Karachi (West Pakistan), on December 25, 1876, in a small and unorthodox Muslim sect, and during the first forty five years of his life had no reputation for Muslim piety or special interest in his community. He chose the law as his career, where he was brilliantly successful, and entered politics early in this century. In 1906 he was

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<sup>3</sup>W. W. Hunter, The Indian Musalman, Calcutta: 1945, pp. 143-144.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), a Parsi, who was known as "the grand old man of Indian politics," and at that time was serving his third term as President of the Congress. In 1910 Jinnah, then prominent in the Congress, became a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, and was already on record as a progressive anti-communal Muslim. He condemned the principle of communal representation, which had been accepted in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, urged the general Indian unity, and was considered by Muslim religious fundamentalists to be anti-Muslim. He remained faithful to the Congress until 1920, when Gandhi, with his strong religious motivation, won an overwhelming ascendancy over that body. At that time the liberalising reforms of the 1919 constitution offered greater political opportunities to Indians than before and consequently brought the ever potent communal rivalry of Hindus and Muslims into heightened activity. During the years 1920-1922, Jinnah and many other prominent Muslims, who had held membership in both the League and the Congress, resigned from the latter body, because they thought that its policies were jeopardizing Muslim interests, and that, therefore, the Muslim community must organize an effective defense.

In 1934 Jinnah was elected permanent president of the Muslim League. The enlarged political opportunities given Indians by the 1935 constitution further increased the friction between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Under

conditions so created Jinnah assumed leadership of the Muslim League. This strong leadership was dubbed by some as a "dictatorship"; his followers gave him the title of Quaid-i-Azam, which means "Great Leader," and regularly used it in addressing him or speaking of him.<sup>5</sup> His domination was indicated by numerous items, of which may be cited as typical a resolution adopted March 23, 1942, at a Pakistan celebration in Calcutta, stating, "this meeting emphatically declares the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of All India Muslim League, alone represents and is entitled to speak on behalf of the Muslim nation."

Jinnah was a man of quick and biting repartee. He was an egotistic man and sensitive to insult. He had the keenest sort of legal mind, and conducted his arguments with intricate and baffling reasoning. He was noted for his personal honesty, which he carried into his public life, having shown himself unsusceptible to political bribery; on several occasions he refused government offers of high office. In his devotion to Pakistan he attacked ferociously and without prejudice anyone--Hindu, British, or Muslim--who opposed the demand for the creation of independent Pakistan. With his leadership, the Indian Muslim community acquired

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<sup>5</sup>Here, materials have freely been drawn from The United States, India and Pakistan, by W. N. Brown, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. His estimation of Jinnah seems partial.

some of that quality of a well-drilled regiment which the Islamic religion had inculcated in the seventh-century Arabs.

Before further pursuing Jinnah and the Muslim League, it should be pointed out here that no account of the creation of Pakistan could be considered complete without accounting for the contributions of Saiyyid Ahmed Khan. We dealt with parts of his philosophy in an earlier section of this study. We maintained that Saiyyid was deeply impressed by the fact that the Muslims were far behind the Hindus in respect of Western learning and consequently the Hindus practically monopolized the higher offices of the state. He, therefore, devoted himself to the promotion of English education among the Muslims and in 1875 laid the foundation of the Anglo-Mohammedan Oriental College which soon became the famed Muslim University at Aligarh.

His efforts were crowned with success. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that no single institution has done so much for any community as this college has done for the promotion of higher education and modern culture among the Muslims. Saiyyid was an ardent patriot and nationalist. He expressed the view that no nation can acquire honor and respect so long as it does not attain equality with the ruling race and does not participate in the government of its own country. He was definitely opposed to the Indian National Congress Movement from the very beginning. He urged the Muslim community to keep aloof from it and denounced its objectives.

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<sup>6</sup>P. C. Majumdar, Advanced History of India, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1950, pp. 896-898.

He was convinced that English education was the crying need of the Muslim community. In light of the overpowering need he thought it unwise for Muslim leaders to dissipate their energies in politics or other activities of secondary importance. He also established two other associations in order to oppose the Congress. The first, the United Indian Patriotic Association founded in 1888, had both Hindu and Muslim members, but the second, founded in 1893 and known as the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India, confined its membership to Muslims and Englishmen.

He had sincere conviction that English education was the crying need of Muslim community and it would be unwise to divest its energy to politics. It was also possible that he detected in the Congress demand for popular government something highly injurious to the Muslim cause. After all, the Muslims formed but one fourth of the population of India and Saiyyid Ahmed publicly expressed his fears that under the democratic system of government which formed the ideal of the Congress leaders, "the larger community would fully override the interests of the smaller community."

This sentiment has been shared by the Muslim leaders ever since, and has largely shaped their views and actions. Saiyyid Ahmed died in 1898, but his policy survived and formed the background of Muslim politics in subsequent years. Though even then, as later, some eminent Muslim leaders occasionally took more Catholic views, adopted a nationalist policy, but they could not carry the whole community with them, and in some notable cases they ultimately fell into line with the old policy. The dread of majority rule first publicly expressed by Saiyyid Ahmed. . .

inspired in successive stages of evolution in Muslim politics, the demand for nomination, for Separate Electorate with Weightage and lastly for Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

The Muslims, according to Sir Ivor Jennings, had never secured equality of opportunity and they, therefore, demanded not merely communal representation with separate electorates but also the reservation to Muslims of a proportion of places in the Public Services. Nor were other interests backward. It was gradually established that the places in the Provincial Administration must be reserved for inhabitants of the Province, if suitable candidates were available, and each group, racial, religious, or language, demanded its quota.<sup>8</sup>

During the spread of these measures the enmity between the Hindus and the Muslims increased. It became all the more savage because of the so-called educated people who had learned to organize and direct their rancor through mob action. In Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, some of the more vicious anti-Muslim riots of 1893 are described. These riots caused apprehensions in Saiyyid's mind.

This state of affairs intensified Saiyyid Ahmed's fears. He began to wonder that, if under the British rule, Hindus wished to exercise so much pressure against normal civic rights of Muslims, what would be the state of affairs if the British left India

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<sup>7</sup>P. C. Majumdar, Advanced History of India, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1950, p. 898.

<sup>8</sup>Sir Ivor Jennings, The Commonwealth in Asia, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 32.

and the reins of government passed into the hands of the majority community.<sup>9</sup>

In a speech in 1883, ten years before the Bombay riots, Saiyyid had expressed grave apprehensions about the fate of the Muslims. He had said, "Now suppose that the English were to leave India. . . then who would be the ruler of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations--the Mohammedans and the Hindu--could not sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable."<sup>10</sup>

On December 30, 1906, the All-India Muslim League was formed at Dacca, with three main objectives:

a) To promote amongst the Muslims of India feelings of loyalty to the British government and to remove any misconceptions that may arise as to the intentions of government with regard to the Indian measures.

b) To protect and advance the political rights of the Muslims of India and respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.

c) To prevent the rise among the Muslims of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforesaid objects of the League.

Whatever may have been the other effects of the foundation of the Muslim League, it set the seal upon the Muslim belief that their interests must be regarded as completely separate from those of the Hindus, and that no fusion of the two communities was possible. The philosopher

<sup>9</sup>A. H. Alberuni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Lahore: Ashraf, 1950, p. 46.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

might deplore the fact that Hindus and Muslims thought of themselves as separate people, but the statesman had to accept it.

The Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, instituted by the British Parliament during 1933-34 confirmed the basic points and purposes the Muslim League stood for. It sharpened the focus on separate cultural identity of the Muslims.

India is inhabited by many races often as distinct from each other in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe. Two thirds of its inhabitants profess Hinduism in one form or another as their religion, over 77 million are followers of Islam and the difference between the two is not only of religion in the stricter sense but also of law and culture. They may be said, indeed to represent two distinct and separate civilizations. Hinduism is distinguished by the phenomenon of its caste, which is the basis of its religious and social system, and save in very restricted field, remains unaffected by contact with the philosophies of the West; the religion of Islam, on the other hand, is based on the conception of the equality of man.<sup>11</sup>

Below the surface (of imposed unity from outside), there was in India a medley of racial, cultural, and religious groupings and patterns which began to be agitated as soon as the prospect of the devolution of political authority to the people of India became a possibility.

As the process of transfer of political authority proceeded, this agitation increased and sharp conflict developed. The main struggle took shape between the two

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<sup>11</sup>The Joint Select Committee on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1933-34, as quoted in Hector Bolitho, Jinnah Creator of Pakistan, p. 126.

largest sections of the population, the Hindus and the Muslims. The objective was political; the urge was economic; the dividing line was cultural. As the two conflicting cultures were both based upon religion, the conflict assumed the character of a religious struggle particularly on the Muslim side.

The British people being Christians sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and today consider religion as a private and personal matter between man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for both these religions are definite social codes, which govern not so much man's relation with his God, as man's relation with his neighbour. They govern not only his law and culture but every aspect of his social life, and such religions essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought on which Western democracy is based.<sup>12</sup>

In 1940 the Muslim League in Annual Session in Lahore adopted a strong resolution demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims. The resolution passed at this session laid down that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it was designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units were demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims were in a numerical majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

"Independent States," in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.

No one had played a greater part in persuading the League to adopt the "Pakistan Resolution" than Jinnah. "The Hindus and Muslims," he said in his Presidential speech at Lahore, "belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. . . . To yoke together, two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state."<sup>13</sup>

Yet this was the same Jinnah who was architect of the Lucknow Pact of 1916 which helped the Muslim League and the Indian Nationalist Congress to work in unison temporarily. At that time he had been hailed by Hindus as the "Ambassador of Unity." It is important to trace the change in his position, for in this change in his position as an accepted leader, he was followed by the majority of politically conscious Muslims.

In 1940 he emphasized the creation of an independent Pakistan. He spoke shrewdly. For as we can see now from

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<sup>13</sup>J. Ahmed, Jinnah--Speeches and Writings, Lahore: Mohammed Ashraf, 1952, p. 153.

the elections of 1946, the whole League leadership could not have checked the impetus to Pakistan even had it wished. The historical importance of the period of Congress Ministries lay not so much in the question of whether the charges of unfair treatment of the Muslim minority were exaggerated,<sup>14</sup> but in the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims believed them to exist. What was significant was not whether physically, or by any anthropological test, the Muslims were a nation, but that the overwhelming majority of the Indian Muslims felt themselves to be Muslims first and Indians only second.

No Indian Nationalist can forgive Jinnah for what seemed to be the abandonment of the principles of a life time. But the Pakistanis will always venerate his memory because at a critical moment in history he came out of the rarified atmosphere of the council chamber and the conference room to give vehement expression to a people's inarticulate desire to form a distinct and independent political unit.<sup>15</sup>

The Muslim and the Hindu societies could not be more divergent. In their attitude both towards the universal and the particular, God as well as man, the Hindus and the Muslims remained at opposite poles of thought. These divergences of belief were so fundamental that though the Muslims had been

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<sup>14</sup>The Congress Ministries were formed in seven out of eleven provinces of India as a result of the elections of 1937. The major Muslim complaint against these Ministries was their discrimination in job opportunities against the Muslims living in Hindu majority Provinces. The Fall of Ministries was, in 1938, "Day of Deliverance " for the Muslims.

<sup>15</sup>Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 61.

living side by side with the Hindus for over a thousand years, their cultures had remained separate. This fact had not been fully realized by America and Europe; and it was this which lay at the root of the creation of Pakistan. For though living in one country, the Hindus and the Muslims had remained two separate nations.

Jinnah maintained that the Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test as a nation. We are a nation of 100 million, and what is more we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclatures, sense of values and proportion, legal law and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitude and ambitions: in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all the canons of international law, we are a nation.<sup>16</sup>

The System of Responsible Government and the "Islamic State."

In Kahin's Major Governments in Asia, appears a well formulated summary account of the circumstances leading to the creation of Pakistan. It is reproduced here in full both as a summation of the preceding section of this study and as a starting point for a discussion of Pakistan's peculiar problems with the system of responsible government and the concept of the "Islamic State."

The discussions of 1928-1932 led ultimately to the Government of India Act of 1935 which granted near autonomy in the provinces and promised a major advance toward self-government at the center. Provincial elections were held in 1937, and the result was a general victory for the Congress. The Muslim League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had contested the

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<sup>16</sup> Jinnah Gandhi Talks, published by the central office, All-India Muslim League, November, 1944, p. 149.

elections on the basis that it would cooperate fully with the Congress if its status was recognized as the true spokesman of the Muslim community. Congress ministries were formed in seven of the eleven provinces, but no gesture of cooperation as between equals was made in the direction of the League. On the contrary, in one province the Congress agreed to nominate Muslim League members to the cabinet only on the condition that they accept party discipline and cease to function as a separate entity.

For the first time Muslims found themselves in the position that they had begun to fear--that of being subject to a mainly Hindu government able to claim the sanction of an electoral victory. This fear acted as a spur to the Muslim League, which had fought the election without carrying the argument to the level of the peasants and the urban laborer. In the by-elections that took place after 1937 the League showed signs of new strength and determination. Many members of minor parties (including two provincial chief ministers) also joined the League in the name of Muslim society.

Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War the Congress ordered its provincial ministries to resign as a protest against the declaration of war on behalf of India without the consent of Indian leaders. This was an opportunity for the League, and Mr. Jinnah proclaimed a Day of Deliverance. The stage was then set for the League to demand an independent state. The formal adoption of this proposal came in 1940 at Lahore. The resolution demanded "that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." This was the Pakistan Resolution. It took by surprise the rest of the world, which was busy watching the battles of France and Britain. The very name Pakistan was unfamiliar. It had been coined six or seven years previously by a student at Cambridge; the idea had been advocated in general terms by the poet and philosopher Iqbal. But practical men had dismissed the scheme as unworkable, a vision incapable of fulfillment. It had scarcely been mentioned in the general elections of 1937. Now it was the official policy of a party that claimed the sole right to speak for one-fourth of India's population. There were many who called it a bluff, a propaganda device to be used in subsequent bargaining.

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Immediately after the war the government of India took steps to hold new elections for both the central and provincial assemblies. Although the Congress emerged clearly as the strongest party, the League carried almost all the provincial Muslim seats except in the North-West Frontier Province and took every Muslim seat in the central Assembly. Its claim to represent the large majority of Muslims could no longer be denied.<sup>17</sup>

Pakistan's politics are of a special interest because Pakistan is almost unique among the new governments of Asia and the Middle East. Unlike most other governments of this area, independence did not find the government at the head of a vigorous national movement and in full command of either a party or a governmental administrative apparatus or both. Not only was an effective bureaucracy lacking and the problems facing the existing bureaucracy immense, but the partition found Pakistan ill-prepared to meet the challenges of daily administration and this stretched the Muslim League, at least in the early days of Pakistan, to the limits.

The political ideas of Pakistan and as of other newly independent countries are based largely on what they have learned from their colonial masters. These ideas, according to Callard, were colored for Pakistan and other newly born states by the experience gathered in the struggle for independence. They had learned to criticize the institutions of Western democracy and, in part, to manipulate

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<sup>17</sup>Keith Callard, "Pakistan and its Origins" in Major Governments of Asia, ed. George M. Kahin, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1958, pp. 386-87.

those institutions with a view to the embarrassment of their rulers. But they had no alternative system of government to put in the place of parliamentary democracy. Consequently these states, a majority of which were ex-British colonies, formed their constitutions after the general pattern of Britain and Western Europe, and they are trying to operate a system that had its origins in a vastly different social and political environment.<sup>18</sup>

Pakistan is one of those countries. It is of particular interest, because it was brought into being only indirectly as the result of the demand of an Asian people to terminate European domination. It became an independent state because the Muslims of India were not prepared to accept independence from British rule within the framework of a united India, where the Hindus would be in a majority. This factor adds a feature to the politics of Pakistan that is not present in the other newly freed Asian states.

In the years immediately before 1947 there were three major political forces in India: the British Raj, or rule, which was steadily weakening in determination and effective powers; the Indian National Congress, concerned with uniting all Indian groups believed in the demand for immediate independence; and the Muslim League, which insisted that it constituted an equal spokesman for the cause of the Muslim nation, demanding independence from

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<sup>18</sup> Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, p. 5.

Hindu as well as British rule. These three were in a state of uneasy and increasingly unstable equilibrium. With the decision of the British to divide and quit, that equilibrium was broken, and each component was left on its own. The British went home; the Congress ruled India, and the League which under the leadership of Jinnah had successfully shouldered the initial heavy responsibilities of administering the affairs of Pakistan ruled Pakistan in spite of the fact that the Muslim League was not as well prepared for the task as was the Congress for ruling India.

The constitutions of many Western states were the result of the attempt to regulate the action of political forces. If the power of the ruler appeared excessive, steps were taken to reduce it and confine it within defined limits. The task of constitution building was that of the canal builder who had to allow for a certain volume and flow of water. "In Pakistan, the constitution makers seemed to disregard the force of waters and proceeded to devise a neat system of locks and dams that were more suited to the quieter streams of England."<sup>19</sup>

Constitutional government works well where there is an informed public opinion capable of judging men and issues. There must be a large enough group not identified with a particular party or cause to render an intelligent or reasonably impartial verdict. The essence of democracy is

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<sup>19</sup>Callard, Political Forces in Pakistan, p. 8.

that on political issues an adverse decision must be respected. In Pakistan informed and detached public opinion is hard to find. Those who represent it are small in numbers when compared with those who are actively engaged in partisan activity. The object of political discussion has seldom been to carry convictions to uncommitted men of good will, but rather to arouse enthusiasm among a man's followers and to divide the enemy camp. The electorate has been looked upon not as a competent jury, but as a mass to be manipulated. The view that there exists a moral sanction of the popular will has received little recognition.

The problem of responsible government, therefore, is primarily a problem of securing an economic development so that the ordinary man finds no reason to change the form of government. Since all parties assume rapid spread of popular education, it is also a problem of passing rapidly through the stage at which a little learning stimulated by virulent vernacular press, induces revolutionary movements, whether these requirements can be satisfied needs the gift of prophecy.<sup>20</sup>

All attempts at constitution making in Pakistan had proceeded on the assumption that the parliamentary and federal principles were sacrosanct and it was sacreligious to suggest any alternatives to them. The constitutional debates had mainly centered around the questions of provincial representation in the parliament and the divisions of powers between the provinces and the center. The two main reasons for the failure of the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan

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<sup>20</sup>Sir Ivor Jennings, The Commonwealth in Asia, Clarendon Press: London, 1951, p. 69.

were the weak position of the Executive and an overly large number of concessions that had been made to the Provinces. The Constitution of 1958 reversed this trend as indicated by the following quotation.

The constitutional ideas of new regime have yet to crystallize, but indications are not wanting about the direction in which its mind is working. A pronounced preference for the Presidential System, a strong and if possible a unitary center, educational qualifications for the membership of the legislature and recall of members by their constituents are some of the dominant trends in its constitutional thinking.<sup>21</sup>

The main attractions of the Presidential System for Pakistan are the stability of administration and the continuity of policy guaranteed by the independence of the executive from the legislature. Deriving his powers directly from the people and not from a territorial constituency of a province, the President can acquire a truly national stature unlike the Prime Minister, who had necessarily to be the choice of an undependable parliamentary majority under the multiparty system. Being indivisible and, therefore, incapable of being shared by a coalition of parties, the Presidency can be a great unifying force and can help resolve what has throughout been a crisis of leadership in the country.

Pakistan and for that matter all of the Middle East Muslim countries have continuously experienced instability

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<sup>21</sup>Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Pakistan Publishing House: Karachi, 1959, p. 233.

and the resultant strong military regimes. This resulted from the imposition of constitutional frameworks which were often divorced from the local conditions and the genius of the people.

Furthermore, the political tradition or authoritarianism in the world of Islam may lead many native and foreign observers to claim that only a strong government, free of irresponsible pressures of public opinion and demagoguery, is capable of accomplishing anything of lasting value to the people concerned. But while it is comforting to have some general law of behavior to go by, it is dangerous to overlook the particular local conditions, the genius of a particular people and the many psychological intangibles which combined, produce a political situation amenable or not amenable to an authoritarian or democratic solution.<sup>22</sup>

In most matters the ordinances of Shariah possess the healthy quality of elasticity. It is the sophists and the jurists who have sought to make them unduly rigid. But outside these limits Muslims are not only left free to exercise their discretion and to apply the lessons of experience and observation, but are constantly and repeatedly exhorted to do so.

A case in point would be the constitutional struggle in Pakistan, 1947-1956. The Quran has laid down the fundamental principles with great emphasis, but has left it to the people concerned to make them effective in accordance with their own needs, requirements, limitations and circumstances. The fundamental principles are thus expressed "God

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<sup>22</sup>Middle East, "The Evolution of Public Responsibility," edited by Harvey F. Hall, published by the Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., p. 4.

commands you that you entrust political authority to those who are best capable of discharging this trust and that when you are called upon to judge between the people, you judge with justice and equity." Quran (IV, 59).

Several principles are clearly deducible from this emphatic injunction, according to Zafrullah Khan, the ex-Foreign Minister of Pakistan and President of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963. First, that under God sovereignty rests with the people. It is for the people to entrust various aspects of political authority into the hands of persons who are deemed most capable of carrying them into effect. Attention is thus drawn to the very important principle that the exercise of the franchise and the performance of the functions of representative, and of executive and judicial office are all in the nature of a sacred trust and must be approached and carried out in that spirit. This exhortation at once lifts politics from the arena of controversy, conflict and sordid manoeuvre into the exalted sphere of a moral and spiritual consideration. The proper exercise of the franchise is thus the key to the successful working of democracy.<sup>23</sup>

Pakistan has been described as an Islamic state. What is the exact significance of this description? Wilfred Cantwell Smith of McGill University, in his Islam in Modern

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<sup>23</sup>Zafrullah Khan in Islam and the West, ed. by Richard N. Frye, Mouton and Co. S-Gravenhage, 1957, p. 203.

History, has made a valuable study of this question and has come to the conclusion that Pakistan is an Islamic state in the sense that 85 percent of its people are Muslims and consequently in setting up their institutions and in ordering their lives, they are likely to be inspired progressively by the true spirit of Islamic teachings and Islamic values.

The community and their spokesmen realized from the very beginning that Islam could not be perfected unless within an Islamic political organization whose maintenance and advancement were, to say the least, a prerequisite to the service of God, if they did not in themselves constitute such service. The inseparability of Islam as a religion and Islam as a political entity has recently been affirmed by stating that Islam is not fully in being as long as there does not exist a strong and independent Muslim state that is able to put into operation the laws of Islam.

One major difficulty for the politician is that his Western education has set a barrier between him and the common man. And nowhere is this barrier stronger than in the field of mutual understanding of the significance of religion. The politician is true to Islam in his fashion, but it is not, and cannot be the fashion of the peasant or the urban worker. It is, therefore, necessary for the political leader to convince the masses that Islam is compatible with modern political forms and programmes.

. . . . .

Consequently the great debate that has been in progress on the meaning of Islam in the twentieth century has been conducted by groups of men who are largely unaware of what the other side is saying and, even when the words are known, unaware of their

meaning. And yet this debate has been of great importance in the efforts to shape the political future of Pakistan.<sup>24</sup>

No one who has given serious thought to the introduction of a religious state in Pakistan has failed to notice the tremendous difficulties with which any such scheme would be confronted. Even Dr. Mohammed Iqbal, who must be considered to be the first thinker who conceived of the possibility of a consolidated North Western Indian Muslim state, in the course of the Presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 said: "Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of the Muslim state will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such state. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism."<sup>25</sup>

The concepts of democracy and sovereignty have been key words used in the context of Pakistan's constitutional struggle in general, and in introducing the Objective Resolution of 1949,<sup>26</sup> in particular. According to Mr. Justice Mohammed Munir of the Supreme Court of Pakistan both these

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<sup>24</sup>Keith Callard, Pakistan--A Political Study, pp. 208-209.

<sup>25</sup>Justice Munir, The Punjab Disturbances, p. 201.

<sup>26</sup>The first step in the framing of a Constitution for Pakistan was taken by the Constituent Assembly in March, 1949, when it passed a resolution on the "Aims and Objects of the Constitution," popularly known as the Objective Resolution. It laid the foundation of the Constitution and indicated the broad outlines of its structure. It was

words were borrowed from Western political philosophy and in that sense they were both wrongly used in the Resolution.

When it is said a country is sovereign, the implication is that its people or any other group of persons

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described as the most important occasion in the life of Pakistan, next in importance only to the achievement of independence.

The Objective Resolution, February 25, 1952

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful

Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

Whereas the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, declared that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice;

And whereas the Constituent Assembly, representing the people of Pakistan, have resolved to frame for the sovereign independent state of Pakistan a constitution;

Wherein the state should exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed;

Wherein the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

Wherein adequate provision should be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religion and develop their culture;

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan should form a Federation, wherein the Provinces would be autonomous with such limitations on their powers and authority as might be prescribed;

Wherein should be guaranteed fundamental rights including rights such as equality of status and of opportunity, equality before law, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, and social, economic, and political justice, subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provision should be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the Judiciary should be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights, including its

in it are entitled to conduct the affairs of that country in any way they like and untrammelled by any considerations except those of the expediency and policy. An Islamic state, however, cannot in this sense be sovereign, because it will not be competent to abrogate, repeal or to do away with any law in the Quran or the Sunnah. Absolute restriction on the legislative power of a state is a restriction on the sovereignty of the people of that state and if the origin of this restriction lies elsewhere than in the will of the people, then to the extent of that restriction the sovereignty of that state and its people is necessarily taken away. In an Islamic state sovereignty, in its essentially juristic sense, can only rest with Allah. In the same way, democracy means the rule of the demos, namely, the people, directly by them as in the ancient Greece and Rome or indirectly through chosen representatives as in modern democracies. If the power of the people in the framing of the constitution or in framing of the laws or in the sphere of the executive action is subject to certain immutable rules, it cannot be said that they can pass any law that they like, or, in the exercise of the executive function, do whatever they like. Indeed if the legislature in an Islamic state is a sort of Ijma, the masses are expressly disqualified from taking part in it because Ijma-i-Ummat in Islamic jurisprudence is restricted to Ulema and Mujtihids of acknowledged status and does not at all extend as in democracy to the populace.<sup>27</sup>

The Punjab Disturbances gave vent to the bitter sense not merely that the aspiration of an Islamic state was not being fulfilled,<sup>28</sup> but that the leaders of the country

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sovereign rights over land, sea and air should be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honorable place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and the progress and happiness of humanity.

<sup>27</sup> Justice Munir, The Punjab Disturbances, p.210.

<sup>28</sup> Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954 to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Lahore, 1954. This is popularly known as the Munir Report (after the Court's President,

were not even taking it seriously. They were not trying to fulfil it. The Punjab Disturbances demonstrated the failure, and some of the serious consequences of the failure, to fit a valid substance to the Islamic form of socio-political aspiration.

That such confusion did exist was obvious because otherwise Muslim Leaguers whose own government was in office, would not have risen against it; sense of loyalty and public duty would not have departed from public officials who went about like maniacs howling against their own government and officers. The respect for property and human life would not have disappeared in the common man who with no scruple or compunction began freely to indulge in loot, arson and murder. The politicians would not have shirked facing the men who had installed them in their offices; and the administrators would not have felt hesitant or diffident in performing what was their obvious duty.

If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry, it is that provided you persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense.<sup>29</sup>

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Mr. Justice Mohammed Munir). Munir Report and the Objective Resolution are the two basic documents for the history of Islam in Pakistan in its first decade. The understanding of these two documents is helpful to grasp the major significance of the constitutional struggle in Pakistan.

<sup>29</sup>Munir, op. cit., p. 232.

There may not be anything more dangerous than the lack of purpose and confused thinking, especially in a predominantly large number of newly developing countries trying to create some semblance of representative institutions. The Muslim, during the Punjab Disturbances, found himself standing on the crossroads, wrapped in the mantle of the past and with the dead weight of centuries on his back, frustrated and bewildered and hesitant to turn one corner or the other. He found himself in a state of helplessness waiting for someone to come and help him out of the morass of uncertainty and confusion.

"Theocracy," "Theo-Democracy" and "The Islamic Democracy."

The most outstanding and the novel feature of the Objective Resolution, March, 1949, was that it sought to base the Constitution of Pakistan on the ideals of Islam. The Preamble of the Resolution made a frank and unequivocal recognition of the sovereignty of God and declared that all authority must be subservient to God. Here started the big step in the framing of a constitution for Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on the "Aims and Objects of the Constitution." This resolution became popularly known as the Objective Resolution.

It is time again to raise the most intriguing problem of the Muslim political thought. Does the idea of the sovereignty of God which the Objective Resolution recognized come into conflict with the idea of popular sovereignty

which is one of the fundamental ingredients of democracy? The Objective Resolution made the frank declaration that there is no power but from God. In this sense, Dr. Choudhury asserts that Pakistan was intended to be a theocracy inasmuch as it recognized the sovereignty of God. But he goes on to say that he is not using the term theocracy in the usual Western sense.

There are no special agents of God recognized and hence theocracy in the ordinary sense has no place in Islamic statecraft. The right to rule is not necessarily associated with any special form of government; either one form or another may be assumed provided it be such as to ensure the general welfare. Moreover, it may be argued, the sovereignty of God ensures that civil authority must not be subservient to the advantage of one or of a few for it is established for the good of all; and if those who are in authority should rule unjustly; or if they should err through arrogance or pride; if their measures should be injurious to the people--then let them know that hereafter an account must be rendered to God.<sup>30</sup>

In such a conformation of the state, there is nothing that may be incompatible or out of tune with the spirit and tradition of democracy or of rule by the people. When there is emphasis on the moral aspect of the civil and political authority, it may help to ensure that laws will aim at the common good and will be determined by truth and justice and that authority will be restrained from deviating from what is just and overstepping the limits of power.

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<sup>30</sup>G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, issued in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations by the Pakistan Branch of Longmans, London: 1959, p. 52.

In order to appreciate the spirit of the Resolution, we must recognize why Islam sought a State for itself. Here we may refer to an excellent passage from Professor Wilfred C. Smith who has analyzed this problem in a highly illuminating way:

Islam is a religion, and like other religions, is transcendent, ineffable; no form can continue or exhaust it. Like other religions it has been expressed in many forms--artistic, intellectual, mystic, but more than some others, social. In fact, Islam is characterized among the religions by the particular emphasis which it has from the beginning given to the social order. The Prophet Mohammed not only preached ethics, he organized a state. Indeed, Islamic history is calculated to begin not on the year when the Prophet was born (after the fashion of the Christian era), nor when he began to receive Divine revelations, but when the Muslim Community came to power in a state of its own. The year 1 A.H. marks the establishment of Islam as a religio-political sovereignty in al-Madinah. The state was organized in accordance with God's revelation; it prospered and expanded and Islam as a process in human history was launched on its career. That career has continued until to-day, with many human ups and downs, many variations of fortunes and of form, many vicissitudes, both of achievement and of aspiration but never very far from being central has been its concern with itself as an organized community.<sup>31</sup>

Major sectarian differences in Islam have had to do with divergences not primarily over dogma but over questions as to how the community should be organized. While the Protestants seceded from the Catholic Church on a point of doctrine, the Shiah seceded from the majority community on a

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<sup>31</sup>G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, the original quote appears in Smith's, Pakistan as an Islamic Democracy, Lahore, 1951. It is borrowed here from Choudhury's above mentioned book, p. 55.

dispute regarding political leadership; Islam is by tradition and by central genius a practical religion, a religion of ethics, including social ethics, and of organized, legalized ethics.

The conception that religion and politics occupy distinct spheres which should not be permitted to overlap is born of failure to grasp the full significance of religion. What is religion and what is its function? Religion is the way of life that should enable each individual to attain the highest possible development of his spiritual, moral, physical and intellectual faculties. Its function is to establish and maintain the most harmonious relationship between man and his Maker on the one hand and between man and man in all aspects of their relationship on the other. Politics is only one aspect of the relationship between man and man. Those who seek to draw a distinction between the sphere of religion and the sphere of politics as being mutually exclusive, put too much narrow a construction upon the functions of religion. To them religion signifies, at its highest, purely individual spiritual communion with the Creator and normally only the performance of certain formal and ceremonial acts of what they call worship. That is not the Islamic conception of religion.<sup>32</sup>

The European or American observer instinctively feels that the concept of a nation and a state whose unity depends almost entirely on religion is an anomaly, and a reactionary anomaly. When the time came to choose, the Indian Muslims, by an overwhelming majority, rejected economics and geography and chose Pakistan. It is a choice that many non-Muslims have found very hard to understand. The concept of the Islamic state is not complex from the view point of a Muslim.

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<sup>32</sup>Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol. V, p. 66.

Islam, therefore, right from the inception of the Medinite period, ceased to be a religion in the secular sense of the word. It became the ideology behind the state, the creed which was to determine the policy and legislation of the new polity. . . . The only parallel for this phenomenon is to be found in the Socialistic state of Soviet Russia, where we find a state based on a particular creed and ideology which guides the policy and legislation of the state.<sup>33</sup>

Further, the bifurcation of human personality into the secular and the spiritual does not find support in the Islamic doctrines.

Islam is a whole, a single indivisible Reality, in which 'dualism' of whatever form has no place. It is not merely a creed; it is no mere thought, nor mere action. It is the embodiment of the ethical expression of the human being's entire life activity, both individual and national. It is concerned with every sphere of human existence: it is the Divine Law of Nature which governs the right functioning of the human social organism.<sup>34</sup>

Leading spokesmen for Pakistan have always been anxious to prove that a state based upon Islam does not need to be, and in fact cannot be, a theocracy in the sense of rule by a priestly class. If theocracy is taken to mean a state governed in accordance with Divine Law, then the term is acceptable, but the idea of rule by priests is in direct conflict with Islam. Pakistan's first Prime Minister was determined to emphasize this point: "Islam does not recognize either priesthood or any sacerdotal

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<sup>33</sup>Mohammed Mazheruddin Siddiqi, Islam and Theocracy, Lahore, 1953, p. 30.

<sup>34</sup>S. G. K. Abbasi and A. de Z. Abbasi, The Structure of Islamic Polity, Part I, The One Party System in Islam, Lahore: 1952, p. 2.

authority; and, therefore, the question of theocracy simply does not arise in Islam."<sup>35</sup>

The demands for Pakistan, and its realization, are not to be understood unless it is clearly perceived that, to the Muslims of India, Islam was more than a religion in the Western meaning. It was, and is, an outlook upon life that embraces social, political and cultural aspects of human behaviour. Islam has guidance to offer in the production and the distribution of wealth, in the maintenance of social services, in international relations, and in the structure of family life, in public finance and the proper position of the hands during the prayer. All of these, and much more, are integral parts of Islam, not mere deductions from general moral precepts. Islam, therefore, speaks as plainly to the statesman or the business-man in his professional capacity as it does to the individual conscience or to the man of religious learning.<sup>36</sup>

The background of the men who organized the campaign for the creation of Pakistan was not theology and Islamic law but politics and the common law, not Deoband (a famous centre of traditional Muslim learning), but Cambridge and the Inns of court. Mr. Jinnah and his lieutenants such as Liaqat Ali won Pakistan largely in spite of the men of religion. They led a secular campaign to create a state based on religion. They employed for the most part strictly political and constitutional methods, the ballot box, the submission of memoranda to the Viceroy and prolonged negotiations with their opponents. The resort to "direct action" was held in reserve until the alternative seemed nothing but

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<sup>35</sup>M. M. Siddiqi, Islam and Theocracy, p. 31.

<sup>36</sup>K. B. Callard, Pakistan--A Political Study, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 197.

surrender or violence. By contrast it was the secular Congress, acknowledging the spiritual leadership of Gandhi, which did not hesitate to break the law as a normal technique of agitation. The leaders of Pakistan, on the other hand, held on to the Constitutional methods throughout the struggle for freedom.

In an outward appearance, these were educated, intelligent and reasonably prosperous members of a middle class, who would have found themselves perfectly at home in Western Europe or America. No one who has met such men and observed them in speech and action could imagine for a moment that they were motivated by religious fanaticism. And yet they chose deliberately the risk and the reality of immense bloodshed in order to establish a state where Muslims could order their lives after their own fashion.<sup>37</sup>

In spite of the apparent non-priestly background of the leaders of Pakistan, there have been constant efforts especially from India to portray Pakistan as a "medieval Theocracy." As a matter of fact the Indian National Congress has retained the dislike of the whole idea of Pakistan which it developed during the long conflict over independence. The Congress thought of Muslims as the Indians and regarded Islam as one of the religions of India to be protected, if protection was thought necessary, by constitutional guarantees.

The idea of founding a state on religion was obnoxious and from time to time Nehru still speaks of Pakistan as a "theocracy." In ordinary sense of the term it certainly is not. It calls itself an Islamic Republic and its constitution contains a few provisions--very few and of no great importance-- of an

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

Islamic nature. On the other hand, its form of government is democratic and parliamentary; and indeed like that of India it is derived from the United Kingdom via the Government of India Act. This is, however, one of the respects in which Nehru's broad appreciation of political conditions breaks down. Pakistan is his biggest failure, and probably his biggest blunder, for it is reasonably certain that the Congress could have avoided it if its ideas had been more elastic in 1940 or 1942.<sup>38</sup>

Professor Leonard Binder has attributed a statement to one of the members of Pakistan Constituent Assembly to the effect that democracy in Pakistan will be a limited one. The people will have some power but they will not have all the power . . . certain things have to be resolved by God and are in His own personal sphere. The remaining sphere has been left open to the people to deal with. The principles of Islam and the laws of Islam as laid down in the Quran are binding upon the state. The people or the state cannot change these principles or these laws. But there is vast field besides these principles and laws in which the people will have free play. It might be called by the name "theo-democracy," that is democracy limited by the word of God, but as the word "theo" is not in vogue, so we call it by the name of "Islamic Democracy."<sup>39</sup>

A major speech was delivered by Jinnah in 1947. The speech was intended both for his own people including the

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<sup>38</sup>Sir Ivor Jennings, Problems of New Commonwealth, London: Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 99.

<sup>39</sup>Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 149.

non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new state was to devote all its energies.

You are now free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed . . . that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state. . . . now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.<sup>40</sup>

The words were Jinnah's: the thoughts and beliefs were an inheritance from the Prophet who had said, thirteen centuries before, that all men are equal in the eyes of God. The Prophet had admonished his followers in these words.

"And your lives and your properties are all sacred: in no case should you attack each other's life and property. Today I trample under my feet all distinctions of caste, color and nationality."<sup>41</sup> Jinnah echoed the sentiments of the Prophet.

As I visualize it, the state of Pakistan will be a state where there will be no special rights for any one particular community or individual. It will be a state where every citizen will have equal privileges and they will share equally all the obligations that lie on the citizens of Pakistan.<sup>42</sup>

The constitutional debates in Pakistan were protracted. The long delay was partially caused by

<sup>40</sup>M. A. Jinnah, Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, August 11, 1947.

<sup>41</sup>H. Bolitho, Jinnah the Creator of Pakistan, p. 197.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 198.

adventitious political circumstances, but also by fundamental disagreements on two major questions: the role of Islam in the new state; and the relation between East and West wings, and the central government. The inaugural speech which Jinnah, as incoming Governor General, addressed to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, appeared to the outsider to envisage the creation of a secular state.

Work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs . . . no matter what is his caste, color or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this state, with equal rights, privileges and obligations . . . I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities will vanish. . . . You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the state.<sup>43</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam's speech of 11 August, 1947, to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan has led some people to argue that he was not favorable to the idea of an Islamic State. But a careful analysis of the same speech and his other utterances before and after partition convinces one that he had no objection to the State based on the broad principles of Islam. Let us examine his views more closely, as his opinions are still held in high respect and exercise a powerful influence on any issue facing Pakistan. Jinnah, in his speech of 11 August said:

If you work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed, if you change your past and work together in a spirit

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<sup>43</sup>Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan--A Political Analysis, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1962, p. 72.

that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, is first, . . . second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make. . . . we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed--that has nothing to do with the business of the state. . . . I think we should keep that in front as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.<sup>44</sup>

What is the spirit of this speech? It was made at a time when the whole Indian sub-continent was swayed with communal frenzy; millions of people, both Muslims and Hindus were victims of communal riots. The Quaid-i-Azam was stressing the necessity for the communal harmony and peace for the progress of the new nation. He again and again stressed in his memorable speech that there would be no distinction made between Hindus and Muslims on the ground of religion, caste or creed, but he never said that the Islamic principles should not be the guiding factor in the Constitution of Pakistan. The Quaid-i-Azam expressed his views on the character of the future constitution of Pakistan in another important speech.

The Constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this Constitution is going to be but I am sure that it will be a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam . . . Islam and its idealism have taught us Democracy;

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<sup>44</sup>Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 1, pp. 19-20.

it has taught equality of man, justice and fairplay to everybody. We are inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future Constitution of Pakistan.<sup>45</sup>

But he also emphatically denied that Pakistan would be run by the Ulema:

In any case Pakistan is not going to be a Theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Parsis, but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.<sup>46</sup>

It would appear from these utterances of the founder of Pakistan that he was anxious to give Islamic ideology a dynamic interpretation and to him, making Pakistan an Islamic State meant basing it on Islamic principles, particularly the principles of equality, brotherhood and social justice. He found these principles of Islam not incompatible with democratic ideals. What he tried to imply was that Pakistan should not be democratic and Islamic, possessing these qualities as two distinct and separate attributes, but that it should be through democratic process, Islamic. Democracy becomes an aspect of its Islamicness, a part of the definition of the Islamic State.

The phrase "Islamic democracy" is very common in Pakistan. We must find out why the Pakistanis insist on

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<sup>45</sup> See Quaid-i-Azam's broadcast to U. S. A., February, 1948.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

this phrase and why they do not simply accept "democracy" which might have saved them from a big constitutional dilemma. The framers of the Constitution had to grapple with this question for so many years, and this hurdle in the way of making a Constitution proved to be very complex. Some would suggest that the use of term "Islamic democracy" is a political stunt used by the politicians to deceive the illiterate Muslim voters who voted for Pakistan and wanted to see it an Islamic State, which the leaders now find impossible of realization. So they have resorted to this phrase while actually they are founding a parliamentary democracy. There may be truth in this in case of some politicians. But generally speaking, one has to look deeper in order to understand the full significance of the phrase "Islamic democracy."

The phrase as Professor Smith states, has puzzled many who wondered how it may be different from other democracies or where in classical Islamic history it is to be found. But, he points out, "Islamic democracy" gains its significance from the fact that democracy has both a political and an ethical element. It cannot exist without the concurrence of both a governmental form and a popular ideal. The ethical aspect is no less an important ingredient; it must have content and must have some solid basis for continuing support. A democrat must believe not in the democratic structure of the State only; he must believe also in the fundamental significance and value of the other

persons in the society. For the West, Professor Smith relates, this faith, the ethical element, comes from two main sources: the Greek tradition and the Judeo-Christian. In the case of Pakistan, that ethical element is Islam. Moreover, for a Westerner on certain matters, judgment of value even though their content be Christian, would be cast in a form derived from the Greco-Roman tradition. Westerners--to some extent Muslims educated in Western ways--are accustomed for example, to considering political questions by means of concepts, categories and modes of thought stemming from the Greek root of Western civilization.

For a Muslim, his whole civilizational heritage is, if not a religious heritage, anyway set in Islamic forms. Herein lies the true significance of the phrase "Islamic democracy." Professor Smith further points out that the demand that Pakistan should be an Islamic state is a Muslim way of saying that Pakistan should build for itself a good society -not merely an independent or a strong or a wealthy or a modern society. All these things perhaps it should be, but it should also be a good society. He concludes that a Muslim's apprehension of goodness is colored by his environment, the pressures and complexities and limitations of his particular time and place and by his own capacity, his moral acumen and the sensibility of his spirit. It is colored also and more uniquely by the fact that he is a Muslim.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>W. C. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, Preliminary Draft, Montreal: 1951, pp. 30-35.

The net result of all this speculation, in the opinion of this author, is the acceptance of the concept of Islamic democracy. Islamic democracy as such does not mean theocracy. But neither does it necessarily mean acceptance of Western democratic procedures as is shown by an examination of the attitude towards political parties.

### The Role of Political Parties

Perhaps the most widespread reaction to the events of the last ten years in Pakistan has been an attitude of skepticism concerning the role of the political party as an instrument of democratic government. In the present century the political party has been the instrument both of democracy and totalitarianism.

Democratic government normally rests on a balance of forces. If one group becomes exceedingly strong, a countervailing power will arise. Government begets opposition even when no substantial differences of policy or interest are at stake. But in India and Pakistan in the aftermath of independence, there was no effective opposition. Virtually all original political power rested in the hands of the Congress and the Muslim League. Each had based its claim on its character as the embodiment of the whole national will.

Before August, 1947, for a Hindu to oppose the Congress and for a Muslim to oppose the Muslim League meant the betrayal of their respective national causes. Immediately after independence the need for national unity was

still strong enough to preclude the easy acceptance of an open political opposition. In India, the Congress has continued for sixteen years to monopolize power at the center and in almost every state. No true equilibrium of political forces has asserted itself, the limits to the power of the Congress and its leaders having been largely those imposed by self-restraint. In Pakistan the authority of the League collapsed after a few years and was succeeded by general instability.

The role played by political parties in the particular context of Pakistan has added confusion more than clarity in terms of the basic principles of political theory which have been discussed in this study. A party, according to Burke, is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors, the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. A political party, according to Ostrogorski, is a special combination, its basis is agreement on a particular principle, and its end is the realization of an object or objects of public interest.<sup>48</sup>

The masses of people have tended to follow personalities rather than principles in the political life of Pakistan. The form of authority becomes modified within parties: a double evolution can be seen. The first phase is one of the

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<sup>48</sup> Ostrogorskie, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, New York; MacMillan Company, 1902, p. 652.

slow change from personal government to institutional government. In the second place, a certain reversal of the process can be seen. Authority takes on a personal character again, while retaining the framework of the institutions. This evolution is, moreover, not confined to political parties; it is met within other associations and, first of all, in the state.

The overpowering monopoly of the Muslim League in Pakistan has discouraged the healthy democratic tradition of political opposition.

The era of masses has entailed the decline of the traditional social elites: the aim of the single party is to form new elites, to create a new ruling class, to unite and to shape the political leaders capable of organizing the country, for the masses cannot themselves govern.<sup>49</sup>

The principal political, administrative, and economic leaders are taken from the party, but the party itself, as a body, unceasingly supervises all state organizations. Its function is not so much to administer as to insure the vitality of the administration and to insure its fidelity. The representatives of the party, therefore, have seats everywhere from the Council of Ministers to the smallest local or special committees, from the civil service to the Trade Unions, cooperative, cultural associations, unless the party assumes directly certain functions for itself or for its ancillary organizations.

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<sup>49</sup>Maurice, Duverger, Political Parties--Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, New York: John Wiley & Sons, p. 257.

The role of political parties has influenced political leaders and the stability and continuity of their regimes.

Parties also give opinion greater stability: without them it is changeable, versatile, fickle. In countries in which democracy has been newly implanted, in which parties have not yet taken strong roots, it is characteristic of elections that there are considerable variations from one ballot to the next, and this weakens the regime. Parties tend to crystallize opinion; they give skeletal articulation to a shapeless and jelly-like mass. Finally, they cause similar opinions to coagulate: they minimize individual differences and smooth down personal idiosyncrasies to mold them into a few great spiritual families. The work of synthesis is not the least important side of party activity, for it alone makes possible the existence of elections and of some form of political representation, since both remain impossible in the inextricable welter of individual attitudes.<sup>50</sup>

The degree of separation of powers is much more dependent on the party system than on the provisions of the constitution. Thus the single party brings in its train a very close concentration of powers, even if the constitution officially prescribes a marked separation. The party binds very closely together the various organs of government. Its role is no different in a pluralist system, but simply less marked. Rivalry between the parties weakens the link that each of them could establish between parliament and government; thus the constitutional separation of powers regains some measure of effectiveness; it may even be paralleled by a party separation arising from the personalization of each part in a given task.

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 378.

It is not unusual in democratic communities to find that popular attention is focussed upon one man rather than upon a party or a policy. In Pakistan attention has concentrated upon individuals virtually to the exclusion of any consideration of policies or regard for party discipline. Dawn, a leading Pakistani Newspaper and one supposed to represent Government's views with a critical and independent attitude, on July 13, 1947, said:

Whatever the constitutional powers of the Governor General of a Dominion may nominally be, in Quaid-i-Azam's case no legal or formal limitations can apply. His people will not be content to have him as merely the titular head of the government, they would wish him to be their friend, philosopher, guide, ruler, irrespective of what the Constitution of a Dominion of the British Commonwealth may contain.

Where strong national parties with the support of the military and the bureaucracy have inherited power from the imperialist governments and often are led by outstanding figures enjoying certain charismatic qualities, religious controversies of the kind that emerged in Pakistan never see the light of day. All groups must compromise with such national leadership, and they must subordinate their ideologies to the benefits to be gained from the appearance of absolute support for the central goal of national independence and the leader who achieved it.

The period following the achievement of independence is, according to Professor Leonard Binder, one of the great unity and enthusiasm and often of very hard work. In

Pakistan this period was very short one, indeed.<sup>51</sup> Pakistan began its life with a set of public institutions that were, broadly speaking, democratic. They were institutions that became familiar, at best to the politically conscious, during the closing years of the British rule. The principles of responsible government formed part of the education of those who studied British history and government in the universities and colleges of undivided India.

However, the legislatures and the cabinets of the British were used not for normal democratic government, but to force the British to leave the country or to convince the Hindus that an independent state must be provided for the Muslims. In these cases it was permissible in the name of nationalism, to use the outward forms of self-government to undermine constitutional authority. It was difficult to develop respect and reverence for the institutions that were being exploited to achieve an ulterior purpose. This was one of the areas in which the mind of educated Muslim operated on two planes.

At one level he had an academic and abstract appreciation of the virtues of cabinet government; at the other and more passionate level he had nothing but scorn and hatred for anything that might stand in the way of achievement of Muslim homeland. After 1947, when the first exhilaration

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<sup>51</sup> Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 113.

had begun to wear thin, he was led to discover how the system might be made to work in the interests of efficient and responsible government.

Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan<sup>52</sup> politicians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. According to President Mohammed Ayub Khan,<sup>53</sup> the politicians waged ceaseless and bitter war against each other, regardless of the ill-effects on the country, just to whet their appetites and satisfy their base motives.

There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, racial and religious differences to set a Pakistani against Pakistani. They could

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<sup>52</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan was born in 1896. He was Jinnah's junior by 20 years. His education had been broader, and richer: he had graduated from the Muslim University, Aligarh in 1918, and had then gone to Exeter College, Oxford, where his political ideas began to stir. He took part in undergraduate debates and was Secretary of India Majlis or Association. He was called to the Bar in the Inner Temple in 1922, and returned to India in the same year. But he did not practice the law. He became a politician and in 1926 was elected to the Legislative Council of the United Provinces. After a brilliant public career, he became the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Liaquat Ali died in 1951.

<sup>53</sup>Ayub Khan was born in 1907, a Pathan of Peshawar district. He went to the Muslim University, Aligarh, and then to Sandhurst. Commissioned in 1928, he first served with the Royal Fusiliers, and then in the 14th Punjab Regiment, which he commanded during the Burma campaign. After the war he commanded a brigade on the North-West Frontier. His selection as C.-in-C. of the Pakistan army followed the death in a plane accident of the designated C.-in-C. Ayub succeeded Sir Douglas Gracy in January, 1951, as the first Pakistani C.-in-C. at the age of 44. He became the President of Pakistan through the Revolution of October, 1958.

see no good in anybody else. In this mad rush for power and acquisition all that mattered was self-interest. The country and people could go to dogs as far as they were concerned. There were few honorable exceptions but their conscience was deadened and they were rendered ineffective by hordes of their supporters in the Assemblies changing party affiliations from day to day. There are two things a man-- a man of conscience--finds it very difficult to do: change his religion, change party affiliations. But our so-called representatives in the Assemblies shifted from one party to the other without turning a hair or feeling any pangs of conscience. This is the basis on which democracy has been run in Pakistan and in the sacred name of Islam. In the process, all ideas and high sense of values inherent in our religion and culture have been destroyed.<sup>54</sup>

It is obvious that the disloyalty of the members to their parties was the principal cause of frequent changes of administration in the past while the continuity of administration under the Presidential System is not disturbed by the fluctuations in parliamentary opinion, even the President for the implementation of his programme has to have a party outside the legislature as well as inside and shifts in loyalties can become a constant source of frustration to him. Until political parties are in a position to discipline their following, the need to prevent exodus from one side of the house to the other can hardly be over-emphasized.

Of far greater importance than provisions of recall and qualifications of membership, is the necessity for preventing the exploitation of religious sentiments and provincial prejudice out of which much political capital was made by the parties during the last eleven years. Such safeguards are not found in democratic constitutions to which the parties are

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<sup>54</sup>M. Ayub Khan, Address to the Nation, October 8, 1958.

### The Basic Democracies

The Basic Democracies Programme instituted in 1958 by President Ayub of Pakistan, has been praised as one of the best planned, theoretically possible models for eventual representative government in Asia today. It may turn out to be a landmark in the constitutional struggle of Pakistan. It is a "sensible approach to eventual representative government which might recommend itself to other under-developed and massively illiterate countries in Asia."<sup>57</sup>

The Bureau of National Reconstruction is the most important institution. It was created by President Ayub in 1959 to oversee and administer the Basic Democracies Programme. He appointed men of proven experience and administrative sagacity to membership of the Bureau. The functions of the Board as officially stated are:

- (1) To explain to the people the policies of the government and bring home to them how these policies are in their own interests, in order to seek their understanding and gain their cooperation.
- (2) To endeavour to obtain a similarity of approach on considerations bearing on major national issues so as to develop a pattern of character which is necessary for the creation of a national outlook; and
- (3) Continually to gauge the feelings of the people regarding government practices and advise the government from time to time in the light thereof.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Louis Depree, American Universities Field Staff Reports, Vol. 1, no: 1, Pakistan, "The Basic Democracies Programme, the 'Quiet Revolution' Keeps Rolling Along," January 18, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup>The Task of National Reconstruction: The Challenge and the Response, The Bureau of National Reconstruction, Karachi, 1959, p. 19.

themselves foreign, as the parties are essentially unwritten constitutions by which the written constitutions are worked. But in the case of infant democracy in Pakistan, their incorporation at least for an interim period, will be part of political wisdom.<sup>55</sup>

The traditions of cabinet government have not been accepted either at the center or in the provinces. This is the system adopted by the constitution, but most politicians seem totally unwilling to pay more than lip service to its requirements. "The political parties have presented a picture of almost unredeemed failure. At no time since the death of Liaquat Ali has a cabinet been in office that seemed to have the clear support of the party, the legislature, and the electorate."<sup>56</sup>

In the wake of the governmental instability caused by the abuse of political parties, the politicians waged ceaseless and bitter wars against each other, regardless of the ill-effects on the country. In the mad rush for power and personal gain all that mattered was self-interest. The country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned. These chaotic conditions led to the October Revolution of 1958 and the consequent introduction of the basic democracies.

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<sup>55</sup>Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1959, p. 234.

<sup>56</sup>Punjab Disturbances Report, p. 326.

Before going into the details of the working of Basic Democracies it is necessary to analyse the causes of the failure of Western type of democracy in Pakistan.

(A) Western democracy presupposes:

1. High degree of National and Political awareness so that people understand the value of their votes in terms of broad national policy.
2. Mass literacy needed for broader outlook and perspective.
3. Advanced system of mass communication for speedy and accurate dissemination of information on a wide scale.

(B) The present situation in Pakistan:

1. Vast majority of our population live in rural areas having inadequate communication facilities.
2. Percentage of literacy is very low; as a result their understanding of political responsibilities in terms of broad national policies is limited.
3. Because of their illiteracy and living in isolation it is not possible for them to judge the merits of persons with whom they have no immediate personal contact.

(C) People are accustomed to look towards officials for leadership and guidance for centuries.

1. Most of the intellegentsia being in Government employment, sufficient leadership did not grow.
2. Dependence on Government help weakened the initiative of the people, Basic Democracy would foster leadership.<sup>59</sup>

Having faced up to failure, the Pakistan leadership considered two possible alternatives:

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<sup>59</sup>Basic Democracy: N D O-B D Integration and Training Programme, Karachi: 1959, p. 21.

"Either

Wait for ideal conditions and try to educate the people so as to make them aware of their self-interest, and hold elections on a national basis after they have been so educated. This would mean waiting for a generation or more before elections can be held.

"Or

Hold elections now at the level at which people are already aware of their self-interest and are in a position to choose between the competing candidates.<sup>60</sup>

The term Basic Democracy implies that Pakistan, not having been able to work out parliamentary democracy efficiently, is not ready for a fullfledged democratic system. Therefore, it should have something more elementary, called in this case "Basic Democracy." There is the tragic experience of illiterate masses and semi-educated and emotional urban groups becoming victims of crafty politicians. The argument does not stop here. It is not only the illiterate masses but also the politicians who have made the working of democracy impossible. In other words, politicians in Pakistan have been worse than their counterparts abroad. Once bought, they do not stay bought, but keep changing their groups or parties with the result that not only democracy but the working of any government becomes difficult.

According to the thinking of the regime of Ayub, if politicians are removed from positions of power, controversies will cease and the civil servants and the army officers will be able to get on with the technical job of governing

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<sup>60</sup> The Scheme for Basic Democracies, Government of Pakistan, Bureau of National Reconstruction, 1959, p. 10.

the country. This is made clear under the new scheme. If people at the local levels are induced to become absorbed in the tasks of administering and developing the country, they are not likely to attach much importance to controversial religious and linguistic issues. Politics in this sense becomes a constructive and not a destructive device which play havoc with the national unity.

Basic Democracy comprises of five-tier system of local government starting from Union Councils or Town Committees and proceeding upward via Tehsil Thana Councils, District Councils, Divisional Councils, to the top tier, the Provincial Development Council. A group of villages with a total population of some 10,000, but varying between 4,000 and 15,000, are represented in the Union Council. Each elected member in the Council represents a constituency of from 1,000 to 1500 people, the idea being that each representative will be well known to his constituents. In the Union Councils, two-thirds of the members are elected and a third are nominated members in the Union Councils. Nominated members come from the groups such as women, agricultural labor and those interests who have been reluctant to expose themselves to the rigors of an election or do not want to take the risk of being defeated with the consequential decline in prestige in their local communities.<sup>61</sup>

Pakistan being predominantly an agricultural country, Union Councils, which consist of rural representatives, are the most important part of the local government. It may be argued that for the first time a Union Council consisting usually of 15 members, ten of whom are elected, has been made responsible for activities ranging from the maintenance of law and order to agricultural development.

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<sup>61</sup>Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Basic Democracy," The Middle East Journal, Summer, 1961, pp. 250-51.

Islam has also been pressed into service to make Basic Democracies look like a religious experiment. President Ayub, on June 16, 1960, gave a statement to an English daily Dawn. He maintained that Basic Democracy was picked up from Islamic injunctions of conscience.

In the orthodox democratic system the only function of the Opposition was to oppose the party in power without the least consideration of national good. Communists and Fascists based their system on party rule smashing individual or group opposition. The whole system of Islam was against both these alternatives. There was no place for independent individual in party system of government. This is why Hazrat Omar thought necessary that councils should consist of men of high character and wisdom belonging to no party.<sup>62</sup>

Some fundamental questions remain to be answered.

Can it be assumed that the local institutions, having been insulated from the influence of politicians, are now likely to function harmoniously and efficiently? When politicians, a great majority of whom came from educated and urbanized groups, could not display esprit de corps, how can better results be expected from the less sophisticated rural leaders? The scheme of Basic Democracy has been constructed on the assumption that the local affairs lend themselves to a non-political or technical or rational approach. The Union Councils will be dealing with the building of roads, establishment of health centers, and the problem of finding the wherewithal to finance these schemes. These are concrete

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<sup>62</sup>President Ayub Khan, Dawn, June 16, 1960.

[ problems in contrast to the more abstract political or  
: linguistic controversial issues.

! The 1962 Constitution: Its Main Features

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan debated these issues for nine years and the shaky compromises reached through the Constitution of 1956 collapsed before the ink of the draft had dried. In 1958 the parliamentary pattern was changed. The revolution of 1958 was genuinely revolutionary in renouncing the dogma nurtured by generations of Westernized nationalist leaders that the inevitable goal of Asia was a parliamentary, party system; and in rejecting the belief that the institutions could be brought about by the efforts of learned legal draftsmen, spinning their clauses, articles and schedules.

The Constitution which was promulgated by the President on March first, 1962, reflected Ayub's determination to create a strong stable system of government. The President expounded the underlying philosophy of the new constitution in a broadcast to the nation which included some trenchant comments in his usual forthright manner. People shall have the right to hire and fire their rulers, he declared and went on:

We have adopted the Presidential System as it is simpler to work, more akin to our genius and history, and less liable to lead to instability--a luxury that a developing country like ours cannot afford. The other alternative was the parliamentary system. This we tried, and it failed. Not that there is anything inherently wrong with it. The trouble is that we have not attained several sophistications

that are necessary for its successful operation. . . . Above all you need really a cool and phlegmatic temperament which only people living in cold climates seem to have. Also it requires a long period of probation. For instance, the British took six hundred years of trial and tribulation to reach this stage. . . . So do not let us kid ourselves and cling to cliches and assume that we are ready to work such a refined system knowing the failure of earlier attempts.<sup>63</sup>

The most obvious feature of the new constitution is the concentration of power in the hands of the President. It specifically lays down that all executive authority of the Republic is vested in the office of the President. He appoints the commanders of the armed forces, the Governors of the provinces, the Ministers of the national government, and their Parliamentary Secretaries; and he appoints the Chief Justice, in his own discretion. The office of Prime Minister is non-existent. The President can issue ordinances, valid as law for six months duration; he may refuse his assent to bills, he may refer any dispute between the Assembly and himself to a referendum of the members of the Basic Democracies; and he may dissolve the Assembly at any time. The President is elected by the Basic Democrats, and is eligible for two five year terms in office. A provision that a candidate for President must not have held the office previously for eight years, appears to afford Ayub some latitude in calculating the ten year rule. He may choose to stay in office until 1972, or thereabouts.

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<sup>63</sup>Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan--A Political Analysis, pp. 89-90.

The President can be impeached by the National Assembly, but a vote of three quarters of the total membership is required to make this effective. An impeachment first requires the signatures of the one third members; and in the event of the motion failing to obtain the support of half the total membership, the original signatories will forfeit their membership. When the floating loyalties of the members of the former legislatures are called to mind, it can be seen that it will require a desperate situation, and bold, iron-nerved members before any attempt to remove the President is ever initiated.

The disputes which brought ruin to the former regime mainly revolved around three issues: the relationship between the executive and the legislative arms, the relationship between East and West Pakistan, and the role of Islam in the State. The first has been firmly decided: the executive is in full control. Regarding the other two major issues, the President has made considerable effort to meet grievances fairly. Urdu and Bengali continue to enjoy parity as the national languages. The creation of two capitals, Dacca, as the seat of legislature, and Islamabad as the seat of the central government, also promotes parity.

It is provided that the Supreme Court will hold sittings at Dacca and, eventually, at Islamabad also. The President has indicated that a convention will be established that the Speaker of the National Assembly, the second citizen in the Republic, shall be chosen from that

wing of Pakistan that the President does not come from. It is provided in the constitution that Governors and provincial Ministers must be natives of the province they administer.

The Islamic provisions in the 1962 constitution go somewhat further than those of 1956 to propitiate orthodox opinion. As before the President must be a Muslim. The Preamble states that "the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam."<sup>64</sup> Or, as the President preferred to put it, "whilst making material progress, we naturally wish to do so under the umbrella of Islamic spiritual and moral values."<sup>65</sup> This will be implemented by an advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, to be appointed by the President from "experts" and research scholars. In law-making, the President and the legislatures will seek the advice of this Council as to whether any proposal is repugnant to Islam. There will also be an Islamic Research Institute, set up by the President, "to undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis."

The poet Iqbal who strove to achieve an intellectual synthesis of Western philosophy and Islamic faith had

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<sup>64</sup>The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Preamble, paragraph 6, 1956.

<sup>65</sup>Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan--A Political Analysis, p. 92.

pondered the final fate of the national idea in Islam. He was not sure whether Islam would assimilate and transform it, as it had assimilated and transformed other ideas before or whether it would allow a radical transformation of its own structure by this idea.

As the Muslim religion is the one tie which binds East to West Pakistan, it is unlikely to be reduced in scale to that of a private, personal faith, as Jinnah envisaged in his inaugural speech to the constituent assembly. Most of the countries of the near and middle East have abandoned the search for a synthesis between religion and the modern, secular state. But Pakistan, whose population equals in number the inhabitants of all other Middle Eastern countries, was created on the premise that it is possible to combine Islam and a modern polity.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Political thought in the earlier period of Islam provides a classical example of the power of Islam to develop a system and theory of its own and to relate this system to the theories and ideas which are brought to Muslims from without. As Al-Farabi notes political philosophy is only a branch of general philosophy; its importance to a large degree is due to the religio-political unitary character of Islam.

Islam knows no distinction between a spiritual and temporal realm, between religious and secular activities. Both realms form a unity under the all embracing authority of the Sharia. Spiritual and temporal are two complimentary sides of the religious law. The caliph is as vicegerent of the prophet, defender of the faith charged with the implementation of law by safeguarding the welfare of the believers in this world and ensuring their salvation in the world to come.

All believers, including the caliph, are equal before the law of God. Muslims are obedient to the caliph so long as he is obeying the higher law. At least in theory, the power of the caliph is conditional upon his faithful discharge of his duty--i.e., to guard the law and enforce its

application in the life of the community of the faithful founded by Mohammed.

Even in the present times one finds that the formal changes in the institutions and functions of the state and government, in the Arab Islamic states, do not necessarily reflect or imply serious structural and conceptual changes. Nor do they necessarily affect appreciably the concept, use, or allocation of power.

Islam in its traditional nexus unavoidably permeates the domain of politics as it colors all discussions of political order and control, leadership and the formulation of public policy, and the definition of national goals and interest. Regardless of the terms in which the attempted secular national myth is couched, it requires religious overtones to penetrate the masses.

The most comprehensive statement of the legalistic theory of the caliphate was that of Al-Mawardi (991-1031). It is to his work and to that of his predecessors that we give the name of classical theory in opposition to the traditional theory devised by the Ulema in the Abbasid period (683-743). This classical theory, despite its dependence upon contemporary circumstances and theoretical controversies was essentially unhistorical.

With the end of the Abbasid Caliphate, orthodox political theory underwent a grave crisis. The crisis consisted in an attempt to legitimize obedience to the petty rulers who clamoured for power and the caliphal mantle after

the actual institution of the caliphate had ceased to exist. Until that time the principles of Islamic government had never been separated from their formal representation in the caliphate. Philosophers, jurists, and statesmen all strove to establish a new basis for legitimacy, and a new symbolism, whereby the traditional values might be retained.

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the most original of Muslim thinkers, presented a useful solution. Ibn Khaldun acknowledged the splintering of political power in the Muslim world. After a careful analysis of history he deduced certain general principles based on a long range point of view rather than the frequent changes in the fortunes of political competitors of power, or other narrow and transitional circumstances. A philosopher of history, he first seized upon the principle of historical continuity. He found in history a divine order based upon the interrelation of social and physical forces. In the regularity and continuity of history he discovered the divine guidance for the Muslim community. He rejected political unity but admitted the spiritual unity of all Muslims. Finally, though he equated constitutional and historical processes, he insisted that good government was only that which accorded with the Sharia.

After the fifteenth century, no political works of much significance appear, until in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries Muslim political speculation is revived by Jamal, who is followed by three representative writers.

Jamal's importance lay not in what he introduced in the development of the Islamic world, so much as what he brought into very sharp focus. He is significant because he was concerned with so wide a sweep of the contemporary Muslim world and its difficulties.

Jamal strove with all his energies to dam and, if possible, to sweep back the encroaching tide of European expansionism by means of the organized power of the existing Muslim governments. He brought inspiration and a popular program to the Pan-Islamic Movement by restating the basis of Islamic community in terms of nationalism. Pan-Islam was, on the political side, aimed against European penetration, it had an internal reforming aspect also. A very great deal of the subsequent Islamic development is adumbrated in his personality and career. In fact, there is very little in twentieth century Islam not foreshadowed in Jamal.

The effect of Abduh's teaching was to separate the religious issue from the political conflicts so that they were no longer interdependent and each was set free to develop along its own appropriate lines. If he had been able to win more general support, he might indeed have created a revolution in the thought and outlook of the Muslim world. Abduh was a modernist in the sense that he urged the pursuit of modern thought, confident that in the last resort it could not undermine but only confirm the religious truth of Islam. In relation to the traditional orthodox belief he

was no innovator. The spirit of his teaching was inherently liberal, yet the finished product of his work transmitted to others incorporates this only very partially.

In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent it was Saiyyid Ahmed who held that it was impossible for there to be any contradiction between Islam and science. He insisted that Islam was in conformity with nature. This, in effect, led him to deny the miraculous element in Islam, and he had to bear the full weight of the hostility of the Ulema. His school gained the name of Nechari (nature worshipper) and under that name earned the violent denunciation of Jamal.

In spite of all these attacks, the influence of the school Saiyyid founded was immense in helping Muslims to adopt a critical attitude toward their traditional way of life and the authorities on which it was based. He exemplified liberal Islam more forcefully than he formulated it. He was a Muslim acting on the liberal values with sincerity and effectiveness. Although there was no popular acceptance of Saiyyid's teachings during his life time, yet the spirit of his thought was carried on by Iqbal.

Iqbal asserted that the modern Muslim must study what Europe has thought and consider how European conclusions can help in the revision (and if necessary the reconstruction) of theology in Islam. He must rethink the whole system of Islam without breaking completely with the past.

Iqbal was largely inspired by the Islamic principles of human liberty, equality, fraternity and social justice in

a practical and dynamic form. He stands for the freedom of the human ego and its perfection through self knowledge, self affirmation and self purification based on the love of God and man. He preached constant action, effort and struggle. He did not believe in narrow and selfish nationalism and placed before the Muslim world the ideal of a spiritual regeneration and international understanding and cooperation. Iqbal was the foremost thinker in the modern world of Islam who attempted a reorientation of Islam in the light of modern philosophical concepts. He gave new destiny to his people and worked toward reaching that destiny.

In his lectures Iqbal tried to do for Muslims what Thomas Aquinas did for Christians several centuries ago. Both Aquinas and Iqbal tried to combine two ideas, which prior to their time, had been considered contradictory. He showed how Muslims could remain true Muslims, and yet enjoy the fruits of modern sciences. He tried to confirm Muslims in their faith and give them a dynamic philosophy of life, philosophy which could give meaning and purpose to their existence. Not only did Iqbal fill the Muslims with his own dynamism and faith, he also spelled out for them the concept of a Muslim homeland in the Indian sub-continent. This he did in his presidential address to the All Indian Muslim League in 1930. He said that Islam itself was destiny and will not suffer a destiny. The life of Islam as a cultural force depended on its centralization in a specified territory. And this idea of a sacred Muslim state in the

sub-continent, the Indian Muslims took up under Jinnah's brilliant leadership and gave to it a practical shape in the establishment of Pakistan within seventeen years of its enunciation by Iqbal.

Following the death of Iqbal, the Muslim intellectuals failed to continue or maintain his standards of inquiry. Pakistan has conspicuously suffered from the lack of effectual ideas. It is the task of the intellectuals in a society to supply the ideas with which it has to deal. The failure here, since the death of Iqbal, has been sad.

Editors, writers and the universities gave but little impression that they realized that the nation's survival turned in a significant measure on the ability of its thinkers to think correctly and creatively. Especially there was little evidence of an operative conviction that the responsible intellect has duty to solve also religious and moral problems, or that reason like faith, is an intermediary between the divine and humanity's activity in history.<sup>1</sup>

It might be expected that some Muslim writers would have been moved to explain, at least to other fellow Muslims if not to the outside world, the nature of the intellectual revolution through which they were passing and how it had affected their thoughts in religious matters. Any expectation of this kind will be speedily dispelled by an examination of the literature of the period. Most books and speeches on the faith by those who are within it today are defensive. They try to champion rather than understand, to buttress rather than to elucidate.

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<sup>1</sup>W. C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 230.

One looks in vain for any systematic analysis of new currents of thought in the Muslim world. Almost all the books written in English or French by Muslim writers, on the the other hand turn out to be apologetic works, composed with the object of defending Islam and demonstrating its conformity with what their writers believe to be the present-day thought. The outstanding exception is the Indian scholar and poet Sir Mohammed Iqbal, who in his six lectures Reconstruction of Religious Thought faces outright the question of reformulating the basic ideas of Muslim theology.<sup>2</sup>

The usual practice of the Muslim commentators on Islam is to concentrate on the early centuries of theological and legal development and sectarian conflicts and the rise of Sufi Movement and brotherhoods. After the nineteenth century or so, it is assumed that, from a religious angle, Islam stayed put--that it remained fixed in the moulds created for it by the scholars, jurists, doctors and mystics of the formative centuries and if anything, decayed rather than progressed.

The ineffectiveness of the modernist to move Muslim opinion can be traced largely to two main causes: first, that they are unable to place the facts and arguments in clear and compelling perspective, because they have not yet formulated to themselves a coherent social ideal adapted to the needs of Muslims generally; and, second, that by their apologetic, which exaggerates, on the one hand, the social virtues of the Islamic system in the past and, on the other hand, the social evils prevalent in the Western societies, they have strengthened the opposition of conservative opinion to their own cause. The confusion of the purposes resulting from the failure to think out their own position has been, in other words, further confounded by a strong infusion of historical romanticism in their thought.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, Foreword pp. ix and x.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

It is necessary to point out that the scientific habit of thought has never been lost by Muslim scholars, though they may very likely need to revise their scientific method and to broaden out as well as deepen their grasp of it. In spite of this lack of creative thinking, the scientific habits of thought have never been completely lost by the Muslim writers. What is urgently needed is a more widespread acceptance of a critical and scholarly mode of thought which is more objective and less sentimental.

Nothing is more disconcerting to the student than to find otherwise well-informed followers of Iqbal mechanically repeating his immature historical judgments or to find modernists in Egypt eagerly seizing on any pronouncements by Western writers no matter how ill-founded, uncritical or partisan, which chime in with their own sentiments or flatter their pride.<sup>4</sup>

In human affairs and political institutions which serve the interests of man, nothing seems to be eternally fixed. It is the task of Muslims themselves to find the way and to reformulate their principles of belief and action accordingly, a task which will not be completed by many generations and probably not without conflict. Truth must always fight for its existence, and it is not always victorious in the short run. This search for clarity and truth has continued in Pakistan.

The basic principles of Muslim political thought and cultural heritage, from the perspective of this study have direct relevance for the constitutional struggle in Pakistan.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

She affords the best focal point to test the most pressing and complex problem: the relation of Islam to the actual problems and prospects of the modern world. For in Pakistan we find a situation which combines both the behaviorial and the theoretical aspects of our major problem. The lengthy process of adapting a constitution for Pakistan affords us just such a situation.

The constitutional controversy in Pakistan forced all concerned to offer concrete suggestions, to compromise on some things on committee tables, and to stubbornly resist compromise on essential doctrinal points.

The conflict regarding the proper role of religion in an Islamic Constitution generally found the Ulema or the religious leaders and the intellectuals on the opposite sides of the table. Some Ulema expected that the constitution would not incorporate any new ideas but would strictly follow the patterns of the republic of the pious caliphs (632-661). They held that Islamic law is complete and merely requires interpretation by those who are experts in it.

The intelligentsia in Pakistan and indeed most of its politicians think that the requirements of Islam can be met without departing from the essentials of a modern democratic state. The framers of the constitution were engaged in producing a synthesis of modern needs and Islamic principles. The constitution makers talked about the "experts" of the religious law who would advise the Constituent Assembly on the question of the consonance of the new

legislation with that of the Quranic laws. It never established such a body of "experts" with authority to declare such legislation unconstitutional.

To date neither the Ulema nor the intellegentsia have produced a workable system. Both have used religion to support their positions.

The old and new trends in thought have found a newer and fresher expression with the emergence of Pakistan as a sovereign nation. And their study in contemporary Muslim political thought can be examined with special reference to the recent constitutional issues in Pakistan. Generally speaking in Pakistan there are four loosely organized groups reflecting four divergent points of view of the solution to the constitutional crisis.

The Traditionalist view is almost exclusively that of the Ulema, who are not only the upholders of tradition but also identify the establishment of Islam with recognition of their own institution.

The Modernist view is held by most of the politicians, westernized businessmen and many professionals in Pakistan. The Modernist view is founded on the assumption that Islam is applicable to the modern conditions of life. The Modernists insist on the legal doctrine of consensus as the basis of both Islamic democracy and adaptability. Hence, Modernists would institutionalize the legal doctrine of consensus in a legislative assembly.

There is only one important Fundamentalist group in Pakistan, Jamaat-i-Islami,<sup>5</sup> but its supporters and sympathizers seem to be drawn from the traditional middle class, the students, and those that have failed to enter into the modern middle class, even after securing a bachelor's degree

The Secularists are small in number, but extremely powerful since they are the most highly Westernized and are often found in important positions in the Civil Service and the Military. The small but growing groups of industrialists tend to fall into the latter category.

### Conclusions

On the strength of the evidence we have examined, it is clear that the Pakistani intelligentsia favor the Modernist point of view. The Fundamentalists offer too rigid a mode of thought. The Secularists, though influential and well placed in the public offices of the Muslim world and Pakistan, take a stand that negates the historical genius of Islamic political thought by trying to completely separate Islam from politics.

It is the conviction of the present writer that the blend of the doctrines of the Modernists with the partial adaptation of the Traditionalist's position will become

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<sup>5</sup>Into the breach left by the ever more conspicuous failure of both modernizers and classicists to offer significant Islamic leadership, a new movement was developed, represented most importantly by the Mawdudi group (Jamaat-i-Islami, 1941).

increasingly dominant as Pakistan moves along the road to becoming an industrially complex society. The solution of the large number of problems yet unanswered remains the task of the future political thinkers of Pakistan. They must face up to the necessity of encouraging a more thorough examination of Western ideas even though this approach may involve serious risks in both the political and the cultural sphere of national life.

The traditional ways of thought will give way to modern outlook of life only in the wake of an accelerated pace of industrialization and increased economic opportunities and, therefore, greater independence of mind. The crux of the ethical problem is not only to live but live well. Independence of mind, originality and, therefore, dissent: these words are the signs of progress. They determine the character of the society and the individuals in it. Any religious or ethical system that discourages these virtues undermines the sense of honor, dignity and tolerance which are the indispensable prerequisites of free and democratic life.

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Islamic Political Thought: The Case of Pakistan

Raja Mohammed Naib, Ph.D.  
Kansas University, 1963

The purpose of this study is to examine the major problems of Islamic political philosophy as reflected in the development of Pakistan against the backdrop of the historic development of Islam. Since Pakistan fell partial heir to the British democratic tradition, a study of Pakistani political thought will of necessity be in part a study of the possibility of developing democratic institutions in Muslim countries.

The discussion of Islamic political theory can not be carried out in purely secular terms. The religion of Islam claims obedience in religious, economic, political, and social affairs. There is no separation between the rules governing man's life and conduct in this world and the world hereafter. As such the discussion of Islamic political theory must often shift from the secular to the religious and vice versa.

The study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides a survey of Islamic political thought and political institutions from the time of Mohammed (571-632), through the successive periods of the early caliphs (632-661), the reign of the Omeyyades (661-749), and the Abbasids (749-1268). Special emphasis on the last part of the chapter is placed on the most influential classical Muslim political writers.

Chapter II is confined to the Muslim Middle East and to two of its most representative and influential philosophers. The creative writings and activities of Jamal (1839-1897), and Abduh (1849-1905), have had direct impact on the latter developments in the field of political theory as indeed in other related areas.

Chapter third covers the Indo-Pakistan scene. The writings of Saiyyid Ahmed (1817-1899), and Mohammed Iqbal (1876-1938), have been discussed. Saiyyid's contributions in the domain of political life of the Muslim community are enormous. He emphasised education to affect a happy blend of the Muslim and the Western modes of thought. Iqbal's status in the political life of the Muslims is immensely important. He wrote an outstanding systematic and philosophical work on political theory.

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Chapter IV, entitled "A Century and a half of Muslim Political Thought", is an important anchoring part of this Dissertation. In addition to spotlighting the major issues of the previous chapters, this chapter contains a critical analytical study of the ideas of the Muslim reformers discussed in the preceding chapters and sets the stage for the discussion of Pakistan's constitutional struggle.

Chapters V and VI embody the contention of this writer that there is a direct relationship between the past Islamic heritage and the creation of Pakistan as an independent nation in 1947. Generrally speaking there are four loosely organized groups reflecting four divergent points of view of the solution to the constitutional crisis in Pakistan.

The Traditionalist view is almost exclusively that of the Ulema, who identify the establishment of Islam with recognition of their own institution. The Modernist view is founded on the assumption that Islam is applicable to the modern conditions of life. Modernists would institutionalize the legal doctrine of consensus in a legislative assembly. The Fundamentalists offer too rigid an interpretation of Islam. The Secularists would prefer to separate the religious from the political.

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It is the conviction of the present writer that the blend of the doctrines of the Modernists with the partial adaptation of the Traditionalists position will become increasingly dominant as Pakistan moves along the road to becoming an industrially complex society. The intelligentsia must face up to the necessity of encouraging a more thorough examination of Western ideas even though this approach may involve serious risks in both the political and the cultural sphere of national life.

In conclusion, therefore, it is ~~is~~ <sup>desired</sup> suggested that the traditional ways of thought will give way to modern outlook of life only in the wake of an accelerated pace of industrialization and increased economic opportunities and, therefore, greater independence of ind. The crux of ethical problem is not only to live but live well. Independence of mind, originality, and, therefore, dissent: these words are the signs of progress. They determine the character of the society and the individuals in it. A religious or ethical system that discourages these virtues undermines the sense of honor, dignity, and tolerance which are the indispensable prerequisites of a free and democratic life.