

CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION? A CASE STUDY OF THE DEFINITION
OF TERRORISM

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OF TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

In 2015, China procured a formal and statutory legal definition of terrorism for the first time. Where does the definition stand in comparison to prior Chinese state conceptions? How does the definition compare to other states internationally? The standard model of comparison between states lacks cohesion—academics war over the basic definition of terrorism (or simply invent one) to cover-up a gap in the literature of Terrorism Studies. The weakness is mirrored on a global scale, where no consensus-level definition of terrorism has been reached. Often, the focus is on actor/action senses of the phenomena, and not a legalistic definition. Despite the lack of consensus regarding terrorism, I will evaluate the general definitions in international organizations, conventions, regional agreements, and individual countries, and compare these to China's definitions. Centers of socialization, chiefly supra-national organizations such as the United Nations, international organizations, treaties, etc. are often forums of exchange and deposit for accountability between States and defining terrorism—these organs are my data source. I do not evaluate, however, the outcomes of how states and organizations define terrorism, focusing exclusively on the definitions themselves. Through this analysis, I hope to reach several conclusions: 1) identify trends in definitional composition between and among States; 2) identify China's own path of definitional evolution; 3) compare China's evolution internationally to gain insight into either China's definitional socialization or resilience to potential international norms.

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INTRODUCTION

Despite a well-documented history of domestic security laws that violate international conventions, international media erupted into a firestorm in late-2014 when it was revealed China had drafted a new counter-terrorism law. Predictably, various media outlets and human rights groups decried the draft as “dangerous” for a traditional set of reasons: Chinese expansionism, new room for human rights violations, and a dangerous vagueness.¹ However, how realistic are these claims? Did China simply rename its domestic attacks on Uyghurs after 9/11 to avoid human rights criticism? Was there anything revolutionary about the new law beyond a statutory provision defining terrorism? This paper deals directly with those questions by considering China’s history in defining terrorism. Contrary to earlier assessments, this paper concludes China’s Counter-Terrorism Law is *not* only expected, but further aligned China with the international community, suggesting socialization with specific international norms.

In Chinese law, the concept of terrorism, despite being a non-native political term, has roots as early as the 1979 Constitution, but began to gain formal legal footing in 1997, with an even-quicker development following 9/11. Terrorism is an exogenous expression and concept to China, historically characterized as “counter-revolutionary” crimes against the ruling elite, or earlier simply crimes against the emperor (Wong, 2008). Li Enshen (2016) sums-up the situation as:

Given that terrorism was essentially unheard of in China prior to the 1980s, China did not incorporate terrorist crimes into its domestic legislation until 1997. Those who arrested for

¹ Excellent examples can be found from the South China Morning Post <<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1647945/pla-could-be-used-fight-terror-abroad>>, Human Rights Watch <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/20/china-draft-counterterrorism-law-recipe-abuses>>, and Amnesty International <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/china-draconian-anti-terror-law/>>.

terrorist, separatist, and/or extremist acts were often charged with the crimes of "disrupting public order," "endangering state security," or other individual crime stipulated in the 1979 Criminal Law (e.g., crimes of causing explosions or hijacking motor vehicles (2016, p. 355).

Following 9/11, the Chinese government followed the rest of the international community in ordering a penal structure against terrorism, with key amendments to the Criminal Code in 2001² and 2011.³ Additionally, China acceded to major regional and international agreements, partnering to combat the threat of global terrorism,⁴ with attention drawn to the need to combat terrorism

² Amendment (III) of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑法修正案(三)) (2001). Article 120 (I) is added to the Criminal Law, outlining penalties for those funding "a terrorist organization" or anyone who "commits terrorist activities" (资助恐怖活动组织或者实施恐怖活动的个人的).

³ Amendment (VIII) to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑法修正案(八)) (2011). Article 66 is amended to punish "recidivism" of terrorists, those violating national security, and gang members (危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪、黑社会性质的组织犯罪的犯罪分子，在刑罚执行完毕或者赦免以后，在任何时候再犯上述任一类罪的，都以累犯论处).

⁴ In total, China has acceded to over a dozen broad-spectrum, open-membership treaties and conventions. These include: 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage Convention or Montreal Convention), 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention), 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention), 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention), 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Airport Protocol), 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Maritime Convention), 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol), 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives Convention), 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing Convention), 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention), 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), and 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing Protocol). See: *The United Nations Treaty Collection Website for a comprehensive list of accessions, signatures, and dates.* <https://treaties.un.org/>

before and after a formal adoption of a definition of terrorism into the Criminal Code.⁵ The recurrent theme throughout this paper will be: China has continued to socialize by adopting broad-spectrum changes to criminal law and state policy, eventually leading to 2015 (effective 2016) when China adopted standing international norms of defining terrorism into statutory law.

In 2015, China procured a formal and statutory legal definition of terrorism for the first time:

For the purpose of this Law, “terrorism” means any proposition or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes upon personal and property rights, or menaces state authorities and international organizations, with the aim to realize political, ideological and other purposes.⁶

Where does the definition stand in comparison to prior Chinese state conceptions? How does the definition compare to other states internationally? The standard model of comparison between states lacks cohesion—academics war over the basic definition of terrorism (or simply invent one) to cover-up a gap in the literature of Terrorism Studies. The weakness is mirrored on a global scale, where no consensus-level definition of terrorism has been reached. Often, the focus is on actor/action senses of the phenomena, and not a legalistic definition. Despite the lack of consensus regarding terrorism, I will evaluate the general definitions in international organizations, conventions, regional agreements, and individual countries through coding for ten frequently-occurring standards. The goal through the coding is to repeat the process with respect to China’s definitions, and identify potential convergence. Centers of socialization, chiefly supra-national organizations such as the United Nations, international organizations, treaties, etc. are often forums

⁵ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues concerning Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work (全国人大常委会关于加强反恐怖工作有关问题的决定) (2011). Defined terrorism prior to 015/2016, but it was not formally part of the Criminal Code.

⁶ Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法) (2016).

of exchange and deposit for accountability between States and defining terrorism—these organs are my data source. Through this analysis, I hope to reach several conclusions: 1) identify trends in definitional composition between and among States; 2) identify China's own path of definitional evolution; 3) compare China's evolution internationally to gain insight into either China's definitional socialization or resilience to potential international norms.

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCING TERRORISM STUDIES: A PROBLEM WITH DEFINING TERRORISM

Terrorism Studies, or the wholesale study of the phenomenon of terrorism, is a relatively new field. With most of the research in the body of literature authored post-9/11, many structural weaknesses have yet to be worked-out. The greatest being the lack of consensus with defining terrorism. Despite having a rich study of actors, actions, and consensus, scholarly infighting has paralyzed the field on old data. Newer, increasingly practical data sources such as law are a better fit to the study, given terrorism's native home being in the legal sphere. I propose creating a new methodology for comparing state definitions of terrorism by consensus. To accomplish this, I combine the academic consensus approach with the legal discourse's data of law to generate standards of comparison, rather than complete definitions.

Terrorism Studies, as a field, has yet to agree upon a cohesive definition of terrorism. The practical result of a diversified field of international legal definitions is that one country may claim anti-terrorist security measures are justified under a broad definition of terrorism, leading to human rights violations. Scholarly considerations, while less intense, carry long-standing research concerns that skew and limit the field toward narrow theses, often highlighting the constant

contestation over definitions of terrorism (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015).⁷ On one side of the spectrum, Terrorism Studies represents a field plagued with practical research constraints, unable to grapple with state secrets and interstate disagreement (e.g. Young & Findley, 2011; Freilich, Chermak, & Gruenewald, 2014). Conversely, Terrorism Studies' recent (13 years) empirical strength, collaboration, and new data show promise to less-skeptical parties (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015). Exemplifying the issue is the debate over whether to debate weakness within the field and how to debate the debate over weakness (Bell, Schlesinger, & Laqueur as cited in Schmid, 2004).⁸ However, general weakness in and of itself is an empty concern—the impact of weakness is what should be worrisome. The most pronounced weakness and side-effect of a lack of cohesion within the field of Terrorism Studies remains an inability to amicably define terrorism.

Defining terrorism in both law and policy serves as a point of focus, both in terms of a country's prosecutorial methodology for punishing terrorist acts as well as building a strategy to pre-empt and combat terrorists. However, a country's definition of terrorism matters differently to different audiences—when asking a regular person on the street, one might an answer relating to

⁷ Some of the key works attempting to answer this “health” assessment are: Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1988); Clark McCauley (ed.), *Terrorism Research and Public Policy* (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Edna Reid, “Evolution of a Body of Knowledge: An Analysis of Terrorism Research,” *Information Processing & Management* 33, no. 1 (1997): 91–106; Andrew Silke (ed.), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London: Routledge, 2004); Monica Czwarno, “Misjudging Islamic Terrorism: The Academic Community's Failure to Predict 9/11,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 7 (2006): 657–678; Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), *Mapping Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2007); Richard Jackson, Marie B. Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (eds.), *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2009); and, Alex Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (London: Routledge, 2011). Andrew Silke & Jennifer Schmidt-Peterson's work, *The Golden Age? What the 100 Most Cited Articles in Terrorism Studies Tell us*, provided this list (2015, p. 10).

⁸ Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) also list reasons explaining the disunity, choosing to focus upon methodological issues. They isolate: moral relativism, conceptual overlap, and conceptual stretching (2004).

“civilian deaths” or “explosions,” while asking a lawyer may illicit a recitation of statutory law, leading to a discussion of munitions, methods, and motive. The narrative remains consistent across the globe: everyone, from academics to regular folk with access to an outlet to express an opinion, owns a definition of what constitutes a “terrorist” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009; Schmid, 2004, p. 378).⁹ Explaining the differences in answers are the four discourses terrorism can be defined and discussed: academic, legal, public, and the terrorist actor (Schmid, 1992). The academic discourse is the approach most familiar to research, often seeking understanding in how a terrorist has been defined and how terrorists should be defined in the future. However, the approach isn’t uniform and contains several prominent strains dealing with defining terrorism.

Generally speaking, the three approaches to defining terrorism in academia are: the action-sense approach, the actor-sense approach, and mapping consensus among researchers.¹⁰ On the state level, definitions take a similar approach, but are often couched through defining either specific acts constituting terrorist crimes, or associations with groups. The first two academic approaches, in many respects, are the two main “veins,” while the consensus mapping approach tries to make interdisciplinary sense. Action-sense approaches seek to understand the standards constituting terrorism instead of trying to identify terrorists with special focus paid to understanding the targets and audience of an attack, and the attack’s behavioral underpinnings

⁹ Google hits on definition of terrorism"

	October 4, 2004	January 27, 2005
1. "definition of terrorism"	6,070 hits	2,310,000 hits
2. "definitions of terrorism"	230,000 hits	856,000 hits
3. "definitions terrorism"	232,000 hits	867,000 hits
4. "definition of terrorism"	2,040,000 hits	82,400 hits
5. "terrorism definition"	2,050,000 hits	2,250 hits
6. "terrorism"	9,580,000 hits	21,200,000 hits

¹⁰Beck and Miner defined this separation (2013, p. 837).

(Lizardo, 2008, p. 92; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009, p. 33; Bergesen, 2007; Goodwin, 2006; Tilly, 2004). The academic goals of the actor-sense approach are to understand both the underlying factors causing terrorism's emergence (such as environment and political factors) as well as designate "who" a terrorist is *en lieu* of what terrorists do—typically requiring a focus on groups (Gibbs, 1989; Lizardo, 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009). However, both the actor and action-sense approaches feed a narrative of searching for a definition instead of settling upon one, always searching for new modes and modules to plug-in to a newer and more-academically palatable definition. Consensus mapping remedies part of the problem by presenting a definition *de lege lata*, despite continued data recycling.

Academic consensus approaches, while exhibiting strength through embracing a wide-variety of perspectives, have suffered from data incest, inviting criticism for either oversimplification or under-utilization of key aspects of terrorism's definition. The problem lies in the data examined thus far—examining only other academic definitions, without including extra-academic data. Alex Schmid & Albert J. Jongman's seminal 1988 work, *Political Terrorism: Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases Theories, and Literature*, set the bar for most work attempting to consolidate numerous academic definitions of terrorism (Blackbourn, Davis & Taylor, 2013, p. 242). The work defines terrorism as:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of

demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.¹¹

The widely-cited definition¹² is often criticized either for severe vagueness or for exhibiting a piecemealed, standardized approach (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). An answer to the incestuous over-application and reapplication of the same academic data is to start looking elsewhere: at law and policy. Through seeking a consensus-based definition of terrorism based-upon law instead of academic definitions, this paper contributes toward changing the conversation regarding academia's data sourcing, without seeking a definition so much as a point of comparison though standards.

The nativity of terrorism to legal discourse makes law a far-better source of data in understanding how terrorism is defined as opposed to how an academic may or may not view the term. Legal or “state” discourses—typically divided into common, criminal, administrative (policy), and civil law, both nationally and internationally—are the modes states, lawyers, and other legal organs take in defining terrorism. Academics have begun to slowly introduce legal data into scholarly consensus methods, but focus narrowly on small-scale country comparison studies and not global definitional consensus (e.g. Schmid, 2004; Blackburn, Davis, & Taylor, 2013). These introductions accelerated along with the rest of the field of Terrorism Studies, when academics sought to understand the range, scope, and approaches of the treatment and prosecution of terrorists (Acharya, 2009; LaFree & Ackerman, 2009). Eventually, the ideal dataset would be to generate a “Global Counter-Terrorism Database,” but research has only entered the preliminary

¹¹ Even this definition has been amended since its publication, with one of the more-recent iterations found here: <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-terrorism-definition/html> (Schmid, 2012)

¹² I encountered very few works that did *not* either cite this work or a later inception of the work from the same authors.

proposal stage (Shor, 2011). In order to construct an international narrative of terrorism's legal development, this paper contributes to the literature identifying legal convergence in comparative country studies by adding China's formal legal definition, comparing the definition internationally, and also giving a lens to view the definitions by—an international consensus method of looking at terrorism focused on law supplemented with policy.

To have a stable basis of study, law must be the source of comparison because unlike China where legal reform is in a relative height, criminal law changes far-less frequently than state policy dealing with terrorism. Much of this instability is directly attributable to issues traditional issues of politics, such as: political figureheads changing, departments of government evolving, and public anxiety controlling both the evolution of and inception of policy. Often, rightist political parties act to strengthen terrorist policy regimes in the aftermath of elections following public anxiety following terror attacks (Huddy et al., 2005), straining stable policy examinations (*Gibson, 2006; Gibson, 2008; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011 in Peffley et al., 2015*). Departments of government and political parties will take to labeling opposition as “terrorists” both formally and informally (Zeidan, 2006; Beck & Miner, 2013). With the typical features of departmental evolution, labeling, and oppositional anxiety extant, China is a unique case-study in the proliferation of research on policy because China (modern) was governed heavily by policy-driven “campaigns” prior to the 1990's legal reforms, contains only one party capable of holding power, and has transformed into a law-based system. In China, unlike other states, a policy regime without stable legal code made defining terrorism unsurprisingly difficult.

SCHOLARS AND DEFINING CHINA'S TERRORISM

The literature surrounding China's relationship with defining terrorism is meager—China is portrayed as a major international player, influential UN Security Council roadblock, and

potential future target of terrorism. However, very little literature exists examining China's domestic definitions of terrorism and how the definitions developed independent of the international arena. Human rights-oriented research and scholars examining Terrorism Studies have called specific attention to China's treatment of the country's religious and ethnic minorities, chiefly the Uyghurs, using a critical lens to interrogate the application of policy. While useful to consider, the critical lens provides a context without a pre-textual understanding of "what" terrorism is in China prior to 2015. Domestic law must also be re-contextualized despite the limited literature available discussing terrorism—there is now a law on the books to be examined.

Contemporary literature on China's terrorism policy in the context of ethno-religious repression studies, specifically concerning the treatment of Xinjiang and the Uyghur people, explores the policy implications of how religion (Islam) and Uyghur identity have been impacted by China's counterterrorism policy. In Xinjiang, academics define terrorism within the context of broad-spectrum human rights abuses and discounting the scale of the issue, looking at the effects of law instead of the law itself. While nearly all state-identified terrorist activity in contemporary China has taken place in Xinjiang, scholarly consensus that is the normative and daily political activity of Uyghurs is done under strict repression, with wide-spread disapproval of the Central Chinese Government (Bovingdon, 2014, p. 40; Bovingdon, 2010; Tschantret, 2016). Through multiple "Strike Hard" (*dafa*) campaigns, and orchestrated state repression of ethnoreligious identity, the tumult occasionally spurs violence against governmental organs, but rarely targets civilians (Boehm, 2009, pp. 68-69; Roberts, 2012, p. 13). However, the lack-of transparency regarding terrorism of the Chinese state, coupled with a change in rhetoric regarding the risks and

associations of Uyghur “separatists” following 9/11 (Roberts, 2012; Pokalova, 2013),¹³ makes it difficult to determine what is and is not an actual *act* of terrorism. As pointed out earlier, China is a study of similar issues plaguing the field of Terrorism Studies—limited area access, unreliable media reporting, state secrets preventing access to prosecutions and detentions of terrorist suspects, and purported propaganda. While the determination and focus of specific acts of terrorism are difficult, by focusing on legal definitions of terrorism rather than applications, we measure consistent changes in documentable policy rather than a situational analysis which can be incomplete.

Domestic legal examinations of Chinese anti-terrorism have failed to capture an effective and consistent definition of terrorism because of a focus on policy instead of law. An effective and consistent Chinese terrorism definition would be widely used among scholarship, reflect legal norms, and provide a base-line source of comparison. Instead, as is endemic and reflective of Terrorism Studies, definitions of domestic terrorism in China attempt to define terrorism within the ever-changing context of policy, such as: comparative punitiveness (Li, 2016),¹⁴ campaign-style justice to rule of law transformation (*ibid*),¹⁵ and the confluence of regime transition and state capacity (Fu, 2012; Vicziany, 2003). Among the select studies examining legal development

¹³ According to Elena Pokalova (2013), the world had very-little knowledge of Xinjiang and Uyghur violence prior to 9/11, and China regarded the domestic conflict as a ‘separatist’ issue. She argues China orchestrated a global P.R. campaign, coinciding with the anti-jihadi/al-Qaeda (anti) movement, trying to identify Uyghur Islamic identity with the global jihadi movement—with great success. For further discussion, see: Pokalova, E. (2013). *Authoritarian Regimes against Terrorism: Lessons from China. Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 6(2), 279–298.

¹⁴ Punitiveness, or the severity of punishment, was found to be *greater* in the post-campaign justice era (where large military deployments and mass-line social projects ruled) than in the rule of law era (Li 2016, pp. 348-349).

¹⁵ “...during the 1980s and the most of the 1990s, the campaign-style justice against terrorism was in effect directed by Party policies rather than state laws. In many policy statements and official speeches, stringent state controls were prescribed as the principal means to address the concerns about Uyghur separatist activity and Islamic-based terrorism in Xinjiang” (Li 2016, p. 355).

looking exclusively at law (e.g. Boehm, 2009; Li, 2015; Fu, 2005; Li & Verhoeven, 2015), only one puts forth a concrete definition of terrorism (Li & Verhoeven, 2015, p. 909), despite overwhelming calls for reform (Boehm, 2009, pp. 117-118).¹⁶ Effectively ending debates over how China defines terrorism, the 2015 Counter-Terrorism law has opened-up a new gap in the literature: how did China get to 2015? This paper argues China's relationship with the international community has so strongly influenced domestic policy, China's international socialization has produced a very "global" definition of terrorism. International Socialization Theory is the mechanism through which this change occurred.

AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION

The theoretical underpinnings of International Socialization Theory (IST) are not unlike the study of group and organizational socialization. If one pictures a country as a child entering a group/family of the international order, and gradually becoming accustomed to the norms of said family, you understand the basic tenants of IST.¹⁷ Treated largely as a metaphor, the most-concise and simple definition I rely upon is: "the process by which states internalize norms originating elsewhere in the international system" (Alderson, 2001, p. 417). The process is far-more difficult to measure, and can best be accomplished through identifying standards to assess the degree of socialization.

¹⁶ Li & Verhoeven (2015) offer a definition born from a comparative review between Beijing, Hong Kong, and Macau. Owing to Hong Kong's and Macau's colonial past, both have separate legal structures from the central PRC, with both Special Administrative Regions already having comprehensive counter-terror regimes.

¹⁷ The metaphor of a child's interactions is frequent in IST. For example, In Kai Alderson (2001), "We all know what internalization looks like when we are speaking about individuals: a child has internalized a social norm when he or she no longer needs to be told what to do..." (p. 418) and Johnston (2007), "Child socialization involves a child developing tastes, likes, and dislikes...though social interaction first with the family... (p. 5).

An effective, but impossible source to verify would be identifying the actual source of China's domestic terrorism definition. However, absent honest and revelatory interviews with high-ranking statesmen,¹⁸ the degree of legal internalization from a non-native source would be difficult. Legal internalization is a frequently cited mechanism for measuring the degree of international socialization (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 1994; Alderson, 2001; Goodman & Jinks, 2004). The process of internalization, however, is far-more complex: states can be driven to adopt law by virtue of their standing (global power), proximity, coercive factors, or simple choice (Johnston, 2007; Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). Proximity and global standing factors are the most-relevant to China, given the state's growing international integration and status as a potential superpower. However, IST points toward looking at the probable outcome of recent and passed legislation—that the definition came from somewhere else and was thus “transplanted.”

This paper assumes the existence of legal transplants as an extant phenomenon, but that stance is not without controversy. Legal transplants, and the study therein, like international socialization, are heavily dependent on factors such as: timing and occurrence, elites, sources, and other socio-economic conditions (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Markovits, 2004). Some post-modernists question the fundamental assumptions outright, dismissing the study, labeling all law as “socially determined” and describing analysis as “a function of the interpreter's epistemological assumptions, which are themselves historically and culturally conditioned” (Legrand, 1997 in Markovits, 2004, pp. 95-96). Legal transplants can be measured and compared, such as in the works of Alan Watson (1993) and Jeffrey Reeves (2016), who assume “savvy lawyers” and academics frequently influence the governmental adoption of global legal principles.

¹⁸ I say states “men” purposefully, as China is notoriously insulated to women in positions of leadership in the post-Mao era.

A SOCIALIZED CHINA?

Assuming the existence of legal transplants, the importance of describing what a “socialized” terrorism legal transplant might look like is paramount. I incorporate Ann Kent’s (2002) three-part test of socialization. The Kent test proposes a measurement of socialization specific to China and other non-liberal states: Given China’s wide-participation in global international organizations, three standards can measure the socialization of a legal principle:

“China’s readiness to redefine its actual interests, including its implementation of international norms in domestic law and practice; China’s preparedness to renegotiate its sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressures; and the degree to which China shows a readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of organizational participation (Kent, 2002, p. 349-350).

The first standard is easily measured through tracking the changes in China’s preferential nature for defining terrorism and the inception of a counterterrorism law, but the “international norm” requires a construction of an international trajectory—which this paper tackles by looking at the legal development of terrorism internationally over time. The renegotiation of sovereignty standard and the shouldering of costs require additional work.

The final two standards of “renegotiation of sovereignty” and “shouldering costs” must be measured through looking at China’s attitude toward domestic versus international convention. Given China’s historical proclivity to remain nativist and reject internationalization, a change in trajectory would mark a positive outcome for socialization. Mirroring this sort of examination, a pivotal study conducted by Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan (1997) examined the relationship between legitimacy and proximity by analyzing trends in adopting women’s suffrage rights. When a norm becomes important, and neighboring countries begin to adopt the norm, the likelihood the domestic government will follow-suit is high (1997). Other factors include the “bandwagon effect,” rendering domestic forces almost irrelevant due to the

degree of international pressure (Hawkins & Hums, 2002). However, states also frequently abandon the robustness of legal principles from one country to another (Goodman & Jinks, 2004, p. 652). Despite potential issues associated with robustness, the relationship aspect could be very strong between China, regional organizations, and other broadly-scoped international actors. This paper contributes to the scholarship on international socialization through a comprehensive examination of country, regional, and IGO definitions of terrorism, and how these institutions relate to and pull from one another. The key takeaway: China seems to be moving away from defining terrorism as a strictly domestic concern to include international authority, especially within the context of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Examining China's definition of terrorism in an international context requires two sets of data: compositional elements of international terrorism definitions, and the same from China. Using online research collected from the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), two international legislative databases, and one online dual-language (Chinese and English) database specific to China's own legislative procurements, I thematically coded each report and law on ten standards frequently appearing in international definitions of terrorism. Then, through thematically charting said standards by the date of first appearance, I show clustered trends in how terrorism "has" and "is" defined. Finally, I use the charted material to generate: a global international definition of terrorism, a set of regional definitions of terrorism, and a Chinese definition of terrorism. Juxtaposing China's definition to both the regional and international definitions I generate an answer whether China's definition is a product of international socialization, or an individual phenomenon unto itself.

DATA

The data I obtained from the United Nations Security Council CTC is a unique form of data due to the CTC's comprehensive coverage of most countries, the individual interpretive analysis coming from each submitting state, and the legitimacy granted from the reports coming from the highest organ of international power—the United Nations. Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) collected and compiled Country Reports on 747 submissions from 196 submitters, usually by UN Member States.¹⁹ The primary concern of the Country Reports was to assess how each state met the requirements of UNSCR 1373. In a surprising boon, the Reports also frequently cite how each party defines terrorism.²⁰ Resolution 1624 (2005) built-upon Resolution 1373, adding the requirement of reporting to the CTC measures to combat the incitement of terrorist acts and to strengthen border controls, but with far-fewer submissions and submitters, totaling 115 and 110 respectively.²¹ Given the absence of a “Global Counter-Terrorism Legislation Database” (Shor, 2011), the CTC collection is the most-comprehensive listing of international legislation and the interpretive methods countries use in defining terrorist activities. Further, many data sources of international and domestic law have been filtered by translation or come from non-native understandings of domestic institutions, inviting individual and unofficial interpretations of state statute—the state-sponsored statutory interpretation in the CTC Reports eliminated reporting bias

¹⁹ Four of the submission parties, the Cook Islands, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union, and UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

²⁰ In certain cases, such as Afghanistan's second submission, S/2003/353, the country identifies the lack of counterterrorism law and then attempts to list qualifiers that might meet a future definition of terrorism.

²¹ It should be noted that 51 of the submitters concurrently submitted documents pursuant both UNSCR 1373 and 1624. These instances were marked as, “See: S/XXXX (Year)/XXX”. For example, Andorra submitted S/2006/309 to fulfill the requirements of both UNSCRs.

on my end. Finally, given the legitimacy of government reports in general, but especially reports coming from supranational intergovernmental organs like the United Nations, the CTC Reports have the additional benefit of being a broadly-legitimated source for collecting definitions of terrorism.

Serving as both a supplement and check to legislation discovered in the UNSC Counter-terrorism Committee Country Reports, I also utilized searches and legislation in two widely circulated and utilized databases: *Legislationonline* and *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)*. I focused solely on legislation containing definitions or statutes dealing with acts of terrorism. *Legislationonline* contains legislative sources from 52 country collections from North America, Europe, and Central Asia. *SATP*'s legislative selection is more-limited than *Legislationonline*, containing country legislative documents from six South Asian countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Each country's page has a comprehensive listing of "Acts and Ordinances," ordered by date. *Legislationonline* and *SATP* together cover most regions of the world and give a secondary check to the CTC—jointly providing limited breadth and manageable depth for a thesis project. However, a larger project could conceivably utilize other databases covering more areas and wider legislative options.

Three other supplementary sets of data I consulted were the *United Nations Treaty Collection* and Peking University's *Chinalawinfo*. I searched the UN Treaty Collection for conventions concerning the issue of terrorism, and noted each convention's membership totals. As for PKU's *Chinalawinfo*, I searched for Chinese policy and law involving terrorism in order to serve as the baseline for comparison of my study.

Other equally comprehensive (if not more so) databases exist for the purposes of data collection. However, I decided against using *WorldLII*, *HeinOnline*, *Lexadin* and *WestLaw*. The

three databases are too comprehensive for the nature of my project, offering thousands of legislative and judicial citations of the word “terrorism.” While the substantial provision of data would narrow my findings, I would spend five years doing the work. I may revisit the data in the future to strengthen the integrity my results through providing not only legislative, but also judicial opinions on terrorism specific to each country. Another practical concern was linguistics—*Lexadin* does not always contain English translation and given my limited readership of only Chinese and English, I could not use the information. Each of the comprehensive capabilities of *WorldLII*, *HeinOnline*, *Lexadin* and *WestLaw* offer future potential to researchers looking to investigate deeper into the country-specific interpretations of terrorism I code in my study. However, I decided against using those points of data.

To discover how the Chinese government approaches definitions of terrorism, I will examine China’s publicly-available statutory legal history from 1997-to-present. In doing so, I will look at the 36 laws promulgated and decisions from the National People’s Congress and Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The areas of law covered include: constitutional, government affairs, national security, foreign affairs, public security, civil law, banking & finance, post & telecommunications, culture, criminal law, criminal litigation, and judicial assistance. In limiting my selection to the highest legal authorities in China, I was able to receive the clearest national understanding of how terrorism is defined as opposed to sub-national actors, where the results in a federal system could be variable. While a thorough examination of every-level of Chinese terrorism definition and application would provide additional insight to how the Chinese state congruently (from the top-down) defines terrorism, such an examination would escape the scope of what I attempt to answer—I only want to know how national governments interpret terrorism.

COLLECTION

I rely solely on online research gathering techniques for investigating the legal definition of terrorism internationally. The most-challenging collection was through the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee website. Once on the site, the Country Reports listed fall into two categories: Resolution 1373 (2001) and Resolution 1624 (2005). I reviewed each report from each available link. I am unfamiliar with alternative methods to review the reports, as I was unable to locate any comprehensive listing, comparison, or reporting of the material. *Legislationonline* and *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)* each have individual mechanisms for gathering legislative material. *Legislationonline* allows for a “Search by Topic” on the left pane. Upon clicking the link to “Counter-Terrorism,” a selection emerges of 52 countries. Each country contains listings for: “Primary legislation,” “Secondary legislation,” “Case-law,” and “Others.” I consulted only listings under the “Primary legislation” to narrow the scope of the search. *South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)* lists 6 countries, each with a clickable drop-down menu. The “Documents” tab, when clicked, takes the navigator to the respective country’s listings of: “Acts and Ordinances” and “Papers.” While alternative methods for gathering legal information exist, the most-prevalent form of late is to utilize international legal databases, which often contain translated and easily navigable material.

ANALYSIS

I employed thematic content analysis to methodologically code and sort through data. After obtaining my legislative sources, I examined each for definitions and components of the law. Borrowing from the methodology of Alex P. Schmid (2004), I utilized ten categories to search thematically through: demonstrative use, threat, terror (population), civilians, coercion (government) tactic/strategy, communication, illegal/criminal, political character, and

psychological warfare. Each instance received a single code, but I do not account for multiple listings—only the general existence of a definition within each law. Additionally, I notate both the date of passage of the law as well as the submission (for the UN CTC documents). I did not account for any further deletions of law (repeals, reconsiderations, or court decisions), which would impact the findings. Additionally, when coding for dates, I coded all instances prior to 2001 as “2001” to show consistency through instances where the original date of passage for the countries’ domestic laws were unclear. Unfortunately, this likely served to skew data later as an average, but less-severe as one might expect, as 1/3²² of the occurrences of “2001” within the CTC/SATP/Legislationonline data were isolated to the Illegal/Criminal standard, which was triggered by either the characterization of terrorism as an illegal/criminal act, *or* the act of terrorism being codified in criminal law. In the end, I was left with 775 documents coded for ten frequently occurring standards present in international definitions of terrorism.

The analysis of the international conventions and regional agreements each filled a different analytical purpose. The conventions served as evidence for China’s compliance with international norms, such as acceding to, signing, and ratifying conventions related to terrorism. The regional agreements to which China is either a party or observer (or equivalent) functioned similarly to the CTC/SATP/Legislationonline data, where definitions were coded by standard and the first appearance of the standard within multiple iterations and policy documents of the conventions. I then compared the definitions within the regional agreements to China’s own definitions.

²² 505/1507 (to be discussed in the Analysis section)

ANALYSIS
 GLOBAL NORMS V. CHINA
 DOMESTIC CHINESE NORMS: CHANGING TERRORISM DEFINITIONS IN CHINA

Before exploring regional and international conceptions of terrorism, it is important to first establish how China, the point of comparison, views and has viewed terrorism. The background section already explains the process of legislative adoption in China, but there is difficulty in imagining the relationship between sets of law without visual representation:

Table 1: Chinese Definitions of Terrorism By: Treaty, Reporting, and Domestic Law

	Illegal/ Criminal	Demonstrative Use (Intent)	Terror (Population)	Coercion (Government)	Threat	Political Character/ Purpose	Civilians
Chinese Treaty Obligated Definition	2001	2001	2001	2001	2009	2009	2001
Chinese CTC Report Definition	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0
Chinese Domestic Definition ²³	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2016	0

As the table above illustrates, there are several competing methods through which China defined and expressed definitions of terrorism but can best be summed up in two categories: domestic and international convention. The international dimension includes both the self-reported CTC Reports, as well as treaty-obligated definitions developed through international and multi-state consultation. The domestic-sense's definition, realized through the *Counter Terrorism Law*, includes the standards of: Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), Coercion (Government), Threat, and Political Character. Many of these standards appeared in

²³ Includes *both* Criminal Code Definitions as well as Decisions issued by State Council.

other earlier decisions and treaty obligations reflecting both an evolving and standing definition of terrorism at the customary level.

The international-sense took shape beginning in 2001, through both China's CTC Reporting and accession to the Shanghai Convention. China reported as early as its 2001 CTC Submission, standards of Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s). The *Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Approving the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism (2001)* includes a definition of terrorism holding the following standards: Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), Coercion (Government), and Civilians.²⁴ The disconnect between the domestic and international zone of China's terrorism definitions could be a sign of international engagement taking priority over domestic installation of law, but it could also be a sign of general insincerity regarding terrorism as a legal institution. At least in terms of stated interpretation: China's definition of terrorism has evolved from an internationally agreed-upon definition into domestic statute. However, the trajectory is incomplete without situating the definition both substantively and longitudinally within the international sense.

CHINA V. CONSENSUS MAPPING OF TERRORISM DEFINITIONS: CTC, LEGISLATIONONLINE, AND SATP

The CTC was tasked under UNSCR 1373 (2001) with the monitoring of the implementation of the resolution, as well as assessing the needs and structures within each member

²⁴ Article 1, Section 1 of *The Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism (2001)* (<http://eng.sectsc.org/load/202907/>) defines terrorism as: "any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate population, violate public security or compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the Parties."


state of the United Nations through reporting back to the Committee.²⁵ Membership of the Committee was-and-is composed of current members of the Security Council, and was further given timetable reporting authority for state compliance.²⁶ Between the years of 2001 and 2016, 664 reports were submitted by 192 member states, with each report reflecting varying levels of state compliance and correspondence between the Committee and the member state.

Nearly all states reported some-level of conception of terrorism, while relatively few opted to not define the concept. Although not immediately clear as to why states opted to, *en masse*, engage in reporting their respective domestic definitions of terrorism, it could be attributable to the multiple sections of the resolution mandating actions, reporting, and cooperation against “terrorist acts,” incentivizing the provision of what a terrorist act “is” according to the laws and codes of each state. As a supplement to these reports, and for consistency across results, I have included the data from Legislationonline as well as the SATP.

²⁵ See: UNSCR 1373, Section 6: “Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution... ([https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373\(2001\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001))).

²⁶ *Ibid*

Figure 1: CTC, LegisOnline, and SATP Recorded Standards within Country Definitions of Terrorism



Terrorism's definition should include the standards of Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use (Intent), and Terror (Population) if one is generous and takes a majoritarian approach to defining terrorism. However, a less-generous application has only one standard, Illegal/Criminal, showing a high-degree of convergence among state definitions of terrorism. Among the data: 189 countries (98.44%) identify terrorism as an Illegal/Criminal act, 113 (58.85%) identify terrorism as having Demonstrative Use (Intent), 106 (55.21%) identify terrorism as having Terror (Population), 92 (47.92%) identify terrorism to include Threats, 83 (43.23%) identify terrorism as having a Coercion (Government) component, 39 (20.31%) identify Communication(s) as being a target of terrorism, 33 (17.19%) identify terrorism has having a Political Character/Purpose, 13 (6.77%) identify terrorism as targeting civilians, 4 (2.08%) identify terrorism as having a having a Psychological Warfare component, and 3 (1.56%) identify terrorism as having a Tactic/Strategy component. Among reporting states: there was a notable and troubling trend, wherein 1/3 of states

either did not specify a definition of terrorism or did not make clear that the act of terrorism was a crime. Some of the “lack” could be attributed to the lack in requiring the submission of a formal definition but given that many states were asked for specific statutes in subsequent review by the CTC, the definition likely would have appeared if present in domestic law.

A different set of standards emerge as having a high-degree of convergence when controlling for countries that have either no response or only respond with the standard of Illegal/Criminal—Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), Threat(s), and Coercion (Government) are all elevated to in-excess of 2/3 of states. When removing countries both non-responsive countries (4 or 2.08%) and countries *only* identifying terrorism as having an Illegal/Criminal component (66 or 34.38%), the breakdown becomes: 100% Illegal/Criminal, 92.62% Demonstrative Use (Intent), 86.89% Terror (Population), 75.40% Threats, 68.03% Coercion (Government), 31.97% Communication, 27.05% Political Character/Purpose, 10.66% Civilians, 3.27% Psychological Warfare, and 2.46% Tactic/Strategy. Interestingly, China could be said to meet *both* the non-reporting and reported definitions of terrorism. While China’s definition of terrorism evolved in multiple spheres (international and domestic) over the course of nearly two decades, and exhibited resistive factors of domestic installation, China’s international compliance was and remains clear.

Critical to showing longitudinal trajectory are both the average first year of installation of a standard, as well as the breakdown of each standard into percentage of convergence by year. Among all countries, on average, individual standards were first adopted at the following years: Illegal/ Criminal: 2001.43, Demonstrative Use (Intent): 2002.7, Terror (Population): 2002.97, Threat: 2002.99, Civilians: 2006.46, Coercion (Government): 2003.34, Tactic/ Strategy: 2003, Communication: 2003.21, Political Character/ Purpose: 2003.76, and Psychological Warfare:

2004.25. However, again, a significant proportion of countries *never adopted any standard other than Illegal/Criminal*. This breakdown of adoption and broader timing is addressed in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Percentage of Countries Having Already Adopted Standard(s) By Date of First Appearance

Standard	Percentage By Year										
	Never	2001 or Sooner	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (+)
Illegal/ Criminal	2.08%	53.13%	90.63%	96.35%	97.40%	97.40%	97.40%	97.40%	97.92%	97.92%	97.92%
Demonstrative Use (Intent)	41.15%	26.04%	39.58%	46.35%	50.52%	51.56%	54.17%	54.69%	55.21%	55.73%	58.85%
Terror (Population)	44.79%	25.00%	34.90%	40.63%	45.31%	47.40%	48.96%	49.48%	50.52%	51.56%	55.21%
Threat(s)	52.08%	21.88%	31.25%	36.46%	39.06%	39.58%	41.67%	42.71%	43.23%	44.27%	47.92%
Coercion (Government)	56.77%	15.10%	24.48%	30.73%	35.42%	35.42%	36.46%	36.98%	38.02%	39.58%	43.23%
Communication	79.69%	7.81%	10.42%	15.63%	16.67%	17.19%	18.23%	18.75%	18.75%	18.75%	20.31%
Political Character/ Purpose	82.81%	6.25%	9.38%	11.46%	11.98%	12.50%	14.58%	14.58%	14.58%	14.58%	17.19%
Civilians	93.23%	1.56%	2.60%	2.60%	2.60%	3.13%	3.65%	3.65%	4.69%	5.21%	6.77%
Psychological Warfare	97.92%	1.04%	1.04%	1.04%	1.04%	1.04%	1.56%	1.56%	1.56%	2.08%	2.08%
Tactic/ Strategy	98.44%	0.52%	0.52%	1.04%	1.04%	1.56%	1.56%	1.56%	1.56%	1.56%	1.56%

China's (1) *readiness to redefine its interests by implementing international norms in domestic law and practice* is apparent based-upon a preliminary look at when significant percentages of states first adopted standards of defining terrorism. As early as 2001, China was reporting definitional components of: Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s), which all would show as longitudinal constants consistent with global trends in Illegal/Criminal (53.13% adopted by 2001), and significantly ahead of global trends in Terror (25.00% adopted by 2001) and Threat (21.88% adopted by 2001), and Coercion (15.10% by 2001). China further bucks

international trends with the definition(s) adopted through the treaties and international agreements: Civilians (1.56% adopted by 2001), Political Character/Purpose (14.58% adopted by 2009), and Threat(s) (44.27% adopted by 2009). The standards themselves have become normative through both wide-spread usage and linguistic frequency, and China's readiness to adopt the standards into domestic and international positions meet the standard put forth by Kent. The argument becomes even-stronger when implementing the same controls from earlier—countries that have either no response or only respond with the standard of Illegal/Criminal:

Table 3: Percentage of Countries Having Already Adopted Standard(s) By Date of First Appearance; Controlling for Illegal/Criminal and Non-Responding Countries

Standard	Percentage By Year										
	Never	2001 or Sooner	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (+)
Illegal/ Criminal	0.00%	67.21%	95.08%	97.54%	99.18%	99.18%	99.18%	99.18%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Demonstrative Use (Intent)	7.38%	40.98%	62.30%	72.95%	79.51%	81.15%	85.25%	86.07%	86.89%	87.70%	92.62%
Terror (Population)	13.11%	39.34%	54.92%	63.93%	71.31%	74.59%	77.05%	77.87%	79.51%	81.15%	86.89%
Threat(s)	24.59%	34.43%	49.18%	57.38%	61.48%	62.30%	65.57%	67.21%	68.03%	69.67%	75.41%
Coercion (Government)	31.97%	23.77%	38.52%	48.36%	55.74%	55.74%	57.38%	58.20%	59.84%	62.30%	68.03%
Communication	68.03%	12.30%	16.39%	24.59%	26.23%	27.05%	28.69%	29.51%	29.51%	29.51%	31.97%
Political Character/ Purpose	72.95%	9.84%	14.75%	18.03%	18.85%	19.67%	22.95%	22.95%	22.95%	22.95%	27.05%
Civilians	89.34%	2.46%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%	4.92%	5.74%	5.74%	7.38%	8.20%	10.66%
Psychological Warfare	96.72%	1.64%	1.64%	1.64%	1.64%	1.64%	2.46%	2.46%	2.46%	3.28%	3.28%
Tactic/ Strategy	97.54%	0.82%	0.82%	1.64%	1.64%	2.46%	2.46%	2.46%	2.46%	2.46%	2.46%

China remains largely ahead of the rest of the world in adopting standards. Again, Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s) all would show as longitudinal constants consistent with global trends in Illegal/Criminal (67.21% adopted by 2001), and significantly

ahead of global trends in Terror (39.34% adopted by 2001) and Threat (34.43% adopted by 2001), and Coercion (23.77% by 2001). Through standards present in treaties and international agreements, China's definitions are ahead with: Civilians (2.46% adopted by 2001), and Political Character/Purpose 22.95% adopted by 2009). However, China's late adoption of Threat(s) (69.67% adopted by 2009) is the only instance where China fell behind the rest of the controlled countries. As early as 2005, 62.30% (nearly 2/3) of the controlled group had adopted the standard.

A second key component of Kent's first standard, *implementing international norms in...practice* encounters similar difficulty as other forms of research relating to China's treatment and prosecution of terrorism suspects—we cannot know how China treats suspects because the information is not widely available. However, if we examine the legal structure as it relates to procedural rights and protections, specifically due process rights, and how each fits within an international context, a limited scope of understanding is to be had.

GLOBAL NORMS: DEFINING TERRORISM NORMS THROUGH TREATY, CONVENTION, AND MULTILATERALISM

In this section, I utilize China's membership in international agreements as a measurement of China's international socialization. Further, I offer a unified supplement to the first section, where I compare regional agreements' language on terrorism to China's.

OPEN MEMBERSHIP INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CHINA

International conventions, whether open or regionally restricted, are one of the highest forms of international conventional and customary law. Conventional law binds states party to international agreements and customary law binds states that are *not*. Fifteen open membership international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols have been signed and adopted since 1963. I chose to focus on the 13 most widely adopted and currently in-force conventions and protocols as

a source of comparison.²⁷ Despite the widespread success in adopting the conventions, none go as far as to define terrorism, limiting the scope of conventional law. China's increasing presence in the treaty process, however, is noteworthy: the state is a party to all but one major international counterterrorism treaty.

China's international socialization begins in acceding to international conventions and treaties. China's increasing participation in international conventions, treaties, and regional organizations is well-documented, and often cited as a reason explaining China's international socialization (Panda 2006; Li 2016; In examining Table 4, the vast-majority of countries are a party to each international convention or treaty concerning terrorism. Likewise, with the exception of the Plastic Explosives Convention (1991), the People's Republic of China is a party as well.

*Table 4: International Conventions and Chinese Participation*²⁸

Treaty/Convention Name	Year	# of Parties	China Adopted
Tokyo Convention	1963	186	1979
Hague Convention	1970	185	1980
Sabotage Convention/Montreal	1971	188	1980
Diplomatic Agents Convention	1973	180	1987
Hostages Convention	1979	176	1993
Nuclear Materials Convention	1980	155	1989
Airport Protocol	1988	188	1980
Maritime Convention	1988	166	1991
Fixed Platform Protocol	1988	155	1991
Plastic Explosives Convention	1991	153	no
Terrorist Bombings Convention	1997	170	2001
Terrorist Financing Convention	1999	188	2006
Nuclear Terrorism Convention	2005	109	2010

Although China has yet to formally declare acceptance of the Plastic Explosives Convention, it has indicated an interest, indicating the only non-accessioned treaty is still an active socialization project. Designed to track and prevent the manufacturing of unmarked explosives,

²⁷ Both the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention) and 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing Protocol) have been adopted, but currently lack the signatures necessary to be in force.

²⁸ For a comprehensive listing of citations for each convention and party, see *Appendix*.

the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, more commonly referred to as, “The Plastic Explosives Convention,” was adopted at the 1991 Montreal meeting of the International Conference on Air Law, and took effect on 21 June 1998 after the 35th party ratified the agreement (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Despite not signing the initial agreement, and having yet to accede, the People’s Republic of China claimed to be actively “conducting an in-depth study” of the Convention (Wang, 2004; CTC S/2004/342). The claim was later reiterated in China’s CTC submission in response to a question from the Committee (Wang, 2006, S/2006/470). Still a non-party, China has yet to outright dismiss the Convention, signaling that the country may-yet still accede, erasing any anomaly.

MAJOR REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CHINA

In conjunction with rising global pressures in the post-9/11 era, regional agreements are likely the source of where China’s definition of terrorism transformed from international policy into domestic law. China is an observer state to dozens of international agreements, conventions, and treaties dealing with subject matter related to terrorism. Four key memberships and each respective definition of terrorism is listed below in Table 5:

Table 5: China, Regional Agreements, and Definitions of Terrorism

	Date	Illegal/ Criminal	Demonstrative Use (Intent)	Threat	Terror (Population)	Coercion (Government)	Civilians	Political Character	Chinese Status
The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)	2001 - 2009	2001	2001	2009	2001	2001	0	2009	Party
Declaration of the First CICA Summit on Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations	2002 - 2014	2002	2002	0	0	0	2002	0	Party
Declaration of the 14th SAARC Summit	1987 - 2007	1987	1987	0	0	0	2007	0	Observer
ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism	2001 - 2007	1987	1987	0	0	0	0	0	ASEAN Plus THREE (APT)

Much in the same way of other international agreements and adaptations of the definition of terrorism, each iteration of the listed international agreements adapted and changed over time. Among the listed documents, one stands out: *The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. The definitional standards between the agreement's definition and China's domestic law (as of 2016) are identical. In fact, this stands alone outside the 14 or 7.29% of countries sharing the same composition of terrorism standards as China, with China and Uzbekistan as the only SCO members sharing the same definitions.²⁹

China meets both the second and third of Kent's standards through its broad participation, negotiation, and adaptation in response to treaty pressures surrounding the definition of terrorism. Standard (2) *renegotiation of sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressures* is difficult to calculate beyond a simple "yes/no" accession to treaty and compliance question.

²⁹ Both Azerbaijan and Turkey also share the definition, but are only "Dialogue Partners" with the SCO, and not full members.

However, upon closer examination (especially of the *Shanghai Convention*), it is evident that China is engaging in sovereign renegotiation. For example, Article 9, Section 1 of *The Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism (2009)* mandates, “the following intentional acts shall be recognized as criminal offenses by all Parties, and necessary legislative measures shall be adopted accordingly...” (criminalizing specific acts of terrorism are listed). Questions of jurisdiction, perhaps the most fundamental of legal sovereignty renegotiations are also handled under the Convention, wherein Parties cede authority to international bodies and instruments under circumstances of transnational terrorist attacks.³⁰ In addition to the authority ceded in answering questions and agreeing to compliance requirements associated with UNSCR 1373,³¹ China has shown the practical step of implementing a domestic law with significant international characteristics—something that would likely not have happened if the country exhibited resistive qualities to defining terrorism.

The third standard, *shouldering both the costs and benefits of organizational participation*, indicates some sort of responsibility tied to organizational membership. Specific to organizations and conventions dealing with terrorism, China is either a full Party (carrying different levels of responsibility depending on the treaty, but certainly bound to all of the rules and regulations within), or an observer (or equivalent) which also carries responsibility. The costs are reflected in some of the previous discussion related to obligations and secession of sovereignty, but the benefits could include: stronger regional ties, cooperation on transnational issues (in this case, terrorism),

³⁰ *Ex: See Article 3.*

³¹ Could have vetoed the requirements of this Resolution, but opted not to, showing a willingness to cede both sovereignty in the decision-making process and shouldering costs associated with the Resolution.

and specific partnerships with individual states. Especially on the final benefit, China has undertaken several initiatives and agreements with individual SCO states.³²

In a larger context of socialization, China has accepted significant costs in order to join international organizations and seek legitimacy. The most-obvious example of this has been China's continued adaptation and adjusting of law to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), where significant market reforms, a collapse of state-owned enterprises, loss of industrial competitiveness, and destruction of China's ability to control its own market (Gao Shangquan in Kent 2002, p. 356; Pekkanen 2010, p. 530). Concurrently, China has also acceded to multiple international agreements in other areas of security, nuclear weapons reduction, and human rights (Wan 2007),³³ which historically had been against China's domestic interests, but the government determined them to be unavoidable and necessary (Kent 2002, p. 353). The same has happened in defining terrorism, where China has shouldered both the costs of cooperating in regional organizations, allowed the international community to lead on defining the issue (Panda 2006), and reaped the benefits of that leadership through redefining domestic issues to be in-line with international concerns.³⁴

³² Outside of the ratifications of each iteration of the SCO Convention, China has standing and formal counter-terrorism working agreements with: Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (*See: <http://en.pkulaw.cn.www2.lib.ku.edu/Search/SearchLaw.aspx>*).

³³ Wan argues that the economic reforms since 1978 "necessitated introduction of laws that meet "the international standards" and has gradually reshaped Chinese national identity. Western rights pressure on China since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident has made it necessary for Beijing to characterize its legal reform as evidence of progress in human rights" (2007, p. 728).

³⁴ It could be said that one of the "benefits" reaped by China's socialization and adoption of international standards of defining terrorism *is* the ability to redefine domestic human rights abuses, such as the ongoing abuse of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

COUNTER POINT 1: CHINA IS USING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (NORMS) TO JUSTIFY OPPRESSIVE LEGAL PRACTICE

Conventional wisdom is, with each new legal update regarding issues of security and crime, China is becoming a more punitive and ruthless regime. In the minds of critics: China is not currently undergoing socialization, but rather, is artfully using the international system and norms related to counter-terrorism to justify human rights abuses, specifically within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The argument contains three assumptions: one, China's rhetoric surrounding anti-Uyghur activity changed after 9/11 to reflect international language surrounding terrorism, but in practice remained the same (Pokalova 2013); two, China seeks to enhance state power, and using international language makes that easier (Wang 2000); and three, China is facing massive internal pressure to behave in such a way that completely undermines the socialization narrative.

It is entirely likely (and probable) that China is using and, in some cases, abusing the international system for domestic gains by the leadership (which carries implications for the due process argument in the next sub-section). In practice, while China has acceded to multiple conventions concerning human rights and terrorism, the state still mass-incarcerates, forcibly relocates, forces into re-education, and indefinitely monitors the daily lives of Uyghur people. However, practice aside, China has steadily adopted international language and definitions as it relates to terrorism, which begs the question: if China wanted to either maintain or steadily increase the volume of violence committed against Uyghur people, why adopt international norms to justify the acts? The answer: China would not do so if international social constraints had not forced China's hand.

Shortly after 9/11, broad consensus existed to redirect the fight against terrorism to a more-serious area. The UN took-up multiple resolutions and conventions to further strengthen the international community's ability to fight, defund, and prevent acts of terrorism. The result was the creation of an international hegemonic power of socialization, where the international community compelled change in states (including China). According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, "when socialization occurs, the hegemon is able to secure the compliance...without resorting to material sanctions and inducements" (1990, p.290). This point is even-stronger in the instance of China, where it retains veto-authority by virtue of its position as a Security Council member—China chose to comply with international pressure.

Much like the first standard, both (2) China's seeking of state power and (3) internal pressure can be explained by international socialization. While China's venturing toward international hegemony has been characterized as revisionist by many, others choose to identify China's pursuit of power as pushing new principles into the existing international system—creating an "Eastphallian" vision of the future, within the present Westphalian (Lo 2010). Lo contends that China's foreign policy is guided by the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," among which include:

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual nonaggression;
3. Mutual noninterference in internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit;
- and 5. Peaceful coexistence (Lo, 2010, 17).

It could be that China's pursuit of state power necessitates a social atmosphere, wherein the mutuality of many of the Principles requires communication, idea exchange, and respect of non-native standards. In the instance of terrorism, a non-native concept, China has chosen to adopt international standards instead of resisting the adoption, which flies in the face of revisionist state power arguments.

Internal pressure to change overriding the effects of socialization ignores the role that elites play within the decision-making apparatus of China's political system. The ruling elites, many having been foreign-educated, often in western elite institutions, while also exposed to "diplomatic channels and cultural exchanges" (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, p. 290), are in a unique position to take-in foreign standards of thought and rule—an exclusive phenomenon according to Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). The push and pull factors of instability, ethnic separatism, while serving as the impetus for action, do not serve as the *modus operandi* for the action. Elites make choices on how to proceed, how to rule, and how to make law based-upon what they have learned and what they know. If the history of the Cultural Revolution taught anything to current elites, it is that rule by law is a better alternative than rule by man, as not even the "human rights of a former state president, Liu Shaoqi, were not guaranteed" (Yu Haocheng in Wan 2007, p. 739).³⁵ The adoption of an internationally "accredited" definition of terrorism, in this respect, makes sense as a rule of law, foreign educated and considered phenomenon.

COUNTER POINT 2: CHINA IS NOT EXPERIENCING INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION, BUT RATHER,
A PARTICIPANT IN MULTILATERALISM

In many respects, the phenomenon of international socialization could be seen as an extension of multilateralism—a community of states coming together to reach a solution to an issue. However, the two phenomenon are distinct: international socialization in illiberal states, as defined by Kent (2006), include the standards of:

- (1) readiness to redefine its actual interests, including its implementation of international norms in domestic law and practice; (2) a preparedness to renegotiate sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressures; and (3) the degree to which a state shows readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of organizational participation (p. 349-350)

³⁵ How Xi Jinping's clearing of term limits affects these considerations is unclear as of now since he has yet to assume a third term.

Multilateralism, on the other hand, is:

In a literal sense, it means "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states." But to scholars of multilateralism, this nominal definition falls short. It "misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon that makes it distinct." In contrast to nominal multilateralism, qualitative multilateralism refers to "an institutional form which coordinates behavior among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence (Wang, 2000, 476).

To determine whether China is engaging in either multilateralism or is being internationally socialized, it is instructive to first look at the timing of China's definitional components of terrorism.

While it is true that China's participation in international organizations, specifically regional agreements, likely influenced its decision-making apparatus on the adoption of certain standards of terrorism, many standards pre-dated the international agreements through which multilateral engagement relies upon. If true, the origin point of the standard would indicate a home-grown standard at worst, but most-favorably an internationally socialized definition. As previously addressed, China reported as early as its 2001 CTC Submission, standards of Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s). Instructional to how these standards were viewed is how China's team framed the discussion: these were standards extant in other criminal statutes *framed as terrorism but not exclusively defined as terrorism*.³⁶ *The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)*, however, contains an explicit definition of terrorism. If China were participating in multilateral negotiations, one would expect the 'generalized principle' to make it into Chinese national law, but it did not.

The idea that China's conduct is occurring in a solely multilateral capacity ignores the language of the standards, which are far too widely accepted for any small network of states to

³⁶ See China's UN CTC Submissions: S/2001/1270; S/2001/1270 Add. 1.

have contrived alone. If looking at the data from the CTC alone, hundreds of states are coming together identifying similar norms, rules, and standards for the definition of terrorism, despite the many differences within. The standards reached on the individual level, to some extent, are predictable, consistent, and use similar vernacular—something that would probably not exist in a multilateral vacuum.

Finally, the timing of socialization can occur both before, during, and after an act of multilateral engagement. China is a Party/Observer to dozens of international organizations and agreements, and each state within each agreement could exhibit similar relationships.³⁷ While many states could have come together to influence China's decision-making in adopting certain linguistic characteristics in the Criminal Code, the larger force of the international community's acceptance and drove probably exceeded the push and pull of one or two conventions.

CONCLUSIONS

China has both moved closer to international standards of defining terrorism, and in some cases, gone further in clarity than many prominent international actors. If one thing should be taken away from this paper, it is that China's definition of terrorism, while new by statute, is neither new in practice nor conception. Both critical and less-skeptical parties of China's 2015/16 Counterterrorism Law can agree: China has historically defined terrorism in some capacity, and has (and continues to) commit human rights abuses. However, the definition itself can now be both situated domestically and internationally: the definitional standards within China's 2015/16 Counterterrorism Law have been extant, at the earliest 2001, but as late as 2009. The longevity of the 2001 standards, Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use (Intent), Terror (Population), and

³⁷ China alone, between the years of 1877-2000, signed 226 treaties (See: <http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/flsw/t28583.htm>).

Coercion (Government) show congruency through 2015/16, and the addition of the 2009 standards of Threat and Political Character/Purpose show a willingness to evolve further along the lines of international norms.

Initially, I predicted the international definitional convergence of how to define terrorism would mark several departures from current Terrorism Studies literature, most-notably with “civilian targeting.” Despite data from other sources showing 41% of countries and international organizations and 36% of academia include “civilians” as a target of terrorism (Schmid, 2004), my research shows this *not* to be the case—13 Countries, or 6.77% are all I could show with the available data. Further, given the absence of “civilian” targeting and “political character” from all international organizations I reviewed, excluding ASEAN, I predict prior research into academic and legal convergence projects to either be incomplete or wrong. With these findings, I anticipate generating a reconceptualization of consensus techniques searching for a definition of terrorism.

Another initial prediction I made was that China would largely fall within international norms of defining terrorism and that China’s statutory definition of terrorism would meet all elements of Ann Kent’s three-part test of international socialization. This proved to be the case. China has become a party to dozens of international terrorism conventions, been strongly influenced by foreign-trained academics within the legal system (Reeves, 2016), and continues to advocate for a greater internationalization of counterterrorism policy (Panda, 2006; Potter, 2013)—the empirical and conceptual evidence strongly argue in favor of a socializing China. Given China’s recent history in previous socializations, such as environmental law (Barresi, 2013), and China’s relative increase in power parity over the last 10 years, the conditions are ripe for China to continue socializing even beyond terrorism, which would also help to satisfy Kent’s standards. After examining these conditions, I believe not only has China socialized in the area of

terrorism but has been on a path of further socialization for decades in multiple areas—security, trade, and human rights to name a few.

Curiously, reports sponsored by the CTC *never* publicly took account for any formal standardization of laws and definitions of terrorism when reports were submitted to the body. In terms of the discipline of Terrorism Studies, this paper offers the contribution of a new definition of international terrorism by consensus *and* a case-study situating a new contribution, China, to the mix. In my opinion, the data from this study has a wide-variety of uses, ranging from applying the CTC definitions to any other country for comparison, to critical evaluations of other academic definitions.

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APPENDIX
CTC LEGISONLINE, AND SATP DATA

Country	Data Source	Type of Source	Y	DU (I)	TH	TER	CIV	CO(G)	T/S	COM	I/C	PC/P	PSY
Afghanistan	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Afghanistan	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albania	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albania	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Albania	LEGONL	REPORT	2010	2002	2010	2002	0	2010	0	2010	2002	2010	0
Albania	LEGONL	LAW	2012	2002	2010	2002	2012	2010	0	2010	2002	2010	0
Algeria	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Algeria	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Algeria	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Algeria	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Algeria	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Andorra	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Andorra	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Andorra	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Andorra	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Andorra	CTC	REPORT	2006	2006	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Angola	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	2002	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Angola	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	2002	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Angola	CTC	REPORT	2003	2003	0	0	2002	0	0	0	2002	2003	0
Antigua and Barbuda	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	0	0	0	0	2002	2002	0	0
Antigua and Barbuda	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	0	0	0	0	2002	2002	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Argentina	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Armenia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	2002	0	0	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Armenia	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	2002	0	0	0	2002	2002	2002	0

Bosnia-Herzegovina	CTC	REPORT	2006	2006	2006	2006	0	2006	0	2006	2001	2006	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	LEGONL	LAW	2015	2006	2006	2006	2015	2006	0	2006	2001	2006	0
Botswana	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Botswana	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brazil	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Brunei Darussalam	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Brunei Darussalam	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Brunei Darussalam	CTC	REPORT	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Brunei Darussalam	CTC	REPORT	2007	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Bulgaria	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	LEGONL	LAW	2010	2010	2010	2010	0	2010	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	LEGONL	REPORT	2013	2010	2010	2010	0	2010	0	0	2001	0	0
Bulgaria	LEGONL	LAW	2017	2010	2010	2010	0	2010	0	0	2001	0	0
Burkina Faso	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Burkina Faso	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Burundi	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Burundi	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Cambodia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Cambodia	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Cambodia	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0

Democratic People's Republic of Korea	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2005	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2008	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	CTC	REPORT	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Denmark	LEGONL	REPORT	2007	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Djibouti	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Djibouti	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Djibouti	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Djibouti	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Djibouti	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Dominica	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Dominican Republic	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Dominican Republic	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Dominican Republic	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Ecuador	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0

Ecuador	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Ecuador	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Ecuador	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
Egypt	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
El Salvador	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Eritrea	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Eritrea	CTC	REPORT	2007	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Estonia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Ethiopia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Ethiopia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Fiji	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2002	0	0	2002	2002	0
Fiji	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	0	0	2002	0	0	2002	2002	0
Finland	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	CTC	REPORT	2003	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	CTC	REPORT	2004	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	CTC	REPORT	2005	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	LEGONL	REPORT	2014	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	LEGONL	LAW	2015	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Finland	LEGONL	LAW	2015	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
France	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
France	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0

Honduras	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Hungary	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Hungary	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Hungary	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Hungary	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Hungary	LEGONL	REPORT	2012	2012	2012	2012	0	2012	0	0	2001	0	0
Iceland	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iceland	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Iceland	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Iceland	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Iceland	LEGONL	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
India	SATP	LAW	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
India	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
India	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
India	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
India	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
India	CTC	REPORT	2007	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Indonesia	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Indonesia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Indonesia	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Indonesia	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Indonesia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iran	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iran	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iran	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iran	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iran	CTC	REPORT	2007	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Iraq	CTC	REPORT	2001										
Iraq	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2002	0	2002	2002	0	0
Iraq	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2005	2005	2002	2005	2002	2002	0	0
Ireland	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Ireland	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Ireland	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Ireland	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Ireland	LEGONL	REPORT	2007	2002	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Ireland	LEGONL	LAW	2015	2002	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	2015	2001	0	0
Israel	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Israel	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Israel	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0

Israel	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Israel	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	0	2005	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Italy	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Italy	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Italy	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Italy	LEGONL	REPORT	2008	2001	2001	2005	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Jamaica	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jamaica	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jamaica	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jamaica	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jamaica	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Japan	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Japan	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Japan	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Japan	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Japan	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jordan	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jordan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jordan	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Jordan	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kazakhstan	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kazakhstan	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kazakhstan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Kazakhstan	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Kazakhstan	LEGONL	LAW	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	2004	0
Kazakhstan	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Kenya	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Kenya	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Kenya	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Kirbati	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Kuwait	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kuwait	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kuwait	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kuwait	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kuwait	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Kyrgystan	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Kyrgystan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Kyrgystan	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Kyrgystan	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0

Kyrgystan	LEGONL	LAW	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	2002	2002	2002	0
Laos	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Laos	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Latvia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	0	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Latvia	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	0	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Latvia	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	0	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Latvia	CTC	REPORT	2005	2002	2002	0	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Latvia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	0	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Latvia	LEGONL	REPORT	2013	2002	2002	2013	0	2002		0	2002	0	0
Lebanon	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Lebanon	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Lebanon	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	0	2002	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Lebanon	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	0	2002	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Lebanon	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	0	2002	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Lesotho	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Lesotho	CTC	REPORT	2004	2004	0	2004	0	2004	0	0	2002	0	0
Liberia	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Libya	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Libya	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Libya	CTC	REPORT	2003	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2001	0	0
Libya	CTC	REPORT	2005	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2001	0	0
Libya	CTC	REPORT	2006	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	CTC	REPORT	2006	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Liechtenstein	LEGONL	REPORT	2012	2003	2009	2009	0	2009	0	0	2001	0	0
Lithuania	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Lithuania	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Lithuania	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Lithuania	LEGONL	REPORT	2005	2002	2003	2003	0	2003	0	2004	2002	0	0
Lithuania	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2003	2003	0	2003	0	2004	2002	0	0

Mauritius	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mauritius	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mauritius	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mauritius	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mauritius	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Mexico	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mexico	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mexico	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mexico	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mexico	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Micronesia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Monaco	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Monaco	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Monaco	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Monaco	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Mongolia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mongolia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Mongolia	CTC	REPORT	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Montenegro	CTC	REPORT	2008	2008	2008	2008	0	2008	0	0	2008	0	0
Montenegro	LEGONL	LAW	2013	2008	2008	2008	0	2008	0	0	2008	0	0
Montenegro	LEGONL	REPORT	2013	2008	2008	2008	0	2008	0	0	2008	0	0
Morocco	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Morocco	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Morocco	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Morocco	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Mozambique	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mozambique	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Mozambique	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Myanmar	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Myanmar	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Myanmar	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Myanmar	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Myanmar	CTC	REPORT	2006	2006	0	0	2006	0	0	0	2001	2006	0

Niger	CTC	REPORT	2008	2003	2003	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Nigeria	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Nigeria	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Nigeria	CTC	REPORT	2007	2007	2007	2007	0	2007	0	2007	2002	0	0
Norway	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Norway	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Norway	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Norway	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Norway	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Norway	LEGONL	REPORT	2008	2001	2001	2008	0	2008	0	2001	2001	0	0
Oman	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Oman	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Oman	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Pakistan	SATP	LAW	1997	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Pakistan	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Pakistan	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Pakistan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Pakistan	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Pakistan	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
Palau	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Palau	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Panama	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	2002	0
Panama	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	0	2003	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Panama	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	0	2003	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Panama	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	0	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2002	0	0
Papua New Guinea	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Paraguay	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Paraguay	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Paraguay	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Paraguay	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Paraguay	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Peru	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	2002	0
Peru	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	2002	0
Peru	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	2002	0
Philippines	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Philippines	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	2001	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0

Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Republic of the Congo	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Romania	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Romania	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Romania	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Romania	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Romania	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Romania	LEGONL	REPORT	2008	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	CTC	REPORT	2003	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	LEGONL	LAW	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Russia	LEGONL	REPORT	2008	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2001	0	0
Rwanda	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Rwanda	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Rwanda	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Rwanda	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0	0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Saint Lucia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Samoa	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Samoa	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Samoa	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
San Marino	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
San Marino	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
San Marino	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
San Marino	CTC	REPORT	2004	2004	0	2004	0	2004	0	0	2001	0	0

Sao Tome and Principe	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Saudi Arabia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Saudi Arabia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	2001	2001	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Saudi Arabia	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	2001	2001	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Saudi Arabia	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	2001	2001	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Senegal	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Senegal	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Serbia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Serbia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Serbia	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Serbia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Serbia	LEGONL	REPORT	2012	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Seychelles	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Seychelles	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Seychelles	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Sierra Leone	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Singapore	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Singapore	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Singapore	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Singapore	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Singapore	CTC	REPORT	2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Slovakia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Slovakia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Slovakia	CTC	REPORT	2004	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Slovakia	CTC	REPORT	2005	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Slovakia	CTC	REPORT	2006	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Slovakia	LEGONL	REPORT	2007	2002	2002	2002	0	2002	0	0	2002	0	0
Slovenia	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Slovenia	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0

Slovenia	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Slovenia	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Slovenia	LEGONL	REPORT	2009	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Solomon Islands	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Somalia	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
South Africa	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
South Africa	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
South Africa	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
South Africa	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	2001	0
South Africa	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Spain	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Spain	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Spain	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Spain	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Spain	LEGONL	REPORT	2013	2010	2010	2010	0	2010	0	0	2001	0	0
Sri Lanka	SATP	LAW	1979	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sri Lanka	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sri Lanka	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sri Lanka	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sri Lanka	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sudan	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Sudan	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Sudan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Sudan	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Sudan	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	0	0	0	2001	2001	0
Suriname	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Suriname	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Swaziland	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	2003	0	2003	2003	0	0
Sweden	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sweden	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Sweden	LEGONL	LAW	2003	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Sweden	CTC	REPORT	2004	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0
Sweden	CTC	REPORT	2005	2003	2003	2003	0	2003	0	0	2001	0	0

Turkey	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Turkey	LEGONL	LAW	2010	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2010	0
Turkey	LEGONL	REPORT	2013	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2010	0
Turkmenistan	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Turkmenistan	LEGONL	LAW	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2003	0	2001	0	0
Turkmenistan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2003	0	2001	0	0
Turkmenistan	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2003	0	2001	2005	0
Turkmenistan	CTC	REPORT	2009	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	2003	0	2001	2005	0
Tuvalu	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Tuvalu	CTC	REPORT	2007	0	2007	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Uganda	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Uganda	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Uganda	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Ukraine	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	LEGONL	LAW	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2003	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2003	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2003	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2003	2001	2001	0
Ukraine	LEGONL	REPORT	2011	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2003	2001	2001	0
United Arab Emirates	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
United Arab Emirates	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
United Arab Emirates	CTC	REPORT	2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
United Kingdom	LEGONL	LAW	2000	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United Kingdom	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0

United Kingdom	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United Kingdom	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United Kingdom	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United Kingdom	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United Kingdom	LEGONL	REPORT	2007	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
United States	LEGONL	LAW	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
United States	CTC	REPORT	2001	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
United States	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	0	0
United States	LEGONL	LAW	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	2003	0
United States	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	2003	0
United States	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	2001	2001	2003	0
Uruguay	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Uruguay	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Uruguay	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Uruguay	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Uzbekistan	LEGONL	LAW	2000	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Uzbekistan	CTC	REPORT	2002	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Uzbekistan	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Uzbekistan	CTC	REPORT	2005	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	0
Uzbekistan	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	2001	2006
Vanautu	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Vanautu	CTC	REPORT	2007	0	2006	0	0	0	0	0	2003	0	0
Venezuela	CTC	REPORT	2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Venezuela	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Venezuela	CTC	REPORT	2003	2003	2001	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2001	2003	0
Venezuela	CTC	REPORT	2004	2003	2001	2003	0	2003	0	2003	2001	2003	0
Vietnam	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2001	0	0
Vietnam	CTC	REPORT	2003	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0

Vietnam	CTC	REPORT	2004	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Vietnam	CTC	REPORT	2006	2001	2001	2001	0	2001	0	0	2001	0	0
Yemen	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Yemen	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Yemen	CTC	REPORT	2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Yemen	CTC	REPORT	2006	2006	2006	2006	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Zambia	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Zimbabwe	CTC	REPORT	2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0
Zimbabwe	CTC	REPORT	2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2002	0	0