

Peter L. Bunce

***Foundations on Sand:
An Analysis of the First US
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934***



**Institute of Haitian Studies
University of Kansas**

Occasional Paper N° 27

Bryant C. Freeman, Ph.D.

Series Editor

Peter L. Bunce

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An Analysis of the First US
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934***



**Institute of Haitian Studies
University of Kansas
2003**

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FOUNDATIONS ON SAND: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST US OCCUPATION OF
HAITI, 1915-1934

This is the twenty-seventh in a series of documents concerning the language, history, and culture of Haiti to be made available through the University of Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies. Much has been published concerning the details of the first US Occupation of Haiti (e.g., Balch, Craige, Healy, Kuser, McCrocklin, Millspaugh, Niles, Plummer, Schmidt, Seabrook, Spector, Steedman, Wirkus — and of course the Heinls). Considerably less has appeared in print concerning its overall results. As Peter Bunce asks here, “Did it accomplish anything? Did anything it accomplished amount to anything?” (p. 32). Was it, as is so often stated, simply “a racist exercise in imperialism by the United States?” In Part I Peter Bunce presents a broad outline of the actual events, and in Part II undertakes a penetrating analysis of the goals, attitudes and results of the Occupation, finishing with a brief examination of very recent Haitian history seen in the light of these preceding events. Included are valuable annexes detailing the actual make-up of the occupying force, less numerous than commonly believed, as well as very specific facts and figures relating to the unfortunately highly relevant fiscal background of the Occupation. The Bibliography is eloquently indicative of the research presented, including, to take only one example, the intriguing material brought to light from the 77 volumes perused of *The Marine Corps Gazette*.

The 1915-1934 US Occupation of Haiti was almost certainly the most crucial period in the forming of Haitian-American relations. The reasons advanced were chiefly humanitarian, whereas the reality was reflected far more by geopolitical — and especially fiscal — concerns. In spite of many good intentions by good men such as General John H. Russell and Dr. George F. Freeman, the many results were lamentably essentially short-lived. Nevertheless it is too often overlooked that a large percentage of the rather imposing public buildings of Port-au-Prince, such as for example the beautiful National Palace, were constructed during the period of the first Occupation. The concept of foreign aid is essentially a post-World War II one, and these buildings owe their existence not to US funding, but to Haitian funding applied, for once, to the public good instead of to graft and corruption. And these buildings are still very much with us today. But regarding general financial responsibilities, the US attitude at the time is well illustrated in Article V of the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty: “These customs duties collected will first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then pay off the public debt, third, pay for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and finally, meet the expenses of the Haitian Government.” (See page 33 below.)

My own personal experience with Haiti began in 1958, and starting in that period I had occasion to listen to Haitians of the elite class already adults in 1915. Several have admitted privately to me that they were at first frankly relieved at the arrival of US forces, given the political and financial chaos of the preceding years. As time wore on, however, their initial

reaction turned into displeasure, and finally hostility. We must keep in mind, though, that it is the members of this elite class who for so long had personally profited from the graft and corruption which the US Occupation put to an end. Thus at least some of the resulting radical patriotism was influenced by thwarted personal gain. To this underlying current must certainly be added, as anyone familiar with Haiti and Haitians is well aware, the strong feeling of national pride and dignity inspired by “the Heroes of 1804” who overcame the three major powers of the time, the French, British, and Spanish, establishing the world’s first Black nation whose independence was won on the field of battle. And of course since 1804 there was the recurring nightmare of the possibility of the return of the Whites whose expulsion had cost so much Haitian blood, not to mention work without pay, i.e., slavery — as the *corvée* was interpreted (see below, page 17 and *passim*). As for the mass of Haitians, this hurt pride was at least somewhat mitigated by the realities expressed in the account of “one old black peasant” found below on page 107.

Those of us who teach Haitian history can offer several plausible explanations as to the causes of the 28 July 1915 invasion, but what is far more difficult to explain is just why it dragged on for so long. To begin with, there is the blatant hypocrisy of President Woodrow Wilson who, while preaching to both the European and the American publics about the right to self-determination of small nations, was at the same time trampling the rights of Haiti — to name only one small nation — for six of the eight years he was in office. His successors, Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge, did not appear to be overly concerned as the years wore on, and Herbert Hoover’s only real action in this regard was to send to Haiti the Forbes Commission which — just as his reaction to the Depression — was fruitless. It took Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19 years, 2 weeks and 4 days after its start, to take concrete action and withdraw our forces.

Probably the two most notable lasting results of the Occupation are: 1) national consciousness-raising, as articulated especially in the masterful 1928 book by Dr. Jean Price-Mars, *Ainsi Parla l’Oncle* (translated as *Thus Spoke the Uncle*) wherein it is made clear that Haitians are not simply transplanted Frenchmen with somewhat more pigment, but members of a fully independent culture which has created its own distinct language and its own distinct religion; and 2) the creation, for better or for worse, of a politically potent force which came eventually to be known as the Forces Armées d’Haïti. And well over three-quarters of a century after its initial creation as the Gendarmerie d’Haïti, the United States is still blamed for its excesses. That President Jean-Bertrand Aristide abolished this force in early 1995 may be a permanent or a temporary situation. Why did or does Haiti need an army, except to oppress its own people? The most obvious foreign adversary would be the Dominican Republic, and as its long-time president, Joaquín Balaguer, has often stated, an invasion of Haiti would be sheer lunacy, taking on responsibility for all its problems, in addition to those of his own country. And the only other possible adversary, the United States, is so powerful as to render any available Haitian resistance quixotic. Yet the existence of the Haitian army is amply noted in the present Constitution, and certainly theoretically could thus be quite legally reconstituted. Every nation needs a police force, but — following the examples of Costa Rica and Panama — why does Haiti need an army? But then, will the existing Haitian police force turn into, in fact if not in name, another army? One remembers

only too well the Gendarmerie d'Haïti which became the Garde d'Haïti which became the Forces Armées d'Haïti.

Perhaps the great fault of this long first US Occupation of Haiti involves the well known fish principle: if you love a man, you do not give him a fish — you teach him how to fish. It is always easier to do than to teach. The US forces in Haiti did much good: hospitals, roads, telephones etc., but they did not teach. Thus, the result after the *Désoccupation* was a gradual return to the status quo.

Bryant C. Freeman

Dramatis Personae
(Presented Alphabetically)

George Barnett
MajGen, USMC

Major-General Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1914-1920; initiated first investigation into *corvée* abuses in Haiti.

Benoît Batrville
a. k. a. "Benoît"

Caco chief Péralte's *ministre en chef* (see below), who continued Péralte's revolt after his death in 1919; alleged cannibal and *bòkò* (Voodoo sorcerer); killed in an ambush in 1920.

Arthur Bailly-Blanchard

American Minister (Ambassador) to Haiti, 1914-1922.

Dr. Rosalvo Bobo

Chief challenger to President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (see below) in July 1915; one of the few serious challengers to the Haitian Presidency in the 1911-1915 period not to have succeeded to the Presidency (courtesy US Marine Corps).

Louis Borno

Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs under Dartiguenave (below) who signed the American-Haitian Treaty of 1915 that justified the American Occupation of Haiti. President of Haiti, 1922-1930.

Smedley D. Butler
Maj (later LtCol, BrigGen), USMC

Battalion commander, 1st Regiment of Marines, 1915; first Commandant of the Gendarmerie d'Haïti, 1915-1918; returned to Haiti in 1920 to assist General Lejeune's *corvée* investigations.

William B. Caperton
Rear Admiral USN

Commander, Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic Fleet in 1915; senior US officer in the initial Occupation of Haiti.

Eli K. Cole
Col (later BrigGen), USMC

Commander, 2nd Regiment of Marines during initial landing; later commanded 1st Regiment (1915-1916) and 1st Marine

	Brigade (1916-1917). Better liked by Haitians than Waller or Butler.
Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave	President of Haitian Senate in July 1915, was elected first Haitian President of the US Occupation period in August 1915 (courtesy US Marine Corps). Forced to stand down in favor of Louis Borno in 1922.
Josephus Daniels	Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1921; later Ambassador to Mexico. Perhaps best known for the order making all U. S. Navy ships "dry," anticipating Prohibition.
Robert B. Davis, Jr.	United States Chargé d'Affaires in Port-au-Prince at the time of the original intervention. His cablegrams were instrumental in bringing Admiral Caperton from Cap-Haïtien to Port-au-Prince in July 1915 and landing troops. Also the U. S. Plenipotentiary in the 1915 American-Haitian Treaty that justified the American Occupation of Haiti.
Dr. George F. Freeman	Appointed director of <i>Service Technique</i> , organized by John H. Russell to provide vocational (primarily agriculture) education to Haitians; his actions unfortunately helped precipitate the student riots of 1929. His death (in Puerto Rico, 1930) was celebrated by some Haitian students.
Warren G. Harding	President of the United States, 1921-1923.
Herbert Hoover	President of the United States, 1929-1933.
Charles E. Hughes	US Secretary of State, 1921-1925; later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Robert Lansing	US Secretary of State, 1915-1920.
John A. Lejeune Col (later MajGen), USMC	Assistant to the Commandant, 1915-1917; Major General Commandant, 1920-1929.

John A. McIlhenny	Financial Advisor to the Republic of Haiti (nominated by the President of the United States, appointed by the President of Haiti), 1919-1922.
Dr. Dana G. Munro	US Minister (Ambassador) to Haiti, 1930-1933. Later Professor of Latin-American History and Affairs at Princeton; author of several books on United States policy and the Caribbean.
Charlemagne Masséna Péralte	Member of the Haitian elite turned Caco chief, led Caco revolt in northern Haiti in 1918-1919 until his death in late 1919.
Eugène Roy	Provisional President of Haiti, 1930. Succeeded Borno, who was forced into retirement after being outmaneuvered in Haitian legislature by Sténio Vincent.
John H. Russell Col. (later BrigGen), USMC	Commander, 1st Brigade 1917-1918 and 1919-1922, United States High Commissioner in Haiti, 1922-1930; later Major General commandant of the Marine Corps.
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam a. k. a. "Guillaume Sam"	Last President of Haiti prior to the US Occupation. Killed by a mob of the Haitian elite 27 July 1915, his body was later dragged through the streets; 28 July the US intervened.
Sténio Vincent	Haitian President 1930-1941; virtual dictator 1938-1941. Maneuvered out of power by Elie Lescot.
Littleton W. T. Waller Col. (later MajGen), USMC	Brigade Commander, Advance Force Brigade, which, upon deployment to Haiti, became 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines; senior American officer ashore in original intervention.
Sumner Welles	Chief of the Latin-American Division of the State Department, 1920-1921; American

Commissioner to Dominican Republic,
1922-1925; later Ambassador to Cuba,
Under-Secretary of State.

Alexander S. Williams
Capt (later Maj, LtCol), USMC

Butler's assistant in forming the
Gendarmerie d'Haïti in 1915, succeeded
Butler as *Chef* of the Gendarmerie 1918-
1919; outlawed the *corvée* in November
1918; was blamed for much of the *corvée*
abuses that resulted in the Caco revolt.

Woodrow Wilson

President of the United States, 1913-1921.

Frederick M. Wise
LtCol, USMC

Commandant of the Gendarmerie d'Haïti,
1919-1921.

Conciliate Haitians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and firm control of situation, and issue following proclamation: 'Am directed to assure the Haitian people United States of America has no object in view except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian independence and the establishing of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It is the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.' Acknowledge.

Benson, Acting¹

(Radiogram from Department of the Navy to Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, USN, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 7 August 1915.)

Part I

The Occupation

Haiti Before the Occupation

Haiti is the second oldest independent country in the New World, second only to the United States. Haiti first overthrew its the French overlords in 1791 in the wake of the French Revolution. It then suffered Spanish and British interventions, and a Napoleonic French invasion and attempted restoration of slavery in 1802, before finally achieving independence in 1804, all without significant outside assistance.² According to legend, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the bloody successor to Haiti's national hero Toussaint Louverture,³ created the Haitian flag by ripping the white center out of the French Tricolor.⁴ Haitians are proud of their country and proud of their independence.

By the turn of the 20th century, Haiti was a deeply troubled country. Its society, since the Revolution, had always been divided. In the absence of the French

colonialists--most of whom had fled the country by 1804, or were killed--the *mulâtres*, the mulatto class, approximately three percent of the population, assumed the social role of the colonials. The peasantry, almost exclusively African in ancestry, remained peasants. The elite of Haiti, who for all intents and purposes ran (and run) Haiti, are largely, not exclusively, *mulâtres*. *Noirs*, particularly those with a military background or powerbase, could become part of the elite, and often ruled Haiti. But Haiti was and is most often administered for the benefit of the elite, and the elite are heavily *mulâtre*. "As in colonial Saint Domingue [Haiti], where the *gens de couleur* and black slaves hated each other, racial antagonism persisted between the elite and the black peasantry of Haiti."⁵

When Haiti was a French colony, "Saint Domingue" was a rich jewel of the French empire--its exports were more than double of all of England's colonial trade in 1789.⁶ By the 20th century, however, Haiti was in debt, could not pay its bills or claims against it, and most of the Great Powers--save Russia and Japan--were threatening some kind of action.

Political power in Haiti means the power to make money, usually through graft. "'Under [President Florvil] Hyppolite in 1890, 1891, and 1892, there was a carnival of contracts in the Chambers [Legislature]. Every party regular, senator, minister, deputy, or former *volontaire de la révolution* had at least one in the bag . . . Handsome favors, to be sure, that [the] Good Fairy handed out to the faithful who had just ravaged the four corners of the country with fire and sword.'" Haiti's public debt increased from \$4.4 million in 1891 to over \$25 million in 1895 after a flurry of public works instituted by Hyppolite and his finance minister Frédéric Marcelin (who retired to France in 1895).⁷

Hyppolite's successor, Simon Sam, resigned in 1902 amidst a scandal concerning a debt consolidation loan from German and French interests and the loss of over a million and a quarter dollars in kickbacks and illegal payments. (Unusually, Sam's successor, Pierre Nord Alexis, prosecuted Sam and his immediate cronies in 1904, and Sam, several Haitians, a German, and two Frenchmen were convicted; not that anyone went to jail.) Nord Alexis feared foreign debt collectors (who were arriving with warships by this time⁸) and printed money instead of borrowing it. Paranoid, sometimes murderous, Nord Alexis, after two more brushes with civil war, fled to a French cruiser in favor of Antoine Simon in 1908. Simon and his immediate circle returned to the tradition of looting the public purse.⁹

Surprisingly, given the United States' domination of the Caribbean after the Spanish American War (1898), American financial investment in Haiti was quite small: \$4 million invested in Haiti compared with some \$800 million in Mexico or \$220 million in Cuba; a total of \$1.7 billion in all of Latin America.¹⁰ About 65 to 70 percent of Haiti's imports came from the United States, the bulk of the balance coming from Germany and France. Between the Haitian elite's growing desire for foreign products, a severe drop in world agricultural prices in the 1890's (which affected all of Haiti's exports, except cheap labor), and aggressive foreign competition, Haiti by 1900 was severely dependent on foreign imports, and had a serious balance of payments problem.¹¹

France and Germany were the dominant financial players in Haiti at the turn of the 20th century. France received about two-thirds of Haiti exports, and exported luxury goods in return. The Germans were striving to overcome the French in the Haitian

markets: they exported more to Haiti than the French, more Haitian exports were carried on German ships than French, and the Germans controlled the only railroad in Haiti, to the Plain du Cul-de-Sac east of Port-au-Prince.¹²

The *Banque Nationale d'Haiti* was Haiti's treasury and fiscal agent. Instead of being a financial entity controlled by the Haitian government, it was a French stock company, owned principally by French banks, led by the *Banque de l'Union Parisienne*. It charged a commission on the Haitian issue of paper currency and on the cashing of checks. Since the French blacklisted Haiti on the world financial markets, so as to keep the Haitian account for themselves, the French funneled all loans to the government through the *Banque*, often at outrageous discounts*.¹³ To give an example of French loan practices, Haitian obstacles to establishing a bank in 1874 were multiplied by the various political and financial thieves inside and outside Haiti:

[Late 19th-century political leader Anténor] Firmin and historian Antoine Magloire say the loan was 60 million francs, to be repaid in forty annual installments of 7.5 million francs, a return of 400 percent. [Dantès] Bellegarde says 50 million francs, but that the *Crédit-Général* in Paris was able to raise only 36.5 million, of which 26 million went to intermediaries and private pockets in Port-au-Prince and Paris, while the remaining 10 million francs were used to liquidate, at par, a mountain of worthless Haitian bonds bought up as scrap paper by European speculators. The *Crédit-Général's* commission alone exceeded 9.5 million francs.¹⁴

Finally chartered in 1880, the *Banque Nationale d'Haiti* lost its charter in 1905, after refusing to back Nord Alexis' blizzard of paper money. A five-year period of

*Discounting was the practice of offering a loan at a certain amount, then subtracting fees and allowing for variable exchange rates up front, leaving the borrower with the balance to spend, but liable for repaying the entire amount, at whatever interest was agreed upon initially.

intense competition between French, German, and American (relative newcomers) banking interests ensued over rechartering a new bank. Finally, in late 1910, the Haitian legislature voted to dissolve the *Banque Nationale d'Haïti*, and created a new *Banque Nationale de la République d'Haïti*, which moved into the old *Banque's* headquarters. French banking interests, which put the package together with several German-American private banks, diplomatically invited in American interests (including the infamous National City Bank¹⁵). The French had a 75% interest in the new bank, the Americans and the German-American banks 20%, and the German *Berliner Handelsgesellschaft* Bank 5%. Not surprisingly, the new \$13 million loan was discounted to \$9.4 million.¹⁶

Another notorious incident which demonstrates the inability of the Haitian government to control its own economy was the granting of a railroad concession to an American named James P. McDonald. Haiti promised to back bonds funding the railroad to the Haitian northern city of Cap-Haïtien at six percent, pay McDonald regular payments as the railroad was completed, and grant him a fifteen-mile wide right of way for banana plantations (Haiti is only thirty miles wide at its most narrow point). In short, the government was prepared to give up roughly half the arable land in Haiti, and go still further in debt, in return for a railroad that was never completed.¹⁷

After a mere 15 months in power, Antoine Simon began to lose control of Haiti, particularly in the north country around Cap-Haïtien (helped not in some small part by the boorish behavior of McDonald's American engineers). Simon and his army took ship to Gonaïves, landed, and moved north and seized Fort Liberté, pillaging and slaughtering as he went.¹⁸

The North had rebelled against Port-au-Prince before. Those of peasant stock who had lost their lands, and who rebelled at exploitation by the city dwellers and foreign concessionaires, drifted into the private armies of petty warlords in the wilds of the north country. Often described by Europeans and Americans as bandits or mercenaries, these men became known in Haiti as Cacos. Their loyalty was to their local chiefs, bound through family ties and patronage.¹⁹ Now, in 1911, these men and their leaders were to become the king (or president) makers of Haiti.²⁰

The Cacos rampaged through the north country (focusing, at least in part, on McDonald and his railroad camps), and boxed Simon into Fort-Liberté. Simon escaped to Port-au-Prince, but his time had passed. General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, a general with a northern power base, had Cincinnatus Leconte declared "Supreme Chief of the Revolution." Simon barely made it to a Dutch ship ahead of an angry mob. Less than two weeks later, 14 August 1911, Leconte was voted in as President by the National Assembly.²¹

Leconte apparently was an honest man and, according to observers, was willing to try to administer Haiti honestly. Unfortunately, his administration lasted just under a year: the National Palace blew up with him in it in early August, 1912. (He and previous presidents apparently stored ammunition and explosives in the basement to keep it out of the hands of rivals.) The real cause of the explosion remains unknown.²²

Leconte's successor was Tancrède Auguste, a sugar plantation owner. His administration was marked with a continual fight with the new *Banque Nationale* over retiring the paper currency left over from Nord Alexis's administration. It was also short:

Auguste was dead the following May after a mysterious illness; some said poison. After a chaotic funeral, to the point of a near rebellion in the capital, Michel Oreste was voted in as President, literally bribing his way into office with drafts on the national treasury. Oreste, the first Haitian President to have no ties whatsoever with the military (regular or Caco), made almost everyone in any position of power in Haiti angry with his proposals: reform the Army, retire paper money, and reform the educational system (a great source of graft in the government).²³

In 1914, the Cacos, whose quiet had been bought by Leconte and Auguste but not Oreste, rebelled in the north country under the leadership of the Zamor family. The army soon went over to the Cacos. Michel Oreste took ship under the cover of British, American, French and German marines on 27 January 1914. Oreste Zamor, heading a Caco army with his brother Charles, was quickly elected President. Oreste and Charles Zamor soon fell out with a former collaborator and rival, Davilmar Théodore.

Unfortunately for the Zamor brothers, the *Banque* proved difficult with funding again, the Orestes ran out of money and, therefore, soldiers. Amid much chaos, Théodore and his ally Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, entered Port-au-Prince at the head of a Caco army as Oreste Zamor took refuge aboard a German commercial ship and his brother sought safety with a General Polynice and a Committee of Safety. Théodore was elected President on 7 November 1914.

Intervention and Occupation

In January 1915, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton took command of the Cruiser Squadron of the United States Atlantic Fleet, flying his flag on the armored cruiser USS *Washington* (CA-11). The Atlantic Fleet's cruiser squadron had the additional responsibility of monitoring political events in the Caribbean, and Admiral Caperton's first mission upon assuming command was to tour his new area of responsibility. Admiral Caperton's first visit to Haiti was short and apparently uneventful. But he no sooner departed for other ports when he was recalled to Haiti. Still another revolt was forming in the north country of Haiti to challenge the Haitian presidency. This time the proclaimed "Chief of the Executive Power" was General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former President-maker, Caco leader, and now candidate for President. Admiral Caperton intercepted Guillaume Sam outside of Cap-Haïtien and persuaded him that the United States would not interfere with the transfer of power in Haiti, so long as Guillaume Sam curbed the behavior of his Cacos. Admiral Caperton and his gunboats and cruisers in effect shadowed Guillaume Sam down the coast to Port-au-Prince, where he was duly elected President on 4 March 1915.²⁴

In July 1915, the *Washington*, Rear Admiral Caperton embarked, sat in Port-au-prince harbor as still another Haitian presidency wound its way to a messy conclusion. This time it was Guillaume Sam who was besieged in his palace by a new challenger, Dr. Rosalvo Bobo. At daybreak on 27 July 1915, Sam made a break for the French legation next door. Sam made it, although most of the people accompanying him did not. He sent a message to his chief of police, Charles-Oscar Etienne, at the Police

Arrondissement in the lower city, to the effect that his presidency was over and that Etienne should follow the dictates of his own conscience [*"La partie est perdue, j'abandonne le pouvoir. Faites ce que votre conscience vous dictera."*]. Accounts vary, but somewhere between 160 and 'nearly 200' political prisoners, from Haiti's *mulâtre* elite—including ex-president Oreste Zamor, died. The next day, a mob of the elite attacked Guillaume Sam in the French legation and murdered him. Sam's mutilated body was dragged through the streets. Having received a green light from the State Department via the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Caperton met with the American and British chiefs of mission and the French minister aboard the *Washington* and, with their concurrence, decided to land troops and restore order.²⁵

While his small landing force secured the legations in Port-au-Prince, Admiral Caperton had a problem. With Guillaume Sam dead, there was no one really in charge in the city. There was a revolutionary committee formed by General Polynice,²⁶ Charles Zamor (brother of the recently deceased ex-president), and others*, but no one, at least to American eyes, appeared to be in charge. The landing force was disarming what remained of the Haitian Army in Port-au-Prince (and confiscated five wagon-loads of weapons the first day), and the Haitian legislature was going through the opening stages of voting for still another new President. However, with the immediate crisis under control, Caperton didn't know what the United States Government wanted. The Secretary

*Haitian politics in the late 19th, early 20th century was a series of cycles of recurring personalities, the details of which are beyond the scope of this paper; however, it can be said that most of the personalities in the revolutionary committee were prominent figures in Haitian politics, although not all of them were necessarily supporters of the late President Guillaume Sam, or of Dr. Bobo for that matter.

of State, Robert Lansing was relatively new (his predecessor, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in June 1915, in a disagreement over President Wilson's handling of the *Lusitania* crisis), so he asked the President: "The situation in Haiti is distressing and very perplexing. I am not at all sure what we ought to do or what we legally can do . . . I hope you can give me some suggestion as to what course we can pursue." Wilson apparently answered the next day:

I suppose there is nothing to do but to take the bull by the horns and restore order . . .

1. We must send to Port-au-Prince a force sufficient to absolutely control the city not only but also the country immediately about it from which it draws its foods . . .

2. We must let the present Haitian Congress know that we will protect it but that we will not recognize any action on its part that does not put men in charge of affairs whom we can trust to handle and put an end to revolution.

3. We must give all who now have authority there or who desire to have it or who think they have it or are about to have it understand that we shall take steps to prevent the payment of debts contracted to finance revolutions.

. . . In other words, that we consider it our duty to insist on constitutional government and will, if necessary (that is, if they force us to it as the only way), take charge of elections and see that a real government is elected which we can support.²⁷

Caperton radioed Washington DC on 5 August that the President of the Haitian Senate, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, appeared most electable, and that he "realizes Haiti must agree to any terms laid down by the United States, professes to believe any terms demanded will be for Haiti's benefit, [and] says he will use all his influence with [the] Haitian Congress to have such terms agreed upon by Haiti."²⁸ To insure Dartiguenave's election, all Caperton had to do was neutralize the Cacos, take Dr. Bobo out of the running, and make sure the election in the Haitian legislature went for Dartiguenave.

The Marine 2nd Regiment landed in Port-au-Prince on 4 August 1915, and began securing the city. With the arrival of the remainder of First Provisional Brigade of Marines through August 1915, the Caco problem, at least in theory, would be settled in a matter of time (Annex A).

With a flare of the dramatic, Caperton invited Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo to the American legation on 8 August and, speaking through his chief of staff, Capt. Edward L. Beach, who spoke excellent French by all reports, challenged the two to do what was right for Haiti. Not surprisingly, both men declared their devotion to the service of their country. Caperton, according to his Senate testimony in 1921, then asked:

"Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be elected will you promise that you will exert every influence in your power to assist him for Haiti's good; that you will join with him heartily and helpfully and loyally?"

"If Dr. Bobo is elected president I will give him the most loyal, earnest support in every effort he may make for Haiti's welfare," replied Dartiguenave, with simple dignity.

"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartiguenave is elected president, will you help him loyally and earnestly in his efforts to benefit Haiti?"

"No, I will not!" shouted Bobo. "If Senator Dartiguenave is elected president I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I alone am fit to be president of Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's aspirations, no one is fit to be president but me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be compared with mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me."²⁹

And so Dr. Bobo failed his interview. He left a week later, aboard a French ship, for Santo Domingo, where he was refused residence, and ended up in Cuba. He later moved to Jamaica, where he had a successful medical practice.³⁰

On August 10, Admiral Caperton received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy ordering that the election of the President of Haiti be allowed to take place and that "the United States prefers election of Dartiguenave. Has no other motive than that

establishment of firm and lasting government by Haitian people and to assist them now and at all times in future to maintain their political independence and territorial integrity."³¹

The next day, at Admiral Caperton's orders, Captain Beach ordered the revolutionary committee in Port-au-Prince to resign. Admiral Caperton himself, and Captain Beach, both ended up arguing the term "free election" with the Bobo supporters. Dr. Bobo's backers believed that a "free election" would be one that would recognize his military position and elect him president. Admiral Caperton's definition allowed none of that. Finally, the 2nd Regiment of Marines secured the building and the Haitian legislature--39 senators and 102 deputies--met in the Chamber of Deputies. Captain Beach was present as Admiral Caperton's representative, and probably acted as an impromptu floor manager for Dartiguenave. "All senators and deputies were armed at their own request."

Dartiguenave was elected on the first ballot: "...the vote was announced as 94 for Dartiguenave, 16 for Bobo, and a scattering [31] for Cauvin, Thegun, and others." The United States formally recognized the Dartiguenave government on 18 August 1915.³² While only a complete optimist would claim that the United States had no influence over this vote, a favorable vote of only 67% for the desired leader compares favorably with the more familiar rigged election results in excess of 99% common in the mid- and late 20th century. And, lest it be forgotten, Dartiguenave had his own agenda:

Besides being a civilian with no army behind him (except, of course, the U.S. Marine Corps), he was the first elite *mulâtre* from the South to take office since 1876--an office that, since the days of Boisrond, had been all but monopolized by *noirs*, generals, and men of the North and Artibonite. Not that Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave had no constituency:

his constituency, like that of Haiti's presidents for the next thirty years, was the elite. Numerically insignificant, usually without lucrative occupation save politics, this was the group that, now more than ever before, events were propelling into a monopoly of office and, to the extent the Americans would permit, of entrenched power.³³

Less than a month later, a Treaty between the United States and Haiti gave the legal underpinnings for the United States occupation of Haiti. Eighty years after the fact, it is hard to imagine a sovereign nation agreeing to such a treaty: it is as if an adolescent was surrendering his paycheck and check book to an over-bearing parent, to be put on a strict budget and with a solemn promise to behave. For the United States, it was contracting a huge responsibility against which we will later examine the results of the Occupation.

Another byproduct of the American-Haitian Treaty was the Haitian Union Patriotique, which was to become the principal organization of Haitian resistance to the First Occupation. Interestingly, it was an organization of and for the Haitian elite, the opinion of the *noir* peasantry concerning the Occupation was apparently neither desired nor solicited.³⁴ (A comment by the French minister in May 1916 (after the pacification of the Artibonite and the North by the Marines): "'The peasants, the pure *noirs*,' he wrote, 'are, like the tradesmen in the towns, delighted with the American occupation.'"³⁵)

Even before the signing of the Haitian-American Treaty, Admiral Caperton, acting on instructions from the Navy Department, started taking over the financial and civil administration of Haiti.³⁶ Like many aspects of the First Occupation, while this particular action was of dubious legality under international law, it was established and conducted with the intention of maintaining a scrupulous honesty. This had an immediate impact on the Haitian elite:

American assumption of customs control . . . for the first time brought home to the elite (which in this context is to say all politicians) some hard practicalities of foreign intervention. For that entire class, whose livelihood after all had been the public treasury, the blow, square in the pocketbook, was disastrous. (Footnote: Adding injury, Paymaster Conard promptly stabilized the gourde at a fixed (5 to 1) exchange rate for the dollar, thus at one stroke putting out of business the currency speculation, both Haitian and foreign, that had so often gutted the treasury. *Emile Elie*, Dartiguenave's Finance Minister, pled in vain to Conard that all his friends had been accustomed to make their living from a floating gourde and 'it would be an economic crime to ruin their business.'³⁷

Dartiguenave was unable to control Port-au-Prince's streets, and Admiral Caperton declared Martial Law on 3 September 1915. Apparently Dartiguenave told Caperton that this action would also facilitate the Haitian legislature's acceptance of the Haitian- American Treaty.³⁸

For the United States, the easiest part of the Treaty to implement would be the requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish law and order in Haiti. This would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haïti (in 1928 renamed the Garde d'Haïti).

The forcing of the Haitian-American Treaty through the Haitian legislature was brutal--Admiral Caperton eventually had to threaten to withhold the Haitian government's paychecks until the Treaty would be ratified.³⁹ The Americans were pushing for constitutional and legal changes in Haiti and Dartiguenave was unsure if he could deliver, especially with the "American insistence on eliminating graft, reducing palace patronage, stopping double or triple pensions to single individuals, and ending fraud and kickbacks on government contracts."⁴⁰

Using an ancient Haitian constitutional device, Dartiguenave dissolved the Haitian Senate 6 April 1916, and instituted a Council of State in its place. He then designated the

lower house a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution.⁴¹ Interestingly, a document from the *Butler Papers* (Butler was *Chef* of the Gendarmerie by this time), entitled "Coup d'Etat" details the reports the American had made on the closing of the Senate⁴². From the title, and its inclusion in Butler's papers, it would appear that Butler, his Marine Gendarmerie officers, or both, disapproved of Dartiguenave's action, even though it served American interests as well as Dartiguenave's. This is especially interesting, considering Butler's part in the closing of the Haitian legislature the following year. According to his testimony before the Senate investigating committee in 1921, Colonel Waller, who had been told by Dartiguenave that he feared impeachment, was also opposed to the action.⁴³

Nevertheless, Butler and Waller enforced the closure of the Senate and, when Dartiguenave decided that even the Chamber of Deputies was too difficult to work with and ordered legislative elections, Waller and Butler held elections and enforced an unusual honesty. According to Waller's proclamation, the role of the occupying forces was limited to maintaining order, restricting gatherings from closer than 30 feet from polling places, placing a representative in each of the polling places, allowing Gendarmes who were Haitian citizens to vote (but without their weapons), and some rules on party nominations and the prevention of fraud.⁴⁴ Some observers view this election as more free of coercion than any in memory before it.⁴⁵

However, as the primary purpose of the new legislature was to draft a new constitution (Haiti's 17th since independence), it was not going to be very cooperative. A draft constitution was written for the legislature by a Dr. Edmond Héraux—formerly

Antoine Simon's Foreign Minister in 1908--which was duly passed on to Washington for suggestions. Dartiguenave received said suggestions, and dumped them on the legislature as an American *dictat*. The legislature rebelled and started writing its own constitution with a decidedly anti-American tone. Dartiguenave apparently wished the Marines to close down the legislature for him, which would allow him to rule unimpeded by any other Haitian legal body. But as he deferred to Colonel Cole (Waller's successor), Cole deferred to Washington, who deferred to Dartiguenave. Dartiguenave finally called in Major Butler and ordered him to close down the legislature. It did not reopen until 1930.

The American-amended constitution was then passed to an all-Haitian referendum in early 1918, and duly passed. The Gendarmerie enforced the honesty of the election, although it was admittedly and openly pro-constitution, and the elite apparently boycotted the referendum. And, despite his frequent claims to the contrary, Franklin Roosevelt did not write the Haitian constitution: the American "suggestions", incorporated in the Héraux draft, had their origin in the State Department.⁴⁶

Off to a Rough Start

The Marine suppression of the Cacos brought peace to Haiti which, as noted above, was appreciated by the *noirs* and the tradesmen, if not the elite or the Cacos. Public order was maintained by the new Gendarmerie d'Haïti, a national police force, manned by Haitians and officered by Marines.

Public order, however, did not immediately bring financial stability, as World War I was consuming most of the liquidity in World money markets at the time, and nothing was available for a Haitian consolidation loan. With Haiti's heavy debt, most of the revenues collected by the Navy paymasters--although the former skimming off of funds was halted--went to debt service, and not for improving the Haitian infrastructure as desired.⁴⁷ Main functions of government were therefore taken over by the Gendarmerie as it was the only organized "Haitian" entity capable of taking any kind of positive action in Haiti at the time. These functions included public health, prisons, and public works.⁴⁸ Lacking sufficient funds to improve roads, bridges, and culverts, Butler found a provision in the Haitian rural code that provided for Haitians to provide labor in lieu of money for the payment of taxes. Butler used this labor, called the *corvée*, in the construction of rural roads. According to his testimony in 1921, he was able to bring the cost of building roads down to \$205 a mile, from a pre-occupation cost of \$51,000 a mile (a figure inflated, no doubt, by large amounts of graft). Butler "repaired" (rebuilt is probably a closer term) 470 miles of roads during his tenure as *Chef* of Gendarmerie. He took pains to provide food, shelter, entertainment, and motivation to the laborers, and went to the trouble to get President Dartiguenave out of Port-au-Prince to periodically praise the laborers' efforts. (Butler's papers include a collection of photographs of the first automobile trip taken in Haiti, outside of Port-au-Prince, apparently to Cap-Haïtien.⁴⁹)

Colonel Waller, in his testimony before the same Senate committee, told of an irrigation project in the Cul-de-Sac valley in which he received more volunteer labor than

he could employ and brought the project in at a cost of \$800, down from a (Haitian) estimate of \$60,000.⁵⁰

The system, as might have been expected, also lent itself to abuse. The Marines made the mistake of having Haitian civil officials in the process of recruiting labor. These officials were not above using impressment instead of encouraging volunteers to get their numbers, nor were they above exempting certain persons who could bribe their way out of their labor obligation, and putting the work back on those who had already performed their obligation. Butler's successor, Major A. S. Williams, saw that the *corvée* system was being increasingly abused, and causing increasing Haitian discontent with the Americans, and abolished it on 1 October 1918.⁵¹

Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, who succeeded Col. John H. Russell in command of the Marine brigade (Russell had succeeded Cole) in late 1918 after returning from combat duty in France, made a number of inspection trips, starting in March 1919, to investigate reports he had received of abuses of the *corvée* in the Hinche and Maïssade districts. General Catlin found that the *corvée* was still in force in these districts and was using impressed labor. In addition, much of the labor was being used for private projects as opposed to public works.⁵² The abuses of the *corvée* were probably more extensive than General Catlin was able to discover on his inspections, as the ensuing revolt, which Marine officers believed to have originated concerning discontent over the *corvée* (which in itself resurrected the old paranoia about *blancs* reinstating slavery), became widespread. The popular leader of the revolt, Charlemagne Peralte, a former Caco General and a brother-in-law to the Zamor brothers, had been serving a sentence of hard

labor in Cap-Haïtien when he bolted for the mountains, taking his gendarme guard with him. Charlemagne, and his successor after his death, Benoit, were found to have political and financial connections with Dr. Rosalvo Bobo.⁵³

The revolt would last until 1920. But if that had been the Marines' only problem in Haiti, no one in Washington DC would probably have noticed. However, late in 1919, Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps George Barnett was reviewing a court martial case of two Marine privates accused of unlawfully executing Caco prisoners. His eye caught an argument by the Marines' counsel to the effect that such executions were rather common in Haiti. Barnett was shocked. He immediately fired off a letter to Col. Russell (who had reassumed command of the Marine Brigade after General Catlin returned to the United States) ordering him to investigate and correct the situation immediately. Col. Russell investigated, found abuses, and started the slow process of military justice.

Unfortunately, General Barnett's letter to Colonel Russell got into the papers.⁵⁴ Despite Col. Russell's investigation, a later investigation by General Barnett's successor, Major General John A. Lejeune, and now-Brigadier General Butler, and a formal Naval Board of Inquiry chaired by Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, all of which found that military justice had been imposed on all those who were guilty, within naval jurisdiction, and within the statute of limitations⁵⁵, the bad press continued. In particular, *The Nation* accused the Marines of "racial snobbery, political chicane" and "torture...theft, arson, and murder" . . . "actual slavery" . . . and a "five-year massacre of Haitians." The upshot was a Senate investigation which lasted from 1921 to 1922, sat in Port-au-Prince and as well

as Santo Domingo, and allowed a representative of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Union Patriotique advisory rights with a right to cross examination;⁵⁶ and yet found that most of the charges had been greatly exaggerated:

On the evidence before it the committee can now state--

(1) That the accusations of military abuses are limited in point of time to a few months and in location to restricted area.

(2) Very few of the many Americans who have served in Haiti are thus accused. The others have restored order and tranquillity under arduous conditions of service, and generally won the confidence of the inhabitants of the country with whom they came in touch.

(3) That certain Caco prisoners were executed without trial. Two such cases have been judicially determined, the evidence to which reference has been made shows eight more cases with sufficient clearness to allow them to be regarded without much doubt as having occurred.⁵⁷

The committee also noted that the thrust of most of the accusations had been an effort to discredit the entire Occupation of Haiti.⁵⁸ More importantly, the Committee noted that the Occupation was not serving its goals and recommended changes:

- ♦ "... [place] within reach of the Haitian masses, justice, schools, and agricultural instruction . . . [and] . . . send to Haiti a commission comprising a commercial advisor, an expert in tropical agriculture, and an educator . . ."
- ♦ "...advise the Haitian government against permitting foreign interests to acquire great land holdings in Haiti."
- ♦ "...as communications are opened up and as the peasants are secure in their life and property, . . . reduce the force of Marines in the territory of the Republic and ultimately to intrust the maintenance of order and peace exclusively to the gendarmes."
- ♦ Eliminate provost courts for civil crimes and "offenses by the press against public order."

- ♦ Raise the caliber and qualifications of the Americans who represent the United States in Haiti.⁵⁹

Interestingly, almost a year earlier, President Harding had apparently solicited an evaluation of the Occupation from the State Department shortly after his inauguration in 1921. Written by Sumner Welles, who at the time was Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department and who would become the American High Commissioner in the Dominican Republic in 1922,⁶⁰ it recommended similar changes in the Occupation and its administration:

- ♦ Increase the size of Gendarmerie d'Haïti in order to increase public order.
- ♦ Appoint a single representative of the United States to represent the President in Haiti and subordinate all United States "Treaty officials" to this representative.
- ♦ Change the basic supervision of the Occupation of Haiti from the Navy Department to the State Department, which would presumed to be more diplomatic in budget items, for instance.
- ♦ Develop the Haitian economy, principally by reforming the Haitian education system.⁶¹

Thus, getting recommendations from all sides, the Occupation of Haiti entered a period of great change and, ultimately, some progress.

Smooth(er) Sailing

On 10 March 1922, John H. Russell, twice former commander of the First Provisional Brigade of Marines in Haiti and recently promoted to Brigadier General, became the United States High Commissioner in Haiti.⁶²

According to the American-sponsored Haitian constitution of 1918, a Haitian President served for a term of four years, and could be immediately reelected for a second term. However, under the Title VII, Transitory Provisions of the constitution, the sitting President--Dartiguenave--was the one who decided the next legislative elections, it being the Haitian Senate which would elect the President. The Senate itself had not sat since 1916, when Dartiguenave with, if not the approval, at least the assistance of the Americans, locked it out of the legislative building (above). In 1921, Dartiguenave's representatives began feeling out the Americans about reelection without the inconvenience of legislative elections. The State Department proved coy on this particular request, apparently preferring legislative elections if Dartiguenave wanted reelection as President.

To make a long story short, Dartiguenave preferred not to suffer legislative elections and the Americans preferred a new President. Dartiguenave had proved unpopular among the Haitians and, in particular, the Haitian elite for years. So it was with little sorrow that Dartiguenave was out-maneuvered in his own Council of State. Louis Borno, one-time Foreign Minister for Dartiguenave, was elected President in May 1922. On the 15th, "for the first time since Nissage-Saget [President 1870-74] and only the second time in the history of Haiti, a constitutional transfer of power took place."⁶³

Louis Borno, like Dartiguenave, would be still another client-President of Americans,⁶⁴ or a strong-willed Haitian with his own agenda,⁶⁵ depending on which interpretation of the First United States Occupation you prefer, but he and John Russell could at least work together in an atmosphere approaching mutual respect, and things were accomplished.

With the end of World War I, and a world recovery taking place, the Haitian Government finally solicited a \$16 million loan on which there were serious bids. The National City Bank took high bid of 92.137 [%] in 1922 (which means a discount of just under 8%, which compares rather favorably with loans taken by the Haitians prior to the Occupation) at 6% interest. Of the \$16 million face value of the loan, the Haitians were therefore able to actually see over \$15 million of it, which went to retire the claims of the National Bank and the National Railroad, and refunded three outstanding French loans. A second loan, also funded through National City Bank for some \$5 million, paid off 73,269 claims against the Haitian government settled by a joint American-Haitian claims commission. A third loan for \$2.66 million, this time through the Metropolitan Trust company of New York in 1923, finally relieved Haiti of the financial albatross of Mr. McDonald's National Railroad plan.⁶⁶

Although, besides a peaceful transition of political power, arguably the greatest contribution to Haiti made by the occupation, to quote the British minister in Haiti in 1929, was that it "maintained peace and allowed the peasant to work in safety." Other, more tangible results were to the Occupation's credit during the Louis Borno-John Russell period:

- ♦ over 1000 miles of roads, with 210 bridges, serving 3000 motor vehicles;

- ♦ nine major airfields and numerous auxiliary fields;
- ♦ 15 modern lighthouses (as opposed to three antiques in 1915), 54 buoys, ten harbor lights and other aids to navigation;
- ♦ restoring a functioning telephone and telegraph system;
- ♦ ten towns with running, potable water, and 64 villages with clean wells, in addition to irrigation projects; and
- ♦ a *Service de Santé Publique* which included 11 hospitals--98% staffed by Haitians, and 147 public clinics, not counting three military hospitals and the Catholic hospital in Port-au-Prince.⁶⁷

One area in which the Americans encountered an immense amount of resistance was in the area of public education. In his memo for President Harding, Sumner Welles accused the Haitian elite of publicly funding education at adequate levels, while actually pocketing the bulk of the money for themselves.⁶⁸ In 1923, General Russell instituted a *Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de l'Enseignement Professionnel*, or Service Technique as it became known, to provide an agricultural educational system for the *noir* peasantry under Dr. George F. Freeman. This was "a matter of extreme social sensitivity for the elite," who feared both the social consequences of an educated *noir* peasantry and the loss of the *noirs'* loyalty to the *blancs*, who were improving their lives.⁶⁹

The "show window" of the Service Technique was the Central School of Agriculture at Damien where

[in] the way of things in Haiti, and more particularly because such studies required literacy and prior preparation, the students came from elite families, though, alas, with no more appetite for the dunghill side of agriculture (let alone for going out into the country to instruct peasant *noirs*) than their predecessors at Turgeau [a reference to the Haitian forces

under Dessalines who took Port-au-Prince in October 1803]. To overcome such reservations, there was adopted a system of scholarships, or *bourses*, whereby each student received the not-inconsiderable sum of \$25 a month and, as Dr. Freeman was later quoted in the *New York World*, was 'virtually hired to go, by means of scholarships.' This incentive notwithstanding, student *bousiers* concentrated on academic work while hired peasants dug ditches, cleaned stables, slopped hogs, and shoveled manure.⁷⁰

The American attempts at educational reform were also strongly resisted by the Catholic church in Haiti, which saw its system of confessional schools threatened by the proposed American system. The Church had been in opposition to the United States Occupation since 1915, when they declined to perform the traditional *Te Deum* to mark Dartiguenave's election. This appears to be primarily a jurisdictional and religious (the Catholic church appeared to view the advent of the Americans in 1915 as the advent of rampant Protestantism) issue, as opposed to a nationalist issue, because the Haitian clergy was 30 times more French and French-Canadian than Haitian.⁷¹

Needless to say, elite students, and not just those in the Service Technique, were highly politicized, nationalist, and, almost by definition, anti-American. Louis Borno, by 1929, had also overstayed his political welcome, so students were anti-government as well.

What touched everything off was a seemingly innocent decision by Dr. Freeman of the Service Technique. Dr. Freeman needed funds to set up some experimental stations at Hinche--to serve the *noir* peasantry rather than just the elite students--and proposed on cutting back on *bourses* and paid labor at the main facility at Damien. The students went on strike, and were quickly joined by sympathy strikes in other elite schools in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. President Borno's reaction was initially restrained by

General Russell, although Russell did cable Washington to request reinforcements for the Marine Brigade in case the Garde d'Haïti (the Gendarmerie d'Haïti had been redesignated on 1 November 1928) proved unreliable.

The unrest continued through November 1929, until the first week in December, when the situation at Les Cayes suddenly got out of hand. The peasantry of the region, for reasons other than why the students revolted, rebelled after agitators from Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien had their say, and headed for the town of Les Cayes. A patrol of 20 Marines stood in their way. The confrontation eventually got out of hand, and 12 Haitians died. President Hoover, who had been inaugurated that year, called for an investigation.⁷² Given President Hoover's predisposition to get out of Haiti, it is hardly surprising that the resulting Forbes Commission recommended that the Occupation be terminated as soon as possible.⁷³

Haitianization

The United States Government signed an agreement in 1931 with the Haitian Government for a rather quick "Haitianization" of the Treaty services in Haiti and the eventual withdrawal of all United States forces from Haiti. Louis Borno stood down as President in early 1930, and the Council of State elected Eugène Roy as the new President. He took office on 15 May 1930; the first Catholic *Te Deum* since 1914 was said for the new President. Ironically, in a flurry of legislative machinations that represented a bitter struggle between the *mulâtres* and nationalistic *noirs*, Sténio Vincent, a light skinned *noir*, was elected President in November 1930.⁷⁴ It appears that the United States Mission in Haiti originally believed that the United States Occupation

should last until at least 1936, in order to reassure holders of Haitian government bonds. However, the State Department, and presumably President Hoover, wished to complete the process before the lapse of the Haitian-American Treaty of 1915. The agreement on Haitianization, which included no actual date for the termination of the Occupation, although most other Treaty services were given transition dates, was signed 5 August 1931.⁷⁵

A final agreement for the withdrawal of United States military forces was eventually agreed upon and signed with Haiti on 7 August 1933, with a termination date of 1 October 1934. However, after conversations between President Vincent and President Roosevelt, in Cap-Haïtien in July of 1934, the date was moved up to 1 August 1934.⁷⁶

Aftermath.

The actual withdrawal of American troops in Haiti was somewhat of an anticlimax: most equipment and troops were withdrawn from Haiti prior to the actual withdrawal date. On 1 August 1934, at Marine Brigade headquarters, the American flag was lowered, with honors, and the Haitian flag was raised, with honors. The last aircraft from Marine Observation Squadron Nine left Bowen Field outside Port-au-Prince and flew back to the United States.⁷⁷ For the Haitians, the "Second Independence" was one big, long party.⁷⁸

The Constitution, modified in 1928, was again changed in 1935 to invest more power in the President. According to the first Haitian *Chef* of the Garde d'Haïti--

Démosthènes Calixte, the same officer who was the Haitian deputy of the then-new *Ecole Militaire* in 1922 under General Russell--the Garde was rapidly politicized, beginning in 1934.⁷⁹ This same officer offers some observations (1939) to what happened to the institutions left the Haitians by the United States Marines Corps and Navy:

- ♦ The Sanitation and Hygiene Service, which was originally an organization trained by the officers of the Medical Corps of the United States Navy, has lost its real purpose as an institution. The persons responsible for its administration are rank politicians and the most ill-bred officials Haiti ever had.
- ♦ The Public Works Administration was also organized by officers of the Civil Engineer Corps of the United States Navy. But since its "Haitianization", it has become merely a payroll institution for all the friends of the President who are jobless, as well as those who do not care to work. The engineers and architects in charge of various departments cannot do anything to remedy the situation. This is why this service has spent so much money and Haiti still has no roads, no bridges, and no sewers in areas where such construction is badly needed.
- ♦ The Agricultural and Rural Education Service . . . was, after its "Haitianization" placed under another foreigner, a Belgian, who resigned in 1938. This department could have rendered great service if the five-year plan submitted by the scientific agriculturist-in-charge had been approved by the government. . . Political opportunism was rampant. No attempt was made even to try the plan.
- ♦ The Contribution or Internal Tax Service was also organized by Americans. The Haitians who have replaced the Americans are competent and honest; but again political interference was followed by embezzlement of Government funds, which of course went unpunished.
- ♦ Education is purposely neglected for the benefit of politics and social prejudice. The method of education in Haiti has always been a matter for "discussion." The removal from office of competent administrators and personnel of the Education Department for political reason renders the problem practically insoluble.
- ♦ There cannot be an independent press in Haiti, because of the enactment of a law against a free press. A 'state of siege' is maintained by the present government, but even in time of peace no one can express an honest opinion as to the general condition or administration of the country without being mistreated.⁸⁰

Other observers, even those hostile to the United States Occupation, have noted the deterioration of the infrastructure: "American civil service reform, for instance, had little impact. After the occupation, Haitian politics reverted to the 'spoils system' whereby successive administrations installed their own partisans in public office."

"...The network of roads, potentially the most significant legacy of the occupation, didn't last long because almost all roads were unpaved and required elaborate maintenance."⁸¹

President Vincent became a dictator in all but name by late 1938. He was eventually maneuvered out of power by Elie Lescot in 1941. Lescot was exposed in 1945 as a virtual agent for Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (by the Dominicans). Students and rioters took to the streets. In January 1946, the Garde, headed by an Executive Military Committee [*Comité Exécutif Militaire*] led by a Colonel Lavaud (a *mulâtre*) took charge. The result was chaos--rioting, looting, arson--with an ugly racial--*noirs* versus *mulâtres*--tone, although there apparently was even some Communist influence in the violence as well.

The Comité eventually restored order, resurrected the 1932 constitution, and returned Haiti to a state approaching normalcy. In August 1946, presidential elections were held. Dumarsais Estimé, an Artibonite *noir*, was declared the winner, a *Te Deum* was said in his honor, and the Garde went back to the barracks.

Estimé enacted a new constitution in November. The Garde was redesignated "L'Armée d'Haïti" and its police functions were theoretically separated from the military functions. Estimé was a populist as well as a *noir*, and he nationalized the Standard Fruit holdings as well as instituted an income tax for the elite. He also was seen as a threat by Trujillo, who worked steadily to destabilize him.

Estimé declared a state of siege in 1949 because of the threat from the Dominican Republic. Faced with a loss of income from the Standard Fruit nationalization and other

causes, he suddenly required every worker to buy government bonds redeemable in 1959, which proved immensely unpopular. So did Estimé's efforts to be reelected President, despite a constitutional prohibition against presidents succeeding themselves. His attempt at modifying the constitution was blocked in the Haitian Senate, even though the attempt was popular with the masses. Finally, the army, with rioting groups supporting both sides of the position in the streets, faced Estimé on 10 May 1950 and told him he had resigned.

Initially, Colonel Franck Lavaud was the new President. However, Colonel Paul Magloire, initially declared the Minister of the Interior in the new junta, was the real power in the group. New national elections were declared on 3 August, and Magloire resigned from the junta to run for President. He was opposed by the Communist Party and an architect who wanted to execute Estimé. Elections on 10 October finalized Magloire's presidency, reflecting the popular opinion of most Haitians.⁸²

In the end, however, Magloire fell prey to the fatal disease of all Haitian elected Presidents: the desire to hold on after his term of office would expire. Magloire attempted a coup against himself--he resigned as President and, as commander in chief of the army, declared himself Chief Executive Power (shades of 1915). The constitution was suspended and dissidents jailed. The people took to the streets in a general strike, the army refused to support him, and Magloire fled to Jamaica in exile on 12 December 1956.⁸³ *Time* didn't give his fall much play, the big news that Christmas was the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet tanks.

Magloire's immediate successor, Nemours Pierre-Louis, took office the same day he left. He resigned 55 days later.

Haiti entered another riotous election cycle. Rioters stormed schools and attacked *mulâtres*. The army--whose back pay had been mysteriously paid by Dr. François Duvalier, an old follower of Estimé--attempted to gain control under Colonel Armand. Opposed by loyalist elements, the coup failed. Rioting and looting prevailed in Port-au-Prince.

On 26 May 1957, Daniel Fignolé was inaugurated as President. He didn't last long. The man he appointed as head of the Army turned on him and demanded his signature on a letter of resignation on 14 June. Fignolé and his family were immediately flown out of the country. Duvalier was steadily gaining support in the army and in the country as well. On 22 September, François Duvalier, was elected President by a ratio of three votes to two.⁸⁴

Part II

An Analysis of the Occupation

Looking at the bleak history of the Occupation and its aftermath, there are a number of questions which come to mind. Did it accomplish anything? Did anything it accomplished amount to anything? If the answers to the first two questions are yes, what happened to Haiti? The Occupation was scarcely over before Haiti seemed to revert to its bad old ways.

Goals of the Occupation

There is little written concerning the United States' goals for the Occupation, and it is not difficult to find those commentators who denounce the entire occupation as a racist exercise in imperialism by the United States.⁸⁵ One of the few hints about actual goals is Sumner Well's memorandum for President Harding, talking about the lack of progress in the occupation based on what was stated in the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty.

The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty is often denounced as an *ex post facto* Treaty that served only to justify the American occupation.⁸⁶ It was certainly after the fact, and it was often cited as if it were a moral contract that must be accomplished before the Occupation could end. However, as a statement of goals, it does offer some insight into what the United States hoped to accomplish through the Occupation.

I. Finances. "...the United States will . . . aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a first and solid basis." (Article I) This was to be accomplished through the mechanism of the appointment of a General Receiver to collect and spend Haiti's customs duties for it. The General Receiver would be assisted by a Financial Advisor. (Article II) Haiti would agree that the General Receiver would receive all customs duties from Haiti. (Article III). The Financial Advisor would "collate, classify, arrange and make full statement of" all of Haiti's debts, to include all of their financial obligations. (Article IV) These customs duties collected will first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then pay off the public debt, third, pay for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and finally, meet the expenses of the Haitian Government. (Article V) Haiti could not increase its public debt without the agreement of the United States. (Article VIII)

II. Security. Haiti agreed to an American officered and organized constabulary, which Haiti would pay for. (Article X)

III. Resources. In response to American "aid [to] the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources, the Haitians agreed to not give or sell any of Haiti's territory (Article XI), settle all claims with the United States (Article XII), and develop its resources with the assistance of the United States. (Article XIII)

In return, the United States agreed to help preserve Haitian independence and maintain a Government "adequate for the protection of life, property and individual

liberty." (Article XIV). The treaty was to run for ten years, and for a further ten if "for specific reasons presented by either of the . . . parties, the purpose of this treaty has not been fully accomplished." (Article XVI) Article XVI (and the Treaty extension of 1917) is the origin of the obligation of the United States to stay until 1936, which was mentioned repeatedly in debates about the Haitian Occupation in the 1930's.

The financial situation that the Americans found in 1915 was awful. Haiti had borrowed so much money that its debt service was threatening to exceed its budget. However, even when they were paying off their debt service, the Haitians preferred to take out further loans rather than cut back on current expenses. By the time the Occupation began, according to testimony given at the 1921-22 Senate investigations, Haiti was unable to borrow any more money, or pay off the debts it had already taken on. As was noted in Part I, World War I's effect on the World financial markets precluded a major consolidation loan for Haiti until 1922. However, as was presented to the Senate in 1922, some progress had been made in reducing the debt burden in the years up to 1922 (Annex B). Near the end of the Occupation, General Russell's annual report stated

At the end of the fiscal year, 1928-29, the Government of Haiti had an unobligated cash balance of more than \$4,000,000. Bonded indebtedness had decreased from \$30,772,000 to \$17,735,479, in spite of the contraction of new loans, 1922, 1923, and 1924, totaling \$22,695,000 [the debt consolidation loans] utilized chiefly to refunded previous bonded indebtedness, and satisfy claims against the Government, but also to effect material improvements.

Government revenues have more than doubled, chiefly through better collections and yields of existing taxes enabling the various departments of the Government to undertake the greatest program for public welfare the country has ever seen. Internal revenue has been increased, yielding over \$1,200,000 during the year just finished, or more than one-fourth the total receipts of thirteen years ago (1915-16) and further important increases are forecast. A sound currency has been achieved.⁸⁷

While the Great Depression caused serious government deficits in the early thirties, and therefore caused the curtailment of many developmental programs, Haiti was still in good enough shape in 1935 to be the only one of fifteen Central and South American countries not to have defaulted on public dollar bonds.⁸⁸

Article X of the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty provided for an American organized and officered constabulary funded through Haitian customs revenue. As noted in Annex A, Appendix 3, it was first renamed the Garde d'Haïti in 1928 and again, after the Occupation, renamed the L'Armée d'Haïti. Despite its relatively small size--some 2100 enlisted gendarmes in a country of 3.5 million--it had served Haiti, and the Occupation well.

To begin with, it had replaced a pre-Occupation army "of thirty-eight (38) line and four (4) artillery regiments of a total paper strength of over 9,000, a Gendarmerie of over 1,800, plus four regiments of the President's guard, the whole officered by 308 generals and 50 colonels, not to mention the honorary generals created by the President pro tem among his friends."⁸⁹ In addition to being a drain on the treasury, a source of corruption, and a burden on the civil society (business people pressed to supply money, draft animals; a system of conscription more resembling impressment, etc.), the army was a constant threat of insurrection or *coups d'état* against the sitting government. Michel Oreste was the first truly civilian president of Haiti.⁹⁰

As was shown in Part I, the Gendarmerie/Garde quickly proved a useful tool of the Haitian Government, even if some Occupation leaders had reservations over their use (*viz.*, locking the Haitian Senate out of their chambers in 1916, closing the Haitian

legislature in 1917), although, admittedly, these early actions served the Occupation as well as the Dartiguenave presidency. The Marine Corps, as might be expected, would argue that the establishment and maintenance of order was generally good for Haiti.⁹¹ Many other observers (but not all) would agree, including a British minister who had little other good to say about the Americans and their Occupation: "What has America done for Haiti in the fourteen years since the intervention? Primarily, maintained peace and allowed the peasant to work in safety."⁹²

The main shortcoming in the American institution of the Gendarmerie/Garde was the failure to effectively separate the military function of the guard from the police function;⁹³ this would have severe implications not only during the Duvalier years, but up through to the ouster of Aristide and the Second United States Occupation of Haiti. To its credit, the United States did not use the Garde as a vehicle to set up a pro-American military dictator such as Somoza in Nicaragua or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic; however, the centralized organization of the Garde and, to an extent, its professionalism, allowed it to be used more effectively by Duvalier and his successors.⁹⁴

In addition to its police and military functions (which included Coast Guard and prisons), the Gendarmerie/Garde also served as the principle builder of Haitian infrastructure and at one time or another built or rebuilt Haitian internal communications (telephone and telegraphs, roads and airfields), fire services in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien, traffic control as well as vehicle registration, communal administration, and public works construction.⁹⁵

As noted in part 1, claims against the Haitian government--in excess of 70,000 separate claims--were paid off in 1923. As far as natural resources went, Russell reported in 1930 that Haiti still was dependent on the coffee crop, and the coffee crop of 1928-29 suffered from poor weather. As a means of diversification, sisal plantations were started on land abandoned to cultivation, a pineapple plantation and cannery started, and corn and other new crops started.⁹⁶ However, the Depression reduced the coffee price by 40 per cent between 1930 and 1935; logwood exports went nowhere by 1935; the pineapple company, rolling by 1932, was also killed by the Depression. On top of that 1935 was a year of severe weather. To compensate, the Haitians granted a banana monopoly to Standard Fruit in 1935, but nationalized it--killing the golden goose--in 1947.⁹⁷

The most serious failure of resources, as shown in Part I, was the failure to extend significant education to the *noir* peasantry. Despite the recognition of this factor in Sumner Well's memorandum in 1921, almost all of the significant contributions of the Service Technique went to the benefit of the elite, and those students rebelled when their allowances were cut. A more telling statistic comes from General Russell's 1930 report: "there are almost 400,000 children of school age and the existing schools of all types (including national, religious and private schools) can only accommodate slightly more than 100,000 students."⁹⁸ The 100,000 number included all of the elite's children, the shortfall fell entirely upon the *noir* peasantry.

American success in providing Haiti with a government "adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty," is problematical. On one hand, three of the four peaceful transitions of power up to the end of the Occupation occurred during

the Occupation. On the other, the Occupation acquiesced in Presidents Dartiguenave and Borno operating from the Constitution's Transitory Articles, and the closing of the Haitian Senate in 1916 and the Chamber of Deputies in 1917, until Roy took office and legislative elections were held in October 1930.

The constitution itself, written in Haiti, modified by the US State Department and thrown to a national referendum when it appeared the Chamber of Deputies would not approve it, has been criticized on a number of issues, most notably the provision, new in 1918, allowing foreigners to own property (particularly land) in Haiti.⁹⁹ However, a major area of disagreement between the United States and the Haitian governments in 1922 was a Haitian law "interpreting" this constitutional provision in such a way that the article was all but nullified.¹⁰⁰ It is also interesting to note that neither the amendments to that constitution passed during President Borno's administration in 1927, nor the 1932 constitution written during the Haitianization period removed this provision.¹⁰¹

Imperialism and Racism

As noted above, the United States Occupation of Haiti in 1915 to 1934 has been accused of both imperialism (or colonialism) and racism. Both charges have a bearing on an analysis of the Occupation and need to be addressed. Of the two, imperialism probably rates the shorter answer.

If Imperialism (or colonialism) is the long-term taking over of a country or region for the purpose of economic exploitation, then the Occupation, however dubious its status in international law of the time or by political standards of the end of the 20th Century, was not Imperialism. The period of the Occupation was fixed by Treaty,

however *ex post facto* it may have been, and American officials appear to have had every intention of abiding by its limits. In any case, as discussed in Part I, other factors prevented the US Occupation from reaching its stated treaty limit of 1936.

Another line of investigation that could be followed is the opportunities the Occupation gave the United States business community in Haiti. It is true that the German business community was for all intents and purposes shut down in Haiti in 1917-18, but that was more due to war paranoia than to present an opening to the United States business community.¹⁰² Franklin Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and John McIlhenny, then financial Advisor to Haiti, apparently sought out some sort of financial investments in Haiti in the 1917-19 time frame, assisted by Roosevelt's cousin Harry, who was serving with the Gendarmerie at the time. Although apparently nothing came to fruition, it was a surprising breach of government ethics, even for 1917.¹⁰³ Other investment opportunities simply did not materialize. Both Standard Oil and the United Fruit Company declined to invest in Haiti at the time because of State Department investment regulations.

However, with the United States controlling Haitian customs, it was apparently easy to abrogate an 1907 Franco-Haitian commercial convention, to favor American imports. The National City Bank did float the Series A, B, and C loans for Haiti in 1922-23, and the *Banque Nationale* was by then a subsidiary of the National City Bank, from which the bank profited.¹⁰⁴ However, the National City Bank was induced to sell out its interest to Haiti for a mere \$1 million in 1936, when President Vincent nationalized the *Banque*.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the most critical evaluation that might honestly be made of the Occupation is that:

[it] was a matter of US self-interest. It was not principally and exclusively a philanthropic act because after US troops landed in Haiti, it took much pressure from local dissidents and American sympathizers to force the occupation troops to withdraw (Weatherly [U. G., Haiti: An Experiment in Pragmatism. *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1926), pp. 353-66], 1926: 354). The public statements made by the White House and the State Department that the United States came to rescue a friendly neighbor in trouble were purely whitewashing propaganda created for international and national consumption (Buell [R. L. *The American Occupation of Haiti* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1929), 1929: 341). The occupation was instead a strict application of the Monroe Doctrine that viewed the Caribbean as *mare nostrum*.¹⁰⁶

Racism is a much more difficult issue to address, particularly because of what one author called "the American racial mores of the day"¹⁰⁷ have changed so dramatically since 1915. Nevertheless, the case that the Americans conducted their Occupation with severe racial prejudices is based on three basic arguments or sets of evidence: language used by the Americans, testimony of racial prejudice by Haitian citizens, and an allegation that Marine Corps policy deliberately selected Southerners for duty in Haiti, "because they can handle Negroes."

The chief villain in the racist language argument is Colonel (later Major General) Littleton W. T. Waller, USMC (1856-1926). As the first commander of the Marine Brigade pacifying and garrisoning Haiti, he might be expected to have set a tone for the conduct of the Occupation. Waller was of the old Marine Corps, when it was referred to as America's "colonial infantry." He was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, served

in the Boxer Rebellion, commanded the Marine Battalion on Samar, and commanded brigades in interventions in Cuba and Mexico before the landing in Haiti.

Colonel Waller was born into a slave-holding family in Virginia before the Civil War, a family who lost eleven members, ten of them children, in the Nat Turner Slave Rebellion in 1831.¹⁰⁸ Waller was also infamous as the "Butcher of Samar." In January 1902, while commanding the Marine Battalion (as was customary in those days, the battalion was provisional and otherwise undesignated), Waller allegedly ordered the murder of eleven natives on Samar, one of a number of atrocity cases that arose out of the Philippine Insurrection. Waller was court-martialed for murder in March 1902 and was eventually acquitted.¹⁰⁹

Writing Colonel (later Major-General Commandant) John A. Lejeune, then Assistant to the Major-General Commandant of the Marine Corps, in October 1915, Waller remarked, "you can never trust a nigger with a gun." Hans Schmidt quotes this remark twice in his *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* and once in *Maverick Marine*, a biography of Smedley Butler, in building his case on the role of American racism in the Occupation of Haiti.¹¹⁰ Elizabeth Abbott, in *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy*, uses the phrase to characterize the entire US Occupation.¹¹¹ Waller probably was a racist--given his background and history this is probably an unremarkable conclusion--and, as Schmidt makes his case in both *US Occupation*--quoting Waller liberally--and *Maverick Marine*, this was certainly the manner in which Waller spoke on a regular basis.¹¹²

However, on occasion, Waller rose above his racist prejudices: recall from Part I his disagreement with shutting down the Haitian Senate even when it would serve immediate Occupation objectives as well as Haitian President Dartiguenave's. Waller was also ready to counsel his protégé Smedley Butler on curbing his behavior towards the elite: "There is more harm done by such an act than can be remedied by months of work and labor."¹¹³ Another point to remember is that Colonel Waller commanded 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines for only 15 months (Annex A, Appendix 1), and was senior American officer present (after Caperton's departure for Santo Domingo) only from May to November 1916.

A much more appropriate person for scrutiny would be John H. Russell, twice brigade commander of 1st Brigade and United States High Commissioner from 1922 to 1930. If any officer's personal prejudices had a significant influence on United States policy in Haiti, it would be his. Yet, to many observers, General Russell, who spoke rather good French, was decidedly not a racist. A Haitian who had no shortage of critical remarks about the Occupation, B. Danache, who once called Waller and Butler "torturers without scruple," had kind words for both General and Mrs. Russell.¹¹⁴ Even critics of the Occupation note that General Russell "pursued a policy designed to eliminate racial friction."¹¹⁵

Finally, as we discuss language, we must acknowledge that what constitutes permissible language in racial, sexual, or any other context, changes as society evolves. Insensitive, even brutal, racial characterizations colored the language of many white Americans, and not just Southerners or racists, in the early part of this century, which is

why use of language is so inaccurate a gauge of racism. Even Smedley Butler--whose use of crude racial characterizations is well documented--and his wife are seen by a critic of the Occupation as "perhaps relatively liberal, and at least made an effort to be polite and gracious."¹¹⁶

However we characterize the official racial tone of the Occupation, it was certainly seen by at least part of the Haitian population as racist. This segment was the elite, particularly the *mulâtres*. As they were the literate class in Haiti, their opinion is the one on the written record. As they spoke French, and many spoke English before the Occupation was through, they were the Haitians that outsiders--supporters of the Occupation as well as critics--sought out to talk to. And the elite did not mince words:

"The Americans have taught us many things," *Le Nouvelliste* [Port-au-Prince] newspaper owner Ernest Chauvet told author Seabrook [author of *The Magic Island*, 1929]. "Among other things they have taught us that we are niggers. You see, we really didn't know that before. We thought we were negroes."¹¹⁷

The problem with this position is that, despite elite perceptions otherwise, most Americans appear to have had separate opinions of the elite and the *noir* peasantry, the former rather negative, the latter rather positive. One of the more noted of these separate characterizations is from Smedley Butler's testimony before the Senate investigating committee in 1921:

The Haitian people are divided into two classes; one class wears shoes and the other does not. . . Those that wear shoes I took as a joke. . . They wore cut-away coats, brass-head canes, stove-pipe hats 3 inches in diameter, and anything else they could put on to make themselves conspicuous. But the people who were barefooted, the women wearing themselves hubbards and the men dungarees half-way up to their knees, with scarred feet, indicating the hardest kind of toil, and with great blisters

on their hands, and with the palms of their hands as hard as a piece of sole leather--those people you could absolutely trust.¹¹⁸

Other famous Marines besides Smedley Butler served in Haiti, particularly in the early years, and some of their memoirs echo Butler's characterization of the two classes in Haiti: A. A. Vandergrift, who served twice in Haiti, once as Butler's adjutant, and was later Commandant of the Marine Corps¹¹⁹, or Frederick M. "Dopey" Wise, another double veteran of Haiti and *Chef* of the Gendarmerie d'haïti from July 1919 to January 1921.¹²⁰ Memoirs of enlisted Marines with Haitian service are more rare, but best known of these, *The White King of La Gonâve*, by Marine Sergeant and Gendarmerie Lieutenant Faustin Wirkus, may not offer the colorful parallels of Butler, but the general comparisons in his book are much the same.¹²¹ Former Brigade commanders Eli Cole and Russell also have been quoted in similar statements showing favor towards the peasantry and distrust towards the elite.¹²²

To some writers, the Marine and American attitude towards the elite constitutes racism; I read mostly contempt for a parasitic level of society. Even Hans Schmidt, the most quoted writer of the racist analysis of the Occupation, in building his case, comes close to recognizing this contempt:

The cultural clash between Americans and the Haitian elite was all the more exacerbated because the Americans, who subscribed to political ideologies of democracy and egalitarianism, were repulsed by the very concept of elitism and that was fundamental to the social and economic position of the elite in Haiti. This revulsion, of course, ignored the paradox of American racial and cultural elitism. During the early years of the occupation American military commanders were especially trenchant in this respect, scorning the aristocratic pomposity of the elite while expressing affection for the common people. This attitude was firmly rooted in ideals of democratic egalitarianism. . .¹²³

How the actual peasant *noir* felt about this American attitude comes to us only second hand, the old peasant quoted in Abbott's *Haiti* (fn 91), for instance. Other interpretations come to us filtered through one political view or another, such as the anti-Occupation *Occupied Haiti* (1927) by Emily Balch:

It may be true that the peasants in general like the Occupation. It is possible that they are sufficiently conscious of the benefits that have come with it, and ascribe them sufficiently clearly to the Americans. One is told that they now build their houses on the roadside as they did not dare to do in the old days, for fear of being seized by some revolutionary enterprise or to serve as soldiers. Again this story is laughed at, and one is told the houses always stood as they do now.

It is hard to believe that given the deep-seated traditional belief that the return of the white men spelled a return of slavery, and given the land situation, the peasants do not feel uneasy under their new white masters.¹²⁴

However, there was no mistaking how the elite felt: Americans had not understood:

the social experiment [that was Haiti, nothing] that calls for shame or concealment. . . [T]hey throw the history of Haiti in our face--its long tissue of revolutions and massacres. . . . Efforts to help the masses have been made again and again and in many ways, . . . The American invasion might have been a good thing if, although unjust and even infringing for a time upon our independence, it had been temporary and had led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But such is not the case. . . .

"Even the good that they do turns to our hurt, for instead of teaching us, they do it to prove that we are incapable. They are exploiters."¹²⁵

But if the Americans had contempt for the elite, the elite returned it in kind:

"But it is a grand joke, isn't it?" Chauvet continued. "The sergeant's wife or the captain's, who maybe did her own washing at home, is our social superior and would feel herself disgraced to shake hands with any nigger. Why, many of those white Marine Corps people couldn't have entered my mulatto father's house except by the servants' entrance."¹²⁶

Haitian civil courts never were controlled by the Occupation and were also perceived as anti-white and anti-American: "though a black foreigner might win his case

against a Haitian, a white man stood little chance and a white American none at all."¹²⁷

Most curious--to me at least--is the Haitian elite's scorn towards American Blacks, whom they considered servile. In 1924, the Haitian ambassador in Washington informed the State Department that even the *noirs* looked down on American Blacks [something I doubt, as relatively few *noirs* then lived in the cities and larger towns where they would have come in contact with them]. This had serious impact on American representation in Haiti which, since the end of the 19th Century, had been largely Black, a small legion which had included Ambassadors (ministers) Frederick Douglass (1889-91) and Dr. H. W. Furniss (1905-1913), and CPT Charles Young, 9th Cavalry, USA, the first Black American military attaché and the first military attaché assigned to Haiti. As a result, the President was forced to appoint White diplomats to Haiti rather than the Black Republicans he had wanted to reward.¹²⁸

Balch repeats the elite's accusation--repeated in turn by Schmidt (less the prostitution) and Abbott, that the Occupation brought about the hereto unknown phenomenon of public intoxication and prostitution.¹²⁹ Other sources confirm the public intoxication--as it was the Prohibition period back in the United States, Americans tended to take advantage of being out of the United States in that regard (much to the disapproval of the British, incidentally).¹³⁰ As of yet, other sources do not confirm the prostitution charge.

While I do not doubt that many an individual American was a racist, or at the least used language with nasty racial characterizations, it must be remembered that this behavior is being reported by a class of people who have been displaced from positions of

power or influence and, in many cases, income by the Occupation. The elite also feared rising American influence--to their disadvantage--among the *noirs*. This was the same class, through various patriotic organizations, which fed atrocity stories back to the *Nation* and other periodicals in 1919-1922, many of which were found to be exaggerated or without basis in fact. (Part I) Therefore, the magnitude of the reports--not the existence of prejudicial behavior--must be taken with several grains of salt.

For more than 30 years, various writers and periodicals such as Harry Franck in *Roaming Through the West Indies* (1920),¹³¹ *The New York Times* (1920),¹³² Balch (1927),¹³³ James Leyburn in *The Haitian People* (1941),¹³⁴ Selden Rodman in *Haiti: The Black Republic, The Complete Story and Guide* (1954),¹³⁵ and even *Time* magazine (1954)¹³⁶ repeated as fact or alluded to a Marine Corps policy that had recruited Southern officers for service in Haiti "because they can handle blacks." (Colonel Waller, true to form, had made a similar statement about his qualifications in a letter to Lejeune in 1916.¹³⁷)

The truth of the matter is that no such policy existed. In 1964, an analysis by a history student in Wellesley College, followed up by both critics and supporters of the Occupation--both academic and Marine--shows, statistically, that the charge is inaccurate. In fact, as shown in Table 1, the proportion of Southern officers to the total number of Marine officers serving in Haiti varies randomly from year to year; the lack of a pattern or of a fixed proportion of officers being Southern strongly suggests the lack of a policy in such a matter. In addition, no one has found any documentary evidence, or personal

Table 1: Southerners in the Population

<u>Year</u>	<u>U. S. Population¹</u>	<u>Marine Population²</u>	<u>Marines in Haiti³</u>	<u>Southern Population⁴</u>	<u>Southern Marines⁵</u>	<u>Southern Marines in Haiti⁶</u>
1910	92,228,531			24.28		
1916		328	77		22.56	19.48
1917		372	72		24.73	31.94
1918						
1919		1767	59		20.43	28.81
1920	106,021,431	1098	80	23.78	22.67	22.5
1921		976	75		22.54	22.66
1922		1028	88		20.82	21.59
1923		1043	118		21.57	20.34
1924		1067	109		21.56	18.35
1925		1101	119		22.16	18.49
1926		1094	94		22.21	29.79
1927		1121	97		21.23	24.74
1928		1185	90		20.84	26.67
1929		1173	80		20.72	30
1930	122,906,848	1180	88	23.44	20.51	23.86
1931		1183	87		19.7	17.24
1932		1173	77		20.03	15.58
1933						
1934						
1940	132,165,131			24.06		

¹ Includes total United States population for the 50 states only.

² Includes total population of commissioned and warrant officers of the U.S. Marine Corps, only if born in one of what are now the 50 states.

³ Includes all United States born commissioned and warrant officers in the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Haiti.

⁴ The percentage of U.S. population born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

⁵ The percentage of Marine Corps Officers born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

⁶ The percentage of Marine Corps officers in Haiti born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

Source: Ann Hurst Harrington.¹³⁸

recollection, that any such policy existed, either for First Brigade or the Gendarmerie. Ironically, while the majority of Marine officers serving in Haiti were not Southern, many of President Wilson's appointees were. Except for the possible exception of John McIlhenny, who had regrettable personal relations with President Dartiguenave, most of these men acquitted themselves well.¹³⁹

Analysis of the racial situation, based on all of the above, is of an Occupation that had no officially racist policy, perhaps even one discouraging racist behavior and word during the Russell years, yet due to the racist attitudes of individuals--both American and the Haitian elite--the general social climate in Haiti's cities was, at times, very racially charged. However, amongst the *noirs* in the countryside, those Americans who had regular contact with them through the Gendarmerie and other means, with exceptions, generally shared feelings of affection and mutual respect for the people with whom they were in contact.

Culture

In 1930, President Hoover's Forbes Commission, amongst its findings, included "The failure of the Occupation to understand the social problems of Haiti, its brusque attempt to plant democracy there by drill and harrow, its determination to set up a middle class--however wise and necessary it may seem to Americans--all these explain why, in part, the high hopes of our good works in this land have not been realized."¹⁴⁰ This is

probably the major failing of the Occupation, and when one wonders why the effects of the Occupation were so short lived, this is why. The Occupation addressed problems and applied solutions that simply did not apply to Haiti.

One must remember that for the bulk of its first century of freedom, Haiti was an isolated country, partially because the United States wanted little contact with a free Black country, and partially because the Haitians wanted the *blancs* to have no excuse to reestablish slavery. This led to a peculiarly insular Haitian society and a peculiarly Haitian method of transferring power and governing the country. It had also been a poor country for all of its history since independence, and this led to intense competition for the riches of the country. This fed a competition for power in Haiti, for it was those in power who disbursed the riches.

Initially, the elite--made up of the *mulâtres* descended from the French colonialists--had the easiest access to power through education, social position and birthright. For the *noir*, the route to power led through the military, and by the beginning of the 20th Century this had become so routine that American officers observed that "there is a regular procedure in this warfare" that one Senator likened to American elections.¹⁴¹ A ritual battle would be fought near the town of Saint-Marc, and the challenger to the Presidency, if he won, marched on Port-au-Prince, and was voted into the Presidency. In most cases, the new President then disbursed the spoils of his victory until challenged by a new power. The military *noirs* thus became part of the elite.

Through all this squabbling for power, the peasantry, exclusively *noir*, stood by, struggling to provide a living for themselves and their families, and, if they participated

Table 2: Haiti's rulers since Independence

	Ruled	Fate
Jean-Jacques Dessalines	1804-06	shot
Henry Christophe ("King" of Northern Haiti)	1807-20	suicide
Alexandre Pétion	1807-18	died of illness
Jean-Pierre Boyer	1818-43	fled to France
Charl��s H��rard	1843-44	fled
Philippe Guerrier	1844-45	died of old age
Jean-Louis Pierrot	1845-46	unknown
Jean-Baptiste Rich��	1846-47	unknown
Faustin Soulouque	1847-59	fled to Jamaica
Fabre Geffard	1859-67	fled to Jamaica
Sylvain Salnave	1867-69	executed
Nissage Saget	1870-74	retired
Michel Domingue	1874-76	fled to Jamaica
Boisrond Canal	1876-79	fled to Jamaica
F��licit�� Salomon	1879-88	fled to France
Florvil Hyppolite	1889-96	apoplexy
Tir��sias Simon Sam	1896-1902	fled
Nord Alexis	1902-08	fled to Jamaica
Antoine Simon	1908-11	fled to Jamaica
Cincinnatus Leconte	1911-12	blown up
Tancr��de Auguste	1912-13	poisoned
Michel Oreste	1913-14	fled to Jamaica
Oreste Zamor	1914	murdered in jail
Davilmar Th��odore	1914-15	fled
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam	1915	dismembered
American occupation	1915-1934	
St��nio Vincent	1930-41	resigned
Elie Lescot	1941-46	fled to Florida
Dumarsais Estim��	1946-50	overthrown
Paul Magloire	1950-56	overthrown
Nemours Pierre-Louis	1956-57	resigned
Fran��k Sylvain	1957	overthrown
Daniel Fignol��	1957	overthrown
Fran��ois Duvalier	1957-71	died of illness
Jean-Claude Duvalier	1971-86	fled to France
Henri Namphy	1986-88	stepped down
Leslie Manigat	1988	overthrown
Henri Namphy	1988	overthrown
Prosper Avril	1988-90	fled
Ertha Pascal-Trouillot	1990	taken hostage, freed, ceded power peacefully.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide	1991	fled to America
C��dras junta	1991-94	thrown out
American occupation	1994-1995	
Jean-Bertrand Aristide	1994-1996	Peacefully ceded power
Ren�� Pr��val	1996-2001	

Source: *The Economist*, updated, *Written in Blood*, 2nd Edition¹⁴²

in the process at all, it was in being exploited or killed. It was this situation the Americans sought to change through the imposition of a new constitution and the orderly installation of several Presidents. The class of Haitians who temporarily lost power and income through this process--the elite--resisted. Many of the American reforms were in the long-run essentially pointless. Putting Haitian finances to rights and restoring their credit, on which a great deal of effort was eventually expended (Annex B), was of little interest to the elite. These accounts had never been that important to them, except as a source of graft. Increased credit meant nothing more than increased opportunity for future graft.

An improved Gendarmerie, intended as a source of public order during the Occupation, was, after the Occupation, quickly politicized and became an efficient tool for forcing the transfer of power. It was much more efficient than the corruption-plagued pre-Occupation Haitian Army that had so lost any efficiency that private armies--the Cacos--had become more effective in forcing the transfer of power.

Improved agriculture techniques and education for the *noir* peasantry were resisted by the elite because anything that enfranchised the peasantry increased the competition for the power and the riches. However, many peasants resisted agricultural reforms simply because they were new and untried in Haiti, and in many cases they were right in resisting inappropriate agricultural methods. Improved medical facilities for the peasantry were only a source of plunder for the elite;¹⁴³ the elite had their own hospitals and doctors.

One glaring example of the American inability to grasp the Haitian culture was the Occupation's allowing the Borno presidency to use the Gendarmerie to persecute practitioners of Voodoo. The Americans were persuaded that Voodoo was witchcraft,¹⁴⁴ even though individual Americans, serving with the Gendarmerie for example, were perfectly capable of understanding Voodoo's role as a religion.¹⁴⁵

In some ways, those who accuse the Americans of racism have a point: many of the American administrators--Marine and civilian--were incapable of understanding that Haitians were a culture completely different from the Black culture that they had been accustomed to in the United States and thought they knew; witness Colonel Wise complaining about "one of those American Treaty Officials arrived with a book entitled 'The Development of the Negro Mind,' from which he quoted on all occasions!"¹⁴⁶

Despite all the good intentions, despite the years of hard work, despite the lives lost or ruined, the Occupation failed to have a lasting impact on Haiti (except perhaps in legend), because the areas the Occupation sought to improve were not those areas that would fundamentally alter Haitian society.

Part III

The Never-ending Story

Based on my research on the First Occupation, without going into the Duvaliers and what led to the Second United States Occupation of Haiti, some observations about the fall of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Second Occupation, and the recent turn-over of the pacification effort to the United Nations, are offered.

The military coup that overthrew Aristide was nothing special in Haitian politics. United States political actors and events made it so. While the election that brought Aristide to power was democratic, it does not mean that Haiti was a democratic country subsequently overthrown by a military coup. The elections were simply a new means of seizing power, and therefore the riches, in Haiti, and was probably viewed by the elite--and Aristide--as no more valid, or less valid, a method than marching on Port-au-Prince at the head of a Caco army.

Haiti is a more violent country than it was prior to the First Occupation. Part of this is because the Duvaliers politicized the *noir* peasantry more than their predecessors, part of this is the increasingly desperate condition of the peasantry, and those seizing power must either organize them or suppress them. Aristide organized the peasantry, Cédras suppressed them. It is still all part of the struggle for power in Haiti.

Aristide was able to bring a new player into the struggle for power in Haiti--the United States, acting this time as an agent for Aristide as well as itself. The departure of

the United States, particularly if the United Nations is unable to maintain order, will simply renew the struggle for power.

Change to a different political system will not occur in Haiti unless either the culture of seizing political power and therefore riches changes, or one of the parties departs the scene. Neither seems likely. Absent Aristide, the elite--still *mulâtre* although with a strong *noir*, component--will resume the struggle for power and riches amongst itself.

The *noir* peasantry, who a hundred years ago fled to the hills to escape oppression or exploitation, however, now has nowhere to go. The lush forests that Smedley Butler fought through are largely gone for lumber, fuel, or charcoal. Charcoal is often the only cash crop to which the *noir* peasantry has access. Forests, which covered about 60 per cent of Haiti in 1923, now cover only 3 per cent. The coffee trees, that provided the crop that John Russell and his advisors were so worried about Haitian dependence on, have gone for charcoal with the most recent U. S. embargo. The farmland, of which originally only 11 percent of the country was even considered suitable, has mostly washed away, no longer held to the ground by the trees.¹⁴⁷

The chances for Haitian migration are largely gone. There is probably little more room in the Dominican Republic for any more illegal workers; Cuba has not been a source of employment even before Castro came to power; the United States cut off illegal migrations during the Aristide crisis.

Given the lack of real political reform in Haiti (Aristide did turn over the Presidency in 1996, but the turmoil over the recent parliamentary elections, makes it

appear that he will resume power in 2001--freely elected, probably--and perhaps this time will keep it); given the destruction of the Haitian economy--which the American embargo hastened, but didn't cause; given the prospects for no end to the oppression of the *noir* peasantry; given the lack of a safety valve so these people can escape: when will these people explode?

Annexes

Annex A: The US Marine Corps' Military Campaigns in the First United States Occupation of Haiti

The day after the mob attacked Guillaume Sam and dragged his body through the streets, Admiral Caperton landed troops to restore order.¹⁴⁸

Under command of Capt. George Van Orden, USMC, the Cruiser Squadron Marine Officer, a two-battalion landing force composed of three companies of seamen, 12th Company of Marines (earlier detached from 2nd Regiment), and the Marine detachment from the *Washington*, was landed at 5:45 P. M., a force of probably no more than 500 men. After landing at Bizoton, west of Port-au-Prince, and marching on the capital, the landing force cleared the streets from the harbor to the foreign legations and established guards there. The 12th Company furnished most of the guards, while the remainder of the landing force bivouacked in front of the present-day National Palace.¹⁴⁹ The 24th Company, transported from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, reinforced the landing force the following day.¹⁵⁰

Caperton radioed for a regiment of Marines on the 28th.¹⁵¹ Col. John A. Lejeune, Assistant to the Commandant and, in the temporary absence of the Major General Commandant, Acting Commandant, detached the 2nd Regiment from the Advance Base Brigade in Philadelphia and dispatched it to Haiti aboard the battleship USS

Connecticut (BB-18) within 24 hours of notification. In his memoirs, Lejeune stated that the necessary arrangements took an hour to accomplish over the phone. A week later, Caperton requested further reinforcements and Lejeune dispatched 1st Regiment on the armored cruiser USS *Tennessee* (CA-10) (often reported as a battleship, even in contemporary sources) as the requested reinforcements, and the Advance Base Brigade headquarters under Col. Littleton W. T. Waller to take charge. Admiral Caperton would be the senior American officer present in Haiti, Col. Waller became the senior American officer ashore.¹⁵²

Second Regiment, commanded by Colonel Eli Cole, landed at Port-au-Prince on 4 August 1915. The next day, Col. Cole, 2nd Regiment, and the *Washington* landing party persuaded the Haitian commander of Fort National, Port-au-Prince, to surrender his command to the Marines. Fourteen cannon, 450 rifles, and a million rounds of ammunition were captured with the Fort. The garrison and other Haitian troops in Port-au-Prince were detained for a time at the old Dessaline Barracks.¹⁵³ On 8 August, the Haitian gunboat *Nord Alexis* arrived at Port-au-Prince from Cap-Haïtien, with 766 Haitian soldiers to be demobilized by Marines. After putting 30 of the most destitute into the hospital, the Marines paid off the remainder at 10 gourdes (about \$2.00) a head. The soldiers were apparently quite delighted at the deal (Caperton described them later as destitute and with nothing to eat) and apparently happy to go, although some thought they had to bribe their way out of the Navy Yard, and offered some of their bounty to the Marine sentries.¹⁵⁴

First Regiment (Col. Theodore P. Kane), Colonel Waller, a signal company and Headquarters, 1st Brigade arrived in Port-au-Prince on 15 August 1915. Colonel Cole took command of First Regiment (Col. Kane took over Second Regiment) and took it to Cap-Haïtien, landing about 18 August. The Artillery Battalion (at the time the only artillery battalion organized as such in the Marine Corps), equipped with 12 3-inch landing guns and two 4.7-inch heavy field guns were landed on 31 August after a return trip to the United States by the USS *Tennessee*.¹⁵⁵ Col. Waller's campaign guidance was written by Admiral Caperton. Martial law was proclaimed by Admiral Caperton in Port-au-Prince and vicinity on 3 September 1915.¹⁵⁶

In accordance with Admiral Caperton's instructions to Colonel Waller, 2nd Regiment secured Port-au-Prince and its environs, while Colonel Cole and 1st Regiment occupied Cap-Haïtien on the northern coast. After initial expectations of an attack on Cap-Haïtien from the local Caco bands did not materialize, local patrolling began. The landing of the USS *Connecticut* battalion (composed of seamen equipped as infantry), allowed Colonel Cole to send 19th Company by sea to Port-de-Paix on 24 August as the first step in spreading control along the northern coast. A military government was proclaimed in Cap-Haïtien under Colonel Cole on 1 September 1915.¹⁵⁷

At this time, Major Smedley D. Butler, commander of 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, reported on various operations to both, or either, Colonel Cole, his regimental commander, and Colonel Waller, the brigade commander. On one such operation, reporting to Colonel Waller, Butler and his adjutant, First Lieutenant A. A. Vandergrift, took ship to Gonaïves, where Butler took command of a tiny ad hoc battalion consisting

of 7th Company and the Marine detachment of the USS *Castine* (PG-6), a total of five officers and 104 Marines, counting Butler and Vandergrift. Butler's mission was to open the rail line (which no longer exists) to the interior town of Ennery, approximately 30 kilometers inland.

Butler's problem was a Caco chief named Rameau, a "General, in command of a rabble of thieves and vagabonds, squatting in the surrounding bushes," whom he notified, when he arrived in Gonaïves on 20 September 1915, that he would not tolerate any interference with the rail line or with the food supply for Gonaïves. He also told Rameau, through the American consul, that he wanted to meet with him to give him the warning in person. Before the meeting could come off, however, Butler and several squads from 7th Company were off chasing Cacos who had been burning the rail line. By the time he returned to Gonaïves, 24 hours later, Butler had chased the Cacos out of their headquarters in a small town named Poteaux, and had a chance to warn Rameau in person. Rameau led about 450 Cacos, who, according to Butler's report to Waller, "not half of whom had serviceable rifles." Rameau came into Gonaïves the following morning, the 22nd, and met with Butler, who repeated his warning, and offered Rameau money for his guns and men.

The morning of the 23rd, Butler and sixty Marines boarded a small train for Ennery. The major problems encountered on the trip were those repairing the damage caused by the Cacos, and it was 9:30 at night before the train reached Ennery. After hasty repairs to the locomotive, the Marines headed back to Gonaïves, stopping briefly at

Poteaux to discover that Rameau and his men "had left for their homes the morning [sic] and that all was quiet."¹⁵⁸

Major Butler returned to the north on 9 October, landing from the USS *Nashville* (PG-7) at Fort-Liberté with 15th Company, 2nd Regiment and several attached officers from the 11th Company. At the same time, reinforced elements of 13th Company occupied Grande-Rivière from Cap-Haïtien. Butler expanded his operating area south to Ouanaminthe, routing Cacos out of several old French forts used as bases in the area.¹⁵⁹ At the same time, Colonel Waller was diplomatically disarming the old Haitian army--about 750 from Fort-Liberté and Ouanaminthe. He also tried to bring in several Caco chiefs in the same manner.¹⁶⁰ The problem was that not all the Caco chiefs were willing to sign agreements with Waller nor be bought off.

First Regiment was now in position to finish the war with the Cacos. Using Major Butler's battalion and elements of the USS *Connecticut* battalion, under Butler's command, the Marines were in position by the end of October 1915 to remove Caco bases and forts from the north country and the border area with the Dominican Republic. In a campaign that stretched from 9 October to 27 November 1915, Butler, at times working with 5th, 11th, 13th, and 23rd Companies as well as the 15th, plus the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th *Connecticut* companies, destroyed four Caco camps and seven old French forts used as bases by the Cacos, destroyed 122 rifles, and reported 21 Cacos killed and at least 10 wounded.¹⁶¹ An assault by Lt. Edward A. Ostermann and six Marines of 15th Company seized old Fort-Dipitié from about two dozen Cacos on the night of 24 October 1915.¹⁶² The campaign culminated in an assault on old Fort-Rivière under the cover of

automatic rifles and machine guns and its capture after hand to hand fighting. A ton of dynamite was carried by mules to the Fort to destroy it after its capture. While Butler did not report Caco casualties in the Fort-Rivière assault, others present reported at least 30 Cacos dead.¹⁶³ Other sources quote 50 dead Cacos. In any case, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels telegraphed Caperton halting further operations. The campaign was over anyway.¹⁶⁴ Second Regiment, besides garrisoning and controlling Port-au-prince, apparently secured the southern peninsula of Haiti through vigorous patrolling and avoided the sharp actions 1st Regiment experienced with the Cacos.¹⁶⁵

Three enlisted men were reported killed in the initial occupation of Haiti and one officer and 13 enlisted wounded.¹⁶⁶ Two officers and three enlisted men were awarded Medals of Honor for valor in the campaign.¹⁶⁷

Nineteen Sixteen saw a shift in the Marine forces in Haiti and in Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic), its neighbor on the island of Hispaniola. Various companies from 1st and 2nd Regiments were dispatched to the Dominican Republic during 1916. In April, in a move to rationalize the chain of command, all units in the Dominican Republic were subordinated to 1st Regiment, 2nd Provisional Brigade of Marines; and all units in Haiti were subordinated to 2nd Regiment, 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines. Second Regiment from this point on represented all or most of the "muscle" for 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines.¹⁶⁸ First Marine Brigade settled into a normal garrison routine.¹⁶⁹

Building on resentments over the *corvée*, an impressed labor system, a Caco general named Charlemagne Peralte started a revolt in October 1918. Initially, the new

Gendarmerie held off the rebels, but eventually they had to ask for help. First Marine Brigade was in a low strength period--barely battalion strength by World War II standards--but pitched in the defense of Port-au-Prince and participated in the aggressive patrolling of the north country and the Artibonite region that followed. *Péralte* himself was finally killed in 1919 by Marine Sergeants Herman H. Hanneken and William R. Button--attached to the Gendarmerie as Gendamerie Lieutenants--leading a patrol of 20 Gendarmes in what amounted to a Special Operation¹⁷⁰. The rebellion lingered on in the Artibonite region, led by Benoît Batrville, and included a second assault on Port-au-prince, before Batrville and his followers were hunted down in the border country and killed in May 1920. After the death of Batrville, most organized resistance from the Cacos ceased, although scattered outlaws, as they were often characterized, were skirmished with and captured up to the end of 1921. The campaign required the enlargement of the 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines by 50%, and saw its first deployment of aircraft.¹⁷¹

The routine of 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines after the Caco revolt soon enough returned to the norms of Caribbean garrison life.¹⁷² The strength of the 1st Brigade gradually waned to half that of a modern infantry battalion as commitments in more important areas drew away troops and resources from Haiti, reflecting service realities in a "tween-wars" Marine Corps hard pressed for resources (see Appendix 1).

Throughout its service in Haiti, 1st Brigade endured incredible personnel and command turmoil. As can be seen in Appendix 1, there were 18 brigade commanders in 19 years. Second Regiment had 22 commanders in the same period. Eighth Regiment

had nine commanders in six years. Even allowing for the detachment of 1st Regiment to Dominica in early 1916, only two of six original companies of Marines were present in mid-1917, joined by five new companies. Two years later, as the Caco revolt heated up, six new companies were added, and 8th Regiment was formed by the end of the year. However, by the mid-1920s, both regiments were ghosts of their former selves and 8th Regiment was deactivated 31 June 1925. That the Brigade was able to quickly respond to the *corvée* crisis in 1919, to replace Gendarmes in the Hinche-Maïssade region, and then to lend effective support to the Gendarmerie during the early months of the Caco revolt appears, at this distance, to be little short of miraculous. That the Brigade was able to maintain its professionalism, training, and discipline--most of the atrocity allegations in 1919-21 were of Marines serving as Gendarmerie officers--is a tribute to the inherent strengths of the Marine Corps in those lean years between the World Wars.

The 1st Brigade played a very limited role in the civil disturbances in October-December 1929. The sole "combat", if it can be called that, was the so-called "Les Cayes Massacre" when a section of Marines, defending themselves against a mob of some 1500, killed 12 and wounded another 23 rioters.¹⁷³

Department of State
August 15, 1934
Statement by the Secretary of State

Haiti:

Today the withdrawal of our Marine and naval forces from Haiti is being completed. Under an agreement between the two Governments of August 7, 1933, the Haitian Garde, which has been trained and partly officered by our Marines, would be turned over to the complete command of Haitian officers on October 1, 1934, and our Marine and naval forces would be withdrawn during the month of October. However, when President

Roosevelt visited Cap-haïtien July 5 last, President Vincent [of Haiti] requested that, if at all possible, the date for carrying out these movements should be advanced; and President Roosevelt stated that we would advance the date for turnover the command of the Garde to August 1, instead of October, and would withdraw our forces from Haiti in the following fortnight. . . ¹⁷⁴

Companies C and D, 2nd Marines were transferred to the United States in July 1934. Headquarters, 2nd Marines and Company B were deactivated.¹⁷⁵

Appendix 1: First Provisional Brigade of Marines

There have been a number of "1st Provisional Brigade of Marines" in the history of the US Marine Corps, dating back to at least 1899, usually organized for expeditionary purposes. The early history of "1st Marine Regiment" follows a similar pattern.

The first permanent Marine regiments were organized in 1913 as part of the Advance Base Force. 1st and 2nd Marines were originally designated 1st and 2nd Regiments, Advance Base Force Brigade. However, except for one exercise, on the island of Culebra with the Atlantic Fleet in early 1914, both regiments would see more service as expeditionary regiments.

After returning to the United States in late 1914, after duty in Vera Cruz, Mexico, First and Second Regiments were reequipped as fixed and mobile (base) defense regiments, respectively. According to the 1915 report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1st Regiment was to reorganize and reequip with four 5-inch gun companies, a searchlight company, an engineer company, a mine company, and an air defense company. Second Regiment was split between the Advanced Base Force base at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pensacola Naval Air Station, the New Orleans naval station, and the USS *Washington* (probably the 12th Company). The Artillery Battalion (one wonders why they decided to maintain an artillery battalion of three 3-inch gun batteries when 1st Regiment was to have four 5-inch (fixed) gun batteries) was stationed at the Naval Academy. Nevertheless, the entire brigade would deploy, in stages over July and August 1915, as infantry regiments and an artillery battalion. "The force in Haiti includes the technical companies which have been engaged in advance base training in Philadelphia.

Owing to this interruption in the training of the fixed defense force, its efficiency as an advance base organization will be materially interfered with."

First Provisional Brigade of Marines were apparently the first significant deployed Marine force to use motor transport for troops and artillery. A Marine aviation squadron deployed to Haiti in 1919 and was attached to 1st Brigade. The 1919 Commandant's report states the squadron, and a detachment in Santo Domingo were performing a wide variety of missions: "Offensive operations with machine guns and bombs; reconnoitering, photographing, and photographic map-making; contact patrols and cooperating with ground troops; quick transmission of messages, papers, and officers; regular mail service between different units." The Marine squadron, under various designations, would remain attached to 1st Brigade until it was withdrawn in 1934.¹⁷⁶

August 1915:

1st Provisional Brigade

3rd Company (Signal)

1st Regiment

1st Battalion

5th Company

11th Company

19th Company

23rd Company

2nd Battalion

4th Company

6th Company

22nd Company

USS *Connecticut* Battalion

1st Conn. Company

2nd Conn. Company

3rd Conn. Company

4th Conn. Company

Marine Detachment, USS *Connecticut*

2nd Regiment

1st Battalion

15th Company

16th Company

17th Company

2nd Battalion

7th Company

12th Company

20th Company

24th Company

Marine Detachment, USS
Washington

Artillery Battalion

1st Company

9th Company

13th Company

Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (August 1915): 88 officers, 1,941 Marines.

September 1916:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

Naval Detachment

1 & 2 Secs, 7th Company

1 & 2 Secs, 17th Company

16th Company

18th Company

19th Company

20th Company

22nd Company

23rd Company

(11th & 15th Companies detached; 10th Company to return to 2nd Regiment in November.)

Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 1916): 61 officers, 1,020 Marines.

June 1917:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

15th Company
19th Company
53rd Company
54th Company
57th Company
64th Company
65th Company

Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31, 1918): 64 officers, 884 Marines (including Gendarmerie detachment).

June 1919:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

36th Company
53rd Company
54th Company
57th Company
64th Company
65th Company
100th Company
148th Company
153rd Company
196th Company
197th Company

1st Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (attached)

Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (July 1, 1919): 98 officers, 1,526 Marines (including Gendarmerie detachment).

December 1919:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

53rd Company
54th Company
62nd Company
64th Company
153rd Company
197th Company

8th Regiment

36th Company
57th Company
63rd Company
100th Company
148th Company
196th Company

Squadron E, Marine Aviation (attached) (Redesignated 4th Air Squadron, 1 January 1921)

Reported Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31, 1919): 83 officers, 1,261 Marines (including Gendarmerie detachment).

July 1924:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

53rd Company
54th Company
64th Company
153rd Company
197th Company

8th Regiment

36th Company
57th Company
63rd Company
100th Company
148th Company
196th Company

Observation Squadron No. 2 (VO-2M) (attached) (redesignated 1 March 1923)

July 1925:

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

2nd Regiment

36th Company
53rd Company (Machine Gun)
63rd Company
64th Company

2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment

54th Company

VO-2M (attached)

January 1933:

1st Marine Brigade

2nd Marines

Company B

Company C

Company D

VO-9M (attached) (redesignated 1 July 1927)

Commanders

1st Provisional Brigade of Marines

Col Littleton W. T. Waller	15 Aug 1915 - 21 Nov 1916
BrigGen Eli K. Cole	22 Nov 1916 - 27 Nov 1917
Col John H. Russell	28 Nov 1917 - 6 Dec 1918
BrigGen Albertus W. Catlin	7 Dec 1918 - 14 Jul 1919
LtCol Louis McCarty Little	15 Jul 1919 - 1 Oct 1919
Col John H. Russell	2 Oct 1919 - 14 Jan 1922
Col George Van Orden	15 Jan 1922 - 28 Mar 1922
Col Theodore P. Kane	29 Mar 1922 - 15 Nov 1923
Col William N. McKelvy	16 Nov 1923 - 21 Jan 1924
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller	21 Jan 1924 - 11 Jun 1925
Col William N. McKelvy	12 Jun 1925 - 25 Jun 1925
Col Harold C. Snyder	26 Jun 1925 - 29 Jul 1925
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller	30 Jul 1925 - 7 Dec 1925
Col John T. Myers	8 Dec 1925 - 24 Jan 1928
Col Presley M. Rixey, Jr.	25 Jan 1928 - 22 Feb 1928
Col Louis M. Gulick	23 Feb 1928 - 24 Jun 1929
Col Richard M. Cutts	25 Jun 1929 - 11 May 1931
BrigGen Louis McCarty Little	3 Jun 1931 - 15 Aug 1934

1st Regiment

Col Theodore P. Kane	8 Aug 1915 - 15 Aug 1915
Col Eli K. Cole	16 Aug - 8 May 1916

2nd Regiment (later, 2nd Marines)

Col Eli K. Cole	31 Jul 1915 - 15 Aug 1915
Col Theodore P. Kane	16 Aug 1915 - 30 Jun 1916
Col Eli K. Cole	1 Jul 1916 - 30 Nov 1916
LtCol Philip M. Bannon	1 Dec 1916 - 10 Jan 1918
Maj Richard S. Hooker	11 Jan 1918 - 31 Mar 1918
Maj John W. Wadleigh	1 Apr 1918 - 28 Apr 1918
LtCol Richard S. Hooker	29 Apr 1918 - 20 Jul 1919
LtCol Thomas H. Brown	21 Jul 1919 - 2 Oct 1919
Col Randolph C. Barkeley	3 Oct 1919 - 20 Oct 1921
Col George Van Orden	21 Oct 1921 - 9 Jul 1923
Col William N. McKelvy	10 Jul 1923 - 10 Jun 1925
Maj Maurice E. Shearer	11 Jun 1925 - 30 Jun 1925
Col Harold C. Snyder	1 Jul 1925 - 8 Apr 1926
Col Macker Babb	9 Apr 1926 - 30 Jun 1927
Maj Archibald Young	1 Jul 1927 - 19 Aug 1927
Col Presley M. Rixey	20 Aug 1927 - 21 May 1929
Col Richard P. Williams	22 May 1929 - 30 May 1930
Col Edward B. Manwaring	31 May 1930 - 15 May 1932
Col Harry G. Bartlett	16 May 1932 - 16 Jun 1932
Col James T. Buttrick	17 Jun 1932 - 27 Dec 1933
Col Eli T. Fryer	28 Dec 1933 - 31 May 1934
Maj Samuel P. Budd	1 Jun 1934 - 15 Aug 1934

8th Regiment

LtCol Thomas M. Clinton	17 Dec 1919 - 4 Jan 1920
LtCol Louis McCarty Little	5 Jan 1920 - 28 Jul 1920
LtCol Thomas M. Clinton	28 Jul 1920 - 19 Sep 1920
LtCol Louis McCarty Little	20 Sep 1920 - 30 Apr 1921
Col Dickinson P. Hall	1 May 1921 - 9 Apr 1923
Col James T. Bootes	9 Apr 1923 - 29 Apr 1923
LtCol Harry R. Lay	30 Apr 1923 - 30 May 1923
Col James T. Bootes	31 May 1923 - 20 Jul 1924
Col Harold C. Snyder	24 Jul 1924 - 31 Jun 1925

Artillery Battalion

Maj Robert H. Dunlap	15 Aug 1915 - 17 May 1916
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1st Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (later, in order of redesignations, 4th Air Squadron, VO-2M, and VO-9M)

Capt. Harvey B. Sims	22 Feb 1919 - 30 Nov 1919
Capt Roy S. Geiger	1 Dec 1919 - 20 Jan 1921
Capt Arthur H. Page, Jr.	21 Jan 1921 - 28 Mar 1921
Maj Francis T. Evans	29 Mar 1921 - 4 Mar 1923
Capt. Louis M. Bourne	5 Mar 1923 - 12 Nov 1925
Maj Roy S. Geiger	13 Nov 1925 - 8 Jul 1927
Capt. Russell A. Presley	9 Jul 1927 - 28 Aug 1928
Maj Francis T. Evans	29 Aug 1928 - 2 Jul 1930
Maj James E. Davis	3 Jul 1930 - 15 May 1932
Maj James T. Moore	16 May 1932 - 15 Aug 1934 ¹⁷⁷

Appendix 2: Ships of the 1915 Haitian Campaign

<u>Ship Name</u>	<u>Pennant</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>United States Ships</u> ¹⁷⁸			
USS <i>Connecticut</i> *	BB-18	Pre-Dreadnaught Battleship	
USS <i>Washington</i> **	CA-11	Armored Cruiser	renamed USS <i>Seattle</i> , November 1916
USS <i>Tennessee</i>	CA-10	Armored Cruiser	renamed USS <i>Memphis</i> , May 1916
USS <i>Castine</i>	PG-6	Gunboat	
USS <i>Nashville</i>	PG-7	Gunboat	
USS <i>Marietta</i>	PG-15	Gunboat	
USS <i>Sacrament</i>	PG-19	Gunboat	
USS <i>Eagle</i>	none	Converted Yacht	
USS <i>Jason</i>	AC-12	Collier (Coal carrier)	
USS <i>Osceola</i>	AT-48	Tug	
USS <i>Solace</i>	AH-2	Hospital Ship	
<u>Haitian Ships</u> ¹⁷⁹			
<i>Nord Alexis</i>	unknown if any	Gunboat	fate unknown
<i>Pacifique</i>	unknown, if any	Gunboat	Blown ashore, August 1915

*Not believed assigned to Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet, 1915.

**Flagship, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet.

Appendix 3: The Gendarmerie (Garde) d'Haïti, 1916-1934

For the United States, the easiest part of the Haitian-American Treaty to implement would be the requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish law and order in Haiti. This would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haïti.

From the documentary evidence, the actual Gendarmerie Agreement appeared to evolve from some period of negotiation between the United States and Haiti. An original English-language draft, for example, set forth a requirement for 1,296 Gendarmes¹⁸⁰, while the final document required 2100. Additionally, the American officers in the original document would report to the Haitian Secretary of State for the Interior, in the final document they report to the President of Haiti.

While the Gendarmerie agreement was not officially signed until August 1916, the documentary evidence shows that the United States was actively recruiting and organizing a Gendarmerie in December 1915 and January 1916, using Article X of the American-Haitian Treaty as their authority. (The Gendarmerie Agreement would be renegotiated at least twice before the end of the Occupation.) By 1 February, 1916, the first *Chef* of the Gendarmerie, Smedley Butler, and Colonel Waller felt they were in a position to take over the law enforcement mission.

The organization of the Gendarmerie was completed by October 1916, and a total of 117 Gendarmerie posts were established throughout the country. Four Gendarmerie districts were established in the country, consisting of Port-au-Prince, the Cape, the Artibonite, and the South. Eighteen Gendarmerie companies were raised and were

roughly divided amongst the four districts. What amounted to a battalion (1st, 4th, and 17th companies) garrisoned Port-au-Prince.¹⁸¹

A small coast guard of six officers, eight petty officers, and 30 seamen was authorized by the original agreement. By 1919, a force of three former-US Navy submarine chasers (relatively small, wooden patrol boats with a nominal anti-submarine capability [probably removed for the Haitians]) was in operation.¹⁸²

Haitians were recruited as volunteers, clothed in uniforms supplied by the Marine Corps, and provided with surplus American weapons (Krag rifles by most reports). While Butler would brag to the Senate investigating committee in 1921 that he was able to recruit the best men in Haiti for the Gendarmerie, he was also forced to admit that initially he had problems with disease in the ranks ("95 per cent of them had blood diseases and 85 per cent had intestinal worms") that had to be eradicated before the troops could be effective.¹⁸³

The Caco revolt of 1918-20 was the Gendarmerie's first major crisis, and one might argue its finest hour. The initial Caco attacks initially fell on Gendarmerie posts, and there are many reports of outnumbered gendarmes loyally defending their posts, often successfully, and in some cases bravely protecting their wounded Marine officers.¹⁸⁴ Limited offensive operations, particularly in the Artibonite, were conducted by small Gendarmerie units and their Marine offices.¹⁸⁵ Eventually, however, the Marine Brigade had to be called in to assist in a problem that had grown out of control.

Major A. S. Williams, Butler's successor, was the man who had outlawed the *corvée* (it was certain officers ignoring this order that led, in part, to the investigations of 1920-22 and, in some Marines' opinions, one of the primary causes of the Caco revolt.)¹⁸⁶ Colonel Frederick M. ("Dopey") Wise, Williams' successor, found that the Gendarmerie at the height of the Caco revolt had been pretty much worn down and out:

I found the Gendarmes in Port-au-prince well drilled, well uniformed, well armed. They had been the show troops of my predecessors. But outside of Port-au-prince they were in bad shape. Their uniforms were in rags. Most of them were barefooted. Their rifles were a joke. They were discarded Krag's, most of them with the sights knocked off. If they hit a house at point-blank range with those weapons they were doing well. Their barracks were tumble-down. Their morale was pretty low. . . .¹⁸⁷

Colonel Wise got money from the financial advisor for uniforms, barracks, an increased rations allowance, and new Springfield '03 rifles from the Marines. He spread the Marine standard of drill throughout the Gendarmerie and emphasized marksmanship. His troops responded well, and became a significant fighting force.¹⁸⁸ The special operation that killed *Péralte*, the principal Caco leader, was led by Marine Sergeants Herman H. Hanneken and William R. Button serving as Gendarmerie officers, but also included 20 gendarmes; all their intelligence came from gendarme sources as well, including at least one man operating under cover with the Cacos.

The Gendarmerie Agreement of 1916 had been renegotiated in 1920 to allow for easier financial administration by the *Chef* of the Gendarmerie, although Colonel Wise did not receive everything he had wanted, and the ability of the Gendarmerie to surge by 467 men in times of emergency, finances permitting. Established strength would still be 81 American officers, 383 Haitian non-commissioned officers, and 2100 gendarmes, but

would also now include 39 Haitian officers.¹⁸⁹ Soon after General Russell arrived in Port-au-prince as High commissioner, an *Ecole Militaire* for the commissioning of Haitian officers (capacity 12) was established in Port-au-Prince, with a Haitian officer as deputy to its American commander.¹⁹⁰

One complaint about the Marine officers up to the time of the Caco revolt

. . . was that the ex-enlisted Garde officers were ill-educated, raw rankers, an accusation that during World War I, when the best Marines of all ranks were going to France, was probably true. But Russell's earliest effort was to upgrade this class of officer not only by diligent selection but by a three-month indoctrination course before the officers were passed for duty with the Garde. In 1930, 49 Garde officers were college graduates; 51 had high school diplomas or some college courses. That same year 85 spoke French and 92 also spoke *Créole*. The entire group, 116 Americans in all, averaged over four years in Haiti and thirteen years in the Corps.¹⁹¹

Although the Gendarmerie (Garde after 1928) was the local police force as well as the Haitian military, it had never received significant riot control training, which is one of the reasons the Marines had to be called in to handle the Les Cayes incident that eventually resulted in 12 deaths. Nevertheless, General Russell could say in his final report:

. . . the Garde d'Haïti is less than a fourth of the numerical strength of the old forces. An officers' school has been created and a military career is one which a self-respecting Haitian can adopt. The men are modernly housed, equipped, uniformed, educated if illiterate, and paid \$10.00 a month, a suitable pay for Haitian conditions. Prisons are immaculately clean and airy; buildings have workshop facilities. Graft has been eliminated. A modern accounting and purchasing system has been introduced which has effected important economies. Due to supervision by district commanders Haitian communal revenues, previously dissipated in graft and unwise expenditures, have greatly increased and communal administration strengthened. A reorganized medical department has more than halved the death and disease rate among personnel and prisoners. In the first four years of the Occupation, the Garde also carried over an important road-building program.¹⁹²

In 1930, General Russell reported a force of 2,622 enlisted gendarmes, in a total strength of 3,460 (one gendarme for every 3.4 square miles and 690 inhabitants of Haiti); 36% of its officers were Haitian, and the *Ecole Militaire* had graduated 17 aspirants the previous year. In addition to its police and military duties, Russell reported the following:

- ♦ Communications; 309.5 miles of telephone lines, 9 airfields built through Garde labor.
- ♦ Police services, fire and traffic control.
- ♦ communal administration; Garde commanders were communal advisors and had to supervise the collection and distribution of communal revenues.
- ♦ Marksmanship; a hitherto unknown Haitian military skill.
- ♦ Construction, a four year program that resulted in 24 modified and eight new outpost buildings.
- ♦ Coast Guard, which also has the responsibility for 15 lighthouses and a buoy system.¹⁹³

A lot of the Haitianization negotiations went into the Haitianization of the Garde. On August 1, 1934, the completely Haitianized Garde, with its new Haitian Commander, Colonel Démosthènes P. Calixte--the same Haitian who was the first Haitian deputy commander of the *Ecole Militaire*, saluted the Marine Brigade as it left Port-au-Prince, and hoisted the Haitian flag over the former Marine headquarters.

Gendarmerie (Garde) d'haïti Commanders, 1915-1934 (appointment as Haitian general of division):

LtCol. Smedley D. Butler	3 Dec 1915-1 May 1918
Col. Alexander S. Williams	2 May 1918 - 18 Jul 1919
LtCol. Frederick M. Wise	19 Jul 1919 - 16 Jan 1921
LtCol. Richard S. Hooker	17 Jan 1921 - 14 Apr 1921
LtCol. Douglas C. McDougal	15 Apr 1921 - 11 Apr 1925
Col. Julius S. Turrill	12 Apr 1925 - 12 May 1927
Col. Frank E. Evans	18 May 1927 - 31 Mar 1930
Col. Richard P. Williams	1 Apr 1930 - 21 Jun 1933
LtCol. Clayton B. Vogel	22 Jun 1933 - 31 Jul 1934 ¹⁹⁴

Annex B: The Fiscal Case for Occupation

One of the basic justifications for the American intervention and occupation of Haiti was that Haiti was incapable of handling its own finances. The Senate committee investigating the United States Occupations of Haiti and Santo Domingo heard evidence on the finances of both countries.

John A. McIlhenny, financial advisor to the government of Haiti (1919-1922), presented the US Government's case on the financial state of Haiti at the time of the Occupation.

Fiscal Year 1912-13 (Haitian fiscal years ran 1 October to 30 September):

Total Revenues:	\$5,073,691.40
Debt Service:	2,507,533.07
Balance for all other expenses	2,506,138.33
Expended on all other expenses	3,787,426.48
Deficit	1,281,288.15
Loan (in partial coverage of the deficit)	607,902.76

The \$600,000 loan was nominally at 6 2/3 per cent interest; but as McIlhenny explained, discounting and exchange rate manipulations (favorite areas for graft in and around the Haitian Government) resulted in a drastically different picture.

The loan was issued at 94, meaning that for every 100 dollars of the loan the Haitian government was liable for, it only would receive 94 dollars to spend. In theory. This particular loan would only accept payment at an exchange rate of 3.50 gourdes to the dollar, while the commercial rate for the gourde at the time of the loan was 4.70 to the dollar. So, translated into gourds, instead of 100 dollars discounted to 94 dollars (a discount rate of "94"); the loan really was at a rate of 470 gourdes, discounted to 329. The real discount rate was therefore 61. [My math comes out to 70.] Thus, the Haitian

Government was paying 6 2/3 per cent interest on a loan principle (in gourdes) of 2,857,142.97 gourdes, but only received an even 2 million gourdes to try to balance their budget.

The \$600,000 balance or so of the 1912-13 deficit was taken care of by a "statutory advance" from the *Banque Nationale*, which was required, by its concession, to hold at the disposal of the Haitian Government.

Fiscal year 1913-14:

Total revenues:	\$5,018,801.32
Debt service:	4,231,091.31
Balance:	787,710.01
Other Expenditures:	3,803,244.85
Deficit:	3,015,534.84

Three loans totaling a little over \$1 million partially covered the deficit, the remainder of the deficit was covered by the *Banque Nationale*. These internal loans were at the same 6 2/3 percentage rate as the loan for 1912-13, with the same ledgermain as that loan:

Amount of Loan	Nominal Discount	Loan Gourde Rate	Commercial Gourde Rate	Actual Discount
500,000	80	3.50	4.75	59
300,000	80	3.50	5.00	56
240,000	80	3.50	6.00	47

The balance of the deficit was covered by still more loans from the *Banque Nationale* and by "unauthorized private loans, which now constitute claims of more or less doubtful validity." These loans to private individuals were covered by the government by issuing "*bons du trésor*", denominated in either gold or gourdes depending on the issue. These *bons du trésor* were also issued to cover government salaries.

Fiscal year 1914-15

Total Revenue	\$3,311,548.14
Debt Service	754,892.82
Balance	2,556,655.28
Other Expenses	3,082,700.53
Deficit	526,045.25

The low debt service for 1914-15 was because "a revolutionary government", presumably that of Guillaume Sam, "took revenue service away from the bank . . . revenue pledges disregarded . . . and only \$754,892.82 was devoted to debt service." So in 1914-15, the new Guillaume Sam government ignored at least three quarters of his new government's obligation to make debt service payments and was still unable to balance the budget. According to McIlhenny's testimony, the government issued "paper flat money" worth 3 million gourdes (which at a nominal rate of 5 gourdes to the dollar would barely cover the year's deficit) and had the effect of pushing the gourde rate down to 9.90 to the dollar.

Mr. McIlhenny's opening statement concluded "the borrowing capacity of Haiti at home and abroad was exhausted. Its paper money was practically worthless. For four years it had been the scene of uninterrupted revolution."

During these years [1911-1915] a large part of [the Haitian Government's] running expenses had been left unpaid. Revenue pledges, if observed, left an amount for other expenses than debt services which was only about 20 per cent of the amount required for that purpose, and the deficit could no longer be covered by loans, whether internal or external, or by issues of flat money. The closing of foreign markets by war restrictions affecting Haiti's export products, and practical cessation of foreign commerce because of lack of maritime transportation, resulted in an enormous decrease in customs revenues, which then constituted fully 95 per cent of the total revenue of the country. Financially and politically Haiti was in a condition of complete collapse.

At the time of the Intervention, Haiti was in arrears on three French loans (1875, 1896, 1910), for a total of over 12 million French francs on loans totaling over 120 million francs. There were also another loan covering "the interest coupon maturing May 15, 1915, on the external loan of 1910." In May 1916, Admiral Caperton's revenue collectors made payments to the French *Banque de l'Union Parisienne* of just under \$300,000, extinguishing the loan, and leaving Haiti of a small credit of just under 400,000 francs.

McIlhenny was asked about the public debt of Haiti for the years 1919 and 1922, and he presented the balance sheets found in Appendix 1. It was noted by the Senate panel that Haiti's public debt had been reduced about \$4.5 million between 1919 and 1922. This McIlhenny noted would be about \$5 million if the value of his sinking funds were included. He did not call attention to the fact that the external funded debt of Haiti was reduced from almost \$26 million to \$8.3 million in part because the exchange rate for the French franc fell from 18 cents to 9½ cents. McIlhenny then offered a short statement on "outstanding fiduciary" Haitian currency for the two years, remarking that it, as a debt, was in addition to what was shown on the two balance sheets presented in Appendix 1.

Fiduciary currency outstanding February 28, 1919:

Paper money equivalent to.....	\$1,775,594.40	
Nickel coin equivalent to.....	1,400,000.00	
Copper coin equivalent to.....	<u>49,000.00</u>	
		\$3,224,594.40
Less reserve for retirement of paper money (Dec. 31, 1918)		<u>1,735,664.69</u>
Net debt on account of fiduciary currency.....		1,488,929.71

Fiduciary currency outstanding February 28, 1922:

Nickel coin equivalent to..... \$1,400,000.00

Copper coin equivalent to.....	<u>49,000.00</u>	
		\$1,449,000.00
Less reserve for retirement of nickel coin (Jan. 31, 1922)		
Nickel coin equivalent to.....	184,448.37	
United States currency.....	<u>49,467.80</u>	
		233,916.67
Present net debt on account of fiduciary currency...		1,215,083.83
Reduction in net debt on account of fiduciary currency		273,845.88
At the request of the committee, McIlhenny then presented comparative		
statements of Haitian receipts and expenses.		

Comparative statement of Haitian receipts and expenses.

Year	Receipts.			Expenses ¹
	Customs.	Internal.	Total.	
1911-12....	\$6,324,652.21	(2)	\$6,324,652.21	(3)
1912-13....	5,073,691.40	5,073,691.40
1913-14....	5,018,801.32	5,018,801.32
1914-15....	3,311,548.14	3,311,548.14
1915-16....	4,559,002.14	\$109,878.38	4,668,880.52
1916-17....	3,795,364.88	136,375.46	3,931,740.34	\$3,350,471.58
1917-18....	3,178,022.53	154,245.14	3,332,267.67	2,922,999.49
1918-19....	5,747,117.43	216,762.87	5,963,880.30	2,818,486.84
1919-20....	6,421,000.41	374,820.28	6,795,820.69	4,080,373.25
1920-21....	3,606,173.00	360,102.42	3,966,275.42	3,819,625.70

1. Other than debt service, and including certain expenses properly pertaining to past years as detailed in table below.

2. No separate record of internal revenue prior to American intervention; amount was negligible and is probably in customs receipts.

3. There are no data to determine expenditures to the first year shown.

Year.	Debt Service.		Other Expenses.		Total.
	External.	Internal.	Past.	Current.	
1912-13	\$1,391,997.44	\$1,175,555.63	\$3,787,426.48	\$6,354,979.55
1913-14	3,199,310.72	1,031,780.59	3,803,244.85	8,034,336.16
1914-15	511,002.35	243,890.51	3,082,700.53	3,837,593.39
1915-16	¹ 321,531.38	215,237.17	2,227,358.36	2,764,126.91

1916-17	3,350,471.58	3,350,471.58
1917-18	2,922,999.49	2,922,999.49
1918-19	² 281,409.25	³ \$70,056.00	2,748,430.54	3,099,896.09
1919-20	⁴ 3,000,000.00	⁵ 49,000.00	4,080,373.25	7,129,373.25
1920-21	⁶ 2,896,789.00	⁷ 187,989.00	⁸ 34,560.00	3,785,065.70	3,819,625.70

-
1. Including transfers by Admiral Caperton to France in the amount of \$296,715.06.
 2. Composed of \$181,981.25 interest on indebtedness to Banque Nationale from Jan. 1, 1917 to Sept. 30, 1918, and \$99,428 interest and amortization on short-term Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction notes for the current year and from Oct. 1, 1919 to Feb. 29, 1920, of the following fiscal year.
 3. Composed of \$41,120 arrears of P. C. S. Railroad interest guaranty for balance of year 1916-17 and part of year 1917-18, and \$28,936.30 arrears of wharfage pledged to Wharf Co. of Port-au-Prince for the fiscal years from 1915-16 to 1917-18.
 4. For arrears of interest to Dec. 31, 1919.
 5. For interest on the short-term Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction notes for the balance of the current year from Mar. 1 to Sept. 20, 1920.
 6. Composed of \$2,200,000 for arrears of interest and amortization to Sept. 30, 1920, and \$695,789.47 for service of current fiscal year.
 7. Composed of \$84,000 interest and amortization on the short-term Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction notes for the current year, and \$103,989.29 interest on the note to the Banque Nationale for the fiscal year 1918-19.
 8. Arrears of P. C. S. Railroad interest guaranty for balance of fiscal year 1917-18.

Amounts shown under "Current" above are amounts actually paid for those years.

Some items of current expense not paid during year accrued, thus total of "Past" and "Current" columns show a more accurate basis of comparison of amounts available for debt service after other expenses:

1913-14.....	\$1,231,374.84	1917-18.....	\$409,268.18
1914-15.....	228,847.61	1918-19.....	3,145,393.46
1915-16.....	2,441,522.61	1919-20.....	2,715,447.44
1916-17.....	581,268.76	1920-21.....	146,649.72

Average of last 10, 5, and 3 years of the receipts, expenses, and amounts available for debt service:

	Receipts.	Expenses.	Available for debts.
Last 10 years.....	\$4,838,745.80
Last 5 years.....	4,797,996.88	\$3,398,391.37	\$1,399,605.21
Last 3 years.....	5,575,325.47	3,572,828.60	2,002,496.87

Under the [1922] loan project, the following amounts would be required [annually]:

\$16 million external debt.....	¹ \$1,110,000
\$5 million internal.....	<u>350,000</u>
	¹ 1,460,000

1. Increasing at the annual rate of \$5,000.

According to McIlhenny's testimony, the Haitian budget for ordinary expenses had been \$3,481,064.43, excluding debt service, since fiscal year 1919-20. Over the two year period since that first fiscal year, it had been necessary to seek extraordinary or supplemental credits for emergencies such as, in the previous year, fighting a small pox epidemic, \$48,000; fires, \$2,000; League of Nations [dues?], \$10,000; fire protection system for Port-au-Prince, \$10,000; purchase of real property, \$10,000; supply purchase fund, \$15,000; water system for Port-au-Prince, over \$20,000; geodetic survey, \$25,000. Nevertheless, McIlhenny thought that the current year budget could be kept within the allotted \$3,481,064.43. Added to that the projected \$1,460,000 for debt service under the loan project, then the revenue requirement to meet Haiti's annual expenses would be \$4, 941,064.43.

To this, would have to be added the annual interest and sinking fund guaranty on the national railroad bonds, a further \$248,120.71. This would bring the total revenue requirements to \$5,189,185.14.

"This amount is well within the average receipts of the last three years, but is more than the average receipts for the past five years." McIlhenny pointed out the five year average was thrown off by World War I, and given the current increases over previous years in customs receipts, he would anticipate that total annual revenues would amount to some \$6 million.

In response to a question about customs duties, McIlhenny said that coffee exports, which was about 95% of Haitian exports at the time, had a export duty of 32%, or three cents gold per pound. At current prices, the export duty did not affect exports to France, but combined with the United States import duties, it was priced out of the coffee markets by Brazilian and Santos coffees. McIlhenny said his goal was to reduce the export duty on the coffee, which adversely effected the Haitian peasant, by increasing the internal revenue of Haiti.

Apparently there was no internal revenue collection in Haiti prior to the U. S. Occupation, although some laws were on the books. While the Occupation was not responsible for the collection of internal taxes, the Haitians had made some effort for their collection under U. S. urging. It turned out that McIlhenny had had to go to the *Banque Nationale* for the records of tax collections because the Haitian treasury didn't keep such records. Discovering that internal revenue taxes were due on the rental of government property, McIlhenny approached the responsible Ministry of the Interior

official for the records, The man told McIlhenny that he had stopped keeping the records about four years prior because they were too much trouble to keep! So, in many cases, McIlhenny had no way of finding out just what the Haitian government was legitimately owed, and so, even if he had wanted to lower tariffs to help Haitian exports, he couldn't do so until he could figure out what the Haitian government was owed for the laws already on the books. In another case, the *Banque Nationale* had records of \$41,000 for collections for laws that McIlhenny could not find on the books (other testimony held that they were an income tax and transfer stamps based on a law passed in 1907 and modified in 1913.)¹⁹⁵

When McIlhenny's testimony resumed on 15 March, 1922, questioning began with expenditures for the maintenance of the government, based on an estimated \$6 million government revenue. The following figures are from a memorandum read to the committee by McIlhenny.

Present actual annual cost of debt service (including amortization only in the cases of the external loans and in the Compagnie Haïtienne de Construction short term notes):

External funded debt, 6,952,097.21 francs @ 9½ cents.....	\$660,449.23
Internal loans of 1912 and 1913.....	44,885.63
Internal loans of 1914.....	104,353.82
Banque Nationale short-term note.....	103,989.29
Irrigation and market Cayes.....	4,392.22
Sambour commission ¹	66,677.05
Bons Fouchard.....	939.59
Compaigne Haïtienne de Construction.....	84,000.00
	1,069,686.83

1. The Sambour Commission adjudicated a floating debt, and bonded it at 6 per cent. Although the bonds were never issued, the 6 per cent interest was due annually on the amount.

The above figures did not include the debts for the Haitian railroad company. Part of this was because of the different funding schemes over the years yielded internal as well as external debts, financed at variable rates of interest between 6 and 6 2/3 percent. Total internal and floating debt came to over \$10 million as of 28 February 1922. Based on that figure, McIlhenny figured the debt service as:

Service of internal debt; interest, 6 per cent; and amortization, 1 percent.....	\$753,860.23
Service of external debt, 6,952,097.21 francs at par, 19.3 cents.....	1,341,854.56

(It must be remembered that McIlhenny was still promoting his debt consolidation plan, which would most commonly be known as the 1922-23 loan plan) According to McIlhenny, his debt consolidation plan compared favorably with this at:

\$16,000,000 external series.....	\$1,110,000
\$5,000,000 internal series, interest 6 per cent and amortization 1 per cent....	<u>350,000</u>
Total cost of debt service under refunding plan..	1,460,000

However, McIlhenny's figures got worse when he figured the current external debt (denominated in French francs) at the current exchange rate for the franc (9½¢) as opposed to the "at par" rate (19.3¢):

Service of internal debt, as above.....	\$753,860.23
Service of external debt, at the current exchange rate.....	660,449.23
Total approximate cost of present debt service at current rate of exchange.....	1,414,309.46

While the current exchange rate brought total debt service about \$46,000 under the refunding plan, McIlhenny advised not depending on the continued devaluation of the franc and going ahead with the refunding plan. He was still arguing for anything that

would reduce the import/export tax burden, which McIlhenny said was borne entirely by the peasant class.

The Senators' questioning then turned to the national railroad, which McIlhenny said was \$1,700,071.29 in interest arrears, plus \$230,407.77 in arrears for the sinking fund, for a total of \$1,930,479.06. Apparently, the Haitian government, before the Occupation, got itself into a contract with the railroad company where it was required to pay "kilometric guaranties", in effect, it had to guarantee the interest on bonds that the railroad company issue upon the completion of every 20 kilometers of line (\$20,000 per kilometer). In other words, since a total of 177 kilometers (!) of railroad had been completed, the Haitian Government was responsible for the interest on \$3,544,581.60 par value of outstanding railroad bonds. Normal annual charge were for \$212,674.90 for interest and \$5,445.81 for amortization, meaning that the Haitian government was almost nine years in arrears. The debt still stood, however, despite the fact that the railroad had never produced any income for the Haitian government, and it had been recently decided by its engineers that the current planned route had been in error.

Finally, on the 19th, McIlhenny responded to questions about the internal revenue fees. McIlhenny had originally taken the estimate of the Ministers of the Interior and Finance that revenues from the rentals of government land would be \$9,000; the actual amount turned out to be \$23,473, even though there were no assessment rolls or other accounting devices to actually check where the money came from.

Consular fees were another area where the estimates fell well short of the actual "product". For 1919-20, the estimate was \$2,000 and the product was really \$9,686.71.

This is despite the fact that the amount actually collected, in Cuba at least, was much higher. It turns out that the Haitian consuls collected \$2 from each Haitian laborer that went to Cuba to work. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1919-20, 29,181 Haitians went to Cuba to work. Of their \$2, one dollar went to the consul, the other dollar was supposed to be sent to Haiti for the Government. However, only \$1,984 in consular fees came in from Cuba in 1919-20, less than 7% of what was supposed to have been collected.¹⁹⁶

Appendix 1: Public Debt of Haiti, 1919 vs. 1922.

Public debt of the Republic of Haiti. Condition as of February 28, 1919.

Funded debt:

External loans (in francs)

1875, at 5 per cent interest--

Capital.....19,252,560.00

Interest Arrears.....3,529,636.00

22,782,196.00

1896, 6 per cent--

Capital.....37,638,500.00

Interest Arrears.....8,280,470.00

45,913,970.00

1910, 5 per cent--

Capital.....64,021,000.00

Interest Arrears.....11,641,858.84

75,662,858.54

144,364,024.54

Internal loans--

Fouchard, 6 per cent--

Capital..... \$15,659.85

Interest Arrears.....2,818.77

\$18,478.62

1912, 6 per cent--

Capital..... 246,347.00

Interest Arrears.....44,342.46

290,689.46

1913, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital..... 451,572.10

Interest Arrears.....94,065.03

545,637.13

1914-A, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital..... 705,078.00

Interest Arrears.....160,601.10

865,679.10

1914-B, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital..... 528,264.00

Interest Arrears.....127,663.80

655,927.80

1914-C, 6 2/3 per cent--		
Capital.....	331,965.25	
Interest Arrears.....	<u>66,393.05</u>	
		<u>398,358.30</u>
		<u>2,774,770.41</u>

Floating debt:

Banque Nationale advances.....	1,733,154.87	
Interest accrued, 6 per cent....	<u>225,310.13</u>	
		1,958,465.00
Cie Haïtienne de Construction.....		360,000.00
P. C. S. railroad interest guaranteed		
arrears.....	75,680.00	
National Railroad Bonds--		
Interest guaranteed arrears.....	1,062,046.59	
Sinking fund guaranteed arrears.	<u>124,060.34</u>	
		1,186,106.93
Cie Haïtienne du Wharf, subsidy arrears.....		28,936.29
Banque Nationale, treasury commissions.....		107,260.45
French cable company, subsidy arrears.....		84,422.04
Irrigation system, Cayes.....	43,109.40	
Interest accrued, 6 per cent.	<u>7,759.69</u>	
		50,869.09
Market, Cayes.....	39,094.26	
Interest accrued, 6 per cent	<u>5,668.68</u>	
		44,762.94
Sambour commission debt.....	1,111,284.11	
Interest accrued, 6 per cent.	<u>344,498.07</u>	
		1,455,782.18
Féquièrè commission debt.....		733,630.98
Cathedral.....		83,690.00
Archbishopric.....		46,380.68
Jetty, Jacmel.....		<u>111,040.33</u>
		<u>6,367,026.91</u>
Total Interest funded and floating debt.....		9,141,797.32
Claims (estimated amount of allowances).....		750,000.00
External funded debt converted at 18 cents per franc.....		<u>25,985,524.42</u>
Total public debt.....		35,877,321.74
Less sinking funds reserves, fiscal year 1915-16.....		21,920.98
Net public debt.....		<u>35,855,400.76</u> ¹⁹⁷

Public debt of the Republic of Haiti--Condition as of February 28, 1922.

Funded debt:

External loans (francs)--

1896, 6 per cent.....	26,338,500.00
1910, 5 per cent.....	<u>61,094,500.00</u>
Total.....	87,094,000.00

Internal Loans--

Short-term notes--

Cie Haïtienne de Const. 6 per cent.....	\$194,400.00
Banque Nationale 6 per cent.....	<u>1,733,154.87</u>
Total.....	1,927,554.87

Bonds--

Fouchard, 6 per cent--

Capital.....	\$15,659.85	
Interest arrears.....	<u>5,480.95</u>	
		21,140.80

1912, 6 per cent--

Capital.....	246,347.00	
Interest arrears.....	<u>86,221.45</u>	
		332,568.45

1913, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital.....	451,572.10	
Interest arrears.....	<u>177,580.74</u>	
		629,152.84

1914-A, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital.....	705,078.00	
Interest arrears.....	<u>293,782.50</u>	
		998,860.50

1914-B, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital.....	528,264.00	
Interest arrears.....	<u>227,467.00</u>	
		755,711.00

1914-C, 6 2/3 per cent--

Capital.....	331,965.25	
Interest arrears.....	<u>129,097.62</u>	
		<u>461,062.87</u>

Total..... 5,126,051.33

Floating debt:

National Railroad bonds--

Interest guaranteed arrears..... 1,700,071.29
Sinking fund guaranteed arrears. . 230,407.77

Banque Nationale, treasury commissions..... 107,260.45

French Cable Co., subsidy arrears..... 84,422.04

Irrigation system, Cayes..... 43,109.40

Interest accrued, 6 per cent..... 15,519.31

58,628.71

Market, Cayes..... 39,094.26

Interest accrued, 6 per cent..... 12,705.63

51,799.89

Sambour commission debt..... 1,111,284.11

Interest accrued, 6 per cent..... 544,529.21

1,655,813.32

Fequièrè commission debt..... 773,630.98

Cathedral..... 83,690.00

Archbishopric..... 46,380.68

Jetty, Jacmel..... 111,040.33

Total..... 4,903,145.46

Total internal funded and floating debt..... 10,029,196.79

Claims (estimated amount of allowances)..... 750,000.00

External funded debt converted a 9½ cents per franc..... 8,306,135.00

Total public debt..... 19,085,331.79

Less sinking fund reserves:

Fiscal year 1915-16..... \$21,920.98

Fiscal year 1920-21--

Port-au-prince..... \$127,481.33

New York..... 143,145.80

270,627.13

Fiscal years 1921-22..... 321,883.85

614,431.96

Net public debt..... 18,470,899.83¹⁹⁸

Appendix 2: Import and Export Figures, Fiscal Year 1918-19

Imports:

Wheat flour.....	\$2,708,772
Rice.....	1,123,658
Meat.....	191,847
Other foods.....	1,334,934
Soap.....	839,756
Cloth.....	4,789,814
Iron and steel.....	731,227
Tobacco.....	381,844
Liquor, beer, and other beverages.....	129,212
Automobiles.....	70,996
Agricultural implements.....	32,003
Total.....	<u>17,117,608</u>

Exports:

Coffee.....	\$16,407,233
Cotton (including seed).....	1,933,576
Cocoa.....	648,395
Logwood.....	578,698
Sugar.....	506,959
Goatskins.....	369,959
Hides.....	149,992
Honey.....	260,565
Castor beans.....	231,453
Lignum-vitae.....	70,825
Mahogany.....	4,436
Total.....	<u>21,460,044</u>

Chief ports for imports:

Port-au-Prince (\$9,597,499)
 Cap-Haïtien (\$2,301,909)
 Cayes (\$1,469,278)

Chief ports for exports:

Port-au-Prince (\$7,450,599)
 Jacmel (\$3,256,580)
 Cap-Haïtien (\$2,933,6589)

Trading Partners:

Imports:	United States (93%)
Exports:	United States (44%)
	France (52%) ¹⁹⁹

Appendix 3: Haitian Government Expenses since Fiscal Year 1914-15

1. Sanitation (under the department of war), FY 1914-15

Salaries for hospitals.....	\$7,666.80
Supplies for hospitals.....	1,200.00
Rations for hospitals.....	<u>4,668.00</u>
	13,534.80

Since the Occupation, hospital expenses

1916-17 (estimated)	\$60,000
1917-18	177,974.15
1918-19	191,751.34
1919-20	267,718.26
1920-21 ¹	308,296.46
1921-22 (appropriated)	268,200.00.

1. Expenses in 1920-21 were abnormally high due to a smallpox epidemic which cost about \$48,000 to fight.

2. Public Works, Fiscal Year 1914-15

Repair of public buildings	\$8,000
Repair of public roads	6,000
Repair of prisons	7,000
Repair of bridges	6,000
Repair of wharves, etc.	7,000

Nothing in 1914-15 was appropriated for construction. Since the Occupation, "repair of prisons" was included under Gendarmerie allocations for maintenance and repair of prisons.

Public works appropriation, FY 1919-20:

Construction and repair of public buildings	\$24,000
Repair and maintenance of streets, etc.	68,400
Irrigation, etc.	24,000
Ports, harbors, wharves, and quays	9,600
Public roads, bridges, etc.	180,000
Construction of school buildings, etc.	12,000

Current expenditures did not include special projects like repaving the streets of Port-au-Prince, or the rebuilding of the Presidential Palace, both of which had been completed by 1921. In his testimony, McIlhenny gave the past four years expenditures for public works:

1917-18.....	\$329,476.81	1919-20.....	\$639,936.05
1918-19.....	451,288.07	1920-21.....	526,925.63

3. Education. The Haitian 1914-15 appropriation for education was \$23,016.80; no figures were available as to their actual expenditures. Budget appropriations in 1919-20,

kept education at roughly \$400,000, even though the salaries of Haitian teachers were raised 25% in 1919. In 1917, the Occupation contracted a Mr. Bourgeois as superintendent of education. His contract was terminated in 1920. In his final report, Mr. Bourgeois said the \$360,000 that the Occupation was spending on education in Haiti was being thrown away because of the incompetence of the entire system.

4. Justice. In 1914-15, the appropriation was \$192,438, and again McIlhenny could only assume the money was spent. In 1919-20 and 1920-21, the appropriation had been fixed at \$245,759.

5. Government Operations. No figures for the period prior to the Occupation apparently exist. In 1915-16, under Admiral Caperton's administration, the Haitian government was allotted \$100,000 a month for governmental expenses. Since then their annual expenses have climbed slightly, partially because of a 19% pay increase for clerical workers approved in 1919.

1917-18.....\$1,109,577.77	1919-20.....\$1,698,049.34
1918-19..... 1,161,374.26	1920-21..... 1,401,100. ²⁰⁰

¹ Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings, 67th Congress, First and Second Sessions*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1922), (hereafter cited as *Hearings*), p. 313.

² Heintz, Robert Debs, Jr., and Heintz, Nancy Gordon, *Written in Blood, The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), pp. 57-122.

³ "Louverture" was apparently his preferred spelling of his last name, based on a calling card on display at the Museum of Haitian History at Moulin-sur-Mer, Haiti. Letter from Bryant C. Freeman, Ph. D., Institute of Haitian Studies, University of Kansas, 13 October 1997.

⁴ Maclean, Frances, "'We will Confound the Calumniators of Our Race...'" *Smithsonian*, (vol. 18, no. 7, October 1987), p. 165.

⁵ Schmidt, Hans, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 19, 21-22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 321. The quote is by Rodolphe Charmant, son of Acius Charmant, a political figure of the late 19th century, and a confederate of Hyppolite. An electric street lighting system for the town of Jacmel, which functioned for about a year after its installation, was described by a resident as "It was nothing but a fine pretext for official pillage."

⁸ A German warship demanding indemnities totaling 3,000 pounds Sterling arrived in Port-au-Prince as early as 1872. In March 1902, two French and one Italian cruisers, in separate visits, collected \$105,000 in claims. Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 256, 326.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 326, 333-334.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

¹¹ Plummer, Brenda Gayle, *Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 44, 46-51.

¹² Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 352.

¹³ Plummer, *Haiti and the Great Powers*, pp. 141-143.

¹⁴ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 259.

¹⁵ National City Bank has an unsavory reputation in Haitian financial affairs (although they appear no more venal than any other bank of the period that the Haitians dealt with) at least in part because of Smedley Butler and several Senators' accusation that the United States invaded Haiti as bill collectors for National City Bank of New York. Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 17.

¹⁶ Plummer, *Haiti and the Great Powers*, pp. 147-155.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁸ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 359.

¹⁹ Plummer, *Haiti and the Great Powers*, pp. 36-37. Cacos "took their name from a native red-plummed bird-of-prey, which emits a cry something like 'Kaaa-Koo' and lives by preying on weaker birds." Snyder, H. W., "Butler at Fort Rivi re," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. 64, no. 11, November 1980), p. 84.

²⁰ *Hearings, Ibid.*, p. 609. From General Waller's testimony:
Gen. Waller. Well, they [the Cacos] were the king makers of Haiti.

Mr. Howe. Do you mean that under the conditions which prevailed at that time the Haitian Government existed during the pleasure of these Caco leaders?

Gen. Waller. That had been the case before we landed. What I mean is that an aspirant for political power, a man who wanted to be President, would go to the north and make an agreement with these Caco leaders, and for a certain sum to be paid from the Haitian treasury after he was successful; also the privilege of looting some of the towns on the way down [to Port-au-Prince from the north]. They would descend from the mountains and put the President in power.

²¹ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 359-361.

Ibid., pp. 364-365. Leconte wasn't in office a year when Philander C. Knox, United States Secretary of State and the first of his position since the Lincoln administration to actually visit Haiti, paid a visit in April 1912, aboard the armored cruiser USS *Washington* (CA-11), and delivered the message that now that the Panama Canal was completed, it was time for the countries of the Caribbean (this message was also carried to Costa Rica, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela) to straighten up: "A community liable to be torn by internal dissension or checked in its progress by the consequences of nonfulfillment of international obligations is not in a good position to deserve and reap the benefits . . . such as are certain to come with the opening of the canal."

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 369-370.

²⁴ *Hearings*, pp. 285-295.

²⁵ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 394-400.

Hearings, pp. 307-308.

²⁶ *Webster's Biographical Dictionary*, (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1980), p. 207.

²⁷ *Hearings*, pp. 308-313.

Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 406, 408-409.

Untitled Memorandum for President Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921,

Butler Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.

²⁸ *Hearings*, p. 312.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

³⁰ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 417.

³¹ *Hearings*, p. 315.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 315-321, 333.

August 18, 1915

From: Commander cruiser squadron.

To: Secretary of the Navy, via wire.

If American charge d'Affaires extends to President elect of Haiti the formal recognition of the United States Government, as directed in department's radiogram 02014, unless otherwise directed, I will fire national salute of 21 guns with Haitian flag at the main if this salute can be returned by the Haitian authorities. 22318.

Caperton.

³³ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 417-418.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 425-426.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

36 *Hearings*, pp. 333, 336.
37 Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, p. 421.
38 Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 74.
39 Heinl and Heinl, *Written in Blood*, pp. 422-425.
40 *Ibid.*, p. 437.
41 *Ibid.*
42 *Butler Papers*, Box 1, Folder "1916":

COUP D'ETAT

Extract from Admiral Caperton's report of operations for April 6, 1916"

"The Senate did not meet on this day. On coming to the Senate building, it found the doors locked. The permanent committee met in the house of a member and decided to request the keys from the secretary of the Interior. The Chamber of Deputies did not meet."

Extract from report of operations by Admiral Caperton for April 7, 1916:

"On April 6, 1916, the president of Haiti directed a lieutenant of Gendarmerie to lock the doors of the Senate building. The keys for the building were taken to the President who directed the Lieutenant of Gendarmerie to give them to the Minister of the Interior. Upon arrival at the buildings[,] the Senate body found them locked. This measure being considered irregular by that body, it decided to meet on 7 April at 10:00 a.m., at a private dwelling. What action is contemplated by it is not yet known. I am taking no action in this matter other than preserving peace and order."

Inclosure to above report of Admiral Caperton:

"From: The Expeditionary Commander. 7 April 1916.
To: The commander Cruiser Squadron.

Subject: Report re locking of doors of Haitien [sic] Senate.

1. On April 6, 1916, the President of Haiti directed Lieutenant A. August Daumec, Gendarmerie d'haiti, to lock the doors of the Senate building. This at about 9:00 a.m. The building was locked by the said Daumec at about 9:45 a.m., and the keys were then taken to the President, who then directed Lieutenant Daumec to give them to the Minister of Interior, who was present. This Daumec did at about 10:30 a.m.

Littleton W. T. Waller."

Inclosure to report of operations of Admiral Caperton covering the date of April 7, 1916:

"From: President Permanent Committee. 6 April, 1916.
To: Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller, Commander of the U.S. Expeditionary Forces.

Mr. Colonel:

The members of the Legislative Body on arriving, this morning at the place of their meetings have found that the building was hermetically [sic] closed up.

Viewing this proceeding as an attempt upon the National Sovereignty, the Members of the Legislative Body have decided to meet tomorrow, at 10:00 a.m., in a private dwelling in the Rue Magloire Ambroise No. 56, close to the former place of the Exposition - under the reserves of all rights.

The Senate's Permanent Committee has been authorized to give you this information, Mr. Colonel, in order to prevent all commentaries of the object of said meeting.

Pray accept, Mr. Colonel, the assurances of our high consideration.

/s/ P. LARAQUE

President Permanent Committee.

Extract from report of operations of Admiral Caperton for April 14, 1916:

"By order of the President of Haiti the gates to the grounds of the Legislative Building were locked."

Extract from report of operations of Admiral Caperton for May 3, 1916:

"For the purpose of holding a meeting, a number of the Senators attempted this afternoon to enter the house which they have rented. They were dispersed by Gendarmed [sic], there being no disorder. Instructions have been given the Provost Marshal to prevent any further meetings. Otherwise the Haitian situation remained unchanged."

⁴³ *Hearings*, p. 623.

Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this question, sir. Did that desire to prorogue the legislature originate with the President of Haiti or was it inspired by the United States [?]

Gen. Waller. It originated with the Haitian Government, the President and his secretaries.

Mr. Howe. As far as you know.

Gen. Waller. As far as I know.

Mr. Howe. As far as you know, was the prorogation of this legislature desired by our government?

Gen. Waller. Only to carry out the request of the President.

Mr. Howe. Of Haiti?

Gen. Waller. Personally, I was bitterly opposed to it.

Mr. Howe. To the prorogation?

Gen. Waller. Absolutely; and I worked over it even after the prorogation with the greatest efforts to get them together again, but I was always confronted---

Mr. Howe. Upon whom did you bend your efforts?

Gen. Waller. On the Haitian Government.

Mr. Howe. The President of Haiti?

Gen. Waller. The President of Haiti and his secretaries, but was bitterly opposed all the time.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 624-625.

⁴⁵ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 438.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 437-442.

Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 97-99.

Weisberger, Bernard A., "Ragtime Diplomacy," *American Heritage*, (vol. 45, no. 3), pp. 24-26.

⁴⁷ Untitled Memorandum for President Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921, *Butler Papers*, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁴⁸ *Hearings*, pp. 521-522.

⁴⁹ *Butler Papers*, Box 7, Folder "Photographs".

⁵⁰ *Hearings*, p. 627.

⁵¹ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 450-451.

⁵² *Hearings*, pp. 649-659.

⁵³ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 451-452.

⁵⁴ *Hearings*, p. 432.

⁵⁵ Lejeune, John A., *The Reminiscences of a Marine*, (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930; republished Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1990), pp. 465-467. "We [Lejeune and Butler] not only questioned hundreds of officers and men, but conferred with many Haitians concerning the treatment they had received at the hands of Marines. French priests and American and foreign civilians were also interrogated, but no real evidence of the mistreatment of the Haitians by Marines was obtained except a few individual cases in which court martial proceedings had been instituted and appropriate penalties awarded." (p. 467) That said, one senses, seventy-odd years away and very much reading between the lines, a regret on Lejeune's part that some Marines had their charges dropped as a consequence of the findings of the Mayo naval court of inquiry.

⁵⁶ Chapin, John C., *The Marines' Role in the U. S. Occupation of Haiti: 1915-1922*, (Washington: Columbia College of Art and Sciences of George Washington University, unpublished, 1967), pp. 94.

Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 467-473.

⁵⁷ United States Senate, *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Report No. 794*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1922) (Hereafter cited as *Report 794*) p. 21. More specific findings were:

During the five and one-half years of the occupation, 8,000 individuals have served in an average force of 2,000 Marines maintained in Haiti since the Occupation. It is true that some few of these individuals have committed crimes affecting the Haitians, the offenses depending in no way on the military character of the guilty parties. The very small number of such individual crimes reflects credit on the discipline of the Marine Corps. Proper diligence has been exercised by our military authorities in prosecuting and punishing the criminals. (p. 12)

...certain instances of unauthorized executions of captives at the hands of Marines or at their command are beyond much doubt established. The number is small.

In fact, after full inquiry and earnest invitation to complainants to come forward as witnesses or with affidavits, the committee is to this day reasonably satisfied of the fact of 10 such cases, of which two have been established in the course of judicial inquiries. Of the three Americans who, as officers, would be directly responsible, if the facts were judicially established, one (1) was insane, one (2) is dead, and the other (3), commissioned in the gendarmerie from the enlisted personnel of the marines, has been discharged from the service. (p. 17)

Accusations have been made of tortures and cruel beatings. Many of these accusations have been completely refuted; others bear a resemblance to types of cruelty well known in Haiti for many years but foreign to anything known in America. (p. 19)

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23: "In concluding this portion of the report the committee expresses its chagrin at the improper or criminal conduct of some few members of the Marines Corps and at the same time feels it to be its duty to condemn the process by which biased or interested individuals and committees and propagandists have seized on isolated instances, or have adopted as true any rumor however vile or baseless in an effort to bring into general disrepute the whole American naval force in Haiti. This committee wishes to express its admiration for the manner in which our men accomplished their dangerous and delicate task."

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶⁰ Welles, Sumner, *Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic 1844-1924*, (New York: Payson & Clarke Ltds., 1928), title page.

⁶¹ Untitled Memorandum for President Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921, *Butler Papers*, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁶² Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 473.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations of the US* with the appropriate year), (Washington: USGPO, 1938), vol. II, pp. 461-467.

⁶³ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 475-476.

Foreign Relations of the US, 1922, vol. II, pp. 468-471.

⁶⁴ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 147.

⁶⁵ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 476.

⁶⁶ Millspaugh, Arthur C., *Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930*, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931, reprinted Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970), pp. 119-122.

⁶⁷ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 476-480.

⁶⁸ Untitled Memorandum for President Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921, *Butler Papers*, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁶⁹ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 480, 490.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 492-493.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 417, 502-505.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 490-497.

Foreign Relations of the US, 1929, vol. III, pp. 204-217.

⁷³ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 497-502.

Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 216-217.

⁷⁴ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 505-507.

⁷⁵ *Foreign Relations of the US, 1931, vol. II, pp. 403-510.*

⁷⁶ Bevens, Charles L, compl., "Withdrawal of Military Forces," *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, (Washington: USGPO (Department of State), 1971). pp. 703-709, 712-713.

⁷⁷ "Final Ceremonies in Haiti," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (November 1934), pp. 20-21.

⁷⁸ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 515-516.

⁷⁹ Calixte, D. P., *Haiti, The Calvary of a Soldier*, (New York: Wendell Malliet and Company, 1939; republished, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969) pp. 25-32. Calixte wrote this small book in exile, having resisted the politicization of the Garde to the point that he was accused in an assassination plot against President Vincent—which he denies—and had to flee the country. After the book was written, Calixte ended up in the Dominican Republic, as a soldier working for that country's dictator Trujillo, but later returned to Haiti as an unsuccessful Presidential candidate in 1946.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

⁸¹ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 233, 234.

⁸² Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 550-564.

⁸³ "Haiti: Au Revoir, Magloire," *Time*, (vol. LXVIII, no. 26, 24 December 1956), p. 25.

⁸⁴ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 575-584.

⁸⁵ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 4-18. "The belief that Haitians were inherently inferior, coupled with the dictates of State Department diplomacy in the Caribbean, led to grotesque perversion of the declared missionary ideal of spreading liberal democracy." (p. 10) "The perversion of professed American liberal democratic intentions was, of course, the function of a whole constellation of unfavorable circumstances, as well as of the racial and cultural prejudices of the invaders." (p. 12)

Abbott, Elizabeth, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988) pp. 37-43.

⁸⁶ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 11.

⁸⁷ Russell, John H., "The Development of Haiti During the Last Fiscal Year," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. XV, no. 2, June 1930) pp. 92-93.

⁸⁸ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 221.

⁸⁹ Russell, "Development of Haiti", p. 88.

⁹⁰ Laguerre, Michel S., *The Military and Society in Haiti*, (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1993), pp. 30, 43-61.

⁹¹ McCrocklin, James H., *Garde d'Haiti*, Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1956), p. 234. This work, "compiled" by a reserve Marine officer stationed at Quantico, amounts to an official Marine Corps history of the Gendarmerie/Garde. Written in 1955, it, of course, just misses the Duvalier years, and is generally favorable not only concerning the history of the Gendarmerie/Garde, but of l'Armée d'Haiti which it became.

⁹² Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 477, pp. 406-514 *passim*, pp. 513, 545-550. Or for example, the observation of the French minister on Page 14.

Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 43. Despite her generally disapproving tone concerning the Occupation and the Gendarmerie/Garde as an instrument of the Occupation, Abbott does

quote "one old black peasant . . . [who] saw the occupation differently: 'Ten years ago this country was full of *cacos* (bandits) and there were no roads. The *cacos* often robbed and murdered us. Our own government tax-gatherers often robbed and starved us, then gave us nothing in return. It was hardly worth while to plant. It took four days on a donkey to go down to the city. And if we weren't killed by *cacos* or drowned fording streams, when we did reach the city we were conscripted to fight for the government, or on one side or the other of some new revolution which was going to make things better and never did. Now the bandits are all gone, there is no more revolution, I live in peace, I plant all I can, I pay a reasonable tax, I go to the city in the motor bus in four hours, and I am not conscripted, and while I am away, my wife, my children, my ears of corn, and my little goats are safe as if they were all in the arms of Jesus..."

Laguerre, *Military and Society*, pp. 63-83 *passim*, sees the Gendarmerie/ Garde more as an instrument of oppression rather than rural security: "The oppressive control of the Gendarmerie became clear as they were called on to suppress and rout the *Kakos* [sic] in order to maintain peace and order and control the traffic of arms. Their alliance with American forces (evidently against Haitian nationalists), which they viewed as a necessary evil, was part of that duty. Castor [S. Castor, *La ocupación norteamericana de Haiti y sus consecuencias (1915-1934)* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1971) p. 56.] is probably right in seeing the Gendarmerie as having an essentially repressive mission" (p. 70).

⁹³ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 433-435.

⁹⁴ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 235.

Laguerre, *Military and Society*, pp. 84-190, *passim*.

⁹⁵ Russell, "Development of Haiti", pp. 90-92.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁹⁷ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 520, 552-553.

⁹⁸ Russell, "Development of Haiti", pp. 113-114.

⁹⁹ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 99-100.

¹⁰⁰ *Hearings*, *Ibid.*, p. 1351.

¹⁰¹ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 509.

¹⁰² Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 92-96.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-112.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-164.

¹⁰⁵ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 519.

¹⁰⁶ Laguerre, *Military and Society*, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰⁷ Schmidt, Hans, *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History*, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1987), p. 95. Schmidt, whose *US Occupation* (1972) indicts the United States as conducting a racist imperialist occupation, mellows a bit in *Maverick Marine*. But not a lot.

¹⁰⁸ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 410fn.

Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, p. 84.

"Waller, Littleton Waller Tazewell" *Who Was Who in American History--The Military*.

Schott, Joseph L., *The Ordeal of Samar*, (New York: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Inc., 1964), p. 67.

¹⁰⁹ Schott, *Ordeal of Samar*, pp. 175-276.

¹¹⁰ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 6, 103.

Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, p. 84.

¹¹¹ Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 38.

¹¹² Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, pp. 78-81.

Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, *Ibid*.

¹¹³ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 79. Quotes a letter from Waller to Butler in July 1916.

¹¹⁴ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, pp. 442-443, 489.

¹¹⁵ Schmidt, *United States Occupation*, p. 141.

¹¹⁶ Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, p. 95.

¹¹⁷ Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 39.

¹¹⁸ *Hearings*, p. 517.

¹¹⁹ A. A. Vandergrift, as told to Robert B. Asprey, *Once a Marine*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1964; republished Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1982), pp. 49, 52, 56-57. "Haiti was not a poor country but corruption made it so. . .

"The situation made Tammany Hall politics seem like a Sunday-school picnic. Local politicians, I soon learned, had been paying teachers dead for twenty and thirty years. Some living teachers scarcely merited the title: one high school 'teacher of English' could not read, write, or speak the language—I fired him and returned his pay to the Haitian government. Like most honest reforms, our work proved popular with the bulk of the people but created enemies among local vested interests. . .

"Our intended reforms encountered enemies other than Cacos. An honest administration deprived some important Haitians of large sums of money heretofore stolen from the customshouses."

¹²⁰ Wise, Frederick May, as told to Meigs O. Frost, *A Marine Tells It to You*, (New York: J. H. Sears & Company, 1929; republished, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1981) pp. 135, 307-308. "There are Haitians who are very rich. There are Haitians incredibly poor, who live in the same jungle life their ancestors lived in Africa more than a century ago. You can meet a Haitian who has been educated at great world capitals, who speaks four modern languages fluently, and has a really French appreciation of music and art and literature. You can meet a Haitian living in a shack in the jungle, half naked, supported by his group of wives, each one of whom works a small clearing with primitive implements. . .

"The gentry are a proud, formal race. Some of the best blood of France is in their veins. They are descended from generations of rich plantation owners. Their sons got their degrees from European universities. Their daughters were educated in the convents of France and England. They were at home in the drawing-rooms of any capital in the world. They looked upon France as their mother country, and when money was plentiful visited it yearly."

¹²¹ Wirkus, Faustin, and Dudley, Taney, *The White King of La Gonâve*, (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1931), *passim*.

¹²² Schmidt, *U. S. Occupation*, pp. 146-147. "The Negroes of mixed type, who constitute the majority of educated people and politicians, have the general characteristics of such people the world over--vain, loving praise, excitable, changeable, beyond belief illogical, and double faced. Many of them are highly educated and polished, but their sincerity must always be doubted." (Cole, c. 1917) "[Our] sympathies lie entirely, however, with the huge uneducated mass of Haitians who have by the despicable action of inappreciable few of their countrymen been kept for years in a bondage that is akin to slavery." (Russell, c. 1921)

¹²³ Schmidt, *U. S. Occupation*, pp. 146-147.

¹²⁴ Balch, Emily Greene, ed., *Occupied Haiti*, (New York: The Writers Publishing Company, Inc., 1927, republished, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 118. Ms. Balch's book is presented as a "report of a committee of Six disinterested Americans representing organizations exclusively American", and was written under the sponsorship of the International Executive Committee of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. It is often quoted by works critical of the Occupation (*viz.*, Laguerre, *Military and Society*, pp. 74, 80; Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 43).

¹²⁵ Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, pp. 175-180. This comes from an unsigned letter in an appendix to Balch, which "reveals in some degree how things may look from the Haitian [elite] side. Among other things, it bears on the remark one so commonly hears from Americans in Haiti that Haitians have no sense of patriotism.

"The very beautiful French style of the letter, with its poetic turns of phrase, has necessitated a rather free translation, in which the original inevitably suffers." This remarkable piece of self-denial and revisionist cultural propaganda is reproduced here in its entirety:

"Your letter gave me at the same time much pleasure and some pain. It seemed to me as if I were hearing you speak--that was the pleasure; and it seemed to me that we were misunderstanding one another--that was the regret. I had the impression that you were a little tired with me for not understanding your country and I on my side still feel that your country has not even begun to realize what Haiti is, not even distantly.

"What is needed is not an intellectual operation, however subtle, but an intimate touch, an act of love making it possible to understand others, to make them part of oneself; that is, to get so close to them that we love them like ourselves--more than ourselves. This human thrill, this practical sympathy, I have found--to be frank without being unjust--in a few exceptional persons only, in Doctor Gruening, who love Haiti like a good Haitian, as a clear-sighted son would love his mother, and in some of the large-hearted women of this last mission to Haiti whom I had the opportunity of meeting. But you came and went like birds of passage; what you saw of this was necessarily their surface, a bird's-eye view. You would have needed to experience for a year, or six months at least, what we are suffering, to have felt the same revolt of conscience at legalized lying and triumphant injustice, to have had a sight of what lay under the cards, and of the reverse side of the medal.

"Then only, then perhaps, you might begin to understand. You would have to read many books--and to forget them again, see many people, talk with old men and women, and get them to tell you about the Haiti of the old days and compare and explain the past. You would have to go ever further back in our history and listen to the dead, you would

have to try to fathom the quiet of our starry nights and listen for the voices of our sleeping centuries. Ours is a land of beauty, but also a land of suffering, a people of tormentors and tormented.

"Nevertheless a special form of civilization was created here, a social experiment was being worked out. The Negroes of old Haiti and the sons of the 'philosophe' colonialists of the XVIIIth century were developing a social order and shaping customs and ways inherited from the most civilized people of the world—those of old France—with the modifications inevitably brought about by the differences of climate and race.

"Think of the unique drama that was being unfolded here. The first cause of our financial and economic bankruptcy was the long-continued rancor of France and the immense indemnity demanded from Haiti. Like a poor debt-burdened student beginning the world wholly without credit, Haiti had to live the life of a small and poor people in the midst of the hostility and sneers of stronger nations, without help or support. I affirm, and no one can contradict me, that what we have accomplished under such conditions is very fine.

"There is nothing in the history of Haiti that calls for shame or concealment. It is the story of painful gropings, of the uncertain youthful steps of a little country, the difficult adolescence of a young nation.

"I know they throw the history of Haiti in our face—its long tissue of revolutions and massacres. Yet the American war with the Cacos killed more people than 10 or 20 revolutions put together; it devastated whole regions and ruined the cattle for Haiti, as veterinary experts can testify if they are honest. Revolutions were fomented by foreigners—English, French, American, Dutch traders—who risked nothing, and always profited. Loans which dealt rather in human lives than in merchandise were made at rates of 1,000 per cent, and those who thus enriched themselves overthrew any government that was not subservient to them.

"And the diplomatic claims made upon Haiti! They were a regular industry. What documents the chancelleries could offer to the sociologist and historian if they could! If it were they who were under indictment, many who are now accusing would have to lower their heads in shame and blush redder than are their hands, still stained with the blood of innocent men who were quite unaware of how they were being used.

"I know—and I do not excuse—the Haitian accomplices in all this, ambitious men, bloody men. Ambition blinded them, as it still blinds many others, survivors of a disastrous past who are still with us, or our misfortune. These men were the agents of the invasion. Bad shepherds of a heedless flock, drunken pilots of a ship in distress, they consciously or unconsciously prepared the capitalist and militarist subjugation that we are now enduring.

"For the honor of the Haitian name, for the pride of our élite have cherished, be it said that a succession of men of heart and capacity have continuously struggled and suffered for a civilized, a truly civilized, Haiti. The heroes who achieved independence had their successors. This is not sufficiently known, or rather it is persistently ignored.

"Balthazar Inginac, finance minister under Pétion and Boyer, Boyer himself, a great president and a great statesman, who although beset by the greed of France, Spain, England, and (already) the United States, yet ruled Haiti for 25 years and brought to pass the voluntary union of the whole island under one government; Edmond Paul, the great

tribune and apostle of a liberal Haiti; Armand Thoby; Alcibiade Pommayrac, Justin Dévot, Léon Audain, Georges Sylvain, Auguste Albert, (perhaps I forget others)--any country would be honored to count such men as these among its sons. They are 'representative men' such as Carlyle would put in his gallery, men who lived for their ideals and were ready to die for them. These are the witnesses of Haiti, our country, of our humiliated élite. Even when, like Anténor Firmin, they sought to realize their ends by violence, they are excusable, for they meant well.

"Efforts to help the masses have been made again and again and in many ways, but the poverty of our budgets and the instability due to the causes mentioned made progress difficult and slow. Nevertheless a Haitian civilization was in progress of development. This is what the men of your country do not understand. They came and interrupted it. They act like barbarians, for they have established nothing but a coarse materialism, the religion of money, the worship of force and success. I do not hate them, because it is not my turn of mind nor the way my feelings have been trained. I cannot any longer hate, but I despise them. That does not trouble them, I know; but I despise them for their sterile lack of understanding, for their vanity, men who are parvenues in matters of intellect and feeling.

"Although foreign domination is never a good thing, medicine teaches us that painful operations sometimes effect a cure. The American invasion might have been a good thing if, although unjust and even infringing for a time upon our independence, it had been temporary and had led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But such is not the case. The Americans have not even this excuse. They have made themselves the allies of the evil past of oppression and tyranny; they have abolished liberty, justice, independence; they are bad administrators of the public funds; they offer a peace of degradation and subjection, shame and dishonor. They push forward like the rising tide; they attack our traditions, our soul. Is it not claimed that they want to change our culture, our religion?

"Even the good that they do turns to our hurt, for instead of teaching us, they do it to prove that we are incapable. They are exploiters. How can they teach us when they have so much to learn themselves? I am not bitter as I may appear. If when you were here I seemed less emphatic than I do now, it is because I was not well informed then. Every day I learn more, and things that I had felt and suspected prove to be true. It is not that I have been disillusioned unless you understand that to mean that I formerly hoped for a change peacefully brought about by mutual consent; in that sense—yes. I do not aspire to propose any plan. I do not desire to be given any government place. My social position and relations would put fortune and honor within my reach, but I should feel myself an accomplice. I have long accepted poverty and obscurity. Poverty is painful only when you see those that you love suffering.

"The present régime, an American occupation with a false façade of Haitian government, is a pretense and a lie.

"It is a pathetic sight, a country that is being slowly killed. I am not an agitator. Like you I am opposed to useless gestures. I want to be a man of action to remain sincere and honest.

"I should have liked to visit and know your country, for there must be sympathetic Americans capable of understanding all that I am trying to put before you. I should like

to give the proofs of what I have been saying, and to show the facts that explain what I feel. It would have been an opportunity to fulfill my desire to make the real situation known and to try to scatter the clouds of misunderstanding, which separate our two countries, in the interest of both our peoples, so that the sun of truth may triumph."

¹²⁶ Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 39.

¹²⁷ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 484.

¹²⁸ Schmidt, *U. S. Occupation*, p. 141.

Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 293, 311, 315, 327, 337.

¹²⁹ Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, pp. 118-119.

Schmidt, *U. S. Occupation*, pp. 148-149; Schmidt declines to pass on the prostitution charge.

Abbott, *Haiti*, p. 40.

¹³⁰ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 486-487.

¹³¹ Franck, Harry A., *Roaming Through the West Indies*, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1920), p. 118. "By chance or design the great majority of our officers in Haiti are southerners, and they naturally shun any but the most unavoidable intercourse with the natives. . . The Southerner is famed for his ability to keep the 'nigger' down, but he is less successful in lifting him up, and that is the task we have taken upon ourselves in Haiti."

¹³² Schmidt, *U. S. Occupation*, p. 119. "How American marines, largely made up of and officered by Southerners, opened fire with machine guns from airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages, killing men, women, and children in the open market places;

¹³³ Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, p. 133. "It seems to be a marvel that these young marines, recruited as they are, with very commonly the extreme Southern attitude toward Negroes, trained as they are, isolated in black villages, do as well as they do, but this does not mean that it is a proper system!"

¹³⁴ Leyburn, James G., *The Haitian People*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, 1966), p. 103fn. "The United States government in the early days had sent Marines from the Southern States to Haiti, on the theory that they would, from long acquaintance with Negroes, know how to 'handle' them. This stupid blunder was shortly rectified."

¹³⁵ Rodman, Selden, *Haiti: The Black Republic, The Complete Story and Guide*, (New York: The Devlin-Adair company, 1954, 1961), p. 25. "In the early days of the Occupation the Americans had sent Marines from Southern states to Haiti on the fantastic theory that they would 'know how to handle' Negroes."

¹³⁶ "Bon Papa," *Time*, (vol. LXIII, no. 8, February 22, 1954) p. 42. "Officers from the U. S. South ('they know how to handle the blacks, you know') humiliated highbred Haitians."

¹³⁷ Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, p. 84.

Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 489.

¹³⁸ Hurst, Ann, *Southerners to Handle the Haitians?* (Wellesley, MA: Wellesley College, 1964, 1995), p. 8.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 487-490.

Schmidt, *US Occupation*, pp. 144-145.

- ¹⁴⁰ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 501-502.
- ¹⁴¹ *Hearings*, pp. 289, 290. Admiral Caperton's testimony; comment by Senator Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
- ¹⁴² "Haiti: The Nightmare Next Door," *The Economist*, (vol. 332, no. 7882, 24 September 1994), p. 21.
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- ¹⁴³ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 513. "By the end of 1932, doctors of the newly Haitianized Service d'Hygiène were already diverting so many government drugs and medical supplies into private hands that pharmacists complained they might be run out of business."
- ¹⁴⁴ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 485-486.
- ¹⁴⁵ Wirkus, *White King*, *passim*.
- ¹⁴⁶ Wise, *A Marine Tells You*, p. 308.
- ¹⁴⁷ Kurlansky, Mark, "Haitian Soil", *Audubon*, (vol. 197, no. 1, Jan-Feb 95), pp. 50-57.
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- ¹⁴⁸ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 394-400.
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- ¹⁴⁹ Utley, H. H., "The Landing and Occupation of Seaports," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. 19, no. 1, February 1935), p. 54.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Report of the Major General Commandant to the Secretary of the Navy, 1915*, (Washington: USGPO, 1915), p. 11. Hereafter cited as *CMC* with the appropriate year.
- ¹⁵¹ *Hearings*, p. 308.
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- ¹⁵⁶ "Proclamation to the People of Port-au-Prince, Haiti," 3 September 1915, *Butler Papers, Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁷ Field Orders No. 1 (21 August 1915), 2 (22 August), 3 (24 August), 4 (25 August), 5 (26 August), and 6 (27 August), Headquarters, First Regiment, First Brigade, United States Marine Corps, Cape Haitien, Haiti; Regimental Orders Nos. 45 and 46, Headquarters, First Regiment, First Brigade, United States Marine Corps, Cape Haitien, Haiti, 24 August 1915; and Order No. 1, Office of the Military Governor, Cape Haitien, Haiti, 1 September 1915, *Butler Papers, Ibid.*, Elaborate instructions were established for the defense of Cap-Haïtien by First Battalion, which had been put in charge of the defense

of the city (Regimental Order No. 51, Headquarters, First Regiment, 3 September 1915), re: Letter of Instruction, First Battalion, First Regiment, First Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps, Cape Haitien, Haiti, 4 September 1915; *Butler Papers, Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Headquarters United States Forces on Shore in Gonaïves, Haiti, subj: Report of Operations, September 20th to September 26th, inclusive, dtd. 26 September 1915, *Butler Papers*, Box 1. This version of the "battle" with Rameau is in contradiction to the account in Butler's memoirs (ghosted by Lowell Thomas): "We were sitting down to a well-earned supper when one of the outposts telephoned us that Rameau's rebels were burning the railroad. I rushed downstairs and called out to the men, 'Who wants a fight?'"

"The Marines were in their underclothes, trying to capture a stray evening breeze. Without stopping to dress they snatched up their rifles and belts. We flew up the street, streaked along the railroad track and plunged headlong into the rebels. We didn't think they were so close. They fired first. And then the scrap started.

"It was the funniest fight I ever saw. Those damn Marines were baying like bloodhounds all through the bushes." Thomas, Lowell, *Old Gimlet Eye: The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler*, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1933; republished, Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1981), pp. 183-184.

¹⁵⁹ Headquarters, First Regiment, Cape Haitien, subj: Occupation of Grande Riviere, 15 October 1915; Headquarters, First Regiment, First Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps, Cape Haitien, Haiti, subj: Orders, 15 October 1915; Headquarters, First Regiment, Cape Haitien, Haiti, subj: Disorders beyond Grande Riviere, 15 October 1915; District Commander, Fort Liberte and Ouanaminthe, Haiti, subj: Report of Operations, October 9th, 1915, to November 27th, 1915, inclusive, 7 December 1915; *Butler Papers*, Box 1, Folder "1915".

¹⁶⁰ "Memo for Col. Cole," Ouanaminthe, Haiti, 13 October 1915, *Butler Papers, Ibid. Hearings*, pp. 610-611.

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¹⁶² MacCloskey, Monro, "A Medal for Lt Ostermann," *Marine corps Gazette*, (vol. 48, no. 11, November 1964) pp. 46-47.

¹⁶³ Thrasher, Thomas E., "The Taking of Fort Rivière," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. XV, no. 4, February 1931), pp. 31-33, 64.

¹⁶⁴ Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p.430.

¹⁶⁵ Hill, Walter N., "A Haitian Reconnaissance", *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. II, no. 1, March 1917), pp. 31-36.

¹⁶⁶ *CMC, 1915*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁶⁷ *CMC, 1917*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁸ Johnstone, John H., *A Brief History of the 1st Marines*, (Washington, DC: HQs, US Marine Corps, 1962, revised 1968), pp. 10-12.

Kane, Robert J., *A Brief History of the 2d Marines*, (Washington, DC: HQs, US Marine Corps, 1961, revised 1962, revised 1969, 1970), pp. 5-14.

¹⁶⁹ Coyle, Randolph, "Service in Haiti," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. I, No. 4, December, 1916), pp. 343-348. This assessment is based on the assumption that these instructions to those looking forward to service in Haiti, advising them about the servant

problem, schools, recreation, and motor cars, is describing normal garrison life rather than combat.

¹⁷⁰ Herman H. Hanneken, "The Official Report of the Death of Charlemagne," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. 49, no. 11, November 1965), p. 39.

¹⁷¹ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 449-463.

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¹⁷² Brady, John D., "Haiti", *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. IX, no. 2, June 1924), pp. 149-156. Conclusions are based on the same reasons as in footnote 43.

¹⁷³ Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 493-497.

¹⁷⁴ "Final Ceremonies in Haiti", *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (November 1934), pp. 20-21.

"After Nineteen Years", p. 21.

¹⁷⁵ Kane, *2nd Marines*, p. 14.

¹⁷⁶ Marine companies were not organized as permanent organizations until 1911. They were numbered consecutively throughout the Marine Corps, apparently to avoid the confusion of having more than one "1st" or "A" companies in a battalion or regiment organized for expeditionary purposes. The first four standing regiments of Marines were organized in 1913; Fifth and Sixth regiments were raised for duty in France in 1917. Regiments of Marines were redesignated Marine Regiments (as in "4th Marines") in 1933; at the same time, companies were permanently assigned to regiments and were given letter designations.

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- 184 Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, pp. 451-454.
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- 187 Wise, *A Marine Tells You*, p. 309.
- 188 *Ibid.*, pp. 309-310.
- 189 Amendment to the 1916 Haitian-American Gendarmerie Agreement, 23 March 1920, *Butler Papers*, Box "1920-23", folder "1920." Refer to HQs, US Expeditionary Forces Operating in Haiti, Port-au-Prince, 14 Feb 1916, subj: Commission of Haitien Gendarmerie d'Haiti; this shows at least the official intention of commissioning Haitians in the Gendarmerie at the start of the organization. According to Heint and Heint, initial efforts to recruit members of the elite into the Gendarmerie failed because military service was beneath their social position. Heint and Heint, *Written in Blood*, p. 479.
- 190 "March of Events," *The Marine Corps Gazette*, (vol. VII, no. 1, March 1922), pp. 96.
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