NATO's post-Cold War Relevance in Counter Terrorism

By

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Abstract

From the end of the Cold War, through the process of globalization, national security has transitioned from an idea of purely state versus state interaction into a concept including both state and non-state actors. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), once the counter balance to the Soviet Union, has evolved into an alliance that has expanded its attention to include non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. Scholars have theorized on the lifespan of NATO post-Cold War, however the majority of these theories have focused on state versus state issues, a common paradigm of the 20th century, and not included state versus non-state issues, such as international terrorism. As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance has it been able to transition to a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within each member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the international community? With statistical data of terrorist attacks within NATO member states from the Global Terrorism Database this study focuses on each new member that joined during three influential time periods before and after the end of the Cold War in order to determine if becoming a member correlates to an increase or decrease in the number of terrorist attacks. Complementing the statistical data is a content analysis of NATO Summit Declarations in order to determine the combined strategies of each member state in reference to international terrorism. According to the findings of the statistical data, I hypothesize that each state will have experienced a decrease in terrorist attacks within their borders after becoming a member of NATO. The content analysis will illustrate that the alliance has continued to evolve its existence by increasing attention and resources to the fight against international terrorism.

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Introduction: The Journey from Red Scare to Terror

Globalization and international terrorism are intricately intertwined forces perceived as the most dangerous threat to international security in the twenty-first century. Globalization has enabled non-state actors to reach across international borders, in the same way and through the same channels that business interests are linked. The elimination of barriers through the North American Free Trade Area and the European Union, for instance, has facilitated the smooth flow of many things, good and bad, between countries (Cronin, 2003). The increased permeability of the international system has also enhanced the ability of non-state organizations to collect intelligence as well as counter it; states are not the only actors interested in collecting, disseminating, and/or profiting from such information. Terrorists have greater access to powerful technologies, potential targets, ungoverned territory, elaborate means of recruitment, and more exploitable sources of civil grievances than ever before.

The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign occupations and shrinking global space have created opportunities to utilize this ideal asymmetrical weapon, for more ambitious purposes. International terrorism is in many ways becoming like any other global enterprise. But the benefit of globalization is that the international response to terrorist networks has sparked increasing, state to state cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, and especially financial controls being areas of notable recent innovation (Cronin, 2003). The globalization of terrorism is perhaps the current leading threat to long-term stability in the international system.

Today the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has performed as the primary opposition to international terrorism, a tactic used by non-state actors. The alliance was originally forged as a state-state institution in opposition to the expansion of another state-state entity, the USSR. Under a multi-polarity or uni-polarity international system, differences in definitions and perceptions over proposed threats likely lead to internal divisions within the alliance, undermining cohesion. State to state alliances are more likely to survive in conditions of bipolarity, if they are in fact birthed as a response to an external threat. Neo-realists believe that the world now experiences uni-polarity since the end of the Cold War, and assume the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will slowly fall apart. Many have theorized the alliance's inevitable demise, only to be proven wrong by its continuing existence. Numerous studies have been conducted to understand and challenge theories of the lifespan of the alliance, mostly focusing on the macro level, while this study will focus one function, specifically on the counterterrorism efforts of NATO.

The relevance of the alliance has been a matter of discussion among scholars, politicians, and military strategists since its inception after World War II. Born out of the threat perceptions of the Soviet Union by an alliance of democratic nations in the North Atlantic, the organization has continued its maturity even as those threats have shifted, along with the respective perceptions. While the alliance has remained twenty four years and counting after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is arguably not the same institution as it was once realized, but an evolved version to fit the world as we know it today. As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance has it been able to

transition to a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within each member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the international community?

As NATO entered the post-Cold War era, uncertainty remained as to whether a shared identity would be enough to maintain the Alliance in the absence of any overarching threat to its ideology. NATO's 1991 New Strategic Concept had accurately forecasted that future threats from NATO were likely to come from 'ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes' in Central and Eastern Europe, but the alliance proved unprepared to deal with those threats as they appeared (Hallams, 2009). While European members were pressing forwards with the European Security and Defence Policy, the Americans were pushing to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative that had been launched at the 1999 Washington Summit in an effort to encourage the European members to address the obvious lack of capabilities that the Balkan conflict highlighted.

The apparent success of NATO's peacekeeping operations in the Balkans had less to do with its organizational strength than with the overwhelming military capability of British and US forces. However, this success helped NATO alleviate the political pressure to change its charter, keeping the organization's original architecture intact; by 2000, the issue was all but forgotten since NATO appeared to have made the transition from a defensive organization to a peacekeeping one without any major structural changes (Chavez, 2003). The old charter was able to remain unaltered, and NATO continued to exist without resolving arguments among its member states over its future role. The delicate balance unraveled when the United States fell victim to the first major attack against a NATO country in 2001. Article V, while intended as a collective security

agreement against a Soviet attack, now obligated NATO members into supporting the US in a situation they were not prepared for militarily.

Because of the multi-functionality of the alliance, it is necessary to consider the different sets of institutions with particular issue areas, suggesting varied degrees of institutionalization.   Therefore, one measure of effectiveness will be NATO's ability to pass the functions of collective security from the organization as a whole to each of the member states (Webber, Sperling, Smith, 2012). Asset portability has assisted NATO in its transformation from an exclusive, threat-focused entity, to an inclusive, risk-focused security institution.

> "*We need, in short, to ensure we do not lose our core combat competencies and structures as we embrace new missions. Collective defense remains the fundamental purpose of NATO and should be the basis for a rational transformation of the Alliance to respond to new demands. Nonarticle V capabilities are derivative from article V requirements—not the reverse. We also need to preserve and build on structures and procedures that enable 16 sovereign nations to discuss and agree to political objectives, then transform the objectives into guidance for NATO military authorities. This is a unique strength of NATO which must be preserved.*" (Christman, 1996)

In regards to counterterrorism campaigns, if membership to NATO enhanced a member's ability to detect, disrupt, or destroy possible attacks or the organizations that plan them, a likely outcome would be a decrease in terrorist activity in and around that member state.

NATO's existence since the attacks of 11 September 2001 has been more about the fight than the defense. Instead of positioning equipment and personnel and waiting to be attacked in Europe, the Alliance has operated in locations that were never considerations during the Cold War, such as Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden. Member states have shed blood and sustained operations such as International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan that have gone on longer than both World Wars combined. They may have been only able to resource small contingents in the field, but after the prolonged combat experience in Afghanistan, these forces are more versatile, battle-tested, better equipped, and therefore more useful than the larger, mainly static European forces of the previous twenty years. Indeed one of NATO's key challenges upon completion of its combat role in Afghanistan is to preserve the connectivity, interoperability, and readiness that it has achieved in recent operations.

In the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO admitted its need for its own "modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management." Ironically this epiphany came after three decades of counter terrorism efforts shifting from a law enforcement model to a military reaction model, punctuated by the events of and following 11 September 2001. All of these polices, initiatives, summits, and conferences will be of great value in the analysis of NATO's perception of international terrorism, a non-state actor, as a threat to the international community, the alliance as a whole, and to each of the members: all state actors.

Since the end of the Cold War collective security theorists believe that the international environment is more conducive for states to cooperate, sharing values and interests. The preservation of NATO, even since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet

threat, appeared as confirmation that international cooperation could outlast the initial realist-inspired conditions for that institution (Dannreuther, 2013). Unfortunately the alliance has remained an institution limited to providing a military response to terror threats, lacking the civilian resources to address a more comprehensive approach. NATO members have evolved in their threat perceptions, ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, to failing states on the European periphery, to organized crime, to international terrorism, and even illegal or uncontrolled migration. As many scholars as well as counterterrorism experts and operators argue, quality and robust intelligence gathering is key to understanding and defeating terror organizations.

It is widely known across the member states that threat perception of international terrorism takes many forms. In an alliance of differing loyalties and economic interest, how the organization identifies, defines, and prioritizes terrorist threats is a constant struggle. David Lake suggests that there appear to be situations in which nations sacrifice some of their sovereignty (both economically and through security to the United States) and that when these hierarchical relationships exist the subordinate nations lower their defense efforts (Lake, 2007). Whereas the United States almost doubled its defense spending after 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and had spent nearly two trillion US dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Europeans have cut their defense spending since 2008 by between 10 to 15 percent. This is not likely to be a short-term phenomenon but rather a long-term decline (Hillison, 2014). The consensus principle has been the sole basis for Alliance decision-making since NATO's creation in 1949. It applies for all bodies and committees (Public Diplomacy, 2013). A shared consensus of what leads to terrorist activity, the players involved, or the likely effects on

the population would be an epic achievement in itself, however would be short lived due to the ever evolving and changing terrorist organizations that exist.

Terror campaigns, like battles in conventional warfare, are difficult to limit and control once they have begun, often resulting in collateral damage and other tragedies to civilians caught up in the violence. Even when terrorists' actions are not as deliberate or discriminating, and their purpose is in fact to kill innocent civilians, the target is still regarded as "justified" because it represents the defined "enemy." Although attacks may be quantitatively different in the volume of death, damage, or destruction caused, they are still qualitatively identical in that a widely known "enemy" is being specifically targeted (Hoffman, 2013). This distinction is often accepted by a terrorist organization's constituents and at times by the international community as well. Terrorist organizations are able to maintain success depending on their ability to keep one step ahead of authorities and counter terrorist technology. The terrorist organization's fundamental imperative to act also drives the persistent search for new ways to circumvent or defeat governmental security and countermeasures.

During the 1970s and 1980s terrorism achieved a firmly international character, evolving in part as a result of technological advances and the height of state-sponsorship terrorism, an attractive tool for accomplishing a state's clandestine goals while avoiding potential retaliation for the attacks. Individual, scattered national causes began to develop into international organizations with links and activities increasingly across borders and among differing causes. Sometimes the lowest common denominator among the groups was the shared, perceived enemy against which they were reacting rather than the specific goals they sought.

In the post-Cold War era, terrorists aimed to exploit the frustrations of the common people, especially in the developing world where reforms occurred at a pace much slower than was desired. David Rapoport argues that modern terrorism is part of a larger phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have and have-not nations, as well as between the elite and underprivileged within those nations (Rapoport, 2001). The jihad era is animated by widespread alienation combined with elements of religious identity and doctrine, a dangerous mix of forces that resonate deep in the human psyche (Cronin, 2003). As states continued their own transitioning from the former bi-polar world system to the new uni-polar world order, their populations often suffered the brunt of the growing pains.

Both the international system and international terrorism have experienced critical events to their evolution over the last four decades. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the launch pad from which modern international terrorism sprang forth. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system experienced massive shock waves, on which terrorist organizations rode to newer, more modern methods and ideologies. Sparked by the fantastic events of 11 September 2001, the international system again was jolted into an era of warfare against international terrorism, creating incredible leaps in the technology of globalization. This study will pay particular attention to these three time periods: (1) 1979 – 1991, beginning with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, (2) 1991 – 2001, defined by the collapse of the Soviet Union and end to the bipolar world order, and (3) 2001 – (dependent on available data), after the attacks on 11 September 2001, when international terrorism became a stated, perceived threat in NATO doctrine. A statistical

analysis of terrorist attacks within member states, coupled with a content analysis of

NATO doctrine and publications will shed light on the alliance's ability to transition to the

premiere counter balance to both state and non-state threats.

The Importance of Institutions

In order to properly frame my analysis, I must begin from the building blocks of the Alliance and proper selection of timeframe for measurement. Examining the function of counter terrorism without the context of terrorism itself would produce insufficient results. Therefore, the framework for this study will be anchored on the neoliberal institutionalism theory of several scholars in regards to NATO, and the four waves of terrorism theory posited by David Rapoport. The combination of these theories allow for a robust, time based analysis of NATO's trajectory as an alliance with a valid, counter terrorism function.

NATO and Its Institutions

The bargains struck and institutions created at the building of NATO have not simply persisted for almost 70 years, but they have actually become more deeply rooted in the structures of politics and society of the member states. That is, more people and more of their activities are linked to the institutions and operations of the alliance. A wider array of individuals and groups, in more countries and more realms of activity, have a stake, or a vested interest, in the continuation of NATO's existence. The costs of disruption or change in this system have steadily grown over the decades, meaning that alternative institutions are at a disadvantage. The system is increasingly hard to dismantle or replace.

This study will enhance the scholarship on NATO's existence with respect to examining the alliance through the lens of neoliberal institutionalism. Several previous

works have measured the relevancy of NATO as a whole, as a state to state alliance, balancing against another state entity. Particularly, the recent publication from Webber, Sperling and Smith, examines the alliance's trajectory as either decline or regeneration using neoliberal institutionalism theory as one of their arguments. Expanding on this work, this study focuses on a particular function of the alliance (counter terrorism), illustrating the applicability of theory to the current international environment of states balancing against non-state entities. As the theory holds to the organization as a whole, so it should apply to each of the numerous functions of the alliance.

Whether concerned with relative-gains or absolute-gains, there is common agreement that states act within the rational choice model. The preservation of NATO, even since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, appeared as confirmation that international cooperation could outlast the initial realist-inspired conditions for that institution (Dannreuther, 2013). Keohane explains that it is more difficult to create a regime, rather than to maintain one (2005). Stein explains that although power or interests might shift drastically within a regime, there are reasons why they will continue to exist (1982). Stein finds that there are two possible explanations for this: the nations are not continuously calculating their "interactions and transactions" and that "[i]nstitutional maintenance is not, then a function of a waiving of calculation; it becomes a factor in the decision calculus that keeps short-term calculations from becoming decisive" (1982). Both authors explain that states may also maintain institutions because of their concern for their reputation (Keohane 2005, Stein 1982). Since the end of the Cold War collective security theorists believe that the international environment is more conducive for states to cooperate, sharing values and interests.

Lake (2007) challenges the assumption that anarchy is the ordering principle of the system, and argues that it might actually be hierarchy. The author explains that because these theories are based on the legal interpretation of authority, which equates law and authority, that "from this conception that international politics lack authority [, b]ecause there is no lawful position or institution above the state, there can be no authority above the state" (2007). This naturally leads to the assumption that the international system must be dominated by a constant state of anarchy. Lake proposes a change in the view that authority stems from a contract that is devised between the rulers and ruled. In this view the people are able to challenge the rule and therefore authority becomes no longer based on law, but contract (2007). This conceptual shift allows an examination of the level of hierarchy that may be present in the international system without a world government, or within the NATO alliance, which is the only way that realism and neoliberal institutionalism are able to conceptualize hierarchy in the system.

A more powerful state can go beyond internal openness to establish formal, institutional links with less powerful states, limiting state autonomy and allowing the weaker states to have a "say" in the decision-making of the more powerful state. These binding institutional strategies have been explored by Joseph Grieco and Daniel Deudney. Grieco argues that weaker states within the European Union (EU) have had an incentive to create institutional links with stronger states so as to have a "voice" in how the strong states exercise their power, thereby preventing domination of the weaker by the stronger states (Greico, 1993).

"*States . . . are likely to assign great significance to the enjoyment of such effective voice opportunities in a cooperative arrangement, for it may determine whether*

states can obtain redress if they are concerned about such matters as the compliance of stronger partners with their commitments in the arrangement, or imbalances in the division of otherwise mutually positive gains that may be produced by their joint effort."

Weak states are likely to find institutionalized collaboration with stronger states attractive if it provides mechanisms to influence the policy of the stronger states.

Relationships among the more developed, industrial countries since the end of the Cold War are characterized by an increasingly dense web of state to state institutions that are drawing more governments and more functional parts of these governments into the extended postwar Western political order. This means that great shifts in the basic organization of the Western order are increasingly costly to a widening array of individuals and groups that make up the order (Ikenberry, 1999). More and more people have a stake in the system, even if they have no particular loyalty or to the United States or its allies and even if they might really prefer a different order. Through the years, the operating institutions of the Western order have grown and become even more complex. Any radical change to the existing system would severely disrupt the lives of a growing number of people. This inevitably preserves the post-World War II political order among the major first world countries. It is in this sense that the lifespan of NATO is stable and growing.

Neorealist theories are inadequate to explain both the durability of Western order and its important features, such as its extensive institutionalization and the consensual and reciprocal character of relations within it. Neoliberal institutionalists agree that states act in their own interests, yet hold a more optimistic view on cooperation. They focus

exclusively on absolute gains, while neorealist paradigm provokes states to seek out relative gains. This is important because, unlike the rational egoistic, i.e. atomistic state understanding of neoliberal institutionalists, Grieco argues that states bare a character with concerns of survival, lacking any central agency to protect them (1988). To be sure, decades of balancing against Soviet power reinforced cooperation among these countries, but the basic organization of Western order predated the Cold War and survives today without it. In contrast to some realist orthodoxy that forecast a collapse of order in the absence of hegemony, Keohane argued that cooperation, can operate if interests sufficiently converge and institutions are appropriate (2015). The success of the World Trade Organization over the last twenty years in preventing a return to protectionism supports this argument. Continued cooperation among the major democratic countries on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights challenges to the world financial crisis of 2008 also support Keohane's argument.

Neoliberals agree with neorealist assumptions that states are unitary and rational actors, and anarchy is the major force in shaping state actions. The fact that these two theories focus on behavioral regularities, and the state-centric focus on addressing issues that disrupt the status quo, show clear evidence of synthesis. The evolution of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism has resulted in these theories falling under one header (Whyte, 2012).   It was the exercise of strategic restraint, made good by an open polity and binding institutions, more than the direct and instrumental exercise of hegemonic domination that ensured a cooperative and stable postwar order. For all these reasons, it is necessary to look beyond neorealism for an understanding of order among the advanced industrial societies.

Neorealist theories also expect that the gradual decline of American power, magnified by the Cold War, should also lead to rising conflict and institutional disarray. Institutionalized rules can increase the cooperation and discourage cheating in various ways. They raise the cost of cheating by instilling fear in "the shadow of future"; they allow for reciprocation, or a tit-for-tat strategy, to pay back the cheater in the future; and finally they reward and punish states for good and bad reputations, respectively (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Therefore, institutions that provide information and lower transaction costs can solve this problem. Recently, some realists have argued that it is actually the extreme preponderance of American power, and not its decline, that will trigger counterbalancing reactions by Asian and European allies.

Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states are rational actors, maximizing utility, differing from neo-realism in the value it places on institutions. This value is defined as cooperation to overcome mistrust, uncertainty in intentions, high transaction cost, and collective action problems, as well as providing a platform for policy coordination. Neorealists have a hard time believing that cooperation can exist without a coercive power and feel that uncertainty is obstructing international cooperation (Grieco, 1988); whereas neoliberals attempt to explain cooperation by combining international institutions into the neorealist picture. Neoliberal institutionalism seems to explain cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed (Keohane, 2005; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). One key solution to the dilemma of cheating or defection lies in collaboration and cooperation that involves monitoring, sanctioning and bargaining (Stein, 1982). The idea here is to mitigate the threat of cheating, i.e. defection. For neoliberal

institutionalists the meaning of anarchy is reflected as the fear of cheating and lack of cooperation, which can be mitigated through institutions.

A central tenet of neoliberal institutionalism is the defense of cooperation and importance of international regimes, primarily because these are the only grounds on which they differ from realism (Grieco 1988). Keohane recognized that cooperation is not an easily attained, but states could potentially benefit from cooperative strategies (Keohane, 2005). Institutions provide a coordinating mechanism to help states capture potential gains from cooperation; this "constructed focal point" increases the opportunity of cooperative outcomes (Keohane, R, O., &, Martin, 1995). Institutions reflect the distribution of power of states; and they are assumed to have little influence on state behavior. The purpose of international regimes is that "International regimes by no means substitute for bargaining; on the contrary, they authorize certain types of bargaining for certain purposes" (Keohane, 2005). Therefore, Keohane cautions for the distinction between a state's bargaining power and its relative gains. Bargaining and repeated interaction between states might solve the relative gains issue through institutions. Coherence is also a property of institutions, but refers more to the relationship among institutions than to the properties of any single institution (Keohane, n.d.). Coherent institutions or clusters of institutions have clear lines of authority linking them, so that for any given situation it is clear which rules apply, or at least which adjudicatory institutions are authorized to determine which rules apply.

Because their chief function is to achieve coordinated action among states and other actors, institutions should generate reliable information about coordination points and make it available to relevant actors. An institution's legitimacy could be called into

question if suboptimal performance persists, and there is an acceptable alternative institution that could be created without excessive transition costs (Buchanan & Keohane, 2011). Institutions must have the capacity to revise their goals and processes over time as circumstances dictate, and this in turn requires the capacity to revise the terms of accountability through a process of principled deliberation that ultimately leads to consensus.

Alliances have often been formed not only as a primary balance against external threats, but also to allow alliance partners to manage joint relations. Traditionally, alliances have been seen as temporary cooperation that bring states together for mutual security assurance in the face of a common threat, a commitment specified in a particular portion of the treaty. But as Paul Schroeder and others have noted, alliances have also been created as pacts of restraint. They have served as mechanisms for states to manage and restrain their partners within the alliance. "Frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally's policy," Schroeder argues, "was the main reason that one power, or both, entered into the alliance." Alliances create binding treaties that allow states to keep a hand in the security policy of their partners (Schroeder, 1975). When alliance treaties restrain each of the members, potential rivals tie themselves to each other, alleviating suspicions, reducing uncertainties, and creating institutional mechanisms for each to influence the policies of the other.

Within NATO, cooperation depends on mutual interests that have continued to develop over the last half century. Institutionalist approaches are usually seen as more appropriate in the field of political economy than security. (Lipson, 1984) Webber, Sperling and Smith argue that institutions are still important to security as they assist in

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overcoming obstacles of cooperation. During NATO's Cold War incarnation, the alliance fulfilled the functional needs of its members through the development of institutional assets that both addressed the Soviet threat and helped to promote pacific relations allies (Wallander, 1999). Security cooperation institutions within the alliance were born from non-adversarial relationships.

Furthermore, institutions provide an arbitrary body that is able to provide states with information preventing states from cheating. In general the negotiation process is rapid since member countries consult on a regular basis and therefore often know each other's position in advance. The consensus principle has been the sole basis for Alliance decision-making since NATO's creation in 1949. It applies for all bodies and committees (Public Diplomacy, 2013). As explained in the game theory, more specifically Prisoners dilemma, states seek to maximize individual pay-offs, and so institutions offer a platform through which greater coordination and cooperation can be executed, subsequently benefitting both parties.

Neoliberal Institutionalism is a theoretical approach that attempts to explain International Relations with concepts of rationality and bargaining in an institutionalized environment. The central argument of this approach is that cooperation may be a rational strategy for states "under certain conditions" (Keohane 2005). Neoliberal institutionalism retains concern with formal organized activity between states, so has found an application in the case of NATO's counter-terrorism efforts. A NATO that is under-institutionalized would be less able to stem disagreement and non-compliance, and so effectiveness of the alliance would diminish. If member states were to marginalize or abandon institutions that lag behind security challenges would put the alliance into a trajectory of decline

(Webber et al, 2012). The likelihood of NATO meeting new and multiple security challenges, persisting as an effective actor, rises with institutional adaptation and the development of portable institutional assets. Institutional adaptation decreases the probability of non-compliance brought about by NATO's more complex agenda and increasing number of members.

The relevance of NATO can be determined by the effectiveness of its functions and the commitment by each member state to carrying out those functions. Applying the theory of neoliberal institutionalism to a specific function of NATO with the use of the proposed methods of analysis, this study will enhance existing scholarship on the relevancy of the alliance. Based on the current international environment and the increasing influences of non-state actors, state to state alliances and their members must adapt their functions to remain effective and relevant. This theory will be effective in future evaluation of other functions of NATO even outside the security realm.

Terrorism Across Time

The definition of terrorism is varied not only across the member states of NATO, but also varied within government agencies of each nation. In the US, the Departments of State and Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency all consider slightly different versions as the official definition. The term was introduced into our language in 1795 during the French Revolution. By 1879, almost a hundred years later, the concept appeared again in Russia as a tactic used by rebel forces seeking a change in the social order. David Rapoport observes four waves since the late 1870s,

the first three lasting approximately twenty to forty years. Rapoport's argument is set apart from other theories because of its emphasis on generational waves of terrorism (Rapoport, 2001). The first wave began in Russia and was largely the result of slow democratization processes. The predominant strategy of this generation was the assassination of authority figures, sometimes financed through bank robberies. The technological changes in the world's communication and transportation also facilitated large-scale emigration from various parts of Europe to more democratic political systems, thereby creating sympathetic audiences abroad.

Rapaport's Waves of Terrorism			
1ST	2ND	3RD	4TH
1880 - 1915	1920 - 1955	1965 - 1985	1979 - ??

World War I, ignited by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, encouraged reforms and revolution which softened the incentives for anarchic terrorists. Meanwhile, the post-war treaties helped to delegitimize colonies and empires by breaking up the imperial and colonial structures of the defeated powers and establishing supposedly temporary mandate arrangements. On the other hand the victors were able to maintain their empires, but were not able to erase the concept of national self-determination. Therefore, the second wave of terrorism focused on dissident efforts to discourage European occupation of overseas territories, particularly in areas such as Ireland, Palestine, and Algeria where the local populace preferred their colonial status

quo in comparison to what independence might bring (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). Although World War II extended the second wave of terrorism, it quickly ushered the dismantling of the remaining European empires. Consequently, this second wave of terrorism produced by nationalists and anti-colonial groups gradually tapered off.

A third wave of terrorism, centered on Marxist revolution, dominated the last third of the twentieth century. Tactics such as assassinations resurfaced, along with the hijackings of airplanes and public offices, as well as the kidnapping of individuals whose release required concessions or ransoms. Terrorism as a strategy was also reinforced by the Viet Cong's abilities to outlast the political will of the United States to maintain a military presence in Vietnam. Within the Cold War context, training and support for terrorists became internationalized, as did the targets of terrorist attacks. The end of the Cold War and the international community's sustained resistance to these terrorist demands eventually led to the waning of this wave by the 1980s.

The fourth wave coincided with the introduction of two major events in southwest Asia. The first event occurred with the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, bringing to power Islamic clerics who sought to ''export the revolution.'' In the same year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to save a client regime against an internal revolt, mobilizing Muslims to wage a holy war against the infidels (Rapoport, 2001). The fourth wave of terrorism quickly assumed a strongly religious orientation. Eventually, terrorism spread to include actions from radical wings of other religions in reaction to militant Islam. Suicide bombings and a strong emphasis on attacking U.S. targets emerged in order to encourage American withdrawal from the Middle East.

The general pattern is not one of random and unstructured violence. Each wave has a life cycle with initial expansion and contraction phases which are influenced by the number of terrorist organizations in operation and the intensity of their attacks. Terrorist organizations that survive the contractionary phase of the wave in which they originated, adapt by taking on the operational characteristics and tactics that appear in the next wave of terrorism. The duration of each wave depends on a myriad of explanations: the presence or lack of successes attributable to terrorism, the resilience of terrorist organizations, and the effectiveness of states' responses to terrorist claims and tactics (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). Duration also may be contingent on generational differences associated with terrorists' aspirations and calculations about what works and what does not seem to be efficacious. Or, it may be that new generations simply find it easier to break with older strategies that have lost their allure. The central motivation for terrorism in each wave is distinctive as are the tactics that are most likely to be employed. The violence is carried out by non-state organizations and is directed at states and their populations deemed to be antagonistic to the aims of revolutionary organizations. Terrorists, including some of their targets, are apt to view their conflict as warfare, albeit an unconventional form of warfare. Yet, the one recurring pattern in terrorism waves is their limited duration. Each wave is likely to play itself out and to be replaced by a new wave of terrorism that is centered on a motivation that is as difficult to predict as the timing of the next upsurge.

Enders and Sandler examined time series of terrorist activity and found break points in the mid-1970s, early 1990s, and 2001 that they attribute to various factors (2005). An increase in deaths in 1975 is traced to a rise in the formation of terrorist groups

around this time. The early 1990s increase in deaths is said to be due to the decline in left-wing groups and to decreases in state sponsorship. After 11 September 2001, Enders and Sandler find that bombings increased and hostage-taking decreased. They hypothesize that groups became more interested in the amount of carnage that could be inflicted. (Enders & Sandler, 2005) In another evocative study, Thompson, who examined a list of terrorism events for the last fifty years of the twentieth century, found that nationalist events had declined from a high of 60 percent to less than a quarter (23%) of the total terrorism underway. Ideological terrorism, both left and right, had peaked in the 1960s at around 53 percent and declined to 27 percent. Religious activity had been nonexistent in the 1960s but had risen to 50 percent of the total by the 1990s (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). Terrorist movements work much like sectors of economic growth. At any point in time, there are old sectors dying off, new ones just getting started, and others proceeding more or less in their ''normal'' growth phase. Rapoport contends that the waves are distinguished by generational-length periods of ideological predominance.

Understanding the evolution of terrorism across time will allow this study to better analyze NATO's response to this threat. The theoretical framework provided by David Rapoport's four waves of terrorism enables the measurement of content with regards to context between the trajectories of the Alliance and that of terrorist strategies. Both entities seem to evolve in a reactionary pattern, and understanding the major stimuli provided by the international system will better assist the study in charting the relevancy of NATO as a counter terrorism force.

The Two-sided Mirror of Statistics and Content

Introduction

For the purposes of this study, I will conduct a two-pronged approach at examining NATO's identity as a counter terrorism force and how it relates to institutions among member states and the number of terrorist attacks experienced within each state. The first approach will be the statistical analysis of the number of events associated with NATO members, bringing a quantitative dimension to the research. The second approach will be the analysis of counter terrorism content within NATO publications, giving the study a qualitative dimension. I pay particular attention to three time periods: (1) 1979 – 1991, (2) 1991 – 2001, and (3) 2001 – 2014, and the member states that joined the alliance during these time periods. The combination of these two methods will afford a better understanding of the evolutionary changes or lack thereof within NATO during a continual academic debate on the saliency of the alliance.

Time period selection

Each of the time periods were selected based on historical events that affected the current world order. NATO has continually adjusted its courses of action over the decades, but truly only evolved in response to severe, external stimulus. Marking the time periods from significant events, and maintaining closely similar lengths of time allow for a more consistent measurement. Using a time period of at least ten years accounts for possible

leadership changes within NATO structure, as well as within the governments of each of the member states. This limits the effect of a single leader personality on the environment of each of the states measured. Therefore, the time parameters are event based, similar length, and long enough to avoid personality phenomenon in the data.

Two major events are the launch pad for the data collection. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian Revolution redefined the relationships between the two great powers of the world and terrorist organizations. At the same time, thanks to the multiple social and technological factors of globalization, the world was becoming smaller and easier to travel. In the Muslim calendar, 1979 was the start of a new century that was supposed to herald the coming of a redeemer according to the faith's prophecies. Islamic extremist at the time viewed the Iranian government as a puppet of the West. The Iranian Revolution began the rule of the more religious regime, illustrating to the region that Islam could in fact purify itself from Western influence. As the Palestinian issue continued to metastasize in the 1980s, the new Iranian regime supported the growth of terrorist operations within Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. As the mujahedeen slowly forced the Soviets to withdraw from the mountainous terrain for Afghanistan, key non state actors like Osama Bin Laden proved to his followers that a small contingent of guerilla fighters, insurgents, and terrorists could defeat a great power. According to David Rapoport's theory, this timeframe fell under what he called the "third wave of terrorism". Rapoport constructed a framework that categorized the evolution of international terrorism into "waves", each with its own set of historical events and each with an evolving set of tactics (Rapoport, 2001). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution were

the first indicators of the decline of the bipolar world order, and the rise of transnational terrorism in the globalizing world.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a clear disruption to the existing world order. By the end of 1991, the Berlin Wall had been breached, and Soviet flag was lowered from Kremlin for the last time. As the Cold War ended, so did the flow of economic and military support from either side to some of the most volatile places on the globe. Authoritarian regimes and weak states alike found themselves needing new ways to control their populations, continue the flow of patronage to elites, and maintain their standard of living. The end of the Cold War was a defining moment for NATO, the former Soviet members and states that had aligned with either side.

The events of 11 September 2001 were a wakeup call to most of the modern world. For the first time in its history, NATO enacted Article V of its Charter to tend to an area of the world that no one had talked about since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union twelve years prior. Rapoport's fourth wave of terrorism is distinctive as it is religion that is used to transcend state bonds and boundaries (2001). As the Global War on Terrorism vaulted in existence, NATO and its members were thoroughly engaged commanding International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, establishing NATO Training Mission – Iraq, conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and eventually intervening in Libya, all within a decade since the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States. Member states were accelerating cooperation and intelligence sharing, new technologies were developed, and membership was being expanded to new states in response to a non-state threat. Those attacks were a clear evolutionary transition point for the international system and how NATO perceived external threats.

Member states

NATO has added new members six times since its founding in 1949, starting from the original twelve at its founding. For the purpose of this study, I selected only the member states that joined the alliance during the designated time periods. The majority of these states were accepted into membership in 1999 and 2004, expanding across two of the measured time periods. The measured states are: Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, and Croatia.

Document selection

NATO summit meetings are often held at key moments in the Alliance's evolution. Summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities. They are not regular meetings, but important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. These summits are used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major initiatives and reinforce partnerships. Since 1949, there have been twenty-six NATO summits; the last took place in Wales, the United Kingdom, in September 2014. NATO summits, chaired by the NATO Secretary General, are always held in a NATO member country.

Chicago Summit Declaration

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012

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1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.

2. Our nations are united in their commitment to the Washington Treaty and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO remains the transatlantic

NATO summit meetings are effectively a gathering of the principal political decision-making body the Alliance, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Many of NATO's summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. Due to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning of the Alliance as well as NATO's relations with external partners. From the founding of NATO until the end of the Cold War there were ten summit meetings. The first post-Cold War summit in 1990 was held in London, and outlined proposals for developing relations with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of

State and Government published the new Strategic Concept that reflected a new security environment. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council that officially assembled the Alliance and partner countries from Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, to join NATO, and established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague Summit pledged major commitments to transforming NATO's military command structure and improving capabilities.

Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the changes brought on by new security challenges. NATO summit meetings can be held in any of the member countries, including Belgium, home NATO Headquarters. In recent years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the 1999 Washington Summit commemorated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at a summit meeting in 2004. This initiative is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East.

While NATO summit meetings normally involve only member countries, on occasion, other formats can be convened, provided Allies agree. They include, for instance, meetings of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. As was the case at the 2010 Lisbon Summit they can also include top representatives from international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union or the World Bank and leaders from troop contributing countries for the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

beneficial ways. NATO missile defence efforts and the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach provide enhanced possibilities to do this. We are also prepared to engage with other relevant states, on a case by case basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase missile defence mission effectiveness.

39. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and transnational illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people. Terrorism in particular poses a real and serious threat to the security and safety of the Alliance and its members. All acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motivations or manifestations. We will continue to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter. In accordance with the Strategic Concept, we will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO's contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing. We reiterate our continued commitment to dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners in this important area. We deplore all loss of life and extend our sympathies to the victims of terrorism. What they suffer is a visible demonstration of the evil of terrorism and should help mobilise civil society against it.

40. Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In order to ensure NATO's permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO's doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection. We will use NATO's defence planning processes in order to promote the development of Allies' cyber defence capabilities, to assist individual Allies

Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations. These are public documents that explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm Allies' support for aspects of NATO policies. The decisions are then translated into action by the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC's subordinate committees and NATO's command structure, which cover the whole range of the Organization's functions and activities. Based on the actors involved and the level of consensus necessary to produce the declarations from summit meetings, these public

documents are ideal for examining the way in which the Alliance as a whole views its role in the current security environment.

Method 1: Quantitative – Statistical Analysis

I examined the number of terrorist attacks experienced by each member state, NATO as a whole, and the international community during each of the time periods. This data can be obtained from an existing database, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This data can be grouped by nation, by type of attack, or by perpetrator. Based on the number of attacks experienced by each case during the time periods, I will attempt to determine a correlation (not causation) of membership to NATO and number of experienced terrorist attacks. The number of attacks are graphed to show an increase, decrease, or negligible change over the selected time periods for each of the cases. The findings of this research will shed light on whether joining NATO could have a positive, negative, or negligible effect on the number of terrorist attacks that a new member or NATO may experience.

Hypothesis 1: A noticeable decrease in the number of terrorist attacks experienced by a member state over the three designated time periods will indicate a positive outcome to joining NATO strengthening the value of institutions that pass along the counter terrorism function from the alliance to each member state.

Method 2: Qualitative - Content Analysis

In order to compliment the findings from the statistical analysis, I will also conduct qualitative analysis of official text from NATO Summit Declarations in order to gain a clearer picture of the priority of counter terrorism efforts in the alliance as a whole. Because the decision process in NATO is built upon total consensus, these documents will offer a generalizable view of each member's stance on combatting international terrorism. Within each of the declarations are topic points of differing numbers, some of which are solely dedicated to the subject of counter terrorism, while others only mention terrorism as a sub-topic. I will utilize a system of coding that includes the number or times the subject of "terrorism", "terrorists", or "counter terrorism" is referenced in the document as a whole in combination with how many item numbers include the same terms. In addition I will analyze the language used when discussing each of the terms to determine the intensity of NATO's response to the topics. Based on the framework of the declarations, the order and placement of the topics indicate a level of priority for the organization, and thus can be analyzed to indicate a high, medium, or low priority relevant to the other topics discussed. Contextually, an analysis of the counter terrorism strategies of each member state could offer insight to the varying level of terrorism they experience, respectively; however, this could also be affected by regional issues and not state specific experiences and are not covered by this analysis.

Hypothesis 2: Counter terrorism becoming a higher priority in NATO doctrine over each of the three time periods will indicate that each member state is in consensus over threat

perception of international terrorism, strengthening the value of institutions that pass

along that function from the alliance to each member state.

What Do the Numbers Mean

PART I – Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in Member-States

The data provided by the Global Terrorism Database shows a correlation between the joining of NATO and a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks experienced by new member states. However, there were some interesting patterns in the numbers with respect to some members and their historical trajectory. In previous sections I presented the importance of the measured time periods with respect to the evolving international system. In this section I will focus my description of the data on the different member states and how each member's background is reflected.

Tables

The tables are constructed to have the member states in left column, grouped specifically by how and when they joined NATO, as well as the situation they came from (former Soviet or former Yugoslavia). The three columns on the right are the number of terrorist attacks experienced in each of the time periods indicated. An "x" in the cell indicates that country did not exist at that particular time period, and thus had no measurement. A single * indicates the time period in which that country joined NATO. A double ** indicates an other-than-expected measured outcome.

	TP1	**TP2**	**TP3**
	1979 - 1991	**1992 - 2001**	**2002 - 2014**
NATO	8,310	5,129	2,507
World	42,396	23,931	68,463

Table 1

Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia States

In order to effectively depict the number of terrorist attacks experienced, I included both the current member state and its former configuration, i.e. Czechoslovakia became the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This group followed a predictable pattern across the three time periods, beginning with a low number of attacks, spiking in the second period, then dropping again in the third. The early low numbers could be attributed to a few factors; the most common among scholars have to do with the power of the "strong state" in an authoritarian regime. The strength of the Soviet government over the population could have contributed to the low number of attacks. Also, with the assistance of state controlled media sources, the number of attacks could have been under-reported. The spike in attacks during the second time period, are likely related to the turbulent government transition these countries experienced at the end of the Cold War. The loss of authoritarian control from Soviet supported regimes, a massive increase in domestic and international crime, and the democratization of these countries are all probable contributors to the increase during this period. For all of these particular members, the hypothesis held that the joining of NATO is correlated to a decrease in terrorist attacks.

		TP1	TP2	TP3
		1979 - 1991	1992 - 2001	2002 - 2014
Former Soviet States	Soviet Union	77	x	x
	Poland (1999)	9	**25***	0
	Bulgaria (2004)	11	27	**11***
	Estonia (2004)	0	13	**1***
	Latvia (2004)	0	15	**1***
	Lithuania (2004)	1	7	**0***
	Romania (2004)	3	2	**1***
	Czechoslovakia	6	3	x
	Czech Republic (1999)	x	**12***	11
	Slovakia (2004)	x	17	**0***
FYR	Yugoslavia	26	173	3
	Croatia (2009)	x	49	**6***
	Slovenia (2004)	x	6	**0***

Table 2

Other Strategic Expansion States

This group of states provided the most interesting results. Some followed the expected
pattern that was hypothesized, others followed a similar pattern to the former Soviet
states, but more importantly some followed neither pattern. Hungary, Germany, and
Albania fit the former Soviet group, Spain and Turkey were similar to the Founders group,
but Greece had its own unique outcome. Turkey, having the largest number of attacks in
this group over all three periods, can be explained by a mix of domestic and international
issues. Its geography alone can help explain why it has experienced such a greater
number of attacks than other member states. Truly this group exemplifies why a nation's
own history plays such a crucial role in determining any relationship with the number of
terrorist attacks that nation will experience.

		TP1	TP2	TP3
		1979 - 1991	1992 - 2001	2002 - 2014
Strategic Expansion	Greece (1952)	404	231**	400
	Turkey (1952)	1832	1233	599
	Germany (1955)	66	481	51
	West Germany (1955)	285	x	x
	Spain (1982)	1824*	575	221
	East Germany (1990)	19	x	x
	Hungary (1999)	4	36*	4
	Albania (2009)	3	65	5*

Table 3

Spain was the most overwhelming supporter of Hypothesis 1, having the most significant drop in the number of terrorist attacks after joining NATO. In the first time period, 1277 of 1824 (70%) attacks were perpetrated by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or the Basque Fatherland and Freedom group. This is a separatist organization of armed, Basque nationalists in northern Spain and southwestern France whose was gaining independence for the Greater Basque Country. The group was founded in 1959 and later evolved from a group promoting traditional Basque culture to a paramilitary group engaged in a violent campaign of bombing, assassinations and kidnappings in the Spanish Basque country and throughout Spanish territory. Between 1983 and 1987 a "dirty war" ensued by means of the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), or Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, a self- identified, counter terrorist, paramilitary group active (Romm, 2010). The discovery of the state-sponsored "dirty war" scheme and the imprisonment of officials responsible for GAL in the early 1990s led to a political scandal in Spain. The group's connections with the state were unveiled by a Spanish journal and a national trial was initiated (Sullivan, 1988). In 1992, ETA's three top leaders were

arrested, which led to changes in ETA's leadership and direction. As a consequence, the group's attacks since the revelation have generally been dubbed state terrorism.

Greece has dealt with left wing extremist groups for most of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union, recognizing the strategic importance of this ancient land in the Mediterranean, would have been a powerful influence over pro-Communist, anti-Western political and extremist groups throughout the Cold War. The clear majority of the attacks over all three time periods that Greece experienced were from these domestic groups, targeting government facilities and officials, banks and other businesses. There were plenty of attacks on US and European targets, but they were a small percentage of the overall number. During the second time period, there was a significant dip, almost by fifty percent in the number of attacks that Greece experience, probably due to the loss of the Soviet influence over the left wing groups (Kassimeris, 2013). The sharp increase in the third time period, because of a higher percentage of the attacks targeting international banking institutions, could be explained by the degrading economic situation Greece has experienced during this time period. Even with the odd numbers from Greece and Spain, this group as a whole still fit the hypothesis, with an overall decreasing number of attacks.

Founding Members

All of the original alliance members (with the exception of France) have maintained a steady, healthy relationship with each other in the spirit of cooperative security. France withdrew from the integrated military command in 1966 to pursue an independent defense system but returned to full participation on 3 April 2009. Of this list, the United States,

United Kingdom, and France experienced the most terrorist attacks in all three time periods, which could be attributed to any number of causal factors theorized in other works such as population size and density, and the amount of intervention these three countries provide around the globe. Two members, Norway and Iceland, experienced such low numbers that any variation was not seen as significant. Taken as a whole, the founding members experienced fewer terrorist attacks over the three measured time periods.

		TP1	TP2	TP3
		1979 - 1991	1992 - 2001	2002 - 2014
Founding Members	Belgium (1949)	86	22	16
	Canada (1949)	14	26**	22
	Denmark (1949)	21	11	3
	France** (1949)	1236	801	282
	Iceland (1949)	0	2	2
	Italy (1949)	545	104	78
	Luxembourg (1949)	13	3	0
	Netherlands (1949)	52	35	12
	Norway (1949)	6	6	6
	Portugal (1949)	93	5	2
	United Kingdom (1949)	1967	961	557
	United States (1949)	647	382	216

Table 4

The one variation from the norm in this group was Canada, which nearly doubled the number of terrorist attacks from the first to the second time period. The majority of these attacks were perpetrated by the Earth Liberation Front in response to national policy on an oil pipeline on Canadian soil. This is a domestic issue in a country with large fossil fuel deposits and also enormous government protected lands like parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. Other attacks of note were from foreign groups, targeting foreign groups within Canadian borders, such as anti-Semitic or anti-Turkish terrorist groups attacking

synagogues or the Turkish Embassy. Like the United States, Canada is a melting pot of cultures and backgrounds from around the globe. However, unlike the United States, Canada has had a more liberal immigration policy over its history, accepting larger numbers of refugees from conflict and natural disaster zones.   Canada's example highlights a recurring situation in developed countries in which two non-host nation ideologies are clashing on host country soil (Armenian vs Turkish, Palestinian vs Israeli).

So What?

The data shows that NATO as an alliance has experienced fewer terrorist attacks over the three time periods measured. While few members showed an increase in the number of attacks, it was not significant enough of an increase to alter the total outcome. Even with six waves of expansion, the alliance experienced fewer attacks over time.   The majority of the Founding Members showed a significant decline in the number of attacks which fit the hypothesis the easiest. The Former Soviet States, with its spiked increased in the second time period, still fit the hypothesis as most of those members saw a rapid decrease after joining in the third time period. The Other Expansion States, with the most interesting story to tell, had an overall decrease in the number of attacks which still fit the hypothesis.   The outliers of this group were explained with each state's historical background and specific, domestic situations.

PART II – Content Analysis of "Terrorism" in NATO Publications

NATO has increasingly viewed itself has a counter terrorism institution since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based on the language used from official declarations and the changing security environment, NATO's perception of threats evolved to match the Alliance's existence and interests. At the same time, throughout the measured time periods, the Alliance still presented itself as a balancing power against Russian aggression and sought to expand its influence from the north Atlantic to the Baltic to the Mediterranean. In this section I will highlight that the level of attention given to the terrorist threat by the Heads of State of each of the Alliance members illustrate that NATO as a whole sees itself as a counter terrorism institution. As discussed in previous chapters, the level of consensus among the members ensures that these publications speak for all, and are ratified by attending Heads of State.

Number of Meetings

The majority of the NATO Summit meetings took place during the three time periods measured. They have increased in frequency over the lifespan of the Alliance, which could be attributed to any number of factors. The need to meet and discuss the ever changing security environment plus the increased opportunity thanks to advancing global communications technology are just two possibilities. While the Soviet Union and NATO both attempted to maintain currency in their strategies and technologies, the mere fact that they are large, bureaucratic, state institutions makes for a steady pace of evolution. This steady and predictable pace is easy to follow with regularly scheduled gatherings to

discuss future actions. After the transition from Soviet collapse to the Global War on Terror, that predictably was a thing of the past. NATO needed to hold a meeting of the minds more often in order to keep up with the rapidly changing, non-bureaucratic threat of international terrorism, all the while being able to maintain its counter balance to a growingly aggressive Russia. This increased pace of meetings supports Hypothesis 2 in that increased focus on terrorism shows that the Alliance considers counter terrorism as a primary function.

Topics Discussed

The common topic covered in all three time periods was organizational reform, normal updates required year after year. However, bracketed by the major global events, the topics discussed at the Summits did change. In the first time period the major points of discussion expectedly were focused on the threat of Soviet influence and the strategies to counter such. Nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, reducing the spread of conventional arms were all the subjects of the era. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of the second time period, the major concern for NATO members was the volatile environment facing not only Eastern Europe, but other states across the globe that were formerly under Soviet control and patronage. The danger of former Soviet nuclear weapons falling into the hands of dangerous state or non-state actors created a call to action for all member states to embrace a plan of action to assist Russia and other Soviet satellites in accounting for these devices. Without a doubt the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 created the greatest disruption to the status quo of NATO priorities. For the first time in its history, a member state (US) invoked Article V of the Treaty,

obliging the other members to assist in the fight against terror in Afghanistan. This unavoidable call to action had a profound effect on NATO priorities of the third time period, increasing the frequency of the Summits and adding to an already lengthy list of topics to be discussed. The addition of terrorism topics to the Summits, in that terrorism did not replace an existing issue, supports Hypothesis 2, showing that NATO was increasing focus and elevating the priority of international terrorism in what it considered the most important issues of the member states.

	Year	Location	# of Topics	Main Topics
	**NATO Summit Declarations**
	**Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the NAC**
TP1	1986	Halifax	9	Arms Control, East-West Relations, Terrorism
TP1	1989	Brussels	37	Strategic Environment, Arms Control
TP1	1990	London	23	Strategic Environment, Org Reforms, WMD, Expansion
TP1	1991	Rome	21	Org Reforms, Strategic Concept, WMD
TP2	1992	Oslo	23	Baltic States, Non-member Partners
TP2	1994	Brussels	26	Org Reforms, Expansion, WMD, Bosnia
TP2	1996	Berlin	26	Org Reforms, Bosnia, Expansion
TP2	1997	Madrid	27	Org Reforms, Expansion, WMD, Strategic Concept
TP2	1999	Washington	65	Strategic Environment, WMD, Expansion
TP3	2002	Prague	19	Expansion, Org Reforms, **Terrorism**
TP3	2004	Istanbul	46	Afghanistan, **Terrorism**, Org Reforms, Expansion
TP3	2006	Riga	46	Afghanistan, Non-member Partners, **Terrorism**, Org Reforms, Expansion
TP3	2008	Bucharest	50	Afghanistan, Kosovo, **Terrorism**, Expansion, Missile Defense, Org Reforms
TP3	2010	Lisbon	54	Strategic Concept, Missile Defense, Org Reforms
TP3	2012	Chicago	65	Afghanistan, Expansion, Missile Defense, Org Reforms
TP3	2014	Wales	113	Ukraine, **ISIS**, Missile Defense

Table 5

Number of Terrorism Topics

For the purposes of the content analysis I searched each of the NATO Summit Declarations for terms such as "terror", "terrorism", "terrorists", and "counter terrorism". For example, in the 1997 Summit in Madrid, there were 27 points covered, and one of the coding terms was used just once, and in the 25th point. For this entry, a Low priority was selected due to the percentage of the overall Declaration that focused on one of the terms. The language used when discussing the subject suggested that terrorism was a concern of the Alliance, but no major response was initiated from the Declaration.

> *"We reaffirm the importance of arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. We continue to condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge."*

- Official text: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Another example would be the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that had 50 points, of those 50 points, 6 different points covered one of the terms. In those 6 points, one of the terms was used 17 times, resulting in a High priority. The language used when discussing the

subject suggested that terrorism was a top priority, and was deserving of a portion of the budget, organizational reform, and troop/equipment deployment to engage in conflict.

> *"Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. For that reason, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, currently comprising 40 nations, is our top priority. Working with the Afghans, we have made significant progress, but we recognize that remaining challenges demand additional efforts. Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people. With our ISAF partners, and with the engagement of President Karzai, we will issue a statement on Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan. We welcome announcements by Allies and partners of new force contributions and other forms of support as further demonstration of our resolve; and we look forward to additional contributions…"*

- Official text: Bucharest Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

	Year	# of Topics	Terrorism Topics	Coding	Priority	Response to Terrorism
NATO Summit Declarations						
Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the NAC						
TP1	1986	9	(#08)	1	M	Concern
	1989	37	(#28)	1	L	Concern
	1990	23		0	L	
	1991	21	(#19)	1	L	Planning Consideration
TP2	1992	23		0	L	
	1994	26	(#19)	1	L	Condemn
	1996	26	(#25)	2	L	Concern
	1997	27	(#25)	1	L	Condemn
	1999	65		0	L	
TP3	2002	19	(#03) (#04) (#07) (#08) (#10)	10	H	Mobilize, Transform, Engage
	2004	46	(#10) (#12) (#13)	15	H	Mobilize, Transform, Engage
	2006	46	(#02) (#04) (#0) (#20) (#40) (#41)	13	H	Mobilize, Transform, Engage
	2008	50	(#06) (#13) (#14) (#15) (#17) (#28) (#29)	17	H	Mobilize, Transform, Engage
	2010	54	(#06) (#39)	6	M	Engage, Planning Consideration
	2012	65	(#05) (#15) (#38) (#51)	10	H	Winning, Transform, Condemn
	2014	113	(#79)	6	M	Monitor, Concern

Table 6 is constructed to depict the number of times that a terrorism subject is referenced (Coding) in the entire document, how many and which topic points the coding appeared in the document (Terrorism Topics), the priority of the terrorism subject compared to other subjects (Priority), and the level of position the group took on terrorism in each of the Summit Declarations (Response to Terrorism).

NATO's attention to terrorism was minimal in the first and second time periods. While the obvious focus was on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the Alliance still had an eye on events surrounding the PLO in the Middle East and the IRA in the United Kingdom. During the second time period, or post-Cold War, NATO's primary focus was

on chaotic situations resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the stockpiles of Soviet made conventional weapons. Former Soviet and Yugoslav states were experiencing a spike in terrorist activity with the loss of the repressive regime and democratization of the respective governments. This data clearly shows an increased focus on terrorism in the third time period, with a significant jump after the attacks on 11 September 2001. The focus peaks in 2008 with NATO forces engage in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan and begins to slowly wane towards 2014. The introduction of the Arab Spring, the operations in Libya, and the explosion of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq have kept member states focused on the threat of international terrorism so far.

So What?

Based on the analysis of the NATO Summit Declarations, the data clearly shows an increased focus on international terrorism from the Alliance as a whole, and thus by each member state. Of note, this increased attention on NATO's part is reactionary. As in, the terrorist attacks did not occur as an Al Qaeda response to an increase in NATO's counter terrorism operations, but in fact the opposite is true. When looking at the language of the documents during the first two time periods, NATO clearly did not see itself as the primary counter terrorism force for its member states. During these two time periods the Alliance viewed itself as the collective security apparatus to protect member states from the Soviet Union and the fallout of its collapse. In the case of the third time period, the priority of counter terrorism, as shown by the placement of the topic among the list of points discussed, was placed at a much higher level. A key finding from this data is that during the third time period, NATO's focus did not simply turn from Soviet or Russian topics to

those of terrorism. In fact, the focus on terrorism was in addition to maintaining a watchful

eye on Russian aggression in regards to the Georgia and Ukraine situations.

After Evolving, Know Who You Are

Summary

This study examined the role of NATO in order to determine its relevancy in the fight against international terrorism. As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance has it been able to transition to a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within each member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the international community? The data from the Global Terrorism Database shows that NATO as an alliance has experienced fewer terrorist attacks over the three time periods measured, even though the world experienced a decrease in the second time period and an increase in the third time period. Based on the analysis of the NATO Summit Declarations, the data clearly shows an increased focus on international terrorism from the Alliance as a whole, and thus by each member state. A key finding from this data is that during the third time period, NATO's focus did not simply turn from Soviet or Russian topics to those of terrorism. In fact, the focus on terrorism was in addition to maintaining a watchful eye on Russian aggression in regards to the Georgia and Ukraine situations.

Theory Building

Contrary to the pessimistic assessments of NATO's future found in the neo-realist literature, the expansion of NATO supports two well-established new-realist hypotheses about alliance formation and persistence; expansion presents an example of states balancing in response to a balance of threats or making a utility calculation that expansion

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will enhance alliance operational capabilities or further its strategic objectives. If Article V is considered as the sole characteristic of the Alliance and reason for existence, then the contribution expansion makes to the collective defense is the definite criterion for assessing the future of the Alliance. Even if NATO were defined by Article V alone, it is clear that the Allied effort to discharge the obligation to collective defense against the threat posed by al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups has been facilitated by the strategic depth provided by expansion. If non-Article V operations are considered as part of the raison d'etre of the Alliance and an auxillary dimension of collective defense, then the willingness to enlarge the Alliance would reflect the necessity of adding strategic depth to the Alliance to meet security challenges emanating along entire eastern and southern borders. On the demand side, the neo-realist proposition is even more compelling: states seeking membership have clearly engaged in the process of strategic bandwagoning against possible regional threats to national sovereignty or territory and seek NATO membership as the guarantor of national security. The demand for expansion could also be assessed as reflecting, at a minimum, a tactical bandwagoning towards gaining access to NATO resources for the purposes of modernizing national military forces and infrastructure. The expansion process then benefits the whole of the organization with respect to the security and collective defense capabilities compared to the pre-expansion membership that benefits the aspirant state.

Neoliberal institutionalism does not necessarily reject a neo-realist explanation for NATO's post-war origins and persistence, but casts a broader argument that NATO persisted not only because of the Soviet threat, but because NATO provided an institutional mechanism for resolving intramural conflicts of interest with respect to the

definition of threat and the best way to meet those threats. The evolution of NATO strategies reveal an adaptation to a new strategic context that has recognized a new range of security threats outside the Article V responsibilities of the Alliance (Robertson, 2003). Expansion has supported applicant state progress towards the operational objectives of modernization as well as the acceptance of Alliance norms (collective defense obligation, consensus goal, etc.). It has also provided NATO with an opportunity to test whether the applicant states will meet their contractual obligation to the Alliance prior to membership. Moreover, this process creates transparency in aspirant-state defense planning and ensures that strategic and defense concepts are consistent with NATO practice and doctrine. Additionally, post membership behavior has not led to crowding out; there has not been a deterioration in the ability of the Alliance to reach consensus (at least not in the behavior of the new members) and there has been an increase in Alliance cohesion, perhaps demonstrated most convincingly in the significant contributions of new members to out of area operations. Finally the new member states have met the expectation that expansion should not lead to a deterioration of the Alliance's operational capabilities; their willingness to operate in multinational brigades and to develop niche capabilities have made a positive operational contribution to the Alliance. Expansion, therefore, represents an institutional adaptation to a changed strategic context, has preserved the integrity of Article V obligations and institutional norms, and has not degraded the operational capabilities of the Alliance.

Interpretations

The NATO security strategies may be assessed comparatively along the self-ascribed role and strategic purpose of the Alliance itself. These strategies have been subject to modification and revisions over time in response to external shocks or the emergence of new security problems, supplemented by auxiliary statements, particularly on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The supplementary statements on security preoccupations in conjunction with the framing "headline" security statements, most recently the 2010 Strategic Concept, provide a firm foundation for assessing the admixture of complementarity and rivalry that characterizes the critical institutional relationship between NATO and the European Union.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the emergence of contested and weak states within Europe, and the malevolent role of non-state actors created a new set of security threats and concerns that diminished the immediacy of NATO's two key functions as an alliance: the Article V collective defense obligation and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee backing it. The disintegration and civil conflicts plaguing the former Yugoslavia nonetheless underscored the continuing threat of military conflict in Europe, albeit far short of an Article V contingency.

The rationale for NATO extended beyond Article V and collective defense consequently, any assessment of the impact that expansion will or has had on NATO may not be restricted to the narrow criterion of successfully discharging the Article V obligation. The expansion process represents a successful adaptation of the Alliance to a changed external environment and perception of threat. Although expansion also required the conformity of the accession states to the requirements of collective defense, the offer of

membership arose from the need to adapt to a changed threat environment that shifted the priority from the relatively narrow task of collective defense to the more encompassing task of collective security.

The rising salience of non-Article V threats was derived from the securitization of terrorism, failed states, energy, and economic infrastructure, and drove this transformation and adaption of the Alliance. This securitization process accelerated after 2001 and became inextricably linked with the dual threats of transnational organized crime and terrorism, particularly one inspired or directed by al Qaeda (Kaplan, 2011). The Alliance viewed expansion as a mechanism for fostering transparency in defense planning, strengthening the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance, and fostering the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building within the Alliance's institutional framework.

States aspiring to become NATO members sought to become fully integrated into the Alliance's security system and to modernize national forces. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland similarly claimed that NATO membership would provide an opportunity to participate meaningfully in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations without risking national security, facilitate the rationalization of national defense efforts, thereby facilitating a capability based specialization of national armed forces or a broader division of labor with the Alliance, and improve the combat effectiveness of national armed forces through the NATO planning process. For the larger members, NATO membership has also been viewed as an essential institutional framework for enabling the newer members to become fully integrated in the Alliance's security system and to modernize national forces.

The most important contribution that NATO membership has made to the Baltic States' defense policies and military force structures has been to connect a process of "Baltification" with the development of force specialization within the Alliance as a whole (Webber, Sperling, & Smith, 2010). As was the case for the three Baltic states, NATO membership provided Slovakia, Slovenia, and the two Black Sea accession states with a framework for defense modernization, interoperability with Allied forces and participation in multilateral operations, all of which were deemed essential tasks if they were to meet the probable threats to national security. These same broad concerns and advantages were identified for Georgia and Ukraine as factors impelling them to seek membership. Georgia and Ukraine viewed the accession process as a way to align the modernization of national forces with NATO standards, an institutionalized framework for participation in peacekeeping and anti-terrorism operations, and enhancing regional stability by facilitating the Open Door in to the Black and Caspian Sea regions.

The offer of expansion and the demand to join the Alliance constitute evidence that the institutional adaptation of NATO to the changed strategic context was successful. The power vacuum that emerged in central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union created the potential for a destabilized region caught between the highly institutionalized Atlantic security system and an enfeebled Russian Federation interested primarily in reclaiming its former prerogatives in the region. This geopolitical calculation was reinforced by the changed security agenda and emergence of non-state actors as the primary agents of threat (Webber, Sperling, & Smith, 2010). The offer of NATO membership, and the adoption of common policies and strategies to address the trans-

boundary challenges of terrorism and transnational organized crime linked to it, would enhance the ability of the Alliance to adapt to the requirements of collective security.

Limitations and Future Research

In the analysis of terrorist activity there are limitations that are characteristic of all studies. Information about terrorists and terror organizations available to the public and to scholars is typically limited, especially if there is a related terror campaign in progress. Terror organizations are typically secretive to begin with, so communicating with them for research purposes while the organization is being hunted my international military forces could be ill advised. In the cases of suicide terrorist attacks, the possibility of an interview with the attacker is incredibly low.   Understanding the motivations and ideology of terrorists and terror organizations is usually limited to the broadcast message of the organization, which may or may not be the actual truth. The data on the number of attacks is constrained by the transparency of the state in which the attack(s) occur. As seen in more authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union, China, or Yugoslavia, it is not beneficial to the regime to acknowledge the existence of dissenters, or any successes they may have. This of course limits the amount of data available on the number of attacks when researching certain countries.

With respect to counter terrorism efforts, again the data is limited, especially if involving an ongoing campaign. Military and law enforcement forces will resist sharing too much information with the public so as to not show their hand to the terrorist organization.   Counter terrorism efforts are increasingly effective when the terrorist

organization does not suspect any infiltration in their ranks by enemy forces. In a world of conflict does the absence of hostilities mean a successful peace process, or just the absence of hostile capabilities or will to fight? This question is very relevant in the counter terrorism subject. A decrease in terrorist activity does not necessarily correlate to an increase in counter terrorism efforts, nor is the opposite true. Every conventional conflict between states experiences surges and lulls in activity. As discussed in regards to Rapoport's waves of terror, terrorist organizations wax and wane in size and activity, clearly evident in the data of terrorist attacks.

Challenges and advantages exist when researching a state to state alliance such as NATO. Because the member states of the organization are predominantly transparent democracies, information is readily available to the public. Strategies and policies are available to enhance the public's trust with the organization. On the other hand, being a military alliance does close quite a few doors to a vault of sensitive information that only the military leaders and heads of state will have access to. This holds true for the Alliance as well as for each of the member states. When deciding which documents to examine for the content analysis portion of this study, availability to the public was one of the key criteria for selection.

To increase the validity of this particular study, access to sensitive information would be helpful. In order to understand the flow of counter terrorism capabilities from the Alliance to each of the new member states, there are several pathways that could be examined. The content of any of the large military exercises that NATO has conducted with member states would be helpful in determining if procedures and tactics were being shared from the group to the member. Lists of technology and weaponry that are shared,

and their respective capabilities would offer insight into the types of conflict NATO is preparing each member state for. Of course the most helpful, and yet the least likely to be available, would be the amount and types of intelligence that the Alliance is sharing with new member states in regards to terrorist organizations and their activity.

The methodology of this study would be useful in understanding the other functions, outside of counter terrorism, that NATO serves. Being closely related to terrorism, piracy on the seas and transnational organized crime are two other threats to collective security that could be examined with the same model. These two threats, just like terrorism, would require a close relationship between the Alliance and civilian authorities in order to effectively counter. Research of NATO's efforts to minimize these threats could offer a similar analysis of the relevance of the Alliance in regards to those specific functions.

Conclusion

I have illustrated in this study that for a nation, while there are many advantages to joining NATO, one valuable outcome is a decrease in terrorist attacks within that nation's borders. The theories of neoliberal institutionalism and the four waves of terrorism provided the framework for this study to build upon. The two pronged analysis showed that membership in the Alliance, coupled with the commitment shown by NATO published documents correlate to a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks a member, and NATO as a whole experiences. The key factors that had to be considered was that NATO as an organization passed on the knowledge and capabilities of counter terrorism to its

new members and that each Summit Declaration, based on alliance consensus principles, indicated a specific self-identity with counter terrorism as a proclaimed function. Security threats to states, whether by state or non-state actors, will continue to evolve in type and lifespan. This study, among others will show that NATO will continue to be relevant for all Article V and non-Article V functions in the post-Cold War era.

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