Political Leadership and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Israel and Turkey

By

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ABSTRACT

Frequent references to "hawkish" and "dovish" leaders in Israel, or Turkey's "secular" and "Islamist" leaders, lack a systematic analysis of the personalities of political leadership in Israel and Turkey. Notwithstanding, such portrayals attract not only domestic actors in these countries but also others across the globe. Scholars, pundits, the public, as well as the policymakers, easily adapt these dichotomous and simplistic perceptions of leadership in Israel and Turkey. Utilizing contemporary at-a-distance measures of personality assessment (specifically, leadership traits analysis and operational code analysis), this study draws profiles all of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers since November 1991. As such, this dissertation expands the political leadership literatures to two strategically located countries in the Middle East. In its unique design with two methods of personality assessment, it illustrates the gains from such an approach. Then, this study also makes an effort to link leadership styles and belief systems with foreign policy behavior. The results cast doubt on simplistic appraisals of political leadership in terms of "hawkish" and "dovish" in Israel and "secular" and "Islamist" in Turkey. Furthermore, the findings here suggest the significance of distrust of others (a personality trait in Leadership Traits Analysis) in predicting conflictual foreign policy behavior. In much broader terms, this dissertation also contributes to understanding political leaders of the Middle East.

Sümeyye Pakdil'e

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Henry Kissinger once said, "As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make" (cited in Byman and Pollack 2001). In the field of international relations, Synder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1962 founded their argument on what Kissinger told: The individual constitutes the heart of international politics (also see Hudson 2005). In contrast to such assessments, however, the individual level of analysis has not necessarily been the most attractive one to many political scientists. Instead, systemic factors such as the distribution of power have appealed to many in their attempts to explain international politics. During the latter half of the 20th century, and particularly following Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin's footsteps, there has been a strong interest in the individuals who are indeed the source of all state actions.

For many who follow the tradition of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), individual characteristics of political leaders influence state behavior.[1] Personality characteristics

[1] Snyder, Bruck and Sapin published their *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* originally in 1962; an earlier, 1954 version was also printed as "Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3" at Princeton University. Unless otherwise noted, any citations here refer to an updated edition

(such as beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style) affect personal orientation to behavior, which in turn shapes one's general orientation to foreign affairs (Hermann 1980a: 12). As such, in contrast to variants of realism, individuals——or, groups of individuals——are the source of all state actions (Hudson 2005; Walker and Schafer 2004). This argument by corollary means that "a well-reasoned and informed account of outcomes in foreign policy requires a sophisticated understanding of leaders" (Renfro 2009: 26). Grove recently argues that "[e]specially in a world of great uncertainty and ambiguity, as opposed to rigid Cold War environment, individual leaders make a difference" (2007: 1). Indeed, leaders in every political system or culture make their own imprints in foreign (and domestic) policy. Nonetheless, the extant studies of political leadership heavily focus on Western democracies and systematic studies of non-Western leaders remain in scarcity.

In the broader study of international relations, the lure of systemic factors in explaining international politics is possibly still strong (see Byman and Pollack 2001 for a discussion). The study of individuals in the subfield of foreign policy analysis, on the other hand, has expanded since Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962). This inquiry has benefited from and is closely connected with the field of psychology.[2] Indeed, most research after Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin focused on individual or small group decision

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published in 2002 (*Foreign Policy Decision-Making, revisited*) with additional chapters by Valerie M. Hudson and Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier.

[2] See, Levy (2003) for a review.

making. Most, if not all, of these works have implications for the study of political leadership. Studies about various topics, such as cognitive biases (Jervis 1976), groupthink (Janis 1972), motives (Barber 1972; Etheredge 1978; Winter 1973), have shed light on the decision making processes. In a review of the relevant literature, Young and Schafer (1998) identify operational code analysis, image theory, cognitive mapping, and leadership traits analysis as the most significant research programs about leaders' cognition.[3]

This dissertation employs Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis as its methods of leadership assessment. Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) is a method designed specifically to explain how leaders' react to constraints, are motivated towards the world, and their openness to information, etc. and then with these to assess a leadership style profile. As such, LTA involves a careful content analysis of leaders' discourse and its quantification into seven traits (for a review, see Hermann 2003a). It is assumed that the frequency of use of certain words in leaders' discourse indicates the very saliency of the content (Hermann 2003a: 186). Operational Code Analysis, on the other hand, is the study of core belief system of an individual leader and "asks what the individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs" (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 29). Contemporary examples of this research employ Walker, Schafer, and Young's (1998) the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to measure leaders' operational code indexes.

[3] For recent reviews, see Preston (2010), and Rosati and Miller (2010).

While the literature on psychological characteristics of individuals and their effects on foreign policy have proven beyond doubt that they make a difference, the direct implications of idiosyncratic factors for foreign policy behavior are not as well established. Arguably there are two reasons for this. The first is that once scholars theoretically founded such frameworks as the Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis then the literature has rather focused on discussions about what certain differences exist between, for instance, scripted and spontaneous materials (Mahdasian 2002; Shannon and Keller 2007), leaders' belief systems about democracies and non-democracies (Schafer and Walker 2006c), profiles of one leader or a group of leaders (among many others, Feldman and Valenty 2001; Hermann 1980a, 1987, 2003b, 2003c; Feng 2005, 2006; Renfro 2009). The second reason is that while the larger body of research that relates psychological characteristics with foreign policy progressed steadily, it lacked—or, it was time consuming to develop—the complementary body of research that would provide it with reliable and systematic data on foreign policy behavior.

One of the premises of this study is that presently this linkage between individual characteristics and foreign policy behavior is possible with advances in the assessment of political leadership at–a–distance and quantitative international relations research. Specifically, thanks to the availability of automated content analysis programs, easier access to public domain verbal materials, now words become data in the study of foreign policy analysis and broadly in international relations field. Hence the marriage between the political psychology and large–N foreign policy behavior datasets can take place. Indeed, one can create reliable and systematic personality and event data for a diverse set

of leaders and countries. Such undertakings would help expand the extant literatures and advance the study of foreign policy analysis by seeking answers to old and new questions.

Overview

This dissertation makes the effort to link leadership styles and belief systems with foreign policy behavior. For reasons further discussed later in Chapter 3, Israel and Turkey, and all of their prime ministers, in the post-Cold War era are selected. Israel and Turkey, and their respective political leadership, provide important political settings to explore for the study of international relations in broad terms. First of all, the geographic location of both countries makes the implications of this research most significant not only for contemporary scholarship but also from a policy making perspective. At the least, this study can help understand frequent references to "hawkish" and "dovish" leaders in Israel, or Turkey's "secular" and "religious" leaders, from a systematic analysis of these very leaders. Then, understanding political leadership in Israel and Turkey is also important, because both are influential countries in their immediate geography and also globally. For instance, Israel and its relationship with its neighbors constitute the key to peace efforts in the Middle East. Likewise, Turkey's recent rise to an eminent status in world politics requires an understanding of its politics. In addition, the political and economic relations of both countries with the Western world, and most notably with the United States, make them important actors in that respect as well.

These notwithstanding, there is a relative dearth of research on Israel's and Turkey's political leaders and foreign policy. Hence, in addition to its theoretical and methodological goals, this dissertation is an attempt at this direction. What do personal and political backgrounds of leaders in Israel and Turkey reveal about their leadership styles and beliefs? What can assessment of political leadership in Israel and Turkey tell about their respective foreign policies? Are those popular images of hawks v. doves and secular v. religious leadership and the implications they often carry for foreign policy preferences reflected on leadership styles and beliefs of Israel's and Turkey's leaders?

The organization and main points of this study are as follows. The following chapter first briefly reviews the relevant literature, explains specific theoretical background and coding procedures to two techniques of assessing political leaders at-a-distance: Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis. I argue for utilizing both in explaining leadership characteristics of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers. Next, Chapter 3 sets the research design of this research and also puts forward the hypotheses. In this chapter, I also introduce the large-N dataset that measures the dependent variables in the analyses conducted. The following two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, present leadership style and operational code profiles of Israeli and Turkish prime ministers (as well as the results of statistical tests for each country). Then, Chapter 6 illustrates how at-a-distance methods of personality analysis can provide meaningful explanations of political leadership and foreign policy in the case of Turkey. This chapter looks at Turkey's prime minister Erdogan and explores his leadership style on

foreign policy issues at home in Turkey and abroad. In Chapter 7, I conclude with a review of the findings and implications of this dissertation for future research for in similar vein.

This dissertation is an important milestone in leadership studies for its attempt to marry individual and state level data. As I review such attempts later in the following pages, they have been rare and calls for this kind of research have not been met. It is my contention here that understanding political leadership is indispensible to acquiring a nuanced approach to explaining world politics. The assessment of political leadership in Israel and Turkey, and their foreign policy behavior under different prime ministers, since the end of the Cold War support this argument. Hence, this dissertation is another testament to those following the steps of Synder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962).

The use of Leadership Traits and Operational Code methods of leadership assessment in one study is another unique contribution of this dissertation. It illustrates that utilizing more than one method in profiling same individuals is useful for it brings forth additional information, which helps drawing fuller picture of the individual leader.

Finally, for its comprehensive account of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers and foreign policy in the past two decades, this dissertation is a significant contribution to scholarship specific to these two countries. My findings here question the simple, dichotomous labels of "hawks" or "doves," "secular" and "religious." Political leaders in Israel and Turkey, or for that matter anywhere else, rarely fit into such broad perceptions.

Moreover, as modern personality theory would suggest, such labels would fail to capture the dynamic notions of personality that may change depending on the nature of topic, audience, etc. In broader terms, this dissertation also contributes to understanding political leaders of the Middle East. Both Israel and Turkey, as I argue above, are crucial actors in the region; profiles of their political leadership as such shed light on understanding politics of the Middle East.

Chapter 2

Leaders and Foreign Policy

This work is based on the premise that the individual constitutes the center of all analysis in the study of foreign policy, and broadly speaking of international relations (Hudson 2005, 2007). Studying political leaders, however, require unique methods, because leaders are not available or willing to interview for psychological analysis. "At–a–distance" techniques are especially designed to overcome this problem in leadership studies. Utilizing leaders' publicly available verbal records (speeches, interviews, letters, etc.), "at–a–distance" methods profile political leaders.

At–a–distance measurement of political leaders originate from psychology and its various tests and practices of personality assessment. Nonetheless, because these are not applicable in the study of political leaders, at–a–distance measurement is based on analysis of leaders' verbal material than their psychological tests. These methods require meticulously designed procedures of coding and operationalization of personality measures selected (Winter 2003: 22). In essence, then, these are adaptations of conventional personality measurements in psychology (Winter 1992: 86). In Leadership Traits Analysis, for instance, the intent is to assess the influence of one trait on behavior (Hermann 1974: 202). "The specific traits [are] selected because of their measurement

possibilities and because there is some theoretical basis in the extant psychological literature for hypothesizing about their affect on policy making" (Hermann 1974: 204). These foundations for each LTA variable are explained in detail in Hermann's early work –for instance, Hermann 1974: 204-209. In contemporary Operational Code Analysis, "operational code" refers to a belief system composed of philosophical and instrumental beliefs (George 1969). Distinct from its original definition in Leites (1951, 1953) as political strategy of Bolshevik ideology, this reconceptualization moved the operational code notion into the domain of cognitive theory (Walker and Schafer 2010). As such, beliefs as "subjective representations of reality" are central to Operational Code Analysis as a method of at–a–distance measurement (Walker and Schafer 2006: 4).

"At–a–distance" methods have been automated since the introduction of some certain computer software——specifically, Profiler Plus (explained in the following chapter). In collaboration with the leading scholars in the study of political leadership, the Profiler Plus program coded various "at–a–distance" methods into computer scripts to analyze text. Since its inception, automated analysis proliferated studies particularly using leadership traits analysis and operational code analysis. Indeed, these two approaches become "the empirical basis" of a special issue of *Political Psychology* that dealt with at–a–distance assessment of political personalities (Schafer 2000: 518). These two approaches also stand as major exceptions to the lack of attempts that looked *directly* into any possible linkage between idiosyncratic factors and foreign policy behavior.[1] In order

[1] For instance, Hermann (1980a), Rosati (1984, 1987), and Walker (1977).

to test the match between leader personality characteristics (traits and operational codes) with foreign policy behavior, both research programs occasionally add an events dataset on state behavior to their analysis (for instance Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999). Nonetheless, events data still remains a rather scarce, or under-utilized, element in other similar studies. Indeed, Young and Schafer (1998) note that while the relationship between beliefs and policy positions is a common ground in the operational code research, "[o]nly rarely… has the link between the operational code and behavior been made explicit" (73). More than a decade since its publication, Young and Schafer's argument still remains largely true and others have also echoed their statement (for instance, Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009).

In this section, because they are so central to understanding the respective at–a–distance assessment technique, first I explain each leadership trait and operational code variables as to their coding procedures. A review of some foundational works in Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) and Operational Code Analysis follows each section.[2] Then, I discuss how this present work relates with the extant literatures. There are two motivations in particular; one, as it is implied above, is to link individual–level data with events data. Then, this study aims to expand the geographic focus of the existing literatures into non–Western contexts.

[2] In the extant literature, Leadership Traits Analysis is often abbreviated to LTA. There is no common abbreviation for Operational Code Analysis, yet it is simply referred to as "op code." Here, I follow the current terminology as I use LTA and occasionally use "op code" as well.

Leadership Traits Analysis

As one of the long standing approaches to how psychological characteristics of political leaders affect their foreign policy, the Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) framework proved to be a fruitful line of research (Dyson 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d; Hermann 1976, 1980a, 1984, 1987; 1993, 2003a; Hermann and Milburn 1977; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Renfro 2009; Shannon and Keller 2007; Taysi and Preston 2001). This particular research program derives from the assumption that one can infer a leader's personality from his or her verbal records. In other words, leaders' choices of certain words reflect their personalities. As Hermann (2003a: 186) explains, "In effect, the trait analysis is quantitative in nature and employs frequency counts. At issue is what percentage of the time in responding to interviewers' questions when leaders could exhibit particular words and phrases are they, indeed, used." Each trait is calculated according to a coding scheme developed by Hermann, and the scores for each range from zero to one (discussed later).

According to Hermann, the most useful traits in assessing leadership style are (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others'

ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (2003a: 184). Before a further discussion of the LTA literature, it is worth explaining each trait individually and the coding procedures associated with them, as well as how leadership styles can be assessed based on LTA scores. Behavioral predictions with respect to each trait are also discussed later in this chapter and in the following as hypotheses are revealed. The following borrows primarily from Hermann's (2003a) discussion; the traits are listed alphabetically and the abbreviations are used throughout this dissertation.

Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)

This trait measures an individual leader's perception of the degree of control he or she believes has over the situations they deal with. Leaders with high Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) scores often cast more interest and are active in the policy making process. In addition, they do not delegate authority and rather take initiative than wait for others. When a leader has a low BACE score, the opposite is true: s/he is expected to be rather reactive and follow a 'wait–and–see' policy before they decide to take action. Leaders with low BACE scores are more likely to blame others for mistakes or failures because they often delegate authority to others. Hermann (2003a: 190) also argues that when a leader does not believe that s/he has any control over what happens "fear of failure may supersede and crowd out sense of timing." The BACE score is calculated by "the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has taken responsibility for planning

or initiating an action. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses being examined" (Hermann 2003a: 189).

Conceptual Complexity (CC)

This trait assesses an individual's ability to approach other people, places, policies, or ideas, etc. from multiple perspectives. As such, a conceptually complex leader can reason that there may be various explanations for a particular thing or happening. They would be more comfortable with the idea that there is ambiguity in the political world. A conceptually complex leader would seek additional contextual information from their environments and invite other actors in the decision making processes for that purpose. Because these leaders do not necessarily trust their first response to an event and seek more information, they also take their time to reach a decision. Leaders with low Conceptual Complexity (CC) scores, to the contrary, would find less ambiguity in the world, because they have a dichotomous, 'black–and–white' understanding of the world around them. Such leaders are more likely to trust their intuition and make decisions based on some stereotypes. The first step in calculating a leader's CC score is focusing on the use of certain words in speech. For instance, "approximately," "possibility," "trend," and "for example" suggest high conceptual complexity. In contrast, "absolutely," "without a doubt," "certainly," and "irreversible" indicate low levels of conceptual complexity. The CC score is derived from the percentage of high complexity words to the total number of words that suggest either high or low conceptual complexity

(Mahdasian 2002: 28). "The overall score for any leader is his or her average score across interview responses" (Hermann 2003a: 196–197).

Distrust of Others (DIS)

Distrust of others reflects a leader's perception of his/her trust in the motives and actions of other actors. Leaders high in Distrust of Others (DIS) scores become very suspicious of those who are competitors for their own positions or against their cause and ideology. These leaders always look for ulterior motives and designs in others' behavior. Given their distrust of others, these leaders are rather willing to do some things on their own than depend on others to take care of them. In addition, leaders high in DIS find some utility in shuffling their advisors around so that they cannot challenge their authority over the long run. Leaders with low DIS scores, on the other hand, are capable of evaluating things based on their past experiences with the people they are dealing with and the nature of circumstances. "In coding for distrust of others, the focus is on noun and noun phrases referring to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with whom the leader identifies" (Hermann 2003a: 202). When the noun or noun phrase indicates distrust, then it is coded. The DIS score is the ratio of such uses to the total number of references to other actors in the leader's response.

In–group Bias (IGB)[3]

In–group bias is the leadership trait that assesses the individual's view of the centrality his/her own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) to the world. Leaders have strong emotional attachments to this in–group, and perceive it as the best (Hermann 2003a: 201). High In–group bias (IGB) scores indicate that leaders value the identity of their group, its culture and status, and they would like to maintain these at all costs. Leaders high in in–group bias become very protective of their in–group and find other groups' interests in their group as interference in their internal affairs. These leaders tend to have an "us–vs.–them" view of the world. Finally, leaders with high In–group bias (IGB) scores are more likely to see the positive characteristics of their group but reject any problems with the group. Hermann notes that leaders low in in–group bias still feel an attachment to their group and are interested in maintaining the group identity. However, these leaders tend not to have the friends and enemies perception of the world. The nature of the situation often conditions the "us–vs.–them" categorization for leaders low in in–group bias. According to Hermann, these leaders "may use interactions such as summit conferences and positive diplomatic gestures as strategies for tempering domestic discontent" (2003a: 202). "In coding for in-group bias, the unit of analysis is a word or phrase referring to the particular leader's own group. Of interest is ascertaining the following information when the leader makes a reference to his or her group: are the modifiers used favorable (e.g., *great, peace-loving, progressive, successful, prosperous*); do they suggest strength (e.g., *powerful, capable, made great advances, has boundless*

[3] In Hermann's earlier works, In–Group Bias appeared as "nationalism" (see, Hermann 1980a).

resources); or do they indicate the need to maintain group honor and identity (e.g., "need to defend firmly our borders," "must maintain our own interpretation," decide our own policies")? If any of these modifiers are present, the phrase indicates in-group bias" (Hermann 2003a: 201; italics in original). The In-group Bias (IGB) score is the ratio of references to the in–group that have these modifiers to the total number of references to the group.

Need for Power (PWR)

The need for power and influence trait indicates a leader's aspiration to establish, maintain, or restore his or her power over other individuals, groups, or the world at large (Winter 1973:250). The need for power trait can be traced when the speaker is (a) proposing or engaging in a strong action such as a verbal threat or an accusation, (b) giving advice or assistance when it is not solicited, (c) attempting to regulate the behavior others, (d) trying to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else so long as the concern is not to reach an agreement or avoid disagreement, (e) seeking recognition and praise with an action, and (f) concerned with his or her reputation or position. Leaders who have high Need for Power (PWR) scores "will insert themselves into the political process at every opportunity" (Mahdasian 2002: 26). These leaders do not necessarily care for others around them; others are only instrumental as long as they serve a purpose. When a leader is low in need for power, Hermann expects that s/he would be interested in empowering others by sharing with them a sense of responsibility and accountability for what happens. As such, these leaders do not bother that others receive credit for

accomplishments. In other words, leaders with low PWR scores "are willing to open up the political process to allow other actors significant influence" (Mahdasian 2002: 26). Hermann posits that such behaviors create high morale in leader's followers and a sense of team spirit and goal clarity, also that in doing so these leaders aim to establish a relationship of trust with their followers. The Need for Power (PWR) score "is determined by calculating the percentage of times the verbs in an interview response indicate that the speaker or a group with whom the speaker identifies has engaged in one of those behaviors. The overall score for any leader is the average of this percentage across the total number of interview responses examined" (Hermann 2003a: 190).

Self–Confidence (SC)

Hermann describes the self–confidence trait as an indication of "one's sense of self–importance, an individual's image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment" (2003a: 194). A leader whose self-confidence score is high does not search for more information to evaluate themselves or their behavior; hence, they are closed to incoming information from the environment. These leaders are less likely to be affected by "contextual contingencies" and behavioral consistency is important for them. Leaders with low Self–Confidence (SC) scores, on the other hand, search for new information from their environment as they are challenged by changing circumstances and do not know what to do or how to conform to those circumstances. As such, these individuals are likely to behave inconsistently since the environment around them conditions their behavior and not their needs and desires. "A score on this trait is

determined by calculation the percentage of times [*my, myself, I, me,* and *mine*] are used in an interview response" (Hermann 2003a: 195). When a leader uses these pronouns in his/her speech, then three criteria have to be met for a count: the use of the pronoun (1) represents instigation of an activity, (2) presents the self as an authority figure, and (3) reflects the self as the recipient of a positive response from another person or group. "The trait score is then calculated by dividing the number of positive instances by the total number of self references in the text" (Mahdasian 2002: 28).

Task Focus (TASK)

This trait reflects if a leader's orientation is towards the completion of a task (problem solving) or the maintenance of group spirit and morale (building relationships). "For leaders who emphasize the problem, moving the group (nation, government, ethnic group, religious group, union, etc.) forward toward a goal is their principal purpose for assuming leadership. For those who emphasize group maintenance and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and morale are the central functions of leadership" (Hermann 2003a: 198). Once again, the score for Task Focus (TASK) is calculated by the count of certain words in an interview response. Examples of task–oriented words are "accomplishment," "achieve(ment)," "plan," "position," "tactic"; examples of group-maintenance words are "appreciation," "collaboration," "disappoint(ment)," and "suffering." The TASK score is the ratio of task–oriented words to the total of task–oriented and group–maintenance words.

Table 2.1 Leadership Traits Analysis: Trait Conceptualization and Coding Scheme

Trait	Description	Coding
Belief can control events	Perception of the world as an environment leader can influence. Leader's own state is perceived as an influential actor in the international system.	Percentage of verbs used that reflect action or planning for action of the leader or relevant group.
Conceptual complexity	Capability of discerning different dimensions of the environment when describing actors, places, ideas, and situations.	Percentage of words related to high complexity (i.e., ''approximately,'' ''possibility,'' ''trend'') vs. low complexity (i.e., ''absolutely,'' ''certainly,'' ''irreversible'').
Distrust of others	Doubt about and wariness of others.	Percentage of nouns that indicate misgivings or suspicions that others intend harm toward speaker or speaker's group.
In–group bias	Perception of one's group as holding a central role, accompanied with strong feelings of national identity and honor.	Percentage of references to the group that are favorable (i.e., ''successful,'' ''prosperous,'' ''great''), show strength (i.e., ''powerful,'' ''capable'') or a need to maintain group identity (i.e., ''decide our own policies,'' ''defend our borders'').
Need for power	A concern with gaining, keeping and restoring power over others.	Percentage of verbs that reflect actions of attack, advise, influence the behavior of others, concern with reputation.
Self confidence	Personal image of self–importance in terms of the ability to deal with the environment.	Percentage of personal pronouns used such as ''my,'' ''myself,'' ''I,'' ''me,'' and ''mine,'' which show speaker perceives self as the instigator of an activity, an authority figure, or a recipient of a positive reward.
Task focus	Relative focus on problem solving versus maintenance of relationship to others. Higher score indicates greater problem focus.	Percentage of words related to instrumental activities (i.e., ''accomplishment,'' ''plan,'' ''proposal'') versus concern for other's feelings and desires (i.e., ''collaboration,'' ''amnesty,'' ''appreciation'').

Source: Dyson (2006: 292).

These seven traits help develop a leader's profile; however, scores for each trait are meaningful only when they are compared to another set of scores—that is, those of a norming group. Hermann's research now encompasses leadership traits scores for 122 political leaders and 87 heads of state (Hermann 2003a); this is often treated as the norming group in the literature and the means and standard deviations from those for either the whole group or sub–groups such as leaders from a particular country or region become the basis for comparison.[4] Alternatively, a leader's scores can be compared across time, issue, or under other different circumstances. When a leader's scores are a standard deviation below the norming group's mean, then s/he profiles low in that trait; accordingly, when a trait is a standard deviation above the norming group's, then the leader has a high score for the trait in question. When a leader's score is close to the norming group's mean, the leader is moderate in that particular trait. Based on such a comparison of a particular leader's personality traits scores with a norming group, different leadership styles can be assessed (Hermann 2003a; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998).

Leaders have different styles of decision making because they "relate to those around them—whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders—and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions" in different manners (Hermann 2003a: 181). Once leaders are compared to a norming group, the answers to three particular questions define leadership style (Hermann 2003a):

1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment—do they

[4] The extant LTA literature suffers from a misspecification of its norming group (discussed later). Hermann's average leader profiles, along with others, are presented in Table 2.7 (page 29).

respect or challenge such constraints?

2) How open are leaders to incoming information—do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their response?
3) What are the leaders' reasons for seeking their positions—are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents?

Tables 2.2 through 2.6 summarize how leadership styles can be decided according to the three questions above and based on how a leader's trait scores compare with the norming group selected. First, how a leader ranks according to his/her scores in Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for Power (PWR) help determine the leader's responsiveness to constraints. Here, leader personality is assessed as to "how important it is for them to exert control and influence over the environment in which they find themselves, and the constraints that environment poses, as opposed to being adaptable to the situation and remaining open to responding to the demands of domestic and international constituencies and circumstances" (Hermann 2003a: 182). Table 2.2 summarizes behavioral expectations from a leader depending on their BACE and PWR scores.

Table 2.2 Leader's Reaction to Constraints

Need for power	**Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events**	
	Low	***High***
Low	**Respect constraints**; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important.	**Challenge constraints** but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.
High	**Challenge constraints** but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion—behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where they can pull strings but are less accountable for result.	**Challenge constraints**; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

Source: Hermann (2003a: 188)

Table 2.3 Rules for Determining Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence	**Openness to Contextual Information**
CC > SC	Open
CC < SC	Closed
CC and SC Both High	Open
CC and SC Both Low	Closed

Source: Hermann (2003a: 194)

A leader's Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Self-Confidence (SC) scores together indicate his/her openness to new information. Table 2.3 displays the rules to decide when one can expect a leader would be open or close to new information. This assessment is important because the two ends suggest distinct approaches to decision making (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998). Leaders who are open to contextual information act as "cue–takers" and seek information both supportive and discrepant of their own. Leaders who are less open to new information, on the other hand, act as "advocates" of their own agendas and ideas; they seek support for their position and work to persuade others along the way. Hermann (2003a: 192) argues that a leader whose CC score is higher than his/her SC score—hence, who is open to new information—is able to get others to do things because others perceive that the leader is interested in what happens to them and that s/he is concerned about helping them.

In relation to the third question about why leaders seek their positions, Hermann (2003a: 197) notes that there are two issues that must be accounted for assessing a leader's motivations: one is why the leader sought the office, and the other is the leader's motivations in leading and securing their group (also, their position within). These motives are so important that they "shape [leaders'] character—what is important in their lives and what drives them to act" (Hermann 2003a: 183). Based on the conclusions from relevant literature, Hermann generalizes two types of motivation in political leaders. One is a leader driven by an internal focus such as an ideology, a set of specific interests, problems or a cause that force them to act. The latter group of leaders are motivated by a

desired relationship with others in their environment and they take action because of these factors other than themselves.

Table 2.4 Rules for Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office

Score on Task Focus	Motivation for Seeking Office
High	Problem
Moderate	Context-specific
Low	Relationship

Source: Hermann (2003a: 198)

Task Focus (TASK) score can help profile a leader for his/her motivation for seeking office. Table 2.4 illustrates how this can be determined. Together the In-Group Bias (IGB) and Distrust of Others (DIS) scores assess a leader's motivation towards the world—or leader's identification with the group. Table 2.5 summarizes this discussion. Taken as a whole, these evaluations suggest distinct leadership styles as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, and motivation. In Table 2.6 these different leadership styles are summarized.[5]

[5] A similar table can be found in Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw (2001), which displays some differences with the one in Hermann's own work (2003a). The reason for those is that the former article focuses on decision units and the latter is about leadership styles. Table 2.6 is borrowed from Hermann (2003a) given the focus of this dissertation.

Table 2.5 Motivation Toward World

In-group Bias	Distrust of others	
	Low	***High***
Low	World is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and are reacted to on a case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible. *(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships)*	World is perceived as conflict prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests. *(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant)*
High	While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders view that it is bounded by a specified set of international norms; even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as leaders work to limit the threat and enhance their countries' capabilities and relative status. *(Focus is on dealing with threats and solving problems even though some situations nay appear to offer opportunities)*	International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior. *(Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems)*

Source: Hermann (2003a: 200)

Most extant literature in LTA base their discussion on conclusions from leadership style and how a leader compares to the norming group selected. Hence, a leader profile is created. Hermann (2003a: 206) notes, however, that these profiles can be "contextualized" as well. In doing so, it would be possible to discuss the stability of a leader's traits. Otherwise, one assumes that these traits are relatively stable across time, topics, audience and any other contextual features that a leader may be sensitive to. For instance, Hermann suggests looking at the effects of the audience and if a leader's scores differ according to whom they are talking with and in what setting (Hermann 2003a: 206). According to Hermann (2003a: 208), such further investigations beyond constructing a general leadership profile would add "depth and nuance" to a leader's profile. Indeed, some recent work is based on questioning this very assumption about the stability of leaders traits (for instance, Mahdasian 2002).

Table 2.6 Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information, and Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	***Relationship Focus***
Challenges constraints	***Closed to information***	**Expansionistic** (Focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's, and state's span of control)	**Evangelistic** (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
Challenges constraints	***Open to information***	**Actively Independent** (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)	**Directive** (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
Respects constraints	***Closed to information***	**Incremental** (Focus of attention is on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way)	**Influential** (Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
Respects constraints	***Open to information***	**Opportunistic** (Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important constituencies will allow)	**Collegial** (Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus—on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

Source: Hermann (2003a: 185)

A Review of Leadership Traits Analysis Literature

Margaret Hermann's (1980a) article "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders" builds upon Hermann's (1974, 1976, 1978) previous work on political personality. This article is significant for its unique (and still rare) attempt to link personality and behavior within a conceptual framework. In 1980, Hermann's study included forty–five heads of government from across the world. Her analyses showed that when leaders had little interest or training in foreign policy then their personality characteristics were the most influential (Hermann 1980a: 43–44).

Since, LTA has been applied to a large number of heads of states and political leaders (multiple works), as well as heads of international organizations such as the United Nations (Kille 2006; Kille and Scully 2003). Hermann's individual and collaborated research now spans a worldwide geography of leaders from about 50 countries (Hermann 2003a: 204–205). Specifically, it is 87 heads of state from forty-six countries and 122 political leaders from forty-eight countries. The latter list includes, in addition to the 87 heads of state, prominent members of the various branches of the government——and the leadership of the opposition, and revolutionary leaders since 1945. While the means (and standard deviations) for this sample——or, its sub–groups—of heads of state or political leaders are often used as a reference point for comparison, some now report their own

reference groups. For instance, Dyson (2006) compares Tony Blair's traits scores (Prime minister of Great Britain, 1997–2007) with all other British prime ministers since 1945.

One problem with the extant literature is that as the transition from hand–coding to fully automated coding has been taking place in the past decade or so, there appears to be some confusion as to the reference groups reported in published works. While both of Hermann's samples are based on hand coding of leaders, now a new reference ("norming") group is also being published that is the average profile of 51 political leaders (Dyson 2006; Dyson and Billordo 2004) that come from automated coding.[6] Scholars must be aware of how these profiles were calculated and compare their own leader profiles with Hermann's (or others') only when the same methods are used. Table 2.8 (below) shows the average leadership profiles in Hermann (2003a) and Dyson (2006), and the latest available data from Social Science Automation, Inc. (SSA).[7]

[6] Azamat Sakiev, Hermann's research assistant at Syracuse University, confirms that these are hand–coded results (email communication, May 31, 2010). While Hermann (2003a) does not explicitly state the coding procedure, Michael Young also concludes that the average profiles reported by Hermann are hand–coded (personal communication, June 9, 2010).

[7] Michael Young and Margaret Hermann founded Social Science Automation Inc. in 1997. The company specializes in automated text analysis and provides services to government, business, and academic clients (www.socialscience.net). The Social Science Automation average scores, reported here, come in a file in the ProfilerPlus download package, and are calculated in June 25, 2007 according to the documentation.

Table 2.7 Average LTA Profiles

Leadership Trait	*87 heads of state (Hermann 2003a)*	*122 political leaders (Hermann 2003a)*	*51 political leaders (Dyson 2006)*	*214 political leaders (SSA)*
Belief can control events	Mean = .44 Low < .30 High > .58	Mean = .45 Low < .33 High > .57	Mean = .35 stdev = .04	Mean = .34 stdev = .04
Conceptual complexity	Mean = .44 Low < .32 High > .56	Mean = .45 Low < .32 High > .58	Mean = .57 stdev = .04	Mean = .65 stdev = .04
Distrust of others	Mean = .41 Low < .25 High > .56	Mean = .38 Low < .20 High > .56	Mean = .12 stdev = .04	Mean = .01 stdev = 0
In-group bias	Mean = .42 Low < .32 High > .53	Mean = .43 Low < .34 High > .53	Mean = .09 stdev = .02	Mean = .51 stdev = .07
Need for power	Mean = .50 Low < .37 High > .62	Mean = .50 Low < .38 High > .62	Mean = .24 stdev = .03	Mean = .26 stdev = .04
Self confidence	Mean = .62 Low < .44 High > .81	Mean = .57 Low < .34 High > .80	Mean = .41 stdev = .08	Mean = .36 stdev = .09
Task focus	Mean = .59 Low < .46 High > .71	Mean = .62 Low < .48 High > .76	Mean = .63 stdev = .06	Mean = .73 stdev = .06

Many profiles that have been developed by applying LTA showed accuracy in describing the personalities of political leaders around the world. Hermann (2003a: 211) notes that the profiles of twenty–one leaders in her own work match closely with the accounts of journalists and former government personnel. For instance, in her recent work on Saddam Hussein's leadership style, Hermann (2003b) portrays Hussein as a leader who had an expansionistic orientation (see Table 2.6, above, page 26) to politics because he had high scores in nationalism, need for power, distrust of others, and self–confidence.

Saddam Hussein, according to this profile, saw the political world full of threats and sought to defend himself and Iraq by keeping, as well as, increasing power and influence in the world.

As Hermann (2003b) shows, for Hussein politics was the art of dealing with these threats; hence, he pursued policies of building various types of weaponry, affecting world oil prices, invading neighbors' territories (Iran in 1980; Kuwait in 1990), trying to assume leadership in the Arab world, and challenging the United States at times. In addition, Hermann is to the point in her description of Hussein as a "Machiavellian" in his relationship with his advisers and others. Saddam Hussein did not have any attachments to anyone but his relationships served him a purpose. For instance, Hussein's motivation to approach Yasser Arafat in the late 1980s was to claim leadership in the Arab world by showing his support and sympathy to the Palestinians and filling the gap of Egypt and Jordan at the time. Likewise, many accounts of Saddam Hussein's relations with his advisers and those in his inner circle do indeed correspond to Hermann's (2003b) profile that they had to follow Hussein's orders and will no matter what the consequences of those would be, since doing otherwise would mean leaving the inner circle and in some circumstances torture or even death (for instance, the assassination of Saddam Hussein's son–in–law Hussein Kamal in February 1996—see, Post 2003: 354). Similar profiles of other world leaders exist in the LTA literature; among many others, Hermann's own work contains profiles of African leaders, Hafez al-Asad of Syria, and Bill Clinton. Among others, Taysi and Preston (2001) profile Iran's president Khatami.

Most recent works in LTA shed light on the decision making during the Iraq war (Dyson 2006, 2009a, 2009d; Shannon and Keller 2007) and explain how leadership styles mattered for policy making at the time. A leadership traits analysis of Tony Blair shows how his preferences and behavior explain Britain's choice in Iraq (Dyson 2006). Blair, according to his personality profile, had a high Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE), a low Conceptual Complexity (CC), and a high Need for Power (PWR); as the Iraq war unfolded, Blair "demonstrated a proactive policy orientation, internal locus of control in terms of shaping events, a binary information processing and framing style, and a preference to work through tightly held processes in policy making" (Dyson 2006: 303). In his later work, Dyson (2009d) explores the leadership in the United States administration—specifically, then the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

In another study employing LTA, Shannon and Keller (2007) show that against some constructivist and realist propositions about how international norms violated due to global social pressures or self–interest and anarchic nature of world politics—respectively, leaders' beliefs and their decision making styles have significant impact on why and how leaders may defy international norms. Shannon and Keller look at leadership traits of the members of the George W. Bush administration and their positions regarding the 2003 Iraq war.[8] Bringing insights from political leadership literature, Shannon and Keller's analysis show that particular leadership traits (such as high BACE,

[8] These individuals are: President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

PWR, DIS, and IGB) can predict a leader's propensity to respect or challenge international norms. These works illustrate the significance of LTA as a method of explaining foreign policy behavior and linking it with the personalities of decision-makers.

Operational Code Analysis

Operational code analysis is the study of core belief system of an individual leader and "asks what the individual knows, feels, and wants regarding the exercise of power in human affairs" (Schafer and Walker 2006a:29). Since power relationships entail a social relationship of self and others in the exercise of power, operational code analysis is about the identification of a leader's political belief system about self and others and their interactions with each other (Schafer and Walker 2006a). Like Hermann's LTA, Operational Code Analysis is an at–a–distance technique as well and is based on the assumption that a leader's belief system manifests itself in his or her use of the language.

Present literature in operational code analysis (discussed later in this chapter) uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) method (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) to find quantitative answers to George's (1969) ten questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. These questions are:

Philosophical Beliefs

1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/ or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

As one can infer from the questions to assess an individual's philosophical and instrumental beliefs, the former rather relate to how the leader perceives the world and his or her role within that world. Instrumental beliefs assess the leader's choices in achieving his or her political objectives. In the VICS, the first philosophical belief and instrumental belief are called "master beliefs"—hence, they are "theoretically and

empirically" related to the other beliefs in philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Shafer and Walker 2006a: 33).[9] Master beliefs (P–1: the nature of the political universe, I–1: direction of strategy) and the other eight operational codes are numerical indices, calculated from the speech acts according to the VICS coding scheme.

The VICS follows several other content analysis systems—such as events datasets—as it too focuses on the properties of verbs in speech acts (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 29–32; Walker, Schafer, Young 1998, 2003). In addition, based on its foundations on understanding power relationships between self and other, the VICS method also takes the context (political environment) into consideration as operational code indices are calculated. Essentially, the argument is that the use of verbs in speech acts indicates different intensities of the exercise of power between self and other. Specifically, there are *deeds* (such as "aid" and "attack") that denote positive or negative actions in the exercise of power and *words* (such as "promise" and "threaten") that represent the exercise of power in relatively lower forms of (positive or negative) intensity.

The VICS indices are calculated according to the self–other designation and the levels of intensity. The former is decided by the grammatical subject of the verb since the subject would either talk about self or about others in the political universe. As to the latter, there are three levels of intensity—either negative or positive—in the VICS: (1) low

[9] The label "master belief" comes from Holsti's (1977) reconfiguration of the operational code construct. The ensuing operational code literature adopted this approach. For a brief discussion, see Picucci (2008: 121).

intensity, words, (2) medium intensity, words, and (3) high intensity, deeds. For instance, once the self or other designation is made, then the tense of the verb and whether the verb is cooperative or conflictual are decided. Then, the intensity of a verb corresponds to the following six categories: positive deeds become Rewards (+3), and negative deeds Punishments (–3). Likewise, positive words can take a value of Promise (+2) or Appeal/Support (+1) and negative words Threat (–2) or Oppose/Resist (–1). When verbs do not fit into any of these categories or have no political relevance, they are coded Neutral (0) and do not affect the calculation of operational code. All in all, the VICS method records entries for six characteristics for each verb and its context: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003: 224). These six steps are illustrated below in Table 2.8. The calculation of operational code indices are derived from the records for each and every verbs used in a speech act.

The following discussion explains the calculation of each philosophical and instrumental belief according the VICS. The letters P and I in the ensuing discussion correspond to philosophical and instrumental beliefs, respectively; each belief matches with the question number in George (1969). A short descriptor follows each belief index, which is borrowed from Schafer and Walker (2006a). First, I explain the philosophical indices, which stand for how the leader perceives the world and his or her role within that world. Then, the discussion shifts to the instrumental beliefs in operational code; instrumental beliefs assess the leader's choices in achieving his or her political objectives.

Table 2.8 VICS Steps in Coding A Verb

STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM

1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF OR OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+) OR NEGATIVE (–)

WORDS	APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OR PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)	OPPOSE, RESIST (–1) OR THREATEN COSTS (–2)
DEEDS	REWARDS (+3)	PUNISHMENTS (–3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS

DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

An Example

A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980, address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan . . ."

1. **Subject**. The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category**. The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain**. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and Context**. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.

The **complete data line** for this statement is: other –3 foreign past afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.

Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998: 183)

P–1: The nature of the political universe

This index explains a leader's beliefs about how other actors in the political universe approach and define their goals. The P–1 index is a subtraction of the percentage of negative verbs from the percentage of positive verbs in the speech act, which are attributed to other. The index varies between –1 and +1, a conflictual/hostile view of the political universe and a cooperative/friendly view. As Schafer and Walker (2006a: 33) note, this index captures a broad, general measure of the leader's views of other actors in the political universe. It is assumed, for instance, that when a leader has a cooperative understanding of the nature of the political universe, the cooperative attributions to others in their speech acts will be higher (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 178). The P–1 index can be interpreted according the range of possible values associated with it; indeed, Walker, Schafer, and Young (2003: 227) propose the following continuum of possible scores for the P–1 index:

HOSTILE								FRIENDLY
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
–1.0	–.75	–.50	–.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

P–2: Prospects for realizing fundamental values

The P–2 index, and the other remaining philosophical beliefs, relate at least partly with the master philosophical index, P–1 (the nature of the political universe). The index for realization of fundamental political values (P–2) represents a leader's prospects for success in that regard. A leader's optimism or pessimism about realizing his or her fundamental political values rests on their beliefs about the persistence of conflict—if it is temporary or permanent—in the political universe (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 178). The P–2 index is calculated by first adding the weights (according to their intensity values, –3 to +3) of every verb attributed to the other and then dividing this result with the total number verbs attributed to the other. This would be divided by three, in order to make the P–2 index range from –1 to +1. As such, optimism is associated with a positive mean intensity score. For instance, one would expect that an optimistic leader's net intensity of attributions to others be less negative and more positive (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 178). The P–2 index can be interpreted according to the following scale:

PESSIMISTIC								OPTIMISTIC
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
–1.0	–.75	–.50	–.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

P–3: Predictability of the political universe

This index measures self's view of consistency and predictability in other's actions. The P–3 index is calculated by using a dispersion measure—the Index of Qualitative Variation, IQV (Watson and McGaw1980: 88)—of the distribution of observations across the six verb categories attributed to the other. The assumption here is that when there is a higher variation in the positive and negative verbs attributed to the other, the predictability of the political actions of the other will be lower (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 179). The index is calculated by subtracting the IQV from one, and the score ranges from 0 to 1. Low scores indicate lower predictability in the political universe, and higher scores more predictability.

PREDICTABILITY			PREDICTABILITY	
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

P–4: Control over historical development[10]

The P–4a index is unique in that it includes verbs attributed to both self and other; as such, it is a balance between self and other attributions. This index is a measure of the

[10] This index can be calculated for the self's and the other's control over historical development; often the former is reported in the literature and is called the P–4a index. The latter, P–4b, is in fact 1 minus P–4a and indicates the other's control over historical developments.

leader's view of how much he or she controls historical developments or political outcomes. This perception depends on who the self thinks is taking the most action, which indicates the locus of control in the political universe according to the self. For example, if a leader is attributing more actions to others, then s/he thinks that others control political outcomes and not the subject. The P–4a index is the ratio of self-attributed verbs to the sum of self and other attributed verbs. The P–4a score varies between 0 and 1. Low scores mean others are the locus of control according the subject, higher scores indicate the subject is in control of shaping historical developments or political outcomes.

CONTROL				CONTROL
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

P–5: Role of chance

The P–5 index relates with P–3 and P–4 indices; logically, if a leader believes that others' actions are predictable (a high P–3 score) and s/he is the locus of control in the political universe (a high P–4 score), then there would not be much role of chance in the political universe. The index for the role of chance is calculated by 1 minus the product of the P–3 index times the P–4 index; this P–5 figure can range from 0 to 1.

CHANCE				CHANCE
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I–1: Direction of strategy

The first instrumental belief index, I–1, is also a master belief—like the P–1 index. The I–1 index is a leader's strategic approach to political goals; specifically, it is a measure of self's beliefs about the best strategic direction for actions, either cooperative or conflictual. It is assumed that when the subject talks more about cooperation, his or her direction of strategy will be more cooperative—or, vice versa. It is important to note that the I–1 index does not necessarily tell anything about how self chooses his or her strategy but merely identifies it (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998: 179). This index is calculated by subtracting the percentage of self–attributed conflictual (–) utterances from that of self–attributed cooperative (+) utterances. The I–1 index varies from –1 to +1.

CONFLICT							COOPERATION	
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
–1.0	–.75	–.50	–.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I–2: Intensity of tactics

The I–2 index is about a leader's beliefs regarding the intensity of tactics as s/he pursues his or her strategy (the I–1). Similar to the calculations of the P–2 index, the I–2 is calculated by first adding the weights (according to their intensity values, –3 to +3) of every verb attributed to the self and then dividing this result with the total number verbs attributed to the self. The P–2 index likewise, this output would be divided by three, in order to make the I–2 index range from –1 to +1.

CONFLICT								COOPERATION
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
–1.0	–.75	–.50	–.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I–3: Risk orientation

This index measures self's level of risk averseness or acceptance. In one way, the I–3 index indicates the diversity in self's choice of tactics, because it is assumed that an assorted portfolio of actions reduce risks associated with each one action individually (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 36). The assessment of diversity in choice of tactics is measured with the help of the IQV too. Distinct from the calculation of P–3 index, here in calculating the I–3 the distribution of observations across the six verb categories attributed to the self matters. The I–3 index is calculated by subtracting the IQV from

one, and the score ranges from 0 to 1. Low scores indicate—low tactical diversity and hence—self's risk averseness, and higher scores mean higher levels of risk acceptance.

RISK AVERSE				RISK ACCEPTANT
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I–4: Importance of timing of actions

The I–4 index is in fact composed of two indices: these indices derive from a continuation of interest in the diversity of tactics employed by self (I–3), but in the I–4 index there is a focus specifically on the flexibility of actions. As such, I–4a is a measure of flexibility of tactics between cooperation and conflict, and I–4b is a measure of flexibility of tactics between words and deeds. The formula for I–4a is "one minus the absolute value of [the percentage of cooperative self utterances minus the percentage of conflictual self utterances]" and the formula for I–4b is "one minus the absolute value of [the percentage of *word* self utterances minus the percentage of *deed* self utterances]" (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 36; italics in original). The two I–4 indices vary from 0 to 1; low scores indicate low flexibility levels, and vice versa.

FLEXIBILITY				FLEXIBILITY
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I–5: Utility of Means

The I–5 index corresponds to George's (1969) last question regarding the instrumental beliefs, and measures how a leader perceives the values of different tactics in their use of political power. There are six indices (a: Reward, b: Promise, c: Appeal/Support, d: Oppose/Resist, e: Threaten, and f: Punish), which indeed reflect the six verb categories in the VICS. These indices are calculated by a ratio of each verb category to the total verbs; each index range from 0 to 1. Higher scores mean more utility for each tactic; note the difference in the scale here compared to other indices.

UTILITY				UTILITY
Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.08	.16	.24	.32

A Review of the Operational Code Literature

Research on operational code goes back to Leites's (1951, 1953) works on Lenin's belief system and the Bolshevik revolution. Operational code analysis was later further developed by George (1969) as he refined the concept into a belief system comprising five philosophical beliefs and five instrumental beliefs. As such, George's work very

much shaped the extant literature on operational code analysis. In addition, Holsti (1970, 1977) and Walker (1977) also made significant contributions to this research. More specifically, Holsti (1977) led to the way to systematize the operational code analysis by constructing a coding manual. However, all operational code (and all at–a–distance) research then was based on hand–coding and hence was time consuming. Holsti's (1970) own contribution about John F. Dulles, and Walker's (1977) analysis of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger alike, were all based on each author's review of verbal or written material of the leader profiled. For a review of the earlier operational code literature, see Walker (1990).

After the foundational studies of operational code analysis, Walker, Schafer, and Young's (1998) systematization of the operational code analysis and their introduction of the Verbs in Context System (VICS) has led to a proliferation of research employing operational code analysis. As such, recent works on operational code have been quite influential as well and have led to an increased interest in this research tradition (among others, Bzostek and Robison 2008; Malici 2008; Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2009). The re–emergence of the operational code analysis owes mainly to Walker's individual and collaborative research on the method over the two past decades so (see among others, Walker 1983, 1990; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 1999, 2003; Schafer and Walker 2006c). Most notably, the VICS method has been a milestone in operational code research and it shapes the literature since its introduction in 1998.

Operational codes of many world leaders are constructed with Verbs in Context System (VICS), including U.S. presidents Carter (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998), Clinton (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), George W. Bush (Renshon 2008), George H. W. Bush (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), Kennedy (Renshon 2009); Israeli prime ministers Peres and Rabin (Crichlow 1998); Russian leaders Gorbachev (Malici 2008) and Putin (Schafer and Walker forthcoming); Cuban president Castro (Malici and Malici 2005); Chinese leaders Hu Jintao (Feng 2006) and Mao Zeodong (Feng 2005); Taiwanese leader Chen Shuibian (Feng 2006); North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung (Malici and Malici 2005), British prime minister Tony Blair (Schafer and Walker 2006b), Syrian president Bashar al–Asad (Malici and Buckner 2008), and Iranian president Ahmadinejad (Malici and Buckner 2008).[11] In addition to drawing a broad profile of leaders' operational code beliefs, the literature has explored a variety of topics such as analyzing operational codes through public and private statements (Renshon 2009), how leaders adapt to changing circumstances in the international system (Malici and Malici 2005) and learn (Renshon 2008).

For instance, Renshon (2008) looks at changes in U.S. president George W. Bush's (GWB) belief systems. Specifically, Renshon analyzes GWB's core beliefs in four different phases of his political career: Phase 1 from governor to president (1998 to 2001), Phase 2 pre-September 11th presidency (eight months), Phase 3 post-September 11th presidency (six months), and Phase 4 to the end of his second term in office.

[11] This list does not include operational code profiles before the introduction of VICS (Verbs In Context System) in Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998).

Transitions from one phase to another mark different effects on GWB's beliefs: the effects of role change (1 to 2), exogenous shock (2 to 3), and learning in office (3 to 4). According to the results, there are significant shifts in GWB's operational code from Phase 2 to Phase 3. His view of the nature of universe (P-1) drops to .21 (somewhat friendly) from .51 (definitely friendly) in Phase 2. This shows that traumatic shocks lead to fundamental changes in individual's belief systems. While GWB viewed the world as friendly and cooperative before 9/11, those views became significantly more conflictual and hostile after 9/11. Renshon finds that only the first three philosophical indices change significantly between Phase 2 and 3, suggesting that Bush's overall operational code was relatively stable. Yet, this still illustrates the importance of these indices as they are at the heart of how the individual views the political universe. When Renshon extends the six-month period to eighteen months (Phase 3 till March 11, 2003), his reanalysis suggest that traumatic events can permanently change belief systems. He finds, for instance, that P-1 index (view of the nature of universe) rebounds to .27 for the extended Phase 3. Renshon (2008) argues that while in the short term a severe reversal of key indices is possible over a longer period of time severe changes become slightly attenuated as the new belief system is consolidated. Unlike changes in GWB's belief system, according to Malici and Malici (2005) there were no learning effects on Fidel Castro's and Kim Il Sung's belief systems but changes in Cuban and North Korean foreign policies, respectively, were rather due to the changing circumstances of the international order in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Operational code analysis is one vibrant field of research; in addition to the literature cited above, Schafer and Walker (2006c) collection of essays is an indispensible source in this area. This edited volume illustrates the diversity of operational code research.[12] For instance, in her contribution to this book, Feng (2006) looks at the relationship between China's and Taiwan's leaders. Others (Drury 2006; Stevenson 2006; Thies 2006) illustrate how operational code construct can be applied to topics in international political economy. Also noteworthy is Picucci's (2008) dissertation research; his work is significant in that he takes the concept back to its original application at the group–level (i.e., Leites's discussion of the Soviet belief system) and looks at belief systems of terrorist organizations—specifically, al–Qaeda and Hamas.

Discussion:

Linking Leadership Traits and Operational Code to Foreign Policy Behavior

Both leadership traits analysis and operational code analysis have advanced on many fronts and have expanded our knowledge about foreign policy decision making. However, as Schafer (2000) argued, the broader inquiry into the effects of cognition on international relations remains a relatively young research agenda and much is still left to do. The leading scholars in Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis

[12] For a recent review, see Walker and Schafer (2010).

suggest various avenues for further research. For instance, there is an agreement that both literatures can be expanded and linked with large event datasets (Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009; Young and Schafer 1998). In addition, there is a relative dearth of research in non-Western contexts (some exceptions can be found in an edited volume by Feldman and Valenty, 2001; also see Malici 2008; Malici and Buckner 2008). Indeed, that is one reason behind the call for studying "leaders in dyads with different political cultures and institutions" (Schafer and Walker, 2006b: 580). This section discusses how there is more to benefit from LTA and operational code research as I discuss how this study fits in to these literatures.

One of the contentious points in the literature has been the type of materials (spontaneous vs. scripted, or private vs. public texts) used in assessing political leaders (see Dille 2000; Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009; Renshon 2009). This indeed has been one of the differences between leadership traits and operational code techniques covered in this dissertation. Hermann in her own research made an exclusive preference for the use of spontaneous verbal statements only in profiling political leaders. The operational code literature, on the other hand, tends to rely on leaders' speeches. While there is a lack of agreement as to what type of material is more appropriate to use, recent calls for utilizing both are noteworthy and also hint at where there can be some gains (Renfro 2009). The comparison between spontaneous and scripted materials has been one area of expansion in the LTA literature and also in the broader literature about personality effects on foreign policy behavior. Research in LTA follow Hermann's example; this notwithstanding some recent studies in LTA have compared leaders' profiles derived from spontaneous

and scripted verbal statements (Dille 2000; Dille and Young 2000; Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009; Shannon and Keller 2007). As Mahdasian (2002) notes, there exists conflicting accounts of profiling political leaders with spontaneous or scripted texts (also see, Renfro 2009). On the one hand, Dille (2000) finds that operational code indices vary depending on the spontaneity of the variable but the conceptual complexity trait does not. On the other hand, Dille and Young (2000) find variation in the latter. Like Hermann, Mahdasian concludes in favor of using spontaneous material. Recently, Renfro (2009: 218) argues that using both spontaneous and scripted is useful, and they can be complementary of each other in at–a–distance assessment of political leaders.

In the operational code analysis the preference is in favor of using scripted texts and hence it constitutes one of the differences between LTA and operational code analysis research. Despite different preferences in using scripted or spontaneous materials, the gist of the matter is that public statements are important and valid indicators of leaders' psychological characteristics (see Rosati 1984: 163; Schafer and Walker 2006a: 47). In addition, leaders' speeches, whomever the author of speech might be, are considered as the leader's own words (Winter et al. 1991: 218–219). Moreover, there are definitely other differences, as well as similarities, between the two literatures.

In the existing literatures of leadership traits analysis (LTA) and operational code analysis, scholars use these two measures of leader personality traits and belief systems independent of each other and do not benefit from the potential insights from utilizing

both LTA and operational code analysis at the same time.[13] One possible reason is that one can expect correlations between the LTA scores and operational code analysis indices (see, Young and Shafer 2005). Although some LTA and operational code analysis measurements would relate with each other, this is no reason to ignore their distinct input to foreign policy analysis. I argue that there is a lot to benefit from utilizing a leader's personality traits and belief systems together in the same research design. Before any further discussion, first I summarize the major conclusions, strengths, and weaknesses of both literatures.

Margaret Hermann's Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA), along with many other works using this method, now established that leaders indeed have different norms and principles that guide them in their dealing with other leaders, their constituents and advisers (Hermann 2003a: 181). Among others, Preston (1996, 2001) shows that presidents differ in their relationship with their advisers (also, see Hermann and Preston 1994). Preston uses two personality traits from LTA and given a president's level of expertise he proposes that there are sixteen different leader–advisor relationship models possible. Kaarbo and Hermann (1998) illustrate that European prime ministers have distinct leadership styles and hence this method can explain political leadership in other countries.

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[13] The only exceptions known to this author are Dille (2000) and Lazarevska, Sholl, and Young (2006). Dille uses only the Conceptual Complexity trait along with all the operational code indices. This work remains limited in scope as it looks at a small sample of Reagan's and Bush's statements about the U.S.–Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War. Lazarevska, Sholl, and Young also discuss only selected LTA and operational code variables of terrorist leaders.

LTA is criticized for its ability to capture the leader's personality as a snapshot at a certain moment. This was the criticism of Rasler, Thompson, and Chester (1980), in the same issue of *International Studies Quarterly* Hermann's article was published. Hermann responded to their criticism in the very same issue (Hermann 1980b), made clear that personality can be contextually dependent and this can be determined by studying diverse material. Since then, many leader profiles that were assessed using LTA technique correspond with the image of those leaders in the eyes of other leaders, advisers, and journalists (Hermann 2003a: 211). These works show that a leader's general profile can be assessed with a certain number of word count and a variety of issues covered across time and space. Nonetheless, other studies, and particularly Mahdasian (2002), also discuss how the LTA scores would become less stable when they are calculated at smaller units of time, or across different issues. Finally, a challenge still ahead is to expand this method of analysis in profiling leadership in other countries. Much published work still remains within the Western context (for instance, Dyson 2006; Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009).

As reviewed earlier, the operational code analysis dates back to Leites's (1951, 1953) works and George (1969), Holsti (1977), and Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) are the major milestones in this line of research. Compared to LTA, operational code appears to be a more vibrant area of study, with applications to various other topics than foreign policy (see, earlier discussion in this chapter). One significant difference between LTA and operational code analysis has been that the latter has produced more work as to the

stability of belief systems across time and issues. In addition, some operational code research was based on the sequential games model of Theory of Moves (Brams 1994) by assessing preference orderings from the master indices of operational code (for instance, see Marfleet and Walker 2006; Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003).

One criticism against this line of research, Picucci observes, was that it had not made a serious effort in linking belief systems to behavior (Cottam 1986; Sjoblom 1982 –both cited in Picucci 2008:125). Recent operational code analysis indeed attempts to remedy that with introducing the Theory of Moves and utilizing events data in its analyses. Two criticisms leveled against LTA are not valid in the case of operational code analysis. Unlike LTA, this literature has investigated the changes in leaders' beliefs in response to various contextual factors (issue, time, authorship, etc.). Moreover, arguably, operational code technique has been applied to leadership from many different countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria.

In addition to their strengths and weakness as individual methods of personality assessment at–a–distance, both LTA and operational code analysis face with shared criticism as well as challenges. The first and foremost is the skepticism against the analysis at the individual–level. As discussed in Chapter 1, this rather originates from a structural understanding of international politics. LTA, operational code, and many other approaches to the role of individuals in international politics have successfully shown that such skepticism is baseless. Alas, power politics in its many forms—security, economic, or cultural—continue to lure many. As to the challenges at–a–distance methods had

faced when they were introduced (time, replication issues, etc.), most are remedied by the introduction of automated coding. These notwithstanding, both LTA and operational code analysis can make more strides in explaining personality effects on world politics.

One step forward in LTA and operational code research can be benefiting from each other's achievements and strengths, and utilizing both in at–a–distance assessment of leaders worldwide. As explained earlier, LTA and operational code analysis employ different measures and hence they produce leader profiles with different criteria. That is indeed why I argue for a combination of the two in assessing the impact of leadership on foreign policy making, and I utilize both in the following pages. As a theoretical goal, the present study aims to tackle this question of a possible integration—or, at the least, bridging—of LTA and operational code analysis to understand idiosyncratic effects on foreign policy behavior. What more can LTA and operational code analysis tell when they are used simultaneously? The existing literatures provide some hints at potential answers to this question. Separate LTA and operational code analysis profiles for some world leaders exist in their respective literatures, and these can illustrate the benefits of combining LTA and operational code analysis. For instance, Dyson (2006) and Schafer and Walker (2001) both study British Prime Minister Tony Blair, respectively Blair's leadership traits and operational code.[14]

[14] Dyson (2006) use automated–coding. Schafer and Walker (2001), on the other hand, hand–code Blair's speeches. The reason for selecting these particular studies is that both study reports a general profile of Blair.

According to Dyson's (2006) analysis, Tony Blair has a high Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE), a low Conceptual Complexity (CC), and a high Need for Power (PWR) compared to all 12 British prime ministers in the post-1945 era.[15] First, Blair's significantly higher BACE score suggests that Blair strongly believes in his ability to control events in the political environment and he perceives Britain as an influential actor in world politics. Second, a low CC score—as discussed earlier in this chapter—signals a worldview of binary categories such as good vs. evil and us vs. them. Blair's CC score, which is one standard deviation below other British prime ministers, indicates that he would have a decisive decision making style where other significant factors outside his black–and–white view are not evaluated properly or may go unnoticed. Lastly, Dyson shows that Blair is high in the Need for Power trait hence would be actively involved in policy formulation and work with small groups of hand–picked individuals. In addition, a combined high BACE and high PWR score suggests that Blair would likely challenge constraints in the international system.

Major conclusions from Schafer and Walker's (2001) general operational code profile of Blair are that Blair views the political universe mixed between cooperation and conflict and is slightly pessimistic on the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals. In addition, Blair sees the political future as very unpredictable and ascribes a huge role to chance in international politics. An important characteristic of Blair's operational code profile is that he believes that he has a high degree of control over historical

[15] Dyson reports scores for all seven personality traits, however in his discussion focuses exclusively on these three traits.

developments. Blair has a clear preference for cooperative strategies and tactics. Furthermore, he diversifies his choice of tactics more so between words and deeds than between cooperation and conflict. Rhetorical tactics (of appeal/support and oppose/resist, for cooperation and conflict respectively) serve more utility to Blair. Also, it is noteworthy that Schafer and Walker find Blair being more cooperative towards democratic states than non–democracies.[16]

The conformity between Blair's personality traits in Dyson's work and his operational code profile in Schafer and Walker is significant. Both LTA and operational code analysis find Blair in believing his efficacy in controlling events. Notwithstanding these, a high BACE score on the one hand, and slight pessimism in realizing fundamental values (P–2) and high belief in the role of chance in the political universe (P–5) on the other hand do not necessarily go together. Likewise, Blair's LTA suggests that he would be challenging constraints yet his operational code shows that he is rather a risk–averse leader. Conclusions from these two studies, or for matter from LTA and operational code analysis profiles of the same leader, would not necessarily be the same. Moreover, this is yet to be seen since there have been few attempts in that regard (for an early attempt see Winter et al. 1991; for a quantitative analysis see Young and Shafer 2005; also, Post 2003). Beyond such comparisons, though, I argue that taken together LTA and operational code analysis are rather complementary of each other. While LTA rather

[16] For a follow–up regarding this issue, see Schafer and Walker (2006) where the authors present further evidence that both Blair and Clinton had a more cooperative attitude towards democracies and acted accordingly.

focuses on how leaders may involve in and shape decision making processes with their different styles, operational code analysis indices signal their preferences in pursuing different strategies and tactics. Of course, what is missing in Blair's profile in Dyson (2006) and Schafer and Walker (2001) is that in neither one matches personality characteristics with systematically measured behavior of Britain under Blair's rule.

At first glance, the main distinction between LTA and operational code analysis is that the former's focus is rather on more stable personality characteristics and the latter is more apt to change with situation. This notwithstanding, Hermann (2003a) recognizes that there can be contextual effects on leadership style and encourages exploring those. Still, though, Hermann expects a more or less stable leadership style. When leadership style differs under changing circumstances (across time, audiences, issues, etc.), Hermann argues that it would help understand how leaders adapt to contextual cues and what changes their behavior. The operational code literature, on the other hand, is more open to the idea that leaders' belief systems are apt to change; indeed, Renshon (2008) proves that. Renshon also shows that as the effects of such changes diminish in the long run, leaders can acquire a newly defined belief system (Renshon 2008). As such, while a leader's belief system can be expected to be stable to some extent, this certainly does not translate to a total rejection of potential shifts.

As I investigate how personality, beliefs and events match with each other, the motivation behind this study is the assumption that leader personality traits and beliefs can shift over time. Specifically, I expect to link these shifts with foreign policy behavior

of the state that each leader represents. Such expectation, though, never really was the idea behind any LTA project—Hermann (1980a) is an exception. Despite the calls for linking traits scores with foreign policy behavior, such an undertaking does not exist. While some work in operational code analysis—such as Walker, Schafer, and Young (1999)—explored this, the extant operational code analysis literature too lacks such investigations. Neither the LTA nor operational code analysis literature has any work that focuses on how these idiosyncratic characteristics may explain what states do while both their dependent and independent variables are measured at matching intervals.

Such opportunities certainly do not go unrecognized in the literature. One can find various suggestions for open venues of inquiry in this strand of, LTA and operational code analysis, research. One of the calls has been to benefit from other quantitative research in international relations research, specifically events data (Mahdasian 2002; Young and Schafer 1998). In addition, with the increased availability of public documentation of leaders' interviews and speeches, it is possible to expand the systematic analysis of leadership beyond the leadership of Western societies. As Renfro (2009: 27) aptly notes, with many leaders around the world leaving plenty of media records, "scholars may analyze previously unthinkable amounts of data." Moreover, meeting other calls, these data can be linked with the events datasets that already exist. This dissertation places itself right at that point; using the advantages of automation in creating leader personality profiles and mapping their belief systems, it takes these idiosyncratic factors as its independent variables and puts foreign policy behavior—measured by Kansas Events Data System—on the left side of the equation as its dependent variable.

This research also expands the geographical coverage of extant literature by looking at the impact of political leadership in Israel and Turkey, key allies of the United States in the Middle East, on their foreign policy behavior in general and towards the United States specifically. How well do personality traits and beliefs explain foreign policy behavior? What more can LTA and operational code analysis tell when they are used simultaneously? The following chapter outlines the research design of this dissertation.

Chapter 3

Research Design and Methodology

This study is based on the assumptions that (a) political leadership matters in foreign policy decision making, and (b) the chief executive reflects the "cognition of the state" (Schafer 2000). In a nutshell, I attempt here to investigate the relationship between a state's political leadership and its foreign policy behavior. As such, I propose a study that would systematically seek answers to the following questions:

(1) How do leadership traits and operational codes correspond to state foreign policy behavior?

(2) What benefit, if any, is there to using leadership traits and operational code analyses together in explaining foreign policy?

I use automated text analysis software to create data in seeking answers to these questions. *ProfilerPlus* (Social Science Automation 2008) is a program that profiles an individual's personality traits and operational code based on his/her use of words. *TABARI* (Schrodt 2009), on the other hand, creates a data set of international interactions for state and non-state actors from newswire reports. As discussed later, data used in this study are from Israel and Turkey; hence, other additional questions are implied:

(3) How do Israeli prime ministers' leadership traits and operational codes differ among themselves? What do these tell about Israel's foreign policy?

(4) How do Turkish prime ministers' leadership traits and operational codes differ among themselves? What do these tell about Turkey's foreign policy?

In this chapter, I outline the research design and methodological approach of this project. First, the dependent variable—foreign policy behavior—and its measurement are explained. Then, I discuss the data collection for leadership traits analysis (LTA) and operational code analysis variables, which are the independent variables of this study. This is followed by the methods employed for data analysis. Finally, the hypotheses are covered, and the significance of this research design for the LTA and operational code analysis literatures is discussed.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior

The dependent variable in this study is state behavior as it is captured by an event dataset. Specifically, the data are based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding scheme (Gerner et al. 2002; Schrodt and Yilmaz 2009), and are taken from Kansas Event Data System (KEDS).[1] CAMEO events are comprehensive in that

[1] While KEDS acquired its name from the research of Philip Schrodt and Deborah Gerner at the University of Kansas, now it is renamed the Penn State Event Data System after Schrodt's move

they include almost all political, economic and military types of events and range from mere verbal behavior to the simplest and most extreme types of behavior. Most recently, CAMEO is being used in the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) project (see O'Brien 2010 for a discussion).

Table 3.1 shows an abbreviated list of CAMEO events.[2] Following the CAMEO coding scheme, events are aggregated into verbal and material forms of conflict and cooperation. There are multiple advantages to aggregating events to these four event types (Schrodt and Gerner 2004: 315). First, by doing so rather than working with distinct event categories that may occur rarely (see the full list of CAMEO events in the appendix), this categorizes events to a manageable number in statistical analyses. Then, this approach minimizes some likely coding errors at the tertiary event categories since events are aggregated to a higher level. Table 3.2 shows the four groups of aggregation that are used here in this dissertation.

The Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) is a collection of various event datasets (for Central Asia, the Balkans, the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Turkey, and West Africa) and associated computer programs to generate—and edit—the data. The KEDS is a fully–automated research program, and represents a new generation of

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to the Pennsylvania State University in January 2010. The project website can be accessed at <eventdata.psu.edu>.

[2] A full list of event observation categories in the CAMEO coding scheme is in the Appendix.

event data research.[3] TABARI, Text Analysis of Augmented Replacement Instructions, generates event data in the current KEDS. With automated–coding of English language news reports from Reuters and/or Agence France Presse, TABARI creates a data set of foreign policy behavior (of both state and non-state actors). Besides Schrodt's—and Gerner's—own publications, the KEDS data have been used in various publications (for instance, Bzostek and Robison 2008; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999; Robison 2005; Schafer and Walker 2006b). Leading scholars of foreign policy analysis praised KEDS for its success in creating reliable and systematically–generated datasets for foreign policy behavior (Breuning 2007; Hudson 2005, 2007).

[3] For a review of the history of KEDS, and broadly events data research, see Schrodt (2006).

Table 3.1 CAMEO (0.9b5) Event Codes

01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT
02: APPEAL
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE
04: CONSULT
05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION
07: PROVIDE AID
08: YIELD
09: INVESTIGATE
10: DEMAND
11: DISAPPROVE
12: REJECT
13: THREATEN
14: PROTEST
15: EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE
16: REDUCE RELATIONS
17: COERCE
18: ASSAULT
19: FIGHT
20: USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE

Table 3.2 Aggregation of CAMEO Categories

Type of Event	CAMEO Categories
Verbal cooperation	01 to 05
Material cooperation	06 to 09
Verbal conflict	10 to 14
Material conflict	15 to 20

Presently, KEDS is the best tool available to quantitatively measure foreign policy behavior. Given the history of Schrodt's and Gerner's research interest in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, KEDS has developed a particular strength in the Levant area (Schrodt 2006, 2010). In addition, a well–developed dataset for Turkey emerged out of the KEDS as Omur Yilmaz (who served as a research assistant for Schrodt and Gerner during the development of CAMEO coding scheme) and others devoted their time towards this purpose. The Levant and Turkey datasets, hence, are the highest quality data available in the Kansas Event Data System.

The KEDS data serve very well towards this project; the Levant and Turkey datasets provide rich and systematically–generated measures of foreign policy behavior of various states in the Middle East. Here, I look at the Israeli and Turkish foreign policy behavior as the dependent variables of this research. These two countries selected for the fact that compared to the other countries covered in the datasets, they are the only ones that have had democratic and competitive elections, peaceful change in the executive branch, and many alternations in the post of the head of government. The chief executive in both Israel and Turkey is the prime minister—discussed below.

While the data for Israel go back to 1979, the KEDS Turkey dataset starts in November 1991. Hence, the latter date marks the temporal domain for this study. November 1991, coincidentally, corresponds to the disintegration of the Soviet Union; as such, this study looks at the leadership effects on the foreign policy behavior of Israel and Turkey in the post–Cold War era. The Levant dataset uses Reuters as its primary news source; the

Turkey dataset, on the other hand, codes Agence France Presse news stories. For the purposes of this study, both datasets are updated until the end of 2009.

Once TABARI generates the data, another KEDS utility program is used before events are aggregated. In order to avoid multiple counts of the same event, Schrodt developed the "One_A_Day_Filter" program. This filtering program processes both the Levant and Turkey data; once the filtering program clears the data off from any replications, events are aggregated by month. This aggregation is essentially a numerical count of all the events (or any particular event types) initiated by and targeted towards the country under investigation.[4] Here, I aggregate the events by groups mentioned earlier (see, Table 3.2). When the aggregation processes are complete, the dependent variable can be tested against the independent variables. The discussion now shifts to the independent variables utilized in this study.

Independent Variables: Leader Personality Traits and Operational Codes

The independent variables of interest are the personality traits and operational codes of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers in the post–Cold War era. In order to measure

[4] Event count is advantageous over scaling events (the standard in this vein of research has been the Goldstein scale, see Goldstein 1992) for it is sensitive to event frequency. Moreover, because when scaled events are used cumulatively, totaling positive (cooperative) and negative (conflictual) events to "Net Cooperation," they tend to miss the magnitude of events.

these variables, I collected all the spontaneous foreign policy remarks of Israeli and Turkish prime ministers under investigation here. The independent variables are then generated by automated–coding of these materials. I use the software designed specifically for this purpose: the ProfilerPlus program (Social Science Automation 2008). In this section, building upon the relevant discussion in the previous chapter, I explain the data collection procedures for the independent variables used here.

By selecting the spontaneous foreign policy utterances of leaders', this study follows Hermann's principle. This is also necessary given the contradictory conclusions about the utility of scripted (prepared) and spontaneous statements in profiling leaders (see Mahdasian 2002; Renfro 2009). In addition, given the aim of this study to match state behavior with leader characteristics, it is appropriate to analyze political leaders' foreign policy statements only during their tenure in office and not for the entirety of their political careers.[5] With these principles in mind, I collected spontaneous foreign policy remarks by Israeli and Turkish prime ministers from 1991 to 2009 (Table 3.3 lists the individuals who occupied this office in Israel and Turkey). I aimed at collecting the whole universe of readily available, spontaneous foreign policy statements made by Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers during this time period.

[5] An approach also adopted by Crichlow (1998) and Astroff (2008); though, both collected only a sample of leaders' speeches or interviews.

Table 3.3 Israel's and Turkey's Prime Ministers, 1991 to 2009

	Israel
Yitzhak Shamir	October 20, 1986–July 13, 1992
Yitzhak Rabin	July 13, 1992–November 4, 1995
Shimon Peres	November 4, 1995–June 18, 1996
Benjamin Netanyahu	June 18, 1996–July 6, 1999
Ehud Barak	July 6, 1999–March 7, 2001
Ariel Sharon[6]	March 7, 2001–April 14, 2006
Ehud Olmert	April 14, 2006–March 31, 2009
Benjamin Netanyahu	March 31, 2009–Present
	Turkey
Suleyman Demirel	November 20, 1991–May 16, 1993
Erdal Inonu (acting)[7]	May 16, 1993–June 25, 1993
Tansu Ciller	June 25, 1993–March 6, 1996
Mesut Yilmaz	March 6, 1996–June 28, 1996
Necmettin Erbakan	June 28, 1996–June 30, 1997
Mesut Yilmaz	June 30, 1997–January 11, 1999
Bulent Ecevit	January 11, 1999–November 18, 2002
Abdullah Gul	November 18, 2002–March 14, 2003
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	March 14, 2003–Present

[6] Since Ariel Sharon was incapacitated on January 4th, 2006 and Ehud Olmert functioned as the acting prime minister until the elections were held, Olmert's spontaneous remarks were coded from January 2006 to until he leaves in March 2009.

[7] Given his very short term in office, Erdal Inonu is not profiled for his leadership traits or operational code. For the month that Inonu was the prime minister, though, LTA scores and op code indices are calculated with Inonu's own foreign policy statements.

Spontaneity here means that these statements were made either in an interview or in a press conference setting where the leader responded to the questions from the media members.[8] The texts of these statements were accessed from various databases such as LexisNexis, Factiva, and Foreign Broadcasting and Information System. In addition, some online documentation was readily available for analysis. For instance, the Charlie Rose Show of the Public Broadcasting Service provided a transcript of its interviews. Hence, only those "readily available" materials are incorporated in this study. It is, however, assumed that most if not all spontaneous foreign policy statements (as defined here) Israel's and Turkey's leaders made were accessed. These texts required only minor editing as they were prepared for processing in ProfilerPlus. All the text was already translated into English, or sometimes the leader already spoke in English.[9]

For Israeli and Turkish prime ministers studied here, each leader's statements are aggregated monthly; ProfilerPlus, using its Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis schemes, then codes these verbal outputs. Because LTA and operational code require different criteria for a meaningful analysis, there was some further

[8] Because opening statements in press conferences are often prepared remarks, these are omitted from the analysis. Only the "Q and A" parts of press conferences are coded.

[9] While it is possible that some content may be lost in translation, earlier studies indicate that translation was not an issue in profiling leaders. Hermann (1987) reports that there was a high degree of correlation between the profiles of a leader coded in the original and translated languages.

aggregation when these criteria were not met. For LTA, a response/record of at least 100 words is expected to produce a meaningful result—granted that it would be complemented with other materials that bring up the total number of words to at least 5000 words. An accurate LTA profile requires at least 5000 words analyzed, which is met for all the leaders studied here. For operational code analysis, the criteria proposed by Schafer and Walker (2006a: 34-36) is that there would be 15–20 verbs coded per speech act. In this study, for traits analysis it was rarely the case that 100 words per month was not available for any leader; however, when assessing leaders' operational codes some monthly aggregations did not match up to the at least 15 verbs criterion. When that was the case, I merged a leader's spontaneous foreign policy statements from the following month or two. I used the resulting operational code indices calculated from the merged documents for all the months that verbal material come from.[10] The appendix displays all the data used in this dissertation.

ProfilerPlus generates the LTA scores and operational code indices following the coding procedures discussed in the preceding chapter. Instead of an individual reading the text line by line and coding himself/herself, the program concludes the coding based on the grammatical and coding rules, as well as the vocabularies it is given. For LTA, ProfilerPlus recognizes the words associated with measuring each trait; for operational code, ProfilerPlus follows the "author" for each text and makes the self–other assessment

[10] The total number of months under investigation is 218 months (from November 1991 to December 2009). For Israel's prime ministers, there were LTA scores for all 218 months and operational code indices for 208 data points, "months." For the Turkish prime ministers, there were LTA scores for 216 months and operational code indices calculated for 170 months.

based on that. The programming details of ProfilerPlus are beyond the focus and interest of the present study (see, Young 2001 for a discussion); as discussed earlier, the LTA and operational code schemes for ProfilerPlus program are developed—in collaboration with Margaret Hermann and Stephen Walker—specifically for this sort of research.

Methodology

This dissertation employs multiple methods to assess political leadership and foreign policy behavior of leadership in Israel and Turkey since the end of the Cold War. First, I present each leader's personal background and brief political career particularly as these pertain to their personalities. This qualitative assessment derives from factual information about leaders' personal life and then from extant (albeit few) studies about their personalities or styles, beliefs. A review of all political leaders personal backgrounds and their political career precedes the presentation of findings in this dissertation, and it constitutes a basis of comparison for the latter.

Second, I use the results of LTA and operational code to profile Israel's and Turkey's leaders according to these respective techniques. I discuss these before I present an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression test of the relationship between foreign policy behavior and leaders characteristics in both countries. I run separate tests with traits scores and operational code indices as independent variables, and repeat these for four models where the dependent variable is the number of verbal cooperative, verbal

conflictual, material cooperative, and material conflictual event counts. Following Achen (2000) and Keele and Kelly (2006), I do not use any other lagged independent variables. As such, I treat the traits scores and operational code indices as numbers and explore their effects on foreign policy behavior in the form of event counts. The test results for LTA and operational code are interpreted both individually and together in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively about Israel and Turkey. As discussed earlier, it is expected that there is more to explain if one to utilize both LTA and operational code analysis.

One concern with this particular design can be the circularity problem (see Rosati 1984; also Kaarbo 1997). Because both event data and leaders personality assessment depend on similar or perhaps sometimes even the same sources, this circularity issue becomes a concern. The newswire stories used to create event data often are also used to profile leaders. However, a major distinction between the text that are used for psychological assessment and event data creation will be that the former will use the full text of an interview/speech/statement and the latter will be generated—in the KEDS, for sure—by the lead sentences of news reports in Reuters or Agence France Presse. In addition, the sources of event data are the statements and actions of various actors—civilian and military leaders, various branches of the government, non–governmental associations, etc.—as these are reported in the news stories rather than one, single individual that is profiled only by his/her utterances. Hence, the overlap between the sources used for the analysis here cannot be significant.

In order to address these issues and also explore relationships between leadership traits and operational code variables, I assess correlations among them—following Young and Shaffer (2005). Given the non–normality of several indicators, like Young and Shaffer instead of Pearson's r, I too report Spearman's rho in this study. Correlations are reported in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, where I discuss how the following hypotheses fare with the results drawn from the analyses of political leadership and foreign policy of Israel and Turkey.

Hypotheses

The foundational texts in both LTA and operational code analysis literatures already suggest plenty of hypotheses, which can be tested with the data available here. Moreover, these can be supplemented with findings and suggestions for future investigations in most recent literature. The uniqueness of this research design is that it matches Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers' personality characteristics with their foreign policy behavior, all systematically generated and aggregated monthly.

Given the research questions here, first it is hypothesized that LTA and operational code analysis as independent variables will explain variation in foreign policy behavior in material and verbal forms of cooperation and conflict.

Hypothesis 1a: LTA scores explain foreign policy behavior.

Hypothesis 1b: Operational code indices explain foreign policy behavior.

Given their theoretical constructs, discussed in Chapter 2, I expect that LTA and operational code variables would have the following relationships with the four types of foreign policy behavior here:

Hypothesis 2a: Distrust of Others (DIS) score positively correlates with conflictual foreign policy behavior.

Hypothesis 2b: Need for Power (PWR) score positively correlates with conflictual foreign policy behavior.

Hypothesis 3: P–1 (nature of the political universe) index positively correlates with cooperative foreign policy behavior.

I also expect that such patterns between independent variables (of LTA and operational code) and foreign policy behavior would mirror each other. As such, some LTA and operational code variables will be related to each other (also see Young and Shaffer 2005).

Hypothesis 4: Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and P-4a (belief in ability to control historical development) positively correlate with each other.

Conclusion

Like others (Rosati 1984: 161; Walker 1977: 155) in this vein of research, this study does not claim that any match between beliefs and behavior will explain all foreign policy decisions. Indeed, any direct translation from individual level variables to foreign policy is difficult (Kaarbo 1997: 577). Political leadership literature, however, as discussed in the previous chapter, has already established that leaders matter in foreign policy analysis. This particular research design makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. It is a first in combining personality data with large–N event data. In addition, with its focus on Israel and Turkey, it expands the geographical coverage of the political leadership literature. As such, this dissertation presents analysis of systematically generated personality and event data in a different political context.

Chapter 4

Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy of Israel, 1991-2009

"Prime ministers have been pivotal throughout Israel's history…"

(Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002: 35).

Political leaders in Israel have been of paramount importance to its foreign policy since Israel's pre–independence era. Such prominent prime ministers like David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, and Yitzhak Rabin left their marks not only on the Israeli society but also on the region, as well as on the world. Since Israel declared its independence in 1948, its prime ministers have dealt with a vicious conflict with the Palestinians and also its Arab neighbors, which the world has followed closely from the early 20th century until the present day. The policies of Israeli prime ministers as such have had direct implications within and beyond Israel's borders.

To put it succinctly, as Arian, Nachmias, and Amir argue, "[p]rime ministers are the central political actors in Israel" (2002: 35). The centrality of individual leaders to Israel

and its politics were even more prevalent as the Israeli electorate directly elected its chief executive from 1996 to 2001 for three elections.[1] Arian, Nachmias, and Amir write:

> "While they may share power with party allies and coalition partners, or be stymied by these same actors at critical moments, the agenda is there to be set by prime ministers, and the pace of events is theirs to attempt to control. A prime minister is more likely to be overwhelmed by the power of office than restrained by the checks and balances on it. Prime ministers have been pivotal throughout Israel's history, and the electoral reform [of 1996] only fortified this reality" (2002: 35).

This was not simply confined to the era of the direct of election of prime minister; Arian, Nachmias, Amir (2002) also claim that when the law of the direct election of the prime minister was repealed immediately after the February 2001 elections, this did not necessarily lead to significant decrease in the prime minister's powers. All the Israeli prime ministers functioned under certain domestic and institutional restrictions. These constraints and challenges or the repeal of the law of the direct election of the prime minister notwithstanding, the Israeli prime minister has traditionally hold significant influence and control over Israel's politics and foreign policy. This is not to underestimate the significance of such domestic and institutional constraints (such as, power sharing implications of coalition cabinets, see Kaarbo, 1996); however, in the end, the prime minister could still make necessary arrangements to hold or even improve his/her own and his/her party's relative power to others' in one way or another.

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[1] On this institutional feature of Israeli political system from 1996 until its repeal in 2001, see Arian, Nachmias, Amir 2002 (especially Chapter 1), and Susser, Bernard (1989). "Parliadential Politics: A Proposed Constitution for Israel." *Parliamentary Affairs* 42(*1*): 112-122.

With such prominence in the policy world, Israeli prime ministers have been subject to journalistic and scholarly attention as well. Much like other countries, there are journalistic accounts of Israel's prime ministers (for instance, see Caspit and Kfir 1999 on Netanyahu; and Hefez and Bloom 2006 on Sharon). In addition, and distinct from the Turkish prime ministers studied here, Israel's prime ministers themselves engaged in writing and wrote their own autobiographies or memoirs (for instance Sharon 2001). Such literature is a significant aid for the purposes of similar research. Even more significant is an extant studies of Israeli prime ministers and their foreign policy within the broader political psychology research (e.g. Grosbard 2004) and a few works specifically in the Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis. Hence, unlike the following chapter on Turkey, this study builds upon and improves an existing literature specifically within the two at–a–distance techniques employed here. However, in this literature, with the exception of Crichlow (1998), others do not engage with LTA or op code directly (Aronoff 2001; Astroff 2008; Ziv 2008). Also, in parallel with the broader trend in the study of political leadership, this literature about Israel's leaders and their foreign policy does not make use of events data either.

Beyond these specific literatures, this study is a significant contribution to understanding political leadership in Israel and the role of prime ministers in Israel's foreign policy. Often Israeli politics and its foreign and security policies are interpreted through a simple dichotomy between the so-called "hawks" and "doves." More systematic analyses of Israel's leadership asked how those hawks turned into doves. This dissertation, hence, is

related to such interest in contemporary political leadership in Israel. Are these reflected onto foreign policy leadership traits and styles, and operational codes of "hawks" and "doves" in Israel?

This chapter proceeds as follows; first, I provide a brief personal and political career background for all seven Israeli prime ministers in the post–Cold War era. Then, I present the LTA and operational code profiles of each leader derived from all their spontaneous foreign policy statements during the time of their tenure as prime minister. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the personality variables match with events data in the statistical tests.

Israeli Prime Ministers: Personal Backgrounds and Political Careers[2]

All the prime ministers of Israel in the post–Cold War era assumed this office either after long careers in party–related political work (for instance, Peres and Olmert) or after distinguished military service (specifically, Barak, Sharon, and Rabin). Since 1991, seven different leaders held the office. Among them, only Peres became the prime minister without an election as he assumed office after Rabin's assassination in November 1995. Olmert served as interim prime minister after Sharon was incapacitated in January 2006 but was elected prime minister in April 2006. Recently, in March 2009,

[2] This section benefits from Aronoff (2001), Astroff (2008), Ziv (2008), and the Internet pages of the Prime Minister's Office of Israel (2010) and the Knesset (2010).

a decade after his electoral loss to Barak, Netanyahu made a comeback. Here, in this section, I review such details in personal and political lives of all prime ministers of Israel since 1991.

Yitzhak Shamir

Shamir was born in Poland on November 3, 1915. Growing up, Shamir was attracted to the Revisionist Zionist movement led by Vladimir Jabotinsky and eventually his Zionism led Shamir to move to Palestine (under the British rule) in 1935.[3] This move also ended Shamir's studies towards a law degree at the University of Warsaw, which he started in 1932. According to his autobiography, in his new home Shamir worked as a construction worker and bookkeeper. He was enrolled at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; yet, in short time, Shamir left school as he was drawn into politics. Shamir's attraction was to more extremist paramilitary groups and he joined the Irgun Zvai Leumi ("National Military Organization") in 1937. The main ideas behind the political movements or ideologies Shamir was attracted to were that they defended immediate statehood for the Jewish people and then——more specifically Irgun—— aimed to deter Arabs from further violence by responding to Arab attacks with more violence. As differences of opinion and the outbreak of the World War II led to a division of the Irgun, Shamir stayed with

[3] In this dissertation, I strive to use neutral terminology as much as possible and make sure of historical accuracy (as in this case, one must talk about the Palestine under the British mandate and not Israel). Likewise, for instance, the October War refers to the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War. Similarly, West Bank and Gaza refers to Judea and Samaria or the occupied territories.

"the Stern Gang" (or, Lohamei Herut Yisrael, LHI, "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel"). Eventually, as the British executed LHI's leader in 1942, Shamir assumed a leadership position by reorganizing the movement. According to Astroff (2008: 287), under Shamir LHI undertook "meticulous, disciplined operations," such as the assassination of the British Minister Resident in the Middle East, Lord Moyne in 1944. Shamir's early political activism, hence, was marked by his involvement in underground, violent political movements into the establishment of modern day state of Israel in 1948.

Once Israel became independent, former members of the Irgun or LHI were treated as pariahs (Astroff 2008: 288). Shamir was no exception to this, and he too did not have a chance to assume a role in politics. In 1955, about seven years after Israel's independence, Israeli intelligence agency Mossad recruited Shamir and he worked as a mid-level manager in the organization's European operations (Astroff 2008: 289). Shamir's way into active politics was made possible by Israel's turn to the right in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967. Menachem Begin, the leader of Herut ("Freedom") Party, was Shamir's associate from the Irgun. In 1973, as right wing political parties merged and created the Likud ("Union"), Shamir elected to the Knesset. Later, Shamir served as the Speaker of the Knesset from 1977 to 1980. In October 1980, Shamir assumed the post of Foreign Minister under the Begin government. Three–years later in October 1983, Shamir became the prime minister after Begin's resignation. In the 1984 elections, Shamir led the Likud; in the aftermath, a "national unity cabinet" under Shimon Peres's (of Labor Party) leadership was formed, where Shamir became the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. In 1986, Peres and Shamir

exchanged posts within the government. Together Shamir and Peres led Israel through an unsuccessful bid to reach peace with Jordan, which brought about the Intifada in December 1987. Despite their disagreements, Shamir's Likud and Peres's Labor remained in the coalition after the 1988 elections. Since Likud earned the edge in the elections, Shamir hold the post of prime minister until Peres left the government in March 1990 and in its aftermath Shamir had to leave his post as its government failed to gain a vote of confidence in the Knesset. While Peres was unable to form a new government, Shamir then once again became the prime minister in a coalition government with the three other far-right parties. Shamir stayed in office until Labor's Yitzhak Rabin assumed office the office after the 1992 Knesset elections. He resigned from Likud's leadership but remained in the Knesset. In 1996, Shamir retired from active politics.

Scholarship on Shamir and his leadership style talks about Shamir as a rigid, dogmatic personality and someone with "an extremely narrow, undifferentiated worldview" (Ziv 2008: 84). Sasley (2010: 695) notes that Shamir is an ideological individual and this derives from "a very basic source: his Zionism." As a person, Shamir is portrayed as stubborn both by his "friends and foes" (Ziv 2008: 78). For instance, Shamir is credited for allowing his aides and bureaucrats to freely present contradicting viewpoints but this did not translate him changing his positions. Others mention how Rabin's lack of pragmatism was one of the factors——along with economic problems such as unemployment——that led to an unsuccessful Madrid Conference and brought about the end of the end of Shamir government in 1992 (Astroff 2008: 282–303). Sasley also

reaches a similar conclusion; he argues that Shamir was not able to adjust his policies in light of changing world in the later 1980s into early 1990s. In similar vein, Ziv (2008) argues that Shamir would be "the least cognitively open and complex" among the other Israeli prime ministers that he studied (Peres, Rabin, and Begin). Shamir's world is shaped by a "chronic mistrust of others" (Ziv 2008: 83), a "black and white" understanding of alternative political ideologies (Ziv 2008: 82), an international system that is insecure for the Jews and Israel and "at best indifferent, at worst anti-Semitic" (Sasley 2010: 696). Lastly, Shamir, in Ziv's portrayal, was a self-assured person and denied the appearance of ambiguity (2008: 80).

Yitzhak Rabin

Rabin was born in Jerusalem on March 1, 1922 to a family very active in the (Labor) Zionist movement. Growing up Rabin attended the Workers' School and later the Agricultural School. During the World War II, Rabin was recruited to Palmach (an elite commando unit of the Haganah——the predecessor to the Israeli Defense Forces). Much like Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin was also involved in underground extremist organizations of the pre–independence Israel. However, Rabin was rather recognized as an ideologue in the Palmach. After Israel gained its independence, Rabin stayed with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). He was among the Israeli delegation in Rhodes, Greece in the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian disarmament negotiations as a military representative. Rabin's promotion to major-general came after he spend a year at the Royal Staff College at Camberley in Great Britain; in 1964, Rabin became chief of staff of the Israeli army. As

the commander of the IDF, Rabin shined during the 1967 Six Day War. A year later when he retired from the army, Rabin was appointed as Israel's ambassador to the United States. Returning to Israel in 1973 Rabin got involved in politics and in Golda Meir's short-lived cabinet he was Minister of Labor. Upon Meir's resignation, Rabin won a party contest against Shimon Peres and became the prime minister in June 1974.[4] During his tenure as prime minister for three years, Rabin led Israel through such significant events like visiting West Germany on an official trip, meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, the oil embargo of 1973, negotiating a new disengagement plan with Egypt (hence, paving the way to the Camp David Accords), and the hostages operation in Entebbe, Uganda (Astroff 2008: 311). Rabin's tenure as prime minister ended due to a scandal broke out in 1977: against the Israel foreign currency law, (Rabin and) his wife was keeping a bank account in the United States after they moved back to Israel. Rabin resigned as Labor chairman and prime minister, but continued to serve in the Knesset. In the 'national unity' governments of 1984 and 1988, Rabin served as Minister of Defense until he and Peres (then Labor's chairman) left the coalition led by Shamir due to disagreements regarding talks with the Palestinians. Rabin's return to the office of prime minister required overcoming Peres in the party primary and convincing the Israeli electorate to vote against Shamir; in 1992, Rabin accomplished both and became prime minister for a second and last time to lead Israel to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and a peace

[4] Hence, Rabin became the youngest and first native–born prime minister.

agreement with Jordan in 1994.[5] An extremist Israeli citizen later assassinated Rabin on November 4, 1995.

Rabin's personal characteristics helped him advance early on during the pre–independence years. For instance, in the Palmach, Rabin was recognized for "his keen mind, his love of detail, his emphasis on training and his willingness to obey orders" (Astroff 2008: 306). Rabin as a political persona did not emerge quickly; according to Arian, Nachmias, and Amir (2002), it took awhile for him to learn "the political skills of backslapping, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and inclusion" (122). His background in underground political organizations of pre–1948 Israel and later in the military left their mark on Rabin in that he was a tough person but was pragmatic too.[6] "More than any other politician [Rabin] occupied the middle ground where most Israelis stood" (Astroff 2008: 313). Rabin was open to new information from the environment and was flexible to amend his position depending on the conditions (Ziv 2008: 93–94). This was a cautious openness, though. Rabin, as Ziv argues, was not as open or complex individual as Peres was; yet Rabin was definitely more so than Shamir. Accounts of Rabin's personality are, without an exception, supporting this conclusion. For instance, Crichlow (1998) claims that Rabin's cautiousness was apparent in his own rather skeptical view of the Oslo peace process in the beginning. This, however, was nothing

[5] The Oslo Accords gained Rabin, along with his Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, the 1994 Nobel Peace Award.

[6] Rabin was tough such that he was appointed as Minister of Defense in the Likud –led national unity governments of 1984–1990 (Crichlow 1998). Also, Rabin had this image that Ariel Sharon once described Rabin "a carnivorous dove" (in Astroff 2008: 313).

like how Shamir viewed the world or Israel and the Jews in the international system (Sasley 2010: 698). Rabin was committed to the Land of Israel——like Shamir, yet Rabin was also prioritizing among many other issues; a secure Israel was Rabin's objective and to realize it he was open to consider different ideas (Sasley 2010: 697). Otherwise, Rabin was a reserved person and lacked openness to other individuals (Arian, Nachmias, Amir 2002: 122; Ziv 2008: 93). This in turn affected Rabin's decision making style; Rabin consulted fewer people (Ziv 2008: 92) and compared to Peres was less successful in brining in people from different background in decision making processes (Arian, Nachmias, Amir 2002: 125). Notwithstanding Rabin's ability to comprehend complex situations and his openness to new information, he had "a tendency to dichotomize people" and had a corresponding "binary view of the world" where he would compartmentalize people into good v. bad guys (Ziv 2008: 94–96). Finally, Kissinger wrote about Rabin that he "hated ambiguity."[7]

Shimon Peres

Peres was born in Poland on August 2, 1923 in a small village (Vishneva) with a homogenous Jewish population. In 1934, Peres and the family immigrated to Palestine and started living in the kibbutz. Peres's skills in leadership as administrator and organizer, and in communication emerged during his work with the Hanoar Haoved ("Working Youth"). Through this organization, Peres met with such leading figures in Israel like David Ben–Gurion and Levi Eshkol. Then, Peres joined Mapai and

[7] Quoted in Ziv (2008: 94).

represented it as a delegate at the World Zionist Congress in 1946, in Basel, Switzerland. Upon independence, Peres was appointed as secretary of the navy; in 1949, Ben–Gurion granted his request to study abroad and Peres lived in the United States from 1950 to early 1952. In the United States, Peres took classes at the New School for Social Research and also at Harvard University. In the United States, Peres made contacts with private donors to raise financial support for Israel and its clandestine purchases in the international weapons market (Astroff 2008: 321). When Peres returned to Israel in 1952, as one of Ben–Gurion's 'Young Mapai' protégés Peres continued to raise in the ranks and in less than a year he became director-general of the defense ministry. In office, Peres played a key role in establishing relationship with France as Israel's primary weapons supplier. In 1959, Peres elected to the Knesset and then appointed as deputy defense minister in Ben–Gurion's cabinet. As Ben-Gurion's Mapai divided, Peres initially sided with Ben–Gurion; however, in the aftermath of a failed elections campaign in 1965, in December 1967 Mapai, Ben-Gurion's "Rafi," and Ahdut Haavodah merged to create Labor Party. Peres became the deputy secretary-general of Labor. After the elections of 1969 and 1973, Peres assumed different positions in the cabinet but not prominent ones like ministry of defense or foreign affairs. The primary reason for this was that Golda Meir kept her distance to Peres other "Young Mapai" leaders; once Meir resigned, Peres contested for party leadership. As discussed earlier, while it was a close race, Peres had to bow to the winner: Rabin. Given his prominence in the party, Peres was appointed as minister of defense in the Rabin government. Peres later assumed party leadership as Rabin resigned amid a scandal. Labor, however, lost the elections in 1977 and for 15 years Likud dominant cabinets ensued thereafter. Initially, Peres and his

Labor served as the main opposition. Then, with electoral gains in the elections of 1984 Labor joined Likud in government.[8] In 1984, Peres started as the prime minister in the "national unity" cabinet, which according to the agreement between Likud and Labor he turned over to Shamir in October 1986. As prime minister, Peres met with King Hassan II of Morocco and with President Mubarak of Egypt, and improved Israel's relations with the United States. Peres also proved effective in dealing with Israel's financial crisis. In the aftermath of 1988 elections, because Likud gained an edge in the elections, Shamir stayed as prime minister and Peres became vice premier and minister of finance. Later, Peres remained as the second–man in Labor and under Rabin's leadership Labor won the 1992 elections. Since both Rabin and Peres held significant power in the party, neither man had the luxury to avoid the other and despite their decades-long rivalry they had to work with each other. Peres served as Rabin's minister of foreign affairs and he was crucial in concluding the Oslo Accords of 1993. After Rabin's assassination in November 1995, Peres assumed his position but lost the elections to Likud's Netanyahu in May 1996. Later, Peres remained active in politics. Backed by the then prime minister Ehud Barak Peres ran for presidency in 2000, but he lost the Knesset elections rather unexpectedly despite One Israel's majority. In 2005, Peres left Labor to join Sharon in support of his efforts of "disengagement." In June 2007, Peres was elected President of Israel.

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[8] After the 1984 elections, Peres received the mandate to form a government. However, due to the distribution of seats in the Knesset, he was unable to do so. After losing votes in the 1988 elections, Labor stayed in the new coalition——yet, this time without the rotation of prime minister.

In his research, Ziv finds that references to Peres are that he is open, pragmatic, and adaptable (2008: 98). Peres emerges in others' portrayals of himself as a receptive, good listener leader who seeks ideas and encourages challenges from his advisers (Ziv 2008: 101). For Ziv, Peres is ""a paradigmatic case of a cognitively open individual" (2008: 97). According to people who worked with Peres closely, Peres strives to avoid thinking about in terms of simple dichotomies; instead, he expects, and pushes his aides, that a third, hidden alternative be found (Ziv 2008: 103). This, Ziv notes, becomes a characteristic that Peres is criticized for being detached from reality. Crichlow (1998: 686), on the other hand, claims that it is Peres's "daring, imagination, and general optimism" that overrides what sometimes pushes Peres to see the world as an inherently conflictual place and makes him skeptical of success. In other accounts of Peres's personality, Arian, Nachmias, and Amir (2002) describe Peres as a "patient, tireless, and a skillful bargainer" (107).

Binyamin Netanyahu

Unlike any other Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu was born in the independent state of Israel on October 21, 1949. In addition, Netanyahu had a relatively elite upbringing: his father was a professor of Jewish history and grandfather was a rabbi who migrated from Lithuania to Palestine in 1920. Netanyahu's father decided to move the family to the United States in 1963 and they settled in Philadelphia; hence, Binyamin Netanyahu spent his teenage life and studied in the United States. In June 1967, Netanyahu returned to Israel during the Six Day War and waited two months to be eligible to join the army.

Netanyahu was recruited to the army's elite unit Sayeret Matkal and took part in important military operations (Astroff 2008: 338). In 1972, Netanyahu came back to the United States and enrolled at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he earned degrees in architecture (B.A.) and business management (M.Sc.). During his education, he went back to Israel and served in the October War in 1972. The turning point in Netanyahu's life was the death of his older brother during Operation Thunderbolt in Entebbe, Uganda. Following this personal tragedy, Binyamin Netanyahu decided to move back to Israel and founded the Jonathan Institute (named after his late brother) for the study of terrorism. At the institute, Netanyahu made important contacts in both policy and academia and he edited a book titled "Terrorism: How the West Can Win." In 1982, Israel's ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens appointed Netanyahu as the deputy chief of mission at the embassy. In two-years time Netanyahu became Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations. His service at the U.N. coincided with the national unity governments in Israel, and occasionally Netanyahu had open disagreements with the Labor wing of the government. After Netanyahu resigned from his position at the U.N. in 1988, he ran for a seat in the Knesset and made an entry to active politics as deputy foreign minister thanks to his success at the Likud party primary. As a deputy foreign minister who is fluent in English, Netanyahu made many appearances in press meetings and was a frequent guest at interviews with the foreign press. After Likud lost the 1992 elections and Shamir left party leadership, Netanyahu elected as the new chairperson of Likud in its March 1993 primary. Netanyahu's first task was to rebuild the Likud, and as the opposition leader he also fiercely opposed the Oslo process led by the Labor government. In Israel's first direct elections for prime

minister on May 29, 1996, Netanyahu defeated Peres by only with a margin of about 29,000 votes. Three years in the office, Netanyahu's government fell down after failing to get 1999 budget approved by the Knesset. The most memorable events of Netanyahu's term in office were the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 and the Bar-On affair. Netanyahu lost the 1999 elections to Ehud Barak of Labor. In the aftermath, he resigned from politics temporarily and became Likud's chairman in 2007. Recently, in March 2009, Netanyahu won elections over Kadima's Olmert and since is Israel's prime minister for a second time.

According to Leon Grossier, the dean of students at M.I.T. at the time Netanyahu was a student there, Netanyahu was the most ambitious student to Grossier's experience: "[Netanyahu] would focus on an objective and lock himself on it. When he decides he wants something, there's nothing he can't achieve" (Caspit and Kfir 1999: 70; also referenced in Astroff 2008: 339, fn. 16). Indeed, according to Kimhi (2001: 153), ambition and determination are most likely Netanyahu's most significant character traits; and, Kimhi argues, these have a lot to do with Netahyahu's upbringing. Kimhi's work on Netanyahu presents a comprehensive psychological profile of Netanyahu.[9] Following conclusions are drawn from Kimhi's (2001) portrayal of Netanyahu:

- Netanyahu is egocentric, and has a tendency to megalomania——he thinks about his personal fate connected with the national one (161). His personal

[9] Kimhi (2001) expects that "Netanyahu is not likely to change dramatically" (163). Notwithstanding his claim, my initial findings here comparing Netanyahu's first and second terms in office suggest considerable differences in his personality traits and operational code beliefs. Though, these are not reported in this study.

relationships tend to be instrumental (155), and likewise he is self-centered with his close advisers and aides (154).

- Generally speaking, Netanyahu is closed and withdrawn, and has very limited ability to empathize (155).
- Netanyahu believes that he is more perceptive of the world and historical/political processes than others are. As such, anyone who is in disagreement with Netanyahu does not have a correct assessment of the world (153).
- Netanyahu is considered to be untrustworthy since many public figures portray him as making (and even signing) promises that he eventually did not keep (155).
- Netanyahu's suspiciousness borders a paranoid tendency (162). The world as such is a cruel place where is no altruism or true friendship, and there is a continuous struggle for survival. These feelings have increased since Netanyahu entered political life (156).
- For Netanyahu, personal success is very important and he strives for it (153).
- Finally, Netanyahu tends to work alone and exclude others, and has a desire to control everything. He assigns various tasks to his aides but demands frequent reports and rules with an iron hand (158).

Ehud Barak

Ehud Barak was born to a settler family from Eastern Europe on February 12, 1942 in Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon. Barak's career within the IDF started early in 1959 as he joined the army at the age of 17. He was in the Sayeret Matkal unit and in 1970 became

the head of it. Barak had an impressive career in the military, earned its highest honors, and was the youngest in IDF to become a general in 1982. At the apex of his military career, Barak was the chief of staff from April 1991 to January 1995. During his time with the IDF, Barak also earned a degree in physics (from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1968) and a master's degree in economic engineering systems (from Stanford University in 1978). Barak was a close associate of prime minister Rabin, who he shared a similar military career with. Upon his retirement from the military, Barak temporarily worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and in a few months was offered a position by Rabin in his cabinet. Barak became Rabin's minister of the interior in July 1995. After Rabin's assassination, Peres kept Barak in the cabinet and appointed him as minister of foreign affairs in November 1995. After Labor's tenure in government ended, Barak ran for party leadership and won the party primary in June 1997 to become its chair. Before the 1999 elections, Barak transformed the Labor in reaching out a broader electoral audience and created "One Israel" a coalition among Labor, Gesher, and Meimad. One Israel won the elections and was the senior member of the coalition. After losing the elections in February 2001 to Sharon's Likud, Barak stayed out of active politics until 2007. Then, he re-assumed Labor's leadership in June 2007 and in a few days following the Labor primary Barak joined the Olmert cabinet as minister of defense. After the 2009 elections, in the new Netanyahu cabinet, Barak remained in his post and currently still serves as minister of defense.

Barak talks about himself as a "shy, small sized" boy and is also known as someone lacking discipline——who indeed dropped out of high school because he was bored with it. Some of these may have stayed with Barak, as Astroff (2008: 353) mentions Barak's abrupt decision making style, where for instance he fired a large number of ministry staff without consulting anyone. Barak is also considered to have a high-handed, centralizing style (Astroff 2008; Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002). There are also accounts of Barak's arrogance, particularly during his time in the army.[10] Barak, much like Rabin, is considered to be a tough but pragmatic leader.

Ariel Sharon

Sharon was born in 1928 in Palestine under the British control. His military career started early when he joined the Haganah in 1942. Sharon fought in the Israeli War of Independence in1948 and continued his service in the IDF in the following years. He spent a year at the Staff College in the United Kingdom. In 1952 Sharon was enrolled at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem but was unable to complete his studies when he was recalled to full service military duty. Later in 1962 he completed his studies and received an LLB from the Hebrew University. In 1966 Sharon was promoted to the rank of major general and in July 1973 he retired from the IDF. However, in October of the same year he was recalled again due to the outbreak of the October War. In 1974 Sharon was elected to the Knesset, however later that year he resigned so that he would keep his position as commander of an armored reserved corps and returned to his family farm in

[10] Astroff (2008: 353) notes that in the army Barak was called "Napo" for Napoleon.

the Negev. Sharon political life did not end though: in 1975 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin appointed Sharon as security adviser and in 1977 Menachem Begin appointed Sharon minister of agriculture and in 1981 minister of defense. In the 1980s Sharon also served in Shamir's cabinets first as minister of industry and trade (1984–1990) and then as minister of housing and construction (1990–1992). When Likud came back to power in 1996 under Netanyahu's leadership, Sharon was appointed minister of national infrastructures. Later, in 1997, Netanyahu appointed Sharon minister of foreign affairs and served in that capacity until the government collapsed. In the aftermath of 1999 elections, which Likud lost, Sharon became Likud's chairperson in September. Sharon's comeback to power following the elections February 2001 was as prime minister and he led Israel until his health precluded him to do in January 2006.

Ehud Olmert

Ehud Olmert was born on September 30, 1945 in Palestine. Olmert's parents were active in the Betar movement, and his father Mordechai Olmert was a member of the Knesset from 1955 to 1961 representing the Herut Party. Ehud Olmert earned a degree in psychology from the Hebrew University in 1968; at college he stepped into politics in the Herut Party student organization. Olmert was the secretary of the Free Center faction in the Knesset for a while, but then went back to school to study law. In 1973, Olmert completed his studies and later practiced as an attorney for a number of years. In the meantime, Olmert elected to the Knesset in 1973 as a representative of the Free Center

faction within the Likud Party.[11] During his service in the Knesset, Olmert was a member of various committees and in 1988 Shamir appointed Olmert as a minister without portfolio, charged with minority affairs. Later in 1990, Olmert was picked to serve as the Minister of Health. Then, in late 1992 Olmert announced his candidacy of Jerusalem's mayor and won the mayoral elections in 1993. Olmert was mayor of Jerusalem for the following ten years. During the electoral campaign in 2003, Olmert was the head of Likud elections headquarters and in the aftermath Sharon appointed him vice prime minister and minister of industry, trade, and labor. In August 2005, Sharon appointed Olmert minister of finance. When Sharon became incapacitated in January 2006 Olmert assumed Sharon's duties as interim prime minister; then in April 2006, Olmert and the Kadima Party won the parliamentary elections and Olmert became prime minister. During his tenure, the Lebanon war of 2006 and the Annapolis Conference were the most remarkable events. Olmert's leadership came under great pressure due to the administration of these two events and his personal role in decision making. It was, however, a scandalous event that brought about the end of Olmert's public service. By mid-2008, it was revealed that Olmert was under investigation for bribery. As the investigation unfolded and facing serious contest to his leadership from within Kadima, he announced his resignation as prime minister and as leader of Kadima in July 2008 but

[11] Israel's laws allow Members of Knesset to practice their profession with certain restrictions.

continued to serve prime minister until Netanyahu won the elections in February 2009 despite the fact that he lost support within Kadima.[12]

According to Ziv, Ehud Olmert is "the archetypal hawk" (2008: 275). However, Olmert––—much like Sharon——takes a dovish turn in his views. Ziv explains the reasons for Olmert's change of perspective in his family life. For instance, his wife Aliza once told that she always voted for parties of the left until Olmert became Kadima's leader and led it in the March 2006 elections. Moreover, Ziv notes that one of their sons is affiliated with a group of soldiers [Yesh Gvul] supporting peace and refusing to serve in the "occupied territories" and one of their daughters volunteers for Machsom Watch. Ziv argues these may have influenced Olmert along with a changing public opinion in favor of Labor's position regarding the Palestinian issue (2008: 275–276). In his analysis Ziv (2008: 275) does not study Olmert, yet he expects that Olmert would be more cognitively open and complex than Netanyahu.

Leadership Traits and Operational Code Profiles

In this section, based on earlier review of the relevant literature and results from *ProfilerPlus*, I present leadership traits and operational code profiles of each Israeli prime

[12] Livni, who was minister of foreign affairs at the time, challenged Olmert during this process and became Kadima's leader. However, she was unable to form a new cabinet and hence Olmert stayed in office as a "lame-duck" prime minister.

minister. First, leaders' LTA scores and then operational code indices are presented. Then, in ensuing discussion, I attempt to make connections between the two profiles for each leader and in general so as to illustrate what benefits, if any, there are to utilizing both in assessing leader personalities.

Table 4.1 shows the average LTA scores for all prime ministers of Israel in the post–Cold War era and also an average profile (as well as deviations from the average score) calculated from all scores assessed between November 1991 and December 2009. Israel's prime ministers exhibit different leadership styles; before I sum up overall differences among them, first I discuss how Israeli prime ministers differ in terms of their responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, motivation for seeking office, and motivation toward the world.

Within the LTA framework, Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for Power (PWR) interpreted together tell about leaders' responsiveness to constraints. In terms of their BACE scores, Olmert and Shamir have the highest and lowest scores, respectively. In the PWR trait, Sharon and Netanyahu (in order) score the highest, and Rabin has the lowest scores in this category. According to their scores, among the prime ministers of Israel studied here, Shamir and Rabin respect constraints and all others (Barak, Olmert, Peres, Sharon, and Netanyahu) challenge constraints.

A leader's openness to information, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, is inferred from the relationship between his/her Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Self–Confidence (SC)

scores. According to the results in Table 4.1, all——but one (Shamir)——Israeli prime minister would be open to new information. When the distance between these two scores are calculated, Barak would be the leader who is most open to new information (the highest CC, and the lowest SC scores). Likewise, Rabin, who scores high in both traits, would be expected to open to new information. Shamir is the only leader who would be close to new information; while Shamir has the highest SC score, he ends up with the lowest score in CC. Other differences can be inferred from if one is to consider that whereas Sharon has a higher CC score than his SC, they are so close that one has to attend to the specific circumstances Sharon works in as he may very well be close to new information. Similarly, Olmert's scores suggest that he would be open to new information; however, within the Israeli prime ministers norming group, Olmert ranks low both in CC and SC, which would classify him as closed to information.

Table 4.1 LTA Scores for Israeli Prime Ministers

Leadership Trait	*Israeli PMs average*	*Shamir*	*Rabin*	*Peres*	*Netanyahu*	*Barak*	*Sharon*	*Olmert*
Belief can control events	Mean = .377 Low < .339 High > .414	.305	.348	.396	.401	.379	.401	.408
Conceptual complexity	Mean = .555 Low < .511 High > .599	.508	.600	.554	.580	.614	.511	.519
Distrust of others	Mean = .167 Low < .119 High > .215	.174	.140	.177	.181	.094	.252	.152
In-group bias	Mean = .137 Low < .110 High > .164	.080	.160	.152	.146	.131	.148	.142
Need for power	Mean = .267 Low < .248 High > .285	.264	.240	.263	.287	.256	.294	.264
Self confidence	Mean = .455 Low < .358 High > .552	.638	.484	.403	.467	.350	.475	.369
Task focus	Mean = .621 Low < .584 High > .657	.639	.638	.572	.592	.675	.637	.592

These become so important that would place Sharon and Olmert in different leadership styles depending on how they are categorized in terms of their openness to information. ——Such variations may indeed relate with Ziv's (2008) argument about how 'hawks become doves.'

Task Focus (TASK) in the LTA measures a leader's motivation for seeking office. According to their TASK scores, Barak has the highest score (which is one standard deviation above from the average)——meaning that Barak is a problem–focused leader. Peres, on the other hand, scores one standard deviation from the average and hence is a relationship–focused leader. Other leaders' motivations, who are above the average (Shamir, Sharon, and Rabin) and are below (Netanyahu and Olmert), would be context–specific. They may focus on problem or relationships depending on contextual factors. Because their average scores are considerably away from the general mean score, I interpret their scores as high and low, respectively.

Finally, Israeli prime ministers end up in different quartiles of Table 2.5 (page 24), which displays a leader's motivation toward the world. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, this is assessed with Distrust of Others (DIS) and In-Group Bias (IGB) scores. With high scores in both, Netanyahu, Peres, and Sharon focus on eliminating potential threats and problems. As such, they think that the world is centered around adversaries and they strive to spread their power at the expense of others. Hermann (2003a: 200) expects that such leaders would take risks and engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior. Arguably, Netanyahu and Sharon would fit in this assessment, yet Peres may be

questionable. One can speculate that while such a motivation toward the world pushes Netanyahu and Sharon in the direction expected, it motivates Peres to take measures to the contrary. Peres also confronts Israel's adversaries as expected, but not simply in terms of power but rather on the negotiating table. In contrast to these three prime ministers, Barak has low scores in both DIS and IGB. Hence, Barak would be expected to focus on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships. Shamir, on the other hand, has a high DIS but low IGB score; this suggests that Shamir perceives the world as a conflict–prone and hence remains vigilant. Finally, Olmert and Rabin have low DIS but high IGB scores. Accordingly, they think about the international system as a zero–sum game but one that is bound by a set of international norms. They believe that adversaries are inherently threatening but work to limit the threat and enhance their relative capabilities and status.

When these are all interpreted together so as to assess leadership styles of Israel's prime ministers in the post–Cold War era, since some of the Israeli prime ministers do not score one standard deviation above or below the average but rather cluster around it, it becomes difficult to associate them with one single leadership style. One can safely assume that as such those leaders (for instance, Sharon) would be alternating between different leadership styles depending on the issue, time, and other contextual factors. All together, the LTA scores for Israel's post–Cold War prime ministers suggest different leadership styles (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Leadership Styles of Israel's Prime Ministers

Prime Minister	Leadership Style
Shamir	incremental
Rabin	opportunistic
Peres	directive
Netanyahu	directive
Barak	actively independent
Sharon	expansionistic/actively independent
Olmert	evangelistic/directive

According to Hermann (2003a), leaders with an incremental leadership style 'focus their attention on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while *avoiding* the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way' (emphasis added). Shamir is categorized as such, and his statement after he left the office that he 'would have wanted the negotiations with the Palestinians last 10 years' is a good example of his motivation to avoid dealing with the ongoing conflict.[13] In contrast, Rabin is an opportunistic leader. Sharon's case is worth further elaboration too. When Aronoff's (2001) and Ziv's (2008) arguments about hawks becoming doves are considered, the two leadership styles that Sharon falls into are perhaps the perfect matches to explain such a transformation.

[13] Shamir's remarks in an interview with the Maariv, after he lost the 1992 elections; see Haberman (June 27, 1992).

Table 4.3 Operational Code Profiles of Israeli Prime Ministers

	Israeli PMs average	*Shamir*	*Rabin*	*Peres*	*Netanyahu*	*Barak*	*Sharon*	*Olmert*
Philosophical Beliefs								
P-1 Nature of the political universe	.333	.449	.325	.34	.324	.358	.244	.259
P-2 prospects for realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	.125	.203	.11	.12	.132	.135	.06	.051
P-3 predictability of political universe	.157	.233	.152	.159	.132	.138	.141	.177
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	.330	.423	.30	.338	.327	.341	.341	.306
P-5 role of chance	.947	.904	.953	.944	.956	.953	.95	.947
Instrumental Beliefs								
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	.466	.605	.456	.434	.478	.398	.355	.369
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	.183	.236	.157	.164	.197	.161	.12	.129
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	.278	.389	.285	.24	.247	.204	.257	.253
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:								
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	.510	.375	.534	.566	.503	.565	.602	.567
I-4b word/deed tactics	.419	.408	.388	.364	.467	.46	.389	.371
I-5 utility of means								
I-5a. Reward	.127	.127	.108	.106	.143	.138	.102	.101
I-5b. Promise	.071	.047	.066	.086	.07	.08	.08	.081
I-5c. Appeal	.535	.629	.553	.526	.526	.481	.496	.503
I-5d. Oppose	.116	.093	.116	.121	.115	.121	.146	.138
I-5e. Threaten	.060	.017	.046	.085	.05	.089	.076	.089
I-5f. Punish	.091	.087	.111	.076	.096	.091	.101	.089

Turning onto the operational code profiles of Israel's prime minister, Table 4.3 (above) summarizes the averages for operational code indices for each prime minister, as well as an average profile. The latter is a good starting point for this discussion about Israeli prime ministers' belief systems. The indices for philosophical beliefs (P's) summarize the individual's preferences in achieving his or her political objectives and corresponding choice of strategies and tactics. According to their philosophical beliefs, the general profile of a prime minister of Israel has a somewhat friendly view of the political universe (P–1), is somewhat optimistic to mixed/neutral about realizing political goals (P–2), believes that the predictability of political future (P–3) is low or very low, perceives that s/he has low control over historical development (P–4a), and the role of chance (P–5) for them is very high.

The indices for instrumental beliefs (I's) summarize the individual's preferences in achieving his or her political objectives and corresponding choice of strategies and tactics. The average Israeli prime minister, according to their instrumental beliefs, has a definitely cooperative direction of strategy (I–1), his/her intensity of tactics (I–2) are somewhat cooperative, is low risk acceptant (I–3), has a medium flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I–4a) and also between words and deeds (I4b). As far as the utility of means (I–5) indices are concerned, the least intensity words in cooperative and conflictual tactics (Appeal and Oppose, respectively) are the most preferred means for an average Israeli prime minister. Other means are also utilized; Reward is a medium utility for cooperation for an Israeli prime minister, but is preferred

more than Promise. Likewise, on the conflictual side, the highest intensity Punish is more preferred than Threaten.

In addition to interpreting the results in Table 4.3 according to the VICS scale, for comparison among Israel's prime ministers, here I utilize Hermann's technique of evaluating each leader according to his or her deviation from the average indexes of an Israeli prime minister.[14] First of all, how do the seven prime ministers of Israel rank among themselves according to their indices for master beliefs, P–1 and I–1? According their beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P–1), Shamir has the highest value, well–above one standard deviation from the average score and the second–highest score of Barak. Accordingly, then, Shamir has an almost definitely friendly view of the world. On the other end, Sharon and Olmert score the lowest and second from last (respectively) and they fall well–below one standard deviation away from the average. According the VICS scale, Sharon and Olmert still view of the political universe as somewhat friendly. As far as the master instrumental belief, directionality of strategy (I–1) goes, again Shamir ranks atop and above the average plus one standard deviation mark. Shamir has a very cooperative leaning in his strategy. Netanyahu comes second, above the average but not significantly above it. Then come the Labor leaders, in order: Rabin, Peres, and Barak. Once again, Olmert and Sharon are at the end of this rank-order scale of I-1 index. Specifically, Olmert remains above one standard deviation away from the average but has the second lowest index in I-1. Sharon's average index of I-1 puts him to the end, which indicates that he has somewhat cooperative direction of strategy.

[14] See Table 7.4 and 7.5 in Chapter 7.

What differences, if any, are there among Israeli prime ministers in the other OPC indices? Three prime ministers, Shamir, Barak, and Netanyahu are close to being somewhat optimistic about their beliefs regarding realization of their political values, P–2 index, (in rank–order: Shamir, Barak, and Netanyahu). Others are somewhat optimistic or rather mixed (neither pessimistic nor optimistic) views about it (from the lowest: Olmert, Sharon, Rabin, and Peres).

The seven leaders here share a somewhat similar view about the predictability of political future; the P–3 index here ranges from 0.233 (Shamir) to 0.132 (Netanyahu), with an average of 0.157 score. In terms of the range of this index, there is a similar distribution found among the Turkish prime ministers (next chapter).

Israel's prime ministers believe that they have low to medium control over historical development (P–4a); the average 0.330 puts Shamir (the highest index), Barak, Sharon, and Peres above, on the one hand, and Rabin (the lowest index), Olmert, and Netanyahu below it. Those below do not deviate a lot from the average score. ––However, it is noteworthy that Netanyahu's P-4a score in his second term in office falls significantly below the average index.

The role of chance in the political universe (P–5) is very high for all Israeli prime ministers. The average score of 0.947 ranks close to those reported in other studies, and that of (0.948) among the Turkish prime ministers in this study. Peres's P-5 score is

below but very close to the average. Only Shamir is below one standard deviation away from the average.

The I–1 index for Israeli prime ministers is already discussed briefly above; overall, Israel's prime ministers in the post-Cold War era share a definitely cooperative strategy but there is some noticeable variation among the seven leaders. A gap of 0.25 points exists between the highest (Shamir) and lowest (Sharon) scores. The I–2 index for the intensity of tactics draws a somewhat contradictory picture in that the gap between the highest (Shamir) and lowest (Sharon) scores is much narrower, a 0.121. As a whole the Israeli prime ministers cluster between somewhat cooperative and mixed categories as far as the intensity of their tactics is concerned.

In terms their risk orientation (I-3), the most risk acceptant Israeli prime minister is Shamir (0.389) and the most risk averse is Barak (0.202). The average index and most leaders are low risk acceptant according to the VICS scale.

The I–4 indices tell about the individual's flexibility of tactics between cooperation and conflict (I–4a) and between words and deeds (I–4b). Overall, Israeli prime ministers have a medium level of flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics. In terms of I-4a index, the lowest score belongs to Shamir (0.375) well–below one standard deviation below the average. Otherwise, the rest have a medium level flexibility between cooperation and conflict. As to the I–4b index, the leader who has the most flexibility between words and deeds is Netanyahu (0.467)——just above a standard deviation of the

average. Barak also has a high score of 0.460. On the other end, Peres has the lowest index with a score of 0.364 and hence is below one standard deviation of the average. Finally, other prime ministers remain close to the average score for the index.

As to the indices of utility of means (I–5a through I–5f), according to the results in Table 4.3, among the Israel's prime ministers since November 1991, Appeal is the most preferred means of action. The individual scores range from Shamir's score of 0.629 and Barak's 0.481——which are well above the "very high" mark of 0.32 according to the VICS scale. Against an expectation that there would a dichotomy between the hawks and doves, there is no such distribution in any of the utility of mean indices. Reward, the highest form of cooperation, is the second most preferred means of utility with an average of 0.127. Oppose and Punish come next with averages of 0.116 and 0.091, respectively. The medium intensity cooperative and conflictual means of utility, Promise and Threaten, are the lowest preferred means of utility for the average Israeli prime minister. This possibly very well reflects the reality of Israeli foreign policy where the cooperative and conflictual actions can be either high in intensity or low and not necessarily in between.

As mentioned earlier, there exists some work in the operational code literature on some of Israel's leaders; hence, it is only appropriate to devote some place to compare Crichlow's (1998) operational code index scores for Rabin and Peres with those here. Following discussion is based on two leaders' mean scores for the 1990s. In terms of the master beliefs, Crichlow finds that Rabin has a .04 index score and Peres has a negative

.06 for the P-1 nature of political universe; then, the I-1 approach to goals index is .53 and .68 respectively for Rabin and Peres. Compared to the scores here, Crichlow's results are significantly lower in P-1 and notably higher in I-1. Moreover, the relationship between the two leaders' scores is the opposite of that in the findings displayed in Table 4.3: Peres's P-1 is slightly higher than Rabin's and his I-1 is slightly lower than Rabin's. Among other indices, the most significant differences between Crichlow and this work are in P-4 (control over historical development) and in the utility of means indices. For instance, Crichlow finds very high scores for both Rabin and Peres in the belief in ability to control historical development index. Their scores, .72 and .66 respectively, are significantly higher than the average score found here, which is .33 for this index. Then, Rabin has an average score of .30 and Peres has a .338 according to the results here. These differences between Crichlow's and this study's findings are most likely due to important differences between the two. First, Crichlow's sample is hand-coded and this research utilizes automated coding. Then, Crichlow uses a quite limited sample since he codes only four and three speeches for Rabin and Peres, respectively. These differences, as one would expect, lead to such noticeable differences between the two results.

How do the LTA and operational code profiles of Israel's prime ministers match with each other? What else, if anything, can one learn from combining portrayals of their personality traits and operational codes? As argued earlier, LTA and operational code analysis do not necessarily measure the same qualities or beliefs of an individual but some particular measurements are rather similar to each other——for instance, belief in

ability to control events (BACE) and control over historical development (P–4a) can be expected to reveal somewhat similar conclusions about each leader's views about his or her ability to control historical developments. Notwithstanding this, leadership traits and operational code scores of Israel's post-Cold War prime ministers exhibit some differences. Specifically, Shamir has the lowest Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) score but highest operational code index in control over historical development (P–4a). Likewise, Olmert ranks on different sides of his average scores in both. As the P-1 index about the nature of the political universe reveals, the so-called "hawks" of Israel with the major exception of Shamir share conflictual view of the world. Shamir, by contrast, has the highest index among all the seven prime ministers. The "hawks" also have the highest scores of Distrust of Others (DIS), where Olmert (and Peres) rank closer with their political opponents. In the Need for Power (PWR), once again, one can observe a distinction between the so-called "hawks" and "doves," where the former exhibit higher scores.

Personality Profiles and Events: Results

Tables 4.4 and 4.5, below, respectively display the OLS results with the LTA and operational code data as independent variables and the events data as its dependent variable. As explained in Chapter 3, all data are aggregated monthly. The dependent variable is measured as four different types of foreign policy events: verbal cooperation,

material cooperation, verbal cooperation, and verbal conflict. Hence, with the LTA and operational code data, four different models are tested.

According to Table 4.4 (next page), the OLS tests with the LTA variables reveal that higher scores in Distrust of Others (DIS) variable lead to higher number of conflictual events, both verbal and material. The statistical significance is stronger for explaining the verbal conflict model, at the 0.01 level. Therefore, Distrust of Others can explain the level of conflict in Israeli foreign policy. More specifically, one percent increase in the DIS variable leads to 7.1 more verbal conflict events and 1.8 material conflict events. The results also reveal that the constant is significant at the 0.01 level in the verbal cooperation and verbal conflict models. This may suggest that lower (i.e. verbal) forms of cooperation and conflict are ever–present in Israel foreign policy, no matter who the prime minister is. Finally, the results indicate that LTA variables together account for less than 10 percent of variation in the dependent variable. Notably, the highest R-square values are in the conflict models.

Table 4.4 Israel: Events and LTA

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	5.1733 (10.2572)	0.2572 (0.9510)	0.25 (3.1075)	1.5525 (1.1788)
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.6472 (12.0393)	0.6826 (1.1162)	-5.7278 (3.6474)	-1.2455 (1.3836)
Distrust of Others (DIS)	5.1513 (7.8712)	0.8663 (0.7298)	7.1289 ** (2.3847)	1.8098 * (0.9046)
In-group Bias (IGB)	-5.3795 (12.1145)	-0.4126 (1.1232)	-0.5788 (3.6702)	-0.8 (1.3922)
Need for Power (PWR)	-0.7291 (12.8688)	0.9128 (1.1931)	-0.5305 (3.8987)	1.1205 (1.4789)
Self-Confidence (SC)	-7.9829 (6.3337)	0.6076 (0.5872)	-1.8062 (1.9189)	-0.1496 (0.7279)
Task Focus (TASK)	-9.7364 (9.6323)	0.476 (0.8930)	-0.7705 (2.9182)	-1.2263 (1.107)
cons	31.8772 ** (11.2495)	-0.2256 (1.043)	9.0588 ** (3.4081)	2.1303 (1.2928)
N	215	215	215	215
R-square	0.0149	0.01965	0.06453	0.05352
adj. R-square	-0.01839	-0.0135	0.0329	0.02151
Prob	0.8708	0.7615	0.05166	0.1174
RMSE	14.61	1.354	4.426	1.679

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Table 4.5 displays the OLS test results with the operational code indices as its independent variables. According to the results, there is only some marginal statistical significance between the op code indices of Israel's prime ministers and Israel's foreign policy behavior as measured by the Levant dataset in the Kansas Events Data System. In the material cooperation model, the I–2 (pursuit of goals, direction of strategy) index is significant at the 0.1 level, with a negative effect on the dependent variable. In the material conflict model, the P–2 (prospects for the realization of political values) index and the P–4 (belief in ability to control historical development) index are also significant at the 0.1 level. While the P–2 has a negative effect on the number of material conflict, the P–4 has a positive effect. This may suggest that Israel's prime ministers are less prone to material conflict if they are optimistic about the prospects of their values but they are more likely initiate such events if they believe they can control events. Finally, the results with the op code variables indicate that together they account for more variation in the dependent variables than LTA variables did. Once again, though, the highest R-square values are in the conflict models.

Table 4.5 Israel: Events and Operational Code

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
P-1 Nature of the political universe	19.405	-0.8364	1.2887	2.1622
	(16.457)	(1.5359)	(4.9049)	(1.8720)
P-2 prospects for realization of political values	-26.553	-0.0169	-6.4637	-4.0870 .
	(20.524)	(1.9155)	(6.1170)	(2.3346)
P-3 predictability of political universe	8.664	6.3869	7.5930	7.2074
	(64.525)	(6.0220)	(19.2314)	(7.3399)
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	28.190	3.5379	8.9193	6.7009 .
	(31.458)	(2.9359)	(9.3759)	(3.5784)
P-5 role of chance	141.701	19.7602	35.7643	30.1660
	(183.144)	(17.0926)	(54.5854)	(20.8333)
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	-300.722	37.5491	-71.8560	27.5558
	(408.222)	(38.0990)	(121.6693)	(46.4368)
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	-463.897	-62.0921 .	-56.6218	43.9266
	(346.747)	(32.3616)	(103.3468)	(39.4438)
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	16.657	0.4234	0.5164	1.8824
	(17.534)	(1.6364)	(5.2259)	(1.9945)
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:				
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	2.597	-0.1422	2.0499	1.3333
	(11.746)	(1.0962)	(3.5008)	(1.3361)
I-4b word/deed tactics	9.364	0.5616	1.4908	0.8178
	(10.301)	(0.9614)	(3.0702)	(1.1718)
I-5 utility of means				
I-5a. Reward	1516.720	96.7171	395.7122	-47.5440
	(1579.076)	(147.3736)	(470.6384)	(179.6257)
I-5b. Promise	1374.492	78.3095	376.8896	-35.1144
	(1551.738)	(144.8221)	(462.4903)	(176.5159)
I-5c. Appeal	1211.481	55.1887	361.6850	-19.8374
	(1531.720)	(142.9538)	(456.5240)	(174.2388)
I-5d. Oppose	303.778	90.3546	182.1928	65.1275
	(1550.826)	(144.7370)	(462.2184)	(176.4121)
I-5e. Threaten	167.054	69.2183	170.9845	82.5533
	(1549.761)	(144.6376)	(461.9010)	(176.2910)
I-5f. Punish	-29.722	47.7363	133.2213	91.0975
	(1557.729)	(145.3812)	(464.2759)	(177.1974)
cons	-889.464	-484.276	-304.2232	-54.5341
	(1491.747)	(339.7266)	(444.6102)	(169.6917)
N	217	217	217	217
R-square	0.05372	0.05983	0.1346	0.1143
adj. R-square	-0.02161	-0.01501	-0.06568	0.04383
Prob	0.779	0.6854	0.01778	0.06571
RMSE	14.53	1.356	4.332	1.653

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Conclusion

Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis of Israel's post –Cold War prime ministers suggest distinct leadership styles and operational code profiles. However, the statistical tests between personality variables and Israel's foreign policy behavior appear to explain less than expected. In the tests with LTA variables, Distrust of Others emerges as an important variable to explain conflictual behavior. While none of the operational code indices came up with strong statistical significance, the independent variables accounted for more variation in the dependent variable in all four models than the models with the LTA variables. It is noteworthy that more variation in the verbal and material conflict models (than either form of cooperation) was explained using either LTA or op code variables.

Chapter 5

Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy of Turkey, 1991-2009

> *"From the inception of the Republic in 1923, political leaders in Turkey have dominated politics. They came to have an iron rule over their parties. Politics revolved around political leaders"* (Heper and Sayari 2002:vii).

As this quote from two reputable scholars of Turkish politics well summarizes the argument, leaders have historically enjoyed significant powers in Turkish politics; they decide who is going to make the party list in general elections, who is going to run for office in local elections, who will participate in the decision making bodies of their party, etc. Indeed, Yavuz (2009) argues that in Turkey "personalities are always more important than party programs or institutions" (98). In other words, Turkish politics has always been "a stage for leader–based politics" (Yavuz and Ozcan 2007). Once in power Turkish leaders continue to exert similar, if not more, control over politics. Despite this overtly agreed phenomenon, scholars of Turkish politics and foreign policy rarely, if

ever, attended to systematically studying Turkey's contemporary leadership and tracing their potential effects on foreign (as well as domestic) policy.[1]

Arguably, the primary reason for the lack of attention on the role of political leaders in Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey has not been a major actor in world politics itself. As such, rather than individuals shaping Turkish foreign policy, systemic factors would condition Turkey's place in world politics. Accordingly, its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), alliance with the United States, and historically Western–oriented policies hint at Turkey's close relationships and its dependence on these factors in its foreign policy. This understanding of Turkish foreign policy has served well during and after the cold war. Before, Turkey sided with the United States in the ideological battle between "the West" and the Soviet Union; Turkey was aspiring to be a democracy, rejecting a communist political system. In the meantime, as a developing country it was vulnerable to and dependent on the economic and political support of the West. Under those circumstances, it was of no necessity to talk about any

[1] Excluding works on Turkey's founder Kemal Ataturk (for instance, Vamik and Itzkowitz 1984), two separate edited volumes by Heper and Sayari (2002) and Demir (2007) would be the exceptions here. The Heper and Sayari volume is a very informative study of Turkish leaders and their contributions to Turkey's democratization; although it has rather limited references to foreign policy issues, the book provides valuable information about leader personalities as each chapter has a section on leader personality. The Demir text focuses exclusively on foreign policy and leadership, and is most likely the only such study in Turkish foreign policy. However, this book does not cover all major political actors (i.e. prime ministers in the past two decades); specifically, there is no studies about Tansu Ciller, Mesut Yilmaz, Abdullah Gul, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

other potential effects than systemic factors on Turkey's foreign policy. With the end of the cold war, presumably there were no significant changes. The 1990s and early 2000s were rather marked by political and economic instability in Turkey, and much like the cold war era by Turkey's continued attachment—as well as attraction—to the Western political institutions (NATO and the European Union) and ideals (democracy).

Notwithstanding these perceptions clouded by systemic effects on foreign policy, many would agree that leaders such as Turgut Ozal (particularly during his presidency) and Necmettin Erbakan (during his short one–year tenure in government) did have significant influence over Turkish foreign policy. Likewise, the present Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put his own mark on Turkey's foreign policy since coming to power in November 2002. Erdogan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, and recently sided with Brazil against the rest of the United Nations Security Council as more sanctions are placed on Iran. This study is based on the premise that effects of leadership personalities on Turkish foreign policy can be found in the post-cold war era. Such influences are not confined to one or a few Turkish leaders, explaining Turkish prime ministers' individual characteristics help understand foreign policy behavior of Turkey. This chapter explores this argument at length with both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

It is, then, beyond doubt that political leaders are of vital importance in Turkey. However, the perceptions of their influence in foreign policy can be skewed at times. For example, as this manuscript is being written in the fall of 2010, the Turkish and world

media often portrays the existing leadership and government in Turkey as "Islamic." While these perceptions derive from the political history of the country and personal backgrounds of leaders concerned, much like the case with the Israeli prime ministers, it is controversial that the label "religious" by itself would explain these leaders' approach to the world or their foreign policy motivations. Religion may very well be an important factor for some leaders than others; then, a plausible question is if there would be any differences among the so-called "religious" and "secular" prime ministers of Turkey, and their foreign policies. The findings here can have answers in that regard.

First, I outline personal backgrounds of all Turkish prime ministers in the era under investigation. This is followed by their leadership traits and operational code profiles. Following the design as outlined in the previous chapter, then I present the results for OLS regression of events and personality profiles.

Turkish Prime Ministers: Personal Backgrounds and Political Careers

In the post-cold war period, seven different prime ministers ruled Turkey.[2] Many of these leaders were in and out of government as coalition cabinets governed Turkey from November 1991 to November 2002. Hence, such limitations as coalition cabinet politics

[2] This excludes Erdal Inonu, who led government for about a month as Demirel moved to the president's office and Ciller replaced him leader of the True Path Party (center–right)—the senior partner of the coalition cabinet. Ciller became the prime minister as soon as the transition was completed.

where prime ministers perform need to be recognized in this study as well. This study does not reject them, but rather places the individual within the context s/he operates in. Before presenting any results of personality assessment or statistical tests and discussing a particular decision making context, first I briefly introduce each leader and their personal background. The order of presentation is chronological.

Suleyman Demirel

Suleyman Demirel took an interesting journey in his life from the small village of Islamkoy to the highest posts in Turkey. Growing up in a peasant family, the key to Demirel's upward mobility was his education (Arat 2002: 88). Demirel studied at Islamkoy's elementary school, then at the provincial capital city, and finally in civil engineering at Istanbul Technical University. His college education had a significant impact in Demirel's life; there he met other future leaders of Turkey (most notably, Necmettin Erbakan, Turgut Ozal, and Alparslan Turkes) and upon graduation in 1949 Demirel took a position in a state agency that introduced him to the ranks of Turkish bureaucracy and eventually led Demirel into politics. The 1960 coup d'état cost Demirel his position; he worked temporarily for the US-based Morrison-Knudsen. Demirel lived abroad in the United States, twice for short stays of about a year or so each. In 1962, Demirel became a member of the Justice Party (center–right); the same year, Demirel was elected to the General Administrative Council of the party at its annual convention. Only two years later, Demirel became the leader the Justice Party and in 1965 won a landslide victory in the general elections. Since then, Demirel has the reputation in

Turkish politics to leave the prime minister's office six times (twice due to the military) and come back seven times—the seventh as Turkey's president from 1993 to 2000. Demirel has been a prominent figure in Turkish politics since the 1960s, and is known as *Baba* (Father). Arat (2002: 87) cites Demirel's own description of this title: "benevolent, one who protects and listens to everyone, fair, one you go to when in trouble."

Ambitious, a team-worker, hardworking, realistic, and cautious are the words Arat (2002) uses to describe Demirel's personality. According to Arat, Demirel's quick accession to power in the Justice Party, his vie for and accession to leading Turkey after his first general elections as party leader, and his capability to build coalition governments with various other political parties stand out as exemplars of Demirel's personal characteristics. In addition, Arat argues that Demirel was "not a romantic who was led by impulsive and emotional reaction to critical political events" (91). This is indeed supported by other politicians' accounts of Demirel, for instance Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil (cited in Arat). Demirel is also known for his inconsistency; as Arat aptly notes, Demirel is often ridiculed for his infamous quote: "Yesterday is yesterday, today is today." Throughout his political career, Demirel did not hesitate to use this repeatedly to describe his policy reversals. Overall, this also supports the claim that "Demirel's political style and leadership have varied over time" (Arat 2002: 94). According to this perception, Demirel in the 1970s was a confrontational leader and Demirel as president from 1993 to 2000 was a conciliatory and moderating leader. However, one can argue that this statement is based on a faulty premise in that it compares Demirel as prime minister in

the 1970s with Demirel as president in the 1990s—in two different offices and under different historical circumstances.

Tansu Ciller

Tansu Ciller, daughter of a bureaucrat, was born and raised in Istanbul. Ciller studied at English-medium schools from her early school years and after earning a degree in economics from Robert College (present day Bosporus University), Ciller completed her doctoral studies at the University of Connecticut. Ciller came back to Turkey in 1974 and taught at Bosporus University's Department of Economics until she became actively involved in politics. Ciller was a "technocrat" and served as minister of state responsible for the economy from 1991 to 1993. Upon Demirel's election to presidency, Ciller assumed the post of party leadership and also became the prime minister as her True Path Party (center–right) and Social Democratic People's Party (center–left) agreed to keep the coalition government. Ciller stayed in government with brief interruptions as other coalition cabinets alternated in power and served as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs during the 1990s. As Ciller's reputation gradually eroded due to various scandals and electoral defeats, she finally retired from politics after the November 2002 elections. Ciller's tenure in politics lasted about a decade yet as Turkey's first female leader and prime minister Ciller definitely marked her stamp on Turkey's political history.

According to Cizre (2002), Ciller did never hesitate to use her gender to gain political advantage.[3] However, Cizre claims that Ciller's own description of her personality characteristics rather emphasized "such man-like attributes as courage, endurance, determination, and militarism" (207). In addition, Cizre (2002) notes that Ciller's record in office indicates how she was "motivated for power, egoistical interests, aggression, clientialism, and political intrigues." Quoting Ciller's aides and colleagues, Cizre portrays Ciller as an authoritarian leader, who lacked self-confidence was not a good team player (206).

Mesut Yilmaz

Mesut Yilmaz grew up in Istanbul and studied at prestigious public schools. His extended family members from the Black Sea province of Rize were prominent political figures. Yilmaz himself was actively involved in student politics during his college education at the Faculty of Political Studies of Ankara University. Later, Yilmaz earned his graduate degree from Cologne University in Germany. Although he was quite interested in politics, upon his return from Germany in 1974 Yilmaz was not attracted to any political party (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002). After working at various administrative positions in the private sector, in 1983 Turgut Ozal invited Yilmaz to join and become a founding member of Motherland Party (ANAP; center–right). As Ozal led his party to a number of electoral victories, Yilmaz elected a member of parliament representing Rize and served as a member of cabinet during the ANAP governments. From 1983 until Ozal

[3] Tansu Ciller's self-made titles were *Ana* (Mother) and *Baci* (Sister).

became the president in 1989, Yilmaz gradually raised his status in the cabinet mainly thanks to Ozal's support and at the end was Ozal's minister of foreign affairs. However, as Ozal moved on to assume the president's office, Ozal's choice for party leadership was not Mesut Yilmaz but then the speaker of the parliament Yildirim Akbulut. Yilmaz only temporarily ceded power to Akbulut; after serving as minister of foreign affairs in the Akbulut cabinet for about a year, Yilmaz resigned from his post and challenged Akbulut for party leadership in the party convention. In June 1991, Mesut Yilmaz became ANAP chairman and led the ANAP government until the general elections of October 1991. ANAP came second in the elections, and Yilmaz became the leader of the opposition. Later, Mesut Yilmaz led various coalition cabinets in the mid-1990s and served under different capacities. Yilmaz was a deputy prime minister in the last coalition cabinet that ruled Turkey; in the aftermath of November 2002 elections, Yilmaz decided to retire from politics as ANAP did poorly in the elections. He was accused of corruption during his tenure as prime minister but then acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2006. Later, Yilmaz decided to run for office again and was elected from Rize as an independent member of the parliament in July 2007.

Cinar and Ozbudun (2002) draw two different profiles of Mesut Yilmaz, one that Yilmaz is known publicly and the other that he is known among close friends. According to the former, Yilmaz is "a cold, calculating person with a stern expression that was taken as a lack of humor and compassion" (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002: 186). Cinar and Ozbudun relate this with Yilmaz's lack of self-confidence due to his relative inexperience and self-doubt about replacing Ozal as a leader. Notwithstanding this public image, Cinar and

Ozbudun talk about a passionate and talkative Mesut Yilmaz in private life. According to this, Yilmaz values loyalty in his friendships, is a good listener (of his friends, associates and advisors alike), and has a resolute personality (Cinar and Ozbudun 2002: 187). Cinar and Ozbudun (2002) add "the ability to maneuver" in politics to Yilmaz's personality and skills (188).

Necmettin Erbakan

Due to his father's appointments, Necmettin Erbakan travelled across Turkey as he was growing up. Eventually the family of eight located to Istanbul, where Erbakan studied at prestigious schools. Necmettin Erbakan's political career started after longer than two decades in the academia—hence, the name *Hoca* (Instructor or Professor).[4] Erbakan earned his college degree from Istanbul Technical University and his Ph.D. from Aachen Technical University in Germany in 1953. Before his political career started, Erbakan was a professor of mechanical engineering and was actively involved with the business world. Even before he became a politically renowned figure, Erbakan was elected the president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) in 1969. Erbakan's contacts with the businessmen and the Anatolian merchants helped him earn this position. However, after a confrontation with the government (led by Suleyman Demirel), Erbakan had to leave his post as the president of TOBB. Then, Erbakan ran for a seat and elected in the parliament as an independent from central Anatolian city of

[4] The word "Hoca" also has a religious connation, meaning the prayer–leader. In reference to Erbakan, most likely both are meant.

Konya in the 1969 general elections. In January 1970, Erbakan founded the National Order Party (MNP; extreme–right). This started a line of political parties that were closed either following a coup d'état or by the Constitutional Court: the Constitutional Court closed MNP in 1971, the National Salvation Party (MSP; extreme–right) was among the victims of the 1980 coup d'etat, the Court later closed the Welfare Party (RP; extreme–right) in 1998 and the Virtue Party (FP; extreme–right) in 2001. Erbakan was banned from politics in 1998 and his close associates continued Erbakan's political ideals; the Felicity Party (SP; extreme–right), established in 2002, represents the final political party related with Erbakan. During his political career, the highest political offices Erbakan held were three times as deputy prime minister in the 1970s and as prime minister from June 1996 to June 1997.

Erbakan is a deeply religious person, and was affiliated with the Nakshibendi Order and its pious way of life (Ozdalga 2002). Throughout his political career, Erbakan invented many humorous concepts and used them to attract masses but also to criticize his opponents.[5] Erbakan's discourse and policies suggest that he had "a pronounced disposition toward politically risky behavior" (Ozdalga 2002: 137), which expressed itself in his overt statements and strong preference for conservatism also his policy preferences such as aligning Turkey closely with the Muslim world. Erbakan exerted strong control over his political parties, yet it is also noteworthy that he never had to

[5] Erbakan referred to most other politicians in Turkey as "imitators of the West" and their thinking as "imitator mentality." Ozdalga (2002: 141) cites one of Erbakan's speeches where he calls upon all Muslims to join Welfare Party's mission and argues that those who don't belong to the "religion of potatoes."

compete against alternative leadership (Ozdalga 2002: 137). Necmettin Erbakan emphasized "moral development, nationalism, economic growth, and social justice" (Ozdalga 2002: 138) throughout his political career.

Bulent Ecevit

The single child of a professor and a painter, Ecevit came from an elite and political family background—his father served as a member of the Turkish parliament from 1943 to 1950 (Tachau 2002: 107). During his education Bulent Ecevit grew an interest in poetry and journalism. Indeed, he pursued both even during his political career. Ecevit started his political career at the Republican People's Party (CHP; center–left) in late 1950s and assumed various positions within the party until its closure after the 1980 coup d'état. Then, Ecevit founded Democratic Leftist Party (DSP; center–left) and was the leader of DSP until 2004. Ecevit's political career are marked by his accession to the CHP chairmanship in 1972 (third after Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu), his decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1974, his imprisonment and suspension from politics following the 1980 coup, and the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan (the head of PKK terrorist organization) in 1999 while he was the prime minister. It is also noteworthy that Ecevit led the longest tenured coalition government in Turkish history from May 1999 to November 2002 and initiated significant reforms such as the abolition of death penalty.

As a political leader Ecevit was known for his strong adherence to democratic principles. Indeed, Ecevit's rise within the CHP was due to a disagreement over supporting the

military–installed government of Nihat Erim in 1971. Then the secretary–general of the party, Ecevit resigned from his post protesting the party's decision to support the government. This notwithstanding, Ecevit was also known for exerting a strong control over *his* party. As Kiniklioglu (2000: 12) puts it, "[p]ower was vested almost exclusively in Ecevit and his wife." Tachau (2002) argues that this was due to his concern about an infiltration of extreme leftists to the DSP. Mainly due to his decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1974, Ecevit became to be regarded as a brave and patriotic leader. The Cyprus intervention/invasion led to a common perception that Ecevit was a leader who can and would act decisively and boldly. Throughout his political career, Ecevit (and his wife) lived a modest life and was known as an uncorrupted leader. Hence, for the Turkish people, Ecevit was their *Karaoglan*: a heroic folk figure representing social justice (Tachau 2002: 115).

Abdullah Gul

Like Mesut Yilmaz, Tansu Ciller, or Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul represents a younger generation of leadership in Turkish politics. Gul was born in the middle of the country, in Kayseri, a city known for its entrepreneurship. Gul left his hometown for his university education and studied in Istanbul University where he earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees in economics; Gul also studied abroad in Great Britain (between 1976 and 1978) as he worked towards his doctoral degree. Later, Abdullah Gul worked at Sakarya University and taught economics until he took a position at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Gul and his family

lived there from 1981 to 1991. When Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party recruited Gul to run for a seat in the parliament, Gul left Saudi Arabia once he was elected a member of parliament from his hometown province Kayseri in the 1991 parliamentary election. Once elected, Gul served as a Deputy Chairman in the Welfare Party, responsible for international affairs; then, he became a Minister of State in the Welfare–True Path coalition cabinet and was spokesman of the government. Beyond his educational and work experience abroad, Abdullah Gul served in various international institutions (the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1991–2001 and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2001–2002) representing Turkey.

Gul assumed leadership positions in conservative student organizations while he was at Istanbul University, yet his most significant leadership was during the break up of the Virtue Party in 2001. With Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul led the reformist movement and established the Justice and Development Party (AKP; center–right) that became the governing party after the November 2002 elections. Gul became the prime minister until Erdogan was elected to office following a by–election in March 2003. Later, Abdulah Gul served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Erdogan cabinet and was selected as president by the Turkish parliament in August 2007.

According to Yavuz (2009), "Gul, as a politician, is very pragmatic and his actions are more shaped by the prevailing economic and political forces" (135). Yavuz's later remarks about Gul are important and focus on the influence of Necip Fazil Kisakurek on Gul. Yavuz writes:

> "Gul never became the creator of ideas or the producer of new policies but rather remained a consumer of ideas and policies. This very much reflects his cautious and conservative character. In short, he always remained a man with "part-time identities and ideologies," with the goal of maintaining his power through domestic and international connections with the minimum risk. The fear of making mistakes molded his personality as one loath to take any major initiatives. During his period as prime minister an foreign minister, Gul hardly initiated a policy or came up with new ideas" (Yavuz 2009: 139).

Arguably, this assessment about Gul is questionable at best; while Gul was not the ideologue of Turkish foreign policy during his short–tenured prime ministry or later during the four–years as the head of Turkish foreign affairs, Gul was one of the most ardent proponents of change in major policy issues like Cyprus.[6] As to the argument that Gul is a risk–averse leader, it is certain that Gul acts more cautious, for instance, in comparison to Erdogan. However, in contrast to Yavuz's argument, Gul cannot be characterized as fearful. Gul's decision to support his wife's case against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights regarding the headscarf ban shows that he takes such risky steps. This being said, it is also important note that the Gul family took the case off from the court in early 2004.[7] Overall, Yavuz's book puts more emphasis on Recep Tayyip Erdogan than Abdullah Gul.

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[6] The ideologue would be Ahmet Davutoglu, who was serving as the major foreign policy adviser to the prime minister both during Gul's and Erdogan's term in office.

[7] Hayrünisa Gül davasını çekti. (March 2, 2004).

Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Erdogan's life experience stands in stark contrast to that of many other leaders covered here. Born to a family of modest economic status, in a province on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, Erdogan was the youngest of five children; his father worked as a ferry captain. Erdogan did not study at prestigious schools nor was ever fluent in any foreign language nor lived abroad at any point in his life. Instead, Erdogan was educated in an Imam Hatip (prayer–leader and preacher) school, and then at Marmara University earning a BA in business management. Erdogan was active in sports, and played professional soccer for a while. While he became a businessman, Erdogan was actively involved in local politics of Istanbul as a member of the National Salvation Party of Erbakan. Gradually rising within the parties of National Outlook Movement, Erdogan became the mayor of Istanbul in 1994. Because of his relative success as mayor, he became more visible in politics. Erdogan's political career was halted temporarily after a speech he gave in Siirt.[8] He was imprisoned for ten (served only four) months and banned from politics until a constitutional amendment also changed his status. While Erdogan was arguably behind the scenes leader of the government, he assumed the premiership of the party only after he was elected to parliament after a by-election ironically in Siirt.

[8] Erdogan read a poem of Ziya Gokalp:

> the mosques are our barracks
> the domes our helmets
> the minarets our bayonets
> and the faithful our soldiers.

Yavuz (2009) argues that the Turkish populace perceives Erdogan as a *kabadayi* and a *mazlum*. In essence, a *kabadayi* is a figure of reputation, authority, honor, and someone with a role of "neighborhood disciplinarian." A *mazlum*, on the other hand, refers to someone who was wronged. According to Yavuz, "Erdogan's personality is shaped by four institutions of socialization: the Kasimpasa neighborhood, the religio-conservative Imam Hatip school system, the ethno-religious (MTTB [National Turkish Student Union]) student union, and the National Outlook Movement of Erbakan" (2009: 121). Moreover, Yavuz claims that Erdogan represents "a split identity, torn between his Islamic identity and the politics that he is obliged to pursue in order to stay in government. He has to play a dual role: one for his traditional Islamic supporters, and one for his secularist domestic and international audience" (2009: 121).

Furthermore, Yavuz (2009) claims, Erdogan's worldview is primarily shaped by his religion. This is to such an extent that Erdogan does not place much emphasis on notions of a nation and nationalism, according to Yavuz. "This does not mean that he is not patriotic, but it does signal that his worldview is shaped by his religious upbringing, which supersedes his ethnic or regional origins" (Yavuz 2009: 131). Erdogan's understanding of secularism resembles that of Suleyman Demirel; for both, "secularism should not be interpreted as hostility to religion: the state could be secular, but not individuals" (Yavuz 2009: 133). In short, Yavuz's (2009) profile of Erdogan as an individual is that he is a pious but a pragmatic leader. Erdogan places a lot of importance

on authority, honor, and loyalty. Like Ecevit and Erbakan, Erdogan also has significant control over the party organization.[9]

Yavuz argues that Erdogan "enjoys public rallies wherein he ignites hopes and raises the people's expectations and emotions" (2009: 81); though he adds, in a footnote, that "[Erdogan] is not very convincing in one–and–one interviews where people can question his comments. Thus, one would argue that Erdogan is a man of mass rallies rather than deliberative democracy."

Leadership Traits and Operational Code Profiles

When one follows the discussion about leadership styles in Chapter 2, Turkish prime ministers their leadership styles differ according to Table 2.6 (page 26). It is worth noting that the average profiles of Turkish prime ministers were calculated from their monthly scores, likewise the average profile of a Turkish prime minister was calculated from all available scores for 218 months. As one would expect, when leaders speeches are aggregated to a single document and their profile is assessed from this document, there might be some differences in their leadership styles compared to the method used here. For instance, Erbakan's Self–Confidence (SC) score drops from .502 to .261 when all his foreign policy relevant speeches are aggregated and a single score is calculated for

[9] In 2005, Mehmet Sait Armagan an AKP member of the parliament resigned from the party complaining about "the anti–democratic and authoritarian nature of Erdogan" (Yavuz 2009:101).

him. As discussed earlier, for the purposes of the present inquiry it is essential that any possible variances in personality measures be matched with foreign policy behavior on a monthly basis. Hence, instead of working with an average profile and associated scores for each leader, this study looks at every individual leader's scores on a monthly basis.

Table 5.1 displays the averages for all Turkish prime ministers under investigation here. According to the results of their traits analysis (Table 5.2, below), Turkish prime ministers display different leadership styles. Among them, Erbakan stands out as a unique leader. First, Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Need for Power (PWR) scores for Turkish prime ministers indicate that Ciller, Ecevit, Gul, and Yilmaz respect constraints and Demirel, Erdogan, and Erbakan challenge constraints.

Second, all Turkish prime ministers have higher Conceptual Complexity (CC) scores than their (Self–Confidence) SC score; hence, they all are open to information. However, a rank–order of the difference between CC and SC reveals that there are significant differences among the leaders in this regard. Specifically, Erbakan's CC and SC scores are only .02 points apart from each other and questions the confidence in the judgment that he is open to information. It is probably safe to argue that his openness to information would depend on the context. This also shows the rather difficult nature of interpreting a trait score when it is not easily distinguishable from compared to the mean or has questionable conclusions.

Table 5.1 LTA Scores for Turkish Prime Ministers

Leadership Trait	*Turkish PMs average profile*	*Demirel*	*Ciller*	*Yilmaz*	*Erbakan*	*Ecevit*	*Gul*	*Erdogan*
Belief can control events	Mean = .351 Low < .319 High > .383	.408	.348	.339	.337	.309	.339	.378
Conceptual complexity	Mean = .564 Low < .527 High > .601	.591	.538	.573	.523	.603	.516	.595
Distrust of others	Mean = .138 Low < .097 High > .179	.136	.143	.139	.224	.098	.112	.121
In-group bias	Mean = .142 Low < .114 High > .170	.152	.170	.133	.187	.120	.136	.113
Need for power	Mean = .287 Low < .243 High > .331	.342	.278	.245	.355	.259	.277	.258
Self confidence	Mean = .400 Low < .320 High > .480	.312	.305	.377	.502	.487	.444	.395
Task focus	Mean = .637 Low < .572 High > .702	.572	.610	.692	.542	.660	.722	.662

Turkish prime ministers also differ among themselves as to their motivation for seeking office. With the highest TASK (Task Focus) score, Gul is definitely a problem–focused leader; Demirel and Erbakan are rather relationship–focused leaders according their TASK scores in comparison to others. Yilmaz, Erdogan, and Ecevit remain above the mean for Turkish prime ministers but are not one standard deviation away from it; likewise, in the reverse direction, Ciller is below the mean but has a higher TASK score the low mark. The motivations of these four leaders, according to Table 2.4 (page 23), would be context–specific. They might have a problem or relationship focus depending on contextual factors.

Regarding their motivation toward the world (Distrust of Others, DIS, and In–Group Bias, IGB, scores), the majority of Turkish prime ministers (Ecevit, Erdogan, Gul, and Yilmaz) perceive the world as not a threatening place and they rather focus on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships. These leaders have low scores of DIS and IGB compared to the average Turkish prime minister profile. Ciller and Erbakan, however, have high scores in both DIS and IGB; according to Table 2.5 (page 24), their focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems. These leaders perceive the world to be centered around adversaries and they intend on spreading their power. Moreover, such leaders are expected to take risks because they think it is a moral imperative to challenge those adversaries—a profile that might very well fit to Erbakan's view of the world. Lastly, Demirel has a low (close to the mean) DIS score but a high IGB score. Demirel, then, would perceive the world as a zero–sum game that has a set of

international norms but also ongoing confrontations with adversaries. His focus would be on dealing with threats and solving problems.

Table 5.2 Leadership Styles of Turkey's Prime Ministers

Prime Minister	**Leadership Style**
Demirel	directive
Ciller	collegial
Yilmaz	opportunistic/collegial
Erbakan	directive/evangelistic
Ecevit	opportunistic/collegial
Gul	opportunistic
Erdogan	actively independent

Turkish prime ministers' leadership styles as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, and motivation (Table 2.6) suggest significant differences among them. The results fit very well with broad foreign policy orientations of the Turkish prime ministers. For instance, when Erbakan's openness to information is categorized as "closed" then an evangelistic leadership style definitely explains Erbakan's foreign policy. The "Islamic" international organizations such as a Muslim NATO or a Muslim United Nations desired by Erbakan were indeed his attempts to mobilize other Muslim nations around a mission. Erbakan's two major visits abroad to

the East and then to Africa were based on similar motivations to persuade other Muslim nations like Pakistan, Indonesia, Libya, and Nigeria to come together and work closely with Turkey—and certainly under Erbakan's guidance and vision. Likewise, Erdogan can legitimately be considered an actively independent leader. The "zero problems policy" and "strategic depth" doctrine initiated by the Justice and Development Party governments indeed is very much based on increasing Turkey's maneuverability and status in its region and in the world.[10] Erdogan's policies and leadership mirror these principles.

One of the premises of this present inquiry is that one can benefit from using the LTA and operational code profiles in conjunction with each other. Before I start looking at the LTA and operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers together, first a summary of their operational codes is in order. Table 5.3 (below) displays the average operational code indices for each prime minister, as well as an average profile of a Turkish prime minister.

[10] See, Davutoglu (2008, 2010).

Table 5.3 Operational Code Profiles of Turkish Prime Ministers

	Turkish PMs average	*Demirel*	*Ciller*	*Yilmaz*	*Erbakan*	*Ecevit*	*Gul*	*Erdogan*
Philosophical Beliefs								
P-1 Nature of the political universe	.352	.299	.399	.302	.344	.365	.393	.365
P-2 prospects for realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	.150	.091	.207	.139	.169	.163	.118	.162
P-3 predictability of political universe	.169	.177	.142	.140	.134	.181	.233	.176
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	.306	.261	.339	.301	.238	.276	.374	.356
P-5 role of chance	.948	.959	.951	.958	.972	.950	.908	.939
Instrumental Beliefs								
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	.523	.466	.488	.516	.515	.529	.588	.558
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	.253	.230	.211	.266	.322	.240	.220	.279
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	.336	.325	.368	.261	.306	.393	.423	.279
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:								
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	.443	.503	.485	.443	.425	.390	.413	.442
I-4b word/deed tactics	.398	.432	.367	.413	.435	.376	.275	.491
I-5 utility of means								
I-5a. Reward	.161	.197	.140	.167	.219	.134	.089	.183
I-5b. Promise	.060	.034	.036	.082	.099	.060	.021	.089
I-5c. Appeal	.528	.502	.568	.509	.354	.571	.684	.507
I-5d. Oppose	.139	.145	.151	.147	.122	.158	.128	.125
I-5e. Threaten	.035	.040	.040	.055	.043	.019	.028	.022
I-5f. Punish	.076	.081	.066	.040	.164	.059	.050	.075

According to their philosophical beliefs, the average Turkish prime minister has a somewhat friendly view of the political universe (P–1), is somewhat optimistic to mixed/neutral about realizing political goals (P–2), believes that the predictability of political future (P–3) is low, perceives that s/he has low to medium control over historical development (P–4a), and the role of chance (P–5) for them is very high. The indices for instrumental beliefs summarize the individual's preferences in achieving his or her political objectives and corresponding choice of strategies and tactics. The average Turkish prime minister, according to their instrumental beliefs, has a definitely cooperative direction of strategy (I–1), his/her intensity of tactics (I–2) are somewhat cooperative, is low to medium risk acceptant (I–3), has a medium flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics (I–4a) and also between words and deeds (I4b). As far as the utility of means (I–5) indices are concerned, the least intensity words in cooperative and conflictual tactics (Appeal and Oppose, respectively) are the most preferred means for an average Turkish prime minister. Other means are also utilized, which can be followed from Table 5.3, yet there are significant differences among the Turkish prime ministers in that regard.

The VICS already comes up with a scale of its own for each index; however, for comparison purposes, Hermann's technique of evaluating each leader according to his or her deviation from a norming group is useful. Here, I will follow this approach

interpreting the operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers.[11] First of all, how do the seven Turkish prime ministers rank among themselves according to their indices for master beliefs, P–1 and I–1? With regard to their beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P–1), Ciller and Gul have the highest values and share an almost definitely friendly view of the world. Ciller and Gul are more than a standard deviation above the average for all Turkish prime ministers. Yilmaz and Demirel score the lowest here; according the VICS scale, their view of the political universe is somewhat friendly. As far as the directionality of strategy (I–1) goes, Gul has a definitely cooperative leaning and is more than one standard deviation above the average Turkish prime minister. Erdogan and Ecevit are also above the average; the lowest I–1 index is Demirel's, which is more than one standard deviation away from the mean. Still, though, all Turkish prime ministers have definitely cooperative direction of strategy.

Other differences in the operational code analysis indices are also worth exploring. Most Turkish prime ministers under investigation here rather close to being somewhat optimistic about their beliefs regarding realization of their political values, P–2 index, (in rank–order: Ciller, Erbakan, Ecevit, and Erdogan). Others have mixed (neither pessimistic nor optimistic) views about it (from the lowest: Demirel, Gul, and Yilmaz).

The seven leaders here share a somewhat similar view about the predictability of political future; the P–3 index here ranges from 0.232 (Gul) to 0.134 (Erbakan), with an average of 0.169 score. Turkish prime ministers have a rather low belief in their control over

[11] See Table 7.4 and 7.5 in Chapter 7.

historical development (P–4a); the average 0.306 puts Gul, Erdogan, and Ciller above, on the one hand, and Erbakan (the lowest index), Demirel, Ecevit, and Yilmaz below it. This suggests that Turkish prime ministers rather think that "others" have more control over historical development. Finally, the role of chance in the political universe (P–5) is very high for Turkish prime ministers as a group. The average score of 0.948 ranks close to those reported in other studies.

The I–1 index for Turkish prime ministers is already discussed briefly above; overall, they share a definitely cooperative strategy and there is not much difference among the seven individuals. The I–2 index for the intensity of tactics reveals somewhat similar results, which indicate that Erbakan has the highest index of 0.322 here—hence, has the most cooperative tactics compared to the other Turkish prime ministers. Ciller, once Erbakan's coalition partner, comes last with a score of 0.211. As a whole the Turkish prime ministers cluster around "somewhat cooperative" category as far as the intensity of their tactics is concerned.

The most risk acceptant Turkish prime minister is Gul (0.423) and the most risk averse is Yilmaz (0.261). The results for the I–3 index are fairly surprising, however, as Erdogan and Erbakan come right after Yilmaz (second and third, respectively) and are below the average for the index. Given Erdogan's active and reformist foreign policy since he came to power and the controversial nature of Erbakan's many policies during his one year in government, these are rather unexpected.

The I–4 indices tell about the individual's flexibility of tactics between cooperation and conflict (I–4a) and between words and deeds (I–4b). Overall, Turkish prime ministers have a medium level of flexibility between cooperative and conflictual tactics. Demirel and Ciller have the highest two scores here, which suggests that compared to other Turkish prime ministers they are more likely to go between the tactics. As to the I–4b index, the leader who has the most flexibility between words and deeds is Erdogan—more than a standard deviation away from the average. Erdogan's predecessor, Gul ranks the lowest here with a 0.275 index. Other prime ministers remain close to the average score for the index.

Appeal is the most preferred means of action for all Turkish prime ministers; their individual scores (with the exception of Erbakan) and the average are well above the "very high" mark of 0.32 according to the VICS scale. Erbakan has a 0.354 I–5c index, yet is distinct from all others where the closest is Demirel with a score of 0.502. Appeal, however, still is the most prefered form of action for Erbakan too. Staying with Erbakan, his next two most preferred means of action are at the extreme ends of both cooperative and conflictual means—Reward and Punish, respectively. Erbakan is the only leader with more than one standard deviation away from the average index in both categories.[12] There are relatively low levels of variation in most utility of means indices, particularly in the conflict means (Oppose, Threaten, Punish).

[12] This is the same for Promise (I–5b) category; Erbakan is the only leader who is more than one standard deviation away from the average.

How do the LTA and operational code profiles of Turkish prime ministers match with each other? What else, if anything, can one learn from combining portrayals of their personality traits and operational codes? As argued earlier, LTA and operational code analysis do not necessarily measure the same qualities or beliefs of an individual but some particular measurements are rather similar to each other——for instance, belief in ability to control events (BACE) and control over historical development (P–4a) can be expected to reveal somewhat similar conclusions about each leader's views about his or her ability to control historical developments. One can expect differences as well; for instance, Demirel ranks first in BACE scores but is second from the last in P–4a. While operational code indices of direction of strategy (I–1) and tactics (I–2) can not very well distinguish Erbakan from other prime ministers, LTA's Distrust of Others (DIS) trait puts Erbakan well above others. This is descriptive of Erbakan's foreign policy discourse, which emphasizes his conspiracy theories about the West's policies and actions against Turkey and the Muslim world. As discussed earlier, Erbakan's motivation toward the world then matches with this description. The operational code analysis indices of utility of means (I–5a to I–5f) complement this by placing Erbakan's preferences in this regard. Such a picture cannot be captured by the LTA profile unless a thorough, in–depth analysis of leader's discourse is conducted. Hence, such similarities and differences in the LTA and operational code analysis assessments can very well be used to complement a leader's profile. Overall, LTA eventually helps draw a complete leadership style profile for a leader and operational code analysis can complement this by providing further insights into leaders' approach to cooperative and conflictual means of actions.

Personality Profiles and Events: Results

Tables 5.4 and 5.5, below, respectively display the OLS results with the LTA and operational code data as independent variables and the events data as its dependent variable. As explained in Chapter 3, all data are aggregated monthly. The dependent variable is measured as four different types of foreign policy events: verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal cooperation, and verbal conflict. Hence, with the LTA and operational code data, four different models are tested.

According to Table 5.4, the OLS tests reveal marginally significant results with the LTA variables explaining four models of foreign policy behavior. In the verbal cooperation and verbal conflict models, Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task Focus (TASK) variables are statistically significant; each variable at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels, respectively with the model. In the material conflict model, Distrust of Others (DIS) and Task Focus (TASK) variables are significant at the 0.1 level. The constant, on the other hand, is significant at in the verbal cooperation, material cooperation, and verbal conflict models––at the 0.01 level in the first, and then at the 0.05 level in others. Further tests with some control variables (inflation, public opinion, and reciprocity) do not reveal significantly different results (see Appendix for results).

Table 5.5 displays the OLS test results with the operational code indices as its independent variables. According to the results, there is no statistical significance between the op code indices of Turkish prime ministers and Turkey's foreign policy

behavior as measured in the Kansas Events Data System. Operational code indices accounted for more variation in the dependent variable in all four models than the models with the LTA variables. Further tests with some control variables (inflation, public opinion, and reciprocity) do not reveal significantly different results (see Appendix).

Table 5.4 Turkey: Events and LTA

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	-3.679 (8.726)	-2.012 (1.526)	-2.7947 (2.998)	1.677 (3.338)
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	-21.2323 . (11.907)	-1.8926 (2.082)	-9.5571 * (4.091)	-1.819 (4.555)
Distrust of Others (DIS)	.1609 (10.098)	.6565 (1.765)	4.3464 (3.467)	7.609 . (3.86)
In-group Bias (IGB)	-.2744 (12.274)	.4511 (2.147)	-3.9488 (4.218)	-3.03 (4.696)
Need for Power (PWR)	-13.493 (10.011)	.282 (1.751)	1.6378 (3.440)	-2.987 (3.83)
Self-Confidence (SC)	6.8666 (4.299)	.6646 (.752)	1.8526 (1.477)	.6127 (1.645)
Task Focus (TASK)	16.274 . (8.778)	.5068 (1.535)	6.7334 * (3.016)	5.871 . (3.358)
cons	27.272 ** (10.148)	3.72 * (1.775)	7.5977 * (3.487)	5.18 (3.882)
N	201	201	201	201
R-square	0.056	0.0174	0.0657	0.0452
adj. R-square	0.021	-0.0182	0.0318	0.0106
Prob	0.1273	0.8418	0.0657	0.2498
RMSE	14.858	2.599	5.1059	5.6847

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Table 5.5 Turkey: Events and Operational Code

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
P-1 nature of the political universe	7.739 (13.475)	-2.0605 (2.3139)	1.8857 (4.5975)	-.4378 (4.9529)
P-2 prospects for realization of political values	-13.406 (18.002)	3.1656 (3.0911)	-5.3452 (6.1417)	1.4455 (6.6164)
P-3 predictability of political universe	12.668 (40.886)	-1.9936 (7.0206)	-5.1012 (13.9492)	5.4046 (15.0275)
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	17.968 (22.282)	-2.3503 (3.8261)	2.1832 (7.6020)	11.7396 (8.1896)
P-5 role of chance	74.523 (117.269)	-16.5429 (20.1363)	.5136 (40.0088)	25.8518 (43.1014)
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	11.577 (17.739)	.3001 (3.046)	-5.5059 (6.0522)	-1.7742 (6.5200)
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	-11.360 (24.074)	.1307 (4.1338)	3.7029 (8.2135)	-3.4827 (8.8485)
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	-2.697 (12.117)	-1.7097 (2.0807)	-.9411 (4.1341)	-1.9874 (4.4537)
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:				
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	-1.8718 (9.361)	-1.1647 (1.6074	-3.8124 (3.1937)	-3.1537 (3.4406)
I-4b word/deed tactics	12.195 (7.90)	.4155 (1.3565	.3962 (2.6953)	4.7679 (2.9037)
I-5 utility of means				
I-5a. Reward	951.2358 (1962.978)	503.2155 (337.0622)	930.7236 (669.7062)	-976.8671 (721.474)
I-5b. Promise	978.7296 (1964.874)	502.2192 (337.3877)	934.1916 (670.3529)	-971.0619 (722.1707)
I-5c. Appeal	965.0505 (1964.394)	504.8723 (337.3053)	936.2231 (670.1891)	-972.1212 (721.9942)
I-5d. Oppose	981.7826 (1962.757)	504.6006 (337.0242)	928.4948 (669.6305)	-975.5753 (721.3925)
I-5e. Threaten	999.7834 (1967.004)	506.0557 (337.7534)	942.9491 (671.0794)	-960.3346 (722.9534)
I-5f. Punish	977.7538 (1963.426)	507.3565 (337.139)	941.5401 (669.8588)	-970.6639 (721.6384)
cons	-1031.144 (1978.495)	-484.276 (339.7266)	-924.6595 (675)	953.9063 (727.177)
N	217	217	217	217
R-square	0.0544	0.0494	0.0707	0.1260
adj. R-square	-0.0212	-0.267	-0.0037	0.0561
Prob	0.7722	0.8407	0.5122	0.0329
RMSE	14.954	2.5677	5.1017	5.4961

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Conclusion

Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis of Turkey's post –Cold War prime ministers suggest distinct leadership styles and operational code profiles. However, similar to the results in the previous chapter, the statistical tests between personality variables and Turkey's foreign policy behavior appear to explain less than expected. In the tests with LTA variables, Conceptual Complexity and Task Focus display statistical significance in two and three models, respectively. Distrust of Others once again emerges as an important variable to explain conflictual behavior, albeit with a lower level of significance. While none of the operational code indices came up with strong statistical significance, the independent variables accounted for more variation in the dependent variable in all four models than the models with the LTA variables. It is noteworthy that more variation in the verbal and material conflict models (than either form of cooperation) was explained using either LTA or op code variables.

Chapter 6

Home and Away: Leadership Style and Foreign Policy of Turkey's Erdogan

"*So, I don't think I will come back to Davos after this,*" said Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and walked off the panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 29, 2009. On the stage left were Amr Mousa (Secretary General of the Arab League), Ban Ki–moon (Secretary General of the United Nations), Shimon Peres (Israel's President), and the moderator David Ignatius (of the Washington Post). An emotional and upset Erdogan first confronted Peres about Israel's operation in the Gaza Strip. Later, when the moderator did not grant his request to speak for "one [more] minute," Erdogan furiously stormed out of the panel in protest. Many were simply shocked by this behavior; after all, it is not an everyday happening that prime ministers act in such a manner. The world media found an infrequent and untraditional diplomatic protest in the making at the Davos meetings; the event quickly became "breaking news" across the globe. The prime minister of Israel's main ally in the Muslim world was angry and then absent. In the aftermath, it was not clear whom Erdogan was protesting: the moderator or the Israeli President, or presumably, both. Since, Turkish–Israeli relations have at best been lukewarm.

After Davos, Erdogan was welcomed in Turkey as the 'conqueror of Davos' and many Arab and Muslim nations celebrated him. Even some in the West were content with Erdogan's behavior at the height of Israel's operation in Gaza. The Davos incident was not the first time the Turkish prime minister left a meeting in protest. In November 2005, when Erdogan was visiting Denmark, on the grounds that among the press were the representatives of ROJ–TV and that the Danish authorities were not asking them to leave, Erdogan cancelled his press meeting with the Prime Minister of Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen.[1] Do such examples tell anything about Erdogan's leadership style and his foreign policy? Is it a mere coincidence that these events happened outside Turkey?

Well–established research traditions in political psychology provide a means to explore if leaders' personality and style differ across audiences. However, notwithstanding the hints that leaders' style can change depending on their audience (Hermann, 2003: 208), it remains a topic understudied at best. Such contextual differences are worth exploring in assessing our leaders and the way they act in response to situational demands (Hermann 2003). Alas, the extant literature on leadership traits analysis in particular, and political leadership and foreign policy overwhelmingly but with some notable exceptions in operational code research (see, for instance, Malici and Malici 2005; Renshon 2008), follow the assumption that leader traits and beliefs rather stay stable. There are at least two research programs that one can draw inferences to study this issue: "at–a–distance" methods of assessing leader profiles and the broader personality theory. "At–a–distance"

[1] Turkey claims that ROJ–TV has a direct connection with the PKK terrorist organization. In 2010, Denmark agreed with Turkey and is investigating the ROJ–TV for its illegal ties.

techniques look at leaders' discourse and use their "words as data." The literature on personality, on the other hand, can provide many insights on various effects on behavior. Here, I primarily follow the former but also refer to personality theories. I assume that one way to answer if the audience leaders are talking to makes any difference in their leadership style is to look at how leaders respond to domestic and foreign media.

The Davos incident becomes the primary impetus in looking at Turkey's Erdogan. In addition, as Turkish foreign policy activism increases and intrigues not only those who study Turkey but also others across the globe, the Turkish prime minister and his leadership style remain a puzzle to understand. Erdogan, who is up for elections in 2011 and whose party is also likely to govern Turkey for another term, leads a strategically located, predominantly Muslim, and a European Union candidate country. Following an event like Davos and in fact since Erdogan's Justice and Development Party came to power in November 2002, it is quite common to find arguments about Turkey's 'turning East' or following an 'Islamic foreign policy.' In contrast to such extreme acts abroad as the Davos incident, Erdogan is considered to be a pragmatic leader at home. Despite challenges from multiple domestic actors and institutions to Erdogan (on both foreign and domestic policy issues), one can argue that he has attempted to portray a working relationship within 'the Turkish state.'

The contrasting audiences Erdogan deals with in Turkey (domestic political scene and the actors therein) and abroad (the international clientele Erdogan addresses to regarding his foreign policy ambitions) in some ways suggests a two–level game in Turkey's

contemporary foreign policy (Putnam 1988). Are there any differences in Erdogan's leadership style at home and abroad? If so, what do they say about Turkey's foreign policy under Erdogan? As Erdogan's term continues and he follows an active foreign policy agenda, conclusions of this study are significant not only for presenting a first profile of Recep Tayyip Erdogan but also for offering clues about the future of Turkish foreign policy. Beyond understanding Erdogan and Turkey's foreign policy, this chapter also represents an initial attempt to understand leaders' behavior across audiences.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows; first, I briefly review the literature about at–a–distance methods. Then, I introduce the sources and methods used in my analysis. It concludes with a profile of Erdogan and a discussion about how his general personality profile compares with an audience–specific profile of Erdogan: at home and away. Indeed, there are differences in the Turkish prime minister's trait scores derived from his foreign policy relevant interviews with domestic and foreign media. Based on my findings, I argue that such differences may be due to the multiple domestic and international factors leaders are subject to influence. In Erdogan's case, Turkish domestic politics, his personal and political background, and Turkey's institutional structure are important explanatory factors for two personality profiles at home and away.

Leaders and Audiences

The broader personality theory literature, as well as the LTA literature, suggests that individuals can adjust their discourse and behavior depending on situational demands. For instance, Levi and Tetlock (1980: 209) remind of the importance of the social context in interpreting measures of content analysis. Likewise, in an assessment of conclusions he draws from studying personality of political leaders at a distance, Winter (2005) argues that personality interacts with both the opportunities and obstacles of situational contexts (p. 573). Audience is one of those contextual factors. As to what effects audiences may have on leaders, Holsti (1976) notes that political discourse aims to "persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or otherwise influence the intended audience… to serve and advance practical goals of the moment" (also cited in Levi and Tetlock 1980: 209).

Some research on personality has looked at the level of complexity in private (letters or diaries) and public (books, articles, or speeches) communications with respect to the audience effect on leaders' discourse and style. Dille (2000) brings in an impression management hypothesis as to possible audience and contextual effects on leaders, yet his discussion later focuses on differences in a temporal context. Lerner and Tetlock's (1999) review of accountability literature mentions audience effects in similar vein. Likewise, the integrative complexity literature talks about audience effects. For instance, Guttieri, Wallace, and Suedfeld (1995: 605–607) examine how various studies found the

subject has high complexity when there is a lack of complete agreement with him or her and the audience. They aptly warn that integrative complexity differences suggest that there exists an audience effect but to what degree these are reflected in policy cannot be concluded from those (Guttieri et al. 1995: 606). This literature, though, is much concentrated on the differences between what is called the private and public words of leaders, and works only with the assumption that leaders' audiences can be deducted from these two types of materials. A very similar interest has long existed in the at–a–distance scholarship. Recently, Renshon (2009) profiled President Kennedy's belief system in private and public documents.

Whether the audience makes a difference to leaders' style remains an uncharted territory particularly in the at–a–distance literature. Indeed, it is one of the paths Hermann (2003) suggested as a venue of research but has not been studied yet. In addition to possible differences across domestic and international audiences, Hermann asks if leaders' personality traits scores would differ across topics and time, also if their scores would differ in a crisis as opposed to a noncrisis situation. She argues: "If the changes are found for audience, chances are that these leaders are influenced by the people, groups, and organizations with whom they are interacting. If, however, the changes occur by topic, then the leaders are probably attending to solving the problem at hand and tailoring their behavior to deal with what is happening" (2003: 208). According to Hermann, "leaders of third world countries often show such differences in the way they speak at home and abroad. They are much less directive, more charming, and more diplomatic in dealing with the governments of larger, more developed states from whom they may want

something than when they focus on their own countries" (2003: 208–9). As she claims these leaders are more decisive and act in "authoritarian and autocratic" manner when they talk with the domestic audience. This argument explains how leaders may be constrained by systemic factors, but fails to account for, or even recognize, if and how domestic limitations may affect political leaders and their style.

The extant literature on political leadership has looked at differences across time (Malici and Malici 2005), if leaders exhibited different personalities in scripted and spontaneous utterances (Dille 2000; Dille and Young 2000; Renfro 2009), if they hold different beliefs about democracies and non–democracies (Schafer and Walker 2006a). Shannon and Keller (2007) aim at tracing audience effects (along with topic and time period); they find differences only on the topic and report those. Most of these studies, however, utilize operational code analysis. As far as the LTA literature is concerned, arguably it has not kept up with the same sort of expansion in the operational code analysis literature. For instance, in an analysis of U.S. president George H. W. Bush's belief system, Renshon (2008) showed that our leaders are prone to adjusting the way they interpret the world in response to such dramatic events as the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Even Renshon concedes that while leaders may change their beliefs in a dramatic way, over a longer period of time severe changes become slightly attenuated as the new belief system is consolidated. Such studies have been undermining the assumption that leaders have stable personality traits or beliefs across time or issue (also see, Alker 1972). This article is another attempt to challenge that assumption, and makes a unique attempt in

questioning the audience effect on leaders. Moreover, the use of LTA in this study also adds to the literature that utilizes this technique.

Data and Method

This article tackles the two questions posed earlier, and attempts to reach a conclusion by utilizing at–a–distance methods (Hermann 1977; Post 2003; Schafer 2000; Winter et al. 1991). Following the great strides made within this tradition, this article takes public domain texts as its data——here, the transcripts of interviews with Erdogan. ProfilerPlus (Social Science Automation 2009) is used to analyze these texts. ProfilerPlus is a computer software of content analysis developed by Social Science Automation. Analyzing text with this program guarantees uniformity in the treatment of text; hence, words become the data (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Dyson and Billordo 2004). Under investigation is Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey's Erdogan serves the goals of this analysis very well given the active foreign policy his government pursued and the availability of interviews Erdogan gave both to the domestic and international media on various foreign policy issues.

Only the words directly spoken by the leader, Turkey's Erdogan, are analyzed here. Specifically, Erdogan's interviews with the domestic and international media on only

foreign policy issues are studied from March 14, 2003 (the date Erdogan became Turkish primer minister) until the end of 2009. Hence, these interviews discuss various issues at various different times during Erdogan's tenure in government and represent his general foreign policy approach. The interviews are drawn from *LexisNexis Academic*, *Factiva*, and *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS). In addition, a few sources, such as the *PBS*'s web site, also posted the transcripts of their interviews and hence these were accessed directly from the WWW. It should be noted that as a non–English speaking leader, all of Erdogan's interviews were translated, but as Hermann (1980, 1987) suggests, translation effects are minimal: inter–coder reliability between native speakers' coding and Hermann's coding of translated text averages 0.92 across all seven traits.

One–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of Erdogan's leadership traits scores with interviews at home in Turkey and abroad as factors is employed to assess if Erdogan has indeed two personality styles.

Erdogan's Personality and His Foreign Policy: At Home and Away

Since coming to power in November 2002, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put his own mark on Turkey's foreign policy.[2] Erdogan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, initiated accession talks with the European Union, and in 2010, against the rest of the United Nations Security Council, voted against more sanctions on Iran. As mentioned earlier, Erdogan was the main actor in the most memorable event at the 2009 World Economic Forum. Is it possible that Erdogan has two leadership styles, one in Turkey and another abroad?

Table 6.1 Erdogan's LTA Scores At Home and Away

	Erdogan Away	Erdogan at Home	F (N=53, *df*=1)	*p**
Belief can control events	.366	.433	2.499	.120
Conceptual complexity	.574	.666	10.488	.002
Distrust of others	.109	.081	.836	.365
In–group bias	.103	.106	.016	.901
Need for power	.244	.201	2.711	.106
Self confidence	.411	.276	3.554	.065
Task focus	.623	.749	10.562	.002

* Two–tailed test.

[2] As much as Erdogan influenced Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu is considered to be the ideologue of Turkey's contemporary foreign policy. A professor of international relations, Davutoglu first served as an adviser to prime minister Abdullah Gul and worked closely with both Gul and Erdogan. Then, he became Turkey's minister of Foreign Affairs when Gul was selected president.

Table 2 reports mean scores for Erdogan's leadership traits for 16 interviews he gave to Turkish media and 37 interviews he gave to foreign media; it also displays the one–way ANOVA test results. The two profiles suggest differences between each other. At home, Erdogan has a higher score in Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) but lower Need for Power (PWR) score than mean scores for his away profile. Erdogan has higher Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task Focus (TASK) scores at home than away; conversely, his Self–Confidence (SC) and Distrust of Others (DIS) are higher abroad. Erdogan's In–Group Bias (IGB) scores remain about the same in both average profiles. According to ANOVA results, Erdogan's CC and TASK scores significantly differ at home and abroad. In addition, his SC scores at home and away are marginally different from each other. According to Erdogan's average profiles, while there is no statistical significance, his mean scores for BACE, PWR, and DIS are also noticeably different at home and away.

Hermann's discussion provides a good starting point for interpreting these results. However, as Hermann suggests, a close attention to the context in which individual leaders function provides further details and would expand our understanding of how leaders may indeed alter their leadership styles depending on their audience. In Erdogan's case, the examples of the World Economic Forum panel and the press conference in Denmark highlight the extremes of Erdogan's style. A quantitative analysis of his interviews, however, confirms that Erdogan has different leadership styles at home and abroad.

In Erdogan's case, his behavior can be placed in context as one can compare his interaction with the media at home and abroad. Erdogan's LTA scores providing a general profile and his profile at home and away hold the answers to the questions above once these are interpreted in the context of Turkish politics. One interpretation of these results is that Erdogan responds to a different environment at home in Turkey and outside the country as he discusses foreign policy issues. This argument can indeed be supported by Erdogan's political background and the institutional and historical dynamics of Turkey. In addition, Erdogan's approach to foreign policy would explain the differences in his two profiles.

As argued earlier, traditionally, among other actors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish military have enjoyed significant power in Turkish foreign policy. This institutional structure, civilian and military, successfully excluded the political traditions that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party represented. If this is to be interpreted a "secular" versus "Islamist" clash (Kesgin 2009), then the Ministry and Turkish military were the bulwarks of secularism in Turkish foreign policy and Erdogan has been an "Islamist" threat. Indeed, this concern with the Justice and Development Party governments and its leaders that they are facing Turkey eastwards (meaning integrating "Islamism" into its foreign policy) has existed since November 2002. This argument, to many, found support in Turkey's political history. Given Erdogan's and many of the JDP leaderships' political backgrounds, there has been a suspicion about their true intentions in power. Erdogan and his governments, often perceived as more

conservative than his associate Gul who preceded him as prime minister, functioned in this domestic political context. These have certainly had implications for Erdogan's administration of his foreign policy agenda. Hence, the leadership traits scores for Erdogan's home and away interviews are reflections of this context. His higher Self–Confidence score in interviews with foreign media indicates that Erdogan is more confident away than home.[3] One can read this such that as the chief executive of Turkey, Erdogan feels more in control of foreign policy agenda and is more assertive in his interviews away. Possibly Erdogan is rather defensive, or somewhat restrained at home, and hence is careful about his foreign policy discourse. Given his personal and political background (likewise the political movement he is affiliated with), he may have felt limited rather than free at home.

While at home, Erdogan may be attempting to appear that he himself and his government are not in clash with other main actors in Turkey's foreign policy establishment (i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy and the military) and have a working relationship with them. Abroad, Erdogan possibly is trying to convey a message that emphasizes Turkey's importance in the world and his government's active agenda in world affairs (such as mediating between Israel and Syria, the United Nations' Alliance

[3] One might expect that this would be supported by a higher Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) scores away than home. However, Erdogan's average BACE score at home is higher than his away score and there is also no statistical significance between the two. One possible explanation is that Erdogan thinks that there are systemic constraints on Turkey's foreign policy and hence does not believe in his abilities to control events despite his willingness to do so. At home, nonetheless, Erdogan has a strong electoral mandate and on this translates into a higher BACE score.

of Civilizations project, and reaching out to Iran). This relates with the broader foreign policy understanding of Erdogan and his government, which may account for the difference in his Self–Confidence scores. Eventually, this feeds a "can–do" mentality, which is a latent but very much central principle behind the recent activism in contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey's foreign policy under Erdogan is based on Davutoglu's (2001) principal concept of strategic depth. According to the strategic depth doctrine, due its historical depth of the Ottoman Empire's legacy contemporary Turkey finds itself in a geographical depth.[4] The latter is then part of historical depth, but translates into many geographical influences (in Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Mediterranean) where the former Ottoman Empire ruled. Davutoglu's (2001) book *Stratejik Derinlik* ("Strategic Depth") guides Turkey's foreign policy with such principles as 'zero problems with neighbors' (Davutoglu 2010)——for a review see Murinson (2006), also see Davutoglu (2008). In a way, at a time of transition in the post–Cold war era where Huntington (1993) in his *Clash of Civilizations* found a "torn country" in Turkey, for its Ottoman past and ethnic as well as religious ties Davutoglu (2001) sees immense opportunities to materialize. Hence, the strategic depth doctrine prescribes an active involvement in Turkey's potential spheres of influence and assumes eventually its becoming of a global actor. Erdogan's approach to foreign policy then reflects this doctrine and pushes him to be more assertive; hence, Erdogan is possibly doing his best to look like he is in control by exhibiting a self–confident leader.

[4] Murinson (2006) traces this approach to Ozal's presidency and his foreign policy perspective.

As such, one ramification of this approach to foreign policy is that, aware of the utility of Turkey for the West as a dominantly Muslim, secular, democratic society, Erdogan is motivated to make the most of this opportunity. Erdogan's talk about 'marketing Turkey' corresponds to his understanding of how Turkish foreign policy should be formulated. This "marketing" approach also matches with Erdogan often being portrayed as a pragmatic leader. In an interview with the Arabic language Al Jazeera network (November 16, 2005 on "Without Borders"), in response to a question about how there are accusations that the Turkish government is "selling Turkey to Western, Arab, and Israeli investors," Erdogan says: "I am not selling, I am promoting. These people know nothing about the issue and do not know the meaning of marketing or promotion. We tell them: Learn and study management. Politics, social life, and economy are marketed and you have to do this."

While Erdogan's mean scores for his Self–Confidence (SC) trait at home and away are only marginally significant, his Conceptual Complexity (CC) and Task–Focus (TASK) scores at home and away exhibit strong statistical significance. As such, Erdogan is more conceptually complex and more task–focused at home than away. The CC scores suggest that Erdogan is more likely to approach other people, places, policies, or ideas, etc. from multiple perspectives when he is discussing foreign policy issues in Turkey; likewise, that Erdogan has a more dichotomous, 'black–and–white' view of the world when abroad. His TASK scores, on the other hand, indicate that in Turkey Erdogan is motivated about problem solving but away he is rather concerned about building

relationships. Together these are telling of Erdogan's behavior in the international arena. For instance, his high TASK score at home signals that Erdogan is making attempts to ascertain a working relationship with the institutions of the Turkish state——consistent with the argument made earlier.[5] Erdogan's lower TASK score in his interviews abroad explains his attempts to establish personal relationships with such leaders as Italy's prime minister Berlusconi, Greece's Karamanlis, or Spain's Aznar. Erdogan often referred to these leaders as "my friends." Moreover, he even invited and hosted Berlusconi and Karamanlis to his son's wedding. Hence, relationships are possibly offering an explanation to Erdogan's behavior at Davos. In that infamous example, Erdogan's affiliation with the Palestinians was causing his outburst. However, this relationship focus is not necessarily only oriented towards the Muslim societies as Berlusconi, Karamanlis, Aznar examples suggest otherwise.

Erdogan's profiles at home and away can be more meaningful when they are interpreted against a norming group. Here, I first compared Erdogan's two profiles against each other. This test suggests some statistical support to the argument made here. Then, I also assess his two profiles and his general profile according to an average profile of Turkish

[5] Since November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments under Gul and Erdogan clashed, as much as they cooperated, with these institutions on both domestic and foreign policy issues. The JDP governments did not hesitate to take initiative and introduce major policy changes, for instance regarding Turkey's Cyprus policy. Even then, one would argue that on foreign policy issues the JDP governments were attempting to coordinate with the country's foreign policy establishment; clashes between the two actors have been more serious on domestic issues (such as the election of Gul to the presidency).

prime ministers (Table 3) and interpret them based on Hermann's leadership style as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information and motivation (see Appendix; for a detailed discussion, see Hermann 2003). This comparison helps situate Erdogan with his predecessors. Erdogan's general and at home profiles suggest that he has an actively independent leadership style. Outside Turkey, this is more likely to become a directive leadership style. The difference primarily lies in the huge discrepancy between Erdogan's TASK scores at home and away. Erdogan's Task Focus score in his interviews to foreign media is significantly over Gul's .722, which is the highest among other Turkish prime ministers in the post–Cold war era.

Because Erdogan "challenges constraints" and then is "open to information," Erdogan would alternate between actively independent and directive leadership styles (Hermann 2003). As argued above, Erdogan is more likely to assume the latter when he is discussing foreign policy away but can also alternate to the former leadership style depending on the circumstances. Overall, Turkey's Erdogan indeed has a leadership style that focuses on increasing maneuverability and independence (which also derives from the strategic depth doctrine discussed earlier).[6] Erdogan's behavior and style away from home such as the Davos incident, on the other hand, corresponds to a directive leadership style, where he attempts to maintain and improve status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhances the state's reputation. In the end,

[6] The same conclusion was reached from Erdogan's profile in the larger study.

Hermann's method holds very well as to assessing leadership style of yet another political leader.

Table 6.2 Erdogan's General LTA Profile

	Erdogan's average profile N=53	Average profile of Turkey's prime ministers since 1991
Belief can control events	.386	Mean = .351 Low < .319 High > .383
Conceptual complexity	.601	Mean = .564 Low < .527 High > .601
Distrust of others	.101	Mean = .138 Low < .097 High > .179
In–group bias	.104	Mean = .142 Low < .114 High > .170
Need for power	.231	Mean = .287 Low < .243 High > .331
Self confidence	.370	Mean = .400 Low < .320 High > .480
Task focus	.661	Mean = .637 Low < .572 High > .702

Table 6.2 presents Erdogan's general profile in comparison to other post–Cold War Turkish prime ministers. Erdogan's scores at home are higher than his average profile scores and these are in turn higher than his scores away (Home > Average > Away), in all traits but Self–Confidence; his SC scores come up with the exact opposite relationship

(Away > Average > Home). More specifically, the overall relationship implies that while Erdogan always falls into the "challenges constraints" category as to his responsiveness to constraints, the behavioral assumptions of this category should be stronger given his Need for Power and Belief in Ability to Control Events. Likewise, the same holds for Erdogan's openness to information (Self–Confidence and Conceptual Complexity scores) and motivation (Task Focus scores). The reverse relationship in the SC trait by itself does not lead to any changes in assessing Erdogan's leadership styles, but must be interpreted along the lines that were discussed earlier.

Overall, Erdogan's past experiences and domestic political setting may be affecting his foreign policy discourse in his interviews at home and away. The question, then, is to explain Erdogan's behavior in Davos or in Copenhagen. An oft–made reference is that Erdogan acts emotionally or in an uncalculated manner on some occasions. There is some merit to these arguments. Indeed, Erdogan feels an emotional connection with the Palestinians and thinks that Europeans are not assisting Turkey's fight against terrorism as much as they could. These feelings are motivating such reactions like in Davos and in Copenhagen. Leadership Traits Analysis of Erdogan's interviews on foreign policy issues explains his behavior.

Discussion

The two profiles of Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at home and away as measures of the audience factor are possibly not exclusive to him. Hermann (and others) is right to speculate that contextual factors affect political leaders. However, contrary to Hermann's argument that the leaders of the "Third world" are more prone to exhibit changes in leadership style due to systemic constraints, I posit that any leader can assume a different leadership style over a multiplicity of concerns. In Erdogan's case, the domestic political setting may constrain him at home but he can assume a much different style abroad. The constraints that exist within the Turkish context, though, may take other forms in other countries. Institutions such as the legislative or public opinion may force leadership to attend to them in foreign policy matters. Much like Erdogan, then the leader may assume a more "liberal" discourse abroad, free from such constraints that might exist at home. For instance, the current U.S. administration's policies such as an attempt to reach out the Islamic world or withdrawal from Iraq have been controversial at home but more appealing on an international scale. It is possible that there were differences between Obama's foreign policy take on such issues at home and away. In a similar vein, when an Israeli leader talks about sacrifices for the peace process, he or she may prefer a different discourse to domestic and foreign audiences where the appeal as well as the criticism would be different. Alternatively, a reverse relationship would mean leaders may have to "sell" certain international constraints to their domestic audiences and again take on a different discourse and leadership styles.

The present Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has put his mark on Turkey's foreign policy since coming to power in November 2002. Erdogan led Turkey in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, openly collided with Israel over its Palestine policy, and recently sided with Brazil against the rest of the United Nations Security Council as more sanctions are placed on Iran. Erdogan's leadership style sheds a light on foreign policy behavior of Turkey. Broadly speaking, an at–a–distant analysis of the interviews Erdogan gave in Turkey and abroad also suggests that leaders can alter their style depending on their primary audience. Arguably, the variability of personality traits can be a personality trait itself. More research is needed to assess the validity of such an argument, though. The literatures discussed here provide the theoretical as well as empirical background to such an inquiry; the findings from Turkey's prime minister Erdogan's foreign policy interviews at home and away confirm that this would be a fruitful line of research and contribute to our understanding of political leaders and their leadership styles.

Leaders would most likely differ to what degree they would be influenced by contextual factors and to the degree that those would affect policy. Yet, among those factors is the audience, and it has been neglected this far. Further investigations are necessary to explore this argument for other leaders than Turkey's Erdogan. This study illustrates that it is a worthy venue of research. Audiences can be receptive, hostile, or neutral and leaders try to convince audiences to their policies and agendas. This, in turn, may require different language and tactics to appeal to these audiences; hence, leaders may indeed

take on different leadership styles depending on their audience. Moreover, it is worth reiterating that, as this chapter illustrates, beyond international constraints, domestic political circumstances affect leaders' style on foreign policy matters.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This dissertation aimed at meeting two goals: (1) linking personality variables with large-N datasets, and (2) expanding the extant at–a–distance literatures of Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis to non–Western contexts. To serve the purposes of the research design, I used Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) Levant and Turkey datasets, which are the most developed data available. Since Israel and Turkey are the only states with free and fair elections in the KEDS datasets, these two countries become the focus of this research. Next, I collected data (i.e., spontaneous foreign policy statements) for personality assessment of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers in the post–Cold War era. The result was a large, unique compilation of words–as–data for Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers since 1991. For a total of seven prime ministers in each country, I created a comprehensive archive of spontaneous foreign statements that produced reliable profiles of the individual leaders' as well as a general profile of a prime minister for both countries. Once I presented these profiles, I discussed the results of statistical tests where I linked events data with personality variables.

In this final chapter, first, I re–visit the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 3, review the results from both Israel and Turkey, and then discuss the empirical and theoretical

implications of this particular study broadly speaking, and for understanding Israel's and Turkey's political leadership and foreign policy behavior. Finally, I conclude with suggestions for future research in similar vein.

Hypotheses

The results of the OLS tests would suggest cautiousness to argue for direct and significant implications of personality variables for explaining foreign policy behavior. In the meantime, the leadership style and operational code profiles of the post-Cold War prime ministers of Israel and Turkey fit well with the general perceptions of their foreign policy preferences. For instance, among others, leadership styles of Israel's Shamir and Turkey's Erbakan explain how the former dragged his foot in negotiations with the Palestinians and the latter was motivated to enlist other Muslim nations to his mission against the West. These notwithstanding, it is difficult to claim a conclusive statement about the strengths of Leadership Traits Analysis (*Hypothesis 1a*) and Operational Code Analysis (*Hypothesis 1b*) to explain foreign policy behavior as measured in events data.

Other hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3 predicted certain relationship between the personality variables and foreign policy behavior, and between the personality variables themselves. Table 7.1 and 7.2 display correlations between LTA variables and the four types of foreign policy behavior for Israel and Turkey, respectively. In the case of Israel,

correlation results, as well as OLS results (Table 4.3 in Chapter 4), suggest that Distrust of Others (DIS) is indeed a powerful indicator of conflictual behavior, verbal and material. While this level of significance can not be found in the tests with Turkey data, there is again at a least a marginally significant result in the OLS test which indicates that higher levels of Distrust of Others increase the number of material conflictual behavior (Table 5.3 in Chapter 5). Hence, it is plausible to argue that results from the analyses here support that indeed the Distrust of Others variable positively correlates with conflictual behavior (*Hypothesis 2a*).

Table 7.1 Correlations between LTA Variables and Foreign Policy Behavior: Israel

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
BACE	.074	.089	.137 *	.171 *
CC	-.002	.042	-.120	-.164 *
DIS	.012	.115	.289 **	.198 **
IGB	.019	-.021	.002	-.011
PWR	-.037	-.036	.035	.100
SC	-.090	-.057	-.022	-.021
TASK	-.009	.018	.028	-.089

** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.

Table 7.2 Correlations between LTA Variables and Foreign Policy Behavior: Turkey

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
BACE	-.040	-.089	-.056	-.057
CC	-.027	-.051	-.094	.007
DIS	-.014	-.037	.047	.089
IGB	-.039	.049	-.032	-.060
PWR	-.113	-.023	.020	-.130
SC	.134	.147 *	.110	.023
TASK	.140*	.039	.137 *	.083

* Significant at the .05 level.

As to the other hypotheses, we do not find any such support in any of the statistical tests. it cannot be concluded that the Need for Power (PWR) positively correlates with conflictual behavior (*Hypothesis 2b*).[1] Hence, Hypothesis 2b is not confirmed. Likewise, there is no support for an expected positive correlation between P–1 (nature of the political universe) index and cooperative behavior (*Hypothesis 3*). Finally, notwithstanding their similar theoretical constructs, there is no indication that Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and P–4a (belief in ability to control historical development) index, as predicted by *Hypothesis 4*. Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed either.

Re-Interpreting the Results: Israel and Turkey

Spontaneous foreign policy statements collected for Israel's and Turkey's post–Cold War prime ministers produced what would be broadly accepted profiles of seven political leaders from each country. As such, these are significant contributions to explaining political leadership in both countries. They also add to the leadership traits analysis (LTA) and operational code analysis literatures in terms of expanding their coverage. Notwithstanding these, the results of statistical tests seem to be somewhat disappointing. The most notable outcome of the regression tests was that an LTA variable, that is

[1] This is a somewhat surprising result, since further correlation tests suggest that there is strong correlation between Distrust of Others (DIS) and Need for Power (PWR) variables.

Distrust of Others (DIS), emerged significant in explaining material conflict events in tests with both Israel and Turkey data. What can be concluded from these results?

The data in this study were aggregated at a monthly basis. It is possible that lower–levels of aggregation may serve better in future research with the same motivation to match behavior with personality variables. This may be particularly useful in explaining the relationship between the two at rather short periods of time such as during a particular crisis than about the two decades examined here. Hence, it would go against the logic of covering an extended period of time and accounting for multiple political leaders, but it is possible that such a research design may produce stronger statistical relationships between the dependent and independent variables. For instance, with the data collected here for Israel and Turkey, one can look at one particular time as political leadership deals with a specific crisis in foreign (or security) policy matters. Israel and Turkey can provide one with multiple possible cases; the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and international negotiations between the two parties, or Turkey's relationship with the European Union since the 1990s would make good candidates for such research.

This dissertation did not aim for conducting such studies or other cases of foreign policy decision making. It is, however, most definite that those would shed more light on the quantitative results presented here. Moreover, such work could potentially make contributions to theoretical ground in at–a–distance study of political leadership and in broader literature. Ongoing and future research emanating from the data collected for this dissertation aim at those goals. For instance, in Chapter 6, I explore the idea that

political leaders take their audiences into consideration in their foreign policy statements, and they can assume rather different leadership styles addressing domestic and international audiences.[2] In another study, I ask if the publicly perceived worldviews of political leaders about the role of religion in politics can indeed make any difference in terms of their foreign policy orientations.[3]

Finally, in both Israel and Turkey, there are political leaders who democratically left their seats but were elected to make a come–back (Netanyahu and Yilmaz, respectively). These two cases can provide the background to study what leaders learn in such cases. In both Israel and Turkey, many individuals already profiled here as prime ministers have held different offices in government. For instance, in Turkey, Abdullah Gul was Prime Minister (November 2002-March 2003), Minister of Foreign Affairs (March 2003-August 2007), and has been the President since. How does Gul's leadership style differ in these various positions he served? Those would make a good reason to re–visit the argument "where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison 1969) and can motivate

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[2] This chapter looks at Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and assesses his two profiles in interviews he gave to the domestic and foreign press (for an article length version, see Kesgin 2010). Findings suggest that Erdogan has two leadership styles at home in Turkey and away.

[3] Motivated by the oft-made references to "secular" and "religious" leadership in Turkey and their foreign policy preferences, this paper compares leadership traits and styles, as well as operational codes, of Bulent Ecevit with Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Kesgin 2009). This paper does not find many differences between Ecevit and Erdogan.

similar studies in other cases. For instance, how does former U.S. vice president Cheney differ from the Secretary of Defense Cheney? Does 'where you sit is what you think' translate into leadership styles or belief systems?

Case studies have proven fruitful to this line of research (for instance, Dyson 2006). After all, neither this study nor the political leadership literature is based on the assumption that individual level variables will explain it all. Instead, the argument is that individuals constitute the heart of international politics (Hudson 2005). This recognizes the multiple other actors and various limitations that function along with the individual and limit him or her. In the cases of Israel and Turkey, there are coalition governments, other influential actors such as the public or the military, systemic restraints of economic and security reliance on "great powers," and cultural, ethnic or religious ties that affect and limit the individual leadership. The findings here suggest that leaders, their leadership styles and beliefs make a difference in foreign policy behavior of both Israel and Turkey––while those factors mentioned above are held constant. Further research with the data used for analyses in this dissertation and case studies can shed more light on their effect in particular contexts. Next, I elaborate on the empirical and theoretical implications of this dissertation to the many literatures that it is related with and then discuss potential directions for future research as I conclude this final chapter.

Empirical and Theoretical Implications

It is necessary to review the implications of this dissertation to multiple research areas it builds upon and is related to: (a) Leadership Traits and Operational Code in particular, as well as the political leadership literature in broad terms, (b) Israel and Turkey, as well as the Middle East broadly speaking, (c) foreign policy analysis, and finally (d) international relations. In this section, I also compare the Israeli and Turkish prime ministers to average scores of world leaders.

Differences in leadership styles of prime ministers are not inconsequential and these can affect foreign policies in parliamentary systems (Kaarbo 1997). Here, conclusions from Israel's and Turkey's post-Cold War prime ministers indeed confirm this claim. In particular, it is significant for the LTA literature and broadly for political leadership research that Distrust of Other (DIS) comes up as a crucial variable in the analyses here. Findings in this dissertation suggest that Distrust of Others is an important variable to explain conflictual behavior propensities of political leaders.

Notwithstanding those conclusions, this variable has not received much attention. If the goal of understanding the role of prime ministers in specific and of political leadership broadly speaking is to "ascertain *which* individual characteristics are important *when* individual characteristics matter" (Kaarbo 1997: 560), then this dissertation provides some answers for that purpose. As such, we need to understand the impact of Distrust of Others on political leaders' decision making. Likewise, I argue that another LTA

variable Task Focus (TASK) should be examined carefully. This trait is significant in the Turkey data; elsewhere, I find that Task Focus can offer meaningful information about foreign policy orientations of political leaders (Kesgin 2010). The question "Is the leader focused more on relationships or problem-solving?" indeed has important significance for foreign policy.

Due to the insignificance of results in statistical tests, I do not discuss the operational code indices here. However, the master indices P-1 and I-1, and the I-4a and I-4b indices in particular, deserve some further attention. In the following pages, I briefly review the operational codes indices of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers in comparison to a norming group of world leaders. First, the same comparison with the leadership traits scores is in order.

Table 7.3 compares average Israeli and Turkish prime minister profiles to a general profile of a 'world leader.' Compared to Dyson's (2006) average profile of 51 political leaders, noteworthy differences are that: an average profile of Israel's prime minister has relatively high scores in Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE) and Self–Confidence (SC), significantly higher values of Distrust of Others (DIS), In-group Bias (IGB), and Need for Power (PWR). With the same norming group, an average profile of a Turkish leader also exhibits a relatively high scores in Distrust of Others (DIS), and a significantly high score in In-group Bias (IGB) and Need for Power (PWR). Otherwise, Israeli and Turkish leaders' leadership traits scores are close to those of the norming group. While I report the Social Science Automation scores for 214 political leaders in

Table 7.3, I do not discuss them since their Distrust of Others (DIS) and In-group Bias (IGB) numbers appear to be skewed.

Table 7.3 Leadership Traits Scores of Israel's and Turkey's Post-Cold War Prime Ministers in Perspective

Leadership Trait	*Israel's Prime Ministers*	*Turkey's Prime Ministers*	*51 political leaders (Dyson 2006)*	*214 political leaders (SSA)*
Belief can control events	Mean = .377 Low < .339 High > .414	Mean = .351 Low < .319 High > .383	Mean = .35 Low < .31 High > .39	Mean = .34 Low < .30 High > .38
Conceptual complexity	Mean = .555 Low < .511 High > .599	Mean = .564 Low < .527 High > .601	Mean = .57 Low < .53 High > .61	Mean = .65 Low < .61 High > .69
Distrust of others	Mean = .167 Low < .119 High > .215	Mean = .138 Low < .097 High > .179	Mean = .12 Low < .08 High > .16	Mean = .01 Low < 0 High > 0
In-group bias	Mean = .137 Low < .110 High > .164	Mean = .142 Low < .114 High > .170	Mean = .09 Low < .07 High > .11	Mean = .51 Low < .44 High > .58
Need for power	Mean = .267 Low < .248 High > .285	Mean = .287 Low < .243 High > .331	Mean = .24 Low < .21 High > .27	Mean = .26 Low < .22 High > .30
Self confidence	Mean = .455 Low < .358 High > .552	Mean = .400 Low < .320 High > .480	Mean = .41 Low < .33 High > .49	Mean = .36 Low < .27 High > .45
Task focus	Mean = .621 Low < .584 High > .657	Mean = .637 Low < .572 High > .702	Mean = .63 Low < .57 High > .69	Mean = .73 Low < .67 High > .79

Tables 7.4 and 7.5, in similar fashion, report the operational code indices of average profiles of Israel's and Turkey's prime ministers in comparison to a norming of 168

world leaders.[4] In comparison to this norming group, operational code profile of an Israeli prime minister has a relatively high index in P-1 (nature of the political universe), P-3 (predictability of political universe), P-4 (belief in ability to control historical development, I-1 (direction of strategy), and I-2 (intensity of tactics). Israel's prime ministers flexibility between cooperative and conflictural tactics (I-4a), and between word and deed tactics (I-4b) are relatively low than the world leader's average indices. In terms of utility of means indices (reported in Table 6.5), Israel's prime ministers resort less to Reward (I-5a) and more to Promise (I-5b) and Appeal (I-5c) as cooperative means. As to the indices of conflictual means, Threaten (I-5e) is the most preferred and higher on average than that of the norming group; Oppose (I-5d) and Punish (I-5f) are lower than the average of the norming group.

Operational code profile of a Turkish prime minister is relatively high in P-1 (nature of the political universe), P-2 (prospects for realization of political values), P-3 (predictability of political universe), P-4 (belief in ability to control historical development, I-1 (direction of strategy), I-2 (intensity of tactics), and I-3 (risk orientation). With the exception of P-4, all other indices for an average profile of Turkey's prime minister are higher than those of the Israel's prime minister. Turkish prime minister's flexibility between cooperative and conflictural tactics (I-4a), and between word and deed tactics (I-4b) are relatively low than the world leader's average

[4] Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, provided the data. The Social Science Automation document does not report the means and standard deviations for all operational code indices; hence they are not included here.

indices; in addition, these are lower than those of the Israel's prime minister. In terms of utility of means indices (reported in Table 7.5), compared to the world leaders, Turkish prime minister has a tendency to use Reward (I-5a) and Appeal (I-5c) as cooperative means. As to the indices of conflictual means, all indices are lower than the average of the norming group.

Table 7.4 Operational Code Indices of Israel's and Turkey's Post-Cold War Prime Ministers in Perspective

	Israel's Prime Ministers	Turkey's Prime Ministers	Norming Group N=168
P-1 Nature of the political universe	Mean .333	Mean .352	Mean .273
	Low .270	Low .312	Low -.007
	High .396	High .392	High .553
P-2 prospects for realization of political values	Mean .125	Mean .150	Mean .123
	Low .073	Low .112	Low -.095
	High .176	High .188	High .342
P-3 predictability of political universe	Mean .157	Mean .169	Mean .125
	Low .125	Low .134	Low .068
	High .190	High .203	High .182
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	Mean .330	Mean .306	Mean .207
	Low .285	Low .255	Low .092
	High .376	High .358	High .321
P-5 role of chance	Mean .947	Mean .948	Mean .974
	Low .930	Low .927	Low .953
	High .963	High .968	High .995
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	Mean .466	Mean .523	Mean .346
	Low .361	Low .482	Low .009
	High .571	High .564	High .682
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	Mean .183	Mean .253	Mean .139
	Low .124	Low .214	Low -.089
	High .241	High .292	High .367
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	Mean .278	Mean .336	Mean .272
	Low .202	Low .276	Low .130
	High .353	High .396	High .415
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:			
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	Mean .510	Mean .443	Mean .599
	Low .417	Low .403	Low .332
	High .603	High .482	High .866
I-4b word/deed tactics	Mean .419	Mean .398	Mean .492
	Low .375	Low .330	Low .188
	High .462	High .466	High .796

Table 7.5 Operational Code Utility of Means Indices of Israel's and Turkey's Post-Cold War Prime Ministers in Perspective

	Israel's Prime Ministers	Turkey's Prime Ministers	Norming Group N=168
I-5a. Reward	Mean .127	Mean .161	Mean .145
	Low .099	Low .117	Low .008
	High .155	High .205	High .282
I-5b. Promise	Mean .071	Mean .060	Mean .065
	Low .057	Low .030	Low -.021
	High .084	High .091	High .150
I-5c. Appeal	Mean .535	Mean .528	Mean .463
	Low .487	Low .428	Low .275
	High .584	High .628	High .651
I-5d. Oppose	Mean .116	Mean .139	Mean .166
	Low .094	Low .125	Low .018
	High .139	High .153	High .316
I-5e. Threaten	Mean .060	Mean .035	Mean .038
	Low .094	Low .022	Low -.035
	High .086	High .048	High .111
I-5f. Punish	Mean .091	Mean .076	Mean .123
	Low .077	Low .035	Low -.022
	High .105	High .117	High .267

Beyond these differences, this dissertation has implications for foreign policy analysis and international relations. First of all, this study is yet another testimony to the significance of individuals in foreign policy and international politics. Popular perceptions of "hawkish" vs. "dovish" or "secular" vs. "religious" leadership, as the findings here show, cannot necessarily explain how a political leader understands the world and approaches to various issues they deal with. Such oft-made contrasts, moreover, do not reveal anything about individual styles of decision making. In contrast, the methods utilized here lay out such differences among the post-Cold War prime minister of Israel and Turkey, which do not immediately cross along the lines of hawks

and doves in Israel or secular and religious leaders of Turkey. As such, it is significant that this dissertation assesses the role of political leadership in foreign policies of two very important countries in the Middle East.

This study traces the effect of prime ministers' personality features on their countries foreign policy behavior; as such, I look for how leadership traits or belief systems are reflected onto foreign policy outputs. However, arguably, the decision making process would be the primary mechanism for prime minister leadership style would shape foreign policy (Kaarbo 1997).[5] Then, the statistical tests here seek the effects of leadership styles and belief systems on foreign policy outputs, where the least direct effects are expected. Prime ministers "can establish subcommitees or interministerial consultation groups, absent themselves from important meetings, make decisions on their own, allow issues to be placed on cabinet agendas, and block the moving of a decision from an inner cabinet to a full cabinet" (Kaarbo 1997: 554). Hence, there is more to learn from the quantitative results presented here. Since due to decisions prime ministers make, some ideas are added or excluded, alternatives and advisors are brought in or not, etc., prime ministers' influence on foreign policy can be indirect and can best be traced to decision making processes. According to Kaarbo's proposed framework, these direct and indirect effects of leadership style variables can be traced either individually or in combination. Both Leadership Traits Analysis and Operational Code Analysis techniques provide tools to

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[5] According to Kaarbo (1997: 572), "leadership style affects process the most, outcomes the second, and outputs the least."

assess such differences among leaders. I discuss those in the following section, where directions for future research are outlined.

Directions for Future Research

There are multiple conclusions to draw from this study. First of all, this work stands as a first attempt to link large–N data and personality variables at a temporal domain of almost two decades. As such, distinct from few studies that used this combination for a relatively short period of time (for instance Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999), it covers an entirety of the post–Cold War era. Since events data are already available for some other countries (or can be developed with relatively short time investment), there remains a future task to conduct similar research with them.[6]

One of the challenges, in those cases, would be the collection of words–as–data for political leaders. Particularly when the goal is collecting all the spontaneous foreign policy statements, it can be a demanding, if not impossible, task in some cases. Where already translated statements are not available, it would add to the challenge; and where the leadership is authoritarian, they may not have made enough statements to start with. Moreover, as it was the case with some leaders studied here, language barrier can lead to

[6] The Levant dataset in the Kansas Events Data System includes data for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestine from 1979 to the present day. The extant dictionaries would serve as a great starting point for coding more countries.

multiple problems. Leaders who are not fluent in English may not engage with the international press at all. When they do, the true revelations of their words in their native languages may be lost in translation. Despite Hermann's argument that translation effects appear to miniscule and ignorable, it must be noted that her statement is based on tests that were made in the late 1980s. It is intriguing that similar tests have not been run since Hermann's findings.

In Chapter 2, I briefly reviewed the ongoing debate about using scripted and spontaneous statements and contradictory findings about their utility in at–a–distance assessment of political leadership. I exclusively used spontaneous statements in this study, but different from previous works I collected *all* the spontaneous statements made by the leader. This included more than the interviews a leader gave, and press conferences were also added to the data. Despite the fact that a large number of data were collected, the exclusive use of spontaneous materials may still have limited the study. While Renfro (2009) argued for using both in this line of research, this debate seems yet to be settled. Future works that would compare the results from each, or in line with Renfro's suggestion utilizing both, would contribute to the literature.

The next generation of research in this area will most likely experiment with novel methods of analysis as well. Such work may be utilizing regression analysis but in the meantime introducing other automated methods to analyze words–as–data. One example is Schrodt, Hudson, and Cantir's (2009) paper about Israel's prime ministers and their conflict behavior. The authors use a customized pattern recognition tool to analyze

sequences of political events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Schrodt, Hudson, and Cantir were motivated to do, these attempts may very well concentrate on meeting one of the central goals of the present inquiry: linking behavior with personality variables.

Integrating, or benefiting from the strengths of, both LTA and operational code literatures is another likely venue of fruitful research as well. As this dissertation illustrates, one can find unique insights from the both in assessing political leadership. This analysis here is but one of the few attempts in utilizing findings from both techniques. In addition, there is more to borrow from other similar lines of research—for instance, motives.

Otherwise, one of the closest associations between Leadership Traits and Operational Code is their corresponding variables that measure an individual's ability to control events, respectively "Belief in Ability to Control Events" (BACE) and "P-4 control over historical development." Much like Young and Shafer's (2005), this study does not find a correlation between the two constructs either with data for Israel's prime ministers or with Turkish prime ministers' scores. This is most likely the best avenue for further research into linking leadership traits and operational code methods together. Given the similarity between the two measures, do "Belief in Ability to Control Events" and "P-4 control over historical development capture the same thing? If there are any differences between the two, what are the reasons for those?

This study adds but two more countries and their leadership to the literature; as I argued earlier, many others can be brought in. As it was argued earlier, the operational code literature is much diverse in this regard and some recent works (particularly by Malici and his associates) profiled many non–Western leaders. Notwithstanding Hermann's own research, the Leadership Traits Analysis lacks similar diversity. The challenge there would be geographically and culturally expanding the literature not merely for the sake of doing so, but also contributing to relevant theoretical debates. Above I already suggested one about the source of material. Furthermore, I outlined my ongoing and future research deriving from this dissertation, which are motivated to make such contributions. It is foreseeable that similar research projects would find their own niche in theoretical debates of this literature. As Young and Schafer (1998) argued, the study of human cognition in international relations still remains a young area.

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Appendix: CAMEO Codelist (0.9b5)

01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT
010: Make statement, not specified below
011: Decline comment
012: Make pessimistic comment
013: Make optimistic comment
014: Consider policy option
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility
016: Deny responsibility
017: Engage in symbolic act
018: Make empathetic comment
019: Express accord

02: APPEAL
020: Make an appeal or request, not specified below
021: Appeal for material cooperation, not specified below
    0211: Appeal for economic cooperation
    0212: Appeal for military cooperation
    0213: Appeal for judicial cooperation
    0214: Appeal for intelligence
022: Appeal for diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)
023: Appeal for aid, not specified below
    0231: Appeal for economic aid
    0232: Appeal for military aid
    0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid
    0234: Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping
024: Appeal for political reform, not specified below
    0241: Appeal for change in leadership
    0242: Appeal for policy change
    0243: Appeal for rights
    0244: Appeal for change in institutions, regime
025: Appeal to yield, not specified below
    0251: Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions
    0252: Appeal for easing of political dissent
    0253: Appeal for release of persons or property
    0254: Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
    0255: Appeal for target to allow international involvement (non-mediation)

0256: Appeal for de-escalation of military engagement
026: Appeal to others to meet or negotiate
027: Appeal to others to settle dispute
028: Appeal to engage in or accept mediation

03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE
030: Express intent to cooperate, not specified below
031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below
0311: Express intent to cooperate economically
0312: Express intent to cooperate militarily
0313: Express intent to cooperate on judicial matters
0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence
032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)
033: Express intent to provide material aid, not specified below
0331: Express intent to provide economic aid
0332: Express intent to provide military aid
0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid
0334: Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping
034: Express intent to institute political reform, not specified below
0341: Express intent to change leadership
0342: Express intent to change policy
0343: Express intent to provide rights
0344: Express intent to change institutions, regime
035: Express intent to yield, not specified below
0351: Express intent to ease administrative sanctions
0352: Express intent to ease popular dissent
0353: Express intent to release persons or property
0354: Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
0355: Express intent to allow international involvement (non-mediation)
0356: Express intent to de-escalate military engagement
036: Express intent to meet or negotiate
037: Express intent to settle dispute
038: Express intent to accept mediation
039: Express intent to mediate

04: CONSULT
040: Consult, not specified below
041: Discuss by telephone
042: Make a visit
043: Host a visit
044: Meet at a "third" location
045: Mediate
046: Engage in negotiation

05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION
050: Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below
051: Praise or endorse
052: Defend verbally
053: Rally support on behalf of
054: Grant diplomatic recognition
055: Apologize
056: Forgive
057: Sign formal agreement

06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION
060: Engage in material cooperation, not specified below
061: Cooperate economically
062: Cooperate militarily
063: Engage in judicial cooperation
064: Share intelligence or information

07: PROVIDE AID
070: Provide aid, not specified below
071: Provide economic aid
072: Provide military aid
073: Provide humanitarian aid
074: Provide military protection or peacekeeping
075: Grant asylum

08: YIELD
080: Yield, not specified below
081: Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below
    0811: Ease restrictions on political freedoms
    0812: Ease ban on political parties or politicians
    0813: Ease curfew
    0814: Ease state of emergency or martial law
082: Ease political dissent
083: Accede to requests or demands for political reform, not specified below
    0831: Accede to demands for change in leadership
    0832: Accede to demands for change in policy
    0833: Accede to demands for rights
    0834: Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime
084: Return, release, not specified below
    0841: Return, release person(s)

0842: Return, release property
085: Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo
086: Allow international involvement, not specified below
0861: Receive deployment of peacekeepers
0862: Receive inspectors
0863: Allow humanitarian access
087: De-escalate military engagement
0871: Declare truce, ceasefire
0872: Ease military blockade
0873: Demobilize armed forces
0874: Retreat or surrender militarily

09: INVESTIGATE
090: Investigate, not specified below
091: Investigate crime, corruption
092: Investigate human rights abuses
093: Investigate military action
094: Investigate war crimes

10: DEMAND
100: Demand, not specified below
101: Demand material cooperation, not specified below
1011: Demand economic cooperation
1012: Demand military cooperation
1013: Demand judicial cooperation
1014: Demand intelligence cooperation
102: Demand diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)
103: Demand material aid, not specified below
1031: Demand economic aid
1032: Demand military aid
1033: Demand humanitarian aid
1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping
104: Demand political reform, not specified below
1041: Demand change in leadership
1042: Demand policy change
1043: Demand rights
1044: Demand change in institutions, regime
105: Demand that target yields, not specified below
1051: Demand easing of administrative sanctions
1052: Demand easing of political dissent
1053: Demand release of persons or property
1054: Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
1055: Demand that target allows international involvement (non-mediation)

1056: Demand de-escalation of military engagement
106: Demand meeting, negotiation
107: Demand settling of dispute
108: Demand mediation

11: DISAPPROVE
110: Disapprove, not specified below
111: Criticize or denounce
112: Accuse, not specified below
1121: Accuse of crime, corruption
1122: Accuse of human rights abuses
1123: Accuse of aggression
1124: Accuse of war crimes
1125: Accuse of espionage, treason
113: Rally opposition against
114: Complain officially
115: Bring lawsuit against
116: Find guilty or liable (legally)

12: REJECT
120: Reject, not specified below
121: Reject material cooperation
1211: Reject economic cooperation
1212: Reject military cooperation
122: Reject request or demand for material aid, not specified below
1221: Reject request for economic aid
1222: Reject request for military aid
1223: Reject request for humanitarian aid
1224: Reject request for military protection or peacekeeping
123: Reject request or demand for political reform, not specified below
1231: Reject request for change in leadership
1232: Reject request for policy change
1233: Reject request for rights
1234: Reject request for change in institutions, regime
124: Refuse to yield, not specified below
1241: Refuse to ease administrative sanctions
1242: Refuse to ease popular dissent
1243: Refuse to release persons or property
1244: Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo
1245: Refuse to allow international involvement (non mediation)
1246: Refuse to de-escalate military engagement
125: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate
126: Reject mediation

127: Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute
128: Defy norms, law
129: Veto

13: THREATEN
130: Threaten, not specified below
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below
    1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid
    1312: Threaten with sanctions, boycott, embargo
    1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations
132: Threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified below
    1321: Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms
    1322: Threaten to ban political parties or politicians
    1323: Threaten to impose curfew
    1324: Threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law
133: Threaten with political dissent, protest
134: Threaten to halt negotiations
135: Threaten to halt mediation
136: Threaten to halt international involvement (non-mediation)
137: Threaten with repression
138: Threaten with military force, not specified below
    1381: Threaten blockade
    1382: Threaten occupation
    1383: Threaten unconventional violence
    1384: Threaten conventional attack
    1385: Threaten attack with WMD
139: Give ultimatum

14: PROTEST
140: Engage in political dissent, not specified below
141: Demonstrate or rally, not specified below
    1411: Demonstrate for leadership change
    1412: Demonstrate for policy change
    1413: Demonstrate for rights
    1414: Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime
142: Conduct hunger strike, not specified below
    1421: Conduct hunger strike for leadership change
    1422: Conduct hunger strike for policy change
    1423: Conduct hunger strike for rights
    1424: Conduct hunger strike for change in institutions, regime
143: Conduct strike or boycott, not specified below
    1431: Conduct strike or boycott for leadership change
    1432: Conduct strike or boycott for policy change

1433: Conduct strike or boycott for rights
1434: Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime
144: Obstruct passage, block, not specified below
1441: Obstruct passage to demand leadership change
1442: Obstruct passage to demand policy change
1443: Obstruct passage to demand rights
1444: Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime
145: Protest violently, riot, not specified below
1451: Engage in violent protest for leadership change
1452: Engage in violent protest for policy change
1453: Engage in violent protest for rights
1454: Engage in violent protest for change in institutions, regime

15: EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE
150: Demonstrate military or police power, not specified below
151: Increase police alert status
152: Increase military alert status
153: Mobilize or increase police power
154: Mobilize or increase armed forces

16: REDUCE RELATIONS
160: Reduce relations, not specified below
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations
162: Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance
1622: Reduce or stop military assistance
1623: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance
163: Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions
164: Halt negotiations
165: Halt mediation
166: Expel or withdraw, not specified below
1661: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers
1662: Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers
1663: Expel or withdraw aid agencies

17: COERCE
170: Coerce, not specified below
171: Seize or damage property, not specified below
1711: Confiscate property
1712: Destroy property
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below
1721: Impose restrictions on political freedoms

1722: Ban political parties or politicians
1723: Impose curfew
1724: Impose state of emergency or martial law
173: Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action
174: Expel or deport individuals
175: Use tactics of repression

18: ASSAULT
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified below
181: Abduct, hijack, or take hostage
182: Physically assault, not specified below
1821: Sexually assault
1822: Torture
1823: Kill by physical assault
183: Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below
1831: Carry out suicide bombing
1832: Carry out car bombing
1833: Carry out roadside bombing
1834: Carry out location bombing
184: Use as human shield
185: Attempt to assassinate
186: Assassinate

19: FIGHT
190: Use conventional military force, not specified below
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement
192: Occupy territory
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons
194: Fight with artillery and tanks
195: Employ aerial weapons
1951: Employ precision-guided aerial munitions
1952: Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions
196: Violate ceasefire

20: USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE
200: Use unconventional mass violence, not specified below
201: Engage in mass expulsion
202: Engage in mass killings
203: Engage in ethnic cleansing
204: Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below
2041: Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons
2042: Detonate nuclear weapons

Appendix: Word Counts

Prime Minister	Total Word Count	Months	Average Word Count, monthly
Shamir	9298	9	1162
Rabin	129464	40	3237
Peres	18011	7	2573
Netanyahu	203126	46	4416
Barak	71809	20	3590
Sharon	104678	58	1805
Olmert	58726	39	1506
All	595112	218	2730

Prime Minister	Total Word Count	Months	Average Word Count, monthly
Demirel	19357	19	1019
Ciller	27402	32	856
Yilmaz	18162	22	826
Erbakan	10147	12	846
Ecevit	34843	46	757
Gul	6799	4	1700
Erdogan	100482	82	1225
All	217961	218	1000

Appendix Table 1: Turkey, Events and LTA with controls

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	-8.5249 * (16.2661)	-3.7391 (3.2607)	-4.8113 (6.0870)	-8.6208 (5.6378)
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	-23.5668 (19.8118)	-6.9621 . (3.9589)	-2.7463 (7.6871)	-5.2860 (6.8592)
Distrust of Others (DIS)	33.9008 . (18.6473)	6.7268 . (3.7476)	14.3356 * (6.9304)	16.5001 * (6.4931)
In-group Bias (IGB)	11.2475 (19.2755)	-1.3471 (3.8653)	7.4427 (7.1955)	11.1202 (6.7321)
Need for Power (PWR)	-31.6125 . (18.8104)	-1.2324 (3.8035)	-6.0541 (7.0851)	-13.8242 * (6.6387)
Self-Confidence (SC)	2.3046 (8.4646)	.8209 (1.6844)	.3094 (3.1631)	2.570 (2.9676)
Task Focus (TASK)	-4.6016 (15.1924)	-1.8642 (2.9524)	.0609 (5.4934)	.5833 (5.1106)
Inflation	-.6647 (.822)	-.0042 (.1633)	-.4382 (.3021)	-.3067 (.2913)
Public Opinion	.4722 (.5464)	.1177 (.1093)	.0534 (.2021)	-.3439 . (.1898)
Reciprocity	.413 ** (.1196)	.1794 (.1427)	.0932 (.0839)	.2359 * .1066
cons	34.3326 (2.134)	7.3422 * (3.2417)	9.7341 (6.2422)	16.022 ** (5.5863)
N	201	201	201	201
R-square	0.2822	0.1472	0.1284	0.25
adj. R-square	0.1585	0.0001	-0.0218	0.1207
Prob	0.02486	0.4534	0.8546	0.05856
RMSE	13.53	2.73	5.053	4.736

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Appendix Table 2: Turkey, Events and Operational Code with controls

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
P-1 nature of the political universe	46.7287 (29.2294)	.0325 (6.4203)	4.925e+00 (1.067e+01)	-3.0402 (11.5391)
P-2 prospects for realization of political values	-58.3154 (41.0901)	1.6656 (9.0252)	-8.388e+00 (1.494e+01)	5.9308 (16.0937)
P-3 predictability of political universe	-224.1104 * (88.2534)	-35.1190 . (19.0942)	-4.789e+01 (3.244e+01)	-26.8914 (35.1472)
P-4 belief in ability to control historical development	-81.9114 (49.8741)	-22.4228 * (10.8418)	-3.222e+01 . (1.832e+01)	-16.3027 (19.7749)
P-5 role of chance	-464.9538 . (238.0802)	-113.755 * (51.9051)	-1.401e+02 (8.727e+01)	-46.3086 (94.3716)
I-1 approach to goals (direction of strategy)	66.763 . (36.5402)	2.053 (7.9991)	-1.661e+01 (1.332e+01)	-.6134 (14.335)
I-2 pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)	-57.4484 (34.4898)	-.1519 (7.5676)	1.631e+00 (1.268e+01)	-1.7966 (13.6262)
I-3 risk orientation (diversity of tactics)	-57.9889 . (30.8416)	-8.5479 (6.8218)	-1.642e+01 (1.105e+01)	-20.2123 . (11.8993)
I-4 timing of action: flexibility of:				
I-4a cooperative/conflictual tactics	-18.5394 (25.2928)	-2.5214 (5.5073)	-2.434e+01 * (9.337e+00)	-11.0417 (9.9406)
I-4b word/deed tactics	-4.3316 (15.6183)	-.8577 (3.3936)	-4.413e+00 (5.576e+00)	-1.1364 (5.9958)
I-5 utility of means				
I-5a. Reward	-115.5962 (3215.6082)	309.5914 (690.7175)	1.831e+03 (1.167e+03)	-444.7342 (1256.5927)
I-5b. Promise	-156.2507 (3228.207)	302.2272 (693.1768)	1.815e+03 (1.171e+03)	-455.4188 (1260.7744)
I-5c. Appeal	-95.1017 (3222.6345)	313.8979 (692.2765)	1.841e+03 (1.169e+03)	-428.3783 (1259.4635)
I-5d. Oppose	-20.7793 (3217.2245)	312.1840 (691.1788)	1.835e+03 (1.167e+03)	-437.3543 (1257.4841)
I-5e. Threaten	-60.3336 (3226.7816)	310.9804 (693.1642)	1.829e+03 (1.171e+03)	-432.85 (1260.9135)
I-5f. Punish	-67.1410 (3213.2064)	312.2508 (690.3243)	1.847e+03 (1.166e+03)	-424.7038 (1256.0233)
Inflation	.3383 (.7881)	.0634 (.1699)	-1.822e-01 (2.850e-01)	-.1582 (.3136)
Public Opinion	.2404 (.5552)	.1065 (.1208)	-5.397e-02 (2.034e-01)	-.2391 (.2203)
Reciprocity	.5291 *** (.1205)	.2676 (.1684)	1.159e-01 (7.954e-02)	.2124 . (.1266)
cons	599.5903 (3213.9848)	-187.6247 (689.5763)	-1.653e+03 (1.166e+03)	509.789 (1255.3193)

	verbcoop	matcoop	verbconf	matconf
N	217	217	217	217
R-square	0.4043	0.167	03063	0.2659
adj. R-square	0.1986	-0.1207	0.0666	0.0122
Prob	0.02682	0.9044	0.2356	0.4261
RMSE	13.03	2.833	4.77	5.14

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1