Religion and Ideology as Determinants of Contentious Politics: Terrorism and Beyond

By Ranya Ahmed

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Committee:

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Prof. Mariya Omelicheva (Chair)

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Prof. Donald Haider-Markel

_____

Prof. Alesha Doan

_____

Prof. Nazli Avdan

_____

Prof. Randall Jelks

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The dissertation committee for Ranya Ahmed certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

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Prof. Omelicheva (chair)

Date approved:

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Abstract:

This dissertation includes three independent studies that jointly consider the role of non-material factors, such as ideology and religion, in operational decisions of individuals and groups. It seeks to contribute to the vast scholarship on political contestation, which this dissertation conceptualizes broadly to include various forms of peaceful and violent political activism. The first two articles focus on terrorism as a violent form of political contestation. In the first study, I introduce a new dataset that includes over 25,000 observations and categorizes terrorist groups based on their ideology. I examine the impact of ideology on the terrorist groups' tactic choices controlling for group age and the waves of terrorism, as theorized by Rapoport (2002). Using the same dataset, the second study examines the role of ideology on the terrorist groups' target choice. Finally, the third study focuses on the role of religion and religiosity on various forms of peaceful political contestation. This dissertation finds evidence that tactic and target choices do vary by the ideology of the perpetrating group. It also finds that religions vary in their influence on the forms of political participation considered.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The three studies in this dissertation project, while written to stand alone, fit under a broader theme of political contestation. For the purpose of the dissertation, I conceptualize political contestation in a broad sense, to include both peaceful forms of participation, like joining a demonstration, and violent forms of political participation, specifically terrorism. Consistent with this understanding of political contestation, the first two studies focus on terrorism exemplifying the violence end of the spectrum of political contestation, whereas the third article explores mostly peaceful forms of political contention. All of the studies also speak to a need for careful examination of openly accessible data before its employment in research. The first study speaks to the variation in terrorist group types and how it influences terrorist groups' operational decisions. I argue that ideology is a driving force that impacts how terrorist groups choose tactics, whether those are non-discriminate like bombings or whether they discriminate as in kidnappings. The second study is very closely related to the first, as it speaks to how different terrorist group types select their targets, for example whether they attack businesses or governments. In both the first and second study, I find that there is significant evidence to suggest that terrorist group's ideology mitigates operational choices. The third study speaks to other forms of political participation, and it seeks to understand how religion mitigates decisions to participate in the political process.

There are a number of goals that this dissertation project seeks to fulfill. First, it, introduces an improved and more reliable terrorism dataset. Second, it uses open source data to classify terrorist groups into various group types, based on their ideology, and provides descriptive

statistical evidence in support of the diversity among terrorist groups. Third, it presents theoretical explanations connecting terrorist group types and operational decisions. Fourth, it considers the role of religion and other social factors on various forms of political contestation. The three articles that form my dissertation project will jointly accomplish these goals.

The basis of this dissertation is rooted in the conceptualization of political contestation. This dissertation takes the stance that political contestation varies greatly. Participating in a peaceful strike, signing a petition, or using violence as a means to alter the political landscape are all examples of political contestation. Given the variation in political regimes around the world, political participation is inevitably varied. In democracies, there are channels that allow for active political participation. Citizens of democratic nations may strike, boycott, and demonstrate publicly without the fear for their personal integrity and civil rights, while citizens in non-democracies or transitioning nations have less recourse to non-violent means of political participation. Terrorism is a means of political engagement. It is not only an option that perpetrators in non-democracies use, but it is an alternative for people who do not have access to other forms of participation, or who feel that their voices are not heard. To be clear, this study is not suggesting that terrorism is a legitimate, or even justified, means of political contestation. This study is suggesting that terrorists are seeking a political change, and that they have political goals.

In the following paragraphs, this introduction will briefly introduce each of the articles. The questions, goals, and findings of each of the three articles will be discussed.

Study 1: Terrorist Group-Types and Tactic Choice

Terrorism is a widely studied topic, but there are still many unanswered questions. The scholarship on terrorism and political violence has examined the conditions that facilitate terrorism, but it has not systematically examined the diversity among terrorist groups. This study differentiates between groups based on ideology, and then examines the impact of ideology on operational decisions, specifically tactic choice. Does ideology mitigate tactic choice? Is there variation among ideological group-types and their choice in tactic?

This study posits that ideology is the key factor in operational decisions, but it also suggests that ideology is not the only factor. Capability and target audience are also mitigating factors that drive tactic choice. Groups need resources to survive, and they need a supportive target audience so that they may continue to get resources. Given that groups have varying ideologies, resources, and target audiences, I posit that it would be overly simplistic to think that groups would all make the same operational decisions under similar structural conditions. The results in this study do support my assertion, as statistical evidence supports the study's key argument that there is diversity in tactic choice, by group-type.

Furthermore, noting the possibility of change in this relationship across time, it purports to investigate whether transnational terrorist groups' choice of tactic has varied according to the "waves of terrorism" identified by Rapoport (2002). Rapoport (2002) suggests that there are four distinct waves of terrorism[1]: (1) the anarchist wave in the 1880s, (2) the anti-colonial wave in the 1920s, (3) the new left wave of the 1960s, and (4) the religious wave beginning in 1979 and lasting until today. Rapoport (2002) theorizes that the first three waves lasted

[1] Although Kaplan (2010) disagrees, and suggests that we are currently experiencing the fifth wave, which is representative of a more extremist, xenophobic, and tribal version of terrorism

approximately 40 years, and that we may expect this current wave to also last that same amount of time. However, with the exponential developments in technology, one cannot expect this pattern to hold. Terrorist groups now have greater readily available resources in which they may recruit or fundraise. Not only does Rapoport (2002) suggest that there are four waves, but also that they are distinguished by the tactics used within each wave. He suggests that the first wave was riddled by bank robberies and assassinations, the second wave was also characterized by assassinations, the third wave consisted of hijacking, hostage taking, and kidnapping, while the fourth wave is characterized by bombings, hostage taking and assassinations. Although Rapoport (2002) does not test these assumptions, he makes a compelling argument using historical narratives. Given the limitation of the data in this study, only the presence of the third and fourth waves are examined, and there is some mixed evidence in support of Rapoport's (2002) theory.

Although this study is a step towards understanding terrorist actions, further development of this line of work may assist in producing effective counter-terrorism strategies. Finding patterns within different terrorist group types can help us understand, and eventually combat, terrorist organizations. Understanding how group ideology and group survival effect operational decisions can help us anticipate the use of specific tactics.

Study 2: Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection

Like the first study, this study seeks to answer whether ideology mitigates operational decisions of transnational terrorist groups, but this study focuses on target selection instead of tactic selection. This study also uses the same data as the first study. Target selection is a key

operational decision that groups make, and understanding the constraining factors that help determine the targets is imperative to counter terrorist strategies. The variation among groups, their motives, goals, and capabilities, mitigate their decisions, including their targets. This study seeks to provide evidence to convey that ideology alters choices, and by parsing out groups into types based on their ideology, this may become evident. Groups are divided into nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, religious, and environmental groups.

Target selection has been a relatively understudied question in the terrorism literature, and in order to understand the relationship between operational decisions, like target choice, we need to further examine the question. Targets are only one aspect of terrorist operations, but it is an imperative one. Understanding whether ideology mitigates target choice has counter-terrorism and preparedness implications. If we can associate the likelihood of target selection by terrorist group's type, then scholars can potentially anticipate and prevent future attacks.

The targets examined in this study are comprised of six categories: (1) political, (2) civilian, (3) security, (4) business, (5) rival, and (6) infrastructure[2]. These categories will be further discussed in the data section, but they represent a broad range of terrorist targets.

[2] Political targets include any domestic or international governmental targets, including a government building, government employees, government events, and foreign missions or embassies. Civilian targets include educational institutions such as schools or teachers, journalists and media entities, NGOs, private citizens and private property, religious institutions, and tourists. These targets are unrelated to a nation's security apparatus. Security targets include attacks on the military or police. Business targets include any attacks on businesses, this includes attacks on business patrons. Rival targets are defined as other terrorist groups or non-state militias. Finally, infrastructure targets include attacks on food or water supplies, airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, telecommunication infrastructure such as cell phone towers, transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or electric substations (GTD, 2015).

This study posits, and finds, that there is evidence to suggest that differences in groups' ideologies do have an effect on target selection; an implication being that we need to continue to parse out ideology to further our understanding of terrorist actions. Mitigated by resources and opportunity, terrorist group ideology guides groups towards acts that are acceptable to their belief system. For example, I would not expect left wing groups to attack rival targets; left wing groups are generally revolutionary in nature and seek the change of a political system, thus targeting other terrorist groups would be contrary to their goals and objectives. Meanwhile, I would expect religious groups to attack other groups because they view their message as divine and worthy, while other messages pose a threat; it is essential for their message to reign supreme so threats need to be eliminated. Unsurprisingly, the results of this study indicate that left wing groups do not attack rivals, while religious groups do.

Study 3: Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation

(Co-authored with Prof. Omelicheva)

This study seeks to examine how religion influences political participation. Some scholars have argued that religion has had an undeniable impact on domestic and international political actions, while others doubt that religion has any influence. However, there has been little systematic cross-national examination of whether the effect of religion extends beyond terrorism or other forms of political violence. This study seeks to fill that gap in the literature. While many studies have considered this question, they have considered it only at the country-level. This study looks at the individual level, and the national level data, by utilizing multi-level

modeling. This provides a richer picture of the role of religion on political participation.

This study considers seven forms of political participation: (1) petitions, (2) boycott, (3) demonstrations, (4) strikes, and (5) occupy. These forms of participation provide a wide range of political actions, peaceful and violent, as well as low and high effort actions.

We argue that religion plays a substantial role in mobilizing political participation: (1) dissatisfaction with religious discrimination and under-representation are great motivators for political participation (Vüllers and Wegenast. 2011), (2) when people have grievances related to their religion, religion can become a politicizing issue and may make followers pursue political action, and (3) religious groups or organizations can be powerful mobilizing networks that promote and encourage political participation (Wiktorowicz 2003). Unlike other movements, religious movements often get supported from the state and have the potential to outlast other group types accordingly; they are less affected by shifts in public opinion (Aminzade and Perry 2001, 160). However, this is not to say that other factors are ignored. We examine a range of contributing factors including membership in non-religious group, marital status, and age.

Furthermore, while religion may mobilize political participation, different religions have different views and will therefore be likely to encourage varying forms of political participation. One cannot generalize religion and its influences, considering how religions may vary. Therefore, this study will examine a number of religions to gain a greater understanding of the variation in influence, by religion.

In line with expectations, we find that there is diversity in participation across religions. For example, we find that unlike members of other religions, Buddhists are likely to use all forms of political participation considered in this study. Interestingly, people who express high levels of political interest are less likely to engage politically (the negative statistically significant relationship is found across all models). We also find that age is negatively associated with all forms of participation. However, before discussing any of the results, this study first introduces the questions surrounding the impact of religion, outlines a theoretical framework, introduces the data and methods, and finally discusses the results.

The study uses an openly-accessible dataset, namely, the World Values Survey. The World Values Survey[3] (WVS) provides data about 113 countries from 1981 to 2014. It is a compilation of 367 surveys, and it provides a wealth of information at the individual level.

[3] World Values Survey, 1981-2014 Longitudinal Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: JD Systems, Madrid, Spain

Study 1: Terrorist Group-Types and Tactic Choice

The scholarship in political violence and terrorism has made tremendous strides in understanding terrorism, its driving forces and conditions that facilitate the preparation and perpetration of terrorist attacks. It has catalogued the types of terrorist groups and their tactics, but neglected to systematically examine the relationship between the two. This study seeks to fill this void by examining whether different types of transnational terrorist groups are more likely to employ different tactics to achieve their respective goals. Furthermore, noting the possibility of change in this relationship across time, it purports to investigate whether transnational terrorist groups' choice of tactic has varied according to the "waves of terrorism" identified by Rapoport (2002). To do this, a dataset (1970-2013) was constructed using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

Religious, nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, and environmental groups are considered in this study. By categorizing terrorist actors into these respective categories, I can delve deeper into the actions of specific groups and examine whether tactic choice differs across types of terrorist organizations. These actors have different political goals, consequently it can be expected that different types of terrorist groups are likely to be different in the choice of their tactics. Essentially, this study argues that group ideology is the driving force for a terrorist group's strategic decisions. Terrorist group ideologies offer an interpretation and response to the grievances that gave rise to the terrorist group. They inform the terrorist group's outlook and specific political goals. While Karl Marx hardly referred to the term ideology, he did write of a mechanism that incited actions by virtue of an intangible force, a thought process – a worldview (Hamza, 2016). Ideology is powerful because it is capable of shaping a unique

outlook of reality, and in that lies its great power. In isolation, however, Ideology cannot dictate operational decisions. Ideology informs decisions of the terrorist group, but whether or not the group implements them is mitigated by capability and the target audience. This paper argues that it is this process that shapes tactic choice by terrorist groups.

Although this study suggests that ideology, capability, and target audiences are the factors considered for operational decisions, Rapoport (2002) suggests that tactics are a result of a cycle, or "wave" of terrorism. He theorizes that waves of terrorism determine operational decisions, like tactic or target choices. This study will also seek to examine whether there is any empirical support for these theorizations.

Recognizing the multitude of ways in which scholars and practitioners defined terrorism, this study uses Enders and Sandler's (2000) definition of terrorism as "the premeditated use or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims". This definition is comprehensive as it includes the targeting of both combatants and non-combatants and also includes social, as well as political motives. Most notably, it encompasses two of the most common components in definitions of terrorism, the use of fear via violence or threat or violence, and a political aim (1988). For the purpose of this study, I examine only transnational terrorist incidents. Although most terrorism is domestic (Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle, 2009), it is a distinct forms of politically motivated violence that calls for models that are different from those employed in the analyses of transnational terrorism. (Enders and Sandler, 2000). Transnational terrorism speaks to a different motivation than domestic terrorism, the message or signal groups are intending to send are not localized to only one public, or one country.

Transnational terrorism, in this study, is guided by the definition provided by the GTD. The GTD present a number of criteria to declare an incident as international, and if it possesses any of these characteristics, it is classified as international (GTD Codebook, 2014). Firstly, if any of the victims are of another nationality than the country attacked, secondly, if any of the perpetrators are of a different nationality than the location of the incident, and thirdly, if the group responsible organized the incident from a country other than the country attacked (GTD Codebook, 2014).

This study contends, and finds, that there are important distinctions in terrorist groups' behavior based on their ideology and that it is imperative we reintroduce this ideological context to studies of terrorism. The new dataset used in this study allows scholars to parse out differences among groups. This study provides evidence suggesting that group-types vary in their choice of tactic, and this carries with it implications for targeted counter-terrorism policies.

This study will first review the theoretical literature pertaining to the division of groups into group-types, the role of ideology, and the significance of tactic choice. Within this review, a number of hypotheses concerning tactic selection by the various group-types will be put forth. A series of maximum likelihood models and post-estimation graphs will test the assertions made in this study. Finally, this study will discuss the implications of the results as well as the study's limitations.

Categorization of terrorism group-types

This study examines nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, religious and environmental groups, but other scholars have offered narrower or more expansive typologies. I will first outline the categorization utilized in this study, and then I will examine how other scholars have categorized groups.

Nationalist/separatist groups are groups that seek to overtake the system of government currently in place, or they are groups which seek the autonomy to form an independent nation of their own. For example, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), which was established in 1963, pursued the goal of Papuan autonomy from Indonesia. The group attacked Indonesian military targets and took hostages to further their goal of desired autonomy. Left wing groups are defined as groups with left-leaning and revolutionary ideologies; these groups generally support a socialist or communist ideology, and they may seek to undermine the unequal distribution of wealth in a given nation. For example, the Shining Path is classified as a left wing group. The group sought to overthrow the Peruvian government by means of violence to establish a new form of government that represented the working class people. The Shining Path used a plethora of tactics, including bombing, armed assault and assassinations. Right wing groups defy left wing concepts like communism and socialism, and lean toward fascist, and at times, racist ideology. An example of a group in this category is the Vietnamese Party to Exterminate the Communists and Restore the Nation. This group was founded upon the belief that communism in Vietnam needed to be disavowed. This group assassinated a member of the Vietnamese government, and also perpetrated other attacks in support of their anti-communist message. Religious groups are groups claiming to be guided in their actions by their given religion, for example Daesh as led by Islamic extremism or the Jewish Defense Organization as

led by Jewish extremism. Environmental groups are defined as groups who are guided by their missions to end perceived animal cruelty or ecological destruction. For example, the Animal Rights Militia (ARM) is an animal rights group that seeks to improve the conditions of animals, including seeking an end to animal testing. The group committed numerous bombings, but they have not killed a single individual.

Groups may espouse more than one ideology, and, therefore, can been classified in more than one type. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, has held both nationalist/separatist and religious goal and, therefore, is an illustration of the mixed group type. The IRA seeks an independent and unified Ireland, but is also guided by Catholicism. Groups like the IRA are coded more than once in all of the respective categories. There were no groups in the dataset that were classified into more than two group types based on their ideology.

This categorization was selected because ideology is the focus of this study, specifically with regards to tactic selection. However, like the other classifications put forth, there are flaws with this categorization. It does not consider sub-groups of groups; while this study considers right wing groups, it does not grant right wing subgroups of “racist” or “anti-communist” oriented groups. The categorization selected was broad intentionally, in order to provide a general frame of understanding of the variation among groups.

Other scholars conceptualize group-types in a variety of ways. Vasilenko (2005) classifies terrorist organizations into five types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, (4) nationalist, (5) religious, and (5) criminal. Although no typology can hope to perfectly categorize groups, Vasilenko’s exclusion of environmental groups is notable. Environmental groups are less

numerous than other group types, but they do perpetrate devastating attacks, and to ignore those would be willful exclusion of a group type that has been active in the past, and continues to be active currently. For example, this study examines over a thousand groups, and even though 15 of those are environmental, they are responsible for 479 incidents. Further, Vasilenko separate nationalist and separatist group, while this study categorize them together. Vasilenko (2005) asserts that the difference in aims is enough to separate the categories, but Kaplan (2010) offers a counter argument that nationalist movements are generally associated with separatist or autonomous claims, and it is therefore logical to group them together. For example, as previously noted the OPM sought an independent Papuan state, but this was rooted in the national tides of the Papuan people who feared that their culture and traditions were being threatened by wider Indonesia. This group illustrates that national tendencies often have separatist goals.

Cindy Combs (2000) suggests that we should break down groups into types based on their tactic choice, target choice, and group organizers. This leads to a more unique set of group categories, including sanctioned terror, which involves the leadership of state political officials, targeting the population and using organized repression as a tactic (Combs, 2000). Other typologies of terrorism classified under Combs' requirements are mass terror, dynastic murder, random terror, focused random terror and revolutionary tactical terror (Combs, 2000). Combs' typology is not solely based on goals or ideology, and that adds yet another layer of context in understanding terrorism. However, categorizing groups in this manner is not always possible given information limitations and it does not allow scholars an opportunity to examine the relationship between tactic choice and ideology.

Boaz Ganor (2008) also takes a unique stance on classifying terrorist group types; instead of using ideology, he suggests a model that gauges terrorist motivation and organizational capability to conduct attacks to classify groups. He operates under the assumption that terrorism = motivation + operational capability. He suggests that these two factors, given a terror threshold period (which accounts for a period in time where an attack is more likely) can predict terrorist attacks. According to Ganor (2008), these are the variables that limit the activities and operations of terrorist groups and they are therefore the best factors to categorize groups. Ganor (2008) lists his 5 groups A-E: group A has the motivation, in a given a period of time, but does not have the capability so they are unlikely to perpetrate an attack, but group B has motivation and capability so they are "above the terror threshold" and are likely to attack (since there is a citation in quotation marks, provide a page number for the quote). Group C has the motivation and operational capability, but their motivation is lower than their capability (Ganor, 2008). Group D has the operational capability, but not the needed motivation, and finally Group E has neither the capability nor motivation in the terror threshold period (Ganor, 2008). This is an interesting way to place groups into types. it is highly focused on counter terrorism and preparation, but this is only useful if information is available and accurate.

Wilkinson (1976) has yet another variation of terrorist group types. He lists four types of groups, (1) criminal, (2) psychic, (3) war, and (4) political. He defines criminal groups as those who use terror as a means to material wealth. Psychic groups are led by extreme, fanatical religious beliefs. War groups are described as groups who will attack without abandon to defeat an enemy, and political groups are described as groups who will use systematic violence to

achieve their political goals (Wilkinson, 1976; Poland, 1988). Wilkinson's (1976) typology is not limited by this initial classification. He also lists sub-group characteristics. For instance, political groups are further divided into three sub-types: (1) revolutionary, (2) sub-revolutionary[4], and repressive (Wilkinson, 1976). This typology system that Wilkinson created pays great attention to detail, and conveys the complexity of categorizing terrorist groups. However, because it has so many components and layers, it requires a great deal of information about groups - information that is generally inaccessible.

How and why does ideology matter?

Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find that terrorist lethality is associated with ideology and organizational size. Ideology guides the goals of an organization, and in order to fulfill those goals, groups will be strategic in their choice of tactic. A nationalist/separatist group will be greatly concerned about public perception given their appeal for autonomy, but a religious group who has motives that extend beyond a nation's borders may use less discriminate tactics.

At the root of this argument is the need for context and the admission that terrorist groups are far more complex than initially theorized (Master, 2008). The inclusion of more detail, such as terrorist ideology, adds another piece to the puzzle and furthers our understanding of terrorist actions. Master (2008) finds that terrorist groups behave differently with regards to the number of acceptable casualties. This suggests, like Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find, that ideology plays a role in behavior. In essence, Master (2008) argues that terrorists think rationally about their attacks, and will only perpetrate attacks with acceptable casualty numbers. This is not to

[4] Defined as terrorism that is used for "political motives other than revolution or government repression"

say that terrorism is appropriate or acceptable, but rather that the perpetrators view it is a logical, rational course of action given their grievances, resources, and their goals. Post (2005) also suggests that ideology is a driving force for terrorist groups, and that categorizing them into types is key to understanding their behavior. Post (2005) divides groups into social revolutionaries, nationalist/separatists, and religious fundamentalists, and he explains that these groups are inherently different from one another, because although they may all resort to violence, their motivations, their goals, and their structures vary. Terrorist groups may be united in their willingness to threaten or commit violence, but their motivations vary, so it would be an oversimplification to classify them as a unified bloc.

When considering the role of ideology in informing non-violent political participation, it may be constructed with the input of the broader public via voting or demonstrations (Bawn, 1999). In many circumstances, especially in democracies, there are outlets for participation, whereby members of the public may pursue the realization of their worldviews within their political system. Bawn (1999) suggests that ideology is a "construction of 'us'"; it is a culmination of values and beliefs and leads to formulation of a group identity. Although this form of identity is formed with the direct input of the public, one could also suggest that violent participation, namely terrorism, is formed with indirect input of a target audience. Terrorist groups understand that they need the support for their cause, so they incorporate their grievances with those of the target audience. Their target audience being the individuals and communities they hope to inspire, recruit, and continue to receive financial support from. This leads to the creation of an identity, or of an "us" as Bawn (1999) puts forward. I argue that groups create these identities by establishing their ideology and showing their audience that they are a

collective, or an "us", and that they are fighting on their behalf. Bawn (1999) also argues that ideology allows for a greater platform, since an ideology formulates individuals' worldview. It also informs their decisions on matters that do not directly affect them, "Ideology is an enduring system of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances. For example, if an abortion clinic opens in my neighborhood, my ideology tells me whether I should (a) picket the entrance, (b) write a check to support the clinic, or (c) do nothing" (Bawn, 1999 pages for the quote!). This may also be applied to terrorist groups. Consider once again, the example of the OPM. The OPM's objective was an independent, autonomous state for the Papuan people. Even though they wanted secession, they were also very concerned with non-ethnic Papuans migrating to their areas. Supporters may have joined the cause of the OPM because of secession, but their support also informs their opinion of migration – as a threat. Now, a group which has one main goal, to secede, has also informed them of their view on immigration, as ideology informs people of their reaction to abortion. Ideology is expansive, and highly influential which is why this study argues the ideology is the root driver of tactic choice.

As Figure 1 shows, this study posits that ideology is the main driver of terrorist group choices, but those choices are mitigated by capability. Capability is representative of resources that groups possess; this is not limited to finances - it also includes skillsets (i.e. bomb-makers) and the continued support of target audiences. For example, the Afrkianer Weerstandsbewegig[5] (AWB) is a right wing group based in South Africa since 1973. The pro-apartheid group aims to

[5] Translates to Afrikaner Resistance Movement

disrupt political stability within South Africa. The group has a large base and target audience; the fall of apartheid did not change the entire nation's mindset. The group's supporters largely include white South Africans who believe in a divided society based on race and who believe that apartheid was the appropriate system for South Africa (TRAC, 2015). The AWB has many resources, but it has failed to establish legal or political legitimacy. The group largely uses assassinations and kidnappings as a means of political disruption. This group, although a single example, is illustrative of how ideology may be the motivation for tactic choice. Furthermore, it is illustrative of how actions are taken according to the target audience, and in accordance with the capability of the group – as kidnappings and assassinations require both resources, secondary locations, and skills. In essence, ideology drives tactic choice, but that decision is mitigated by capability and target audience.

Figure 1: Theorization of terrorist group choices

There are scholars who have addressed the importance of tactic choice, even if they do not specifically discuss the role of terrorist group types. Hoffman and McCormick (2004) suggest that terrorism is strategic signaling, and tactic choice frames a given signal. They find that suicide bombing, relative to other attack types, is an instrumental choice of tactic; it is not an expression of desperation but rather a calculated decision to signal their target audience (Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). Bloom (2004) also suggests that suicide bombing is a strategic choice, and it is a tactic choice made in a battle to outbid other terrorist groups. Although this study does not distinguish among bombing and suicide bombing, largely due to data limitations,

previous studies indicate that tactic choice matters, and it is based on a group's objectives and resources.

Given lack of available data, one cannot have a perfect indicator or measure of a group's resources, but there are other means of estimating resources, namely, time of survival. A group's age, for example, is one indicator that may shed light on the amount of resources at a group's discretion. Even though exact age is often difficult to discern given the clandestine nature of terrorist groups, one can usually ascertain whether groups survive past the one-year mark, an important milestone given that Cronin (2006) and Rapoport (2002) find that 90% of groups do not survive past one year. This study also includes a variable to examine whether groups surpass five years.

H1: Tactic choice will vary across ideological group-types

H1a: Capability, with group age as a proxy, will be a significant predictor of tactic choice

Are there "waves of terrorism"?

Rapoport (2002) suggests that there are four distinct waves of terrorism[6]: (1) the anarchist wave in the 1880s, (2) the anti-colonial wave in the 1920s, (3) the new left wave of the 1960s, and (4) the religious wave beginning in 1979 and lasting till today. Rapoport (2002) puts forth that the first three waves lasted approximately 40 years, and that we may expect this current wave to also last that same amount of time. Not only does Rapoport (2002) suggest that there

[6] Although Kaplan (2010) disagrees, and suggests that we are currently experiencing the fifth wave, which is representative of a more extremist, xenophobic, and tribal version of terrorism

are four waves, but also that they are distinguished by the tactics used within each wave; he suggests that the first wave was riddles by bank robberies and assassinations, the second wave was also characterized by assassinations, the third wave consisted of hijacking, hostage taking, and kidnapping, while the fourth wave is characterized by bombings, hostage taking and assassinations. Although Rapoport (2002) does not test these assumptions, he makes a compelling argument using historical narratives. Given the limited timespan of the data used in this study, only the presence of the last two waves may be examined.

Although there are scholars, like Rapoport, who suggest that this new wave is potentially upon us, there hasn't been a systematic study to support the argument (Crenshaw, 2000). Rapaport's choice of date for the fourth wave is oddly specific, he declares its beginnings in 1979. His definition of the other periods are much more vague. The choice of date is particularly interesting; he sets it because of Muslim based events only, even though religious terrorism does not only consist of Islamic terrorist groups. Rapoport (2002) selects this date because it was the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran, when Muslim fighters forced the Soviets out of Afghanistan, and it was the beginning of a new Muslim century according to the Islamic calendar. All of these events center solely on Muslim events; perhaps it is short sighted to consider only Muslim events. Rapoport does say that Islam is the most important religion in the fourth wave, but should Muslim events be the only determinant for the date of the wave? Blomberg et al (2011) do however find that groups who are motivated by religious goals, as opposed to more political goals, are more likely to survive the test of time.

Nonetheless, Rapoport makes a compelling argument. The historical analysis and description of the trends in terrorism tactics and ideological prevalence are theoretically sound, and this study offers one an opportunity to examine whether Rapoport's theories have any empirical basis.

H2: The third wave of terrorism will be associated with hijacking and kidnapping

H3: The fourth wave of terrorism will be associated with bombings, kidnapping, and assassinations

The role of the Internet

Terrorist organizations are inherently rational as they seek to fulfill specific objectives or goals by the use or threat of use of violence. However, this effect is mitigated by other factors, including the improvement of technology and the emergence of competition. The evolution in technology has allowed data sharing to become instantaneous, and that has consequently affected how terrorists behave. Many groups, like Daesh, have a proclivity to using twitter to inform their supporters, sympathizers, and their enemy about their acts and intentions. Not only does the expansion of the internet and technology allow for immediate sharing, it also allows terrorists to communicate and be closer to their potential recruitment pool. Technology has radically altered our ability to access information about groups that could previously be ignored in the limited news cycle of media outlets. Furthermore, the emergence of twenty-four-hour news cycles has also given terrorist groups greater opportunity to garner attention, but now, they have serious competition. The internet has not only given terrorist groups access to a wider audience and potential recruits, but it has also given them, and other groups, the ability to counter the previously dominant state narrative, "terrorism as theater" (Weimann,

2006). Operations are “orchestrated” to suit the goals and objectives of the group, including their fight for coverage and attention (Weimann, 2006). Given this appeal of terrorist theater, one could expect that the internet has encouraged less discriminate tactics, such as bombings and armed assaults. Tactics themselves communicate a message to a target audience, and the internet facilitates the distribution of that message.

H4: The rise of the internet will be associated with increases in less discriminate tactics, namely bombings and armed assaults.

Understanding tactic choice allows us to examine the actions and choices of various group-types. It also allows us to examine whether ideologies matter, or whether terrorist groups pursue the same tactics. A group is sending a very different message by bombing a public place, or by kidnapping a leader. The tactics are additional indications of the groups’ intentions and how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals. However, the goals of terrorist groups are mitigated by their resources and capabilities. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of terrorist groups do not survive past 1 year. It takes resources and skill to maintain and fund a terrorist organization so we can expect that group viability is a critical factor in predicting tactic choice. Groups cannot orchestrate a kidnapping, for example, if they do not have a secure secondary location or the ability to negotiate a ransom. It would be a mistake to treat terrorist groups as if they were a uniform block. This addition of context is imperative to furthering our understanding of terrorism.

Data and Methods

This study utilizes a new dataset that was compiled from the edited data contained in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is a publicly available dataset that collects information about terrorist incidents. Based within The University of Maryland's National Consortium for the study of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (also known as START), the GTD is an enormous effort that employs a plethora of scholars and researchers to help improve our understanding of terrorism (GTD, n.d). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially funded the GTD with a $12 million grant, and has since continued to fund the center to further research in the field of terrorism (GTD, n.d). The GTD's contributions are great, and given the growing usage of the dataset, it is especially important to improve the quality of its content.

The GTD records information about thousands of terrorism incidents (1970-2013), and it is therefore susceptible to error. I began to go through the transnational dataset, line by line, and noticed a plethora of irregularities. There were 'terrorist' groups included that were actually organized crime syndicates, not terrorist groups. For example, the 14 K Triad is listed as a transnational terrorist organization when it is an organized crime group. The triad is responsible for illegal gambling, drug trafficking, and human trafficking; the organization's key goal is financial benefit, not a political agenda. Accordingly, I would put forth that this group does not qualify as a terrorist group. There were various spellings of the same group listed, so that the group was listed twice instead of once. There were even ethnicities and nationalities listed, like "Arabs" or "Egyptians", instead of terrorist groups. The latter is not only inaccurate, but unprofessional and insensitive[7]. Therefore, I began the process of "cleaning" the data. While

[7] I did contact the GTD to inform them of these errors, but I received no response

the mistakes in the dataset are problematic, it does not render the dataset useless. Many of the groups were consequently dropped. While it is understandable that the coders were trying to place an identifying marker, i.e. “Egyptian” perpetrators, their coding scheme would instead suggest that coders mark the perpetrator as “unknown”. By far, “unknown” perpetrators commit the greatest number of terrorist incidents in the dataset. This fact, does, inevitably affect any findings because it suggests to us that while we may have a large amount of “clean” data, we are still missing information about many more terrorist incidents, so I have to be careful when interpreting any findings resulting from this dataset. Before editing, 1335 groups were identified, but after the data was cleaned, 1053 groups remained.

After the data was cleaned, the groups needed to be identified and categorized into their respective group-type. This was done with the guidance of the Terrorist Research Analysis and Consortium (TRAC)[8] and Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)[9]. TRAC and TOPs are databases containing information about a plethora of terrorist organizations. They provide a brief history and biography of each group while also indicating their ideological beliefs. At times, this is more complex because groups evolve and include additional goals to their agenda - thereby shifting their ideology. In these cases, I consulted the entire history of a group for its categorization, unless the evolution consisted of a split. For example, if a religious group changed its agenda to also include a goal of securing an autonomous region, then it has shifted from just religious to both religious and nationalist/separatist. However, if the group splintered, and the original group maintained its religious category, then it was assigned as religious. The splinter group

[8] TRAC. 2015. Retrieved from www.trackingterrorism.org
[9] TOPs. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database

was categorized as religious and nationalist/separatist. These shifts were not always accounted for in the histories provided in TOPs and TRAC, and therefore there will be some evolving categorizations that have been missed and that needs to be considered in the finding stages of the studies included in this dissertation.

Evolution is not the only complication however. Some groups have multiple political agendas and therefore fit into multiple categories. I coded groups in every category that they fit into. For example, the Basque Separatist group, ETA, is categorized as both left wing and nationalist/separatist, since their agenda and goals fit both criteria. Unlike other groups such as the Colombian Black Hand, which is only categorized as right wing. This is a coding decision based on previous literature, but I also consider it is the most appropriate course of action because it more accurately reflects the groups' agendas (Asal and Rethmeyer, 2008).

To code the group types, I created five dummy variables coded "1" if the group was defined as belonging to right wing (left-wing, etc.) ideology, and "0" if otherwise. Consequently, there were five separate dummy variables. Groups with one ideology, say left wing, would be assigned a value of "1" in the left wing variable. Groups who had more than two ideologies, were coded within both categories, for example the ETA would have a value of "1" in the left wing variable, and another "1" in the nationalist/separatist variables. I also created two variables to code mixed ideologies, given a value of 1 if they met both group-type criteria, and 0 if they did not: Nationalist/Separatist and Religious and Nationalist/Separatist and Left Wing. These two groups are the only balanced groups available that may be tested without biasing the estimates (Johnson, 2010). Mixed groups need to share at least 10% of observations,

otherwise they bias the estimates within the model (Johnson, 2010). Only two mixed groups meet that requirement, and are therefore included.

Table 1: Number of groups in the dataset

	Number of Groups
NS	368
LW	309
RW	84
Religious	276
Environment	15
NS/LW	35
NS/Religious	80
Total	1167[10]

Table 2: Number of observations in the dataset

	Number of Observations
NS	10193
LW	7195
RW	1222
Religious	5650
Environment	479
NS/LW	3057
NS/Religious	2265
Total	30061

Dependent variables

There are six tactics that are being examined in this study. These include bombings, armed assaults, hijacking, barricading, assassinations, and kidnappings. Bombing is defined as the use of an explosive device to cause harm or destroy property for political ends (GTD, 2015). Armed assaults are described as the intent to injure or kill politically rich targets with the use of incendiary devices, firearms, or knives (GTD, 2015). Hijacking is defined as gaining control of a vehicle (plane, car, bus etc.) and rerouting the given vehicle's course for political ends (GTD, 2015). Barricading is akin to kidnapping, but the targets are kept in the same location as opposed to kidnappers who take their targets to secondary locations (GTD, 2015). Assassination is defined as aiming to kill a high value target for political purposes (GTD, 2015). Kidnapping is

[10] Please note that this number is reflective of how many groups are coded within each category, so this is inclusive of some groups that are coded in two categories.

defined as the taking of hostages for political ends (GTD, 2015). The variables are coded 0 if the tactic was not used, and 1 if the given tactic was used.

Independent variables

The models include six group types, including two mixed group-types: left wing, right wing, religious, environmental, nationalist/separatist and religious, and nationalist/separatist and left wing, with nationalist/separatist groups as the reference category. All of these variables are dummies: they are coded 1 if they are in that given group, and 0 if they are not. Furthermore, there are two variables that represent capability and survivability of groups. There is a variable that represents survival of one year, 1 if they do survive their first year, 0 if they do not. A variable indicating survival past 5 years is also included, 1 if they survive 5 or more years, 0 if they do not.

Controlling for time

The models also account for time. There are three specific time-based dummy variables. The third wave variable accounts for the years 1970-1995, as indicated by Rapoport, and the fourth wave variable accounts for the year after 1978, also indicated by Rapoport. The internet age is accounted for by including a variable that examines the years after 1995. Also, a general time variable is included denoting the years to control for time for the entire 1970-2013 period. Post-estimation will then be conducted on each model, and these findings will be graphically represented to convey tactic choice over time.

Method

Given the binary dependent variables, maximum likelihood models are used. In Table 3, six models are represented, each model pertaining to a tactic type. These time series, cross sectional models all utilize logistic regression. Post-estimation will then be conducted on each model, and these findings will be graphically represented to convey tactic choice over time.

Table 3: Logistic regression models	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
	Bombing	Armed Assault	Hijack	Barricade	Assassinate	Kidnap
Left wing	0.963	1.044	0.426	9.003**	0.162**	3.472**
	0.046	*0.08*	*0.197*	*2.229*	*0.017*	*0.221*
Right wing	0.446***	0.527**		0.036**	8.25**	0.856
	0.038	*0.092*		*0.037*	*0.717*	*0.1*
Religious	1.694***	0.765**	2.075**	0.352*	2.166**	0.630**
	0.087	*0.054*	*0.759*	*0.166*	*0.245*	*0.052*
Environmental	0.144**		0.752		0.042**	0.021**
	0.028		*0.796*		*0.021*	*0.021*
NS/Religious	1.833**	1.297**	1.368	0.851	1.116	0.701**
	0.103	*0.094*	*0.584*	*0.479*	*0.107*	*0.064*
NS/Left wing	2.041**	0.641**	0.583	1.43	1.971**	0.444**
	0.106	*0.058*	*0.265*	*0.484*	*0.14*	*0.046*
One year	1.894**	5.402**	0.85	0.025**	0.068**	0.876
	0.131	*0.92*	*0.549*	*0.008*	*0.012*	*0.083*
Five years	0.460**	1.095	1.323	1.538	6.302**	1.356**
	0.025	*0.092*	*0.71*	*0.454*	*1.111*	*0.108*
Third wave	1.933**	0.752*	0.985	1400059	1.127	2.143*
	0.155	*0.077*	*0.611*	*9.33E+08*	*0.122*	*0.522*
Fourth wave	2.310**	0.251**	1.886	81.479**	0.804*	0.418**
	0.138	*0.026*	*0.931*	*25.976*	*0.071*	*0.037*
Internet age	2.701**	0.467**	1.629	1689321	0.143**	14.21**
	0.224	*0.051*	*1.012*	*1.13E+09*	*0.018*	*3.439*
Year	0.967**	1.095**	0.949	9.04E-01	1.004	0.967**
	0.004	*0.006*	*0.027*	*0.02*	*0.006*	*0.005*
Constant	1.05e+28**	1.62e-79**	4.16E+42	5.23e+77**	0.00009	5.34e+27**
	7.65E+28	*1.78E-78*	*2.4E+44*	*3.49E+80*	*0.001*	*5.93E+28*
N	18413	17990	17448	17990	18413	18413
LR chi2	1406.71	1554.98	16.26	1232.09	3365.72	2028.47
Prob > chi2	0	0	0.1317	0	0	0
R2	0.0556	0.1092	0.0198	0.433	0.2191	0.1393

** P value < .001; * P value < .05

Results in odd ratios; Nationalist/Separatists is the reference category for group-types; Standard errors are included below coefficients in italics; Empty cells are an indication of perfect prediction of failure

Discussion

The results presented in Table 3 support my hypothesis that there is some variation in terrorist groups' tactics based on their ideology. The models sample sizes are very large, with an N of approximately 20,000 in each model. Keeping in mind that the larger the N, the higher the chances of significance, the models produce some very interesting results.

For instance, in Model 1, one can observe that religious groups are more likely to use bombing, relative to nationalist/separatist groups, but right wing groups are less likely to use bombing, relative to nationalist/separatist groups, ceteris paribus. This variation is an indication that treating groups as uniform entities ignores the diversity among groups. Most of the findings are in line with expectations. For example, right wing groups are generally more targeted in their goals, and use more discriminate tactics to gain political favor for their agendas which is why it is not surprising that they are less likely to use bombing. It is also unsurprising that right wing groups are more likely to use assassination, as indicated by Model 5. Relative to nationalist/separatist groups, right wing groups have 8.25 higher odds ratio of using assassination as a tactic, ceteris paribus. As stated earlier, right wing groups seek to destabilize the political arena within a given state, and assassinations may cause chaos and panic; the large coefficient is further indication of this.

However, some of the findings are not in line with expectations. Left wing groups, as previously described, are revolutionary in nature and seek to institute a new government regime, and therefore I would expect them to use less discriminate tactics such as bombing. Bombings evoke large reactions and garner a great deal of attention, thus granting groups a large platform, which they may use to promote their agendas. Unexpectedly, the left wing variable is

insignificant in the bombing model. This is possibly due to model being relative to nationalist/separatist groups, but there is an alternative explanation. In the other models, left wing groups do have higher odds ratios for barricading and kidnapping, suggesting that they use high profile tactics, but discriminate ones. This contradicts my expectation, but it does still convey a need to garner attention. Conceivably, less discriminate tactics may negatively impact the target audience when a key objective of the group is to replace the current regime.

I also predicted that capability, measured by group age, would be significant across all models. This is not the case, but the five-year variable is insignificant for the armed assault, hijacking, and barricade models, possibly suggesting that these tactics are not frequently used by older groups. However, one must remember that although a variable is insignificant, it does not mean that the value of the variable is actually equivalent to zero. The group age variables do present interesting results. For example, Model 6 shows a large, positive, and significant coefficient for the five-year survival variable. Relative to groups who do not survive past five years, those who do have a 1.356 higher odds ratio of using kidnapping as a tactic, ceteris paribus. This suggests that older groups are more likely to commit kidnappings, which is logical, because they are a form of revenue. Survival is dependent on resources, and older groups need to maintain a flow of resources. Kidnapping brings revenue, and they continue to vie for survival. Moreover, relative to groups who do not survive past one year, groups that do survive past the one-year mark have a 1.894 higher odds ratio of using bombing, ceteris paribus. Relative to groups who do not survive past one year, groups who do survive have a 5.042 higher odds ratio of using armed assault, ceteris paribus. The latter two results indicate that groups who survive one or more years use less discriminate tactics. This is expected, as groups need to

continue to vie for attention, and these tactics result in large-scale attacks. This further conveys that group factors mitigate tactic choice.

Moreover, there are four empty cells in the table, namely in Models 2, 3 and 4. This is an indication of perfect prediction of failure, meaning, for example, that environmental groups did not perpetrate any armed assaults or use barricading as a tactic in this data as indicated by Model 4. Consequently, there are no coefficients or standard errors produced in the models. However, this is not to say that we cannot learn from these empty cells. This perfect prediction of failure is informative about environmental group behavior, for example. Environmental groups generally avoid any collateral damage, so it would be contradictory for the groups to use tactics such as armed assaults.

Although the findings do not all fall within expectations, ideology does prove to be a useful predictor of tactic choice.

In order to better evaluate the findings of the models, the predicted probabilities were calculated and are illustrated in Graphs A-M.

Post-estimation Graph Collection 1: Predicted probability of tactic choice by group type[11]



[11]NS: Nationalist/Separatist; LW: Left wing; RW; Right wing; R: Religious; E: Environmental; NSR: Nationalist separatist and religious; NSLW: Nationalist separatist and left wing. As can be observed, not all group-types are significant in Table 1, but they are all represented in the graphs above except in the case of perfect prediction of failure. Even when coefficients are insignificant, we cannot assume that they are equal to zero. This is why they are included. Insignificant coefficients may be considered inaccurate measures, but not unimportant ones.


Graph E: Predictive Margins of Group-Type with 95% CIs
0
.2
.4
.6
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
NS
LW
RW
R
E
NSR
NSLW


Graph F: Predictive Margins of Group-Type with 95% CIs
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Year
NS
LW
RW
R
E
NSR
NSLW

The collection of graphs above provides a visualization of the differences among groups. Graph A, which conveys the predicted probability of using bombings as a tactic, by group-type shows that groups differ in their use of bombing. The graph shows that the confidence intervals do not overlap, with the exception of the overlap between religious and nationalist/separatist groups. Graph A also suggests that environmental groups are the least likely to use bombings as a tactic.

Graph B conveys the predicted probability of using armed assault as a tactic, by group-type. This graph also shows a diversity in the likelihood of using armed assaults, but some of the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that not all variation is significant. However, it does suggest that the mixed group-type of nationalist/separatist and religious is the most likely group-type to use armed assault. Religious and right wing group-types have overlapping confidence intervals suggesting that I cannot distinguish among them when it comes to the likelihood of using armed assault.

Graph C indicates the predicted probability of using hijacking as a means of attack, by group-type. All of the groups' confidence intervals overlap with at least one other group, suggesting that there is an inability to distinguish likelihood of using hijacking, by group. For example, while religious groups are most likely to use hijacking as a tactic, the confidence intervals overlap with environmental and nationalist/separatist and religious (NS/R) groups. However, the overall trend indicates that the probability of hijacking is approximately the same for all groups.

Graph D conveys the predicted probability of using barricading as a tactic, by group type. Similar to Graph C, there is overlap among the confidence intervals. I can observe, for example, that left wing groups have the highest predicted probability of using barricading, but that overlaps with the confidence intervals of the NS/R groups and their probability of using barricading also decreases over time.

Graph E conveys the predicted probability of using assassination, by group type. There is some overlap in this graph, but as can be observed, right wing groups have the highest predicted probability of using assassination as a tactic, as previously indicated by Table 3.

Graph F indicates the predicted probability of using kidnapping as a tactic, by group type. The graph shows that there is a distinguishable difference in the probability of using kidnapping for left wing and environmental groups. Left wing groups have the highest predicted probability, 0.22, of using kidnapping as tactic. Environmental groups have the lowest predicted probability, with confidence intervals going below zero in some years.

To further understand if there is any evidence in support of the “waves of terrorism”, post-estimation graphs were created.

Post-estimation Graph Collection 2: Predicted probability of hijacking and kidnapping during the third wave



Rapoport (2002) puts forth that the third wave, also known as the leftist wave, is associated with hijacking and kidnapping. As can be noted from Graph G, there is a very slight downward use of hijacking during the period of the third wave. This suggests that while this tactic was utilized during the timeframe of the wave, it did not increase in the period. This does not dispute Rapoport's finding that hijacking was used in this period, but it does suggest that the probability of hijacking was not increasingly over time. It suggests that the predicted probability goes from approximately 0.0035 to 0.0033 during the third wave.

Graph H indicates support for Rapoport's theorization of the use of kidnappings during the third wave, but unlike hijacking, the predicted probability of using kidnapping as a tactic increases during the wave; going from approximately 0.09 to 0.17. The graph indicates that there is a clear increase in the probability of using kidnapping in this time frame.

Further post-estimation was conducted to address H3, which predicted that the fourth wave, also known as the religious wave, is associated with bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations.

Post-estimation Graph Collection 3: Predicted probability of bombing, kidnapping, and assassination in the fourth wave



As indicated by Graph I, there is clear evidence to suggest that the probability of bombings increased during the fourth wave. The predicted probability of bombing in the fourth wave goes from approximately 0.3 to 0.49. This further bolsters Rapoport's theorization and provides evidence in support of the third hypothesis.

Graph J suggests that there is a decreased predicted probability in the use of kidnappings in the fourth wave. This does not suggest that this tactic was not used in this period, but it does suggest that the predicted probability of the use of this tactic is lower during the fourth wave.

There is a decreased predicted probability of the use of assassinations as a tactic within the fourth wave, illustrated by Graph K. Again, this is not an indication that this tactic was not used, but that it was on the decline during the period.

The graphs indicate that only bombings showed a higher predicted probability of being used over the course of the fourth wave.

Finally, to address the fourth hypothesis, post-estimation was conducted to convey the role of the internet on tactic selection. H4 expected that the internet age would be associated with less discriminate tactics, specifically bombings and armed assaults, as they would garner greater attention.

Post-estimation Graphs L and M: Predicted probability of bombing during the internet age



As expected, the predicted probability of the use of bombings increased with the rise of the internet. Less discriminate tactic use garners greater attention, and it is unsurprising that groups would use this method because they can gain a greater audience. H4 indicated that the internet age would specifically be associated with bombings and armed assaults, and the graphs indicate that while the predicted probability of bombing increases after the emergence of the internet, the predicted probability of armed assaults decreases. This is perhaps the result of a proclivity to use bombings over armed assaults because they can cause more harm and potentially garner more attention. Model 6 also indicates that the internet age is positively associated with kidnapping. This is of particular interest, because while I did not conceptualize this tactic as associated with the rise of the internet, kidnapping is a high-profile tactic that could use the internet medium to reach the target audience's goal.

Conclusion

This study sought to examine the diversity among terrorist group-types and to convey that there is a diversity of group choices and actions. It also sought to examine whether the waves of terrorism theorization were supported by empirics, and whether the dawn of the internet affected the use of less discriminate tactics. This study used a new dataset based on the GTD to tests the hypotheses put forth in this study.

This study did find evidence to suggest that there is variation among terrorist groups' tactic choices by ideology. Groups' likelihood of using a given tactic varied in each model. This is an indication that we should not treat all groups as though they make the same choices under

similar conditions. I also find that groups' choices are mitigated by capability, as the majority of the group age variables are significant across models.

This study also finds some evidence in support of Rapoport's waves of terrorism theorization, but this is limited to the third and fourth waves, as this data were limited. However, not all of Rapoport's expectations were supported by the data. For example, the predicted probability of bombing rose during the fourth wave, as expected, but the predicted probability of kidnapping decreased, counter to expectations. Finally, this study found that the internet age was associated with greater predicted probability of bombings. I expected that armed assaults would also be more likely in the age of the internet, but the post-estimation indicates that armed assaults are decreasing in likelihood after the emergence of the internet.

While this study is a step towards understanding the diversity among terrorist group choices by ideology, more studies need to be done. This study was limited in the number of group-level variables considered. It would be greatly improved if additional factors were included, for example, whether the group was centralized or decentralized. Additional factors could help improve and strengthen the models. However, I would posit that this study's greatest contribution is that it conveys empirical support for the diversity among groups.

Study 2: Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection

The terrorism scholarship has made strides in understanding the logic of terrorism, but there are still notable gaps in our understanding of terrorist actions. This study seeks to answer whether ideology mitigates target selection for transnational terrorist groups. Target selection is a key operational decision that groups make, and understanding the contributing factors that help determine terrorist targets is imperative to counter terrorist strategies. Terrorist groups are not uniform. Terrorist scholarship recognizes this diversity, but emphasizes the capabilities dimensions as an important difference impacting the success of terrorist organization. Other differences, including those related to the groups' ideology, have been largely overlooked in the studies of terrorism. The ideological variation among groups impacts their goals and motives, and, therefore, mitigates their decisions, including their choices of targets. This study seeks to provide evidence to convey that ideology alters choices.

Target selection has been a relatively understudied question in the terrorism literature, and in order to understand the relationship between operational decisions, like target choice, we need to further examine the question. Targets are only one aspect of terrorist operations, but they are critical for counter-terrorism considerations. Understanding whether ideology mitigates target choice also has counter-terrorism and preparedness implications. If we can associate the likelihood of target selection by group-type, then we can anticipate and potentially prevent future attacks.

In order to examine the question of target selection by ideological group-type, the dataset developed by Ahmed (n.d.) was used. The dataset is an enhanced version of the Global

Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD was cleaned meticulously, and each terrorist group was categorized into a group-type based on their ideology. Two variables denoting group age were also created.

For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as "the premeditated use or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims" (Enders and Sandler, 2000). This broadly inclusive definition is especially useful as I consider attacks on combatants, specifically the military, as being terrorist attacks. Targets in this study are comprised of six categories: (1) political, (2) civilian, (3) security, (4) business, (5) rival, and (6) infrastructure. These categories will be further discussed in the data section, but they represent a broad range of terrorist targets. Moreover, this study only examines transnational terrorist groups.

Transnational groups are defined in congruence with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD has three criteria for transnational groups, and they are classified as such if they meet one or more of these criteria); (1) if any of the victims are of another nationality than the country attacked, (2) if any of the perpetrators are of a different nationality than the location of the incident, and (3) if the group responsible orchestrated the incident from a country other than the country attacked (GTD Codebook, 2014). Any group discussed in this study meets 1 or more of these criteria.

Before introducing the dataset and results, this paper will first review the theoretical literature pertaining to the division of groups into group-types and the role of ideology in target selection. Within this review, a number of hypotheses concerning target selection by the various

typologies will be put forth. The results will then be reviewed, and will include post estimation results. Finally, this study will discuss the implications of the results as well as the study's limitations.

Theoretical literature

Division of groups

Before reviewing the literature pertaining to the role of ideology in terrorist group decision making, one needs to understand the divisions within terrorist groups. As previously stated, terrorist groups are not harmonized entities. While we understand that groups all threaten or use violence to pursue their agenda, their motivations and actions vary.

This study considers five main group-types and two mixed ideologies: nationalist/separatist (N/S), left wing (LW), right wing (RW), religious (R), environmental (E), nationalist/separatist and religious (NS/R), and nationalist/separatist and left wing (NS/LW). I chose this typology of terrorist group-types because it is based on the groups' differences in ideology. The aim of this study is to understand how ideology shapes target choices. Nationalist/separatist groups are groups that seek to overtake the system of government currently in place, or they are groups which seek an autonomy and territorial integrity from a given country. Left wing groups are defined as groups with left-leaning and revolutionary ideologies; these groups generally support a socialist or communist ideology. Right wing groups defy left wing concepts like communism and socialism, and lean toward fascist, and at times, racist ideology. Religious groups are groups claiming to be guided in their actions by their given religion. Environmental groups are defined as groups who are guided by their missions to end to perceived animal

cruelty or ecological destruction. Mixed groups are groups who hold more than one ideology, and in this study, two of these mixed typologies are included: nationalist/separatist and religious and nationalist/separatist and left wing[12]. These groups are categorized in both ideological groups because they are guided by two ideologies. For example, the IRA is guided both by the pursuit of a united, independent Ireland, but it is also guided by Catholicism, making the group both nationalist/separatist and religious.

However, there are other ways to conceptualize or categorize terrorist groups. Wilkinson (1986) for example, suggests that groups should be divided into four group types: (1) criminal, (2) psychological, (3) war, and (4) political. Wilkinson defines criminal groups as those who use terror as a means to material wealth, psychic groups are led by extreme, fanatical religious beliefs, war groups are groups who attack without abandon to defeat an enemy, and political groups are described as groups who will use systematic violence to achieve their political goals (Wilkinson, 1976; Poland, 1988). Wilkinson's (1976) typologies are not limited by this initial classification. He also lists sub-group characteristics. For instance, political groups are further divided into three sub-types: (1) revolutionary, (2) sub-revolutionary[13], and repressive (Wilkinson, 1976). The categorization system that Wilkinson created pays great attention to detail, but its weakness lies in its complexity. The amount of information required to classify

[12] Ahmed (n.d.) notes that only two mixed group types were included in the dataset because they were the only balanced groups, if the groups do not share at least 10% of their observations, they bias the estimates within the model (Johnson, 2010).

[13] Defined as terrorism that is used for "political motives other than revolution or government repression"

groups would be incredibly difficult to capture, given the clandestine nature of terrorist operations.

Vasilenko (2005) breaks groups down into five types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, (4) religious, and (5) criminal. While no typology can hope to provide a classification of terrorist group types that are both comprehensive and exclusive, Vasilenko's omission of environmental groups is notable. Environmental groups are less common, but they do perpetrate devastating attacks. To ignore those would be an exclusion of a terrorist group-type that has perpetrated a large number of attacks. However, what is most interesting about Vasilenko's (2005) groupings is the variation in scope. For example, he differentiates politically motivated groups from nationalist or separatist groups, even though one could say that both nationalists and separatists are politically motivated. Political motivation would be inherent to terrorist groups; nationalist and separatist groups would fall under the umbrella of political groups. However, his inclusion of criminal groups is also interesting, because it would suggest that his definition of terrorism includes financial aim, as opposed to a social or political aim.

Flemming, Schmid and Stohl (1988) are concerned with this variation in terrorist group types, but this could be a simplistic assessment of the state of the literature. Typologies vary because studies vary. Scholars are not pursuing the same questions, and it is therefore unfair to expect them to standardize typologies. However, standardization can be useful in developing the terrorism literature. Scholars studying ideology could use the same categorizations, and studies examining capability could use the same groupings. Given that the current literature is somewhat minimal regarding the actions and choices of terrorist typologies, this could be more easily achieved.

The Role of Ideology in Target Selection

Converse (1964) used the term 'belief system' to describe the concept of ideology, and he defined it as the "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence". Converse (1964) explains constraints as personal limitations on thoughts and behavior. In essence, one's opinions are rooted in a belief system, and regardless of the situation, opinions will be formed with regard to ideology. This definition may be imperfect and somewhat simplistic[14], but it is one that introduces the inherent power of ideology. In the previous section, the various ways to categorize groups by ideology were discussed. My conceptualization of groups is rooted in ideological differences, so that I may test the link between ideology and target choice.

Ideology is a powerful concept that can guide both an individual's and a group's actions, "ideology establishes who the enemy is" (Silke, 2010). Ideology has long been the justification for political action, including war. Stephen Sykes (1992) suggests that soldiers going into battle have long been memorialized and motivated by Christian teachings and sayings, "there has been a close relationship between the sort of commitment a soldier, or indeed a civilian, exhibits in his or her presumed readiness to die in battle and the Christian language of sacrifice". Worldviews have long guided decisions, and actions, both violent and non-violent. As with terrorist groups, states or other groups may want to take action to achieve their goals, but they are limited by their resources.

[14] It assumes a great deal about people's positions (there is a high degree of extrapolation), and it assumes that people make all their decisions based on their ideology.

Although this study is focused on terrorist groups, it is still focused on group-level dynamics. As with any other group, individuals may enter into the group with variations of the same ideology. They share enough to form a collective, and they take on the collective vison (Drake, 2007). The resulting group takes on an identity, takes a name, and sets goals. The establishment of the group is the establishment of the group ideology and worldview. Members who enter into it are committing to fulfilling the given vision. Leaders and, or group members form the collective. As the collective grows, members take on the group identity (Drake, 2007). This is why ideology plays such an integral role in decision making, as it informs the collective worldview and consequent actions of a given group.

This study firmly posits that ideology lead to a deliberate selection of targets. Targets are not random, and they are not accidental (Asal et al, 2009; Drake, 2007). In essence, every target selection is filtered through the worldview, and capabilities, of the group. Groups are rational actors that make calculations based on their objectives. One can think that that is why Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) suggest that target selection grants us insight into terrorist groups and their motivations. This study is not suggesting that terrorism is an acceptable act, or that it is a measured response to grievances. It is suggesting that the perpetrators consider terrorist acts as a rational, logical means of communicating their message and furthering their goals.

It is imperative that one recognizes that the link between ideology and target selection is mitigated by resources and opportunity. Asal and Hastings (2009) seek to balance these factors in their examination of terrorist attacks on maritime targets, “while some terrorist organizations traffic in drugs, most don't even though they have the capability to engage in both terrorist and criminal behavior. For organizations, the frame in which they see the world is

important for understanding their organizational choices". Even though Asal and Hastings (2009) seek to convey that capability is a strong factor in operational decisions, they acknowledge that ideology is often a driving force for decision making within a terrorist group. This is not to say, however, that individual members of a terrorist group are all led by ideology, but rather that the *group's* actions are guided and instructed by ideological beliefs. To be clear, capability is conceived as resources meeting opportunity. Toft et al (2010) also find that terrorists attack vulnerable targets, suggesting that capability is a mitigating factor in the choice of targets. Toft et al (2010) examine energy infrastructure targets specifically, and find that they are selected based on their inability to be secured at all times. Consider a ship transporting oil, how can it be secured at all times? Ideology drives decisions, but choices cannot be made unless the group is capable of completing the attack.

Figure 1: Theorization of ideology's impact on operational decisions



Boaz Ganor (2008) suggests that it is motivation, operational capability and a window of opportunity that guide choices, not ideology. This study seeks to couple the role of ideology

and capability. Ideology is the driving force, but it is capability that mitigates a given terrorist group's actions, as illustrated by Figure 1. Capability, in this study, is measured by the years a group survives. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of groups dissipate before they reach the one-year milestone. Cronin's (2006) findings are partly due to the prevalence of competition and partly due to availability of resources. This statistic is also informative of choices that groups make. In order to survive, groups need to be extreme at first. For example, Horowitz (2010) finds that the likelihood of use of suicide bombing is 50-60% in year one of a group's life, but that number falls to 27% in year five (Horowitz, 2010). This is suggestive that groups are mindful of their survival, and consequently shape their decisions to ensure their viability and survival. Therefore, this study measures capability with a variable noting the one-year and five-year milestones. In essence, there is an expectation that capability mitigates ideological goals.

H1: Groups that survive one year or less are more likely to attack less aggressive and complex targets, such as infrastructure targets

H2: Groups that survive five or more years are more likely to attack more aggressive and complex targets, such as security targets to continue to appease their target audience

Capability is integral to the decision making process for terrorist groups, but another important mitigating factor is the given group's target audience. For example, multiple terrorist groups have attacked or threatened to attack the Olympic games, but not the Paralympic games (Silke, 2010). Silke (2010) posits that this is because terrorist groups are calculating and rational actors that will only make decisions that further their goals.

Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) also find that resources, coupled with target audience restrictions, guide terrorist choices. They examine two nationalist/separatist groups, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) and find that both groups wanted to garner attention, but did not want to do so at the cost of their audience, so they avoided civilian or accidental deaths. Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) theorize that collateral deaths would be unacceptable to the groups' target audiences, and planned their attacks accordingly. However, Hoffman (1995) theorizes that although some groups may be mitigated by their target audience, for religious groups, their target audience may be god, and this leads to a notion of 'total war' whereby religious groups are unbound by the perception of their earthly target audience. While Hoffman (1995) makes an interesting argument, one could still argue that groups need the support of a target audience, even if it is just to provide material resources to ensure groups' survival.

As the previous paragraphs suggest, group-types do not make decisions with the same calculations. Consider left wing groups, they generally do not attack rival targets. Left wing groups are generally revolutionary in nature, and seek the change of a political system, thus targeting other terrorist groups would be contrary to their goals and objectives. Within the context of this data, left wing groups only attack rivals 11 times, while religious groups attack rivals 114 times. Nationalists/Separatists seek to make country-level changes, and will likely attack forces that stand in their way, such as the police or national military (Drake, 2007). Right wing groups are generally threatened by change and want to maintain the status quo, and so they are more likely to target what they perceive as a threat to life as they know it, including civilians and government offices (Drake, 2007). Meanwhile, religious groups attack other groups

because they view their message as divine and worthy, whereas other messages pose a threat. It is essential for their message to reign supreme so threats need to be eliminated. Piazza (2009) also argues that religious groups are much less discriminate in their target choices because their attack is against a way or life, or culture, which makes any target legitimate. Scholars have found that environmental terrorist groups do not generally intend to cause harm, as it is contrary to their worldview (Taylor, 1998). Environmental groups, in principle, hope to avoid any harm, but Ackerman's (2010) study reveals that the ELF (Environmental Liberation Front) sought to avoid collateral damage, but it was acceptable if measures were taken to avoid the risks.

H1: There will be differences in target selection by group-type

H1a: Left wing groups will be less likely to attack rival targets

H1b: Right wing groups will likely attack targets they view as threatening the status quo, such as civilian and political targets

H1c: Religious groups will attack any given target, as they consider any target legitimate

H1d: Environmental groups will be more likely to attack targets that do not have the potential to harm human life, like business targets after hours

Data and Methods

As previously mentioned, this paper utilizes an enhanced version of the GTD. It covers the years 1970-2013[15], and has a total of 25,735 observations[16]. 1053 groups are included in this study. The unit of analysis is incident-year. Systematically using TRAC (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium) and TOPs (Terrorist Organization Profiles), the groups were sorted into ideological categories of religious, nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, and environmental, and coded accordingly[17] by Ahmed (n.d.). However, groups are not necessarily composed of one group-type. Some groups have two categorizations, for example they are both nationalist/separatist and religious, like the Lebanese-based group Amal. Amal was formed in the hopes of carrying out two goals, (1) bring greater respect to Shiite Muslims in the Lebanese south, and (2) pressure the government to allocate greater resources to the area (TRAC, 2015). Amal was rooted in religion and nationalism, and it is consequently coded as both categories; this ensures appropriate representation of the groups. Groups were categorized in each group-type they belonged to. There were no groups in the dataset that had more than two ideological categorizations.

Dependent variables

There are six binary dependent variables included in this study. They each represent a category of targets attacked by terrorist groups. The dependent variables are (1) political targets, (2) civilian targets, (3) security targets, (4) business targets, (5) rival targets, and (6) infrastructure targets; if the given target is used, a value of 1 is given, 0 if otherwise. The GTD tracks targets

[15] 1993 is excluded as it is excluded from the GTD due to insufficient data
[16] Only a select number of variables from this dataset were used for the sake of this study
[17] TRAC and TOPs provide descriptions of groups, including their goals, intentions and attacks.

for each terrorist incident, and these targets were examined and then place in one of the six target types. There was no overlap in the categorization process.

Political targets include any domestic or international governmental targets, including a government building, government employees, government events, and foreign missions or embassies. Civilian targets include educational institutions such as schools or teachers, journalists and media entities, NGOs, private citizens and private property, religious institutions, and tourists. These targets are unrelated to a nation's security apparatus. Security targets include attacks on the military or police. Business targets include any attacks on businesses, this includes attacks on business patrons. Rival targets are defined as other terrorist groups or non-state militias. Finally, infrastructure targets include attacks on food or water supplies, airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, telecommunication infrastructure such as cell phone towers, transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or electric substations (GTD, 2015).

Independent variables

The key independent variables in the models are the group-types. In order to gain a more substantive interpretation of results, the most numerous group-type, nationalist/separatist, is used as a reference group. The remaining group types, including mixed typologies are included in the models, also as dummy variables. Left wing, right wing, religious, environmental, nationalist/separatist and religious, and nationalist/separatist and left wing.

Also, the variable denoting survival past one year is included. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of groups do not survive past one year, so this variable is a mark of viability and resources. Thirdly,

a variable denoting survival of five or more years is also included as a measure of viability and resources. This extended survival can give us insight into the capability of groups that beat the statistics. These viability variables act as proxies for resources for terrorist groups. These are the only group level controls included in the model[18].

Method

Given that the dependent variables are binary, maximum likelihood models are used to test the hypotheses. Logistic regression indicates the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1. The six models in Table 1 are all time series, cross sectional models. The results in Table 1 will be represented as odds ratios. If coefficient values are greater than one, then the given coefficient is considered positive. If the coefficient value is less than one, then the coefficient is considered negative. Post-estimation results are also calculated for all six models.

[18] Although there are other group level variables available in replication datasets, I do not think that they are accurate. For example, estimates of income or group members, but given that terrorist groups evolve or dissipate quickly, I do not think these are accurate measures – especially given the clandestine nature of their pursuits.

Table 1: Target selection maximum likelihood models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Political Targets	Civilian Targets	Security Targets	Business targets	Rival Targets	Infrastructure Target
Left wing	0.653**	1.156*	0.42**	3.355**	0.954	0.443**
	0.032	*0.072*	*0.064*	*0.196*	*0.644*	*0.034*
Right wing	1.508**	1.188	0.1**	0.256**	2.272	1.344*
	0.117	*0.124*	*0.059*	*0.043*	*1.912*	*0.128*
Religious	0.682**	1.183*	3.252*	0.831*	8.965**	1.029
	0.038	*0.069*	*0.289*	*0.065*	*4.328*	*0.082*
Environment	0.736*	1.51**	0.119**	7.904**		0.093**
	0.084	*0.186*	*0.085*	*1.071*		*0.036*
NS/Religious	0.412**	2.282**	1.916**	1.025	21.066**	0.723**
	0.028	*0.14*	*0.187*	*0.08*	*9.871*	*0.072*
NS/LW	0.331**	0.712**	5.858**	1.694**	1.34	1.658**
	0.02	*0.05*	*0.513*	*0.103*	*0.816*	*0.113*
One year	0.294**	3.039**	5.882**	7.971**		0.953
	0.021	*0.28*	*2.294*	*1.041*		*0.083*
Five years	0.919	0.555**	3.222**	2.013**	4.646	0.457**
	0.052	*0.036*	*0.517*	*0.136*	*4.719*	*0.033*
Years	0.972**	1.058**	1.03**	0.96**	1.001	0.984**
	0.002	*0.002*	*0.003*	*0.002*	*0.008*	*0.002*
Constant	3.46e+24**	3.21e-50**	7.62e-29**	1.17e+33**	0.00004	1.06e+13**
	1.17E+25	*1.23E-49*	*4.00E-28*	*4.72E+33*	*0.0006*	*5.00E+13*
N	18413	18413	18413	18413	15794	18413
LR chi2	2478.64	2367.16	2061.38	2761.32	190.46	668
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2	0.1084	0.1186	0.1677	0.1478	0.1264	0.0501

Notes:
** P value < .001; * P value < .05

Results in odd ratios; Account for time by including years as a control; Nationalist/Separatists is the reference group for group-types; Standard errors are included below coefficients in italics; Empty cells are an indication of perfect prediction of failure. Variable description can be found in the appendix.

Discussion

This study theorized that there would be differences across group-types in terms of their choice of targets, and this is evident when looking at the six models. Left wing groups, relative to nationalist/separatist groups, have a 0.653 lower odds ratio, ceteris paribus, of attacking political targets while right wing groups, relative to nationalist/separatist groups have a 1.508 higher odds ratio of attacking political targets, ceteris paribus. This is just one example, but the diversity is evident in each model, thus providing support for H1.

This study also expect that left will groups would be less likely to attack rival targets. Model 5 indicated no support for this, as the left wing variable is insignificant, making the variable statistically equivalent to zero. However, this variable is relative to nationalist/separatist groups, so it does not illustrate a complete negation of the expectation set forth by H1a.

Right wing groups were also expected to attack civilian and political targets, but there are mixed results indicated in the models. Right wing groups, as noted above, do have a higher likelihood of attacking political targets, but the right wing variable in the civilian targets model is insignificant. This perhaps indicates that political targets are more suited to achieving the goals of right wing groups.

I also theorized that religious groups would attack any target, as they view any target as legitimate. The religious variable is significant across Models 1-5, but not Model 6. The religious variable is positive and significant in Models 2, 3, and 5. This suggests that relative to nationalist/separatists, religious groups have a 1.183 higher odds ratio of attacking civilian targets, 3.252 higher odds ratio of attacking security targets, and a 8.965 higher odds ratio of

attacking rival targets, ceteris paribus. Religious groups are not more likely to attack political or business targets, relative to nationalist/separatists.

Finally, I expected that environmental groups would be more likely to attack business targets. Environmental groups generally try to avoid any harm to individuals, and they have historically tended to attack businesses after hours. There is support for this in Model 4. Relative to nationalist/separatists, environmental groups have a 7.904 higher odds ratio of attacking business targets, ceteris paribus. The large coefficient is further indicative of the likelihood of environmental groups choosing to target businesses.

Interestingly, there is a perfect prediction of failure for the one-year variable in Model 5 while the five-year variable is positive, but insignificant. Conceivably, capability does not play a role when making the decision to attack a rival. However, as expected, groups that survive five or more years have a higher odds ratio of attacking more complex targets, like security targets. I expect this to be a show of force and strength to further pander to their respective target audiences.

To further examine these findings, post-estimation graphs were created to illustrate the predicted probability of targets, by group-type.

Figure 2: Collection of post-estimation graphs[19]



[19] NS: Nationalist/Separatist; LW: Left wing; RW; Right wing; R: Religious; E: Environmental; NSR: Nationalist separatist and religious; NSLW: Nationalist separatist and left wing. As can be observed, not all group-types are significant in Table 1, but they are all represented in the graphs above except in the case of perfect prediction of failure. Even when coefficients are insignificant, we cannot assume that they are equal to zero. This is why they are included. Insignificant coefficients may be considered inaccurate measures, but not unimportant ones.





Graph 1 represents the predicted probability of attacking political targets, by group-type. The graph suggests that, over time, the predicted probability of attacking political targets has declined for all group-types. Most notably, right wing groups have the highest predicted probability of choosing political targets. The predicted probability of a given target, as can be seen in all the graphs, varies over time. For example, in the case of Graph 1, we note that right wing groups have approximately a 0.62 predicted probability of attacking political targets in 1970, but that declines to approximately 0.37 in 2013, ceteris paribus.

Graph 2 represents the predicted probability of attacking civilian targets, by group-type. Unlike Graph 1, Graph 2 shows an increase in predicted probability of attacking civilian targets across all group-types. NS/Religious groups have the highest likelihood of choosing civilian targets. The confidence intervals of right wing groups do not overlap with the predicted probability of other groups, suggesting that right wing groups behave uniquely from other groups.

Graph 3 represents the predicted probability of attacking security targets, by group-type. Unlike the other graphs, in Graph 3, four of the group-types have predicted probabilities that have predicted probabilities which do not overlap. Of these, NSLW groups have the higher predicted

probability of attacking security targets, followed by religious groups, then NS/Religious groups, and right wing groups. However, the graph also suggests an overall trend that the predicted probability of attacking security target is on the incline for all groups, albeit not at the same rate.

Graph 4 represents the predicted probability of attacking business targets, by group-type. The graph conveys a trend of decline in the predicted probability of attacking business, across groups. However, the rate of decline varies by group-type. Environmental groups have the highest likelihood of attacking businesses, as expected, but left wing and NSLW groups also have predicted probabilities with confidence intervals that do not overlap with other predictions. Environmental groups have approximately 0.7 predicted probability of attacking businesses in 1970, but that declines to approximately 0.32 by 2013.

Graph 5 represents the predicted probability of attacking rival targets, by group-type. This graph is unique in that it conveys very large confidence intervals. Consequently, the predicted probabilities cannot differentiate by group-type.

Graph 6 represents the predicted probability of attacking infrastructure targets, by group-type. This graph suggests that there is an overall stasis in the predicted probability of attacking infrastructures over time. Although NSLW groups have the highest predicted probability of attacking infrastructure targets, the group-type's confidence intervals overlap with those of right wing groups. However, left wing groups, while the second least likely group to attack infrastructure targets, are distinctive in that the group-type's confidence intervals do not

overlap with any other group. Left wing groups are associated with approximately 0.8 predicted probability of attacking infrastructures in 1970, but that declines to approximately 0.6 by 2013.

Limitations and conclusion

This study focused on understanding operational decision making at the group level, specifically examining target choice by ideological group-type. This study sought to convey that terrorist groups do not make the same choices and they are not equal in capability, and therefore it is illogical to treat them as a uniform entity. The findings of this study further assert that claim. Religious groups, for example, are the most likely group-type to attack rival targets, whereas environmental groups have never done so in the context of this data.

Moreover, the post-estimation graphs in this study suggest, overall, that civilian and security targets seem to be increasingly chosen by all group-types over time, whereas there is a decline in the choice of political, business, and infrastructure targets. These are only few examples of the differences among group-types with regards to target selection. Consequently, the terrorism scholarship needs to continue to address this diversity in future studies.

This diversity not only improves our understanding of terrorist operational decisions, but it also has implications for counter-terrorism measures. Having provided evidence that civilian and security targets are increasingly likely targets, states or other counter-terrorism forces could take greater measures to protect those specific targets. It assists states in the allocation of resources to aid in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Not only do we understand that these targets are at greater risk, but we also understand who is the most likely perpetrator. For example, NSLW groups are the most likely to attack security targets. If states are suffering

terrorism at the hands of a groups meeting the NSLW criteria, then it is likely that that group will attack a security target.

Moreover, this study does examine decision-making at the group-level, but future studies could also add more context by adding country-level factors. However, this is not to say that additional group-level factors could not increase our understanding. The clandestine nature of terrorism makes it difficult to unearth group dynamics, but added factors, such as strength of leadership or group structure would allow us to further examine the decision making process.

Study 3: Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation[20]

Since the last quarter of the 20th century, religion has asserted itself as a powerful social force dispelling the forecasts of its imminent decay under the impact of modernization. A global religious resurgence has transformed many aspects of national and global politics, including education, human rights, and transnational activism. Although religious influence has been noted in many areas, including democratization and social movements (Banchoff, 2008; Bellin, 2008; Driessen, 2014; Fox and Sandler 2004; Nexon, 2011; Philpott, 2000; Thomas, 2005; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011), much of the academic and political attention has focused on the use of religious rhetoric and symbolism to promote mobilization in violent conflict (Henne, 2012; Pearce, 2005; Shah and Toft, 2006; Toft, 2007; Toft et al. 2011). The most striking, if not unsurprising, trend in the literature has placed Islam within a "securitization paradigm" approaching it as an issue of security and Muslims as potential agents of conflict (Pew Research Center, 2014; Swensson, 2013; Tepe and Demirkaya, 2011).

If some scholars have argued that religion has had an indelible impact on state politics and international relations, others have called the impact of faith into question arguing that religion is merely the marker for identifying a social group, and any relationship between religion and conflict is spurious (Armstrong, 2014; Bloom, 2007, Cavanaugh, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Whether or not the impact of faith extends beyond political violence on other forms of political engagement is another subject that has received

[20] Co-authored with Prof. Mariya Omelicheva

little systematic and cross-national examination[21]. This study purports to fill in this gap. In the interest of cultivating a broader and more comprehensive knowledge of the role of religion as a multifaceted force, it examines the impact of religion on various types of individuals' political participation. Much of the scholarship on religion and politics has focused on the country-level analyses. This study uses longitudinal data from the aggregated World Values Survey (WVS) to examine the relationship between religion and politics at the individual level but controlling for contextual country-level factors in a multi-level research design. Relying on the previous WVS research, it utilizes a composite measure of religiosity to examine whether religion engages individuals politically. By including measures of the different types of religion, the paper also aims to explore if some religions have a greater impact on political participation.

Religion is a term that eludes a textbook definition. Most definitions are problematic for several reasons. First, they imply uniformity across religions and conceal immense diversity within a particular faith. For instance, if a definition lists a belief in a deity as one of the characteristics of religion, it excludes Buddhism because it does not meet this criterion. Secondly, most definitions emphasize existential issues that are less relevant to social scientists interested in the impact of religion on politics and society (Fox and Sandler 2004, 2). Following Fox and Sandler (2004), we assume that religion influences human behavior and focus our effort on discovering these influences, rather than on constructing a specific definition of the term. After we review the debate over the impact of religion in the first section of the study,

[21] The impact of religion has been examined in the studies of voting behavior (Hayes, 1995; Lijphart, 1979; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Roemer, 1998). However, beyond the general expectations that religious voters are more conservative in their views, the impact of religiosity on political views and behavior is not well understood (Grzymala-Busse, 2012).

we detail such influences in section two. Section three discusses the research design of the study followed by the presentation and discussion of empirical findings.

Debate over the impact of religion

That religion would ebb before the juggernauts of the modern world – science, democracy, economic development, and education – had been a scientific truism for a long time (Brathwaite and Bramsen, 2011; Driessen, 2013, 21; Gill, 2001; Tift, Philpot, and Shah, 2011, 1). A classical view on this relationship can be found in the works of influential Western social thinkers, including Comte, Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Voltaire, and Weber, to name a few who rejected divine explanations. Instead, they believed that rational, scientific, and legalistic thought would replace religion as the basis for understanding and managing the world. Modern social scientists followed in the footsteps of these thinkers and proposed theoretical paradigms predicting the erosion of religion's significance in the lives of individuals and societies (Fox and Sandler, 2004). Modernization theory, which dominated political science thinking from the late 1950s to the 1970s, posited that the various forces of modernization would extinguish primordial factors, such as ethnicity and religion, in politics and society. If modernization theory was largely preoccupied with ethnicity, its sociological analogue – secularization theory – focused on religion. It predicted a general decline in religion for the same reasons modernization theory portended the demise of ethnicity. Science and modern medicine would replace religion's traditional role of interpreting the world. Technical, rational, and empirical criteria would replace religious dogmas and norms. The "will of the people" would displace religion as a source of state legitimacy (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Toft, Philpott, and Shah, 2011).

The main forces that facilitate the secularization process have been theorized in several frameworks. Functionalist scholars have pointed out that access to a wide range of non-religious goods that become available thank to modernization will decrease people's demand for traditional religious good. Technological advances will reduce the need for prayers, and visitation of the places of workshop will decline with the rise in modern means of entertainment (Driessen, 2013; Fox and Sandler, 2004). Other scholars, particularly those working in the Weberian tradition, have emphasized the structural changes caused by modernization, including the separation of religion and state, which further reduces the sphere of religious influence. The opposition to the idea of religious authority in politics has been bolstered by the rise of classical liberalism and critical theory accompanying the processes of democratization. The philosophic tradition expressed in the works of Mill, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and Habermas has argues that decision making in a liberal democratic society should be free of religious reasoning or values (Driessen, 2013; Fox and Sandler, 2004). As cogently summarized by Rawls (1993), "take the truths of religion off the political agenda".

Contrary to the prognosis of secularization theory, religious trends and events in the modern world have revealed the tenacity of individual religious beliefs, and growing religious influence on the institutions and politics of the modern states (Driessen, 2013). In spite of the expectations of liberal philosophy, the fully institutional separation of religion and state has never occurred even in established democracies (Fox, 2008; Grim and Finke, 2006). Economic development has not undermined religious participation (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Religions have entered public debate, in this way influencing policymaking and the shape of democratic life (Casanova, 1994). Recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa that toppled

long-standing regimes and brought Islamist-oriented parties to positions of power cast further doubt on the secularization thesis.

Religion has reemerged in its social and political influence by the same factors that secularization theory predicted would beget its demise. Modernization has allowed the state to increase its sphere of influence, but it has exerted similar impact on religion fostering the contact and competition between the two. Modern political systems, particularly those in democratic states, provided avenues for avenues for religious' sectors participation in politics. Rapid progress in communications and technology afforded religious groups an opportunity to disseminate their view and learn from the actions of other religious organizations. The proliferation of religious trends together with the freedom of choice in many societies to select one's own religion has led to an increase in religiosity and religious following (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). All in all, modernization has brought about changes in religious systems and beliefs, but not necessarily extinguished them.

If many agree that religion has become and in likelihood will continue to be a vital political and social force, disagreements persist about the nature of its impact. Over its long history, religion has fostered some of the most dramatic changes in human history by mobilizing people to resist oppression and unjust rule (Finke and Harris, 2012). It has also curbed social change by supporting traditional institutions and oppressive status quos (Aminzade and Perry, 2001). There are numerous, well-documented cases of the stabilizing role of religions, just like there are many instances of religiously inspired violence and war. Still, little is known about the conditions that contribute to religious mobilization. Why did the Bosnian crises take on a religious current, while conflicts between Turkish Muslims and Greek Christians in Cyprus

remained secular? While religion provided a mobilizing platform for the Sinhalese Buddhists during the Sri Lankan civil war, it was absent from the Tamil Hindus' rhetoric. There are various explanations as to the varied religious effects on conflict or political participation, Glazier (2015) finds that religious individuals, who he calls providential believers, are usually less likely to be politically active. However, Glazier (2015) also finds that when providential believers are confronted with politically laden sermons by their religious leaders, they become more politically engaged. Religions may impact the tone or motivation of a given political action, but those actions are also guided by levels of religiosity.

Arguably, no other religions' political impact has received greater attention in recent years than that of Islam. In fact, much of the increase in religion's rising political profile has been due to the violent conflict and events attributed to Islam. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the frequency and intensity of suicide attacks in different parts of the world, relentless sectarian violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, and the rise of Daesh have captivated the attention of scholars, policy makers, and the general public as they struggle to fathom the rationale for the use of mass violence. Although all religions have the potential to inspire violence (see Finke and Harris, 2012; Fox, 2013; Grim and Finke, 2007; Piazza, 2009; Sandal and Fox, 2013, Testas, 2004), such events and episodes tend to confirm the worst stereotypes about Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2003). Non-violent activism inspired by Islam or other religions or ways in which doctrinal differences translate in individuals' political behavior have so far received considerably less attention. This is especially interesting, as religiously is usually

negatively associated with non-violent forms of political participation (Ayers and Hofstetter, 2008).

Theoretical framework

As discussed in the preceding section, religion has long provided an impetus for a wide range of social action. This study uses the term "political participation" to denote any action taken by an individual in the political realm. Political participation ranges from signing a petition to attending a demonstration to participation in boycotts. What unites all forms of political participation is that it involves activities of ordinary citizens participating in the political process by making their opinions and voices heard.

Although the doctrinal differences and specificities of religious praxis can lead to important differences in political activism within and across religious denominations as well as in comparison to secular political activism. The social action itself demonstrated some consistency across actors, systems of beliefs, and dynamics and mechanisms of contention. In other words, neither religious political participation not Islamic, Christian, or Hinduism is sui generis (Wiktorowicz, 2003). It, therefore, can be studies using the modes of inquiry developed for understanding political contention and collective action, in general (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2003).

Scholars of contentious politics have identified a number of properties that hold across a wide variety of collective action. For analytical purposes, we group the most prominent characteristics of political participation in the following categories: motive, political opportunity structure, incentive, and frames (see Figure 1). These concepts appeared in

different schools of study of contentious politics from the 1960s to present. They describe a range of considerations and strategic evaluations affecting decisions making by rational actors. They also allow researchers to go beyond a purely instrumentalist perpective to explore the expressive dimensions of religious conviction in the processes of contention. Importantly, these concepts offer the shared language for comparative analysis of political participation and theory building[22].

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework for Political Participation



	MOTIVE	STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES	INCENTIVES	FRAMES
ROLE OF RELIGION	Religious grievances	Membership in religious organizations	Levels of religiosity	Levels of religiosity and membership in religious organizations
OTHER FACTORS	Other grievances/the level of satisfaction with individual's life	Membership in political parties and other voluntary organizations	Repression and/or opportunities for political action	Membership in voluntary organizations

[22] Although, several prominent scholars called for the integration of research on political and religious contention (e.g., Show and Marshall 1984) and elimination of an artificial divide between the studies of religion and non-religious movements (e.g., Hanigan 1991; Williams 1994), others have cautioned against any attempt at developing a unifying framework for understanding all forms of contentious politics. The reasons for this objection are that a shared framework precludes systematic comparison between different types of contention and cloaks important differences between religious and non-religions social movements.

Motive refers to a need or a grievance that causes a person to act. Although all societies have grievances, different types of collective action arise only in a subset of social contests characterized by conditions in which individual discontent can be mobilized. This refers to the opportunity structure for a motivated actor to engage in political action. Incentive denotes a strategic evaluation that the actor will be better off from engaging in political action; it refers to the consideration of benefits and costs of political participation. With the proliferation of interest in the role of ideas, identities, and beliefs, researchers of contentious politics turned to the analysis of frames that mediate the impact of various background conditions on people's decisions to engage in political action. Frames render specific understandings of solutions to individuals' grievances and provide the rationale needed to encourage their participation in different forms of contention (Benford and Snow, 2000; Chandler, 2005).

What is the role of religion in the framework of political opportunity structures, motives, incentives, and frames? Noting important quantitative and qualitative differences characterizing the world religions and impacting the ways in which they affect the followers' course of political action or inactions, we propose several plausible links between religion and political participation. First, when religious issues with direct implications for lives and livelihood of the faithful enter the local or national agendas, they can provide a powerful motive for political participation, especially if they appear on the backdrop of religious discrimination, underrepresentation on religious grounds, or existing inter-religious tensions (Vullers and Wegenast, 2011). Religious needs, demands, and grievances offer a ground for

religious politicization that makes religion socially relevant for the believers making them consider political action.

Second, churches and religious movements can serve as effective mobilizing networks (Wiktorowicz, 2003). The scholars of religious movements have pointed out that resource opportunities available to churches and religious movements often place them at an advantage compared to secular movements. The church-based social movements may have a longer lifespan than other social movements, as they are less affected by shifts in public opinion or divisions among secular political elites (Aminzdale and Perry, 2001). They may benefit from exemptions from taxation and conscription. In many societies, state authorities recognize and respect the sanctity of religious spaces, even if they offer a forum for oppositional political mobilization (Aminzdale and Perry, 2001). Religiously based movements, organizations, and groups, in turn, can provide their congregations with various selective incentives for taking part in political action. The fear of damnation or exclusion enables religious organizations to exert considerable pressure on their members compelling them to act consistent with the organizations' expectations and terms (Wald et al, 2005).

Under authoritarian rule, religious groups become a natural vehicle for limited political participation. It has been noted that faith-based organizations, especially those operating within religions with decentralized power structures, are more difficult to repress than labor unions, secular political groups, mass media, or student organizations (Sahliyeh, 1990). Subsequently, contention through religious movements often represents the only option for confronting a sense of political exclusion in authoritarian states (Wiktorowicz, 2003).

In any form of political participation, a rational actor calculates their costs and benefits, and then chooses their best course of action (or inaction) that will result in the highest likelihood of benefit, with the lowest risk or cost. Religion, however, can confer an unusually demanding identity that changes the consequentialist logic of action. Some religions lay claim to every aspect of their adherents' lives ranging from their political views and behavior, to dress codes and dietary restrictions. In conjunction with beliefs in the inferiority of other beliefs and conversion as the only means to removing the sources of spiritual pollution, the omnipresent religious identity can make costly actions appear as justifiable and rational. Under these circumstances, credible threats, including risks associated with physical harm, will offer a less effective deterrent for a faithful person than for a more secular one (Toft, 2007). For the religious leaders themselves, the costs of political participation, even if high from the standpoint of individual safety and resources spent on the communal mobilization, as far less than the losses incurred by inaction. With inaction, the religious leaders risk their communal authority, legitimacy and congregation (Wittenberg, 2006).

Scholars who study religion and violence have pointed out that holy scriptures in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam strictly regulate the conduct of believers. The Old Testament, New Testament, and Quran promise considerable rewards for following the precepts of sacred tests and punishment for disobeying the divine laws. Subsequently, the faithful members are less likely to violate key tenets of their faith even if doing so would result in a better outcome, such as peace. Furthermore, both Christianity and Islam prioritize the religious self, which is eternal and immortal, over the temporal and mortal physical self. Therefore, sacrificing the temporary and moral for the sake of the eternal and immortal is not only rational but desirable.

Abrahamic religions prioritize the immortal self, while Buddhists believe that nirvana may be reached within their lifetimes. Nirvana is the ultimate goal of Buddhists, it is the ultimate form of enlightenment, akin to the Christian or Muslim concept of heaven (Collins, 1998). Given that Buddhists ultimate goals may be achieved within the course of their lives, we expect that Buddhists will be more concerned with political activity, while Abrahamic religions will not, relatively. We also expect that more institutionalized, structured, and centralized sects, like Evangelical Christians or Catholics, will be more politically active because their religious affiliation and organization will be a mobilizing force.

The preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses about the impact of religion on political participation:

H1: The members of religious organizations will be more likely to engage politically than non-members of religious groups

H2: Those identifying with Buddhism will be more likely to engage political activities compared to other religions

The stronger an individual's identity is tied to a particular faith (i.e. the stronger the individual's religiosity is), the greater the likelihood that he or she will seek further exposure to religious teachings and become involved in the discussion and exchange of ideas over religious meanings, solutions, and alternative ways of viewing the world, including through membership in church and religious organizations. The ability of a religious organization to frame this debate in such a way that it resonates with the listeners' grievances and their religious identity will determine success of its mobilizing efforts. Once the frame alignment is achieved, i.e.

individuals accept the group's interpretations and solutions to the pending problems, they become more committed to its cause through participation in a variety of micro and macro mobilization activities, which can include various types of non-violent and violent action. This leads us to the final hypothesis:

H3: Higher levels of religiosity will be associated with higher levels of political participation

The discussed theoretical framework also incorporates a number of other factors that motivate, incentivize, and provide opportunities for individuals' political engagement. Political activism is a response to a grievance or need that provides motivation for political action.

Scholars have debated the relative important of different precipitants for political action. Some argues that socioeconomic distress is the principal cause, while others pointed out a variety of forms of discrimination. The underlying assumption of these approached is that individual's feeling of dissatisfaction with his/her life serves as a motive for political action. As churches and religious organizations serve as vehicles for individuals' mobilization, so do other forms of voluntary associations. Political parties, in particular, have been the primary agents of electoral mobilization. Repression by the state will affect both incentives for engaging in political actions as well as the structure of political opportunities.

Research design

The analysis of the impact of religion on political participation is performed on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 6 wave aggregate, which includes WVS 1981-1984, WVS 1990-1994, WVS 1995-1998, WVS 2000-2004, WVS 2005-2009, and WVS 2010-2014. The Integrated

Values Survey (1981-2014) encompasses 367 surveys, 113 countries/regions, 1261 variables, and 507,779 cases[23]. The selection of the WVS data for this study generated more than 95,000 cases as the first level and more than 65 countries at the second level. The temporal and spatial coverage of the WVS data includes more than 65% of the world's population. The survey relies on national teams that follow the established survey protocol. Still, not all survey instruments and sampling procedures are identical (Inglehart et al., 2000). Despite these caveats, many of the survey items from the 1981 wave of the survey are asked in precisely the same way in each of the successive waves and in each of the participating countries. To maximize the reliability of the longitudinal analysis, we scanned the root surveys from all waves for questions with identical question wording and identical response categories across countries and time points. Unless otherwise noted, identical survey items were used to measure the variables.

The summary of the dependent and independent variables is presented in the appendix. To measure the dependent variable of the study – political participation – we chose a survey item that asked respondents to indicate whether they done the following: signed a petition, joined boycotts, attended lawful demonstration, joined unofficial strokes, or occupying buildings or factories[24]. We created five binary variables coding positive responses with "1" and "0" otherwise.

[23] World Values Survey 1981-2014 Longitudinal Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: JDSystems, Madrid SPAIN.
[24] In addition to these items, the earlier waves survey asked whether respondents used personal violence or became involved in the destruction of property, such as breaking windows. We did not use these items in the study.

In section two, we hypothesized that three manifestations of religion, namely, *religiosity*, *religious affiliation*, and *membership in religious organizations*, have an independent effect on political participation. Drawing on the previous research (Esmer, 2007), we used two measures of *religiosity*, which we alternated in the models. The first is an additive scale consisting of three dichotomous (0 and 1) questions.[5] These questions are:

(1) Religion is an important value for children to learn;

(2) Attendance at religious services (one a week or more vs. less frequently);

(3) Respondent defines himself/herself as a religious person vs. not religious or atheist

The scale has a minimum value of 0 (not religious at all) and a maximum value of 3 (very religious). The second measure is the "Importance of God in one's life scale", which runs from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating more importance of God in a respondents' lives. To measure individual religious affiliation, we created 10 dummy variables where we assigned "1" if a given respondent chose Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Evangelical Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Orthodox, Protestant, or Catholic as their religious identity. We used a survey question that asked about respondents' memberships in religious organizations to create a binary variable for membership in churches and religious organizations "1", or "0" otherwise[25]. To measure

[25] There is a slight discrepancy in wording of the questions and choices of responses between waves 1, 3, 5 and 2, 4, and 6. In waves 1,3, and 5, respondents were asked if they belonged to churches and religious organizations (as well as a number of other voluntary associations), whereas in waves 2,4, and 6, respondents were read a list of voluntary organizations and asked if they were active members, inactive members, or non-members of those types of organizations. If respondents in waves 1,3, and 5 chose "belong" to an organization and in waves 2, 4, and 6 they chose "active member" in an

the "motive", we used two survey items: one asking respondents to indicate how satisfied they were with their life, and another one inquiring about respondent's satisfaction with the financial situation in his/her household. Both items are measured on a scale from 1 ("completely dissatisfied") to 10 (completely satisfied"). The "financial satisfaction" scale also serves as a proxy for respondent's subjective assessment of his/her economic well-being/income. To measure the structure of political opportunities, we included a binary variable denoting respondent's membership in political parties or other groups ("1" indicating membership), and created another binary variable denoting membership in one or more of the following voluntary associations: humanitarian or charitable organizations, education or art groups, trade unions, organizations concerned with human rights, environmentalist or animal welfare groups, youth work, sport or recreational groups, consumer groups, professional associations, and other voluntary groups. We also included a measure of political interest with the scale of importance of politics in one's life: 1 (very important to 4 (not at all)[26], and demographic variables: age and marital status.

We used three country-level variables to measure the structure of incentives and political opportunities for individual political action. The first one is GDP per capita measured in constant 2005 $US from the World Bank data[27]. The second variable measures a regime type

organization, we coded those responses as "1s" (membership). If respondents in waves 1,3, and 5 did not chose "belong" to an organization and in waves 2, 4, and 6 they chose "inactive member" or "non-member" in an organization, we coded those responses as "0s" (membership).

[26] An original scale contains six items. We adopted a limited scale to increase the number of observations in the model since questions about respondents' beliefs in life after death, hell, and heaven were not included in several survey waves.

[27] Available here: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?page=5

with Polity IV scores. We used a modified version of the combined annual Polity variable, where all instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e. -66, -77, and -88) are converted to conventional polity scores ranging from -10 to 10[28]. Lastly, we used the Cingranelli and Richards Empowerment Rights index to control for the overall situation with civil and political rights in the country[29]. This is an additive index constructed from seven indicators of the freedoms of Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Speech, Religion, Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, and Electoral Self-Determination. The index ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 14 (full government respect for these rights).

Given the hierarchical nature of our data, we have information on individuals (level 1 units) belonging to different countries (level 2 unites), we chose to perform a multi-level analysis. Multi-level models allow for the introduction of higher-level explanatory variables in this way voiding the ecological fallacy arising from the conflation of the levels of analysis, when inferences derived from one level are applied to another level. Ordering the data in a hierarchical model offers a clear picture of where (which level) and how effects are occurring.

[28] Marshall, Monty G., Gurr, Ted Robert, and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. Dataset Users' Manual". Center for Systemic Peace, 2014, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf

[29] Cingranelli and Richards, "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." When CIRI index was used as a dependent variable, it was excluded from the right-hand side of the equation. We also added the random coefficient (slope) to the models. A likelihood-ratio test showed that the models with the random coefficient were not significantly better than the models with just the random intercept.

We make the standard assumption that residuals at both levels follow a normal distribution with zero mean, which allows partitioning total variance in two components, a within-group component ($\sigma\varepsilon^2$) and a between-group component ($\sigma\mu^2$). In this random intercept model, the same relationship between different measures of religion and political participation holds for each country (same slope) but the intercept ($\beta_0 + \mu_j$) varies randomly across countries. Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, which takes 0/1 values, we used a mixed effects logistic regression to estimate it in STATA 14.

Results:

Table 1: Political participation with religiosity index

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
	Petition	Boycott	Demonstrate	Strike	Occupy
Religiosity index	0.974**	0.963**	0.984**	0.948**	0.939**
	0.002	*0.002*	*0.002*	*0.003*	*0.004*
Life satisfaction	0.987**	0.974**	0.982**	0.968**	0.961**
	0.003	*0.003*	*0.003*	*0.004*	*0.005*
Importance of politics	0.722**	0.718**	0.699**	0.732**	0.75**
	0.004	*0.004*	*0.004*	*0.006*	*0.008*
Religious membership	1.067**	0.954*	0.963*	0.956*	0.98
	0.018	*0.015*	*0.015*	*0.02*	*0.028*
Political party member	1.923**	1.174**	1.928**	1.599**	1.653**
	0.055	*0.042*	*0.049*	*0.048*	*0.064*
Other memberships	1.159**	1.287**	1.498**	1.481**	1.325**
	0.026	*0.031*	*0.032*	*0.042*	*0.478*
Perception of freedom of choice	1.029**	1.023**	1.025**	1.028**	1.01*
	0.003	*0.003*	*0.003*	*0.004*	*0.005*
Christian	1.391*	1.498*	1.46*	1.16	1.221
	0.199	*0.223*	*0.218*	*0.378*	*0.718*
Buddhist	1.756**	1.206**	1.386**	1.092	1.022
	0.098	*0.063*	*0.069*	*0.08*	*0.112*
Evangelical	1.34**	0.897	1.025	0.88	0.803
	0.073	*0.051*	*0.054*	*0.077*	*0.09*
Hindu	1.11	1.021	0.978	0.792*	0.642**
	0.061	*0.055*	*0.053*	*0.058*	*0.068*
Jewish	1.542**	1.753**	1.538**	1.844**	1.182
	0.171	*0.178*	*0.15*	*0.212*	*0.206*
Orthodox Christian	1.385**	1.035	1.336**	1.088	0.911
	0.049	*0.039*	*0.045*	*0.051*	*0.073*
Protestant	1.55**	1.159**	1.173**	0.928	0.78**
	0.053	*0.04*	*0.037*	*0.042*	*0.055*
Catholic	1.359**	1.097*	1.207**	0.982	0.888
	0.043	*0.036*	*0.037*	*0.042*	*0.059*
Financial satisfaction	1.005	0.99*	0.981**	0.984**	0.985*
	0.003	*0.003*	*0.003*	*0.004*	*0.005*
Age	0.987**	0.984**	0.982**	0.978**	0.976**
	0.0003	*0.0003*	*0.0004*	*0.0005*	*0.0008*
Married	1.085**	1.029*	1.014	0.935**	0.876**
	0.013	*0.013*	*0.011*	*0.015*	*0.02*

GDP per capita logged)	0.495**	0.818**	0.659**	1.459**	1.569**
	0.018	*0.031*	*0.213*	*0.055*	*0.143*
Polity score	0.964**	0.964**	0.98**	1.033**	0.949**
	0.004	*0.004*	*0.004*	*0.005*	*0.009*
Emancipatory index	1.01	1.042**	0.99	0.922**	0.889**
	0.007	*0.007*	*0.006*	*0.009*	*0.018*
Constant	1680.325**	10.985**	149.15**	0.161**	0.143*
	686.319	*3.889*	*47.66*	*0.056*	*0.103*
N	169540	164756	168250	111596	84567
Number of groups	69	67	67	54	51
Random effects parameters					
Country	2.153	1.16	1.25	0.668	0.946
ICC	0.585	0.29	0.322	0.119	0.214

**P value < .001; * P value < .05

Notes: Religious reference group is Islam; Results in odds ratios; ICC is the intra-class correlation of the two levels; Standard errors are in italics under coefficients

As can be seen from Table 1, we found that membership in religious organization has been positively related to signing a petition only. The conditional odds ratios for members of religious organizations from the same state (or states with identical random effects) signing petition is 1.067, holding other individual level factors constant. The models of demonstrations, strikes, and building occupations revealed a negative, relationship between these forms of political participation and membership in a religious organization. However, the relationship between occupation and signing a petition is negative, but it is statistically insignificant.

When we further examine the impact of religion on political participation across different religious affiliations, we note an even greater diversity of findings. Noting that the results are relative to Muslim respondents, we find that Christian respondents are more likely to sign petitions, join boycotts and participate in demonstrations, ceteris paribus. We also find that

Catholics, relative to Muslims, have a higher odds ratio of participating in petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes, and occupations. Relative to Muslims, Catholics have a 1.4 higher conditional odds ratio of signing petitions, holding other factors constant. Buddhists, as expected, also are more likely to participate in all forms of political participation, relative to Muslims. Coefficients are positive and highly significant across models.

The results indicate that there is no support for our hypothesis that higher levels of religiosity are associated with higher levels of political participation. The religiosity index is statistically significant across models, but it is negatively associated with all forms of political participation. This suggests that more religious individuals are less likely to sign petitions, take part in boycotts and demonstrations, or occupy buildings, holding other factors constant.

As expected, political party membership is consistently positively associated with all forms of political participation, and this finding is highly statistically significant in all models. Interestingly, people who express high levels of political interest are less likely to engage politically (the negative statistically significant relationship is found across all models). Also consistent with expectations, higher levels of life satisfactions (and, by extension, the lower levels of grievances) are associated with lesser odds ratios of individuals' engagement in all forms of political activity, except for fighting, but the latter finding is statistically insignificant. Financial satisfaction, on the other hand, has a varied relationship with different forms of political participation. Higher levels of financial satisfactions are associated with greater odds ratios of signing petition, but lesser odds ratios for demonstrations, occupations, and strikes.

Age appears to be negatively associated with all forms of political actions. This is perhaps due to what Putnam (2001) called a generational change, the results indicate that younger people are less likely to participate in all forms of political actions relative to older people. Priorities of involvement, perhaps, have not reached the younger demographic. However, marital status is positively associated with all forms of political participation with the exception of occupation and strikes.

With regards to the country-level variables, the higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with lesser odds ratios of individuals signing petitions, or joining boycotts. The higher levels of democracy are associated with lesser likelihood of individuals from these states signing petitions, joining boycotts, or participating in strikes. Lastly, the Emancipatory Rights Index was found to be negatively associated with demonstrations, strikes, and occupations. In other words, the higher the country's level respect for a variety of civil and political freedoms, including the freedoms of movement and religion, the less likely individuals from these states would engage in these forms of political participation.

In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the second measure of religiosity – the Importance of God scale, to test the models (see appendix). The results are overall consistent with the findings reported above.

Post estimation

Given that this study uses binary multilevel models, post-estimation is to be expected to further explain the results.

Graphs 1- 5: Predicted probabilities of political actions, by religion











The graphs represent the predicted probabilities of participation, by religion for the various forms of political participation. Although some of the religion variables were insignificant in

Table 1, you will observe that predicted probabilities are still calculated for all religions. Just because a variable is not statistically significant, it does not mean it is unimportant or actually equal to zero.

At first glance, Graph 1 indicates that members of the Jewish faith have the highest predicted probability (approximately 0.52) of signing petitions, whereas Muslims have the lowest predicted probability (approximately 0.2) of signing petitions. However, as can be observed, all the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that these religions are not truly unique in their predicted probability.

In Graph 2, we can see that there is greater variation in predicted probabilities of boycotting. While none of the confidence intervals have confidence intervals that do not overlap, the variation is more stark than in Graph 1. Interestingly, all the religions predicted probability of boycotting are below zero.

Graph 3 looks more like Graph 1, as we see that all the confidence intervals overlapping. However, we can note that Muslims have the lowest predicted probability of demonstrating, relative to Jewish people, who have the highest predicted probability. This is interesting because many Muslim states face authoritarian regimes, and we would consequently expect Muslims to avoid demonstrations as they are frowned upon (Fish, 2002).

Graphs 4 and 5 both convey all values below zero, suggesting that for both striking and occupations, all religions are averse.

These predicted probabilities present a slightly varied image than Table 1, as the diversity among religions is shown to be present, but limited.

Discussion and conclusion

This study was motivated by an observed gap in the study of religion and various types of individual political participation. Although the last three decades witnessed a renewed interest in the study of religion in comparative politics and international relations, the scholarly attention has largely concentrated on the topic of religious violence inspired by the explosive growth of fundamentalist movements in some of the world's largest faiths – Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam in particular (Gill, 2001). With the exception of analyses of the impact of religion on political attitudes and behavior conducted at the individual level, the studies of religious influences on public policies, institutions, and the long-term outcomes (e.g., regime type and durability) have been performed using state-level data. Furthermore, much of the research on religious commitment and how it affects individual's political attitudes and behavior has been conducted on the case of the United States. Religious influences in other national contexts are far less clean (Grzymala-Busse, 2012).

What we found was that religion matters, but not always in the ways we expected it to have an impact on political participation. Notwithstanding the denominational differences, our research showed that religiosity, by itself, often serves as a deterrent rather than mobilizing force for non-violent political engagement, everything else being equal. It is the membership in political parties that make individuals more consistently politically active.

Although the hierarchical models used in this study tapped the variation in the religious and other impacts across states by allowing their intercepts vary (the models with random slopes did not perform better than those with random intercepts only), they did not delve into

important differences within religions as well as the variation in religious influences within states. Not all religiosity and not all religions are the same. Doctrinal differences differentiate one religion from another. Much like nationalism and political ideology, the doctrinal beliefs will drive the behavior of faithful in different directions depending on what people believe and way.

To probe the consequence of doctrinal differences on political participation, we singled out several of the world's largest religions and examined how individuals' self-identification with those faiths affected their willingness to engage politically. One the one hand, these analyses offered several insights supporting findings of previous research, for example, Glazier (2015) finds that, in general, non-religious people are more likely to participate in politics. She also finds, however, that this changes after religious leaders make appeals (Glazier, 2015). While this study accounts for religiosity as identified by volunteered information, it does not account for religious leaders' influence. This is mainly due to the information would be difficult to measure, or collect, but it is a weakness of the study that we need to acknowledge.

Religions also differ in their professions about legitimate political authority and institutional structures, which affect how religious authorities relate to political regimes and policies and how they mobilize their faithful (Philpott 2007, 505). The ways in which Catholic organizations and members interface with politics are shaped significantly by the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church, which translates into ideological monopoly and authority to define official teachings across its entire global infrastructure. Evangelicals and Protestants, on the other hand, have a greater diversity of religious views but share a belief in the corruptive influence of politics. These differences affect the degree and type of influence that the members of these

faiths seek to exert on politics (Heyer and Rozell 2008, 2). Our study, for example, found that Evangelicals, like Catholics, were more likely to engage in most forms of political participation.

Moreover, as other studies have shown, political behavior cannot be inferred from religious beliefs or membership in religious organizations alone. Religion interacts with secular structures and pressures to move or deter the individuals from engaging with the political world. In examining the relationship between religion and politics, we, therefore, need to be sensitive both to the independent roles played by religious factors and to the interactions between religious influences and a range of non-religious considerations and strategic evaluations affecting decisions of individuals to engage politically.

Conclusion

This dissertation sought to introduce an improved terrorism dataset, provide statistical evidence in support of the diversity among terrorist groups, present theoretical explanations connecting terrorist group-types and operational decisions, and to examine the role of religion, religiosity, and other social factors on various forms of political participation. I believe that the three articles presented have fulfilled these goals.

The first article sought to examine the link between ideology and tactic choice. An enhanced version of the GTD was developed in order to test this question. Groups were systematically assigned an ideological identity, or two in some cases, and each group's length of survival was also recorded. The five ideological categories are: nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, religious, and environmental. The new dataset allowed me to test the role of ideology and capability on the selection of six different tactics, including bombing, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricading, assassination, and hijackings. I find that there is indeed diversity of choices based on ideologies. I also find mixed answers to Rapaport's "waves of terrorism" theory. Given the time limitations of the data, I was only able to test Rapoport's expectations for the third (leftist) and fourth (religious) waves. Rapoport's expectations, at times, meet up with his expectations. However, the key contributions of this piece are: (1) an enhanced dataset to test terrorism questions at the group-level, (2) finding answers to the waves of terrorism theory, and (3) statistical evidence of diversity among ideological group-types with regards to tactic choice.

The data introduced in the first article, and the consequent findings, suggest that future studies need to take more care in understanding the variation among groups. The dataset may be used to test a multitude of theories, and it will allow scholars to incorporate the group level dynamics.

The second article, like the first, sought to further understand a specific operational decision, namely target choice. This article argues that ideology is the driving force of operational decisions, and these decisions are mitigated by capability. This article detailed the role of ideology and how a group identity can shape decisions. This article contributes to the literature as it shows that ideology is a compelling force for target selection as it provides empirical evidence conveying the diversity among group-types selection of targets.

Moreover, the first and second articles both have implications for counter-terrorism. The articles' find evidence of trends regarding tactic and target selection by group-types, and these trends can inform the distribution of resources. For instance, understanding that right wing groups are likely to use assassination and likely to attack political targets, helps inform authorities how to deal with the threat of a right wing group.

The final article, which is co-authored with Prof. Omelicheva, sought to convey the link between religion, religiosity, and various forms of non-violent political participation. The study addresses the variation among religions, and explains how that variation compels us to consider the differences among them. We find mixed results that are both in convergence and alignment with the literature; we find that political party members are more likely to participate in political actions, whereas we find that members of religious groups are not. We also find that

while there is diversity among religions in terms of their members' participation in political actions, that diversity is somewhat limited, as post-estimation indicated. This study also suggests that when considering the role of religion on political activity, we need to consider other factors, including membership in political parties, membership in social groups, and demographic factors. In sum, religion is not a sole influencing factor on political activity.

This dissertation also makes an additional contribution, as a whole, it contends that all political activity, violent or non-violent is a form of political activism. This may not be a conventional view, but I believe that actions are, at least in turn, motivated by grievances, and these political actions are in reaction to those grievances.

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Appendices

Study 1 Appendix:

Item 1: Variable names and descriptions

Dependent variables	
Group-Type	Categorical variable denoting group-types: (1) Nationalist/Separatist (2) Left wing (3) Right wing (4) Religious (5) Environment (6) Nationalist/Separatist and Religious (7) Nationalist/Separatist and Left wing All coded as "1" if they fit into their respective group-type(s) and "0" if not. Nationalist/separatist groups, the most numerous category, is the reference category.
Independent variables	
Nationalist/Separatists (N/S)	Dummy variable; "1" if the group is nationalist/separatist and "0" if they are not
Left wing (LW)	Dummy variable; "1" if the group is left wing and "0" if they are not
Right wing (RW)	Dummy variable; "1" if the group is right wing and "0" if they are not
Religious ®	Dummy variable; "1" if the group is religious and "0" if they are not
Environmental €	Dummy variable; "1" if the group is environmental and "0" if they are not
Nationalist/Separatist & Religious (NS/R)	Interaction variable; N/S * R
Nationalist/Separatists & Left wing (NS/LW)	Interaction variable; N/S * LW
One year	Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past one year, "0" if they did not
Five years	Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past five years, "0" if they did not
Third wave	Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is <1995, "0" otherwise
Fourth wave	Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is >1978, "0" otherwise
Internet age	Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is >1995, "0" otherwise
Year	Continuous variable, denotes years, from 1970 to 2013

Study 2 Appendix:

Item 1: Variable descriptions

Dependent variables	
Political target	"1" if the target is political (government buildings, government employees, government events, and foreign missions or embassies), "0" if otherwise
Civilian target	"1" if the target is civilian (educational institutions such as schools or teachers, journalists and media entities, NGOs, private citizens and private property, religious institutions, and tourists), "0" if otherwise
Security target	"1" if target is a security body (military or police), "0" otherwise
Business target	"1" if the target is a business (business or business patrons), "0" otherwise
Rival target	"1" if the target is a rival (other terrorist groups or non-state militias), "0" otherwise
Infrastructure target	"1" if the target is an infrastructure target (food or water supplies, airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, cell phone towers, transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or electric substations), "0" otherwise
Independent variables	
Group Type	Categorical variable denoting group-types: (1) Nationalist/Separatist (2) Left wing (3) Right wing (4) Religious (5) Environment (6) Nationalist/Separatist and Religious (7) Nationalist/Separatist and Left wing All coded as "1" if they fit into their respective group-type(s) and "0" if not. Nationalist/separatist groups, the most numerous category, is the reference category.
One year	Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past one year, "0" if they did not
Five years	Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past five years, "0" if they did not
Year	Continuous variable, denotes years, from 1970 to 2013

Study 3 Appendix:

Item 1:

Concept	Variable(s)	Measure(s)
Political Participation (DV)	Petition Boycott Demonstrate Strike Occupy	A survey item that asked respondents to indicate whether they signed a petition (yes=1; no=0) A survey item that asked respondents to indicate whether they joined in boycotts yes=1; no=0) A survey item that asked respondents to indicate whether they attended lawful demonstrations yes=1; no=0) A survey item that asked respondents to indicate whether they joined unofficial strikes yes=1; no=0)
Religiosity	Religiosity1 Religiosity2	An additive scale ranging from 0 (not religious at all) to 3 (very religious) A survey item measuring the importance of God in one's life, which runs from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating more importance of God in respondent's life
Religious Affiliation	Islam Christianity Buddhism Evangelical Hinduism Judaism Orthodoxy Protestantism Catholicism	Dummy variables with "1" if respondent chose Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Evangelical Christian, Hindu, Jew, Orthodox, Protestant, or Catholic as his/her religious denomination. The religion variable included takes these dummies and a categorical variable is created. 1 = Muslim, 2=Christian, 3=Buddhists, 4=Evangelicals, 5=Hindus, 6=Jewish, 7=Orthodox, 8=Protestant, and 9=Catholic. Muslim is the reference category.
Membership in religious organization	Religious organization membership	A survey item asking about respondent's membership in religious organization (yes=1, no=0)
Motive for political participation	Satisfaction with life Satisfaction with financial situation	A survey item asking respondents to indicate how satisfied they were with their life A survey asking about respondent's satisfaction with the financial situation in his/her household. Both items are measured on a scale from 1 ("completely dissatisfied") to 10 (completely satisfied").
Political Opportunity	Membership in political party	Survey item asking about a respondent's membership in political parties (yes=1; no=0);

	Membership in other groups	A binary variable denoting membership in one or more of the following voluntary associations: humanitarian or charitable organizations, education or art groups, trade unions, organizations concerned with human rights, environmentalist or animal welfare groups, youth work, sport or recreational groups, consumer groups, professional associations, and other voluntary groups. A
	Perception of the freedom of choice and control	survey item asking a respondent to assess how much freedom of choice and control over his/her life he/she has (10= a great deal; 0=none).
Incentive for political participation	Political interest	The scale of importance of politics in one's life: 1 (very important) to 4 (not at all)
	Political regime	Polity score
	Empowerment Rights Index	An additive index constructed from seven indicators of the freedoms of Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Speech, Religion, Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, and Electoral Self-Determination. Ranges from 0 (no government respects for these rights) to 14 (full government respect for these rights).
Other	Age	Respondent's age
	Marital status	Respondent's marital status
	GDP per capita	GDP per capita measured in constant 2005 $US

Item 2:

Table 2: Political participation with Importance of God index

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
	Petition	Boycott	Demonstrate	Strike	Occupy
Importance of God	0.905**	0.854**	0.915**	0.844**	0.863**
	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.01	0.014
Life satisfaction	0.99	0.978**	0.988*	0.969**	0.966**
	0.004	*0.004*	*0.004*	*0.005*	*0.007*
Importance of politics	0.702**	0.695**	0.686**	0.714**	0.734**
	0.006	*0.006*	*0.005*	*0.007*	*0.011*
Religious membership	1.107**	1.008	0.989	0.983	0.997
	0.026	*0.023*	*0.021*	*0.029*	*0.041*
Political party member	1.937**	1.771**	1.933**	1.643**	1.574**
	0.071	*0.057*	*0.064*	*0.065*	*0.082*
Other memberships	1.159**	1.334**	1.451**	1.494**	1.31**
	0.034	*0.0427*	*0.041*	*0.056*	*0.062*
Perception of freedom of choice	1.021**	1.016**	1.019**	1.025**	1.005
	0.003	*0.004*	*0.003*	*0.005*	*0.006*
Christian	1.348	1.23	1.839*	1.11	0.592
	0.313	*0.322*	*0.423*	*0.571*	*0.673*
Buddhist	1.945**	1.432**	1.516**	1.394**	1.951**
	0.14	*0.977*	*0.097*	*0.132*	*0.317*
Evangelical	1.348**	0.858*	1.017	0.935	0.834
	0.098	*0.066*	*0.069*	*(0.108*	*0.127*
Hindu	1.162*	1.093	0.97	0.921	0.761*
	(0.079	*0.079*	*0.065*	*0.086*	*0.103*
Jewish	1.859**	2.102**	1.638**	2.249**	1.408
	0.279	*0.279*	*0.208*	*0.339*	*0.319*
Orthodox Christian	1.464**	1.134*	1.439**	1.311**	1.152
	0.063	*0.052*	*0.06*	*0.077*	*0.119*
Protestant	1.59**	1.192**	1.189**	1.085	0.903
	0.07	*0.052*	*0.048*	*0.063*	*0.085*
Catholic	1.4**	1.131*	1.235**	1.147*	1.111
	0.057	*0.047*	*0.047*	*0.063*	*0.096*
Financial satisfaction	1.006	0.996	0.98**	0.981*	0.979*
	0.004	*0.004*	*0.003*	*0.0005*	*0.007*
Age	0.987**	0.984**	0.984**	0.978**	0.976**
	.0004	*0.0005*	*0.0005*	*0.0007*	*0.001*
Married	1.093**	1.013	1.01	0.922**	0.88**
	0.018	*0.016*	*0.149*	*0.018*	*0.027*

GDP per capita (logged	0.434**	0.684**	0.479**	1.307**	1.71**
	0.02	*0.036*	*0.021*	*0.051*	*0.176*
Polity score	0.982**	0.979**	1.003	1.056**	0.956**
	0.005	*0.006*	*0.005*	*0.007*	*0.013*
Emancipatory index	0.979*	0.996	0.932**	0.921**	0.875**
	0.008	*0.009*	*0.008*	*0.01*	*0.022*
Constant	7251.31**	73.238**	3762.258**	0.308*	0.06**
	3666.205	*37.057*	*1686.856*	*0.126*	*0.047*
N	99676	97207	99571	66067	47696
Number of groups	68	66	66	54	50
Random effects parameters					
Country	2.341	1.421	1.709	0.688	0.952
ICC	0.625	0.38	0.47	0.126	0.216

** P value < .001; * P value < .05

Notes: Religious reference group is Islam; Results in odds ratios; ICC is the intra-class correlation of the two levels; Standard errors are in italics under coefficients