

A Question of Treason? Confederate Generals and U.S. Army Post Names

By Michael A. Hill

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael A. Hill served in the U.S. Army from 2001 to 2007, including one tour in Iraq, and he spent some time at most of the Army posts investigated in this study. After leaving the Army, he worked as a school teacher and Department of the Army civilian employee before deciding to further his education. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Kansas, where his research broadly seeks to better connect the history of the U.S. West and U.S. Foreign Relations in the nineteenth century. His work has appeared in Western Historical Quarterly, Nebraska History, Kansas History, and the Journal of Sport History. He would like to thank Edward Crowther and Richard Loosbrock for their feedback and encouragement while working on this project.

In recent years, a surge of historical research has analyzed the meaning of popular memory and the commemoration rituals of the Civil War. Honoring the dead through memorial and decoration days, Civil War cemeteries statues and monuments, literature, art, and film have recently proven to be popular and insightful topics of investigation.¹ But to date, few have explored the naming of U.S. Army posts as an act of memorialization.

Memorialization is a political action. David Bight refers to this as the “politics of memory.”² How to accurately remember the Civil War, however, is a question that historians have debated for decades. Any attempt to “rightly” interpret the Civil War is perhaps a quagmire from which there is no escape; interpretation is, nonetheless, of significant because it dictates how the sectional conflict and those who fought in it are remembered.³

The memorialization of Confederate officers through the naming of Army posts is unique because of the the federal government’s tacit


endorsement of the Rebels and their cause through such memorialization. Usually, Confederate cemeteries, statues, paintings, literature, and films are individually or locally supported. For instance, the federal government was not a participant in the creation of or continued existence of the Civil War monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol in Austin, a monument that endorses the perspective of the Texas state government and perfectly reflects the Lost Cause tradition.⁴ By naming Fort Hood after John Bell Hood, however, the federal government proclaims that Hood's actions are to be respected, honored, and even emulated by all Americans, especially by those serving in the armed forces today.

Before exploring the creation of Army posts named for Confederate officers, an understanding of how the Army has gone about naming installations is needed. Unsurprisingly, records outlining the procedure for Army post naming are sketchy until well into the twentieth century. The job of the Army is to fight, not to keep historical records on the naming process of what were often temporary military outposts. When Confederate officers are taken into account, the subject of naming becomes even more confused. One historian at the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum, located at Fort Lee, stated, "It was our impression that most cantonments were named per the Secretary of War and QM Construction Division using Civil War general names, as at Camp Lee. Those north of the Mason Dixon Line Union and south Confederate."⁵

It appears that on 6 February 1832, the Army took the first steps toward regulating the naming of installations. Adjutant General Roger Jones issued General Order No. 11, stating that all cantonments were to be known as forts and that all future posts would be named by the War Department and announced in general orders originating from the Headquarters of the Army.⁶ While seemingly straightforward in delineating responsibility for the naming of posts, the Army has returned to this topic repeatedly.

Despite the fact that General Order No. 11 of 1832 reserved the right to name posts to the War Department, General Order No. 95 of 1868 further clarified, "Permanent military posts can only be established under special authority from the Secretary of War, and they will be named by him."⁷ While not truly altering the existing order of 1832, it did further specify the naming authority as the Secretary of War, rather than simply the War Department.

In 1878, the Army, probably in response to the proliferation of temporary posts in the West, issued General Order No. 79. This order authorized division commanders (of a geographic territory, rather than a military unit) to designate permanent posts as "forts" and



Brig. Gen. Richard Napoleon Batchelder in 1865 (*National Archives*)

temporary posts as “camps.”⁸ Despite these orders, the naming of Army posts remained slapdash at best.

Brig. Gen. Richard Napoleon Batchelder, Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army, noted that by 1893 randomness had returned to the naming of Army posts. In his annual report, Batchelder cited General Order No. 11 of 1832, stating, “With the lapse of time, however, a contrary practice grew up and, although a partial reform was instituted by General Order 79, of 1878, certain anomalies still exist in the nomenclature of our military posts which might be corrected, for the sake of uniformity and propriety.”⁹

Batchelder sought to remove naming authority from the various division commanders and return it solely to the Secretary of War. Additionally, although two previous general orders directed that permanent installations were to be called forts, Batchelder thought it necessary that the order be repeated a third time and that the nomenclature “barracks” be dropped completely because all military posts “must of necessity comprise a variety of buildings and quarters for officers, as well as barracks for enlisted men.” Finally, Batchelder recommended that all “local names be eliminated from the nomenclature of military posts” and be replaced with the names of men who had served the nation with distinction, honor, and bravery. “What names more appropriate could be bestowed upon the different military posts of the country?” asked Batchelder. “To perpetuate the names of such men is to keep the memory of their deeds ever in the minds of our officers and soldiers.”¹⁰ Despite more than sixty years of regulating the naming of Army posts, this is the first recorded instance of concern for the *name* rather than the *nomenclature* of Army installations.

Batchelder’s report served the purpose he desired, but no official change in Army policy was forthcoming for over a decade. A 1906 circular directed that no Army post “will be named in honor of a living officer” as was the “established practice with regard to naming military posts.”¹¹ Apparently, while the Army did not officially change the naming practices for installations between 1893 and 1906, Batchelder’s suggestions resulted in establishing a new, generally comprehensive, practice of naming posts after deceased men of honor. For the first time, questions of nomenclature—whether posts

were to be called forts, barracks, cantonments, or camps—were not mentioned. The Army remained officially silent on the question of post naming for the next forty years. In the interim, the Army established Forts Lee, Benning, Bragg, and the first Fort Gordon due to the needs of World War I, and Forts Polk, A.P. Hill, Rucker, Hood, and the second Fort Gordon because of World War II.

After the Second World War, while the military did not maintain its pre-war levels, the beginning of the Cold War ensured that the United States, for the first time, maintained a large peacetime Army. The Army's bureaucratic structure grew appropriately large as well, and began to regulate on a scale never before seen. In the seventy-four years between 1832 and 1906 the Army published four official orders and updates to those orders, as well as the 1893 Quartermaster-General report, concerning the naming of Army posts. In the sixty years between 1946 and 2006 the Army published no fewer than fifteen regulations and revisions regarding installation naming. As time went on, the regulations themselves became longer and more detailed, reflecting the refinement of the Army's bureaucracy.

The first of these regulations came shortly after the end of World War II. In 1946, the Army established the Department of the Army Memorialization Board.¹² Army Regulation (AR) 15-190 tasked the Board with executing Army policy "relating to the memorialization of outstanding military personalities" and recommending legislation to aid in the "performance of its mission."¹³ Nothing was stated, however, about any criteria to be used in the memorialization efforts of the Board. A revised regulation published in 1951 remedied this shortcoming, directing that "only deceased persons will be memorialized" and that "no installation ... whose naming might for any reason provoke objection or controversy will be named."¹⁴ Additionally, the 1951 regulation declared that the Adjutant General would receive all recommendations for memorialization and that the Memorialization Board would make the final decision in questions concerning memorialization and post names.¹⁵ These categories and criteria formed the foundation upon which all future memorialization regulations were built.

In 1958, the Army eliminated the Memorialization Board, and AR 1-30 replaced AR 15-190. The new regulation maintained the standards of the previous AR, the only significant difference being that the approving authority for memorialization became the Headquarters Department of the Army.¹⁶ In 1972, the Army again updated the regulation, this time to AR 1-33. The 1972 regulation removed the Adjutant General from the naming process, with all recommendations to be sent directly to the Headquarters of the Department of the

Army.¹⁷ A 1975 revision discouraged the renaming of posts, "because they [renaming actions] are seldom appropriate, and strong resistance can be expected from local residents, heirs, historical societies, and others."¹⁸ The 1979 revision stipulated that installations should be named in honor of those who, meeting the other criteria, were also significant and well known in the locality of the installation.¹⁹ It is interesting to note that the 1980 revision reminded commanders that the memorialization program was intended to "honor deceased heroes ... of all races in our society" and to "present them as inspirations to their fellow soldiers, employees, and other citizens."²⁰

No other changes were made to AR 1-33 until 2006. In this most recent version of the regulation, the Secretary of the Army is clearly named as the final approving authority for the entirety of the Memorial Program. The 2006 version of AR 1-33 also discourages renaming but does acknowledge that renaming may become appropriate and briefly outlines such a process. The updated regulation allows an installation to be named after any "deceased distinguished individuals" except Presidents, Chiefs of Staff, and generals of the Army (five-star generals).²¹ Finally, in 2008, Army Directive 2008-03 authorized the Secretary of the Army to dedicate "facilities" to living soldiers or their spouses in exceptional cases.²²

Clearly, how the Army views the naming of Army posts has changed over the last 180 years. Nonetheless, the Army's policy regarding installation names is highly reactionary, preferring to maintain the status quo when and wherever possible. For example, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, meets neither the criteria General Batchelder wished to establish in 1893 nor the criteria of ARs 15-190, 1-30, or 1-33, taking its name from a Native American word which means "place of thunder."²³

The Army policy discouraging the renaming of posts was almost certainly written with an eye toward the Confederate posts and their surrounding communities. The two orders, one declaring that post names should be uncontroversial and the other declaring that changing names was "seldom appropriate," clearly indicates that Army leadership wishes to avoid controversy and will act in seemingly contradictory ways to sidestep it. Regarding Confederate-named posts, the Army seems to believe the converse of the saying, "Any press is good press." In this case, the Army's motto might be, "All silence is good silence."

While the Army discourages renaming posts, it also intends the names to honor "all races" and serve as inspiration to the various citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand, however, how posts named after those who fought to preserve the institution of



Ft. Benning under construction in 1918. (*Wikipedia*)

slavery, honor or inspire African Americans and others mindful of questions of race and ethnicity. Additionally, because the Army does almost nothing to instruct soldiers regarding the namesakes of Army installations, it seems likely that at some time in the past Army leaders saw contradictions in those installations named for Confederates, but wanting to avoid controversy, made a conscious decision to make the naming of Army posts a non-issue by simply remaining silent. The question becomes, therefore, how do we explain why so many posts bear the names of Confederate generals?

Currently, eight U.S. Army posts bear the names of former Confederate Army officers. All are in the states of the former Confederacy and were established less than eighty years after the end of the Civil War in response to either World War I or World War II. While posts were established in the North and West during the world wars, the Army preferred southern locales because the warmer climate allowed for year-round field training exercises.²⁴ Each post was established independently of the others and has a unique story. But common themes run throughout the creation of each post that help us understand the existence of U.S. Army posts bearing the names of men who fought to destroy the Union.

Fort Benning is located south of Columbus, Georgia, sprawling across the Chattahoochee River into Alabama. When the United States entered the First World War, Gen. John J. Pershing demanded

the creation of a new infantry and machine-gun school. While the War Department chose the site for the new school, local groups such as the Rotary Club, Confederate Veterans, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), lobbied for the new post to be named after Brig. Gen. Henry Lewis Benning. It was UDC member Winnifred Moore Minter who presented the written proposal to Secretary of War Baker and members of Congress.²⁵ Benning's daughter, Anna, took part in the official opening ceremonies of Camp Benning in December 1918, raising the American flag over the new post and participating in a celebratory parade.²⁶ In a speech given in 1975, Louise Jones Dubose recalled that her grandmother, "a completely unreconstructed rebel," upon seeing Anna Benning in the parade riding behind a large United States flag, "cried out, 'Tina Benning, I'm ashamed of you—riding down Broad Street behind that old rag,' and she pointed her finger at the stars and stripes."²⁷

Fort Bragg was named after North Carolina native, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg. Like Fort Benning, Fort Bragg was created in response to World War I. Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, the Army's Chief of Field Artillery, sought a location that would allow for better training of artillery soldiers and testing of new artillery weapons and equipment; thus, Braxton Bragg's natural selection as the post's namesake due to both his North Carolina origins and service as an artillery officer. The sparsely populated area, adequate rail lines, and a climate that allowed for year-round training, convinced Snow and Army chief of staff Gen. Peyton March that the Fayetteville, North Carolina, location was ideal.²⁸

Honoring Robert E. Lee, Fort Lee is located, three miles east of Petersburg, Virginia, with much of the installation located upon the ground Union and Confederate soldiers fought over during the siege of Petersburg.²⁹ Like Forts Benning and Bragg, Fort Lee was



Ft. Gordon in 1918. (*Fortwiki*)

created as a mobilization and division training center for World War I.³⁰ Area locals welcomed the construction of the installation, deriving civic pride from the camp, as well as recognizing the economic benefits of having a military installation as part of the community. Additionally, local residents envisioned Camp



Col. Andrew D. Bruce. (Wikipedia)

Lee as serving a vital purpose in “the healing of sectional wounds in a way that rhetoric and patriotic gestures never could.”³¹

The first Camp Gordon, named in remembrance of John Brown Gordon, was also established in response to World War I, near Atlanta. One historian called this first Camp Gordon the “focus of Atlanta’s wartime patriotic spirit.”³² At war’s end, however, the camp became superfluous, and by 1921 Camp Gordon was closed and the land sold. Today the Peachtree-

DeKalb Airport occupies most of the original Camp Gordon.³³ In 1941, Camp Gordon was resurrected, this time near Augusta. The second Camp Gordon was used for a variety of purposes during the war, including training infantry and armor soldiers, serving as a prisoner of war camp, and military prison, or disciplinary barracks.³⁴

Located twenty miles southeast of Fredericksburg, Fort A.P. Hill has the smallest population of the Army posts named for Confederate officers.³⁵ While its population is small, Fort A.P. Hill occupies almost 76,000 acres, making it, geographically, the sixth-largest military installation on the East coast, and is a key training area for units in the region.³⁶ During World War II, the post served as a training area, and in 1942 Fort A.P. Hill was a staging area for Operation Torch’s Task Force A, commanded by George Patton.³⁷

Fort Hood came into existence as a reaction to the success of German tanks throughout Europe during the early years of World War II. The Army needed an area where infantry soldiers and officers could be trained to fight tanks and other armored vehicles. Local political and business leaders lobbied hard for the post, with their efforts rewarded in January 1942 when the Army announced that the home of the new Tank Destroyer Technical and Firing Center would be based at Killeen.³⁸ Col. Andrew D. Bruce chose to honor Confederate Gen. John B. Hood by naming the post after him.³⁹ Apparently, Bruce sent the secretary of the Tank Destroyer Center to the local library in search of possible names for the new post. The library’s offerings were meager, but Hood’s name was the one most frequently found, thus securing his name for the installation.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Hood’s audacity and aggressive manner fit the image Bruce wished to instill in the armored soldiers he would train and

lead.⁴¹ The Confederate general's son, Col. (Ret.) John Bell Hood, was present on 18 September 1942, when Camp Hood officially opened.⁴²

Fort Polk is located in west-central Louisiana, about 45 miles from Alexandria, 150 miles from Baton Rouge, and 250 miles from New Orleans.⁴³ The post was established in 1941 as an infantry training location for World War II and covers nearly 200,000 acres.⁴⁴ The post is named in honor of Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, the so-called "fighting bishop," who served for a time as the commander of the Confederacy's Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.⁴⁵ Like many military posts established during World War II, Fort Polk was closed when the war ended. With the beginning of the Korean War, Fort Polk was reopened, but was once again closed at the end of the conflict.⁴⁶ In 1961, the post was reopened yet again, this time permanently, in response to the Berlin Crisis.⁴⁷

The land for Fort Rucker, situated in the southeastern corner of Alabama, was acquired by the Federal government in 1935, as part of a New Deal project, and received the nickname "Bear Farm" when a government employee, frustrated by repeatedly explaining what the government planned on doing with the land, finally stated, "They're going to raise bears out there; it's going to be a bear farm."⁴⁸ In July 1941, the War Department announced that the Bear Farm had been selected as the site for a new army post, designated the "Ozark Triangular Division Camp."⁴⁹ In 1942, the War Department announced that the new post would be named Camp Rucker in honor of Col. Edmund W. Rucker, commander of the famous Rucker Legion and the last surviving brigade commander of the Confederate Army when he died in 1924.⁵⁰

It is also interesting to note which Confederate generals the Army has not honored with installation names. The most obvious omission is Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. If A.P. Hill is worthy of a post, then certainly Jackson is as well. There is, however, already a Fort Jackson among the list of U.S. Army posts. Built in Columbia, South Carolina, the installation is named in honor of President Andrew Jackson.⁵¹ Lt. Gen. James Longstreet is another notable exclusion. Jeffrey D. Wert believes "Longstreet, not Jackson, was the finest corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia; in fact, he was arguably the best corps commander in the conflict on either side."⁵² Many Southerners, however, have never forgiven Longstreet for his "betrayal" of the Confederacy when, after the war, he advocated cooperation with the Republican Party and even accepted a government position in New Orleans from Ulysses S. Grant.⁵³ Additionally, as the Lost Cause developed, Longstreet became the scapegoat for the Army of Northern Virginia's defeat at Gettysburg.⁵⁴



Camp Rucker in 1945. (Wikipedia)

Jubal Early served as a corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia as well, and his importance in establishing the Lost Cause might lead some to expect a post to be named after him. Early remained far too unreconstructed after the war, however, serving a self-imposed exile in Mexico and Canada from where, at one point, he wrote, "I have got to that condition, that I think I could scalp a Yankee woman and child without winking my eyes."⁵⁵

Three other Confederate generals bear mentioning—Joseph Johnston, J.E.B. Stuart, and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Each of these men has been passed over for rather understandable reasons. Johnston is forgotten because his cautious, defensive style of fighting was unpopular in the 1860s and remains so today. Stuart lacks recognition because there is a Fort Stewart in Georgia, named after Revolutionary War Brig. Gen. Daniel Stewart.⁵⁶ While the names are spelled differently, their pronunciation makes it next to impossible to name posts after both men. And finally, Forrest remains one the most romanticized Lost Cause heroes of the Civil War, but his infamous ties to the Ku Klux Klan make him completely unacceptable for memorialization.

The first reason for this support of the reintroduction of the Army to the South is economic. The building and manning of posts created jobs and the introduction of soldiers and their paychecks meant a

dramatic shot in the arm to local economies. One must also remember that when Forts Gordon (reestablished), A.P. Hill, Hood, and Rucker were created in the early 1940s, the nation was still recovering from the Great Depression. The building of Army posts, which meant jobs and an influx of dollars, was met with widespread approval.

A second reason for the general support of the establishment of Army posts in the South was a sense of patriotic duty. There is a generally held belief that the Spanish-American War did much to achieve sectional reconciliation. In 1887, John Brown Gordon himself stated, "I have sometimes thought that I would be willing to see one more war, [so] that we might march under the stars and stripes, shoulder to shoulder, against a common foe."⁵⁷ Paul H. Buck, among the first to suggest the Spanish-American War helped to heal the old wounds of the Civil War, wrote, "when it [the Spanish-American War] subsided a sense of nationality had been rediscovered, based upon consciousness of national strength and unity."⁵⁸ Gaines M. Foster argues the Spanish-American war so successfully healed sectional wounds that, "Southerners who sought to both vindicate the Confederate soldier and to reunify the nation might have staged the Spanish-American War if it had not come along when it did."⁵⁹

Whether or not the Spanish-American War truly allowed Southerners to resolve conflicting U.S. and Confederate patriotisms, many viewed the war as such an opportunity, and it probably did achieve much in reconciling North and South.⁶⁰ Additionally, the war exposed Southerners to military posts in the former Confederacy; temporary installations for the training, equipping, and organizing of the hastily assembled military forces were established throughout the South. The largest two were Camp Alger, at Falls Church, Virginia, and Camp Thomas, named for Union Maj. Gen. and Virginia native George H. Thomas, located on the Chickamauga Battlefield Park.⁶¹ While none of the Army posts established for the Spanish-American War were long-lasting, they did begin the process of acclimating Southerners to the reintroduction of federal troops on Southern soil, a process completed with the onset of World War I and the creation of the first Confederate-named posts in 1917.

Finally, there is no evidence of any significant controversy or debate surrounding the creation of Confederate-named posts from either the African American community or white Northerners angered by the prospect of honoring the leaders of those who attempted to split the nation. This is hardly surprising, however. In *Race and Reunion*, Blight writes of the silence with which the African American community reacted to the unveiling of the monument to Robert E. Lee in Richmond in 1890. Some black leaders, like Frederick

Douglass, did condemn the monument, but more common were reactions similar to that of John Mitchell, editor of the *Richmond Planet*, who wrote that African Americans “had a perfect right to ‘keep silent’ about the monument.”⁶² If the black community chose to remain silent in 1890, how much more silent would it be in 1917 after twenty-seven years of Jim Crow’s further entrenchment?

The lack of complaint from Northern whites is not surprising either. By the early twentieth century, the Lost Cause, reconciliation, and Northern accommodation of Southern Civil War memory had become the order of the day. If the Lost Cause was instrumental in helping to speed reunion between the sections as Foster argues, it did so at the expense of honestly exploring the causes of the Civil War, and focused instead on the shared valor of soldiers, regardless of whether they wore blue or gray. What the South had fought for became insignificant; how the South had fought became all consuming.⁶³ An understanding of the Civil War based on this matrix left any discussion of the appropriateness of Confederate-named posts completely irrelevant.

While the naming of Army installations after Confederate officers raises questions, the naming of posts for Union officers would seem, on the other hand, a natural, almost obligatory, action. If posts should be named for “departed heroes distinguished for brilliant and grand achievements in the service of the Republic,” as General Batchelder suggested in 1893, then certainly the U.S. Army of the Civil War must have provided a few such heroes.⁶⁴

While there are two posts named for Union officers in recognition of their Civil War service (Forts Sill and Meade), it is far more interesting who posts are *not* named after. The most important Union generals are completely unrepresented: Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan, and George Henry Thomas. All proved vital to the Union victory and all were involved in pivotal battles that saw the defeat of all of the memorialized Confederates. This is not to say that these four generals were perfect, without blemish or controversy, but in the end, they won. Yet it is the victors who remain unhonored.

The fact that these men lack memorialization is due to several factors. The first is, as previously noted, that Civil War memory seems to carry far less weight in the North. A second reason, one that is closely tied to the first and has been previously mentioned, is the tradition of the Lost Cause. Because of the Lost Cause, the leaders of the Confederate armies are often portrayed as enormously skilled; they only lost due to the overwhelming industry and manpower of the North. The inverse of this is potentially the assertion that



The 349th Field Artillery at Ft. Sill, 1942. (Wikipedia)

Northern generals were not very capable and the fact that the war lasted so long is proof of their incompetence.

The final reason for a lack of Army posts named after Union generals is the exigencies of history. At some point in time each of these men did have a military installation named after him. The unforeseen turns of history brought about the

closure of each of these posts while allowing other posts to remain active. Camp Thomas was created during the Spanish-American War in Georgia for the training and transportation of soldiers bound for Cuba. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were also honored, only to have the locations of their memorials forgotten, or at least misplaced. We see in the examples of posts named after Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas a trend of closing posts named after Union generals, while posts named after Confederate generals seem to be much more resilient.

Since the Department of Defense's first Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) in 1988, six Union-named posts have been closed—Fort Sheridan (1993), Fort Wingate (1993), Fort Ord (1994), Fort McClellan (1999), Fort Sherman (1999), and Fort McPherson (2011)—while only one Confederate-named post—Fort Pickett (1997)—has been closed during that same period. The various BRAC Commissions cited financial reasons for the closing of these posts—for example it was estimated that closing Fort McPherson would save the Department of Defense \$257,000,000 over a twenty-year period—revealing once again that finance remains among the most important concerns in regard to Army posts, and that naming posts after Confederate heroes was not and is not vital to the acceptance of Army installations in the South.⁶⁵

The fact is Southern communities that received Army posts wanted the Army there. Even the few dissenters, mostly small farmers forced to sacrifice their land to the federal government under the authority of eminent domain, were motivated by financial concerns, not ideology. Those not forced to abandon their land almost universally welcomed Army installations and the accompanying

economic benefits. In fact, these communities were so eager for the financial windfall of an Army post that they actively campaigned for Army posts. It is clear, therefore, that these posts did not *need* to be named after heroes of the Confederacy. At most, recognition of Confederate generals was a polite nod to the white members of these Southern communities. Because naming posts for Confederates was not a necessity, and previous posts built in the South during the late nineteenth century were named after Union generals, it stands to reason that there was a shift in the popular memory of the people of the United States during the early twentieth century. This shift was caused by the growth and acceptance of the Lost Cause, which remains influential in popular culture today.

Despite the continuing progress of Civil War scholarship, the Lost Cause and its variants continue to influence the country's understanding of the war. Part of the reason for the resiliency of such misinterpretations is the endorsement of the Lost Cause that the United States government continues to provide through the continued existence of Army posts named for Confederate generals. Post naming is a unique form of memorialization because of the direct involvement of the federal government in approving names and thus legitimizing the Confederate cause. The inclusion of Confederate sections within Civil War cemeteries may be the only other form of memorialization that gives a similar validation of the Confederacy.

Along with endorsing the Confederate cause, Confederate-named posts also endorse the men they honor. Again, the Army's memorialization program is intended to "provide lasting honor and to pay tribute to deceased Army military ... personnel with records of outstanding and honorable service" and to "present them as inspirations to their fellow Soldiers, employees, and other citizens."⁶⁶ While the regulations outlining these requirements were written after the Confederate-named posts were established, the continued existence of these posts implies that their namesakes meet the requirements the Army has since established for post naming. Therefore, the Army, and by extension the federal government, declares that the Confederate officers honored by post names are men of "outstanding and honorable service" who should serve as "inspirations to their fellow Soldiers ... and other citizens." Honoring Confederates is difficult to reconcile with the fact that these men made war against the United States. The honored Confederates may have been "good" men—a moral question rather than a historical one—but the regulation does not demand that honored individuals be morally good. Instead, it requires honored individuals to have honorably served the Army and the United States. Confederate officers cannot be viewed as having

provided honorable service to an Army and country they attempted to destroy.

Finally, Army personnel honored with post names are supposed to serve as inspirations to their fellow soldiers and citizens. It is difficult to understand how these men, who fought to protect slavery, serve as inspirations to African American soldiers and citizens today. Yet in naming, and perhaps more importantly, maintaining Confederate-named posts, the federal government serves as an advocate for slavery and those who sought to rupture the country. It requires a romantic reading of the Civil War to conceive of these Confederate-named posts as anything other than an insult to the memories of those who fought and died to preserve the nation and destroy slavery. It is especially insulting to the 200,000 African Americans who served in the U.S. military during the Civil War. Surely no one in the Army or the national government today would publicly endorse such beliefs, but it is an understanding of the Civil War based upon the Lost Cause that allows the military's and the nation's leaders to overlook such blatant conflicts.

The Civil War preserved the Union and helped end the slavery of African Americans. For a time, Reconstruction sought to incorporate African Americans as full and equal members of the nation. The end of Reconstruction saw the U.S. government abandon African Americans in favor of a united white America. The Lost Cause gained influence due to the North's belief that reconciliation made it preferable to forget the Civil War's lessons, while the South seized the opportunity to shape public memory. It was during this time, because of the Lost Cause, that the U.S. Army named posts in honor of Confederate heroes. But now, more than 150 years after the Civil War ended, perhaps it is time to honestly evaluate the lessons of the Civil War and Reconstruction and consider the consequences of the chosen path. An important first step will be the elimination of Confederate-named Army posts.

ENDNOTES

1. David Blight's, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* is often viewed as the standard by which all other works addressing Civil War memory are measured. In *American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era*, investigates the role of popular writers in shaping Civil War memory. In *Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America*, Kirk Savage explores the role of statuary memorialization. William Blair examines how memorial and decoration days were used to cement the power of white Southerners in *Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865-1914*. John Neff, in *Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of*

Reconciliation, argues that memorialization served to divide rather than unite and that rapid reunification of the sections after the Civil War best served the North's needs, even at the expense of African Americans. Caroline Janney's *Burying the Dead but not the Past: Ladies' Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause* is important for its focus on the role of women in the South's remembrance of the Civil War. Barbara A. Gannon investigates the crossing of racial boundaries in the Grand Army of the Republic in her work, *The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic*. Finally, Gary Gallagher analyzes Civil War remembrance in art and film in *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War*.

2. David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 4.
3. Early crafters of the Lost Cause argued that Southern leaders did all in their power to avoid the dissolution of the Union, and that once the North forced the Southern states to exercise their "constitutional right of secession," Davis and other Southern leaders did everything possible to "avert war, stood purely on the defensive, and made as purely a *defensive* fight for sacred principles and rights as the world ever saw." John William Jones, *The Davis Memorial Volume: or Our Dead President, Jefferson Davis, and the World's Tribute to His Memory* (Richmond: B.F. Johnson & Co., 1889; reprint, Nabu Press, 2010), p. 196. Gary W. Gallagher has referred to efforts to remember the Civil War as the great Northern victory that eradicated the scourge of slavery from American shores as the "Emancipationist Cause." Gary W. Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know About the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 29. An interpretation of the war as fought primarily to preserve the union of the United States has been referred to as by Gallagher as the "Union Cause," by John Neff as the "Cause Victorious," and by Barbara A. Gannon as the "Won Cause." Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten*, 25. John R. Neff, *Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 8-9. Barbara A. Gannon, *The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 7. Gallagher and Blight describe one further interpretation of the Civil War, one Gallagher calls the "Reconciliationist Cause" and Blight refers to as the "reconciliationist vision." This remembrance of the Civil War is essentially a re-envisioning of the Lost Cause, presented in a manner so as not to offend Northern whites and diluting any significant lessons to be learned from the sectional conflict. Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten*, p. 33. Blight, *Race and Reunion*, p. 2.
4. The plaque on the memorial reads: "Died for state rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The people of the South, animated by the spirit of 1776, to preserve their rights, withdrew from the federal compact in 1861. The North resorted to coercion. The South, against overwhelming

- numbers and resources, fought until exhausted. During the war, there were twenty two hundred and fifty seven engagements; in eighteen hundred and eighty two of these, at least one regiment took part. Number of men enlisted: Confederate armies, 600,000; Federal armies, 2,859,132. Losses from all causes: Confederate, 437,000; Federal, 485,216.”
5. Luther Hanson, e-mail message to author, 10 September 2012. Such a policy never existed. Several installations, such as Forts McClellan, Meade, and McPherson, were named after Union generals and built south of the Mason Dixon Line.
 6. In Robert W. Frazer, *Forts of the West: Military Forts and Presidios and Posts Commonly Called Forts West of the Mississippi River to 1898* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), p. xxi.
 7. *Regulations of the Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on the 17th of February, 1881*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881), p. 40.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. Exec. Doc. 1, Pt. 2, serial 3198, pp. 219-220.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
 11. *Circulars and Bulletins of the War Department Issued between February 15, 1881, and December 31, 1915*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 172.
 12. *War Department Memorandum No. 400-15-1*, 7 November 1946.
 13. *Army Regulation 15-190: Boards, Commissions, and Committees: Department of the Army Memorialization Board*, 30 March 1949.
 14. AR 15-190, 20 August 1951, p. 1.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 16. *Army Regulation 1-30: Administration: Department of the Army Memorialization Program*, 8 December 1958.
 17. *Army Regulation 1-33: Administration: Memorial Programs*, 1 February 1972.
 18. *Army Regulation 1-33*, 23 September 1975, p. 2.
 19. *Army Regulation 1-33*, 1 November 1979, p. 2.
 20. *Army Regulation 1-33*, 15 December 1980, p. 3.
 21. *Army Regulation 1-33*, 30 May 2006, pp. 1-4.
 22. *Army Directive 2008-03 (The Army Memorial Program)*, 20 October 2008.
 23. Dan Cragg, *Guide to Military Installations*, 6th ed. (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000), p. 18.

24. William S. Pugsley, *Imprint on the Land: Life before Camp Hood, 1820-1942* (Austin: Prewitt and Associates, Inc., 2001), p. 12.
25. Peggy A. Stelpflug and Richard Hyatt, *Home of the Infantry: The History of Fort Benning* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), p. 8.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
27. Louise Jones Dubose, "Women in Columbus, 1828-1928," Louise Jones Dubose Papers, Columbus, GA, 1975.
28. One hundred seventy families occupied about seven percent of what became Fort Bragg. The U.S. government paid these families \$6 million for their land. "Fort Bragg History," <http://www.bragg.army.mil/Pages/History.aspx> (accessed 16 January 2013).
29. Cragg, p. 253. Tim O'Gorman and Steve Anders, *Fort Lee, Images of America* (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2003), p. 7.
30. Cragg, p. 253.
31. O'Gorman and Anders, p. 7.
32. deQuesada, p. 101.
33. Sean Joiner, Gerald Smith, and Robert Anzuoni, *Fort Gordon, Images of America* (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2009), p. 7.
34. Alejandro M. deQuesada, *A History of Georgia Forts: Georgia's Lonely Outposts* (Charleston: The History Press, 2011), p. 143.
35. United States Department of Defense, "Installation Summary: Fort A.P. Hill," UNT Digital Library <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc21422/> (accessed 12 February 2013).
36. Cragg, p. 249.
37. "Installation Summary: Fort A.P. Hill."
38. Odie B. Faulk and Laura E. Faulk, *Fort Hood: The First Fifty Years* (Temple, TX: The Frank W. Mayborn Foundation, 1990), pp. 31-34. Despite hard times accompanying the Depression and the fact that the area was ill-suited for agriculture, three farmers took their own lives rather than abandon their property. William S. Pugsley, *Imprint on the Land: Life before Camp Hood, 1820-1942* (Austin: Prewitt and Associates, Inc., 2001), pp. 8-9, p. 139, and p. 148.
39. Faulk and Faulk, *Fort Hood*, p. 39.
40. Richard L. Powell, email message to author, 12 September 2012.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Faulk and Faulk, p. 58.

43. United States Department of Defense, "Installation Summary: Fort Polk," UNT Digital Library <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc21480/> (accessed 11 February 2013).
44. "About JRTC & Fort Polk: History," http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/JRTC-Polk_NEW/sites/about/history.asp (accessed 11 February 2013). "Installation Summary: Fort Polk."
45. Terry L. Jones, "The Fighting Bishop," *The New York Times*, 10 October 2012.
46. "The Fighting Bishop" and "About JRTC & Fort Polk: History."
47. "Installation Summary: Fort Polk."
48. Val L. McGee, *The Origins of Fort Rucker* (Ozark, AL: The Dale County Historical Society, Inc., 1987), pp. 47-50.
49. The attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the Army speeding up the acquisition of additional land. Eventually, 325 families were forced off their land when the federal government invoked eminent domain. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-112.
50. Rucker was promoted to brigadier general near the end of the Civil War, but the commission officially conferring the rank did not reach him until after the war. *History of Alabama and Her People*, vol. II (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1927), p. 548, and McGee, p. 92.
51. Cragg, p. 217. It is a violation of AR 1-33 for an Army post to be named for a U.S. president.
52. Jeffrey D. Wert, *General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1993), pp. 405-406.
53. Jeffrey D. Wert, "James Longstreet and the Lost Cause," in *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 129.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
55. In Gary W. Gallagher, *Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995; reprint, 2010), p. 10.
56. Cragg, p. 95.
57. Huber W. Ellingsworth, "Southern Reconciliation Orators in the North, 1868-1899" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1955), p. 77.
58. Paul H. Buck, *The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), p. 306.
59. Gaines M. Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865 to 1913* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 145.

60. During the Spanish-American War several former Confederate generals received commissions as general officers in the United States Army. Fitzhugh Lee, Robert E. Lee's nephew and a Confederate major general, was commissioned a major general of volunteers and after the war was added to the retired list of the Regular Army. Matthew C. Butler and Thomas L. Rosser, also Confederate major generals, were commissioned as a major general of volunteers and brigadier general of volunteers, respectively. None of these men saw combat, but Joseph Wheeler, a Confederate lieutenant general, did. Commissioned a major general of volunteers, Wheeler served as a division commander in the V Corps and at the Battle of San Juan Hill reportedly yelled to his men, "We've got the damn Yankees on the run!" Wheeler retired as a brigadier general from the Regular Army in 1900. James M. Powles, "Civil War Veterans of Both Sides Fought in the Spanish-American War 30 Years Later," *Military History* 21, no. 1 (2004), p. 72.
61. Ivan Musicant, *Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), pp. 248-249; Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War*, 2nd ed. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1994), p. 129.
62. In Blight, *Race and Reunion*, p. 270.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.
64. H. Exec. Doc. 1, Pt. 2, serial 3198, p. 220.
65. United States Government Accountability Office, *Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating Savings Estimates* 2009, GAO-09-217, p. 42.
66. *Army Regulation 1-33*, 30 May 2006, p. 3.